Texas State University

Interpretations of Hobbesian Social Contract TheoryDr. DeHart 5302C

Christian Marrero3-6-2014

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In his famous work Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes explicates his

theory of how and why man chooses to enter into civil society.

Denying the metaphysics of Aristotle’s final causes-the

philosopher’s teleological approach towards human civilization-

Hobbes instead claims that human society and his construction of

the Leviathan state is but “artificial man”1. This synthetic

civilization is to be ruled by an absolute sovereign, whose power

stems from a social contract in which subjects surrender the

majority of their natural rights to a ruler in exchange for

security. By establishing an absolute sovereign, security is

maintained and the integrity of the social contract is guaranteed

as so long as the sovereign does not compromise the lives of his

subjects. Jean Hampton argues that Hobbes’ social contract

argument is invalid because of a flaw in Hobbes’ psychology which

denies the conditions necessary for absolute sovereignty; this

approach is defective due to Hampton misidentifying a contract as

a coordinative agreement, a contract when properly understood

allows for absolute sovereignty. Hobbes’ social contract allows

for a commitment to obedience that is stronger than self-

1 Thomas Hobbes and E. M. Curley, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1994), 3.

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interest, circumvents the “free-rider” problem, and allows for

the complete alienation of rights as opposed to authorizing mere

agency.

Hobbes’ social contract theory must be understood

within the contexts in which such an agreement is made. By

denying Aristotle’s teleological approach of the development of

civil society, Hobbes presents his reader with an alternative

view on the growth of the state. Instead of claiming that man

naturally enters into civilization, our author instead presents a

theory where man chooses to enter into society through an

agreement with his fellow man for their mutual benefit. This due

to conditions within what Hobbes describes as the state of

nature.

Hobbes describes the state of nature-as specified in his

title to chapter XIII of Leviathan-as “…the Natural condition of

Mankind”2. This is the world in which man lives in the absence of

a civil society to direct his action. An existence in which all

men are equal to each other. A claim that Hobbes holds to despite

the physical differences between men, which he claims can be 2 Ibid., 74

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easily nullified since “…the weakest has strength enough to kill

the strongest, either by secret machinations, or by confederacy

with others that are in the same danger with himself.”3

In fact, the only difference among men within the state of

nature claimed to by Hobbes would be the natural differences of

intelligence. He explains “For such is the nature of men that

howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or

more eloquent, or more learned, yet they will hardly believe

there be many so wise as themselves. For they see their own wit

at hand, and other men’s at a distance.”4 Hobbes continues by

describing how this leaves man in essentially an egalitarian

state since “…every man is contented with his share.”5

But these egalitarian conditions create very real problems

in Hobbes’ state of nature. The author continues by explaining

how without civil society the notion of right or wrong, or the

conceptualization of justice as we may understand it does not

exist. “To this war of every man against every man, this also is

consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and

3 Ibid.4 Ibid., 755 Ibid.

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wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is

no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.

Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.”6 Without an

authority able to establish and promulgate notions of justice,

who has the ability to arbitrate between parties, humans exist in

what is essentially a state of war. In such a condition

…there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, bruitish, and short.7

Man’s life within the state of nature does not allow for the

development of any of man’s great achievements. His focus instead

is strictly on his own survival.

Recognizing the deficiencies of living under such

conditions, and driven by passions which “…incline men to peace

[such as] fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary

6 Ibid., 787 Ibid., 76

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to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain

them…”8 man chooses to enter into a social contract.

This contract is established when individuals in the state

of nature forfeit the majority of their natural rights to a

sovereign, effectively becoming his subjects. In Hobbes’ own

words

…thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is toconfer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man…9

Here as Hobbes describes the basic terms of the social contract

one sees that those individuals within the state of nature are

effectively giving full representative power to the sovereign,

8 Ibid., 789 Ibid., 109

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including the power to make final judgments on behalf of the

members of the Leviathan state.

Continuing, Hobbes describes the commonwealth created by

such a contract:

And in [the sovereign] consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which (to define it) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.

