ML13283A131.pdf - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FYI

From: Motiska, MelanieSent: Friday, March 25, 2011 9:22 AMTo: Poole, WilliamSubject: FW: FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CONDUCTS A SUCCESSFUL EXERCISE WITH TURKEYPOINT NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY

Tracy - Just sent this out- Thanks for all your support in getting it done!

From: Motiska, MelanieSent: Friday, March 25, 2011 9:20 AMSubject: FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CONDUCTS A SUCCESSFUL EXERCISE WITH TURKEYPOINT NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: PUBLIC INFORMATIONFRIDAY, MARCH 25, 2011 (850) 413-9969

www.FloridaDisaster.org

FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CONDUCTS A SUCCESSFUL EXERCISEWITH TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY

TALLAHASSEE -- The Florida Division of Emergency Management received a draft evaluation thisweek from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that the state, in coordination withcounty partners and Florida Power and Light, has conducted a successful exercise on February 23,2011 with the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant located in Biscayne Bay, Florida.

"I applaud our state, local and private sector team's dedication to successfully completing this annualexercise," said Bryan W. Koon, Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. "Everyindividual who participated showed exceptional effort to make this exercise a success."

The overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness inresponding to a simulated radiological emergency at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. NoDeficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action were identified by the federal evaluators.

Each year, all nuclear power plants (Crystal River, Turkey Point, and Saint Lucie, as well as Farley inDothan AL), conduct a full-scale exercise with the surrounding counties, state, FEMA, and theNuclear Regulatory Commission. These exercises ensure all levels of government are well-versed onthe plans and procedures needed to respond to an emergency.

For more information on the Florida Division of Emergency Management and to GET A PLAN! pleasevisit: www.FloridaDisaster.orq. Follow us on Twitter at www.Twitter.com/flsert or join our blog athttp://flsertinfo.blogspot.com/.

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STATE OF FLORIDA

OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENTDIVISIONRICK SCOTTGovernor

BRYAN W. KOONDirector

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEFRIDAY, MARCH 25, 2011

CONTACT: PUBLIC INFORMATION(850) 413-9969

www.FloridaDisaster.orq

FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CONDUCTS A SUCCESSFULEXERCISE WITH TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY

TALLAHASSEE -- The Florida Division of Emergency Management received a draftevaluation this week from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that thestate, in coordination with county partners and Florida Power and Light, has conducted asuccessful exercise on February 23, 2011 with the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plantlocated in Biscayne Bay, Florida.

"I applaud our state, local and private sector team's dedication to successfully completingthis annual exercise," said Bryan W. Koon, Director of the Florida Division of EmergencyManagement. "Every individual who participated showed exceptional effort to make thisexercise a success."

The overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of state and localpreparedness in responding to a simulated radiological emergency at the Turkey PointNuclear Power Plant. No Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action were identifiedby the federal evaluators.

Each year, all nuclear power plants (Crystal River, Turkey Point, and Saint Lucie, as well asFarley in Dothan AL), conduct a full-scale exercise with the surrounding counties, state,FEMA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These exercises ensure all levels ofgovernment are well-versed on the plans and procedures needed to respond to anemergency.

For more information on the Florida Division of Emergency Management and to GET A PLAN!please visit: www.FloridaDisaster.org. Follow us on Twitter at www.Twitter.com/flsert or joinour blog at http://flsertinfo.bloQspot.com/.

FLORIDA RECOVERY OFFICE • DIVISION HEADQUARTERS o36 Skyline Drive 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard

Lake Mary, FL 32746-6201 Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100Tel: 850-413-9969 - Fax: 850-488-1016

www.FloridaDisaster.orq

STATE LOGISTICS RESPONSE CENTER2702 Directors Row

Orlando, FL 32809-5631

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From: [LA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:09 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Release of EPZ Information

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

W**X OR OFICIAL USE ONLY

DO NOT- RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Fontenot, Rebecca [mailto: [email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:35 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Release of EPZ Information

Ok, so I will double check with Dan. He does know to which EPZ information you are referring? I will try and see what Ican do. By the way, is this Harry? If so, you should try and update the signature b/c it says Bonnie, and she is next doorto me ©

Sincerely,

Rebecca FontenotREP Program(202) 212-2315

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:32 AMTo: Fontenot, RebeccaSubject: RE: Release of EPZ Information

No, I haven't yet received a response. I sent a follow-on message to the principles there in the office with a request forresponse, since there was no indication in the log that any follow-up information was provided on the action. No oneresponded, so around 0950 1 spoke with Dan Feighert about it. I provided in my request a general statement for theirreview/modification, approval and/or disapproval with an official response they are comfortable conveying. He statedhe would get on top of it and get back with me...still waiting.

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187 BI

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******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*`*"''

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Fontenot, Rebecca [mailto: [email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 10:22 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Release of EPZ Information

Hello,

Did you get a response on this? What EPZ information are you referring to?

Sincerely,


From: Quinn, VanessaSent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 6:39 PMTo: Fontenot, RebeccaSubject: FW: Release of EPZ Information

Vanessa E. QuinnBranch ChiefRadiological Emergency Preparedness ProgramOffice: 703.605.1535BBerry:1 (b)(6)

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 6:12 PMTo: Dan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten;Vanessa E. QuinnSubject: Release of EPZ Information

The State Liaison Representative asked the following question:

Q) Could the EPZ information submitted by FEMA to the operations center a couple of days ago be released to the stateand/or public?

Larry Broockerd Dayshift 0700-1500Harry Nash Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

""FO OFFICIAL USE ONLY'""~DO NOT RELEASE OUTS. DE OF TlE. FEDERAL FAMILY

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:09 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Inquires related to U.S procedure during Nuclear Emergency


' *-*-* *:':FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"•.DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE I OF Tile iEDILKAL I'ANIILY

From: Greten, Timothy [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 8:43 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Out of Office AutoReply: Inquires related to U.S procedure during Nuclear Emergency

I will be out of office until 0900 Friday, March 25. Please cc urgent issues to Vanessa.quinnra~dhs.gov and harrv.sherwood64dhs.gov.

Thank you!Tim

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:08 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW:


""A "'FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMviILY

From: Sheffield, Bonnie [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 3:15 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE:

Thank you.

Bonn,/ Shef,Program Specialist (Emergency Management)Policy and Regulations UnitU.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMATechnological Hazard DivisionRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program1800 S. Bell StreetArlington VA.20598-3025202 212 2120 office

(b)(6) blackberry703 305 0837 fax

From: prvs=0565adb72= [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 2:57 PMTo: Sheffield, BonnieSubject: RE:


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**.**.FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*"

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TIlE FEDERAL FA.I..

From: Sheffield, Bonnie [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 2:54 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject:

Please send me the SOP for the Liaison position

Program Specialist (Emergency Management)Policy and Regulations UnitU.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMATechnological Hazard DivisionRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program1800 S. Bell StreetArlington VA.20598-3025202 212 2120 office

(b)(6) J blackberry703 305 0837 fax

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FEMA Liaison

NRC Operations CenterDuties and Responsibilities

LOCATION

* 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville MD 20852* The position is located in the Liaison Team Room of the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) Emergency Operations C~en•te"r,(EOC).

* The security clearance requirement is SECRETýor "L".o Other security levels may be used, but will need constant escorts

DUTIES" Report to the Liaison Director

o Report on the status of FEMAo Reporst from the RAC Chair is officialfo•rthat Region

" Represent FEMA at all timeisjna professional manner.o Do not speak outside your'area of eexpertiseo If needs be contact FEMA HQ or verification of information that is requestedo Do speak:.withconfidenceo All inforýmation comes to andfrom this position, ifyou are not receiving information

from either•parties contact them for updates.

* Log i nall information on th.!log-sheet..o-, a Send yesterdays log.sheet to FEMA. Contact list in the beginning of the morning shift.

e RepOt all PubliciMeetinggý t6The FEMA Contact list and Mr. Kish

* Send all-e-mails and information to FEMA Contact list which includes:Vanessa E:QjLiinn; Tim Greten; Ralston, Michelle; Harry Sherwood; Andrew

Seward; Steve Horwitz, Dan Feighert and John Simpsono FEMA Contact-list will come up on the email by typing the letter F in the 'TO" section.o FEMA Contact list may need to be updated, contact FEMA HQ for the latest personnel

list that the information will be sent to and add to the Duties and Responsibilitieso To updated the FEMA Contact list go to the Contact section of the e-mail and FEMA

contact list group and FEMA RAC list group will come up click on them and makecorrections

• Any documents that have FEMA on it have to be reviewed by FEMA and HQattorneys and FEMA Contact list.

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" If time allows, any statements from NRC OPS Center that included FEMA

should to be reviewed by FEMA HQ attorneys and FEMA Contact list

* Send NRC SITREP to FEMA Contact list twice a day: After the 0600 reportand after the 1700 report

o The NRC SITREP is located on the desktop folder named M-OPS Center drive/Japan

electronic briefing package/NRC status reports. It is filed by date.

This file may change for different events ,

* Information from FEMA HQ is received: i.,,e. 'FEMA SITREP, talking points eto Forward it to NRC State,Federal Liaisons and Liaison directoro Copy and put in the FEMA Liaison infomrmation/ FEMA SITREP information file

c.

PHONE PROTOCALS:

" Answer the desk phone:, NRC Operation..Cente•r•, FEMA, then your name,this is a recorded line. It is law to notify the speaker that they are on arecorded line

" Watch what yousay, on the phone, don't speak for other agencies.

ATTACHMENT A: FEMA,.LiaisonLog sheetn.-

ATTACHMENTIB: -FEMANCon4,ct infdrmation,;ai This mayneed toepdated,ontactFEMA HQ for the latest names and numbers and

add to the:SOP

*. Duties,;Iog sheets an' dall oth:erinformation located on the desktop underthe file FEMA Liaison information.

'4... 4 , -.. -. ;-.•.4 . . 4: 4: :4 .: 4:; ..

• W 4-'-;• •;:.: •;

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ATTACHMENT A

FEMA Liaison LOGNRC Operations Center

DATE:TIME ENTRY

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ATTACHMENT B

RAC Contact informationRegion RAC Chair Email Phone

1 Steve Colman [email protected] 417-832-4731-0

2 Rebecca Thomson Rebecca.Thomsongdhgov 212-680-8509-0(b)(6) -C

3 Darrell Hammons Darrell. Hammrions@ dhs.sgov 215-931-5546-0._._'__-_. I (b)(6) IC

4 Conrad Burnside Conrad;[email protected] 770-220-5486-0_______(b)(6) [C

5 William King Willia"[email protected] ",312.408-5575-0(b)(6) ýC

6 Lisa Hammond ,.• Lisa.Ham m' ond@dhs'gov 940898'5199-0.( :.• "'N - :(b)(6) C

7 Ronald McCabe govRo €,[email protected], 816-283-7007-0. ". (b)(6) -C

8 Dan Feighert,: 'iD• n.Feigte dh gov 303-235-4737-0. . . . . ., . , . . . . . "'*4' (b )(6 ) [ C

9 Cra ig lFi 6.r•e• e Cra ig.Fiore @'dhs.g 510.627.7252-0________ _______ ...___ -_________= "__ ;_____... _______.________ [~j~ (b)(6) jC

10 Bill Webb' [email protected] 425-427-2175-0

4 4. . '44444

444 '44 44

'4 ~4 3'

444 '4

"44 4"4"

N' 444 4

4~4~

'4' 4

4

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Technological Hazards DivisionHeadquarters Contacts

Name Last, FirstArszulowicz, JohnBarker, RonaldBarnes, JoshuaBroockerd, LarryButler, LolitaColeman-Marbury, BrendaCollins Jr., Richard W.Connell, Renae

Coons, AlbertDarlington, LisaDeFelice, AnthonyDeGilio, LouDu, Jingtong (James)Eberst, WilliamFiore, CraigFlores, KaoriFontenot, Rebecca

Galloway, ClarkGardner, PatriciaGates 11, Russell P. (Russ)Gilder, DavidGreten, TimHallett, ScottHalsey, LaShawnHamilton, LisaHammond-Woodard, OdessaHerring, JoeHobbs, Terry

BranchREPPCSEPPREPPREPPCSEPPBizOps

Title

Program Specialist(Emergency Preparedness)

Emergency Management SpecialistTraining SpecialistSecretaryExecutive Assistant

FRPCC Program SpecialistREPP Emergency Management Specialist.]

Lead Program Spe iahst

REPP (Emergency Preparedness)BizOps Acting Branch ChiefREPP Attomey ,REPP Traing SpecialistProfServices, -)Eectr6nIcsEngineerProfServices Program Spe~ialistREPP Deputy Branch Chief .REPP. Emergency Manigement Sp'eiilist,REPP Emergenc Management Speciahist

1Program Specialist.ilzOps (mergency preparedness) .-"

'REPP Progm Specialist,%..; ;,", .I -.. A ".

PrbfServices SeniOr Electronics EngineerCSEPPV Prograi Specialist'Division'•..,,' Deputy DirectorREPP Training SpecialistREPP "Emergency Management SpecialistREPP !Emergency Management SpecialistProfServices Pi60am Support AssistantCSEPP Deputy DirectorCSEPP Acting Branch Chief

Affce**:,tbd .

703-605-1210202-2124874202-212-2238703-605-12 1'202-212-230o"..202-212-47531202-212-2130

,:.202-212-2318

".703-605-1377

703-605-1400-,202-2•2•231310O2-2 124870202-212-2321703-6054218202-212-2287202-212-2315

202-212-2333202-212-2314202-212-2196703-605-1206202-646-3907202-212-4896202-212-2235202-212-2123202-646-4015703-605-1378703-605-1379

Emailjohn.arszulowiczqdhs.govronald.barkerCdhs.govjoshua.bamesadhs.govlarry.broockerdadhs.govlolita.butler@dhs.gov

,"brenda.coleman-marbulry(dhs.govnichard [email protected]

[email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected]@dhs.gov

[email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected]@dhs.gov

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Horton, DouglasHorwitz, SteveHowe, Michael

Jeremy, DavidKish, JamesMauldin, Deborah

McSwain, Alonzo

Mingledolph, JuvartNash Jr., Harry W.Nevitt, JasonNorville, RobertOwens, TamaraPage, ChristopherPurvis, JamesQuinn, Vanessa E.

Name Last, FirstRalston, Michelle

Sanders, TamaraSchafer, JohnScipio, Tanya

Sheffield, Bonnie

Strother, ThomasTaylor-Redman, Crystal

Tenorio, PatTurner, SheilaWard, PaulWarnock, Thomas

REPPProfServicesProfServices

REPPDivisionREPP

BizOps

BizOpsREPPBizOpsCSEPPFRPCCtbdREPPREPP

BranchProfServices

BizQps.;Prof Services.:ý

.BizOps

REPP,

BizOpsBizOps

BizOpsBizOpsProfIServicesCSEPP

AttorneyPublic Affairs SpecialistHealth PhysicistProgram Specialist(Emergency Management)DirectorEmergency Management Specialist IProgram Specialis(Emergency Preparedness)Senior Program Specialist.,'-(Emergency Preparedness)Program SpecialistLead Program Specialist(Emergencyreparcdness)Administrative Program SpecialistEmergency Management SpecialistEmergency Manageiment'SpccialistBranch Chief -

.Title:Emergency Management Specialist..Program Specialist(Emergency Preparedness)Electronics Engineer:

::Program/Policy Specialist .Branch ChiefPfogram Specialist (EmergencyMan iagIment)Program: Specialist";

(Emergency Preparedness)Programh SpecialistProgramSpecialist(Emeirgency Preparedness)Program AnalystHealth PhysicistProgram Specialist

703-605-1519703-605-1208202-2124875

..202-212-2316

202-212-2205'703-605-4214

202'2 12-2322

202-212-2332202-212-2317,:'202-212-2332703-605-1209202-646-2620

.tbd202-212-2334703-605-1535

[email protected][email protected]@dhs.gov

[email protected]@[email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]@dhs.gov

.ason.nevitt~2dhs,govr6bert.norvilleadhs.govtamara.owensl @dhs.gov

[email protected]@dhs.gov

[email protected]

[email protected]@dhs.govandrew.seward(dhs..ov

Office**202-212-2310

703-605-4217202-212-4740202-646-2813

202-212-3828

202-212-2120 [email protected]

202-212-2121703-6054163

202-355-3768202-212-2331202-212-2337202-657-2301

[email protected]

[email protected]@dhs.govpaul.ward [email protected]

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Wilt, Michael C

Wierman, Ken

DivisionBizOpsProfServicesREPPCSEPPFRPCC

REPP

REPP

Emergency Management SpecialistProgram SpecialistTraining Specialist

202-212-4741 [email protected]

703-605-1227 kenneth.wiermanadhs.gov

Technological Hazards DivisionBusiness OperationsProfessional ServicesRadiological Emergency Preparedness ProgramChemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness ProgramFederal Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

i7

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/ N

N -'

Add DHS/ FEMA Org Chart.

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t

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:07 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Timeline


' * *":'FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"****


From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto: Michelle. [email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 10:57 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Timeline

That would work.

RespectfUll.

Michelle Ralston, MS. PMIPublic Allfairs, Stakeholder Outreach & Cunpaign PlanningProfessional Services & IntegrationTechnological Hazards DivisionProtection & National PreparednessDHS/FENIA1800 South Bell Street, Rm. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk

I (b)(6) ]Blackberry

(703) 305-0837 facsimile

From: prvs=0565adb72= LIA05. [email protected] [mailto: prvs= [email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 10:47 AMTo: Ralston, MichelleSubject: RE: Timeline

Are you asking for more than the SITREP that we provided? Do you want the Operations tempo?

Larry

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500

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Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

***-**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL.. .**.**

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TIE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto: Michelle. [email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 10:45 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Timeline

Good morning,

Do you know if the NRC has a running timeline that you can share?

Thanks.

Respectfully.

Michelle Ralston, MS. PMIPublic Alfifars, Stakeholder Outr-each & Campaign PlanningProfessional Services & IntegrationIcchnological Haz;rds l)ivision

Protect~oio & Naltional PreparednessDHS/FEMA1800 South Bell Street, Rm. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk

I (b)(6) JBlackberry(703) 305-0837 facsimile

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Emergency SupportFunction 15Standard Operating Procedures

August 2009

HomelandSecurity

Emergency SupportFunction 15Standard Operating Procedures

August 2009

~H omelandSecurity

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HomelandSecurity

August 13, 2009

Preface and Transmittal

Providing our citizens timely lifesaving information during major incidents remains our highestpriority. Emergency Support Function (ESF) #15 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 2009is our primary Federal tool to accomplish that objective, as well as a guiding document tocoordinate overall Federal incident communications.

This document builds upon the external affairs policy established in Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 5, the National Response Framework, National Incident ManagementSystem, and Incident Command System. It identifies key components in the Federal externalaffairs team and provides tactical guidance and notional organizational recommendations foruse during incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response.

This version has been updated following the TOP OFFICIALS 4 exercise and the 2007 Federalresponse to the California wild land fires. Refinement of the SOP continued based onengagement of a U.S. satellite, the Federal response to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and theH1N1 flu outbreak.

The SOP contains new annexes from Federal departments and agencies involved in incidentcommunications and emergency response. It will be continually reviewed, and users areencouraged to submit comments and recommendations to the incident communications teamwithin Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Public Affairs.

We encourage all participants to recognize that success is dependent on the concept of unity ofeffort-many departments and agencies working together as a team. This SOP will be a keytool to ensure unity of effort on behalf of our citizens.

Jeff KaronisDirector of Incident CommunicationsOffice of Public AffairsU.S. Department of Homeland Security

-i-

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Table of Contents

Preface and Transmittal

Table of Contents ii

Quick Reference Guide iii

Basic Plan

Annex A, Organization, Staffing, and Operations A-I

Annex B, Intergovernmental Coordination B-1

Annex C, Cyber C-I

Annex D, Private Sector D-I

Annex E, Community Relations E-1

Annex F, Joint Information Center F-1

Annex G, Congressional Affairs G-I

Annex U, Planning and Products H-1

Annex I, Department of Defense I-1

Annex J, Federal Law Enforcement J-1

Annex K, National Guard K-1

Annex L, Public Health L-1

Annex M, Environmental M-1

Annex N, Radiological N-I

Annex 0, NTSB Transportation Investigations 0-1

Annex P, Agriculture and Food P-1

Annex Q, Staffing and Deployments Q-1

Annex R, Social Media R-1

Annex X, Administration and Logistics X-I

Annex Y, Training Y-I

Annex Z, Acronyms and Key Terms Z-1

- ii -

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Quick Reference GuideThe Emergency Support Function (ESF) #15 - External Affairs Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)consists of the following components:

Basic. Plan

Annex A. Organization, Staffing, andOperations

" Purpose" Background" National Response Framework" Mission" ESF # 15 Director's Intent" Objectives" Concept of Operations" Department and Agency Responsibilities" External Affairs Components" Roles and Responsibilities" ESF #15 Organization, Staffing, and Operations

* PurposeMission

" Organization" Staffing" Operations" Activation" Incident Operations" ESF #15 Daily Operations" Communications Protocols" App 1 Federal Authorities" App 2 Coordinated Federal Response" App 3 No-Notice Checklist" App 4 Deliberate Planning Checklist" App 5 Operations Director Designation" App 6 External Affairs Officer (EAO) Designation" App 7 Daily Routine" App 8 Daily Communications Summary" App 9 Information Update

" Quick Summary" Purpose* Mission" Organization" IGP Activities with State, Local, Territorial, and

Tribal Officials" ESF #15 IGP Staff Positions

Annex B, IntergovernmentalCoordination

- Ili -

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Annex C, Cyber

Annex 0,•PiVat• Sector

Annex E, Community Relations

Annex F, Joint Information Center

Annex G, Congressional Affairs

PurposeBackgroundPlanning AssumptionsControlCoordinationCommunicationGuiding PrinciplesPolicyApp I Relationship of Emergency Support Functionsto CI/KR Sectors

Quick SummaryPurposeAssumptionsConcept of OperationsRoles and ResponsibilitiesFederal Government Agency CoordinationPrivate Sector Outreach Activities

Quick Summary.PurposeCommunity Relations FunctionsConcept of OperationsApp 1. Special Needs

Quick SummaryPurposeJIC Operating ConceptsJIC OrganizationJIC TypesJIC EstablishmentJIC Operational ElementsApp I Release of Information and SpokespersonsApp 2 JIC Organizational ChartApp 3 JIC Establishment ChecklistApp 4 Disaster News ReleaseApp 5 Media Access Program and Operations

Quick SummaryPurposePrimary FunctionConcept of OperationsInitial Activation and DeploymentIncident TasksOutreachOther Incident Coordination Measures

- iv -

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Annex H, Planning and Products

LAnnex !' Department of Defense.

Annex J,.Federal Law Enforcement .

Annex K, National Guard (NGB)

Annex L, Public Health

m

U

Quick SummaryPurposeConcept of OperationsPlanning and Products OperationsStrategy and MessagingCreative ServicesTechnical SupportLiaisonsApp I Organizational Chart

PurposeMissionConcept of OperationsCoordinationApp I U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

PurposeOperating Concepts

Communication ProtocolsObjectivesPoliciesMessage/ThemesMessage DevelopmentMessage DisseminationOffice of Public Affairs IncidentCommunications Plan

PurposeBackground

Public Affairs PostureThemes and MessagesMedia InterestMedia OutletsPublic Affairs ProductsResponsibilitiesInteragency/Intergovernmental RelationshipsQuestions and AnswersPoints of ContactAfter-Action Report (AAR)

PurposeBackgroundObjectivesPlanning AssumptionsControlCoordinationCommunicationCore Communication FunctionsMessage DevelopmentMessage Dissemination

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Annex N, Radiological

Ane 0...,. :..T..B Transportat:.•."'..:ioni"

" Purpose" Guiding Principles" Mission" Concept of Operations" Coordination

* Purpose* Background* Quick Summary" Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)" Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)" Federal Response" Responsibilities" App I Nuclear Regulatory Commission" App 2 •Department of Energy/National Nuclear

Security Administration" App 3 Department of Defense" App 4 National Aeronautics and Space

Administration." App 5 EPA Office of Air and Radiation

Annex 0; NTS13 Transportation-

Investigations

Annex P, Agriculture and Food

U PurposeMissionProcedures for Major AccidentsFederal Bureau of Investigation

PurposeBackgroundPoliciesLaboratory TestingConcept of OperationsCoordination

U

p

p

U

U

PurposeStaffing Leadership PositionsResponsibilitiesTrainingFederal Deployment Teams

PurposeConcept of OperationsSocial MediaContent

PurposeRequirementResponsibilitiesPersonnel and StaffingApp I ESF #15 Leadership Roster

- Vi -

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PurposeTraining and ObjectivesTraining Program RequirementsTraining ResourcesApp 1. ESF #15 Staff Training Requirements

Annex Z, Acronyms and. Key Terms

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Emeroency SuDoort Function #15 - External Affairs Standard ODerating Procedures(SOP)Basic Plan

References:A. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5)B. National Response Framework (NRF)C. National Incident Management System (NIMS)D. Interagency Integrated Joint Field Office (JFO) SOP

NOTE TO USERS

This ESF #15 SOP is an updated guidance document to the original version. The 2009 versionincludes updates to all original annexes and contains the following new additions: Cyber, SpecialNeeds, Federal Law Enforcement, Public Health, Environmental, Radiological, NTSBTransportation Investigations, Agriculture and Food, Staffing and Deployments, and Social Media.

1.0 PurposeThis SOP establishes procedures and protocols for Emergency Support Function #15External Affairs to support Federal domestic incident management during an incidentrequiring a coordinated Federal response. Emergency Support Function #15 integratesPublic Affairs, Congressional Affairs, Intergovernmental (State, Territorial, Local, andTribal) Affairs, Community Relations, and the Private Sector under the coordinatingauspices of external affairs. The Department of State oversees International Affairs (aprevious ESF #15 component) for the Federal Government.

2.0 BackgroundHomeland Security Management Directive 5 (HSPD-5) created the National ResponsePlan (NRP) to coordinate the Federal response to actual or potential incidents requiring acoordinated Federal response. The NRP grouped the capabilities of the Federaldepartments and agencies and the American Red Cross into emergency support functions.The full or partial activation of these emergency support functions is how the FederalGovernment responds to incidents. An ESF may be selectively activated for incidentsrequiring a coordinated Federal response and may also provide staffing for the NationalResponse Coordination Center (NRCC), Regional Response Coordination Center(RRCC), Joint Field Office (JFO), Joint Information Center (JIC), and IncidentCommand Post (ICP) as required by the incident. ESF #15 ensures that sufficient Federalexternal resources are assigned during an incident requiring a coordinated Federalresponse in order to provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affectedaudiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace.

3.0 National Response Framework

3.1 The National Response Framework (NRF) superseded the National ResponsePlan (2004 and 2006 revisions). The NRF is a guide that details how the Nation

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conducts all-hazards response - fiomn the smallest incident to the largestcatastrophe.

3.2 The NRF describes how communities, States, the Federal Government, andprivate-sector and nongovernmental partners apply these principles for acoordinated, effective national response. In addition, it describes specialcircumstances where the Federal Government exercises a larger role, includingincidents where Federal interests are involved and catastrophic incidents where aState would require significant support.

3.3 It can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat, in anticipationof a significant event or in response to an incident. Selective implementationallows for a scaled response, delivery of the exact resources needed, and a level ofcoordination appropriate to each event.

3.4 The ESF #15 and the Public Affairs annex are available online at the NRFResource Center (www.fema.gov/nrf).

4.0 MissionUpon activation of ESF #15 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) AssistantSecretary for Public Affairs, Federal external affairs resources will be employed toconduct sustained operations in support of the Principal Federal Official (PFO), FederalCoordinating Officer (FCO), and JFO during an incident requiring a coordinated Federalresponse in order to provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affectedaudiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace. Inaccordance with the NRF, the Secretary will only appoint the PFO for catastrophic orunusually complex incidents that require extraordinary coordination.

5.0 ESF #15 Director's Intent"Our shared commitment, as the Federal external affairs team, is to execute therequirements and plans developed by the Principal Federal Official, if appointed, theFCO, and the JFO staff. Our supporting external communications strategy, based uponthe concept of unity, of effort, must be rapidly developed, with forces deployed in advanceof an incident wherever and whenever possible, and fully integrated and synchronizedwithin the incident command systemi to our State, local, tribal, territorial, and privatesector partners. The PFO, FCO, and ESF #15 leadership cadre are empowered to developand disseminate external affairs plans and information. We are guided by the operatingprinciple of 'Maximnu disclosure, with minimum delaY.

6.0 ObjectivesThis SOP will be used to fornulate external affairs incident action plans and proceduresthat will help save lives and protect the health and safety of the public, responders, andrecovery workers. It will also be used as a firamework to guide messaging to protectproperty; mitigate damages and impacts to individuals, communities, and theenvironment; and facilitate recovery information for individuals, families, businesses,governments, and the media.

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7.0 Concept of OperationsThrough coordination with the FCO, JFO, and affected State, local, territorial, and tribalpartners, the Federal Government will establish and conduct supporting external affairsactivities. These activities and supporting organization will be scalable and flexible withrespect to the incident situation. The effort will be fully synchronized and integrated withall participating counterparts, from whatever authority. The ESF #15 team will developand execute an external affairs strategy to support the JHO incident action plan. The ESF#15 team will utilize this SOP as procedural guidance for activating, establishing, andoperating the external affairs operation. A central feature of this concept, consistent withthe incident command system, is a unified planning component that brings unity of effortto all strategic communications planning and product development.

8.0 Department and Agency Responsibilities

8.1 Coordinating AgencyDepartment of Homeland Security (DIIS)

8.2 Primary AgencyFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

8.3 Support AgencySubject to the nature of the incident, all NRF signatory departments, agencies, andorganizations may be part of the external affairs operation.

9.0 External Affairs Components

9.1 Joint Information CenterJoint Information Center activities ensure the coordinated and timely release ofincident-related prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigationinformation to the public. ESF #15 provides the interagency coordinationmechanisms and resource support for Federal JIC activities.

9.2 Community RelationsCommunity Relations program provides the vital information link between theDHS, FEMA, the State and local communities, and those affected by disasters.

9.3 Congressional AffairsCongressional Affairs provides information to the Washington, D.C., and districtoffices of members of congress. It addresses incident-related questions, concerns,and problems expressed by their constituents.

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9.4 Intergovernmental (State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal) AffairsIntergovernmental Affairs incorporates State, local, territorial, and tribalcoordination to assist the FCO and JFO with direct cormnunications interactionand outreach to public and elected officials. Tribal Affairs provides procedures tofacilitate incident management programs and resources available to tribalgovernments to assist them in protecting their families, conmmnity livelihood,and cultural and environmental resources.

9.5 Private SectorPrivate Sector coordination assists the FCO and JFO with communicationsinvolving counterparts in the non-governmental and commercial areas.

9.6 Planning and ProductsThis new component develops all external and internal communications strategiesand products for the ESF #15 organization and components. This includesrecognition of the need for specialized communications procedures to coverlanguage and special needs.

10.0 Roles and ResponsibilitiesESF #15 unifies Federal external affairs support for all external affairs functional areasdeployed to support an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response. The followingpositions cover the key roles and responsibilities for ESF #15. Their relationship toincident management echelons is noted where applicable.

10.1 ESF #15 DirectorDHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA)

10.2 ESF #15 DHS Component DirectorsAs ESF # 15 is structured around a composite team of mutually supportingexternal affairs activities, this unique coordination scheme must beaccommodated within the Incident Command System (ICS). To this end,component directors designated below coordinate as necessary with the ESF #15Director.

10.2.1 Congressional AffairsDHS Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs

10.2.2 Intergovernmental (State, Tribal, and Local) AffairsDHS Director, National Protection Programs Directorate

10.2.3 Private SectorDHS Assistant Secretary, Private Sector Coordination Office

10.2.4 Community RelationsFEMA, Recovery

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10.3 ESF #15 Operations Director (OD)The DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs will designate the ESF #15Operations Director using the template in Appendix 5 to Annex A. Duringincidents requiring a coordinated Federal response, DHS may retain the OD role.In those incidents where FEMA has a lead role, the ESF #15 OD responsibilitywill be assigned to FEMA. Other DHS component agency communicationsdirectors may be assigned as OD if the nature of the incident falls largely withintheir agency mission profile. (Note: In order to support State-county levelincidents, the FEMA Director of External Affairs is authorized to designate ESF#15 External Affairs Officers.) Specific duties of the OD include the following:

10.3.1 Execute the Director's Intent and strategic communications plan,National Operations Center (NOC) and NRCC guidance, FCO, and JFOin accordance with the NRF, NIMS, JFO SOP, and incident action plan.

10.3.2 Provide direction, oversight, and coordination to the ESF #15 ExternalAffairs Officer.

10.3.3 Represent ESF #15 on the NRCC.

10.3.4 Coordinate with DHS ESF #15 Component Directors and their staffs andinternational, interagency, and State, local, territorial, and tribalcounterparts to ensure that operational infornation and tasking areintegrated and executed.

As soon as possible following notification, the OD reports the followinginformation to the ESF #15 Director:

" The name and contact information for the prospective or designated ESF #15External Affairs Officer

" The status of coordination with the affected State

" The JIC location

" The status of available ESF #15 resources in the affected area

10.4 ESF #15 JFO Leadership CadreThe ESF #15 JFO leadership cadre is detailed below and includes the keyfunctions for Federal external affairs. Leadership cadre assignments will be madein advance for some potential incidents and to support FCO and JFO staffingdirection. Positions will be assigned subject to the nature of the incident, externalaffairs requirements, and coordination with the JFO staff

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10.4.1 ESF #15 External Affairs Officer (EAO)The ESF #15 OD recommends the External Affairs Officer to the ESF# 15 Director prior to, or immediately following, an incident requiring acoordinated Federal response. Upon approval of the recommendation(or selection of another EAO), the ESF #15 Director will designate theEAO using the template in Appendix 7 to Annex A. Designation andwritten notification of the EAO should occur as soon as possible. Thisincludes National Security Special Events (NSSE). The EAO serves asthe primary external affairs advisor to the FCO and UnifiedCoordination Group and Staff. The EAO has a dual-report responsibilityto both the ESF #15 Director and the FCO. Specific duties includecoordinating and developing the external affairs and communicationsstrategy in support of the FCO and the incident action plan. The EAO isresponsible for coordinating the external affairs information flow amongthe ESF #15 Director; FCO; JFO; other departments and agencies; andState, local, territorial, and tribal counterparts. The EAO is alsoresponsible for coordinating visits by governmental officials, foreigndignitaries, and other VIPs.

