STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY

E s s ay s a n d A d d res s e s

by

A. R . RADCLIFFE-BROWNPROFESSOR EMERITUS OP OXFORD UNIVERSITYh—fl

Witha Foreword byE . E . EVANS-PRITCHARD

PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

FRED EGGANPROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY , CHICAGO UNIVERSITY

THE F R E E P R E S S

G L E N C O E , IL L IN O I S

1952

ACKNOWLEDGMENT for permission to prin t the essays andaddres ses in this volume is hereby made to the fol lowing :The SouthAfrican Association for the Advancement ofScience

,the Iowa Law Review

,the Royal Anthropological

Institute , the International African Institute,the Fourth

Pacific Science Congress, the Syndics of the Cambridge

University Press,the American Anthropo logical Association

and the Macm il lan Co.,New York.

COPYR IGHT

PR INTED IN GREAT BR ITAIN AT

THE UN IVERS ITY PRESSA B E R D E E N

FOREWORDROFESSOR RADCL I FFE-BROWN has never had much regardfor what he calls the odd things that I have writtenfrom time to tim e his major interesthas been in conveying

ideas directly to students and colleagues by personal contacts . Inthis he has been eminently successful . He has taught social anthropology at Cambridge , London , Birm ingham , Pretoria ,Johannesburg

,Cape Town , Sydney, Yenching , Oxford , Sao

Paulo,Alexandria and Grahamstown

,and in each of these p laces

he is remembered with affection and respect . The indebtednessof his studentshas been shown in two collections of essays— oneAm erican and one English— written in his honour. And therehashardly been a book or article on social anthropology publishedduring the last quarter of a century which does not illustrate

,

directly or indirectly,his teaching .

An examination of the essays in this volume will suggest thathis writings have been just as influential as his personal contacts .He has not

,considering that hehas been engaged in teaching and’

research in social anthropology for almost fifty years, written'

as much as m ost persons of his academic em inence . What hehas lwritten

,however, has been faultless . We do not mean by this that

’

we necessarily accept his methods or conclusions in detail , butrather that the point of View he expresses could not have beenbetter expressed . Each of the essays is perfect in conceptionand in expression , and they are tied together by a consistencyand direction which is rare in modern anthropology .

We believe that the publication of these essays will be ofvalue for several reasons . In the first p lace , they show thedevelopment of the thought of a distinguished anthropologistfor the last twenty-five years , an d at the same tim e illustratesom e of the more important changes in the orientation of socialanthropology, with which Professor Radcliffe-Brown was so

intimately associated during this period . These essays havealso demonstrated their value in the training of graduate studentsin our major centres for social anthropology .zThe individualpapers are widely spread in time and p lace

,and frequently

V

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIMIT IVE SOC IETY

d ifl‘icu lt to consult . We feel that in presenting this collectionof essays we are not only showing our esteem for ProfessorRadcliffe-Brown , but are also provid ing a book which will bevaluab le to students of social anthropology for a long time to come .

E . E . EVANS PRITCHARDFRED EGGAN .

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFRICA

PATRIL INEAL AND MATRIL INEAL SUCCESS ION

THE STUDY OF K INSH I P SYSTEM S

ON‘

JOKING’

RELAT IONSH I PS

A FURTHER NOTE ON JOKINC RELAT I ONSH I PS

THE SOCIOLOG ICAL THEORY OF TOTEMISM

TABOO

RELIG ION AND SOCI ETY

ON THE CONCEPT OF FUNCT IONIN SOC IAL SCIENCE

ON SOC IAL STRUCTURE

SOC IAL SANCT IONS

PRIM IT IVE LAW

INTRODUCTION

HE papers reprinted here are occasional papers In thefu llest sense of the term ; each of them was written for aparticu lar occasion . They do

,however

,have some

m easure of unity as being written from a particular theoreticalpoint of View .

What is meant by a theory is a schem e of interpretationwhich is applied , or i s thought to be applicable , to the understanding of phenomena of a certain Class . A theory consistsof a set of analytical concep ts , which should be clearly definedin their reference to concrete reality, and which should be logicallyconnected . I propose , therefore , by way of introduction to thesemiscellaneous papers

,to give definitions of certain concepts of

which I make u se for purposes of analysis of social phenomena .

I t must be rem emb ered that there is very little agreement amongstanthropologists in the concepts and terms they use

,so that this

Introduction and the papers that follow are to be taken as anexposition of one particular theory, not of a commonly acceptedtheory .

History and TheoryThe difference between the historical study of social institutions

and the theoretical study can be easily seen by comparing economichistory and theoretical economics

,or by comparing the history

of law with theoretical jurisprudence . In anthropology , however ,there has been and sti l l is a great deal of confusion which is maintained by discussions in which term s such as ‘history’and ‘ science’

or ‘ theory’are used by disputants in very different meanings .These confusions could be to a considerable extent avoided byusing the recognised terms of logic and methodology and distinguishing between idiographic and nomothetic enquiries .In an idiographic enqui ry the purpose is to estab lish as

acceptable certain particular or factual propositions or statem ents .A nomothetic enquiry

,on the contrary

,has for its purpose to

arrive at acceptable define the natureof an enquiry by the d at .

AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

Ari/istory,as usua l ly understood

,i s the study of records and

monuments for the purpose of providing knowledge about cond itions and events of the past , including those investigations thatare concerned with the quite recent past . It is clear thathist '

y

consists primarily of idiographic enquiries . In the last centu rythere was a dispute , the famous Methodenstrez't, as to whetherhistorians should admit theoretical cons iderations in their workor deal in generalisations . A great many historians have takenthe view that nomothetic enquiries should not be included inhistorical studies

,which should be confined to telling us what

happened and how it happened . Theoretical or nom otheticenquiries should be left to sociology. But there are som e writerswho think that a historian may , or even should , include theoreticalinterpretations in his account of the past . Controversy on thissubject , and on the relation between history and sociology , stil lcontinues after sixty years . Certainly there are writings by historians which are to be valued not solely as idiographic accountsof the facts of the past but as containing theoretical (nom othetic)interpretations of those facts . The tradition in French historicalstudies of Fustel de Coulanges and his followers

,such as Gustave

Glotz , i llu strates this kind of combination . Some modern writersas sociological history orhistorical sociology .hropology, meaning by that the study of what are

called the primitive or backward peoples,the term ethnography

applies to what is specifically a mode of idiographic enquiry,the aim of which eptable accounts of such peoplesand their social 1 in thatthe ethnographer major part ofit , from direct ob servation of or contact with the people aboutwhom he Wm , like the historian , from written records }Prehistoric archaeology , which is another b ranch of anthropology ,is clearly an idiographic study, aimed at giving us factua l knowledge about the prehistoric past .The theoretical study of social institutions in general is

usually referred to as sociology , but as thi s name can be looselyused for many different kinds of writings about society we canspeak more specifically of theoretical or comparative sociology.

When Frazer gave his Inaugural Lecture as the first Professorof Social Anthropology in 1908 he defined social anthropologyas that branch of sociology that deals with primitive societies

.

INTRODUCT ION 3

C e rtain confusions amongst anthropologists resu lt from thefailure to distinguishbetweenhistorical explanation of institutionsand theoretical understanding . If we ask why it is that a certaininstitution exists in a particular society the appropriate answer isa historical statement as to its origin . To explain why the UnitedStates has a political constitution with a President , two Housesof Congress , a Cabinet , a Supreme Court , we refer to the historyof North America . This is historical explanation in the propersense of the term . The existence of an institution is explained byreference to a complex sequence of events forming a causal chainof which it is a resu lt .The acceptability of a historical explanation depends on the

fullness and reliability of the historical record . In the primitivesocieties that are studied by social anthropology there are nohistorical records . We have no knowledge of the developmentof social institutions am ong the Australian aborigines for example .

Anthropologists,thinking of their study as a kind of historical

study,fall back on conjecture and imagination , and inven t

‘pseudo-historical’or ‘pseudo-causal’explanations . We have had ,for example

,innumerable and sometimes conflicting pseudo

historical accounts of the origin and development of the totemicinstitutions of the Australian aborigines . In the papers of thisvolum e mention is made of certain pseudo-historical sp eculations .The view taken here’ is that such speculations are not merelyuseless but are worse thanUseless . This does not in any way imp lythe rejection of historical explanation but quite the contrary .

Comparative sociology , of which social anthropology is abranch

,i s here conceived as a theoretical or nom othetic study

of which the aim is to provide acceptable generalisations . Thetheoretical understanding of a particular institution is its inter

pretation in the light of such generalisations .

Social Process

A first question that must be asked if we are to formulatea systematic theory of comparative sociology is wat i s theconcrete

,observable , phenomenal reality with which the theory

is to be concerned ? Some anthropologists would say that the‘ societies’conceived as being in some sensereal entities . Others , however, describe thebe studied as consisting of ‘cultures’

,each of

4. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

which is again conceived as some kind of discrete entity . Stillothers seem to think of the subj ect as concerned with b othkinds of entities ,

‘ societies’and ‘

cultures’, so that the relation ofthese then presents a prob lem .

N l

.

My own view is that the concrete reality with which the socialhrOpologist is concerned in ob servation , description , com

Classification , i s not any sort of entity but a process ,of social life . The unit of investigation is the social

life of some particular region of the earth during a certain periodof time . The process itself consists of an immense multitude ofactions and interactions of human beings , acting as individual s orin comb inations or groups . Amidst the diversity of the particularevents there are discoverable regularities , so that it i s p ossibleto give statem ents or descriptions of certain generalfeatures of thesocial life of a selected region . A statem ent of such significantgeneral features of the process description of nception

of social study Of

forms of social life amongst primitive peoples .)A form of social life am ongst a certain collection of human

beings may remain approximately the same over a certain period .

But over a sufficient length of tim e the form of social life itselfundergoes change or m odification . Therefore

,while we can regard

the events of social life as constituting a process,there is over and

above this the process of change in the form of social life . In aSynchronic description we give an account of a form of social lifeas it exists at a certain time

,abstracting as far as p ossib le from

changes that may be taking place in its features . A diachronicaccount , on the other hand , is an account of such changes over aperiods In comparative sociology we have to deal theoreticallywith the continuity of, and with changes in, form s of social life .

Anthropologists use the word culture’ in a number ofdifferent senses . It seem s to me that some of them u se i t asequivalent to what I call a form Of social life . In its ordinary usein Engl ish ‘

Culture’, which is much the sam e idea as cultivation ,refers to a process , and we can define it as the process by whicha person acquires , from contact with other persons or from suchthings as books or works of art

,knowledge

,ski l l

,ideas

,b eliefs

,

INTRODUCT ION 5

tastes,sentiments . In a particular societyflg camdiscoy en certain

processes of cultural tradition , using the word tradition in itsliteral meaning of handing on or handing down . The understanding and use of a language is passed on

,‘

by a process of culturaltradition in this sense . An Englishman learns by such a processto understand and use the English language , but in some sectionsof the society he may also learn Latin, or Greek , or French , orWelsh . In complex modern societies there are a great number ofseparate cu ltural traditions . By one a person may learn to be adoctor or surgeon

,by another he may learn to b e an engineer

or an architect . In the simplest form s of social life the number ofseparate cultural traditions may be reduced to two

, one for menand the other for women .

If we treat the social reality that we are investigating as beingnot an entity but a process , then cultture an cultural traditionare names—fen c ertain recognisable aspects of that prOCeSSFI

-

sut

not,of course

,the whole process . The terms are convenient

v. . ~w .— m

way s“of refeerring to certain aspects ofhuman social—life : It 18 byreason of

'

the existence of Culture and cultural traditions thathuman social life differs very markedly from the social life ofother animal species . The transmission of learnt ways of thinking

,

feeling and acting constitutes the cultural process , which is aspecific feature of human social l ife . It 13 , of course , part of thatprocess of in teraction amongst persons which is here definedas the social process thought of as the social reality . Continuityand change in the forms of social life being the subjects of investigation of comparative sociology, the continuity of cu lturaltraditions and changes in those traditions are amongst the thingsthat have to be taken into account .

Social System

I t wasWWI—who,in the m iddle of the eighteenth

century , laid t e foundations of comparative sociology , and indoing so formulated and used a conception that has been andcan be referred to by the use of the term social system. His theory

,

which constituted what Comte later called ‘ the first law of socialstatics’

,was that in a particular form of social life there are relations

of interconnection and interdependence , or what Com te calledrelam aarity, amO

'

nESEThe various features . The ideaof a natural or phenomenal system i s that of a set of relations

6 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

amongst events , just as a logical system , such as the geometryof Euclid

,i s a set of relat ions amongst propositions , or an ethical

system a set of relations amongst ethical judgments . When onespeaks of the ‘banking system’of Great Britain this refers to thefact that there i s a considerable number of actions , interactionsand transactions

,suchfor example as payments by means of a

signed cheque drawn on a bank , which are so connected thatthey constitute in their totality a process of which we can makean analytical description which will Showhow they are interconnected and thus form a system . We are dealing, of course , witha process

,a complex part of the total social process of social life

in Great Britain .

these essays I have referred to ‘kinship systems’. Thethat in a given society we can isolate conceptually , if

not in reality,a certain set of actions and interactions amongst

persons which are determined by the relationship s by kinship ormarriage

,and that in a particu lar society these are interconnected

in such a way that we can give a general analytical descriptionof them as constituting a system . The theoretical significance ofthis idea of system s is that our first step in an attempt to understand a regular feature of a form of social life , such as the use ofcheques

, or the custom by which a man has to avoid socialcontact withhis wife’s mother

,i s to discover its place in the

system of whichThe theory 0 however, is what we may call a

theory of a total social system , according to which all the featuresof social life are united into a coherent whole . As a student ofjurisprudence Montesquieu was primarily concerned with laws;and he sought to Show that the laws of a society are connectedwith the political constitution

,the economic life

,the religion

,

the climate , the size of the population , the manners and customs ,and what he called the general spirit (esprit ge

’ne’ral)— what later

writers have called the ‘ ethos’of the society . A theoretical law,

such as this ‘fundamental law of social statics’,i s not the sam e

thing as an empirical law, but is a guide to investigation . Itgives u s reason to think that we can advance our understandingof human societies if we investigate systematically the interconnections amongst features of social life .

INTRODUCTION 7

S tatics and DynamicsW t that in sociology , as in other kinds ofscience

,there are two sets of problems , which he called problems

of statics and problems of dynamics . In statics we attempt todiscover and define conditions of existence or of co-existence ;in dynamics we try to discover conditions of change . The conditions of existence of molecules or of organisms are mattersof statics

,and similarly the conditions of existence of societies

,

social systems , or form s of social, life are m atters for social

statics . Whereas the problem s of ,

social dynamics deal withthe conditions of change of form s

/of social l ife .

The basis of science is systematic classification . It i s thefirst task of social statics to make some attempt to compareforms of social life in order to arrive at classifications . But forms a

of social life cannot be classified into Species and genera in the waywe classify forms of organic life ; the classificationhas to be notspecific but typological , and this is a more complicated kind ofinvestigation . It can only b e reached by means of the establishingof typologies for features of social life or the complexes of featuresthat are given in partial social systems . Not only is the taskcomplex but i t has been neglected in View of the idea that them ethod of anthropology Should be a historical m ethod .

But though the typological studies are one important partof social statics , there is another task , that of formulating generalisations about the conditions of existence of social system s , orofgeneralisation affirmcontinue the various features must exhib it some kind and measureof coherence or consistence

,but this only defines the problem of

social statics,which is to investigate the nature of thi s coherence .

The study of social dynam ics is concerned with egeneralisations about how social systems change . It i s a corollaryof the hypothesis of the systematic connection of features of sociallife that changes in some features are likely to produce Changesin other features .

Social Evolution

m of social evolution was formulated by Herb ert

Spencer as part of his formulation of the general theory of

evolution . According to that theory the developm ent of life on

8 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIE'

IY

the earth constitutes a single process to which Spencer appliedthe term ‘ evolution’. The theory of organic and super-organic

(social) evolution can be reduced to two essential prOpositions :

( I ) That b oth in the development of form s of organic life and inthe development of forms of human social life there has been a

process of diyegifigam by which many different forms of

organic lifehr of social life have b een developed out of a verymuch smallernumber of original form s . (2) That there has beena general trend of development by which more complexfi f‘orms ofstructure

~and organisation (organic or social) have arisen from

simpler form s . The acceptance Of’

the theory Of T

e

'

YBITI-

tib’

fi’

onlyrequires the acceptance of these propositions as giving us a schem e

of interpretation to apply to the study of organic and social life .

But it must be rem emb ered that som e anthropologists reject thehypothesis of evolution . We can give p rovisional acceptance to

Spencer’s fundamental theory , while rej ecting the various pseudohistorical speculations which he added to it , and that acceptancegives us certain concepts which may b e useful as analytical tools .

W‘L-

Tji is is a key concept of the theory of evolution . It is , orcan be , applied b oth to the study of the form s of organic lifeand to the form s of social life am ongst human b eings . A livingorganism exists and continues in existence only if it is b othinternally and externally adapted . The internal adaptationdepends on the adjustment of the various organs and theiractivities

,so that the various physiological processes constitute

a continuing functioning system by which the life of the organ ismis m aintained . The external adaptation is that of the organismto the environment within which it lives . The distinction of

external and internal adaptation is merely a way of distinguishingtwo aspects of the adaptational system which is the sam e fororganism s of a single SpWhen we com e to t 1 life of animals another feature

of adaptation makes its appearance . The existence of a colonyof bees depends on a comb ination of the activities of the individual worker bees in the co l lection of honey and pollen

,the

m anufacture of wax,the building of the cel ls

,the tending of eggs

and larvae and the feeding of the latter,the. p rotecti on of the

store of honey from robbers,the ventilation of the hive by fanning

INTRODUCTION 9

with their wings,the maintenance of temperature in the winter

by clustering together . Spencer uses the term‘

co-Operation’torefer to this feature of social life . Soci

social life continues .“W ham a form of social life amongst human beingsas an adaptational system it is useful to distinguish three asp ectsof the total system . There is the way in which the social life isadjusted to the physical environment , and we can , if we wish ,Speak of this as the (e cological adaptation . Secondly, there arethe institutional arrangements by which an orderly social life ismaintained , so that what Spencer calls co-operation is providedfor and conflict is restrained or regulated . This we m ight call

,

if we wished,the institutional aspect of social adaptation . Thirdly

,

there is the social process by which an individual acquires habitsand mental characteristics that fit him for a place in the sociallife and enable him to participate in its activities . This

,if we wish

,

could be called cultural adaptation , in accordance with theearlier definition of cultural tradition as process . What must beemphasised is that these modes of adaptation are only differentaspects from which the total adaptational system can be lookedat for convenience of analysis and comparison .

The theory of social evolution therefore makes it a part of ourschem e of interpretation of social systems to examine any givensystem as an ada tational system . The stability of the system

,

and therefm r a certain period , depends othe effectiveness of the adaptation .

Social S tructure

The theory of evolution is one of a trend of developm ent bywhich more complex types of structure come into existence byderivation from less complex ones . An address on Social Structureis inc luded in this volum e

,but it was delivered in war tim e and

was printed in abbreviated form,so that it i s not as clear as it

might be . When we u se the term structure we are referring to somesort of

”orderg l A musicalcomposition has a structure , and. so does a sentence . A buildinghas a structure , so does a m olecule or an animal . The componentsor units of social structure are persons , and a person is a human

STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

being considered not as an organism but as occupying positionin a socia l structure .

4’ One of the fundamental theoretical pr ems of sociology isthat of the nature of social continuity . in formsof social life depends on structural continuity , that i s , somesort of continuity in the arrangements of persons in relationto one anotherXAt the present day there i s an arrangement ofpersons into nations , and the fact that for seventy years I havebelonged to the English nation

,although I have l ived much of

my life in other countries,is a fact of social structure . A nation ,

a trib e , a clan , a b ody such as the French Academy , or such as theRoman Church

,can continue in existence as an arrangement of

persons though the personnel,the units of which each is com

posed,changes from time to time . There is continuity of the

structure,just as a human body , of which the components are

molecules , preserves a continuity of structure though the actualmolecules , of which the body consists , are continually changing .

In the politica l structure of the United States there must alwaysbe a President ; at one time it is Herbert Hoover, at another timeFranklin Roosevelt

,but the structure as an arrangement remains

continuous .(flThe social relationships , of which the continu ing networkconstitute social structure , are not haphazard conjunctions ofindividuals

,but are determined by the social p

’

focess , and anyrelationship is one in which the conduct of p ersons in their interactions with each other is controlled by norms , rules or patterns .So that in any relationship within a social structure a personknows that he is expected to b ehave according to these norms and

u stified in expecting that other p ersons should do the same .

e estab lished norms of conduct of a particular form of sociali t is usual to refer to as institutions . An institution is an es

lished norm of conduct recognised as such by a distinguishab l eial group or class of which therefore i t is an institu tion . The

Insti tu tions refer to a distinguishable type or class of socialrelationships and interacti ons . Thus in a given locally definedsociety we find that there are accepted rules for the way a man i sexpected to behave towards his wife and children . The relationof institutions to social structure is therefore twofold . On the oneside there is the social structu re

,such as the fam i ly in this instance

,

for the constituent relationships of which the institu tions provide

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1 2 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

Social Fung ion/f —xThe term function has a very great number .of different

meanings in different contexts . In m athematics the word , asintroduced by Euler in the eighteenth century, refers to anexpression or symbol which can be written on paper , such as‘ log . x

’,andhas no relation whatever to the same word as used

in such a science as physiology . In physiology the concept offunction is of fundamental importance as enabling us to deal withthe continuing relation of structure and process in organic life .A complex organism , such as a human b ody ,has a structureas an arrangem ent of organs and ti ssues and fluids . Even anorganism that consists of a single cellhas a structure as an arrangement of molecu les . An organism also has a life , and by thi s we

concept of organic function is one that isetween the structure of an organ

ism and the life process of that orga The processes that goon within a human body while it is are dependent on theorganic structure . It is the function of the heart to pump bloodthrough the body . The organic structure , as a living structure ,depends for its continued existence on the processes that make upthe total life processes . If the heart ceases to perform its functionthe life process comes to an end and the structure as a livingstructure also comes to an end . Thus process is dependent onstructure and continuity of structure is dependent on process .In reference to social system s and their theoretical under

standing one way of using the concept of function is the sam e asits scientific use in physiology . It can be used to refer to theinterconnection between the social structure and the process ofsocial life . It is this use of the word function that seems to me tomake it a useful term in comparative sociology

’q mthree concepts

of process , structure and function are thus components“

of ? S ingletheory as a scheme of interpretation of human social systems ..The '

three concepts are logically interconnected , since ‘ function’

is used to refer to the relations of process and structure . The theoryis one that we can apply to the study both of continuity in formsof social life and also to processes of change in those forms .If we consider such a feature of social life as the punishment

of crime , or in other words the applicati on , by some organisedprocedure , of penal sanctions for certain kinds of behaviour, and :

INTRODUCTION I3

ask what is its social function , we have a fundamental problemof comparative sociology towards which a first contribution wasmade by Durkheim in his D ivision du Travail Social. A very widegeneral problem is posed when we ask what is the social functionof religion . As it has been pointed out in one of the papers in thisvolume, the study of this problem requires the consideration of alarge number of more limited problem s

,such as that of the social

function of ancestor worship in those societies in which it is found .

But in these more limited investigations,if the theory here

outlined is accepted , the procedure has to be the examinationof the connection between the structural features of the sociallife and the corresponding social process as b oth involved in acontinuing system .

The first paper in this collection may serve to illustrate thesetheoretical ideas . I t deals with an institution by which a sister’sson i s allowed privileged familiarity in his conduct towards hismother’s brother . The custom is known in tribes of North Americasuch as the Winnebago and others , in peoples of Oceania , such asthe inhabitants of Fij i and Tonga

,and in some tribes of Africa .

My own observations on this institution were made in Tonga andFij i

,but as the paper was addressed to a South African audience

it seemed preferable to refer to a single South African example ,since a wider comparative discussi on would have called for a muchlonger essay . The usual way of dealing with this institution , bothin Oceania and in Africa , was to offer a pseudo-historical explanation to the effect that it was a survival in a patrilineal societyfrom a former condition of mother—right .The alternative method of dealing with the institution is to look

for a theoretical understanding of it as a part of a kinship system ofa certain type , within which ithas a discoverable function . Wedo not yet have a systematic general typology of kinship systems ,for the cons truction of such is a laborious undertaking . I haveindicated some partial and provisional results of such an attemptto determine types in a recent publication in the form of anIntroduction to a book on African System s of Kinship andMarriage .

!Amongst the great diversity of kinship systems we can ,I think

,recognise a type of what we may call father-right , and

another of mother-right . In both these types the kinship structureis based on lineages with m aximum emphasis on lineage relationships . In m other-right the lineage is matrilineal , a child belonging

I4. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

to the lineage of the mother. Practically all the jural relationsof a man are those withhis matrilineal lineage and its members ,and therefore he is largely dependent onhis m other’s brothers , whoexercise authority and control over him and to whom he looks forprotection and for inheritance of property . In a system of fatherright , on the other hand , a man i s largely dependent onhispatrilineal lineage and therefore on his father and father’s brothers,who exercise authority and control over him, while it i s to themthat he has to look for protection and for inheritance . Father-rightis represented by the sysyefn of patria potestas of ancient Rome ,and there are systems that approximate m ore or less closely to thetype to be found in Africa and elsewhere . We may regard theBaThonga as so approximating . Mother-right is representedby the systems of the Nayar of M alabar and the Menangkubau

Malays,and again there are systems elsewhere that approximate

to the type .

The point of the pap er on the mother’s brother may be saidto be to contrast with the explanation by pseudo-history theinterpretation of the institution to which it refers as having afunction in a kinship system with a certain type of structure . IfI were to rewrite the paper after thirty years I should certainlymodify and expand it . But it has been suggested to me that thepap er may have a certain minor historical interest in relation tothe development of thought in anthropology and it i s thereforereprinted almost as i t was written with only minor a lterations .Any interest this volume may have will p robab ly be as an

exposition of a theory , in the sense in which the word theory ishere used as a schem e of i nterpretation thought to be applicab leto the understanding of a Class of phenomena . The theory canbe stated by means of the three fundamental and connectedconcepts of

‘process’,‘ structure’and ‘ function’. I t i s derived

from such earli er writers as Montesqu ieu,Comte

, Spencer ,Durkheim and thus belongs to a cultural tradition of twohundred years . This in troduction contains a reformulation inwhich certain terms are used differently from the way they wereused in the early papers here reprinted . For example

,in the

earliest papers written twenty ormore years ago the word‘cu lture’

i s used in the accepted meaning of that time as a general termfor the way of life

,including the way of thought , of a particu lar

locally defined social group .

C H A P T E R I

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFRICA 1

MONGST primitive peoples in many parts of the world agood deal of importance is attached to the relationship of

In some instances , thespecial rights over the property ofhis

mother’s brother . At one time it was usual to regard these customsas being connected with matriarchal institutions

,and it was held

that their presence in a patrilineal people could be regarded asevidence that that people had at some time in the past been matrilineal . This view is still held by a few anthropologists and hasbeen adopted by Mr . Junod in his book on the BaThonga peopleof Portuguese East Africa . Referring to the customs relating tothe behaviour of the mother’s brother and the sister’s son to oneanother

,he says : ‘

Now , having enquired with special care into thismost curious feature of the Thonga system , I come to the conelusion that the only possib le explanation is that , in former andvery rem ote times , our tribehas passed through the matriarchalstage .

’(Junod , The Life of a SouthAfrican Tribe, 191 3 , Vol. I ,

P 253It is with this theory that I wish to deal in this paper ; but I

do not propose to repeat or add to the objections that have beenraised against i t by various critics in recent years . Purely negativecriticism does not advance a science . The only satisfactory wayof getting rid of an unsatisfactory hypothesis is to find a betterone . I propose , therefore , to put before you an alternative hypothesi s , and if I am successful , not in proving my hyp othesis

,but in showing that it does give a possib le explanation of

the facts ,“

I shall at least have refuted the View of Mr . Junod thatthe explanation he accepts is the ‘ only possib le’one .For many African tribes we have almost no information about

customs of this kind . Not that the Customs do not exist , or

are not important to the natives themselves , but because the

1 A paper read before the SouthAfrican Association for the Advancemen t

of Scien ce , 9 Ju ly 1 924 , and prin ted in SouthAfrican journal of S cience ,Vol. XX I, p p . 5 42

—5 5 .

IO STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY

systematic and scientific study of the natives of this country hasas yethardly begun . I sha l l , therefore , have to refer chiefly tothe customs of the BaThonga as recorded by Mr . Junod . These areto be found in the first volume of the work quoted above (pp . 22 5

et seq. ,and pp . 253 et Som e of the more important of them

may be summarised as follows :

I . The uterine nephew all through his career is the object ofspecial care on the part ofhis uncle .

2 . When the nephew is sick the mother’s brother sacrificeson his behalf.

3 . The nephew is permitted to take many liberties with hismother’s brother ; for example , he may go to his uncle

’shome and eat up the food that has been prepared for thelatter’s m eal .

4 . The nephew claim s som e of the property of his m other’sbrother when the latter dies

,and may som etimes claim

one of the widows .

5 . When the m other’s brother offers a sacrifice to his ancestorsthe sister’s son steals and consumes the portion of m eat orbeer offered to the gods .

It must not be supposed that these custom s are peculiar tothe BaThonga . There is evidence that sim ilar customs may befound amongst other African tribes

,and we know of the existence

of similar customs amongst other peoples in various parts of theworld . In South Africa itself custom s of this kind have been foundby Mrs . Hoernle amongst the Nama Hottentots . The sister’s sonmay b ehave with great freedom towardshis m other’s b rother , andmay take any particularly fine b east from his herd of cattle , or anyparticu larly fine object that he may possess . On the contrary, them other’s b rother may take from his nephew

’s herd any b eastthat is deformed or decrep it , and may take any old and worn-outobject he may possess .What is particularly interesting to me is that in the part of

Polynesia that I know best,that is , in the Friendly Islands

(Tonga) and in Fij i , we find custom s that show a very closeresemb lance to those of the BaThonga . There

,also

,the sister’s

son i s permitted to take many lib erties with his m other’s brother,

and to take any Of his uncle’s possessions that he may desire . Andthere also we find the custom that

,when the uncle makes a

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFR ICA I7

sacrifice,the sister’s son takes away the portion offered to the gods ,

and may eat it . I shall , therefore , make occasional references to theTo an custom s in the course of this paper .

LThese three peoples

,the BaThonga , the Nama , and the

Tongans,haveM m patriarchal institutions ; that is ,

the children belong to the social group of the father,not to that

of the m other ; and property is inherited in the male line , passingnormally from a father to his sorpThe View that I am Opposing isthat the customs relating to the mother’s brother can only beexplained by supposing that

,at some past time , these peoples

had matrilineal institutions,suchas are found today amongst

other prim itive peoples , with whom the children b elong tothe social group of the m other, and property is inherited in thefemale line

,passing from a man to his b rother and to his

sister’s sons .

Ifi s a mistake to suppose that we can understand the institutions of society by studying them in isolation without regardto other institutions with which they coexist and with which theymay be correlated , and I wish to call attention to a correlationthat seems to exist between custom s relating to the mother’sbrother and custom s relating to the father’s sister . So far asp resent information goes

,where we find the mother’s brother

important we also find that the father’s sister is equally important,

though in a different way. The custom of allowing the sister’s'

son to take liberties with his m other’s brother seems to begenerally accompanied with an obligation of particular respectandM etres to -Mr. Junod says little ab outthe father’s Sister amongst the BaThonga. Speaking of a man’sbehaviour to this relative (his rarana) he says simply :

‘He showsher great respect . However

,She i s not in any way a m other

(mamana)’(Op . cit .

,p . About the Nama Hottentots we

have better information , and there the father’s sister is the object

of the very greatest respect on the part of her brother’s child .

In Tonga this custom is very Clearly defined . A man’s father’ssister is the one relative above all others whom he must respectand obey . If she selects a wife for him he must marry her withouteven venturing to demur or to voice any obj ection; and so through

law ; and one of the greatest offences of which he could be guiltywould be to Show himself lacking in respect to her .

1 8 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

Now this correlation (which is not confined , of course ,to the three instances I have mentioned , but seem s , as Ihave said ,to be general) must be taken into account in any explanation. of

the customs relating to the mother’s brother , for the correlatedcustoms are

,if I am right , not independent institu tions , but part

of one system ; and no explanation of one part of the system issatisfactory unless it fits in with an analysis of the system as

primitive societies the social relations of individualsregulated on the basis of kinship . This is brought

about by the formation of fixed and more or less definite patternsof behaviour for each of the recognised kinds of relationship .

There i s a Special pattern of behaviour, for example , for a son

towards his father, and another for a younger brother towardshis elder brother . The particular patterns vary from one societyto another ; but there are certain fundamental princip les ortendencies which appear in all societies

, or in all those of acertain type . It is these general tendencies that it i s the specialtask of social anthropology to discover andOnce we start tracing out relationship t

distance the number of different kinds of relatives that it i slogically possible to distinguish is very large . This difficulty isavoided in primitive society by a system of c g sificaQon ,

bywhich relatives of what might logically be held to be of differentkinds are classified into a limited number of kinds . The principleof classification that is most commonly adopted in primitivesociety may be stated as that of the e uivalence of bro 3 . Inother words if I stand in a particular relation to one man I regardmyself as standing in the sam e general kind of relation to hisbrother ; and Similarly with a woman and her sister . In this waythe father’s brother comes to be regarded as a sort of father, andhis sons are , therefore , relatives of the same kind as brothers .Similarly , the mother

’s Sister is regarded as another mother , andher children are therefore brothers and Sisters . The system is theone to be found amongst the Bantu tribes of South Africa , andamongst the Nama Hottentots , and also in the Friendly Islands .By means of this princip le p rimitive Societies are able to arriveat definite patterns of behavi our towards uncles and aunts andcousins of certain kinds . A man’s behaviour towards his father’sbrother must be of the same general kind as his behaviour

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20 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

sister in a patrilineal soci ety on the basis of the principle ortendency which I have suggested is present . To do this we mustfirst know the patterns for the father and the mother respectively ,and I think that it wil l

,perhaps

,be more reassuring if I go for

the definition of these to Mr . Junod’s work , as his observations

will certainly not have been influenced by the hypothesis that Iam trying to prove .

The relationship Of father,he says

,

‘ implies respect and evenfear . The father, though he does not take much trouble wi thhis children

,is , however , their instructor, the one who scolds

and punishes . SO do also the father’s brothers’(op . cit . , p .

Of a man’s own mother he says : ‘

She is his true mamana , and thisrelation is very deep and tender

,combining respect with love .

Love,however, generally exceeds respect

’(Op . cit .

,p .

Of the mother’s relation to her children we read that ‘

She i sgenerally weak with them and is often accused by the father ofSpoiling them .

’

me danger in condensed formula ,but I think

we Shall not‘

be far wrong in saying that in a strongly patriarchalsociety

,such as we find in South Africa

,the father is the one who

must be respected and ob eyed,and the m other is the one from

whom may be expected tenderness and indulgence . I could Showyou , if it were necessary , that the sam e thing is true of the familylife of the Friendly Islanders .If, now , we apply the principle that I have suggested is at

work in these peoples it will follow that the father’s Sister isone who must be obeyed and treated with respect

,while from the

mother’s brother indulgence and care may be looked for . But thematter is complicated by another factor . If we consider the relationOf a nephew to hi s uncle and aunt

,the question of sex comes in .

In primitive societies there is a m arked difference in the behaviourof a man towards other men and that towards women . Riskingonce more a formula

,we may say that any considerab le degree

of familiarity is generally only perm itted in such a society as theBaThonga M em personi OL same sex; A man must treathis female relatives with greater respect than his male relatives .Consequently the nephew must treat his father’s sister with evengreater respect than he doeshis own father . ( In just the same way ,owing to the princip le of respect for age or seniority, a man musttreathis father’s elder brother with more respect than his own

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFR ICA 2 1

father .) Inversely , a man may treat his mother’s brother

,who is of

his own sex,with a degree of fam iliari ty that would not be possible

with any woman,even his own m other . The influence of sex

on the behaviour of kindred is best seen in the relations of brotherand sister . In the Friendly Islands and amongst the Nama a manmust pay great respect tohis Sister

,particularly his eldest sister

,

and may never indulge in any fam iliarities with her . The sam ething is true

,I believe , of the South African Bantu . In m any

prim itive societies the father’s Sister and the elder Sisters are theobj ects of the same general kind of behaviour

,and in some of

these the two kinds of relatives are classified together and denotedby the same name .

Wehave deduced from our assumed principle a certain patternof behaviour for the father’s Sister and for the mother’s brother .Now these patterns are exactly what we find amongst theBaThonga, amongst the Hottentots , and in the Friendly Islands .The father’s Sister is above all relatives the one to be respected andobeyed . The mother’s brother is the one relative above all fromwhom we may expect indulgence

,with whom we may be familiar

and take liberties . Here,then , is an alternative

‘possib le explanation’Of the custom s relating to the mother’s brother, andit has this advantage over Mr . Junod

’s theory that it also explains

the correlated custom s relating to the father’s sister . Thi s b ringsus

,however

,not to the end but to the beginn ing Of our enquiry .

It is easy enough to invent hypotheses . The important and difficultwork begins when we set out to verify them . It will b e impossiblefor me

,in the Short time available , to make any attempt to verify

the hypothesis I have put before you . All I can do is to pointout certain lines of study which will , I believe , provide thatverification .

The first and most obvious thing to do is to study in detailthe behaviour of the sister’s son and the m other’s brother toone another in matriarchal societies . Unfortunately , there i spractically no information on thi s subj ect relating to Africa , andvery little for any other part Of the world . Moreover , there arecertain false ideas connected with this distinction of societie sinto matriarchal and patriarchal that it is necessary to removebefore we attempt to go further .In all societies

, primitive or advanced , kinship is necessarilybilateral . The individual is related to certain persons through his

22 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIMIT IVE SOCIETY

father and to others through his mother , and the kinship systemof the society lays down what shall be the character ofhis dealingswith his paternal relatives and his maternal relatives respectively .

But society tends to divide into segments ( local groups , lineages ,clans

,and when the hereditary principle is accepted , as it

most frequently is , as the means of determining the membershipOf a segm ent

,then it is necessary to choose b etween maternal

or paternal descent . When a society is divided into groups with arule that the children belong to the group of the father we havepatrilineal descent

,while if the children always b elong to the

group of the mother the descent is matrilineal .There is

,unfortunately, a great deal of looseness in the

use of the term s matriarchal and patriarchal , and for that reasonmany anthropologists refuse to use them . If we are to use them atall

,we must firstg ive exact definitions A society may be called

patriarchal when descent is patrilineal (i.e . the chi ldren belongto the group of the father) , marriage is patrilocal (i.e . the wiferemoves to the local group of the husband), inheritance (ofproperty) and succession (to rank) are in the male line , ant efamily i s patripotestal (i.e . the authority over the members of thefami ly i s in the hands of the father or his relatives) . On theother hand

,a society can be called m atriarchal when descent

,

inheritance and succession are in the female line,marriage is

matrilocal (the husband removing to the home ofhis wife), andwhen the authority over the children is wielded by the mother’srelatives .If this definition of these Opposing terms is acc epted

,i t

is at once obvious that a great socieg s areneither m atriarchal nor patriarchal, :thoughsome may inclifiemore to theb fie’ SidC, and others m ore to the other . Thus, if weexamine the tribes of Eastern Australia, which are sometimesSpoken of as matriarchal , we find that marriage is patrilocal , so thatmembership of the local group is inherited in the male line

,the

authority over the children is chiefly in the hands of the father andhis brothers , property (what there is of it) is mostly inheritedin the male line

,while

,as rank is not recogn ised , there is no

question of succession . The only matrilineal institution is the .

descent of the totemic group,which is through the mother

,so

line ratherthoroughly

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFRICA 23

bilateral , but for most purp oses kinship through the father is ofmore importance than kinship through the mother. There is someevidence

,for example , that the obligation to avenge a death falls

upon the relatives in the male line rather than upon those in thefemale line .

We find an interesting instance of this bilateralism,if it may

be so called , in South Africa , in the OvaHerero trib e . The factsare not quite certain

,but it would seem that this tribe is sub

divided into two sets Of segments crossing one another . For oneset (the omaanda) descent is matrilineal , while for the other (otuz o)it is patrilineal . A child belongs to the eanda Of its mother andinherits cattle from its mother’s brothers , but belongs to the oruz oof its father and inheritshis ancestral Spirits . Authority over thechildren would seem to be in the hands of the father and hisbrothers and Sisters .It i s now clear

,IhOpe , that the distinction between matriarchal

and patriarchal societies is not an absolute but a relative one .

Even in the most strongly patriarchal society some social importance is attached to kinship through the mother; and Similarlyin the most strongly matriarchal society the father andhis kindredare always of some importance in the life of the individual .In Africa

,

we have in the south-east a group of tribes thatincline strongly to patriarchy

,SO much so, in fact , that we may

perhaps justifiably Speak of them as patriarchal . Descent ofthe social group

,inheritance of property, succession to chieftain

ship , are all in the male line ; marriage is patri local , and authorityin the fam i ly is strongly patrip otestal . In the north of Africa , inKenya and the surrounding countries

,there is another group of

strongly patriarchal peoples,some of them Bantu-Speaking , while

others are Nilotic or Harnitic . Between these two patriarchalregions there is a band of peoples stretching apparently rightacross Africa from east to west , on the level of Nyasaland andNorthern Rhodesia , in which the tendency is towards matriarchalinstitutions . Descent of the social group

,inheritance of property ,

and succession to the kingship or chieftainship are in the femaleline . In some of the tribes marriage seems to be matri local , at anyrate temporarily if not permanently

,i.e . a man on marriagehas to

go and live with his wife’s people .I t is about these people and their customs that we urgently

need information if we are to understand such matters as the

24 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

subj ect of this paper . Of one tribe of this region we have a fairlyfull description in the work of Smith and Dale (The Ila-speakingPeople of Northern Rhodesia ,

Unfortunately,on the very

points with which I am now dealing the information is scanty andcertainly very incomplete . There are , however, two points I wishto bring out. The first concerns the behaviour of the mother’sb rother to his sister’s son . We are told that ‘ the mother’s b rotheris a personage of vast importance ; having the power even of lifeand death over his nephews and nieces , which no other relations ,not even the parents

,have ; he is to be held in honour even ab ove

the father . This i s avunculi potestas, which among the BaIla isgreater than patria potestas . In speaking of the mother’s brother,it i s customary to u se anhonorific title given to people who are respected very highly

’(Op . cit . , Vol. I , p . This kind of relation

between the mother’s b rother and the sister’s son is obviouslywhat we might expect in a strongly matriarchal society . Buthowthen

,on Mr . Junod

’s theory

,can we explain the change which

must have taken place from this sort of relation to that which nowexists among the BaThonga?This brings me to another point which it will not be possible

to discuss in detail but which has an important bearing on theargum ent . We have been considering the relation of the Si ster’sson to his m other’s brother ; but if we are to reach a really finalexp lanation , we must study also the b ehaviour of a man tohisother relatives on the m other’s side

,and tohis m other’s group

as a whole . Now in the Friendly Islands the peculiar relationbetween a Sister

’s son and a m other’s brother exists also betweena daughter’s son andhis m other’s father . The daughter’s son

must be honoured by his grandfather . He is ‘a chief’tohim .

