ML18018A601.pdf - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

REGULATOR~t»lFORMATION DISTRIBUTION S EM ('R IDS)

ACCESSION NBRs8307O80390 DOC.DATE:,83/07/01 NOTARIZED:. NO

FACIL:50.400 Shearon Harris Nuc;lear PoWer Planti Unit ii ~ Carol)na. 50 401 Shearon Harris. Nuclear Power Plants Unit 2s Carolina.

AUTH.NAME,, AUTHOR AFFILIATIONMCDUFFiERM A. Car ol ina Power L Light Co ~

RECIP. NAMg RECIPIENT AFP'IL>IATIONDENTONSH R Office of Nuclear Reactor Reoulations Director

COPIESLTTR ENCL"

1 0Oi 1 1

1 1

1 1

1 0-1 1

2 21 1

"1 1

1 1

1 0-1 1

1 1

~ 1 1

1 1

1 1

0

I ~ - ~~ 4 ~

SUBJECT: Forwards resoonses to draft.SER open -items ~ List of »it'ems<resoonsibl'e review NRC branch L reviewer encl

DISTRIBUTE'ION CODE: BOO IS COPlES RECEIVED:LTR g( ENCI.'+0 SIZE:TITLEt Licensina Submittal: PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8 Related Cor respondence

NOTES'SEC 6g PLPuC~5RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT

ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAMENRR/DL/ADL 1 0 NRR LB3 BC

INRR LB3 LA 1 0 KADAMBIs P

INTERNAL: 'ELD/HDS1 1 0 IE» FILEIE'/DEPER/EPB 36 3 3 IE/DEPER/IRB "35IE/DEQA/QAB 21 1 1 NRR/DE/AEABNRR/DE/CEB 11 1 . 1 NRR/DE/EHEBNRR/DE/EQB 13 2 2 NRR/DE/GB 28NRR/DE/MEB 18 1 1 NRR/DE/MTEB 17NRR/DE/SAB 24 , 1 1 NRR/DE/SGEB 25NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 1 1 NRR/DHFS/lQB "32NRR/DHFS/PSRB 1 1 NRR/DL/SSPBNRR/DSI/AEB 26 1 1 NRR/DSI/ASBNRR/DSI/CPB 10 1 1 NRR/DSI/CSB 09NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 1 1 NRR/DSI/METB 12NRR/DSI/PSB 19 1,1 ~NM 22NRR/DSI/RSB 23 1 1 F»ILE'4RGN2 3 '3 /MI8.

DOCKET0500040005000401

EXTERNAL. ACRS 41DMB/DSS (AMDTS)LPDR 03NSIC'5

6 BNL,(AMDTS ONlY) 1 1

1 1 FEMA~REP DIV "39 "1 1

1 1 NRC" PDR 02 1 1

1 '1 NTIS 1 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF'OPIES REQUIRED! lTTR 53 ENCL 46

0e l N I

)tN4'I I q4 ffr r Nl, N» 4 ~ Nrr)

) 1I f II g()4(l r gh /II I II

"Ni,I1 N

IW

~ 44 N j'III 'f I

)'f "N II

ii NI I

r 'ti'4N r i e) '44

f fliN Ni 4

,I I

I .3 f f I)

g1 r Q )II I li PNI IW I '4'~C e 11 Ii

ll 'I

~ I I pl if g

'IIJ f ',Ii„'f, r ~ ii~ ff ckrIII I ifii ' ril

I I i '41

iW'll V

I I

I 4 4 I

II I,

")I'')N

'' I') 4$

II il

I, 'ill)'io 9 il 'I

I '), ) I

II wi li 4if4 N ll Ii 4

g, i Ng(

Ii i ii li 144 N'I

Wi li ' 'tN )

I Ii

44 r

lii ii,I 4) 'I

li

)1

W)I 4

4 Nu

K)l' i. 4 I I ll

IwJi N ,N

4

4

Carolina Power 8 Light Company

JUL'),1, 1983

SERIAL: LAP-83-248

Mr. Harold R. Denton, DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTUNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-400 AND 50-401DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT RESPONSES

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) hereby transmits one originaland forty copies of responses to Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant DraftSafety Evaluation Report Open Items. The response numbers are listed on thecover page of the attachment along with the corresponding review branch andreviewer for each response.

We will be providing responses to other Open Items in the DraftSafety Evaluation Report shortly.

Yours very truly,

JDK/tda (7117JDK)Attachment

M. A. McDuffieSenior Vice President

Engineering & Construction

Cct Mr. N. Prasad Kadambi (NRC)Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII)Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP)Chapel Hill Public LibraryWake County Public Library

Mr. Wells EddlemanDr. Phyllis LotchinMr. John D. RunkleDr. Richard D. WilsonMr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB)

8307080390 830701PDR ADOCK 05000400E PDR j

411 Fayetteville Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh, N. C. 27602'1

4l ~ I w% ~ I

I

~ a ~ gllt

'I ~

List of Open Items, Review Branch, and Reviewer

Structural Engineering Branch/S. KimOpen Items 2, 3, 4, 6

Core Performance Branch/J. VogelwedeOpen Item 28

Containment Systems Branch/J. HuangOpen Items 66, 69, 242

Reactor Systems Branch/E. MarinosOpen Items 73, 214, 216

Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch/H. Li.Open, Items 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 85,,87,,89,90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 100, 101, 223

Power Systems Branch/E. TomlinsonOpen Items 105, 107, 112, 127, 150, 151*, 154

Meteorological and Effluent Treatment Branch/J. HayesOpen Items 164, 167, 174, 180, 188, 192, 231

Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch/D. KersOpen Item 196

Accident Evaluation Branch/K. DempseyOpen Item 211

Mechanical Engineering Branch/D. Terao'.-Open-Items 249, 258

Emergency Planning Branch/G. SimmondsOpen Items 314, 315

f

Materials Engineering Branch/J. Halapatz/D. SmithOpen Items 293, 324, 325, 326, 330, 331

*The 12 full size drawings included in the response to Open Item 151are being transmitted only to E. Tomlinson

Structural Engineering Branch/S. KimOpen Items 2, 3, 4, 6

Shearon Bar "s Nuclear Prier E'lantgra=t SHr Item Mo. 2Additional Response to NRC Question 220.18

Expand.the d. scuss-on 'n page 3.7.3-4 and 3.7.3-5 ~-'th regard tomultiple fixed brances and looped systems. Provide an example ofillus"=ative calculation that starts from an input motion to -"naLresultant stresses and displacemencs.

Resoonse

i

For the case of multiple fixed branches and looped systems theinput motion is transmitted to the piping system through thepiping supports. The piping supports are modeled as springsact"ng in the appropriate directions. Spring rates are based oncharac er's'tic values for various rigid restraints and snubbers,

;.as,,stated,,'a FSAR Section 3 7 3 8 1 Since the system may besituated at various elevations and/or structures; the input motionis resolved into tvo dist'nc effects A response spec um analys'sis performed to determine incr ia effects. For this analysis, asstated in FSAR Sec ion 3.7.3.9.1, an enveloped response spectrumis used. The effect of differential seismic movement betveenfloors and/or building is considered statically in an integratedsystem analysis, as stated in FSAR Section 3.7 ~ 3.1.1. As notedin the response to NEB question 210.33; relative displacementsvithin a structure are assumed to be in phase relative to the .mat,awhile relative displacements betveen structures are assumed tobe totally out of phase.

Note: This is a supplemental response to 'the originalquestion 220.1S.

Draft SER 0 en Item 3

The applicant in response to f220.20, requested delaying ultimate capacityanalysis of the containment. This is under consideration. (SEC: 3.8.1)

~Res oese

Carolina Power 6 Light Company is awaiting the NRC decision on our -delay-request. No additional information is scheduled for submittal.

Shearon Har is nuclear Power PlantDraft SKR Item No. 4(add't'onal esoonse for i~C 220.23)

Additional information regarding 'ine design is expected rom the applicant

ResoonseThe value of 63.6 ksi yield strength (TOF 10-0F) for the 3/8 inoh thickplate which is the basis for conside ing tha, for both service andfactored load cond'ions yield stress is not exceeded in the regionsidentif'ed as ove stressed (if olate vield stress is 38 ksi (70F-100F)),is extremely conservative, and vas obtained as follows:

- All certified mill test reports for he 3/8 inch thick plate that ~as suppliedvere revieved. The least yield stress value from all reports for thatthickness plate is 45.6 ksi. This is the value that ~as used. It +asreduced for higher temperatures (temperatures from 100F to 240F) by the

;faplication of ASME, Section III Division I Appendix Table I-2.1 "YieldStrength Values Sy for Ferritic Steels", values for SA 516 Grade 70. Tvostraight line reductions in vield strength vere obtained from the table, thefirst, for reduction in strength" betveen lOOF and 200F, and the second, forreduction in strength between 20QF and 300F. The slopes of the tvo lines vereexpressed 'n terms of reduct'on in strength, ksi, per degree F temperatureincrease and applied to the 45.6 ksi least yield strength value to obtainreduced yield strength values for temperatures up to 240F.

Redu'ctions in modulus of elasticity for the material due to increase intemperature vere also evaluated, based on APE Section III Appendix I TableI-6.0 "Aoduli of Elasticitv E of Materials for Given Temperatures", andconside.ed in the determination of strain at var'ous temperatures.

The certified test reports of all the welding electrodes for the linerplate )oining fields vere also reviewed. The least value of yield vas foundto be 58.0 ksi. Ie, was concluded that the electrodes supplied do notadversely affect the yield strength o'f the liner plates.

Verification of liner strains due to contain...ent oressurization is obtainedfrom the liner strains measurements made for the conta'nment buildingstructural integrity test. The test is described in Section 3.8.1.7.1. Theliner strain gage locations are shorn in Figures 3.8.1-47, 48, and 49.

Draft SER 0 en Item 6

Resolution of noncompliance with ASME Code Section III, Division 2/ACI-359.This is discussed in Section 3.8A of the FSAR and is under review. (SEC:3.8)

~Res oese

Carolina'ower & Light Company is awaiting any questions from the Staff.. Shen'questions are formulated by the NRC, CP&L will prepare responses.

Core Performance Branch/J. VogelwedeOpen Item 28

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)0 en Item 28 (DSER Section 4. 2.4. 2 a es 4-28 and 4-29)

The applicant should provide on-line fuel rod failure detectionmethods. These are needed to satisfy the guidelines described in ParagraphII.D.2 of the SRP.

~Res oese

On-line failed fuel monitoring is accomplished by use of thegross failed fuel detector (GFFD), which is connected to the Reactor CoolantSystem loops 2 and 3 hot legs. A coolant sample passes through a samplecooler and then into a coil surrounding moderator and a BF3 neutron detectorwhich monitors delayed neutrons, after which it flows into the Chemical andVolume Control System letdown volume control tank or into the waste holduptank. A flow transmitter is installed for periodic checks of the flow rate.

'-A 'sensor mon'itors the temperature prior to entering the neutron sample coil.

Figure 7.7-13, which shows the block diagram of the GFFD channel,will be included in the FSAR. The detector, preamp, sample cooler, andassociated flow controls are located outside of the containment. The signalprocessing equipment and readout are mounted in a rack located in the controlroom. The delayed neutron signal of the detector is displayed on a recorderlocated in the rack. The neutron detector has a sensitivity of 4.5 cps/mVoltfor thermal neutrons. The response time for the GFFD is on the order of 60seconds.

4827.2

SFSDETECTOR

TEST

JILOW ALARMI

AECOAOER

I BIST4BLE 4ELAT BS MV

I

DISC FLIP FLOP~ DRIVER LOG PULSE

INTEGRATOR BISTASLE AE LAY TO CARPI'PUTE4

PRE AMP5 HVCOUPLING

HIGH VOLTAGEPOWER SUPPLY

IcQK ALAAM

L LOW VOLTAGEPOWER SUPPLY

TEMP SENSORINCICA'TOR5 TRIP HIGH TEMP

GFFD RACK

CONTROL ROOM

SHEARON HARRISNUCLEAR POWER PLANT

CarolinaPower & Light Company

FINALSAFETY ANALYSISREPORT

Gross Failed Fuel DetectorElectronics Diagram

FIGURE

7.7-13

Containment Systems Br;anch/J. HuangOpen Items 66, 69, 202

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Containment Systems Branch0 en Item 66 (DSER Section 6.2.4 ., a e 6-25)

The applicant's compliance with BTP CSB 6-4, "Containment Purging DuringNormal Plant Operations," is contingent on the acceptance of the valveoperability assurance program for normal containment purge system isolationvalves.

~Res ense

The following is specific information in response to the staff's review forconformance to the Valve Operability Assurance Program (NUREG-75/087, StandardReview Plan (SRP) 3.9.3, I.2.).I. "A listing of active Class 1, 2 and 3 valves and pumps identified by

'*syst'm "a'nd -"active" 'function. The Auxiliary and Power Conversion SystemsBranch and the Reactor Systems Branch confirm the acceptability of thelisting for Class 1, 2 and 3 pumps and valves."

Refer to Final Safety Analysis Report Table 3.9.3-14 for a listing ofactive valves.

II. "The components, in terms of size, type, design, and manufacturer, forwhich one prototype test is proposed to confirm operability."

The test item identification proposed is an 8" lug wafer BIF butterflyvalve mounted with a Bettis actuator, a NAMCO/2 limit switch, and an ASCOsolenoid valve.

III. "The components for which prototype test results are available, fromapplications for other plants or other sources, and the comparisions thatshow that the test conditions are equivalent to the plant designconditions."

Carolina Power 6 Light Company will assure that the test results from theQualification Test Reports will ultimately conform to the plant designconditions.

IV. "The identification of combinations of plant conditions and loads whichthe active component is expected to withstand during the active function(such conditions are generally specified in the component designspecification, as required by Code rules)."

Plant conditions to which valves are expected to withstand are identifiedin specification CAR-SH-BE-35 (Butterfly Valves) paragraph 6, page 11 andits Addendum E. They are as follows:

(7168PSA)

Res onse to 0 en Item 66 (Continued)

A. Seismic Considerations

Equipment indicated in Butterfly Valve Data Sheets, SpecificRequirements, as Seismic Category I equipment shall be designed andfurnished in accordance with Specification CAR-SH-BE-35, Addendum F.

The following earthquake criteria is applicable to thesite:

Maximum Ground Acceleration (g)

Horizontal Vertical

.„„.OBE ..SSE..

0 '75 O.i5

,„, . OBE . „.SSE

0 '75 0.15

Notes: OBE = Operating Basis Earthquake (1/2 SSE)

SSE ~ Safe Shutdown Earthquake (DBE)

2 ~ The equipment is required to be rigid, i.e., thefundamental fr'equency will be equal to or greater than33 Hz ~

The equipment shall be seismically qualified for 3.0g forboth OBE and SSE in all three orthogonal directionssimultaneously.

The, seismic test procedure shall be in accordance withIEEE-344 requirements. The sine beat test is the preferredtest method.

30 In addition to above all Seismic Category I electricalequipment shall meet the requirements of.IEEE Std:344-1975, and IEEE-382.

B. 0 cretin And Post Accident Environment Inside Containment Buildin

Equipment for which environmental qualifications must be performedshall meet the maximum temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation andchemical spray conditions within the containment as attached for "

normal operation and various sequential time periods following thedesign basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or steam line break.

(7168PSA)


l. Operating Environment

a ~ Normal Operting Environment - Inside Containment

Temperature — 80'F to 120'F

Pressure — 0 psig

Relative Humidity — 50X

Radiation — (40 years normal operation) 8 x 10 Rads4

integrated dose.

b.

Chemical Spray — None

'Po'st 'Accident Environment — Inside Containment

b-1

Initial Emergency Environment Conditions — Equipment shallbe designed to withstand the transient conditions listedbelow after meeting the normal conditions in a.

Temperature — 120'F to 366'F in 45 secs (based on maximumhypothetical steam line break with containment temperatureof 120'F).

Pressure — 0 psig to 38.2 psig in 130 secs (based onmaximum hypothetical steam line break with initialcontainment temperature of 120'F).

Relative Humidity — 50X to 100X

Radiation — 0 to )5 secs — 1.6 x 10 Rods/ht initial dose6

rate. (0.67 x 10 Rads integrated over this time period).

Chemical Spray — aqueous solution, 4000 ppm Boron andbuffered to an 8 ' pH by addition of NaOH.

Two Hour Environment Conditions —Equipment shall bedesigned to operate when subjected to the environmentalconditions listed below after meeting the initial transientconditions in b-l.

(7168PSA)


Temperature - 260'FPressure — 38 psigRelative Humidity — 100XRadiation - 1.6 x 10 Rads/hr initial dose rate (2 x 106

Rads integrated over this time period)Chemical spray-aqueous solution, 4000 ppm Boron andbuffered to an 8.5 pH by addition of NaOH.

Two to twenty four hour Emergency Environment Conditions.The equipment shall be designed to operate when subjectedto the environment conditions listed below after meetingthe conditions in b-2.

Temperature —'215'F

Pressure — 15 psig

Relative Humidity — 100%

Radiation - 5.5 x 10 Rads/hr initial dose rate (4.2 x 105 6

Rads integrated over this time period).

Chemical spray — aqueous solution, 4000 pm Boron andbuffered to an 8.5 pH by addition of NaOH.

Long Term Emergency Environmental Conditions — Twenty four hrs.to thirty one days. The equipment shall be designed tooperate when subjected to the environmental conditionslisted below after meeting the conditions in b-3.

Temperature — 180'F decaying to 140'F at the end of 31days.

Pressure - 8 psig decaying to 4 psig at the end of 31 days.

Relative Humidity — 100X

Radiation — 9.0 x 10 Rads/hr initial dose4

rate. (2.5 x 10 Rads integrated over this time period).

Chemical spray — aqueous solution, 4000 ppm Boron andbuffered to an 8.5 pH by addition of NaOH.

(7 168P SA)


Maximum Long Term Emergency Environmental Conditions—Thirty one days to 365 days. The equipment shall bedesigned to operate when subjected to the environmentalconditions listed below after meeting the conditions inb-4.

Temperature — 140'F decaying to 120'F

Pressure — 4 psig decaying .to 2 psig

Relative Humidity - 100X

Radiation - 1.3 x 10 Rads/hr initial dose rate.4

(2".9 x'107-'Rads integrated over~.this time period).

Chemical spray - aqueous solution, 4000 ppm Boron andbuffered to an 8.5 pH by addition of NaOH.

V. "The test conditions and loads that will be imposed on components toconfirm operability, and the comparisions to show that these arerepresentative of plant conditions and loads (where more than one set ofconditions may be applicable, the most adverse or bounding combinationsshould be evaluated)."

Carolina Power 6 Light Company will assure that the Qualification TestReports from the Vendors will ultimately conform to the informationrequired.

"':"VI.'""Theextent to which"analytical"methods will be used in lieu or partialfulfillment of the provisions of the component operability assuranceprogram."

Analytical methods will be used to show operability of valves as per therequirements of NUREG 0737, II E.4.2 using transient flows through thevalve during a LOCA condition per pages 19 and 29 of specificationCAR"SH-BE-35. They are as follows:

A S ecial Re uirements

1. Nonnuclear Requirements

(7 168PSA)


The following..special requirements shall apply to nonnuclear safetyclass valves:

Seller shall provide and maintain an inspection/qualitycontrol system which will assure that all items submittedto Purchaser for acceptance conform to contractrequirements whether manufactured or processed by Seller orprocured from subcontractors.

b — Seller shall perform or have performed the inspection andtest required to substantiate product conformance todrawing, specification, and contract requirements and shallalso perform or have performed all inspections and testsotherwise required by the contract.

Seller's in'spection/quality control system shall bedocumented and shall be submitted to Purchaser for reviewprior to award of contract and be available for reviewthroughout the life of the contract.

Purchaser at his option may furnish written notice of theacceptability or nonacceptability of the inspection/qualitycontrol system.

Seller shall notify Purchaser in writing of any change tohis inspection/quality control system. Theinspection/quality control system shall be subject todisapproval if changes thereto would result in anonconforming product.

2. Containment.,Isolation Valves

Containment isolation valves shall be hydrostaticallytested to 1.5 times the design pressure given on Form 593-2, or to 75 psig, whichever is greater; Valves shall beleak tight when the test pressure is applied to either sideof the valve.

Isolation valves shall have seats mechanically attached tothe valve body and capable of easy adjustment andreplacement.

Where air operators are specified for the isolation valves(which are normally open) the operators shall be sized toclose the valves from a fully open condition in 5 secondson a loss of actuating air or on receipt of a closuresignal. Butterfly valve data sheets indicate thisinformation if applicable.

(7 168P SA)


Vendor shall submit calculations to show operability of 8"

Normal Containment Purge and Make-up Valves on Data Sheets43,44,47, 6 48 as per the requirements of NUREG-0737 ItemII.E.4.2. The transient flow conditions through thesevalves are as follows:

FLOW THRU 8" PURGE VALVES FOR WORSE

LOCA PRESSURE TRANSIENT CASE

Timesecs;

0.00.250.500+751.001 ~ 5

2.02.53.03 '4.04.54.755.06.07.08 '9.0

10 '11. 0

Containmentpressure, psia

14. 841015.6067

.17.44919.001220.405422 928925.164727.148828.946930.605432.165533-640734.353835.064837.483040.083842 '07244.507345.902847.3242

Mixturedensit~ibm/ft

0.06900.07230.07560.07860.08150-08690 09170.09600 09990 10350-10690.11010.11170 11330.11850.12420.12970 13380.13680.1399

Flow Throughthe purge line,

acfm

1684.14171.97104.0

8714.89856.9

11464-012585.013415.414068.614604.215058.315451.815626.90.00 '0.00.00 '0.00.0

The calculation shall show that the valves are capable of closing fully at4.-75 seconds under the maximum flow conditions given above and remain tightly.closed thereafter. The point at which the highest dynamic torque will be

experienced by the valve during the closing cycle shall be indicated.

The time of 4.75 seconds is based on the following data:

1. The containment isolation signal which initiates valve closure isenergi.zed at 0.75 seconds into the LOCA when the containment pressurereaches 4.5 psig.

2-. Processing time for, the signal so that the solenoid valve loses power is0.50 seconds.

3. It will take 3.5 seconds for the solenoid valve to bleed theinstrumentation air andd close the butterfly valve.

(7168PSA)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER 0 en Item No. 69

Provide a complete description of the actual Post Accident HydrogenMonitoring System to be installed so that the staff can confirm itscompliance with,NUREG-0737 Item II.F.I Attachment 6 (Section 6.2.5).

Resoonse

Identical and independent Post Accident Hydrogen Monitoring (PAHM)

Systems will be installed at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantUnits 1 and 2. Each system consists of the following components:

1. Two (2) local hydrogen analyzer cabinets installed in theRAB't

EL +236.00 approximately 100 apart with associated sample0

tubing and valves;

2. Two (2)'"'re'mote 'control panels located:in the RAB Main ControlRoom 'envelope at EL +305.00;

3. One remote sample dilution panel located in a shielded accessiblepost-LOCA area in the RAB at EL +236.00.

The RAB areas of'concern are shown on FSAR Figures 1.2.2-23 and 35.A simplified flow diagram of the PAHM System in operation isshown on attached Figure l.The Analyzer Cabinet and the Remote Control Panel are categorizedclass lE, seismic Category I. Sample tubing, sample valvesand containment isolation valves are safety class 2. Additionalinformation regarding valves and containment penetrations can befound in FSAR Section 6.2.5. The Remote Sample Dilution Panel,

'at'e'gori'ze'd"'as" rion'-'"sa fety class 'and''non-seismic Category I, is ofhigh quality commercial grade construction selected to withstand thespecific service. All system components required for continuousmeasurement of hydrogen concentration in the containment samplewill be qualified to IEEE-323-1974 and Regulatory Guide-l.89 Rev 0;The analyzer cabinet and remote control panel will be seismi-cally qualified to meet the requirements of IEEE-344-1975 and RegulatoryGuide 1.100 Rev 1. The hydrogen analyzer is designed and qualifiedin accordance with the applicable requirements of Regulatory Guide1.97 Rev 2. Additional information regarding conformance toRegulatory Guide 1.97 may be found in FSAR Sections 1.8 and 7.5.

The system is designed to provide continuous indication and recordsng(in the Main Control Room) of Hydrogen Concentration in the con-

tainment atmosphere during a Post-LOCA condition. The sensor hasa measuring range of 0-10% hydrogen by volume and has the capabilityto provide a 100/ final reading of hydrogen concentration in thecontainment within less than 10 minutes after initiation of safetyinjection. This includes 5 minutes margin for the operator to turnon the system. In addition, capability is provided for obtainingcontainment atmosphere grab samples to be diluted, cooled and trans-„ported to the laboratory for analysis.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER en Item No. 69 Cont'd

Response (Cont'd)

Thy control center for the analyzer system is in the microprocessor/.recorder ~equipment in the Control Panel located in the Main ControlRoom o'f each Unit. The microprocessor acts as a functional'integratorfor the system by performing the following:

a - Synchronizing analyzer functions

b - Conditioning all sensor outputs to engineering units

c - Monitoring analyzer parameters for alarm conditions

d — Providing drive for external monitors

e - Initiating automatic calibration sequence

f - Providing,„print command to .the...speedomax.multipoint recorder

An alarm will be activated in the Main Control Room when the hydrogenconcentration in the containment reaches a preset "not to exceed"level of 3X by volume. The recorder configuration initiates analarm contact closure specific to each sample stream. Once closedthe alarm relay will not deactivate until a "below limit" of 3%hydrogen concentration measurement is obtained during a subsequentscan.

The sample transport is provided by a qualified dual headed diaphragmpump driven by a class lE electric motor. The pump provides suctionfor a sample withdrawal of up to l~g CFM under both positive andnegative pressure condition in the containment. Radiation resistantnonmetallic materfal is used for the pump diaphragm.

The system has provisions for purging and for re urning the sample collectionresidues to the containment. Purge gas (nitrogen) and the calibrationgases are provided for periodic calibration and testing purposes.The purge gas and calibration gases are not required for operationof the analyzer system during a postulated LOCA.

The Hydrogen Analyzer sensor that will be used at Shearon Harrisutilizes the technology of electro-chemical sensing of reactivegases. The hydrogen sensor measures hydrogen partial pressure withcomplete independence from such factors as other constituents inthe sample, free water, reagent gases, reference cells, total pressuresample flow or face velocity. The volume percent of hydrogen isdirectly proportional to the partial pressure of hydrogen. Theelectrochemical sensor is a diffusion limited device. The selectivediffusion of hydrogen across a solid polymer diffusion barrier isa direct function of hydrogen partial pressure in the atmosphere.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

Resoonse (Cont'd)

The sensor consists of a diffusion limited platinum block sensing, electrode and a metal oxide counter electrode within a polysulfonehousing.. The electrolyte, providing the ion-conducting path betweenthe two electrodes, is separated from the ambient atmosphere by a

gas permeable membrance which is in intimate contact with the sensingelectrode. When the ambient atmosphere contains hydrogen, anelectrical current is generated which is directly proportional tothe partial pressure of hydrogen in the atmosphere. The change inpermeability of the membrane due to changes in temperature, iscompensated for by measurement of the temperature at the sensor.The volume percent of hydrogen is determined by measuring thetotal containment atmosphere pressure and dividing the hydrogenpartial pressure by this value. The total containment atmospherepressure is measured by a pressure transmitter located in the inletstream in the analyzer cabinet. The hydrogen sensor is self powered op-erates at the sample temperature and does not represent an ignitionsource. The hydrogen -sensor accepts the full gas sample flow atall times providing for a three (3) minute sample cycle.

The Hydrogen Analyzer System has the following operational characteristics:

1 - Sensitivity - 0.1% H (by volume)

2 - Accuracy — +2% of full scale

3 — Range - 0-10% H2 (by vol'ume)

4 - Warm up time - 1 minute

5 — Sample transit time to the sensor - .2 minutes

6 — Time to reach 100% of final reading after sample enters analyzer—2 minutes (1 minute for 90% of final reading)

7» Turnover time for one sample, including stabilization - 3 minutes

The Remote Sample Dilution Panel (RSDP) consists of an enclosed,lead shielded sample system compartment. The panel face and bothsides will be shielded with lead shot so that the criteria ofGDC-19 of Appendix A, lOCE'R50, limiting the radiation exposure tothe operator is met. The panel compartment is equipped with a

positive ventilation exhaust. Ventilation is provided by aninternal exhaust blower which maintains the sample panel undernegative pressure and will exhaust to an overhead HVAC duct. Theventilation exhaust is routed through charcoal absorbers and HEPA

filters before leaving the plant.


Resoonse (Cont'd)

The MDP provides capabilities for obtaining diluted and cooledsamples of the post accident containment atmosphere for the followinglaboratory analysis:

a - 0-lOX by volume hydrogen concentration

b - 0-30/ by vo'ume oxygen concentration

c — iodine concentration

'd - gamma spectrum analysis for noble gases and other radionuclides

„Basically,,the„panel consists of a zeolite filter to capture iodine,a cooler and c'ondensate coll'ec'tor to obtain a sample of consensablesand a gas sample cylinder to obtain diluted containment atmosphericsamples. Capabilities will be provided for obtaining a nondilutedsample of the containment atmosphere. The system is heat traced toprevent iodine from plating out on pipe wall surface.

The control panel portion of the sample dilution panel houses allelectrical components (i.e., switches, relays, indicators) necessaryfoi controlling and monitoring all system modes. A mimic panel andappropriate status lights provide immediate visual indications oftemperature, pressure and flow for assessment of process samplecondition.

The dilution panel has the capability of providing grab samplesof post accident containment atmosphere dilution factors from 1-1000by a combination of sample cylinder evacuation and nitrogen dilution.Separate samples are taken of diluted gas and condensate. The samplecylinder and condensate collector are equipped with a septum. Asample will be withdrawn with a syringe. The sample will then beimmediately injected into an evacuated vial for transporting to thelaboratory. At the conclusion of a sampling operation the 'panel is

.purged with nitrogen, the dilution cylinder evacuated," and the'solation valves closed. Backup grab samples of undiluted containment

atmosphere may be taken for laboratory analysis from an inlineinstalled septum.

Details of the overall system layout and sample points location werediscussed previously in the response to the NRC Question 480.46.

FSAR Section 6.2.5 will be modified in a future amendment to reflectthis response.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Containment Systems Branch

.,0 en Item,242 (DSER'Section 6.4.2, . a e 6-26)

The applicant has not adequately demonstrated that the containment setpointpressure that initiates containment isolation has been reduced to the minimumcompatible with normal operating conditions. Therefore, the staff concludesthat the applicant has complied with the provisions of NUREG-0737,Item II.E.4.2, with the exception of the containment isolation setpointpressure, which will be covered in the plant Technical Specifications review.

~Res ense

In conformance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2, thecontainment setpoint pressure which initiates containmentisolation fornonessential penetrations will be reduced to the minimum compatible withnormal operating conditions. The pressure setpoint established will be abovethe maximum expected pressure inside containment during normal operation sothat inadvertent containment isolation will not occur during normal operationas a result of instrument drift, pressure fluctuations and instrumenterrors. In addition, pressure history data from similar plants will beutilized if feasible in determining expected pressure inside containmentduring normal operation.

The containment isolation setpoint pressure will be established along with theplant Technical Specifications becau'se of its association with otherparameters. The basis for establishing the setpoint will be noted and will bejustifiable. Therefore, this item will be considered a confirmatory issue.

(7 168PSA)

Reactor Systems Branch/E. MarinosOpen Items 73, 214, 216

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Reactor Systems Branch0 en Item 73 (DSER Section 15.9.3 a e 15-36

Provide details of the review and modify procedures for removingEngineered Safety Features (ESF) from service (TMI Action Plan Item II.K.1.10,"Review and Modify Procedures for Removing ESF from Service to AssureOperability Status is Know.")

~Bes oase

Procedures are presently being written which govern the pre-maintenance and post-maintenance safety-related system status. Typically, toremove safety-related equipment from service, two operations documents will beinitiated.

One of these documents is an Operations Work Procedure (OWP) ~ An

OWP will define the testing required on redundant equipment prior to andduring the maintenance. It will also define the testing requirements of theequipment that has been removed from service in order to declare itoperable. Double verification line-ups are provided on the OWP for"maintenance positions" and "return to normal positions."

The Equipment Inoperable Record (EIR) is a document which logs theequipment out of service and keeps a running total of any time limitationsthat apply. The EIR is updated at the beginning of each shift as part of theshift foreman's turnover procedure.

(7 164PSAl cv)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power. PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Reactor Systems Branch0 en Item 214 (DSER Section 5.2.2.2 pa e 5-4)

Provide additional information concerning the adequacy of the low temperatureoverpressure protection system (FSAR Safety Review Questions 440.18, 440.106,440.140).

~Res ense

Provided below is FSAR Safety Review Question 440.106 and its response.

The staff„is concerned that your proposed low temperature overpressureprotection (LTOP) system does not adequately protect the reactor vessel duringtransient lags behind the temperature used in the variable setpointcalculator. For. example, starting an RCP in a loop with a hot steam generator

'when the"RCS is w'ater."solid causes the RCS pressure and temperature to rise.Your. LTOP system would automatically raise the PORV setpoint as a function ofauctioneered cold or hot leg temperature, but the vessel wall will not beheated in this transient at the same rate. Thus, part of the RCS susceptibleto brittle fracture will be at a lower. temperature and higher. pressure thanthe LTOP system is protecting against.

If, during a cooldown, a cold 1'eg temperature detector. downstream of thegenerator(s) being used failed, and a mass input event occurred, your. proposedLTOP system may not protect the coldest. location in the vessel since thesetpoint would not be based on the coldest fluid temperature.

Address the above concerns by addressing the following questions:

1) Show that for. all normal events and events in which the RCS fluidtemperature is changing, your. proposed system suitably protects thereactox vessel at its col'dest location.

2) Show data to justify the RCS temperature transients assumed in (1) above.

3) Include your analyses the most limiting single failure, and justify thechoice.

4) Include in your analyses the effects of system and components responsetimes, including:

a) temperature detectorsb) pressure detectorsc) logic circuitryd) PORV and its associated air. system

Show the response "times "that were assumed and the techniques, includingsurveillance requirements, for ensuring their. conservatism.