Initial ESF #15 External Affairs OfficerIn the event of a no-notice incident requiring a coordinated Federalresponse, an initial EAO may be assigned pending arrival of thepermanently assigned officer. The ESF #15 Director will assign theinitial EAO in consultation with the FCO. Duties of the initial EAOfollowing relief will be subject to the nature of the incident.

10.4.2 ESF #15 Deputy OfficerReports directly to the ESF #15 EAO. Supports the EAO inmanagement of the ESF. The Deputy represents the officer on the JFOCoordination Staff when the incumbent is unavailable. Specific dutiesinclude overall management of the ESF # 15 staff, personnel,administration and logistics, and effective functioning of the ESF #15team.

10.4.3 ESF #15 Executive OfficerReports directly to the ESF #15 Deputy External Affairs Officer.Specific duties include management of ESF #15 Assistant ExternalAffairs component officer and their functions. The Executive Officerensures that components are working as a team with unity of effort.This position frees the Deputy to assist the EAO in incidents while theExecutive Officer continues to provide oversight and management of theESF team. [Note: This position may not be required subject to thenature of the incident, duration, and staff.]

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10.4.4 ESF #15 LiaisonThis position may be assigned during incidents where robust externalaffairs coordination and liaison to the Unified Coordination Group arenecessary. Assists the ESF #15 EAO and Unified Coordination Group,and facilitates the exchange of information, tasking, andcommunications.

10.4.5 ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for CongressionalAffairs (CA)Reports to the ESF #15 Executive Officer and oversees all activitiesinvolving Congressional Affairs. Responsibilities include coordinatingthe exchange of information with members and committees of Congressand their staffs, and serves as the senior advisor for all issues relating toCongressional matters.

10.4.6 ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for lntergovernmental(State, Tribal, and Local) AffairsReports to the ESF #15 Executive Officer and oversees all activitiesinvolving State, tribal, and local affairs (also known asIntergovernmental Affairs). Responsibilities include coordinating theexchange of information with State and local elected officials and tribalgovernment leadership, informing them of Federal programs that may beavailable to them, and serving as the senior advisor for all issues relatingto intergovernmental matters.

10.4.7 ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector (PS)Reports to the ESF #15 Executive Officer and serves as the senioradvisor on all issues involving private sector matters.

10.4.8 ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for CommunityRelations (CR)Reports to the ESF #15 Executive Officer and oversees all activitiesinvolving Community Relations. Responsibilities include coordinatingall CR field activities to the general public and local governments tohelp educate, inform, and assist with the delivery of disaster assistanceprogram information. Also assists in training new staff, organizing aspeaker's bureau, and acting as a senior advisor to the Officer, FCO, andJFO Staff on issues involving the general public.

10.4.9 ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for the JICReports to the ESF #15 Executive Officer and oversees the operationalcomponent of the Joint Information Center to include establishing thefacility, obtaining logistics support, media center, and daily coordinationand support to the media, including the Media Access Program. The JICDirector is responsible for management of Federal tbrces supportingmultistate or satellite JICs.

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10.4.10 ESF #15 SpokespersonWhere possible, and if required, the Officer may assign a primaryspokesperson(s). Consistency in spokespersons can help ensure unity ofeffort and consistency in. messaging and support public confidencethrough association with a known presence. Assignment of aspokesperson does not preclude the availability of the FCO or ESF #15leadership cadre to conduct external communications activities.

10.4.11 ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for Planning andProducts (PP)Reports to the ESF #15 Executive Officer and oversees all activitiesinvolving research and writing, external and internal strategy and plandevelopment, messaging, and information gathering. Responsibilitiesinclude the development of a pro-active incident action plan, mediacommunications materials and products about the Federal responseeffort, design of a communications strategy for outreach to uniquelanguage or special needs populations, and information and educationfor the public and media about Federal assistance programs during theincident. This officer serves as a senior advisor for all issues relating tostrategy and messaging.

10.4.12 ESF #15 Resource Mananer (ESF #15 RM)If assigned, the ESF #15 Resource Manager will report to the ESF #15Deputy EAO and supervise all related activities in this function. Thiswill include office space and equipment needs, JIC support, andcoordination with JFO staff elements. The RM will coordinate directlywith the ESF #15 staff and JFO Logistics and Finance andAdministration staffs as necessary.

10.4.13 Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) External AffairsSpecialist (FEMA)External Affairs is represented on National and Regional IMAT throughan External Affairs Specialist. This Emergency Authority (EA)specialist deploys with the IMAT in a notice event prior to the expectedincident and provides situational awareness to the Regional ExternalAffairs Officer (or designated ESF #15 lead) and through the RegionalEAO (or designated ESF #15 lead) to FEMA headquarters ExternalAffairs. During a no-notice event, the time between the deployment ofthe IMAT and EAO and ESF #15 staff may be similar- and in this case,the IMAT EA specialist provides support to the EAO as needed and aslong as the ]MAT is activated. During non-incidents, the EA specialisttrains with the IMAT and works under the mentorship of the RegionalEAO by developing plans and outreach in their region.

11.0 ESF #15 Organization, Staffing, and Operations

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Guidance on organization, staffing, and operations is contained in Annex A.

AnnexesA Organization, Staffing, and OperationsB Intergovernmental (State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal) CoordinationC CyberD Private SectorE Community RelationsF Joint Information CenterG Congressional AffairsH Planning and ProductsI Department of DefenseJ Federal Law EnforcementK National GuardL Public HealthM EnvironmentalN RadiologicalO NTSB Transportation InvestigationsP Agriculture and FoodQ Staffing and DeploymentsR Social MediaX Administration and LogisticsY TrainingZ Acronyms and Key Terms

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Annex A to Emnergency Support Function #15 External AffairsOrganization, Staffing, and Operations

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated JFO Standard Operating Procedures

1.0 PurposeThe purpose of this Annex is to provide guidance on the organizational structure,staffing, and operational employment of Emergency Support Function # 15.

NOTE TO USERS

In an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, external affairs is an operationalresource that can help save lives and support State and local incident managementauthorities.

2.0 MissionUpon activation of ESF #15 by the DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Federalexternal affairs resources will be employed to conduct sustained operations in support ofthe FCO and JFO during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response in order toprovide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affected audiences, includinggovernments, media, the private sector, and the local populace.

3.0 Organization

3.1 General GuidanceThe ESF #15 organization is prescribed within the NRF. This organization isintended to be scalable and flexible to support incident requirements. Theorganization may be modified by the FCO and ESF #15 EAO.

3.2 Federal Interagency ParticipationWhen Federal personnel are assigned to the ESF #15 field organization, they willconform to and support this SOP and other policies as directed by the FCO andJFO SOP.

3.3 Organizational Structure - Coordinated Federal ResponseAppendix 2 provides a notional organizational chart and process flow for ESF #15during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response with an FCO. Thisorganization is for planning purposes and may be modified as necessary tosupport incident management activities.

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3.4 Multi-State/Single PFO Coordinated Federal ResponseCertain coordinated Federal responses may require a single designated PFO for acatastrophic or unusually complex incident with FCOs and staffs in multipleaffected States. In this case an ESF #15 Deputy EA Officer for each affectedState(s) with an FCO(s) will be identified. In order to ensure unity of effort, ESF#15 Deputy EA Officers will coordinate activities with the PFO's ESF #15 EAOfficer. The ESF #15 Deputy EA Officer support cadre/staff will be identified, asnecessary, for the incident, but will follow the normal ESF #15 structure, wherefeasible.

4.0 Staffing

4.1 DHS Headquarters and ESF #15 Component StafflngUpon ESF #15 activation, deployment and staffing will be initially coordinated bythe DHS OPA Director of Incident Communications. Assignments will be basedon pre-incident staffing plans and/or determined during communications betweenthe Director, FCO, departments and agencies, and component directors. DHScomponent directors will nominate candidates to support the leadership cadre, ifnot already assigned.

4.2 Federal Interagency StaffingFederal departments and agencies are encouraged and desired to support the ESF#15 organization and staff. Interagency personnel are eligible for assignment toall ESF leadership cadre and staff assignments, with the concurrence of theDirector, the supporting department and agency, and FCO. All Federalinteragency personnel will conform to the guidance and policies containedwithin this SOP and as specified by the FCO and JFO SOP. DHS PublicAffairs will coordinate and solicit requests for staffing support with the Federaldepartments and agencies during an incident requiring a coordinated Federalresponse. Departments and agencies deploying personnel may be responsible forall travel and per diem costs. [Federal reimbursement will be dependent also onthe Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act or otherlegislative actions concerning an incident.] Housing will be determined by theavailability, but agencies should be prepared to be flexible and support memnberlogistics needs.

5.0 Operations

5.1 Concept of OperationsThrough coordination with the FCO, JFO, and affected State, local, territorial, andtribal counterparts, the Federal Government will establish and conduct supportingexternal affairs activities. These activities and supporting organization will bescalable and flexible with respect to the incident situation. The effort will be fullysynchronized and integrated with all participating counterparts, from whateverauthority. The ESF #15 team will develop and execute an external affairs strategyto support the JFO incident action plan. The ESF #15 team will utilize this SOP

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as procedural guidance for activating, establishing, and operating the externalaffairs operation. A central feature of this concept, consistent with the incidentcommand system, is a unified planning component that brings unity of effort to allstrategic communications planning and product development.

5.2 Plan CoordinationThis Plan will be executed in accordance with HSPD, the NRF, the NIMS, othersupporting Federal plans, and in coordination with State, local, territorial, andtribal emergency response plans.

5.3 Strategic DirectionStrategic communications direction will originate from White HouseCommunications, the ESF #15 Director, ESF # 15 DHS Component Directors, andFederal department and agency leadership. Through this strategic direction, theexternal communications plan will be developed by the ESF #15 EAO to supportthe FCO's incident action plan, in close coordination with appropriate authoritiesand counterparts. The ESF #15 EAO will engage fully with the FCO and theUnified Coordination Group and Staff. The ESF # 15 EAO is encouraged toprovide recommendations to the chain of command and senior External Affairsleadership. This ensures that incident-specific issues are integrated with thestrategic communications direction. Appendix 2 details the chain of coordinationfrom the National Federal level to the ESF #15 EAO.

5.4 Intergovernmental (State, Tribal, and Local) CoordinationState, tribal, and local communicators and authorities are presumed to leadincident management efforts. To this end, Federal external affairs forces mustwork closely with State and local communications counterparts from the outset ofthe incident to integrate and synchronize efforts to the fullest extent possible.Close coordination between all counterparts is critical in maintaining unityof effort.

5.5 Incident Leadership and ManagementExecution of this SOP will employ processes and organizations specified in theNRF to execute Federal incident management operations. These include theNOC, the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), FCO, JFOs, the NRCC,and RRCC.

6.0 ActivationThe DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs will direct activation of ESF #15 incoordination with the NRCC, NOC, and FEMA. The ESF # 15 OD is also authorized todirect activation of ESF # 15 when FEMA has the lead role.

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6.1 ESF #15 External Affairs Officer DesignationThe ESF #15 OD will designate an ESF # 15 EAO using the template inAppendix 6. This designation will be coordinated with the FCO. Tasking withinthe letter may be modified due to the nature of the incident.

6.2 DHS Office of Public Affairs (OPA)The DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs will activate the NRF IncidentCommunications Emergency Policy and Procedures (ICEPP) in conjunction withthe ESF #15 activation order. This action, and all DHS-directed incidentcommunications activities, will be closely coordinated and executed withcounterpart leadership from Federal departments, agencies, and the FCO. DHSactions will focus on:

6.2.1 Execution ChecklistsActivation operations and execution measures for deliberate and no-noticeincidents requiring a coordinated Federal response are provided inAppendices 3 and 4. These are notional checklists and may be modifiedas necessary.

6.2.2 DHS National Joint Information Center (NJIC)If required to support interagency communications, the DHS NJLC willserve as the Federal incident communications coordination center duringincidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. It is staffed byexperienced incident communications response personnel and can rapidlymobilize and coordinate the Federal external communications effort. The"virtual" Federal interagency team and National Incident CommunicationsConference Line (NICCL) are controlled in the NJIC. In those incidentswhere FEMA or another agency has the lead role, the ESF #15 OD may bedelegated to lead the "virtual" Federal interagency team and NICCL lineresponsibility. The NJIC coordinates with and supports the Secretary,NOC, Crisis Action Team (CAT), IMPT, NRCC, National InfrastructureCoordination Center (NICC), FCO, JFO, and ESF #15 Staff.

6.2.3 DHS Component AgenciesWithin DHS, component agency communications directors have a dual-report to the DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Through thischain of coordination, agencies receive strategic direction from the DHSAssistant Secretary and respective agency leadership in order to conductincident communications operations in support of the overall Federaleffort.

7.0 Incident OperationsIn coordination with the FCO, the ESF #15 External Affairs Officer will lead ESF #15deployment and establishment efforts for the JFO. The nature of the incident must becarefiully assessed at this point to determine if special procedures or more restrictiverelease of information or media access may be required. Lead roles for the incident and

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emergency support functions, in accordance with the NRF, will be considered during thisassessment. Special consideration is also noted for the following:

7.1 National Special Security Events (NSSEs)The U.S. Secret Service leads external affairs activities and ESF #15 duringNSSEs. These events frequently involve highly sensitive security operationswhere the external affairs strategy and Federal visibility must be protected toensure the success of the operation. An ESF #15 EA Officer for the NSSE will beassigned from the Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Secret Service. The ESF #15 EAOfficer may modify or adapt procedures and communications operations asnecessary. During an NSSE, security is a paramount consideration indetermining the type and detail of information released. The Secretary mayappoint a PFO to support NSSEs.

7.2 Terrorism and Law EnforcementIn accordance with HSPD 5, "the Attorney General has lead responsibility forcriminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groupsinside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions...." Morespecifically, and per the NRF, "the FBI is the lead agency for criminalinvestigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats within the United States." If aJFO is established, the FBI will establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC), whichwill become a section within the JFO. Close coordination between DHS andDepartment of Justice (DOJ)/FBI incident communications counterparts tosupport this arrangement and investigation must be maintained throughout aterrorist incident to ensure effective activation and employment of ESF #15communications activities. Procedures for release of information and mediaaccess outlined in this SOP may be modified because of this incident andinvestigation. More information about law enforcement procedures is in Annex J.

7.3 Radiological IncidentsThe nature of a radiological incident may require modification to releaseinformation and media access guidelines. In accordance with the NRF, there arenumerous coordinating agencies for radiological incidents. Accordingly, the ESF#15 EA Officer designated for a radiological incident should coordinate closelywith the FCO and lead agency subject to the type of incident. Annex N providesadditional information on responsibilities during a radiological incident.

7.3.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the coordinating agency forincidents involving nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC.

7.3.2 The Department of Energy (DOE) is the coordinating agency for incidentsinvolving the transportation of radioactive materials shipped by or for theDOE.

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7.3.3 The Department of Defense (DOD) is the coordinating agency forincidents involving nuclear weapons under Department of Defense (DOD)control.

7.3.4 The National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) is thecoordinating agency for incidents involving space vessels carrying nuclearmaterials.

8.0 ESF #15 Daily Operations

8.1 ESF #15 Daily RoutineAfter activation of the JFO and determination of Federal, State, local, territorial,tribal, and "battle rhythm," (daily briefings, operational meetings, etc.), the ESF#15 EA Officer will develop a daily external affairs routine. This routine iscritical to the smooth flow of information and will assist synchronization.Participants must be flexible and work to ensure that communications objectivesand initiatives are accommodated and timed for optimum delivery. A notionaldaily routine is contained in Appendix 7. This may be modified as necessary bythe ESF #15 EA Officer.

8.2 ESF #15 Daily Communications SummaryThis document is based on a template and will be prepared daily by the ESF #15lead component, with input from Federal departments and agencies. Thesummary is a compilation of high-level messages from any Federal or privatesector partners involved in the preparation, response, and recovery effortssurrounding an incident. These messages should be well-crafted, concise, high-level messages specifically designed to convey the broad, overarching issuesfacing citizens in the affected area(s). These messages should not only addressissues facing citizens today, but also any anticipated issues or guidance withrespect to significant challenges such as housing, economic impacts,infrastructure, communication, etc. A notional example is contained inAppendix 8.

8.3 ESF #15 Information Update (scroll)During multiple incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response, public affairspersonnel will generate a large volume of press releases and other documents.Sharing information among multiple incident locations is paramount. An ESF#15 Information Update (scroll) may be necessary in order to ensure that OD'soutputs do not overwhelm recipients' ability to process information. During theseinstances, the OD will develop and distribute an abbreviated summary of keynews releases and informational items on an hourly basis or as needed. Thesedocuments will be provided in fill detail on Homeland Security InformationNetwork (HSIN) and/or a supporting incident Web site if required. Appendix 9provides a notional example of an information update.

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9.0 Communications ProtocolsIn accordance with the NRF, pre-identified incident communications protocols areestablished and ready for use during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response.

9.1 National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL)The NICCL is used for transmission and exchange of critical and timely (e.g.,"breaking") incident information among Federal and affected State, local,territorial, and tribal authorities. If the nature of the incident is of criticalimportance and urgency, DHS Public Affairs will maintain a controller on the linecontinuously to provide and receive updates from departments and agencies.During sustained incident management activity, the NICCL will be used for dailyor other incident communications coordination calls. DHS Public Affairs willmaintain a summary of key NICCL communications and interagency coordinationactions. These will be maintained and distributed to participants in a timelymanner. NICCL call conferees are reminded that this is an executive call.Information and access should be protected. Conferees should keep commentsbrief and place their phones on mute when not talking. Specific or complexdepartment or agency-specific issues should be addressed off-line with theappropriate parties. The NICCL call agenda will normally follow the belowrout ine:

" Roll call (by department and agency)" Opening remarks by DHS" Brief operations summary (on-scene reps or operations)" Summary of major communications plans and events" Department- and agency-invited comments" Conclusion

9.2 State Incident Communications Coordination Line (SICCL)The SICCL is a similar dedicated Federal-State incident communicationsconference line. This standing communications resource can facilitate and ensurethe inclusion, transmission, and exchange of incident management information,evacuee coordination, and messaging relating to all States and territories. Accessand use of this line will be managed by DHS Public Affairs. Examples ofinformation could include unclassified public affairs guidance supporting threatinformation or status changes, pending national decisions, and major incidentswhere updates are beneficial in support of State-Federal external affairssituational awareness.

9.3 Private Sector Incident Communications Coordination Line (PICCL)The PICCL is a standing line that DHS Public Affairs uses to provide timelypublic information to the Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (Cl/KR) sectorsand their affiliated entities during an incident requiring Federal coordination andresponse. More information about the PICCL is contained in Annex D (PrivateSector).

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AppendicesI Quick Reference - Key Federal Authorities and Incident Management Directives2 Organizational Chart - Coordinated Federal Response3 ESF #15 No-Notice Incident Execution Checklist4 ESF #15 Deliberate Planning Execution Checklist5 ESF #15 External Affairs Operations Director Designation Letter6 ESF #15 External Affairs Officer Designation Letter7 ESF #15 Notional Strategic External Affairs Daily Routine8 ESF #15 Daily Communications Summary9 ESF #15 hIformation Update

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Appendix 1 to Annex A to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsQuick Reference - Key Federal Authorities and Incident Management Directives

Auhrt/Gi c Summar

Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive I

Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 2







Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 8Annex 1



Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive I 1


Ensures coordination of all homeland security-related activities amongexecutive departments and agencies and promotes the effectivedevelopment and implementation of all homeland security policies.

Provides for the creation of a task force that will work aggressively toprevent aliens who engage in or support terrorist activity from enteringthe United States and to detain, prosecute, or deport any such alienswho are within the United States.

Provides guidance and directs DHS to coordinate the HomelandSecurity Threat Advisory system.

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Appliesnew technologies and increased emphasis on intelligence collectionand analysis, strengthens alliance relationships, and establishes newpartnerships with former adversaries to counter this threat in all of itsdimensions.

Directs DHS to coordinate Federal operations within the United Statesto prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, majordisasters, and other emergencies.

Provides for the establishment of the Terrorist Threat IntegrationCenter.

Directs DHS to coordinate the overall national effort to protect criticalinfrastructure and key resources

Directs DHS to implement "all-hazards" preparedness activities in theUnited States, coordinate Federal response assets, and support Stateand local entities' preparedness efforts.

Further enhances the preparedness of the United States by formallyestablishing a standard and comprehensive approach to nationalplanning.

Establishes a national policy to defend the agriculture and food systemagainst terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

Provides a comprehensive framework for our Nation's biodefense.

Implements a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening that supports homeland security, at home and abroad.This directive builds upon HSPD 6.

Establishes a mandatory, Government-wide standard for secure andreliable forms of identification issued by the Federal Government to itsemployees and contractors (including contractor employees).

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I Ato ityGiac Su mrHomeland SecurityPresidential Directive 13






Stafford Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Act

National Emergencies Act

National ResponseFramework EmergencySupport Function #15

Establishes policy guidelines to enhance national and homelandsecurity by protecting U.S. maritime interests.

Details a strategic vision for aviation security while recognizingongoing efforts, and directs the production of a National Strategy forAviation Security and supporting plans.

Establishes policy guidelines to draw upon the considerable potentialof the scientific community in the public and private sectors to addressmedical countermeasure requirements relating to chemical, biological,radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats.

Establishes a national policy, and calls for the development of anational strategy and implementation plan, on the prevention anddetection of, protection against, and response to terrorist use ofexplosives in the United States.

Directs DHS to coordinate the implementation, execution, andassessment of continuity operations and activities (COOP).

Establishes a national strategy that will enable a level of public healthand medical preparedness sufficient to address a range of possibledisasters.

Provides authority for coordinating the Federal response to a majordisaster or emergency

Presidential authority to declare a state of emergency

Creates framework for providing timely information to affectedaudiences during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response.

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Appendix 2 to Annex A to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsOrganization Chart - Coordinated Federal Response

HQ Level

Field Level

IMAT External AffairsSpecialist (Note 2)

I I I" IIAsst EA Officer AsEAOfcr Asst EA Officer Asst EA Ofcer AstAOfce AstAOfcrfor State, Local, for the Joint for for Community for the Private for Planning && Tribal Affairs lnfor-ation Congressional Relations Sector Prducts

Center (JIC) Affairs

Notes:1. Within United Coordination Staff2. Regional EA asset who may deploy under the direction of the IMAT Director at any time

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Appendix 3 to Annex A to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsESF #15 No-Notice Incident Execution Checklist

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated JFO Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

1.0 PurposeThis checklist provides a guide for major actions and responsibilities in the event of anincident requiring a coordinated Federal response.

2.0 Activation and Deployment Execution Checklist: No-Notice Incident

Action Directed by - Additional Information

El Incident(s) occurs Notification by NOC, NRCC, or other Federal orState emergency operations center

El Activate and execute NRF ICEPP Protocols DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

El ESF #15 activated DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

El * Contact affected State(s), local(s), tribal, or ESF #15 Directorprivate sector communications counterparts Participating State, local, or private sector

" Communications plans counterparts" Emergency Alert System (EAS)" Lead agencies" Public Affairs (PA) support from Federal

counterparts *The State PIO should provide incident* J-IG location(s) and collocationSte shudicenSP ploatns) information and be first on the agenda for the" PA plans call" ESF #15 deployment plans

El DHS NJIC is activated DHS Public Affairs

El FCO designated (time approximate) Secretary of Homeland Security

l NICCL interagency call. Discuss: NICCL interagency participants

" Situation DHS Assistant Secretary (or designate)" Lead agency roles" State and local communications on incident" Federal strategic plan (initial)" ESF #15 activation and deployment needs" JIC establishmnent" Statements by principals" Homeland Security Alert System (HSAS) or

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other declarations

El Incident requiring a coordinated Federal response Secretary of Homeland Securitydeclared or being considered

0 ESF #15 activation order distributed NICCL and NRCC

E1 ESF #15 Operations Director designated DHS 15 Director

El ESF #15 Operations Director reports to the ESF #1 5 Operations DirectorDirector:

" The name and contact information for theprospective or designated ESF #15 ExternalAffairs Officer.

" The status of coordination with the affectedState.

" The JIC location." The status of available ESF #15 resources in

the affected area.

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer designated. ESF #15 DirectorBrief/Discuss: ESF #15 Component Directors

" FCO and team inobilization orders ESF #15 EAO (designee)" ESF #15 Director strategic tasking" PA deployment" HSAS status, if applicable" External rules of engagement" Supporting leadership cadre needs" State and local guidance/counterparts" ESF #15 Component key issues

El ESF #15 Officer Component Conference Call Conference call with ESF #15 componentsconveys FCO expectations and ESF #15 Directorvision.

11 ESF #15 staff mobilization orders initiated ESF # 15 Operations Director to D/Acommunications directors.

El Unified Coordination Group and.Staff Scoping FCO, ESF #15 EAO, JIC Officer, others asMeeting necessary. Identify ESF #15 priority physical

requirements for JFO in order to be fully missioncapable as soon as possible.

El IMAT Deployed FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team

El ESF #15 Leadership Cadre identified ESF #15 Operations Director

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El FCO & ESF #15 Advance Meeting (or call) FCO, FCO Press Secretary, and ESF #15 EAOfficer discuss advance communications plans,JIC location, and special logistics requirements.

El ESF #15 Initial Staff Requirements Identified ESF # 15 Operations Director, ESF # 15 ExecutiveOfficer, and DHS PA Chief of Staff

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer arrives on scene - ESF #15 External Affairs Officermeets with FCO, JFO staff

El If feasible, JIC established or collocation initiated Asst External Affairs Officer, JICwith State and local counterparts/JIC

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer meets with ESF #15 External Affairs Officer, LeadershipLeadership Cadre Cadre

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer meets with State, ESF #115 External Affairs Officerlocal,territorial, tribal, and lead incidentcommunications team

El ESF #15 Leadership Cadre and Team operationalin support of FCO and JFO

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer coordinates ESF ESF #15 External Affairs Officer# 15 team in preparing communications plancomponent to the FCO's Incident Action Plan

El Satellite JIC's established or potential sites ESF #15 External Affairs Officeridentified for later activation (e.g., post hurricanelandfall)

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Appendix 4 to Annex A to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsESF #15 Deliberate Planning Execution Checklist

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated JFO SOP

1.0 PurposeThis execution checklist provides a template covering major actions and responsibilityfor those actions. The planning objective is for full ESF #15 operational capability 24hours before an incident is projected (if known or estimated).

2.0 SituationsSunmmarized below are examples of potential incidents requiring a coordinated Federalresponse and activation of ESF # 15 before an incident occurs.

2.1 Possible or imminent natural disaster (e.g., hurricane, severe tropical storm).

2.2 Credible terrorism threat to a domestic location(s).

2.3 Potential man-made disaster (e.g., spill of national significance, reactoremergency, large HAZMAT release).

2.4 National Security Special Event (NSSE) (subject to threats, etc.).

3.0 Activation and Deployment Execution Checklist: Deliberate PlanningNote: These are notional actions and may be modified according to the specific incident.

Action Directed by- Additional Information

El Incident or threat awareness Notification by NOC, NRCC, or other Federal orState emergency operations center

El * Contact affected State(s), local(s), tribal, or DHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/ESFprivate sector communications counterparts #15 Director

" Communications actions thus far Affected State, local, territorial, and private sector" EAS communications, if required counterparts" Lead agencies *The State P1O should provide incident" Support from Federal counterparts information and be first on the agenda for the" JIC location(s) call

" ESF #1.5 deployment plans

El FCO Designated Secretary of Homeland Security

El Execute NRF ICEPP Protocols Per NRF

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Action Directed by- Additional Information

El DHS NJIC Activated (as necessary) DHS Public Affairs

l NICCL Interagency Call ESF #1.5 Director

" Situation Participating Federal, State, local, territorial, and" Lead agency roles tribal lead communications counterparts" State and local communications on incident" Federal strategic plan (initial)" JIC establishment and Federal support desired

for communications" Statements by principals" HSAS or other declarations

El Incident requiring a coordinated Federal response Secretary of Homeland Security

El ESF #15 activated ESF #15 Director (DHS Assistant Secretary forPA)

El ESF #15 Operations Director designated ESF #15 Director

El ESF #15 Operations Director reports to the ESF #15 Operations DirectorDirector:

" Who is the prospective or designated EAO?" What is the status of coordination with the

affected State?" Where will the JIC be located?" Are there sufficient ESF #15 resources

available in the affected area?

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer designated. ESF #15 DirectorBrief/Discuss: ESF #15 Component Directors

" FCO and team mobilization orders ESF #15 EAO (designee)" ESF #15 Director strategic tasking and vision" Go-Team deployment" HSAS status, if applicable" External rules of engagement" Supporting Leadership Cadre needs" State and local guidance/counterparts" ESF #15 letter of designation

El ESF #15 All Component Conference Call initiated ESF #15 Director

ESF #15 Component Directors

ESF #15 External Affairs Officer

El ESF #15 Leadership Cadre identified ESF #15 Operations Director

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El IMAT Deployed FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team

El ESF #15 mobilization orders initiated ESF #15 Operations Director

0l United Coordination Group and Staff Scoping FCOMeeting ESF #15 EAO

JIC Officer, others as necessary

Identify ESF # 15 priority physical requirementsfor JFO in order to be fully mission capablewithin 24 hours of notification.

El ESF #15 initial staff requirements identified ESF #1 5 Operations Director

ESF # 15 Deputy/Executive Officer

FEMA Public Affairs

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer arrives. Meets ESF #15 External Affairs Officerwith FCO, and JFO staff. Briefs Director.

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer meets with State, ESF #15 External Affairs Officerlocal, tribal, and lead incident communicationsteam

El JIC established or collocation initiated with State Asst External Affairs Officer, JICand local counterparts FEMA IMAT

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer meets with the ESF #15 External Affairs OfficerFCO and JFO staff

El External Affairs Officer meets with ESF #15 ESF #15 External Affairs OfficerLeadership Cadre ESF #15 Leadership Cadre

El ESF #15 Leadership Cadre and staff operational insupport of the FCO and JFO

El ESF #15 External Affairs Officer coordinates ESF ESF #15 External Affairs Officer#15 team in developing communications plan and ESE #15 Planning and Productsstrategy component to the FCO's Incident ActionPlan

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Appendix 5 to Annex A to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsESF #15 External Affairs Operations Director Designation. Letter

TO:

FROM: Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Designation as ESF #15 Operations Director

Reference: A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated Joint Field Office (JFO) Standard Operating ProceduresD. Emergency Support Function #15 SOP

1. In accordance with the above references, and following activation of Emergency SupportFunction # 15, you are hereby designated as the ESF # 15 Operations Director in support ofthe Federal response for

2. You will report to me as my senior external affairs director in support of the Federalresponse. You will coordinate through me and the White House Office of Communicationsfor strategic direction.

3. Coordinate with me and my staff to make contact with public information officials in (State)as soon as possible. Afford me and my staff the opportunity to be on the (State) call.Maintain close coordination with that staff as well as Federal, local, tribal, and private sectorcounterparts, as determined by the nature of this incident.

4. Additionally, as soon as possible, provide me the following information:

a. The name of your designated ESF #15 External Affairs Officerb. The location of the Joint Information Centerc. Your outlook whether there are sufficient ESF #15 resources availabled. An incident action plan detailing the multi-day coordination strategy and key

events/actions

5. You are authorized to modify the ESF #15 organizational structure in accordance withFederal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and JFO requirements to effectively execute Federalexternal affairs activities.

6. You are authorized to reassignESF #15 leadership and staff personnel in coordination withthe FCO and ESF #15 Component Directors.

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Appendix 6 to Annex A to Emergency Support Function #15 External Affairs

ESF #15 External Affairs Officer Designation Letter

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Designation as ESF #15 External Affairs Officer

Reference: A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated JFO Standard Operating ProceduresD. Emergency Support Function #15 SOP

1. In accordance with the above references, and following activation of Emergency SupportFunction #15, you are hereby designated as the ESF #15 External Affairs Officer in supportof the Federal response for

2. You will report to and serve as the senior external affairs advisor to the Federal CoordinatingOfficer (FCO), You will coordinate through me and theESF #15 Operations Director, ,for strategic direction.

3. You are authorized to modify the ESF #15 organizational structure in accordance with FCOand JFO requirements to effectively execute Federal external affairs activities.

4. You are authorized to reassign ESF #15 leadership and staff personnel in coordination withthe FCO, the ESF #15 Director, and ESF #15 Component Directors.

5. Maintain close coordination with public information officials in as well asFederal, local, tribal, and private sector counterparts, as determined by the nature of thisincident.

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Appendix 7 to Annex A to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsNotional Strategic External Affairs Daily Routine

NOTIONAL DAILY EVENT SCHEDULE(Modify as necessary)

Time Event Action

0500 Secretary DHS News Summary Prepared NOC

0600 News summary distributed by JIC JFO JIC

0630 JFO Operations Briefing Key personnel, ESF #1 5 EAO

0730 ESF #15 Senior Leadership Meeting ESF #1.5 Leadership Cadre

0800 ESF #15 Core Group Conference Call (1) Director, ESF #15 EAO, Other key reps

0930 Federal Strategic Comms Conf Call White House, Director, Cabinet ASPAs,ESF #15 EAO

1000 State and local news briefing (2) State and local counterparts

ESF #15 staff/spokesperson

1000 Federal daily incident release (3) DHS Public Affairs

1030 NICCL Conference Call (4) Federal. interagency, ESF #15, State/local

11.30 NICCL Call Summary Distributed DHS Public Affairs

1300 DC News Briefing ESF #15 Director, Interagency

1400 State Community Relations Conf Call (5) DHS PA, ESF # 15 Comrel., States

1700 ESF #15 Core Group Conference Call. DHS PA, ESF #15, Other key reps

1900 ESF #15 Daily Summary Distributed ESF #15 Planning and Products

2000 NICCL Next Day Plans Distributed DHS Public Affairs

(I) Primary planning and strategy discussion for preceding and immediate events(2) Time subject to State and local determination(3) Release is focused on key statistical measures and incident-related facts(4) NICCL call leads with ESF #15 EAO brief, followed by affected State/local and Federal interagency(5) Call addresses incidents with multistate evacuee issues

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Appendix 8 to Annex A to Emereency Support Function #15 External AffairsESF #15 Daily Communications Summary - Sample Template

Emergency Support Function #15 - External AffairsNorth Dakota Floods

03/27/2009

President Issues Emergency Declaration frr Minnesota. The declaration allows FEMA to identify,mobilize and provide at its discretion, equipment and resources necessary to alleviate the impacts of theemergency. Emergency protective measures, including direct Federal assistance, will be provided at 75percent Federal funding. The declaration affects seven Minnesota counties and two Indianreservations.