And he that carrieth this person is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.10

By the mutual agreement of all the subjects the sovereign is

authorized certain powers with the intention that she will defend

the peace and preservation of the commonwealth. The strength and

means of them all also include the majority of the subjects’

natural rights, which are forfeited to the sovereign creating

what is essentially an absolute sovereign power. “…the sovereign

power…is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And

though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil

consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is

10 IbId., 109

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perpetual war of every man against his neighbor, are much

worse.”11 To deny the sovereign absolute authority would allow

for conditions that would unravel the Leviathan state, leaving

the commonwealth’s subjects back in the state of nature.

Under the rule of an absolute sovereign the life of man can

be secured and allow for the development of civil society. With

the absolute sovereign as the final arbitrator of disputes, and

the fountainhead of all civil law and justice, the dangers of the

state of nature-and the state of war which accompanies it-are

avoided. This agreement is thenceforth considered unbreakable

except under specific conditions.

The purpose of the social contract is to protect society

from the inherent dangers to life and limb present in the state

of nature. As long as the sovereign is respecting the basic right

to life, all other infractions against the subject are

authorized. But here is found the limits of the social contract’s

authorization of force to the sovereign. Hobbes explains “…that

covenants not to defend a man’s own body are void. Therefore, if

the sovereign command a man(though justly condemned) to kill, 11 Ibid., 135

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wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him,

or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other

thing without which he cannot live, yet hath that man the liberty

to disobey.”12 If the sovereign were to disrespect this right,

then, and only then, do the subjects of the Leviathan state hold

the right of rebellion.

But in her article The Failure of Hobbes’s Social Contract Theory Jean

Hampton argues that Hobbes’ social contract theory is invalid

because he fails to establish absolute sovereignty. Hobbes’

theory claims that the subjects within the Leviathan state retain

the right of rebellion under the condition that the sovereign

threaten their lives. This precludes that the subjects retain the

right to judge whether or not the sovereign’s commands are

authorized by the terms of the social contract. Under these

circumstances the sovereign is not as Hobbes described, the final

arbitrator in the state. Without the ability to make final

judgments within the Leviathan state, the conditions for absolute

sovereignty have not been met, therefore invalidating Hobbes’

social contract argument.

12 Ibid., 141-142

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Hampton begins her argument by first asking the reader to

accept a number of ideas as fact which she has defended in detail

in a previous work. First is what she describes as “Hobbes’s

regress argument”13 which concludes that “…civil society must

have a person with unlimited decision and enforcement power at its

helm: That person is called the sovereign, and he has the power

to decide all questions in the commonwealth, holding power

permanently insofar as he has the power to decide the most

important question in the commonwealth, that is, whether or not

he should remain in power.”14 Hobbes does point to the importance

of the sovereign acting as the final arbitrator of disputes. “…he

is judge of what is necessary for peace, and judge of doctrines;

his is sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies…”15

Additionally, one truly authorizes a sovereign when she is

willing to obey her commands to punish another and do nothing to

frustrate her power of enforcement. Only by supporting and aiding

in the sovereign’s harshest edicts-those of punishment-does the

13 Jean Hampton, "The Failure of Hobbes's Social Contract Argument," in The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 43.14 Ibid.15 Hobbes, 128

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subject prove her authorization of power to the sovereign. But

the question then is posed, could such a sovereign be authorized

by a Hobbesian people?

According to Hobbes’ social contract theory, though the

subjects of the Leviathan state forfeit the majority of their

rights, they cannot by the laws of nature surrender their lives

to the sovereign. Therefore, any command of the sovereign that

would threaten the life of the subject can be lawfully disobeyed.