0 en-Item 214 (Continued)

Res onse to Question 440.106

The design basis for the cold overpressure mitigation system is to preventoverpressure excursions in excess of appendix G for. the most likely potentialoverpressurization events while simultaneously preserving the 200 psi delta P

requirement across the RCP seal. Specifically this includes a mass input ofup to 120 gpm with letdown isolated. Setpoints are based on this transientand on the inadvertent startup of an RCP Mth a primary to secondary sidetemperature mismatch of 50'F. The fifty degree mismatch is chosenbecauselarger temperature differences would be very obvious to the operator..

Since the cold leg temperature detectors for all loops are upstream of thesafety injection lines, cold leg temperature detectors "woul'd not reflect theaddition of cold water from this source. Failure of the cold leg temperaturedetector wouldn't make any difference for this occurrence. The normalcharging line enters the RCS downstream of the loop 2 cold leg temperaturedetector.. As long as both letdown and charging are proceeding water entering

"the RCS via the .,normal chargi'ng:line is at about the same temperature as theRCS. Thus the effect of failure of the loop 2 cold leg temperature detector.would not be impacted by an increase in the charging flow.

Fluid and thermal mixing tests simulating SI at various loop flows have shownthat the SI and loop flows mix such that nearly complete thermal mixingoccurs. An SI fluid temperature of 40'F would result in lowering the coolanttemperature at the reactor vessel wall by about 3'F. This is'ot significant.

The most limiting single failure would be the failure of a PORV to open for.any reason.

Component response times:

A) Temperature detectors — Time response for. RTDs in RCS wells is about 9seconds for. 63 ' percent of the temperature change at 50 ft/sec.

B) Pressure detectors response time is about 1 second.

C) Logic circuitry s about .1 second or.less')

Valves similar to the Shearon Harris PORVs have been tested as a part ofthe EPRI Safety and Relief Valve test program and total valve stroke timeis about 2 seconds.

(7 250PSAkj r)

PPP„..~ y-."".~ i~o. 215 (g~PP, qect'oq 1g.5.3y pape ]5 2 )

Pr..vide addit'on@' .formation concerning the applicant's stean gene"ator tubeany vs'+ .I40 ~ 111 440, 131 hard 440 ~ 134) ~

P+ 1 'fS 1 Al) PP lg'f Tier ~ f Po P 1 5

~h" recuested '.nforr'.ation @as c~eviousl.v p"esented as . SAR Safetv Hev'..r9 zest=:o-..s 440. 111, 4"0. 13"-, and 440. 134. Responses to "!:ese quest'ns areo-nv~~~" '~ >'"ac'" "~r" ~

ATTACH!~PT

Responses tn FSAH SafetyHev~ e'iJ '1'le~tio")s ~!".0. 1 1 1, «90. 1 +3 y Qnd 040. 1 34

guestion 440. 111 (Section 15.6.3)

The recent steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event at the R. E. Ginna

Plant and previous SGTR events at other pressurized water reactors indi-cate the need for a more detailed review of your analysis of the SGTR

accident. Provide the following additional information and clarifica-tion.

(1) A comprehensive analysis of the plant response to the SGTR accident

should be presented including (a) figures showing the pressure,

flow, temperature and water volume or level of components in the

primary and secondary systems, (b) a figure showing the DNB ratioand a discussion of the potential for fuel failure as a result ofthe accident, (c) figures showing the power level and reactivitywhere the reactivity curve is based on the assumption that the

highest worth rod cluster control assembly is stuck out of the core

and this curve accounts for any flow of non-borated water from the

secondary to primary system as the primary pressure is reduced, and

(d) a table showing the sequence of events such as time of operatoractions, trip and delay times, time of loss of offsite power, and

equipment actuation and delay times.

(2) The most limiting single failure should be identified, justifiedand assumed in the analysis of the SGTR accident. This should

include consideration of relief or safety valves failing to close.

(3). Discuss any credit taken for the functioning of normally operatingplant systems (including non-safety grade systems) and the effectsof their operation on the consequences of the accident.

(4) Assumptions used in the analysis should be identified and justified(also, see guestions 440..95 and 440.96). Section 15.6.3.3. 1 states

that the main steam condensers are not available for steam dump forthe case of loss of offsite power. However, Table 15. 6.3-1 shows

that steam is released to the condenser during the first 8 hours of

440.111-1

the accident. This also raises concerns about the validity ofvalues given in the table for steam release via atmospheric reliefvalves, break flow, auxiliary feedwater flow and reactor coolant

released to the defective steam generator. This should be clari-fied and the values justified.

(5) Confirm that your analysis of release of steam to the atmosphere is

via safety valves only. Show that this is conservative relative to

potential operator actions such as reducing secondary system pres-/- sure using a PORV or automatic PORV operation.

(6) Section 15.6.3.3.1 states that primary-to-secondary leakage 'is

evenly distributed in the steam generators. Show that your dose

calculations are conservative with regard -to the most limitingassumption for primary to secondary break and leakage flow points

in combination with the most limiting assumption for the secondary

to atmosphere release location.

(7) Provide an analysis of the dose resulting from the exhaust of the

turbine dirven auxiliary feedwater pump for the duration of the

accident.

(8) In view of the above concerns and the potential for longer leak

times, liquid can enter the main steam lines. Discuss the effectof the liquid on the integrity of the steam piping and supports.

Consider both the liquid dead weight and the possibility of water

hamner.

Response to guestion 440.111

(l)(a) The comprehensive analysis of the SGTR accident is discussed inSection 15.6.3 of the FSAR. Pertinent transients of pressure,

flow, temperature, level and mass from the analysis were given

in the response to guestion 450.4.

440 111-2

(b) Results of the DNB calculations within LOFTRAN indicate that no

additional fuel failures would occur as a result of the SGTR. The

DNB ratio for the accident as determined by LOFTRAN is shown in

Figure 1.

(c) The power level and reactivity transients following the SGTR are

shown in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. The analysis assumes

failure of the highest worth control rod. potential boron dilutionvia reverse flow fr om the ruptured steam generator is not a concern

until operator actions to terminate break flow have been com-

pleted. Beyond this time reactivity can be controlled using normal

charging/letdown since the SGTR event does not .result in uncon-

trolled cooldown of the plant.

(d) A table giving the sequence of events for the SGTR analysis was

included in the response to (}uestion 450.4. The single failureassumed in the analysis is the failure of an auxiliary feedwater

pump. This results. in an increase in the total steam produced and

thus an increase in radiological releases.

(2) No failure in the SIS is assumed since maximum SI flow results inincreased break flow. All three charging/HHSI pumps are assumed tooperate for 30 minutes after the accident. Failure of a safetyvalve to close would be a passive failure, and passive failures are

not required to be considered until after 24 hours following, the

initiation of the accident. No significant steam releases occur

after the initial 8 hours following the accident. If any atmos-

pheric relief valve stuck open, there is a backup isolation valvewhich can be manually controlled to close the leak path. To have

an uncontrolled release would require failure of both the reliefvalve and the backup isolation valve. Similiar ly, an alternativemeans of isolating the affected steam generator is available should

any MSIV fail (see 3 below).

(3) If the faulted steam generator MSIV failed to close, the control

grade turbine stop and steam dump valves are assumed to operate and

provide isolation of the faulted steam generator. The turbine stop

and steam dump valves are designed to fail close on loss of power.

The atmospheric relief valves are assumed available if offsitepower is assumed to be lost. Although they are not explicitlymodeled in the SGTR analysis, the pressurizer PORV or sprays would

be used for primary sytem control by the operator.

After reactor trip, normal feedwater flow control is assumed to

throttle feedwater flow to control steam generator inventory.

Consequently, normal feedwater flow is terminated prior to feed-

water isolation following safety injection actuation.

(4) The assumptions used in the.SGTR analysis have been discussed inSection 15.6.3 of the FSAR and in the responses to numerous ques-

tions. The principal assumptions, which are made to maximize steam

releases and offsite doses, are:

(1) A double-ended rupture of a single tube (2) all three charg-

ing/HHSI pumps operate for 30 minutes after the accident,

and (3) no credit is taken for operator actions to reduce

the break flow for the initial 30 minutes following the

accident.

The statement on Table 15.6.3-1 that steam releases go tothe condenser when offsite power is lost is in error. Steam

releases in this case go to the outside atmosphere and the

offsite doses were calculated based on the steam being

released directly to the atmosphere.

The LOFTRAN code was used to calculate the reactor coolantcarried over to the faulted steam generator as well as the

steam releases from and feedwater flows to all steam gener-

ators.

&he FSAR will be changed to correct this error.

~ (5) Aftei reactor trip, the secondary system pressure is assumed to be

controlled at the maximum safety valve setpoint pressure plus

accumulation. This is consistent with loss of offsite power since

normal steam dump would not be available. Although sensitivitystudies to relief valve setpoint indicate that the minimum setpointresults in slightly increased radiological releases, the effect isnot significant.

(6) The 1.0 gpm primary-to-secondary leakage is equally divided among

the three steam generators since the leakage in any one steam

generator is limited to 500 gallons per day by the plant technicalspecifications. The secondary to atmosphere release point isdiscussed in parts 5 and 7 of this question.

(7) All steam generated after. reactor trip is assumed to be released to

atmosphere. The offsite radiological consequences are not affected

by the specific release path. The operator i s assumed to isolatethe steam supply from the ruptured steam generator to the turbinedriven auxiliary feedwater pump within 30 minutes.

(8) Extrapolation of the FSAR results suggests that the faulted steam

generator would not fillwith water until approximately 70 minutes

following the accident initiation for the design basis event.

Hence, there is sufficient time to complete the recovery sequence

before the water level rises into the main steamline.

440.111-5

41

4

~ I

ItLulFEL 4 tb'Ml< t:0 saot <a us ~

~ ~

I~ I

I:I{I II: I

I I

j:ij

~ ~

I.).

I o .".

~ ~

o iTIt ~ ',

:I)~

I)eI ~ t

~ Ilf

olj

IiiIII:Iit'.

I;.:oiW:II:~ e ~

~ ~

tftf

:I):: ~ I.

i:I:'-{:Qe I

.'i:)

it}i::l:

lT!;: IlI I II

i::ijl

:l}1

~ ~ ~ ~

~I

~

~ ~ ~

l)oIe)

i!I

If)

I'llII:ij

p~ o

jt

Dj::I

- ~ ~

ds

~ ~ ~

e

I

:'I~ t

I "I

JJJI

II

Jjj

:j:Ii)'I:..Ii

~ ~

~ ~ e

~ ~

;ss'ii

:1.ts".Ifoll

~ ~

~ ~

::I

:::I

t ~

j i!I til

lfI{,'II

I ~

i:II~~

I::IiI:::"It'jl':Ii

~ ~

::I:~ ~

~ ~t~ ~~ ~~ ~

~ ~

'I

I:i

iT)ef'

~I"'~ ~

~ ~

~ ~

~ I ~

: I,.t

~ s:I

~ ~ ~

~ ~

~ ~

~ e

:Ii.11:tl;

:jij

fs. ~

~ t~ I

I ~

e

~ ~

I:::

liio Le'

t:I

!

I

::I

.I

1

'::I

I

~ at

est HEI. 5

st

I{!

Ii.}~

i::Ie:

I

~ ~

I fl

i!

~ ~

~ o

e

:":.I! Ilji

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

Itl i:lt

I'}I tel;

~ e

o ~t

~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~~ ~

~ ~

o

e ~

'

~ I

~ ~

~ ~ ~

o

~ o ~ ~

::!I Ljj!

EIS t:O ss ~ ss s ss s s

~ ~

ji)il eliso ~

ef

I

I

iiil

~ e)il)il}

Il:s I

II I.'.,IIi)ltII I

.I)I

I ~

I

Ij

Te

~

I: I~ ~

~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ s

~ ef ~

-:I

~ ~ ~

~ ~

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~

t

~ o ~

~ ~

~t~ ~

:::}i

-.Ijl

!i)i

~ ~ ~

o ~ ~o ~

~ ~

:ol:

:ol::tl:

e'o

~ ~

e ~

::tl":I:i!I

I

I "o

~ e

el~ ~

~ ~

'\I'~ ~ ~

{

,:Cl

Il~ ~

li

5ijl::

~ ~

I~

::If

Ill)f~, litI;i'!

I ~

'l:j

ef}1fl)t

ji:!e

::I

::;I

~ I~ I

~ It o ~ I ~

(g'I

)lf

li

I

e

I

I 'I

'. i

: II

e ~

,'ll;:I! 'I: is

'. il

ilj11!

I

TTCI

:)ta

~ ~

{~

IIett

!

Iotll:,'!Ilt:I'j-':l

{~ ~ I

IL!II..)::Ij!::i

If!I

II'l

::lf

~ to

I

I

le:'I:

s ~ ~

::ele

:::I

i:ill

ll::

ltl')il

't ~~ ~

Jio

I

I

~ ~

if

tlef

jl:I I

!Iff

I » oI

II:

si II'

ij ~

ol:~ II

e ~

i,l:.

s~

~ ~

)e

I

I~'I

I::lo.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o

f)ls

IIt

~ ~

)l)':

ltj!

tg~ etI::

li!:.

r!;:~ ~

m':I:

"I:tjioil'-.

I

I

II

!

1

ki;

T

~ ~

:ilj::I)

~ ~ e

!Iii

~ e

Cl

o II

I it!s

~ ~ ~

.'I::

~ ~ ~~ ~s

~ ~

IIITo ~

li i

I::I':

~ ~e

.Ii:I:

Ie II:il

j}lt

:.Iiltf'-f:::.I:

,llI

: I)

~ ~

'I:~ ~

~ t: I'll

Tet

e

I~ ~

.I::I:

e ~ ~

I ~

It ~ ~

it',il

~ ~~ ~

tt ~ I

+I!.)

II'Ife ~ e

e I'

~

~ ~~ ~

f,

ol

li

I

:.I

!

!

::.I

:i

III

I

il

~ ~ I

II ~

jl

I

Il

tjfi)tlIII

jl

I

I

Ii~ ~

Ri

!i!e t

e'!!

~ ~

e'.of

:I;:

I~

tte:I'l

t ~ ~

!i

I

(+4, ll) X IU IO liltCkNllt1 IC E lo > 4>S „KLUIFELb LLSEII CO esse>cuss

I

guestion 440.133 (Section 15.6.3)

The- response to question 440.95 is not acceptable. You stated,"Assuming the secondary pressure is equal to the steam generator safetyvalve pressure, the break flow would be stopped". This is true only ifthe primary pressure is reduced to the setting of the lowest set S.G.

safety valve or secondary PORV.


See Response to guestion 440.134

440.133-1

guestion 440. 134 (Section 15.6.3)

The response to question 440.96 is not acceptable. The response states

that actions necessary to terminate break flow include terminating

safety injection flow. You also mention that primary system pressure

remains above the faulted S/G pressure. This fact alone precludes

termination of break flow. Also, your response to question 440.95

stated that maximum safety injection flow throughout the transient isassumed. This means the operator cannot terminate safety injection.Your response states that 30 minutes is. considered as adequate time to

terminate releases from the faulted S/G. In light of the recent SGTR

experience of another PMR, additional justifications are necessary toverify the 30 minute termination criteria.


Following a steam generator tube rupture event, RCS pressure willequilibrate at a value above the affected steam generator pressure where

incoming, safety injection flow matches primary-to-secondary leakage.

Break flow will continue until operator actions to cooldown and depres-

surize the RCS are completed. The required actions are described inSection 15.6.3.3.1 and include terminating safety injection. In the

analysis of this event, these specific actions have not been explicitlymodeled since such actions would reduce the radiological releases.

Consequently, the calculated primary pressure is greater than the

affected steam generator pressure for the initial 30 minutes. Ie isassumed that operator actions to equilibrate primary and secondary

pressures would be completed within this 30 minute period. Hence, no

primary-to-secondary leakage occurs after the initial 30 minutes. Since

the recovery actions can be completed from within the control room, 30

minutes is considered adequate time to complete the recovery sequence.

Although additional time may be required to recover for smaller break

sizes, break flow would be less and, hence, more time would be available.

440.134

instrumentation and Control Systems Branch/H. LiOpen Etems 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 85, 87, 89,

90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 100, 101, 223

Draft SER Item Number 75

The applicant was requested to provide an evaluation and/or an analysis of theeffect of post.-accident environmental conditions on the setpoint for thereactor trip system instrumentation (Technical Specification Table 2.2-1) andthe engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation (TechnicalSpecification Table 2.2-2) ~ The margins from the normal setpoint to thelimiting setpoint should include the instrument drift, calibrationuncertainty, transmitter error, and base starting margin. This item is beingpursued with the applicant. Additional information and formal documentationare required.

.v~Res onse

Each of the reactor trip system instrumentation and ESF system setpoints andthe allowable tolerance of those setpoints is determined by the evaluation ofthe system design calculations. This evaluation establishes the allowablesystem tolerance of a setpoint which will still result in the ESF systemperforming its intended function and within the limits of acceptable systemperformance.

The capabilities of the instrument or instrument loop is then evaluatedagainst the allowable system tolerance to ensure that the control systemperformance will comply with system requirements.

The overall instrument or instrument loop accuracies take into accounta) instrument accuracy under accident environment b) calibration uncertainty

- -..c)~setpoint drift. The calculated instrument loop uncertainty is the squareroot of the sum of the squares of individual instruments uncertaintiescomprising that loop.

OPEN LITEM 76

7.2.2.3 Response-Time Testingpg. 7-12/13

gllESTION

To ensure that the response time of each protective function of thereactor trip system and the engineered safety features activationsystem (ESFA) is within the time limit assumed in the accidentanalyses, the Technical Specification requires response-time testingat specified intervals. - This aspect of the design will be reviewedwhen the plant zest procedures are available. Consideration oflead, lag, and the rate time constant for the setpoints should alsobe incorporated- Additional information and formal documentationare required.

RESPONSE:

'The pre-op'era.ional procedures 'on'esponse-Time testing will containzhe criteria listed in FSAR test summary 14.2.12.1.11. Theseprocedures will be approved during the *last quarter of 1984.

OPEi ITE'f 77

7.2.2.4 Indepencent Verification of the Operability of Reactor T='pBreaker Shunt and Undervoitage Coils

pg. 7-13

gL.STIQÃ:

In the review of OL applications, the staff has discussed withapplicants the concern for independently verifying the operabilityof shunt, and unde'rvoltage coils of reactor trip breakers. The staffconcludes that the diverse features of reactor tr'p breakers (shuntand undervoltage coils) provide an additional degree of reliabil'tyfor ensuring the abil'ty to tr'p the reactor. Further, surve'llance

.procedures should independently ver-'fy the operability of thesediverse features. The staff concludes that it would be unacceptableif the operability of one of these diverse features was not con-firmed during the normal 40-year life of a plant. Thus the staf.position is that. "a function test of the undervolzage-and, shun-trips, shall be conducted every 16 mon hs..and following adjustmen- ormai.-.'"enanc'e of the reactor trip breaker to independently ver'fy theoperability of the breai er to perform its safe:y function in re-sponse to a trip signal for each of these dive=se tr'p features."

This requirement would be in add'tion to those surveillancerequirements for reactor trip breakers covered in the plantTechnical Specifications. The present Harris design does not allowthe shunt trip to be independently tested. This item is beingpursued with the applicant. Additional information and formaldocumentation are required.

RESPO'ASE:

FSAR Section 14.2.12.1.10 Reactor Protection System EngineeredSafety Features Actuation Logic Summary, will be revised in a future

- -amendment to independently test the undervoltage and shunt trips.Surveillance procedures will be instituted to provide forindependent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trips every 18months during plant operation and following any adjustment ormaintenance that could affect trip coil operation.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER 0 en Item Number 78

The interface design between NSSS and BOP scope of supplies is notclear. The applicant will re-evaluate the turbine trip circuitry andlogic. Additional information and formal documentation are required.

~Res onse

The turbine trip system employs a two channel concept which utilizesredundant inputs from critical parameters. The functional logic is shownon FSAR Figure 7.2.1-1 Sheet 15. FSAR Section 7.2.1.1'.2 Item f) will be

-- modified to include the following discussion of the trip circuitry'ndLogics

"The turbine trip system employs the two channel concept with..redundant -inputs -from.each critical parameter. All local trips(i.e., low bearing oil pressure, turbine overspeed, thrust bearinglow pressure, condenser low vacuum, low E.H. fluid pressure) and allremote trips (i.e., Reactor trip, steam generator Hi-Hi level,Generator trip, Manual trip, electro/hydraulic DC power failure)activate both turbine trip channels through four solenoid valves.The four valves are arranged in a series/parallel configurationseparating into two channels so that at least one solenoid valve fromeach channel must be open to cause a trip.Separate Reactor Trip contacts (two train "A" and two train "B") arewired out to each of the four turbine trip solenoids. Reactor tripcontacts from either train (A or B) will trip the turbine, sincetrain "A" contacts are wired to solenoids 20-1/AST & 20-2/AST andtrain "B" contacts are wired to the solenoids 20-3/AST 6 20-4/AST.

These reactor trip contacts utilize power .from the Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control Cabinet for the turbine trip. Refer to FSAR Figure7.2.1-1 Sheet 15."

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plantraft SB Open Item No. 79 (CESAR Section 7.2.1.1.2,

ICS3 Ouestion 19)

Low feedwater flow trip is actuated by steam/feedwater flowmismatch in coincidence with low water Level in any steam -generator. ----However,. the main feedwater flow elements are located in the turbinebuilding. The instrument lines do not satisfy the safety graderequirements. It is the staff's position that all inputs to thereactor trips system must be seismically and environmentallyqualified and conform to the requirements of IEEE-279-1971

'dditionalinformation is required.

Response

-.Low feedwater flow is sensed by flow elements in the feedwaterlines and a low feedwater. flow signal is an input to the SolidState Protection System that provides a reactor trip to protect.the reactor from a sudden loss of heat sink. The low feedwater'flow ',signal „is not used as'he primary protection for a loss ofnormal feedwater flow or a feedwater system pipe break event. Thelow feedwater flow.trip is, developed by a steam/feedwater flo;-mismatch in coincidence with low ~ater level in any steam generatorand provides one of two inputs that generates a steam generatortrip. The other steam generator trip is developed from a Low-Lowsteam generator water level trip signal and provides the primarytrip signal input. Table 7.2.2-1 lists those trips that are notassumed- to function in an accident and therefore Chapter 15 doesnot take credit for them in the accident analysis. The lowfeedwater flow trip signal is considered an anticipatory tripand the low-low steam generator water level trip will providethe primary trip to protect the reactor from a loss of heatsink. Because the low feedwater flow input is considered ananticipatory tripp the flow elements associated with it can belocated in the Turbine Building.

The low feedwater flow signals functioning is unrelated to aseismic event in that it is anticipatory to other diverse para-meters which will cause reactor trip. The signal will serve tointerrupt power to cause reactor trip. The reactor ProtectionSystem cabinets ~hich receive the inputs from the low feedwaterflow transmitters are seismically qualified but will not be degradedby the anticipatory trip signals because the input is de'-energizedto trip. The flow elements of the Low feedwater flow system arenon-nuclear safety and are located in non-seismic Category I lines.The associated flow transmitters used to monitor the flow areClass 1E, seismic Category I, Environmentally Qualified (VestinghouseQuality Group B-Class 1E for a mild environment for equipment oiProtection Sets III and IV). The instrument sensing lines providingthe trip „signal from the flow element to the instrument cabinetswill be seismically supported in accordance with Regulatory Guide1.29 positions C.2 and C.4. The sensing lines for each flow trans-mitter are independently routed in order to meet the separationcriteria specified in IEEE-279-1971. The flow transmitters arelocated in non«nuclear safety grade cabinets in the Turbine Building.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDteit SEE Coen Item No.. 79~Cont'd)

L'oss 'o'f power, 'the most likely mode of failure, to a channel orlogic train will result in a signal calling for a trip. The designmeets the requirements of GDC 23. The reactor trip system is designedas a fail safe system. Cables and conduits associated with thereactor trip circuits are designed to meet IEEE standard 279-1971including redundancy, separation and single failure criter"'a.Refer to Section 7.2.1.1 for Reactor Trip system description.Separation Criteria and methods are described in FSAR Sections8.3.1.2.30 and 7.1.2.2.2 Single Failure Criteria, is. describedin PSAR Section 7.2.2.2.3.2.

..The power supply arrangement is discussed in FSAR Section'.3.1.2.2.2.Capability for testing is described in FSAR Section 7.2.2.2.3.13.Plow measurement elements and sensors vere located in an area ofthe plant vith consideration for safety and optimization ofoperational control. Location of the system in a Category Ibuilding such as the Reactor Auxiliary Building vas consideredbut these locations introduced greater system loop accuracy errors,safety setpoint inaccuracies and reduced the capability foroperational control.

The flov elements PE-0476, 0496, 0486 and their associated flowtransmitters FT-0476, 0477, 0486, 0487, 0496, 0497 are shown onFSAR Figure 10.1.0-3. Physical location within the plant is alsoindicated on PSAR Figure 10.1.0-3. The flow transmitters arelocated in instrument cabinets TI-C19, TI-C20 in the turbinebuilding and connected to the flov elements via instrument lines,piping and valves as shovn on drawing 2165-B-431 Sheet F-39.Instrument cabinets TI-C19 and TI-C20, protection sets III and IV,provide the low feedwater flow signals for input to reactor pro-tection systems reactor trip as shown on PSAR Figure 7.2.1-1Sheet 7.

.The. following insert will be added

.in.a future amen'dment.to FSAR Section 7.2.-1.1.2e.

Low feedwater flow is a non-primary input to the Solid StateProtection System; therefore, the input is considered an anticipatorytrip and the flow elements associated vith it are non-nuclearsafety> located in non-seismic Category I piping within the

Turbine Building. The flow elements and their associatedflow transmitters are shown in Figure 10;1.0-3. The flow trans-mitters are Class 1E located in non-nuclear safety grade instrumentcabinets in the Turbine Building. The instrument sensing lines areseismically supported in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29,positions C.2 and C.4 and independently routed in accordance withthe s'eparation criteria specified in IEEE-279-1971.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER Open Item No. 79 (Cont'd)

Resoonse (Cont'd)

The low feedwater flow input signal functioning is unrelated to asiesmic event in that they are anticipatory to other diverseparameters which cause reactor trip. The low feedwarer flowsignal is fail safe in that it, serves to interrupt power (de-energize-to-trip) to cause reactor trip. The SSPS cabinets whichreceives the input signaLs from the low feedwater flow instrument .

cabinets (anticipatory trip sensors) are seismically qualified..The primary trip that protects the reactor from a loss of. heatsink is the low-low steam generator water level trip. .The lowfeedwater flow trip along with other trips that are not required

.because the trips are not assumed to function in an accident'ndtherezore no credit is taken for them in the accident analysis

are listed in Table 7.2.2-1.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER 0 en Item No 80 (PSAR Section 7.3 ICSB-57)

In the Harris design, some of the protection systems do not have systemlevel ESP manual initiation capability. These protection systems includethe feedwater line isolation, containment ventilation isolation, controlroom isolation, fuel-handling building ventilation isolation, RABventilation isolation, and auxiliary feedwater isolation.

Provide ESF manual initiation capability.

~Res oese

ESF manual initiation capability is provided for the identified systems ona component basis as shown in PSAR logic diagram, Figure 7.2.1-1, Sheet 8of 15, Revision 7.

Individual components of the Feedwater System can be manually isolated atany time from the Main Control Board (MCB). Manual ContainmentVentilation isolation is provided on the MCB. Manual isolation of thecontrol room is accomplished from the MCB by the manual actuation ofSafety Injection (SI) or control room component manual isolation from theMCB after SI and CRI reset. The fuel handling building can be manuallyisolated from the control room by actuation of emergency exhaust fans andsupply 1 exhaust ventilation system dampers. Manual isolation of the RABventilation system can be accomplished by manual safety injectionactuation. As described in FSAR Section 7.3.1.3.3, manual initiation ofauxiliary feedwater isolation is provided in the control room or auxiliarycontrol panel.

FSAR Section 7.3.1.3.2 will be revised to include the followinginformation in a future amendment.

The isolation of the Peedwater System can be accomplished manually throughthe Safety Injection (SI) manual actuation control switch from the MainControl Board. However, individual components of the Feedwater System canbe manually isolated at any time from the MCB. The FWXS & SI signal mustbe reset prior to the opening of the isolation valves. Separate controlsswitches (Train A and Train B) are provided on the MCB for the resettingof the SI and FWIS signals.

Manual CVIS initiation is provided on the MCB and Table 7.3.1-3 will berevised as follows:

No. of Channels No. of Channels to Tri Sensor Location

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER 0 en Item No. 80 (Cont'd)

Res onse (Cont'd)

FSAR Section 7.3.1.5.7 will be revised to include the followinginformation:

The isolation of the control room can be accomplished manually through theSafety Injection (SI) manual actuation control switch from the MCB

However, individual components of the control room isolation can bemanually operated from the MCB with the exception that SI and CRI signalsmust be reset prior to the equipment change over from an actuated mode toa normal mode. Separate control switches (Train A and Train B) areprovided on the MCB for the resetting of the SI and CRI signal.

'FSAR 'Section 7.3.1.3.4 will be revised to include the followinginformation:

Fuel Handling Building (FHB) manual isolation is provided in the controlroom on a component basis. The FHB system is completely isolated uponradiation monitoring signal actuation.

The RAB ventilation isolation is part of the component isolation during amanual safety injection actuation. Manual actuation of SI will alsoinclude the isolation of the RAB ventilation system. Manual reset of theSI from the MCB will autoraatically reset the RAB ventilation isolationsignal.

FSAR Table 7.3.1-3 will also be revised accordingly.

Sh ea ron Harris Nuclear Power Plan tOraft SZR item No. 85

The containment spray syste~ cools the containment atmosphere andremoves the fission products after a LOCA. The staf has ident'='ed"the concerns on the adequacy of the instrumentation for terminat'ngsodium hydroxide addition in the containment spray system and thecapability to test the spray additive tank isolation valves.Because the applicant has not responded to this concern, itsresolution will be addressed in a subsequent report.

Response

, Adequate information for determining spray additive 'tank leveland for terminating; spray additive is provided by the use ofredundant class-1E level indicators with read-out on the main

..control .board .in the control zoom. The capabil ty of testing themot'or operated spray a'dditive tank isolat on valves is provided bythe use of a manual isolation valve located down stream. Underadminist ative-test procedure the manual isolation valve would beclosed and the motor operated valves tested from the control room.After valve testing is completed, the manual isolat''on valve will beopened. The manual isolation valve is easily accessible.

FSAR Sections 6.5.2 and 7.5 «ll be modified to reflect the use ofredundant class lE level indicators. FSAR F gure 6.2.2-1 andFigures 7.3. 1-6 and 7 are currently undergoing rev'sions. Thesefigures will be updated wnen available.

OPEN ITEN 87

7.3.3.9 Spare Pump in CCV Systempg /m)7

QL~STION:

A dis'cussxon of the automatic and manual operation and control ofthe station service water system and the component cooling watersys em was provided in the September 14-16, 1982 I&C meeting. As a

result of this discussion, CP&L will revise the Technical Specifica-tions for component cooling wate" surge tank level testing. CP&L

will also modify Technical Specifications to ensure that the breakerfor "C" component cooling water pump cannot be racked in unless theothe associated component cooling water pump breaker s racked out.The revised Technical Spec'fications will be submitted-for NRC

review.

RESPONSE:

"'The rev.'sed SHYPP Technica1 Specif'cations .will ensure that. thebreake" for "C" component cooling water pump cannot be rackeduniess the othe" associated comoonent cooling water pump breaker isracked out. The Technical Specifications will also be revised forcomponent cooling water surge tank level test'ng. The SiLNPP

Technical Specifications will be submitted to the NRC in June, 1984.

S".ez" n .-.zrr s nuclear Pover PlantDrzft SER C-en Ite... Yo. S9

>..e s=z="f ;".as rev'eved the resu ts oz ana'.-sesto de-. "nstrate proper iso ation betve n

se"z=zt'z=ety

a'nd nonsafety systems. Tne sta'as recinfo....ation to justify the adeauzcy of the stdevices. Tnis matter ''s subject to zurther staf

znd et. een"'cnal

. -cg=zm zor 'sozationreview."

Response

The design criteria on the isolat'on dev'ces in tne Balance of Plant(BOP) Systems is based on actual mounting and viring oz the isolat'onrelays within the Isolation Cabinets. The devices. which are part ofredundant safety channels and their respective BOP inter=aces arelocated in individual freestand'ng isolation czbinets. The solat onCabinets are constructed to provide electrical 's"'ie.n zn physicz"n'd'ep'endenc'e bet'-'een diff'erent 't 'ain class 1E circ its znd betweenClass lE and non Class 1E Syste-.„s. Any circ it or component 'zilu".e,on one side oz the isolat"'on bar - er .il'ot proc ce z =a'e or mz'-funct on on the other side.

Tne analysis of BOP control c'rcuits shows that no cred hie faultswill induce voltage transients exceeding the nor al operatingconditions of the isolation devices. The circuits are protectedagainst contact arcing and contact welding as well zs against coilfailure so that the failure of the non-safety part of the isolationdevice would not result in degradat'on of class 1E circu's. Thepower supplies were analyzed not to create overcurrent. Thus theseparation between safety groups and between safety and non-safetysystems is achieved.