States Continue to Meet the Challenge. Officials were considering the evacuation of up to 100,000residents in the Fargo, N.D., area as the Red River threatened to rise two feet above a 112-year-oldrecord of 41 feet. The State is working with the Red Cross to identify sheltering facilities near Fargofor up to 30,000 people. North Dakota continues to address ice jams near Bismarck and to raise andreinforce dikes and levees along the Red and Missouri rivers. Approximately 1,000 NationalGuardsmen and members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were assisting a growing number oflocal volunteers in sandbagging efforts. In Minnesota, evacuations are being planned for Georgetownand Moorehead. Preliminary damage assessments (PDA) were scheduled to begin today in both States.

FEMA Steps Up Support of State Efforts. The agency has ramped up its operational activities as thesituation has developed. Acting Administrator Nancy Ward toured Fargo and Bismarck today and isscheduled to visit Minnesota on Saturday. Community Relations (CR) teams have been deployed toassist in communications and in evacuations out-of-state, if necessary. FEMA Logistics hasapproximately 150,000 meals and 47,000 liters of water on hand at the National Logistics Staging Area(NLSA) at Grand Forks AFB and another 20,000 meals, 243,000 liters of water and six generators areen route. Tribal Representatives met with the chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Nation to offersupport and technical assistance. The reservation is located on the Minnesota-South Dakota border.Tribal Representatives travel to the White Earth and Red Lake reservations in Minnesota this weekend.Region VIII is continuing to monitor flooding in northern South Dakota.

The Role of the Federal Government. The Federal Government continues its close coordination withlocal, State and voluntary agencies in flood preparations and response. State and local communitiescontinue to identify and prioritize their critical needs. FEMA will deploy additional personnel,equipment and supplies to meet those needs. The Corps of Engineers' efforts have been focused onbuilding emergency levees in 22 Minnesota and North Dakota communities. The Corps is alsoexpected to stage a minimal release of water from the Garrison Dam today; flows from the dam hadbeen halted for the first time in its history earlier in the week. Meanwhile, the U.S. Coast Guardreported it had rescued 72 adults, one child and several animals. Other agencies involved include theDepartment of Homeland Security, the American Red Cross, U.S. Army Northern Command andNational Guard, among others.

The Rest of the Nation. FEMA also continues to monitor situations in Mississippi where tornadoes

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KE MESAEwere expected to continue, and in Colorado, where a spring storm has dumped more than a foot ofsnow on the State's Front Range and eastern plains.

Preparedness Is Everyone's Responsibility. As the threat of flooding spreads, residents arc stronglyencouraged to make emergency preparations in anticipation of rising water. Families and individualsshould make an emergency kit and have an emergency plan in place. It is critical that North Dakotaand Minnesota residents and businesses monitor all forms of communications for flood reports andfollow the advice of State and local authorities. Don't put yourself- or first responders - at risk. Iftold to evacuate, do so. For more information on emergency preparedness, visit www.ready.gov.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)* Federal disaster aid has been made available for the State of Minnesota to supplement

State and local recovery efforts in the area struck by severe storms and floodingbeginning on March 16, 2009, and continuing. The assistance was authorized underan emergency declaration issued for the State by President Obama.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)" Rising flooding waters have prompted numerous Federal, State, tribal and local

activities. FEMA activated its National Response Coordination Center to Level II andplaced the IMAT-East on alert for possible deployment. The North DakotaEmergency Operations Center (EOC) has been activated at Level 1, with 24/7operations.

* FEMA's objectives on the ground in North Dakota include assessing potentialevacuations, supporting sandbagging requirements, and providing generators and staffto conduct joint Individual Assistance PDAs.

U.S. Coast Guard* Last count for Coast Guard rescues: 72 adult, 1 infant, several animals (including 1

deer fi'om the ice).

U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USA CE)• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is working around the clock under challenging

conditions to construct emergency levees for the flooding in the Upper Midwest.Public safety is the top priority in this mission.

* The Corps' main eftbrt is building emergency levees in 22 communities in NorthDakota and Minnesota. Crews have completed emergency levee construction to raiseFargo levees to 42 feet and expect to raise emergency levees to 43 feet by March 27.

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I KEYEFFORS -

U.S. Northern Command (NOR THCOM)" A Mission Assignment (MA) has been received requesting five CH47 rotary wing

aircraft for anticipated search and rescue and cargo transport in support of disasteroperations in response to flooding events in North Dakota.

* Current support includes a National Logistics Staging Area (NLSA) at Grand ForksAFB with over 5 acres of space to support staging and distribution of supplies.Deployment of Region VIII Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and DefenseCoordinating Elements (DCE) to Bismarck, N.D. expected to be in place 28 MAR.The DCO is the liaison between FEMA and United States Northern Command(USNORTHCOM) and DCE is administrative support to the DCO.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)" HHS is deploying approxinately 250 personnel fi'om the U.S. Public Health Service

Commissioned Corps, the National Disaster Medical System, and the Centers forDisease Control and Prevention, as well as two 250-bed Federal Medical Stations andcaches of equipment, pharmaceutical and medical supplies to assist the State of NorthDakota with basic medical care of residents affected by floods.

* HHS Acting Secretary Charles Johnson declared a public health emergency undersection 319 of the Public Health Service Act and, under section 1135 of the SocialSecurity Act that waives or modifies certain Medicare, Medicaid and State Children'sHealth Insurance Program (SCHIP) requirements for North Dakota to ensurebeneficiaries of Medicare, Medicaid and the SCHIP continue to receive benefitsduring this emergency.

American Red Cross (ARC)* ARC is sending in shelter teams today to coordinate with the State of North Dakota.

Most shelters are located outside of Fargo. Currently, 30,000 beds are targeted forshelters. They feel they will use 10% of their maximum beds. ARC Mass Care isramping up and working with the Southern Baptists to stand up a kitchen.

" The latest information about Red Cross relief efforts and flood preparednessinformation is available at http://newsroom.redcross.org, and broadcast-quality videois available for download athttp://www.redcross.org/portal/site/ien'menuitem.d8aaecf2l4c576bt97l e4cfe43181 aa0/?vgnextoid=518b5032f953e 1I OVgnVCM I 0000089tI)87OaRCRD&vgnextfint=default under "Spring Floods, 2009."

Department of the Interior* U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has 21 hydrographer crews deployed in Minnesota,

North Dakota, and South Dakota, making special direct measurements of streamfiow

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I K~~~EY FOT

using acoustic Doppler technology. In addition, USGS real-time streamgages haveseen numerous peaks of record, including 6 peaks of record in Minnesota, 4 peaks ofrecord in South Dakota, and 15 peaks of record in North Dakota. The Red River isstill on the rise, with several record peaks expected at select locations along the RedRiver.

USGS continues to feed direct measurements of streamflow to the North CentralRiver Forecast Center (NCRFC). An example of the criticality of this data can befound in the new forecasted flood crest for the Red River at Fargo, released late thisafternoon. Around 3:30 PM CDT, USGS supplied an updated estimate of thestrearnflow for the Red River at Fargo to NCRFC that was based on an acousticDoppler current profiler measurement by a USGS hydrographer team. The USGSmeasurement at Fargo, along with other evidence, resulted in the NCRFC raising theprojected crest at Fargo from 41 feet to 42 feet. As part of this process, USGShydrologists participated in a conference call with NCRFC to discuss the veracity andaccuracy of the measurement. The decision to raise the forecast at Fargo involved thehighest levels of the National Weather Service, given that 42 feet at Fargo could behighly catastrophic to the Cities of Fargo, N.D. and Moorhead, Minn. USGS willcontinue direct observations of streamflow at Fargo throughout this crisis in supportof NCRFC.

Small Business Administration (SBA)* A Small Business Administration (SBA) public information officer and field

operations specialist are on the ground in Fargo working with interagency partners,SBA's North Dakota District Office, Small Business Development Centers andChambers of Commerce in preparation of an anticipated declaration. Additional staffare being deployed to participate in preliminary damage assessments.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

Region V• FEMA Region V External Affairs mobilized staff to support the Preliminary Damage

Assessments for seven (7) counties beginning today. Staff is on site at the State EOCto support State JIC. Additional staff (including Tribal) has been requested forsupport at the SEOC and the field.

* External Affairs personnel in Moorhead and SEOC are standing by to assist withActing Administrator Nancy Ward's visit tomorrow.

Region VIII* See Daily Event Schedule

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International Affairs" CBP posts Border Wait Times information at http://apps.cbp.gov/bwt/. This site

provides information on possible delays or closures at the Pembina crossing in NorthDakota.

" Please refer media inquiries regarding Canadian border and flood issues to theCanadian Embassy. The point of contact there is Tristan Landry, Public Affairs,202.682.7732. Lisa Khouri, the Public Safety Canada liaison to FEMA in Operations,is monitoring the situation and a good source for information and contacts.

Public Affairs contact at the Department of State is:Suzanne K. HallPublic Diplomacy Advisor, Mexico & CanadaMain State, Room 39092201 C St, NW, Washington, DCTel: 202-647-7137

Tribal Affairs* Continued Tribal support includes clarification on Tribes bearing the costs of

sheltering personnel and citizens; FEMA Roads Policy - will it cover damages to allroads including tribally owned roads leading to citizens' homes and what is theimpact of tribal lands and citizens in South Dakota since only North Dakota isdeclared? Next steps: Begin process for Request for Public Assistance with FEMAand tribal staff. Deploy additional FEMA Tribal Liaisons to assist if needed.

Multilingual Coordination* FEMA External Affairs conducted Language, Special Needs and Media for North

Dakota and Minnesota. Languages to support Spanish, Vietnamese, Korean, Chinese,Japanese, Russian and Mongolian Limited English Proficiency and Special Needs, toinclude American Sign Language and Braille. News Media list for outletsdisseminating information in the languages above have been created for North Dakotaand Minnesota.

" A team of three reservists will be deployed to conduct field research work for theLimited English Proficiency and Special Needs populations in North Dakota and tocreate, develop and execute a program for these audiences with Minnesota sistercities. A team of two reservists will be identified and deployed to Minnesota for anidentical project.

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NAIOA DAIL EVN SCEDLToday

Time Event Lead Organization

Governor, Congressional, Mayor,9:00 a.m. CDT Briefing at City Hall in Fargo FEMA and other Federal agency

representatives

FEMA Acting Administrator, NancyWard on site in Bismarck and Fargo

10:00 a.m. CDT to meet with local officials, members FEMAof the ND Congressional Delegationand General Walsh USACE. Media

availabilities TBD.

11:00 a.m. EDT Regional Coordination Call FEMA HQ, Regions 5 and 8

Press briefing in Bismarck withMayor, Governor Hoeven,

11:00 a.m.L CDT FCO Mike Hall, and National Guard FEMA Region 8Adjutant General

1:00 p.m. EDT NICCL Call FEMA

3:00 p.m. CDT USACE Media Avail USACE

4:00 p.m. EDT Secretary Napotitano conducts DHS Public Affairs

conference call with media

.omorrow. ..-.


11:00 a.m. EDT Regional Coordination Call FEMA HQ, Regions 5 and 8

1:00 p.m. EDT NICCL Call FEMA

Secretary Napolitano CNN interview2.30 p.m. EDT with Frederica Whitfield DHS Public Affair

3:00 p.m. EDT Video Teleconference (VTC) FEMA


TBD Mayor's press briefing in Fargo Fargo

TBD Mayor's Command meeting in Fargo Fargo

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What Others Are Saying

Fargo Mayor Dennis Walaker noting that the river had risen 9 feet in the last three days. "This isuncharted area. We've never been in anything like this before." Los Angeles Times

Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) on asking for flooding assistance: "Our local officials, first responders,citizens and volunteers from the region are doing incredible work, but it is clear that we need the fullresources of the Federal Government to support the communities threatened by flood waters. We have seenthe strength of these communities shine through in these difficult days and I will continue to push for allappropriate Federal assistance for our affected communities." Perham Enterprise Bulletin

Fargo Mayor Dennis Walaker says the city has no plans to build the dike any higher. "We're not going toproceed to take it to 44. Is that a gamble? We don't think so."

I MEIANLYI IFargo, N.D.: Evacuations were underway after authorities found cracks in a levee built to protect thearea from the threat of the rising Red River. The river has risen to 21 feet above flood stage and showsno sign of slowing down. Forecasters say it will crest Saturday at an all-time record possibly as high asthe dike protecting the city. In Grand Forks, the river is 18 feet above flood stage.

Return: Bismarck, N.D.: Fox Island residents were told they could begin the early recovery process aftercity and county inspectors checked homes for structural and environmental damage. Most homes hadposted notices about the condition of the house, letting residents know if everything was safe inside.

Morton and Mandan County: Still have areas under voluntary evacuation. Residents are being warnedto be prepared to leave quickly if the river backs up. Experts are monitoring water levels very closely stillsaying Dam releases may not start up again for another two to four days.

Moorehead, Minn.: Minnesota leaders applauded President Barack Obamna's decision to grant the State'srequest for Federal assistance. Emergency disaster aid has been granted to seven Minnesota countiesaffected by flooding. As Red River Valley communities fight rising floodwaters, a low-lying townshipalong the Red River fears that as many as 500 of its 550 homes could be lost.

National Media: Associated Press reports: A. CNN journalist and seven other people have been arrestedfor standing on top of sandbag levees in flood areas in the Fargo.http://I-Aw.inforum.com/eventiapArticle/id/D976EH4G3/On March 24 the Fargo Police Department cautioned citizens to remain safe and facilitate emergencyefforts by following city ordinances:Do not climb dikes or destroy them. This can result in your arrest.(ordinance 1.0-0318)Do not enter areas deemed off-limits by city officials. This can result in your arrest.(ordinance 10-0318)Do not operate watercraft in a way that damages flood protection efforts (wakes)

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MEDIA ANLYI

This can result in your arrest.(ordinance 10-0318)Do not drive your vehicle on a dike. This can result in your arrest or a fine.(ordinances 10-03 18 and 08-0123)Do not drive through or around a barricade. This can result in a $20 fine.(ordinance 08-1301D)

PRESS RELEASES

FEMA: http://www.f fma.gov/ncws/newsrelease.fema?id=47798,http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=47800 ;http://www.fema.,qov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=47805 ND Press Release;http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=47804b FEMA Touring ND;http://www.fema.qov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=47801 MN Declaration

U.S. Coast Guard: https://www.piersystem.com!go/doc/ 1769/263070/> Office of Personnel Management: Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and

Agencies Subject: North Dakota Severe Storms and Floodinghttp://www.chcoc.g!ov/Transniittals/Transmitta]Details.aspx?Transmitta]ID=2160North Dakota Department of Emergency Services (NDDES) is making available the publicinformation section of their Web site in WebEOC as a way for other agencies to get informationon incident reports and operational updates on North Dakota, and as an informationclearinghouse among our local, State, and Federal partnership. Agencies can post their mediainquiries and news releases on this site so that information can be shared.To post your information:

1) Go to www.nd.gov/des, click on the WebEOC button (lower left)2) Log on with the username: JIC.3) Use password: 4JICinfo.

If you have questions, please contact State PIO Cecily Fong directly at:(701) 328-8101 (office), (701) 391-8158 (cell).

IMAGES AND VIDEO

- FEMA: www.feina.gov/mediaUSGS is disseminating geospatial data for the Red River valley at the following Web site:http://hdds. usgs. ov/EO.

> USACE (St. Paul District) Flickr account: http://www.flickr.com/photos/30539067(iitN04/> U.S. Coast Guard: www.uscgfloodwatch.corn, www.cgvi.uscg.mil> North Dakota flood imagery found at: http://tiniurl.com/nd09flood. Please be sure to give the

ND Wing, Civil Air Patrol a byline if you publish any of these images.

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Appendix 9 to Annex A to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsESF #15 Information Update (scroll) - Sample Template

Monday, April 27, 2009HINI Influenza Outbreak

43 (Sent 3:38 p.m.) State Incident Communications Conference Line (SICCL) AdvisoryState communicators,Please find the NICCL call summary notes, an ESF #15 Information Update (scroll), and updatedtalking points from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and DHS. Please continueto send your completed press releases to the National JIC and notices about upcoming pressconferences to xxxx. If you have any questions please call.Please note that the CDC swine flu widget with code is available fromhttnl//uww hh,• •nv/•x,•'hi,,-hrarj/indpyx html (•crnll tn the hnttnm AfthP nau5P'•

42 (Sent 3:31 p.m.) Governor Culver: This Is a Time for Prevention and for CautionGovernor, State Health and Homeland Security Officials provide update on Swine Flu preventionefforts.DES MOINES - Governor Chet Culver and Lt. Governor Patty Judge joined with State health andagriculture officials to provide an update on steps the State is taking to prevent an outbreak ofswine flu.

41 (Sent 3:21 p.m.) The CDC swine flu widget with code is available fromhttp://www.hhs.gov/web/library/index.html (scroll to the bottom of the page).

40 (Sent 3:00 p.m.) North Dakota Department of Health schedules media conference call todiscuss swine influenzaBISMARCK, N.D. - To answer media questions about swine influenza and North Dakota'sresponse, the North Dakota Department of Health will hold a telephone media availabilityconference call Monday, April 27, 2009, at 3 p.m. The following State health department officialswill participate in the 3 p.m. conference call: Dr. Terry Dwelle, State health officer Tim Wiedrich,section chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response Section Kirby Kruger, State epidemiologist.

39 (Sent 2:34 p.m.) Virginia Office of the Governor Kaine Announces Precautions to PrepareVirginia to Respond to Swine Flu OutbreakRICHMOND - Governor Timothy M. Kaine announced today that, though there are no confirmedcases in Virginia, the Commonwealth is preparing for any outbreak of swine flu by increasing itscommunication with healthcare providers and is preparing to receive additional antiviralmedication from the Centers for Disease Control.http://wwwv.uovernor.virginia.gov/

x (2:30 p.m.) SICCL Call38 (Sent 2:18 p.m.) NICCL Call Summary

Please find a copy of the NICCL call summary, updated CDC talking points, updated DHS talkingpoints, an OPM memorandum sent to Federal D/As and the draft ESF #15 Information Update(scroll) that was discussed on the NICCL call this morning.

37 (Sent Approx. Noon) Probable Swine Flu Case Reported in MichiganLivingston County Department of Public Health (LCDPH) will hold a press conference today at11:30 a.m. at LCDPH, 2300 East Grand River, Howell, Michigan. The following information isprovided as background information.LANSING - The Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH) announced today that oneprobable swine flu case has been reported in Livingston County. State laboratory results showedthat a 34-year-old woman of Livingston County has a probable case of the swine influenza A(H IN I) virus._ http://xvwv.michigan.gov/mdch/0, 1607,7-132--213586--,00.html

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36 (Sent 11:50 a.m.) Governor of Missouri Gov. Nixon Press ReleaseGov. Nixon directs public health officials to prepare State for possible bout with new strain ofswine flu.JEFFERSON CITY, Mo. - Gov. Jay Nixon announced today that Missouri health officials aretaking significant steps to deal with a new strain of swine flu that has prompted Federal officials todeclare a nationwide health emergency.The Governor said that while no case of swine flu had been confirmed in Missouri, State healthofficials and the medical community have been on high alert since Friday because of thecontagious nature of the new flu virus.

35 (Sent 11:16 a.m.) Oklahoma State Department of HealthNews Conferences on Swine Flu Outbrcak Scheduled in Oklahoma City and Tulsa Today.What: The Oklahoma State Department of Health and the Tulsa Health Department will each hostnews conferences this afternoon at their respective offices to update news media on status of swineflu outbreak in Oklahoma.When: Today - Monday, April 27, 2009, 1:30 p.m.www.health.ok.gov

x (11:00 a.m.) NICCL Call334 (Sent 10:33 a.m.) CDC Press Release

Information for airline passengers exposed to swine flu.This information is current as of today, April 27, 2009, at 10:33 a.m.

33 (Sent 10:28 a.m.) CDC Press ReleaseRisk of Swine Flu Associated with Travel to Affected Areas.This information is current as of today, April 27, 2009, at 10:28 a.m.Public health officials within the United States and throughout the world arc investigatingoutbreaks of swine influenza (swine flu). www.cdc._gov/travel

32 (Sent 10:03 a.m.) Wisconsin Office of the GovernorGovernor Doyle Statement on Swine InfluenzaMADISON - Governor Doyle today gave the following statement regarding swine influenza,which has been reported in several States and in Mexico."It is important that everyone remain calm, use common sense and simple good health practiceslike washing your hands. If you have flu-like symptoms, stay at home and contact yourphysician." Governor Doyle said. "We are in regular contact with health officials across our Stateand Nation, and new information will be provided as it becomes available."http://,Aww.wisgov.state.wi.usiuournal media detail.asp?locid= I 9&prid=4160

31 (Sent 9:27 a.m.) US Postal Service Press ReleasePersonal hygiene is key to reducing risk of illness.You've heard the news that U.S. health officials are investigating a number of cases of swine flu inseveral areas of the United States, and a Public Health Emergency has been declared by the FederalGovernment. All of these U.S. cases have been mild-all of the patients have recovered.

30 (Sent 8:13 a.m.) This is a reminder that there will be a NICCL call this morning at 11 a.m.regarding the swine flu outbreak. It is imperative that all Departments have a commnunicationsrepresentative on this daily call. We plan to limit the call to just 30 minutes. Please coordinatedirectly with the National JIC offline if a specific issue does not warrant discussion on the call.

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Annex B to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsIntergovernmental (State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal) Coordination

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. National Preparedness GoalD. National. Infrastructure Protection Plan

NRF ESF #15 Quick Summary - Intergovernmental (State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal)Coordination

Supports State and Local Coordination:external affairs Preparing an initial action plan to support the FCO and JFO with incident-by: specific guidance and objectives, at the beginning and throughout an actual

or potential incident" Promoting Federal interaction with State, local, territorial, and tribal

governments" Implementing a system of information sharing among Federal, State, tribal

and local governments" Informing State and local elected and appointed officials on response

efforts, protocols, and recovery programs" Disseminating information with the assistance of State municipal leagues

and county associations

Tribal Coordination:0 Providing a Tribal Relations Officer, if necessary, to coordinate with tribal

governments on all aspects of incident management operations; thisposition will report directly to the Assistant External Affairs Officer forIntergovernmental Coordination and the ESF #15 EA Officer

0 Supporting the Tribal Relations Operations Element with incident-specificsubject-matter experts from other departments and agencies, if and whenrequired

a Depending on the situation, establishing a Tribal Relations InformationElement within the Tribal Relations Operations Element to manage thetimely flow of information to and from the tribes involved in the incident

0 Organizing and managing a Tribal Relations Field Component to facilitateFederal relations with tribal governments and their incident managementorganizations, conmmnities, victims, and tribal advocacy groups

Directed by: { Assistant External Affairs Officer for Intergovernmental Coordination

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1.0 PurposeThe annex describes the State, local, territorial, and tribal coordination function during anincident requiring a coordinated Federal response.

2.0 MissionThe component serves as a liaison to State, local, territorial, and tribal officials within anaffected area(s) during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response.

3.0 Organization

3.1 External Affairs Organizational ConceptIt is recognized that an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response willhave a large effect on our nation, societal functions, infrastructure, economy, andpopulation. Accordingly, DHS will employ pre-identified organizationalprocesses to foster information-sharing, deliver constituent services, and serve asa liaison between State, local, territorial, and tribal elected and public officials.

3.2 National Protection Program Directorate (NPPD) Office ofIntergovernmental Programs (IGP)IGP serves as the ESF #15 Component Director in the ESF #15 organization. IGPcoordinates communications with governors, mayors, parish presidents, andcounty executives of affected jurisdictions and State, tribal, and local leadershipacross the United States during incidents requiring a coordinated Federalresponse. IGP will also coordinate as necessary with preparedness and responsecommunities, national associations, and other non-governmental counterparts.

3.3 National Coordination and SupportTo ensure that DHS maintains a fully informed external affairs capability at thenational level during incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response, SLGCmaintains close coordination with the White House, DHS senior staff, ESF #15leadership, and other senior officials.

3.4 ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for Intergovernmental (State,Local, Territorial, and Tribal) CoordinationThe ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officer for IGP serves as a liaison toState, local, territorial, and tribal elected and senior appointed officials on behalfof the PFO and ESF #15 EAO. This coordinator communicates with State, local,territorial, and tribal officials in the affected areas and proactively reaches out tothese officials to provide information on response and recovery activities andprograms.

3.5 FEMA Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (FEMA IGA)The FEMA Office of Intergovernmental Affairs provides staffing and support forthe ESF #15 External Affairs Officer in coordination with the FEMA Regions,ESF #15 leadership, and other elements during incidents requiring a coordinatedFederal response. IGA builds relationships with key stakeholder groups to

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stimulate a unified Federal, State, tribal, local, county, parish, municipal, andprivate-sector effort. IGA identifies issues, responds to questions, clarifies orcorrects policy and procedure concerns, and links government officials withquestions or problems to those who can assist them.

4.0 IGP Activities with State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal OfficialsThe Assistant External Affairs Officer for IGP, in coordination with FEMA IGA andother JFO elements, maintains relationships with State, tribal, and local officials duringan incident requiring a coordinated Federal response and may conduct the followingactivities:

4.1 Introductory meetings4.2 Programmatic briefings4.3 Sustained information sharing4.4 Issue and problem solving4.5 Casework

5.0 ESF #15 IGP Staff PositionsIn addition to the Assistant External Affairs Officer for Intergovernmental Programs(State, tribal, and local coordination), the IGP component may include the following staffassignments:

5.1 ESF #15 Branch LiaisonRepresents IGP in field offices and reports to the Assistant External AffairsOfficer for IGP

5.2 ESF #15 Outreach TeamConducts outreach to county and parish elected officials, mayors, borough andcity council members, and other elected officials within a designated region toinform them of updates in all program areas and to provide each with a singlepoint of contact for ongoing issues and concerns

5.3 ESF #15 Casework TeamPerforns casework and provides customer service to State, local, territorial, andtribal officials concerning disaster assistance requests under the Robert T.Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

5.4 ESF #15 Tribal LiaisonServes as the liaison to ensure that federally recognized tribes included in thedisaster declaration are provided with disaster response and recovery services;works with the Outreach Team lead to address incident response and recoveryneeds of the tribe(s)

5.5 ESF #15 Administrative AssistanceProvides administrative support to the ESF #15 function

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Annex C to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsCyber

References:A. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7)B. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5)C. National Response Framework (NRF), Cyber Incident AnnexD. National Incident Management System (NIMS)E. Federal Information Systems Management Act (FISMA)F. Executive Order 12472G. The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amendedH. National Security Directive 42I. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)J. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the Department of Homeland Security and its components' externalaffairs roles and responsibilities in response to a Cyber Incident requiring a coordinatedFederal response. For more information about a Cyber Incident, refer to the CyberIncident Annex of the NRF.

2.0 Background

2.1 A cyber attack may originate from anywhere in the world. This creates a widerFederal, State, and local communications challenge as the response and publiccommunications effort may involve many governors and authorities beyond thesite where a physical manifestation of the attack occurred.

2.2 Over 85 percent of the critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the privatesector. Private-sector critical infrastructure/key resource (CJIKR) owners andoperators are responsible at the corporate, functional, and physical asset levels forrisk and incident management planning, security, and preparedness investments.

2.3 CI/KR sectors rely on information-sharing mechanisms such as InformationSharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which provide operational and tacticalcapabilities for information sharing and, in some cases, support for incidentresponse activities.

3.0 Planning Assumptions

3.1 Operational Communications Assumptions

3.1.1 A major cyber incident has occurred; the NRF is always in effect.

3.1.2 White House Communications will guide overall communications strategyand policy for the U.S. Government.

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3.1.3 The DHS/FEMA Office of Public Affairs (OPA) will lead the overallcommunications response under ESF #15.

3.1.4 The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is engagedwith the operational aspects of incident management and response efforts.

3.1.5 Sector Specific Agency(s) (SSAs) have started to coordinate with Cl/KRcommunity; this may include notifications and information sharing.

3.1.6 The National JIC (NJIC) has been activated and is coordinating with anincident or virtual JIC at or near the incident site.

3.1.7 US-CERT will deploy SME(s) to the NJIC to provide technical advice andwill coordinate with the public affairs liaison within the National CyberResponse Coordination Group.

3.2 Strategic Communications Assumptions

3.2.1 A cyber attack in any one site likely affects far more than just that site,State, or even that region of the United States.

3.2.2 Public affairs professionals from organizations involved in the incidentmanagement activities can collocate at the NJIC to perform critical publicaffairs functions.

3.2.3 If access to communications channels and business destinations arehindered, external affairs staff may need to work remotely.

3.2.4 Traditional communications channels (e.g., telephone, e-mail, Internet)may be unavailable or inaccessible, which will create difficulties forinternal communications within departments/agencies and across the U.S.Government, resulting in delays or barriers to the timely release ofinformation to the public.

4.0 Control

4.1 Director of Incident CommunicationsThe Director of Incident Communications consults with the National Protectionand Programs Directorate in addition to normal incident communicators.

4.2 DHS Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C)The DHS Assistant Secretary for CS&C leads the National Protection andPrograms Directorate's external affairs mission related to cyber security andcommunications.

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4.3 National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG)The NCRCG serves as the Federal Government's principal interagencymechanism for ensuring that sound, strategic decisionmaking accompanies theFederal Government's management of a Cyber Incident. The NCRCG providessubject-matter expertise, recommendations, and strategic policy support to theSecretary of Homeland Security (hereinafter Secretary) during and in anticipationof a Cyber Incident.

4.4 United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)US-CERT is a 24/7 single point of contact for cyberspace analysis, warning,information sharing, incident response, and recovery for security partners. Thepartnership between DHS and public and private sectors is designed to enableprotection of cyber infrastructure and to coordinate the prevention of and responseto cyber attacks across the Nation. (Further information on US-CERT incident-related activities is included in the Cyber Incident Annex.)

4.5 National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC)The NCC is a 24/7 government-industry sector forum that provides a mechanismfor jointly responding to National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP)and other communications incidents. The NCC is the operational component ofthe National Communications System (NCS) and the lead Federal office forcommunications incident management. (Further details on the NCC and NCS areincluded in the ESF #2 - Communications Annex.)

5.0 Coordination

5.1 The National JIC public affairs officers will use the NICCL, SICCL, and PICCLcoordination protocols during a Cyber Incident. If available, these protocols andprocedures will be used the same way as in any other incident requiring acoordinated Federal response. However, during a Cyber Incident theseconference lines may not function or may have degraded service. DHScomponents will use non-traditional communications methods to coordinateexternal affairs, such as US-CERT's Secure Portal, Wireless Priority Service,Satellite Phones, High Frequency Radio, CWIN, and LAN Mobile Radios.

5.2 Upon notification from the NOC of a potential or actual Cyber Incident, theCS&C/US-CERT coordinates with the SSAs, Cl/KR sectors (GCCs and SCCs),ESFs, industry partners, and other established information-sharing mechanisms tocommunicate pertinent information. The NICC is not the focal point for Cyberand Communications CI/KR items. CS&C components have a direct reportingline to the NOC.

5.3 The NCRCG will provide recommendations to the DHS Office of Public Affairson content for public messaging. As a member of the NCRCG, the DHS NCSDOutreach and Awareness representative will serve as NCRCG Public Affairsliaison to DHS Office of Public Affairs. The representative will ensure that all

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messaging provided to the Office of Public Affairs has been vetted by theNCRCG.

5.4 The DHS Office of Public Affairs will be responsible for ensuring interagencyPublic Affairs coordination. Any product produced through the DHS Office ofPublic Affairs interagency process will be reviewed by the NCRCG prior to beingmade public. Additionally, the Public Affairs Liaison will work with the DHSInternational Affairs representative to coordinate communications withinternational partners.

6.0 Communication

6.1 SpokespersonsDHS will provide senior leaders as primary cybersecurity spokespersons. The listwill be supplemented as necessary by cyber security subject matter experts.

6.1.1 Secretary6.1.2 Deputy Secretary6.1.3 Under Secretary for National Protection and Programs Directorate6.1.4 Assistant Secretary Cybersecurity and Communications6.1.5 Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs6.1.6 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs6.1.7 Director of Public Affairs for National Protection and Programs

Directorate6.1.8 Deputy Assistant Secretary Cybersecurity and Communications6.1.9 Director, National Cyber Security Division6.1.10 Director/Deputy Manager, National Communications System6.1.11 Director, United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-

CERT)6.1.12 Director, National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC)6.1.13 Director, Office of Emergency Communications

6.2 Message DevelopmentFederal, State, and local communicators must ensure that messaging reflects bothunknown issues as well as facts as they become acknowledged. In a cyber orcommunications emergency, many issues will fall within the unknown category,and to this end, communicators should be careful not to over-reassure and shouldnote that uncertainty remains.

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7.0 Guiding Principles

7.1 Ensure all information dissemination is coordinated with the DHS ESF #15 EAOand the NJIC.

7.2 Share data and information with the media to keep the public informed about theincident in a timely and purposeful way.

7.3 Release information in accordance with applicable law and agreements tosafeguard protected critical infrastructure information.

7.4 Communicate all data and information in a simple, easily understood format.

7.5 Work with partner agencies at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels, as well asprivate sector and non-governmental organizations, to develop and communicateactionable information to the right groups, through the right channels, at the righttime.

7.6 Ensure that messages are consistent and conveyed quickly.

7.7 Promptly respond to rumors and inaccurate information to minimize concern andsocial disrupt ion.

7.8 Coordinate international information exchange and communication strategies.

8.0 PolicyThis annex does not alter or supersede existing:

8.1 Statutory responsibilities for CI/KR protection, incident management, emergencymanagement, or other related functions under the law.

8.2 Regulatory, contractual, or other legal relationships between Federal agencies andthe private sector.

8.3 International agreements, treaties, or other agreements for incident managementor between the U.S. Government and other countries.

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ADpendix 1 to Annex C to Emereencv SuDport Function #15 External AffairsRelationship of Emergency Support Functions to Cl/KR Sectors

Emergency Support Function Related CI/KR Sectors

ESF #2 - Communications

Primary Agencies:

DHS/Cybersecurity andCommunications/NationalCommunications System

* Information Technology SSA:DHS/Cybersecurity andCommunications

* Communications SSA:DHS/Cybersecurity andCommunications/NationalCommunications System

" Emergency Services SSA:DHS/Infi'astructure Protection

ESF #15 - External Affairs All

Primary Agency:

* DHS/Federal EmergencyManagement Agency

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Annex D to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsPrivate Sector

References:

A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated JFO Standard Operating ProceduresD. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)

NRF ESF #15 Quick Summary - Private Sector

Supports external affairsby:

" Serving as a liaison between the government response andrecovery operations and the private sector community.

" Disseminating preparedness, response, recovery, andmitigation and other relevant information to the privatesector.

" Enabling public-private partnerships and conducting publicoutreach and education.