This creates real problems for Hampton, she contends that the

people essentially hold the power to decide whether or not the

commands of the sovereign are authorized by the conditions of the

social contract. As Hampton explains

…because empowerment comes about only from obedience, why doesn’t this make the sovereign’s empowerment conditional on people’s determination that such obedience is rational? Yet, insofar as it does, they do not really empower a truly absolute sovereign at all, because there is no single permanent power to decide all questions and hence ensure peace among men.16

By retaining their ability to judge the sovereign’s actions, the

people have denied the sovereign absolute authority as the

ultimate decision maker.16 Hampton, 44

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Hampton points to a number of examples within the text of

Leviathan in which she feels that Hobbes is admitting that the

subjects within the commonwealth retain a right of judgment.

Among them Hobbes’ statement that “The obligation of subject to

the sovereign is understood to lasts as long, and no longer, than

the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them…The end of

obedience is protection…”17 This claim seems to point directly to

subjects who have not forfeited all of their rights to an

absolute sovereign. Hampton claims that in order for the

sovereign to have absolute rule over her subjects she must in

actuality exist in a master/slave relationship with the people.

The problem with the Hobbesian construct is that essentially “…

these “slaves” are continually deciding whether or not to let

their master have the whip!”18

This relationship between sovereign and subject then cannot

be considered one in which a complete alienation of rights has

occurred. At best it can be described as a loan from the people

as opposed to a permanent grant. Whenever the people feel that

their self-preservation is in jeopardy the sovereign can lose his17 Hobbes, 14418 Hampton, 49

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punishment power. In fact, Hampton goes on to say that the people

essential have the ability to hire on or terminate the sovereign

as they deem fit. As she explains “…as long as people retain the

right to preserve themselves in the commonwealth, Hobbes is also

forced to admit that there is really an agency relationship between

people and ruler, and this is exactly what he did not want to

conclude in Leviathan.”19

This leads us back to Hobbes’ redress argument which Hampton

then openly attacks based on three major flaws. First, as stated

before, the Hobbesian psychology of the subjects within the

Leviathan state allows them to retain what is essentially private

judgments over the sovereign’s commands. This to Hampton does not

signal a contract, but an agency relationship between the

sovereign and the subjects. The nature of this relationship makes

the creation of an absolute sovereign impossible since the

sovereign essentially answers to the people.

19 Ibid., 50

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Furthermore, Hampton presses that though the subjects

contract with each other, the sovereign makes a contract with no

one.20 Hobbes explains:

That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand is manifest, because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or he must make several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible, because as yet they arenot one person; and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof is the act both of himself and of all the rest, becausedone in the person and by the right of every one of them in particular.21

Hobbes believed that any agency created commonwealth, that is, a

commonwealth created by a direct contract between the sovereign

and the subjects which lacks an overarching authority to enforce

it, could not long survive. Individuals within the commonwealth

will inevitably take it upon themselves to decide whether or not

the sovereign’s commands threaten their self-preservation. It

will then only be a matter of time until violence commences over

whether or not the sovereign is performing her role adequately.

20 Hobbes, 111-11221 Ibid.

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Finally, when the subjects surrender their right to all

things they are essentially bestowing the sovereign with a

property right. To snatch this right away from its new and legal

owner is considered an injustice in Hobbes’ view. But whether or

not one accepts the subjective moral argument here is irrelevant.

The central point is that the subjects allow the sovereign to rule

at their pleasure.

But if one does turn to the moral rhetoric taken up by

Hobbes in this discussion, Hampton expresses how “…given Hobbes’s

subjectivist meta-ethics and his analysis of the validity of the

laws of nature, that moral tone is completely out of place in his

argument, and actually signals that argument’s failure.”22

Pronouncing a moral judgment regarding the ability of the subject

to retake certain rights from the sovereign is contradictory to

Hobbes’ previously expressed views.

Hampton concludes by showing how her attempt to define

‘authorization’ effectively concluded in the subject not

surrendering power to the sovereign, she simply loans power to

her. Hobbes characterizes authorization as surrender in an 22 Hampton, 54

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attempt to appear unfailing in his understanding of absolute

sovereignty. But when these two concepts are shown to be

inconsistent, Hobbes’ political argument is proved to be invalid.