Electrical isolation is maintained by electro-mechanical plug-in typerelays whose special construction provides an electrical iso'ation oz

4000 V RfS between the input and output. Physiczl independence isprovided by means of a metal bar ier. The relay is fitted with e"..tended

pins to relay coil leads'nd corresponding socket terminals are divertedto the bottom side of the socket and sealed in the socket. The socketis installed on the isolation barrier which divides the isolation panelsinto class IE and non-class IE sections. The wi ing to the relay coil isthus separated from the wiring to tne relay contacts by the use of th'sbarrier. The wiring is fla e resistant in co=,pl'ance with I CEA publi-cation S-19-81, section 6.19.6 with solderless r ng-tongue co=pressiontype connectors. The relays used are oz t. o types: 125 VDC relay vhichhas two (2) Form C contacts rated for 250 4 at 125 VDC n"uctive and

120 VAC relay provided with two (2) For C contacts rated 250 mA at125VDC .'nductive. DC zelays are fed from tne 125 VDC Class,l= buses(SA & SB) supplied from the station batter'es. AC relavs are fed fromthe 120 VAC un-interruptible power supply service buses. Separate feedersare provided for each isolation cabinet. Pover fault annunciation for each

cabinet indicates a loss of any one of the pover supplies.

pazris nuclear Power Plant1e o f t ~ %

e -'solat-'cn cab nets are located n 3='~ "it'.". n co"..tzol'eo e".:-.ental comitions (Control Roon "=nve3.ope) . No=...a condit'ons ='".. -'..isarea will be ra ntained before, during and folic "ng an accioe-;.t.Poweve , in ozcer to assure that the isolat'on pzo"ezties of t;.e ze aywere maintained after exposure to anv poss'ble abnormal cond'teons,(i.e., the relay maintains its KV RMS isolation capability) stresstests were performed. Random selected sa...ples o" the re ays =-'ththeir sockets were subjected to environmental quali= cateon type tes" ~

Tne accelerated aging of the relay-socket assembly under e'eva"edtemperature and humidity qualified the zelays for 15 yearswithout loss of functions.

. The folios'ing tests vere conducted on the 30P Svstem Isolation Deviceto con=irm the dev'ce isolation capability:

A. 'D 'lectric 'S trenath:

1 ~ The isolat-on device was sub-itted to a test volt ge ctwice rated circuit voltage plus 1,000 volts zoot r...ean

square (E~S), for circuits rated 600 volts, or less.

— The 'solation device was submitted to a test voltage oi2-1/4 times rated circuit voltage plus 2000 volts, rootmean square (RNS), for circuits rated above 600 volts.

The relays were submitted to 4400 iPS between coil and contactsfor one minute after aging the sample tested for 3864 hours ata temperature of 185 P (85 C). Similar test was conducted for ~

isolation test from contact to fzame. All samples tested with-stood a voltage of 4300 VL8S above for one =inute.

H ~otential Test DBE Test

Xsolarion devices (relays} vere also sub-...icred ro an ele:acedte. perature of 119 P (48.3 C) and 95/ relative. hu=idity

'(non-condensing) environ=ent. Devices are tested at 4400VP!S from coil to contact and contact to fr me.. Pll sa=plestested withstood the specified voltage. The minim voltagetested was 4200 VER from contact to frame.

At tne end of the test cycle the equip"..sent .. s allo .ed to stabili-eat zoom ambient te..perature . nd hu.=idi-y and a set oz unctionalper or."..ance test was conducted at maxi-...w, =inimu= and nom'nalvoltages. In order to prove the 4%i R~S minimum capability,dielectric strength test was performed on several sa=ples and an .0insulation resistance Hi potential test was perzormed at 1 9 z

and 95Z relative humidity.

S:".earon Harris Nuclear Pover Plant=":-".-. Ooen Zte-, ';:o. 89 (cont d)

C. T"..s" a t=on Res is "ance ~ es-

Xs'olation Devices ~ere su"=.'t ted to an ins" at'on resistancetest. Prior to application of es" voltage, the grouncs orall grounded circuits vere disconencted fro= ground. Testvoltage ~as appl'ed bee:een electr. cally isolated devices andbetveen c'rcu't and ground. Time for test voltage applicat'onsha' not be less than 60 seconcs. Specified volta"e ''s 500VDC for one minute. Mini um insulation resistance is 25 megohmn

at 25 C and ambient relative hunid ty. The tests res l=s con-firmed the 25 megohms minimum insualtion resis"ance-

After tests A through C vere performed a Functional Test vas performedto de.,onst ate that the isolation devices conserve the "isolationcapabilitv" ~ithout arcing, phys'val breakdo~~ or loss of isolation.The test performed at,120 VAC for 120V relays (AC) and 125V DC .'orthe 125 VCD relays.

OPEN ITE."i 90

Section 7.3.3.12 Solid State Logic Protect'on Svstempg. 7-28/29

gLKSTEOF:

On August, 6, 1982, Westinghouse informed. NRC under 10 CZR 50.55(e)that a potential significant deficiency was identified in the sol'd-state logic protection system (SSLPS) test c'rcuits.

During testing of tne master relays, the voltage applied to theslave relay is reduced from 120-V ac to 15-V dc to preclude theiroperation during this phase of the testing. Also during this test alight is placed in series with the master relay contact, which isnormally used to pick up the slave relays. On complet'on of thesetests, the light used to confirm the continuity of master claycontacts and slave relav coil is removed from the c'rcuit. The.problem revealed is that these tests confirm that the continuity.light 's removed from the circuit. If the light remained '.". se 'eswith the slave relay coil, the operabi'ity of the protect.ve ac" onwould not be assured. The staff will review this matter once theapplicant's proposal to resolve th's concern is received.

RESPONSE:

The Westinghouse recommendations provided in Westinghouse letterNS-EPR-2638, dated August 6, 1982, will be included in the Solid'State P otection system testing procedure. This procedure will bein place 90 days prior to initial fuel load.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER 0 en Item No. 92

The design of the AHOIS has not been completed. Add'tionalinformation is required in the following areas:

(2)

the capability to isolate a faulted steam generator

design change on steam inlet valves to the auxiliaryfeedwater pump steam turbine

(3) design change on auxiliary feedwater flow control valves

(4) reli.ability analysis on auxiliary feedwater system (T.'ilAction Item II.E.1.1)

Response

(1) The capability to isolate a faulted steam aenerator is described-.-in FSAR* subsection 7.3.1.3.3.and is reneated below:

A comoarison of the differential pressures between all steamgenerators is made and used in conjunction with the i'lSISto determine a steam line break and isolate the faultysteam generator from auxiliary feedwater. Both the steamgenerator (steamline) pressure mismatch logic and MSIS areresults of two out of three logics and are combined in acoincidence logic to develop a steam generator availablesignal (SGAS).

A SGAS will perform the following actions:

a. Open the auxiliary feedwater regulating and pump dischargevalves to the intact steam generator.

b. "Close the a~iliary'"feedwater'"regulating and pump dischargevalves to the faulty steam generator.

(2) FSAR Sections 7.3.1 and 10.4.9 will be revised to indicatethat the steam inlet valves to the steam driven AuxiliaryFeedwater Pump are powered from their respective safety trainDC battery system.

(3) FSAR Figure 7.3.1-9 will'be revised to show the electro-hycraulic operators of the auxiliary feedwater flow controlvalves.

(4) The Reliability Analyses on Auxiliary Feedwate system wasincluded in the response to NRC question 410.22 (2)(Open Item 225, part 2).

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDra t SKR Ooen Item No. 93

The Harris design uses the steam generator PORVs in conjunction withthe AiRS to allow the plant to be cooled from the pressure setpointof'the lowest safety valve setting down to the point where the ResidualHeat Removal System can be placed in service. However, the PORVsare located in the steam tunnel and the PORV actuator is onlyqualified to '165 P (the steam tunnel normal temperature is around105 P). The staff has a concern that the PORV may not functionunder a postulated steam line break accident in the steam tunnel;therefore, the plant'ay not be able to achieve cold shutdo~w.This item is being pursued with the applicant. Additional informationis required.

Response

The Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valve operatorswillbequalified to function under a postulated steam line break in thesteam tunnel. Refer to CESAR Section 3.6A.3.2 for further information.

DSER 0 en Item 96

The staff is concerned that a single failure in the auctioneering device- used to .determine the lowest loop temperature could prevent both PORV A

and PORV B from opening when required. This item is being pursued withthe applicant. Additional information is required to demonstrate that thedesign satisfies the single failure criterion.

~Res ense

To prevent a single failure of a temperature auctioneering device fromallowing either Train A PORV or Train B PORV to perform its intendedfunction, the control logic for the Low Temperature OverpressurizationSystem (LTOPS) will be modified.

A manual enabling switch and alarm, located on the Main Control Board,will replace the Train B permissive signal, thus allowing Train A PORV tooperate independently of Train B components. Similarly, Train Apermissive will also be replaced by a manual enabling switch and alarm toallow independent operation of Train B PORV. The potential single failureconcern is eliminated.

The modified control logic also prevents inadvertent opening of eitherPORV,'by requiring manual action. Manual action/arming of the system willbe addressed in operating procedures.

DSER 0 en Item 97

The staff is concerned that when the valve power is locked out duringnormal operation, the control power is removed from one set of valveposition indicating lights. Therefore, the valve position and alarm wouldnot satisfy the single failure criterion. This item is being pursued withthe applicant. Additional information is required.

~Res oose

The accumulator motor operated isolation valves are provided with red(open) and gxeen (closed) position indicating lights located at thecontrol module for each valve. These lights are powered by separate Class.lE, 120 VAC supply and actuated via valve motor operator limit switches,in order to maintain valve position indication during normal opexationwhen valve power is locked out. A white indicating light is also provided

~ at the control module, powered by the valve control power, to indicatepower available. Redundant red and green position indicating lights forthese valves are also provided at the MCB, via separate Class 1E stemmounted limit switches and powered by separate 125 Volt DC power.

In addition, a white monitor light is provided for each valve to indicatethat valve is not in the fully open position. These lights are combinedto indicate the proper valve positions for the safeguard operation. Thetotal. array of lights is powered from a separate Class 1E, 120 Volt ACsource and actuated via valve motor operated limit switches. Fordescription of these monitor lights refer to FSAR Subsection 7.5.1.10.3.

The following is a listing of valves for which electrical power is removedduring normal operation:

Valve Tag No.

Accumulator A DischargeAccumulator B DischargeAccumulator C DischargeCharging Pump High Head to Hot LegCharging Pump High Head to Cold LegCharging Pump High Head to Hot LegRHR Loop 1 Low Head to Cold LegRHR Loop 2 Low Head to Cold LegRHR Loops 1 6 2 Low Head to Hot LegContainment Spray RecirculationContainment Spray Recirculation

8808A SA8808B SB8808C SA8884 SA8885 SA8886 SB8888A SA8888B SB8889 SACT"V25 SACT-V49 SB

(7242JHEccc)

7.g.2.3 Testing fo Remote Shutdovn pe at'onD>. 7-gwO

'h

Durin~ the reviev process a concern vas ra'sec oy the s"a== e~ard-in> tne remote shutdovn capabil'ty anc the need for a test to verifydes'gn adeouacy. The appl'cant stated tha" emergency procecuresvi 'e preparec to inc uce emote shutcovn, and a tes- v-' 'oe

conducted cu" ng startup testing to conf'rm the capability =orremote shutcovn. Tn's item 's confirmatory, subiect to con='mat'onthat tnis test has 'oeen successfu ly completed.

RESPONSE

The remote snutdown capabi'.'ty test villloac as descr-bed 'n the Remote Snutdovn

be oer ormec a"terTest Summary, ."-SAR

ue 1

Sect'on

i.".e plant's Abnormal Ooe ating . rocecures are current'', be'ngdeveloped. and a procecure ut'lizing the plant's remote shutcovncapabi i. y o the Auxi'ary Control Board vi . be 'ncluce . At, =h'stime, the procedure is en" it,led "Control Room inaccessibility." Theprocecure vi'1 be in-place six months pr'or to 'nit-'al fuel 'oac.

DSER 0 en Item 101

The staff has requested the applicant to include a description in FSARSection 7.7 to describe the features of the Shearon Harris environmentalcontrol system that ensure that instrumentation sensing and sampling linesfor systems important to safety are protected from freezing duringextremely cold weather. Additional information is required.

~Res oese

The following'information on the SHNPP Freeze Protection System willinclude as FSAR Section 7.7.1.11 in a future amendment:

«SAFETY REL'ATED INSTRUMENTATION~FREEZEsPROTECTION

Freeze protection for safety related instrumentation at SHNPP consists oftwo systems: the Freeze Protection System and the Temperature MaintenanceSystem.

A. FREEZE PROTECTION SYSTEM

The Freeze Protection System is a non-nuclear class lE system. It isdesigned to protect preselected piping systems exposed to ambienttemperatures between 40'F and -2'F. System controls incorporate ambientsensing controlled freeze protection panels with two thermostats connectedin parallel. The thermostats are preset to turn on at 40'F and off at45'F. A line sensing temperature device is added to those circuits wherethe piping or equipment design temperatures can be exceeded due to theheater cable characteristics. The device will interrupt the current atpreset values (under the design temperatures for lines or equipment).Additionally, the freeze protection panels include the following alarms:

aeb.Ce

d ~

under-temperature alarm (35'F ambient sensing thermostat)under current circuit alarmunder voltage alarmground fault alarm

B. TEMPERATURE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM

The temperature maintenance system is a non-nuclear class lE system. Itis designed to maintain temperatures within specified minimum and maximumlimits. The following systems have temperature maintenance:

a. caustic systemb. waste management systemc. safety injection system

en Item 101 (Cont'd)

~Res onse (cont'd)

System controls for temperature maintenance incorporate individuallycontrolled circuits, each including a Resistancq<Tempprature Detector(RTD) and a thermocouple. The RTDs are used to>control the current in thecircuit at the panel. Current is interrupted when maximum temperaturelimits are reached. The thermocouples are used to monitor the surface

~temperatures of the equipment or lines being protected. Additionally, thetemperature values are remotely recorded with a dataloger. Thetemperature maintenance panels include the following alarms:

a. high temperature alarm/circuitb. low temperature alarm/circuitc. under current alarm/circuit,d. ,„ground fault alarm, remote/panele. power supply to panel and control power loss of voltage alarm,

remote/panel.f. high/low temperature/current failure, common alarm, remote/panel

C. SYSTEM REDUNDANCY

Either partial or total redundancy is provided for pre-selected systems.Redundancy for the freeze protection system is provided for a) systemswhich are critical to the safe operation of the plant, and b) systemswhich are essential for safe shutdown of the plant. Redundancy in thetemperature maintenance system is provided for the waste management systemand safety injection system. The redundancy is accomplished through localmanual operation at the system panels.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER Ooen Item No. 223

The Cormission has instructed the staff to use SECY-82-111 (Supplement1 of NUREG-0737) in the implementation of emergency responsecapaoility (including requirements for post-acc'ent monitoring) .

Therefore, conformance to the guidelines of RG 1.97, Revision 2,will be included in the evaluation of designs for the emergencysupport facilities. The implementation schedule will be establishedin conformance with Supplement, 1 of ~i ~G-0737. The completion ofthe review of this item will be performed dur'ng the post-implementationreview discussed under TNI Action Plan Item III.A.1.2, "UpgradingEmergency Support Facilities."

Response

The emergency response facilities will meet the intent of %;REG 0737(Supplement 1) Item 6.1, "Regulatory Guide 1.97-Applicat'on toEmergency Response Facilities." The implementation schedule hasbeen su'am'ed.in confor...ance, with Supplement 1 or !iVREG 0737for Connission approval. A report delzneating SHNPP compliance~n Regulatory Guide L.97 will be submitted consistent withthat schedule. This subject shall be regarded as a confirmatoryite... since it will be the subject of the stai:'s post-implementationrev ew.

Power Systems Branch/E. TomlinsonOpen Items 105, 107, 112, 127, 150f 151 f 154

The 12 full size drawings included in the response to Open Item 151are being transmitted only to E. Tomlinson

OPEN ITEif 105

QUESTION:

Diagram and tabulation of communication systems within plantrequired'or use during and/or following accidents and/or transients($430.15). SEC: 9.5.2)

ORIGINAL QUESTION:

430. 15 Identify all working stations on the plant site where itmay be necessary for plant personnel to communicate withthe control room or auxiliary contzol room during and/orfollowing transients and/or accidents in order to mitigatethe consequences of the event and to attain a safe coldplant shutdown.

RESPONSE:

The plant communication 'system, consists of sound-powered phonecircuits, a telephone/PA system, and dedicated two-way,radios. Thetelephone/PA system provides private two»way communication betweenthe main control room and the operating stations. This. system alsoprovides one-way paging capability from the main control room to theoperating stations and from the operating stations back to the maincontrol room. The radio system includes portable units withrepeaters and built-in antennas, as well as a base station in themain control room. The radios operate on a dedicated, assignedfrequency and provide maximum plant covezage.

The auxiliary control room's communication capability isidentical to the main control room capability, with the exception ofthe radio base station. A sound-powered phone circuit and atelephone/PA circuit exist between each control zoom and all levelsof the Containment Building and the Reactor Auxiliary Building. TheFuel Handling Building also has telephone/PA communication on eachlevel, and sound-powered communication is available on the lowerfour levels.

Convenient, emergency access to sound-powered phones andtelephone/PA c'ircuits exists as shown in the below table. Adedicated fuel handling sound powered circuit also exists betweenthe main control room, the containment, building 286'evel, and thefuel handling build'ng 286'evel.

The following stations are not necessarily required after an accident but areavailable:

LOCATION PA PHONES

Containment Bldg.Containment Bldg.Containment Bldg.

286'61'36' 55

67

21

~'OCATIONContainment Bldg.Reactor Aux. Bldg.Reactor Aux. Bldg.Reactor Aux. Bldg.Reactor Aux. Bldg.Reactor Aux. Bldg.Reactor Aux. Bldg.Fuel Handling. Bldg.Fuel Handling Bldg.Fuel Handling Bldg.Fuel Handling Bldg.Fuel Handling Bldg.Fuel Handling Bldg.Emergency Service

Water 6 CoolingTower MakeupStructure

Emergency ServiceWater ScreeningStructure

221'05

'86'61'36'16'90'24'05'86'61'36'16'ELEPHONE/

PA

5*17

98

1154116

1015

61

0

SOUND-POWERED

PHONES

523242331

7

600

11112421

2

-Includes telephone in the elevator.

~ ~ 4 W 4 ~

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant:Draft SER 0 en Item No 107

Information is required regarding the protection provided foraccident loading on the long run fuel oil piping between thestorage tanks and the diesel generator building that passesunder roadways, railroad tracks and over the circulating waterpipe {i.e. undermining due to break washout).Was the method for modelling of the Seismic Analysis for the circulating~ater pipes used on other dockets or elesewhere? Is this a standardformula? If so please identify the formula. What standard is theconcrete pipe in accordance with?

~Ras onse*

An analysis of the circulating water pipes buried in soil in theyard where they pass under the diesel fuel oil pipes indicatesthat the circulating water pipes will neither fail nor will theirjoints open due to seismic forces. Therefore, the integrityof the diesel fuel oil pipes. crossing over the circulating waterpipes will not be impaired.

The ten (10) feet diameter reinforced concrete circulating ~aterpipes are buried approximately ten (10) feet in the soil. Thepipe line has joints every sixteen (16) feet and each joint issealed with a rubber o-ring gasket. In a seismic event the pipeswill move with the surrounding soil with articulation at each joint.The pipe has been analyzed based upon Newmark, N.M., "EarthquakeResponse Analysis of Reactor Structures." The maximum axial andlateral displacements of the sixteen (16) foot long piece ofpipe due to shear and compression waves in the 'soil backfillduring an SSE are computed to be smaller than the design overlapof the pipe ends. The bending and shear stresses in the pipedue to the seismically induced curvatures in the pipe line arelower than the allowable stresses. Therefore, the C.W. concretepipe is strong enough to resist the seismic forces due to theSSE and the joints will not open.

The two (2) inch buried diesel fuel oil pipe lines run fromthe diesel fuel oil storage tank building to the diesel generatorbuilding. They cross underneath the plant. road, and rail roadtrack in the yard and also run parallel to the road for somedistance. The applicable elevations are listed below:

Location

Intersection of the pipe line and plantroad (bottom of pipe)

Elevation

253.75 ft

Crown of road

Grade 'high ptlow pt

261.0 ft,

260.5259.5

Thus the pipe line has a cover of approximately 7 feet under theroadway and a minimum cover of 5'-5" elsewhere. These coversexceed the minimum requirements of 4 feet and 3 feet respectivelyrecommended for such pipe lines, by the American PetroleumInstitute, ."Recommended Practice for Liquid Petroleum PipeLines Crossing Railroads and Highways."

eedlCDJ Vee SS4e e kO eesel ICOS ~ lVWCe I J 4eee

Draft SER en Item No. 107 Cont'd

~Res oose (Cont'd)

Bending and shear stresses in the pipe were computed for thefollowing postulated loads:

l. 30 kips wheel load for construction equipment

2. H-20 ton, standard truck on the verge of over turning onone side of wheels

3. Impact of overturned H-20 truck

4. Landing of H-20 truck on front wheels while moving at aspeed of 15 mph.

The penetration of the wheels works out to be less than a foot.The maximum penetration, considering rotation of the wheels, willnot exceed half the diameter of the wheel up to the bottom ofthe axle which is less than the soil cover on top of the pipes.The pressure aserted by the impact force is far less than thecapacity of the pipe in bending or shear.

The two (2) inch diesel fuel oil pipe lines also cross underplant railroad tracks. The crossings are close to the dead endsof the tracks at the fuel unloading building and the turbinebuilding no. 2, .and the train sneed is not expected to be anygreater than two miles per hour.

The top of the rail is at El 261.0 feet and the lowest point inthe railroad side ditch will be approximately at El 257.75 feet.Therefore, the pipe line with the bottom of the pipe at El 253.75will have a 6.5 feet cover under the base of the rail and 3.75feet at the railroad side ditch which are more than the 4.5 feetand 3 feet recommended by the American Petroleum Institute forsecondary or industrial tracks.

The pipe line was analyzed for a fuel cask rolling down intothe ditch from the rail car. The bending and shear capacityof the pipe is much greater than the impact force transmitted bythe rolled down fuel cask.

Therefore, two (2) inch diesel fuel oil pipe lines with soilcovers as provided in the design drawings do not need anyadditional protection against overturning trucks or trainaccidents.The standard formula used in modelling the Seismic Analysis for thecirculating water pipes is based on N. M. Newmark's "EarthquakeResponse Analysis of Reactor Structure." This method was previouslyused on St Lucie, Waterford, and for Shearon Harris electrical conduit.

The concrete pipe was manufactured in accordance with InterpaceSpecification SP-12 (AWWA Standard C-301-72)-

Attached for your use is a copy of AWWA Standard C-301-72. Includedin the standard are specifications for curing of concrete and strengthof concrete. Also attached is a copy of Ebasco's specificationCAR-SH-CH-9 for the circulating water system concrete pipe.

S P EC I F I CAT I 0 N

Lock JointPrestressed

Concrete Embedded

Cylinder Pipe withRubber and Steel Joint

Produced according toAWWAStandard

C-301 - 72

MRPAClECORPQRATlON

TCCL CTLSCCi

Q RECCO VTt1WTJlLJTlDI

%4%7 C45KC>

KSTJt Pll55 VTtOwctu.s~Vaovac

NominalDiameter

inches

NominalLength

feet

MinimumMortarCoating

ThicknessInches

NominalConcreteCoating

Thicknessinches

CoreThickness

inches

Weight lbs/ft.

9/16 Cores

CoreThickness

inches

Weight Ibs/ft.With

MortarCoating

2430364248

546D

667278

114120=126

132138144

16 or 2D

16 or 2D18 or 2016 or 2016 or 20

18 or 2016 or 2016 or 2016 or 2016 or 20

16 or 2D16 or 2016or 2016 or 2016or 20

161616181612

13/1613/1613/1613/1613/16

13/1613/1613/16 ~

13/1613/16

13/16t3/1613/1613/1613/16

13/16

1

1

1.1/21-1/21-1/2

1-1/21-1/21-1/21-1/21-1/2

1-1/222222

2-1/42-1/42-1/42&83

44-1/255-t/26

6-'I/26-1/26-1/26-1/27

88.1/2

9851200144017001980

22752410257027353080

5750

161518852180

2-1/42-5/83

3.3/83-3/44-1/841/24-7/8

5-1/45-5/866 3/86.3/4

7-1/87-1/27-7/88.1/48 5/89

430555700

8551030121514201605

18702100239026902960

330037054055442048005200

rAvailable lengths, cclting type and core thickness are functions of individual plant capabilities.

SPECIF}CATIONS FOR PRESTRESSED CONCRETE EMBEDDED CYLINDER PIPE WITH RUBBER AND STEEL JOINTS

Prod ttcad AccordinII toAWWAStandard C.3Ã-72

TYPE OF PIPE

Ttw pipe shall be af ttw type known as Prestressed ConcreteCylinder Pipe. It shall be reinforced with a welded steel

linder with steel joint rings welded to its ends. The steel cylindershall be lined with not less than 1" af concrete and the nominal corewell will be according m the tabl ~ an the faclhg page, The care shallbe wrapped with ~ high tensile strength wire under tension andcaned with a dense covering of ce~t mortar or concrea. Eachpipe shall be constructed with a»lf~ntaring expansion joint »sledwith a rubber gasket and capable of caring for normal movementdue to earth»tttement and extremes of tempenture.

DIMENSIONSThe dimensions of the straight pipe shall be in accordance with

the table on the facing page.--- Dimensions for larger diameters shall be submitted by the manu-facturer for approval. Special pipe for bends, reducers, closurepieces and other fittings mey be made in shorter lengths as required.

The pipe shall be round and true. Thc average internal diameterof the straight pipe shall not be less than the nominal diameter bymore than 1/4" for sizes M"or smaller; by mare than 3/8" for sizes42" and 48"; by more than 1/2" for sizes 54" to 78"; or by morethan 3/4" for 84" or larger.

PIPE DESIGNThe diameter of wire used, its centerline spacing and the tension

under which it is wound around the core shall be sufficient toproduce the required prestrcss in ttw core. The ~ lastic and inelasticdeformations af the concrete and steel shall be taken into consid-~ration, The gross wrapping stress in the high tensile wire shall notexceed 75% o( the minimum ultimate tensile strength of the wire.The maximum centerline spacing shell be 1-1/2", Minimum center-

~

~

~

spacing of the wires shall be that which produces a «leartshce between wires of 3/16". The minimum diameter of the

u»d shall be No. & gage.Steel sheets snd steel wire af qualities other than those indicated

below may be used, provided the desifei of the pipe is based uponthe respective physial properties af the materials.

Tlw con shell not be wrapped with the wire until the concretehas rcechtd the specified»ven dsy compressive strength. The initialcompression induced in the concrete shall not exceed 55% of itscompressive strength at ttw tinw af wrapping.

PIPE JOINTSThe joint shall be»cled by a rubber gasket in such ~ ~ncr

that it will remain tight under all conditions of service, indudingihovement due to expansion, contraction and normal aettlcmcnt.Each length of pipe shall be provided with bell and spigot endsformed by steel joint rings welded m ttw cylinder, The spigot ringshall be lined with concrete on jts interior surface and the bell ringshall be covered with concrete on its exterior surface. Portions afthejoint rings which will be exposed after ttw pipe irmmufacturedshill be protected from corrosion by an atXxtsved coating. Ttwspigot ring shall have ~ poove tor ttw purpo» of receiving, holdingand protecting the gasket. The jaint surfaces shell be af such shapeand dimensions that the joint willbe»lf~ntaring when the pipe islaid so that the gasket will not be nquired to support the weight afttw adjoining pipe.

Steel of flat »ction for ball rings 3/16 thick shall be used onpipi stz» up m ind inducting ~'nd shell confonh m "StandardSpedficetion for Hot Rolled Carbon Steel Sheets and Strip, Struc-tural Ouality", Grade C, ASTM Designation A%70.

Steel plate for bell rings 1/4" or mcxe in thickness and specialshapes for spigot joint rings shall conform to Standard Spedfica-lions for Carbon Steel 8ers Subject m Mechanical Property Require-

nts", Gnde 50, ASTM DesiIPwtion A~.The gasket sealing ttw jcNnt shell be made of a rubber having aun-to assun-~ight and permanent ~l and shall be ttw

af a hwhufacturer having at least five years'xperience in

the manufacture of rubber gaskets for pipe joints. The gasket shellbe a continuous ring, of suitable croon ahd al such Nze as tofill the groove on the spigot joint ring when the pipes are laid. Therubber gasket shall be the sole ~ lament depended upon to make thejoint watertight and shall have ahoath surfaces free from pining,blisters, porosity end other imperfections. Each gasket shall besubjected to e stretdt af IOC% and examined for any defects while ihthe stntched condition. Cement mortar a plastic materials used tofinish ttw joint shall not be depended upon for watertightness.

Synthetic isoprene gaskets shall comply with the followingphysical requirements:

Tensile strength, mirl, psl ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3000Elongation at rupture, min. percent r.........,... „425Accelerated aging

Tensile strength ntained, min. percent of original ..... 85Elongation retained, min. percent of original ......... 80

Water absorptionVolume and weight increase, max. percent ....,..... ~ 5

Durometer hardness, points...... 60~5The physical properties of the gaskets shall be determined in

~ccordance with the following methods:

Tensile Strength Tension Testing of Vulcanized Rub.ber", ASTM Designation D412

Elongation "Tension Testing of Vulcanized Rub.ber", ASTM Designation D<12

Compreaion Set "Compression Sct of Vulcanized Rub.ber", ASTM Designation D 395, Method8, age 22 hours at 70 C

Accelerated Aging "Oven Test for Aging of Rubber-,ASTM Designation D473, age 96 hourset 70 C

Water Absorption Change in Properties of ElastomericVulcenizates Resulting from Immersionin Liquids", ASTM Designation D<71,age 48 hours at 70 C

"Indentation Hardness af Rubber andPlastics by Means ot ~ Duromcter", TypeA, ASTM Designation D-2240

STEEL CYLINDERThe steel cylinder shall be made of hot rolled steel sheets not

lighter than No. IS gage for 24" thru 48"diameter pipe and l6 gagefor 54" and above, both OB. Standard and conforming to therequirehWntS Of "Standard Specification for Hot+oiled CarbonSteel Sheets and Strip, Structural Ouality", Grade C, ASTM Dcsig.nation A~O.

Each completed cylinder, with joint rings welded to its ends.~II be subjected to a hydrostatic test by dosing the ends at thejoint rings; filling with weter in contact with wslds at all points: andrasing the water pressure to produce ~ stress af 20,000 to 25.000psi in the cylinder. While under pressure test, all welds shall bethoroughly inspected. If any leaks are faund, they shell be repairedand the cylinder shall be retastad. The finished cylinder, with jointrings attached, shall be watertight under the required test prcssure.Welding shall be by en approved process end test wclds shall befurnished from the work as nquired.

STEEL REINFORCEMENTTtw win used for prestressing shall conform to the requirements

af "Standard Specification for Hard. Drawn Steel Mechanical SpringWin", ASTM Designation A-227 and "Standard Specification forSteel Wire, Hardtlrewn for Prestressing Concrete Pipe", ASTMDesignation A~.

CONCRETECement st»ll fulfillthe requirements of "Standard Specification

for pordand Canwnt", ASTM Designation C-150. Concrete aggre-

gates shall be composed of herd durabl ~ peltldes, clean and freefrom loam or organic materials. Water used in mixing the concrete

~

~

~at»li be d~ end free from dsleterioua amounts ot adds, alkalis orgenic matariata.The concrete used in lha manufacture of tt» pipe shall consin of

ment, send and crushed stone or crushed or uncrushed gravelaccurately proportioned for maximum density end specifiednrength. In no ca» shall the cement content be less than 564 lbs. (6bays) per cubic yard in tt» finist»d product.

The concrete shell be placed in nael mdds so constructed thatthe In~ and outer forms, joint rings and cylinder shall be held indrcular and concentric positions. The molds shall be vibrated duringthe pladflg of each belch of concrete+

The concrete shall have ~ minimum strength of 3000 psi at seven

days and 4500 psi at 2S days as nwasured by 6" x 12" companioncylinders molded in accordance with the "Standard Method forMaking and Curing Concrete Compression and Flexure Test Sped-mans in the Field", ASTM Designation C.31, and cured in the samemanner and for ttw same duration as the pipe. To conform to tt»requirements of this section, the average of any ten consecutivenrength tests of cylinders representing sech type of,concrete shallbe equal to or greater than the specified strength and not more than20% of the strength tests shall have values leaa than the specified

, nrength.

CURING OF CONCRETE

Curing shall be by either steam or water. The use of water shallbe limited to times when the temperature in the curing endoaure ia

continuously above 40 F. Adequate facilities and apace shall beprovided for proper curing.

Steam Curing-The cores shall be placed in the steam curingchamber or otherwise covered by a suitabl ~ endosure that willallowproper circulation of steam. A delay period of from 1 to 4 hoursshell be allowed before moist neam is admitted in contact with ttiecores. The temgerature within ttw enclosure shall be gradually raised

~ t lean 110 F and not more than 150 for a twriod ot at least 24ura. The preset time shell be included in the 24 hour period.ring by steam shall be continuous, except during a period suf-

ficient to remove the forms cr supporting rings.The forms shall not be removed until at lean 6 hours after the

beginning of neam curing. Following this minimum period, in lieuof further neam cu'ring, the cores may be "tipped" from their bassaand removed to the storage yard, where they shall be kept contin-uously moist by intermittent spraying for e period of at lean 5 days.

Water Curing-The core shall be kept moin by water spraying fora period of 32 hours. The forms shall not be removed from the coreuntil at lean 12 hours after beginning of curing. After being placedin the storage yard, the core shall be kept moist by intermittentsprinkling for a further period of three days.

PIPE COATINGTl» coating. eittwr cement mortar or concrete, shall be applied

to the cores after ttwy have been wrapped under tension with hightensile wire...

CEMENT MORTAR COATINGTl» mortar used for this coedng shall conain of one part of

cement to not more tt»n 3 parts of the fine aggregate measured byvolume, Tile lllortar shall be placed ofl tt» pipe by a Illechule In

which the mortar, previously mixed, ia driven against the exteriorsurface of the core to produce a dense coating around the preatresawires. The thickness of coating, measured from the outer aurtace of't» cora, shall not be lass than that specified.

CONCRETE COATINGThe concrete used for this coating shall be so proportioned that

the cement content is no leal than 658 lbs. I7 begsi per cubic yard.The concrete shall be placed in steel molds so constructed that theouter form and the core shall tw held in circular and concentricpositions. The molds shall be continoualy vibrated during thepiecing of each batch of concrete.