" Support situational awareness by engaging with the privatesector in information-sharing efforts

" Coordinating with the Infrastructure Liaison and the DHSOffice of Infrastructure Protection on matters relating tocritical infrastructure and key resources sectors (CI/KR).

Directed by: j Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the structure and concept of operations for effective communications,outreach, and coordination with the private sector from government at all levels inresponse to any type of emergency or threat. The private sector is defined in this annex,consistent with the National Response Framework, to be organizations and entities thatare not part of any governmental structure and includes for-profit and not-for-profitorganizations, formal and informal structures, commerce, and industry.

Coordinated communications with the private sector help make incident managementmore effective by making it easier to obtain additional support needed to restore businessoperations to the affected areas and engaging key stakeholders who can bring resources,capabilities, and expertise to bear during the disaster response and recovery eftorts.

2.0 AssumptionsThe following are key assumptions about the private sector in the event of an incidentrequiring a coordinated Federal response:

2.1 Regardless of the nature of the incident (natural disaster, terrorism, or other),businesses (and the local economy) may be disrupted in some manner.

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2.2 The majority of critical infrastructure and key resources are owned and controlledby the private sector, making public/private partnerships central to effectivepreparedness, response, recovery, and resiliency.

2.3 Business recovery is a central and critical component in a community's recovery.No Jobs = No Economy = No Recovery

2.4 Small- to medium-sized businesses may be most vulnerable to disruptions and areessential to local economic and community recovery. Ninety-nine percent ofbusinesses in America are small businesses.

2.5 Private sector organizations play a key role in providing goods, services, andtechmical expertise that can complement effective preparedness, response, recovery,and mitigation operations.

2.6 The private sector can be engaged as a means of efficiently distributing informationthrough internal and external communications channels (employeecommunications, customer interaction, information exchange with suppliers andpartners).

3.0 Concept of Operations

3.1 The Private Sector organizational structure within ESF #15 is intended to beflexible, scalable, and adaptable to the size, scope, and requirements of the specificincident.

3.2 In coordination with the Federal Coordinating Officer, the ESF #15 EA Officer willdesignate the Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector. In a large-scaleor catastrophic incident, the ESF #15 EA Officer will coordinate with theDepartment of Homeland Security's Assistant Secretary for the Private Sectorregarding this designation.

3.3 Communications liaisons from DHS Private Sector Office, DHS Office ofInfrastructure Protection, and DHS Office of Cyber Security and Communicationsmay be deployed to the National Joint Information Center, if established. Theseliaisons provide subject-matter expertise and support messaging and outreach to theprivate sector, in coordination with the Assistant External Affairs Officer for thePrivate Sector.

3.4 The Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector conmmnicates with, andproactively reaches out to, private sector organizations hi the affected areas. He orshe also works closely, in a support role, with State, local, territorial, and tribalofficials responsible for private sector programs and services.

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3.5 The Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector reports to the ESF #15 EAOfficer and will collocate in the Joint Field Office with other External Affairspersonnel.

3.6 The Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector will work closely with theESF #15 Executive Officer, and the Assistant External Affairs Officers for Planningand Products, and other ESF #15 section leads to ensure that private sector effortsand plans are fuilly synchronized.

3.7 The Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector will coordinate with theInfrastructure Liaison, Private Sector Liaison, Community and Faith BasedInitiatives Liaison, ESF #6, ESF #14, and other JF0 leadership, as applicable, tofacilitate coordination with established local, regional, and national private sectornetworks; industry-specific associations and organizations; State and localemergency management partnerships; Chambers of Commerce; Citizen CorpsCouncils; academia; non-profits; and other non-governmental organizations.

3.8 The Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector also coordinates effortswith private sector liaisons in the State Emergency Operations Center, RegionalResponse Coordination Center(s), and National Response Coordination Center.

3.9 In addition to the Assistant External Affairs Officer for the Private Sector, theprivate sector component may include Private Sector Outreach Liaisons. PrivateSector Outreach Liaisons report to the Assistant External Affairs Officer for thePrivate Sector.

3.10 Private sector outreach and engagement are focused on conveying approved andrelevant public information and/or situational updates to private sector contacts toinclude:3.10.1 Business preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation assistance;

3.10.2 Specific guidance on response and recovery processes to private sectororganizations serving special needs populations; and

3.10.3 Local economic and long-term recovery planning in coordination withESF #14.

4.0 Roles and Responsibilities

4.1 DHS Private Sector OfficeThe. DHS Private Sector Office coordinates public information and outreach withnational private sector stakeholders, associations, academia, and non-governmentalorganizations.

4.2 DHS Office of Infrastructure ProtectionThe DIHS Office of Infrastructure Protection establishes and maintains acomprehensive, multidirectional, dynamic information-sharing network designed toprovide timely and actionable threat information, assessments, and warnings to

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public and private sector security partners including CI/KR owners and operators.DHS/lnternet Protocol (IP) serves as the executive agent to carry out DHSresponsibilities as the coordinating agency for the Cl/KR Support Annex to theNational Response Framework. In this capacity, DHS/IP coordinates thedeployment of Infrastructure Liaisons to JFOs to implement CI/KR supportactivities including coordination with ESFs, Federal Sector Specific Agencies;State, local, tribal, and territory entities; and CI/KR owners and operators.

4.3 FEMA Private Sector OfficeThe FEMA Private Sector Office coordinates staffing resources, training andoperational and tactical support to the Assistant External Affairs Officer for thePrivate Sector, and ESF #15 private sector operations located in the NationalResponse Coordination Center, the Regional Response Coordination Centers, andJFOs.

4.4 DHS Office of Cyber Security and CommunicationsDHS Office of Cyber Security and Communications coordinates public informationand outreach with owners and operations of our Nation's critical communicationsand cyber infrastructure, and Federal agencies that have authorities or equities inprotecting the communications infrastructure. The office works through itsestablished networks to include the National Communications System's NationalCoordination Center, the National Security Telecommunications AdvisoryCommittee (NSTAC), the Cormmunications and Information Technology ISACs;and the Communications and Information Technology Sector CoordinatingCouncils, as well as the National Cyber Security Division's U.S. ComputerEmergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).

4.5 Assistant External Affairs Officer for the Private SectorThe Assistant External Affairs Officer for the Private Sector serves as a liaison toprivate sector organizations and partners. This officer communicates with andproactively reaches out to private sector organizations in the affected areas andworks closely with and in support of State, local, territorial, and tribal officialsresponsible for private sector programs and services.

5.0 Federal Government Agency Coordination and Support

5.1 The Assistant External Affairs Officer for Private Sector will coordinate privatesector outreach efforts at the JFO with deployed representatives from the SmallBusiness Administration (SBA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), General ServicesAdministration (GSA), Infrastructure Liaison, and other Federal, State, and localagencies or non-governmental organizations.

5.2 DHS PSO will facilitate the sharing of information within the Federal interagency(SBA, IRS, GSA, Commerce, Labor, and others) at the national level to create asynergized Federal outreach to the private sector.

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6.0 Private Sector Outreach Activities

6.1 Private Sector Outreach and EngagementFacilitate outreach to and establish relationships with local, regional, and Stateprivate sector organizations and networks in affected areas (i.e., Department ofCommerce, Small Business Administration representatives; city, county/parishchambers; trade and industry associations and affiliates; Citizen Corps Councils;local, regional, and State economic authorities). Leverage established private sectornetworks, associations, and organizations (e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce,Business Executives for National Security [BENS], National Federation ofIndependent Businesses, Better Business Bureau, Business Roundtable) to supportprivate sector communications efforts. Provide Web links, articles, and informationto disseminate through private sector entities to their employees, customers/clients,stakeholders, and partners. Connect private sector partners with availableresources, capabilities, and/or services to operational elements through promotionand engagement in the National Donations Management Network (ESF #6) andother resource registries. Support ESF #14 in engaging private sector organizationsin long-term recovery strategies by providing information to private sector partners.

6.2 Communications and Information DisseminationIn collaboration with representatives of the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection,the DHS Office of Cyber Security and Communications, the DHS Private SectorOffice, and/or the FEMA Private Sector Office, conduct teleconferences withbusinesses, organizations, and other parties; organize workshops focusing onbusiness recovery issues and Federal procurement needs related to the disaster; andconvey official information including regular updates on operational priorities andrecovery efforts in coordination with Planning and Products.

6.3 External ProductsIn coordination with Planning and Products, develop audience-specificcommunications tools, including private sector-specific Web content, presentations,and flyers for use in field operations, and disseminate press releases and otherofficial (and releasable) information to associations and business networks so thatthey may distribute them to their respective constituencies. Coordinate targetedmedia relations through the JIC to business reporters and publications. All productdevelopment and information dissemination must consider support for limitedEnglish proficiency needs, accessibility, and other special needs.

6.4 Field OperationsProvide liaison support at Disaster Recovery Centers, public meetings, businessdistrict canvassing, and other public outreach venues to engage private sectorstakeholders and convey relevant information.

6.5 Principal Coordination and EventsCoordinate with the ESF #15 EA Officer: Assistant External Affairs Officer(AEAO), Planning and Products; and ESF #14 to engage Federal agency principals

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who work closely with the private sector or specific industries, in conveying officialinformation and updates.

6.6 Support to Long-Term RecoveryCoordinate with ESF #14, if activated, to share business, economic data, and otherinformation collected, including information from the Office of InfrastructureProtection, as well as to receive any ESF #14 information or analysis of thesituation for potential long-term community recovery needs. Obtain infornationfrom any ESF #14 Advance Team elements. Participate in ESF #14 NationalWorkgroup conference calls.

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Annex E to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsCommunity Relations


NRF ESF #15 Quick Summary - Community Relations (CR)


" Preparing an initial action plan to support the FCO, JFO, andState Coordinating Officer (SCO) with incident-specificguidance and objectives, at the beginning and throughout anactual or potential incident.

" Conducting the external affairs function in a joint mannerbetween Federal and State personnel, when available. Fieldteams are organized and dispersed throughout the affected area.Teams include trained Federal, State, tribal, and if necessary,locally hired individuals who know the community.

" Coordinating closely with the affected State(s) to identifycommunity leaders (e.g., grassroots, political, religious,educational, business, labor, ethnic) and neighborhoodadvocacy groups to assist in the rapid dissemination ofinformation, identify urmnet needs, establish an ongoingdialogue and information exchange, and facilitate collaborativeFederal, State, and local planning and mutual support fordisaster recovery.

" Deploying management and field officers simultaneously withother initial elements as directed by the ESF #15 ExternalAffairs Officer at the JFO

Directed by: * Assistant External Affairs Officer for Community Relations

1.0 PurposeThe annex provides guidance on Community Relations activities in support of an incidentrequiring a coordinated Federal response.

2.0 Functions of Community Relations

2.1 Assist disaster victims and affected conmmunities in understanding DHS-FEMA'srole in the disaster response and recovery, how to access DHS-FEMA assistance,

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and how to gather information from affected communities to guide response andrecovery efforts.

2.2 Assist in managing expectations among public officials and the public as to whatthe Federal response can and cannot do for them so that there are not any falseexpectations as to what disaster assistance really can provide.

2.3 Develop a coordinated interagency Community Relations strategy forresponse/recovery for the FCO and JFO with input from all responding agencies.

2.4 Identify geographic, demographic, and economic areas that are most affected bythe incident.

2.5 Develop a target list of groups and organizations most "at risk" and strategies toreach them.

2.6 Identify pertinent community-based organizations (CBOs) that can assist withdissemination of information to target audiences and establish an ongoingdialogue with leadership within those organizations.

2.7 Establish strategies to reach those individuals or groups that may not be reachedby CBOs and/or conventional media.

2.8 Coordinate with counterpart ESF #15 Assistant External Affairs Officersregarding community concerns, issues, message strategy, and multi-lingual andcultural issues.

2.9 Implement the Speaker's Bureau and coordinate public presentations, individualmeetings, and special events with the JFO Coordination Staff to meet operationalpriorities.

2.10 Work closely with ESF #15 Planning and Products to identify special populations,strategies, and materials to reach them.

3.0 Concept of OperationsEffective Community Relations is essential during an incident, as affected individualsand families will turn to churches, civic groups, and other cornmmunity organizations forhelp and guidance.

3.1 Community Relations Priorities

3.1.1 First priority: reduce loss of life and property

3.1.2 Second priority: those activities that accelerate or refine the recoveryprocess

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3.2 Community Relations FeaturesThe Community Relations staff give the Federal response a human face andprovides critical response and recovery information to State and local emergencymanagement officials, community-based organizations, and the private sector.

3.3 Community Relations ESF #15 LocationCommunity Relations staff should locate in the JFO within the ESF #15 team.

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Appendix I to Annex E to Emerpency Support Function #15 External AffairsSpecial Needs

References:A. National Response Framework.B. National Incident Management SystemC. Special Needs Preparedness GuideD. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 - Programs, Services and Activities,

Section 508 - Electronic and Information TechnologyE. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990F. Communications Act of 1934, Section 79.2G. Executive Order 13166H. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights ActI. Executive Order 13347

1.0 PurposeThe appendix provides considerations regarding individuals with special needs.

2.0 Background

2.1 Individuals with special needs make up a sizeable portion of the U.S. population.Before, during, and after an incident, members of this population may haveadditional needs such as maintaining independence, communication,transportation, supervision, and medical care.

2.2 Special needs populations include individuals who:

2.2.1 Have disabilities2.2.2 Live in congregate settings2.2.3 Are elderly2.2.4 Are children2.2.5 Are from diverse cultures and/or have limited English proficiency (or are

non-English speaking)2.2.6 Are transportation disadvantaged

2.3 The provision of timely and potentially lifesaving information to members of thispopulation before, during, and after an emergency must be ensured through theuse of communication strategies that are tailored to reach a maximum number ofindividuals.

3.0 Planning AssumptionsTo ensure appropriate implementation of ESF # 15 Community Relations supportactivities, involved staff should:

3.1 Have sound working knowledge of the accessibility and nondiscriminationrequirements applicable under Federal disability and civil rights laws;

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3.2 Be familiar with the demographics of the population of people with special needswho live in their community;

3.3 Engage in efforts to remove communication barriers faced by members of thespecial needs populations within the affected area;

3.4 Involve a variety of people from the special needs population in identifying thecommunication and transportation needs, accommodations, support systems,equipment, services, and supplies that residents and visitors with special needswill need during an emergency; and

3.5 Identify existing and develop new resources within the community that meet theneeds of residents and visitors with special needs during emergencies.

4.0 Communication StrategiesFederal civil rights laws require equal access for, and prohibit discrimination against,people with disabilities in all aspects of emergency planning, response, and recovery.Equal access applies to emergency information pertaining to preparedness, notification ofemergencies, evacuation, transportation, communication, shelters, distribution ofsupplies, food, first aid, medical care, housing, and application for and distribution ofbenefits. Additionally, steps must be taken to ensure that persons with limited Englishproficiency have meaningful access to communication regarding programs, services, andinformation provided to the general public.

4.1 Preparations should be made for individuals with a variety of limitations,including individuals who are deaf, are hard of hearing, or have speechimpairments, and need information presented in a visual format. Auxiliary aidsand services may be needed to ensure effective communication. These mayinclude closed captioning, pen and paper, and sign language interpreters throughon-site or video interpreting.

4.2 Individuals who are blind, have low vision, or have cognitive disabilities mayneed information presented in an audio format, materials in large print, or peopleto assist with reading and filling out forms.

4.3 Service animals have access to the same facilities and evacuation assets as thehumans they service under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.

4.4 Individuals who do not speak English or have limited English proficiency mayneed information in a language other than English or an interpreter who can relayinformation to them. It is important to identify groups and organizations that canprovide interpreters for local populations with limited English proficiency.

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5.0 Individuals from Diverse CulturesResidents who are members of culturally diverse populations may not have the ability tospeak, read, write, or understand English. If the unique communication needs of a givenculturally diverse population are not considered, this may be construed as a type ofnational origin discrimination.

5.1 It is important when communicating emergency related information to ensure:

5.1.1 The civil rights of an ethnically diverse population are respected.

5.1.2 The staff engaged in Community Relations support functions work closelywith the DHS Civil Rights Civil Liberties Office following a homelandsecurity incident or terrorist attack to ensure that lines of communicationremain strong and open.

5.1.3 Methods of communication that have built in cultural competence areutilized, including calling upon ethnically oriented businesses to assist indisseminating information.

5.1.4 When possible, Federal staff familiar with the culture of the affectedpopulation are engaged to disseminate information.

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Annex F to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsJoint Information Center


NRF ESF #15 Quick Summary - Joint Information Center (JIC)

Supports External Affairsby:

" Preparing an initial action plan to support the FCO and JFOwith incident-specific guidance and objectives at thebeginning and throughout an actual or potential incident.

" Establishing a joint information center or co-locating with anestablished State, local, or tribal joint information center.

" Overseeing the key function of media relations and ensuringunity of effort among all Federal JIC participants.

Coordinating messages with Federal, State, local, territorial,and tribal governments.

* Providing incident-related lifesaving and life sustaininginformation through the media and other sources toindividuals, families, businesses, and industries directly orindirectly affected by the incident.

* Conducting news conferences and press briefings.

* Gathering information on the incident.

* Using a broad range of resources to disseminate information.

* Monitoring news coverage to ensure accurate information isdisseminated.

* Coordinating the Media Access Program.

* Directing and coordinating Public Affairs activities.

* Training Federal responders on media release policy.

* Responding to rumors and inaccurate reports.

Directed by: * Assistant External Affairs Officer for the Joint InformationCenter

1.0 PurposeThe annex specifies guidance for the Federal Joint Information Center(s) and JFO publicaffairs operations.

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2.0 JIC Operating Concepts

2.1 A JIC is a central point for coordination of incident information, public affairsactivities, and media access to information regarding the latest developments.

2.2 In the event of an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, JICs areestablished to coordinate Federal, State, local, tribal, and private-sector incidentcommunications with the public.

2.3 The JIC is the FCO's resource to communicate incident management responseinformation. The FCO and ESF #15 leadership are empowered to speak onoperations and policy.

2.4 The JIC must be ready to rapidly respond to developing situations andcommunicate to the public through the media.

2.5 Collocation with the State and local JIC is encouraged, as it facilitatescoordination and joint cooperation for messaging.

2.6 As incident conditions and safety permit, the JIG must be able to forward deploysatellite JICs or public affairs personnel to central locations with high levels ofresponse activity and potential media interest (e.g., airport receiving responsesupplies).

2.7 Major announcements, daily briefings, and incident updates from the JIC arecoordinated with the FCO and Director before public release and with State andlocal counterparts as appropriate.

3.0 JIC Organization

3.1 RequirementA JIC, or collocation of Federal JIG staff with the State and local JIC, must beestablished during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response. The JICis a component of ESF #15 and is directed by the Assistant External AffairsOfficer for the JIC.

3.2 Scalable and FlexibleThe JIC is designed to accommodate the diverse range of responses likely to beperformed by the ESF #15 team, ranging from a large multiple agency-all-hazards response-to a small single agency-single-hazard response. The JICstructure is equally scalable and flexible for use in any incident. The structure cangrow or shrink, depending on the unique requirements of a specific response.This adaptability encompasses staffing, the organizational structure, facilities,hours of operation, resource and logistical, requirements, and products andservices.

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3.3 JIC Information ManagementConsistent with the decentralized organization and execution of externalcommunications, press releases, interviews, news briefings, and statements areauthorized for release by the ESF #15 External Affairs Officer and as delegated.Significant policy statements and potentially sensitive external materials shouldbe coordinated with the FCO before release. Any potential release issue thatposes a concern with national security, law enforcement, nuclear security andsafety, and classified information should be coordinated with the FCO andJFO Coordination Group.

3.4 JIC Coordination and Planning and ProductsTo ensure unity of effort and effective execution of the communications plan,close coordination must be maintained with the Planning and Productscomponent. Visual emphasis and products are critical to communications, and theJIC should seek to maximize their employment for briefimgs, statements, andother releases depicting the response effort.

4.0 JIC Types

4.1 National JICEstablishment of the National JIC is coordinated by the DHS office of publicaffairs. Federal departments and agencies would be requested to providerepresentatives to support the National JIC. The National JIC is activated whenan incident requiring a coordinated Federal response is expected to be of a longduration (i.e., weeks or months) and when the incident affects a very broad area(s)of the country (e.g., coordination for a nationwide pandemic). If necessary,and/or to support Federal incident communications continuity of operations(COOP), the National JIC may be established outside Washington, D.C.

4.2 Area JICDue to the geographic magnitude of a large incident, an area command structuremay be employed per the incident command system. If an area structure isemployed, it must be assessed whether a supporting area JIC is necessary. Inestablishing this organization, careful consideration must be given as to where themedia will get their primary information, existing State and local JICs, and liaisoncoordination among participating JICs.

4.3 Virtual JICAs noted in the NRF, a virtual JIC may be employed. A virtual JIC usestechnology and communications to connect participating external affairscomponents when physical collocation is not feasible or practical. If a virtual JICis employed, leadership must ensure that connectivity and inclusion of incidentparticipants is ensured.

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4.4 Incident JICThe incident JIC supports the FCO and JFO. This is the physical location fromwhich external affairs professionals from organizations involved in the responseand recovery work together to provide critical emergency information, mediaresponse, and public affairs functions. The JIC serves as a focal point for thecoordination and dissemination of Federal information to the public and mediaconcerning incident prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.The JIC is established at or virtually connected to the JFO, through the ESF # 15staff A media center may be established at a central location for all workingmedia to obtain news briefings and press conferences. Collocation or use of oneincident media center by the Federal, State, and local counterparts may be anoption.

4.5 Satellite JICThe Satellite JIC and its staff and operations are directed by the ESF #15 EAOfficer and the Assistant External Affairs Officer for the JIC. The satellite JIC(s)provides scalable and flexible capability for timely release of information, as theincident situation evolves.

5.0 JIC Establishment

5.1 ActivationThe ESF #15 EA Officer, with his Assistant External Affairs Officer for the JICand ESF #15 Leadership Cadre, will work closely with the FCO during the JFOCoordination Group Scoping Meeting to outline initial and final requirements forthe JIC. This is critical as the JIC must be established and communicating as soonas possible. ESF #5 is responsible for ensuring that facilities and equipment forthe JIC are provided and operational.

5.2 JIC Coordination with State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal CounterpartsFrom the onset of an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, JICcollocation or coordination is a high-priority decision. If possible, ESF #15leadership should collocate Federal JIC forces with the State and localincident JIC. While this may not always be feasible, the ESF #15 ExternalAffairs Officer should provide liaisons if collocation is not appropriate orpossible. The key element that must be remembered is "unity of effort."Consistency in communications messaging and support to our citizens areenhanced by working together as a team.

5.3 Configuration and StaffingJIC organization and staffing are based on the basic requirements established inNIMS and integration capabilities with the State and local authorities. The JICshould reflect the size and nature of the incident and the anticipated needs of theagencies and partners who will staff it.

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5.4 Satellite JICsSatellite JICs remain under the direct supervision of the Assistant External AffairsOfficer for the JIC. They will always maintain the closest liaison to the parentJIC.

5.5 SpokespersonsThe spokesperson(s) will be designated by the ESF #15 External Affairs Officerand Assistant External Affairs Officer for the JIC.

5.6 Logistics Support (See Annex X)Through ESF #5, the JFO ensures that logistics support, working space,equipment, and technical support are provided to the JIC in a timely manner. TheESF # 15 EA Officer and Resource Manager must prepare and provide detailedrequirements as soon as practical to ensure the rapid establishment and support ofthe JIC.

5.7 Federal Interagency Staffing (See Annex Q)The ESF #15 external affairs team and representatives from all Federaldepartments and agencies will locate in the JIC or be linked through the jointinformation system. Federal personnel reporting to work in the ESF #15 JICwill be required to comply with this SOP. The JIC and its operations are aunified Federal communications operation.

5.8 State and Local LiaisonIf all communications counterparts decide to collocate the JIC at the JFO, liaisonsare requested from State and local communicators to staff the facility and ensureunity of effort.

6.0 JIC Operational Elements

6.1 Assistant External Affairs Officer for Joint Information CenterManages all JIC activities. Responsible for maintaining proper staffing levels.Also responsible for the development and creation of the media center and foracquiring the needed equipment to support the media center.

6.2 Media Relations Unit LeaderManages media relations responsibilities in support of the FCO JFO, and directshour-to-hour JiC media functions. Works closely with the Planning and Productsstaff to coordinate strategic messaging and to inform them of issues that might bedeveloping from a media standpoint.

6.2.1 News Desk ManagerServes as the primary point of contact for the media concerning all Federaldisaster response, recovery, and mitigation programs. Responsible formaintaining all media lists and documenting all media contacts by newsdesk and field staff

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6.2.2 Media Analysis ManagerReviews media reporting for accuracy, content, and adjustment to ensurethat accurate public infonnation is being disseminated to the media andcitizens.

6.2.3 Field ManagerCoordinates activities in conjunction with other Federal, State, and localcounterparts with primary responsibility of overseeing media relationsstaff in the field as opposed to the JFO. Develops field strategy forreaching all media outlets in a proactive, strategic manner. Responsiblefor supplying all field staff with the latest produced information and thelatest strategic messaging. Gathers and summarizes field reports with anemphasis on developing issues to be used to help develop strategicmessaging.

6.2.4 Special Projects/Events ManagerHandles events such as news conferences, press briefings, and tours forsenior officials of affected areas. Works as the point of contact for allprotocol issues and for organizing and planning all VIP visits.

6.3 Operations Unit LeaderManages JIC media operations involving imagery, photography, and events.

6.3.1 Broadcast ManagerEnsures that imagery and video products are captured, processed,collected, and distributed in a timely manner. Develops public servicecampaigns, video documentation, special productions, remote liveinterview feeds, and logistical support of public meetings andpresentations. Responsible for overseeing all contract work involvingsatellite trucks and services.

6.3.2 Administrative SpecialistSupports Operations and in coordination with the ESF # 15 ResourceManager and ESF #5.

6.3.3 Photography/Videography ManagerProvides still photography documentation of the response to support printand Internet media needs. Responsible for maintaining a database ofphotos involving the specific event for utilization by any and all entities inthe JFO.

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AppendicesI Release of Information and Spokespersons2 JIC Organizational Chart3 JIC Establishment Checklist4 Disaster News Release5 Media Access Program and Operations

Appendix 1 to Annex F to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsRelease of Information and Spokespersons

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated SOP

1.0 PurposeThis appendix outlines policy and guidance for release of information by the JFO andFederal personnel.

2.0 Discussion

2.1 National PolicyIn accordance with HSPD 5 and during an incident requiring a coordinatedFederal response, it is Federal policy to maintain public trust by proactivelydisseminating consistent, timely, and accurate public information and instructionsthrough coordination among Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribalcommunicators. This concept is best characterized as "Maximunm disclosure withminimun delaY. "

2.2 Factors in Releasing InformationMany factors are considered in the release of information during an incidentrequiring a coordinated Federal response. Normal Federal or departmentalprocesses are adjusted to ensure that lifesaving and life-sustaining information isprovided as soon as possible. In fact, release of information is a balance betweenthe mandate described above and full consideration of certain limitations orcontributing factors described below. It is important that the FCO, JFOleadership, and ESF #15 Leadership Cadre and senior staff fully understand thesefactors.

2.2.1 Federal InteragencyAn incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, regardless of itsnature, presents both coordination and communications challenges to theESF #15 team. These challenges must be quickly and consistentlymanaged by all levels of the strategic Federal communications team.While the FCO and ESF #15 team will have discretion and authority torelease infornation, they will also ensure that higher authorities are

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apprised of the forthcoming announcement of major developments. Dailyconference calls between the strategic communications teamrepresentatives are the best means to support this requirement and ensureconsistency of messaging.

2.2.2 Coordination with State, Local, Territorial, and TribalFederal external affairs personnel must ensure that public communicationsactivities are fully and appropriately coordinated and/or synchronized withState, local, territorial, and tribal authorities. This recognizes theleadership role of the latter with regard to incident management and as thebest source of lifesaving and life-sustaining public guidance andinformation.

2.2.3 Classified and Law Enforcement InformationIncidents requiring a coordinated Federal response may involveinformation dealing with national security, classified issues, lawenforcement investigations, and radiological security and safety.Consideration must be afforded to this material where its release couldjeopardize national security and/or interfere with a judicial proceeding orlaw enforcement official or activity. (See Annex J for more information.)

2.2.4 PrivacyCommunicators must ensure that the Privacy Act, other Federal statutes,and those issues that are clear unwarranted invasions of personal privacyare not compromised by external communications.

3.0 Spokespersons

3.1 JFO/ESF #15 Headquarters StaffThe ESF #15 Leadership Cadre and Staff support mission requirements andincident communications operations. Personnel are authorized to speak on behalfof the FCO, JFO, and ESF #15. They are authorized to brief the media on allaspects of the Federal response, including policy and operations.

3.1.1 Authorized Spokespersons

3.1.1.1 ESF #15 EA Officer3.1.1.2 ESF #15 Deputy Officer3.1.1.3 ESF #15 Executive Officer3.1.1.4 Press Secretary3.1.1.5 Assistant External Affairs Officer for the JIC or designated

spokesperson

3.2 JFO Field OperationsThrough policy established by the Director and when authorized by the FCO,Federal field response personnel are authorized to speak to the media within the

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scope of their assigned duties and knowledge. This is an important element as itcan provide the public a clear perspective of the dedication of Federal respondersand the scope of the response effort. The guiding principle is "Talk about whatyou do. "Examples include the following:

3.2.1 Rescue Helicopter AircrewsDiscuss rescues, missions, special training.

3.2.2 FEMA Urban Search and Rescue TeamDiscuss mission, experience, operations-what they are doing now andwhere they came from.

3.2.3 National Disaster Medical SystemDiscuss mission, qualifications, experience, previous incidents.

3.3 Policy Questions and IssuesQuestions about policy and national decisions are beyond the scope of this andwould be politely deferred to ESF #15 HQ spokespersons.

3.4 Media Access (See Appendix 5)Media access is a critical component of the overall external communicationseffort and highly encouraged. The above guidelines continue to apply whenmedia are provided access to Federal incident management forces.Remember - Talk about what you do.

4.0 ESF #15 Release of Information Procedures

4.1 Federal ESF #15 and Joint Information Center PolicyThrough authorized spokespersons, the Federal Government will respond in aprofessional and timely manner to all media requests for information, interviews,and visual imagery.

4.2 Release AuthorityConsistent with the decentralized organization and execution of externalcommunications, press releases, interviews, news briefings, and statements areauthorized for release by the ESF #15 EA Officer, and as delegated. Significantpolicy statements and potentially sensitive external materials should becoordinated with the FCO before release. Any potential release issue that posesa concern with national security, law enforcement, radiological security andsafety, and classified information should be coordinated with the FCO andJFO Coordination Group.

4.3 Spokespersons

" ESF #15 leadership can address policy, and incident management operations." All others can talk about what they do.

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5.0 Contractors and Release of Information SpokespersonsDuring an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, Federal contract personneldo not have a standing authorization to conduct media interviews and activities. Seniorcontractors or those with specific skill sets, such as scientific or technical expertise, maybe identified as primary or potential spokespersons. In other cases, contractors may beapproached in the field by media, but lack the qualifications or authority to speak in anofficial capacity. The general guidance below covers contractors participating in aFederal response.

5.1 Contracted personnel should have language in their national contract or agreementthat details the scope and nature of their authority to speak, under certaincircumstances, but as standard practice should seek guidance from their corporateheadquarters before proceeding. Contractors are not automatically empowered toconduct media activities in the same manner as Federal employees.

5.2 The ESF #15 EA Officer, Assistant External Affairs Officers, and the seniorrepresentative of a Federal agency with contract oversight, working within theJFO or ESF #15 staff, should coordinate with contractors, as appropriate, toidentify potential spokespersons; conduct training on the release of informationprocedures; and provide approval for media activities, oversight, and guidance asnecessary.

5.3 Special Federal departmental and agency guidance or protocols for contractorswill be considered in executing this policy.