He may takehis grandfather’s property , and he may take awaythe Offering thathis grandfather makes to the gods at a kavacerem ony . The mother’s father and the m other’s brother are theobj ects of very Similar b ehaviour patterns

,of which the out

standing feature is the indulgence on the one Side and the libertypermitted on the other . Now there is evidence of the sam e thingamongst the BaThonga , but again we lack the full informationthat we need . Mr . Junod writes that a grandfather ‘

is more lenientto his grandson by his daughter thanhis grandson by his son

’

(Op cit . p . In this connection the custom of ca l l ing themother’s brother kokwana (grandfather) is significant .

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFRICA 25

Now here is som ething that it seems impossib le to explainon Mr. Junod

’s theory . In a strongly matriarchal society the

mother’s father does not belong to the same group as his grandchild and is not a person from whom property can be inheritedor who can exercise authority . Any explanation Of the libertiesperm itted towards the m other’s brother cannot b e satisfactoryunless it also explains the similar liberties towards the mother’sfather which are found in Polynesia and apparently to some extentin South Africa . This Mr . Junod S theony clearly does not do,and cannot do .

But on the hypothesis that I have pu t forward the matteris fairly Simp le . In primitive society there is a strongly markedtendency to m erge the individual in the group to which he or shebelongs . The result of this in relation to kinship i s a tendencyto extend to all the members of a group a certain type Of behaviourwhich has its origin in a relationship to on e particu lar memberof the group . Thus the tendency in the BaThonga tribe wouldseem to b e to extend to all the members of the mother’s group

(family or lineage) a certain pattern Of behaviour which is derivedfrom the special pattern that appears in the behaviour of a son

towardshis m other . Since it i s from his m other that he expectscare and indulgence he looks for the sam e sort of treatment fromthe p eople of his m other’s group

,i.e . from all his maternal kin .

On the other hand it is to his paternal kin that he owes obedienceand respect . The patterns that thus-arise in rela tion-to thei ajtherand the m other _ar_e . g eneralised and extend ed to the kindredon the one Side and on the other . If I had tim e I think I couldShow you quite conclusively that this Is really the princip le thatgoverns the relations between an individual and his mother’skindred in the patriarchal trib es of South Africa . I must leave thedemonstration

,however

,to another occasion . I can do no more

now than illustrate my statement .The custom

,often m iscalled bride-purchase and generally

known in South Africa as lolzola ,is

,as Mr . Junod has well Shown , a

payment m ade in compensation to a girl’s fam i ly for her loss whenshe is taken away in marriage . Now ,

Since in the patriarchal tribesof South Africa a woman belongs to her father’s peop le , the com

pensationhas to b e paid to them . But you will find that in manyof the tribes a certain portion of the

‘

marriage paym ent’is handed

g an g-n

over t6 the mother’s brother Of the giflwrwhomit is pa id. Thus ,

26 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTI ON IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

amongst the BaPedi, out of the lenyalo cattle one head (calledhloho) i s handed to the m other’s b rother of the girl . Am ongst theBaSotho a portion of the cattle received for a girl on her ma rriagemay som etim es be taken by her mother

’s brother, this b eingknown as ditsoa . Now the na tives state that the ditsoa cattlereceived by the m other

’s brother are really held byhim on behalfof his Sister’s children . If one of his Sister’s sons or daughters is i llhe may be required to offer a sacrifice to his ancestral spirits , andhe then takes a beast from the ditsoaherd . Also , when the sister

’sson wishes to obtain a wife ,he may go to his mother

’s brother tohelp him to find the necessary cattle andhis uncle may givehimsome of the ditsoa cattle received at the marriage of his Sister, ormay even givehim cattle from his own herd , tru sting to being re

paid from the ditsoa cattle to be received in the future from themarriage of a niece . I believe that the Native Appeal Courthasdecided that the paym ent of ditsoa to the m other’s brother i s avoluntary matter and cannot b e regarded as a legal obligation

,and

with that judgm ent I am in agreement . I quote this customb ecause it illustrates the sort of interest that the mother’s brotheri s expected to take in his Sister’s son , in helping him and lookingafterhis welfare . It brings us back to the question as to why them other’s brother may be asked to offer sacrifices when his nephewis sick .

In south-east Africa ancestor worship is patrilineal,i.e . a

man worships and takes part in sacrifices to the Spirits of hisdeceased relatives in the male line . Mr . Junod

’s statements about

the BaThonga are not entirely clear . In one place he says thateach family has two sets of gods

,those on the father’s Side and

those on the m other’s ; they are equal in dignity and b oth can beinvoked (Op . cit . , II , p . 349 , and I , p . 256 , note) . But in anotherplace it is stated that if an offeringhas to be made to the gods ofthe m other’s family this must b e through the maternal relatives

,

the malume (op . cit . , I I , p . Other passages confirm this andShow us that ancestral spirits can only be directly approached inany ritual by their descendants in the male line .

The natives of the Transkei are very definite in their statem ents tom e that a person’s maternal gods

,the patrilineal ancestors

of his mother, will never inflict supernatural puni shment uponhim by makinghim Sick . ( I am not quite SO sure about the Sothotrib es , but I think that they probab ly have sim ilar views .) On

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28 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

of behaviour towards the father is extended to the father’s brothersand sisters

,and to the whole of the father’s group (or rather to all

the older members of it , the principle of age making importantmodifications necessary) , and finally to the paternal gods .The father andhis relatives must be obeyed and respected

(even worshipped , in the origina l sense of the word) , and sotherefore also must be the paternal ancestors . The father punisheshis children , and so may the ancestors on the father

’s Side . Onthe other hand

,the m other is tender and indulgent to her child ,

and her relatives are expected to be the same,and so also the

ant principle,which I have tried to demonstrate

elsewhere (The Andaman Islanders , Chapter V) , i s that the socialvalues current in a primitive society are maintained by beingexpressed in ceremonial or ritual custom s . The set of valuesthat we here m eet with in the relations of an individual tohiskindred on the two sides must

,therefore

,also have their proper

ritual expression . The subject is too vast to deal with at alladequately here

,but I wish to discuss one point . Am ongst the

BaThonga , and also in Western Polynesia (Fij i and Tonga) , theSister’s son (or in Tonga also the daughter

’s son) intervenes in thesacrificial ritual . Mr . Junod describes a ceremony Of crushingdown the hut of a dead man in which the batahalu (sister’s children) p lay an important part . They kill and distribute the sacrificialvictim s and when the officiating priest makes his p rayer to thespirit of the dead man it is the Sister’s sons who

,after a time

,

interrupt or‘ ‘cut’the prayer and bring it to an end . They then ,among the BaThonga clans

,seize the portions of the sacrifice

that have been dedicated to the Spirit Of the dead man and runaway with them ,

‘ Stealing’them (Op . cit . , I , pI would suggest that the meaning of thi it gives a

ritual expression to the Special relation that exists between theSister’s son and the mother’s brother . When the uncle is alivethe nephews have the right to go to his village and take his food .

Now that he is dead they come and do this again,as part of the

funeral ritual , and as it were for the last time , i .e . they com e andsteal portions of meat and beer that are put aside as the portion ofthe deceased man .

The same sort of explanation will be found to hold , I think ,Of the part p layed in sacrificial and other ritual by the Sister

’s

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFR ICA 29

son both amongst the Bantu of South Africa and also in Tongaand Fij i ; AS a man fears his father, so he fears and reverences hispaternal ancestors

,but he has no fear ofhis mother’s brother

,

and SO may act irreverently to his m aternal ancestors ; he is ,indeed

,required by custom so to act on certain occasions

,thus

giving ritual expression to the Special social relations between aman andhis m aternal relatives in accordance with the generalfunction of ritual , as I understand it .It will , perhaps , be of help if I give you a final brief statement

of the hypothesis I am advancing , with the assumptions involvedin it and some of its important implications .

1 . The characteristic Of m ost of these societies that wecall primitive is that the conduct of individuals to one

another is very largely regulated on the basis Of kinship ,this being brought about by the formation of fixed patternsof behaviour for each recognised kind Of kinship relation .

2 . This is sometimes associated with a segmentary organisationof society, i.e . a condition in which the whole society isdivided into a numb er of segm ents ( lineages , clans) .

3 . Whi le kinship i s always and necessarily bilateral , or

cognatic,the segmentary organisation requires the adoption

of the unilineal principle , and a choice has to be m adebetween patrilineal and matrilineal institutions .

4 . In patrilineal societies of a certain type , the Special patternof b ehaviour between a si ster’s son and the m other’sb rother is derived from the pattern of behaviour betweenthe child and the m other

,which is itself the product of the

social life within the family in the narrow sense .

5 . This sam e kind of behaviour tends to be extended to allthe maternal relatives , i.e . to the whole fami ly or group towhich the mother’s brother belongs . 1

1 This exten sion from the mother’s brother to the other m aternal re lativesis shown in the BaThon ga trib e in the kin ship term inology . The term malume

,

prim arily app lied to the mother’s brother, is exten d ed to the son s of those m en ,

who are also malume . If m y mother’s brothers are dead it is their son s who wil lhave to sacrifice on my behalf to m y m aternal an cestors . In the northern p art

of the tribe the term malumehas gon e out Of us e , and the mother’s father,the mother’s brother, and the son s of the mother’s brother are all cal ledkokwana (grandfather) . However ab surd it m ay seem to u s to cal l a mother’sbrother’s son ,

who m ay be actual ly youn ger than the sp eaker, by a word

m ean ing‘

grandfather’, the argum en t of this p ap er w il l enab le us to see som e

m ean ing in it. The p erson who must Sacrifice on m y b ehalf to my m aternal

30 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIMIT IVE SOCIETY

6 . In societies with patrilineal ancestor worship ( such as

the BaThonga and the Friend ly Islanders) the same type ofbehaviour may also be extended to the gods of the mother

’sfam ily .

7 . The Special kind of behaviour to the maternal relatives

( living and dead) or to the maternal group and its gods andsacra

,is expressed in definite ritual custom s

,the function

of ritual here , as elsewhere , being to fix and make permanentcertain types of behaviour

,with the obligations and senti

ments involved therein .

In conclusion,may I point out that I have selected the subject

of my contribution to this meeting because it i s one not only oftheoretical but also of practical interest . For instance , there is thequestion as to whether the Native Appeal Cou rt was really rightin its judgm ent that the paym ent of the ditsoa cattle to the m other’sbrother Of a bride is not a legal but only a moral obligation . So

far as I have b een able to form an Opinion,I Should say that

the judgment was right ."The whole subj ect of the payments at marriage (lobola) i s

one of considerable practical importance at the present tim e tomissionaries and magistrates , and to the natives themselves . Nowthe study Of the exact position in which a person stands to hismaternal relatives is one without which it is impossible to arriveat a completely accurate understanding of the custom s of lobola .

One of the chief functions of lobola i s to fix the social position ofthe children of a m arriage . If the proper payment is m ade by afamily, then the children of the woman who comes to them inexchange for the cattle belong to that family

,and its gods are their

gods . The natives consider that the strongest Of all social bonds isthat between a child and its mother, and therefore by the extension that inevitab ly takes place there is a very strong bondbetween the child and its mother’s family . The function of thelobola payment is not to destroy but to modify thi s bond , and toplace the children definitely in the father’s family and group forall matters concerning not only the social but also the religious

an cestors is first my mother’s father, then , ifhe is dead ,my mother’s brother,

an d after the decease of the latter,his son , who m ay b e youn ger than I am .

There is a Sim ilarity of fun ction for these three re lation ship s , a Sin g le gen eralp attern of behaviour form e toward s them all and this is again s imi lar in generalto that for grand fathers . The nomen clature is , therefore , app ropriate .

THE MOTHER’S BROTHER IN SOUTH AFRICA 3 1

life of the trib e . If no lobola is paid the Child inevitably belongsto the mother’s family , though its position is then irregular .

But the woman for whom the lobola i s paid does not become amember of the husband’s family ; their gods are not her gods ;and that is the final test . I have said enough , I hope , to Show thatthe proper understanding of customs relating to the m other’sbrother is a necessary preliminary to any final theory of lobola .

C H A P T E R I I

PATRILINEAL AND MATRILINEAL SUCCESSION 1

F we are to understand aright the laws and customs of nonEuropean peoples we must be careful not to interpret them interms of our Own legal conceptions , which , simple and obvious

as som e of them may seem to us , are the product of a long andcomplex historical development and are Special to our own culture .If

,for instance

,we attempt to app ly to the custom s of the Simpler

peoples our own precise distinctions between the law relating topersons and the law relating to things we shall produce nothingbut confusion in the result .With us one of the most important aspects of succession is

the transmission of property by inheritance . Yet in some of thesimplest societies this is a m atter of almost no sign ificance at all .In an Australian tribe

, for example , a man possesses a few weapons ,tools

,utensils and personal ornam ents , things of little value or

permanence . On his death some of them may be destroyed,others

may be distributed am ong his relatives and friends . But theirdiSposal is of SO little importance , unless in relation to ritual ,that it is often diflicult to find any rules of customary procedure .

But even in such Simple societies , where inheritance of privateproperty may be said not to exist or to be of m inim al importance ,there are prob lem s of succession in the widest sense of the term .

The term ‘ Succession’will here be taken as referring to thetransm ission Of rights in general . A right exists in

,and is de

finable in term s Of,recognised social usage . A right m ay be

that of an individual or a collection Of individuals . It may bedefined as a measure of control that a person

, or a collection ofpersons ,has over the acts of some person or persons , said to bethereby made liab le to the performance of a duty . Rights may be

classified as Of three main kinds :

(a) Rights over a person imposing some duty or duties uponthat person . This i s the jus in personam of Roman law.

A father m ay exercise such rights over his son , or a nationover its citizens .

1 Rep rin ted from The Iowa Law Review ,Vol. XX

,No. 2 , Jan uary 1 93 5 .

3 2

PATRILINEAL AND MATR ILINEAL SUCCESS ION 3 3

(b) Rights over a person‘as agains t the world’, i.e . imposing

duties on all other persons in respect Of that particularperson . This i s the jus in rem of Roman law in relation topersons .

(c) Rights over a thing , i.e . som e object other than a person,as against the world

,imposing duties on other persons in

relation to that thing .

The rights classified under (b) and (c) are fundam entally ofthe same kind

,distinguished only as they relate to persons or to

things,and are Of a diff erent kind from those classified under (a) .

We may consider a few examp les from such a Simple societyas an Australian trib e . A man has certain rights over his wife .

Some of them are rights in personam whereby he may require fromher the performance of certain duties . Others are rights in rem.

If anyone Should kill the wife he commits an injury against thehusband . If anyone Should have sexual intercourse with the wifewithout the consent of the husband he comm its an injury againstthe latter . In some trib es a man may lend his wife to another ; thisi s an exercise by the husband both of his rights in personam and ofhis rights in rem.

In a great number of Australian tribes the custom Of thelevirate holds sway . By this , when a man dies all his rights overhis wife (and over his immature children) are transferred to hisyounger brother

,or failing such

,to an agnatic cousin . This is

a Simple instance of fraternal succession . What is transferred iscertain rights in personam and in rem over certain persons (the wifeand children) and with these rights there go, of course , certainobligations or duties .Let us next consider

,in such a trib e as the Kariera of Western

ia,the nature of the group that I shall call a ‘horde’.

b ody of persons who jointly possess , occupy andExp loit‘

aN

certain (I The rights of the horde over itsterritory by saying that no person who isnot a member of the horde has the right to any animal , vegetab leor mineral p roduct from the territory except by invitation orconsent of m embers of the horde . Acts of trespass against thisexclusive right of a horde to its territory seem to have been veryrare in the social life Of the aborigines but it appears to have beengenerally held that anyone committing such a trespass cou ld

2

34 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

justifiably be killed .

1 This exclusive use of its territory by a hordeis m odified by Obligations of hosp itality whereby

,when there is an

abundance of som e kind of food at a certain tim e , memb ers offriendly neighbouring hordes are invited to come in and Share it .The son Of any woman born in the horde and married elsewhereis always/entitled to visit his mother’s horde and hunt in itsterritoyIt IS convenient to Speak of such a group as the Kariera horde

as a ‘corporation’having an ‘ estate’. This is an extension of theterms ‘ corporation’and ‘ estate’as they are commonly used in law,

but I think this extension is justifiable,andhOpe that at any rate

it will be adm itted for the purposes of the present exposition . Byan estate is here meant a collection of rights (whether over personsor things) with the implied duties , the unity of which is constitutedeither by the fact that they are the rights of a single person and

can be transmitted,as a whole

, or in divi sion , to some otherperson or persons, or that they are the rights Of a defined group(the corporation) which maintains a continuity of possession . Apersonal estate thu s c orresponds to that universitasjuris which iswhat , in Roman law,

was transmitted by inheritance . 2The corporate estate of a Kariera horde includes in the first

place its rights over its territory . The continuity of th e hordeis m aintained by the continuity of possession of the territory

,

which remains constant,not subj ect to divi sion or increase

,for

the Australian aborigines have no conception of the possibilityof territorial conquest by armed force . The relation of a hordeto its territory does not correspond exactly to what we regard as‘ownership’in modern law. Ithas some of the qualities of corporate ownership , but also partakes of the nature of the relation of

a modern state to its territory,which we may Speak of as the

exercise of ‘dominion’. Rights of ownership over land and rightsof domin ion have seemingly both had their origin by developmentand differentiation from such a simple relation as that exemplifiedin the Australian horde .

1Wehave records from a part of SouthAustralia of occasional d eliberateacts of trespass witharm ed force , a body of m en invadin g a territory in whichred ochre was foun d for the purpose of ob tain ing a supp ly. This was actuallyan act of war and as the invaders took care to com e in force thehorde whoserights were thus invadedhad no effective rem edy.

2 Hereditas est successio in universumjus quod defunctushabuit : an inheritan ceis a succession to the en tire legal position of a deceased man .

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36 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

If now we turn from considering the horde as a whole toconsider the individual m ale members we find here also a processof customary transmission of rights . Children ‘

b elong’,we may

say, primari ly to the father , i.e . it i s he who exercises over themrights in personam and in rem. AS the father in turn belongs tothe horde this horde has some rights over his children . When agirl reaches puberty the rights over her are transferred (perhapsnot in entirety but in great part) from her father andhis horde toher husband . When the boy reaches puberty he is transferred fromhis position of dependence on his father to that of an adult memberof the horde . Now a member of the horde has certain rights overother members and over the territory of the horde . These rights arepart of his personal estate or statu s . Thus there is a process of‘patrilineal succession’whereby the sons of male members of thehorde become in their turn members , thus acquiring rights andhaving a Share in the estate .We are thus brought

,after necessary and it is hoped not too

tedious preliminary considerations , to the problem with which thispaper is to deal , that of the nature and function of the uni linealtransmission Of rights . In the patrilineal succession of theAustralian horde the most considerable part of the body of rightsof a male person ,his status , his personal estate as a Sharer orco-parcener in the estate of a horde, are derived byhim throughhis father to the exclusion ofhis mother and are transmitted inturn to his sons to the exclusion of his daughters . It is important ,however, to recognise that in this instance , and , so far as we know,

in all instances Of patrilineal succession , som e rights are alsotransmitted through the m other . Thus in the Kariera tribe a manhas certain quite important rights overhis mother’s horde

,over

its individual m embers,and over its territory .

In matrilineal succession the greater part of the body ofrights Of an individual , over things , over persons , or as a memberof a corporation

,are derived byhim through his mother and can

not be transmitted to his children but devolve uponhis Sister’schi ldren .

As an example of a very thorough system of matrilineal succession we may consider the taravad Of the Nayar caste of Malabar .A taravad is an incorporated matrilineal lineage . It includes allliving descendants in the female line of an original ancestress .It has therefore both male and female m embers , all of whom are

PATR IL INEAL AND MATRIL INEAL SUCCESS ION 37

children of female members Of the group . It is constituted as acorporation (a joint-fam ily in the terminology of Indian lawyers)by the possession of an estate which includes in the first instancepossession of a house or houses and land , and in the second p lacerights over the persons of its members . The control of the estateis in the hands of a ‘

manager’who is normally the Oldest malemember of the group . In order that the group may retain completeand exclusive possession Of the children born to its female membersthe Nayars have estab lished a system which denies a ll legal rightsto a male parent . A Nayar girl i s ‘

married’while still very youngto a suitable bridegroom by the Hindu religious ceremony ofthe tying of a j ewel . ( It is probable that in former times the‘bridegroom’ceremoniously deflowered the virgin Onthe third day the newly-wedded pair are divorced by the H induceremony Of dividing a piece of cloth . Thereafter the divorcedbridegroomhas no rights over the person , the estate or the childrenOfhis.bride . At a later period the girl takes a lover . In form er times

,

amongst some of the Nayar,if not generally , a woman was per

mitted by custom to have two or more lovers at the same tim e .

AS the lover is not married to the woman he also has no legalclaims over her person or estate or over any children that maybe born of the union .

The Nayar system is the m ost thoroughgoing example of

perpetual m atrilineal succession . The lineage group m aintainsits continuity and its unity by not adm itting any outside personto any share in its estate . It retains possession of its own womenand c laims exclusive rights over the children born to them .

The status 1 of an individual at a given moment of time maybe defined as the totality of all his rights and duties as recognisedin the social usages ( laws and custom s) of the Society to which hebelongs . The rights constituting a status , and Similarly the duties ,are of many diff erent kinds

,some relating to ‘ the world at large’

,

to the society as a whole , others relating to some definite socialgroup of which the individual is a member (e .g . a man’s rightsover and duties towardshis own clan), or to some group of whichhe is not a member but to which he stands in a special relation (e .g . a man’s relation to his mother’s clan in a patrilinealclan system

,or to his father’s clan in a matri l ineal system ) , and

1 It is we l l a lways to rem em ber that sta tus , esta te , sta te, and the Fren chéta tare all diff eren t forms of on e an d the sam e word , the late Latin estatus .

38 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIMIT IVE SOCIETY

yet others concernhis special relations as an Individual withother individuals .Everywhere in human society the status of an individual is

very largely determined by b irth as the child Of a particular fatherand particular mother. Behind the question of succession , therefore

,lies the question of what elements of statu s , i.e . what rights

and duties,are transmitted to the child by the father on the one

hand and by the m other on the other . Every society has to establishits system of rules in this m atter and there is an immense diversityof system s to be found in surviving and historic communities . Thealmost universal ru le is that an individual derives some elementsof his status from or through his father, and others from or throughhis mother .It has to be rem embered that in all societies there is a general

difference between the status of a man and that of a woman,and in some societies these differences are very marked and veryimportant . Thus when a son ‘ succeeds’his father he may attaina status very Similar to that ofhis father

,but a daughter cannot do

so to the same extent . The reverse holds true in the instance ofa mother and her daughter on the one hand and her son on theother . Thus in African kingdoms where succession is matrilineal aking is succeeded by his younger brother and then byhis sister’sson . The heir therefore acquires

,through his m other, important

elements of the status Of his mother’s brother . The king’s Sister ,who holds a very important position

,is

,of course , succeeded

by her daughter .One solution of the problem of the determination of status

would be to let the sons derive from the father and daughtersfrom the m other . This principle is only known to b e adopted in afew tribes , about which we know very little , in East Africa and inNew Britain . AS a working arrangement ithas weighty objectionswhich cannot be gone into here .It is possible to have a system in which a child

,by birth

,

acquires the same rights , Of the same kind and to an equal degree ,over the persons to whom he is related through his father and thoseto whom he is related through his m other . An instance Of this isthat where a person has an equal expectation of testamentary orintestate succession to the estate of the brothers and Sisters ofhis father and those of his mother . A further instance is providedby the customs relating to wergild am ongst the Teutonic peoples .

PATRILINEAL AND MATRILINEAL SUCCESS ION 39

By birth a man acquired rights over a number of persons whoconstituted his sib.

1 This included all his relatives throughhis father and through his m other, counting either through malesor through females , within a certain range . This range variedin different Teutonic communities and perhaps in the same community at different times . Amongst som e of the Anglo-Saxons itextended as far as fifth cousins . If a man were killed all the membersof his Sib could claim a Share in the indemnity (wergild ) paid by thekiller

,proportionate to the degree of the relationship . Inversely ,

if a man killed another all m embers ofhis Sib were under obligationto contribute to the blood-money he had to pay , each contributingin the same proportion as he would receive if the man him selfhad been killed . The members of a man’s Sib had Specific rightsin rem in relation to him and Specific duties in personam towardshim .

The solution adopted by the great majority of human societiesof the problem relating to the determina tion of status has beenone by which a child derives certain rights and duties throughthe father and others Of a different kind through the mother . Wherethe rights and duties derived through the father preponderatein social importance over those derived through the m other wehave what it is usual to call a patrilineal system . Inversely amatril ineal system is one in which the rights and duties derivedthrough the mother preponderate over those derived through thefather .There are

,however

,some societies in which there is a fair ly

even balance between the elements of status derived through thefather and those through the mother . An example is providedby the OvaHerero of south—west Af rica . Through his mother achild derives m embership in an eanda

,a matrilineal clan ; throughhis father he becomes a member of an oruz o, a patrilinea l clan .

There is thus a double system of clans crossing one another .As both kinds of clans are exogam ous a man cannot belong to theeanda of his father or to the oraz o of his m other . Through hismother and as a member of her eanda hehas certain rights over ,and duties towards

,that group and particularlyhis m other’s

1 Professor Low ie an d som e American writers use the term ‘

sib’as equivalen t

to What ishere , in accordan ce withEurop ean usage , cal led a‘

clan’. It seem s

d es irab le to retain the word ‘

sib’for the bilatera l group of kindred to whichit

was origin al ly app lied .

40 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

brothers and his Sister’s children . Secular property is inheritedonly within the eanda so that a man inherits such property fromhis mother’s brother and transm its it to his Sister’s son . On theother hand through his father and as a m ember of his oraz o hehas rights and duties of other kinds in relation to that group .

Certain sacred cattle may only be inherited within the oraz o andare therefore transmitted from father to son .

There are to be found in Africa and in Oceania other instances of system s in which patrilineal and matrilineal successionare combined and more or less balanced against one another . Ina considerab le part of Africa this is rationalised by a conceptionthat every hum an being is compounded of two principles , one ,called the ‘

b lood’in Ashanti , derived from the m other, the other ,the ‘ Spirit’, derived from the father .Probably the most important factor in determining the na ture

of succession in the simpler societies is the need of definingrights in rem over persons . When a child is born there is thequestion

,

‘To whom does the child belong?’It may , of course, beregarded as belonging jointly to the two parents . Both have aninterest in it

,both have rights in personam and in rem in relation

to it . But there are other persons who have rights, inpersonam andin rem over the father (his parents , and brothers and Sisters) andothers who Sim ilarly have rights over the m other . In any societyin which kinship is of fundamental importance in the total socialstructure

,as it is in the maj ority of non-European soc ieties , it i s

essential for soc ial stability and continuity that the rights ofdifferent individuals over a given individual Should be defined insuch a way as to avoid as far as possib le conflicts Of rights . Wehave seenhow the ancient Teutonic system gives Similar , and insome instances e qual

,rights in rem to the father’s kin and to the

mother’s kin of a given individual SO that if he is killed all membersOfhis Sib ( i.e .his kindred on b oth sides) are entitled to compen

sation . Let us now consider examples Of the solution of this problem in m atrilineal and patrilineal system s .

For a matrilineal system we may return to the Nayar as

affording an extreme , and therefore crucial instance . In thatsystem the taravad

, or j oint-fam ily, maintains intact and absoluteits rights in rem over all its members . Marriage norm ally gives thehusband certain rights in rem over his wife and over the children .

The Nayars may be said either to have eliminated marriage or to

PATR IL INEAL AND MATR ILINEAL SUCCESS ION 4 1

have eliminated this aspect of m arriage . It i s true that the unionof a Nayar woman and her sambandham lover is often a life-longun ion of great affection and that the lover has a great attachmentto the children . But legally hehas no rights overhis ‘wife’

,if

we call her such , or over the chi ldren . In turn the group has norights in rem overhim for these remain with his own taravad .

The taravad as a corporation retains undivided and undisputedpossession of its own estate .

AS an instance of a definitely patrilineal solution of the problemof the distribution of rights in rem we may take the Zulu-Kaffir

tribes Of South Africa . In these tribes m arriage requires thepayment of an indemn ity in the form of a number of cattle

,

called the Ikas i, the act of transfer of these being known asuku-lobola . An unmarried girl belongs to her father

,or to her

guardian (father’s brother or brother) if her father be dead , and

to her agnatic kindred . They have over her certain rights in

personam and in rem. An offence committed against her,as rape

,

seduction , maiming or hom icide , is an injury to her kin and theyhave the right to be indemnified . A father may bring before thechief an action for compensation for an offence committed againsthis daughter . By the act of marriage the father and the agnatickindred surrender a great part of these rights over the daughterto her husband and tohis agnatic kindred . The payment of cattleis an indemn ification for this surrender of rights . For thesepeople the great value of a woman is as the m other of children .

(For this reason there is no more unhappy , unwanted personamong them than a barren woman .) The act of lobola is thereforeprimarily a procedure whereby those paying the cattle acquireund ivided and indisputable rights over all children born to thewoman. This is readily demonstrated by an analysis that wouldbe out of place here . The natives state the princ ip le in two ways :‘Cattle beget children’;

‘The children are where the cattle are not.

’

In case of divorce either the wife and her children return to herfather and any cattle paid are returned

,or if (as is usual) the husband

retains the children he must abandon claim to the cattle hehaspaid or to som e portion thereof. On the death of a wife who hasborne children (a barren wife m ay be repudiated and the repaym ent of the cattle or the substitution of a sister may be claimed)if all the cattle have been paid

,the children remain with the father

and the m other’s kin have no rights in rem over them . The system

here outlined is a simple legal procedure for giving the father andhis agnatic kindred indisputable and undivided rights in rem

over his children .

em of patrilineal or m atrilineal successionund the system of marriage . In an extreme

matrilineal society a man has no rights in rem over his children,though he does usually have certain rights in personam. Therights remain with the m other and her relatives . The result is toemphasise and maintain a close bond between brother and Sisterat the expense of the bond between husband and wife . Consequently the rights of the husband over his wife are limited .

In an extrem e patrilineal society we have exactly the Opposite .

Rights in rem over the children are exclusively exercised by thefather and his relatives . The bond between husband and wife isstrengthened at the expense of the bond between brother and

his wife are considerab le ;

comparatively rare,and

extreme matrilineal systems perhaps even rarer . Generally thereis som e modification by which

,while the kindred on the one side

have a preponderant right,some rights are recognised on the other

side also . Thus in the Cherokee tribe of North American Indians,

whi le a man belonged to his mother’s clan, so that if he werekilled they and they alone would demand satisfaction, yet he stoodin a very Special relation tohis father and to his father’s clan.

Little has been said so far about the inheritance of property .

This is because in the Simpler societies the transmi ssion of propertyis generally dependent upon the transmission of status . Thusamongst the Nayar the important property (land, houses , etc .) i sthe undivided or j oint possession of a corporation constituted by amatrilineal lineage . Am ongst the Zulu-Kaffir tribes the sons succeed to a Share of the father’s estate to the exclusion of daughtersand their descendants . In general , though there are a few exceptions , it may be said that the transmission of property follows thesam e line as does the transmission of status .With regard to the institutions of patrilineal and matrilineal

succession the question is frequently asked as to what is theirorigin . The term ‘ Origin’i s ambiguous . In one sense we may talkof the ‘historical origin’. The historical origin of the Nayar system

,

or that of the Zulu-Kaffirs, or of any other system ,

is a series of

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44. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM ITIVE SOCIETY

that conflicts of rights can be resolved without destroying thestructure . It is this need that is met by the establishm ent ofsystems of justice and legal institutions .

Every system of rights necessarily involves the existence ofcomm on, j oint or divided rights over the sam e person or thing .

The father and the m other of a child both have rights in personamover their child . In an orderly family it is necessary that there shouldbe no unresolved or unresolvable conflict between these rights .The sam e thing is true throughout a society as a whole in all thevarious relations into which persons are brought . When two

persons A and B have rights over something Z or rights in rem

over som e person Z ,there are three ways of adjusting these rights

so as to avoid unresolvable conflicts . One is the mode of rights incommon A and B have Sim ilar and equal rights over Z and theseare such that the rights of A will not conflict with those of B .

An instance is to be found in the native tribes Of South Africa inwhich

,as the native saying is ,

‘grass and water are common’.Any member of a tribe has the right to graze his cattle Or waterthem

,or take water for his own use , in any part of the territory

over which the tribe (represented by its chief) exercises dominion .

A second is the mode of joint rights in which A and B (or anynumber of persons) exercise jointly certain rights over Z . Theestablishm ent of such joint rights immediately establishes what i shere called a corporation . An infringement of the rights normallycalls for a j oint action on the part of the corporation , which may,of course , be carried out by its Official representatives . A SouthAfrican tribehas joint possession of its territory , the possession(the estate) being vested in the chief. An infringement of theserights may be adjusted by the chief or may lead to the action ofwar, in which , under the chief, the whole tribe seeks to maintainits rights . The third mode is that of rights in division . Here Ahascertain definite rights over Z and B has certain other definiterights ; the respective rights may be defined either by custom or bya specific contract , or agreement . An example is the relation ofowner and tenant of a leased land or building .

So far as rights over persons go the exercise of rights incommon is necessarily very lim ited . In an unfam iliar region onemay ask direction from any person one meets and expect to receivewhatever inform ation that person can give . In English law theking’s Officers can demand from any passer-by

‘ in the king’s name’

PATR ILINEAL AND MATRILINEAL SUCCESS ION 45 “

assistance in the arrest of a malefactor . 1 Rights over personsin personam are usually exercised either jointly or in division .

Rights over persons in rem can Obviously never b e exercisedin common . Wehave seen , from the examp le of the Teutoniccustoms relating to wergild, that they can b e held in divisi on . Butsuch a thing is rare and for the reason that it requires a complicated definition of the respective shares of various kindred intheir interest in their kinsmen . Onehas only to glance at someof the early laws of Norway and Sweden relating to the division of

the wergild between agnatic and cognatic kin of different degreesto realise with what difliculties such a system is conf ronted in itsworking .

It results from this that rights in rem over ‘ a person mustas a general rule either be exclusively personal

,i.e . confined to a

single individual (a condition to which the rights of an ownerover a slave may approximate in som e instances) or must bej oint . The rights of a Roman father over his children were nearlyexclusive but even these

,at certain periods ofhistory certainly,

were subj ect to the rights,exercised j ointly

, of the gens or of thestate ; even the potestas of a paterfamilias was not absolute . Thu swe may say that any society that recognises rights in rem overpersons (and all known societies do so to some extent) willnormally

,and with only the rarest exceptions

,make some provision

for'

the joint exercise of such rights . This implies the existenceof corporations of some kind

,Since a corporation is here defined as

a collection of persons who jointly exercise some right or rights .A corporation can on ly form itself on the basis of a common

interest . In the simplest societies the easiest , perhaps almost theonly

,ways in which common interests can be created are on

the basis of locality ,i.e . residence in the same local community

or neighbourhood , or kinship . Corporations therefore tend to beestablished either on the one basis or the other oron both combined

(the Kariera horde is an example of the latter) or else a doublesystem of local groups and kinship groups is form ed .

We must here appea l to another sociological law ,the necessity v

not merely for stability , definiteness and consistency in the socialstructure

,but also for continuity . To provide continuity of social

1 The latter in stan ce ,however, might be in terpreted as the exercise of a

joint right, sin ce the king is the represen tative of the nation which, as a cor

poration ,has join t rights over the p ersons Of its citiz en s .

46 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT I VE SOCIETY

structure is essentially a function of corporations . Thus a modernnationhas its continuity as a corporation exercising joint rightsover its territory and over the persons of its citizens .We can imagine as a possibility an incorporated local com

munity which was completely endogamous and which wouldtherefore not have to face the issue of choosing between matrilinealand patrilineal succession

,Since any child born in the community

would have both its parents there. But the moment there areintermarriages between two corporate local groups the question oflineal succession does arise . In such a Situation it is possible thatno customary rule may be established, each instance being ad

justed by agreement of the persons most nearly concerned . It seemsthat this was the case of the hordes or local groups of the AndamanIslanders . The result is to produce a loose and indefinite structure .If any definite rule does arise it must usually take the form of one

either of matrilineal or of patrilineal succession.

If any society establishes a system Of corporations on the basisof kinship— clans

,j oint-families

,incorporated lineages— it must

necessarily adopt a system of unil ineal reckoning of succession .

It would , of course , be theoretically possible to establish some sortof rule whereby

,when the parents belong to different groups

,in

certain definite circumstances the children belong to the father’sgroup and in others to the mother’s . This would produce complicated conditions , and in general any complicated definition Ofrights i s likely to be functionally ineflicient as compared with aSimpler one .Thus the existence of unilineal (patrilineal or matrilineal)

succession in the great maj ority of human societies can be tracedto its sociological ‘cause’or

‘origin’ in certain fundamentalsocial necessities . Chief amongst them

,I have suggested

,is the

need of defining , with sufficient precision to avoid unresolvableconflicts , the rights in rem over persons . The need Of precisedefinition of rights in personam and of rights over things wouldseem to be secondary but still important factors .There are many facts whichmight be adduced to support this

hypothesis . I will mention only one kind . In societies organ isedon the basis of clans one of the most important activities Of theclan is to exact vengeance or indemnification when a clansman iskilled . The list of known instances of this would fill many pages .The clan as a corporation has rights in rem over all its clansmen .

PATRILINEAL AND MATRILINEAL SUCCESS ION 47

If one is killed the clan is injured and ithas the right , and itsmembers are under an obligation, to proceed to some actiontowards receiving satisfaction , either through vengeance or byreceiving an indemnity.

Thus the cause of the decay of the clan (the genos or gens)in ancient Greece and Rome was the trans fer of its rights in rem

(and necessarily therefore of some of its rights in personam ) tothe city or state , the nature of these rights being ,

inevitablyconsiderab ly modified in the process of transference . But thedecay Of the gens in Rome still left the patriarchal family as acorporation (as Maine long ago pointed out) the basis of which ,however, was not merely the exercise of rights in rem by the paterfamilias overhis chi ldren , but also the exercise of j oint rightsover property and the maintenance of a religiou s cu lt Of ancestor

logical laws , i.e . the necessary conditions of exi stence of a society , that have here been suggested as underlying the ,

cu stoms of unilineal (patrilineal or matri lineal) successi on are :

I . The need for a formulation of rights over persons andthings sufliciently precise in their general recogniti on asto avoid as far as possib le unresolved conflicts .

2 . The need for continuity of the social structure as a systemof relations between persons , such relations being definable in terms of rights and duti

eflBy Am erican ethnologists who object to the method of

explanation adopted in the preceding argument it is said that anysociological laws tha t can be formulated must necessarily betruisms . The laws formulated above

,if they be true

,as I believe

,

even if not adequately expressed , may be truisms . But even so

they would seem to need to be brought to the attention of at leastsome ethnologists . A recent writer on the subject of matrilinealand patrilineal succession1 m akes the following statements‘Unilateral ins titutions are in themselves anomalous and artificial .Matrilineal ones are doubly so.

’‘Unilateral institutions , whereverfound, represent deviations from the expectable , abnormalitiesin the social structure .’‘Unilateral reckoning contradicts theduality of parenthood and results in an unnatural stressing of one

1 Ronald L . O lson ,

‘Clan and Moiety in NorthAm erica’, University of

California Publications , Vol. 3 3 , pp . 409 , 4 1 1 .

48 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

side of the fam i ly to the exclusion of the other .’ On the basis ofthese assertions he seem s to conclude that unilineal determinationof status mu st have had a single origin in som e one aberrant peopleand to have spread from them , by a process of

‘diffusion’, to vastnumbers of peoples in Europe , Asia , Africa , Australia , Oceaniaand America . (One wonders , of course , why so many societiesof so m any different types should have accepted and retainedsuch ‘anomalous’

,

‘abnormal’and ‘unnatural’institutions .)I hope that the argument of this paper has Shown , on the

contrary,that unilineal institutions in some form

,are almost , if

not entirely,a necessity in any ordered social system . What is

therefore unusual or rare (we need not say abnormal or anom alousand still less unnatural) is the discovery of a people such as theTeutonic peoples of Europe (apparently alone am ongst IndoEuropean Speaking peoples) maintaining for som e period , unti lthe coming of feudalism and Rom an law

,a system in which there

is considerable , if not quite complete , avoidance of the unilinealprincip le , in which a person derives similar and equal rightsthrough the father and through the m other . 1

It might well be expected that such a paper as this would dealwith the question of what general factors determ ine the selectionby some people of the matrilineal and by others of the patrilinealprinciple in determ ining status or succession . My Opinion is thatour knowledge and understanding are not sufficient to perm it u sto deal with this problem in any satisfactory manner .