The thickness of coating shall not be lass than 1".

CURING OF COATINGSteam Curing-The coated pipe shall be placed in the curing

chamber aa soon es practicable after placing the coating and shall be

atea~red as specified under Curing of Concrete for a period ot atleast 12 hours. The pipe shall be handled in such a manner as toavoid injury to the coating during transportation to and trom. thecur ltlg chamber,

Water Curing-Aa soon as the coating has aet sufficiently, it shall

be kept moist by continuous water spraying or by intermittentspraying and burlap and canvas covering for a period of at'least 4days.

CURVES AND FITTINGSCurves of long radius may be formed by the deflection of eadl

joint, by the use of pipe on which the spigot joint rings are placedon a bevel or by bevel adapters. Fittings shall be designed to providettw same strength as the adjacent pipes. Elbows, tees, reducers andwyes shall be of non~renreaaed steel cylinder type construction.Branch connections or openings such as rnanholes, sir valves andblowoffs may be incorporated in straight pipe and shall be suitablyreinforced. Finings shall be provided with joint rings correspondingto tho» on adjoining nraight pipes. Special adapters shall be pro-vided where required to connect to valves or pipes of other manu.facturera.

NOTE-Pipe lines utilizing the type of pipe covered by the abovespecification ele designed to meet a ten with leakage notexceeding 25 gallons per inch of diameter per mile of pipe

'

per 24 hours, at normal operating pressure.Small cracks in the concrete which are not damaging

should not be considered aa cau» tor rejection.The term "ASTM" shell mean the American Society for

Testing and Materials. When stwciflc ASTM specificationsare cited, the designation w»ll be connrued to refer to thelatest revision.

5/73

C I GAWWA C301-72

Revision oiAWKVAC301-64

A~AStandard for

Prestressed Concrete Pressure Pipe,Steel Cylinder Type, for Water

and Other Liquids

Section I-General

Sec. 1.1 —Scope

This standard covers the manuiac-

O ture of circumferentially prestressedconcrete water pipe vvith a steel cylin-der and vvire reinforcement in sizesfrom 16 to 144 in., inclusive. Thcstandard covers tivo types of pre-stressed pipe: (1) lined-cylinder pipewith a core composed of a steel cylinderlined with concrete and subsequentlywire-wrapped and coated with pre-mixed mortar; and (2) embedded-cylinder pipe with a core in which asteel cylinder is encased in concrete andsubsequently wire-wrapped and coatedwith premixed concrete or mortar.This standard does not include requirc-mcnts for handlin, delivery, hying.field testing, or disinfection of the pipe.

Sec. 12—Defiztitions

In this standard the following den-nitions shall apply:

12.1 —Purrltascr. The word "p»r-

e

~., chaser" shall mean a person, firm, cor-'oration, or government subdivision

1

entering into a contract or agreen:ent t"purchase pipe and fittings accordi»g tothis standard.

12.2—Contractor. The word "con-tractor" shall mean thc person, firm. orcorporation executing the contract nragreement with the purchaser to furnishpipe and fittings according to thisstandard.

1.2.3 —.1Sannfactnrcr. The word"manufacturer" shall mean thc person.firm, or corporation vvho actually man-ufactures the pipe, acting either di-rectly as the contractor or as a sub-contractor or supplier. If the manu-facturer is acting as a subcont;actorunder the contractor or otherwise as asupplier to the contractor, the obliga-tions of the manufacturer under tltisstandard shall be considered as obli„.-tions of the contractor. and the con-tractor shall be responsible for theirperformance.

1.2 4—AST.lf. The term "AST11"shall mean the American Society forTesting and llaterials. XVhcn specificASTAI specifications are cited without

A%'Wh STANDARD

dates, the designation shall be con-strued to refer to the latest rerisionunder the sante specification number,or to superseding specifications undera net number. except for provisions inthe revised specifications that clearlyare inapplicable.

12.5—AXSl. The term "A,NSI"shall mean the A,merican NationalStandards Institut~.

12.6—8//'ro rd. The term "ap-proved" shall mean having received theapproval of the purchaser.

12.7 —Design press((rr. The designpressure shall be the maximum sus-tained internal hydrostatic pressure towhich thc pipe is:o be subjected. Gen-erally, the design pressure for eachpipe. or portion oi the pipeline. shall bethe operating pressure established bythe hydraulic gradient or the statichead specified by the purchaser. which-ever results in the greater pressure.

I.Z.S—S((rgb / rrss((res. Surge pre-sures are internal prcssure overloadsof relatively short duration.

12.9—External loads. The term"external loads" shall mean all super-imposed live and dead loads appliedto the outside of the pipe after installa-tion.

12.10 —For(((al o/ erafi((J( ro((ditio((s.Formal operating conditions are de-fined as a combination of design prcs-sure and external dead loads.

12.11 —Transit((t conditio((s. Tran-sient cnnditinns are conditions due tosurge pres ures nr live !on<is that ex-ceed nor(nal operating conditions andare of short duration.

1..1=Pi/>r dian(rtrr. The term"pipe dia(neter" or "size" shall meanthe design inside (<v((tcrwt(y) <lian(et«rof the pi!>e.

Sec. 1.3—Essential Requlzetttonts

The pipe shall have the followingprincipal features: a welde<l steel cyl-inder with steel joint rings welded tnits ends; for line<1-cylin(ler pipe. a coreconsisting of a lining of concrete ivithinthe steel cylinder, or for en(be(lde(l-cylinder pipe. a core consisting nf thesteel cj'linder encased in concrete; re-inforcement consisting oi high-tensi!(wire ivound around the outsi(lc of thecore in one or more layers at a pre-determined stress and securely fastet(e(lat its ends: a cnating of dense mortaror concrete covering the core and ivire.except for the necessarily exp(>sed sur-faces oi the jnint rings: a self-centerin"joi»t ivith a preformed gasket nf rub-ber, so designed that thc joint evil! beivatertight under all conditions ni serv-ice. Lined-cylinder pipe shall be use(lfor pipe sizes up to and inclu<lin 20in. and may bc used for pipe sizes up ~to and including «8 in. Entbedded-cylinder pipe may be us«d fnr pipesizes 24-4S in. and shall be used ivrlarger pipe. For e(nbedded-cylinderpipe. at least one third of the total c(>re

thickness shall be outside the cylinder.

Sec. 1.4—P1ans and Data Tn BeFurztfshed by Purchas<(r

1.4. l—Dcsig(( data. The purcha=ershall designate the design prcssure fnrwhich the pipe shall be manuiac'.ured.If the pipe is to be used under c(>nd( ~

tions >vhere the external loads or surgepressure will bc in excess nf tha! sn(tn>in Sec. 3. as provided for in th» n<>r

mal design of tl(e pipe. the l)urcha.-«rshall d«signnt« the external lva(l orsurge-pr«ssure c<>n(liti<»» for <vhivh thc

pipe sltall b«design«<I. Fvr «xtern:(1

)oa(ls in excess oi th>(s«prvvi<lnl ivr in

Sec. 3..d(n aninclude>

1A.2.to ntan(nish th,files shloca<i<»

specialfor eac.cial dv,sary f<

and;„.stan.'.;,:

ls mad

Sec. 1.

by)1.5.J

((Irs.fnr af

ni r.i~

d((»(".:.-

All pi,nl ac<

draivi:

supp(('ha.

c'r

AVhcnsubn:i:inch: l:with (

grad:pli«<! l

shall>vhich

slg('ppliv:

c}la(>">

be c(t (

The d

pr( s<<>

PRESTRESSED Co'ACRE'TE PRESSt:RE Pll'E

Sec. 32, A statement or rlctail of bed-ding and backfilling procedures shall bcincluded.

1.42—Plans. 3 t least I month priorto manufacture, the purchaser shall fur-nish the contractor with phns and pro-files shoiving: alignment and grades:location of all outlets, connections, andspecial appurtenances; design pressuresfor each part of the line; and such spe-cial details or information as are neces-sary for the manufacture of thc pipeand fittings in accordance with thisstandard and with the specific require-ments of the work for xvhich ihe pipeis made.

rzaeats

folloivrrlg1 steel cyl-

welded to>ipc, a coTc'Tete withirlembedded-tirlg of thcncrete; re-Aigh-tensi!eside of the: at a pre-:ly fastenednsc mortar

and wire.:posed sar-!centering

irct oi Tub-)in( ivill beins of serv-all be usedeluding 20

t llP

pee usc ford-cylinder

. total coreie cylinr!cr.

Sec. 1.5—Data To Be Subndttedby Maaufacturer

To Be

purchaserrcssure foraufactured.ader cond)ls or surgethat salted,n the nrirpurchaser

il load orwhich the

r externalidled ior in I

C 0

1.3.1 —Detail draa~rros cud selred-ules. The manuiacturer shall subnlii,for approval by the purchaser. draiv-

Cings and schedules shoiving full detailsl'f reinforcement, concrete. and jointdimensions for the pipe and fittings.All pipe and fittings shall be iabricatedin accordance with these approveddrawings and schedules. Pipe may besupplied irom inventory unless the pur-chaser has indicated otherivise.

1.5.2—Tabulated layout selredule.IVhen specifically required, the datasubmitted by the manuiacturer shallinclude a tabulated layout schedule.with reference to the stationing andgrade line shown on the drawings sup-plied by the purchaser. The scheduleshall show pressure zones, each ofavhich shall be desigriated by the de-sign prcssure and transient pressureapplicable therein, and the point ofchange from one zone to the neit shallb: clearly indicated by station number.The diameter of the pipe. the designprcssure and transient pressure, and

the thickness of pipe i'll and area nistccl (per linear foot of pipe) in thereinforcing wire and steel cylinder shallbe listed for each portion of pipeline.

Sec. 1.6—MarkingEach length of straight and special

pipe and each fitting shall have plainlymarked inside, on the hell or spigotend, the identification marks spccinedby the purchaser. These shall include. ~

as specified, either the pressure inrwhich the pipe or fitting is designed nrthe area of efiectivc circumiercntial re-iniorccment per ion t of pipe ivall.Special marks of identification, suH-cient to shiv the proper location oi thepipe or fitting in the line by reiercnceto layout drawings and schedule.- speci-fied under Sec. 1.5, shall be phccd onthe pipe ii specincally required. Al!beveled pipe shall be marked with theamount oi the bevel, and the point oimazimurn pipe length shall be markedon the beveled end.

Sec. 1.7—Iaspectioa aad Tes6ag byPurchaser

1.7.1 —Inspection at rrrarrrrfaeturer'splant. If the purchaser desires to in-spect pipe and fittings at the manuiac-turer's phnt, he shall so speciiy in thecontract or agreement, stating the con-ditions (such as time. and the esltei:tof inspe:tion) under ivhich the inspec-tion shall be made.

1.72 —rfeeess to T'orl:. The pur-chaser shall have iree access to thoseparts of the manuiacturer's plani ihalare necessary to assure compliance withthis standard. The mauuiaciurcr snailmake avaihblc ior thc purchaser's uscsuch gages as are necessary ior inspec-tion. The manuiacturcr shall providethe purchaser ivith assistance as ncces-

go«

hWWh 5Th?iDhRD

sary for thc handling of pipe and fi-tting.

12.3—Responsibility. Inspection bythe purchaser, or failure of the pur-.chaser to provide inspection, shall notrelieve the contractor oi his responsi-bility to furnish materials and to per-form work in accordance with thisstandard.

12.4—Tests, Tests under Sec. 1.9,made by the purchaser on materialsamples, shall bc carried out vvithoutdehy. If any sample fails to meet therequir'ements, the man'ufacturer shallbe notified immediately. «Iaterial ai-fected by the test results shall be setaside pending final disposition. Themanufacturer may request a, reviewof test procedures and additional testson the material. ', Duplicate samples,the number of ivhich is to be agreedupon, should be tested by the pur-chaser and by the manufacturer. Thcmanufacturer's tests shall be periorinedby a commercial testing laboratory nrin the manufacturer's laboratory, ivithproper certification. Tests by eitherparty may be ivitnessed by the other.If the duplicate samples meet the testrequirements, the nsaterial shall be ac-

'-cepted. -1f-the material is rejected afterretesting, the manufacturer shall payall costs of retesting.

12.5—Rcj ection. Material, fabri-cated parts, and pipe that are discov-ered to be defective, or that do not con-form to the requirements of this stand-ard, will be subject to rejection at anytime prior to final acceptance oi thepipe. Rejected material and pipe shallbe removed promptly from the site ofthe work.

Sec. 1.8—Matenal cmd Workmansidp

All material furnished by thc manu-facturer shall be new and of the quality

sI>ecific«l. All ivork shall l>c d>»» i»a thorough, xvorkmanlike manner Lymechanics skilled in their varioustrades. XVhen a louver liniit or mini-mum diinension is given herein ior asteel component, thc minus tolerance(as stated in the applicable AST.'>Ispecificatioi)) for such limit or dimen-sion shall be understood to denne,thctrue louver limit or dimension.

Sec. 1.9—Tests

1.9.1 —Cylinder assen«bly. Eachcompleted cylinder with joint ringsivelded to its ends shall be subjected toa hydrostatic test as specified hereinunder Sec. 3..3.

1.9.2—Concrete. Samples oi themixed concrete shall bc taken inr ma>k-

ing conipression test cylinders as spe-cined under Sec. 3.6.:- and 3.6.G.

1.9.3—Steel reports. XIill test re-ports or plant test reports on each hca.irom ivhich the steel is rolled shall Lcobtained by thc manuiacturer and inaclcavailable to the purchaser on reqiicst.

1.94—Steel s/'ceiniens. The manu-facturer shall provide test specimens.cut from each shipment of steel icrcylinders and high-tensile ivire, ii re-quired by the purchaser.

1.9.~Gas4't rubber. Test reportsshoiving the physical properties oi rub-ber used in the gaskets, as specified inSec. 2.11.S, shall be obtained by themanufacturer and shall bc made avail-able to thc purchaser on request.

1.9.6—Espcnse. The expense oitesting the materials a»el oi ~ubinittin„"to the purchaser test reports in accord-ance svith this standard and the pur-chaser's supl>lementary spccincation5reierred to in the foreword, and thcexpense of testing the completed steel

~, ~ 4

1 ac (1< el c in

'le ous ~.lilt miniherein for aus toleranceable ASTMiit or dimen-:o define theion.

PRESTRESSED CONCRETE PRESSURE rtrE

cylinder in accordance ivith Sec. 1.9.1and of testing concrete in accordancewith Sec. 1.92, shaH be borne by themanufacturer. All other tests shall bemade by the purchaser at the pur-chaser's expense, except as other~visespecifically provided.

Sec 1.10—AEdavit of Compliance

Thc purchaser may require an affi-davit from the manufacturer that thepipe and fittings furnished under thepurchaser's contract or agreement com-ply with all applicable provisions oithis standard.

Section 2-Material SpecHications

.bly. Eachjoint ringssubjected to

.-.ified herein

ples oi the4en inr mak-dcrs as spe-3.6.6.

.IiH test re-Dn each heat;Hed shall bee- ~d made

request.anu-.elis.

oi 1 iorwire, if re-

Test reports:rties of rub-

specified in'ined by themade avail-

@quest.

expense ofi subn.it tingts in accord-nd the pur-

.:pecificationsTd, and the

depleted steel

Sec.2.1 —Cement

2.1.1 —Type. Cement for concretework shall coniorm to the "Specifica-tions for Portland Cement" (ASTXIDesignation C1.0). Either Type Ior Ty~ II may be used unless thepurchaser specifies a particuhr type.Sampling and testing shall conform tothe individual ASTXI specificationsdesignated therein.

2.1.2—InsPrrlion. Satisfactory fa-cilities shall be provided for identiiy-

C ing, inspecting. and sampling cement atthe mill. the ivarehouse, and the site oithe work. The purcliaser shaH havethe righ: to inspect the cement and ob-tain samples for testing at.any oi thesepoints.

2.1.3—Storage. Cement shall bestored in a weathertight, dry, weH-ventilated structure.

2.1A—Uriusablc. Cement salvagedby cleaning cement sacks, rnechanicaHyor othern'ise, shaH not be used in thework. Cement containing lumps shaHbe rejected and shall immediately beremoved from the site of the ivork.

2.1 .5 —Tcnif'ratere. If the tem-perature of the cement exceeds 150F,it shall be stored until cooled to thattemperature.

Sec. L2—Fine Aggregate22.1 —Gcri eral. Fine aggregate for

concrete and mortar shaH consist of

clean, hard, durable, and uncoated par-ticles of natural sand or oi sand pre-pared from the product obtained bycrushing stone or gravel. At the tinieof use the fine aggre ate shall be en-tirely iree of frozen niaterial.

222 —Gradation. Fine aggregnteshaH be ivcH graded from coarse tofine and, when tested by means of lab-oratory sieves in accordance ivith the"Xlethod oi Test for Sieve or Scree: >

Analysis of Fine and Coarse Ag re-gates" (AST iI Designation C136l.shall coniorm to the gradation require-ments in Table l.

TABLE 1

Gradalron Rcqnirrrncnts for Fine Aggrcrarr

Toaal Pining. hy KVeigln. rr

Since Sac

1 in.iso. 4No. 8Xo. 16Xo. 50Yo. 50Yo. 10DYo. 200

Conarte Sand

10D95-10065-9845-8020-70

5-502-100-5

Morrar Coarin"Sand

100100

93-100r0-9045-6512-353-120-5

These gradation requirements repre-sent the extreme limits inr deterlniningthe suitability nf nne aggregate underthis standard. To maintain uniformity

C 0

Awwh STANDhRn

t>f gradatiori for aggregate: frnm anygiven source, a fineness mndulus de-termination shall bc nuitle upon repre-sentative samples front that

source.'hereafterthe fincriess modulus of allshipments therefrom shall not varymore than -020 from thc frnencssmodulus of the representative sample.unless suitable approved mist adjust-ments are made.

2.2.3—Irrrrrrritirs. Fine, aggregateshall be free from injurious amounts oiorganic impurities and shall confornl toSec. 4.2 of "Specifications for Con-crete Aggregates" (AST~I DesignationC33-ala).

Sec. 2.3—Coarse Aggregate

2.3.1 —Gr>rrral. Coarse aggregatefor concrc.te shall consist of hard, dur-able particles oi crushed stone orcrushed or uncrushed gravel. conform-ing to the requirements and tests givenin Sec. 2.32 through 2.3.3.

2.3.2—Crnrlafiorr. Cnarse aggregateshall bc well graded irom coarse tofine. The maximum size and gradatinnshall be subject to the approval oi thcpurchaser and shall be such that

the'oncretecan be readily placed in thecore or poured coating, by the particu-lar method used in placing it, to pro-vide a solid, compact. homogeneouseall lvith a smooth surface. Tests forgradation of coarse aggregate shall bein accordance l«ith the "AIethod ofTest for Sieve or Screen Analysis ofFine and Coarse Aggregates" (AST>IDesignation C136). Thin and elon-gated pieces, the matcimum dimensinnof lvhich exceeds five times thc mini-mum, shall not bc in evcess of 10 percent of the coarse aggregate by weight.

2.3.3—Irrrprrritirs. Deleterious sub-stances in coarse aggregate shall not

TABLE 2

Pen»issiblc .4»rou>irs of Dclcrrrinuseiubsro»ccs iu Coorsc 3 ggccgcrc

Qatetht

Soir particlesCoal and ligniteClay lumps

Mswi>nu»tWeight

Ll>>>I',

5.000.500.25

lfaterral nncr than 200 stet e 1.00Combined total of above items 5.0n

L.

Sec. 2.6—Admhctures

At thc option of the manuiacuircr.the concrete may contain a tvater-re-cluclrlg. set-cnntrollirlg admi.'cture con-forming tn the "Specification inr Chen>-

emceed the amounts given in Table 2.as determined by sampling and testingprocedures listed in the -Specincatior:sfor Concrete Aggrc ate.-- (ASTAIDesignation C33 j.Sec. 2.4—Samples of Aggregates

At least 4 tveeks prior tn iniRing ccii-crete, the manufacturer, ii required.shall provide in suitable containers. inrpreliminary approval, saniples ni ni t~less than 1 cu ft each oi fin arrr!Mcoarse aggregate. All samples shallbc plainly labeled to indicate th» ourcof thc materi."1, the date. and the nanlcof the collector. Xlethnds ni sainplingaggregates shall bc in accordance withthe "Xlethods oi Sampling Stn»c. Sla .

Gravel, Sand. and Stnne Block inr I:s»

as Eiightvay ltlaterials" (ASTXI De:ig-natior D7:).

Sec. 2.5—%'ater

AVater used for concrete.and for ctrr-ing pipe shall be fresh tvater a»d .lrrrl!be clean and iree from nil. acirl. strnngalkalies. or vc"etal>1» matter.

It

tl

ri<EsTREsszo covcrzvE raEsst. Rz, rtrz,

s( Deleteriouse Aggregate

ve

staxieumWeigh<

Llmla. Cir

5.000.500.25].00

items)

5.00

vcn in Table 2,i)ing and testinge "Specifications;ates" (ASTif

:rcte and for cur-i svater and shalli ni), acid, strongmatter.

he manufacturer,itain a ivater-re-; admixture con-)cation for Chem-

Aggregates~r to missing con-er, ii required.

le containers. fore"rnp)es oi not+

fine and%H es sha)ldi e sourcete, an the namecods oi samplingaccordance ivith

i)ing Stone, S)ag.ne Block for Use'ASTXIDesig-

ical Adntizturcs fnr C'micrctc" (ASTXIDesignation C494). Yo ae)iniztur«shall contain calciui» chloride. Thctype and amount of admixture shall besubject to the approval of the pur-chaser.

Sec. 2.7—Steel for Cylinders andFitLngs

2>.1—Stet'I slr<rts. Steel sheets forpipe cylinders and fittings may be incut lengths or coils and shall meet therequirements of the "Specification forHot-Rol)cd Carbon Steel Sheets an<1

Strip. Structural Quality" (ASTXIDesignation A570), Gra<)e B or C,or "Specificaiions for Hot-RoHed Car-bon Steel Sheets and Strip. CommercialQuality" (ASTXI Designation A569}.except that for ASTXI A:.69 steel, themarin>uni carbon content niay be 0. 5

per cent and the niinimuni yiekl p~intshaH bc 27,000 psi.

2.7.2—Steel /laths. Stee) plates forpipe cylinders and fittings shall con-forin to the "Specincations for Loiv andInterme<liate Tensile Strength CarbonSteel Plates of Structural Quality"(ASTil Designation A2S3). Gra<lc Bor C.

Sec. 2.8—Steel for Wfze. Bar andWire-Mesh Reinforcement

2.S.I —Prcstrcssittg:.".'rc. The xvirefor circumferential reinforcement shallconform to "Specifications for SteelKire, Hard-D rain for Xlechanica)Springs" (ASTXI Dcsigqation A227).Kire ~vith specific< niininiuni tensilestrengths exceeding those in A~~7,Class II, may bc used ii the ivire meetsthe other requirements for Class II inthat specification, and the pipe designmay be based on these higher strengths.

2.8 ~—If irc ittrsh. Kire-mesh re-inforcement for mortar coating for fit-

tings shall cnnfnrni tn the "Spcciiica-tinns for Ke)dcd Steel Kire Fahric forConcrctc 1(einforcenient" (A ST%IDesignation A)85).

2.8.3—Bttrs. Steel-bar reinforce-ment for concrete for fittings shaH con-form to "5pecificatious fur Carbo»Steel Bars Subject to Alechanica)Property Requirements" (ASTXI De=-ignation A306). Grade 80. or to -Speci-fications for Deformed Billet-Steel Barsfor Concrete Reinforcenicnt- (ASTXIDesignation A6).-Ci<), Grade 40. ex-cept that for plain bars supplied underASTXI A61 ~+. (1) the retfuirement.-ot Sec. 6, r, and 14.3 sha)l not applv:(2) interniediate bar dianieters shallmeet the requireiuents oi the neitsmaHer bar number designation; and(3 j bar diaineters less than Xo. 3 sha!)meet the requircmcnts for Xo. 3 bar.

Sec. 2.9—Steel for Joint Rings

Steel fnr bell rings less than > in.thick shaH conforni to "Specincationsfor Hot-Ro))ed Carbon Steel Shee:sand Strip. Structural Quality" (ASTP IDesignation A:70i, Grade A. or to"Specifications fnr Hot-RoHed CarbonSteel Sheets and Strip. ConiniercialQuality" (AST~I Designation A:69).Special shapes for spigot joint ringsand steel for bell rings ~ in. or morein thickness shall conform to "Specifi-cations For Carbon Steel Bars Subjectto Xlechanica) Property Rc<,ulfemen'.s(ASTXI De=ignation A306), Grade:0.or to 'Specifications for 1 wv and-In-termediate Tensile Strength Carbr nSteel Plates of Structural Qua)i:y"(ASTXI Designation A283). Grade A.or to "Specincation: for ~ierch;".:tQuality Hot-RoHed Carbon Steel Bars"(AST~I Designation A.7. ), Grade101 . or to "Specifications f<>r SpecialQuality Hot-RoHed Carb< n Stee) Bars"

~ '

r

AWWh STANDARD

(ASTWI Designation A576), Grade1012, or to "Specifications for SteelSheet and Strip, Carbon, Hot-RolledCommerical Quality, Heavy-ThicknessCoils (Formerly Phte)" (ASTabI Des-ignation A635).

Sec. 2.10—Steel Castings for Fittings

Steel castings for fittings shall con-form to the "Specifications for AIild toilledium Strength Carbon Steel Cast-ings for General Application" (ASTAIDesignation A27), Grade 70-36, nor-ntalized.

Sec. 2.1 I—Rubber for Gasicets

2.11.1 —Gcncral. The gasket shallhave smooth suriaces iree from pitti»g.blisters, porosity, and other imperfec-tions. The rubber compound shall con-tain not less than 0 per cent by volumeof first-grade natural crude or first-grade synthetic rubber. The re-mainder oi the coo>pound shall consistof pulverized fillers iree from rubbersubstitutes, reclain>cd robber. and dele-terious substances. The compoundshall meet the folloiviog physical re-quirements ivhen testerl in accordancewith the indicated conditions and desig-nated ASTXI test methods.

2.11 ~—Tensile strength. The ten-sile strength oi the compound shall beat least 2,700 psi for natural rubbergaskets and 2.000 psi for synthetic rob-ber gaskets —"XIethod of Tension Test-ing of Vulcanized Rubber" (ASTXIDesignation D41~).

2,11.3 —Elongation at rnj tare. Theelongation at rupture shall be at least400 per cent for natural rubber gasketsand 350 per cent for synthetic rubbergaskets —"Xlethod of Tension Testingof Vulcanized Rubber" (ASTXI Desig-nation D412).

2.11.4 —Spccifrc gra ity. The spe-cifi firavhy shall oor vary orora rhao O=0.05 ivithin the range 0.95-1.45—"~Iethods for Chemical Analysis ofRubber Products" (ASTXI Designa-tion D297).

11.~Cont/rcssion sct. The per-centage oi compression set shall nctexceed 20. The compression 'set dc-terminatioo shall be made in accordanceivith "~Iethods oi Test for ContpressiooSet oi Vulcanized Rubber" (AST~IDesignation D39. ) Alethod B. ivith theexception that the disc shall be a A-in.-thick section oi the rubber gasket stock..

2.11.6 —Tcnsilc strength aitcr ag nr..After being subjected to an acceler.":.edaging test for 96 hr in air at 70C inaccordance ivith "Alethod of Test iorAccelerated Aging oi X olcanized Rub-ber by the Oven lie:hod" (ASTXIDesignation D573) nr in a pressurechamber for 48 hr at 70C in an niygenatmosphere at 300 psi in accordancewith "Xlethod oi Test for AcceleratedAging of Vulcanized Robbrr by theOtcygen-Pressure ~lethnd" (AST~ I

Designation D572). the tensile strergthof the compound shall be not less thanSO per cent of the tensile stren th beioreaging.

2.11.7—Shore dnrotnctcr. TheShore A durometer hardness sh ll bein the range of 50 to 65 and shall bedetermined in accordance ivith "llcthodof Test for Indentation Hardness oiRubber and Phstics by 'Alcans oi aDurometeraa (ASTXI Desi"nationD2240-M) ivith the exception oi Sec.4 thereof. The detertnination shall betaken directly on the gasket.

2.11.8 —Test rcf"orts. li required bythe purchaser, the maouhctorcr shallsubmit test reports shoiving the physi-cal properties of the rubber compoundused in thc ntanufacture of the gaskets.

PRESTRESSED CONCRETE PRESSURE PiPE

spe: more than0.95-1 45—Analysis oiAl Designa-

The per-:t shall notion set de-

i accordance. rnllpression" (ASTilB, ivith the

; bc a sc-in.-asket stock.after aging.acceleratedat 70C in

ai Test iornized Rub-

(ASTila pressure"- ONygen

nceed

ie he(ASTXI

lc strengtht less thanigth before

The~ s shall bed shall bei "~lethodhardness ofcans of ae«jgnationan of Sec.n shall be

quired bysrer shallhe physi-:0mpound- gaskets.

CSection 3-Design an

Sec. 3.1—General Requirements3.1.1 —iVisninmns laying length. In

general, pipe shall have a minimumnominal hying length o! 16 ft unlessshorter lengths are require:d by weightor other considerations.

3.1 ~—Dianseter toleranc'es. PipeshaLI be round and true and shall havea sntooth and dense, interior surface.Thc mean internal diameter of any por-tion of each piece of pipe shall not beless than the design diameter or size

. Specified hy more than s, in. for 36-in.and smaller pipe; by more than a in.for 42-in. and 48-in. pipe; by more thanj in. for 54- to 78-in. pipe; or by morcthan a in. for S4-in. and larger pipe.

3.1.3—Core and coating toleranrrs.The minimum design thickness of thecore, including the thickness of thecylinder, shall be *oi the design pipe

C.diameter for nortnal applications.Thickness oi cores shall be not lessthan thc design thickness bi more thans„ in. for 36-in. and smaller pipe; bymore than < in. for 42-in. and 48-in.pipe; by more than j in. ior 54- to 72-in. pipe; or by more than -', in. for pipelarger than 72 in. The thickness oi themortar coating shall provide a mini-mum cover of „" in. over the wire. Thethickness of cast concrete coatings shallbe 14 in. and shall provide a minimumcover of 1 in. over the core.

, Sec. 32—Design of Pipe3.2.1 —General. The reinforcement

of the pipe shall consist of a weldedsteel'cylinder in the core and high-tensile wire helically wrapped aroundthc core under measured and uniiormtension after the concrete in the corehas been placed and cured. The mini-

emum thickness oi the cylinder shall be

d Fabrication of Pipe18 gage up to and including 4S-in. pipeand shall be 16 gage for M-in. pipe andlarger. The size of the high-tensilewire and the spacing and tersion un-der which it is wound shall be such thatthe conditions required by the designmethods in Appendiz A or B are me.The designs shall fully recognize alllosses due to elastic and inehstic deior-mations. such as relaNation oi the ivireand plastic strains in the concrete. Theaverage gross wrapping stress in thehigh-tensile wire shall not exceed 75per c'ent oi the minimum ultimate ten-sile strength of the xvire. The wireshall not be'smaller than 0.162 in. indiameter. The minimum centerlinespacin" oi thc wire shall be that whichproduces a clear distance oi 1'-„ in. be-tsveen wires in the same layer oi rein-forcement. The centerline spacing oithe wire shall not crcceed 14 in. Forlined-cylinder pipe with ivire largerthan 0.192 in.. the mateimum centerlirespacing of the wire shall bc 1 in. Themanuiacturer shall submit design cal-culations for approval prior to themanufacture oi any pipe. ii required bythe purchaser.

32.2—Reqnirentents for nornsal op'-erating conditions. Xormal operatingconditions shall be defined as a c':bi-nation of internal design pressure ( s

defined in Sec. 12.7) and coeternalearth (dead) load.

Allpipe shall be designed ior a com-bination oi internal design pressure oiat least 4H psi and at least 6 it oi earthcover with "ordinary" bcdiiing. orsuch greater pressures and earth loads

~ "Ordinary" bedding is dchncd cs ClassC in "Design and Construction nf Sanitaryand Storm Scsvcrs," Nfanual of EngineeringPractice Xo. 31, ASCE, Rcv. 1K9, pp.212-213.

N

h

! ~

10 AWWh SThXDhRD

as nta> be spccificd in the supplcn>en-tary specifications or as shown on thcpurchaser's drawings. Thc combinat iondesign shall be as described in eitherAppendix A or B in accordance ivithstandard practice. XIaxintunt internaldesign pressures for lined-cylinder pipeusing minimum core thicknesses. 18-gage cylinders. and centritugal concretestrengths required by Sec. 3.6.S shallbe 250 psi for 16- to 20-in. pipe; 200psi for 24- to 36-in. pipe; 175 psi for42-in. pipe; and 150 psi ior 4S-in. pipe.Higher internal design pressures arepermissible using thicker cores, heaviercylinders, or higher concrete strengths,either singly or i» combination. Xlax-imum internal design pressures for em-beddedwylinder pipe are lhnited onlyby the strength requirements of thecomponent materials.

3.2.3—Pro";isions for transient con-ditions. The design methods ior nor-mal operating conditions under Ap-pendix A or B provide ior surge pres-sures of at least 40 per cent ot designpressure and for live load (includingimpact) at least equal to AmericanAssn. oi State Highiva> Ofncials H20loading. Ii sur e pressure or live loadexceeds these limits for a given designcondition, such greater value shall bestated in th' "supplementary specifica-tions.

In all designs the following combina-tinns shall not exceed the design limitsfor the transient-condition require-ments of Appendix A or B: (1) designor normal operating prcssure plussurge pressure in combination ivithearth dead load; or (2) design or nor-mal operating pressure in combinationwith earth dead load plus external liveload, including impact.

Sec. 3.3—Joint RingsThe steel bell and spigot joint rings

shall be so designed and fabricated that

ivhen thc pipe is laitl it will bc self-crn-tcrcd. Thc rings shall be accuratvl!gformed and finished to obtain a close,sliding fit ior the self-centered sur:aces.Each ring shall bc formed by one ormore pieces of steel butt-iveldcd to-gether. either by a resistance ivelder orby a hand electric weld. IVetds ongasket contact suriaces shall be groundsmooth and Hush tvith the adjacent sur-faces. The rings shall be expanded b!a press beyond their elastic limits sothat they are accurately sized.