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Appendix 2 to Annex F to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsJIC Organizational Chart

~~~~~Special Amnsrtv htgahNews Media Field Projects/ Broadcast Administrative Photograph/Desk Analysis Manager Events Manager Specialist Manager

Manager Manager Manager

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Appendix 3 to Annex F to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsJIC Establishment Checklist

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Interagency Integrated JFO SOP

1.0 PurposeThis appendix details key actions for establishment of a JIG. This list is obviouslyaffected by coordination with other counterparts and pre-incident facilities. It is intendedto be a job aid to the public affairs team.

JIC Establishment Checklist

Because of the critical nature of providing emergency information to disaster victims, one of themost pressing needs the external affairs staff face in a crisis is arranging for necessary workspace, materials, telephones, and staff to properly establish a JIC. The following list will assist instanding up a JIC.

El Coordinate with FCO; JFO Coordination Group; and State, local, territorial, and tribal authorities toidentify the optimum JIC site for all participants

El Brief JIG staff on concept of joint operations (play in the JIC equals play for the FCO) and policy onrelease of information

El Identify staffing needs and request inter-agency support from DHS OPA

El Determine JIC stafting hours (scope of response/level of media interest may require staffing beyondcore JFO hours of operations)

El Obtain desks/tables and chairs

El Obtain telephones and phone lines (dedicate one line with multiple phones as news desk number)

El Obtain a telephone answering machine to answer dedicated lines

El Obtain computers loaded with software for Internet browsing, word processing (e.g., MicrosoftWord), presentations (e.g., Microsoft PowerPoint), databases, e-mail, and communication systems

El Obtain Internet access (Wi-Fi or landline)

El Obtain photocopiers

El Obtain telephone directories, including Media /Governmental Yellow Books

El Obtain pens, pencils, note paper, staplers, etc.

El Obtain computer printers

El Obtain two fax machines with broadcast capability

El Obtain power strips with surge protector

El Obtain Associated Press stylebooks

El Obtain dry erase boards or flip charts

El Obtain a color poster printer (or access to one)

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JIC Establishment Checklist

Because of the critical nature of providing emergency information to disaster victims, one of themost pressing needs the external affairs staff face in a crisis is arranging for necessary workspace, materials, telephones, and staff to properly establish a JIC. The following list will assist instanding up a JIC.

El Obtain AM/FM Radio

El Obtain televisions/monitors

El Obtain VHF/DVD players/recorders

El Obtain broadcast operations package (satellite truck and crew)

El Obtain pipe and drape (blue curtains)

El Obtain podium, microphone, speakers, and multi-box

El Obtain media camera riser/platform

El Obtain sufficient seating for press briefings

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Appendix 4 to Annex F to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsDisaster News Release - Sample Template

No. # -EM Release No. #

Contact: JIC News Desk (602-xxx-xxxx)

DISASTER RESPONSE UPDATE NUMBER TEN (10)Phoenix, Ariz. [Date]

Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities continue to coordinate the response to the radiologicalexplosion at the intersection of the Loop 101 and Loop 202 freeways on Tuesday, Oct. 16.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy deployed 34 two-person sampling teams to Arizona to assist with contamination monitoring in the Phoenix area.Ten teams are sampling in the immediate area of Tuesday's blast and the remaining teams aresampling in Mesa residential areas. The sampling teams will use hand-held direct readinginstruments to provide immediate data. In addition, air monitoring equipment has been installedfor sampling breathing-zone air.

A Joint Housing Task Force is convening in Arizona to begin to transition evacuees out of theshelters. It will look at both short-tern and long-term strategies and will first look at availablerentals and existing housing before bringing in mobile homes. The task force will consist ofFederal, State, and local housing agencies.

The Arizona Division of Emergency Management (ADEM) today opened two IndividualAssistance Service Centers (IASCs) in Tempe and Mesa to aid residents affected by the disasterTuesday. The centers are located at the Arizona State University main campus in Tempe and theArizona State University east campus in Mesa. The centers' hours of operation are 8 a.m. to10 p.m., seven days a week. Affected residents must attend one of the centers in person in orderto meet with a case worker and identify personal needs. Additionally, ADEM is now providing ashuttle service between the various evacuation shelters.

Ongoing response activities include the following:

* The American Red Cross needs additional volunteers to help with its relief efforts inPhoenix. People are needed to work in a variety of positions including clerical,administrative, and licensed nursing. Volunteers should register online at www.AZ21 l.govor call .602-973-2212.

* The volunteer module has been activated on the Arizona 2-1-1 Web site (training.az2l 1.gov.)This Web page can be used by Arizonans who wish to volunteer their services for disasterrelief.

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AIRPORTS AND AIRSPACE

Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport Update

* Phoenix Sky Harbor is open and flights are returning to nornnal. Travelers who havebeen waiting to return to their homes outside of the Phoenix metropolitan area may nowresume travel to their intended destinations.

* Travelers are being asked to arrive at the airport at least three hours prior to their flightwhen limited flights resume this morning. Airport roadways are expected to becongested due to vehicle inspections mandated by the Federal Government as part of theRed level alert in the Phoenix area.

PUBLIC SAFETY

* Eight additional bodies were recovered from a local hospital, bringing the total number offatalities to 78.

TRANSPORTATION

" All roads in the City of Mesa are opened except those within the evacuation zone.Traffic into the evacuation zone is limited to public safety and medical personnel.

" The most updated information about Valley freeway conditions can be found by dialing

5-1-1 or by logging onto www.az51 l.com.

EVACUATION AND SHELTERING

" The City of Mesa's evacuation area is bounded on the north by Broadway, on the east byAlma School, on the south by 8th Street, and on the west by Dobson.

* In Pinal County, the shelter at Casa Grande High School is still accepting people;capacity is 500. The shelter at the Pinal County Fairgrounds is still accepting people;capacity is 5,000.

" In Coconino County, the shelter at Northern Arizona University is still accepting people;capacity is 4,000. The shelter at Coconino High School is not accepting anyone else;capacity is 1,000. The shelter at Flagstaff High School is not accepting anyone else;capacity is 1,000.

* In Gila County, the shelter at Payson High School is still accepting people; capacity is2,400.

* In Navajo County, the shelter set up at Show Low High School is still accepting people;capacity is 500.

" In Pima County, the shelter at the Pima County Fairgrounds is still accepting people;capacity is 5,000. The shelter at the Convention Center is still accepting people; capacityis 2,500. The shelter at McKale Center is still accepting people; capacity is 2,000.

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JOINT STATE/FEDERAL RESPONSE

* In light of the attacks, the Department of Homeland Security is encouraging everyAmerican to take three basic precautions to improve personal preparedness and safety.

* Prepare yourself and your family for situations that may be beyond your control. Eachindividual and family needs to have an emergency supply kit and a plan to deal with asituation like those in Guam, Portland, and Phoenix.

* Listen to and actively seek instructions provided by your local authorities. You may needto make decisions based on the latest information your local officials have to offer.

* Remain vigilant. Being alert, attentive, and observant of your surroundings and reportingunusual activity may help prevent further attacks.

* For more information on protecting yourself and your family members and how to getprepared for an emergency situation, visit www.ready.gov.

Citizens with questions are encouraged to call the Arizona 2-1-1 Emergency Call Center at 602-xxx-xxxx. Current updates are available at http://training.az211 .gov

Reminder for media: all media interviews and requests for information should be made to theState Joint Information Center. Contact: JIC News Desk (602-xxx-xxxx).

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Appendix 5 to Annex F to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsMedia Access Program and Operations

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management System

1.0 PurposeThe purpose of this appendix is to outline policy and guidelines for the Federal domesticincident management media access program.

2.0 Rules of EngagementFor the safety and security of DHS units and media, media will adhere to establishedground rules. Ground rules will be agreed to in advance and signed by media prior toaccess. Violation of the ground rules may result in the immediate termination of theaccess and removal from the disaster scene. These ground rules recognize the right of themedia to cover JFO/Federal response operations and tell the stories of their importantwork.

2.1 Evaluations regarding media access will be granted with the followingconsiderations:

National Security: Operational security and classified information must beprotected.

Law Enforcement: Media access will not be granted if ongoing law enforcementoperations or the prosecution of forthcoming legal action will be jeopardized.

Safety: Safety is paramount for all ESF #15 media access. Media will not bepermitted access to response and recovery teams if there is a significant risk.

State and Local Approval: The Federal response to disasters is at the request of-State officials. At all times, response units will abide by State and officialdirectives and requirements. Local officials may restrict media access to somedisaster areas and those prohibitions are outside of DHS control. Access willbe defined by local officials.

2.2 The following rules must be followed to sustain media access with a Federalresponse unit:

2.2.1 Prior to the media access, media must provide proof of credentials.

2.2.2 During the access, media must comply with the previously agreed rules.

2.2.3 The media is responsible for loading and carrying their equipment at alltimes.

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2.2.4 Media may live, work, and travel as part of the units with which they areafforded access.

2.2.5 Media will pay their own lodging expenses if staying at a hotel, motel, bedand breakfast, or other commercial facility, as well as food and othertravel expenses.

2.2.6 Media will deploy with the necessary equipment to collect and transmittheir stories, if required.

2.2.7 Media should remain with their assigned unit. Media may terminate theiraccess opportunity at any time. However, if the access is in a restrictedaccess location, media will be expected to adhere to ground rules untilthey can be transported outside of the restricted area. The Unit PAO orassigned team point of contact will provide, as the situation permits andbased on the availability of transportation, movement back to the nearestlocation with commercial transportation.

2.2.8 All pre-determined interviews with Federal employees will be on therecord. Any "comments" made by Federal employees during actual"work" that are not part of a pre-determined interview are off the record.

2.2.9 Media with access to units are not permitted to carry weapons.

2.2.10 Media may report on the type of units involved and characteristics of thoseunits (size, number of personnel, types of resources they bring to bear,etc.).

2.2.11 Media may report on names and hometowns of unit members, but onlyafter obtaining their consent. Photographs of unit members will be takenonly with their consent.

2.2.12 If a media representative is killed or injured in the course of the disasterresponse/recovery operation, the unit will immediately notify ESF #15offices. FEMA HQ and DHS OPA will contact the reporter's own mediaorganization(s), which will make next of kin notification in accordancewith the individual's wishes.

2.3 Medical facilities, children, wounded or injured peopleThe following procedures and policies apply to coverage of wounded, injured,and ill civilians and personnel:

2.3.1 Media representatives will be reminded of the sensitivity of using namesof individual casualties or photographs they may have taken that clearlyidentify casualties. The deceased are the responsibility of the respective

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State until next of kin can be notified. The authority to report thisinformation must be granted by them.

2.3.2 We expect media representatives to not photograph or name any child orminor (under the age of 8) without written permission of the child's parentor guardian. In cases where such permission is not available, it will be aviolation of the embed guidelines to photograph or videotape any childwho could be identified by the recording method.

2.3.3 Media visits to medical or mortuary facilities will be in accordance withapplicable regulations, standard operating procedures, operations orders,and instructions by attending physicians. Reporters who have access withNational Disaster Medical System (NDMS) teams will follow allguidelines set forth by the team, local officials, and/or the host medicalfacility to ensure patient privacy at all times. State and local officialsmay restrict media access to some disaster areas, and thoseprohibitions are completely outside ESF #15 control. Any violation ofthis guideline will be grounds for immediate removal from the program.

2.3.4 Reporters may visit those areas designated by the facility commander, butwill not be allowed in operating rooms during operating procedures.

2.3.5 Permission to interview or photograph an adult patient will be grantedonly with the consent of the attending physician or facility commanderand with the patient's informed consent, witnessed by the escort.

2.3.6 "Informed consent" means the patient understands his or her picture andcomments are being collected for news media purposes and they mayappear worldwide in news media reports.

2.3.7 With adult patient permission, media can photograph, videotape, record,and interview that adult patient in waiting areas or between medicalprocedures with the understanding that the adult patient may rescindhis/her permission at any time and that unit leaders may rescind the adultpatient's permission on their behalf if doing so would be in the bestinterest of that adult patient; and with the understanding that medicalprocedures always take precedence and that any medical authority mayend any interview at any time to perform such medical procedures.

2.4 Immunizations and Personal Protective Equipment

2.4.1 Media organizations should ensure that media are properly immunized* before embedding with units. Recommended immunizations will vary

from disaster to disaster. A general guide for immunizations wouldinclude tetanus, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, and possibly vaccinations againstmosquito-borne illnesses. Before traveling, individuals should check with

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the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a FEMAHeadquarters Office of Public Affairs (HQ OPA) contact, or their doctor.

2.4.2 Because the use of personal protective gear, such as helmets, may bemandatory at some disaster scenes, media will be responsible forprocuring/using such equipment at the direction of the unit leader.Whenever possible, ESF #15 will give as much direction as possible onadditional gear needed before departure.

2.4.3 Media may be authorized and required to use additional personalpreparedness equipment including nuclear, biological, or chemicalprotective equipment, firefighting turnout gear, wildfire fighting gear,urban search and rescue safety equipment, or other gear. Information onthat gear will be provided before access. Unit leaders may provide gear ona temporary loan basis or reporters may be required to provide theequipment.

2.5 Security

2.5.1 Federal personnel shall protect classified information firom unauthorizedor inadvertent disclosure. Access to classified materials will only begranted to those in the ESF function holding a current security clearanceand on a need-to-know basis. Media provided access to sensitiveinformation will be informed in advance by the unit leader or his/herdesignated representative of the restrictions on the use or disclosure ofsuch information. When a question regarding reporting specific materialarises, media will consult with the unit leader or his/her designatedrepresentative.

2.5.2 The nature of the access process may involve observation of furthersensitive information, including Federal employee deployments andmovements, response and recovery preparations, response capabilities andvulnerabilities, and other information. When a unit leader or his/herdesignated representative has reason to believe that a media member willhave access to this type of sensitive information, prior to allowing suchaccess, he/she will take prudent precautions to ensure the security of thatinformation. The primary safeguard will be to brief media in advanceabout what information is sensitive and what the parameters are forcovering this type of information. If media are inadvertently exposed tosensitive information, they should be briefed after exposure on whatinformation they should avoid covering.

2.5.3 The Federal response to disasters is at the request of local officials. ATALL TIMES, response units will abide by State and local officials'directives and requirements. Local officials may restrict media accessto some disaster areas, and those prohibitions are completely outside

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of Federal control. Travel into disaster sites will be coordinated throughlocal public information officials and local authorities. If State or localauthorities forbid media from entering sites, accessed media will abide bythose orders.

2.5.4 Media and public affairs personnel will, at all times, follow any orders ofthe unit leader on-scene or his/her designee. If there are concerns, thePublic Affairs Officer (PAO) will discuss them with the unit leader.However, the unit leader's decision will be final.

2.6 Other

2.6.1 Media will travel with the PAO or designated team point of contact (POC)with the understanding that the POC is not a personal guide into thedisaster site. The POC will be responsible for providing other disasterinformation outside the scope of the unit's work. Reporters understandthat the opportunity for access with the unit means that there may be longperiods of time without discernable action while units await assignment.Media understand that they may miss other events or stories related to thedisaster while provided access to the team.

2.6.2 When purchasing gear, please consider the wide range of temperaturespossible. For cold-weather gear, consider bringing clothing made out ofpolypropylene versus cotton and clothes that have wind-resistant ormoisture-wicking features.

2.6.3 News media personnel must carry and support any personal andprofessional gear they take with them, including protective cases forequipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

2.6.4 A more comprehensive list of suggested equipment is in Tab C.

2.7 Internal Guidelines

2.7.1 The FEMA Headquarters Office of Public Affairs (HQ OPA), incoordination with DHS Public Affairs and the JFO ESF #15 team, is thecentral office for managing and approving all media access with nationalteams, to include allocating access slots to media organizations.

2.7.2 Unit leaders with a deployment order may invite local or regional media toaccess with them with the approval of FEMA HQ OPA. Unit leaders willinform these media, prior to deploying, that FEMA HQ OPA is theapproval authority for all media access and that their particular access mayend after the unit's arrival on a disaster scene. The media organizationmay apply to FEMA HQ OPA for continued access, but there is no

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guarantee and the media organization will have to make arrangements forand pay for the journalists' return trip.

2.7.3 Without making commitments to media organizations, deploying unitsmay identify local media for potential embeds and nominate them toFEMA HQ OPA at 202-646-4600. Information required to be forwardedincludes media organization, type of media, and contact informationincluding bureau chief/managing editor/news director's name; office,home and cell phone numbers; pager numbers; and e-mail addresses.Submissions for embeds with specific units should include a unitrecommendation as to whether the request should be honored. Unitleaders should also express, through their chain of command and PublicAffairs channels to FEMA HQ OPA, their desire and capability to supportmedia embeds.

2.7.4 Freelance media will be authorized access if they are selected by a newsorganization as their access representative.

2.7.5 Reporters who happen upon units operating in the field may be permittedto join the team with the consent of the PAO assigned to the team incoordination with the team leader and FEMA HQ OPA and ResponseDivision, as well as the agreement of other accessed media.

2.7.6 Units will be authorized direct coordination with media after assignmentand approval by FEMA HQ OPA. All units with an accessed reporter willdesignate a PAO to facilitate media coverage and access. The PAO willbe responsible for checking in with FEMA HQ OPA daily or as often asconditions allow. PAOs will also be responsible for forwarding questionsabout any topic other than the unit activities to FEMA HQ OPA.

2.7.7 Accessed media operate as part of their assigned unit. Unit leaders willensure the media are provided with every opportunity to observe actualoperations. The personal safety of correspondents may be a reason toexclude them from actual operations, but every effort should be taken sothat media can witness operations from a safe distance whenever possible.

2.7.8 If, in the opinion of the unit leader, a media representative is unable towithstand the rigorous conditions required to operate with his/her team,the leader with consultation from the PAO, may limit the representative'sparticipation with the unit to ensure safety.

2.7.9 Media will agree to abide by the FEMA HQ OPA ground rules, (copyincluded in this document). Any violation of the ground rules could resultin termination of that media's access opportunity.

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2.7.10 If pooling is implemented, pool products will be made available to allaccredited media on an equitable, no-fee basis. Media pool coordinatorsand bureau chiefs will be responsible for distributing media pool products.Media pooling will be decided upon in advance. Media will be notifiedbefore deployment if pooling will be implemented.

2.7.11 Issues, questions, difficulties, or disputes associated with ground rules orother aspects of accessed media that cannot be resolved at the unit or JFOlevel will be forwarded to DHS/FEMA HQ OPA. Unit leaders who wishto terminate an access for cause must notify FEMA HQ OPA prior totermination. If a dispute cannot be resolved at the JFO/ESF # 15 level,FEMA HQ OPA and the FEMA Response Division will be the finalresolution authority. In all cases, this should be done as expeditiously aspossible to preserve the news value of the situation.

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TabsA Media Access LetterB Media Access Informed Consent FormC Media Access Suggested Gear List

Tab A to Appendix 5 to Annex F to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsMedia Access Letter

Dear [Media]

We welcome each of you to the experience of seeing the work of response and recovery teamsfirst hand.

We appreciate your interest and willingness to live and work alongside response and recoveryprofessionals firom across the United States as they help those affected by disasters. For us, itgives an opportunity to demonstrate the service provided by these outstanding individuals. Foryou, it provides a unique vantage point from which to tell the story of these brave and proudAmericans - from behind the yellow caution tape and in the midst of the disaster scene, as theyserve their neighbors.

Depending on the type of disaster and the unit you might be deploying with, you'll see the firestAmerica has to offer - from doctors and nurses setting up hospital emergency rooms in tents tobrave search and rescue professionals climbing into the depths of mangled buildings with theirsearch animals or wading through high water in an effort to ensure that no one is left behind.

A media escort will deploy with you during your access and be your guide along the way. Theirjob is to ensure you the best access possible to get a good story, while also looking out for yoursafety and enforcing some modest rules so that your stay with a unit goes well, and that ouroperational teams keep inviting media back on future disaster deployments.

Access with a Federal Government response team does have certain constraints. As an enclosureto this letter you will find a list of ground rules we must ask you to follow. Please understandthat agreement to these rules is necessary to protect you as well as the units you will work with.Failure to comply with these rules may result in termination of a news media representative'saccess.

In addition to ground rules, we ask that you come prepared to operate safely in a complexenvironment. This includes, but is not limited to, coming prepared with appropriate gear such aswork boots, long pants, and extreme weather gear. A gear list is included for your use. Beingproperly outfitted and obeying the orders of operational unit leaders will go a long way tokeeping you safe and comfortable during your embed.

Speaking of comfort, it is important to understand that disaster situations are not pleasant places.You may experience sights, smells, and sounds that are highly unpleasant, and you need to beprepared for that. You may also have very limited access to basic services that we all rely upon.

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You may go for several days without water, food, electricity, or a wanr bed. Pack what you'llneed to sustain yourself and stay modestly comfortable. Obviously you'll need clean water andfood, but also bring along your toiletries, sunscreen, extra clothing, sleeping bag, camping gear,and anything else you can think that will be required in a very primitive environment for up to aweek or more, depending on your team assignment.

FEMA Headquarters Office of Public Affairs (HQ OPA) will be the final authority on access andwill limit, restrict, or terminate access whenever necessary, and solely at the discretion of theoffice, for safety and security reasons, or to ensure the overall viability of the program.

FEMA HQ OPA will serve as your final stop before you leave, during your access, and whenyou return. In the field, the team leader has the ultimate authority as to where you go and howyou access the team. Your public affairs officer will work with the team leader to ensure thegreatest accessibility possible within the confines of keeping you and our team members safe. Ifyou have questions, concerns, or a problem that cannot be solved within your access, contact theHQ OPA office (202-646-4600).

For more information, or if you are interested in access but have not yet coordinated with FEMAHQ OPA, please contact the office at 202-646-4600 and be ready to provide your full name,media organization you represent, phone number, fax number, e-mail address, and best way toreach you.

Thank you again for your interest in the media access program and we look forward to workingwith you soon.

FEMA's Office of Public Affairs

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Tab B to Appendix 5 to Annex F to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsMedia Access Informed Consent Form.

I recognize that covering response/recovery operations at disaster scenes or elsewhere carries with itcertain inherent risks to life, limb, and cquipment.

I recognize that the Department of Homeland Security, in pursuing the successful accomplishment of itsmission, cannot guarantee my personal safety or the safety of my equipment.

I understand that my acknowledgment of this statement is a condition of being credentialed to have mediaaccess with operations and receiving assistance for that coverage.

Whereas, I (NAME) , I am about to travel with ,and whereas I am doing so entirely upon my own initiative, risk and responsibility; now therefore inconsideration of the permission extended to lne, I do hereby for myself, my heirs, executors, andadministrators, release, remnise, acquit, satisfy, and forever discharge and its memberofficers, agents, and employees acting officially or otherwise, from any and all claims, demands, actions,or causes of action, on account of my death or on account of any injury to me or my property that mayoccur from any cause during my stay, travel, and all ground, flight, or water operations incident thereto.

I also agree to abide by the media access ground rules that have been provided to me and to withhold anysensitive information, which may be accidentally disclosed to me. I agree that all pre-determinedinterviews with employees or employees of contractors during the media access will be on the record. Iagree that any "comments" made by employees or contractors during actual "work" that are not part of apre-determined interview are off the record. During my stay with , I will not interferewith operations. I understand that failure to comply with these restrictions will result in the loss ofauthorization to accompany and may result in cancellation of my participation in themedia access program.

Signature Date

Printed Name Media organization

Address:

Phone:

Please provide contact information for a person to be notified in an emergency(preferably next immediate relative):

Witness Witness

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Tab C to Appendix 5 to Annex F to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsMedia Access Suggested Gear List

Recommended items for media access:

" SUV or all-terrain type vehicle if needed for your equipment" Gear you need to do your job and file your stories from the field, if needed - pens, pencils,

pads, recorders, spare batteries, spare tape, spare digital media, etc." Cushion-sole socks (hiking socks are good)" Boots/sturdy shoes - steel-toed and/or steel-shanked boots may be required when embedding

with some teams; ask for guidance" Comfortable shoes - tennis shoes or other comfortable shoes when boots are not required" Long pants - ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED when operating with USAR teams and other

front- line disaster response teams" Shorts - for warm-weather operations, NOT for operating in areas with heavy damage and

safety issues" Shirts - both long-sleeved and short sleeved" Rain/wind resistant jacket" Cold-weather coat, gloves, hat - if needed" Thermal underwear - if needed" Water - enough for three days" Food to last three days - protein bars, calmed meat, jerky, MREs, etc." All personal hygiene (one week's supply):

o Toothbrush/pasteo Soapo Deodoranto Brush/combo Foot powder

" Prescription/non-prescript ion medications:o Painkiller (aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, Naproxen)o Antacido Anti-diarrheao Vitaminso There is no guarantee that medications can be kept cold or refrigerated.

" Contact lenses and supplies" Denture needs" Sunglasses" Insect repellent w/ DEET" Lip balm" First-aid kit" Ear plugs w/ case" Sunscreen" Baby wipes or the adult version - Bath-size wipes are available hi the camping section of

sporting goods stores and are a must in areas without water." Identification, including ID with photo" Cash ($100 in tens and $20 spare tucked somewhere else) and various change

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" Flashlight w/ batteries" Hard hat - required with some teams" Safety glasses - required with some teams" Dust filter mask (fit-tested N-95 filter mask if working in areas with communicable diseases)" Latex-free exam gloves if working in areas with communicable diseases" Multi-purpose tool - knife, screwdriver, can-opener, etc." Pocket sewing kit" Waterproof matches" Can opener for food (if kit contains canned food) and plastic flatware" Cell phone with spare battery, charger, and automobile charger" Credit cards" Health Insurance card or information" Long-distance calling card" Entertainment - Paperback book, deck of cards, etc." Battery-powered radio and extra batteries" Sleeping bag and pillow" Sleeping bag pad or inflatable mattress" Travel alarm clock" Towel" Backpack/daypack" Maps - Road, topographic if necessary

This is not an all-encompassing list. Individual gear lists should be based on personal experiencewith activities in a prolonged primitive environment. Feel free to consult with FEMA HQ OPAto help gauge appropriate gear.

Prohibited articles:

" Weapons - If you can't take it on the plane, you don't bring it, with the exception of a multi-purpose tool, which should be packed in checked baggage.

" Controlled substances or alcoholic beverages" Destructive devices (explosives caps, tear gases, projectiles, etc.)" Explosives and flammables (heat tabs, Sterno, etc.)" White phosphorus matches" Pornographic material" Prescription drugs (restricted) - nust be in original labeled container and not loose; should

be in hygiene kit

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Annex G to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsCongressional Affairs


NRF ESF #15 Quick Summary - Congressional Affairs (CA)


" Preparing an initial action plan to support the FCO and HFOwith incident-specific guidance and objectives, at thebeginning of and during an actual or potential incident.

" Establishing contact with congressional offices representingaffected areas to provide information on the incident.

" Organizing an initial interagency congressional briefingwithin 24-72 hours of the event when possible and conductingdaily briefings thereafter.

" Arranging for incident site visits for Members of Congress

and their staff.

" Responding to congressional inquiries.

" Assisting in the development of written materials forpresentation and making congressional notifications.

" Coordinating with the local liaison officers (LNOs) on allcongressional issues.

Directed by: * Assistant External Affairs Officer (EAO) for CongressionalAffairs

1.0 PurposeThe annex provides guidance on congressional affairs activities in response to an incidentrequiring a coordinated Federal response.

2.0 Congressional Affairs Primary FunctionThe purpose of the CA component is to coordinate the exchange of information betweenDHS, FEMA, Members of Congress, their staff, and congressional committees byfostering a positive and continuous dialogue. CA will educate, build relationships, directenergies, and manage expectations throughout the response and recovery phase of theincident.

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3.1 An effective CA office requires delivering a coordinated message and an openexchange of information between the FCO, JFO, DHS, ESF #15 staff, FEMA, andregional elements.

3.2 The FEMA Director of Legislative Affairs will designate an Assistant EAO forCongressional Affairs during an incident requiring a coordinated Federalresponse.

3.3 CA will physically locate within ESF #15 spaces within the JFO. If notphysically located in the JFO, every effort should be made to move CA withinproximity of ESF #15 elements.

3.4 A coordinated interagency CA strategy will be developed with the staff from eachFederal department or agency involved. It is important to establish proceduralguidelines with congressional liaisons from other Federal agencies as soon aspossible.

3.5 IMAT CA staffing needs shall take priority over other CA disaster staffing needs.This will require close consultation with the National Cadre Manager for CA.

3.6 ESF #15 Planning and Products will support CA for materials and information.

4.0 Initial Activation and Deployment Actions

4.1 Determine staffing using the "Staffing Analysis Guidelines" and consult withNational Cadre Manager.

4.2 Make initial contact with the FCO and JFO staff.

4.3 Coordinate closely with the ESF #15 EA Officer, DHS Assistant Secretary forLegislative Affairs, Director, FEMA Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA),Disaster Response Team, and National Cadre Manager.

4.4 Assign CA staff to congressional offices.

4.5 Develop preliminary organizational chart and anticipated assigmnents.

4.6 Assign CA staff to liaise with key JFO components.

4.7 Establish protocol with Planning and Products for researching inquiries.

4.8 Anticipate staffing needs for potential increased individual assistance casework.

4.9 Anticipate need to acquire local hire staff to supplement CA operations.

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4.10 Inform the JFO logistics staff and ESF #15 Administration and Logistics Officerof specific requirements and personnel movements promptly.

4.11 Identify current and anticipated potential incident effects on normal practices(safety, transportation, communications, etc.) and plan alternate procedures asnecessary.

5.0 Congressional Affairs Incident Tasks

5.1 Establish advisory and notification procedures for the coordinated release ofresponse information to congressional, district, and Capitol Hill offices.

5.2 Determine when the OLA congressional briefing for Capitol Hill offices will takeplace, and provide supporting information if necessary.

5.3 Make initial contacts with congressional district offices as soon as possible.

5.4 Introduce Congressional Affairs Officer (CAO) as the Assistant EAO forCongressional Affairs.

5.5 Provide one point of contact, either CAO or designee, to congressional offices.

5.6 Provide initial incident information as necessary.

5.7 Confirm contact person(s) and contact phone, pager, fax, and cell numbers.

5.8 Determine district office needs and specific concerns.

5.9 Follow up with a fax/e-mail of the CAO or designee contact numbers and namesto congressional State/district offices.

6.0 Outreach and Communications Activities

6.1 Provide key external messages to congressional offices that will be communicatedto the public via congressional members and their staffs.

6.2 Use congressional office visits to identify congressional offices' concerns, needs,and emerging issues.

6.3 Update congressional State and district offices promptly by phone, e-mail, and/orfax advisories as significant information becomes available.

6.4 Maintain ongoing communications with all impacted congressional offices andpromptly respond to all congressional inquiries.

7.0 Other Congressional Affairs Incident Coordination Measures

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7.1 Support to FCO and JFOProvide the ESF #15 EA Officer and FCO summaries on the members affected(including expected level of their involvement), impact on their districts and othersignificant issues, biographical sketches of members (including their affiliation,term in office, major committee assignments, and leadership positions, andlocation of State/district offices)

7.2 Product DevelopmentIdentify emerging issues and coordinate closely with the Planning and Productsstaff

7.3 Congressional Advisory ProcessEstablish a congressional advisory and notification process within the JFO.

7.4 Interagency ContactEstablish contact with Federal department and agency personnel involved in orderto develop a coordinated interagency CA strategy. Establish proceduralguidelines with congressional liaisons fiom other Federal agencies.

7.5 Conference CallsInitiate conference calls with affected congressional offices prior to disasterlandfall (if applicable) or 24-72 hours after the event and throughout the responseoperations. Initially, the conference call should be held daily and adjusted basedon congressional needs and interests.

7.6 DocumentationDocument all significant activities and interactions with congressional districtoffices and key parties. Keep records of congressional inquiries.

7.7 Congressional Briefing MaterialsPlan for and develop a congressional briefing to be held within one week of anincident, or as soon as practical. Contents of briefing packet normally include:

7.7.1 Situation overview (1 page)7.7.2 Status of declarations7.7.3 State map of disaster area and designated counties7.7.4 Map of congressional districts (with members' names and district numbers7.7.5 Background information page(s) - disaster specific7.7.6 Talking points7.7.7 Disaster report summaries7.7.8 Maps7.7.9 Overview of response7.7.10 Other appropriate materials

7.8 Anticipate VIP visits

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7.8.1 Coordinate with the ESF #15 EA Officer and staff.7.8.2 Pre-plan likely visits.7.8.3 Use the VIP Visit Guidelines and tools to plan for VIP visits.

7.9 Long-Term RecoveryDHS and the FEMA OLA should coordinate the designation of a long-termAssistant EAO for Congressional Affairs and long-term staffing needs. Thisshould also include the transition of the incident to the long-term Assistant EAOfor Congressional Affairs and staff.

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Annex H to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsPlanning and Products


NRF ESF #15 Quick Summary - Planning and Products (PP)

Supports external affairs by: N Preparing an initial action plan and follow oncommunications plan(s) to support the FCO and JFO withincident-specific guidance and objectives before and duringan actual or potential incident

" Supports lifesaving and life-sustaining communications bycreating timely products to alert and advise the public, incoordination with State, local, territorial, and tribalcounterparts

" Through unity of effort, centrally directs and develops allmessaging from the JFO

" Developing all written external products and internalcommunications documents

" Using a broad range of resources, including the commonoperating picture (COP), to prepare timely informationproducts

" Providing inputs for the ESF #15 Daily Summary

Directed by: ] Assistant External Affairs Officer for Planning and Products

1.0 PurposeThis annex describes processes for centralized development of messaging under thePlanning and Products component.

2.0 Concept of OperationsCentral coordination and unity of effort in development of all communications strategyand materials within ESF #15 and the JFO are critical. To this end, a new ESF #15component, Planning and Products, is established to coordinate and develop allcommunications plans and materials. This central focus provides greater strategiccoordination and enhanced messaging efficiency.

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3.0 Planning and Products Operations

3.1 Staff OrganizationPlanning and Products is directed by the Assistant External Affairs Officer forPlanning and Products. It includes the following:

3.1.1 Strategy and Messaging3.1.2 Creative Services3.1.3 Liaisons

3.2 Staff CompositionAs the staff supports the communications requirements of the FCO, JFO, and allESF #15 components, the Leadership Cadre should ensure that appropriateplanners and skills are assigned. This will be critical if the nature of the incidenthas a specialized focus (e.g., law enforcement threat; impact on certain ethnic,cultural, or special needs groups; or unique teclnical and hazard requirements).The ESF #15 Director will support the EAO as necessary in obtaining thenecessary talent.

3.3 Release AuthorizationPer Annex F to this SOP, and consistent with the decentralized organization andexecution of external communications, routine release of information will beapproved by the ESF #15 EA Officer or as delegated. Significant policystatements and potentially sensitive external materials should be coordinated withthe FCO and JFO Coordination Group before release.

4.0 Strategy and MessagingThis element is the central location for development of strategic planning and messaging.Personnel with strong interagency and strategic communications experience are desiredfor this function. The staff works closely with the JFO staff: ESF #15 components;Federal departments and agencies; White House Communications; and State, local,territorial, and tribal communications counterparts. Strategy and Messaging acquiresinformation, assesses commnunications requirements within the incident response,incorporates FCO and JFO tasking, and develops and/or updates strategiccommunications plans. This element also prepares the ESF #15 Daily Summary incoordination with other Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, and private-sectorcounterparts as appropriate.