1 There are system s of bilateral kin ship withsucces sion throughbothmalesan d fem ales in som e p arts of In don esia , e .g . in the Ifugao of the Philipp in eIs lan d s . The d iscussion of these wou ld be comp lex an d require space that isnot availab le .

C H A P T E R I I I

THE STUDY OF K INSHIP SYSTEM S 1

OR seventy-five years the subj ect of kinship has occupieda Special and important position in social anthropology .

I propose in this address to consider the m ethods that havebeen and are being used in that branch of our studies and thekinds of results may reasonably expect to arrive at bythose nsider and compare two methods whichI Shal conj ecturalhi story and that of structural

was first app lied to som e social institutions by

'

French and British (mostly Scots) writers of theeighteenth of this m ethod that Dugald Stewartwrote in 1795 pecies of philosophica l investigation

,

which has no in our language,I Shall take

the liberty of giving the title of Theoretical or ConjecturalHistory ;an expression which coincides pretty nearly in its m eaning withthat of Natural History ,

as employed by Mr . Hume (seehisNatura lHistory of Religion) , and with what some French writershave called Histoire Raisonne

’e.

’I Shall accept Dugald Stewart’ssuggestion and Shall use the name ‘ conj ecturalhistOFy’TjThe m ethod of conjectural history is used in a nfimber of

different ways . One i s to attempt to base on general considerations ,on what Dugald Stewart calls ‘known principles of hum anconj ectures as to first beginnings- of political society (Hobbes) ,of language (Adam Sm ith) , of religion (Tylor) , of the family

(Westermarck) , and so on . Sometimes an attempt is m ade to dealwith the whole course of developm ent of human society, as inthe works of Morgan

,Father Schm idt and Elliot Smith . Some

tim es we are offered a conjectural history of the developmentof a particu lar institution

,as in Robertson Sm ith’s treatm ent of

sacrifice . The Special form of the method with which we Shallbe concerned in what follows is the attempt to explain a particularfeature of one or more social system s by a hypothesis as to howit came into existence .

1 Presiden tia l Address to the Royal Anthropological Institute , 1 94 1 .

Reprin ted from the journal of the Roya l An thropolog ical Ins titute.

49

50 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT I ON IN PRIM IT IVE SOC IETY

An early example of the m ethod of conj ectu ral history appliedto kinship is to be found in the essay on Primitive Marriage

published by John .F . M ‘

Lennan in 1 865 . You will rememberthe two principal theses put forward in that book : the origin ofthe custom of exogamy from marriage by cap ture , and the proposition that ‘ the most ancient system in which the idea of bloodrelationship was embodied was a system of kinship throughfemales on ly’. Six years later there appeared The Systems ofConsanguinity and Afi

'inity of Lewis Morgan, a monument ofscholarly

,patient research in the collection of data , to be followed

in 1 877 by his Ancient Society , in which he offered a conj ecturaloutline history of the whole course of social development . Theseworks ofM ‘

Lennan and Morgan were followed by a considerablemass of literature , which has continued to be produced down tothe present day , in which the method of conj ecturalhistory hasbeen applied in different forms to variou s features of kinship

think you know,I regard the pursuit of this method as one

bief obstacles to the development of a scientific theory ofhuman society . But my position has often been misunderstood.

My objection to conj ectural history is not that it ishi storical ,but that it is conj ectural . History shows ushow certain events orchanges in the past have led to certain other events or conditions ,and thus reveals human life in a particular region of the world as achain of conn ected happenings . But it can do this only when thereis di rect evidence for both the preceding and succeeding eventsor conditions and also some actual evidence of their interconnection.

In conjectural history we have direct knowledge about a state ofaffairs existing at a certain time and place

,without any adequate

knowledge of the preceding conditions and events,about which

we are therefore reduced to making conjectures . To establish anyprobability for such conjectures we should need to have a knowledge of laws of social development which we notpossess and to which I do not think weMy own study of kinship began in

I washis first and at that timehis only student in social anthropology , having for three years previously studied p sychology underhim . I owe a great deal to that contact with Rivers

,and more rather

than less because from the outset it appeared that we disagreedon the subject of method . For Rivers followed the method of

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52 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

son or daughter and brother or sister . When a man m arries andhas children he now belongs to a second elementary family

,in

which he is husband and father . This interlocking of elementaryfam ilies creates a network of what I Shall call

,for lack of any better

term,genealogical relations

,spreading out indefinitely .

The three relationships that exist within the elementaryfamily constitute what I call the first order . Relationshipsof the second order are those which depend on the connectionof two elementary families through a common member , and aresuch as father’s father , mother

’s brother, wife

’s Sister,and so on .

In the third order are such as father’s brother’s son and mother’sbrother’s wife . Thus we can trace , if we have genealogical information , relationships of the fourth, fifth or nthorder . In anygiven society a certain number of these relationships are recognised for social purposes , i.e . they have attached to them certainrights and duties , or certain distinctive modes of behaviour . It isthe relations that are recognised in this way that constitute whatI am calling a kinship system

,or

,in full

,a system of kinship and

affinity .

A most important character of a kinship system is its range.In a narrow range system

,such as the English system of the

present day,only a limited number of re latives are recognised

as such in any way that entails any Special behaviour or anySpecific rights and duties . In ancient times in England the rangewas wider

,Since a fifth cousin had a claim to a share of the wergild

when a man was killed . In system s of very wide range,such as are

found in some non-European societies,a man may recognise

many hundreds of relatives , towards each of whomhis behaviouri s qualified by the existence of the relationship .

It must b e noted also that in some societies p ersons are regarded as being connected by relationships of the same kind lalthough no actual genealogical tie is known . Thus the members s

of a clan are regarded as being kinsmen, although for som e of themit may not be p ossib le to Show their descent from a commonancestor . It is this that distinguishes what will hereclan from a lineage .Thus a kinship system , as I am using the term ,

or a systemof kinship and aflinity if you prefer so to call it , is in the first p lacea system of dyadic relations between person and person in acommunity,

\

the behaviour of any two pers ons in any of these

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 5 3

relations being regulated in som e way, and to a greater or lessextent

,by social usage .

A kinship system also includes the existence of definite social\ _

groups . The first of these is the domestic family, which is a groupof persons who at a particular tim e are living together in one

dwelling,or collection of dwellings , with some sort of economic

arrangement that we may call j oint housekeeping . There are manyvarieties of the domestic family, varying in their form ,

their size,

and the manner of their common life . A domestic family mayconsist of a Single elementary family

,or it may be a group in

cluding a hundred or more persons , such as the z adruga of theSouthern Slavs or the taravad of the Nayar . Important in som esocieties is what may be called a local cluster of domestic families .In many kinship system s unilinear groups of kindred— lineagegroups

,clans and moieties— play an important part .

By a kinship system ,then

,I m ean a network of social relations

of théTind just defined , which thus constitutes part of that totalnetwork of social relations that I call social structure . The rights~

z

-

irf

fd'

d’

uties of relatives to one another and the social usages thatthey observe in their socia l contacts

,since it is by these that the

relations are described , are part of the system . I regard ancestorworship

,where it exists

,as in a real sense part of the kinship

system,constituted as it is by the relations of living persons to their

deceased kindred,and affecting as it does the relations of l iving

persons to one another . The term s used in a society in addressingor referring to relatives are a part of the system , and so are theideas that the peop le themselves have about kinship .

You will perceive that by using the word ‘ System’I have m adean assumption, an important and far-reaching assumption ; forthat word implies t to is a complexunity , an organised S is that betweenthe various features there is acomplex relation of interdependence . The formulation of thisworking hypothesis leads imm ediately to the m ethod of sociological analysis , by which we seek to discover \the nature ofkinship systems as systems , if they be really such? ) For this purpose We need to make a system atic comparison of a sufficientnumber of sufficiently diverse systems .)We must compare them ,

not in reference to single,superficial

,and therefore imm ediately

observable characters , but as wholes , as systems , and in reference ,

54. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

therefore,to general characters which are only discovered in the

process of comparisonfiOur purpose is to arrive at valid abstraetions or general ideas in terms of which the phenomena can bedescribed and classified .)I propose to illustrafte the two methods , that of conj ectural

history and that of system,analysis

,by means of a particular

example,and for this purpose I select a peculiar feature of the

kinship terminology of a number of scattered tribes . WhenMorganmade his study of the term inology of kinship in North Americantribes

,he noted certain p eculiarities in the terms for cousins .

In the Choctaw tribe he found that a man callshis father’s sister’sson by the same term of relationship that he applies to his ownfather and his father’s brother. We may say that the father’sSister’s son is thus treated in the terminology as though he werea younger brother of the father . Reciprocally a man callshism other’s brother’s son by the term for ‘ Son’. Consistently withthis he applies one term of relationship to his father’s Sisterand her daughter, and Speaks of his mother

’s brother’s daughteras a ‘daughter’. In the Omaha trib e, on the other hand , Morganfound that a man calls his mother’s brother’s son

‘uncle’,i.e .

mother’s brother,and calls his mother’s brother’s daughter

‘mother’, so that reciprocally he Speaks of his father’s Sister’s son

by the term that he uses for his sister’s son,and a woman uses

a Single term forher own son , her sister’s son and her father’sSister’s son . Figs . 1 and 2 will help to make these term inologiesclear .Terminologies Similar to the Omaha are found in a number of

regions : ( 1 ) in the Siouan tribes related to the Omaha , such asthe Osage , Winnebago , etc . ; (2) in certain Algonquian tribes, ofwhich we may take the Fox Indians as an example ; (3 ) in anarea of California which includes the M iwok ; (4) in some tribes ofEast Af rica , both Bantu and non-Bantu , including the Nandi andthe BaThonga ; (5 ) amongs t the Lhota Nagas of Assam ; and(6) in some New Guinea tribes . Terminologies Similar to theChoctaw are found : ( 1 ) in other south-eastern tribes of the UnitedStates , including the Cherokee ; (2) in the Crow and Hidatsatribes of the Plains area ; (3) amongst the Hopi and some otherPueblo Indians ; (4) in the Tlingit and Haida of the north-westcoast of Am erica ; 5) in the Banks Islands in Melanesia ; and (6)in one Twi-Speaking community of West Africa .

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 5 5

There are some who would regard this kind of terminologyas ‘contrary to common sense’

,but that means no more than that

it is not in accordance with our modern European ideas of kinshipand its terminology . It ought to be easy for any anthropo logist torecognise that what is common sense in one society may be the

AB

FIG . I— CHOCTAW C “W“ '

1

FIG. 2— 0MAHA

l

l

opposite of common sense in another . The Choctaw and Omahaterminologies do call for some explanation ; but so does theEnglish terminology , in which we use the word

‘cousin’for allchildren of both brothers and sisters of both m other and fathera procedure which would probably seem to some non-Europeansto be contrary not only to common sense but also tom orals . WhatI wish to attempt

,therefore

,is to Show you that the Choctaw

and Omaha term inologies are just as reasonable and fitting in the

56 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT I ON IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

social systems in which they occur as our own term inology isin our own soc ia l system .

I would point out that the Choctaw system and the Omahasystem exhibit a Single structural principle applied in differentways

,in what we may perhaps call opposite directions . We Shall

therefore consider them together,as varieties of a Single species .

Attempts have been made to explain these terminologies bythe m ethod of conj ectural history . The first was that of Kohler in1 897 , in his essay

‘Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe’. Kohler set out todefend Morgan’s theory of group-marriage , and used the Choctawand Omaha system s for his argument . He explained the Choctawterminology as the resu lt of marriage with the mother’s brother’swife

,and the Omaha system as the result of a custom of marriage

with the wife’s brother’s daughter . Kohler’s essay was reviewedby Durkheim ( 1 898) in what was an important , if brief, con

tribution to the theory of kinship . He rej ected Kohler’s hypotheses,

and pointed out the connection of the Choctaw and Omaha systemswith matrilineal and patrilineal descent respectively .

The subject was considered again by Rivers in reference to theBanks Islands

,and

,without bringing in

,as Kohler had done

,

the question of group—marriage,he explained the Banks Islands

terminology as resulting from a custom of marriage with themother’s brother’s widow. Gifford having found thecharacteristic feature of the Omaha system in the M iwok of

California,followed the lead of Kohler and Rivers , and explained

it as the result of the custom of marriage with the wife’s brother’sdaughter . About the sam e tim e

,and independently

,Mrs . Seligman

( 19 17) offered the same explanation of the Omaha feature as itoccurs in the Nandi and other tribes of Africa .

Let me summarise the argum ent with reference to the Omahatype . The hypothesis is that in certain societies

,m ostly having

a definite patrilineal organisation , a custom was for some reasonadopted of perm itting a man tomarry his wife’s brother’s daughter .

Referring to Fig . 3 , this m eans that D would be allowed tomarry f. When such a m arriage occurred

,then for G and h, f,

who is their m other’s b rother’s daughter,would becom e their

step-m other,and E

,their mother’s b rother’s son ,

would b ecom ethe brother of their step-m other . The hypothesi s then assumesthat the kinship term inology was so modified as to anticipate thisform of marriage wherever it might occur . G and h will call f,

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEM S 57

their mother’s brother’s daughter and therefore their possib lefuture step-mother

,

‘mother’, and her brother E they will call‘

m other’s brother’. Reciprocally f will call G ‘

Son’and E will callhim ‘ Sister’s son’. There is an exactly parallel argum ent for the

Choctaw system . A custom arises by which a man may occasionallymarry the widow ofhis mother’s brother . In the figure , G wouldmarry b , the wife of his mother

’s brother A . Thus E and f wouldbecom e his step-children . If this marriage is anticipated in theterminology , then E and f will call G

‘father’and h ‘father’ssister’.Let us note that in the Om aha tribe and in some others having

a simi lar term inology it is regarded as p ermissib le for a man tomarry his wife’s brother’s daughter . Marriage with the mother’sbrother’sWidow does not seem to occur regularly with the Choctaw

A = O

FIG . 3

N0te —A and c are brother an d sis ter

terminology,and does certainly occur without it , even in tribes

with an Omaha term inology such as the BaThonga .

The basis of what we may call the Kohler hypothesis is theobvious fact tha t in each of the two varieties the terminologyand the Special form of marriage are consistent ; the two thingsfit together in what may be called a logical way . Thi s

,I think

,

anyone can see by inspection of the data . But the hypothesis goesfar beyond this . It supposes that there is som e sort of causalconnection such that the marriage custom can be said to havecaused

,produced

,or resulted in

,the Special terminology . No

evidence is adduced that this is actually the way in which thingshappened . The arg ument is entirely a priori. It is the essentia lweakness of conjectural history that its hypotheses cannot beverified . Thus this hypothesis cannot be considered as anythingmore than a Speculation or conjecture as tohow things m ighthave happened .

58 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM ITIVE SOCIETY

Now it would be equally plausible to suggest that the Specialform of marriage is the result of the term inology . If, as in theterm inology of the Omaha type , I treat my wife

’s brother’sdaughter as being the younger sister of my wife

,and

,by the

custom of the sororate , it is considered proper for me to marry mywife’s younger Sister

,then I might well be permitted to marry the

woman who , in the terminological system , is treated as such ,namely her brother’s daughter. This hypothesis is , of course ,equally lacking in proof. If we adopt the Kohler hypothesis theterminology is conceived to be in some sense explained

,but there

is no explanation of the marriage custom . By the alternativehypothesis the marriage custom is explained

,but the terminology

is not . I do not see how there can be any ground for a choiceof one of these two hypotheses in preference to the other exceptpurely personal predilection .

However,while we could conceive of the marriage custom

as being the immediate result of the terminology in a societywhich already has sororal p olygyny , the terminology cannot bethe immediate result of the marriage custom without the concom itant action of some other undetermined factor. We have examples of societies in which a man sometim es marries the widow ofhis m other’s brother, but only uses the term inology which thism arriage makes appropriate after the marriage has taken p lace .

Although we have no recorded instance of this procedure inmarriage with the wife’s brother’s daughter it i s at least conceivablethat it might occur . What is lacking in the hypothesis we areexamining is some reason why the whole terminology Should beadjusted so as to fit a particu lar form of marriage which onlyoccasionally occurs .Let us now leave the hypothesis and examine the structural

principles of those kinship systems in which this term inologyoccurs

,whether in the Choctaw or the Omaha form . It is necessary ,

however,to say something on the subject of kinship term inologies ,

about which there has been a great deal of controversy. Morgan’sfirst interest in the subject was as an ethnologist

, i.e. one seekingto discover the historical relations of the peoples of the earth . Hethought that by collecting a sufficient sample of term inologiesand comparing them he could reveal the historica l relation of theAmerican Indians (the Ganowanian peoples as he called them )to the peoples of Asia . In the course of his work , however, he

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60 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

between which can be estab lished only through evidence thatis subj ectively selected . On wider knowledge and freedom frommotive it is becom ing increasingly apparent that causal explanationsof detached anthropological phenom ena can be but rarely foundin other detached phenom ena .

’With this statem ent I am inagreem ent .But b oth Kroeber and Rivers seemed to agree that causal

explanations are necessary for the constitution of what Kroebercalls ‘ true science’. For Rivers anthropology is a true sciencebecause

, or to the extent that , it can Show causal connections ;for Kroeber it is not a true science . Here I disagree with bothKroeber and Rivers

,holding that a pure

(whether physical , biological or social) is not concerned withcausal relations in this sense . The concept of cause and effectbelongs properly to applied science , to practical life and

'

itS :

arts and techniques and to history .

This brings us to the crux of the Rivers-Kroeber debate .

Rivers held that the characteristics of a kinship nomenclatureare determ ined by socia l or sociological factors , that particularfeatures of terminology result from particu lar features of socialorganisation . Against this Kroeber held that the f eatures of asystem of term inology ‘are determ ined primarily by language

’

and ‘

reflect p sychology not sociology’. ‘Terms of relationship’,

he wrote,

‘are determined primarily by linguistic factors andare only occasionally

,and then indirectly

,affected by social

circum stances .’But in his later paper Kroeber explains thatwhat he calls p sychological factors ‘are social or culturalphenomena as thoroughly and completely as institutions , beliefsor industries are social phenom ena’. His thesis is therefore concerned with a distinction b etween two kinds of social phenomena .

One of these he calls institutional,defined as ‘practices connected

with marriage , descent , personal relations , and the like’. These

are what he called inhis first paper ‘ social factors’. The otherkind he speaks of as the ‘psyche’of a culture

,

‘ that is,the ways of

thinking and feeling characteristic of the culture’. These constitutewhat he calls the psychological factors .Thus Kroeber’s thesis

,on its positive side

,is that Sim ilarities

and differences of kinship nom enclature are to be interpreted orunderstood by reference to sim ilarities and differences in thegenera l ‘

m anner of thought’. On its negative Side , and it is with

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS OI

this that we are concerned , Kroeber’s thesis i s that there is no

regular close connection between similarities and differencesof kinship nom enclature and Sim ilarities and differences of‘ institutions’

,i.e . practices connected with m arriage , descent and

personal relations . He admits , i n 1 9 17 , the existence of‘undoubted

correspondence of terminology and social practice in c ertainparts of Australia and Oceania’, but denies that such are to befound in California . It may be pointed out that in Australia andOceania they have been deliberately looked for

,in California they

have not. I t may well b e that in the remnants of Californian

ertain sense In agreem enthold that all over the world there are impor

tant correspondences b etween kinship nom enclature and socialpractices . Such correspondences are not to be simply assumed ;they must b e demonstrated by field work a nd comparativeanalysisfJ

But their absence may not be assumed either ; andKroeber’s arguments from their absence in Californiaremain , I think , entirely unconvin

e of a people representstheir general manner of thought as it i s app lied to kinship . Butthe institutions of a people also represent their general manner ofthought about kinship and marriage . Are we to suppose that inCalifornian tribes the way of thinking about kinship as it appearson the one hand in the terminology and on the other hand insocial customs are not merely different but are not connected ?

This seem s to be in effect what Kroeber is proposing .

Kroeberpointed out in 19 17 that his original paper represented‘

a genuine attempt to understand kins hip systems as kinshipBut by ‘ kinship system’Kroeber means only a system

of Kroeber is an ethnologist , not asocial anthropologist . His chief, if not his sole , interest in thesubj ect is in the possib il ity of discovering and defining thehistorical relations of peoples by comparison of their systems ofnomenclature .My own conception is that the nomenclature of kinship is

an intrinsic part of a kinship system ,just as it i s also , of course ,

an intrinsic part of a language. The relations between the nomenclature and the rest of the system are relations within an orderedwhole . My concern, both in field work in various parts of the world

62 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT I ON IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

and in comparative studies,has been to discover the nature of

these relations .In the actual study of a kinship system the nom enclature i s

of the utmost importance . It affords the best possible approachto the investigation and analysis of the kinship system as a whole .

This,of course

,it could not do if there were no real relations of

interdependence between the terminology and the rest of thesystem . That there are such relations I can aflirm from my ownfield work in more than one region . It will be borne out, I believe ,by any anthropologist who has made a thorough field studyof a kinship system .

1

I have dealt with the controversy between Kroeber andRivers because

,as both the controversialists point out, the real

issue is not simply one concerning kinship terms , but is a veryimportant question of the general method of anthropologicalstudies . It seemed to me that I could best make clear my ownposition by Showing you how it differs from that of Rivers onthe one Side and that of Kroeber on the other .Kinship systems are made and re-made by man, in the same

sense that languages are made and re-made , which does not meanthat they are normally constructed or changed by a p rocess ofdeliberation and under control of conscious purpose . A languagehas to work

,i.e . it has to provide a more or less adequate in

strument for communication,and in order that it may work it

has to conform to certain general necessary conditions . A morphological comparison of languages Shows us the different ways inwhich these conditions have been complied with by using differentmorphological princip les such as inflection , agglutination , wordorder , internal modification or the use of tone or stress . A kinship)system also has to work if it is to exist or persi st . Ithas to providean orderly and workable system of social relations defined by socialusage . A comparison of different systems Shows us how workablekinship systems have been created by utilising certain structuralprincip les and certain mechanisms .One common feature of kinship systems is the recognition

of certain categories or kinds into which the various relatives of a1 My positionhas been misunderstood and con sequen tly m isrepresen ted

by D r. Op ler ( 1 9 376) inhis pap er on Apache Data con cern in g the Re lation of

Kin ship Term inology to Social C lassification’; but the first two p aragraphsof another of D r. Op ler

’s p ap ers ( 1 937a) on

‘Chiricahua Ap ache Social Organ isation

’, state what was arthat timehis , an d is also my , poin t of view .

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 63

single person can be grouped . The actual social relation between aperson and his relative

,as defined by rights and duties or socially

approved attitudes and modes of behaviour , is then to a greateror less extent fixed by the category to which the relative belongs .The nom enclature of kinship is commonly used as a means ofestablishing and recognising these categories . A Single term maybe used to refer to a category of relatives and different categorieswill b e distinguished by different terms .Let us consider a simple examp le from our own system .

We do what is rather unusual in the general run of kinshipsystem s : we regard the father’s brother and the m other’s brotheras relatives of the sam e kind of category . We apply a single termoriginally denoting the mother’s brother (from the Latin avun

culus) to both of them . The legal relationship in English law,

except for entailed estates and titles of nobility, is the same for anephew and either of his uncles ; for example , the nephew has thesame rights of inheritance in case of intestacy over the estate ofeither . In what may be called the socially standardised behaviourof England it is not possib le to note any regular distinction madebetween the maternal and the paternal uncle . Reciprocally therelation of a man tohis different kinds of nephews is in general thesame . By extension , no Significant difference is made betweenthe son of one’s moth n of one’s father’sbrother .

take another Europeansystem the father’s brothers constitute one category and themother S brothers another . These relatives are distinguished bydifferent term s, and so are their respective wives

,and the social

relations in which a man stands to his two kinds of uncles Showmarked differences .There is nothing ‘natural’about the English attitude towards

uncles . Indeed many peoples in many parts of the world wouldregard this failure to distinguish between relatives on the father’sSide and those on the mother’s Side as unn atural and even improper . But the terminology is consistent with our whole kinshipsystem .

The kinship systems with which we shall be concerned hereall have certain forms of what Morgan called the ‘

classificatory’

terminology . What Morgan meant by this term is quite clear fromhis writings , but his definition is often ignored , perhaps because

64 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCI ETY

people do notwhen it __uses tas ‘father’to refer alS Thus by Morgan

’sdefinition the English word "uncle is not a classificatory term,

but the very Opposite,Since it is used only for collateral relatives .

Kroeber ( 1909) criticises Morgan and rej ects his conception of

classificatory terminologies , and then proceeds to make use of thesam e distinction by taking as one of the important features ofterminologies the extent to which they separate or distinguishlineal from col lateral relatives . It seem s to be merely the word‘

classificatory’that Kroeber does not like . Doubtless it is not the

ideal word ; but it has long been in use and no better one has beensuggested

,though others have been put forward .

I do not propose to deal w ith all systems in which the classificatory principle is applied in the terminology , but only with acertain widespread type . In these systems the distinction betweenlineal and collateral relatives is clearly ‘recognised and is of greatimportance in social life

,but it is in certain respects subordinated

to another structural princip le,which can b e Spoken of as the

princip le of the solidarity of the.

sibling group . A group of Siblingsi s constituted by the sons and daughters of a man andhis wife inmonogamous societies

,or of a m an and his wives where there

is p olygyny , or of a wom an and her husbands in polyandrouscommunities . The bond uniting brothers and sisters togetherinto a social group is everywhere regarded as important , but it i smore emphasised in some societies than in others . The solidarityof the sib ling group is Shown in the first instance in the socialrelations b etween its members .From this principle there is derived a further principle which

I shall Speak of as that of the unity of the Sibling group . Thisrefers not to the internal unity of the group as exhib ited in thebehaviour of members to one another

,but to its unity in relation

to a person outside it and connected with it by a specific relationto one of its m embers .A diagram may help the discussion . Fig . 4 represents a sib l ing

group of three brothers and two Sisters,to which Ego is related

by the fact that he i s the son of one of the three men . In thekinship systems with which I am now dealing

,Ego regards him self

as standing in the same general kind of relation to all the m emb ersof the group . Forhim it constitutes a unity . His relation to the

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 65

brothers and si sters ofhis father is conceived as being of the sam egeneral kind ashis relation to his father . Within the group

,

however,there are two principles of differentiation

,sex and

seniority, __which have to be taken into account. In system s in whichseniority Is not emphasised a man treats his father’s brothers

,

both older and younger , as being likehis father . He refers tothem or addresses them by the sam e term of kinship that he app liestohis own father, and in certain important respects his behaviourtowards them i s Similar to his behaviour towards his own father .What defines this behaviour is , of course , different in differentsystems . Where seniority is strongly emphasised

,a man may

distinguish between the senior brother and the junior brothereither in behaviour alone or both in behaviour and term inology ,

but there still remains a common element in the pattern of behaviour towards all ‘fathers’.!The difference of sex is more important than the difference of

seniority,and in this matter there is considerable variation in the

system s we are considering . But in quite a considerable numberof systems

,in different parts of the world

,there are certain features

of a man’s relationship to his father’s Sister which can be correctlydescribed by saying that he regards her as a sort of female father .In some of these systems he actually callsher ‘female father’

,

or some modification of the term for father . If it seems to youimpossible that a man should regard his father

’s Sister as a relativeof the same kind as his own father

,this is b ecause you are thinking ,

not about social relationships as defined by modes of behaviour ,with which we are here concerned

,but about the physiologica l

relationship,which is irrelevant .

The same kind of thing happens with the Sib ling group of themother . The mother’s sisters are treated as relatives of the samekind as the mother

,both in term inology and in certain principles

of behaviour or attitude . In a numb er of system s the m other’sbrother is also treated as a relative of the sam e kind as the m other .

3

66 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

He may be called ‘

male mother’, as in Bantu tribes of Africa and inTonga in the Pacific . If the principle of seniority is stressed , themother’s brothers may be distinguished according as they areolder or younger than the mother .Those of you who have never had any direct contact with

systems of this kind may find it difficu lt to comprehend how afather’s Sister can be regarded as a female father or a mother’sbrother as a male mother . This is due to the difficulty of di ssociatingthe terms ‘ father’and ‘mother’from the connotations they have inour own social system . It i s absolutely essential to do thi s if thekinship systems of other societies are ever to be understood .

Perhaps it will help somewhat if I refer to another terminologywhich seems to us peculiar . Most of the systems with which I amnow dealing have a word for ‘child’, or words for

‘ Son’and‘ daughter’

,which a man applies tohis own children andhis

brother’s children,and a woman applies to her own children and

her Sister’s children . But in some Australian tribes there are twodifferent words for ‘child’. One is used by a man for hi s own chi ld

(or his brother’s child) and by a woman for her brother

’s child ;the other is used by a woman for her own or her Sister’s child, andby a man for his Sister’s chi ld . I think you will see that this isanother way of expressing in the term inology the unity that linksbrother and Sister in relation to the c hild of either of them . I amcalled by one term by my father and his brothers and Sisters ;and by another term by my mother and her Sisters and brothers .The same princip le , that of the unity of the Sib ling group ,

i s applied to other Sibling groups . Thus the father’s father’sbrother is regarded as belonging to the sam e category as thefather’s father, with the result that his son i s a somewhat moredistant relative of the same kind as the father and his brothers .By means of such extension of the basic princip le , a very largenumber of collateral relatives of different degrees of distance canbe brought under a limited number of categories . A man mayhave many , even hundreds , of relatives whom he thus classifiesas ‘fathers’,

‘brothers’,‘mother’s brothers’and so on . But there are

different ways in which this extension of the basic classificatoryprinciple can be applied , so that there result systems of differenttyp es . What is comm on to them all is that they m ake some useof this structural princip le which I have bri efly illustrated .

What I am trying_to_ -shom y ou is that the classificatoryw A

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68 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOC IETY

term inology may be the result of the customs of the levirate andsororate . That the two things are connected is , I think , clear,but for the supposed causal connection there is no evidence whatever . Their real conn ection is that they are different ways ofapplying or using the principle of the unity of the sib ling group

,

and they may therefore exist together or separately.

An organisation into clans or moieties is also based on theprinciple of the solidarity and unity of the sib l ing group in combination with other principles . Tylor suggested a connectionb etween exogamous clans and the classificatory term inology .

Rivers put this in term s of conjectural history, and argued that theclassificatory term inology must have had its origin in the or

ganisation of society into exogamous moieties .

I I

It is necessary , for our analysis , to consider briefly anotheraspect of the structure of kinship systems , namely the divisioninto generations . The distinction of generation has its basis in theelem entary fam i ly

,in the relation of parents and children . A

certain generalising tendency is discoverab le in many kinshipsystem s in the behaviour of relatives of different generations .Thus we find very frequently that a person is expected to adoptan attitude of more or less m arked respect towards all his relativesof the first ascending generation . There are restraints on behaviourwhich m aintain a certain distance or prevent too close an intimacy. There is , in fact , a generalised relation of ascendancyand subordination between the two generations . This is usuallyaccompanied by a relation of friendly equality b etween a personandhis relatives of the second ascending generation . The nomenclature for grandparents and grandchildren is of significance inthis connection . In som e classificatory systems , such as those ofAustralian tribes , the grandparents on the father

’s side are distinguished , in terminology and in behaviour , from those on themother’s Side . But . in many classificatory systems the generalisingtendency results in all relatives of the generation being classedtogether as ‘grandfathers’and ‘grandmothers’.We may note in passing that in classificatory terminologies

of what Morgan called the Malayan type and Rivers the Hawaiiantype , this generalising process is applied to other generations ,

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 69

so that all relatives of the parents’generation may be called‘ father’and ‘mother’and all those of one’s own generation maybe called ‘

brother’and ‘ Sister’.There are m any kinship system s in various parts of the world

that exhibit a structural principle which I Shall speak of as thecombination of alternate generations . This means that relatives ofthe grandfather’s generation are thought of as combined with thoseof one’s own generation over against the relatives of the parents’

generation . The extrem e developm ent of this principle is to beseen in Australian tribes . I Shall refer to this later .While some system s emphasise the distinction of generations

in their term inology or in their soc ial structure,there are also

system s in which relatives of two or more generations are included in a Single category . So far as I have been able to make acomparative study

,the various instances of this seem to fall into

four classes .In one class of instances the term of relationship does not

carry a connotation referring to any particular generation and isused to m ark off a sort of marginal region b etween non-relativesand those close relatives towards whom specific duties and overwhom specific rights are recognised . The application of the termgenerally only implies that Since the other person is recognised as arelative he or She must be treated with a certain general attitudeof friendliness and not as a stranger . A good example is providedby the terms ol-le-sotwa and en-e~sotwa in Masai . I would includethe English word ‘ cousin’in this class .A second class of instances includes those in which there is

conflict or inconsistency between the required attitude towards aparticular relative and the required general attitude towards thegeneration to which he belongs . Thus in som e tribes in SouthEast Africa there is conflict between the general rule that relativesof the first ascending generation are to b e treated with markedrespect and the custom of privileged disrespect towards themother’s brother . This is resolved by p lacing the mother’sbrother in the second ascending generation and calling him‘grandfather’. An Opposite example is found in the Masai . Aman is on term s of familiarity with all his relatives of the seconddescending generation

,who are his ‘grandchildren’. But it is felt

that the relation between a man and the wife ofhis son’s sonshould be one not of fam iliarity but of m arked reserve . The

70 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IMIT IVE SOCIETY

incons istency is resolved by a sort of legal fiction by which She Is

moved out of her generation and is called‘ Son’s wife’.

A third class of instances are those resulting from the struetural princip le

,already mentioned , whereby alternate generations

are combined . Thus the father’s father may be called‘ older brother’

and treated as such,and the son’s son may be called

‘youngerbrother’. Or a man and his son’s son m ay be both included in aSingle category of relationship . There are many illustration sof this in Australian tribes and som e elsewhere . An examplefrom the Hopi will be given later .The fourth class of instances includes the system s of Choctaw

and Omaha type and also certain others , and in these the distinction between generations is set aside in favour of anotherprinciple

,that of the unity of the lineage group .

Since the word lineage is often loosely used , I must explainwhat I m ean by it . A patrilineal or agnatic lineage consists of aman and all his descendants through males for a determ inatenumber of generations . Thus a minimal lineage includes threegenerations

,and we can have lineages of four

,five or 72generations .

A matrilineal lineage consists of a woman an d all her descendantsthrough females for a determ inate number of generations . Alineage group consists of all the m embers of a lineage who are aliveat a particular time . A clan , as I shall use the term here , is agroup which

,though not actually or demonstrab ly (by genealogies)

a lin eage,is regarded as being in som e ways Sim ilar to a lineage .

It normally consists of a numb er of actual lineages . Lineages,

both patrilineal and m atrilineal,exist implicitly in any kinship

system,but it is only in som e system s that the solidarity of the

lineage group is an importan t feature in the social structure .

Where lineage groups are important we can Speak of thesolidarity of the group , which shows itself in the first instancein the internal relations between the m embers . By the principleof the unity of the lineage group I m ean that for a person whodoes not belong to the lineage but is connected with it throughsom e important bond of kinship or by marriage , its m embersconstitute a single category , with a distinction within the categorybetween males and fem ales , and possib ly other distinctions also .

When this princip le is applied in the term inology a personconnected with a lineage from outside app l ies to its members

,of

one sex, through at least three generations , the s am e term of

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 7 1

relationship . In its extreme development,as applied to the clan , a

person conn ected with a clan in a certain way applies a singleterm of relationship to all members of the clan . An example wil lbe given later .The Omaha type of terminology may be illustrated by the

system of the Fox Indians,which has been carefully studied by

Dr . Sol Tax The features of the system that are relevant

A = O O = AI

d

FIG . s— Fox

Father’s L in eageto the argum ent are illustrated in the accompanying diagram s(Figs . 5In his own patrilineal lineage a man d istingu isheshis relatives

according to generation as ‘grandfather’ (GF) ,‘ father’(F) ,

‘older or younger brother’(B) ,‘ Son’(S) ,

‘grandmother’(gm) ,

1 In these diagrams A represents a m ale p erson and O a female . The sign

conn ects a man an dhis wife and the lin es d escending from it ind icate theirchildren . The letters (cap itals form ales and lower case for females) stan d for thekin ship term s of a classificatory system , in whichthe s am e term is app lied to a

number of re latives . GF stan ds for the term used in referrin g to a grandfather,and sim ilarly gm for grandmother; the others are F , father, In ,

mother, m s ,

mother’s Sister, fs , father’s Sister, MB,mother’s brother, FL ,

father-in -law ,

m l,mother-in -law ,

B,brother, Sis , Sister, BL , brother-in—law ,

Sl,s ister-in -law ,

S , son , (I, daughter, N , nephew (strictly sp eakin g sister’s son ) n ,

n iece ( s ister’s

daughter of a male) CC or go, grandchild .

72 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY‘father’s Sister’(fS) ,

‘Sister’(sis) , and‘daughter’(d) . I would draw

your attention to the fact that he app lies a single term ,

‘brother-inlaw’(BL) , irrespective of generation , to the husbands of the wom enof the lineage through three generations (his own and the twoascending generations) , and that he calls the children of all thesewomen by the sam e term s

,

‘nephew’(N) and‘niece’ Thus the

wom en of Ego’s own lineage of these generations constitute a sortof group , and Ego regards himself as standing in the sam e relationship to the children and husbands of all of them , al though thesepersons belong to a number of different lineages .

lA O AGF gm

AMB fs m s F

FIG . 6 —F0x

NIother’s L in eageTurning to the mother’s patrilineal lineage , i t can be seen

that a man calls his mother’s father ‘grandfather’, but calls all themales of the lineage in the three succeeding generations ‘

mother’sb rother’(MB) . Sim ilarly he calls the wom en of these threegenerations

,except his own m other, by a term translated as

‘

mother’s Sister’(m s) . He applies the term‘ father’(F) to the

husbands of all the wom en of the lineage through four generations

( including the husband of the mother’s father’s sister) and thechildren of all these women arehis ‘

brothers’and ‘ sisters’.He is the son of one particular wom an of a unified group ,

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 73

and the sons of the other women of the group are thereforehis‘brothers’.

gm

FIG . 7— F0x

Father’s Mother’s L in eageA O

l c'>

BL s l

FIG. 8— Fox

Wife’s L in eage

In his father’s mother’s lineage Ego calls all the men andwomen throughout three generations ‘grandfather’and ‘gran dmother’. The children of these ‘grandmothers’are all his ‘fathers’

and ‘father’s Sisters’,irrespective of generation . In his mother’s

74 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIMIT IVE SOC IETY

mother’s lineage he also calls all the males ‘grandfather’and thefemales ‘grandmother’

,but I have not thought it necessary to

include a figure to Show this .In his wife’s lineage a man calls his wife’s father by a term

which we will translate ‘ father-in—law’(FL) . It is a modificationof the word for ‘grandfather’. 1 The sons and brother’s sons ofthe ‘ fathers-in -law’are ‘brothers-in-law’(BL) , and the daughtersare ‘sisters-in-law’(SI) . The children of a

‘brother-in -law’areagain ‘brother-in-law’and ‘ Sister-in-law’. Thus these two termsare applied to the men and women of a lineage through three

rA O AFL m l FL

I I IA O O AFL ml BL Wife EGO

F IG . o— Fox

Wife’s lVIother’s Lin eagegenerations . The children of all these ‘ sisters-in-law’are ‘ sons’

and ‘daughters’.Fig . 9 Shows the lineage of the wife

’s mother . In this l in eagethrough three generations , all the men are called

‘ father-in-lawand all the wom en ‘

m other-in-law’

IS the classification of relatives in the Fox terminologysimply a matter of language

,as some would have us believe ?

Dr. Tax’s observations ( 1 937) enable us to affirm that it is not .He writes :

The kin ship term inology is app lied to all known re latives (even insom e cases where the genealogica l re lation ship is not traceab le) so thatthe en tire tribe is d ivided into a sm al l numb er of typ es of re lationship

1 The Fox term s for father-ih-law and mother-in -law are modification sof the term s for gran dfather and gran dmother. In the Omaha tribe the termsfor grandparen ts , without mod ification ,

are app lied to the p arents-in -law an d

to those who are cal led ‘

father-in-law’and ‘

mother-in -law’in the Fox tribe .

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76 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

The most Significant features of the system are illustrated in theaccompanying figures .

BFIG . IO— HOP I

Mother’s L in eageman’s own lineage is , of course , that of his mother . He

distinguishes the wom en of his lineage by generation as ‘gran dmother’(gm ) ,

‘mother’(m ) ,‘ Sister’(sis) ,

‘niece’(n) , and‘grand

child’(gc) . Amongst the men of his lineage he distinguishes his‘mother’s brothers’(MB) ,

‘brothers’ (B) and‘nephews’(N) .

But he includes his mother’s mother’s brother andhis Sister’sdaughter’s son in the same category ashis brothers . The structuralprinciple exhibited here is that already referred to as the combination of alternate generations . It Should be noted that a man

includes the children of all men of his own lineage , irrespectiveof generation , in the sam e category as his own children . Fig . 10

Should be carefully compared with Fig . 5 , for the Fox Indians , asthe comparison is illuminating .

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 77

In his father’s lineage a man calls all the male memb ersthrough five generations ‘ father’and , with the exception ofhisfather’s mother (his he calls all the wom e n‘ father’s Sister’. The husband of any woman of the lineage is a‘grandfather’

,and the wife of any man of the lineage is a ‘mother’

A OF In

FIG. 1 1—HOP I

Father’s L in eageThe children ofhis ‘fathers’are ‘brothers’and ‘ Sisters’. Fig . 1 1

should be carefully compared with Fig . 6 .

In his mother’s father’s lineage a man calls all the men

and wom en through four generations ‘grandfather’and ‘grandmother’.The Hopi do not regard a man as related to his father’s father’s

lineage as a whole , and the princip le is therefore not applied to it .He does call his own father’s father ‘grandfather’.Dr . Eg an has Shown that for the Hopi this classification

of relatives into categories is not simply a matter of term inology

78 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY

or language , but is the basis of much of the regulation of

social life .

What is , I think , clearly brought out by a comparison of theFox and Hopi systems is their fundamental sim i larity . By thetheories of conjectural history this Similarity is the acciden ta lresult of differenthistorical processes . By my theory it is theresult of the systematic application of the same Structural princip le ,in one instance to patrilineal and in the other tom atrilineal lineages .