Hampton’s position is built on the premise that what Hobbes

refers to as the social contract is no contract at all and that

Hobbes’ alienation is instead a form of agency. From her position

what occurs amongst the individuals entering into Hobbes’

artificial man can instead be understood as a self-interested

agreement. This is a convention in which the subject gives agency

to the sovereign so long as she protect the lives of the

subjects.

But to read Hobbes’ social contract as a self-interested

agreement is to misunderstand Leviathan’s author. David Gauthier in

Hobbes' Social Contract instead defines a contract as “…exchanges of

intentions to act that introduce or replace each party’s

motivation to attain the true objective of the agreement.”23 By

using this definition of contract, Hobbes’ social contract takes

on more than just the qualities of a self-interested agreement 23 David Gauthier, "Hobbes' Social Contract," in The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Lanham, MD: Rowman &Littlefield, 1999), 61.

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between parties. With the exchange of intentions to act as

opposed to self-driven motivation, the temptation to refer to the

social contract as a self-interested agreement is removed.

This conceptualization of the social contract as a self-

interested agreement also fails due to how Hobbes himself

prohibits any sort of direct covenant between the sovereign and

the subjects. “…because the right of bearing the person of them

all is given to him they make sovereign by covenant only of one

to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no

breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently

none of his subjects, by any pretense of forfeiture, can be freed

from his subjection.”24 The social contract does not lay between

the subject and the sovereign, but amongst the subjects alone.

The sovereign exists as a tool for the utility of the social

contract. Hobbes’ absolute sovereign acts as an enforcement tool,

not as a part of the objective of the contract.

For even if we suppose that everyone keeps this covenant for purely self-interested reasons, yet these reasons stem, not simply from the concern to achieve the primary objective of agreement, peace and security, but rather from the power of the sovereign, a

24 Hobbes, 111

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supplementary incentive called into play, and indeed created, by the agreement itself. The institution of a sovereign is not the primary objective of agreement, orpart of this objective. Were mere agreement on conditions of peace sufficient-were the covenant a purely coordinative agreement-then a sovereign enforcerwould be not merely unnecessary, but positively undesirable.25

Hampton seems to overlook that the point of the agreement is the

peace and security of all those within the Leviathan state, not

just individual self-interest. The person of the sovereign falls

within this context as a necessary evil needed to maintain these

ideal conditions. To view the social contract as a coordinative

agreement defined by individual self-interest is incorrect.

Hampton also contended that the redress argument allowed for

the subjects to retain their private judgments which conflicted with

absolute sovereignty. But this interpretation of authorization in

the social contract does not need to be accepted. One could argue

that Hobbes’ psychology can be understood differently. Hobbes

states that:

…the sovereign [has] the right of judicature, that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies which may arise concerning law (either civil or natural) or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies there is no protection of one

25 Gauthier, 62

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subject against the injuries of another, the laws concerning meum and tuum are in vain, and to every manremaineth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war,and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth isinstituted.26

Hampton’s argument stands if you agree that adherence to the

social contract allows for subjects to make judgment calls in

each particular situation, but Hobbes does not give the subjects

such license. Instead each subject must support the sovereign

even under conditions in which the individual may be placed in

danger. He must understand that actions that will allow for the

peace and security of the Leviathan are authorized by the social

contract.

If each subject decides whether or not to obeyby considering whether to not, in each particular situation, obedience is to his own interest or advantage, then private appetite remains the measure ofgood and evil, and the sovereign will be unable to elicit the degree of obedience requisite for him to bring about and maintain peace. Each subject must realize that his prospect of living securely and at peace with his fellows is maximized if he is committed to offering active support to the sovereign, even when giving that support is not itself maximally conducive to his peace and security.27

26 Hobbes, 11427 Ibid., 67

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Any interpretation of Hobbes that contradicts such an

understanding of authorization will inevitably end in a

psychology dependent on self-interest which will not allow for an

absolute sovereign.