5.0 Creative ServicesCreative Services supports the critical need for timely public education in the aftermathof an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response. News advisories, press releases,and prepared materials will inform the media of the Federal response mission,responsibilities, and activities. This information will be disseminated promptly.Organization and primary focus is summarized below:

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5.1 Written MaterialsCreative services will produce all written products involving ESF #15components. In addition to external affairs materials, this includes brochures andflyers for internal communications, Community Relations, and translatedmaterials.

5.2 Graphics and Visual MaterialCreative Services will develop audio-visual presentations, briefings, briefingpackages, talking points, and report summaries as well as providing informationto the media as needed. Creative services develop graphics and visual supportaids.

5.3 Recovery TimesCreative Services oversees the creation and delivery of the Recovery Times. Aninitial edition will be developed following declarations and additional editionswill be determined by the Executive Officer in coordination with the ESF #15EAO.

5.4 Web Materials and Incident Web siteIf required, and with the approval of the Director, an incident-specific Web sitewill be established. This site will be the primary Web location for Federalresponse information. It will be linked to all Federal, State, local, territorial, andtribal counterparts.

6.0 Technical SupportVOCUS [brand name of a system] is a tool used for releasing written materials to themedia and for documenting all media contacts. It serves as the database for all mediacontact information. VOCUS is important to the establishment of a JIC. One personshould be identified to oversee all VOCUS activities and support within Planning andProducts. Key VOCUS points:

6.1 A complete hardware/software package and staff must be in place and functioningwithin the first hours of response operations at the JIC in order to upload video,digital images, and .news releases to other counterparts and/or major mediaoutlets.

6.2 VOCUS must be utilized as soon as possible after the incident to allow for near-simultaneous transmission of news releases and media advisories to regional andnational news outlets.

7.0 LiaisonsPlanning and Products will gather information from JFO staff elements and other ESFs.A daily report summarizing current and emerging issues will be created to identify trendsthat can be tracked and analyzed. Planning and Products will work closely with the JFOCoordination Group and Coordination Staff. If assigned, the ESF #15 FCO Liaison willbe a primary point of contact and coordination.

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Appendices1 Planning and Products Organizational Chart

Appendix 1 to Annex H to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsPlanning and Products Organizational Chart

Assist External Affairs OfficerPlanning/Products I

Creative Services I Strategy/Message Liaiso

Unit LeaderI Unit Leader Unit Le=

F -I I II_ _ =IResearch & Wb Recovery Grap ic Strategy/

Writing Speciablist i Times SGrpecaicst Message |Porn

Manager Specialist

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Annex I to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsDepartment of Defense

References:A. National Response FrameworkB. National Incident Management SystemC. Joint Publication 3-61, Public Affairs

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the roles and responsibilities of the public affairs function of theDepartment of Defense (DOD) in support of ESF #15. The DOD support will be executedby the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Northern Command in the ContinentalUnited States (including Alaska), by U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii and the PacificTerritories, and by U.S. Southern Command for territories in the Caribbean area. The U.S.Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Emergency Support Function 3, Public Works andEngineering are contained in Appendix 1 to this Annex. The National Guard is describedin Annex K.

2.0 Mission

2.1 Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)

2.1.1 DOD Support Agency RoleUnder Reference A, DOD would be designated a support agency providingDefense Support of Civil Authorities for all Emergency Support Functions.Requests for DOD forces are submitted through the DCO and the missionassignment process and must receive approval from the Secretary ofDefense prior to deployment.

2.2.1 Requests for DOD Public Affairs SupportThe same process described above must be used when requesting DODpublic affairs officers are needed to support a JIC or to obtain other DODpublic affairs personnel or equipment.

2.2 DOD Public Affairs OperationsGenerally, DOD will deploy public affairs officers with military units as theydeploy in support of civil authorities. Those officers and service members remainwith those units and are focused on providing tactical level public affairs support tothe respective commanders. DOD has a responsibility to maintain public trust andconfidence in the U.S. military. Therefore, DOD will actively engage the media toensure that the public fully understands the role of the U.S. military in anyoperations. DOD will coordinate these actions with other Federal agencies at theappropriate levels and integrate their efforts with a Joint Information Center if andwhen one is established.

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3.1 DSCA operations with advance noticeWhen there is advance notice, there are several preparatory actions DOD may take.Those actions include the following:

3.1.1 DCO Public Affairs SupportThis PAO will support the DCO, maintain liaison with the ESF #15 POC,assist with requests for additional public affairs assets, and help managepublic expectations of a DOD response.

3.1.2 DOD Pre-positioned Public Affairs AssetsPublic affairs officers with these units and or organizations will activelyengage the media to provide information regarding DOD preparations.

3.1.3 Primay Federal Agency (PFA) RequestThe PFA may request use of certain military installations for staging andother operations. The public affairs officers assigned to these installationswill actively engage the media to provide information regarding DODsupport to the event and the PFA.

3.1.4 Requests for DOD Public Affairs Personnel SupportWhen specifically requested and approved through the MA process, publicaffairs officers and equipment may be deployed to JICs or other ESF #15functions.

3.1.5 Rapid Response Public Affairs SupportDOD may also provide Public Affairs assets to the Lead Federal Agency(LFA) in support of their Go-Team concept.

3.2 Response to a Major IncidentFor all events requiring DOD support, DOD may take the following actions:

3.2.1 Joint Task Force (JTF) DeploymentIf a JTF is deployed, DOD will deploy a Public Affairs cell to conductactive media operations, coordinate Public Affairs operations with otherFederal agencies and the National Guard, and support DOD senior leadersand spokespersons. This cell will provide representatives to the appropriateJoint Information Center, unless that support has already been requested.The JTF Public Affairs structure will normally be led by the JTFCommander's organic Public Affairs staff and augmented as required for theincident.

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3.2.2 Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)In the event the JTF Commander is not able to provide the necessary PublicAffairs structure and staff immediately in response to a major incident, thecommander has the ability to request and deploy a JPASE.

" JPASE training teams provide a standing, rapidly deployable, turn-keyjoint public affairs capability to support various operationalrequirements.

" Each training team is a scalable Public Affairs response, ready andmission-tailored to support exercises and to deploy in support ofcombatant commands for operations and contingencies. Each JPASEresponse team is designed to be self-supporting for up to 179 days.

" JPASE is organized to provide direct support to specific combatantcommands. This aligmnent establishes a traditional and habitualrelationship.

3.2.3 Media AccessDOD will actively seek to involve the media in all DOD operations,including media embeds. The goal is to ensure that the media has maximumaccess to the event to accurately report it to the public.

3.2.4 Satellite CoordinationDOD will request uplink capabilities (DVIDS) to be positioned at all DODresponse centers of gravity. These assets will normally be requested by theDOD supporting command and may be organic DOD capabilities orcontracted as required.

3.2.5 Supplementary Staffing SupportIf properly requested and approved, DOD may provide additional publicaffairs support to the overall Federal response (additional manpower for JICoperations, public information distribution, etc.).

4.0 Coordination

4.1 Supporting Command CoordinationThe DOD supporting combatant command Public Affairs Officer and the Office ofthe Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs will regularly participate inNICCL calls.

4.2 JTF Liaison with ESF #15The deployed Joint Task Force Public Affairs Officer will maintain liaison withESF #15 and the Joint Information Center.

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4.3 DOD Public Affairs Personnel Operational ControlThe commander, U.S. Northern Cormnand, through the Director of Public Affairs,will retain operational control of all DOD public affairs personnel deployed insupport of the operation or event in the Continental United States (includingAlaska).

4.4 DOD Public Affairs Support OverseasIn the event of a terrorist attack overseas, DOD public affairs support will beprovided by the appropriate geographic combatant command as requested by thehost nation and approved by the Department of State and the Secretary of Defense.

AppendicesI U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

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Appendix I to Annex I to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsU.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

References:A. HQUSACE Operations Order 2008-05, USACE Support to the National Response Plan (All

Hazards OPORD 2008), 22 January 2008 (updated as required)B. Emergency Support Function #3 (ESF #3) Field Guide Supplement, "All Hazards Contingency

Plan," October 2007(updated as required)C. Emergency Support Function #3 (ESF #3) Field Guide & Supporting Documents, 31 Oct 02,

(updated CD 6 May 2004)D. AR 360-1, The Army Public Affairs ProgramE. AFM 3-61.1 Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and ProceduresF. AFM 46-1, Public Affairs OperationsG. AR 25-1, Army Information ManagementH. ER 360-1, Public AffairsI. USACE CPAT Standard Operating Procedures

1.0 PurposeThis appendix outlines roles and responsibilities of the public affairs function of the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers in support of the NRF and under its own authority PL 84-99.

2.0 Mission

2.1 National Response FrameworkUSACE is the primary agency for ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering.Activities within the scope of this function include conducting pre-incident andpost-incident assessments of public works and infrastructure; executing emergencycontract support for lifesaving and life-sustaining services; providing technicalassistance to include engineering expertise, construction management, andcontracting and real estate services; providing emergency repair of damaged publicinfrastructure and critical facilities; and implementing and managing the DHS/FEMA Public Assistance Program and other recovery programs.

2.2 Public Law (PL) 84-99Public Law (PL) 84-99 (33 U.S.C. 70 In) (69 Stat. 186) provides USACE with theauthority to plan for all hazards. Under this law, the Chief of Engineers, acting forthe Secretary of the Army, is authorized to undertake activities including disasterpreparedness, advance measures, emergency operations (Flood Response and PostFlood Response), rehabilitation of flood control works threatened or destroyed byflood, protection or repair of federally authorized shore protective works threatenedor damaged by a coastal storm, and provisions of emergency water due to droughtor contaminated source.

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3.1 USACE has 8 divisions with 41 districts that cover the United States and itsterritories. The Public Affairs offices in each district and division are responsiblefor coordinating mfibrmation with local, State, and regional Federal agencies. Theseoffices work with FEMA Regional External Affairs. If ESF #15 is activated, thenUSACE will provide public affairs support to the Federal JIC, the JFO, andExternal Affairs Planning and Products component.

3.2 USACE Headquarters Public Affairs Office is responsible for staffing the NationalResponse Coordination Center and National JIC as required.

3.3 USACE PAOs provide mission public affairs support to Recovery Field Offices(RFOs) and/or FEMA efforts to include publicizing ice and water, debris, power,temporary housing, demolition, logistical distribution points, Rights of Entry (ROE)signup points for Blue Roof, and other related information needed by the victincommunity and other audiences.

3.4 USACE public affairs will maintain initial release authority prior to JFOestablishment. Once FEMA public affairs operations are established, USACEPAOs will coordinate with their FEMA counterpart to determine local proceduresfor release of information. General guidance is that release authority is at thelowest level to provide accurate and timely information to citizens affected by theemergency.

4.0 Geographical Relationships

4.1 State Planning and ResponseThe following USACE Divisions have the lead for PL-84-99 State planning andresponse consistent with Civil Works boundaries and authorities: Great Lakes andOhio River Division (LRD), Mississippi Valley Division (MVD), North AtlanticDivision (NAD), Northwestern Division (NWD), Pacific Ocean Division (POD),South Atlantic Division (SAD), South Pacific Division (SPD), and SouthwesternDivision (SWD).

4.2 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act Planningand ResponseThe following Divisions have the lead for Stafford Act planning and response asindicated:

4.2.1 LRDFEMA Region I11, for the State of WVFEMA Region IV, for the States of KY and TNFEMA Region V, for the States of IN, OH, and MI

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4.2.2 MVDFEMA Region IV, for the State of MSFEMA Region V, for the States of IL, MN, and WIFEMA Region VI, for the State of LAFEMA Region VII, for the State of IA

4.2.3 NADFEMA Region I, for the States of CT, MA, ME, NH, VT, RIFEMA Region 11, for the States of NY and NJFEMA Region III, for the States of DE, PA, MD. VA, and DC

4.2.4 NWDFEMA Region VII, for the States of KS, MO, and NEFEMA Region VIII, for the States of CO, MT, ND, SD, and WYFEMA Region IX, for the States of ID, OR, and WA

4.2.5 PODFEMA Region IX, for the State of HI, territories of Guam and AmericanSamoa, the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, and Pacific governmentsauthorized assistance under provisions of the Robert T. Stafford DisasterRelief and Emergency Assistance Act (Federated States of Micronesia andRepublic of Marshall Islands).\FEMA Region X, for AK

4.2.6 SADFEMA Region II, for Puerto Rico and the Virgin IslandsFEMA Region IV, for the States of AL, FL, GA, NC, and SC

4.2.7 SPDFEMA Region IX, for the States of AZ, CA, and NVFEMA Region VI, for the State of NMFEMA Region VIII, for the State of UT

4.2.8 SWDFEMA Region VI, for the States of AR, OK, TX

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USACE Civil Engineer Divisions and Districts

Other CommandsEngineer Research and Development CenterHuntsville Engineer Support CenterTransatlantic Programs Center249th Engineer Battalion

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Annex J to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsFederal Law Enforcement


1.0 PurposeThis annex provides a framework for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and itscomponents working with other Federal agencies to inform the public of the lawenforcement efforts in response to an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response.This annex outlines the roles and responsibilities of the public affairs function of DOJ incoordination with its components: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA); U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); Bureau of Prisons (BOP); the U.S. Attorneysoffices; and other DOJ components as appropriate.

2.0 Operating Concepts

2.1 If an incident is deemed to be terrorist-related, the FBI is the lead DOJ componenthandling the investigation.

2.2 Coordination of all DOJ components is crucial. As soon as an incident occurs,DOJ's Office of Public Affairs will initiate a conference call with public affairsrepresentatives at the FBI, ATF, DEA, USMS, BOP, and other DOJ components asappropriate, to discuss the incident and coordinate press strategy.

2.3 In the event of ESF #15 activation, an FBI and/or ATF public affairs officer will bedesignated as an ESF #15 EA Officer.

3.0 Communication ProtocolsThis annex will be used in addition to the existing conununications processes alreadyestablished, which include:

3.1 Communications strategy developed and coordinated with White HouseCommunications and the DHS.

3.2 Participation in the NICCL and SICCL.

3.3 DOJ's Office of Public Affairs will initiate a conference call with public affairsrepresentatives at the FBI, ATF, and other DOJ components as appropriate beforeeach NICCL call in order to discuss law enforcement operations and coordinate lawenforcement messages.

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3.4 Coordination with other government agencies as appropriate, including NationalTransportation Safety Board (NTSB), Department of Health and Human Services(HHS), and the Director of National intelligence.

3.5 Activation of a NJIC.

4.0 ObjectivesDuring a terrorist-related incident, DOJ will:

4.1 Coordinate with its components, Federal Government agencies, and State and locallaw enforcement as appropriate to inform the public and the media of lawenforcement and investigative efforts.

4.2 Provide information that will help ensure the public's safety.

4.3 Ensure that information disseminated is accurate and provided in a timely manner.

5.0 PoliciesThe DOJ Office of Public Affairs (OPA) coordinating with its component public affairsoffices leads public affairs efforts for law enforcement.

5.1 The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI will participate in any lawenforcement announcement. Depending on the nature of the incident, other DOJcomponents may participate in a law enforcement announcement.

5.2 Any written or oral statement regarding law enforcement will be approved by DOJOPA in consultation with FBI and other appropriate DOJ components.

5.3 No statement should be made that could possibly compromise DOJ's investigationof the incident or any future prosecution.

5.4 The Department of Justice is the only authorized agency to declare an incident an"act of terrorism" and will be the first agency to confirm whether or not an incidenthas occurred as a result of terrorism. No other agency may confirm publicly that anincident is the result of "terrorism" or involves "terrorists" without DOJ consent.

5.5 Statements to the public and media may address the following:

5.5.1 Law enforcement and investigative efforts5.5.2 Federal, State, and local coordination5.5.3 Public safety5.5.4 Legal issues5.5.5 The need for public and media assistance to help track down those

responsible for the crime through tip lines, photos, and other means

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6.0 Message/Themes:

6.1 The DOJ is using all available law enforcement resources working with all[international] Federal, State, and local enforcement agencies in order to track downand hold accountable those responsible for the incident.

6.2 Law enforcement is organized and focused on these efforts. Our mission is clear -we are united in our efforts across [international] Federal, State, and local lines tobring those responsible for this incident to justice.

6.3 We are steadfast and resolute in our resolve to prevent further incidents against theUnited States.

6.4 We ask the American people to remain vigilant and report any suspicious activity tothe FBI [or the DOJ component with primary jurisdiction].

6.5 We will continue to keep the public informed of our law enforcement efforts.

7.0 Message Development

7.1 The DOJ is the lead on law enforcement messages. Any mention of a lawenforcement activity by any Federal agency official, in any press release orstatement by any Federal agency, must be approved by the DOJ Public AffairsOffice.

7.2 The DOJ Public Affairs Office will coordinate with its components and approveany message about law enforcement or investigative efforts.

7.3 Federal, State, and local law enforcement must work together to ensure that lawenforcement messages are coordinated, accurate, and presented to the media and thepublic in a timely manner.

7.4 Correct misinformation promptly.

8.0 Message DisseminationThe DOJ will utilize a variety of ways to provide critical law enforcement information in atimely manner to the media, public, government, and non-government agencies.

8.1 The DOJ's Office of Public Affairs will provide critical law enforcementinformation to the media and public in a timely manner through various means:

8.1.1 Conduct news conferences with the media (with agency and/or appropriatelaw enforcement officials). Press conference location sites may includeMain DOJ, FBI Headquarters, DHS NJIC.

8.1.2 Conduct conference calls with the media.

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8.1.3 Issue press releases, press statements, fact sheets.

8.1.4 Issue media advisories.

8.1.5 Organize and participate in media briefings (on the record and onbackground).

8.1.6 Organize and participate in television and radio interviews.

8.1.7 Provide information .on the DOJ Web site as well as other DOJ components'Web sites as appropriate.

8.1.8 Send e-mail alerts to subscribers/e-mail lists.

8.1.9 Provide updates to community partners through conference calls.

8.1.10 Provide photos of fugitives (for law enforcement purposes).

8.1.11 Conduct telephone calls and e-mail information to a list of DOJ beatreporters (which includes national and international media outlets: newswires, newspapers, television, magazines, Internet).

8.2 The DOJ's Office of Public Affairs will coordinate law enforcement messages withits various components' public affairs offices that will then provide information totheir staff. For example, DOJ OPA will coordinate with the FBI and ATF PublicAffairs Offices who will then communicate the law enforcement message to theirSpecial Agents in Charge (SACs) across the country.

8.2.1 Provide Qs & As, talking points, public affairs guidance, and otherinformation (and resources) to field office media coordinators (U.S.Attorneys offices, FBI, and ATF SACs) in order to ensure law enforcementmessage is accurate and coordinated.

8.2.2 DOJ and its components will draft talking points and speeches for seniorofficials.

8.3 The DOJ's Office of lntergovernmental and Public Liaison will provide informationto State and local govermnent and non-government agencies.

8.4 The DOJ's Executive Office for United States Attorneys will coordinateinformation to the 94 United States Attorneys offices around the country.

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9.0 Office of Public Affairs Incident Communications Plan

9.1 In the event of an incident, the Department of Justice's Office of Public Affairs(DOJ OPA) will coordinate its operations with its components. DOJ OPA. willrelocate and conduct operations with the FBI's Office of Public Affairs withrepresentatives from ATF and DOJ's other components. The offices will conductoperations and have representatives in several locations, which may include theFBI's Special Incident Operations Center (SIOC), the Department's CommandCenter, the DHS NJIC, and other undisclosed locations.

9.2 OPA's Crisis Management Team, which includes the Director, Deputy Directors,senior Public Affairs Specialists, and Press Assistants, will report to variouslocations to perform its public affairs responsibilities. DOJ's OPA staff will workin shifts to ensure that during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response,OPA's areas of responsibilities will be addressed 24 hours a day as necessary. TheOPA Director, Deputy Directors, and senior Public Affairs Specialists will provideinformation to the media and answer press inquiries. OPA staff responsibilitiesinclude the following:

9.2.1 Director or designee (Deputy Director) responsible for overall lawenforcement message, answers press inquiries and provides information tothe media. Director or designee also accompanies the Attorney General to arelocation site.

9.2.2 Deputy Directors/Public Affairs Specialists coordinate efforts with the WhiteHouse, DHS, and other Federal agencies. These representatives willparticipate in the NMCCL and the NJIC. They will answer media inquiriesand coordinate OPA staff directives.

9.2.3 Speechwriters and Public Affairs Specialists will draft press releases,statements, and law enforcement messages. Public Affairs Specialists willprovide information to the media and answer press inquiries.

9.2.4 Public Affairs Specialists will provide information and coordinate with U.S.Attorneys Offices and DOJ components.

9.2.5 Designated Public Affairs Specialists will participate in a Federal agencydeployment team as appropriate.

9.2.6 Press Assistants will disseminate press releases, media advisories, and otherpublic statements and logistical information to the media by telephone,e-mail, and fax. Press Assistants will also post press releases and pressstatements to DOJ's Web site in coordination with the Department's JusticeManagement Division (JMD).

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Annex K to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsNational Guard

References:A. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5)B. National Response Framework (NRF)C. National Incident Management System (NIMS)D. NGB-PAM 360-5, NG PA GuidelinesE. Joint Pub 3-61, Public AffairsF. AR 360-1, The Anrmy Public Affairs ProgramG. AFI 35-101, Public Affairs Policies and ProceduresH. DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil SupportI. DOD Homeland Security Joint Operating ConceptJ. DOD Directive 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil AuthoritiesK. (Draft) DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept 2.0L. JP 3-12 Information Operations

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the key elements to be used by the National Guard Bureau PublicAffairs (NGB-PA) office in planning and executing a response to a contingency such as anatural disaster or a national response to incidences of significant magnitude. Elementsinclude themes/key messages, Qs & As; PA products, expected media interest, targetedinternal/external audiences, and key POCs for agencies involved in the response to thenatural disaster or incidences of significant magnitude.

2.0 BackgroundThe NGB, in cooperation with the State Adjutants General, will respond to nationalincidents and natural disasters in accordance with the NRF and the roles andresponsibilities outlined in the Homeland Defense/Defense Support of Civil Authoritiesdirectives (DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support; DOD HomelandSecurity Joint Operating Concept; DOD Directive 3025.dd, Defense Support of CivilAuthorities; and (Draft) DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint OperatingConcept 2.0). In all instances, NGB will cooperate and coordinate responses with theStates involved, USNORTHCOM, Department of Defense, and other Federal agencies, asrequired.

3.0 Public Affairs Posture (PAP)Public Affairs approach to the contingency will depend on the nature of the crisis. In alllikelihood, the response will be active in coordination with the lead agency (State EOC,DHS, FEMA, or NORTHCOM). The following guidance should be included in thePublic Affairs posture statement:

3.1 Personnel and units identified for deploymentWill actively engage the media to explain their role and support; however, anycomments regarding a specific disaster situation will be referred to the primarylead agency (State EOC, DHS, FEMA, or NORTHCOM).

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3.2 Units should deploy with a Public Affairs officerUnits are encouraged to embed media and place media on military flightssupporting the operation. Advise NGB-PA of all embeds as soon as possible.

3.3 Units that deployConduct PA activities in support of this operation and forward a sitrep of PAactivities to NGB-PA daily. Send sitreps to NGB-PAP via e-mail.

4.0 Themes and MessagesThemes and key messages should include emphasis on the role of the National Guard as afirst military responder to natural disasters and incidents requiring a coordinated Federalresponse. Use key messages to emphasize the roles and responsibilities of NGB and theJoint Force Headquarters (JFHQ)-States as related to Homeland Defense and DefenseSupport to Civil Authorities. The following paragraph provides an example of anoverarching message delineating the roles and responsibilities of HQ NGB and JFHQ-States in responding to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response.

4.1 Overarching Message(QUOTE) The National Guard has been defending the homeland since thefounding of our nation. We are frequently requested to support civil authorities,and we always answer the call. The Guard is uniquely suited like no other entityin the Defense Department. No other organization has our combination of size,skills, training and experience, dispersion across the nation, command andcommunications infrastructure, and the legal flexibility to support civil authoritiesat a moment's notice. (UNQUOTE)

4.2 Other Key Messages

4.2.1 The National Guard is most often the first military organization calledupon to respond to natural disasters and incidents requiring a coordinatedFederal response. As a result, the National Guard has developed enhancedcapabilities and diversified readiness that will save Americanlives--"Always ready, always there..."

4.2.2 The National Guard's expanded coverage, proximity, agility, andefficiency ensure that we are critical to America's homeland defense,continuing our tradition since the founding of our nation--"When you callout the Guard you call out America."

4.2.3 NG roles and responsibilities in Civil Support means the State NG isunder the command and control of the State governors and AdjutantsGeneral until such time the President federalizes these Soldiers andAirrnen--"Neighbors helping neighbors..."

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4.2.4 In cases involving terrorism, the following bullet should be used: We areready, willing and able to deter, defend against, and defeat terroristactivities.

5.0 Media InterestExpect natural disasters and incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response togenerate 24-hour media coverage.

5.1 External (national, regional, local media outlets): High5.2 Internal (internal news services, comnand publications, NG Web sites): High5.3 Congressional: High5.4 Civic Leaders: Moderate to High (depending on the proximity of the

incident)

6.0 Targeted Media OutletsAll Public Affairs Officers will target national, regional, and local media outlets in orderto convey NGB messages to internal/external audiences.

7.0 Public Affairs Products

7.1 Daily Update/Talking Points7.2 Internal/External News Releases7.3 Media Embed Rosters7.4 PA Volunteer Deployment Rosters7.5 PA Deployment Assets Rosters7.6 Media Interview Report (24 hrs past/24-48-72 hrs future)7.7 Web Pages/Links7.8 Internal Publication Special Issue - Focused on Issue/Incident

8.0 ResponsibilitiesPublic affairs practitioners are responsible for communicating information regarding theNational Guard response, recovery and mitigation actions, as well as dissemination ofemergency information to the media and general public during a contingency or crisisoperation. The PAO coordinates public affairs activities/programs in assigned area andadvises leadership on public affairs implications of National Guard policies anddecisions, which includes recommending actions to correct misperceptions and toenhance public understanding. The PAO ensures that all information and materialsaccurately reflect the policies, views, and program initiatives of the National Guard.

8.1 NGB-PAProvides public affairs advice and support to the Chief, NGB, and the States.Liaison with State and Federal agencies, Northern Command, Army, Air Force,and DOD. Deploys the National Guard Public Affairs Rapid Response Team(PARRT). Provides policy and public affairs guidance. NGB-PA managesembedding in support of the National Guard.

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8.2 State National Guard PAOProvides public affairs advice and support to the State adjutant general. Publicaffairs liaison with State agencies and the National Guard Bureau. Responsiblefor all National Guard support to incidents and events in their State/territory.Publishes daily talking points. Provides guidance, direction, and contactinformation to supporting PAOs. The State PAO will assess locations, spaceassets, and resources for the establishment of the JIC.

8.3 Supporting PAOReports to the State PAO, as assigned. Provides public affairs support to the StatePAO. Embeds media when authorized to do so.

8.4 Unit Public Affairs Representative (UPAR)Reports to the unit PAO and the State PAO. UPARs provide internal publicaffairs support and do not engage the media, the general public, or other externalaudience beyond the scope of their assigned duties.

9.0 Interagency/Intergovernmental Relationships

10.0 Questions and AnswersThe plan includes anticipated questions and answers about the natural disaster or nationalincident of significant magnitude. The following Qs & As are examples of the types ofquestions that should be included in the Qs & As section of the plan. If the PA posturefor the incident is passive, the Qs & As should only be used in response to a query.Don't avoid the "hard questions" when developing Qs & As.

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QI: How many National Guard Soldiers and Airmen are on (State, Title 32 or

Title 10) active duty? How many have been placed on alert?

Al:

Q2: How many States are providing National Guard personnel/assets and what

types of assets have been deployed or requested to deploy?

A2:

Q3: What capabilities have been deployed in response to the incident?

Firefighters? Medical teams? Vehicles? Air assets? WMD-CST? CERFP?

A3:

Q4: What other NG/DOD assets/installations/capabilities have been tasked to

provide support?

A4:

05: Will National Guard members be working for the Governor (SAD or Title 32)

or the President (Title 10)?

A5:

Q6: Has this incident been declared a Special Event Homeland Security Level

One?

A6:

Q7: Who is the lead agency for responding to the incident? Who is the

supported military command in response to this incident?

AT:

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Q8: Who is the JTF commander? Does he have dual status?

A8:

For a terrorist incident:

Q9: Were you previously aware of any communicated threats against the United

States, its installations, or national assets?

A9:

Add additional Qs&As as appropriate.

11.0 Points of ContactNGB, DOD, NORTHCOM, DHS, FEMA, State Adjutant General offices.

12.0 After-Action Report (AAR)National Guard PAOs in the State(s) involved or who deployed in support of theincident/operation should provide an after-action report no later than seven days uponconclusion of PA activities or as determined by NGB-PA. Send AARs to NGB-PAP.

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Annex L to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsPublic Health

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. National Incident Management System (NIMS)

1.0 PurposeThe Public Health annex to ESF #15 - External Affairs provides a framework for theU.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its agencies, working withother relevant Federal agencies, to educate and inform the public, health careprofessionals, policy makers, partner organizations, and-the media in a timely, accurate,and coordinated way during the response phase of an incident requiring a coordinatedFederal response. This annex outlines the roles and responsibilities of the public affairsfunction of the HHS and its agencies in support of ESF #15.

2.0 BackgroundUnder the NRF, HHS is the primary Federal agency for coordination of ESF #8 - PublicHealth and Medical Services. Given the unique requirements for the external affairsresponse during a national public health emergency, HHS and DHS, as the respectiveleads for ESF #8 and ESF #15, will team together to jointly coordinate and disseminatecritical public health information and guidance.

3.0 ObjectivesDuring an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, HHS will:

3.1 Coordinate public health and medical messages across the Federal Government toensure accuracy and consistency.

3.2 Coordinate communications activities with State and local communications staff,including regional or local communications centers as appropriate.

3.3 Promptly respond to rumors and inaccurate information to minimize concern,social disruption, and stigmatization.

3.4 Coordinate international information exchange and communication strategies.

4.0 Planning Assumptions

4.1 Operational Communications Assumptions

4.1.1 The HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (OASPA),along with all relevant HHS agencies and offices, will lead the overallFederal public health communications response under ESF # 15.

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4.1.2 The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department ofHomeland Security, will lead communications for non-health effects of anincident (e.g., transportation, commerce, economy, education).

4.1.3 White House Communications will guide overall communications strategyand policy for the U.S. Goverr-nent.

4.1.4 Access to communication channels and business destinations may behindered, so OASPA staff may need to work remotely.

4.1.5 Traditional communications channels (e.g., telephone, e-mail, Internet)may be unavailable or inaccessible, which will create difficulties forinternal communications internally within departments/agencies andacross the USG, resulting in delays or barriers to the timely release ofinformation to the public.

4.2 Strategic Communications Assumptions

4.2.1 The news media will be the first to publicly announce a potential publichealth emergency.

4.2.2 The public affected by the incident will need to be informed quickly aboutthe measures they can take to protect their health and the health of theirfamilies.

4.2.3 There will be incomplete information, misinformation, rumors, andmisconceptions among the public.

4.2.4 There will be an insatiable demand for information from the public andfrom domestic and international media.

4.2.5 There will be overwhelming public pressure on government to providefacts quickly.

5.0 ControlA public health emergency may be locally confined or may have a non-specificgeographic focus, which may require a very comprehensive and inclusivecommunications strategy. This plan recognizes that many players, especially non-governmental, have and will play a key role in communicating preparedness andlifesaving information on a rapid and mass scale. The principal elements ofcommunications control and key leadership team include:

5.1 Strategic CommunicationsWhite House will direct strategic communications activities and efforts.

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5.2 Medical and Public Health CommunicationsHHS will coordinate and direct all medical and public health communicationsactivities, with support to VA and DOD.

5.3 Incident CommunicationsDHS will coordinate and, with HHS, direct appropriate elements of the Federalincident communications activities.

6.0 CoordinationOASPA is the central authority within HHS that will manage and coordinate the publichealth communications response to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response.OASPA will work closely with its Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and itsother key emergency response agencies. Although certain functions may be delegated toAgency assets at the discretion of OASPA, primary key coordination resources will be:

6.1 OASPA EOCWhen the Plan is activated, OASPA will operate out of its EOC with thecapability of originating or accessing video feeds; coordinating news conferenceswith studio/broadcast staff on the first floor; posting mass electronic mailings;responding to media calls; clearing and vetting messages of HHS OPDIV staffmembers, personnel of other Federal agencies, and State and local personnel.Primary methods of coordination include e-mail, virtual status boards, and theHHS Public Affairs Conference Line. CDC and DHS will each assign an agencypublic affairs staff member as a liaison in the ECC.

6.2 OASPA Public Affairs Conference LineCentral to the OASPA coordinating effort will be a conference line to allowtelephone connectivity for public affairs staff throughout the Department. Thisconference line will allow HHS public affairs personnel to work from dispersedsites during the crisis yet be able to receive guidance or direction or to provideinformation to those needhig it.

6.3 NICCLThe DHS NICCL will be used for transmission and exchange of critical andtimely [e.g., "breaking"] incident information among Federal authorities. DHSwill turn over control of the NICCL to HHS, when needed, to coordinatecommunications information.

6.4 ESF #15 - External AffairsOASPA will support the activation and management of ESF #15 - ExternalAffairs, which will be under the leadership of the DHS Office of Public Affairs.This function could involve a Washington, D.C. area and/or deployed site(s) tosupport a JFO(s) in other U.S. States, the District of Columbia, or insular areas.

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6.5 HHS Secretary's Operations Center (SOC)SOC serves as HHS's official notification point for operational/non-media aspectsof an impending or actual disaster or emergency. The SOC is staffed 24 hours aday, 7 days a week. This facility maintains a 24-hour capability to monitor allsources of warning/disaster information, including other Federal agencies, DHSregions, and the news media. The SOC reports disaster events to DHS keyofficials, DHS regions, and NRF signatory agencies. An OASPA staff memberoccupies a seat in the SOC during emergencies and serves as POC and liaison tothe OASPA headquarters office.

6.6 IlHS Incident Response Coordination Team (IRCT)HHS may deploy an IRCT to the field within hours following the identification ofa public health emergency to establish situational awareness on the ground and toassess the short-term and potential long-term requirements for the HHS response.The IRCT leader is identified as the Senior Health Official (SHO) for the Federalresponse. A senior OASPA staff member will typically deploy with the IRCT andwill serve as the senior public affairs advisor to the SILO and their IRCT staff, andwill represent OASPA in the field, reporting back to OASPA HQ for finalapproval and clearance of public affairs activities.

7.0 Communication

7.1 SpokespersonsHHS will provide two types of spokespersons, depending on the informationneed-public affairs officers and tectmical/subject-matter experts. When aninformation request is received, the HHS Public Affairs Office will assess therequest and detennine the kind of spokesperson who is needed to address theissues or provide the information. The information request will then be forwardedto the most appropriate available spokesperson.

7.2 Public Affairs OfficersThe Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs will act as the lead departmental publicaffairs officer. OASPA staff will act as the clearinghouse for informationrequests, triaging them as to priority and directing them to the properspokesperson for a timely response. OASPA will track the number and type ofrequests and the follow-up responses. This information will be used to compilelists of frequently asked questions and to develop consistent communicationmessages that can be provided to HHS's partners as appropriate.

7.3 Technical/Subject-Matter Experts (SME)ttHS's technical/subject-matter experts comprise the Secretary of HHS, seniorDepartmental and Agency officials, and the broad array of very specific subject-matter experts throughout the Department. These individuals will provideresponses for information requests that cannot be addressed by the HHS PublicAffairs Officers or are requested for official media interviews by OASPA.

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7.4 HHS LeadershipIndividuals serving in the following senior HHS leadership positions have beenidentified as primary spokespeople and/or subject-matter experts for public healthemergencies. This list wiii be supplemented by additional staff-level subject-matter experts rclevant to the specific nature of the emergency.