On the finishcd pipe, the circu:nicr-ence oi the inside bell-ring contact sur-face shall not exceed the circutniervnccof the outside spigot-ring contact sur-face by more than + in. ior gasket: -„"!.

in. in diameter or less and s in. ii rgaskets greater than j!. in. in diameter.The out-of-roundness oi either contactsurface, measured as the diEerenc~ be-t tveen the ma'xhnum and iuinhnumjoint-ring diameters, shall not exceed~,0.5 per cent of the average oi the:vVdiameters. The miniinum thickness oithe completed bell rings shall be --,. in.for 36-in. and smaller pipe and,'n.for pipe larger than 36 in. The ringsshall conform to the details subinittcdby the manufacturer and approved bythe purchaser. The joint rings shall beso designed that, ivhen the pipe is laidand the joint completed. the gasket ivillb» enclosed on all iour sides. The con-tact surfaces shall be such as t~ preven:cutting oi the rubber gasket durirg in-stallation. The;portion-:. oi,the joint-.-rings that ivill be expo ed.vn the con>-pleted pipe shall be protected from cor-rosion by an approved contin .

Sec. 3.4—Rubber Gaskets

Joints shall be sealed tvith a con-tinuous solid-ring rubber gasket havina circular cross section ivith a diani-etral tolerance ot -Ps in. Gaskets shal!~be of sufncient volume substantially tiM

PRESTRESSED CONCRETE PRESSURE PIPE

ci i be self~n-s accurately<I to ain a close,li-centered surfaces.

formed by one or~ el butt-)velded to-csistance welder orweld. acids on

ccs sl)aH be groundih the adjacent sur-aH bc ezcpanded byir elastic limits sotcly sized.ipc, the circumfer--B-ring contact sur-I the circimiferencei-ring contact sur-; in. for gaskets I>less and $ in. fors! in. in diameter.s of either contactthe dif)erence be-

)11 al)cl min!)nun). shaH not eNccedt

.age of these<inion) thickness cifng be T'-, in.e and»,'n.36 . The ringsdetails submittedand approved byoint rings shaH beni the pipe is laidd, the gasket wiH

r sides. The con--uch as to preventgasket during in-inns of the joint.osed on the com-otected-from cor-

,''oating.

sketsr

.Ied with a con-ser-gasket havingon xvith a diam-in. Gaskets shaH -.

." substantially tZ~

fiH the recess provided when the pipeoint is assembled, so that the gasket

vviH be compressed to form a pressure-tight seal. The gasket shaH be the soleelement depended upon to n)ake thejoint watertight.

Sec. 3S—Fabrication of SteelCyhaders

3.5.1—Gc))eral. The cylinders shaHbe formed b> shaping and )veiding to-gether cut lengths or coils oi specifiedmaterial and thickness. The cylindersshall be accurately shaped to the sizerequired and the joint rings shaH bewelded to the ends before testing.

3,5.2—ll cldinrt. Butt ivelding oroffset lap ivelding of the longitudinaland circumferential or helical seamsshaH be used to produce a smooth anclcontinuous eNternal surface xvhcn wireis to be wrapped directly on the cylin-der. The nianuiacturer inay use either

Gbutt welding or lap welding for longi-tudinal and circumferential or helicalwe!ds, if the cylinder is encaseci in theconcrete core. Prior to )velding. thesheets shall be Fined closely an<i shaH beheld firmlyduring )velding. The manu-facturer shall submit for approval. ifrequired, thc specific details oi ma-terials and methods he proposes to usebefore any )velding is done.

3.5.3—Hydrostatic test. Each steelcylinder, ivith joint rings welded to itsends, shall be subjected to a hydrostatictest. KVhen the cylinder is tested in ahorizontal position. the stress shall beat least 0,000 psi but not greater than25,000 psi. XVhen the cylincier istested in a vertical position. the stressat the Io)ver end shaH be 25.000 psi.KVhile under pressure test. RH weidsshaH be thoroughly inspected and aBparts showing leakage sh:iB I)e n)arked.Cylinders that sho)v any leakage under~ ~

'.est shaH be rcvveldccl at the points oteakage and suiijectecl tn another hy-

drostatic test. The finished cylinder,with joint rings attached, shall not beused in the work unless it is completel.watertight under the required test pres-sure.

3.SA—Cleaning stccl snrfac rs. Be-fore the concrete core and mortar coat-ing are placed, each steel cylinder shaHbe cleaned to remove loose or otherforeign matter that would interferewith the bonding oi the concrete ar.c!n)ortar.

Sec. 3.6—Concrete for Pipe Core3.6.1 —Gc))eral. The concrete in the

cores may be placed by the centriiugaimethod, by the vertical casting method,or by other approved methods.

3.6.2—Prol ortioning. The propor-tions of cement. fine aggregate. coar=eaggregate, and water used in concretefor pipe cores shall be subject to tiieapproval of the purchase.. The prop r-tions shall be deterniinecl and controlledas the ivork proceeds to obtain hnrnn-geneous. dense. workable. durable cn:i-crete of specified strength in the vvaHsof the pipe and a minimum ni defectsin the surface of the pipe. Tlie propor-tions shall be those tliat iviH give thebest overall resu!ts ivith the particularmaterials and method of placing uscclfor the work. A. minimum of site ba„sof cement shall b» used for each ciibicyard of concrete. The )vater-cementratio shall be such as to assure that theconcrete wiH meet the strength require-ments.

3.6.3—Ilrasnrrn)rnt of nnrtrria!s.:Xbarrel of cement shaH be consiclereclas 4 cii ft or 3Ri lb and a bag nicement shaH be consiclerecl as 1 cii f;oi'4 H). Cen'iell'i )11 slali(larcl scick.need not be iveiglied, but bul'k cenientshall I>e weigheci. KVater for»iisinsishaH be n)m=urecl by volume or byiveight. Concreie aggregates for eaciibatch shall be measured seliarately by

AWWh SThNDARD

weighing. The proportions of aggre-gates shall be, computed on the satu-rated and surface-dry basis and the in-ter-cemeiit ratio sliaH be exclusive ofwater within the aggregates and ab-sorbed b> them. The equivalent unitweights for both fine and coarse aggre-gates shall be determined in accordancewith the "XIethod of Test for UnitIVeight of Aggregate" (AST~I Desig-nation C29). The equipmcnt and de-vices for weighing and measuring shaHat,.aH times be accurate ivithin 1 percent.

3.6A—Qfi.ring. The mixing shall bedone thoroughly by a mixer of ap-proved type. ~lixing time shall be con-sistent with the type of mixer used.Transit mixing shall not be used ex-cept by ivritten authorization and underspecifIc requireinent of the purchaser.

3.6.5—Staiidard Irsl cylinders. Aset of at least four standard test cyl-inders shall be taken from each day'pour of the mixed concrete for pipecores made by thc centrifugal method.thc vertical casting method. or otherapproved methods. Standard test cyl-inders shall be made in conformancewith thc "XIethod for Xilaking anilCuring Concrete Compressive andFlexural Test Specimens in the Field"(ASTcI Desigiiation C31). The air-ing of the test cylinclers shaH be in con-formity with the curing of the pipecores.

3.6.6—Centrifugal test cylinders.CentrifugaHy cast test cylinclers niay besubstituted for standard test cylinders,at the option of the manufacturer, whenthe centrifugal niethnd is usecl formaking cor~s. A set of at least fourtest cylinders shall lie taken eacli clayfrom tlie mixed concrete fcir cores'.

Test cylinclers shaH be ceiitriiugaHycast in 6-in.-diameter by 12-in.-lci»steel molds spun about their longi-tuclinal axes. at a spcecl that iviH simu-

late the compaction of concrete in thecores, to produce a spunmlinder ivan.

thickness of about 2 in. The curing ofthe test cylinders shall be in conformitywith the airing ot the cores. The netarea of the hoHoiv cylinder sliall beused to determine its compressivestrength.

3.6.7—Testing ryliners. AH testcylinders shall be tested by an ap-proved testing laboratory at the ex-pense of the manufacturer, unless themanufacturer lias approvecl testiii<„facilities at the site of the work. lnsuch an event. the tests shall be ina<ie

by and at the expense of the manu-facturer in the presence of the liur-chaser, or, if permitted by the pi:r-chaser. certified test reports rn,.y be

submitted by the manufacturer.3.6.3.—Strength of ronrrrlc. Stand-

ard concrete cylinders sliaH at:aiii a

minimum compressive stren "th nf .

3.000 psi in seven days and 4.:00 p:<Qin 28 days. Centriiugal test speanien.-shaH attain a minimum cornpres.-ivestrength oi 4.000 p~i in seven days a ul6.000 psi in 28 day:. The conipressiiestreiigth at the time oi ivrapping sliaH

conform to the requirements in Scc.3.S. To conform to the requiremei<t.-of this section, the average ni any tencol'lsecilt'Lve strengtli tests of cyiil'icier:representing each type of concrete:haHbe equal to or greater than the speci-fied strength. and not more than 20

per cent of the strengtli test= sliaH

have i~lues less than the speci&eel

strength. Pipe made from concretethat doe: not meet thc strength tests inaccordance ivith the fnrr nin liaH be

suiiject to rcjectinn.3.6.9.—Placing ronrrrtr bv criitrii-

ngal ni<'tlioct. The steel pilie cylinderivith joint rings attac heel ~lnH be

iilacrcl hnrizontaHy in a spinni»machine and may lie liclcl liy a spiunin-~frame. The spinning inachi»c shaH bc~

PRESTRESSED CONCRETE PRESSt:RE P?PE

in the-ier walsring ofI I 0 rilll'tyThe nettltall bePl'CsslVC

Kll testan ap-the ex-Icss t)ICtes'ting

rk. 1nie made

manu-Ic pur-lc por-may be

nd-

:cimensiressivcQs and)rcssivci" shallin Sec.ementsmy tenlinderstc shall

SPCCl

han 20sliall

ecifieclJncrctctests inhall be

.rntrif-yllndcr:ill beiinningiinningtholi bc+

Ccapable of revolving the cylinders at

~ speeds that will produce concrete meet-ing the requirements of Sec. 3.6.8 and3.8. The metiiod of placing concretein the cylinder and the spe d of rota-tion durilig placing shall be such thatthe concrete «ill be eveilly distributedar.d well compacted at the specifiedthickness throughout the length of thepipe. After the concrete has been de-posited, the rotation shall be continuedat a speed and for a length oi time suf-ficient to provide the specincd strenghand sufficien compaction and bond topermit removal from the spinningrnachine «ithout injury to the pipecore. Fxcess «ater and laitance shallbe removed irom the interior surfacesof the pipe in an approved manner sothat the surface is solid. straight, aodtrue.

3.6.10 —Plaring conrrrtc by:'crti-alcasting inetliod. The concrete linio

, or core shall be cast on end on a cast-iron or steel base ring with rigid steelcollapsible forms for thc concrete sur-faces. The forms sllall be so desigoeilthat they «ill have smooth contact sur-faces and tight joint=- and « ill be firmlvand accurately held in proper positionwithout distortion during the placing ofthe concrete. The forms shall be pro-vided «ith top and bottom stifteningrings and shall be designed to permitremoval without 'injury to the insidesurface of the pipe. The forms shallbe thoroughly cleaned and oiled be-fore each use. The transporting andplacing oi concrete shall be carriedout by approved methods that «ill notcause the separation of concrete nla-terials and the displaccmclit of the steelcylinder or forms from tlleir properposition. Approveil nlethods of me-chanical vibrating sliall be useful to com-pact the concrctc iii thc fornls and to

~ seaire satisfarton interior surfaces.Forms sllall not be removed until the

concrete has set sufficiently to avoidspalling or damage to the pipe duringthe process oi form removal.

3.6.11 —Othrr ntctliods of placing tlrrlining. If the manufacturer proposesto employ a method other than the cen-trifugal or vertical casting method forplacing the concrete linin«or core. hesllall submit tor approval complete de-tails of the methods and equipment heproposes to use.

Sec. 3.7—Curing of Core

3.i.1—Ccncral. The purpose oi air-ing pipe cores as specified next is toobtain concrete oi the strength speci-fied for test cylinders on<ier Sec. 3.6.8.The cores shall bc aired Ly steam or by«ater unless other«i~e specifically per-mitted. KVater a»d steam curing maybe used interchangeabli on a time ratiobasis of 4 hr oi lvater curing to 1 hr oisteam airing, except that water corin"may bc used only ii the minimum am-bient tenlperature exceeds 40F.

3.7.2—Stcani criring. The coresshall be placed in the steam-coringchamber or otherwisc covered by asuitable enclosure that «ill allo«pro-per cirallation oi steam. A delayperiod oi from 1 to 4 hr sliall be allo«'edbefore moist steam is admitted in con-tact «'ith the cores. The temperaturewithin the enclosure shall be gradual!yraised to at least 110F aod not morctitan 150F for a period of at least 24hr. The pre~et time shall bc includedin the 24-hr period. Curing by stean>

shall bc contli)ooos cxccp't dorlllgperiod sofficient to remove the iormsor supporting rings. The iorms sliallnot be removed until at least 6 hr afterthe begilming of airing. After thisminimum Ci-hr perind. tlic cores may be"tipped" fronl their bases and airingshall be continued by either steam or«+ter.

14 AWWh SThNDARD

3.7.3—0'alrr rtrri>rg. The coresslall bc kept moist by interinittent wa-ter spra>ing for a period of at least 32hr. The ivater-curing period shall becontinued 1 hr for each hour, in thefirst 24, duri»g which the ambient tem-perature is below 50F. Following thisniinimum period, tliey may be "tipped-from their bases arid removed to thestorage yard where they sliall be keptcontinuously moist by intermitte»tspraying for an additional period of atleast three days.

Sec. 3.8—Placing of WireReinforcetnent

The high-tensile xvire shall not bewound around the core until the con-crete has reached the minimum seve:>-

day compressive strength specifiedu»der Sec. 3.6.S of this standard. Theinitial conipressio» i» the concrete sliallnot exceed .: per cent of tlie co»i-pressive strength of the concrete at the'time of xvrappi»g. ilethods and equip-ment for applying the ivire shall besuch that it will be wrapped aroundthe core i» a helical form at the de-sig»e<l predetermi»ed spacing and te»-sion for the full length of the core.except tltat at the ends of thc corethere shall be an extra complete cir-cumferential wrap of wire that may beapplied at one lialf the design tensio».The number of coils in any 2-ft lengthof core shall be not less than requiredby the design. AVire splices shall becapable of withstanding a force equalto the minimum specified ultiniatetensile strength of the iiire. An-chorages of the wire atthe ends of thecore sltall be capable of resisting a

fore~ equal to 75 per cent of the speci-fied mi»imum ultimate tensile strengtliof the wire.

1 f i»ultiplc layers of circunifere»ti;dreinforccme»t are used. each layer lx»the hst sltall be coated tvith cement

mortar applied in accordance with Sec.3.9 to provide e minimum cove.. over Othe reinforcement at least eq»al to thediameter of the tvire and stea»i-cure(lin accordance with Sec. 3.10.2 fur a

period of not less than ~ hr. The nrs.layer of reinforcement sliall be wu»ridon the surtace of the core. anrl subse-quent layers sltall be wound over theprevious layers r>f cc»ient mortar asspecined in this sectiu». The fi»aicoating of cement mortar sliall l>c al>-plied in accordance tvith Sec. 3.9. shallprovide the mi»imuir. cover over thereinforceineiit specinerl i» Sec. 3.1.3.and shall bc ciired in accordance witl.Sec. 3.10.

Sec. 3.9—Pipe Coating

3.9.1 —Cr>rrral. After the core hasbee» ivrapped tvith higli-te»:ile wire.an exterior mortar or concrc:e continshall be apl>lied.

3.92 —.llortarroali>ra. Xfortar fur ~coati»g sliall ciaisist oi one part cc:»en:

~'o

not niore than three parts ile:lggrc-gate. Ce>»c»t arid fine ag -.c a'.« .-.1>ai:

conform to Sec..l and . hcrei».Rebound rot to exceed one 'ourth oi thctotal mix tveight n ay be used. but theresulting mix proportions shall »nt b«leancr than those just siwcified. Rc.bound nut used within 1 hr shall bediscarderl. The mortar shall bcthoroughly mixed. anil. after mixi»g i=

completerl, i! shall be drpnsited ttndrrimpact by an approved me:hod sn tltata dense. rlurahle encaseme»t is nb-tai»ed. Co»c»rre>itly tvith !he niortarcoating. a ccinent slurry cn>tsistirig nfo»c s;ick of c«nicnt tn»ot >»nrv titanu+ gal oi ivatcr shall bc al>plied t> th.c<>re j»~t ahead of tire»iorinr cuatii; .

3.9.3—Co»rrrtr roati>r r. Co»cretefuf cuatlllg sliall l>e uf aii apl>rove>1

mix. The prolx>rti<>ris shall l>c tl>u.ctliat will give the hest nvcrall res»lt.- ~ivith tlic particul:ir niatcrials a»rl ~

~ ~ ~~

I


iVla. C.

s'vcr ovcflal-to theam-cured)2 for aThe first

>c ivo'Llndld subse-OVCf thCiortar ashe fina!

II bc ap-3.9, shallovcf tllclc. 3.1.3,nce with

core hasile ivire,: coa'ting

forq

ltCherein.

.h oi thebut thenot be

J. Re-hall,beall beixing isI underso thatis ob-mortarting ofe than.to thcoa'tinconcreteprove(l

thoseresults ~

an(f Q

Cmethods of placing used for the ivork. Aminimum of seven bags of cement shallbe 'used for each cubic yard of concrete.The fine and coarse aggregates andcement shall meet the requirements of

*

Sec. 2.1, 22 and 2.3 of this standard,except that the grading ot coarse aggre-gate shall be such that it ivill all passa g-in. laboratory sieve, The concreteshall be placed and compacted by ap-proved methods and equipnient to pro-duce a dense, durable coating.

3.9 4—Strength. Concrete for coat-ing shall develop a minimum com-pressive streng'.h of 3,000 psi in seven

'days 'and'4;500 psi in 28 days in ac-cordance ivith Scc. 3.6.S.

Sec. 3.10—Curing of Coating3.10.1 —Gcncra!. The coating out-

side the core shall bc cure(l by steamor by ivater unless otlicrivise specin-cally permit ted. Kater and steamcuring may be used interchangeably ona time ratio basis oi 4 hr oi ivater cur-ing to 1 hr oi steam curing. except thatwater curing may be used only ii theminimum ambient temperature cxcccds

40F. Adequate space and faciliticsshall be provided for proper curing.

3.102—S!cau> curing. The coatedpipe shall be placed in the curing cham-ber as soon as practicable aiter plachlgthe coating and shall be stcam-cured asspecined under'ec. 3~2 for a periodof at least 12 hr. The pipe shall behandled in such a nianner as to avoidinjun to the coating during tran:-porta-tion to and from the curing ciiambef.

3.10.3 —ff'atcr curing. As soon asthe coating has set suInciently, it shallbe kept moist by intermittent sprayingfor a period oi at least four day'. Thcinter-curing period shall bc continued1 hr for each hour, in the first 24, dur-ing ivhich the-ambient temperature isbeloiv 50F.

Sec. 3.11 —'Seal Coat

Ii thc purcliasef specifically orders abitunlinous seal coat, the materials andallplication sliall comply ivith the ap-pfvpriate provi~ions oi AAVKAC104(ANSI A IA) insoiar as they areapplicable.'he material sliall be ap-plied aiter the pipe is cured.

Sec. 4.1—General

Fittings and special pipe shall in-clude closurcs. connections to main linemives, bends. tees, ines. beveled pipefor curves, and pipe ivith outlets re-quired for manholes. air valves, andblowoffs as shoivn on the purchaser'sdraivings or ordered by the purcliaser.Fittings shall coniorm to the detailsfurnished by the purchaser, or, if re-quired, to the details furnished bythc ntanu fact@ref and approved bythe purchaser. Fittings shall be eithertype as described in Sec. 4.2 or 4.3 at

thc option of the manufacturer andshall be designed for the same condi-tions as tlie pipe.

Sec. 42—Fittings (Type A)

Type A fittings are compose(1 olsteel ci'lln(lcfs, concrctc of nlof'„'lf lllling. an(l reinforced concrete or mort rexterior coating. The steel for the

cylinder shall b» cut. shaped. andiveI(lc(I to fofnl tlic properly shape(lben(l, tec. rc(luccr, or fitting. Theivclds sliall be insllcctcd and thc com-pleted cylin(ler shall be tested fnr

..„Section 4-Fittings ancl Special Pipe

r oo

16 hWWh STheVDhRD

tightness by the dye penetrant or othtrapproved method, if specifically re-quired by the purchaser. A cage orcages of steel reinforcement ivith ap-proved cross-sectional areas shall beformed around thc cylinder and open-ings. Longitudinal reinforcement suf-ficitnt for additional stresses in thefitting iva!ls sliall be provided. Theinterior and exttrior concrete or mor-tar shall be placed in an approved man-ner. Curing shall be as specified inSec. 3.10 herein.

Sec. 4~FitUngs (Type B)

T>~ B fittings are composed of ciitand welded steel plate of approvedthickness, lvith mortar coating on in-terior and exterior surfaces.

4.3.1 —Steel plate. The steel for thefabricated steel plate fittillgs shall becut. shaped, and ivelded so that the,finished fitting shall have the requiredshape and interior diinensions. Thedeflection angle between adjacent seg-ments of a bend shall be not greaterthan ~~k deg. Adjacent segmentsshall be joined by lap or butt ivelding.Fabrication and welding shaH conformto the requirements of Sec. 3.".1 and3.5.2 of this standard. Thc weldsshall be inspected and the completedcylinder shall be tested for tightness nythc dye penetrant or other approved

'method, if specifically required by thepurchaser.

4.32—Rei'llfore eilieiit. XVirt mtshreinforcing shall be applied to the in-terior and exterior surfaces of thefabricated fitting. !Ihlcsh shall be 2- by4-in. Wl welded-ivire fa4ric, held >

in. from the surfaces of the steel phte.The members on the 2-in. spacing sliallextend circumferentially around tilefitting ivith ends overlapped 4 in. andtied together. Longitudinal splicesshall be staggered,

4.3.3—Mortar. Steel plat» fittings. sltatt be lined with mortar at least I in. fi

thick, except at adapter ends or outlets,but under no conditions shall the linin"be less than > in. thick. The exteriorshall be coated ivith mortar at least1 in. thick. The mortar shall containnot less than one part cemeiit to threeparts sand, of a grading. approved;nrthe method of application used.

4.3.4—CIIriiig. Xlortar-coated fit- ~

tings shall be cured by ivater sprayir;g.by steam, or by curing compound=.

Sec. 4A—Curves, Bends. audClosures

Long-radius ciirvts and small angu-lar changes in pipe alignment shall beformed by deflecting joints, by siraigiltpipe with beveled ends, by bevel adap-ters. or by a combination oi th =e.

Pipe ends may be beveled up to . deg.Short-radius curves ant! clo=urcs )Ia:ibe formed by fittinfit. e,Sec. 4.5—Openings and Connections

llanholes and Ranges. spigot or bellconnections for air valves, blnworI=, orconnections to oilier pipe shall be buil:into the ivalls of the concrete pipe atlocations shoivn nn the purchaser'sdraivings or ordered by the purcha=er.IVall openings shall be suitably rein-fnrced. The high-tensile wire sllall beseciirely hstentd on tach side oi theoutlet or shall be ivrapped cnntinunuslyfrom one side of the opening to theother. The casting or fabricated nutle'.sliall be weldtil tis the saddie plate rsr

sQCldle lleck after tiltholt ls tilt ihrouglslthe plate. cylinder. a»d concrtit. lirequired. thc interior and exttrior sur-faces of structural-sttel connectionssliall bc lined and coated with mortar.Altcrnitive outlet designs may be used.if specifically approved by thc pur-chaser.

plate fittings ~r at least g in. Q

laptcr ends or outlets,litions sl)all the liningthick. The exterior

ivith mortar at leastmortar shall containpart cement to threerading approved for

tlication used.'.Itfortarwoatcd fit-

:d by water spraying,triltg contpotltl(ls.

, Bends, cmd

vcs and small angu-c ali nment shall be

1g joints, by straightcttds. by bevel adap-mbination oi these.beveled 1'Ip 'io o deg.

~ s and closures shallI. ("

nnectionssu igot or bellva h S, blthhvOIIS, Orr pipe shall bc builtlte concrete pipe at>n the purchaser'sd by the purchaser.ll be suitably rein-ensile tvire sltall betn each side of the.apped continuously'he opening to theor fal>ricated outletthe saddle pIate or

~ hole is cut througlland concrete. If

- and exterior sur-~ steel connectionsoated tvith mortar.5!glIS may bc used,)ved by the pur-

C

17

The wire area, tension, and spacingunder which the vtire'is wound and thecore thickness shall be varied so thatthe specific combination of designpressure and earth load tvill fall on orunder the design curves in Fig. A.

(a and b). The resulting design hasa transient-load capacity equal to thcdifferenc between the design pressureor orth load and the value determmedfrom the extension of the appropriateline for surge pressure or live load untilit intersects the transient-load curve.If surge prcssure exceeds'0 per centof design pressure or live load (in-etndint impact) exceeds the AmericanAssociation of State Highway OfitcialsH-20 loading, this greater value shouldbe stated in the supplementary speci-fications.

The design curve is defined by thefollowing equation:

PPn p

earth load, in combination with designpressure P.

Thhc-edge-bearing values of ll „

used for design shall be conservativelybased on the manufacturer's accumu-lated test results. Supporting test datasltall be provided if required by thecnginccr.

s

Ch~I

Ig Wp

Wn

Ip. Ict

(cpaph ( ~ )

tp. In~tait

~(pe P~p, tst

~s

2

WO

— I.2 Wo

It'p

OAP~ Pn 12 Pp

(era ph (h)tt, ccw nrtt

tp P p, sessIII

I II II II I

in which P, is the internal pressure re-quired to overcome all compression inth» core concrete, exclusive of the ef-fect of external load; ll; is nine tenthsof the thrmdge-bearing load produc-ing incipient cracking in the core, withno internal pressure~ p is the maxi-mum design pressure in combinationwith three-edge-bearing load, tti, and is

not to exceed 0.8 P, for lined cylinderptpe [Icig. A (a)];;t ts the 111axtlltutn

thrcc~dge-bearing load, equivalent to

I.4 Pp

Intdptthl pieItttse

Eig. h. Design and Transient-CapacityCurves for Lined and Embedded CrtinderPipe Using Cubic Parabola Design method

Graph (n) is for lined- and Graph '(b)=

for ctnbcddI'd-cylindt r pipe. ln bothgraplts, T'csignatcs tt'Ic transient-lanais

ctrr: c and 1) the design cttree; tot is jtirthe thrcc-cdgc-braring load ctltti:alcnt tiili c- load: and P,p is for sttrge prcssnrc n

crccss of tltc norntal opcroting or dcsig»prcsstt rc.

PRESTRESSED COXCRETE PRESSURE P1PE

Appendix ACubic Parabola Design Method

This appcndis's for information only astd is not part of AW8'3 C301-7

18 AWWA STANDARD

Appendix 3Stress Analysis Design Method

The wire area, tension, and spacingunder which the wire is wound and thecore thickness shall be varied so thatthe specific combination of designprcssure and earth load will fall on or

O

C

les

Graph (a)

Tip, r+«i)

(p+P», «)W

cp. «iI

08 Pr 12 Pr

„"- Wire Graph (b)

rcp, «+«i)

caw Pgp. «ID

cp «i III

Pe iAP«

!ntrmal pressure

Pig. E. Design and Transient CapacityCurves for Lined and Embedded CylinderPipe Using Stress Analysis Design Method

Graph (o) is far lined- and Grapli (b)embedded-cylinder pipe. lu bntlr graphs.T designates the truusient-load cirrcc'ndD thc design eur:ei P, is thc internalprcssure rc'quired to o:crcomc all eoni-prcssion iu thc core coucrctc, cxciusi:cof thc effect of crtcrnal load; P» is thcsurge'ressure iu cxccss of thc irorrnaloperating or design prcssure; lYc is

thc'raximumdesign field external load nithinternal pressure cqnal to =ero; and cei

is thc litic load in cxccss of the c'xtc mal

dead load.

under the design curve illustrated inFig. B (a and b). The resultingdesign has a transient-load capacityequal to the difference between thedesign pressure or earth load and thevalue determined from the extensionof the appropriate line for surge prcs-sure or live load until it intersectsthe tran sic)it-ion(l curve. 1 f surgepressure exceeds 40 per cent oi designpressure, or live load (including im-pact) exceeds the American Associa-tion of State Highway Ofncials H-20loading, this greater value should be

stated in the supiileiuentary spccifiica-tioiis.

The design curve is defined by the

following equation:

M Fl Aip ~~f +7~ Mj' ———J-S AJ12R,

in which p is the maximum designpressure in combination with field ex-ternal load, tt', and is not to exceed O.S

P, for lined-cylinder pipe [Fig. B(a}j;f is thc resultant induced compres-

sion; 7.5itf', is the allowable tensilestress where f, is the specified 28-daycompressive strength of the concrete',3l is the total lnonieut iu the pipe sec-

tion due to pipe weight, water weight,and external load; F is the total thrustin the pipe section due to pipe weight,water iveight, and external load: S is

thc section modulus of the control pipesection based on thc total pipe wail at

the crown and invert sections and on

the core only at thc side section: Aris thc tran:formed cross-sectional area

This appcndi- is for information only and is uot part of A/Vlf'AC3N-7

~ ~ ~

ripe u~ll attions and o-

section; an(ste.l cylind

The cotthrust calciniaed and

~ c;I C3N-72

e illustrated inThe resulting

t-load capacitye- between theh load and the

the extensionfor surge pres-il it intersectsve. I I surgecent of desi n

(including im-.rican Associa-Olncials H-20

alue should beutar> spccihca-

'he control section based on the totalpe weal at the crown and invert sec-

tions and on the core only at the sidesection; and R„ is the outside radius ofsteeI cylinder.

The coefFicients for moment andthrust calculations shall be from recog-ni"ed and accepted theories, examples

of which are to be found in "Coeffi-cients for Large Horizontal Pipes," byJ. H. Paris [Ellg. Zeus-Record, vol.87, p. 768 (1921) ]; and "Stress Aml-ysis of Concrete Pipe," by H. C.Olander [Fng. Monograph Xo. 6 4SBureau of Reclamation, Dept. of theInterior, AVashington, D.C.].


defined by the

Ae?P. ~

xim designwith field ex-

t to exceed 0.8: [Fig. B(a) j;uced compres-owable tensileoecified 28-day

the concrete;l the pipe sec-water weight,he total thrusto pipe weight,nal load; S isle control pipe.1 pipe wall atctions and onte section; 8<-sectional area

0

1750/11'rojectIdentification

No. CAR-SH- CH-

EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATED

SPECIFICATION EBASCO

CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM

CONCRETE PIPE

(NONNUCLEAR SAFETY ITEM)

P~~O Oq K,SS/g/

SEAL6498

VVI'NEe +/'~ "/1gY VJ

~ g~ e

PURCHASER: EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATED AGENT

OWNER: CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

OPERATING COMPANY: CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

PROJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

UNIT NO.: 1 2 36dd NOMINAL KW 900 000 KW PER UNIT

LOCATION: WAKE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA

SELLER:

OriginalRl 1/31/75

"THIS DOCJMENT IS DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND IS SUBJECTTO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION X OF THE CONTRACT BETWEENCAROLINA POWER & LIGEC COMPANY AND EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATEDDATED SEPTEMBER 1, 197Q, AS ED."

Prepared under the supervision of N C PE No. 4935. Andrew A Ferlito

Wd'. /oC~o /o~~~ CRT.Approval

'~WM Verdlbello 2 Mere /'C'r C 'i~ C 6//7CC 5/23/74M Verdibel/ 2 Mere~ ~ '2-1, 111-1 22/2P/74

R2 2/27/75 M Verdibelfo E Merc 'g ~'/'> i, III-1, 2/4/754/ ~4 P»/ie 111-2, 111-4,

tA- IV-2R3 5/12/75 M Verdlbello R Mere~+7 7/7j ZI2-1,2,3,5,6 5/28/75

pF 4r ~

~alii/n"

R4 12/9/76 E Ver Eecke E Merr III-1,2,3,4,5,6, Il/26/78 18 +AC dt/ IggR5 „..6/22/77 E Ver Eecke E.Merci~ 7124/y7 II-1 III-2,3.-'.5 8/16/77

,- ..Pro)ect Ide: =ification

No. CAR-SH-CH-9

Order No

EBASCO SERVICESINCORPORATE'BASCO

SPECIFICATION

CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM

CONCRETE PIPE

(NONNUCLEAR SAFETY ITEM)

Revisions

R6

Date

11 /7/77

11/21/80

E. VerEecke ~S. Goya l

Reviewed Bv:4 ~/~/g~

E Herakr. W~ ~~@/n

E Merc~ / ~/<ll7g'6~ iy ii/gs

III-8 9/7/78

CP6rLPages Approval

Affected Date

II-1, IV-2 10/19/77

EBAS CO SERVICES INCORPORATED

EBASCO SPECIFICATIONCIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM

CONVKTE PIPE

Section ~ara ra h ~Pa e

GENERAL

IV

ScopeSpecifications and StandardsDefinitions

MATERIALS AND FABRICATION

Pipe and FittingsTestsWeldingMarking

DESIGN CRITERIA

Design StandardsDesign LoadsWater QualityInstallation Conditions

DELIVERY & MISCELLANEOUS SELLER'REQUIREMENTS

123

4567

89

1'0

11

II-1 f >oII-2II-3II-3

III-1III-1III-6 R4III"7

DeliveryFactory InspectionSupplementary Information by SellerManufacturer DravingsInspectionfQuality Contiol- .