A O

EGO

0GF g m

FIG. 1 2— HOP I

Mother’s Father’s Lin eageI cannot , of course , discuss all the various systems of Choctaw

and Omaha type . The variations that they Show In certain featuresare very interesting and important . If you wish to test my theoryyou will examine them , or som e of them ,

for yourselves , and theeasiest way to analyse any system is to reduce it to a set of lineagecharts Sim ilar to those given here for the Fox and the Hopi .For any system such a set of charts will reveal the exact way inwhich the general princip le of the unity of the lineage is applied .

The manner of application varies som ewhat,but the principle

appears in each system of the typ e .

You will doubtless already have noticed that in these systemsthere are an extraordinary number of relatives of all ages to whom

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 79

a man applies the terms ‘grandfather’and ‘grandmother’. Thereis , I believe , a good reason for this , which should be brieflyindicated . It is a general rule in societies having a classificatoryterminology that for all the various relatives included under aSingle term there is some more or less defin ite pattern of behaviourwhich is regarded as normal or appropriate . But there are importantdifferences in this matter . In certain instances the pattern canbe defined by reference to specific rights and duties , or by specificmodes of behaviour. For example , in the Kariera tribe of Australiaa man must practice the most careful avoidance of all women whoare included in the category of ‘ father’s Sister’, of whom there arevery many and of whom his wife’s mother is one . But in otherinstan ces all that the application of a term implies is a certain

general attitude rather than any more Specific relation . Withinsuch a category there may be a specific jural or personal relationto a particular individual . In many classificatory systems the termsfor grandfather and grandmother are used in this way , as imp lyinga general attitude of friendliness

,relatively free from restraint

,

towards all persons to whom they are applied . Grandparents andgrandchi ldren are persons withwhom one can be on free andeasy terms . This is connected with an extremely widespread ,indeed alinost universal , way of organising the relation of alternategenerations to one another .

In the Fox and Hopi systems all the members of the lineageof a grandparent are included in one category with the grandparents and the attitude that is appropriate towards a grandparentis extended to them . This does not imply any definite set of rightsand duties

,but only a certain general typ e of behaviour, of a kind

that is regarded as appropriate towards relatives of the secondascending generation in a great many societies not belonging to theChoctaw and Omaha type .

I Should have liked to discuss this further and to have dealtwith those varieties of the Omaha type (such as the VaNdau )in which the mother’s brother and the mother’s brother’s son arecalled ‘grandfather’. But I have only time to draw your attentionto a Special variety of the Choctaw type which is of great interestin this connection . The Cherokee were divided into sevenmatrilineal clans . In the father’s clan a man called all the men andwomen of his father’s and all succeeding generations ‘ father’and‘father’s Sister’

,and this clan and all its individual members

80 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

had to be treated with great respect . A man could not marry awoman ofhis father’s clan , and of course he could not marry intohis own clan . In the clan of his father’s father and that ofhismother’s father a man calls all the women of all generations‘grandmother’. He thus treats , not the lineage , but the wholeclan as a unity , although a clan must have numbered manyhundreds of persons . With any woman whom he calls ‘grandmother’a man is allowed to be on free and easy terms . It wasregarded as particullary appropriate that a man should m arry a‘grandmother’

,i.e . a woman of his mother’s father’s or father’s

father’s clan .

Let us now return to a brief consideration of the Specialcustom s of marriage that have been proposed as causes Of theChoctaw and Omaha terminologies respectively . Marriage withthe wife’s brother’s daughter is theoretically possib le and doesperhaps actually , though only occasionally , occur in some of thetribes having a system of Omaha type . Though there has been nomarriage of this kind in the Fox tribe in recent times it is spokenof as a custom that form erly existed .We have seen that them arriagecustom and the terminology fit consistently . The reason for thisShould now be easy to understand , for a little consideration willShow that this particular marriage is an application of the principle of the unity of the lineage combined with the custom of thesororate or sororal polygyny . In the usual form of these customswe are concerned only with the principle of the unity of thesib ling group . A man marries one woman of a particular sib linggroup and thereby establishes a particular relation to that groupas a unity. The men are now perm anently his brothers-in-law .

Towards one of the women he stands in a m arital relationship,and

therefore towards the others he is conceived as standing in aSimilar relationship which may be called a quasi-marital relationship . For instance , they will regard his children as being their‘ children’. Thus it is appropriate that when he takes a second wife ,whether before or after the death of his first

,he Should marry

his wife’s Sister .I am quite aware that sororal polygyny can be attributed

to the fact that co-wives who are Sisters are less likely to quarrelseriously than two who are not so related

,and that the sororate

may Similarly be justified by the fact that a stepmother is m orelikely to have proper affection for her stepchildren if they are the

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 8 1

children of her own sister . These propositions do not conflictwith my explan ation but support it , for the principle of theunity of the Sib ling group as a structural principle is based on thesolidarity of brothers and Sisters within one fam ily .

When we turn to systems of the Omaha type , we see that inplace of the unity of the sib ling group we now have a unity of thelarger group , the lineage group of three generations . When a man

marries one woman of this group he enters into a relation with thegroup as a unity , so that all the men are now his brothers-in-law ,

and he at the same tim e enters into what I have called a quasim arital relationship with all the wom en , including not onlyhiswife’s sisters but also his wife’s brother’s daughters , and in som esystem s his wife’s father’s Sisters . The group within which , by theprincip le of the sororate , he may take a second wife without entering into any new social bonds is thus extended to include his wife’sbrother’s daughter ; and the custom of marriage with this relativeis Simply the result of the application of the principle of the unityof the lineage in a system of patrilineal lineages . The special formof m arriage and the special system of terminology , where theyoccur together

,are directly conn ected by the fact that they are

both applications of the one structural prin cip le . There is noground whatever for supposing that one is the historical cause ofthe other .The matter is much more complex when we com e to the custom

of marriage with the mother’s brother’s widow . This form of

marriage is found associated with terminology of the Choctawtype in the Banks Islands

,in the tribes of North—West America

and in the Twi-Speaking Akim Abuakwa . But it is also found inmany other places where that type of term inology does not exist .Nor is it correlated with matrilineal descent

,for it is to be found

in African societies that arem arkedly patrilineal in their institutions .There does not seem to be any theoretical explanation that willapply to all the known instances of this custom . There is no tim eon this occasion to discuss this subject by an analysis of instances .

I must briefly refer to another theory , which goes back toDurkheim’s review ( 1 898) of Kohler , and by which the Choctawand Omaha term inologies are exp lained as being the directresult of emphasis on matrilineal and patrilineal descent respectively. We have , fortunately , a crucial instance to which we canrefer in this connection

,in the system of the Manus of the

82 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IMIT IVE SOCIETY

Adm iralty Islands,of which we have an excellent analysis by Dr .

Margaret Mead The most important feature of the Manussystem is the existence of patrilineal clans (called by D r. Mead‘gentes’) and the major emphasis is on patrilineal descent . Thesolidarity of the patrilineal lineage is exhibited in many featu resof the system

,but not in the terminology . However this emphasis

on patrilineal descent is to a certain extent counterbalanced by therecognition of m atrilineal lineages , and this does appear in thetermin ology in features that make it Sim ilar to the Choctaw type .Thus a single term

, pinpapu,is applied to the father’s father’s

Sister and to all her female descendants in the female line , and aSingle term

, patieye, is applied to the father’s sister and al l her

descendants in the female line . The unity of the matrilin eallineage is exhibited not only in the use of these terms , but alsoin the general social relation in which a person stands to themembers of it , and is an important feature of the total comp lexkins hip structure .

One of the strange ideas that has been , and I fear still is ,current is that if a society recognises lineage at all it can onlyrecognise either patrilineal or m atrilineal lineage . I believe theorigin of this absurd notion

,and its persistence in the face of

known facts, are the result of that early hypothesis of conjecturalhistory that matrilineal descent is m ore primitive

, i.e . historicallyearlier, than patrilineal descent . From the beginning of this centurywe have been acquainted with societies

,such as the Herero , in

which both matrilineal and patrilineal lineages are recognised ;but these were dism issed as being ‘ transitional’forms . This isanother examp le of the way in which attachm ent to the methodand hypotheses of conjectural history prevents us from seeingthings as they are . It was this , I think , that was responsible forRivers’ failing to discover that the Toda system recognisesm atrilineal lineage as well as patrilineal

,and that the islands of

the New Hebrides have a system of patrilineal groups in additionto their matrilineal m oieties . Apart from the presuppositions of themethod of conjectural history

,there is no reason why a society

Should not build its kinship system on the basis of both patrilinealand matrilineal lineage

,and we know that there are many societies

that do exactly this .In my criticism of the m ethod of conjectural history I have

insisted on the need for demonstration in anthropology . How then

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84. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIMIT IVE SOCIETY

Yaralde terminology , and it would afford no explanation whateverfor the term inological unification of the clans of the father’sm other and the mother’s mother . The structural princip le involved is obviously that of the merging of alternate generations ,which is of such great importance in Australia

,and which we have

also seen in the Hopi system . A system very similar to the Yaralde

Q.

na ztja

mother’s father’s S ister

mother’s brother mother

mother’s brother’s son mother’s brother’s daughter

wano

mother’s brother’sson

’s son

FIG . 1 3—YARALDE

Mother’s lin eage

is found in the Ungarinyin trib e of North-West Australia , but Iwill not do more than refer to it .Earlier in this address I said that I would try to Show you that

the Omaha type of terminology is just as reasonable and fittingin those social systems in which it is found as our own term inologyis in our system . I hope Ihave succeeded in doing this . On thebasis of the elem entary family and the genealogical relationshipsresulting therefrom

,we English have constructed for ourselves a

certain kinship system which m eets the necessities of an orderedsocial life and is fairly self-consistent . The Fox or the Hopi haveon the same basis constructed a relatively self-consistent system

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 85

of a different type which provides for the needs of social cohesionin a different way an d over a wider range . We understand theterm inology in each instance as soon as we see it as part of anordered system . The obvious connection of the Omaha terminology with the custom of m arriage with the wife’s brother’sdaughter is seen as a relation between two parts of a self-con sistentworking system , not as a relation of cause and effect .If you ask the question

,

‘How is it that the Omaha (or anyother of the tribes we have considered) have the system that theydo ?’then it is obvious that the method of structural analysis doesnot afford an answer . But neither does conject uralhi story . Theproffered but purely hypothetical explanation of the Om ahaterminology is that it resulted from the adoption of a certainunusual custom of marriage . This obviously gives us no explanationunti l we know why the Omaha and other trib es cam e to adopt thiscustom . The only possible way of answering the question why aparticu lar society has the social system that it does have is by adetailed study of its history over a suffi cient period

,generally

several centuries . For the tribes’

withwhich we are here concernedthe materials for such a history are entirely lacking . This is

, of

course,very regrettable , but there is nothing that we can do about

it . If you want to know how England com es to have its presentsystem of constitutional monarchy and parliam entary government

,

you will go to the history books , which will give you the details ofthe growth of the system . If there were no records at all of thishistorical developm ent

,would the anthropologists think itworth

while to spend their time in m aking conjectures as to what itmight have been ?Even when there are historical records

,they only enable us

to discover how a particular system has grown out of a somewhatdifferent particular system . Thus it would be possib le to write ahistorical account of the changes of the kinship system of Englandduring the past ten centuri.es hiS’w0uld take us back to theTeutonic b i lateral Sib system , as exhibited in the institution of

wergild . But we stil l should not know why the Teutonic peopleshad this kind of system

,while the Romans had a different system

of agnatic lineages . The great value of history for a science ofsociety is that it gives us materials for the study of how socialsystems change . In this respect conjectural history is ab solutelyworthless .

86 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IMIT IVE SOC IETY

But if you ask,not how the English kinship system or the

English political system came into existence , but ow it works atthe present time

,that is a question that can be answered by

research of the sam e kind as anthropological field-work ; andhistorical considerations are relatively, if not ab solutely , unimportant .Such knowledge of how social system s work is of great valuefor any understanding of human life . It often has b een and stil lis neglected by anthropologists who consider it their principaltask to write the history of peop les or institutions that have nohistory .

If you accept the analysis that I have given , but still wish toapply the m ethod of conjecturalhistory , what you have to conjecture is why all the tribes that have been enumerated electedto construct their kinship systems on the basis of the unity ofthe lineage .

What kind of resu lts can we expect to obtain from the methodof sociological an alysis ? Nothing , of course , that will be acceptable as significant by those who demand that an y explanationof a social phenomenon must be a historical explanation , or bythose who dem and what is called psychological explanation

, i.e .

explan ation in term s of the individual and his m otives . I suggestthat the results that we may reasonab ly expect are as follows :I . It will enab le us to m ake a systematic classification of

kinship system s . System atic Classification is an essentialin any Scientific treatment of any class of phenom ena ,and such classification must be in term s of general properties .

2 . It enables us to understan d particular features of particular system s . It does this in two ways : (a ) by revealingthe particular feature as a part of an organised Whole ;(b) by showing that it is a special example of a recognisab lec lass of phenom ena . Thus I have tried to Show that theChoctaw and Omaha term inologies belong to a class whichalso includes the Yaralde term inology

,and that these are

all Special applications of the general principle of thesolidarity and continuity of the lineage , which appears inmany other form s in a great number of different societies .

3 . It is the only m ethod by which we can hope ultim atelyto arrive at valid generalisations about the nature of humansociety ,

i.e . about the universal characteristics of allsocieties , past , present , and future . It is , of course , such

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 87

generalisations that are meant when we Speak of sociologicallaws .

In the m ethod of conjectural history single problem s areusually considered in isolation . On the other hand

,the method

of structural analysis aims at a general theory,and a great many

different facts and problem s are,therefore

,considered together

and in relation to one another . It is obvious that in this address,

inordinately long as it has been , I have only b een able to touch ona few points in the general theory of kinship structure . I havedealt briefly with one or two other points in earlier publications.That particular part of the general theory which has occupiedus today may be said to be the theory of the establishment oftyp e relationships . I have mentioned the tendency present inmany societies to set up a type relationship between a person andallhis relatives of the parents’generation

,and the even more

marked tendency to establish a type relationship , usually one of

free and easy behaviour, towards the relatives of the grandparents’

generation . I have not tried to deal with this except incidentally .

The major part of the expositionhas been concerned with twostructural princip les which are them selves examples of a m oregeneral structural principle or class of principles .(By the princip leof the unity of the sib ling group a type relationship is set upbetween a given person and all the members of a sibling group towhich he is related in a certain s by reference to thisprinciple , I hold , that we must the classificatory terminology and such customs as the sororate and levirateyBy theprinciple of the unity of the lineage group a type relationship is setup between a given person and all the members of a lineage groupto which he is related in a certain way . It is by reference to thisprincip le , I hold , that we must interpret the terminologies of theFox

,the Hopi and the Yaralde and other similar systems in many

scattered parts of the world,

’

If you will take the tim e to study two or three hundredkinship systems from all parts of the world you will be impressed ,I think ,

by the great diversity that they exhibit . But you will alsobe impressed by the way in which some particu lar feature , suchas an Om aha type of term inology, reappears in scattered and widelyspread regions . .

To reduce this diversity to som e sort of orderis the task of analysis , and by its m eans we can , I believe , find ,beneath the diversities

,a lim ited number of general princip les

88 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

applied and combined in various ways . Lineage solidarity in oneform or another is found in a majority of kinship system s . Thereis nothing at all surprising in the fact that term inologies of theChoctaw and Om aha type , in which it finds what may be calledan extrem e development , should be encountered in separatedregions of Am erica , Africa , Asia and Oceania , in many differentfam i lies of languages , and in association with m any differenttypes of ‘culture’.Last year I exp lained in general term show I conceive the

study of social structure (Radcliffe-Brown , 1 940b) . In this address ,by m eans of a particular example , I have tried to Show you something of the nature of a certain method of investigation . But donot think that this method can be applied only to the study ofkinship . It is applicab le in one way or an other to all socialphenom ena

,for it is Simply the m ethod of abstractive generalisa

tion by the comparison of instances,which is the characteristic

m ethod of the inductive sciences .‘Why all this fuss about m ethod ?’some of you m ay perhaps

ask . We cannot reach agreem ent as to the validity or the value ofresults unless we first reach som e agreem ent as to objectives andthe proper methods of attaining them . In the other naturalsciences there is such agreem ent ; in social anthropology there is not.

Where we disagree,it should be the first purpose of discussion to

define as precisely as possible the ground of difference . I haveput my case b efore you , without , I hope , any unfairness towardsthose with whom I disagree . It is for you to judge which of the twom ethods that I have compared is most likely to provide that kindof scientific understanding of the nature of human society whichit is the accepted task of the social anthropologist to provide forthe guidance of m ankind .

REFERENCES

D urkheim , E .

‘

Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe , Prof. J . Kohler’,An alyses I I I , L a Fam il le , Anne

’e Sociologique, Vol. I , pp . 306

—3 1 9 .

Eggan , F .

‘

The K in ship System and Socia l Organ isation of theWestern Pueb los w ith Sp ecial Referen ce to the Hop i’, Ph.D . thesis ,Un iversity of Chicago.

G ifford , E . W .

‘M iwok Moieties’, Arch. and Bthu . P ubl. , Un iv .

California , Vol. XI I , No. 4 .

G ilb ert , Wil liam H. , Jr.

‘

Eastern Cherokee Social Organ isation’,in S ocial An thropology of NorthAmerican Tribes ( ed . Fred Eggan ) .Chicago Un iversity Press

, pp . 283—3 3 8 .

THE STUDY OF KINSH I P SYSTEMS 89

Kohler, J . ( 1‘

ZurUrgeschichte derEhe’,Zeitschriftfitr Vergleichende

Rechtswissenschaf t (Stu ttgart) , Bd . 1 1 .

K roeber, A . L .

‘

Clas sificatory System s of Re lation ship’,_7. R . Anthrop . Inst. , Vol. XXXIX, pp . 77

—84 .

‘Californ ia K in ship System s’, Arch. and Bthu . Publ. Univ .

California , Vol. XI I , No. 9 .

Mead , M argare t ‘

K in ship in the Adm iralty I s land s’, An throp .

P apers Amer. Mus . Na t. History , Vol. XXXIV , Pt. I I , pp . 1 8 1—3 5 8 .

M ‘

L enn an , John F . Primitive M arriage. Ed inburgh : Adam 85

Charles Black .

Morgan , Lewis H.

‘

The System s of Con san guin ity an d Affin ity’,

Smithsonian Institution Contributions to K nowledge, Vol. XVI I .Ancien t Society or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress

from S avagery to Civilisa tion . Lon don : Macm il lan ; New York :Hen ry Holt.

Op ler, M . E . ( 1 937a ) .‘Chiricahua Apache Socia l Organ isation’, in Social

Anthropology of NorthAmerican Tribes (ed . Fred Eggan ) , ChicagoUniversity Press .

( 1 937b) .‘

Ap ache D ata Con cern ing the Re lation of Kin ship Ter

m inology to Social C lassification’, Amer. Anthrop . , Vol. XXXIX ,

pp . 20 1—2 1 2 .

Radc liffe-Brown , A . R .

‘

Notes on the Soc ia l Organ isation of

Austral ian Tribes’, Pt. I , f . R . Anthrop . Inst. , Vol. XLVI I I ,

pp . 222—25 3 .

‘

The Mother’s Brother in South Africa’, SouthAfrican3 . S cience , Vol. XXI .( 1 930—3

‘

The Social Organ isation ofAu stralian Tribes’, Pts . I—I I I ,Oceania ,

Vol. I , pp . 34—6 3 , 206

—246 , 3 22—34 1 , 426

—45 6 .

‘

Patrilin eal and M atrilinea l Succession’, Iowa Law Review ,

Vol. XX , No. 2 .

( 1 940a) .‘

On Joking Re lation ship s’, Africa , Vol. XI I I , No. 3 ,

pp . 1 95—2 1 0 .

( 1 940b) .‘

On Social Structure’, _7. R . Anthrop . Inst. , Vol. LXX ,

pp . 1—1 2 .

Rivers,W . H. R .

‘

On the Origin of the C lassificatory System of

Re lation ship’, in Anthropological Essay s Presented toEdward Burnett

Ty lor. Oxford : C larendon Press . (Reprin ted in Socia l Organisa tion .

Lon don : Kegan Paul , 1 9 24 , App . I , pp . 1 75

( 1 9 1 4a ) . History of M elanesian Society . Camb ridge Un ivers ity Press .

( 1 9 14b) . K inship and Social Organisa tion . Lon don : London School ofEconom ics .

Se ligm an , Brenda Z.

‘

The Re lation ship System s of the Nan d iM asai and Thonga’, M an , Vol. XV I I , 46 .

Starcke ,C . N . The Primitive Family (The In tern ational Scien tific

Series , Vol. LXV I ) . Lon don : K egan Pau l .Stewart , D ugald In trodu ction to E ssay s of Adam Smith.Tax , Sol

‘

The Social Organ isation of the Fox Ind ian s’, in S ocialAn thropology of NorthAmerican Tribes (ed . Fred Eggan ) . ChicagoUniversity Press , pp . 24 1

—282 .

C HA P T E R I V

ON JOK ING RELATIONSHIPS 1

HE publication of Mr . F. J . Pedler’s note 2 on what arecalled ‘joking relationships’, following on two other paperson the same subject by Professor Henri Labouret 3

and Mademoiselle Denise Panlme,

4 suggests that som e generaltheoretical discussion of the nature of these relationship s may beof interest to readers of Africa .

5

What is m eant by the term‘

jokingl elation sluipj is a relationbetween two persons in which one Is by custom permitted

,and in

som e instances required,to tease or m ake fun of the other

,who in

turn is required to take no offence . It is important to distinguishtwo m ain varieties . In one the relation is symmg tgigal; each of thetwo persons teases ormakes fun of the other . In the other varietythe relation is asymmetgigal; A jokes at the expense of B and Baccepts the teasing goodhuin ouredly but without retaliating ; orA teases B as much as he pleases and B in return teases A only alittle . There are

'

many varieties in the form of this relationship indifferent societies . In Som e Instan ces the joking or teasing is onlyverbal

,in others it includes horse-play ; in some the joking

includes elements of obscenity , in others not.

Standardised social relationships of this kind are extremely-'widespread

,not only in Africa but also in Asia

,Ocean ia and

North America . To arrive at a scientific understanding of thephenom enon it is necessary to make

,

a wide compgrntivejtndy .

Som e m aterial for this now exists in anthropological literature ,though by no m eans all that could be desired

,Since it i s un

fortunately stil l only rarely that such relationships are observedand described as exactly as they might be .

1 Rep rin ted from Africa ,Vol. XI I I , No. 3 , 1 940 , pp . 1 9 5

—2 1 0 .

2 ‘

Joking Re lation ship s in East Africa’, Africa , Vol. X III , p . 1 70 .

3 ‘

La Paren téE Plaisan teries en Afrique Occidentale’, Africa , Vol. I I , p . 244 .

4 ‘Paren té ‘

a Plaisan teries et Allian ce par le Sang en Afrique Occiden tale’,Africa ,

Vol. X II, p . 4 3 3 .

5 ProfessorMarce l Mausshas pub lished a brief theoretical discussion of thesubject in the Annuaire de l

’Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes , S ection des

S ciences religieuses , 1 927—8 . It is also d ealt w ithby D r. F . Eggan in Social

Anthropology of NorthAmerican Tribes, 1 93 7 , pp . 7 5—8 1 .

90

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92 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

may use the terms . The man has his own definite position in thesocial structure

,determ ined forhim byhis birth into a certain

fam i ly,lineage or clan . The great body of his rights and duties and

the interests and activities that he Shares with others are the resultof his position . Before the marriage his wife’s family are outsidersforhim as he is an outsider for them . This constitutes a socialdisjunction which is not destroyed by the m arriage . The socialconjunction results from the continuance , though in altered form ,

of the wife’s relation to her family , their continued interest in herand in her children . If the wife were really bought and paid for

,

as ignorant persons say that She is in Africa , there would be'

nop lace for any perm anent close relation of a man with his wife’sfam ily . But though slaves can be bought , wives cannot .

Socialdisjunction implies divergence of interests and thereforethe possibility of conflict and hostility ,the avoidance of strife . How can a relation which combines thetwo be given

_

a_stable, _

opdeLQd rm ? There are two ways of doingthis . One is to maintain between two persons so related an extrememutual respect and a lim itation of direct personal contact . This isexhibited in the very formal relations that are

,in so many societies

,

characteristic of the behaviour of a son-in law on the one side andhis wife’s father and mother on the other . In its most extreme formthere is complete avoidance of any social contact between a man

and his mother-in-law .

This avoidance must not be mistaken for a Sign of hostility .

One does , of course , if one is wise , avoid having too much to dowith one’s enem ies

,but that is quite a different matter . I once

asked an Australian native why he had to avoidhis mother-in—law ,

andhis reply was,

‘Because she is my best friend in the world ; shehas given m e my wife’. The mutual respect between son-in-law

and parents-in—law is a mode of friendship . It prevents conflictthat m ight arise through divergence of interest .The alternative to this relation of extrem e mutual respect and

!y1restraint is the joking relationship , one , that is , of mutual disrespect and licence . Any seriou s hostility is prevented by theplayful antagonism of teasing , and this in its regular repetition isa constant expression or rem inder of that social disjunction whichis one of the essential components of the relation , whi le the socialconjunction is maintained by the friendliness that takes no

offence at insu lt .

ON JOKING RELAT IONSHI PS 93

The discrimination within the wife’s fam ily between thosewho have to be treated with extreme respect and those withwhom it is a duty to be disrespectfu l is made on the basis ofgeneration and som etimes of seniority within the generation .

The usual respected relatives are those of the first ascendinggeneration

,the wife’s mother and her sisters

,the wife’s father

and his brothers,sometimes the wife’s mother’s brother . The

joking relatives are those of a person’s own generation ; but veryfrequently a distinction of seniority w ithin the generation is made ;a wife’s older sister or brother may be respected while thoseyounger will be teased .

In certain societies a man may be said to have relatives bymarriage long before he marries and indeed as soon as he is b orninto the world . This is provided by the institution of the required

marria will , for the sake of brevity , cons ideronly one km fi i

—i

’

cif

organ isations . In many societies it is regarded as preferab le that a man should of

fi n, fi -se, ‘

M other’s bQM this is a form of the custom known as crossThus his fem ale cousins of this kind , or all those

women whom by the classificatory system he classifies as such ,are potential wives forhim ,

and their b rothers are his potentialbrothers-in—law . Among the Oj ibwa Indians of North America ,the Chiga of Uganda

,and in Fij i and New Caledonia

,as well as

elsewhere,this form of m arriage is found and is accompan ied by

a joking relationship between a man and the sons an d daughtersof his mother’s brother . To quote one instance of these

,the

following is recorded for the Oj ibwa .

‘When cross-cousins meetthey must try to embarrass one another . They “joke”one another

,

making the most vulgar allegations,by their Standards as well

as ours . But being “kind” relations,no one can take offence .

Cross-cousins who do not joke in this way are considered boorish,

as not p laying the social gam e .’1

The joking relationship here is of fundam entally the sam e kindas that already discussed . It is established before marriage and iscontinued

,after m arriage

,with the b rothers and sisters-in - law .

In som e parts of Africa there are joking relationships that havenothing to do withmarriage . Mr . Pedler’s note , m entioned above ,refers to a joking relationship between two distinct trib es

,the

1 RuthLandes in M ead , Co-operation and Competition among PrimitivePeoples, 1 937 , p . 1 03 .

94 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

Sukuma and the Zaramu, and in the evidence it was stated that

there was a similar relation between the Sukuma and the Ziguaand between the Ngoni and the Bemba . The woman’s evidencesuggests that this custom of rough teasing exists in the Sukumatribe between persons related by marriage , as it does in so manyother African tribes . 1

While a joking relationship between two tribes is apparentlyrare

,and certainly deserves

,as Mr . Pedler suggests , to be carefully

investigated,a similar relationship between clans has been observed

in other parts of Africa . It is described by Professor Labouret andMademoiselle Paulme in the articles previously mentioned

,and

amongst the Tallensi it has been studied by Dr . Fortes , who willdeal with it in a forthcoming publication .

2

The two clans are not,in these instances , Specially conn ected

by intermarriage . The relation between them is an allianceinvolving real friendliness and mutual aid combined with an

appearance of hostility .

The general structural situation in these instances seems to beas follows . The individual is a member of a certain definedgroup ,a clan

,for example

,within which his relations to others are

defined by a complex set of rights and duties , referring to all themajor aspects of social life , and supported by definite san ctions .There may be another group outside his own which is so linkedwith his as to be the field of extension of jural and moral relationsof the sam e general kind . Thus , in East Africa , as we learn fromMr . Pedler’s note , the Zigua and the Zaramu do not j oke withone another because a yet closer bond exists between them sincethey are ndugu (brothers) . But beyond the field within which socialrelations are thus defined there lie other groups with which

,Since

1 In ciden tally it may be said that it washard ly satisfactory for the magistrate

to estab lisha preceden t whereby the m an,who was ob servin g what was a

p ermitted an d m ay evenhave b een an ob ligatory custom , was d eclared guilty ofcommon assau lt, even withextenuatin g circum stan ces . It seem s quite possib lethat the m an m ayhave comm itted a breachof etiquette in teasin g the woman

in the presen ce ofher mother’s brother, for in m an y p arts of the world it isregarded as improp er for two person s in ajokin g relation ship to tease on e another(p articu larly if any ob scen ity is involved ) in the presen ce of certain re lativesof either of them . But the breachof etiquette wou ld stil l not make it an assau lt.A little know ledge of an thropology wou ldhave enab led the m agistrate , by

puttin g the ap prop riate question s to the w itn esses , tohave obtain ed a fu l lerunderstanding of the case and all that was in volved in it.

2 Fortes , M ., The Dynamics of Clanship among the Tallensi. Oxford Un iver

s ity Press , 1 94 5 .

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96 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

tribes of East Africa that are organised into age-sets a man isrequired to Show Special respect to all men ofhis father’s ageset and to their wives .The social function of this is obvious . The social tradition is

handed down from one generation to the next . For the traditionto be maintained it must have authority behind it . The authority istherefore normally recognised as possessed by members of the

preceding generation and it is they who exercise discip line . AS aresult of this the relation b etween persons of the two generationsusually ggptaips an elep i ent of ipe‘qil g lityg the parents and thoseof their generation being in a position of superiority over thechildren who are subordinate to them . The unequal relationbetween a father and his son is m aintained by requiring the latterto Show respect to the former . The relation p

is”asymm etriczi .

When we turn to the relation of an ind ividual tohis grandparents and their brothers and sisters we find that in the maj orityof human societies relatives of the second ascending generationare treated with very much less respect than those of the firstascend ing generation

,and instead of a m arked inequality there is a

tendency to approximate to a friendly equality .

Considerations of Space forb id any full discussion of this featureof social structure

,which is one of very great importance . There

are m any instances in which the grandparents and their grandchildren are grouped together in the social structure in oppositionto their children and parents . An important clue to the understanding of the subject is the fact that in theflow of social lifethrough tim e , in which men are born , become m ature and die ,the grandchildren So s w a n k

In m any societies there is an actual joking relationship,usually

of a relatively mild kind,between relatives of alternate genera

tions . Grandchildren make fun of their grandparents and of thosewho are called grandfather and grandmother by the classificatorysystem of term inology

,and these reply in kind .

Grandparents and grandchildren are united by kinship ; they areseparated by age and by the social difference that results from thefact that as the grandchildren are in process of entering into fullparticipation in the social life of the community the grandparentsare gradually retiring from it . Important duties towardshis relatives inhis own and even more inhis parents’generation imposeupon an individual m any restraints ; but with those of the second

ON JOKING RELAT IONSH I PS 97

ascending generation,his grandparents and collateral relatives

,

there can be,and usually is , estab lished a relationship of Simple

friendliness relatively free from restraint . In this instance also,

it is suggested,the joking relationship is a method of ordering a

relation which combines social conjunction and disjunction .

This thesis could,I believe

,be strongly supported if not

demonstrated by considering the detai ls of these relationships .There is space for only one illustrative point . A very comm onform of joke in this connection is for the grandchild to pretendthat he wishes to m arry the grandfather’s wife

,or that he intends

to do sowhen his grandfather dies , or to treat her as already beinghis wife . Alternatively the grandfather may pretend that the wifeofhis grandchi ld is

,or might be , his wife .

1 The point of the jokeis the pretence at ignoring the difference of age between thegrandparent and the gran dchild .

In various parts of the world there are societies in which asister’s son teases and otherwise behaves disrespectfully towardshis mother’s brother . In these instances the joking relationshipseem s generally to be asymm etrical . For example the nephewm ay take his uncle

’s property but not vice versa ; or, as amongstthe Nama Hottentots , the nephew may take a fine beast fromhis uncle’s herd and the uncle in return takes a wretched beastfrom that of the nephew .

2

The kind of social structure in which this custom of privilegeddisrespect to them other’s brother occurs in its most m arked form s

,

for example the Thonga of South-East Africa , Fij i and Tonga inthe Pacific

,and the Central Siouan tribes of North America , is

characterised by emphasis on patrilineal lineage and a markeddistinction between relatives through the father and relativesthrough the mother .In a former publication3 I offered an interpretation of this

custom of privileged fam iliarity towards the mother’s brother.Briefly it is as follows . For the continuan ce of a social systemchildren require to be cared for and to be trained . Their caredemands affectionate and unselfish devotion ; their training

1For examp les see Labouret, Les Tribus du Rameau Lobi, 1 93 1 , p . 24 8 , an d

Sarat Chan dra Roy , The Oraons of Chota Nagpur, Ran chi, 1 9 1 5 , pp . 3 5 2—4 .

2 A. Win ifred Hoern lé, ‘

Social Organ isation of the Nam a Hotten tot’;American Anthropologist, N .S .

,Vol. XXV I I , 1 925 , p p . 1—24 .

3 ‘

The Mother’s Brother in SouthAfrica’, SouthAfrican f ournal of S cience,Vol. XXI , 1 924 . See Chap ter I .

4

98 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

requires that they Shall be subjected to discipline . In the societieswith which we are concerned there is something of a division offunction between the parents and other relatives on the two Sides .The control and discipline are exercised chiefly by the father andhis brothers and generally also byhis Sisters ; these are relativeswho must be respected and obeyed . It is the mother who isprimarily responsible for the affectionate care ; the mother and herbrothers and sisters are therefore relatives who can be looked tofor assistance and indulgence . The m other’s brother is called

mother’in Tonga and in some South African tribes .I believe that this interpretation of the special position of the

mother’s brother in these societies has been confirmed by furtherfield work since I wrow e article referred to . But I was quiteaware at the time it was written that the discussion and interpretation needed to be supplemented so as to bring them into line witha general theory of the social functions of respect and disrespect .The joking relationship with the mother’s brother seems to

fit well with the general theory of such relationships here outlined .

A person’s most importan t duties an d rights attachhim tohispaternal relatives , living an d dead . It is to his patrilineal lineageor clan that he belongs . For the m embers ofhis m other’S l ineagehe IS an outsider, thoughone in whom they have a very Special

. L

and tender interest . Thi s here again there is a relation In whichthere is both attachm ent

, or conjunction,and separation or

disjunction , between the two persons concerned .

I ”

But let us rem ember that in this instance the relation isasymm etrical 1 The nephew is disrespectful and the uncleaccepts the d isrespect . There IS Inequality and the nephew IS thesuperior . This IS recognised by the n atives themselves . Thus In

Tonga it is said that the sister’s son is a ‘chief’(eiki) tohis mother’sbrother, and Junod 2 quotes a Thonga native as saying

‘Theuterine nephew is a chief ! He takes any liberty he likes with hismaternal uncle’. Thus the joking relationship with the uncledoes not m erely annul the usual relation between the two generations , it reverses it . But while the superiority of the father an d the

1 There are some societies in whichthe re lation between a mother’s brotherand a sister

’s son is approxim ate ly symm etrical

,and therefore on e of equality.

This seem s to be so in theWestern Is land s of Torres Straits , but wehave no

in form ation as to any teasing orjokin g , thoughit is said that eachof the twore latives m ay take the prop erty of the other.

Life of a SouthAfrican Tribe, Vol. I , p . 2 5 5 .

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STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

Thus by the fiction of terminological classification the Sister isp laced in the father’s generation

,the one that appropriately

includes persons to whom one must exhibit marked respect .In the south-eastern Ban tu tribes there is assimilation of two

kinds of j okin g relatives , the grandfather and the mother’s brother .

It may help our understanding of this to consider an examplein which the grandfather and the brother-in-law are Similarlygrouped together . The Cherokee Indians of North Am erica

,

probably numbering at one time about were divided intoseven m atrilineal clans . 1 A man could not marry a woman of hisown clan or of his father’s clan . Common membership of the sam eclan connects him with his brothers andhis mother’s brothers .Towards his father and all his relatives inhis father’s clan of hisown or his father’s generation he is required by custom to show amarked respect . He applies the kinship term for ‘father’not onlyto his father’s brothers but also to the sons of his father’s Sisters .Here is another example of the same kind of fiction as describedabove ; the relatives ofhis own generation whom he is requiredto respect and who belong to his father’s m atrilineal lineage arespoken of as though they belonged to the generation ofhis parents .The body of his immediate kindred is included in these twoclans

,that of his mother andhis father . To the other clans of the

tribe he is in a sense an outsider . But with two of them he isconnected , namely with the clans of his two grandfathers, hisfather’s father and his mother’s father . He speaks of all them embers of these two clans

, of whatever age , as‘grandfathers’

and ‘grandmothers’. He Stands in a joking relationship with allof them . When a man marries he must respect his wife’s parentsbut j okes withher brothers and sisters .The interesting and critical feature is that it is regarded as

particularly appropriate that a man should marry a woman whomhe calls ‘grandmother’

,i.e . a m ember of his father’s father’s

c lan or his mother’s father’s clan . If this happenshis wife’s brothersand Sisters

,whom he continues to tease

,are amongst those whom

he previously teased as his ‘grandfathers’and ‘grandmothers’.This is analogous to the Widely spread organisation in which aman has a j oking relationship with the children of his mother’sbrother and is expected to m arry one of the daughters .

1 For an accoun t of the Cherokee see Gilbert, in Social Anthropology ofNorthAmerican Tribes, pp . 285

—3 3 8 .

ON JOKING RELAT IONSH I PS 10 1

It ought perhaps to be mentioned that the Cherokee also havea one-sided joking relationship in whicha man i easeshis fam

sam e custom is found in Mota of the BankIslands . In both instances we have a society organ ised on am atrilineal basis in which the mother

’s brother is respected,the

father’s Sister’s son is called ‘father’(so that the father’s Sister’s

husband is the father of a an d there is a special termfor the father’s Sister’s husband . Further observation of thesocieties in which this custom occurs is required before we can besure of its interpretation . I do not remember that it has beenreported from any part of Africa .

What has been attempted in this paper is to define in the mostgeneral and abstract term s the kind of structural Situation in whichwe may expect to fin d well-marked joking relationships . Wehavevbeen dealing with societies in which the basic social structure isprovided by kinship . By reason ofhis birth or adoption into aceit ain position in the social structure an individual is connectedwith a large number of other persons . With som e of them hefinds himself in a defin ite and Specific jural relation , i.e . one whichcan be defined in term s of rights and duties . Who these personswill be and what will be the rights and duties depend on the formtaken by the social structure . As an example of such a specificjural relation we may take that which normally exists betweena father and son

, or an elder brother and a younger brother .Relations of the sam e general type may be extended over a considerable range to al l the members of a lineage or a clan or an

age-set . Besides these Specific jural relations which are definednot only negatively but also positively

, i.e . in terms of things thatmust be done as well as things that must not , there are general

( 2jural relations which are expressed almost entirely in term s ofprohibitions and which extend throughout the whole politicalsociety . It is forbidden to kill orwound other person s or to take ordestroy their property . Besides these two classes of socialthere is an other

,including many very diverse varieties , which can

perhaps be called relations of alliance or consociation . For

examp le , there is a form of alliance of very great importance inmany societies

,in which two persons or two groups are connected

by of gifts or services }, Another examp le is provided1 See Mauss ,

‘

Es sai sur le Don’, Anne

'

e Sociolog ique, Nouve l le Série , tome I ,pp . 30

—1 86 .

STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PR IM IT IVE SOCIETY

by the institution of blood-brotherhood which is so widespreadin Africa .

The argumentof this paper has been intended to show that thej oking relationship IS one special form of alliance in this sense . Analliance by exchange of goods and services may be associated witha joking relationship

,as in the instance recorded by Professor

Labouret . 1 Or it may be combined with the custom of avoidance .

Thus in the Andaman Islands the parents of a man and the parentsof his wife avoid all contact with each other and do not Speak ; atthe sam e time it is the custom that they Should frequently exchange

presents through the m edium of the younger married couple .

But the exchange of gifts may also exist without either j okingor avoidance

,as in Samoa , in the exchange of gifts between

the fam i ly of a man and the fam ily of the woman he marriesor the very Sim ilar exchange between a chief andhis ‘ talkingchief’.

So also in an alliance by blood-brotherhood there may be aj oking relationship as amongst the Zande ; 2 and in the som ewhatSimilar alliance formed by exchange of names there may also bemutual teasing . But in alliances of this kind there may be arelation of extrem e respect and even of avoidance . Thus in theYaralde and neighbouring tribes of South Australia two boysbelonging to communities distant from one another, and thereforem ore or less hostile , are brought into an alliance by the exchange oftheir respec tive umbilical cords . The relationship thus establishedis a sacred one ; the two boys may never speak to one another .But when they grow up they enter upon a regular exchange ofgifts

,which provides the m achinery for a sort of comm erce

between the two groups to which they belong .

Thus the_four mo

_d! of alliapggp r”con sociation , ( 1 ) through

intermarriage , (2) by exchange Of goods or services , (3 ) by bloodbrotherhood or exchanges of nam es or sacra , and (4) by the j okingrelationship

,may exist separately or combined in several different

ways . The comparative study of these combinations presentsa number of interesting but complex prob lems . The facts recordedfrom West Africa by Professor Labouret and Madem oisellePau lme afford us valuab le material . But a good deal more intensive

1 Africa ,Vol. I I , p . 24 5 .

2 Evan s-Pritchard,

‘

Zande Blood -brotherhood’,Africa ,

Vol. V I , 1 93 3 ,

pp . 3 69—40 1 .