7.4.1 Secretary7.4.2 Deputy Secretary7.4.3 Assistant Secretary for Health7.4.4 Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response7.4.5 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response7.4.6 HHS Science Advisor7.4.7 Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention7.4.8 Director, National Institutes of Health7.4.9 Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National

Institutes of Health7.4.10 Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration7.4.11 Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs7.4.12 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs/Media7.4.13 Director, HHS News Division7.4.14 Director of Media Affairs (regional media)

8.0 Core Communication Functions

8.1 Leadership TeamLed by the HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Coordinates overallpublic affairs response effort. Liaison with Secretary, CDC Director, NIHDirector, Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) Director,FDA Commissioner, and other principals.

8.2 Media/Message TeamCoordinates the handling of media inquiries, including coordinating requests anddelivering on requests. Coordinates the development of unified talking points onissues that would be used by principals and communications staff in speaking tothe media or in other public venues.

8.3 Materials Development and Writing TeamThis team is charged with developing, writing, obtaining clearance, and producingany documents necessary in sharing information during an emergency. Thiscovers press releases, background papers, fact sheets, question-and-answerdocuments, and secretarial speeches. This team also maintains documents toensure they are up-to-date.

8.4 Web TeamOversee the posting of public affairs materials on www.hhs.gov in a promptmanner. Assess how the Web can be best utilized to get messages and

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information out about the crisis at hand.

8.5 Outreach TeamOversee the outreach of communication materials and information to HHS partnerorganizations as well as interested organizations. This will include outreach toother governments, the private sector, not-for-profit organizations, minoritygroups, and other targeted organizations affected by the crisis.

8.6 Studio/Broadcast TeamPrimary duty is to make sure the studio and auditorium are ready to go quickly,effectively, and professionally in an emergency. This includes quickly callednews conferences; the need to tape messages on short notice; and the ability tolink CDC into the auditorium. Sets up communications for any teleconferences.Document via video and still photography the activities of the Secretary and keycomponents of HHS response during crisis.

8.7 GO TeamThis team will leave the premises of OASPA and serve as its eyes, ears, andhands in the field or as part of other emergency response functions within HHS.The lead OASPA staff member deployed will serve as the public affairs advisor tothe Senior Health Official assigned to lead the H14S Incident ResponseCoordination Team deployed to the field.

8.8 Support TeamThis team is charged with essential administrative and technical support forEmergency Response Teams.

9.0 Message Development

9.1 Federal, State, and local communicators must ensure that messaging reflects bothunknown issues as well as facts as they become acknowledged. In a public healthemergency, many issues will fall within the unknown category, and to this end,communicators should be careful not to over-reassure and should note thatuncertainty remains. Extensive risk communications research data shows thattelling the public the truth about a difficult situation or unknown factors actuallystrengthens the public's trust in an organization and enhances its publiccredibility, especially if further uncertainty or bad news is expected. To this end,transparency in the actions and words of authorities is absolutely critical to publicconfidence and national cohesion.

9.2 HHS will utilize existing standardized communication messages, educationalmaterials, and fact sheets to the maximum extent possible for carrying out itspublic health communication activities. In particular, HHS will rely on audience-tested messages developed for use in communicating in the first hours of a crisis.These messages are available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/firsthours.

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10.0 Message DisseminationHHS will utilize a variety of channels for distribution of public health information andmessages during a public health emergency, including the Web, new media (e.g., RSS,podcasts), satellite broadcast, public meetings, press briefings and releases, and massmedia channels. Infonnation will also be available through secured communicationnetworks such as the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS), HealthAlert Network (HAN), and the Epidemic Information Exchange (EPI-X) for health-related agencies. A more detailed list of potential channels is shown below:

10.1 Mass Media10.1.1 Nationally broadcast public service announcements (PSAs)10.1.2 Live-read radio PSAs on commercial stations and networks10.1.3 Official USG Web sites, including xv~kw.hhs.gov, www.cdc.gov, etc.10.1.4 National news and wire service releases10.1.5 Mainstream media medical reporters10.1.6 Multi-language media10.1.7 Cell phone and telecommunications provider supports10.1.8 Educational Channel 110.1.9 Emergency Alert System (EAS)

10.2 Governmental, Non-Governmental Agencies, and Private Sector10.2.1 National Publ ic Health Information Coalition (NPHIC)10.2.2 Association of State and Territorial Health Organizations (ASTHO)10.2.3 National Association of City and County Health Officials (NACCHO)10.2.4 HRSA Commuunity Health Centers10.2.5 SAMHSA Grantee network10.2.6 American Red Cross Chapter Network (860 nationwide chapters)10.2.7 Newspaper editorial roundtable10.2.8 U.S. Postal Service emergency mailing and distribution10.2.9 Clinicians and medical experts10.2.10 National Aging Services Network10.2.11 Reverse 91110.2.12 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather

radio broadcasts

10.3 Corporate Intranet sites

10.4 Special Communications and Non-Traditional Methods10.4.1 "Highway alert" boards with referring information10.4.2 CDC EPI-X and HAN systems10.4.3 Professional medical associations and organizations10.4.4 State emergency health alert systems10.4.5 First responder and cable television outlets10.4.6 Faith-based and community organizations10.4.7 Schools10.4.8 Home and community based long-term care organizations

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Annex M to Emeraency Support Function #15 External AffairsEnviron mental

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. NRF ESF #10 and ESF #15C. National Contingency PlanD. National Incident Management System (NIMS)E. EPA's National Approach to ResponseF. EPA Memorandum on "Incorporating Environmental Justice Considerations into EPA

Disaster and Response Procedures," dated Nov. 2, 2006

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the roles and responsibilities of the public affairs function of the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in support of ESF # 15. EPA support will becoordinated by the headquarters Office of Public Affairs and the ten regional offices ofPublic Affairs as outlined in the EPA's National Approach to Response CrisisCommunications Plan.

2.0 Guiding Principles

2.1 Use the Web to share data and information with the media and the public in atimely manner;

2.2 ComTmnunicate all data and information in a simple, easily understandable format;

2.3 Work with partner agencies at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels, as well asprivate sector and non-governmental organizations, to develop and communicatekey environmental and public health information to the public; and

2.4 Ensure that these messages are conveyed to the media and the public quickly andconsistently; and as required by the incident, ensure all information disseminationis coordinated with the DHS ESF #15 EAO and the DHS JIC.

3.0 Mission

3.1 EPA Support of the Inter-Agency Federal Public Affairs EffortEPA is a support agency for many Emergency Support Functions under theNational Response Framework. EPA will support the inter-agency public affairseffort, including JIC. staffing, to ensure coordination with DHS and otheragencies' communications and outreach efforts. Public affairs personnel may bedeployed from EPA headquarters, the affected region(s), or other regions. (SeeAppendix 1 for a map showing the EPA's regional organization.)

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3.2 ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials

3.2.1 Incidents in Inland ZonesEPA is the lead agency for ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous MaterialsResponse Annex for incidents in inland zones. Inland zones are theenvironment inland of the coast zones excluding the Great Lakes andspecified ports and harbors along inland rivers. ESF #10 provides theappropriate response and recovery actions to prepare for, prevent,minimize, or mitigate a threat to public health, welfare, or the environmentcaused by actual or potential oil and hazardous materials incidents.

3.2.2 Incidents in Coastal ZonesThe U.S. Coast Guard is the lead agency for ESF #10 incidents in coastalzones. For incidents affecting both inland and coastal zones, EPA is thelead agency and DHS/USCG serve as the deputy.

3.1.3 Lead Agency ResponsibilitiesWhen EPA is the lead agency for ESF #10, EPA public affairs willcoordinate with and support the ESF #15 function in establishing andstaffing a JIC, including private sector representation, when appropriate.EPA has the dual responsibilities of protecting human health and theenvironment. The agency public affairs effort at the on-scene, regional,and headquarters levels will pursue active media relations and publicinformation programs during all incidents to quickly and accuratelyprovide the media and the public with accurate and timely informationabout the extent of and risk from the incident.


4.1 EPA Public Affairs Deliberate Planning OperationsIn those instances where there is advance warning of an impending incident, EPAthrough its headquarters and regional public affairs offices will support the inter-agency effort under ESF #15 by providing the media and the public withinformation on EPA's preparations for responding to the event. EPA will deploypublic affairs personnel to the JIC(s) or other ESF #15 functions in advance of anincident when requested by the ESF #15 EAO.

4.2 Response to a Major Incident

4.2.1 EPA will staff the public information officer positions in its headquartersEmergency Operations Center and regional EOC(s), as well as continue tosupport the JIC(s) for the duration of the incident.

4.2.2 EPA will make every effort to give the media access to agency incidentoperations so that they can report them fully and accurately to the public.

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4.2.3 EPA will issue press releases and other materials to inform the media andthe public of the health and environmental consequences of the incident.

4.2.4 In coordination with the affected region(s), EPA headquarters publicaffairs will develop and maintain one Web site to keep the public informedwith up-to-date information and data on the incident.

5.0 Coordination

5.1 EPA Personnel Operational ControlThe Associate Administrator for Public Affairs and/or the Regional Public AffairsDirector(s) will coordinate the deployment of EPA public affairs personnel duringan incident and the timing, methods, and content of agency information releases.The Associate Administrator for Public Affairs is the final approval authority forthe release of incident data-related materials and information.

5.2 National Incident Communications Coordination LineThe EPA headquarters Office of Public Affairs will represent the agency onNICCL calls during incidents and will maintain liaison with the ESF #15 functionat DHS Public Affairs.

Appendix 1 - EPA Regional Organization

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Annex N to Emereencv Support Function #15 External AffairsRadiological

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. National Incident Management System (NIMS)C. DOD 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Manual D

1.0 PurposeThe annex details radiological incident communications strategy, actions, andcoordination in conjunction with a domestic radiological accident or an act of nuclearterrorism in order to ensure coordination and execution of a unified public outreacheffort.

2.0 Background

2.1 DIIS is the coordinating agency for the overall Federal Government response toradiological incidents in accordance with HSPD 5 and the NRF. For radiologicalincidents of lesser severity (those incidents that do not reach the level of anincident requiring a coordinated Federal response), the agency with jurisdictionalauthority will serve as the coordinating agency for the Federal response.

2.2 Radiological IncidentsIncidents involving radioactive materials may vary in nature. The incident sourcewill dictate which Federal department or agency is the lead coordinator. Forexample, the NRC is the coordinating agency for incidents involving commercialnuclear facilities licensed by the NRC. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) isthe coordinating agency for incidents at weapons production nuclear facilities andincidents involving the transportation of radioactive materials shipped by or forthe DOE. The DOD is the coordinating agency for nuclear weapons undermilitary custody, and the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) isthe coordinating agency for the launch of radioactive materials. (See Table 1)

NRF ESF #15 Quick Summary - Nuclear/Radiological Facilities or Materials Involvedin Incidents I

Type of Incident Coordinating AgencyNuclear facilities:1. Owned or operated by DOD or DOE 1. DOD or DOE2. Licensed by NRC or Agreement State 2. NRC3. Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an 3. EPA

Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed facilities forwhich the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwiseunable to respond

Radioactive materials being transported:1. Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE 1. DOD or DOE2. Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-liccnscd materials 2. NRC

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3. Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are 3. DHSIUSCGnot licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State 4. EPA

4. All othersRadioactive materials in space vehicles impacting within the U.S.:1. Managed by NASA or DOD I. NASA or DOD2. Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the 2. DHS/USCG

coastal zone 3. EPA3. All othersForeign, unknown, or unlicensed material:1. Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive 1. DHS/USCG

material in certain areas of the coastal zone 2. EPA2. All othersNuclear weapons DOD or DOE (based on

custody/time of event)All deliberate attacks involving nuclear/radiological facilities or DHSmaterials, including Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) orImprovised Nuclear Devices (IND)

Table 1

3.0 Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)A dirty bomb is one type of RDD that uses a conventional explosion to disperseradioactive material over a targeted area. RDDs could also include other means ofdispersal such as placing a container of radioactive material in a public place or using anairplane to disperse powdered or aerosolized forms of radioactive material.

4.0 Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)An [ND is a crude nuclear device built from the components of a stolen weapon or fiomscratch using nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium). Unlike a dirtybomb, which disperses radioactive material using conventional explosives, a nuclearattack is the use of a device that produces a nuclear explosion. A nuclear bomb createsan explosion that is thousands to millions of times more powerful than any conventionalexplosive that might be used in a dirty bomb. The resulting mushroom cloud (or plume)from a nuclear bomb contains fine particles of radioactive dust that can blanket largeareas (tens to hundreds of square miles) with fallout. By contrast, most of the radioactiveparticles dispersed by a dirty bomb would likely fall to the ground within a few cityblocks or miles of the explosion.

5.0 Federal Response

5.1 Federal Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center(IMAAC)The TM.AAC is responsible for production, coordination, and dissemination ofconsequence predictions for an airborne hazardous material release. The IMAACis the sole source for Federal plume modeling (prediction of atmosphericdispersions) and their consequences for incidents requiring a coordinated Federalresponse. IMAAC results are Web based and made available to departments andagencies participating in the response and State and local EOCs.

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Lethal prompt (initial) radiation

Severe shockwave damage Severe thermal damage

Prevailing Wind

Bomb site

The immediate area of detonation of a 10 kiloton IND would result in a significant loss of life,flying debris, fires and intense radiation. The destruction from the initial effects-shockwave,thermal (heat) energy, and initial radiation-could extend to about a half a mile. Severethermal damage would extend out about a mile. Flying debris could extend up to a few miles.Initial (prompt) nuclear radiation for a I 0-KT blast could expose unprotected people withinabout 3/4 mile of the explosion site to a lethal radiation dose. Radioactive fallout occurs in anelliptical pattern in the direction the wind is blowing; lethal radiation could extend up to sixmiles.

5.2 Access to Plume MapsThe plume is a critical component to develop public releases and messages.During a radiological incident, providing guidance to the impacted population iscritical to a successful response. Emergency response personnel, including publicaffairs responders, need to understand and have access to plume maps. Both alack of information and understanding can lead to ineffective, inappropriate, oreven detrimental actions during an incident.

5.3 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)The FRMAC is an interagency organization with representatives from variousFederal, State, and local radiological response organizations. The purpose ofFRMAC is to assist the State, local, and tribal governments in their mission toprotect the health and well-being of their citizens with:

5.3.1 Verified radiation measurements5.3.2 Interpretations of radiation distributions based on EPA, FDA, or local

Protective Action Guidelines5.3.3 Characterization of overall radiological conditions

5.4 Protective Action Recommendations (PAR)State, tribal, and local governments are responsible for issuing andcommunicating protective actions to the public as they deem appropriate. DHSand the agency with jurisdictional authority support State, local, territorial, andtribal governments by developing and delivering Federal advice to State, tribal,and local governments (not directly to the public). These Federal PARs mayinclude advice and assistance on measures to avoid or reduce unnecessary

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radiation exposure to the public. This includes advice on emergency actions suchas sheltering, evacuation, and use of pharmaceutical countermeasures, such aspotassium iodide (Ki). It also includes advice on long-term measures, such asrestriction of food, temporary relocation, or permanent resettlement, to avoid orminimize exposure to residual radiation or exposure through the ingestionpathway.

6.0 Responsibilities

6.1 DHSDHS will coordinate the overall Federal incident management response fornuclear incidents. Immediate action by DHS public affairs and other Federal,State, and local authorities is necessary to communicate health and safetyinformation.

6.1.1 National Incident Coordination Conference Line (NICCL)The NICCL is the primary interagency protocol for all departments andagencies involved in the coordinated Federal response to an IND, an RDD,or other radiological incidents. DOE, National Nuclear SecurityAdministration (NNSA), DOD, FEMA, EPA, NASA, NORTHCOM, andother Federal public affairs personnel represent their agency on theNICCL to maintain liaison with the ESF #15 functions based on the natureof the radiological incident.

6.2 DOE and NNSADOE and NNSA facilitate the immediate and tbllow-on scientific support forpublic affairs as the public messaging effort is critical to saving lives by directingthe movement of people to safe areas. The National Atmospheric ReleaseAdvisory Center (NARAC), the DOE component of the IMAAC, maps the initialspread of contamination so emergency managers can decide what protectiveactions are necessary. (See Appendix 2 for more information on the NARAC.)

6.2.1 DOE and NNSA public affairs may also be involved in preparing a SeniorEnergy Official (SEO) for a press conference along with the Secretary ofHomeland Security following an IND/RDD.

6.3 DOJ/FBIUnder HSPD 5, the Attorney General, generally acting through the FBI, has leadresponsibility for crimlinal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats andfor coordinating activities of other members of the law enforcement community todetect, prevent, preempt, investigate, and disrupt terrorist attacks against theUnited States.

6.3.1 A radiological terrorist incident may affect a single location, or multiplelocations, each of which may require an incident response and a crimescene investigation simultaneously.

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6.4 Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)Established by HSPD 14, DNDO resides within DHS and reports to the Secretaryof Homeland Security. As part of the national effort to protect the nation fromradiological and nuclear threats, the national office is staffed by representativesfrom several Federal, State, and local government agencies. DHS, Office ofPublic Affairs is responsible to determine what detection information is releasedto the media.

6.5 Radiological Web Information

6.5.1 Radiation and Radiological Emergencies" Centers for Disease Control

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/index.asp" Department of Homeland Security http://www.dhs.gov/dhsptiblic" NRC http://ww-w.vnrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation/what-is.html

6.5.2 Radiation Protection and Measurement" International Conunission on Radiological Protection

http://www.icrp.org" National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements

http://www.ncrp.com

6.5.3 Health Effects of Radiation" Health Physics Society

http://hps.org/publicinformation/radfactsheets/" Radiation Effects Research Foundation http://www.rerf.or.ip

AppendicesI U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission2 Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration3 Department of Defense4 National Aeronautics and Space Administration5 EPA Office of Air and Radiation

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Appendix I to Annex N to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)


1.0 PurposeThis appendix outlines the key elements to be used by the U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission's Office of Public Affairs in response to a significant incident which mayaffect public health and safety and involves a nuclear power plant licensee or any otherfacility or organization licensed by the NRC to use radioactive material.

2.0 BackgroundIn response to a serious event involving an NRC licensee, NRC activates its IleadquartersOperations Center in Rockville, Md., and one of its four Regional Incident ResponseCenters (Region I in King of Prussia, PA; Region II in Atlanta, GA; Region III in Lisle,IL; and Region IV in Arlington, TX). NRC's highest priority is to provide expertconsultation, support, and assistance to the licensee and State and local public safetyofficials.

2.1 An Executive Team assembles in the Headquarters Operations Center to lead theresponse, obtain and evaluate event information and to assess the potential impactof the event. The Executive Team is typically headed by the NRC Chairman or aCommissioner acting as Chairman. NRC scientists and engineers analyze theevent and evaluate possible recovery strategies. Meanwhile, other agency expertsevaluate the effectiveness of protective actions recommended by the licensee,which may be implemented by State and local officials to minimize the impact onpublic health and safety and the environment.

2.2 If event conditions warrant, the NRC will dispatch a Site Team, consisting oftechnical experts and a Site Team Director, firom the Regional Office to the site.Once the Site Team is in place, authority to manage event-related activities isturned over to that team. The Site Team provides a firsthand assessment of thesituation and face-to-face communications with all participants. TheHeadquarters Operations Center provides round-the-clock logistical and technicalsupport throughout the response.

2.3 As described in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the NationalResponse Framework, the NRC is the Coordinating Agency for events occurringat NRC-licensed facilities and for radioactive materials either licensed by NRC orunder NRC's Agreement States Program. As Coordinating Agency, NRC hastechnical leadership for the Federal Government's response to the event. If theseverity of an event rises to the level of General Emergency (the highest of theNRC incident severity categories), or is terrorist-related, DHS would assumecoordination of the overall Federal response to the event, while the NRC wouldretain a technical leadership role.

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3.0 PA PostureThe NRC Office of Public Affairs is responsible for keeping the public and the mediainformed about NRC's actions during an event. OPA's approach depends on the nature ofthe crisis and the potential impact on the public. Effective communications need toprovide accurate, timely and reliable information.

3.1 It is intended that these communications should serve to:

" Convey the status of the crisis and our actions to protect people and theenvironment;

" Reduce uncertainty and dispel rumors in order to minimize counter-productivebehaviors;

" Underscore NRC professionalism and credibility; and" Reassure employees, Congress, the public and stakeholders that the situation

is being handled appropriately.

3.2 Further, OPA uses these philosophies to guide its crisis response:

" Timely, accurate information is key to maintaining public trust and reducingpossible health or safety consequences.

" Verified information must be released as quickly as possible, even if all thedetails are not yet known.

" Open and prompt information at the onset of a crisis protects theorganization's credibility and creates a positive initial image.

3.3 Erroneous information not corrected immediately can become "commonknowledge" and almost impossible to refute later. Monitoring the media andresponding rapidly to correct mistakes is vital.

3.4 The concept of "people first" should motivate communication actions, includingexpressing concern for any victims or potential victims of the crisis.

3.5 Incident information must be in simple language and can and should be repetitiveas people under stress are not processing information as well as under normalcircumstances. Repeating consistent messages and using multiple media (i.e.print, television, radio and the Web), helps ensure the messages are heard andunderstood.

3.6 Incident communicators should look at the media as more of a partner than anadversary in extreme emergencies, when normal rules and roles are oftentemporarily suspended.

3.7 There will be many "voices" in the media from the Federal, State, localgovernment, the private sector, academia, etc. during an incident requiring acoordinated Federal response. NRC spokespeople must discuss only NRC-relatedissues with the media.

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3.8 When appropriate, an incident can be an opportunity to educate the public and themedia about the NRC, its programs and responsibilities, and even nuclear andradiological subjects that might not otherwise draw attention.

3.9 If the NRC makes a mistake at any time during the crisis, either in handling thesituation or in conveying information, the mistake must be immediatelyacknowledged and corrected.

4.0 Themes/Key Messages

4.1 The NRC is working with the facility operator (licensee), State and local officials,industry experts, and our Federal partners to bring this incident to a close asquickly as possible and to protect people and the environment.

4.2 The NRC is committed to keeping the public informed of the actions we aretaking as this incident unfolds and will provide timely and accurate informationprimarily through the media and directly on our Web site, at www.nrc.gov.

4.3 We understand this situation may cause worry, but please stay calm and listen toinstructions from your local officials if you are located near the site of theincident.

4.4 We have activated our headquarters' Operations Center and regional IncidentResponse Center and have a team of experts en route/onsite. (Specific NRCactions being taken, as appropriate.)

5.0 Media InterestAny significant event involving nuclear or radiological material with a possibility ofcompromising public health and safety - whether terrorist-initiated or a safety systemmalfunction - will generate significant media attention requiring a coordinated Federalresponse and 24-hour-a-day media relations activities. Media attention will come fromlocal, regional, national, and international news outlets and trade press. It can beanticipated that information on the incident will be disseminated via traditional print andbroadcast media, as well as through new media channels, including Web sites, blogs,podcasts, electronic bulletin boards, e-mail, etc.

6.0 Media OutletsNRC will release information to traditional media and new media outlets in order toensure the timely, accurate dissemination of critical information related both to the safetyimplications of the event and the government's response.

7.0 Other AudiencesThe NRC's Office of Congressional Affairs is responsible for communication with theCongress; other offices are responsible for communication with State, tribal, and localresponders, the industry, and other stakeholders. OPA oversees communication viainternal or external "call centers" to the general public.

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8.0 PA Products

8.1 Press releases8.2 Media interviews8.3 Press conferences and teleconferences (alone or with other State, local, and

Federal officials)8.4 Fact sheets, backgrounders, and Qs & As8.5 The Web site (including activation of the Emergency Event Web Page), Web

casts, and streaming video8.6 Response to inquiries (e-mail, phone)8.7 Other tools as appropriate following resolution of the situation, including Op-Eds,

trade press articles, public meetings, etc.

9.0 NRC Public Affairs Responsibilities and Staffing

9.1 HQ OPA Operations Center TeamDuring normal working hours, OPA's Director and another staff person move tothe Public Affairs Liaison desk in the Operations Center immediately after it'sactivated and the Executive Team (ET) is called in. In this position, the OPAteam assesses the situation, collects information, offers public affairs guidance tothe ET, initiates press releases, obtains appropriate approvals beforedisseminating material, and schedules media briefings, as appropriate, using aphone bridge or the NRC News Center. OPA may also activate NRC'sEmergency Event Web Page if the crisis warrants. The OPA team will alsocoordinate with the regions, as appropriate.

9.2 HQ OPA News Center TeamWhen OPA, with ET approval, determines the News Center should be activated,at least one Public Affairs Officer and one OPA support person staff the NewsCenter. Activation is recommended if it seems likely that a briefing will beneeded and/or that the media are likely to arrive onsite.

9.3 HQ Public Affairs Office TeamOne secretary and at least two Public Affairs Officers remain in the Public AffairsOffice to answer phones, maintain telephone logs, respond to incoming OPAe-mail, conmmunicate with Federal partners and the regions, and manage theEmergency Event Web Page. (Note: Media monitoring could be done by theBulletin News contractor; a decision to activate an internal or external "callcenter" would have to be made if OPA is overwhelmed or expects to beoverwhelmed by public calls.)

9.4 Regional Public Affairs StaffTwo regional PAO staff members are initially dispatched to the licensee's JIC orto another suitable local site. Other regions' public affairs staff may come toheadquarters or be dispatched by the OPA Director to other locations as needed.Regional public affairs staff communicate regularly with HQ and coordinate

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release of intbrmation as appropriate. (Note: A technical briefer - an expert ineither reactors or nuclear materials - is assigned to support OPA in each of theselocations.)

9.5 Field OperationsAs the focus of the event shifts from headquarters to the field, generally withinthe first 24-48 hours, a primary, high-ranking spokesperson will be designated toserve as the voice of the NRC. This spokesperson could be the Chairman, directorof public affairs, regional administrator, or another knowledgeable individualexperienced with the media. This individual will operate out of whatever locationis most suitable and most accessible to the media. Additional NRC public affairsand administrative back-up from other regions and headquarters will also bedispatched to the field operations, depending on the scope of the event and theavailability of space and resources. In a significantly large event, adjunct publicaffairs personnel will also need to be sent to the field.

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Appendix 2 to Annex N to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsDepartment of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)

1.0 Purpose:This appendix outlines the public affairs roles and responsibilities of the Department ofEnergy and National Nuclear Security Administration in response to significantradiological incidents.

2.0 BackgroundDOE/NNSA public affairs would coordinate the Federal response with DHS followingradiological incidents involving materials in DOE custody such as:

2.1 Nuclear/radiological release at a DOE facility or involving DOE materials duringthe use, storage, and shipment of a variety of radioactive materials.

2.2 The shipment of spent reactor fuel.

2.3 The production, assembly, and shipment of nuclear weapons and special nuclearmaterials.

2.4 The production and shipment of radioactive sources for space vehicles.

2.5 The storage and shipment of radioactive and mixed waste.

3.0 Nuclear Weapons Incident Response ProgramIn response to an incident involving a nuclear weapon in DOE custody; DOE will be thecoordinating agency. However, regardless of custody, DOE and DOD will conduct theresponse operation as partners. The NNSA Nuclear Weapons Incident Response (NWIR)Program serves as the Federal Government's primary capability for radiological andnuclear emergency response. The NWIR responds to all nuclear emergencies whetherDOE is the Coordinating Agency or not. The NWIR provides emergency management,operations, support, and incident response to emergencies requiring DOE/NNSAexpertise and technical assistance. Members of the program work as a team to respondwith an effective range of technical and scientific capabilities to mitigate nuclear andradiological incidents worldwide. The NWIR provides core competencies in thefollowing areas:

3.1 Knowledge of U.S. nuclear weapons, RDD and INDs with specific specialties inspectroscopy, nuclear device modeling, radiography and device diagnostics, andassessment technology

3.2 Technical operations (explosive ordinance disposal procedures and techniques fordevice access, disablement, render safe procedures, weapon recovery,stabilization and packaging for final disposition)

3.3 Technical support requirements (attribution, weapons effects, health and treatment

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capabilities, and the radiological elements of consequence management)

3.4 Technical support for radiological monitoring and assessment, atmosphericmodeling of radiological releases, and the medical effects of radiation exposure.

4.0 PolicyDOE/NNSA policy is to provide accurate, candid, and timely information to the publicduring all emergencies consistent with the requirements of the Freedom of InformationAct and the Privacy Act in order to establish facts and avoid speculation. In situationsinvolving classified information, DOE policy is to provide sufficient unclassifiedinformation to explain emergency response and protective actions required for the healthand safety of workers and the public. Furthermore, under DOE policy, a DOE/NNSApublic information officer will accompany the DOEiNNSA Senior Energy Official (SEO)to the accident site and be present in the Incident JIC.

5.0 NNSA Emergency Response AssetsThere are numerous emergency response national assets that may gain the attention of thenews media as the assets provide nuclear/radiological assistance in support of State andlocal agencies. Activation of these assets would occur following a major national orinternational nuclear or radiological accident or incident.

5.1 Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)Maintained since the late 1950s, the RAP is designed to provide first-responderradiological assistance to protect the health and safety of the general public andthe environment and to assist other Federal agencies, as well as State, tribal, local,and private individuals in the detection, identification and analysis, and responseto events involving the use of radiological/nuclear material. Deployed RAP teamsprovide traditional field monitoring and assessment support. To provide a timelyresponse capability, RAP is implemented on a regional basis. This regionalcoordination is intended to foster a working relationship between DOEradiological response elements and those of State, local, and other Federalagencies. RAP ensures a 24-hour response capability that can be deployed within2 hours of the request for assistance. The response team(s) will be on the site of aradiological emergency within 6 hours of a request for assistance. The RAPresponse capability is self-sustained for the initial 24 hours of an emergency oruntil more permanent support is deployed to the emergency site.

5.2 National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC)NARAC is the DOE component of the IMAAC. When a hazardous material isaccidentally released into the atmosphere, the NARAC can map the probableplume in time for an emergency manager to decide if taking protective action isnecessary. NARAC is located at Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory(LLNL), Livermore, California. NARAC provides world-wide centralizedemergency response service. (See http://narac.llnl.gov/.for additionalinformation.)

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5.3 Aerial Measuring System (AMS)The AMS provides helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to respond to radiologicalemergencies. Personnel and equipment aboard these aircraft provide aerialradiological detection and aerial radiation surveys. Aircraft are located at LasVegas, NV, and Washington, D.C.

5.4 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)Formed in 1976, the REAC/TS has provided support to the DOE, the WorldHealth Organization (WHO), and the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) in the medical management of radiation accidents. REAC/TS operate theonly Cytogenetic Biodosimety Laboratory (CBL) in the U.S. civilian community.The CBL has the capability to clinically determine dose levels for potentiallyexposed victims following a nuclear emergency. REAC/TS is a 24-houremergency response program at the Oak Ridge Institute for Science andEducation (ORISE). As such, it trains, consults, or assists in the response to alltypes of radiation accidents or incidents. The Center's specially trained team ofphysicians, nurses, health physicists, radiobiologists, and emergency coordinatorsis prepared around-the-clock to provide assistance at the local, national, orinternational level. Designated a WHO Collaborating Center in 1980, REAC/TSis recognized around the world for its expertise and is called upon to assist theglobal community in providing medical care to radiation accident victims, directlyor indirectly as consultants.

5.5 Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)In the emergency phase of the response, the DOE/NNSA coordinate FRMACactions. Once the immediate emergency situation is stabilized, DOE transfersresponsibility tor coordinating FRMAC actions to the EPA to continue long-termmonitoring activities.

6.0 DOE Personnel Operational ControlDuring an incident, the DOE Deputy Director of Communications will coordinate thedeployment of DOE public affairs personnel to support a NJIC.

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Appendix 3 to Annex N to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsDepartment of Defense (DOD)

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. DOD 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Manual

1.0 PurposeThis appendix outlines the Department of Defense (DOD) public affairs response to asignificant incident that may involve the transportation of nuclear weapons and the use ofradiological dispersal devices (RDD) or improvised nuclear devices (IND). TheDOD 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Manualcontains more information about the DOD response.

2.0 BackgroundDOD will manage the on-site response for incidents involving a DOD facility and theoverall response for nuclear weapons or other radioactive material in DOD custody. IfDOD has custody of the nuclear weapon at the time of the accident, DOD becomes theCoordinating Agency; regardless of custody, however, DOD will manage the response inpartnership with DOE. In accordance with the NRF, the Coordinating Agency supportsthe DHS incident management mission by providing the leadership, expertise, andauthorities to implement critical and specific aspects of the response.

3.0 PolicyThe DOD policy for U.S. nuclear weapon accidents is to provide effective public affairsactivities near the scene of a nuclear weapon accident in order to speed the flow ofinformation to the public and the internal audience. Although it is routine DOD policy toneither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or nuclearcomponents at any specific location, exceptions exist when a nuclear accident occurs.Joint Pub 3-61 provides further guidance on DOD support to media in conjunction withmilitary operations.

3.1. In the United States, its territories, or its possessions, DOD policy requires DODincident communications to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons orradioactive nuclear components in the interest of public safety or to reduce orprevent widespread public alarm. Public authorities must be notified if the publicis, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or other danger posed by theweapon or its components.

3.2. Statements confirming the presence of nuclear weapons should containinformation about the possibility of injury from high explosive weaponcomponents and/or potential radiation exposure. If injury or radiation exposure isunlikely, that should also be stated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD)/PA will be notified in advance, or as soon as possible thereafter, if theseexceptions are used.

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4.0 ResponsibilitiesThe Department of Homeland Security's Office of Public Affairs (DHS OPA) hasprimary responsibility for coordinating the Federal incident communications effort fordomestic incidents. In general, this office fulfills this responsibility by identifyingFederal department and agencies necessary for coordination, providing a leadership roleduring domestic incidents when significant interagency coordination is required, andproviding coordination with the Homeland Security Council and other entities within theExecutive Office of the President on matters related to dissemination of accident-relatedinformation to the public. Specifically, DHS OPA relies on Federal agencies, the JIC,and the DHS ESF #15 EA Officer.

4.1 Interagency Public Affairs DirectorsAt the Federal level, accident messages are developed, coordinated, and deliveredby interagency public affairs personnel involved in the accident response. For adomestic nuclear weapon accident, DHS, the Department of Defense, and DOEwill be the coordinating departments involved in a response. Department of State(DOS) will be a member for foreign accidents.

4.2 Joint Information Centers (JICs)The JIC structure provides a supporting mechanism to develop, coordinate, anddeliver messages. JICs are established to coordinate Federal, State, local, tribal,and private-sector accident communications with the public. Majorannouncements, daily briefings, and accident updates from the JIC arecoordinated through DHS Public Affairs; the affected Combatant CommandPublic Affairs office; affected State, local, territorial, and tribal leadership; andthe interagency core group prior to release.