But such interpretations are essential erroneous in their

contradiction of Hobbes’ own pronouncements. The protection of

self-interest alone is necessary but not sufficient in justifying

rebellion against the sovereign. The subject must show that the

command is not only against his self-interest (that of survival),

but that the command proves not to have utility in maintaining

the conditions of the social contract. Hobbes explains that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself or any other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute anydangerous or dishonourable office, dependeth not on thewords of our submission, but on the intention, which isto be understood by the end thereof. When, therefore, our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained, then there is no liberty to refuse…And when the defense of the commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to beararms, every one is obliged, because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain.28

28 Ibid., 143

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Natural law’s prescription to avoid personal harm is extended to

the members of the commonwealth as one of the few rights retained

by the subjects. Since the very purpose of the commonwealth is

peace and preservation, any action done against this purpose is a

violation of one of the few natural laws retained by the

citizens; therefore against the terms of the contract. In such

cases the subjects hold a right to rebellion. This right does not

extend though to conditions in which the very survival of the

commonwealth is at stake. Since the purpose of the contract is

peace and preservation, the subjects are required under the terms

of the social contract to do everything necessary to preserve the

Leviathan.

Hobbes does not ever explain that living under the absolute

sovereignty of the Leviathan state would not come without its

inconveniences or dangers, instead he claims that it is still

many times more advantages to live under the absolute sovereignty

of the Leviathan than to suffer the condition of perpetual war

found in the state of nature.

And though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of

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the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences;but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds from the subject’s disobedience and breach of those covenants from which the commonwealth hath its being. And whosoever, thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself to the power that can limit it, that is to say, to a greater.29

Life in the commonwealth through agreement to the social contract

does not remove all of life’s impediments and inconveniences for

the subject. It is the surrendering of certain liberties in

exchange for security. This does not remove the responsibility to

actively assist the sovereign in his attempt to maintain peace.

“…no man can thence infer that a particular man has more liberty,

or immunity from the service of the commonwealth, there than in

Constantinople.”30 The real inconveniences and dangers occur when

the subjects disobey the sovereign, effectively preferring the

state of nature over the security found in the Leviathan.

Hampton also points to what may be called the “free-rider”

problem which effects subjects as they attempt to aid the

sovereign in fulfilling his punishment commands.

29 Ibid., 13530 Ibid., 140

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…we argue that one authorizes a sovereign whenone obeys his commands to punish others and, ingeneral, when one does nothing to frustrate hisenforcement powers. We found, however, that there hadto be one big exception to any person’s willingness tosupport the sovereign’s punishment efforts in thecommonwealth: One could never willingly obey thesovereign’s command to punish oneself, insofar as doingso would endanger one’s self-preservation, Hobbes mustgrant that each human being will “surrender” herpunishment powers to the sovereign only insofar asdoing so will not endanger her life. Thus, according toHobbes, each human being carries with her into thecommonwealth a “self-defense” right. But if she does,is the resulting ruler a genuine sovereign? Does hestill have the power to decide all questions in thecommonwealth? Does he still reign permanently?

If the individual retains a right to self-defense even in cases of

guilt then any subject sent to punish them is placed in mortal

danger. The question becomes, does this authorize the individual

to rebel against the sovereign’s command?

Hampton, based on her understanding that the social contract

as a self-interested agreement would answer in the affirmative.

For such a command to be acceptable under the terms of the social

contract would require that said action would provide a greater

utility to the small group charged with enforcement than it would

provide for the society as a whole. Following the command in this

case requires that two conditions to be met in order to comply

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with the provisions of Hampton’s self-interested agreement.