1213141516

IV-1IV-1IV-1XV-2TV-2

fR6

c COPYRIGHT 1974 EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATEDTWO RECTOR

STREET'EW

YORK

Ebasco SpecificationCirculating Water SystemConcrete Pipe

project Identification No. CAR-SH-CH-9

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. SCOFF

This specification covers furnishing, fabrication'aterSystem concrete pipe for the Shearon Harris k

located near Raleigh, North Carolina.

delivery of Circulating.ear Power Plant, Units 1-4,

2. SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDA1G)S

Concrete pipe and miscellaneous materials furnished in accordance with thisspecification shall comply with all Federal and State laws and local ordinancesof the. place of installation and with the following codes and standards to theextent referenced herein. Unless otherwise noted, the document with addenda,amendments and revisions in effect on the date of the purchase order will apply.:.-=er editions may be used by mutual consent in writing between the Seller and

Owner.

.ICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION STANDARDS (AWWA)

AWWA C300 - "Reinforced Concrete Water Pipe - Steel Cylinder Type, notprestressed."

AWWA C301 - "Reinforced Concrete Water Pipe - Steel Cylinder Type, prestressed."

AWWA C302 - "Reinforced Concrete Water Pipe - Noncylinder Type, not prestressed."

;: . D2049 - "Relative Density of Cohesionless Soils."

ASTM D2167 - "Density of Soil in Place by the Rubber-Balloon Method."

ASTM D1556 - "Density of Soil in Place by Sand Cone Method."

AMERICAN RAILWAY ENGINEERING ASSOCIATION (AREA) - "Manual for Railway Engineering."

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE HIGHWAY OFFICIALS (AASHO) - "Standard Specificationsfor Highway Bridges."

Any conflict between this specification and/or the referenced codes and standardsshall be immediately brought to the Purchaser's attention for written resolution.The Seller shall list in his proposal any additional codes or standards heintends to invoke in the performance of this specification's requirements.

Ebasco SpecificationCirculating Mater SystemConcrete Pipe

Project Identification No. CAR-SH-CH-9

SECTION I - GENERAL (Cont'd)

3. DEFINITIONS

.01 Owner

In this specification, the word "Owner" shall mean: 'ndividual appointed bythe Owner, and charged with technical acceptance o= : . work for the Owner,or his authorized agents, engineers, assistants and ;...:;ctors, acting several-ly within the scope of the particular duties and authorities delegated to them.

.02 Seller (or Manufacturer)

In this speci.fication the word "Seller" (or "Manufacturer" ) shall mean theperson, or persons, partnership, company, corporation or organization thatsupplies the concrete pipe and miscellaneous materials covered herein.

Enaineer

i; this specification the word Engineer shall mean the Design Engineer,Ebasco Services Incorporated.


Project Identification No. CAR-SH«CH-9

SECTION II - MATERIALS AND FABRICATION

4. PIPE AND FITTINGS

All pipe shall be fabricated with concrete in accc ~ce with the applicablelatest revision of one of the following AWWA stanc s: C300, C301, or C302.Fabrication standards shall include but will not be imited to the folloving:

.Ol All pipes and fittings shall be fabricated wi".. bell and spigot steelend rings designed for rubber gaskets unless otherwise noted.

.02 All bell and spigot vali fittings shall be fabricated vith anchorstraps and sufficient ring plate length for full penetration through theconcrete vali as per details in the applicable circulating vater systemdravings. All pipe m'aterial for vali fittings shall conform to theapplicable sections of the AWWA standards used for pipe design.

.03 The exposed end of each bell and spigot, plus a 2 in. segment of it==b dded in the concrete shall be galvanized, or an approved equal. R5

.04 All pipe shall be fabricated with the minimum concrete slump con-sistent vith manufactu'ring processes and other means to limit shrinkage cracks.

.05 One (1) continuous rubber gasket and one diaper shall be supplied'foreach length of pipe and for each spigot wall fitting.

.06 The gasket shall be the sole element depended upon to make the jointwatertight. It shall not be required to support the weight of the pipe, butshall be required to keep the joint tight under all normal conditions ofservice, including contraction and expansion and normal earth settlements.

.07 Sufficient lubricant shall be provided by the pipe manufacturer forinstallation of the gasket.

.08 All concrete'pipe shall be steam cured in accordance vith the appli»cable AWWA Specification.

.09 The Seller shall be responsible for permanently repairing all cracksoccurring in the concrete pipe and vhich, in the Ovner's opinion, are of asize as to cause concern for the integrity of the pipe.

.10 Access manholes shall be provided and detailed in accordance with theapplicable design drawings.

.11 Manhole outlets hand manhole outlet covers sh~ll meet all the pipereouirements of this specification end of the applicable AWWA st~nd~rds.

Rl

.12 All joints shall have the capability to be bonded for electrical conti-nuity throughout the entire length of the pipe I



SECTION II - MATERIALS AND FABRICATION (Cont'd)

5.

Tests shall be performed in accordance vith the a= licable AWWA pipe specifi-cations. Test requirements shall include but vil "..ot be limited to thefolloving:

.01 Mill test reports shall be furnished to the E."."ineer on ea'ch heat fromvhich the steel is rolled and for all concrete reinforcing bars and wire mesh.Test reports shying the physical properties of the gasket material shall alsobe furnished.

.02 Certified test reports of concrete test cylinders shall be submittedto the Engineer by the pipe Manufacturer.

.03 An affidavit shall be furnished to the Engineer by the pipe Manufacturer."..at all materials comply vith the applicable pipe specification from which the

is fabricated.

.04 The following additional tests shall be performed by the Manufacturerand test reports or samples furnished to the Owner for pipes manufactured inaccordance with AWWA C302 standards:

a - Hydrostatic pressure tests shall be performed in accordance vithAWWA C302 standards.

b - External load crushing strength tests shall be performed in accord-ance vith AWWA C302 using external loads equal to 1.5 times themaximum external loads specified in Paragraph 9 of this specifica-tion. The pipe shall be designed so as not to develop cracksexceeding 0.01 in. (0.25 uaa) in vidth throughout a length of 1 ft(305 mm) or more when the maximum external load is applied. Theultimate strength of the pipe shall also be determined.

c - Two (2) samples of concrete reinforcement velds shall be furnishedto the Owner for each length of pipe. Testing of these samplesshall be performed by the Owner at his option.

d - Specials and fittings shall be tested for leak tightness. The

method of testing shall be approved by the Owner and/or Engineer.

The expense of testing the materials and the completed steel cylinder and ofsubmitting to the Engineer test reports in accordance with the applicableAWWA standards and the requirements specified herein shall be borne by theManufacturer.



SECTION II - MATERIALS AND FABRICATION (Cont'd)

6. WELDING

All welding involved in the fabrication of concrete pipe covered by this speci-fication shall be in accordance with the applicable AWWA Specifications.

7. MARKING

Marking shall be in accordance with the applicable AWWA standards and asspecified herein. Each special and each length of pipe shall have plainlymarked inside, on the bell or spigot end the following information:

a - Design pressure and transient pressure

b - Pipe diameter

c - Design height of cover

d -. Identification of special areas of use (eg: railroad crossing,highway or road crossing, areas under transformers, etc)

e - Identifying mark to correspond to the piece mark on thepipe Manufacturer's layout drawings

f - Orientation marks for all fittings


Project Identification"No. CAR-SH-CH-9

SECTION III - DESIGN CRITERIA

8. DESIGN STANDARDS

The concrete pressure pipe shall be designed in accordance vith the follovingAWWA standards as applicable:

a - Reinforced concrete vater pipe - steel cylinder type,not prestressed - AWWA C300

b - Reinforced concrete vatez pipe - steel cylindez-type,—prestressed - AWWA C301

c - Reinforced concrete vater pipe» noncylindez type,not pres tress ed - AWWA C302

9. DESIGN LOADS

Concrete pipe shall be designed to adequately resist all the loads and."~mbinations of loads imposed on it without crushing or czacking so as tocause leakage of vater.

.Ol All pipes and fittings shall be designed to vithstand the followinginternal loading conditions:

1 - Normal head: 80 ft (34.6 psi)2 - Max vater haamer negative head:

3 - Max vater hammer positive he'ad:

4 - Pump shut-off head

-34 ft (-14.7 psi)+150 ft (64.8 psi)

150 ft (64.8 psi)

IR4

1 - Normal head: 80 ft (34.6 psi)2 «Max vater hammer negative head: -34 ft (-14.7 psi)3 - Max vater haaxner positive head: +150 ft (64.8 psi)4 - Pump shut-off head 150 ft {64.8 psi)

R4

R3, R2

.02 All pipes and fittings shall be designed to withstand the follovingexternal loading conditions as applicable:

1 - A 15 ton single vheel load thzoughout wigh a minimum cover offour (4) feet of fill.

R3

R4

R3



SECTION III .- DESIGN CRITERIA (Cont'd)

9.

.02

DESIGN LOADS (Cont'd)(Cont'd)

R4

2 - AASHO H20 load (for highway crossings only) with a minimumcover of 4 ft or a maximum cover of 10 ft of fill (or greaterwhere shown on the applicable drawings) and with an impactfactor as specified in AASHO standards.

3 » Cooper E80 load (for railroad crossings only) with a minimum -. R3

cover of 4 ft or a maximum cover of 10 ft of fill (or greater~here shown on the applicable drawings) and with an impactfactor as specified in American Rail~ay Engineering Associa-tion (AREA) Manual.

4 - A minimum of 10 ft of earth cover, or greater cover whereshown on the applicable drawings.

5 - Three (3) Kips/sq ft with a minimum cover of '6 ft of fillbetween bottom of foundation and top of pipe for areas wherethe pipe passes under Transformer foundations.

R4

1 - See 9.02al above

2 - See 9. 02a2 above

3 - See 9.02a3 above

4 - See 9.02a4 above

5 - See 9. 02a5 above

.03 Pipescombinations

and fittings shall be designed to withstand the following load

Inch ID Intake Pine

1 - Construction Conditions

iii-iv-v

Empty pipe + 9.02al

Empty pipe + 9.02a2

Empty pipe + 9.02a3

Empty pipe + 9.02a4

Empty pipe + 9.02a5

R2


Pro]ect Identification No. CAR-SH-CH-9

SECTION III - DESIGN CRITERIA (Cont'd)

9. DESIGN LOADS (Cont'd)

.03 (Cont'd)

a - 120 Inch ID Intake Pi e (Cont'd)

2 - Normal Ooeratina Conditions

R5

i - 9.01al + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9.01al + 9.02a2

iii - 9.01al + 9.02a3

iv - 9.0lal + 9.02a4

v - 9.0lal + 9.02a5

3 - Water Hammer Conditions Ne ative ead)

9.0la2 + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9.0la2 + 9.02a2

iii - 9.01a2 + 9.02a3

iv - 9.01a2 + 9.02a4

v - 9.0la2 + 9.02a5

4 - Water Hammer Conditions (Positive Head)

i - 9.0la3 + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9.01a3 + 9,02a2

9.01a3 + 9.02a3

iv - 9.01a3 + 9.02a4

v - 9.0la3 + 9.02a5

5 - Penn Shut-off Conditions

i - 9.01a4 + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9.01a4 + 9.02a2

iii - 9.01a4 + 9.02a3

iv » 9.01a4 + 9.02a4

v - 9.0la4 + 9.02a5





.03 (Cont')

b - 125 Inch ID Dischar e Pine


R5

i - Empty pipe + 9.02bl

ii - Empty pipe + 9.02b2

iii - Empty pipe + 9.02b3

iv - Empty pipe + 9.02b4

v - Empty pipe + 9.02b5

2 - Normal 0 eratina) Conditions

i - 9.01bl + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9.0lbl + 9.02b2

iii - 9.01bl + 9.02b3

iv - 9.01b) + 9.02b4

v - 9.0lbl + 9.02b5

3 - Water Hammer Conditions Negative Head)

i - 9.01b2 + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9.01b2 + 9.02b2

iii - 9.0lb2 + 9.02b3

iv - 9 Olb2 + 9.02b4

v - 9.0lb2 + 9.02b5

4 - Water Hamner Conditions Positive Head)

9.01b3 + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9 'lb3 + 9.02b2

iii - 9.0ib3 + 9.02b3

iv - 9.01b3 + 9.02b4

v - 9.01b3 + 9.02b5



SECTION IZZ - DESIGN CRITERIA (Cont'd)


~ 03 (Cont'd)

b - o Inch ID Dischar e Pipe (Cont'd)

5 - Pum Shut-off Conditions

R5

i - 9.0lb4 + min. cover of 4 ft of fillii - 9 'lb4 + 9.02b2

iii - 9.01b4 + 9.02b3

iv » 9.0lb4 + 9.02b4

v - 9.0lb4 + 9.02b5

c - 108 Inch ID Intake and Dischar e Pine R4


i - Empty pipe + 9.02alii - Empty pipe + 9.02a4

2 - Normal Ooeratin Conditions

- 9.0lal + 9.02a4

3 - Water Hammer Conditions Ne ative Head

i - 9.0la2 + 9.02a4

4 - Water Hanmer Conditions Positive Head)

i - 9.01a3 + 9.02a4

5 - Pump Shut-off Conditions

i - 9 'la4 + 9.02a4




9, DESIGN LOADS (Cont 'd)

,04 Desi n Stresses

When designing in accordance with AWMA-C-300 specifications, the applicableunit design stresses may be increased by a factor of 25 percent of the allow-able unit design stresses when the pipe is subjected to construction, water—hammer negative he%~ water hammer positive head loading conditions, orpump shutdown pressure.

R4.

10. MATER OMLITY

A typical analysis of the water in the man-made lake for the subject projectis given below.

It is expected that the concentration of solids in the circulating water ofthe Cooling To~er Basin will be approximately 10 times as high as the valueslisted below. The PH of the ~ater, however, will be maintained at a constantvalue of approximately 7.

Total SolidsVolatile SolidsSuspended SolidsDissolved SolidsMaximum TurbidityM 0 Alkalinity as CaC03Total Phosphate as PChloride as ClSulfate as S04Nitrate as NSodium as NaCalcium as Ca.

Magnesium as MgSilica as Si02Iron as FePH

147 ppm

30 ppm117 ppm500 PTU

26 ppm0.65 ppm

13 ppm0.3 ppm

15 ppm8 ppm3 ppm

14 ppm1.4 ppm

6.5 - 7.5


Pro)ect Identification No. CAR-SH-CH-9


ll. INSTALLATIONCONDITIONS

All pipe and fittings shall be designed for the following installation conditions:

.01 The circulating water pipe shall be installed with the class of trench orembankment bedding shown on the applicable Ebasco drawings.

The bedding material - ~here specified on the applicable Ebasco drawings orwhere required by the Owner - shall be crushed rock and shall consist of hard,durable rock such as granite, sandstone or conglomerate and shall meet thefollowing gradation requirement:

Size Percent Finer

1/2 in.No. 4No. 40No. 200

10083-10036-540-10

The bedding material shall be compacted to a minimum relative density of 70

percent or as specified in the applicable design drawings. Density testsshall be conducted by the Owner in accordance with the provisions of ASTM

D-2049, "Relative Density of Cohesionless Soils." In-place density shall bedetermined by either of the following methods:

a - ASTM D1556, "Density of Soil in-place by Sand Cone Method."

b - ASTM D2167, "Density of Soil in-place by the Rubber-BalloonMethod."

.One (1) in«place density test shall be conducted by the Owner for every100 feet of pipe installed.

.02 Selected backfill material shall be soil overburden material obtainedfrom local overburden excavation at the site, and shall not contain any rocksor boulders exceeding 3 in. in size. The material shall be hand or machinecompacted ia layers not more than 6 in. compacted thickness and to the densityspecified in the applicable drawings.

The following unit weights shall be used for the backfill:

a - Maximum saturated unit weight: 135 pcf

b - Minimum submerged unit weight: 73 pcf


Pro)ect Identification No. CAR-SH-CH-9


11. INSTAL1ATION CONDITIONS (Cont 'd)

.03 Random fillmaterial may be any excavated unclassified materialor rock. The material shall be machine compacted in layers and to thedensities as determined by a test fillsection.

.04 The pipeline shall be designed to ~ithstand either of the followinggroundwater conditions under all loadings specified in Paragraph 9:

a- Ground~ster level above top of pipe (pipe completely submerged)

b- Groundwater level below pipe invert (pipe completely dry)



SECTION IV - DELIVERY & MISCELLANEOUS SELLER'S RE UIREMENTS

12. DELIVERY

All necessary precautions shall be observed to prevent any damage to theconcrete pipe and other materials durIng delivery. Such precautions shallinclude but will not be limited to the following:

.01 Concrete pipe shall not be shipped from the Manufacturer's facilityuntil the design strength is obtained.

.02 Rubber gaskets shall be shipped in boxes to prevent damage in transitor while 'in stoi'age.

.03 All pipe shall be securely fastened to the truck or rail car to pre-vent movement or damage during transportation.

.04 The pipes, fittings and gaskets shall be inspected by the Owner uponarrival at the )obsite and damaged material will not be accepted.

.05 Pipe shipped by truck shall be delivered to a storage area as directedby the Owner, and unloaded by the Owner.

.06 Stacking pipe within the storage area will not be allowed.

13. FACTORY INSPECTION

The Seller shall provide every facility for the Owner to perform factoryinspection of the finished pipe immediately prior to shipment. The Ownershall again inspect the pipe in the field, prior to installation (seeParagraph 12.04 above).

14. SUPPLEMEÃSY INFORMATION BY SELLER

In addition to the information required, by the applicable AWWA specificationand specified herein, the Seller shall supply the Engineer with the followinginformation:

.Ol Design calculations showing the adequacy of the pipe design to with-stand the design loadings and conformance to the pertinent AWWA specificationrequirements.

.02 All test reports documenting the results of tests specified in thisspecification and/or in accordance with the applicable AWWA specification(see Section II, Paragraph 5, above).

.03 Installation requirements and procedure for pipe installation.



SECTION IV - DELIVERY 6 MISCELLANEOUS SELLER'S RE IREMENTS (Cont'd)

MANUFACTURER DRAWINGS

The Seller shall prepare and submit to the Engineer for approval drawingsshowing the following information:

.01 Details of the pipe, fittings, coatings and joints to be manufact-ured with pertinent dimensions, locations and reinforcing or prestressingsteel requirements.

.02 The plan and profile location of each section of pipe and theidentifying marks.

.03 Detail drawing of bonded joint showing method used to provideelectrical continuity for pipe line.

R6

16 INSP CTION QUALITY CONTROL

The following inspection ard/o Quality Control requir men s sha3~ bc met:

"(1) The Seller shall provide and main.ain an Inspection/Quality Control Systemv¹ch vi11 assu=e that all items subMt ed to he Purchase" o" acceptancecon.ow to he contract requiremcn.s vhethe manufactured o" processed by the ScDeror procured from subcontractors. (2) The seller shall perfcrm or have pe"formthe insmction and tests required to substantiate product conformance to draw-ing, specification, and contrac requirements and shall also pcrfo~ or haveper orred all inspc tions and tests otheWse requi ed by thc contract. (3) 'heSeLler's Inspection/Quality Control System shall be documented and shall bcsubmitted to the Purchaser for reviev prior to the award of contract and be avail-able for reviev throughout the life of the contract. (4 ) The Purchase" at hisoption may furnish mitten notice of the acceptability or nonacceptability ofthe Inspection/Quality Control System. (5) The Seller shall notify the Pur-chaser in writing of any change to his Inspection/Quality Control System. TheInspection/Quality Control System shall be subJect to disapp oval if changesthereto vould result in a noncon orming product."

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER Open Item No. 112 (FSAR Section 9.5.4,NRC uestion 430 27

EDEFSS compliance with ANSI-N195.

The concern is with the tank overflow line. Provide details andelectrical schematics of the control system design which preventsthe pump from running continuously. Provide a statement that allfloor drains in the diesel generator building are seismicallydesigned or if they are not describe why they are not requiredto be seismically designed. Provide additional information onthe return of fuel oil after it passes through the oil'eparatorsand whether the floor drains, pumps and separators vill performafter a design bases accident. Describe the impact of drainline interconnection in regards to impact on connected dieselgenerator areas to a flooding diesel generator area. Providejustification for using a simplex strainer design rather than.the"recommended-ANSI-N195-1976 duplex strainer. The concern onstrainer type is the potential for clogging and maintenanceproblems.

~Res anse

The emergency diesel engine fuel oil transfer control schemefrom the main fuel oil storage tank to the emergency dieselgenerator day tank is presented on drawing CAR-2166-3-430 Sheets19.3 and 19.5, Revision 6, Figure 7.3.1-26.

The control system shown on the Instrument Schematics and LogicDiagrams maintains the proper level of diesel oil in the day tankby the use of interlocks between the hi-hi, hi and lo level switcheson the day tank. The pumps are automatically controlled throughthe use of level switches activated by the day tank fuel oillevel. In the event the fuel oil transfer pump falls to stopupon receipt of a high day tank level signal, a solenoid operatedvalve, located in the inlet to the day tank will close on a hi-hilevel signal thereby preventing overflow. With the day tank inlet- -,,valve closed, the fuel oil transfer pump will operate-in a .-recirculation mode discharging, oil into the main fuel oilstorage tank as shown in Figure 9.5.4-1.

Each day tank is provided with two level transmitters, one is anon-nuclear safety grade, seismic Category I device for local levelindication and hi, lo-lo alarm annunciation at the diesel enginecontrol panel. This level transmitter also provides a hi, lo-loalarm annunciation for the Control Room. The second level trans-mitter is a class lE, seismic Category I device providing day tanklevel indication in the Control Room.

Each day tank has two class IE, seismic Category I level switches.One switch provides hi, lo level signals and the other switchprovides a hi-hi level signal. Day tank overfill will be preventedby either switch. The hi, lo level switch will provide pumpshutoff on a hi level signal and the day tank inlet valve will beclosed on a hi-hi level signal from the hi-hi level switch.

,Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,Draft SW en Item No. 112 Cont'd)

~Res onse (Cont'd)

Therefore, the safety grade day tank instrumentation will preclude

the overfill event.

Xn the unlikely event the fuel oil transfer pump fails to stopon a day tank hi level signal and the solenoid valve at the day

tank inlet fails to close on a hi-hi level signal, the fuel oilwill exceed its design level and flow out of the day tank througha over flow line to the day tank cubicle.

In the event of a failure of the day tank or piping the day tankcubicle has been sized to hold approximately 3,650 gallons whichexceeds the margin recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.120 (i.e.llOX of the .tank volume) before reaching the cubicle access doorlevel. Cubicle access is via stairs to a platform 3 feet above thefinished floor as sho~n in Figure 1.2.2-87 thereby minimizingthe potential for leakage.

The day tank cubicle has a drain system that includes a normally closed

valve. Drainage of the day tank cubicle can occur via operation of

the diethe normally closed drain valve in con)unction with oper ti fa on 0

e diesel generator sump drain system. Diesel generator cumppumps discharge to the oil separator. Fuel oil, separated fromsludge and water, is not reused but is disposed of as shown inFigure 9.5.5-2, (drawing 2165-G«133, Rev 4).

Floor drains, sump pumps, and oil separators are not required tofunction after a design bases accident and are therefore designedas non-seismic Category I. In the event of a failure of the aon-ceismic Category I systems, safety system will not be adverselyaffected and wi11 function as designed.

hs shown in Figure 9.5.5-2, Amendment No. 5, the diesel generatorroom sump pump discharge drain piping has valving and is physicallyarranged to minimize potential flooding in one diesel generatorarea from affecting the other areas. The cumps include Class IEseismic Categoy I Level instrumentation to alert the Control Roomoperators of potential flooding.

The diesel fuel oiL transfer pumps are provided with a single basketstrainer ia the pump suction line. The simplex strainer was con-servatively sized so that even when the strainer is 90K cl'oggedthere is a negligible pressure drop across the strainer at thedesign flow rate. In addition the suction line is provided witha f2.-'- =-'tch to alarm on abnormal conditions. Since the fueloiL quality is periodically tested and monitored, the straineris emected not to clog during 7 days of operation without maintenance.In the event the pump suction strainer is clogged due to extended dieselgenerator operation,.the strainer can be cleaned/replaced during dieselgenerator operation since adequate day tank fuel oil storage capacityis provided. In addition to the simplex strainers on the diesel fuel oil


~Res onse (Cont'd)

transfer pumps suction line, a duplex strainer is provided at the suctionside and a duplex filter provided at the discharge of the diesel enginefuel oil pump provided for each diesel.

The SHNPP FSAR will be revised to reflect this response.

%jan )AHA-6k& k lk'0l ~ 'I

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER Open Item No. 127 (FSAR Section 10.2,NRC uestion 430.65)

Turbine speed control and overspeed protection description.

NRC Clarification of 0 en Item No. 127

Provide more detailed information on how the turbine speed controland overspeed protection system functions. Provide a narrative onsystem operation including details on the percentage overspeed whereinterlocks are initiated. A description of the system operationshould be provided to determine if the system can withstand a singlefailure and remain functional (i.e. fail safe). A failure modes andeffects analysis is not required but sufficient information should beprovided to determne that if the system has a component failure itwill shutdown the turbine generator unit.

RESPONSEThe responses provided to NRC Questions 430-65 (August 31, 1982) and

430.71 (August 2, 1982) and Open Item 150 adequately address the concerns inthis Open Item with the addition of the following information.

The turbine stop, control, reheat and intercept valves protect theturbine from exceeding set speeds and protect the reactor system from abnormalsurges. Valve arrangement as shown in Figures 10.1.0-1 and 10.1 ~ 0-2 alongwith the valve closure time of 0.25 seconds or less prevent excessive turbineoverspeed in the event of a TGS trip signal and a failure of any single valveto close.

During wide range speed control, the control reference is thedesired value of the turbine generator speed. An operator can set or change

'the-"speed reference through various control panel actuators. Operatorsettings made at the panel are used by the electronic controller to positionthe steam valves by comparing the turbine speed to the reference settingsselected by the operator. After synchronization, the load reference will beused to control the turbine.

Figure 10.2.2-10 shows the turbine emergency trip system and Figure7.3.1-1, sheet 7 of 7 indicates the turbine-generator protection system inputto the Solid State Protection System.

For speed control following load rejection, the Overspeed ProtectionController (OPC) action of the electro-hydraulic control system interruptssteam flow at approximately 103 percent of the rated turbine speed by closingthe control and intercept valves.

The turbine overspeed protection is provided by redundant mechanicaland electrical trip mechanisms. The electrical trip mechanism includes theemergency trip valve which acts as a backup to the mechanical overspeed tripmechanism. This redundancy provides adequate protection against turbineoverspeed in the event of high and moderate energy piping failures.

The DEH electrical overspeed device consists of magnetic pickupsmounted at the turning gear spacer and shaft driven oil pump and speed cardsmounted in the trip system cabinet, for a total of three speed inputs The

pickup output frequencies are converted into an analog signal and compared one

to another to guard against erroneous signals, and then compared with a tripset point. When the turbine speed exceeds the setpoint of approximately 110

percent (1980 rpa) of the rated speed, all four auto stop emergency tripsolenoid valves, 20/AST, are energized to drain EH fluid and thereby shut allturbine steam inlet valves.

All electrical trips including overspeed trip are effected throughthe 20/AST solenoid valves which are arranged in a series-parallelconfiguration into two channels. This arrangement requires at least onesolenoid valve from each channel to be open to cause a trip.

Por additional detail on the overspeed protection devices, see theresponse to Open Item 150.

'PSAR Section 1'0 2;2 will'be revised in a future-amendment to reflectthis response.

Opea Item 150

'rotection of'urbine overspeed control system in case of high ormoderate energy line failure.~Res ense:

In order for the turbine-generator unit to overspeed, it must

first be. disconnected. from fts load, which fs the electrica1

distribution. grid.. Assuming that the T-8 unit fs suddenly

disconnected from the grid while operating at load, %he

following 'overspeed protection devices prevent the T-t'* unitfrom.reaching a damagfng overspeed:.

1. Oversoeed P~otection Controller - The OPC is associated

with the turbine digital electrohydraulfc control

(DEH) system. Speed is detected by an electricalpickup located inside the turbine governor pedestal

and transmitted electrically vfa conduft and cable

tray to the computer equipment room. When the speed

signal reaches, or exceeds, 103% of rated speed, an

electrical signal is sent to solenoid actuated valves

which dump the high pressure EH fluid fn the turbin'e

governor valves and interceptor valves, thereby

'hutting off steam flow to the turbine and 'limiting the

speed to a maximum of approximately 108% of rated

speed.

Pro".ection of the components from a high or moderate

energy line failure fs provided as follows. The speed

pickup is located inside the governor pedestal, which

is well protected against steam or water jets, high

temperature and humidity, and pipe whfp. Electrfcalwiring is run in conduit and electrical trays between

the governor pedes.al, temfnal boxes, computer

equipment room and steam valve servo-actuatons, This

wiring. is we11 separated from the wiring us d with other

protection systems so that damage which might occu~ to the

wiring of one system should not affect the wirfng of other

systems. The servo-actuators are ~ugged components with

~ ~

heavy spring 1oads which close the valves when thehydraulfc pressure is removed. The solenoid actuatedvalves, whfch dump the high pressure hydraulic fluid,

~ are energized to open the steam. valves and de-energized

to close the steam valves.. Therefore, damage to theconnectfng wiring would resu1t fn closure of the steam

valves.'he steam valves are opened by admittinghigh pressure hydraulic fluid under the servo-actuatonpiston, which compresses a heavy spring bank to open

the steam valve. When the solenoid valve is de-energized

to dump the hydraulic fluid under the piston, a passage-

is .opened to allow the fluid to go either to the drainline or to the space above the top of the piston (which

has greater volume than that under the piston, therebyensuring valve closure even ff the drain line were tobe crimped).

'.2. ~01Tt -Tt p dp|kph1 t'ai thturning gear housing, which is well removed from the .

governor pedestal. The e1ectrical -speed signal. istransmitted to the computer equipment room via conduit>terminal box and cable tray, similar to the signal from

" the Qversp'eed"Protectfon Controller. Nhen the speed

. setpoint is exceeded. a single channe'l signal is sentto the Emergency Trip System Cabinet, from which tripsignals are transmitted vfa two channels to the Trip Block

located inside the governor pedestal ~hich dumps the high

pressure hydraulfc fluid supply to drain, thereby closfngall the turbine steam control valves {stop valves, governor

valves, reheat stop valves and interceptor valves). This

.action limits the turbine..speed to not more than 1'Ã ofrated speed. The overspeed trip performs he same function

., electrically as the emergency overspeed,trip does mechanfcally.

In addition, the overspeed trip electrical signal to the Trip Block can beinitiated manually with a switch on the Main Control Board.

3 ~ EMERGENCY OVERSPEED TRIP

If the TW unit speed should reach the setting of the Emergency

Overspeed Trip (approximately 110Z of rated speed), a spring loaded

weight in the turbine rotor, located in the governor pedestal, moves

radially outward and strikes a trip lever which opens a drain passage

and dumps the mechanical overspeed and manual trip header oil. Loss

,of this oil,pressure causes a„hydraulically actuated valve to open

and dump the high pressure hydraulic fluid, closing all the steam

valves (stop, governor, reheat stop and interceptor). This system is

entirely hydraulic, and is independent of electrical control. Itlimits the maximum speed to not more than 120Z rated speed, which is

the design value.

The emergency overspeed trip system is protected against high and

moderate energy line breaks. The emergency trip device is enclosed

in the governor pedestal and actuates a valve mounted on the governor

pedestal to dump the high pressure hydraulic fluid. Although

crimping of tubing is conceivable, damage which would prevent timely

closure of the steam valves is very unlikely as the hydraulic tubing

is run on the inside of the T-G concrete pedestal where minimum

exposure to high and moderate energy lines is attained. In addition,

the redundancy of the three overspeed protection systems makes the

potential:for failure of all three a very low probability. Further,

the emergency overspeed trip can be actuated manually via a lever

mounted on the outside of the governor pedestal.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft SER Open Item No. 151 (FSAR Section 10.2,NRC estion 430.73)

Provide details of the hydrogen storage system.

NRC CLarification of 0 en Item No. 151

Provide a description of the design of the hydrogen system. Include inthe discussion the provisions provided for isolation and interconnectionto the turbine generator. and the procedures used for purging. Providedetailed piping flow and physical drawings for the hydrogen system in theTurbine Building. Provide a description of the provisions for fire andexplosion protection.

~Res esse

Details of the hydrogen storage system will be included in a new sectionto the Shearon Harris FSAR, Section 9.3.9, "Hydrogen Gas System." Thissection is included as the CPGL response in the same format as it willappear. in the FSAR. Sufficient information is provided to address the NRCquestions and conerns. Drawings considered applicable for, your review arelisted in Attachment A. As agreed in an April 27, 1983 telephoneconversation, full size drawings detailing the hydrogen system piping andthe physical layout in the turbine building are provided.

HYDROGEN GAS SYSTEM

Design Basis

The Hydrogen Gas system is a non-safety system designed to applicableindustry standards in order to assure its capability to meet the followingfunctional requirements:

1. Supply the plant main generator with sufficient hydrogen gas forgenerator rotor- and stator cooling;

2. Maintain hydrogen gas pressure in the generator at specified valuesassuring continuous, safe generator cooling;

3. Dry the hydrogen gas and remove any liquids entering the generatorfrom the rotor shaft gland seal oil system or hydrogen coolers;

4 Provide continuous indication of the generator. hydrogen gas pressurestemperature and purity to the plant operator;

5. Provide an alarm upon sensing liquid in the generator stator.

6. Provide for removal of hydrogen gas from the generator by purgingwith carbon dioxide;

7. Supply hydrogen gas to the WPS Gas Storage tanks;

8 ~ Supply hydrogen gas to the volume control tank.

System Description

Hydrogen gas is supplied to the non-safety generator cooling system andthe safety grade'GWPS gas decay tanks and volume control tank as shown onFSAR Figure 10.2.2-5.

The CVCS volume control tank is supplied with hydrogen gas during normalpower operation to control and scavenge oxygen from reactor. coolant. SeeFSAR Section 9.3.4.1. 2. 2 and FSAR Figure 9.3.4-3 for details.