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1 04 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

study of social structure . What I have called , provisionally ,re lations of consociation or alliance are distinguished from therelations set up by common membership of a political societywhich are defined in terms of general ob ligations , of etiquette , ormorals

,or of law . They are distinguished also from true con

tractual relations , defined by som e Specific obligation for eachcontracting party, into which the ind ividual enters ofhis own

volition . They are further to be distinguished from the relationsset up by common m embership of a domestic group , a lineage or aclan

,each of which has to be defin ed in terms of a whole set of

socially recognised rights and duties . Relations _of consoc iationcan only exist between individuals or groups which are in som eway socially separatedI "This paper deals only with formalised or standagdl sed joking

relations . Teasing or making fun Of other persons is of course acommon mode of behaviour in anyhuman society . It tends tooccur in certain kinds of social Situations . Thus I have observedin certain classes in English-speaking countries the occurrenceof horse-play between young men and women as a prelim inary tocourtship

,very Sim ilar to the way in which a Cherokee Indian

jokes withhis ‘grandmothers’. Certainly these unformalised modesof b ehaviour need to be studied by the sociologist . For the purposeof this paper it is suflicient tO '

note that teasingpound of friendliness and antagonism.

The scientific explanation of the institution in the particularform Inwhich It occurs in a given society can only be reached by anintensive study which enables us to see it as a particular. exampleofa widespread phenom enon of a defin ite c lass . This m eans that theWHOIOSO-Cial Stfii ctIIrehastobe thoroughly exam ined In order thatthe particular form and incidence of joking relationships can beunderstood as part of

_

a consistent system . If it be asked why thatsocietyhas the structure that it does have , the only possib leanswer would lie in its history . When the history is unrecorded ,as it is for the native societies of Africa

,we can only indulge in

conjecture,and conjecture gives u s neither scientific nor historical

knowledge .

1

1 The gen eral theory outlin ed in this p ap er is on e that Ihave p resen ted inlectures at various un ivers ities since 1 90 9 as p art of the gen eral study of the form s

of social structure . In arrivin g at the p resen t form u lation of it Ihav e beenhelp‘ed by d iscussion s w ithD r. M eyer Fortes .

C HAP T E R v

A FURTHER NOTE ON JOK ING RELATIONSHIPS 1

ROFESSOR GRIAULE’S article on ‘

L’Alliance cathartique’in

Africa of October 1948 raises a methodological point ofconsiderab le importance . If we wish to

‘

understandcustom or institution that we find in a particu lar soc iety theretwo ways of dealing with it .

is found and the mean ipgI rv-v"

pm-

Saves fProfessor Griaule deals in this way with then M W -d fl"custom by which the Bozo and the Dogon exchange insu lts witheach other . He considers it as an element in a complex of custom s ,institutions

,myths

,and ideas to which the Dogon themselves

refer by the termw He shows us also what meaning thenatives them selves attribute to this exchange of insu lts (p .

As a piece of analysis the article is admirable , and is a most important contribution to our growing knowledge of West AfricanSociety .

But there is another method Open to us,namely

,to make a

W of all those types of social relationshipin which two persons are by custom perm itted

, or even required ,to use Speech or behaviour which in other relationships would begrievously offensive . To the ‘

use of this method it would seemthat Professor Griaule objects . Referring to whathas alreadybeen written on the comparative study of what are called ‘j okingrelationships

’or parente

’s aplaisanterie he writes :

‘Nous adoptons i'

}vis-a-vis travaux parus sur cette question , une attitude negative; .

i

Ethnographers had reported from Oceania ,and Africa instances of a custom by which persons standingin certain relationships resulting either from kinship

, or moreusually from marriage

,were perm itted or required to behave

towards one another in a disrespectful or insu lting way at whichno offence might be taken . Such relationships came to be called

M p n shmp’, adm itted ly not a very good name . The m ost

1 Reprin ted from Africa , Vol. X IX,1 949 , p p . 1 3 3

—1 40 .

1 0 5

l106 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

numerous and widespread examples of this custom were in therelationship of a man to the brothers and Sisters of his wife .

But it was also found in some instances between cross-cousins ,between mother’s brother and Sister

’s son , and in a somewhatmilder form between grandparents and grandchildren . Therethus arose

.

a problem of compa

rati

ve sociol

ogy : What is there i

nall

_ a

meaningful,and functio 9

NW

One Of the first facts that strikes the sociological enquirer isthat the custom of ‘joking’with the wife’S brothers and Sisters isvery commonly associated with a custom of strict avoidance of thewife’s mother

,frequently of the wife’s father, and more occasion

ally the wife’s mother’s brother. Since it is clear that the avoidancecustom and the joking custom are direct contraries , orwopposites

,the problem iIn rnediately became one of dealing with

both these types of custom . And this In turn made it necessaryto consider ce rtain other kinds of relationships .I became interested in this whole set of problems in 1908 when

I was trying to find an explanation of customs of avoidance in theAn daman Islands . There the parents of a man and the parentsof his wife must avoid each other . Their relationship is describedby the term aka-yat, from a stem meaning

‘forbidden’and a prefixreferring to the mouth

,and , therefore , to Speech . Persons in such

a relationship m ight not Speak to each other . On the other handI was told that they will regularly send each other presents Theexplanation given by the Andamanese 13 : ‘They are great friendsbecause their children have married .

’This conception of avoidance relationships as re lationships of friendship I have foundelsewhere . Thus in A ustralia , where a man carefully avoids allsocial contact with his wife’s mother , I have more than oncebeen told that She is the greatest friend he has Since She has providedhim with a wife . Again , the j oking relationship is commonlyreferred to as one of friendship .

‘ I can tease my mother’s brotherand take his property because we are great friends ; I am the sonof his Sister .’‘ I can joke with my grandfather or grandmother , andthey will joke with me because we are great friends .’

What does ‘

friendship’mean in these contexts ? It is clearly

something different from the relationship of solidarity and mutualhelp between two brothers or a father and son . On the basis ofcomparative analysis it seems to me that the assertion of ‘friend

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108 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

indulged in,as between the Dogon and the Bozo . Obscene ta lk , in

all ormost soc ieties , is only permissible in ord inary social intercourse between persons standing in a Specially fam iliar relationship .

The prohibition against any reference to sexual matters before afather

,and still m ore before a father-in-law , in many African

societies,exemplifies this contrast between respectfu l and familiar

or licentious behaviour.The theory

,of which I gave a brief outline in an earlier

number of Africa 1 and to which M . Griaule adopts a negativeattitude

,starts from the position that the custom s of avoidance

or extreme respect towards the wife’s parents , and of privileged‘j oking’with the wife’s brothers and Sisters , can be regarded as themeans of establishing and maintaining social equilibrium in atype of structural Situation that resu lts in many SOClé

-

fi—

e

—S

/from

marriage . In this Situation we have two separate and distinctsocial groups

,families or lineages , which are brought into con

nection with one another through the union of a man of one witha woman of the other . The husband is outside , and sociallyseparated from

,his wife’s group . Through his relationship withher he is in an indirect or mediated relationship with individualsof her group . What is required for ‘Social equilibrium is that

,as

far as possib le,he Should not enter into conflict with his wife’s

group,but be obliged to maintain with that group or its members

a‘

friendly’relation . Both the avoidance custom s and the ‘j oking’

customs are the meansby which this SituatiOfii'

ST O‘

cially regp latted .

‘ L '

Why the difference , then , between the behaviour towardsthe wife’S parents and that towards her brothers and Sisters ?The answer lies in the general principle , widely recognised , thattowards relatives of the first ascending generation respect isrequired , whereas relations of familiarity and equality are ap

propriate between persons of the same generation . There are ,of course , examples of exceptions to this rule , such as j okingrelations or privileged fam iliarity towards the father’s Sister’shusband or the mother’S brother .

.. aao ” m

M ‘ wy

Thus the Spec ial structural situation considered In this theoryIs one of groups which maintain their separateness

,each having

its own system of internal relationships between its members,and

an indirect connection of a person of one group with the other

1 Africa ,Vol. XIII , NO . 3 , 1 940 , pp . 1 9 5

—2 10 . See Chap ter IV.

A FURTHER NOTE ON JOKING RELAT IONSH I PS 109

group through a particular personal re lation . In the instance ofmarriage the indirect relation is that of a man through his wife .

The custom of a joking relationship with the mother’s brother isfound in societies in which an individual be longs to a patrilinealgroup

,and therefore has an indirect relation to his mother’s

group through his mother. The widespread custom of relationship sof familiarity with grandparents

,often taking the form of a joking

/relationship (in Australia , Africa , North America , the Oraons ofIndia) , emphasises the re lation of the two generations as beingsocially separated . The grandparents are thus p laced in contrastwith the relatives of the parents’generation

,and the re lation to

one’s own grandparent is an indirect one through a parent . Thejoking relationship between cross-cousins (Fij i , Oj ibwa , etc .)is frequently a re lation between possible re latives by marriage ,but the re lation is an indirect one through the mother or throughthe father’s sister .An interesting crucial instance for the theory is provided

by the Crow Indians,who have matrilin eal clans . A man must

be respectfu l to all the members ofhis father’s clan ; though he isnot a member of that clan his relation to its members is one ofclose solidarity . In the other clans of the tribe there are to be foundsome men who are sons of men of his father’s clan . They belongto c lans that are separate and distinct

,not only from his own clan

but also from his father’s c lan . With such men , with whom hispersonal relation is an indirect one through his father’s c lan ,he has a joking re lationship ; he may make offensive remarks tothem or receive such from them without offence . In the Crowtribe this relationship has been developed into an instrument ofsocial control of conduct

,Since the joking relative may call public

attention to the shortcom ings of his relative .

The Cherokee also had a system of matrilinea l c lans , and a manwas required to Show respect to all the members ofhis father’s clan .

But with the clans of his father’s father and his mother’s father hehad only an indirect connection through a parent . He called allthe women of these clans ‘grandmother’and could be on are lationship of familiarity or joking with them . Since marriagewith such a ‘grandmother’was approved they were possiblewives or Sisters-in-law .

The theory that I have offered of joking relationships betweenpersons related through marriage or by kinship is that they occur

I IO STRUCTURE AND FUNCT I ON IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

as social institutions in structural Situations of a certain generalkind in which

,

there are two groups , the separateness of which isemphasised

,and re lations are established indirectly between a

person in one group and the members or some of the members ofthe other . The relationship may be said to be one which expressesand emphasises both detachment (as belonging to separated

-~u

groups) and attachm-

e

—n

f

t

'

fthrougfff the indirect personal relation) .These r

f

eIatiOfi-

Sf

l’

fipSu

Of‘friendship’, by avoidance or j oking ,

contrast in a marked way with the relationships of solidarity ,involving a complex system of obligations

,that exist within a

group such as a lineage or a clan . For the further developmentof the theory they need to be compared also with those relations

Y-whichare set up

,between persons be longing to different groups ,

by the regular exchange of gifts . Thus the theory is only one partof an attempt to deal systematically with the types of socialrelationship that are to be found in primitive societies .The great majority of instances of j oking relationship s that

were recorded by ethnographers were relationships betweenindividuals connected through marriage or by kinship . Hence thereference to them in French as relations ofparente

’. But there were

also found instances of a Sim ilar re lation between groups of persons ,by which a member of on e group was permitted and expected tooffer insulting or derogatory remarks to any member of the other.A good example is provided by the ‘ coyote’and ‘wild cat’

moietie s of Californian tribes . More recently sim ilarcu stomshave been reported from Africa (Northern Rhodesia , Tanganyika ,West Africa)

1 in which this kind of relationship exists between twoclans of a tribe or between two tribes . These obviously presenta prob lem of a somewhat different kind . But it is obvious thatany valid general theory of j oking relationships must take intoaccount these relations between groups .Tribes and clans are distinct separated groups each maintaining

its own identity and separateness . Within a clan the relations ofits members are those of solidarity in the Special sense in whichI have been using that term in this note . Two clans may , in someinstances , be united in a way in which there is a permanent unionof solidarity between the c lans as groups and the m embers thereof.On the other hand there may also be a relation between two clans

1 See Bib liography, p . 1 1 5 .

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1 1 2 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

classificatory re lation of‘brother-in-law’but not his own brother

in - law . For b rothers-in-law always necessari ly belong to separatedgroups . There is a clear distinction made between friendship andre lationships by kinship .

I am distinguishing,therefore

,a ce rtain class of what I

call ‘

friendshi ’relations, from what I have called_relations ofS‘ olidarity’es't

—bl fhe d ’by kinship or by membership of a

__N groupsuch as a lineage or clan . These term s are used only for the purpoF s

of the present analysis because In this matter,as in SO many others

in social anthropology , no precise techn ical term s are yet available .

We may regard as one type of ‘ friendship’in this sense therelation set up between persons or groups on the basis of a continued exchange of goods and serv ices . The world-wide cu stom ofgift-exchange has to be considered in this conn ection . But thereare other varieties ; one group may bury the dead of the other orperform other ritual services . In North-West America one groupwould call in a ‘friend’group to erect a totem-pole for them .

A component of the relationship between groups is very comm onlya certain am ount and kind of opposition , meaning by that termsocially controlled and regulated antaggpism . The two groupsmay regularly engage in competitive games Siichas football . Inpotlatchin North America there is competition or rivalry inexchange of valuables . Social re lations of friendly rivalry are ofconsiderable theoretical importance . The universities of Oxfordand Cambridge maintain a certain relation by competing regularly in rowing , football , etc . The joking re lationship is thus oneexample of a wider kind ; for it is a relation of friendship in whichthere is an appearance of antagonism ,

controlled by conventionalru les .The ‘alliance’between the Dogon and the Bozo described and

analysed by M . Griaule is clearly an example of what I have beenreferring to as ‘ friendship’. The Dogon and the Bozo are separatepeoples distinguished by language and by their m ode of life .

The prohibition against intermarriage maintains thi s separation bypreventing the creation of relations of kinship between membersof the two groups . The ‘friendship’appears in the prohibition ,under supernatural sanction

,agains t the Shedding of the b lood

of a member of the allied people , and in the regular exchangeof gifts and services

,for example , the services that individuals

of one group perform in the ritual purification of those of the

A FURTHER NOTE ON JOKING RELAT IONSH I PS 1 1 3

other . T0 these is added a ‘j oking re lationship’,the exchange of

insults between members of the two groups . It is with this lastfeature that we are concerned here .

This alliance is conceived by the two peoples concerned interm s of their own cosmological system of myths and ideas

,and

M . Griaule’s article is an important addition to the series of

publications in which he and his co-workers have given theresu lts of their investigation of this cosmology . It is in term s ofthese ideas that the Dogon interpret the exchange of insults . 1

The exchange of insults is ‘

Cathartic’because it rids the livers ofboth parties of impurities . M . Griaule has thus given uS an exp lanation of the exchange of insults between Dogon and Bozo byShowing what meaning it has to the natives them selves and alsoby Showing its interconnections within a comp lex system of

institutions,ideas

,and myths . He finds that the m ost important

function of the alliance is to provide what he calls , for lack of amore suitable term

,

‘purification’. So, provisionally , he proposesto call this type of alliance

,as found in an extensive region of

Africa ,‘cathartic alliance’. Doubtlesshe would not suggest that we

should app ly thi s name to the exchange of insu lts between clansamong the Tallensi or Bemba

,or between tribes in Tanganyika .

M . Marcel Mauss and I have both been seeking for manyyears to fin d a satisfactory general theory of what I have beencalling relations of ‘ friendship’between separate groups of persons belonging to Separate groups . One part of such a theory mustbe a study of prestations or exchanges of goods or services .Another must be a study of ‘j oking relationships’. It is towardssuch studies that M . Griaule adopts , as he says ,

‘a negativeattitude’. He suggests that to classify together the various examples of ‘joking relationships’and to look for a general explanation

,is like classifying together the ceremonies at which church

bells are rung,such as funerals and weddings

,calling them all

ce'

remonies d cloches . This is the question of methodology in social’

anthropology that seems to me so important . For M . Griaule

seems to be_uestinnint e scientific validity of the

“ comparativeH

A 0

method as amean s of arriving at gen eral tt ehcoretical interpretationsI ffgofgigl Institutions .

It is only by the use of a comparative method that we can arrive

1 Africa , Vol. XV I I I , No. 4 , pp . 2 5 3—4 .

1 14. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

at w generalf exp lanations . The alternative is to confine ourselve sto particularistic explanations Sim ilar to those of the historians .The two kinds of explanation are both legitimate and do notconflict ; but both are needed for the understanding of societiesand their institutions . That the Dogon explain the exchange ofinsu lts as a means of purifying the liver does not prevent us fromtreating the Dogon institution as one example of a very widespread form of

‘friendship’in which such exchange is a distinctivefeature .

It is not a question of whether my theory,or any other general

theory,of j oking relationships is or is not satisfactory. It is the

differen tflquestion of whether suchor whether attempts to arrive at one Should be abandoned infavour of resting content with particularistic exp lanations .The same question of m ethodology arises in connection with

the conclusion of M . Griaule’s article . He touches briefly on the

need for an explanation of the Dogon-Bozo alliance ‘en tant quesysteme de groupes couplés et dont leS deux parties ont des

prerogatives et devoirs comple’mentaires

’. He finds the exp lanation

in ‘ les fondements meme de la métaphysique dogon . En effet ,des l

’origine du monde , la regle était de gémelléité. Les étres

devaient maitre par couple . This is therefore a particularisticexplanation In term s of Dogon ideas about twins .Relations of this kind between paired groups are to be found

in many parts of the world . Outstanding examples are providedby the moiety organisations of North and South Am erica

,

Melanesia,and Australia . The m ost usual way of representing

this unity in duality, linking two groups into one society, is bypairs of Opposites

,such as heaven and earth

,war and peace

,red

and white,land and water

,coyote and wild cat

,eaglehawk and

crow . The underlying conception is therefore that of the unionof opposites

,as in the philosophy of Heraclitus . It was highly

e laborated by the Chinese in the philosophy of Yin and Yang;yang and y in are male and female , day and night , summer andwinter, activity and passivity , etc . . and the dictum is that yangand yin together are required to make a unity or harmony (tao)as in the union of husband and wife

, or the union of winter andsumm er to make a year .The Dogon are therefore unusual when they represent the

re lation between paired groups by reference to human twins .

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1 1 6 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

Paulrne , D en ise .

‘

Paren téap laisan teries et al l iance par le san g en Afriqueocciden tale’, Africa , Vol. XI I , No. 4 , 1 93 9 , pp . 43 3

-44 .

Ped ler, F . J .

‘Joking Re lation ship s in East Africa’, Africa , Vol. XI I I , No.

2 , 1 940 , pp . 170—3

Radc liffe-Brown ,A . R .

‘

On Joking Re lation ship s’, Africa , Vol. XI I ,No. 3 , 1 940 , pp . 1 95

—2 1 0 .

Richard s , A . I . ‘

Recip rocal C lan Re lation ship s among the Bemba of

N . Rhodesia’, M an , Vol. XXXVI I , p . 222 , 1 927 .

Schapera , I . ‘Cu stom s re lating totwin s in South Afr. Soc. ,

Vol. XXVI , cii, pp . 1 1 7—37 .

C HAP T E R VI

THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF TOTEMISM 1

HEREhas been in the past some disagreement and discussionas to the definition of totemism . I wish to avoid as far aspossible entering into any such discussion . The purpose

of preliminary definitions in science is to mark off a class ofphenomena for Special study . A term is useful if and in so far asit brings together for our attention a number of phenomena whichare in reality, and not merely in appearance , closely related toone another . It will be part of my thesis in this paper thathowever widely or narrowly we may define totem ism

,we cann ot

reach an understanding of the phenomena we so name unless westudy systematically a much wider group of phenomena

,namely

,

the general relation between man and natural Species in mythologyand ritual . It may well be asked if ‘ totemism’as a technical termhas not outlived its usefulness .It is necessary

,however

,to have some definition to guide and

control our discussion . I shal l use the term in the wider sense toapply wherever a society is divided into groups and there is aspecial relation between each group and one or more classes ofobjects that are usually natural Species of animals or p lants butmay occasionally be artificial objects or parts of an animal . Theword is sometimes used in a narrower Sense and applied onlywhen the groups in question are clans

,i.e . exogamous groups of

which all the members are regarded as being closely related bydescent in one line . I shall regard ‘clan totemi sm’as only onevariety of totemism

,in the wider sense .

2

Even in the narrower sense of clan totemism , and stil l morein the wider sense

,totemism is not one thing but is a general name

1 Reprin ted from Proceedings of the FourthPacific S cience Congress , Java ,1 929 .

2 It is sometimes said that totem ismhas two aspects , a social asp ect an d a

re ligious or ritual aspect. What is referred to as the ‘

social asp ect’of totemismis simp ly the clan organ isation . But exogamous c lan s Sim ilar in all essen tials tototemic c lan s so far as econom ic orjuridical fun ction s go,

can ,as we wel l know ,

exist without totem ism . The so-cal led ‘

social asp ect’of clan totemism is simp lythe social aspect of the clan .

1 1 8 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

given to a number of diverse institutions which all have , or seemto have

,something in common . Thus even in the limited region

of Australia , whichhas a Single homogeneous culture throughout,there have been recorded a number of different varieties oftotemism

,and new varieties are being discovered by systematic

researches now in progress .In the south-east of the continent is found sex-totemism , i.e .

an association of the two sex—groups , men and women , with twoanimal Species . In the coasta l districts of New South Wales , forexample

,the bat is the totem or animal representative of the men

and the tree-creeper (Climacteris sp .) is that of the women .

In many parts of Australia the tribe is divided into twoexogamous moieties , patrilineal in some regions , matrilineal inothers . In some instances tlfe m oieties are named after Species ofanimals

,generally birds . Amongst such names are the following

pairs : crow and whi te cockatoo , white cockatoo and black cockatoo ,eaglehawk and crow , native companion and turkey ,hi ll kangarooand long-legged kangaroo . In other instances the meanings of them oiety names have not been discovered , and in some of them , atany rate

,it seem s certain that they are not animal names .

In m any of the tribes that have this dual division,indepen

dently of whether the moieties are named after animals or not,

there is a classification of animals and frequently of other naturalobjects whereby some are regarded as belonging to one m oietyand others to the other .

Such m oiety totem ism , if we may use that term for any suchassociation between the m oiety and one or more natural species ,is found in a number of different varieties in Australia

,and still

other varieties are found in Melanesia and in North Am erica .

Over a large part of Australia the tribe is divided into fourgroups which have often been called ‘ classes’but which I preferto call ‘ sections’. The easiest way to understand this divisioninto four is to regard it as constituted by the intersection of a pairof patril ineal moieties and a pair of matrilineal moieties . 1

1 If we denote the four sections as A ,B

,C

,an d D

,the m atrilin ea l moieties

are A C an d B D ; the p atrilin ea l moieties are A D an d B C . Sin ce

a m an m ay not m arry w ithinhis own p atrilin eal moiety or w ithinhis own

matrilin eal moiety it wil l fol low that a m an of A can on ly m arry a wom an of Band the ir chi ldren m u st b e long to section D , i.e . to the p atrilin eal moiety of thefather (A) an d to the m atrilin eal moiety of the mother (B) .

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1 20 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

two totem s and one has three . The association between the clanand its totem is apparently of very little importance in the lifeof the tribe . There is no prohibition against eating or using thetotem

,there are no totem ic ceremonies , and totemism has little

influence on the mythology .

The matrilineal clan totem ism of some tribes of New SouthWales

,Victoria and South Australia seems to be of somewhat

more importance . Here we find matrilineal moieties sometimesnam ed totem ically , sometimes not , and each m oiety is divided intoa number of clans . Each clan has one or more natural Speciesregarded as belonging to it . Where there are several Speciesassociated with each clan

,as is the case in m any tribes , one of

them is regarded as more important than the others and the clanis named after it . Throughout this region there is , so far as weknow

,no prohibition against killing or eating the totem .

Totem ic ceremonial is apparently little developed nor have weany evidence of any elaborate totem ic mythology conn ected withmatrilineal totem ism .

It Should be noted that throughout Australia the m ost important group for social purposes is the horde , i.e . a small groupoccupying and owning a certain defined territory

,and that the

horde is normally strictly patrilineal . It follows that whereverthere is a system of matrilineal totem ic clans the clan consists ofindividuals scattered through a number of hordes . We thus get adouble grouping of individuals . For m ost soc ial purposes theindividual is dependent on the local group , i.e . the horde , to whichhe is connected through his father

,while at the same time he is

also connected through his mother to a totem ic group the membersof which are scattered throughout the tribe .

Patrilineal totemism in Australia is more difficult to describeb riefly than is matrilineal totemism . Where it exists the primarytotem ic group is usually the horde

, i.e . the small patrilineal localgroup . In som e regions the horde is a Clan

,i.e . it consists of close

relatives in the male line and is therefore exogamous . But in afew regions the horde is not a clan in this sense .

AS an example of one variety of patrilineal totemism we maytake the tribes at the m outh of the Murray River (Yaralde ,Here each horde is a local clan and each clanhas one or morespecies of natural object associated with it . There is no prohibitionagainst eating the totem of one’s c lan

,but it is regarded with some

THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF TOTEM I SM 1 2 1

respect . There is no evidence of totem ic ceremonial or of anyelaborate totem ic mythology . The function of the totem seems tobe merely to act as the representative of the group .

Perhaps the m ost important,and certainly the m ost interesting

,

form of totemism in Australia is that to a b rief consideration ofwhich we now pass . This consists of a fourfold association between

( I ) the horde , i.e . the patrilineal local group , (2) a certain numberof classes of objects

,anim als

,p lants

,and other things such as rain

,

sun andhot weather , cold weather , bab ies , etc . , (3 ) certain sacredSpots within the territory of the horde , frequently water-holes ,each one of which is Specially associated with one or more of the‘ totems’of the group

,and (4) certain mythical beings who are

supposed to have given rise to these sacred spots in the mythicalperiod of the beginning of the world . This system of totemismis now being traced and studied in a number of variant forms overa very large part of the Australian continent . It was formerlyknown best from the centre of the continent , where , however , theAranda have it in a somewhat modified or anomalous form .

We now know that it exists or existed over a large part of WesternAustralia . Recently it has been discovered and studied in theCape York Peninsula by M iss McConnel. At the beginn ing of thisyear I was ab le to demonstrate its former existence on the eastcoast ofAustralia in the north of New South Wales and in southernQueensland .

Where this type of totemism is found it is usually accompan iedby a system of ceremon ie s for the increase of natural Species . Themembers of the horde , or som e of them , proceed to the totemcentre or sacred Spot connected with a natural Species and performthere a ceremony which is believed to result in an increase ofthat Species . There is also an elaborate mythology dealing with thesacred totem centres and with the mythical beings who gave riseto them .

It may be noted that this kind of totemism may coexist inthe same tribe with other kinds . Thus in the D ieri tribe it existstogether with a system of matrilineal clan totemism . In someparts it coexists with section totemism .

Finally,we may note that in som e parts of Australia there

exists what is sometimes called individual or personal totem ism .

This is a special re lation between an individual and some one ormore Specie s of animal . A good example is found in some tribe s

1 22 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

of New South Wales where every medicine-manhas one or moreof such personal totems . It is through his association with theanimal species that he acquires his power to perform magic

.

Whether we call this totem ism or not , it is quite evident that it i sclosely related to totem ism and that any theory of totem ism

,to be

satisfactory,must take it into account .

This brief and very incomplete su rvey ofAustralian institutionshas Shown us that Special associations of groups or individualswith natural species exist in that region in a number of differentforms .We find all gradations from a tribe with no form of totemismat al l (such as the Bad of northern Dampier Land) through tribessuch as the Melville Islanders where totem ism of a Simple formexists but is of comparative ly little importance in the life of thetribe

,to a tribe such as the D ieri which combines in a complex

system two form s of totem ism ,one of matrilineal clans and the

other of patrilineal hordes , with a highly elaborated totem icritual and mythology . The only thing that these totem ic systemshave in common is the general tendency to characterise the segments into which society is divided by an association betweeneach segment and some natural Species or some portion of nature .

The association may take any one of a number of different forms .In the past the theoretical discussion of totemism was almost

ntirely concerned with speculations as to its possib le origin .

If we use the word origin to mean the historical process by whichan institution or custom or a state of culture comes into existence

,

then it is clear that the very diverse form s of totemism that existall over the world must have had very diverse origins . To beable to Speak of an origin of totemi sm we must assume that allthese diverse institutions that we include under the one generalterm have been derived by successive modifications from a singleform . There does not seem to me to be a particle of evidence tojustify such an assumption . But even if we make it we can stillonly specu late as to what this original form of totemism may havebeen

,as to the enormously complex series of events which could

have produced from it the various existing totem ic system s,and

as to where,when

,and how that hypothetical original form of

totem ism came into existence . And such Speculations,being for

ever incapable of inductive verification , can be nothing m orethan Speculations and can have no value for a science of culture .

For sociology,or social anthropology, by which I understand

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1 24 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

One of the important problems of sociology is therefore todiscover the function of this universal e lement of culture andto formulate its laws . This general prob lem obviously includes avast number of partial problems of which the problem of totemismis one . That problem may be stated as being that of discoveringwhy in certain societies a ritual attitude towards a certain Speciesof natural object is imposed upon the members of a particularsocial group . It is obvious that no solution of the lesser problemof totem ism can be satisfactory unless it conform s with or is partof a general solution of the wider problem ,

i.e . a theory of ritualrelations in general .With regard to the general problem Durkheim’s theory is that

the primary object of the ritual attitude is the social order itself,

and that any thing becomes an object of that attitude when itstands in a certain relation to the Social order . This generaltheory

,with which I agree

,obviously amounts to very little until

we have succeeded in defining the more important types ofrelation to the social order which result in the object which standsin such a relation becom ing an object of ritual attitude .

If I may restate in my own term s Durkheim’s theory of totem

ism it is as follows . A social group such as a c lan can only possesssolidarity and permanence if it is

‘ the object of sentiments ofattachment in the m inds of its members . For such sentimentsto be m aintained in existence they must be given occasionalcollective expression . By a law that can be , I think , readilyverified

,all regular collective expressions of social sentiments

tend to take on a ritual form . And in ritual , again by a necessarylaw

,some more or less concrete object is required which can act

as the representative of the group . So that it is,a normal procedure

that the sentiment of attachment to a group Shall be expressedin some formalised collective behaviour having reference to anobject that represents the group itself.A typical example is to be found in our own society . National

solidarity depends on a sentiment of patriotism in the minds of thenation . This sentiment , in conformity with the laws stated above ,tends to find some of its chief expressions in reference to suchconcrete objects as flags

,or kings and presidents

,and such objects

become in this way objects of the ritual attitude .

Part of a king’s sacredness,whether in Africa or in Europe

,

is due to the fact that he is the representative of the nationa l

THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF TOTEM I SM 1 25

solidarity and unity , and the ritual that surroundshim is themeans by which patriotic sentiments are m aintained . In the sameway in the flag we have an object which is ‘ Sacred’because it isthe concrete material representative or emblem of a social groupand its solidarity .

Durkheim compares the totem of a clan with the flag of anation . The comparison is valid , in a very general sense , for someform s of totemism ,

if not for all . But putting the comparison aside,

the theory is that the totem is ‘ Sacred’as Durkheim says,or is an

object of ritual attitude , as I prefer to say , because it is the concreterepresentative or emblem of a social group . And the function ofthe ritual attitude towards the totem is to express and so to maintain in existence the solidarity of the socia l group .

With Durkheim’s theory as stated above in my own terms Iam in agreement

,but I do not regard it as complete . In the first

p lace it seem s to me that totem ism has other functions besides theone indicated above . Secondly , the theory so far as stated abovedoes not explain why somany peoples in America

,Asia

,Africa and

Australasia Should select as emblem s or representatives of clansor other social groups Species of animals or p lants . It is true thatDurkheim offers an answer to this question , but it is an entirelyunsatisfactory one . He regards as an essential part

‘

bf totemism theuse of totemic emblem s or designs

,i.e . figured representations

of the totemic animal or plant , and suggests that the reason forselecting natural objects as emblem s of social groups is becausethey are capable of being used in this way .

This hypothesis fails as soon as we apply it to the facts . InAustralia no designs are made of the sex totems or of the totem s ofthe moieties or sections , and even for clan totem ism there are manytribes that do not make any representations of their totems .Totemic designs

,which for Durkheim are so important or indeed

SO essential a part of totemism , are characteristic of central andnorthern Australia but not of the continent as a whole .

Moreover,the reason suggested for the selection of natural

objects as emblems of social groups is of too accidental a characterto give a satisfying explanation of an institution that is SO wideSpread as totem ism . There must surely be some much more important reason why all these peoples all over the world find itappropriate to represent social groups in this way by associatingeach one with some animal or plant .

1 26 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

This,then

,is where I think Durkheim’s theory of totem ism

fails . It implies that the totem owes its sacred or ritual charactersolely to its position as the emblem of a group . Now there are anumber of peoples who have no form of totemism amongst whomwe still find that natural Species such as animals and plants areobjects of ritual or of the ritual attitude expressed in mythology .

And even amongst totemic peoples such as the Australian tribesthe ritual customs relating to natural species are not all totemic .

In other words the phenomena which we have agreed to denoteby the term totem ism are merely a part of a much larger class ofphenomena which includes all sorts of ritual relations betweenman and natural Species . No theory of totem ism is satisfactoryun less it conform s with a more general theory providing anexplanation of many other things besides totemism . Durkheim’stheory fails to do thi s .In a great number

,and I believe probably in all , of the societies

where man depends entirely or largely on the hunting of wildanimals and the collection of wild plants

,whether they have any

form of totemism or not , the animals and plants are made objectsof the ritual attitude . This Is done frequently

,though perhaps not

quite universally,in mythology

,in which anim al Species are

personified and regarded as ancestors or cu lture heroes . It is donealso by a mass of customs relating to anima ls and p lants . Thissystem of ritual and mythological re lations between man andna tural Species can be best studied in non-totem ic peop les suchas the Eskimo or the Andaman Islanders . In such societies wefind that the relation between the society and the natu ral Speciesis a general one

,all the most important animals and plants being

treated as in some way sacred (either in ritual or in mythology)and some being regarded as more sacred than others

,but any

single species being equally sacred to every member of the wholecommun ity . The ritual attitude of the An daman Islanders towardsthe turtle , of Californian Indians to the salmon , of the peoples ofNorth America and northern Asia to the bear

,constitutes a

re lation between the whole society and the sacred Species .Now totem ism

,I would suggest

,arises from or is a Special

development of this general ritual relation between man andnatural Species . Let us assume for the moment that such a generalritual relation of man to nature is universal in hunting societies

,

as I believe it can be Shown to be . When the society becomes

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1 28 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT I ON IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

of totemism which incorporates a great deal of Durkheim’sanalysis and is not open to the criticism s that can be levelledagainst Durkheim’s own presentation . We start with the em

pirical generalisation that amongst hunting and collecting peoplesthe more important animals and plants and natural phenomenaare treated

,in custom and in myth , as being

‘ Sacred’, i.e . theyare made

,in various ways and in different degrees , obj ects of the

ritual attitude . Primarily this ritual relation between man andna ture is a general one between the society as a whole and itssacra . When the society is differentiated , i.e . divided into seg

ments or social groups marked off from one another and eachhaving its own solidarity and individuality

,there comes into action

a principle which is m ore widespread than totemism and isindeed an important part of the general process of social differentiation ,

a principle by which within the general relation of thesociety to its sacra there are estab lished Sp ecial relations betweeneach group or segm ent and some one or more of those sacra .

This theory incorporates what I think is the most valuablepart of Durkheim’s analysis

,in the recogn ition that the function of

the ritual relation of the group to its totem is to express and S0 tomaintain in existence the solidarity of the group . It gives moreovera reason

,which can be Shown , I think , to be grounded in the

very nature of social organisation itself, for the selection of naturalspecies as emblems or rep resentatives of social groups .Before leaving this part of the discussion I would like to touch

on one further point . Durkheim , in reference to clan totemism ,

emphasises the clan and its solidarity . The totem,forhim ,

isprimarily the means by which the clan recognises and expressesits unity . But the matter is much more complex than this . Theclan is m erely a segment of a larger society which also has itssolidarity . By its Special relation to its totem or totems the clanrecognises its unity and its individuality . This is simply a specialexample of the universal process by which solidarity is createdand maintained by uniting a number of individuals in a collectiverelation to the sam e sacred obj ect or objects . By the fact that eachclan has its own totem there is expressed the differentiation andopposition between clan and clan . The kangaroo men not onlyrecognise the bond that unites them as kangaroo men but alsorecognise their difference from the emu men and the bandicootmen and so on. But also the wider unity and solidarity .of the

THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF TOTEM ISM 1 29

whole totemic society is expressed by the fact that the society as awhole

,through its segments

,stands in a ritual relation to nature

as a whole . This is seen very well in the system of increaseceremonies that is so widespread in Australia . Each group isrespons ible for the ritual care of a certain number of Species bywhich the maintenance of that Species is believed to be assured .

For the tribe all these Species are of importance , and the cerem oniesare thus a sort of co-Operative effort , involving a division of

(ritual) labour, by which the normal processes of nature and thesupply of food are provided for . One of the results of Durkheim’stheory is that it over-emphasises the clan and clan solidarity .

Totemism does more than express the unity of the clan ; it alsoexpresses the unity of totem ic society as a whole in the relations ‘

of the clans to one another within that wider unity .

The result of my argument,if it i s va l id

, is to substitute forthe problem of totemism another problem . The question that nowdemands an answer is

,

‘Why do the maj ority of what are calledprimitive peoples adopt in their custom and myth a ritual attitudetowards animals and other natural Species?’My aim in this paperhas Simply been to exhib it as exactly as possible in a brief Spacethe relation of the problem of totemism to this wider prob lem .

It is obvious that I cannot attempt in a mere conclusion to apaper to deal with this subject of the relation in myth and ritualof man and na ture . I attempted some years ago to deal with it inreference to the custom s and beliefs of one non-totem ic people

,the

Andaman Islanders . AS a result of that and other investigations Iwas led to formulate the following law : Any obj ect or event whichhas important effects upon the well-being (material or spiritu al)of a society , or any thing which stands for or represents any suchobject or event , tends to b ecome an object of the ritual attitude .

I have given reasons for rej ecting Durkheim’s theory that intotem ism natural species becom e sacred because they are selectedas representatives of social groups

,and I hold

,on the contrary

,

that natural Species are selected as representatives of socialgroups , such as clans , because they are already obj ects of theritual attitude on quite another basis

,by virtu e of the general

law of the ritual expression of social values stated above .

In modern thought we are accustomed to draw a distinctionbetween the social order and the natural order . We regard societyas consisting of certain human beings grouped in a social structure

1 30 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

under certain moral principles or laws,and we place over agains t

the society its environment,consisting of geographical features,

flora and fauna , climate with its seasonal changes, and so on ,

governed by natural law.

For certain purposes this contrast of society and environm ent,

of man and nature , is a useful one , but we must not let it misleadus . From another and very important point of view the naturalorder enters into and becomes part of the social order . Theseasonal changes that control the rhythm of social life

,the animals

and plants that are used for food or other purposes , these enterinto and become an essential part of the social life

,the social order.

I believe that it can be Shown that it i s just in so far as they thusenter into the social order that na tural phenomena and naturalobj ects become

,either in themselves

,or through things or beings

that represent them, objects of the ritual attitude , and I havealready tried to demons trate this so far as the An daman Islandersare concerned . Our own explicit conception of a na tural orderand of natural law does not exist amongst the more primitivepeoples, though the germs out of which it develops do exist in theempirical control of causal processes in technical activities . Forprim itive man the universe as a whole is a moral or social ordergoverned not by what we call natural law but rather by whatwe must call moral or ritual law. The recognition of this conception , implicit but not explicit , in ritual and in myth is , I believe ,one of the most important step s towards the proper understandingnot only of what is sometim es called ‘primitive mentality

’butalso of all the phenomena that we group vaguely around theterm religion.

1

A study of primitive myth and ritual from this point of viewis

,I think

,very illuminating . In Australia , for example, there are

innumerable ways in which the natives have built up betweenthems elves and the phenomena of nature a system of relationswhich are essentially similar to the relations that they have builtup in their social structure between one human being and another.

1 Amore precise way of statin g the view I amhere suggestin g is that in everyhuman society there in evitab ly exist two differen t and in a certain sen se 00n

fiicting con ceptions of n ature . On e of them , the n aturalistic , is imp licit everywhere in technology, and in our twen tiethcen tury Europ ean cu lture , w ithitsgreat deve lopmen t of con trol over n atural phenom ena ,has become exp licit an dpreponderan t in our thought. The other, whichmight be ca l led the mythologica lor sp iritualistic con cep tion ,

is imp licit in mythand in religion ,and often

becomes exp licit in philosophy.

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1 32 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

Durkheim’s attempt to provide such a theory fails in certaii

important respects . We can , however , incorporate a good deaof Durkheim’s analysis in a theory which rests on the sam i

general hypothesis of the nature and function of ritual or tht‘ Sacred’.Finally, my argumenthas brought out something of the con

ditions in which this universal element of cultu re is most likelI

to take the form of totemi sm . These are ( I ) dependence whollIor in part on natural productions for subsistence

,and (2) the

existence of a segmentary organisation into clans and moieties orother Similar social units . The Andamanese and the Eskimohavr( I ) but not and they have no totemism though they have thtm aterial out of which totem ism could easily be made . There areof course

,apparent exceptions to this generalisation , in SOITlt

of the tribes of Africa,America and Melanesia . The detailec

examination of these , which of course cann ot be undertaken inbrief paper

,really serves

,I believe

,to confirm the rule .