First, each individual’s contribution must be shown necessary to

increasing the peace and preservation of the state. Secondly, the

sovereign must show a benefit to the small group asked to perform

the dangerous task which is over and above the benefit it

provides to society. These being necessary to prove that the

group’s actions are both absolutely necessary for peace and

preservation and personally advantageous. Without this incentive

to act, any member of this enforcement group can easily instead

choose to be a “free-rider”. By allowing someone else to put

their lives in danger, they still gain the same benefit as would

be incurred if they did the dangerous task themselves. Gauthier

comments:

Can the sovereign provide his subjects withpeace and security, if he may expect their activeassistance only when the good to be provided is so muchgreater than the cost of providing? Surely not. Thesovereign cannot motivate the members of a small groupvoluntarily to provide a non-excludable public good…unless it offers a net benefit to the small groupalone. And such goods will not suffice for peace andsecurity. Hobbes has no general solution to the free-rider problem that confronts a sovereign in need of theactive assistance of his subjects, if we assume…thateach subject will decide whether to assist the

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sovereign by a direct appeal to her overall self-interest.31

There can be no justification for placing oneself in mortal

danger in order to punish another party if self-interest is

prioritized over all other considerations within the state.

But an understanding of contract which reflects the

intention to act as opposed to self-driven motivation allows for

a psychology more accepting of the sovereign’s dangerous

commands. Under this conceptualization of contract, the subject

is made to understand by the terms of the covenant that though

their actions may place them in mortal danger, but there is a

greater utility in their actions which positively effects the

overall peace and preservation of the Leviathan. If this

increased utility is not present, that is, if the contribution of

the small group will not promote peace and preservation, then the

citizen may invoke her right to rebellion.

Hampton also claims that the alienation social contract

theory is false, and that what is truly established by Hobbes’

contract is an agency theory. In her eyes, the subjects allow the

31 Gauthier, 64-65

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sovereign to rule on their behalf, as their agent. In this way

sovereignty is removed any time that the subjects feel the

sovereign’s rule is no longer aligned with the conditions of the

social contract. But as Gauthier states “The issue is not whether

the sovereign is the agent of his subjects, but whether he is

only their agent.”32 In order to show that the sovereign is more

than just an agent one can again turn to Hobbes for direction.

Leviathan’s author explains that when one enters into the social

contract they are essentially stating: “I authorize and give up

my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of

men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and

authorize all his actions in like manner.”33 The act of giving authorization

in this context is effectively that of surrendering rights,

including the right of judgment, to the sovereign. Without an

alienation social contract theory designed to defend an absolute

sovereign neither complete nor permanent power can be

established.

Jean Hampton presents the reader with an argument against

the validity of Hobbes’ social contract theory. She believes that32 Ibid., 6833 Hobbes, 109

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the condition of absolute sovereignty cannot be reached by the

subjects of the Leviathan primarily because the social contract

acts in practice as a coordinative agreement based on self-

interest. This interpretation of Hobbes’ contract allows for a

psychology to develop in the minds of subjects which is

antithetical to the terms of the contract. Specifically such a

mindset will not allow for the full authorization of the

sovereign since subjects effectively retain the right of personal

judgment in deciding whether or not a command is contrary to

their self-preservation. This focus on self-interest also gives

traction to the “free-rider” problem when the sovereign issues

punishment commands. Such an understanding of Hobbes’ contract

also essentially reduces the social contract to an agency theory.

If one instead defines a contract as exchanges of intentions to

act that introduce or replace each party’s motivation to attain

the true objective of the agreement the self-interest component

is stripped from the social contract. Under such conditions

absolute sovereignty can be established with the sovereign

retaining her right as final arbitrator of the state. The “free-

rider” problem is avoided since the peace and prosperity of the

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Leviathan overrides personal safety. The contract itself also

cannot be viewed as a mere agency agreement since in each

subject’s authorization of the sovereign is a complete surrender

of natural rights. Without such an alienation social contract

theory Hobbes’ theory would not stand, but to interpret the

contract and the authorization of the sovereign differently is to

have misunderstood Hobbes’ position.

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Bibliography

Gauthier, David. "Hobbes' Social Contract." In The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 59-71. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Hampton, Jean. "The Failure of Hobbes's Social Contract

Argument." In The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 41-57. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Hobbes, Thomas, and E. M. Curley. Leviathan: With Selected Variants from

the Latin Edition of 1668. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1994.