Hydrogen gas is also supplied to the GWPS and mixed with nitrogen. Thegas mixture is then introduced to the gas decay tanks to be used as a

'arriergas for radioactive gas removed from 'various systems as detailed .

in FSAR Section 11.3.2 and shown on FSAR Figure 11.3. 2-1. The hydrogengas in the GWPS is continuously removed by a hydrogen recombiner and notallowed to build up in the GWPS.

The main generator. is a hydrogen inner-cooled unit utilizing hydrogen gasas the coolant. The hyd'rogen gas for charging and replenishing thegenerator is supplied from a central gas storage facility located in theyard as shown on FSAR Figure 1.2.2-2. Carbon dioxide, which is used for.purging hydrogen gas, is also located in the central gas storage facilityas shown on FSAR Figure 1. 2.2-2. The central gas storage facility has a1500-gallon bulk liquid hydrogen cryogenic storage tank equivalent to170,000 scf of hydrogen. The tank is a double tank designed, fabricated,and tested in accordance with the ASME Code for. Unfired Pressure Vessels,Section VIII. The inner tank is stainless steel and the outer tank iscarbon steel. Tank design pressure is 150 psig with an operating pressureof 135 psig. The tank has piping, regulators, valving, rupture discs andexplosion proof instruments for system control and safety. Vented gas isdischarged through a 15 foot 10 inch high stack whichassures atmosphericdispersion with no local pocketing. The tank hydrogen control systemincludes C02 fire suppression provisions.

Liquid hydrogen is fed from the storage tank to ambient vaporizers then toa manifold with valving that delivers hydrogen gas at 120 psig, and 200scfm.

The hydrogen gas system consists of the necessary piping, valves, pressuregauges, regulators, coolers, hydrogen seal oil unit, hydrogen and carbondioxide pressure control stations, turbine-generator hydrogen controlpanel, gas dryer and other ancillary equipment. The hydrogen seal oilunit, pressure control station, hydrogen contiol panel and gas dryer arelocated in the turbine building (elevation 261 feet) as shown on FSARFigures l. 2. 2-64 and 1. 2. 2-76. Piping from the gas storage facility tothe turbine building is shown on FSAR Figure 10.2.2-5. The hydrogen andcarbon dioxide system with interconnecting piping and valving is shown onFSAR Figure 10.2.2-6. Removal of heat from the hydrogen is via coolersserved by the non-nuclear safety portion of the service water system asshown on FSAR Figure 9.2.1-2.

Hydrogen gas system pressure is controlled by manually adjustable pressureregulators and valving.

The hydrogen seal oil unit shown on FSAR Figures 1.2.2-64 and 1.2.2-76provides oil,for gland seals on the, generator rotor shaft for a gas tightenclosure to prevent the escape of hydrogen cooling gas along thegenerator shaft.

Hydrogen gas is routed to the hydrogen pressure control station from thehydrogen gas storage facility where it is introduced to the generator gassystem. The gas is distributed uniformally to the various compartments ofthe generator by means of perforated pipe manifolds located in the top ofthe generator housing.

Purging of the Generator Cooling System

To safely work on the generator unit the hydrogen co'oling gas must beremoved. Introduction of carbon dioxide for hydrogen gas purging is viathe hydrogen gas pipe manifolds. The carbon dioxide is supplied from thegas .storage facility and introduced into the generator cooling system viathe carbon dioxide pressure control panel. Carbon di,oxide is introducedat the bottom of the generator. housing via the pipe manifold, as ascavenging gas and to purge the lighter hydrogen gas out through the topgas cooling pipe manifold. The. purged hydrogen gas is routed via pipingto a vent external to the turbine building. The vent is appropriatelylocated away from personnel and any ignition source. The carbon dioxidepurge operation is conducted when the system is at a standstill or onturning gear. Sufficient carbon dioxide is introduced to replace thehydrogen in the generator. The hydrogen content of the gas mixture willbe purged to less than 5%. At least two volumes (two purges of thegenerator) are required for sufficient scavenging. For the purgingoperation a hydrogen purity meter. is connected to the top of thegenerator housing. An acceptable purging will provide a purity meterindication of approximately 95K carbon dioixde. After successful purgingand pressure reduction the generator housing may be opened and the sealoil supply turned off. Covers in each end of the generator frame are thenopened and forced venting of any carbon dioxide is begun.

Safety Evaluation

The hydrogen gas system is a non-nuclear safety system; however, thepossibility of a hydrogen gas fire and/or explosion exists.

The hydrogen gas storage area is located such that a malfunction orfailure of a component of the hydrogen gas system has no adverse effect onany safety related system or component. The hydrogen gas systems yardpiping is underground with guard piping and appropriately located ventingas shown on FSAR Figure 10.2. 2-5. Gas piping is routed to minimizehazards by locating the gas lines in areas with low fire potential,limited ignition sources and low personnel occupancy. Hazards associatedwith hydrogen gas accumulation within building areas are minimized by thelocation of hydrogen equipment and piping in turbine building areas thatare well ventilated. Fire protection for those areas containing thehydrogen gas system are provided and described in FSAR Section 9.5A.Valving and pressure control is provided with indication and alarms forconditions that may lead to unsafe system operation.

The ensure that the generator cooling gas does not become contaminated andprovide an unsafe condition, the purity of the hydrogen cooling gas in thegenerator is monitored.

Instrumentation and Controls

The hydrogen gas storage tank has a hi-lo pressure switch and local alarm.

Protective alar'ms included in the generator hydrogen gas system are:4

1. Generator. Hydrogen Pressure — High and Low alarm on the hydrogencontrol panel;

2. Generator Hydrogen Cooling System Mater. Detector. —High alarm onlocal hydrogen equipment panel;

3. Pressure Control Station Hydrogen Supply Pressure — Low alarm onlocal pressure control panel.

A hydrogen 'cold gas thermostat is located in the generator to provide atemperature, sensor that will initiate a signal to cause an alarm if thetemperature of the hydrogen gas in the generator. becomes excessive.

The purity of the hydrogen gas in the generator is determined through theuse of hydrogen purity transmitter. and purity meter blower.. The purityindicating transmitter is a differential pressure instrument whichmeasures the pressure developed by the puxity blower. The pressuredeveloped by the blower will vary directly with the density of thegenerator. cooling gas. An explosion-proof purity indicating transmittersupplies an output signal proportional to the hydrogen gas density. Twoswitch assemblies are provided with the purity indicating transmitter.which are set to produce a hydrogen purity high and low alarm whendifferential pressure exceeds or falls below predetermined limits.

Test and Inspection

The hydrogen system is tested functionally under. all anticipated operatingconditions prio'r. to initial plant startup. This verifies that all systemunits and controls function properly. The system is also tested duringnormal plant operation to ensure its operability.

(7 247 JDKk) r)

ATTAQBKNT A

Drawin Number Title

1364-1556, Revision 2

1364-3500, Revision 1

Turbine Generator Gas Diagram

Turbine Generator Gas DryerOutline

1364-1555, Revision 1

CAR-2165-G-ill S01, OpenRevision 7

Turbine Generator Gas SupplyOutline

Miscellaneous 2 inch & Unde".

Piping Turbine Building Unit 1

Sheet 1

CAR-2165-G-111 S02, OpenRevision 7

Miscellaneous 2 inch & UnderPiping Turbine Building Unit 1

Sheet 2

CAR-2165-G-111 S03, OpenRevision 7

1364-1500, Revision 5

Miscellaneous 2 inch & UnderPiping Turbine Building Unit 1

Sheet 3

Turbine Generator HydrogenPanel Outline

CAR-2165-G-002, Open Revision 8

CAR-2165-G-005, Open Revision

8'AR-2165-G-008,

Open Revision 7

CAR-2165-G-088, Revision 6

CAR-2165-G-058, Open Revision 3

Plot Plan Units 1 and 2

General Arrangement TurbineBuilding Ground Floor PlanUnit 1

General Arrangement TurbineBuilding Sections — Sheet 1 Unit 1

Flow Diagram Miscellaneous SystemsUnits 1 and 2

Flow Diagram Miscellaneous Gas

Systems Units 1 and 2

Open Item 1'54

Abflfty of turbine over speed protection system to withstand failureof the turbine bypass.

~ ~ ~

~Res ense:

-"The;-effectiveness of the turbine overspeed protection system is not

related to the operational capability of the turbine bypass system.

Shauld a turbine bypass system pipe fail whi1e the bypass sys.em was

active, it may be possible for the ruptured line to impact a hydraulic

fluid drain line from the turbine overspeed pro.ection system.

However. the redundancy and physical separation of the several turbireoverspeed protection systems would preclude loss of overspeed protection.

Meteorological and Effluent Treatment Branch/J. HayesOpen Items 164, 167, 174, 180, 188, 192, 231

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)0 en Etem 164 (DSER Section 11.4.2 Pa e 11-22)

~nestion

Provide a drawing (CAR-2165&-827) that depicts the resin sluiceheader and the waste concentrate tank.

~Res onse

A copy of drawing CAR-2165M-827, which shows the resin sluiceheader and the waste concentrate tank, was provided with the response toQuestion 460.23 (Sept. 16, 1982 letter to H. R. Denton from CP&L) and wasadded to the FSAR in Amendment 5 as Figure 11.4.2-4. FSAR Figure 11.4.2-4will be revised to delete Units 3 6 4 us'ing the attached updated drawing.

Also attached is a copy of drawing CAR-2165-G-828 which showsconnections from CAR-2165M-827.

(7 205NLUlcv)

%4441 sll

IWI .III44

DETAL.ATTITITTTIIIIIsrNwll

DETAIL C:lslswrw

~ W.~

Iw ~iw.444 TA lrl 44444

. ocTAa.eIsrll ITITwDETAIL D

TTIII

~WS SSSS~4

SS WI' IW~I\4 I' Irs w I

Tl I~

~ Ws IwsII SIOTSSsIr

4

I Sl ~siss ~

Iw 4 ~ Esslswsl

I ms

SW ~ WW4~ «( L

4 tr tsssL I sssswsSEAFasw'EhaTlsw I»II

4 Tssslrss Ot VDIOss

~W SW4K W

SSW sl~wsww IIWI E%7~ZSE4

~~TI ~~~+~@Mes

5\ 4~I

sees

j IWQW \

~ I

@st

IS

i.4

TI ss

Qiteee~l ~

~ ~I4W

4TIS441

a~a~sss

ssslrs

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Carolina Power ET Light Company

saws ~II4 ~s WASTE PROCESSING SySTEMCONCENTRATES STORAGE &SPENT RESIN

TRANSFER

REF DTEo: CARateaoaa7 (ROT.SI FIGURE 11.4.24

~IOTCCL

$0MOOO

W~I MM«4

COCOFO T444FC4 KKCOO 04LL1 LCC 0 CAA LIMCOCMCO M LCO TF

LACOC tCKTKAC 44OLAITO tlLOLAIF'CCO AOTCOC TOKTCAC

Io too LOT ltOltcolOCc 144 5 tcc OLMroL

CAO 44 CIO.COOOW4 11141 OLAAKCO OOOACCO tllOVTIIAC4 Ot MKO

~ C441ICOT404OMOO lt440

IMO04 Mt

ILC

0101~LLM 144

MCCA4

004 ~ tMTK~

MLWMIOCOLWOTIO

14 140"1 \» CC

TM MOOTA~

COOOOO

~ 1114

~ Q+t~04

.4 414

~ I

LMIO410404;

4 14 \0044OOOOO

TOCW

o+

4 I

1~Ol 4

~41 4

COT A

CO~4 ~ 4

~ 4COL+tet

TMMC 4T» WM'AOI

~IF

ttMOFL+1~ 4 '4

~ 1 ~

4 4~41M 04AI

14 014T44 OOO,OI

~A4 «44OOO ~IF

O.MOOOOO'TTVO CAO'l

~ M40~440441

~ MM 444 Ml

MlOVI

~4 T

MOT~ 4

t T.

Icc I


Carolina Power 5 Liqht Companv

naF owot cAR.216ro&428 (Mv.5)

FLOW 0IAGRAM, WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

SPENT RESIN TRANSF ER

FIGURE;164-1

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)0 en Item 167 (DSER Section 11.4.2 Pa e 11-22 and 11-23)

Question

Provide details on how the filter sludge from the following filters will behandled:

reactor coolantseal water injectionseal water returnboric acidBRS recycle evaporator feedBRS recycle evaporator concentratesecondary wasterecycle evaporator condensatefuel pool demineralizerfuel pool and refueling purificationfuel pool skimmer..

NRC Clarification

Reviewer has requested drawing CAR-2165-G847.

~Res esse

FSAR Question 460.27, regarding this same topic, was answered by CP8L's letterof September 16, 1982 to Mr. Harold R. Denton, and supplemented by inclusionof drawings CAR-2165-G-849S01 and CAR-2165-G-849S02 in FSAR Amendment 5 asFigures 11.4.2-5 and 11.4.2-6. respectively.

A copy of drawing CAR-2165-G-847 is attached.

(7218NLUkjr)

041 I

caa-t«t 420nor~«I I I

g«IACtt10 ~%H 04-545 TIITIN~I

'H«1 at Aa t««caaall IC ~

laatlactoa a«T 4044..0 t'Hla« 4

~ sass SI I IW01 I

~III ~

ttr tl stet 4444

Ma 4 ~ IKa«IIII

5tt'AINIran

041 KI

~Krn I ~

nr THIT naasanttl«4«s

I0«

'«« taa«l

Wats.ls ~

W«II HI

HKK«ITI~

I

w«NI(l

1~+5 « I ~

C«lt«W4«t 4

WT«NI

I Kaga

WTHH~

.Kali 40«I

-sn0 ~

W«004CI

ltl'«««sat ~

NI

~tOE1AL C

atSI

I IN~ 44 II IAPICITKIPI

~ 4DETAL o

~0

It

t

1

w ntnaa

Wa IIPs

NI0

~ 4

Wan«CS

Mant 'CI

W45 HI

W4 0 illMaaa 41

444404«000 CCT C

444««CI

NS C

SKITta+I

«0 as

x Qt!

W41 II

P'r ~ «0

Ka

I

Nl~

fi

p

II'l4

H«4

~ 10« III~ala

Wh 1Pa Tn II

4 «1 t ~

444 ~ H IW 141st

an41~I 'I

~ 411 NIC

~ 0

24

Is««tt ~ O'I

~aattllC

~ 411

~~alas

sott 'toa vl«c caAN alo 0AIA«w«T 404~«4 ~g lal«HPs Nc ssltcAColtAas 54550'st«aolatt 5104044 104 asstac Ocsts«sa~E«cac 440444 staat IJP

~ MPK«44 \0 n«044

~ 4

N«TN Cl I041

4444«IC ~

tta~sataw

ClKON1Kn Ia

I I 9 Wttta1n«AIN

5

I .

Pns ns4444414 ~

I

aava«l.t

Rl

Cat A

n \ ~

~ 41\T 4

~In~ aa««It ~

a«tant I

ltt 4

Ott A

«4, allla««lttI&II«01

HC'ATI

4«SPHat

IA/,I~

~ . ~

Ma ISMI~~ I ~

as ~

4

~ t

cataat A

TIIKIINIAt ~ 11 Nts I

«I Oat A4

IaaanWK ~ ~

~.IN ~

(KK I ~~ 'I

r ~I4 «gr TICKvN«sa na%0

ttlt't4SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Carolina Power & Light Company

'EF owot CAR-21G$ 0447 (REV. 4, OPEN)

FLOW DIAGRAM~ FUEL HANDLINGBUILDING '

FILTER BACKWASH SYSTEM i

FIGURE 167-1

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)0 en Item 174 (DSER Section,11.4.2 Pa e 11-23

~uestfon

Provide details showing that the vent exhaust from the spent resinstorage tanks and the decanting tanks are filtered by a HEPA filter inaccordance with BTP ETSB 11-3 (SRP 11.4) .

~Res onse

Attached are copies of the following drawings which show the detailsof the vent exhaust from the spent resin storage tanks and the decantingtanks:

CAR 2168M-494-S01CAR 2168-G"494-S02CAR 2168M-494-S03CAR 2168-G-495-S02CAR 2168M-495-S07CAR 2168-G-495-S08CAR 2168M-495-S10CAR 2168-G-533-S03CAR 2165M-828CAR 2165-G-928

(7212NLU)

aro(1

~ WTAWE

~4 (ttttw(ala Itt-~

WIN ~

«CA«A «two oawaw

INwlw(awa)~CW NO IWI

No Iaot EwaoWNa lll«lo 4 allot(to(

T~MEral o Now«la«at Nl

~Igg tal~

X'

go)

a o wawa

~ WW

N

I~III

(C ~

a«T

~L

I

ot 4

I

NC

~ .

a Nio~ca

~WC

NO-TL'L~~

na lto~CC

Lo~

wa wEw~,

a

~ W«N NI

KN~POOI

« lot % W ~

L! Nt «I«c (

PoWNWO I

~ Iw No or a

OWN~Os

~ a Wt~ ~ ««a

' I

a«ca~o(

4

N \

~ NlN

~ ~

loL'

~

NW W EWC

I2««Iawt~«'WE Nt4

La. Wl

EawT"

~ \

V~wA~V«to

t—"%i%.gtg wa

Ctt IUS

NO(CS~ talatl \ WIINC«rl NNWIWWW CWIE ~ OWW.

CN IWO~WIW IWtWgl~ NC C Ntatal NW

N N4 Co ~ \

r""- 8@I" AVc.III(w Ew w

Jt co

~t

wa No

~\

NN1c~a N ~ tc

~NIPART PLAN

a wl

EI Ealoo

&4 NI

+a wa It«

waa \w.too cwtt ~~ ra ~ Not N aa

I tow« a (((RQa

Pi'i

WCC. 1+A N

a I Caww4N» I

E Iwl

a

ow

. G5-NC Ig

~ ~ ~

E arlN t ~

Aa wl»

~ooaow awo / awaw ~ I altoa 'Ko

~o

w

~«t

NW IWa

r't

5141 w(a((I4

~ wI P «(4 ~ awaWI

aal altoNatlat«I

(C(( A(atc



REF OTTO( CARt21QMW4 501 (REV. 4,OPEN)

HVAC—WASTE PROCESSING'UILDING—EQUIPMENT ROOM

EL 291.00' SHEET IFIGURE 174-1

~ s»%~»t

»1 15

~ i

FV»t.Ms«

TR"'r.

Q~IM

~c

ss

'

C»i

c

~ ca'rh~hct

htt«M tsSr1xh

91 s

~V~sr~ 782

S 1-»-. S rvrvt »M» t V

~ Mt ~ \»tt ~ VMC» M

s

Cnsvt

wtc C~

In I

~

tis'~

rr, '~«M

cssi

ih

Ic

F~~C +VV

'C «SP

Mv

Eaks ii

~Ct s»M

CCRC.1»

%-Met«

=M epw

~ K

I~

i«ttc tti Sis Ct( Witt»V«««»»P+ .~

»Et»MC

s

2'C

Ch« M S»«C St he«st»

et 4. -™

rt.M'2',

t12v.

E'CR»»

~ t«

S«t

EP»

»2'M«2

Ivt

s tts« t

kl"'v

»cs»1 fS~ C«V«VS «»M C Msrhtttt »Mt Mt«cite»O MM ttS«MMMMt V ~ IHWV

C CCV««CW V«h« WC McMVM

BK .''g&= '»V»«h«

c«h»WIC»

»NSI CCCCASCC»

P'»It eg k srt

s ~\» i

h t« CA

C'«TCC s

C"rC»PC'IP

cs

V M~ s cnT

/~vhcs«h~ s»W«h

sc sW

ICCI

OiWPt, Ea»r. rIIC

I. RRs Mc««

cc»»S

ct

gv»

s"I ~

c c

~ ~« h «th«

CM

"192'd«i

«~MCIE



REF OWOI CAR-216%0v194 SO2 (REV.4,OPENI

HVAC—WASTE PROCESSINGBUILDING- EOUIPMENT ROOM

El 291.0(Y- SHEET 2FIGURE 174.2

Irttsp q'llPtt

/tILKjiltIssptaseaeeeceawa wl

(C -;P L<ee It

ItRsrt'

ItTSW

aItji'k~ww

UP I

Ler-Pb7'

~II'~ la ww

~I tSW

ILLPR|"

4

~ IV ', KLL~ ~ r

e'

K

I ~

7~~I i~teeLtt"t

Pew ~

LIVUPL

22ei4 SV ~

PL.r

4'I

@14 4

I~, teat t

E

ats essa

'p)i~7" RRZdrrm

ej

I

I wk' lII

F"t

Pew

UlU wl4

IPaya,PP SveeP

I

LlttUIU

~Uwsev 4I PPV 4

~twssvL

ls ~ '4 ta~ ~ll ~~r

U ~ lt

~ tl I Iw ~

SISWIQI ~ WV~ \

f'I"-'-. F

Lssw el

ltj lt~~

U we

fi

I

Wstw4 IVV'lt ~ laII

~ SV

4 t lePIPEILIVP

"ctwrwaglwl IWl ~ V~later I

L ~

'j

Te

~Itjw~I U~s

~ ww~LPI"~

It~Pew eleve

atCT Wcettsp

htlI~I~

VWI taeva~ I~IJL IV4

tttt ap.44041

t~IIV4

~ ~

~ etw

STCT IIP tpa

ttCT WP hsp

al ltee

„'Nv ate

Itw'IVsttCT WP TOIL

UllUPI

444 w'sr

W Wl~Iwee

SECT WP IPec

Q RCeVesww

~llI4'ITII.

~s ve Il~atCT LIIPTVVI

r.vaWW

~UVVPUWV

ACCT SIP)asa


Carolina Power iit Light Company

REF DWGI CAR-2168-G-494 503 (REV.S)

HVAC—WASTE PROCESSING BUILDINGEL 291t00-SHEET 3

FIGURE 1744

6 2 I3

Ka .

Iftf014

hp.w—

~ i»e I~ 1044IIIC-Ie I~ ~ Ote ) ( ~ Se tte»

sent ~ I~ Ifa lliele

~ Iaa

2kV2

a wa eo

4 a

01

~Il »IIIVItati ItI0 Iw1

at~ W

tf Iaaf~Itvw atv}a»toff44

t I ~

re'attU02

~I«

taa Ieat

Ol

~IN4 50

eva

1

elei ~ I~ I

SECT WPIO I~.»»II04

»etfc al ~

4 taI ~

t»Pw

l2

OCSftaaaLLD

Llt tile

NOIES~ tea tlala «olc' ~ IML ocaal aa»at

fte.tatotitttccaa.late.ttltscCta CWarfefet ~ Cll f444.»ttet

Lffletta oweleef taw tlltffteI»-O»OVI»t

42»»v

\~

ae 4

av

II.w ~~ WW

Ik .7hl

4 ret

4 thee jtWV a~et a of4 &+I

D»ffet

Iatov 1 w oeva~I 1001

~te 04 0~»

Iva

»IW1IIaw ow I~ Ivell WIWW~v»400 It lvvlist I~ »ee» IIow~ ~ ~ ~ Va

4

~ 4»Iill

wleatfa»evfto~li I

I~

the Qftote II 144

CIOIO 0441

1 ~ vft1 ~ ~ I ~lfat 1 1 ~ I

~ gN

SECT. WPA I ~ I-~ I~fetfa

Glffe ~ ~ 11 G> Itete ~ ~ ~ I

~0~@04ffeW4 tv4

lk55}t}

OI}th3}r. IEIIr5

ie ILa

»»

PZ~Fi™boa

g

44 VI}It™w~

4~etta ~ Iet 4401 ~

~00 W

4

~I

I ~ ~ Ire II ICe

attte w 44I 4

' IW 'S'll

0

I tte

r- 4 Iloot Iwetae

vaeoa alaevl

~ 0 04 tfSDk

PkT

VleT

I ~ IIf0414

44V0~PlI4 ef4

ttgri

»ooa

W ~

I

i j;~ 000

}IIP .

, LK"

I

gg IlkIll I 11 taa

W41401e»f tv

~«I I leavtaa

Pt 4 ~

~ 0

~see

IIO t»fit'll

~»'4

SECT IvP CS <IIIVa'4

~ I 4404Vl~ .~

I}00»

4iea 1FSEC'r. WPQI lo.sl ~ cvff

LICIOet et'll 4 Iffatlseltl01 cata aaaltel teat wa attva

I

~0 ffeve ~w0a tttt

41 tltIO

~ tw+ att tai00»e Iee

WP l4 Ctff ta'04SCCT


Carolina Power & Liaht Comoanv

REF OWQC CAR 2188%495 502 IREV. 8,OPENI

HVAC-WASTE PROCESSINGBUILOING—E I

236.00'HEET

IFIGURE 1744

~ IW»eo

I'R TNlf S ~ Ob IOfS

Qo,ewI

0~a»

@l0 locog~»NINW O

IIf.l0 WI ~

'ALVW It we[ ~t

Ifg OWWVII

RIIWI1

eua IOO

~%V.«fCS'h,

WIOI LNA CCOI'IOCIOCu feoO

g ~~i~Lo ~

WO

PZ ~~~vEO

5&~6"-c

.VILVLCIL~ R\WOISIgc0

IIIVIOIL

~I~

RIORVl

IeIPAXI

Qrft«ww+w

~0 lowe ICO00ao

OR I f00'IQ

!

I.L(0 5 fe INOoeI INL

jQE» $

1IO scow) ~I~Ilt:

0 ilOC¹lc5

RIIOIL La0I ~ I IIIIk0 tttO OOafl(ILOIO

E e<O0OR CO

0 I 'O ~

I~IW ~

, OOV.~~i

RL5'A'occca»5wla

Iwe IIWIIIOILV~O ~~a«

~+'IOLVICOL

I

E tarte

la VTS

PJgw

0«a

COTY

~o ~

IC ~

Se

VILVO Q P«samI

uLCL Cll,

IOLVO Cel

WIN«I

VI t»'0

IIRLCOI No N«NLWNLIeaeco ~ Woc

~elaaa ICL Wwo«altJOON otal lolINeoo «w NLvaov o«l NLINWNtow wI I!0 Iaa« NW OVOWON IOWOI~«N ee No colON 0 wIN

'L Na NCNWCI OWWILWNMO0«WOINWN OWI N

0veaf SR

LlVIW»t C

wtc~e)'I

I

~ IV«

I~ICA-~Y~

~e ove~ Iv«

I-0 «OW)5Lg

t»0

&NOILLLOVLaaeff«)~ EOT611LC«Loof

$»1 oT

Iwo ~at»a IWSc»I1

Oa '«0

ltploteLWs a»I ~ '

,IIIIIIWIW let.~

Nof

~IIWILLILIVWIaeea

~ WWWIN ~

0 WI I IafoeOIRI

00E'~ P

SECT Vl LC taa«o0oolavwgot~e

VWW

«I 'II

5ECT .VI'« a woNa« f0«I

~allo

0 ale. IOINVelao'

FT «eooooveNIWI

'1 - CP CP/I«LQ'a r0 ~N Io.l-

e av~»

SEET WP-(y tact»ct«oTavtFOf

WI»

wa

5EET Vl».T (I.„I

LOLVO Ckulf»0&e

a»N

us /I

Lf

Yw.et

f-'wl.

0 IIealelo

I IIOW Ka

w4h 'htE, ',$ 1RT PLOD EL Rtr'0

eccl ~ Fw eo(NIIC IW IWO IINOIN/0)

vfLO at wo««aeo o«ee II



AEF Dwol CAA4168%4sa 607 IAEY.S,OPEN)

HVAC-WASTE PROCESSINGBUILOING—EL 211.00

SHEET 2

F IGURE 174-5

NINO C

pRj'I >0—

ovoeoac

Pn«tsaot

EtLl

ct etoe»It «a rasa al tuoo

~«CP»«4 oa. fel 4111«VC eO

ac CMI teart a t«PTN s»f

040 cave 0«pleo

\

I

PA Too«M I ~ ) ~ .01 IOI

Iva Ieaea col ~ ' t eoo.

lou" v++leaeafta1.1»«tso«ooapoo P OI

IRg

~Acoec.co«Moll asaorto 'Pe)I

lttIa Ctlo

' )$o

ITopolLCO.I '1t 1»o ape

~a~OE TOOL Ocl-I sar-0 CA

Crt LAI atot~ ~

COLTECL Olau

c«paplca 0»M ~+~tritO

)13$-4-%—PS~»~I 1011«

av«14 ~~Stl1 Sf

~1«lat

ILTf-yy—Ig~&4I„I0

oppaosa

~ «eoo

PC ~IA EETE

'll loo I pe

~WOOM '~') ~

4 1001PLE I~EN«saos tt'0«vur

«E CATT«I«Tuoa cauaar ) f+PW wc«le»QPt af oo« ~

I».a~+OM««eras I lett.aao I e IVIlosI VPMaM »plop r

PLNIP01410

~oea wo

PO«etea

~4 Pollao)

444

o

«oa lees oe \»act.tpI

~I VAIL«st»u«4vuea aouaav tlcopaarooe

eatrt «Ls OA rcoaru 41

»earl L«to«0 IL«T«NO»«

81», Ete

aaa toter ILtaros Io~la««M Is« Pal «1 I ~ I~

ocllua 110E TLtaoala IC ~

~»If0 e 0 ta oa«tl solo«~tppct Ooao p o

«avo cauaaf

~ I CCLE. TE»L A»P Lto »N

I~ ««avo ~ oo «N

~ 1 COOL Tse ~ A~~ lese 1»s flap ~ K«I

~ too„CP« «Lva caualr

~ 41«CC«oa»lc IL«f»0

Marl 0«oeoaraa TOIL «ICPOL «LLE ossa av

Wry vawa aoaao srI

oa«a 0«poaarta It Iso»

II

~do+

I

PL«tp )

F3/FQRA

IJR/

Too CM~v«N 40»tw4Petr~Oat L«ftE

~I 1st 'IIIOal A No

I

I

~oea CPOI Oee MILNO o PO)

I CP

~10'zr

, Pa Teeaa IIL011 Car.te

vuv ~ aoaoasp(lctpeuoo«e)

IO»O «OllatCO»atltg

~leal Lo taco ' I plot II

No«o ~IEIE Isea llPLTel 'lI

tco» Else ocul pafao««

I

CogI

sat o eopvaa va» leos«N Ve et

Il

Plotlt Leoc cpscafII III» ~

~Teat «VK Mtoa»E ETLIAL ltafea taco. Coa 11 ~ 0 tt ~ Ve

i ~VI4—)IA~PTE«ta»

PJtl 11 11 ~

) LPENIA WO

«Nve.«LI

r----.:='7'~4-4.-.~~='-=I C

II 4040 aaa

I

I)))$. , @ 0«.or«a«e»

)~poco«as«O

~l)

ap 1st ov«IPPOE«o«M oM+«4 ar sept 1100'er «PMOTOLCte 01 slp 4~oooaere«plao o««Too%ca opa oalvAL~Lo» cora a oaaap,oo oowffpt~«ee oM«o««

0 eo ILP» asap»os «4 aooaaaoc t IMMt pe»oslo oo 0«oa TTOacre« ataoavlc a ocr loe»CTI)oaaaa focv.occpo a»Tea per«Losaeaooeca

~ tce Cfear»e a aoo)auc«t oavoc»0pttle EI ~Ip«NJL wo«sapoa Lar«»Eve»peal sl 4~Le«s oaa «I4agg4 AL4 a«race 444 ae«)ELPEL a$ .~ pe co» Pal«V ICW tool%4«

~atle 10 pevaaoa ovcl LIT»of aLL

'94,«I 11 coo a«N)O. also»et«I 4 0 sea)

~ oooo«op ale»a p«pl o«L

I

—'C~ —s ~-.—.~~e TI(ot N) ~WLA C»44

Vita

OMPLE Oooo tta ~ Ltac «A«aafcaoeo

~Otot

LK ELLIIT

IN«(»1\ a« IWPO Lrlceo

I 'teot ILLLLET

It(\I VLI ~ abat ~ «~L alt I

»ETsot 04 tac»MIIE Cl»I oc 04 ot444 I 111101$

~ E TE)I

REF DWCC CAR 3)SSQ433 503 IREV B,OPEN)


Carolina Power & Linht Comnanv

HVAC-AIRFLOWDIAGRAM.WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING

SHEET 2FIGURE 174-6

t4» WP

~rt ~St CM'a.S 1 w.. 9~ C ~

I2 IS

Stall ~ ~wwi It t

W Pt L ~

I4

CA 4

ctlstaw ssafc» I Pl

ps

~ Is

V4I1—PT.ted%

tSi~

~It ILV

roTEsw trw» wlauw» IWL«p»tPI pw cvsw 4»t w ac v wtt»v«,4» tvapws Ipttvtr«W

rrI IIMISw wcv M

WI

ILttr

pav Isis«I Isla I

WVWI P~VVVLW PV»

KwgLWTI

4 4

ww s«aa«»la Ilawv»st PW

~spsw «slat«

Lww

tW j~g EAT«

@ 1-- w,

~ 4

I Is

Ft

~ ~

~ 4 pr

IIVI»I~ I I

P WL\I»4

P ~S

I

~g taws

5EST . KRa» 2I

E~W»a «

STRAW ES 2SLCKY

'IIs

~ » W

g« stat DIP»I

V ~

»»t. ~

~II 4~«2t

Ia WIW

t(

SECT. SITS 9sl«S

* LN EWP'r

P«»VLWr

tijTV~P

~ WK 44 ~

~ ~~ P~ W»

SECT TITL2Iltl4

~ W» «» prr Csww

SLtv»

IWIP

ttE'9

SECT WTIScsr»

SEC'1 TITSS

stcl TrasI ~ I ~

SECT IIP 4««I


Carolina Power Ec Light Company

HVAC—WASTE PROCESSING BUILDINGEL 201'00 —SHEET 3

FIGURE 174-74EF D2ro: CA4.2TSTSo495 STO 14EV.4l

«t< g,ttTQ~ RWC«t t

Lt«tet ell«l Ie«R«. Cl«i«tee« te tete«e4 4 «lett««tet«i

I2 l9

~Litt«

I«v«tttto

eo few IC MIVfIL2'stl I«to

IO lice «VWtf4 «eet«

RFMP'fiO

Ciot Of ItKfe lsl«

.8L«iN™

«9

+of't«BO

/I«.~ fit

WR «t t«t"Rf

RW"1" "t4've eeet

we«

I t24+

t«p coos449tl: 4fi lc«4

f L'BttIP'=«'. -

J~ '

~ e«-.«l/e

«I

«e»set - we *«4

~ te

2'W

«W

KIWI«SS

pttt«

I VL«.It

el fl

~ W tlW

~4««

SECt ffPÃ f«lf—I 4

MofE9e«c. Iot«4» cele« lice«o 4 tele.iellee «eo I«tee«e«cec ice«

w« If«IIO&~teesoeo~

~ «1 evffo 4«4 ~

c ete vtc tote»wf oem oloo$ ~we tLIEI teef eeet«celt«c

SECt WP 9 otei ««twV» «~

fi-co Stet««1 Lo«RIO ~ w eg

4««fe

~««4

~ l~ R«V » IM tee

eeeife ««totolitle I 4 4IVe«eeeet c«iesf

VI teio~ 4 f4 tte«

'th+- 1-Cotlcco ht rvaM«t«t«e~ t»«te«» I

I

t««e

~CIC oct« tf It«te

&'tt« litt

i

'4 eeegc'tt eel«lit I

~ t»~el.e le« I

44isCI««t««tfiVI

K»«I-~

»««e I~re W«

5ECt WP.fO Oel

4 ~ !tete«tf t«VR '«I««lV'~«ww «I»vt»««\

vekeo ctelsRfj4

tlel I«IVItttJe\l

j s«vccII I

Rt W

et tr

~Rf fteft««4 Cl«f«tc oteee ti«eeti'tt~Ie le«4«wet I

1 WVI

~ ««««t«

t«el Reelh

ti

~ I

t«etI t~Ytee»r4 tl

I iecowl'" 44

I14(95LR'9

~ J

«I~V J2 24

Itt9 . fe flf4 I

~ ~

tl t«r«JL «t

ft «viett6'- ~

gs ofcef fcoeet« 4 c'24 IIIIO

~ 4R IR

ee«9 CLf eeetcote fc overl.«4 tet>

~ 'T 4

let«iIm-

)

-"-lw

I

« ii"«» I t4'g™l« ll(w)

vr»v«e

teed CILf~tf«4 oe«te

Wt«t4Sfff lOtlilll

4 a/PI ~I~


Caroiina Power & Light Company

REF owo: cAR 21M~95 soa Iftav. 8, oPEN)

HVAC-WASTE PROCESSINGBUILDING—EL 21

I.OO'HEET

3

FIGURE 174 8

Vttttt OAA44

~~I4

~IDcr*

Wi.a.seaI

«4 I t ~ 444

c*cwttaatca QActtt Dtcc~ INC D DADNDttltDAtllatlt CIIAAC

AAVIC AAACt CAI «altllAKC44\NVCP TCCC NNCAC IVKtCAC

1 tllttt ttKICIIACC Drtt.ttr'Raf«CAA W CKCACKCN

1 ttta tttaa4 taAKCDtllIVIVIC~ »Vt

»~tttatftNAWAA44% AtIt«It

ltillKCr

RIVIRttt IDA~ IASIACCAV

DI'IIC«I IIR

Ct\ CCIIPNADIC1

VtlRICCItillIDCCtc ctrct

~o~444« 4 ARA

t«attt14

~ «I Nl

ttCCICVR 4

aa«tttra 1 1

taratAII~ 4

Rp: ltl Nl

lait

~ Ww~I

~ I

Wtaat4

I N 44w«44w

'

Ittal Ct ~ 4

~ 0+ ~,'DCtl 4

~AlA

uCtt ~

illI tat»Il1

~NI

TN~~w

~N

iA~t»«A

(Ttt

44 41

Nlt»I«taatiCLCPl

~ tata w~ tt

.W ~~444 lt

~4 «441 WANatlIt I

«4444«A ttt

444

Wa 444)

~I»CIIT144ut

N~tta444

~ t»Wr'~I 4tal haK

\4« I

Na.«l

J »at ~

S.