I would not be understood to maintain the view that totemism ‘

or rather the different institutions which in different parts of theworld we call by this general term ,have arisen independently 0

one another . I think that it is very likely . But it does not matter foithe sociologist

,at any rate in the present state of our knowledge

If anyone wishes to believe that a ll the existing forms of totemisrrhave come into existence by a process of what is rather unsatisfactorily called

‘diffusion’from a Single centre , I have no objectionI would point out that totem ism has not Spread everywhere , OIevenly

,and that it has not su rvived equally in all regions . It is

sufficient for my argument if we can say that it is only wherecertain other features of culture are present that totemism is

likely to be accepted by a people when it is brought to them fromoutside

, or is likely to rem ain in active existence after ithasbeen introduced .

C HA P T E R V I I

TAB00 1

HE purpose of this lecture,which you have done me the

honour of inviting me to deliver , is to commemoratethe work of Sir James Frazer, as an example of life-long

-minded devotion to scientific investigation and as havingas large a measure as that of any man , to layingof the Science of social anthropology . It therefore

propriate to select as the subject of my discoursewhich Sir James was the first to investigate systematicallya century ago

,when he wrote the article on ‘Taboo’for the

h edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica ,and to the elucida

n of which he has made many successive contributions in hisitings Since that time .

The English word ‘ taboo’is derived from the Polynesian‘ tabu’(with the accent on the first syllab le) . In the languageslynesia the word means Simply

‘ to forb id’,‘forbidden’, and

e applied to any sort of prohib ition . A rule of etiquette , anissued by a chief

,an injunction to children not to meddle

ions of their elders,may all be expressed by the

rs in Polynesia adopted the word to refer toons of a Special kind

,which may be illustrated by an

Certain things such as a newly-born infant , a corpse orerson of a Chief are said to be tabu . This means that one should ,1 as possib le

,avoid touching them . A man who does touch

of these tabu obj ects immediately becomes tabu himself.means two things . In the first p lace a man who is tabu

a number of Special restrictions on hismple , he may not use hishands to feedhim self.being in a state of danger , and this is generallythat if he fails to observe the customary pre

autions he will be ill and perhaps die . In the second place he islSO dangerous to other persons—he is tabu in the same senses the thing he has touched . If he Should come in contact with

1 The Fraz er L ecture , 1 9 3 9 .

I 3 3

1 34. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

utensils in which,or the fire at which ,

influence would be communicatedanyone who partook of it . A person who is tabu in this way,by touching a corpse , can be restored to his normal conditiby rites of purification or desacralisation . He is then said tonoa again , this term being the contrary of tabu .

Sir James Frazer has told us that when he took up the stuof taboo in 1 886 the current view of anthropologists at thewas that the institution in question was confined to the bblack races of the Pacific , but that as a result ofhis iny ehe came to the conclusion that the Polyn esian body ofand beliefs ‘

is only one of a number of sim ilar systemsstition which among many , perhaps all the races ofcontributed in large measure

,under many different

with m any variations of detail , to build up the complex fabof society in all the various Sides or elements of it whichdescribe as religious

,social

,political , m oral and economic

’.

The use of the word taboo in anthropology for customsover the world which resemble in essentials thefrom Polynesia seems to me undesirableThere is the fact already mentioned thatlanguage the word tabu has a much wto our own word ‘forbidden’. Thishasconfusion in the lite rature relating to

ambiguity resulting from two differentYou will have noticed that I have usedEnglish spelling and pronunciation) in the meaninganthropologists

,and tabu (with the Polynesian Spelling

pronunciation) in special reference to Polynesia and in the Pnesian sense . But this is not entire ly satisfactory .

I propose to refer to the custom s we are considering as ‘ riavoidances’or ‘ ritual prohibitions’and to define them byence to two fundamental concepts for which I have bethe habit of using the term s ‘ ritual status’and ‘ritualI am not Suggesting that these are the best term s to bethey are merely the best that I have been able to find uppresent . In such a science as ours words are the instof analysis and we Should always be prepared to discardtools for superior when opportunity arises .A ritual prohibition is a rule of behaviour which

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1 36 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

shall sacrifice to m ake an atonement for the sin so that it shall beforgiven him . Here the change in ritual status through touchingan unclean carcase is described by the terms ‘ Sin’

,

‘unclean’

and ‘guilty’.In the Kikuyu tribe of East Af rica the word thahu denotes

the undesirable ritual status that results from failure to observerules of ritual avoidance . It is believed that a person who is thakuwill be ill and will probab ly die unless he removes the thahuby the appropriate ritual remedies , which in all serious casesrequire the services of a priest or medicine man . Actions whichproduce this condition are touching or carrying a corpse

,stepping

over a corpse , eating food from a cracked pot , com ing in contactwith a woman’s menstrual discharge

,and many others . Just

as among the Hebrews a soul may unwittingly be guilty of Sinby touching in ignorance the carcase of an unclean animal

, so

amongst the Kikuyu a man may become thaku without anyvoluntary act on his part . If an elder or a woman when comingout of the hut Slips and falls down on the ground , he or She isthahu and lies there until some of the e lders of the neighbourhoodcome and sacrifice a Sheep . If the Side-pole of a bedstead breaks

,

the person lying on it is thahu and must be purified . If the droppings of a kite or crow fall on a person he is thahn ,

and if a hyaenadefaecates in a village

,or a jackal barks therein

,the village and

its inhabitants are thahu .

I have purposely chosen from our society two examples ofritual avoidances which are of ve ry different kinds . The ruleagainst eating meat on Friday or in Lent is a ru le of re ligion

,as is

the rule,where it is recognised

,against p laying golf or tenn is on

Sunday . The rule against Spilling salt , I suppose it will be agreed ,is non-religious . Our language permits us to make this distinctionvery clearly

,for infractions of the rules of religion are Sins , while

the non-religious avoidances are concerned with good and badluck . Since this distinction is SO obvious to us it m ight be thoughtthat we Should find it in other societies . My own experience isthat in some of the societies with which I am acquainted thisdistinction between Sinful acts and acts that bring bad luckcannot be made . Several anthropologists , however , have attemptedto classify rites into two classes

,religious rites and magical rites .

For Emile Durkheim the essential distinction is that religiousrites are obligatory within a religious society or church , while

TABOO 1 37

magical rites are Optional . A person who fails in religious observances is guilty of wrong-doing , whereas one who does not observethe precautions of magic or those relating to luck is Simply actingfoolishly . This distinction is of considerable theoretical importance . It is diflicult to app ly in the study of the rites ofsimple societies .

Sir James Frazer defines religion as ‘a propitiation or con

ciliation of superhuman powers which are believed to controlnature and man

’,and regards magic as the erroneous application

of the notion of causality . If we app ly this to ritual p rohibitions,

we may regard as belonging to religion those rules the infractionof which produces a change of ritual status in the individualby offending the superhuman powers , whereas the infractionof a rule of magic would be regarded as resu lting imm ediatelyin a change of ritual status; or in the misfortune that follows , by ap rocess of hidden causation . Spilling salt , by Sir James Frazer

’sdefinition , is a question of magic , _while eating meat on Friday is aquestion of religion .

An attempt to apply this distinction systematically meets withcertain difficulties . Thus with regard to the Maori Sir JamesFrazer states that ‘ the ultimate sanction of the taboo

,in other

words,that which engaged the people to observe its command

ments,was a firm persuasion that any breach of those comm and

ments would surely and speedily be punished by an atua or ghost,

who would aflIict the sinn er with a painful malady till he died’.This would seem to make the Polynesian taboo a matter of re ligion

,

not of magic . But my own observation of the Polynesians suggeststo me that in general the native conceives of the change inhisritual status as taking place as the immediate resu lt of such an actas touching a corpse , and that it is only when he proceeds torationalise the whole system of taboos that he thinks of the godsand Spirits— the atua—as being concerned . Incidentally it Shouldnot be assumed that the Polynesian word atua or otua alwaysrefers to a personal spiritual being .

Of the various ways of distinguishing magic and re ligion Iwill mention on ly one more . For Professor Malinowski a rite ismagical when ‘ it has a definite practical purpose which is knownto all who practise it and can be easily elicited from any nativeinformant’, while a rite is religious if it is Simp ly expressive andhas no purpose , being not a means to an end but an end in itse lf.

1 38 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

A difficulty in applying this crite rionwhat is meant by ‘definite practical pluck which results from spilling saltpurpose though not ve ry definite .

all our actions and thus escapeperhaps definiteas not practical . What Shall we say of the desire of the P0to avoid Sickness and possible death which he gives as hifor not touching chiefs

,corpses and newly-born babies ?

Seeing that there is this absence of agreement as todefinitions of magic and religion and the natu re of the distincbetween them

,and seeing that in many instances whether

call a particular rite magical or religious dependsthe various proposed definitions we accept

,the

procedure,at any rate in the present state of an

knowledge , is to avoid as far as possible the use of tquestion until there is some general agreement aCertainly the distinctions made by Durkheim andMalinowski may be theoretically Significant , even tare diflicult to apply universally . Certainly

,

for a systematic classification of rites,

classification will be fairly complex and abetween m agic and religion does not carry usAnother distinction which we make in

within the field of ritual avoidances is betweeunclean . Certain things must be treated with respect bare holy

,others because they are unclean . But

,as

Sm ith and Sir James Frazer have shown , there are main which this distinction is entirely unrecogn ised . Thefor example , does not think of a chief or a temple ascorpse as unclean . He thinks of them all asexample from Hawaii will illustrate thisof holiness and uncleanness . There , in formecommitted incest with his sisteform of tabu) . His presence waswhole community , and Since heto death . But if a chief of high rankof course

,sacred (kapu) , married h

An extreme sanctity oruntouchabib rother and Sister who were them

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STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

words ‘ interest’and ‘value’provide a convenient shorthand bywhich we can describe the reality , which consists of acts of behaviour and the actual relations between subjects and objectswhich those acts of behaviour reveal . If Jack loves Jill

, then '

J illhas the value of a loved object for Jack , and Jack has a recognisableinterest in Jill . When I am hungry I have an interest in food

,and a

good meal has an imm ediate value for me that it does not have atother times . My toothache has a value to me as something that Iam interested in getting rid of as quickly as possible .

A social system can be conceived and studied as a system of

values . A society consists of a number of individuals bound togetherin a network of social relations . A social relation exists betweentwo or more persons when there is some harmonisation of theirindividual interests

,by some convergen ce of interest and by

limitation or adjustment of divergent interests . An interest isalways the interest of an individual . Two individuals may havesimilar interests . Simi lar interests do not in themselves cons titutea social relation ; two dogs may have a sim ilar interest in the samebone and the result may be a dog-fight. But a society cann ot existexcept on the basis of a certain measure of Similarity in theinterests of its members . Putting this in terms of value

,the

first necessary condition of the existence of a society is thatthe individual members Shall agree in some measure in the valuesthat they recognise .

Any particular society is characterised by a certain set of

values— moral,aesthetic , economic , etc . In a Simple society there

is a fair amount of agreement amongst the members in theirevaluations

,though of course the agreement is n ever absolute .

In a complex m odern society we fin d much m ore disagreementif we consider the society as a whole

,but we may find a closer

measure of agreement amongst the members of a group or classwithin the society .

Whi le some measure of agreement about values , some sim ilarity of interests , is a prerequisite of a social system ,

socialre lations involve more than this . They require the existence ofcommon interests and of social values . When two or more personshave a common interest in the same object and are aware of theircommunity of interest a social relation is established . They form ,

whether for a moment or for a long period , an association , and theobject may be said to have a social value . For a man and his wife

TABOO 14 1

the birthof a child , the child itself and its well-being and happiness or its death , are objects of a common interest which bindsthem together and they thus have

,for the association formed by

the two persons , social value . By this definition an object can onlyhave a social value for an association of persons . In the simplestpossib le instance we have a triadic relation ; Subject 1 and Subject 2are both interested in the same way in the Object and each of theSubjects has an interest in the other

, or at any rate in certainitems of the behaviour of the other

,namely those directed towards

the object . To avoid cumbersome circum locutions it is convenien tto speak of the object as having a social value for any one subjectinvolved in such a re lation , but it must be remembered that thisis a loose way of Speaking .

It is perhaps necessary for the avoidance of misunderstandingto add that a soc ial system also requires that persons should beobjects of interest to other persons . In relations of friendshipor love each of two personshas a value for the other . In certainkinds of groups each member is an object of interest for all theothers

,and each member therefore has a social value for the group

as a whole . Further , since there are negative values as well aspositive

,persons may be united or associated by their antagonism

to other persons . For the members of an anti-Comintern pact theComintem has a specific social value .

Am ongst the members of a society we find a certain measure ofagreement as to the ritual value they attribute to objects of differentkinds . We also find that most of these ritual values are soc ia lvalues as defined above . Thus for a local totemic clan in Australiathe totem-centres

,the natural species associated with them ,

i.e .

the totems,and the myths and rites that relate thereto , have a

Specific social value for the clan ; the common interest in thembinds the individuals together into a firm and lasting association .

Ritual values exist in every known society, and Show an immense diversity as we pass from one society to another . Theproblem of a natural science of society (and it is as such that Iregard social anthropology) is to discover the deeper , not immediately perceptib le

,uniform ities beneath the superficial differ

ences . This is , of course , a highly complex prob lem which willrequire the studies begun by Sir James Frazer and others to becontinued by many investigators over many years . The ultimateaim should be

,I think

,to find some relatively adequate answer

STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

to the question—What is the relation of ritual and ritual values

to the essential constitution ofhuman society ? I have chosen aparticu lar approach to this study which I believe to be promisingto investigate in a few societies studied as thoroughly as possib lethe relations of ritual values to other values including m oral andaesthetic values . In the present lecture , however, it is only onesmall part of this study in which I seek to interest you— thequestion of a relation between ritual values and social values .One way of approaching the study of ritual is by the con

sideration of the purposes or reasons for the rites . If one exam inesthe literature of anthropology one finds this approach veryfrequently adopted . It is by far the least profitable , though theone that appeals most to common sense . Sometimes the purposeof a rite is obvious

,or a reason may be volunteered by those who

practise it . Sometimes the anthropologist has to ask the reason,

and in such circumstances it may happen that different reasonsare given by different informants . What is fundamentally thesame rite in two different societies may have different purposesor reasons in the one and in the other . The reasons given bythe members of a comm unity for any custom they observe areimportant data for the anthropologist . But it is to fall into grievouserror to suppose that they give a valid explanation of the custom .

What is entire ly inexcusable is for the anthropologist,when he

cannot get from the people themselves a reason for their behaviourwhich seems to him satisfactory

,to attribute to them some purpose

or reason on the basis of his own preconceptions about humanm otives . I could adduce many instances of this from the literatureof ethnography

,but I prefer to illustrate what I mean by an

anecdote .

A Queenslander met a Chinese who was taking a bowl ofcooked rice to place on his brother’s grave . The Australian injocular tones asked if he supposed that his brother would comeand eat the rice . The reply was ‘N0 ! We offer rice to peop le as anexpression of friendship and affection . But since you Speak as youdo I suppose that you in this country place flowers on the gravesOf your dead in the belief that they will enjoy looking at them andsmelling their sweet perfume .

’

So far as ritual avoidances are concerned the reasons for themmay vary from a very vague idea that some sort of m isfortune ori ll-luck , not defined as to its kind , is likely to befall anyone who

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STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

are also secondary eflects upon the social structure, i.e . the network

of social re lations binding individuals together in an ordered life .

These we may call the social effects . By considering the psychologicaleffects of a rite we may succeed in defin ing its psychological function ;by considering the social effects we may discover its social function .

Clearly it is impossib le to discover the social function of a rite without taking into account its usual or average psychological effects .But i t i s p ossib le to discuss the p sychologica l effects while moreor less completely ignoring the m ore remote sociological effects

,

and this is often done in what is called ‘functional anthropology’.Let us suppose that we wish to investigate in Australian tribes

the totem ic rites of a kind widely distributed over a large part ofthe continent . The ostensib le purpose of these rites

,as stated

by the natives them selves,is to renew or m aintain some part of

nature,such as a Species of animal or p lant

,or rain

,orhot or

cold weather . With reference to this purpose we have to say thatfrom our point of view the natives are m istaken , that the ritesdo not actually do what they are believed to do . The rain-makingceremony does not , we think , actually bring rain . In so far as therites are performed fora purpose they are futile

,based on erroneous

belief. I do not believe that there is any scientific value in attemptsto conjecture processes of reasoning which m ight be supposed tohave led to these errors .The rites are easily perceived to be symbolic

,and we may

therefore investigate their meaning . To do this we have to examinea considerable number of them and we then discover that there isa certain body of ritual idiom extending from the west coast of thecontinent to the east coast with some local variations . Since eachrite has a myth associated with it we have Sim ilarly to investigatethe meanings of the myths . AS a result we find that the meaning ofany Single rite becomes clear in the light of a cosmology , a bodyof ideas and beliefs about nature and human society ,

which , sofar as its most general features are concerned

,is current in all

Australian tribes .The imm ediate psychological effects of the rites can be to

some extent ob served by watching and talking to the performers .The ostensible purpose of the rite is certainly present in theirm inds , but so also is that complex set of cosm ological beliefs byreference to which the rite has a meaning . Certainly a pr oOnperform ing the rite

,even if, as sometimes happens , he perforrhs it

TABOO 145

alone , derives therefrom a definite feeling of satisfaction , but itwould be entirely false to imagine that this is Simply because hebelieves that he has helped to provide a more abundant supp lyof food forhimself and his fellow-tribesmen . His satisfaction is inhaving performed a ritual duty, we might say a religious duty.

Putting in my own words what I judge,from my own observations

,

to express what the native feels,I would say that in the perform ance

of the rite hehas m ade that small contribution,which it is both

his privilege andhis duty to do , to the maintenance of that orderof the universe of which man and nature are interdependentparts . The satisfaction which he thus receives gives the rite aspecial value for him . In some instances with which I am ac

quainted of the last su rvivor of a totemic group who still continuesto perform the totem ic rites by himself, it is this satisfaction thatconstitutes apparently the sole motive forhis action .

To discover the social function of the totem ic rites we haveto consider the whole body of cosm ological ideas of which eachrite is a partial expression . I believe that it is possible to Showthat the social structure of an Australian tribe is conn ected in avery Special way with these cosmological ideas and that the maintenance of its continuity depends on keeping them alive

,by

their regular expression in myth and rite .

Thus any satisfactory study of the totem ic rites of Australiamust be based not simply on the consideration of their ostensiblepurpose and their psychological function , or on an analysis of themotives of the individuals who perform the rites

,but on the

discovery of their meaning and of their social function .

It may be that some rites have no social function . This maybe the case with such taboos as that against Spilling salt in our ownsociety . Nevertheless , the method of investigating rites and ritualvalues that I have found most profitable during work extendingover m ore than thirty years is to study rites as symbolic expressionsand to seek to discover their social functions . This method is notnew except in so far as it is applied to the comparative study ofmany societies of diverse types . It was applied by Chinese thinkersto their own ritual more than twenty cen turies ago.

In China,in the fifth and Sixth centuries B .C . , Confucius and

his followers insisted on the great importance of the properperformance of ritual , such as funeral and mourning rites andsacrifices . After Confucius there came the reform er Mo Ti who

146 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

taught a combination of altruism— love for all men —and utilitarianism . He held that funeral and mourning rites were uselessand interfered with useful activities and should therefore beabolished or reduced to a minimum . In the third and secondcenturies B .C .

,the Confucians, Hsiin Tze and the compilers of the

Li Chi (Book of Rites) , replied to MO Ti to the effect that thoughthese rites might have no utilitarian purpose they none the lesshad a very important social function . Briefly the theory is that therites are the orderly (the Li Chi says the beautified) expression offeelings appropriate to a social situation . They thus serve toregulate and refin e human emotions . We may say that partakingin the performance of rites serves to cultivate in the individualsentiments on whose existence the social order itse lf depends .m . us consider the meaning and social function of an extremelySimple example of ritual . In the An daman Islands when a womanis expecting a baby a name is given to it while it is sti ll in thewomb . From that time until some weeks after the baby is bornnobody is allowed to use the personal name of either the father orthe mother ; they can be referred to by teknonymy , i.e . in terms oftheir relation to the child . During this period both the parents arerequired to abstain from eating certain foods which they may

ot obtain from the An damanese any statement of thepurpose or reason for this avoidance of names . Assum ing that theact is symbolic , what method , other than that of guessing, is thereof arriving at the meaning ? I suggest that we may start with ageneral working hypothesis that when

,in a single society

,the

same symbol is used in different contexts or on different kinds ofoccasions there is some common element of m eaning , and thatby comparing together the various uses of the symbol we may beable to discover what the common element is . Thi s is precisely themethod that we adopt in studying an unrecorded Spoken languageorder to discover the meanings of words and morphemes .In the Andamans the name of a dead person is avoided from

the occurrence of the death to the conclusion of mourning ; thename of a person mourning for a dead relative is not used ; there isavoidance of the name of a youth or girl who is passing throughthe ceremonies that take p lace at adolescence ; a bride or bridegroom is not spoken of or to by his or her own name for a Shorttime after the marriage . For the An damanese the personal name

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148 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

avoidance of their names . They are regarded as likely to suffersome m isfortune , some bad luck , if you will , unless they observecertain prescribed ritual precautions of which the avoidance ofcertain foods is one . In the Andaman Islands the danger in suchinstances is thought of as the danger of illness . This is the case alsowith the Polynesian belief about the ritual status of anyone whohas touched a corpse or a newly-born baby. It is to be noted thatfor the Polynesians as well as for the An damanese the occasion ofa birth has a Sim i lar ritual value to that of a death .

The interpretation of the taboos at childbirth at which wearrive by studying it in relation to the whole system of ritualvalues of the Andamanese is too complex to be stated here infull . Clearly, however, they express , in accordance with Andamanese ritual idiom , a common concern in the event . The parentsShow their concern by avoiding certain foods ; their friends Showtheirs by avoiding the parents’personal names . By virtue ofthese taboos the occasion acquires a certa in social value , as thatterm has been defined above .

There is one theory that might seem to be applicable to ourexample . It is based S to the psychologicalfunction of a class of that in certain circumstances the individual about the outcomeof some event or activity because it depends to some extent onconditions that he cannot control by any technical means . Hetherefore observes som e rite which

,Since he believes it will ensure

good luck,serves to aeronaut takes with

him in a plane a elieves will protecthim fromaccident and thus carries out his flight with confidence .

The theory has a respectable antiquity . It was perhaps impliedin the Primus in orbe deos fecit timor of Petronius and Statius .It has taken various forms from Hume’s exp lanation of religionto Malinowski

’s explanation of Trobriand magic . It can be made

so plausib le by a suitable selection of illustrations that it is necessary to examine it with particular care and treat it with reasonablescepticism . For there is always the danger that we may be takenin by the plausibility of a theory that u ltimately proves to beunsound .

I think that for certain rites it would be easy tomaintain withequal p lausibility an exactly contrary theory

,namely

,that if it

were not for the existence of the rite and the beliefs associated

TABOO 149

with it the individual would feel no anxiety,and that the psycho

logical effect of the rite is to create in him a sense of insecurity ordanger . It seems very unlikely that an Andaman Islander wouldthink that it is dangerous to eat dugong or pork or turtle meat if itwere not for the existence of a specific body of ritual the ostensiblepurpose of which is to protect him from those dangers . Manyhundreds of Similar instances could be m entioned from all overthe world .

Thus , while one anthropological theory is that magic andreligion give men confidence

,com fort and a sense of security , 1

it could equally well be argued that they give men fears and anxietiesfrom which they would otherwise be free— the fear of blackmagic or of Spirits , fear of God , of the Devil , of Hell .Actually in our fears or anxieties as well as in our hopes

are conditioned (as the phrase goes) by the community in whichwe live . And it is largely by the Sharing of hopes and fears

,by

what I have called common concern in events or eventualities,that

human beings are linked together in temporary or permanentassociations .To return to the An damanese taboos at childbirth , there are

difficulties in supposing that they are means by which parentsreassure themselves against the accidents that may interfere with asuccessful delivery . If the prospective father fails to observe thefood taboo it is he who will be Sick , according to the generalAn damanese Opinion . Moreover

,he must continue to ob serve

the taboos after the child IS safely delivered . Further ,how are weto provide a paralle l explanation of the Sim ilar taboos observedby a person m ourning for a dead re lative ?The taboos associated with pregnancy and parturition are

often explained in terms of the hypothesis I have mentioned .

A father,naturally anxious at the outcome of an event over which

he does not have a technical control and which is subject tohazard

,reassures him self by observing some taboo or carrying out

some m agical action . He may avoid certain foods . He may avoidmaking nets or tying kn ots

,or he may go round the house untying

all knots and Opening any locked or closed boxes or containers .I wish to arouse in your m inds

,if it is not already there , a

suspicion that b oth the general theory and this Special application1 This theoryhas been formu lated by Loisy, an d form agichas been adopted

by M alinowski.

1 50 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

of it do not give the whole truth and indeed may not be true at all .Scepticism of plausib le but unproved hypotheses is essential inevery science . There is at least good ground for suspicion in thefact that the theory has so far been considered in reference tofacts that seem to fit it , and no systematic attempthas been made ,so far as I am aware , to look for facts that do not fit . That there

such I am satisfied from my own studies .is which I am presenting for con

follows . In a given community it is appropriatethat an expectant father should feel concern or at least shouldmake an appearance of doing so. Some suitable symbolic expression of his concern is found in terms of the general ritualor symbolic idiom of the society

,and it is felt generally that a man

in that situation ought to carry out the symbolic or ritual actionsor abstentions . For every rule that ought to be observed there mustbe some sort of sanction or reason . For acts that patently affectother persons the m oral and legal sanctions provide a generallysuflicient controlling force upon the individual . For ritual obligations conform ity and rationalisation are provided by the ritualsanctions . The simplest form of ritual sanction is an acceptedbelief that if rules of ritual are not observed some undefin edm isfortune is likely to occur . In many societies the expecteddanger is somewhat more definite ly conceived as a danger ofSickness or

,in extreme cases

,death . In the m ore specialised form s

of ritual sanction the good results to be hoped for or the badresults to be feared are more specifically defined in reference tothe occasion or meaning of the ritual .The theory is not concerned

—13 ththe historical origin of

ritual,nor is it another attempt to explain ritual in terms of human

psychology ; it is a hypothesis as to the relation of ritual andritual values to the essential constitution of human society , i.e .

to those invariant general characters which belong to all humansocieties

,past

,present and future . It rests on the recognition of

the fact that while in animal societies social coaptation depends pnIt depends Symbols

of many different kinds, The thCOfyT am advari'

éihg must there‘ w h

fore,for a just estimation of its value

, be considered in its p lacein a general theory of symbols and their social efficacy .

By this theory the Andamanese taboos relating to childbirthare the obligatory recognition in a standardised symbolic form

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1 52 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

his Psyche’s Task and in his other works , set himself to Show how ,

in his own words,taboos have contributed to build up the complex

fabric of society . He thus initiated that functional study of ritualto which I have in this lecture and elsewhere attempted to makesome contribution . But there has been a Shift of emphasis . SirJames accounted for the taboos of savage tribes as the applicationin practice of beliefs arrived at by erroneous processes of reasoning

,

and he seems to have thought of the effects of these beliefs increating ormaintaining a stable orderly society as being accidental .My own view is that the negative and positive rites of savagesexist and persist because they are part of the mechanism by whichan orderly society m aintains itse lf in existence , serving as they doto establish certain fundamental social values . The beliefs bywhich the rites them se lves are justified and given some sort ofconsistency are the rationalisations of symbolic actions and of thesentiments assoc1ated with them . I would suggest that what SirJames Frazer seems to regard as the accidental resu lts of m agicaland religious beliefs really constitute their essential function andthe ultimate reason for their existence .

N O T E

The theory of ritual outlined in this lecture was first workedout in 1908 in a thesis on the Andaman Islanders . It was writtenout again in a revised and extended form in 19 1 3 and appearedin print in 1 922 . Unfortunately the exposition contained inThe Andaman Islanders is evidently not clear, since some of mycritics have failed to understand what the theory is . For example

,

it has been assumed that by ‘ Social value’I mean ‘utility’.The best treatment of the subject of value with which I am

acquainted is Ralph Barton Perry’s General Theory of Value, 1 926 .

For the Chinese theory of ritual the most easily accessib le accountis in chapter xiv of Fung Yu- lan’s History of Chinese Philosophy ,

1 937 . The third chapter, on the uses of symbolism , ofWhitehead’s

Symbolism,its M eaning and Eflect, is an adm irable brief introduc

tion to the sociological theory of symbolism .

One very important point that could not be dealt with in thelecture is that ind icated by Whitehead in the following senten ce‘No account of the uses of symbolism is complete without therecognition that the symbolic elements in life have a tendency torun wild

,like the vegetation in a tropical forest .’

C HAP T E R V I I I

RELIGION AND SOCIETY 1

HE Royal An thropological Institute has honoured me

with an invitation to deliver the Henry Myers Lectureon the rOle of religion in the development of human

society . That is an important and complex subject,about which

it is not possib le to say very much in a Single lecture , but as it ishoped that this may be only the first of a continuing series oflectures , in which different lecturers will each offer some contribution , I think that the m ost useful thing I can do is to indicatecertain lines along which I believe that an enquiry into thisproblem can be profitab ly pursued .

The usual way of looking at religions is to regard all of them,

or all except one,as bodies of erroneous b eliefs and illusory

practices . There is no doubt that thehistory of religions has beenin great part a history of error and illusion . In all ages men havehoped that by the proper perform ance of religious actions orObservances they would obtain some specific benefit : health andlong life

,children to carry on their line , material well-being ,

success in hunting,rain

,the growth of crops and the multiplica

tion of cattle,victory in war , adm ission of their souls after death

to a paradise, or inversely , release by the extinction of personality

from the round of reincarnation . We do not believe that the rainmaking rites of savage tribes really produce rain . Nor do webelieve that the initiates of the ancient mysteries did actuallyattain through their initiation an imm ortality denied to other men .

When we regard the religions of other peop les , or at least thoseof what are called prim itive p eoples , as system s of erroneous andillusory beliefs

,we are confronted with the problem of how these

beliefs came to be formulated and accepted . It is to this prob lemthat anthropologists have given most attention . My personalopinion is that this method of approach , even though it may seemthe m ost direct , is not the one m ost likely to lead to a real understanding of the nature of re ligions .

1 The Henry M yers L ecture , 1 945 .

IS3

1 54. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

There is another way in which we may approach the study ofreligions . We may entertain as at least a possibility the theory thatany religion is an important or even essential part of the socialmachinery

,as are morality and law

,part of the complex system

by which human beings are enabled to live together in an orderlyarrangement of social re lations . From this point of view we dealnot with the origins but with the social functions of religions

,

i.e . the contribution that they m ake to the formation and maintenance of a social order . There are many persons who would saythat it is only true religion (i.e . one’s own ) that can provide thefoundation of an orderly social life . The hypothesis we are considering is that the social function of a religion is independentof its truth or falsity ,

that religions which we think to be erroneousor even absurd and repulsive , such as those of some savage tribes ,may be important and effective parts of the social machinery

,

and that without these ‘ false’ religions social evolution andthe development of modern civilisation would have beenimpossible .

The” pothesis wthis; re__fore is that In what we regard as falseof religious rites does not

ewho perform or take_ part in them , they have other effects , someat least of which may be socially__valuab le .

fl“

HOw are we to set to work to test this hypothesis ? It IS of nouse thinking In term s of religion In general , In the abstract , andsociety in the abstract . Nor is it adequate to consider some onereligion

,particularly if it is the one in which we have been brought

up and about which we are likely to be prejudiced one way oranother . The only method is the experimental method of socialanthropology

,and that means that we must study in the light

r mof our hesis a sufficient number of diverse

to the particularsocieties in whichtheyare found . This IS a task not for one personbut for a number .Anthropologists and others have discussed at length the

question of the proper definition of religion . I do not intend todeal with that controversial subject on thi s occasion . But thereare some points that must be considered . I Shall assume that anyreligion or any religious cult norm ally involves certain ideas orbeliefs on the one hand

,and on the other certain Observances .

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1 56 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

on ly in conn ection with its interpretation . Thus the study of re ligionhasm eant m ain ly the study of Christian b e liefs , and in struction in re ligionhas hab itual ly b egun with the creed

,re l igiou s duties being p resen ted

to the learn er asflow ing from the dogm atic truthshe is taught to accep t.All this seem s to us so mu ch a matter of course that, when w e app roachsom e strange or an tiqu e re ligion

,w e n atural ly assum e that here also

our first bus in ess is to search for a creed ,an d fin d in it the key to ritual

an d p ractice . But the an e re ligion shad for the most art no creed ;

they con sisted en tire ly of i_p_sti_tution s an d p ractices . No doub t m en” wil l

nothab itual ly fOlfO'w certain p ractices withou t attaching a m ean in g tothem ; but as a ru le w e fin d that while the p ractice was rigorous ly fixed ,

the m ean i ched to It was extrem e ly an d the sam e rite wasefpl

'

aM/WW effi itW-

Oys , withou t any questiOn of

orthodoxy or heterodoxy arisin g in con sequen ce . In an cien t Greece , for

examp le , certain thingswere don e at a temp le , an d peop le were agreed thatitwou ld b e imp ious not to do them . But if you asked why theywere don eyou wou ld prob ab ly havehad severa l mu tual ly con trad ictory exp lan ation sfrom d ifferen t p erson s , an d no on e wou ld have thought it a m atter of theleast re ligiou s im portan ce which of these you chose to adopt. In deed , theexp lan ation s offered wou ld not have been of a kin d to stir any strong fee lin g ; for in most cases theywou ld have b een m ere ly d ifferen t stories as tothe circum stan ces un derwhichthe rite first cam e to b e estab l ished , by thecomm an d or by the d irect exam p le of the god . The rite , in Short, wascon n ected not with dogma but with a myth .

1

I t is of the first im portan ce to realise c learly from the outsetthat ritua l an d practical u sage were , strictly Sp eaking , the sum -tota l ofan cien t re ligion s . Re ligion in prim itive tim es was not a system of be liefwith p ractical app lication s ; it was a body of fixed tradition al practicestowhich every m emb er of society conform ed as a matter of course . M en

wou ld not b e m en if they agreed to do certain thin gs withouthavin g a

reason for their action ; but in an cien t re ligion the reason was not firstformu lated as a doctrin e an d then expressed in p ractice , but con verse ly

,

practice p receded doctrinal theory . M en form gen eral ru les of con ductb efore they begin to exp ress gen era l prin cip les in words ; politica l institution s are O lder than political theories , and in l ike m anner re ligiou sin stitution s are older than re ligious theories . This analogy is not ar

b itrarily chosen , for in fact the p aral le l ism in an cien t society betweenre ligious an d pol itica l in stitution s is comp lete . In eachSphere greatimportan ce was attached to form an d preceden t, but the exp lanationwhy the p receden t w as fol lowed con sisted m ere ly of a legend as to its

first e stab lishm en t . That the precedent, on ce e stab l ished ,was au thoritative

d id not app ear to requ ire any p roof . The ru les of society were b ased onpreceden t, an d the con tinu ed existen ce of the society was sufficien treason why a p receden t on ce set Shou ld con tin ue to b e fol lowed .

11

1W. Rob ertson Smith,Lectures on theReligion of the S emites, 1 907 , pp . 1 6—1 7 .

1op . cit.

, p . 20 .

RELIG ION AND SOCIETY 1 57

The relative stability of rites and the variability of doctrinescan be illustrated from the Christian religions . The two e ssentialrites of all Christian religions are baptism and the eucharist

,and

we kn ow that the latter solemn sacrament is interpreted differentlyin the Orthodox Church , the Roman Church and the AnglicanChurch . The modern emphasis on the exact formulation of

beliefs connected with the rites rather than on the rites them selvesis demonstrated in the way in which Christians have fought withand killed one another over differences of doctrine .

Thirty-seven years ago in a fellowship thesis on theAn daman Islanders (which did not appear in print til lI formulated briefly a general theory of the social function of ritesand ceremonies . It is the same theory that underlies the remarks Ishall offer on this occasion . Stated in the simplest possib le term sthe theory is that ‘ an orderly social life amongst human beingsdepends upon the presence in the m inds of the m embers of asociety of certain sentim ents

,which control the behaviour of the

individual in his relation to others . Rites can be seen to be theregulated symbolic expressions of certain sentiments . Rites catherefore be Shown to have a

__speci _

fic social function when , anto the extent thatfthey

fihpye forg thgip g ffept toregulate , maintaiand transm it from on e generation to another sentiments on whicthe COIl Stl'Cll t Il

-

Of-

tl’le society dependsf I ventured to suggest asgeneral formula thpower .

i

Ihis theory is by no means new . It is to be found in the writingsof the philosophers of ancient China . It is most explicit in theteachings of Hsun Tzu who lived in the third century B .C .

, andin the Book of Rites (the Li Chi), which was compiled some timelater . The Chinese writers do not write about religion . I am doubtful if there is in Chinese any word which will convey just whatwe understand by the word religion . They write about li, and theword is variously translated as ceremonial , customary morality ,rites

,ru les of good mann ers

,propriety . But the character by which

this word is written consists of two parts , of which one refersto Spirits

,sacrifice and prayer

,and the other originally meant a

vesse l used in perform ing sacrifices . We may therefore appro

priately translate li as‘ ritual’. In any case what the ancient

1 58 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

philosophers are chiefly concerned with are the rites of mourningand sacrificial rites .There is no doubt that in China , as elsewhere , it was thought

that many or all of the religious rites were efficacious in the senseof averting evils and bringing b lessings . It was believed that theseasons would not follow one another in due order unless theEmperor

,the Son of Heaven

,performed the established rites at

the appropriate times . Even under the Republic a re luctant magistrate of ahsien may be compelled by public opinion to take theleading part in a ceremony to bring rain . But there developedamong the scholars an attitude which might perhaps be calledrationalistic and agnostic . For the most part the question of theefficacy of rites was not considered . What was thought importantwas the social function of the rites

,i.e . their effects in producing

and maintaining an orderly human society .

In a text that is earlier than Confucius we read that ‘ sacrificeis that through which one can Show one’s filial p iety and givepeace to the people

,pacify the country and make the people

settled . It is through the sacrifices that the unity of thepeople is strengthened’(Ch’u Yil, I I ,You know that one of the m ajor points of the teaching of

Confucius was the importance of the proper performance of rites .But it is said of Confucius that he would not discuss the supernatural . 1 In the Confucian philosophy

,music and ritual are con

sidered as means for the establishment and preservation of socialorder, and regarded as Superior to laws and punishments as meansto this end . We take a very different view of music , but I mayrem ind you that Plato held somewhat simi lar ideas

,and I suggest

that an anthropological study of the relations between music (anddancing) and religious rituals would provide some interestingresults . In the Book of Rites one section ( the Yu

'

ehChi) is concerned with music . The third paragraph reads

The an cient kings were watchfu l in regard to the things by whichthem in d was affected . An d so they in stituted ceremon ies to d irect m en

’s

aim s aright; mu sic to giveharmon y to their voices ; laws to un ify theircon duct ; an d punishmen ts to guard again st the ir ten den cies to evil .The end to which ceremon ies , music , pun ishmen ts and laws conduct

1 Analects , VII, 20 . Waley tran s lates this p assage as :‘

The Master n evertalked of prod igies , feats of stren gth, disorders or sp irits .

’

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1 60 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

Hence the fun era l rites are for no other purpose than to m ake clearthe m ean ing of death an d l ife ,

to send off the d ead with sorrow an d

reveren ce ,an d when the en d com e s , to prep are for s toring the body

away. Service to the living is b eau tifyin g their b egin n ing ; sen din goff the d ead is b eautifyin g their en d . When the en d an d the b eginn ingare both atten ded to, the service of the fi lial son is en ded an d the way of

the Sage is comp leted . S lightin g the dead and over-emphasisin g theliving is the way of Mo (Tz fi) .

1Slightin g the living an d over-atten tion

td tha dead -i s —the of sup erstim e living to send off thed ead is m urder.

2TM J fi ann er of Ii an d stan dard s ofju stice ( i)is to send off the d ead as if they were alive ,

so that in d eath and life , theen d an d the beginn ing , there is nothin g that is not appropriate an d good .

The Con fucian does this .

The View taken by this school of ancient philosophers wasthat ! religious rites have important social functions which areindependent of any beliefs that may be held as to the efficacyof the rites . The rites gave regulated expression to certain humanfeelings and sentiments and so kept these sentiments alive andactive . In turn it was these sentiments which

,by their control

of or influence on the conduct of individuals , made possib le theexistence and continuance of an orderly social life !It is this theory that I propose for your consideration . Applied ,

not to a single society such as ancient China,but to all human

societies,it points to the correlation and co-variation of different

characteristics or elements of social systems Societies differ fromone another in their structure and constitution and therefore ,in the customary rules of behaviour of persons one to anotherThe system of sentiments on which the social con stitution dependsmust therefore vary in correspondence with the difference of

constitution . In so far as religionhas the kind of social function‘vesse ls to the eye of fan cy

’:

‘Con fucius said , In dealin g withthe d ead , if we

treat them as if they were en tire ly dead,that wou ld show a wan t of affection ,

and shou ld not b e don e ; or, if we treat them as if they were en tire ly alive ,that wou ld show a wan t of wisdom ,

and shou ld not b e done . On this accoun t

the vessels of bam boo !used in conn ection w iththe burial of the dead ! are not

fit for actual use ; those of earthenware can not be used to washin ; those of woodare in cap ab le of being carved ; the lutes are strung , but not even ly ; the p an deanp ip es are comp lete , but not in tun e ; the b e lls an d mu sical ston es are there ,but theyhave no stan ds . They are cal led vesse ls to the eye of fan cy ; that is! the d ead ! are thus treated as if they were sp iritual in telligen cies .

”L egge ,

The S acred Books of China , Part I I I , The Li Ki, I—X , Oxford , 1 885 , p . 1 48 .

1 Mo Tz ii was a philosopher who criticised the mourn in g rites as bein gwastefu l .

2 Referring to the an cient practice ofhuman sacrifice at the burial of importan t p erson s .

REL IGION AND SOCIETY 1 6 1

system constituted on the basis of nations whichmakewar on one

another,or stand ready to do so

, a well-developed sentiment ofpatriotism in its members is essential to maintain a strong nation .

In such circumstances patriotism or n ationa l feeling may begiven support by religion . Thus the Children of Israe l , when theyinvaded the land of Canaan under the leadership of Joshua , wereinspired by the religion that had been taught to them by Mosesand was centred upon the Holy Tabernacle and its rites .War or the envisaged possib ility of war is an essential element

in the constitution of great numbers of human societies , thoughthe warlike spirit varies very much from one to another . It i sthus in accordance with our theory that one of the social functionsof religion is in connection with war . i t can give men faith andconfidence and devotion when they go out to do battle , whetherthey are the aggressors or are resisting aggression . In the recentconflict the German peop le seem to have prayed to God forvictory not less fervently than the people of the allied nations .It will be evident that to test our theory we must examine many

societies to see if there is a demonstrable correspondence of thereligion or religions of any one of them and the manner in whichthat society is constituted . If such a correspondence can be madeout

,we must then try

'

to discover and as far as possible definethe m ajor sentiments that find their expression in the religionand at the same time contribute to the maintenance of stabilityin the society as constituted .

An important contribution to our study is to be found in abook that is undeservedly neglected by anthropologists

,La Cite

’

antique, by the historian Pustel de Coulanges . It is true that itwas written some time ago ( 1 864) and that in some matters itmay need correction in the light of later historical research , butit remains a valuable contribution to the theory of the socialfunction of religion .

The purpose of the book is to show the point-by-pointcorrespondence between religion and the constitu tion of societyin ancient Greece and Rome

,and how in the course of history

the two changed together . It is true that the author, in conform itywith the ideas of the nineteenth century

,conceived this cor

relation between two sets of social features in term s of cause and6

1 62 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

effect , those of one set being thought of as the cause producing thoseof the other set. The men of the ancient world , so the argumentruns , came to hold certain beliefs about the souls of the dead .

As the result of their beliefs they made offerings at their tombs .

Sin ce the deadhad need of food an d drink it app eared to be a dutyof the living to satisfy this n eed . The care of supp lying the dead withsusten an ce was not left to the caprice or to the variab le sen tim en ts of

of m en ; it was ob ligatory . Thu s a comp lete re ligion of the dead was

estab l ished , whose dogm as m ight soon b e effaced , but whose rites

endured un ti l the triumphof Christianity .

1

It was a resu lt of this religion that ancient society came to beconstituted on the basis of the family, the agnatic lineage and thegen s

,with its laws of succession , property, authority and marriage .

A comparison of be liefs an d laws shows that a p rim itive re ligioncon stituted the Greek and Roman fam ily, estab lished m arriage an d

p atern al authority, fixed the order of re lation ship ,and con secrated the

right of p rop erty an d the right of inheritan ce . This sam e re ligion, afterhaving enlarged an d extended the fam i ly, form ed a stil l larger association ,

the city , and reign ed in that as ithad re ign ed in the fam ily. From it cam e

all the in stitution s,as we l l as all the private law , of the an c ien ts . It was

from this that the city received all its prin cip les , its ru les , its u sage s an dits m agistracies . But, in the course of tim e , this ancien t re ligion became

mod ified or effaced , an d private law an d political in stitution s were mod ified with it. Then cam e a series of revolution s , an d socia l chan gesregu larly fol lowed the deve lopm en t of kn owledge .

2

Inhi s final paragraph the author writes

Wehave written thehistory of a be lief. It was estab lished andhuman

society was con stituted . It was mod ified , an d society un derwen t a series

of revolution s . I t d isapp eared an d society changed its character.

3

This idea of the primacy of belief and of a causal re lation inwhich the religion is the cause and the other institutions are theeffect is in accordance with a mode of thought that was comm onin the nineteenth century . We can , as I indeed do , completelyreject this theory and yet retain as a valuab le and permanentcontribution to our subject a great deal of what Puste l de Coulangeswrote . We can say that he has produced evidence that in ancientGreece and Rome the religion on the one side and the manyimportan t institutions on the other are closely united as inter

1 The Ancient City (tran s .Willard Sm all) , p . 2 3 .

2op cit. , p . 1 2 .

3op cit. , p . 5 29 .

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1 64 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTI ON IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

ancestor-worship consists of rites carried out by members of alarger or smaller lineage ( i.e . one consisting of m ore or fewergenerations) with reference to the deceased members of thelineage . Such rites include the making of Offerings , usually of

food and drink,and such Offerings are sometimes interpreted as

the sha ring of a meal by the dead and the living .

In such a society , what gives stability to the social structureis the solidarity and continuity of the lineage

,and of the wider

group (the c lan ) composed of related lineages . For the individual ,his primary duties are those to his lineage . These include dutiesto the members now living

,but also to those who have d ied and to

those who are not yet born . In the carrying out of these dutieshe is controlled and inspired by the complex system of sentimentsOf which we may say that the Object on which they are centredis the lineage itself

,past

,present and future . It is prim arily this

system of sentiments that is expressed in the rites of the cult of theancestors . The social functionm m m m m fi ngsolem n expression to them the rites reaffirm , renew—s —rw ~and strengthen those

,sen_timents _ohwhich the social solidarity

We have no means of studying how an ancestor-worshipp ingsociety comes into existence

,but we can study the decay of thi s

type of system in the past and in the present . Pustel de Coulangesdeals with this in ancient Greece and Rome . It can be observedat the present time in various parts Of the world . The scantyinformation I have been able to gather suggests that the lineageand joint-fam i ly organisation of some parts Of

' India is losingsomething of its former strength and solidarity and that what weshould expect as the inevitable accompaniment of this , a weakening of the cult of ancestors

,is also taking place. I can Speak with

more assurance about some African societies,particularly those

Of South Africa . The effect of the impact of European culture ,including the teaching of the Christian missionaries

,is to weaken

in some individuals the sentiments that attach them to theirlineage . The disintegration of the social structure and the decayof the ancestral cult proceed together .Thus for one particular type Of re ligion I am ready to affirm

that the general theory of the social function of religions can befully demonstrated .

A most important contribution to our subject is a work of

REL IGION AND SOCIETY 1 65

Emile Durkheim published in 1 9 12 . The title is Les Forniese’le’mentaires de la Vie religieuse, but the sub-title reads : La Systeme

tote’mique en Australie. It is worth while mentioning that Durkheim

was a pupil of FusteLde Coulanges at the Ecole Normale Supérieureand that he himself said that the m ost important influence on thedevelopment of his ideas about religion was that Of RobertsonSmith .

Du/rkhejmisa im was to establish a general theory of the natureOf religion . Instead of a wide comparative study of many religions

,

he preferred to take a simple type of society and carry out an intensive and detailed analysis

,and for this purpose he selected the

aboriginal tribes of A lia . He held the view that these tribesrepresent the sim lest type of society surviving to om n times ,

but the value of his ana ys18 ay am f we refuse toaccept this view

,as I do myself.

The value of Durkheim’s book is as an exposition of a generaltheory of religion which had been developed with the collaboration of Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss , starting from the foundations provided by Robertson Smith . Durkheim’s exposition Of thistheory has Often been very much misunderstood . A clear

,though

very brief,statement of it is to be found in the Introduction

written by Henri Hubert in 1 904 for the French translation of theManuel d

’Histoire des Religions of Chantepie de la Saussaye .

But it is not possible on this occasion to discuss this generaltheory. I wish only to deal with one part of Durkheim’s work ,namelyunity O

men-ti onjzvhichihg M mli

‘

darityand therefore the social orderitseli ggpm l This theory he tests by an examinatiOhOf thetotemic ritual of the Australians . For while Frazer regarded thetotemic rites Of the Australian tribes as being a matter of magic ,Durkheim treats them as religious because the rites them selvesare sacred and have reference to sacred beings , sacred places andsacred Objects .In 19 1 2 very much less was known about the Australian

aborigines than is known at present . Some of the sources usedby Durkheim have proved to be unreliab le . The one tribe thatwas well known ,

through the writings Of Spencer and Gi llen and

fi .

1op cit.

, pp . 3 23 , 497 and e lsewhere .

1 66 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

Strehlow— the Aranda— is in some respects atypical . The inform ation that Durkheim could use was therefore decidedlyimperfect . Moreover , it cannot be said thathis handling of thismateria l was all that it might have been . Consequently there arem any points inhis exposition which I find una cceptable . Nevertheless , I think that Durkheim’s major thesis as to the socialfunction of the totem ic rite s is valid and on ly requires revisionand correction in the light of the more extensive and more exactkn owledge we now have .

1

The beings to which the Australian cult refers are comm onlyspoken Of as ‘ totem ic ances ’

,tors and I have myself used the term .

But it is somewha'f iiiisleading , sinceW 9 1 3 in the same sense as the dead persons comm emoratedin ancestor-worship . In the cosmology of the Australian nativesthe cosmos

,the ordered universe

,including both the order of

nature and the social order,came into existence at a time in the

past which I propose to Speak of as the World-Dawn,for thi s

name corresponds to certain ideas that I have found amongst theaborigines of some tribes . This order (of natu re and of society)resulted from the doings and adventures of certain sacred beings .These beings

,whom I shall call the Dawn Beings , are the totem ic

ancestors of ethnological literature . The explanations Of topographica l features

,of natural Species and their characteristics

,and

of social laws,custom s and usages are given in the form of myths

about the happenings Of the World-Dawn .

The cosmos is ruled by law . But whereas we think of thelaws Of nature as statements of what invariably does happen

(except , Of course , in m iracles) , and Of m oral or social laws as whatought to be Observed but are sometimes broken, the Australiandoes not make this distinction . For him men and women ought toObserve the ru les of behaviour that were fixed for all time by theevents of the World-Dawn

,and Similarly the rain ought to fall in

its proper season,p lants Should grow and produce fru it or seed ,

and animals Should bear young . But there are irregularities inhuman soc iety and m natu re .

In what I Shall venture to call the totemic religion Of theAustralian aborigines

,there are two main types of ritual . One of

these consists of rites carried out at certain Spots which are com1 For a criticism of some poin ts in Durkheim’s work, see ‘

The Sociologica lTheory of Totemism’in this volum e .

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1 68 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

things : a system Of local groups,and a system Of kinship based on

the fam i ly . Each small local group is a closed patrilineal descentgroup ; that is , a man is born into the group Of his father and hissons belong tohis group . Each group is independent and an tonomous . The stability and continuity Of the social structure dependson the strong solidarity of the local group .

Where there existed the totem ic cult which I have just described (and it existed over a very large part of Australia), eachlocal group was a cult group . The totemic ritual served to ex ress"\Othe unity and solidarity_n gLits individuality andseparation from other groups by the Special relation of the g roupto its sacra : the totem centre or centres

,the Dawn Beings associated

with them,the myths and songs referring to those Beings , and the

totem s or Species connected with the centres . This aspect of thesocial function of totem ism was emphasised

,and I think somewhat

over-emphasised,by Durkheim .

There is,however

,another aspect

,for while the local totemic

groups are separate individual and continuing social entities , theyare also part of a wider social structure . This wider structure isprovided by the kinship system . For an individual in Australiannative society , every person with whom hehas any social contactis related tohim by some bond of kinship

,near or distant, and

the regulation of social life consists essentially of rules concerningbehaviour towards different kinds of kin . For example

,a man

stands in very close relation tohis mother’s local group and , inmany tribes

,in a very close relation to its sacra : its totems , totem

centres and totemic rites .While Australian totemism separates the local groups and

gives each an individuality of its own ,it also links the groups to

gether . For while each group is specially connected with certainparts of the natural order (e .g . with rain

,or with kangaroo) and

with certain of the Beings of the World-Dawn , the society asa whole is related through the totem ic religion to the wholeorder Of nature and to the World-Dawn as a whole . This is bestseen in another kind of totem ic cult , part of which consists ofsacred dramas in which the performers impersonate various DawnBeings . Such dramatic dances are only performed at those religiousmeetings at which a number Of local groups come together , andit is on these occasions that young men are initiated into manhoodand into the religious life of the society .

REL IGION AND SOCIETY 1 69

Australian society is not mere ly a collection of separatelocal groups ; it is also a body Of persons linked together in thekinship system . Australian totemism is a cosmological system bywhich the phenomena of nature are incorporated in the kinshiporganisation . When I was beginning my work in Australia in 19 10 ,

a native said to me ,‘

Bungurdi (kangaroo) ! is! my kaa’ja (elder

This simp le sentence of three words gives the clueto an understanding of Australian totemism . The Speaker did notmean that individuals of the kangaroo Species are his brothers .Hemeant that to the kangaroo Species

,conceived as an entity

,he

stood in a social relation analogous to that in which a man stands tohis elder brother in the kinship system . I am sorry that there is nottime on this occasion to expound this thesis more fully .

The account I have just given Of Australian totem ism differsconsiderab ly from that given by Durkheim . But far from contradicting , it confirm s Durkheim

’s fundamental general theoryas to the social function Of the totemic religion Of Australia andits rites . The two kinds of totemic cult are the demonstration

,in

symbolic action,of the structure Of Australian society and its

foundations in a mythical and sacred past . In maintaining thesocial cohesion and equilibrium

,the religion plays a most im

portant part . The re ligion is an intrinsic part Of the constitutionof society .

I have dwelt,if only cursorily

,with two types Of re ligion :

ancestor-worship and Australian totem ism . In both Of them it ispossib le to demonstrate the close correspondence Of the form Ofreligion and the form Of the social structure . In both it is possibleto see

‘

how the religious rites reaffirm and strengthen the sentiments on which the social order depends . Here then are resultsof some significance for our problem . They point to a certain lineof investigation . We can and shou ld examine other re ligion s in thelight of the results already reached . But to do this we must studyreligions in action ; we must try to discover the effects of activeparticipation in a particular cult

,first the direct effects on the

individual and then the further effects on the society ofwhich theseindividuals are members . When we have a sufficient number ofsuch studies

,it will be possib le to establish a general theory of the

nature of religions and their rOle in social development .In elaborating such a general theory it wi l l be necessary to

determ ine by means of comparative studies the relations between

170 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT I VE SOCIETY

religion and morality . There is only time to refer very brieflyhere to the question of religion and morality . As representing atheory that seem s to be widely held , I quote the following passagesfrom Tylor

On e great e lem en t Of re ligion , that moral e lem en t which among thehigher n ation s form s its most vital p art, is in deed little represen ted in there l igion of the lower races .

1

The comp arison of savage an d c ivilised re ligion s brings in to View,

by the Side Of a deep -lying resemb lance in their phi losophy, a deep -lyingcon trast in their practical action on hum an life . SO far as savage re ligioncan stan d as represen ting natural re ligion , the popu lar idea that the mora lgovernm en t of the un iverse is an essen tial ten et Of n atural re ligion sim p lyfal ls to the ground . Savage an irn ism is almost devoid of that ethicale lem ent which to the educated modern mind is the very m ain spring ofpractica l re ligion . Not, as Ihave said

,that morality is ab sen t from the

life Of the lower races . Without a code of morals , the very existen ce of

the rudest trib e wou ld b e impossib le ; an d indeed the moral stan dardsOf even savage races are to no sm al l exten t we l l-defined an d praiseworthy .

But the se ethical laws stan d on the ir own ground of trad ition and pub licOp in ion ,

comp arative ly in dep en den t of the an irn istic b e liefs an d riteswhich exist b e side them . The lower an irn ism is not imm oral , it isunm oral . The gen era l prob lem of the re lation ofmorality to re ligionis d ifficult

,in tricate , an d requiring imm en se array of

I agree with Tylor that the problem of the relation of moralityto religion is difficu lt and intricate . But I wish to question thevalidity of the distinction he makes between the religions ofsavage sand those of civilised peoples , and ofhis statement thatthe moral element ‘ is little represented in

'the religion of the lower

races’. I suspect that when this View is held it often means onlythat in the ‘ lower raceS’the religion is not associated with thekind of morality which exists in contemporary Western societies .But societies differ in their systems Of m orals as in other aspectsOf the social system

,and what we have to examine in any given

society is the relation of the religion or religions of that societyto their particular system of morality .

Dr . R . F . Fortune , in his book on Manus religion , has challenged the dictum of Tylor . 3 The religion of Manus is what maybe called a kind of spiritualism , but it is not ancestor-worship in

1 Tylor, Primitive Culture, 3rd cd .,1 89 1 , Vol. I , p . 427.

2op cit. , Vol. I I , p . 3 60 .

3 R . F. Fortun e , M anus Relig ion , Phi lade lphia , 1 93 5 , pp . 5 an d 3 5 6 . D r.

Fortun e’s book is a usefu l con tribution to the study of the social fun ction of

religion an d d eals witha re ligion of a very unusual type .

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172 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

are Shown to the initiates , and sacred myths about Baiame arerecounted .

Now Baiame instituted not only the initiation ceremonies,

which are,amongst other things

,schools of morals for young men

,

but also the kinship system with its rules about marriage andbehaviour towards different categories of kin . TO the question

,

‘Why do you Ob serve these complex rules about marriage ?’

the usual answer is,

‘Because Baiame established them’. ThusBaiame is the divine law-giver , or, by an alternative mode ofexpression

,he is the personification of the tribal laws of

morality .

I agree withAn drew Lang and Father Schm idt that Baiamethus closely resembles one aspect of the God of the Hebrews .But Baiame gives no assistance in war as Jehovah did for thechildren of Israel , nor is Baiame the ruler or controller of nature ,of storms and seasons . That position is held by another deity

,the

Rainbow-Serpent , whose image in earth also appears on thesacred ceremonial ground . The position held by Baiame is thatof the D ivine Being who established the m ost important rules ofmorality and the sacred ceremonies of initiation .

These few examples will perhaps suflice to Show that the ideathat it is only the higher religions that are specially concernedwith m orality

,and that the moral e lement is little represen ted

in the religions Of the lower races , is decidedly Open to question .

If there were time I could provide instances from other parts of theworld .

What makes these problem s complex is the fact that law,

morality and religion are three ways of controlling human conductwhich in different types of society supplement one another, andare combined

,in different ways . For the law there are legal

sanctions,for m orality there are the sanctions of public op inion

and of conscience , for religion there are religious sanctions .A Single wrongful deed may fall under two or three sanctions .Blasphemy and sacrilege are Sins and so subject to religioussanctions ; but they may also sometimes be punished by law as

crimes . In our own society murder is immoral ; i t is also acrime punishable by death and it is also a Sin against God , sothat the murderer

,after his sudden exit from this life at the

hands of the executioner,must face an eternity of torment in

the fires of Hell .

REL IG ION AND SOCIETY 173

Legal sanctions may be brought into action in instanceswhere there is no question of m orality or immorality

,and the

same is true of religious sanctions . It is he ld by some of the Fathersor doctors of the Christian churches that an upright and virtuouslife devoted to good works will not save a man from Hel l unlesshe has attained grace by accepting as true the specific doctrinestaught by a church .

The penaltyfrom God . Or

there may be a belief in rewards and pun ishments in an after-life .

But the most widespread form of the religious sanction is thebelief that certain actions produce in an individua l or in a commun ity a condition of ritual pollution , or uncleann ess, from whichit is necessary to be purified . Pollution may result from thingsdone unintentionally and unwittingly

,as you may see from the

fifth chapter of the Book of Leviticus . One who unwittingly hastouched any unclean thing

,such as the carcase of an unclean beast ,

is guilty andhas sinned and must bear his iniquity . He must makea sacrifice

,a trespass offering

,by which he may be cleansed from

his sin .

Ritual uncleann ess does not in itse lf involve moral con

demnation . We read in the twelfth chapter .of the same Book ofLeviticus that the Lord instructed Moses that a woman who hasborne a male child shall be unclean . for seven days and herpurification must continue for a further three and thi rty days ,during which she shall touch no hallowed thing , nor come into thesanctuary. If the child She bears is female , the first period of

uncleanness is to be two weeks and the period of purificationthreescore-and-Six days . Thus , it is polluting , but no one cansuppose that it is immoral

,to bear a child

,and more polluting

if the Child Is female than if It is male .

The Opposite of pollution or Sinfulness is holiness . Butholiness comes not from leading an honest and upright life , butfrom religious exercises

,prayer and fasting , the performance of

penance,meditation and the reading Of sacred books . In Hinduism

the son of a Brahm in is born holy ; the son of a leather-worker isborn unclean .

The field covered by m orality and that covered by religionare different ; but either in prim itive or in civilised societies theremay be a region in which they overlap .

174. STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

To return to our main topic,a writer whohas dealt with

the social function of religions on the basis of a comparativestudy is Loisy

,who devotes to the subject a few pages of the con

cluding chapter of his valuab le Essaihistorique sur le Sacrifice.

1

Although he differs from Durkheim in some matters,his funda

mental theory is,if not identical

,at any rate very Sim ilar to that

of the earlier writer . Speaking Of what he calls the sacred action(l’aetion sacrée) , of which the most characteristic form is the rite ofsacrifice

,he writes

Wehave seen its rlOe in hum an societies , of which ithas m aintain ed

an d strengthen ed the social bon ds , if in deed ithas not con tributed in a

large m easure to creating them . It w as , in certain re sp ects , the exp ressionof them ; but m an is so m ade thathe b ecom es more firm ly fixed inhissen tim en ts by expressin g them . The sacred action w as the exp ressionof social life

,of social asp iration s , ithas n ecessarily b een a factor of

society .

Before we con demn out of han d the m irage of re ligion an d the ap

p aratus of sacrifice as a simp le waste of socia l resources an d forces , it is

prop er to ob serve that, re l igion having b een the form of social con scien ce ,and sacrifice the expression of this con scien ce , the loss was comp en satedby a gain

,an d that

,so far as pure ly m aterial losses are con cern ed , there

is real ly no occasion to dwe l l on them . Moreover the kin d of sacred

con tribution that was requ ired , without real utility as to the effect thatwas exp ected from it, w as an intrin sic p art of the system of renun cia

tion s , of con tribution s which, in every hum an society, are the con dition

of its equ ilibrium an d its con servation .

2

But besides this definition of the social function in termsof social cohesion and continuityLZLoisy seeks for what he calls ageneral formula (formule ge

'

ne’ra le) in whi ch to sum up the part

that religion has played in human life . Such a formula is useful solong as we remember that it is only a formulaf The one thatLoisy offers is that magic and religion have served to give menconfidence .

In the most primitive societies it is magic that gives man

confidence in face of the difficulties and uncertainties , the real andImagmary dangers with which he is surrounded .

A la m erci des élém en ts,d es saison s , de ce que la terre lui donn e ou

lu i refuse , des bon n e s ou d es m auvaises chan ces d e sa chasse ou de sa

péche , aussi du hasard de ses combats avec ses sem b lab les , il croit trouverle moyen d e régu lariser p ar d es s imu lacres d’action ces chan ces p lus on

11 920 , p p . 5 3 1

-

4020p cit. , pp . 5 3 5

—7 .

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176 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

punishments . But the Confucians have Shown us that a religionlike ancestor-worship can be rationalised and freed from thoseillusory beliefs that we call superstition . For in the rites of commemoration of the ancestors it is sufficient that the participantsShould express their reverential gratitude to those from whom theyhave received their life

,and their sense of duty towards those not

yet born,to whomthey in due course will stand in the position

of revered ancestors . There still remains the sense of dependence .

The living depend on those Of the past ; they have duties to thoseliving in the present and to those of the future who will dependon . them .

I suggest to you that what makes and keeps a man a socialan im al is not some herd instinct , but the sense of dependence inthe innumerab le form s that it takes . The process of socialisationbegins on the first day of an infant’s life and it has to learn that itboth can and must depend on its parents . From them It has com fortand succour ; but it must subm it also to their control . What Iam calling the sense of dependence always has these two sides .We can face life and its chances and difficulties with confidencewhen we know that there are powers

,forces and events on

which we can rely,but we must subm it to the control of our

conduct by rules which are imposed, The entirely asocial individual would be one who thought that he could be completelyindependent , relying only on him self, asking for no help andrecognising no duties .I have tried to present to you a thew f thei social function of

religip n . This theory has been developed by the work of such menas Robertson Smith , Puste l de Coulanges , Durkheim ,

Loisy .

It is the theory that has guided my own studies for nearly fortyyears . I have thought it worth while to indicate that it existedin embryo in the writings Of Chinese phi losophers m ore thantwenty centuries ago .

Like any other scientific theory it is provisional,subject to

revision and modification in the light of future research . It isOffered as providing what seem s likely to be a profitable methodof investigation . What is needed to test and further elaborate thetheory is a number of systematic studies of various types of religionin relation to social systems in which they occur .

I will summarise the suggestions I have made

REL IGION AND SOCIETY 1 77

To 1111515 532 9 51 a particular religion we must study it seffe st therefore be studied in a ction .

irecte'

d

by what have been called sentiments,conceived as mental

dispositions,i t is necessary to discover as far as possib le

what are the sentiments that are developed in the individualas the resu lt of his participation in a particular religiouscult .In the study of any religion we must first of all examine

ecificall actions , the ceremonies and the

4 . The emphasis on belief in Specific doctrines which characterises Some m odern religions seems to be the result ofcertain social developments in societies of complex structure .

5 . In some societies there is a direct and immediate relationbetween the religion and the social structure . This has beenillustrated by ancestor-worship and Australian totem ism .

It is also true Of what we may call national religions,such

as that of the Hebrews or those Of the city states of Greeceand Rome .

1 But where there comes into existence a separateindependent religious structure by the formation of differentchurches or sects or cult-groups within a people , therelation Of religion to the total social structure is in manyrespects indirect and not always easy to trace .

6 . As a general formula (for whatever such a formula may beworth) it is suggested that what is expressed in all re ligionsis what I have called the sense Of dependence in its doub leaspect ,

and that it is by constantlymaintaining this Senseof dependence that religions perform their social function .

amon g the an cien ts what form ed the bond of every society was a

worship . Just as a dom estic altarhe ld the m em bers of a fam ily group ed about

it, so the city was the col lective group of those whohad the sam e protectin g

d eities , an d who p erform ed the religious ceremon y at the sam e altar.

’Fus tel

de Cou langes , op cit., p . 1 93 .

C HAP T E R IX

ON THE CONCEPT OF FUNCTION INSOCIAL SCIENCE 1

HE concept of function applied to human societies isbased on an analogy between social life and organic life .The recognition of the analogy and of some of its implica

tions is not new . In the nineteenth century the analogy, the conceptof function

,and the word itse lf appear frequently in social philo

sophy and sociology. So far as I know the first systematicformulation of the concept as applying to the strictly scientificstudy of society was that of Emile Durkheim in 1 895 . (Régles de laMe

’thode Sociologique .)Durkheim’s defin ition is that the ‘function’of a social in

stitution is the correspondence between it and the needs (besoinsin French) Of the social organism . Thi s definition requires som ee laboration . In the first p lace

,to avoid possib le ambiguity and

in particu lar the possibility of a teleological interpretation, I

would like to substitute for the term ‘needs’the term ‘necessaryconditions of existence’, or, if the term

‘need’is used,i t is to be

understood only in this sense . I t may be here noted,as a point

to be returned to , that any attempt to apply this concept of functionin social science involves the assumption that there are necessaryconditions of existence for human societies just as there are foranimal organism s

,and that they can be discovered by the proper

kind of scientific enquiry .

For the further e lucidation of the concept it is convenient touse the analogy between social life and organic life . Like al lana logie s it has to be used with care . An anim al organism is anagglomeration of cells and interstitial fluids arranged in relationto one another not as an aggregate but as an integrated livingwhole . For the b iochemist , i t is a comp lexly in tegrated systemof complex molecules . The system of relations by which these

1 This paper, whichis based on commen ts that I made on a pap er read byD r. Lesser to the Am erican An thropological Association , is reprin ted from

the American Anthropologist, Vol. XXXVI I , p . 3 , 1 93 5 , where it accompaniedD r. Lesser

’s p ap er.

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1 80 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

If we set out upon a systematic investigation of the natu re oforganism s and organic life there are three sets of problemspresented to us . (There are , in addition , certain other sets ofproblem s concerning aspects or characteristics of organic life with

\which we are not here concerned .) One is that of morphologywhat kinds of organic structures are there , what sim ilarities andvariations do they Show , and how can they be classified ? Secondare the problems of physiology— how,

in general,do organic

structures function,what

,therefore , i s the nature of the life

process ? Third are the problems of evolution or developmenthow do new types of organisms come into existence ?To turn from organic life to social life , if we exam ine such a

community as an African or Australian tribe we can recognisethe existence of a social structure . Individual human beings , theessential units in this instance , are connected by a definite set ofsocial re lations into an integrated whole . The continuity of thesocial Structure

,like that of an organic structure , is not destroyed

by changes in the units . Individuals may leave the society ,by

death or otherwise ; others may enter it . The continuity“of structureis maintained by the process of social life , which consistS Of theactivities and interactions Of the individual human beings and ofthe organised groups into which they are united . The social lifeof the community is here defined as the functioning of the socialstructure . The function of any recurrent activity , such as thepunishment of a crime

,or a funeral ceremony , Is the part it plays

in the social life as a whole and therefore the contribution it makesto the maintenance of the structural continuity .

The concept of function as here defined thus involves thenotion of a structure consisting of a set of relations amongst unitentities

,the continuity of the structure being maintained by a life

process made up of the activities of the constituent units .If, with these concepts in mind , we set out on a systematic

investigation of the nature of human society and of social life ,we find presented to us three sets of problems . First , the problemsof social morphology— what kinds of social structures are there ,what are their sim ilarities and differences

,how are they to be

classified ? Second , the problem s of social physiology—_how dosocial structu res function ? Third , the problem s of developmenthow do new types of social structure come into existence ?Two important points where the analogy between organism and

ON THE CONCEPT OF FUNCT ION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 1 8 1

society breaks down must be noted . In an animal organism it ispossible to observe the organic structure to some extent independently Of its functioning . It is therefore possible to make amorphology which is independent of physiology . But in humansociety the social structure as a whole can only be observed in itsfunctioning . Some of the features of social structure

,such as

the geographical distribution of individuals and groups can bedirectly observed , but most of the social relations which in theirtotality constitute the structure , such as relations of father andson ,

buyer and seller , ru ler and subject , cannot be observedexcept in the social activities in which the relations are functioning .

It follows that a social morphology cannot be established independently of a social physiology .

The second point is that an animal organism does not,in the

course of its life,change its structural type . A pig does not become

a hippopotamus . (The development of the animal from germination to matu rity is not a change Of type since the process inall its stages is typical for the Species .) On the other hand a

'

society in the course of its history can and does change its structuraltype without any breach of continuity .

By the definition here offered ‘function’is the contributionwhich a partial activity m akes to the total activity of which it is apart . The function of a particular social usage is the contributionit make}

~

tothe_total social life as the functioning of the total social

system . Such a view implies that a social system (the total socialstru

f

c

f

ii’

ire of a~

S'

ociety together with the totality of social usagesin which that structure appears and on which it depends for itscontinued existence)has a certain kind Of unity , which we mayspeak of as a functional unity . We may defin e it as a conditionin which‘ all parts of the social system work together with asuflicient degree of harmony or internal consistency , i.e . withoutproducing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved norregulated .

l

This idea of the functional unity of a social system is , of course , I

a hypothesis . But it is one which,to the functionalist , i t seem s :

worth while to test by systematic exam ination of the facts .There is another aspect of functional theory that should be

briefly mentioned . To return to the analogy of social life and

1 Opposition ,i.e . organ ised an d regu lated an tagon ism ,

is,of course , an

essen tial feature of every social system .

1 82 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

organic life,we recognise that an organism may function more or

less efliciently and so we set up a special science of pathologyto deal with all phenomena of disfu

nction . We distinguish In an

century B .C . thought that one m ight apply the same notion tosociety

,to the city-state

,distinguishing conditions of eunomia

good order,social health

,from dysnomia , disorder , social ill

health . In the nineteenth century Durkheim , in his applicationof the notion Of function , sought to lay the basis for a scientificsocial pathology

,based on a morphology and a physiology .

1

In his works,particularly those on suicide and the division of

labour, he attempted to find objective criteria by which to judgewhether a given society at a given time is normal or pathological ,eunomic or dysnomic . For example , he tried to Show that theincrease of the rate of su icide in many countries durin g part of thenineteenth century is symptomatic Of a dysnomic or

,in his

terminology,anom ic

,social condition . Probably there is no

sociologist who would hold that Durkheim really succeeded inestablishing an objective basis for a science of social pathology .

2

In relation to organic structures we can find strictly Objectivecriteria by which to distinguish disease from health

,pathological

from normal , for disease is that which either threatens the organism with death (the dissolution of its structure) or interferes withthe activities which are characteristic of the organic type . Societiesdo i f the in the same sense that an imals die and therefore wecannot define dysnom ia as that which leads

,if unchecked

,to the

death Of a society . Further , a society differs from an organismin that it can change its structural type

, or can be absorbed asan integral part of a larger society. Therefore we cann ot definedysnom ia as a disturbance of the usual activities of a social type

(as Durkheim tried to do) .Let us return for a moment to the Greeks . They conceived

the health of an organism and the eunom ia of a society as beingin each instance a condition of the harmonious working together

1 Forwhat ishere cal led dysnom ia Durkheim used the term anom ia (anomiein Fren ch) . This is to m y m in d inappropriate . Healthand disease , eunom ia an d

dysnom ia , are essen tial ly re lative term s .

2 I wou ld p ersonal ly agree in the m ain withthe criticism s of Roger Lacombe

(La M e’thode Sociologique de D urkheim, 1 926 , ch. IV) on Durkheim’s general

theory Of social p athology , an d withthe criticism s of Durkheim’s treatm en t

of suicide presen ted by Halbwachs , Les Causes da Suicide.

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1 84 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

as attempts to relieve a condition of social dysnom ia producedby the rapid modification of the social life through contact withwhite civilisation .

The concept of function as defined above constitutes a‘working hypothesis’by which a number of problems are formulated for investigation . No scientific enquiry is possible withoutsome such formulation of working hypotheses . Two rem arks arenecessary here . One is that the hypothesis does not require thedogmatic assertion that everything In the life of every communityhas a function . It only requires the assumption that It mayhave one

,and that we are justified In seeking to discover it . The

second is that what appears to be the same social usage in twosocieties may have different functions in the two . Thus the practiceof celibacy in the Roman Catholic Church of today has verydifferent functions from those of celibacy in the early ChristianChurch . In other words , in order to define a social usage , andtherefore in order to make valid comparisons between the usagesof different peoples or periods , it is necessary to consider notm erely the form of the usage but also Its function . On this basis ,for example

,belie f In a Supreme Be ing in a Simple society is

something different from such a belief in a modern civi lisedcommunity .

The acceptance of the functiona l hypothesis or point of Viewoutlined above results in the recognition of a vast number

'

of

problem s for the solution of which there are required wide com

parative studies of societies of many diverse types and also intensive studies Of as many single societies as possible . In fieldstudies of the simpler peoples it leads

,first of all

,to a d irect study

of the social life of the community as the function ing of a socialstructure , and of this there are several examples in recent literature .

Since the function of a social activity is to be found by examiningits effects upon individuals , these are studied , either in the averageindividual or in both average and exceptional individuals . Further,the hypothesis leads to attempts to investigate directly the functional consistency or unity of a social system and to determine asfar as possible in each instance the natu re of that unity . Such fieldstudies will obviously be different in many ways from studiescarried out from other points of view

, e .g . the ethnological pointof View that lays emphasis on diffusion . We do not have to saythat one point of view is better than another

,but only that they

ON THE CONCEPT OF FUNCT ION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 1 85

are different,and any particu lar piece of work should be judged

in reference to what it aim s to do .

If the View here outlined is taken as one form of‘functionalism’

,

a few remarks on Dr . Lesser’s paper become perm issib le . Hemakes reference to a difference of ‘content’in functional and nonfunctional anthropology . From the point of view here presentedthe ‘content’or subject-matter of social anthropology is the wholesocial life of a people in all its aspects . For convenience of handlingit is often necessary to devote specia l attention to some particu larpart or aspect Of the social life , but if functionalism meansanything at all it does mean the attempt to see the social life of apeople as a whole

,as a functional unity .

Dr. Lesser speaks of the functionalist as stressing ‘ thepsychological aspects of culture’

,I presume that he here refers

to the functionalist’s recognition that the usages of a societywork

or‘

funCtion’only through their effects in the life,i .e . in the

thoughts ,_ _sentiments and actions of individuals ._

The ‘functionalist’point of view here presented does thereforeimply that we have to investigate as thoroughly as possible allaspects of social life , considering them in relation to one another ,and that an essential part of the task is the investigation of theindividual and of the way in which he is moulded by or adjustedto the social life .

Turning from content to method Dr . Lesser seems to findsome conflict between the functional point of view and thehistorical. This is reminiscent of the attempts formerly made to seea conflict between sociology and history . There need be no conflict, but there Is a difference .

There 18 not,and cannot be , any conflict between the flinctional

hypothesis and the view that any culture , any social system , is theend-result of a unique series of historical accidents . The process ofdevelopment of the race-horse from its five-toed ancestor was aunique series of historical accidents . This does not conflict withthe View of the physiologist that the horse of today and all theantecedent forms conform or conformed to physiological laws , i.e .

to the necessary conditions Of organic existence . Palaeontology andphysiology are not in conflict . One ‘explanation’of the race-horseis to be found in its history— how it came to be just what it is andwhere it is . Another and entirely independent

‘explanation’is toShow how the horse is a special exemplification of physiological

1 86 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

laws . Sim ilarly one ‘explanation’of a social system will be itshistory

,where we know it— the detailed account ofhow it came

to be what it is and where it is . An other ‘explanation’of the samesystem is obtained by showing (as the functionalist attempts to do)that it i s a specia l exemplification of laws of social physiologylor social functioning . The two kinds Of explanation do notconflict

,but supplement one another .

1

The functiOiiaI'

liypothesis is in conflict with two views thatare held by some ethnologists

,and it is probably these

,held as

they Often are without precise formulation,that are the cause of

the antagonism to that approach . One is the shreds and patches’

theory of culture,the designation being taken from a phrase Of

Professor Lowie 2 when he speaks of ‘ that p lanless hodge-podge,

that thing of shreds and patches called civilisation’. The con

centration of attention on what is called the diffusion of culturetraits tends to produce a conception of cultu re as a collection Ofdisparate entities (the so-called traits) brought together by purehistorica l acciden t and having only accidental re lations to one

another . The conception is rarely formulated and maintained withany precision

,but as a half-unconscious point of view it does

seem to control the thinking of many ethnologists . It is,of

course,in direct conflict with the hypothesis of the functional

unity of social systems .The second view which is in direct conflict with the functional

hypothesis is the View that there are no discoverable significantsociological laws such as the functionalist is seeking . I know that

1 I see no reason at all why the two kinds of study— thehistorical and thefun ction al—Shou ld not be carried on side by Side in p erfectharmon y . In fact,

for fourteen years Ihave been teaching boththehi storica l an d geographicalstudy of p eop les un der the n am e of ethnology in close association witharchaeology , and the fun ction al study of social system s under the n am e of socia lan thropology. I do think that there are many d isadvan tages in mixing thetwo subjects together and conq in g them . See

‘

The M ethods of Ethn ologyan d Social An thropology’(SouthAfrican journal of S cience, 1 923 , p p . 1 24

2 Primitive Society , p . 44 1 . A con cise statem ent of this poin t of view is thefol lowin g passage from D r. RuthBen edict’s ‘

The Con cep t of the Guardian

Sp irit in NorthAm erica’(M emoirs, Am erican An thropological Association ,

29 , p . 84 :‘

It is , so far as we can see , an u ltim ate fact ofhum an n ature

that m an build s uphis cu lture out of disparate e lem en ts , comb in ing and re

comb in ing them ; and un til wehave abandon ed the sup erstition that the resu ltis an organ ism fun ctionally in terre lated

, we shal l be unab le to see our cu lturallife objective ly, or to con trol its m anifestation s .

’I think that p robab ly n eitherProfessor Low ie nor D r. Ben edict wou ld ,

at the p resen t tim e , maintain thisview of the n ature of cu lture .

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C H AP T E R X

ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1

T has been suggested to me by some of my friends that IShould use this occasion to offer some remarks about myown point of view in social anthropology ; and Since in my

teaching,beginning at Cambridge and at the London School of

Econom ics thirty years ago,I have consistently emphasised the

importance of the study of social structure , the suggestion made tome was that I Should say something on that subject .IhOpe you will pardon me if I begin with a note of personal

explanation . I have been described on m ore than one occasion as

belonging to something called the ‘Functional School of Soc ialAn thropology’and even as being its leader

,or one Of its leaders .

This Functional School does not really exist it is a myth inventedby Professor Malinowski . He has explainedhow , to quotehisown words

,

‘ the magnificent title of the Functional School ofAn thropology has been bestowed by myself, in a way on myself,and to a large extent out of my own sense of irresponsibility

’.

Professor Malinowski’s irresponsibilityhas had unfortunate

results,since ithas spread over anthropology a dense fog of

discussion about ‘functionalism’. Professor Lowie has ann ouncedthat the leading

,though not the only , exponent of functionalism

in the nineteenth century was Professor Franz Boas . I do notthink that there is any sense

,other than the purely chronological

one,in which I can be said to be either the follower of Professor

Boas or the predecessor Of Professor Malinowski . The statementthat I am a ‘ functionalist’would seem to me to convey no definitemeaning .

There is no place in natural science for ‘ Schools’in this sense,

and I regard social anthropology as a branch of natural science .

Each scientist starts from the work ofhis predecessors , findsproblems which he believes to be significant , and by observationand reasoning endeavours to make some contribution to a growingbody of theory . Co-operation amongst scientists results from the

1 Pres iden tial Address to the Royal An thropological In stitute . Reprinted

from the journal of the Royal Anthropolog ical Institute, Vol. LXX ,1 940 .

1 88

ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1 89

fact that they are working on the same or re lated problem s .Such co-Operation does not result in the formation Of schools

,in

the sense in which there are schools of philosophy or of painting .

There is no place for orthodoxies and heterodoxies in science .

Nothing is more pernicious in science than attempts to establishadherence to doctrines . All that a teacher can do is to assist thestudent in learning to understand and use the scientific method .