(al SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Carolina Power & Liqht Companv

REF Dwo cAR 2165%828 (REY 6I

F LOW 0IAGRAMWASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM

SPENT RESIN TRANSFER

FIGURE 174-9

we tllw J IE4 I14LS

at HS

e.o

Na ~la'Nauutl Inta Nuut 4Illh ~o lhhvlat ~ an ~

~ 4 ION+ ldl

.. SVILIIh'I~, r'En v tail

aatw It44(a lie' lail a'4 FI

~h

h ct a

rhl eh \ Ilot

4

~w I I ~

N 4

a HV 'I+I~44

Vaaaa 4

NaSILVW% \Io lcr

OET A

Wacacae n Naia lhaaolv

OET 8

'VIIW44

6&teats hat liNSo

ohocaa4

anal LINEicc wtltTFSS

LB

~hewa Iav* IN.IW I4W Ia ~

Now l Na ah ~ ~WWITwa

wT'»'ITII'ICCHcat

WaottalIhONW

\CL sat a

~a th o.eliot ~

Io 4 44

Ihlha tlWthl14

loll tt ~ 4laitIIH~

aICLHI

PAIIRALPLAN Aal ts tttcn

VL«™'41

INHHV

fo Lcaeae~ cL heo

hit 4

WIWIaatwu

~ LHL

PIWV

WLI

eha I

I 'I tall CleatIHCI

Nuoaoo

Iaa ~ 444

II

NICel

Ih

OII~

+IW4

SECTIOtt r;E ass oeol cwl NCCaaw~ A toacaltt'llllahl Laoo HwsvSECTION F F wwaa loe cno hwa

~ wahl) 4 tllpOooa waeca alta ws

~Lo4 4 c

Voaw ~ INIaw 4 ~ ~

IOEI E

4 c.

~H~

OET F

~Nyooseew 4IWI

1% 1414

VVWI ~

Vita aaHL al~~ HtlaHW~ 4Hovwhrt lap

vocSwoo~ wtcs taw

W 'I NW

Na 1 ho INatl14 ~

Wi'it@N ~

Nal IWI~ ~Ihtlh toha 1 ~ .IIA7"

NIWI~Whetacth tl~r.

IhtVVAI I IWCVI~~ saa

I I

thhat~II

IVIIta ~Naatt I ~ Iahawn Iaw

SECTION K K ohceaaoowa~SECTKIN L L

Lt

~e+.Tc;Ih r LA->I™krI~It

pst tholIil« I INN

+Mal I ~

I

Iu

n

Ia}

~HI~

WolhtJ'estchl4\ hllww HCaw

At:JL=.II

~ ~

IISIIFP Hcot lcLlirasI W1.\4

QKNII

'wa,.'=Waltto II II<11'IIII''«I%VS LI

It anohl INL.VIO~

Ica ~

~WNLteah

IO

«to I~a lh ~wewe Jl

4

~ ' ~

I Vocac&a I I8 w""48L SECTION A A

(I+IIhthtltg4\I Iha 4

C aakhll ~ .~W\.IIIIC VIht IIWI I atl IvoI h

~LI

Cve to) 1

jI

( ~AM

'ta Iilw

IVII4laoNVI

waH~I

IhalhatOCVIItaeeht

wevwa

IHaWWVItlIoutathah

at LNI4~W What\lh

SECTION C C 41 wtoa~rl~ ak I'I allahSECTION 0 8 Lwaas cn ve evoI I wall ) 4 Ilhswaco wavls auat 'al ~

IIWOIII hl Itsh

./ ( Il ~Wt tataa

aai n'I wNLIvial Naalh 44

~hr ~ Naohooo

) q 4

5 It

4'4 ~

~.5!ld14't4 8thIhlht I IJ

iILPIIII ~4 oNat hl ~it,cia 4

~oolsen ht ~ tllcao Lhatocalt ~atuooIL Itao

ical ICPAATIALPLAN 8al tc Itto'

Ig I JC

I"4

III leNNY tI W1 ltt ~I I I I\L~ \4'

4(Q.satchel

JE

'1411 th44 Vn

.VJ

L hfI oh

~NASIVtthttSECTION 8.8

SIC

Naa tIVI4 ~h~

h',I

QZ aotl

REF OWOI CAR 21BBOJ128 (REV. 7, OPEN)



WASTE PROCESSING BUILDINGPIPINGSPENT RESIN STORAGE TANKSSI

PUMPS AREA —SECTIONS

FIGURE 174-10

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power. PlantDraft SER 0 en Item No. 180

The applicant has provided contradictory information on the" containment pre-jentry purge and the continuous containment purge monitoring features.

~Res oese

The previous response to formal question 460.48 (submitted by CPSL's letter ofSeptember 16, 1982 to Mr. Harold R. Denton, and documented in FSAR Amendment 5,Section 11.5.2.7.2.15) described the high concentration of activity that wouldbe necessary inside containment in order to approach 10 CFR 20 limits at thesite boundary due to inadvertent release through the continuous containmentpurge. This answer failed to point out that, in spite of the improbability ofreaching this high activity level, the containment atmosphere leak detectionmonitors will automatically terminate continuous containment purge upondetecting a high activity level (10 p Ci/cc of Xe-133). However, thisinformation was provided by Amendment 5 in FSAR .Section 6.-2.4.1, causing an.apparent contradiction regarding the ability to automatically terminatecontinuous containment purge.

The following FSAR changes will be made to document the ability toautomatically terminate containment purge due to the presence of highradiation readings during either pre-entry purge or. continuous containmentpurge:r

1. The Unit 1 monitor presently shown on FSAR Figure 6.2.2-3 on thecontinuous purge line (REM-1LT-3502 BSB) and its Unit 2 counterpart(REM-2LT-3502 BSB) will be relocated to the appropriate unit's pre-entry purge line. FSAR Figure 6.2.2-3 will be revised to showthis. The monitors that remain on the continuous purge line, REM-1LT-3502 ASA (Figure 6 '.2-3), and REM-2LT-3502 ASA (Unit 2counterpart) are, in fact, the containment atmosphere leak detectionmonitors described in Section 12.3.4.2.8.1. Thus, both. purge-routeswill be monitored.

2. Section 11.5. 2.7.2.15 (Page 11.5.2-19, Amendment No. 5) will berevised to describe the automatic termination of continuous purgewhen high radiation readings are detected by the containmentatmosphere leak detection monitors.

3. Section 12.3.4.2.8.1 (Page 12.3.4-8, Amendment No. 5) 'will berevised to describe the ability of the containment atmosphere leakdetection monitors to 'terminate continuous purge upon high radiationreadings.

(7109NLU)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)0 en Item 188 (DSER Section 11.5.2, page 11-29)

The conformance of non-ESF instrumentation to the design guidance of Appendix11.5-A has not been addressed.

Incorporation of administrative controls and procedures to minimizeinadvertent or accidental releases of radioactive liquids has not beenaddressed.

~Res onse

The conformance of both non-ESF and ESF portions of the process and effluentmonitoring system to the design guidance of Appendix ll 5-A was confirmed inthe response to formal Question 460 '5. This response was transmitted byCP6L's letter of September 16, 1982 to Mr. Harold R. Denton. The FSAR wasamended (Amendment 5) on page 11.5.1-1 for the process monitoring system, andon page 11.5.1-2 for the effluent monitoring system, to reflect thisconformance.

All radioactive effluent pathways shall be operated in accordance withapproved procedures. These procedures shall require monitoring and grabsampling of all continuous effluent releases, as well as'grab sampling ofbatch release effluent pathways prior to release.

In addition, procedures shall be implemented that require the appropriatereview and approval of each batch release. The control of monitoring,sampling, analysis, and accountability of each potential radioactive effluentpathway shall incorporate the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.21 and 4.15.

(7143NLUccc)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTDRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT (DSER)OPEN ITEM 192 (DSER SECTION 11.5.2 age 11-30)

The staff's review of the process and effluent monitoring system has notaddressed some items of SRP 11.5. Those items that have not beenaddressed will be reviewed when the Radiological Effluent TechnicalSpecifications are reviewed. Those areas of the process and effluentmonitoring system to be reviewed at that time include:

(1) sampling frequencies, required analyses, instrument alarm/typefsic (alarm/trip)]

(2) frequency of routine instrument calibration, maintenance, andinspections

The process and effluent monitoring systems cannot be judged as to theiradequacy until the above items are addressed.

RESPONSE

The requested information shall be available after the plant's RadiationMonitoring System is installed. CP&L considers this to be a confirmatoryitem.

(7 130NLU)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)0 en Item 231 (DSER-Section 11.5.2 Pa e 11-30)

The applicant has not addressed the monitoring of the effluent from theVolume Reduction System.

~Res oese

The gaseous effluent from the Volume Reduction System (VRS) is monitoredby Radiation Monitor REM-1WV-3551 after processing via the VRS HEPA andcharcoal filters. The flow path enters a common header after REM-1WV-3551and is processed through another set of pre HEPA, charcoal adsorber, andHEPA filters. After processing, the effluent is monitored by RadiationMonitor REM-1WV-3546 and then exhausted through plant stack No. 5.

The operation of the Volume Reduction System produces condenser overflowwhich is recycled to the Floor Drain Tanks. After reprocessing throughthe Floor Drain System, this liquid is'sampled in the Waste MonitorTank. It can be discharged as effluent after monitoring by RadiationMonitor REM-lWV-3541.

Drawing CAR 2168&-533S07, showing the plant stack, is attached forinformation.

(7 245NLUkg r)

foa COTL 110wo«coal ~ cl«oa(N 0)

Lavv ewa 4

a

/fr.,'~g-„r-Tft-IVION fel

Pa

~ '

rl=-M:::~—Tg-rc~ ~+-~-gMIN ~ ~

—:===-,':-:-=-H%-~~++„.QT7~ '

~INIW alai

AI ale«slathie I«aa«!aoev Ta wtl«a oolN aoaataa Nfeeo

It a««alai ~

WINO««Lots ave

OCT1ICSLSASCD

I«IN IWNUIIANONU Cov'Nftaooctaact IAloe «fao we

N aaev pj 4 ct v«~oa ccwc tac ON 4 ONINca«s00 I~«W «UN DW te««V «TON CW«ef tolls

~ 11DOO Ctel DfpDO ACITV

tl I«IIOI NN COVT ICS D«L 11«01 CAOD

~I I «N SR'I t

AIT a aa AS N 1 1 I

It'4A

c«IL NCDCN

Ooa lva la«vela

fCeoat«NA«JNstf«I fl

NiCIN Tel

rnROCA-WTheat 1

U

ae

Cfll

~ TN.Al(I ao-«VN

fft«Itl

Ioe cwo ANvw ta Looa

~a,foo OeCool~ VS« IN III «v O.tlooooca. I~

cev atttvha&OO

DION« ~ I11 Ct«

—-4 p;,~=p-tM'=~ CTIttr

~e«oe

WNDI

Vl 'la tat

4:,j-

. VII-7

wv«oa«O«v

~oeevi

'p;r~=-]++~+/PE+-+~T

gg Lf+TIVC«a

Ie TN ~= — p-l.k—(

++'p'I ~pl

~eeal4o4

~Tile« NSRI«

«a04foo~IITha ItISO«

r Ieoaa

AVe«U

I COT OvI

Ac ~ IUT Naoht« I IA«afc«TDelweaAeaeatc vw«v vwaa Noae v tote«

to a«v

IRK~~~]-«NVKlevate«

I' ooo«TC feof~c«ct cav«NT

I 0«a 4 Lost«C«off

~I ~a++ ofwwv to ICILaooavojtvllef«vva eoef aN 4«o 4 CII WC~Well CCLD IAAOOV

self CO« T. Na DUL~ IIITOLCIRDtt«aet«0 ava~vwvaeatv ILNOTES . I~vv aa«ae'av Rovtea«TINS Iet«OAAI IANDofwo 1

V" ala INT v atfa aofov occeataea nass)««CE«f «ellaelaet«eofvecf «TAT~ vn t eo fall.INaaaawfaN taca«aN.'

Ooce Tel I\TIAtav lit«~ aal AITIALNw «t Aaa«ANflavaalll talcoefltcahft AlSOA tlt«.SIAIIAUIAal I«NANTS 1

Ae ~ e«VIIVRtliaSOAOONC TeaAC'NIAL ICOVCWL CN DINI ««NCTIAILAs Tait tea«ate IN ~ 11«AL s«VAVS

etoe Lac«NO «SNAecaao «wealNaca 14 h«INAL eaa«l«IS

~ «IVII «IM+,a«v coewa

~14 Lfawa «Dtel to«C «CUO tall fAOS~Ioefc ~ TLNel Aat «atlas 01 R ttot\Rs

~T tae oa«C Octa taCltl TICCN Alesftel «DNI OWIOVCK Ses ALLTIAIITTDATCRILSIN LNIjat«RIS 1 Ctl«CAL «efll,~CC t«aa CN ILI~ sff+Itee \ «CIIC

LAILSTIT«tl Aaa WS Clast DI

«N

w ~ 1oot «ITS

~ 14

Uh~1stalRAI

CTTI

Cla.lt

.=,Rw~k

'7'ot

cvooec IC

C«NNCN 0 1

Ct«NCO 01

III

Of«CI t 1

I

«ON«I TORT I,„ II

tfe~l

~Nes toaa

Tcce. «Na aa I ~ I

Ol flCC ~ I

ceo IItta

r Aatai «TAC Ntsftaa L

Nso«o NN/ Wl~

~I

~«TV~VC TlaDORTVNO O SPEC CITIES N<a

to DE PURcsIAUED 5DSSThl.LED BY FIELD

No OI'CVIDCNC 1

U 4NCfe

CODIOOC OL

ta«t U lasttaliaf AACAC NTAC Stslf Vwe« e«

I~N~

I~14~

a

II

. IIIII

WC «ea o«t laL +----wTova

I oolfa.v w«~ aaaa AAAAow

IIL'

~ I«eaoa eau ofo««Nloa toh «I~ ~r66t uel

~~fceeeoooe

I.I NTACLE~I~+III ~ L 1 ~ T 0

REF DWGCCARIII68&a33 307 IREV.S,OPENI


Carolina Power Sc Light Company

HVAC-AIRFLOWOIAGRAMWASTE PROCESSING BUILOING

SHEET 6

FIGURE 231-1

Power Reactor SG Licensing Branch/D. KersOpen Item 196

OPEN ITEN 196

13.6 Physical Securitypg. 13-7

QL. STION'i

As a result of its evaluation, the staff ident'fied certain areas ofthe "Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Industrial Security Plan,"the "Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards ContingencyPlan," and the "Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant SecurityPersonnel Training and Qualification Plan" for which additionaliniormat,ion and revision is required before the plans will meet therequirements of 10 CFR 73.55 and Appendices B and C of 10 CFR 73

''henthe plans are revised in accordance with the staff's writtencomments, they will be considered to meet these reouirements.

RESPONSE:

The referenced Security Plans are currentlv being 'revi'sed andapproved by CP&L management. Revisions are being made in accorcancewith the NRC's written comments, and because the plans areSafeguards Information, they wil) be submitted to the NRC underseparate cover.

Accident Evaluation Branch/K. DempseyOpen Item 211

Shearon Harris'uclear Power PlantDraft SER Ooen Item No. 211

i

Pith respect to the maximum operational ECCS leakage outside containment(defined as the sum of the leakage for all the recirculation systemsthat is detectable during tests and above which the TechnicalSpecifications would require declaring a system out of service), theapplicant has not yet provided the required evaluation of theradiological consequences. The staff has requested this information(Question 450.5 j and until this matter is resolved, LOCA doses remainan open item.

~Res oese

Maximum operational ECCS leakage outside containment has been determinedbased on an evaluation of radiological consequences. In addition,calculated leakages for ECCS fluid recirculation systems outsidecontainment have been determined based on ECCS and Containment, SpraySystem components. Calculated leakage is well below the maximumoperational value for radiological considerations.

The maximum operational leakage and calculated leakage along withtheir associated radiological consequences (LOCA doses) are presentedin the response to Question 450.5.

OI 211-1

uestion No.

450.5(15.6.5)

Provide as part of the radiological consequences of a..designbasis loss-of-coolant accident an evaluation of the leakagefrom engineered safety feature components outside containment(see SRP 15.6.5, Appendix B) . Include in the'evaluationthe assumptions, model, and results of dose calculationsperformed for this fission product transport path. The ECCSleakage for calculating the radiological consequences shouldbe taken as two times the sum of the simultaneous leakagefrom all components in the recirculation system abovewhich the technical specification should require declaringsuch systems to be out of service.

ResDonse As part of radiological consequences of a design basisloss-of-coolant accident, an evaluation of the leakagefrom ESP components outside containment has been provided.The calculational models, assumptions, parameters, resultsof dose calculations are presented below. Table 450.5-1is the listing of calculated ECCS fluid leakage outsidecontainment.

As indicated by the results, the dose resulting from twicethe calculated ECCS leakage (2 times 5175 cc/hr) is 1.4 =

rem to the thyroid (LPZ 30 day). Combining the dosereceived from containment leakage with this value resultsin 171 rem to the thyroid (LPZ 30 days). The radiologicalconsequences from containment leakage is .discussed inFSAR Section 15.6.5.4. Utilizing the same model andassumptions presented below,,maximum allowable,„ECCS,,leakage would be 3 gallons per minute. The dose resultingfrom twice the maximum allowable leakage (2 times 3 GPM)

is 300 rem to the thyroid (LPZ 30 days) which is theacceptable limit established in 10CPR100.

OI 211-2

1. The Calculational Models

A. The following equation mathematically models the radioiodineactiVity in the containment sump water at the time when

recirculation begins. The radioiodine activity comprises

that released directly into the sump water from the core.

Sump water activity =

As(t) = As(o)e "R

where:

AS(t)

AS(O)

~R

sump water activity at time t (Ci)activity in sump water that comes from the core (Ci)radiological decay constant for each isotope ofradioiodine (hr-1)

B. The following equation mathematically models the area activityfrom ECCS component leakage integrated over the time of the

accident.

AFCC(t) = LECC AS t (1-e )X

where:

AECC(t)= radioiodine activity leaking from ECCS components (Ci)

LECC= leakage of ECCS components (percent of total volume)

As(t) = activity in ECCS water (Ci)X = removal of radioiodine due to leakage and radiological

decay (hr-1)

2. Assumptions and Parameters

The Table below lists the assumptions and parameters utilized in our

evaluation of the radiological consequences of ECCS leakages followinga LOCA.

OI 211-3

Assum tions and Parameters

A. Percent radioiodine core activity directlytransfered to containment sump water

Value

50K

B. Radioiodine form and percent composition

ElementalParticulateOrganic

C. Time after LOCA when ECCS recirculationbegins

D. Total Volume of containment sump

E. Anticipated ECCS leakage (this value wasmultiplied by 2 in the evaluation)

F. Maximum Sump Solution Temperature

G. Iodine flashing fraction

H. ECCS area filter efficiencies

91K50'o/

30 min

4.47 x 10 gal

5175 cc/hr

230'F

2» (see addendum)

ElementalOrganicParticulate

95»

99»

I. Dose calculation parameters

3. Results and Conclusions

see section15.0A of FSAR

The following tables provide the results of our analysis:

Dose Received from ECCS Component Leaka e,Fo owin a esi n Basss LOC rem

~Th roid

EAB 2 hr 0.4LPZ 30 day 1.4

Whole Bod

9.0 x 10 4

2.4 x 10 3

Total Dose Received from Containment and ECCSFo lowin a Desi n Basis LOCA rem

EAB 2 hr 150LPZ 30 day 171

2.61.6

As can be seen from the results, the exposures received offsite fromthe ECCS component leakages are very small'ompared to those receivedfrom containment leakage. The combined containment and ECCS thyroidand whole body exposures following a design basis LOCA are within10CFR100 guidelines.

OI 211-4

TABLE 450.5-1

MAXIMUM CALCULATED ECCSFLUID LEAKAGE Ol TSIDE CONTAIVaAENT

E uinmentUncollected Collected

Leaka e cc hr

I. ECCS E ui ment-'"

1. RHR Pumps

2: Changing/Sa fetyInjection Pumps(Note 2)

3. Flanges:

a. Pumps

b. valve bonnet tobody (2 inches andlarger)

c. Control valves(Butterfl'y

only)'.

Orifices5. Strainer Tees

6. Valve Stem leakoffs

58

13

5

44

100

150

300

1740

240

390

180

40

80'80

Containment S rav Svstem

1.. Containment spraypump

2. Flanges Orifice Plates3. Valves

100

120

815 140

4175 1000

PoS~: 1. ECCS fluid leakage is assumed to occur in the RAB. The RAB areahousing equipment noted in this table is vented by an ESF-gradefilter system.

2. Normal operation - 2 pumps.

OI 211-5

ADDENDUM

The 2X value for iodine releases from the fluid leaking into the ECCS

area is based upon a conservative set of assumptions.

In the analysis, the temperature of the sump water- has been

conservatively assumed to be constant at 230'F although the

temperature is reduced to 212'F after 25 minutes following thestart of recirculation (Figure 6.5.2-1).

A fraction of water would flash into steam after leaking into'heECCS area. The fraction has been found to be 25 based on heat balance.After flashing, the remaining liquid would be collected in the drainsand removed from the area. The fraction of iodine, (PF) that would

become airborne is calculated using the following model (Reference 1):

PF=S—x 1700 x—1W PC

where,

PF

S

W

PC

1700

= partition factor= mass fraction of steam= mass fraction of water„= partition coefficient, (uCi/cc liquid)/(uCi/cc gas)= the ratio of vapor to liquid specific volumes at 212'F

Standard Review Plan (SRP) 6.5.2 indicates that long term iodineretention with no significant re-evolution may be assumed when the

equilibrium sump pH, after mixing and dilution'with the primary coolantand ECCS injection, is above 8.5. This view is supported by L F Parsly(Reference 2) by indicating high values of PC at pH of 9 and above, when

iodate formation is significant. A value of'.765 x 109 has been indicatedat 212'F, pH equal to 9 and concentration of aqueous iodine of3x10 moles/liter. The PC indicated on Figure 6.5.2-1, SRP 6.5.2is 5xl03. Conservatively, selecting 5xl0 , PF is calculated as

follows:

PF = .02 x 1700 x 1 = 6.9xl0 -3-'98

5x10

This suggests that only .69 percent of the iodine leaking into the

ECCS area would become airborne and be removed with the exhaust.

OI 211»6

Therefore, 2/ value, in effect, does not account for partition and

is a conservative estimate in the dose evaluation.

References

1. WASH 1258 "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and LimitingConditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion As Low As

Practicable for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-CooledNuclear Power Reactor Effluents". Volume 2, July 1973, U.S.

Atomic Energy Commission.

2. ORNL-TM-212, Part IV, "Design Considerations of Reactor Containment

Spray Systems. Calculation of Iodine-Water Partition Coefficients".L F Parsly, January 1970, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. .

OX 211-7

Mechanical Engineering Branch/D. TeraoOpen Etems 249, 258

OPEN ITEM 42" 9

Mechanical Enoineering Branch Question 210.07 (3.6.2.1.1.2), Page 3.6.2-'e r

Branch Technical Position MEB 3.1 requires hat pipe rupture inClass 1 pipi'ng

in areas other than containment penrtration areas be postulated at:

a. terminal ends.

b. intermediate locations where the maximum stress rance as calculated by

Eq. (10) and either (12) or (13) exceeds 2.4 Sm.

c. intermediate locations where the cumulat'.ve usace fac o. ex eels 0.'..Revise your ASME Section III Class 1 pipinc break ops-.„u'a-.ioncr': riato conform .o this posi ion.

RESPONSE

Mestinghouse will use the 1981 version of MEB 3-1 to select break locations inauxiliary lines outside the. reactor coolant loop. Thi.s„-is, consistent.with therecommendation of the staff concerning the break location selection for Class

1 auxiliary lines outlined in the draft questions for the Shearon Harris SER.

In addition, Westinghouse will use the Summer 1979 Addenda of the ASME Code

for fatigue evaluation.

OPEN ITEM ."258:

Mechanical Engine ring Branch guestion 210.16 (3.6.2.5) Page 3.6.2-18

Jus ify the use of limited area circumferential or longitudinal breaks,provide a list showing where limited break areas have been postulated.

RE"PONSE

Westinghouse provided Ebasco with loads for the design of the primary shieldwall pipe whip rest'raints. These loads were calculated from data assuming a

generic break opening area of 150 square inches. This area is a conservativeenvelope of a series of calculated break areas for other Westinghouse plants.Westinghouse used the Ebasco restraint design in the reactor coolant loop andreactor vessel analyses to verify the actual break opening areas to be smallerthan the 150 square inch area.

The actual break opening areas were calculated on a time-history basis. The-maximum outlet nozzle break opening area was found to be approximately 32

square inches with an average area of about 20 square inches. The maximum

inlet nozzle break area was found to be approximately 90 square inches with an

average area of about 75 square inches.

Emergency Planning Branch/G. SymondsOpen Items 310, 315

DSER 0 en Item 314

Respond to NUREG 0737 Supplement 1 requirements for Emergency ResponseFacilities.

~Res sess

An implementation schedule for emergency response facilities was submittedto the NRC on April 15, 1983 in conformance with Supplement 1 to NUREG

0737. These facilities shall be regarded as a confirmatory item since itwill be the subject of the staff's post-implementation review.

DSER 0 en Item 315

Submit Local and State Emergency Plans.

~Res ense

The "North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of SHNPP," withannex plans for Chatham, Harnett, Lee, and Wake Counties, is scheduled forsubmittal in January, 1984. This plan shall be regarded as a confirmatoryitem since it will be the subject of the Staff's post-implementationreview.

Materials Engineering Branch/J. Halapatz/D. SmithOpen Items 293, 324, 325, 326, 330, 331

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Materials Engineering Branch0 en Item 293 (DSER Section 5.3.3 a e 5-18)

The applicant has not provided sufficient information to demonstratethe genetic fracture toughness of ferritic plates and forgings with a minimumyield strength greater than 50,000 psi and of ferritic bolting with a minimumyield strength greater than 130,000 psi (10CFR50, Appendix G, Paragraphs I.Aand I.C).

~Res oese

Demonstration that the genetic fracture toughness of ferritic platesand forgings with a minimum yield strength greater than 50,000 psi and of,ferritic bolting with a minimum yield strength greater than )30,000 psi wasaddressed in the DSER Open Items 34 and 40. Carolina Power 6 Light Companyprovided responses to Open Items 34 and 40 on June 7, 1983 and May 4, 1983respectively.

(7206PSAccc)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Materials Engineering Branch0 en Item 324 (DSER Section 4.5. 1 a e 4-50)

Determine if there was a maximum yield strength specified foraustenitic stainless steels, and its magnitude (Standard Review Plan (SRP)4.5. 1 and 4.5.2).

~Res ense

SRP 4.5. 1 Control Rod Drive Mechanism: No maximum yield strengthspecified for austenitic stainless steels.

SRP 4.5.2 Reactor Internals: Strain hardened (cold worked) type 316is used for threaded fasteners and fuel assembly guide pins. These are theonly applications of cold worked stainless steel. For SHNPP and strainhardened type 316 a maximum yield strength of 85 KSI was specified.

Shearon.Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Materials Engineering Branch0 en Item 325 (DSER Section 4.5. 1 a e 4-50)

For precipitation hardening and martensitic stainless steels, statethe aging and tempering treatments specified (Standard Review Plant (SRP)4.5.1 and 4.5.2).

~Res esse

SRP 4.5.1 and 4.5.2: Precipitation hardening and martensiticstainless steels were not used in the construction of reactor internals forSHNPP and were not used as structural materials in control rod drive mechanismapplications.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Materials Engineering Branch0 en Item 326 (DSER Section 4-50 a es 4-50 and 4-50a)

Identify the materials used based upon Code Case 161B. If thelimitations of Regulatory Guide 1.85 are applicable, justify why therecommendations of the Regulatory Guide were not met (Standard Review Plant(SRP) 4.5.2).

~Res esse

SRP 4.5.2 Reactor Internals

Materials used based on Code Case 161B: (In addition to thoselisted in Table I.1.0 of Appendix 1 of Section III).

Strain Hardened T e 316(16 Cr - 12 Mi — 2 Mo, SA - 193 B8M, SA-479 Type 316)

Inconel X-750(Mi — Cr - Fe, SA-637 Grade 688)

Regulatory Guide 1.85 is not applicable to SHNPP reactor internals;however, the recommendation as identified in 'the question pertaining toInconel - X750 (SA-637 Grade 688) are met in that no welding is done onInconel X-750.

(7202PSAkjr)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantDraft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Materials Engineering Branch0 en Item 330 (DSER Section 10.3.6 a e 10-7)

Provide data and rationale why fracture toughness criteria wereapplied to Class 2 components of the main steam and feedwater systems and notapplied to Class 3 components. Also provide a rationale as to theacceptability of Class 3 components which were not produced to meet a fracturetoughness criteria (SRP 10.3.6).

~Res ense

As stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section10.3.6.1, materials used for Class 2 and 3 components of the main steam andfeedwater systems, non-Westinghouse supplied, were not required to be fracturetoughness tested by either the design specification or ASME Section III,NC-2300 at the time of award of the pipine contract. However, the fracturetoughness properties of these materials is considered to be acceptable, asaddressed in the response to Open Item 38.

As stated in FSAR Section 10.3.6.1, Westinghouse supplied Class 2component materials is fracture toughness tested, materials used for Class 3components supplied by Westinghouse were fracture toughness tested inaccordance with requirements of the design specification.

FSAR Section 10.3.6.1 will be modified in a future amendment toreflect this information.

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP)Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER)Materials Engineering Branch0 en Item 331 (DSER Section 4.5.2 a e 4-50)

Identify materials by specification, grade, type, etc., rather thanby proprietary designations (Standard Review Plan (SRP) 4.5.1 and 4.5.2).

~Res ense

Materials specifications for SHNPP's control rod drive mechanismsand reactor internals are provided in the Final Safety Analysis Report Tables5.2.3-1 and 5.2.3-2.

f.

4

,, i'.Kl,'Cga

pl *g

ML18018A601.pdf - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Documents

Transcript of ML18018A601.pdf - Nuclear Regulatory Commission