It is not his business to make discip les .I conceive of social anthropology as the theoretical natural

science of human society, that is , the investigation of socialphenomena by methods essentially similar to those used inthe physical and biological sciences . I am quite willing to call thesubject ‘comparative sociology

’,if anyone SO w ishes . It is the

subject itself,and not the name

,that is important . As you kn ow ,

there are some ethnologists or anthropologists who hold that it isnot possible

,orat least not profitable , to apply to social phenomena

the theoretical methods of natural science . For these personssocial anthropology

,as I have defined it

,is som ething that does

not , and never will , exist . For them , of course , my remarks willhave no meaning

, or at least not the meaning I intend them tohave .

While I have defin ed social anthropology as the study Ofhuman society

,there are some who define it as the study Of

culture . It m ight perhaps be thought that this difference Ofdefinition is of minor importance . Actually it leads to two differentkinds of study

,between which it is hardly possible to Ob tain

agreement in the formulation of prob lem s .For a preliminary definition Of social phenom ena it Seem s

sufficiently clear that what we have to deal with are relations ofassociation between individual organism s . In a hive of beesthere are the relations of association of the queen , the workersand the drones . There is the association of animals in a herd , Ofa mother-cat and her kittens . These are social phenomena ;I do not suppose that anyone will call them cultural phenomena .

In anthropology,of course

,we are only concerned with human

beings,and in social anthropology

,as I define it , what we have

to investigate are the forms of association to be found amongsthuman beings .Let us consider what are the concrete , observable facts with

which the social anthropologist is concerned . If we set out to study,

190 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

for example,the aboriginal inhabitants of a part of Australia

,we

find a certain number of individual human beings in a certa innatural environment . We can observe the acts of behaviour of

ng, of course , their acts of Speech,

oducts of past actions . We do not observe a‘culture’, since that word denotes, not any concrete reality, butan abstraction

,and as it is commonly used a vague abstraction .

on does reveal to us that these human beingsd by a complex network of social re lations . I use thestructure’to denote this network of actually existing

relations . It ' is this that I regard it as my business to study if I

\ m working , not as an ethnologist or psychologist , but as a socialanthropologist . I do not m ean that the study of social structure isthe whole of social anthropology

,but I do regard it as being In

a very important sense the most fundamental part of the science .

My View of natural science is that it is the systematic investigation of the structure of the universe as it is revealed to us throughour senses . There are certain important separate branches of science ,each of which deals with a certain class or kind of structures , theaim being to discover the Characteristics of all structures of that kind .

So atomic physics dealswith the structure of atom s,chemistry with

the structure of molecules, crystallography and colloidal chemistrywith the structure of crystals and colloids

,and anatomy and

physiology with the structures of organisms . There is , therefore ,I suggest

,p lace for a branch of natural science which will have

for its task the discovery of the general characteristics of thosesocial structures of which the component units are human beings .

Social phenomena constitute a distinct class of naturalphenomena . They are all , in one way or another

,conn ected

with the existence of social structures,either being implied in or

1resulting from them . Social structures are just as real as areindividual organisms . A complex organism is a collection of

living cells and interstitial fluids arranged in a certain structure ;and a living cell is sim ilarly a structural arrangement of complexmolecules . The physiological and psychological phenomena thatwe observe in the lives of organisms are not simp ly the result of thenature of the constituent molecules or atoms ofwhich the organismis built up

,but are the result of the structure in which they are

united . So also the social phenomena which we observe in anyhuman society are not the immediate resu lt of the nature of

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192 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

of employers and employees,are just as much determinants of

social relations as belonging to diflerent clans or different nations .In the study of social structure the concrete reality with which

we are,concerned is the set of actually existing relations , at a g iven

m oment of time , which link together certain human beings .It is on this that we can make direct observations . But it is notthis that we attempt to describe in i ts particularity . Science

(as distinguished from history or biography) is not concernedwith the particu lar

,the unique , but only with the general , with

kinds,with events which recur. The actual relations of Tom ,

D ick and Harry or the behaviour of Jack and Jill may go dovVn inour field note-books and may provide illustrations for a generaldescription . But what we need for scientific purposes is an accountof the form of the structure . For example , if in an Australiantribe I observe in a number of instances the behaviour towardsone another of persons who stand in the relatIOn of mother’sbrother and sister’s son ,

it is in order that I may be able torecord as precisely as possib le the general or normal form of thisre lationship

,abstracted from the variations of particu lar instances

,

though taking account of those variations .This important distinction

,between structure as an actually

existing concrete reality,to be directly observed

,and structural

form,as what the field-worker describes , may be m ade clearer

perhaps by a consideration of the continuity of social structurethrough tim e

,a continuity which is not static like that of a bu i lding,

but a dynam ic continuity,like that of the organic structure of a

living body . Throughout the life of an organism its structure isbeing constantly renewed ; and Similarly the social life constantlyrenews the social structure . Thus the actual re lations of personsand groups of persons change from year to year

,or even from day

to day . New members come into a community by birth or im

m igration ; others go out of it by death or emigration . There arem arriages and divorces .

‘Friends may become enemie s,or enem ies

may make peace and become friends . But while the actual structurechanges in this way

,the general structural form may remain

relatively constan t over a longer or shorter period of time . Thusif I visit a relatively stable community and revisit it after an intervalof ten years , I Shall find that m any of its members have died andothers have been born ; the m embers who still survive are now tenyears older and their relations to one another may have changed

ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE 1 93

i n many ways . Yet I may fin d that the kinds of relations that Ican observe are very little different from those observed ten yearsbefore . The structural formhas changed little .

But,on the other hand , the structural form may change ,

sometimes gradually, sometimes with relative suddenn ess , as inrevolutions and military conquests . But even in the most revolutionary

-changes some continuity of structure is maintained .

I must say a few words about the Spatial aspect Of socialstructure . It is rarely that we find a community that is absolutelyisolated

,having no outside contact . At the present m oment of

history,the network of social relations Spreads over the whole

world,without any absolute solution of continuity anywhere .

This gives rise to a difficulty which I do not think that sociologistshave really faced

,the difficulty of defining what is meant by the

term ‘a society’. They do comm only talk of societies as if theywere distinguishab le , discrete entities , as , for examp le , when weare told that a society is an organism . Is the British Empire asociety or a collection of societies ? Is a Chinese Village a society ,or is it merely a fragm ent of the Republic of China ?If we say that our subject is the study and comparison of

human societies,we ought to be able to say what are the unit

entities with which we are concerned .

If we take any convenient locality of a suitab le size , we canstudy the structural system as it appears in and from that region ,i.e . the network of relations connecting the inhabitants amongstthemselves and with the people of other regions . We can thusobserve

,describe

,and compare the systems of socia l structure of

as m any localities as we wish . To illustrate what I mean , I may

refer to two recent studies from the University of Chicago , oneof a Japanese village , Suye Mura , by Dr . John Emb ree , and theother of a French Canadian community , St. Denis , by Dr .Horace M iner .Closely connected with this conception of socia l structure

i s the conception of ‘ Social personality’as the position Occupiedby a hum an being in a social structure , the complex formed byall his social relations with others . Every human being living insociety is two things : he is an individual and also a person . As anindividual

,he is a biological organism

,a collection of a vast number

of m olecules organised in a complex stru cture , within which,as long as it persists , there occur physiological and psychological

194 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

actions and reactions , processes and changes . Human beingsas individuals are objects of study for physiologists and psychologists . The human being as a person is a complex of socialre lationships . He is a citizen of England

,a husband and a father

,

a bricklayer,a member of a particular Methodist congregation

,

a voter in a certain con stituency,'

a member of his trade union,an

adherent of the Labour Party , and so on . Note that each of thesedescriptions refers to a social relationship

, or to a p lace In a socialstructure . Note also that a social personality is something thatchanges during the course of the life of the person . As a person

,

the hum an being is the object of study for the social anthropologist .We cannot study persons except in term s of social structure

,nor

can we study social structure except in term s of the persons whoare the units of which it is composed .

If you tell me that an individual and a person are after allreally the same thing

,I would remind you of the Christian creed .

God is three persons,but to say that He is three individuals

is to be guilty of a heresy for which men have been put to death .

Yet the failure to distinguish individual and person is not merelya heresy in religion ; it is worse than that ; it is a source of confusionin science .

I have now sufficiently defined , I hope , the subject-matterof what I regard as an extrem ely important branch of soc ialanthropology . The m ethod to be adopted follows immediatelyfrom this definition . It must combine with the inten sive study ofsingle societies (i.e . of the structural system s observable in particu lar communities) the system atic comparison of many soc ieties

(or structural system s of different types) . The use of comparisonis indispensab le . The study of a Single society may providematerials for comparative study, or it may afford occasion forhypotheses

,which then need to be tested by reference to other

societies ; it cannot give dem onstrated resu lts .Our first task

,of course

,is to learn as much as we can about

the varieties, or diversities , of structural systems . This requires

field research . Many writers of ethnographical descriptions do notattempt to give us any systematic account of the social structure .

But a few social anthropologists , here and in America , do recogn isethe importance of such data and their work is providing us with asteadily growing body of material for our study . Moreover, theirresearches are no longer confined to what are called ‘prim itive’

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1 96 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT I VE SOCIETY

Let us first consider the study of language . A language is aconnected set of Speech usages observed within a defined Speechcommunity . The existence of Speech-communities and theirSizes are features of social structure . There is , therefore , a certa invery general relation between social structure and language . Butif we consider the Special characteristics of a particular languageits phonology

,its morphology and even to a great extent its

vocabulary— there is no direct connection of either one-Sidedor mutual determ ination between these and the Special characteristics of the social structure of the community within which thelanguage is spoken . We can easily conceive that two societiesmight have very Similar forms of social structure and very differentkinds of language

,or vice versa . The coincidence of a particu lar

form of social structure and a particular language in a givencommunity is always the result of historical accident . There may ,of course

,be certain indirect

,remote interactions between social

structure and language,but these would seem to be of minor

importance . Thus the general comparative study of languagescan be profitably carried out as a re latively independent b ranchof science , in which the language is considered in abstractionfrom the social structure of the community in which it is spoken .

But,on the other hand

,there are certain features of linguistic

history which are specifically connected withsocial structure .

As structural phenomena may be instanced the process by.whichLatin

,from being the language of the small region of Latium ,

became the language of a considerable part of Europe,displacing

the other Italic languages,Etruscan

,and m any Celtic languages ;

and the subsequent reverse process by which Latin split up intoa number of diverse local form s of Speech

,which ultimately

became the various Romance languages of today .

Thus the Spread of language , the unification of a number ofseparate communities into a single speech-community

,and the

reverse process of subdivision into different speech-communities,

are phenomena of social structure . SO also are those instances inwhich

,in societieshaving a class structure , there are differences

of speech usage in different classes .I have considered language first

,because linguistics is , I

think,the branch of social anthropology which can be m ost

profitably studied without reference to social structure . There is areason for this . The set of speech usages which constitute a

ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE 197

language does form a system , and system s of this kind can becompared in order to discover their common general

, or abstract ,characters

,the determination of which can give us laws

,which will

be Specifically laws of linguistics .Let us consider very briefly certain other branches of social

anthropology and their relation to the study of social structure .

If we take the social life of a local community over a period,let us

say a year, we can observe a certain sum total of activities carriedout by the persons who compose it . We can also observe a certainapportionment of these activities , one person doing certain things ,another doing others . This apportionment of activities

,equivalent

to what is sometimes called the social division of labour,is an

important feature of the social structure,Now activities are carried

out because they provide some sort of gratification as I proposefo

w

call it, and the characteristic feature of social life i s thatactivities of certain p ersons provide gratifications for other

persons . In a.

simple instance,when an Australian blackfellow

“

g““

oes hunting , he provides meat , not only for himself, but forhis wife and children and also for other relatives to whom i t ishis duty to give meat when he has it . Thus in any society thereis not only an apportionment of activities , but also an apportionment of the gratifications resulting therefrom , and some sort ofsocial machinery

,relatively simple or

,sometimes

,highly comp lex

,

by which the system works .It is this machinery

, or certain aspects of it, that constitutesthe special Subject-matter studied by the economists . They concern them selves with what kinds and quantities of goods areproduced

,how they are distributed (i.e . their flow from personto person

,or region to region), and the way in which they are

disposed of. Thus what are called economic institutions areextensively studied in m ore or less complete abstraction from therest of the social system . This method does undoub tedly provideuseful results

,particu larly in the study of complex modern

societies . Its weaknesses become apparent as soon as we attemptto apply it to the exchange of goods in what are called primitivesoc ieties .The economic machinery of a society appears in quite a new

light if‘

it is studied in relation to the social structu re . The exchangeof goods and services is dependent upon

,is the result of, and at

the same time is a means of maintaining a certain structure , a

198 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

network of relations between persons and collections of persons .For the economists and politicians of Canada the potlatch of theIndians of the north-west of America was Simply wasteful foolishness and it was therefore forbidden. For the anthropologist itwas the machinery for maintaining a social structure of lineages ,clans and moieties

,with which was combined an arrangea fi

—

t

'

of

rank defined by privileges .Any full understanding of the economic institutions of human

societies requires that they should be Studied from two angles .From one of these the economic system is Viewed as the mechanismby which goods of various kinds and in various quantities areproduced

,transported and transferred , and utilised . From the

other the econom ic system is a set of relations between persons andgroups which maintains , and is maintained by, this exchange 9 1circulation of goods and services . From the latter point of view,

the study of the economic life of societies takes its p lace aS partOf the general study of social structure .’Social relations are only observed , and can only be described ,

by reference to the reciprocal behaviour of the persons related .

The form of a social structure has therefore to be described bythe patterns of behaviour to which individuals and groups conform in their dealings with one another . These patterns arepartially formulated in rules which , in our own society , we distinguishas ru les of etiquette , of morals and of law . Rules , of course ,only exist in their recognition by the members of the society ;e ither in their verbal recognition

,when they are stated as ru les ,

or in their observance in behaviour. These two modes of re

cognition,as every field are not the same thing and

both have to be taken into account .If I say that in any society the rules of etiquette , morals and

law are part of the mechanism by which a certain set of socialre lations is maintained in existence

,this statement will , I suppose ,

be greeted as a truism . But it is one of those truisms which manywriters on human society verbally accept and yet ignore intheoretical discussions

, or in their descriptive analyses . Thepoint is not that ru les exist in every society

,but that what we need

to know for a scientific understanding is just how these thingswork in general and in particu lar instances .Let us consider

,for example

,the study of law . If you exam ine

the literature on jurisprudence you will find that legal institutions

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STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETYfi

laws , we can say that the lawhas a social value . The s tudy ofsocial values

'

in this sens e is therefore a part of the study of socia lstructure .

Itwas from this point of view that in an early work I approachedthe study of what can conveniently be called ritual values , i.e . thevalues expressed in rites and myths . It is perhaps again a truismto say that religion is the cement which holds society together .But for a scientific understanding we need to know just how itdoes this

,and that is a subject for lengthy investigations in many

different forms of society .

As a last example let me‘

mention the study of magic andwitchcraft

,on which there is an extensive anthropological

literature . I would point to Dr. Evans-Pritchard’s work on theZande as an illuminating example of what can be done when thesethings are systematically investigated in terms of the part theyplay in the social re lations of the members of a community .

From the point of View that I have attempted briefly to describe

,social institutions

,in the sense of standardised modes of

behaviour,constitute the machinery by which a social structure ,

a network of social relations , m ainta ins its existence and itscontinuity . I hesitate to use the term ‘function’

,which in recent

years has been so much used and misused in a multitude ofmeanings

,many of them very vague . Instead of being used , as

scientific terms ought to be,to assist in making distinctions

,it is

now used to confuse things that ought to be distinguished . For itis often employed in place of the more ordinary words ‘

use’

‘purpose’,and ‘meaning’. It seems to me more convenient and

sensib le,as well as more scholarly

,to speak of the use or uses

of an axe or digging stick , the m eaning of a word or symbol , thepurpose of an act of legislation , rather than to use the wordfunction for these various things . ‘Function’has been a veryuse l technical term in physiology and by analogy with its usein that science it would be a very convenient means of expressingan important concept in social science . AS I have been accustomedto use the word

,following Durkheim and others

,I would define

the social function of a socially standardised mode of activity,ormode of thought , as its relation to the social structure to theexistence and continu1ty of which it m akes someAnalogously

,in a living organism, the physmlOg1calT T

nction of

the beating of the heart,or the secretion of gastric ju ices

,i s its

ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE 20 1

relation to the organic structure to the existence or continuity of

which it makes its contribution . It is in this sense that I am interested in such things as the social function of the punishment ofcrime , or the social function of the totemic rites of Australiantribes , or of the funeral rite s of the An daman Islanders . Butthis is not what e ither Professor Malinowski or Professor Lowiemeans by functional anthropology .

Besides these two divisions of the study of social structure,

which I have called social morphology and social physiology ,there is a third , the investigation of the processes by which socialstructures change, of how new forms of structures come intoexistence . Studies of social change in the non -literate societieshave necessarily been almost entirely confined to one specialkind of process of change

,the modification of the social life under

the influence or domination of European invaders or conquerors .Ithas recently become the fashion amongst some anthropo

logists to treat changes of this kind in term s of what is called‘culture contact’. By that term we can understand the one-Sidedor two-sided effects of interaction between two societies

,groups ,

classes or regions having different form s of social life,different

institutions,usages and ideas . Thus in the eighteenth century

there was an important exchange of ideas between France andGreat Britain

,and in the nineteenth century there was a marked

influence of German thought on both France and England .

Such interactions are, of course , a constant feature of social life ,

but they need not necessarily involve any marked change of

sOcial structure .

The changes that are taking place in the non-literate people sof Africa are of a very different kind . Let us consider an Africancolony or possession of a European nation . There is a regionthat was formerly inhabited byAfricanswith their own social strueture . Europeans , by peacefu l or forcefu l means , estab lish controlover the region

,under what we call a ‘

colonial’régime . A newsocial structure comes into existence and then undergoes developm ent . The population now includes a certain number of Europeans— government officials

,missionaries

,traders and in some in

stances settlers . The social life of the region is no longer simplya p rocess depending on the relations and interactions of thenative peoples . There grows up a new political and econom icstructure in which the Europeans , even though few in numbers ,

STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

exercise dominating influence . European s and Africans constitutedifferent classes within the new structure

,with different languages

,

different custom s and modes of life , and different sets of ideas andvalues . A convenient term for societies of this kind would be‘ composite’societies ; the term

‘plural’societies has also beensuggested . A complex example of a composite society is providedby the Union of South Africa with its Single political and economic structure and a population including English-speakingand Afrikaans—speaking peoples of European descent

,the so-called

‘ coloured people’of the Cape Province,progeny of Dutch and

Hottentots , the remaining Hottentots , the‘Malays’of Cape

Town,descendants of persons from theMalay Archipelago

,Hindusand Mohammedans from India and their descendants , and anumber of Bantu tribes who constitute the majority of thepopulation of the Union taken as a whole .

The study of composite societies,the description and analysis

of the processes of change in them,is a complex and diflicult

task . The attempt to simplify it by considering the process asbeing one in which two or more ‘ cultures’interact

,which is the

m ethod suggested byMalinowski in his Introduction to Memorandum XV of the International Institute of African Languageand Culture on ‘Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa’

is simply a way of avoiding the reality . For what ishappening in South Africa

,for example

,is not the interaction

of British culture , Afrikander (or Boer) culture , Hottentot culture;various Bantu cultures and Indian culture , but the interactionof individuals and groups within an established social structurewhich is itself in process of change . What is happening in aTranskeian tribe

,for example

,can only be described by recognising

that the tribehas been incorporated into a wide political andeconomic structural system .

For the scientific study of primitive societies in conditions inwhich they are free from the domination by more advancedsocieties which result in these composite societies

,we have

unfortuna tely an almost complete lack of authentic historicaldata . We cannot study

,but can only speculate about

,the processes

of change that took place in the past of which we have no record .

An thropologists speculate about former changes in the societiesof the Australian aborigines

, or the inhabitants of Melanesia ,but such Speculations are not history and can be of no use in

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204 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

fbetween comp lexity and another feature of structural systems

,

namely, the extent of the field of social relations . In a structUralsystem with a narrow total social field

,an average or typical

person is brought into direct and indirect social re lations withon ly a small number of other persons . In systems of this type wemay find that the linguistic community— the body of personswho speak one language— numbers from 250 to 500 ,

while thepolitical community is even smaller

,and economic relations by the

exchange of goods and services extend only over a very narrowrange . Apart from the differentiation by sex and age , there is verylittle differentiation of social role between persons or classes . Wecan contrastwiththis the systemsof soc ial structure thatwe observetoday in England or the United States . Thus the process of humanhistory to which I think the term social evolution may be ap

prOpriately applied might be defined as the process by whichwide-range systems of social structure have grown out of, orrep laced , narrow-range system s . Whether this view is acceptableor not, I suggest that the concept of social evolution is one whichrequires to be defin ed in term s of social structure .

There is no time on this occasion to discuss the re lation of thestudy Of social structure to the study of culture . For an interestingattempt to bring the two kinds of study together I would referyou to Mr . Gregory Bateson’s bookNaven . I have made no attemptto deal with social anthropology as a whole and with all its variousbranches and divisions . I have endeavoured only to give you a verygeneral idea of the kind of study to which I have found it scientifically profitable to devote a considerable and steadily increasingproportion of my time and energy . The only reward that I havesought I think I have in some measure found— somethin g of thekind of insight into the nature of the world of which we are partthat only the patient pursuit of the method of natural science canafford .

C HAP T E R x 1

SOCIAL SANCTIONS 1

N any community there are certain modes of behaviour whichare usual and which characterise that particu lar community .

Such m odes of behaviour may be called usages . All socialusages have behind them the authority Of the society, but amongthem some are sanctioned and others are not . A sanction is areaction on the part of a society or of a considerable number of itsmembers to a mode of behaviour which is thereby approved

(positive sanctions) or disapproved (negative sanctions ) . Sanctionsmay further be distingu ished according to whether they arediffuse or organised ; the former are spontaneous expressions Ofapproval or disapproval by members Of the community actingas individuals

,while the latter are social actions carried out

according to some traditional and recognised procedure . It is asignificant fact that in all human societies the negative sanctionsare more defin ite than the positive . Social Obligations may bedefined as rules of behaviour the failure to Observe which entailsa negative sanction of some sort . These are thus distinguishedfrom non-Obligatory social usages

,as

,for example

,customary

technical procedures .The sanctions existing in a community constitute motives in

the individual for the regulation ofhis conduct in conform ity withusage . They are effective , first , through the desire of the individualto obtain the approbation and to avoid the disapprobation of hisfellows

,to win such rewards or to avoid such pun ishment as the

commun ity offers or threatens ; and , second , through the factthat the individual learns to react to particular modes of behaviourwith judgments of approval and disapproval in the same way as dohis fellows

,and therefore measures his own behaviour both in

anticipation and in retrospect by standards which conform moreor less c losely to those prevalent in the community to which hebelongs . What is called conscience is thus in the widest sens e thereflex in the individual of the sanctions of the society .

1 Reprinted from the Encyclopcedia of the Social S ciences , Macm illan Co. ,

New York, 1 93 3 , Vol. XI I I , pp . 5 3 1—4 .

205

206 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

I t is conven ient to begin a discussion of sanctions by aconsideration of the diffuse negative sanctions

,comprising

reactions toward the particular or general behaviour of a memberof the community which constitute judgments of disapproval .In such reactions there are not only differences of degree— fordisapproval is felt and expressed with different degrees of intensity— but also differences of kind . Such differences are diflicultto define and classify . In the English language

,for example

,

there are a large number of words which express disapproval ofindividual behaviour ; these vary from discourteous , unrnannerly,unseemly and unworthy

,through improper

,discreditable

,

d ishonourable and disreputable , to outrageous and infamous .Every society or culture has its own ways of judging behaviour,and these might conveniently be studied in the first instancethrough the vocabulary . But until comparative study of societiesof different typeshas proceeded further no systematic classificationof the kin ds of diffuse negative sanction is possible . Provisionallythe negative moral or ethical sanction may be defined as a reactionof reprobation by the communi ty toward a person whose conductis disapproved ; m oral Obligations may thus be considered asrules of conduct which , if not observed , bring about a reactionof this kind . Another distinguishable sanction is that wherebythe behaviour of an individual is met with ridicu le on thepart of his fellows ; this has been called the satirical sanction .

The varieties of diffuse positive sanctions , being less defin itethan negative sanctions

,are therefore stil l more difficult to

classify .

From the diffuse sanctions already described there Should bedistinguished what may be called (by a wide extension of theterm ) religious sanctions ; these have also been named supernaturalsanctions and mystic sanctions

,but both these terms have

unsatisfactory connotations . The religious sanctions are constitutedin any community by the existence of certain beliefs which arethemselves Obligatory ; it is therefore only within a re ligiouscommunity that these sanctions exist . They take the form thatcertain deeds by an individual produce a modification in hisreligious condition

,in either a desirable (good) or an undesirable

(evil) direction . Certain acts are regarded as pleasing to gods orSpirits or as estab lishing desirab le relations with them

,while

others displease them or destroy in some way the desirable

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208 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM ITIVE SOCIETY

which cannot be defined ordescribed in any Simple way . Somewhatsimilar beliefs underlie magical practices and procedure in relationto luck

,but whereas religious Observances and the beliefs associated

with them are Obligatory within a given religious community,

the former are comparable with technical procedures,customary

but not ob ligatory .

Organise d sanctions are to be regarded as Special developmentsof the diffuse sanctions

,frequently under the influenc e of the

beliefs belonging to religion . Organised positive sanc tions , or

premial sanctions , are rarely developed to any great extent .Honours

,decorations

,titles and other rewards for merit

,including

monetary rewards such as Special pensions,given to individuals

by a commun ity as a whole , are characteristic of m odern societies .In preliterate societies a man who has slain an enemy may begiven the right to distinguish him self by wearing some Specialdecoration or in other ways .Organised negative sanctions , important am ong,

which are thepenal sanctions of crimina l law , are defin ite recognised procedufesdirected against “persons whose behaviour iS '

Subject to socialdisapproval . There are many varieties of such procedures , the mostimportant and widespread being the following : subjection toOpen expression of reprobation or derision

,as

,for example ,

through forcible public exposure by confinement in stocks ;partial exclusion

,permanent or temporary , from full participation

in social life and its privileges , including permanent or temporaryloss of civil or religious rights ; specific loss of social rank ,

or

degradation,the exact contrary of the positive sanction of pro

m otion ; infliction Of loss of property by imposition of a fine or byforcible seizure or destruction ; infliction of bodily pain ; mutilationor branding in which pain is incidental to perm anent exposure toreprobation ; perm anent exclusion from the community, as byexile ; imprisonment ; and punishm ent by death . These sanctionsare legal sanctions when they are imposed by a constitutedauthority

,political

,military or ecclesiastic .

In any given society the various primary sanctions form a moreor less systematic whole which constitutes the machinery of

social control . There is an intimate relation between the religioussanctions and the m oral sanctions

,which varies

,however , in

different societies,and cann ot be stated in any brief formula .

The primary legal sanctions Of crim inal law,in all societies

SOCIAL SANCT IONS 209

except the highly secularised modern states,Show a close con

nection with religious bel iefs .Besides these primary social sanctions and resting upon them

there are certain'

sanctions which may be termed secondary ;these are concerned with the actions of persons or group s in theireffects upon other persons or groups . In modern civil law

,for

example,when an individual is ordered by a court to pay damages ,

the primary sanction behind the order is the power of the courtto make forcible seizure of his property or to imprison or other wisepunish him for contempt of court if he fails to obey . Thussecondary sanctions consist of procedures carried out by acommunity, generally through its representatives , or by individualswith the approval of the community

,when recognised rights

have been infringed . They are based upon the general princip lethat any person who has suffered injury is entitled to satisfactionand that such satisfaction should be in some way proportioned tothe extent of the inju ry.

One class of such procedures consists of acts of retaliation, bywhich is meant socially approved

,controlled and lim ited acts of

revenge . Thus in an Australian tribe when one man has comm ittedan offence against another

,the latter is perm itted by public

Opinion,often defin itely expressed by the O lder men , to throw a

certain number of spears or boomerangs at the former or in someinstances to spearhim in the thigh . After hehas been given suchsatisfaction he may no longer harbour ill feelings against theOffender . In m any preliterate societies the killing Of an individualentitles the group to which he belongs to obtain satisfaction bykilling the offender or some membe r of his group . In regulatedvengeance the offending group must subm it to this as an act ofjustice and must not attempt further retaliation . Those who havereceived suchsatisfaction are felt to have no further grounds forill feeling .

Satisfaction for injury may be obtained also through the duel , arecognised and controlled combat between individuals , or throughsim i lar combats between two groups . Among Australian tribesduelling with spears

,boomerangs

,clubs and shields or stone

knives,with the bystanders ready to interfere if they think things

are going too far,is a frequently adopted alternative to one-sided

retaliation . In these same tribes there are sim i lar regu latedcombats between two groups , sometimes in the presence of other

2 10 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

groups who see that there is fair play. It is often difficult to draw adividing line between such group combats and warfare ; in factthey may possibly be regarded as a special kind of warfarecharacteristic of primitive rather than of civilised societies .Frequently

,therefore

,war may be regarded as a secondary

social sanction similar to the duel . A political group maintainsrecognition of its rights by the threat of war if those rights shouldbe infringed . Even in the simplest societies it is recognised thatcertain acts are right in war and others are wrong and that adeclaration of war may be just in certain circumstances and inothers unjust , so that the conduct of warfare is to some extentcontrolled by diffuse sanctions .Indemnification is Often found as an alternative to retaliation as

a means of giving and receiving satisfaction . An indemnity issomething of value given by a person or group to another person orgroup in order to remove or neutralise the effects of an inf ringement of rights . It may be distinguished from a propitiatory giftby the fact that it is obligatory (i.e . subject to a negative sanction ,diffuse or organised) ,

i,n the particu lar circumstances . A payment

m ade in anticipation Of an invasion of rights with the consentof the person or persons receiving it may be regarded as an indemn ity. Thus in many societies taking a woman in marriageis regarded as an invasion of the rights of her family and kin

,

SO that before they consent to part with her they must receivean indemnity or the promise of such . In these cases the process ofindemnification bears some similarity to that of purchase

,which is

a transfer of rights of property for a consideration .

In many preliterate societies procedures of indemnificationare carried out under the diffuse sanction of public opinion

,

which compels an individual to indemnify one whose rights he hasinfringed . In some societies there is a recognised right of an injuredperson to indemnify himself by forcible seizure of the property ofthe Offender. When society becomes politically organised , procedures of retaliation and in demnification

,backed by diffuse

sanctions,give place to legal sanctions backed by the power of

judicial authorities to inflict punishment . Thus arises civi l law ,

by which a person who has suffered an infringement of rightsmay obtain reparation or restitution from the person responsible .

In a consideration of the functions of social sanctions it is notthe effects of the sanction upon the person to whom they are

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C HAP T E R X II

PRIMITIVE LAW 1

ANY historical jurists in contrast with the analytical schoolhave used the term law to include most if not all processesof social control . The term is

,however

,usually confined

to ‘ social control through the systematic application of the forceof politically organised society’(Pound) . The limited application ,more convenient for purposes of sociological analysis and classification

,will be adopted in this article ; the field of law will there

fore be regarded as coterminous with that of organised legalsanctions . The obligations imposed on individuals in societieswhere there are no lega l sanctions will be regarded as matters ofcustom and convention but not of law ; in this sense some simplesocieties have no law

,although all have customs which are sup

ported by sanctions .

The confusion which has resulted in the attempt to apply topreliterate societies the modern distinction between crim inal lawand civi l law can be avoided by making instead the distinctionbetween the law of public delicts and the law of private delicts .In any society a deed is a pub lic delict if its occurrence normallyleads to an organised and regular procedure by the whole community or by the constituted representatives of social authority

,

which results in the fixing of responsibility upon some personwithin the community and the infliction by the community or byits representatives of some hurt or puni shment upon the responsible person . This procedure , which may be called the penalsanction

,is in its basic form a reaction by the commun ity against

an action of one of its own members which offends some strongand defini te moral sentiment and thus produces a condition ofsocial dysphoria . The imm ediate function of the reaction is togive expression to a collective feeling of moral indignation and soto restore the social euphoria . Its ultimate function is to mainta inthe moral sentiment in question at the requisite degree of strengthin the individuals who constitute the community .

1 Rep rin ted from the Ency clopcedia of the S ocial S ciences , M acm il lan Co.,

New York, 1 93 3 , Vol. IX, pp . 202- 6 .

PRIM IT IVE MW 2 1 3

Comparatively little precise information is available concernin gpenal san ctions in preliterate societies . Am ong the actions whichare known to be treated as pub lic delicts in the simpler societiesare incest , i.e . marriage or sexu al congress with persons with whomsuch relations are forbidden ; sorce ry , or evil magic , by one personagainst another within the community ; repeated breaches of

tribal custom ; and various forms of sacrilege . In many preliteratesocieties the penal sanction is applied principally if not sole ly toactions whichinfringe upon custom s regarded by the communityas sacred , so that the sanction itself may almost be regarded as aspecial form of ritual sanction . Ritual sanctions are derived fromthe belief that certain actions or events render an individual or agroup ritually unclean , or polluted , so that some Specific actionis required to remove the pollution . In m any examples of penalsanction it may plausib ly beheld that a deed such as incestproduces a pollution of the whole community within which itoccurs and that the punishment , which may mean the killing of theguilty persons

,is a means of c leansing the comm unity . Upon the

establishment of a political or executive authority even of theSimplest kind disobedience of that authority’s commands may besubject to penal sanctions and treated as a public delict ; moreover,direct Offences against the constituted authority or against thepersons in whom that authority rests may be subject to penalsanctions . Thus when the social authority rests in chiefs , anoffence which would be a private delict if comm itted against acommoner may be treated as a public delict when comm ittedagain st a chief.In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person or a body

of persons that has suffered some inju ry , loss or damage by infringement of recognised rights appeals to a constitu ted jud icia lauthority

,who declares some other person or body of persons

within the community to be responsible and ru les that the defendant shall give satisfaction to the p laintiff, such satisfactionfrequen tly taking the form of the payment of an indemnity or

damages . A private delict is thus an action which is subject towhat may be called a restitutive sanction . The law of privatedelicts in preliterate societies corresponds to the civil law of

modern times . There are , however, certain important d ifferences .

In general in modern law actions which fall simply under civil laware those which cause damage but are not subject to reprobation .

2 14. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

Consequently, although the civi l sanction expressed throughthe payment of damages causes loss to the defendant

,it is not

specifically punitive . Even in modern civi l law,however

,a

magistrate may in special instances award‘punitive damages’

,

thereby expressing the view that the inju ry comm itted is of sucha kind as to be properly subject to reprobation and therefore topunishment . In modern law when a deed is an offence againstmorality and at the same time inflicts injury it may becomeactionable under both criminal and civil law . The emphasis in thepunishment for hom icide or theft is on its aspect as an offenceagainst the . community rather than on the princip le that restitution should be made to those who have suffered by the deed .

In preliterate societies private delicts are for the most part‘

killingy'wound ing, theft, a dultery and

“ failure to pay'

debts; andwhile they are primarily regarded as constituting an injury to

some member of the community they are subject also to moralreprobation as anti-social actions . The sanction is frequently bothrestitutive and repressive

,giving satisfaction to the injured person

and inflicting punishment upon the person responsible for theinjury ; for example , in some African tribes a thief is requiredto restore to the person whom he has robbed double the valueof what he has taken . In its basic form the law of private delictsis a procedure for avoiding or relieving the social dysphoria whichresults from conflicts within a communi ty . An offence committedagainst another member or group of the same community , byinflicting a sense of injury upon the victim , creates a disturbanceof the social life which ceases only when satisfaction is renderedto the injured person or persons . Thus in

’African native law a

judge is not regarded as having properly settled a case until allparties concerned are satisfied with the settlement .The distinction between public delicts and private delicts

illustrates the fact that the law has no single origin . A deedcommitted by a m ember of the community which oflends themoral sense of the community may be subject to three sanctions ,the general or diffuse m oral sanction , which makes the guiltyperson subject to the reprobation of his fellows ; the ritual sanction,which produces in the guilty person a condition of ritual uncleanness that constitutes a danger to himself and to those withwhom he is in contact— in such cases custom may require him toundergo ritual purification or expiation or it may be believed that

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2 16 STRUCTURE AND FUNCT ION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

him in a non-vital part of the body,such as the thigh . In all

instances of retaliatory sanction there is a customary procedurefor satisfying the injured person or group whereby resentmentmay be expressed, frequently by inflicting hurt upon the personor group responsible for the injury . Where it works effectivelythe result is to provide an expiation for the offence and to removethe feeling of injury or resentment in the injured person or persons .In many societies retaliation is rep laced more or less by a systemof indemnities ; persons or groups having injured other persons orgroups provide satisfaction to the latter by handing over certa invaluables . The procedure of providing satisfaction by indemnityis widespread in pre literate societies which have not yet deve lopeda legal system in the narrow sense .

Among the Yurok,who are food gatherers and hunters living

in northern California in small villages with no political organisation, there is no regular procedure for dealing with Offencesagainst the community and therefore no law of public de licts .Injuries and offences of one person against another are subject toindemnities regulated by custom ; every invasion of privilege orproperty must be exactly comp ensated ; for the killing of an ihdividual an indemnity or blood money must be paid to the nearkin . After a feud or war each side must pay for those who havebeen killed on the other side . Only the fact and am ount of damageare considered ; never the question of intent , malice , negligenceor accident . Once an indemnity for an injury has been acceptedit is improper for the injured person to harbour any furtherresentment . AS the payment of indemnities is arranged bynegotiation between the persons concerned and not by appeal toany judic ial authority

,the law of private delicts in the strict

sense is not present . Among the Ifugao , who cultivate rice onterraced hillsides of northern Luzon in the Philippines and whohave no political organisation and no system of clans

,

‘society doesnot punish injuries to itself except as the censure of publicOpinion is a punishment’; that is , there is no law of public delicts ,no actual penal sanction . Nevertheless , a person who practisessorcery against one ofhis own kin is put to death by his kin ;on the other hand

,incest between brother and sister, parricide

and fratricide are said to go unpun ished . It is probable ,however,that there are powerful and effective ritual sanction s against theseacts . An offence comm itted by one person against another person

PRIM IT IVE LAW 2 I7

or an infringement of the rights of one person by another is theoccasion of a conflict between the kindred of the two parties

,

including relatives through btohfather and mother to the thirdor fourth degree . Retaliation by the killing of the offender orsometimes of one ofhis kin is the regular method of obtainingsatisfaction in cases of murder , sorcery , adultery discovered inflagrante , refusal to pay an indemnity assessed for injury suffered ,and persistent and w ilful refusal to pay a debt when there is abilityto pay . Satisfaction is provided in other cases by the paym ent ofindemnities . There are no judicial authorities before whomdisputes may be brought ; the negotiations are carried out by agO

-between who belongs to neither of the two opposed groups ofkindred . Certain persons obtain renown for them selves as successful gO-betweens , but such persons have no authority and are notin any sense representatives of the community as a whole . Duringthe controversy the two parties are in a condition of ritual enm ityor Opposition and when a settlement is reached they join in apeacemaking ceremony . A scale of settlement is recognised bycustom and in certain circum stances the payments vary accordingto the class— wealthy

,middle class or poor— to which the group

receiving or making payment belongs . The Ifugao thus have anorganised system of justice , which , however , does not constitutea system of law in the narrow sense of the term since there is nojudicial authority.

An important step is taken towards the formation of a legalsystem where there are recognised arbitrators or judges who hearevidence

,decide upon responsibility and assess damages ; only

the existence of some authority with power to enforce the judgments delivered by the judges is then lacking . It has been arguedplausib ly that in some societies a legal system for dealing withprivate delictshas grown up in this manner; disputes are b roughtbefore arbitrators who deClare the custom and apply it to thecase before them ; such courts of arb itration become estab lishedas regular tribunals ; and finally there is developed in the societysome procedure for enforcing judgments .A development sim ilar to this is illustrated by the practices

of the A-Kamba , A-Kikuyu and A-Theraka , Bantu peoples to thesouth and south-east of Mount Kenya in East Africa who livein scattered household communities , keep cattle , sheep and goatsand grow grain in hand-tilled fields . They have no chiefs and are

2 1 8 STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN PRIM IT IVE SOCIETY

divided into well-defined age grades,one of which consists of

elders who exercise both priestly and judicial functions . If there isa dispute in which one person believes his rights have been infringed by another , the disputants call together a number of eldersof the district or districts in which they live and these constitutea court to hear the case . The court acts primarily as a court ofarb itration and as a means of deciding upon the customaryprinciples of justice by which the dispute should be settled ; itusually takes no steps to enforce the judgment on the losing partybut leaves this task to the claimant . In serious cases

,however

,

when an offence affects the whole community orwhen the accusedis regarded as an habitual and dangerous offender so that publicindignation makes the affair one of public concern

,the e lders

can exercise authority to enforce judgment . The usual procedurerests on the ritual powers of the elders ; they can pronounce acurse

,which is feared as inevitably bringing down supernatural

punishment,on a person who refuses to obey a judgment . The

killing of a member of one clan by a member of another,whether

intentional or accidental , is treated by the court of elders as aprivate delict and is settled by the payment of an indemnity to therelatives of the vic tim by the killer and his relatives . The eldersalso possess limited powers Of dealing with public de licts by aprocedure known as kingolle , or mwinge . If a person is heldguilty of witchcraft or is regarded as an habitual Offender andthus as a public danger

,the elders may inflict the punishment of

death or may destroy the offender’s homestead and expelhim fromthe d istrict . Before such action may be taken elders from remoteregions must be called in for consultation and the consent of nearrelatives of the offender must be obtained .

The Ashanti afford a contrast to the system of the A-Kamba inthat they have a well organised law of public delicts

,which are

designated by a native term which means ‘ things hateful to thegods’. These include murder, suicide , certain sexual offencesincluding incestuous relations with certain relatives by descen tand by marriage

,certain forms of abuse

,assault and stealing

,the

invocation of a curse upon a chief,treason

,cowardice

,witchcraft

,

the violation of recognised tribal tabus and the breaking of a command of the central authority issued and qualified with an oath .

The Ashanti conception of the law is that all such actions areoffences against the sacred or supernatural powers on which the

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