4.3 Protection of Classified InformationResponders must practice "security at the source" to ensure no classified,sensitive, or privacy information is provided to the media or the public. The DODIncident Commander (IC) reviews all infonnation about nuclear weaponsintended for public release. Most information about the component design andstorage of nuclear weapons is classified. However, certain information aboutnuclear weapon design may be unclassified and appropriate for release to thepublic. In addition, Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) must beprotected from public release. When the JIC responsibility is transferred, becareful to ensure nuclear weapons information proposed for public release isreviewed by the appropriate U.S., DOD, and DOE/NNSA offices.

4.4 Direct Communications with ASD (PA)Establish direct connnunications with the Department-level public affairs office(Office of the ASD [PA] or the DOE/NNSA Office of Public Affairs) and theCombatant Command's public affairs office from the accident scene. The DODIC should ensure that the EAO at the scene quickly establishes directcommunications with the Department-level public affairs office by any meansavailable. The DOD IC must have access to current policy guidance and

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statements issued at the national level. Direct communications ensure that timely,accurate information may be provided at the accident scene and the national level.The Combatant Command, Military Department, DTRA, and interagency publicaffairs offices will be kept informed, as appropriate, of news releases and mediainterest. The U.S. Chief of Mission and the U.S. DOS PAO will be notified andconsulted on accidents overseas or on accidents and significant events near a U.S.border.

4.5 Briefing LocationIdentify and establish - in cooperation with State and local authorities, DOS, andhost nation authorities - a news media briefing area near the accident scene, butnot in a location that interferes with response activities or places the media indanger.

5.0 Public Affairs Response Organizational Concept

5.1 J ICThe JIC will contain public affairs decision makers who will develop a publicinformation strategic plan that incorporates key messages and ensures frequentcoordination with higher headquarters. The JIC should consist of a senior, co-equal on-scene public information representative from the Coordinating Agency,State emergency response (or foreign national government and/or military), and alocal (police and emergency response) public information officer. The JIC shouldbe located with the DOD IC and other senior response leadership.

The JIC should:

5.1.1 Authorize release of information upon approval of the DOD IC.5.1.2 Ensure response personnel are prepared for news briefings/interviews.5.1.3 Ensure adequate staffing, equipping, and support of the JIC.

5.2 Supporting SystemsThe nuclear weapon accident response operation has four supporting systems thatare potentially beneficial for the DOD IC command staff and Public InformationOfficers (PIOs). The systems are the virtual JIC, the National IncidentCommunications Conference Line (NICCL, pronounced "nickel"), the StateIncident Communications Coordination Line (SICCL, pronounced "sickle"), theHomeland Security Information Network (HSIN), and Operations Center Support.

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Appendix 4 to Annex N to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. Launch site emergency response planning documentC. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters Radiological Contingency

Response Plan (by the Office of Security and Program Protection)D. NPR 8715.3B National Aeronautics and Space Administration Launch Requirements

1.0 PurposeThis appendix outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's)public affairs and communications support of the launch of radioactive materials inquantities requiring development of specific contingency response plans andpredeployment of resources as described by NASA requirements or specified inapplicable interagency agreements.

2.0 ScopeNASA will establish a JIC for launches of radioactive materials in quantities requiringdevelopment of specific contingency response plans and predeployment of resources.The JIC is managed by NASA and supports the timely interagency coordination anddistribution of information regarding any launch, ascent, or reentry accident affecting themission.

3.0 Policy

3.1 Public information releases on the status and consequences of a launch vehicleaccident and/or radiological emergency must be accurate, timely, and easilyunderstood. Information disseminated to the public must be released from officialgovernment sources. Information must also be closely coordinated between theFederal, State, and local agencies as well as tribal governments involved inemergency responses and be released from official government sources.

3.2 The NASA-managed JIC provides the single, unified source of information forthe news media and the public about Federal radiological response to a declaredlaunch accident or radiological contingency.

4.0 StaffingEach participating Federal agency and State and county organization will assign a PublicAffairs Officer or designee to the JIC to act on behalf of their respective organizations asa single point of contact for interagency coordination of information.

4.1 All representatives of participating agencies and organizations will be physicallycollocated in one general work area (the JIG) for the purpose of coordination anddiscussion of any issues prior to the preparation of statements, releases, response,or briefing.

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4.2 Minimum JIC Staffing

4.2.1 JIC Manager (NASA Headquarters PAO)4.2.2 JIC Support Manager (Kennedy Space Center PAO)4.2.3 Risk Communication Coordinator(s) (designated by NASA and DOE)4.2.4 NASA External Relations representative to coordinate with the

Department of State4.2.5 Department of Energy public information office representative4.2.6 Launch site State representative(s)4.2.7 Department of Homeland Security/FEMA representative4.2.8 Environmental Protection Agency representative4.2.9 Department of Defense/United States Air Force representative

5.0 JIC Operations

5.1 Activation of the NASA JIC will occur as part of the overall radiologicalcontingency implementation. The JIC will continue to operate until released byemergency operations management.

5.2 JIC operations will be governed by a coordinated and approved JIC Plan,developed specifically for each mission. This plan will describe in detail thecoordination concurrence and approval process for JIC information releases.

6.0 NASA Public Affairs Launch Commentator

6.1 The designated NASA Public Affairs Launch Commentator has the responsibilityfor announcing initial public information concerning emergencies. Thecommentator will be authorized to use pre-coordinated, pre-scripted statementsfor specific contingency situations as directed by the JIC.

6.2 Initial launch commentary releases pertaining to radiological hazards followingany declared launch accident or radiological contingency will include initialemergency instructions and advisories to news media, on-site personnel, andvisitors to the launch.

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Appendix 5 to Annex N to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsEnvironmental Protection Agency Office of Air and Radiation

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. National Incident Management System (NIMS)C. ESF #15 SOP, AnnexMD. EPA National Approach to Response Crisis Communications Plan

1.0 PurposeThis appendix outlines the EPA public affairs response to a radiological incident whereEPA may be the coordinating agency or support an interagency response.

2.0 BackgroundUnder the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, EPA has roles as both a supportagency and as a coordinating agency. EPA is the Coordinating Agency for emergenciesinvolving a source or facility that is not licensed, owned, or operated by another Federalagency and for emergencies involving radiological releases outside the United States.EPA may be called in as a support agency for radiological events that involve materialslicensed, owned, or operated by another Federal agency or an agreement State.

2.1 EPA Office of Air and Radiation (OAR)The EPA OAR develops national programs. technical policies, and regulations forcontrolling air pollution and radiation exposure.

2.2 Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT)As one of EPA's special teams, the RERT supports Federal, State, tribal, andlocal agencies responding to radiological incidents and emergencies. The RERTprovides technical advice, monitoring, sampling, data assessment, and cleanupassistance. These services focus on minimizing threats to public health and theenvironment. Along with the technical experts and specialized equipment, theRERT has Public Information Officers (PIOs) specializing in radiological incidentcormnunications.

3.0 PolicyDuring an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, EPA retains fullresponsibility for incident communication programs and policies related to its activities.EPA will implement an organized, integrated, and coordinated mechanism to ensure thedelivery of understandable, timely, accurate, and consistent infonnation to the publicduring an incident as outlined in EPA's National Approach to Response CrisisCommunications Plan. EPA will contribute to the overall unified message of theresponse and support external affairs activities based on the ESF #15 Annex of the NRF,including providing staff and other support to the NJIC or other ESF #15 function ifrequested.

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4.0 EPA Public Affairs Response

4.1 ESF #15 StaffingEPA, through its field and regional incident management structures, will supportthe interagency effort under ESF #15 by providing the media and the public withinformation on EPA's response activities. EPA will deploy public affairspersonnel to the NJIC or other ESF #15 functions of an incident when requestedby the DHS ESF #15 Director. During a radiological incident requiring acoordinated Federal response, EPA PlOs working in the NJIC will be responsiblefor addressing on all issues raised to the JIC and not just those related toenvironmental or EPA-specific matters.

4.2 Addressing Public ConcernsIn the event of a radiological incident, EPA will make every effort to give themedia access to agency incident operations so that they can report them fully andaccurately to the public. EPA will issue press releases and other materials toinform the media and the public of the health and environmental consequences ofthe incident. EPA's Office of Public Affairs (OPA), in coordination with theOffice of Environmental Information (OEI), the DHS Web team, and the relevantregional Public Affairs Directors and Headquarters program offices, will developand maintain one web site to keep the public informed of the incident status. Allapproved content and data will be posted to the Web site as quickly as possible.Phone lines will be established with a published number for public inquiries.

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Annex 0 to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsNTSB Transportation Investigations


1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the roles and responsibilities of the National Transportation SafetyBoard and public affairs procedures regarding transportation incidents. Under Federallaw, the National Transportation Safety Board is responsible for investigating anddetermining the probable cause of every civil aviation accident in the United States(including accidents involving certain public use aircraft, such as those owned by Stateand municipal governments).

1.1 The Board also investigates major accidents in the other modes of transportation -rail, highway, marine and pipeline. Historically, the NTSB has been the leadFederal investigating agency for such major surface transportation accidentsas maritime oil spills, train derailments, and bridge collapses.

1.2 ESF #15 may or may not be activated following an incident requiring an NTSBinvestigation. Regardless of ESF #15 activation, NTSB retains the lead for allpublic affairs activity involving their investigative role.

2.0 MissionThe NTSB is an independent Federal accident investigation agency. Since its creation in1967, the Safety Board's mission has been to determine the probable cause oftransportation accidents to formulate safety recommendations to improve transportationsafety.

3.0 Procedures for Major Accidents

3.1 The NTSB will send several public affairs officers (PAOs) to accompany aninvestigative Go-Team to the scene of a major accident to facilitate informationdissemination. Usually, one of the five Presidentially appointed Board Membersalso accompanies the team and serves as the principal on-scene spokesperson.However, a senior career investigator, designated as Investigator-in-Charge (JIG),leads the Go-Team.

3.2 While the Board's investigative team will include representatives from otheragencies and organizations (FAA, airline operator, airplane/engine manufacturer,etc.), only the Board will release factual information on the progress of theinvestigation.

3.3 A command post is established at the crash site, usually in a nearby hotel. On-scene public affairs operations are organized from the Command Post.

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3.4 Media briefings are often held at Reagan National Airport, before the Go-Team'sdeparture, and on arrival at the accident site. On-scene, the Board strives toconduct two press conferences a day, one mid- to late-afternoon and the other inthe evening following the daily progress meeting held by the investigative team.

3.5 The Board's spokespersons discuss factual, documented information. They donot provide any analysis, nor speculate as to the significance of any particularpiece of information. The NTSB will not announce the cause of an accident whileon-scene; indeed, the cause may not be determined for 12 to 18 months after theaccident.

3.6 The NTSB also will not release the identities of victims or survivors of accidents.The transportation company involved or the local medical authorities generallyrelease such information. If conditions permit, NTSB PAOs will attempt to bringthe news media to the accident site (using a pool arrangement if it is a largegroup), keeping in mind limitations posed by physical and biomedical hazards.

3.7 The Board maintains a public affairs presence at an accident scene for as long ascircumstances warrant, usually 3 to 7 days. After that, information is releasedfrom the public affairs office in Washington, D.C.

3.7..1 There are occasions when multiple agencies, particularly State and localagencies, are involved in some aspect of the post-accident scene. Forexample, police are responsible for public safety, State transportationofficials are responsible for arranging alternative transportationopportunities, the medical examiner is responsible for victimidentification, etc. Each agency has its need to conduct press conferences.Although the NTSB does not conduct joint press conferences once theinvestigation starts to move ahead, it is willing to work with all otheragencies to arrange press conference schedules so as not to interfere witheach other.

3.8 After the team has left the accident scene, the fact-gathering phase of theinvestigation continues. During this phase, the Board may hold a public hearing.At that time, a public docket is opened and a series of detailed factual reports arereleased, which become the basis for the analysis to come.

3.9 The final report of a major accident investigation - containing the Board'sfindings, a probable cause determination, and safety recommendations - isadopted by the five-member Board at a public meeting held in Washington, D.C.

4.0 Federal Bureau of Investigation

4.1 Federal law provides that, "If the Attorney General, in consultation with theChairman of the Board, determines and notifies the Board that circumstances

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reasonably indicate that the accident may have been caused by an intentionalcriminal act, the Board shall relinquish investigative priority to the FederalBureau of Investigation." The Board then ceases all media activity with regard tothe accident and operates in support of the FBI as requested. This provision wasemployed on September 11,2001.

4.3 Until such time that a criminal determination is made, the NTSB retains primacyin every civil aviation accident investigation, and every surface transportationaccident investigation in which it has asserted jurisdiction.

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Annex P to Emer2ency Support Function #15 External AffairsAgriculture and Food


1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the public affairs roles and responsibilities of the U.S. Department ofAgriculture (USDA) in response to an incident requiring a coordinated Federal responseinvolving agriculture and food systems.

2.0 BackgroundAgriculture and food incidents will require a coordinated external affairs response whenpublic health, animal nutrition, food production, aquaculture, livestock production,wildlife, soils rangelands, and agricultural water supplies are affected.

3.0 Policies

3.1 USDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)USDA and HHS, acting under their own authorities, lead public affairs efforts foragriculture and food incidents that occur due to natural causes.

3.1.1 USDAUSDA public affairs have lead for issues dealing with the safety andsecurity of processed meat, poultry, and egg products through theUSDA/Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS).

" Nutrition assistance, including determining nutrition assistanceneeds, obtaining appropriate food supplies, arranging for the deliveryof the supplies, and authorizing disaster food stamps through theUSDA/Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)

" Animal and plant disease and pest response, which includesresponse to an outbreak of a highly contagious or economicallydevastating animal/zoonotic disease, an outbreak of a highly infectiveexotic plant disease, or an economically devastating plant pestinfestation through the USDA/Animal and Plant Health InspectionService (APHIS)

" National forests and domestic rangelands incident responsethrough the USDA/Forest Service (FS)

" Disaster impacts on the marketing of livestock, poultry, meat,cereals, oilseeds, and related agricultural products, through the

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USDA/Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration(GIPSA)

Producer and rancher assistance, which includes low-interest loansto rebuild the infrastructurc and supply seed and start-up livestock, andthe conservation reserve program to enable farmers and ranchers torestore buffers, trees, and other natural resources that protect water andwildlife through the USDA/Farm Service Agency (FSA)

" The safety and well-being of household pets by coordinatingactivities that include evacuation, transportation, sheltering,husbandry, and veterinary care of affected animals as mandated in thePets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 through theUSDA/APHIS

" Rural utilities and rural housing assistance, which includesessential public facilities and services as water and sewer, electric andtelephone systems, housing, health clinics, emergency servicefacilities, and economic development throughout rural Americathrough the USDA/Rural Development (RD).

3.1.2 HHSHHS public affairs, through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), haspublic affairs lead for all domestic and imported food except for meat,poultry, and egg products (see above). Besides food, HHS also has leadfor issues such as animal feed, food-producing animals, and animaldrugs intended for both therapeutics and non-therapeutic use in foodanimals as well as companion animals.

3.2 Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ/FBI)A terrorist attack on agriculture or food may initially be indistinguishable from anaturally occurring event. Several days could pass before food, medical, oragriculture authorities suspect an attack has taken place. Criminal intent may notbe apparent until some time after illnesses are recognized. Once a public health,food, or agriculture incident occurs (or becomes known) due to a biological,chemical, or radiological agent, or if there are indications that disease may not bethe result of natural causes, the DOJ/FBI must be notified. Due to the criminalnature of the attack, the FBI will assume the public affairs lead for theinvestigation.

3.3 Department of State (DOS)A food or agriculture incident could take place as a result of international trade.The USDA will coordinate with DOS public affairs to release informationinvolving international trade with another nation as this information could have aneffect on the economy.

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4.0 Laboratory TestingThe news media will likely focus on the results of laboratory testing of contaminatedfood and infected animals and plants. USDA public affairs have the lead fordissemination of these results to the media and general public. Confirmation ofcontaminates could come from several labs in the Integrated Consortium of LaboratoryNetworks (ICLN). Some health laboratories are the Food Emergency Response Network(FERN), the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), the National Animal HealthLaboratory Network (NAHLN), and the National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN).


5.1 USDA Public Affairs OperationsUSDA's Office of Communications (OC) will provide policy direction, review,and coordination of all information programs; maintain the flow of information;and provide liaison between USDA agencies, mission areas and the masscommunication media, State and local governments, and the public.

5.1.1 In the event of an agricultural or aninal health emergency that is nationalin scope, OC, with support from USDA agencies, will conduct operationsfrom a USDA JIC. And should the incident require a coordinated Federalresponse due to a natural or man-made disaster, OC will participate in thedesignated U.S. DHS NJIC during the emergency.

5.1.2 Under the ICS, OC will assign a public information officer (PIO) tosupport the incident command structure. The PIO represents and advisesthe Incident Command on all public information matters relating tomanagement of the incident. The PIO handles media and public inquiries,emergency public information and warnings, rumor monitoring andresponse, media monitoring, and other functions to coordinate, clear withappropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely informationrelated to the incident, particularly regarding information on public healthand safety and protection.

5.1.3 The PIO is also responsible for coordinating public information at or nearthe incident site and serving as the on-scene link to the JIS. In a large-scale operation, the on-scene PIO serves as a field PIO with links to theJIC, which is typically collocated with the Federal, regional, State, local,or tribal emergency operations center responsible for primary incidentcoordination. The JIS provides the mechanism for integrating publicinformation activities among JICs, across jurisdictions, and with private-sector and nongovernmental organizations.

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5.2 USDA Response to a Major Incident

5.2.1 Intergovernmental/stakeholder outreach

" Internal USDA conference call with USDA agency PA/mission areas" Federal interagency conference call (WH, HHS, Department of the

Interior [DOI], DHS, Homeland Security Council [HSC], DOS)" Intergovernmental conference call with local/State governments

(including animal health, human health, homeland security, andnatural resources)

" Stakeholder conference call with industry groups" Congressional conference call or personal visits

5.2.2 Media outreach

" Conduct press conference with HHS, State rep, and other relevantofficials to discuss animal, food, and/or human health implications,actions being taken, guidance for the public

" Issue news release" Issue media advisory listing available resources (b-roll Beta tapes, still

photos, Qs & As, fact sheet, updated sound bites via the Web)" Establish media briefing schedule to ensure predictable, established

lines of communication with reporters to provide updates onmanagement of the outbreak

" Distribute Qs & As and fact sheet and post on the Web site" Provide b-roll tapes upon request" Post still photos on the Web site (lab testing/inspectors at processing

plant)" Offer updated sound bites via the Web site" Monitor media 24/7 to promptly correct misinformation

5.2.3 General public outreach

" Distribute PSAs containing key messages to radio stations" Post downloadable PSAs on USDA Web site

6.0 Coordination

6.1 State CommunicatorsThe State conMnunications officials in the affected State(s) will be notified first.OC, in cooperation with agency and interagency public affairs staff, will holdconference calls with communicators from State Departments of Agriculture,Health, Homeland Security, and Natural Resources when needed to coordinateand disseminate information regarding the situation.

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6.2 USDAOC will hold a daily conference call with OC staff and agency and interagencypublic affairs staff to coordinate and disseminate information regarding thesituation. This conference number is available 24/7.

6.3 N1CCLUSDA headquarters will represent the agency on NICCL calls during incidentsand will maintain liaison with the ESF #15 function at DHS Public Affairs.

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Annex Q to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsStaffing and Deployments

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. National Incident Management System (NIMS)C. JFO Field Operations Guide (FOG) June 2006

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines staffing and deployment policies and procedures to ensure that thereare a sufficient number of external affairs personnel ready to deploy to fill critical ESF#15 staff positions following an incident. (Appendix I to Annex X provides the ESF #15Leadership Roster.)

2.0 Staffing External Affairs Leadership PositionsAn incident requiring a coordinated Federal response will require external affairspersonnel to fill ESF #15 leadership positions over an extended time period.Additionally, the nature of the incident may call for PIOs with skills and experience fromspecific departments and agencies.

2.1 Terrorist IncidentsThe FBI, ATF, CBP, ICE, USCG, and other law enforcement PIOs are well suitedto serve as either the External Affairs Officer or Deputy External Affairs Officerdue to their knowledge and background in law enforcement and terrorism.

2.2 Natural DisastersNumerous Federal departments and agencies have deployed to support theemergency response following hurricanes, forest fires, floods, and other U.S.natural disasters. FEMA has the primary responsibility for leading andcoordinating the Federal Government's disaster response efforts. Many otherDepartments and Agencies have a significant public affairs support role.

2.3 Public Health IncidentsPublic Affairs personnel from HHS, the CDC, and the FDA would be called on tofill ESF #15 leadership roles for public health emergencies.

2.4 Aircraft Incidents near Military/Civilian CommunitiesMany unforeseen incidents may require a rapid response from Department ofDefense, U.S. NORTHCOM, the FAA, TSA, and the NTSB. Incidents such ascivilian or military aircraft crashes in (or near) military and civilian communitiesmay call for a military public affairs officer to rapidly deploy to lead ESF #15 inan incident JIC. NORTHCOM relationships between the FAA, TSA, and theNTSB exist and would facilitate such an ESF #15 assignment.

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3.1 DHS Public AffairsFollowing an incident, the DHS Director of Incident Communications mayrequest Federal department and agency volunteers to immediately deploy to helpform a JFO or an incident JIC. Volunteer public affairs personnel from State andlocal authorities in non-affected jurisdictions will be considered for assignment.Costs for deployment of these personnel will be covered by parent departments oragencies.

3.2 FEMA Public AffairsFEMA PIOs frequently deploy in support of natural disasters and incidentsrequiring a coordinated Federal response. Due to the limited size of FEMAregional public affairs staffs, additional public affairs personnel and disasterassistance employees are often needed to staff JICs for more than 30 days.

3.2.1 Disaster Assistance Employees (DAE)DAEs are FEMA reserve employees that are called up to deploy to filllong-term JFO and JIC positions following incidents. DAEs are hiredunder the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief andEmergency Assistance Act.

3.2.2 Automated Deployment Database (ADD)DAEs are recruited, selected, trained, deployed, and managed by regionalcadre managers with support and oversight by HQ-based national cadremanagers. Considered national assets, DAEs make themselves availablethrough the Automated Deployment Database (ADD) system to staff alltypes of disasters, wherever and whenever they occur within U.S.jurisdictional borders.

3.2.3 FunctionsReservists may only be used to perform disaster-related work, defined asspecific disaster, emergencies, projects, or activities of a non-continuousnature. Disaster managers in the field, region, or at HQ identify theirstaffing needs and create deployment orders per current deploymentpolicies, procedures, and protocols. Once identified, these orders areimmediately transmitted to the ADD system for deployment execution bythe Deployment Unit under the auspices of the Disaster WorkforceManagement Section, Disaster Operations Directorate, DHS/FEMA.

3.3 Federal Department and Agency Public AffairsAll Federal department and agency public affairs offices are strongly encouragedto develop plans, policies, and procedures to rapidly deploy personnelimmediately following natural disasters and other incidents requiring acoordinated Federal response. Federal department and agency public affairsoffices should develop and maintain national deployment rosters to give publicaffairs personnel maximum deployment predictability. Such rosters may be

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forwarded to the DHS Director of Incident Communications for coordinationpurposes as they are updated.

4.0 TrainingGiven the activities and responsibilities under ESF #15, personnel must be trained inorder to lead an ESF #15 staff. All personnel reporting to the JFO, including those inleadership positions, must understand a JIC and execute NIMS and NRP principles andhave completed mandatory Independent Study courses offered on the FEMA EmergencyManagement Institute Web page (IS-100, IS-200, IS-700, and IS-800 [or agencyequivalent training on the NIMS and NRP]). Members are also encouraged to completeIS-300, IS-400, and any additional ICS position-specific training. For more informationabout training, see Annex Y.

5.0 Federal Deployment TeamsSome departments and agencies deploy pre-identified personnel regularly in response to acrisis. While most deployment teams do not have an allocation for an external affairs orpublic affairs position, most teams require public affairs reach back support. Some of theFederal Government's deployment teams that would require public affairs support are:

Lead Dept./Agency Team Capability

FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team IMAT-National

IMAT has replaced the Federal Incident Readily deployableResponse Support Team (FIRST) and Of the 26 designated members thereERT-N teams. IMATs are activated for is I external affairs positionNational East and National WestRegions IV,V, and VI have IMATS IMAT-RegionalOthers are standing up by region Will be located within the FEMA

region and contain one externalaffairs position. Regional IMATsare supported with regionalEmergency Response Team-Advanced teams

HHS IRCT Deploys following the identificationof a public health emergency toassess HHS long- and short-termrequirements and response.

A senior public affairs staff membertypically will deploy with the IRCTand wilt serve as the senior publicaffairs advisor to the Senior HealthOfficial and their IRCT staff

CDC Advisory Team for Environment, Food, Team includes representatives fromand Health EPA, the Department of Agriculture

(USDA), the Food and DrugAdministration, the Centers forDisease Control and Prevention, andother Federal agencies.

EPA Environmental Response Team (ERT) ERT- Deploys to emergencies to

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Lead Dept./Agency Team CapabilityRadiological Emergency Response deal with human health andTeam (RERT) environmental impacts of terrorist

National Decontamination Team (NDT) attacksNational Counter-terrorism Evidence RERT- Responds following theResponse Team (NCERT) release of radioactive materials to

provide technical advice,

monitoring, sampling, and cleanupassistance

NDT-Provides decontaminationexpertise of chemical, biological,and radioactive contaminants

NCERT-Provides law enforcementsupport for contaminated sites linkedto terrorism or environmental crimes

NTSB Investigative Go-Team See Annex 0. Investigative teamthat deploys to civil aviationaccidents and major accidents in theother modes of transportation - rail,highway, marine, and pipeline. Thenumber of team members variesbased on the circumstances of theaccident and public interest.

U.S. Army National Guard Public Affairs Rapid Response Team See Annex K(PARRT)

USCG Public Information Assist Team (PIAT) Emergency public informationduring oil spills, natural disasters,domestic terrorism events, exerciseparticipants

CDC CDC Deployment Teams Provide specific disease-relatedadvice to State/Local health officials

FBI Media Fly Team Consists of one to eight publicaffairs specialists that deploy uponthe activation of FBI incident teams

DOE/NNSA Nuclear Incident Response Team FRMAC's public information officer(NIRT) [consist of the:] will deploy with a response teamFederal Radiological Monitoring andAssessment Center (FRMAC)

Aerial Measuring System (AMS)

Accident Response Group (ARG)

National Atmospheric Release AdvisoryCenter (NARAC)

Radiation Emergency AssistanceCenter/Training Site (REACiTS)

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Annex R to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsSocial Media


1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines the plan for Federal departments and agencies to use interactivecommunications (Web and social media) with the public during incidents requiring acoordinated Federal response.

2.0 Concept of OperationsFederal, State, and local departments and agencies have an inherent responsibility toengage with the American public before, during, and after man-made disasters, naturalevents, and acts of terrorism. Providing timely and effective communications through allinteractive communications channels - including Web, social networking, text (SMS),and other emerging technologies in addition to traditional methods - will better informcitizens affected by an incident. Official Web sites, social networking methods, onlinejournals (blogs), photos, and videos are all effective tools to advise and inform the publicif used in a coordinated, strategic, and timely manner.

2.1 Department and Agency Web sitesIndividual department and agency Web sites are the foundation of Internetcommunications and social media efforts. A well-designed, user-focused Website written in plain language is a critical communications channel. As anexample, press offices and Web sites that offer automatic e-mail subscription ofnews releases, speeches, statements, testimony, and multimedia (photo essays)provide the background that will enhance the use of social media outreach. Thebest way to support the relief and recovery efforts on Web sites is to stay withinagency mission-lanes and to link to other agencies with primary expertise. A fewguidelines are listed below:

2.1.1 Immediate Web content focus is on saving lives, sustaining lives, andensuring a comprehensive recovery effort reflecting current citizeninformation needs.

2.1.2 An agency Web site should not duplicate information that is the purviewand expertise of other agencies.

2.1.3 Information needs to remain under control of the "expert" agency andlinked to by other agencies.

2.2 Federal NewsroomA Federal Newsroom will be established as a consolidated Web site for allrelevant Federal department and agency Web sites to locate press releases andannouncements providing information and resources for incident preparedness,

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response, and recovery. Agencies can create RSS (syndication) feeds to helppopulate the newsroom. The Newsroom content will be syndicated to make itavailable to traditional and new media (loggers, social networks).

3.0 Social MediaCitizens immediately affected by an incident will use a variety of information sourcesthat will provide information to save lives and property. There are numerous socialmedia and social networking techniques that may be used to inform the public duringday-to-day operations well prior to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response.

3.1 WikipediaWikipedia is an extremely popular site that allows anybody, anywhere to updateinformation. It has been used to convey real-time information during previousincidents. Monitoring and making corrections to incorrect or dangerous entriesare critical to providing accurate information to the public. In addition, cites onWikipedia to Federal resources can help drive traffic to official governmentinformation on the Web.

3.2 Text Messaging (SMS)Text messaging is an effective method to relay information using cellular phones.

3.3 Social NetworksSocial networks such as Facebook and MySpace are platforms that allow users toconnect online to one other. Early in the conceptual stages of use by officialdepartment and agencies, these social networks may be one of the many futuremethods government personnel connect with members of the public. Facebookand MySpace members must either be invited or accepted into the network.During recent college shootings, student Facebook pages provided real-timeupdates of the affected victims more rapidly than any official collegecommunications.

3.4 Twitter and Micro-bloggingTwitter is a free social networking and micro-blogging service that allows itsusers to send and read other users' updates (otherwise known as tweets), whichare text-based posts of up to 140 characters in length. Tweets can be easily postedvia mobile devices (text/SMS) and can be fed using RSS to other socialnetworking sites, blogs, etc. Twitter requires an account. Federal use of Twittercan push Federal disaster messaging into the Twitter stream and out tosubscribers. It can be used to broadcast updates, press releases, preparednessmessages, and instructions. RSS feeds from an agency can easily be broadcast viaTwitter. Monitoring Twitter provides ground level information as well as rumors.

3.5 WidgetsWidgets are embedded codes that can be used by department and agency Websites to spread official information virally in cyberspace. Widgets are commonlyused by bloggers, social network users, and personnel who own Web sites.

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Widgets embedded on blogs and other Web sites provide direct access to contentsuch as links to other resources, updated news, or instructions.

3.6 Video and Photo SharingSites like YouTube (video sharing), Flickr, and Picasa (photo sharing) can alsoextend the broadcast of imagery during an incident. These sites are an example ofa social media method to showcase digital photography on a Web site.Departments and agencies can use imagery to communicate operational responseto an incident to the public, the media, and other audiences. Imagery content canalso be syndicated through RSS feeds and can be set to interact with other socialmedia tools like blogs or social networking sites.

3.7 PodcastsPodcasts are video or audio clips that are made available through subscription,either via a service like iTunes (Apple®) or RSS feeds. The audio or video file isuploaded to a server and made available using an RSS feed and metadata. Thiscan be used for regular broadcast or rebroadcast of press conferences, speeches, orinstruction or information. An RSS feed can be established during an emergency,but access through another channel, like iTunes, should be established prior to anemergency.

4.0 ContentPosting important, accurate, and timely content is the most important component of anyWeb and social media operation.

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Annex X to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsAdministration and Logistics

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. National Incident Management System (NIMS)C. Interagency Integrated JFO Standard Operating ProceduresD. ESF #5 Standard Operating Procedures

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines information and procedures concerning administration and logisticsrequirements and operations support for the ESF #15 organization.

2.0 RequirementExternal affairs operations are mission-essential tasks, and they must be afforded a highpriority by the JFO when establishing basic operational capabilities. Infrastructure andsupporting capabilities to deliver lifesaving and life-sustaining communications must beestablished in a timely manner. For example, this includes telephones (coordination andcommunications), televisions (media monitoring), and satellite support (to disseminatelifesaving and life-sustaining information). If the ESF #15 team does not have theseand other basic tools, external affairs operations cannot be successfully executed.


3.1 Emergency Support Function #5 Emergency Management SupportIn accordance with the NRF, the ESF #5 staff establishes required field facilities,supplies, and equipment to support ESF # 15.

3.2 ESF #15 External Affairs (EA) OfficerUpon designation and activation of ESF #15, the ESF #15 EA Officer will assessinitial logistical requirements necessary in establishing operational capabilities inthe JFO (and JIG). The ESF #15 EA Officer will work closely with the ESF #15Deputy, ESF #15 Executive Officer, ESF #15 OD, assistant external affairsofficers, and JFO staff to ensure that initial requirements are identified in a timelymanner and action is taken to address shortfalls where they exist. Thisinformation should be provided by ESF #15 to the JFO Coordination GroupScoping Meeting. If the nature of the incident requires, the ESF #15 EA Officershould identify an ESF #15 Resource Manager.

3.3 ESF #15 Resource Manager (ESF #15 RM)If assigned, the ESF #15 RM will report to the ESF #15 Deputy and supervise allrelated activities in this function. This will include office space and equipmentneeds, JIC support, and coordination with JFO staff elements. The RM willcoordinate directly with the ESF #5 staff and JFO Logistics and Finance andAdministration staffs as necessary.

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4.0 Personnel and Staffing CoordinationThe RM will maintain close coordination with the ESF #15 OD, ESF #15 Deputy, ESF#15 Executive Officer, component directors, and interagency and State and local publicaffairs counterparts to ensure that appropriate staffing is provided for the ESF # 15organization.

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ADrnendix 1 to Annex X to Emergencv SuwDort Function #15 External AffairsESF #15 Leadership Roster

EMREC SUPR FUCTO #1 - INIDN LAESHI STFFN

INCIDENT SITE & SITUATION:

POSITION ASSIGNED DUTY E-MAIL OFF PHONE CELL OTHERINFO

DirectorPrivate SectorCong AffairsState & LocalComm RelationsOperations Direct

FCO

Deputy PFO

External Affairs OfficerDeputy, Ext Affairs OffExecutive OfficerPress SecretaryFCO Liaison OffAsst EA Off-PSAsst EA Off-CAAsst EA Off-SLAsst EA Off-CRAsst EA Off-JICAsst EA Off-PPSpokesperson

FEMA Reg EAIMAT EAO

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Annex Y to Emeraency Support Function #15 External AffairsTraining

References:A. National Response Framework (NRF)B. National Incident Management System (NIMS)C. Interagency Integrated SOP

1.0 PurposeThis annex outlines necessary training for ESF # 15 staff personnel and trainingrequirements for Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal counterparts.

2.0 Training and Objectives

2.1 Director's PerspectiveTraining is critical to the success of ESF #15 in support of the FCO and JFO. Werecognize that personnel assigned to the ESF # 15 team are proficient in theirfunctional areas. But integrating these different component players in one team toachieve unity of effort is the larger requirement. To this end, pre-incident trainingbuilds teamwork, expertise, and confidence that the ESF # 15 staff will besuccessful during an incident requiring a coordinated Federal response or majorincident. Training will be a fundamental building block of the ESF #15operation.

2.2 ESF #15 Training Program Responsibilities

2.2.1 Program Direction, Oversight, CoordinationDHS Office of Public Affairs

2.2.2 Program Support (Materials and Course Development)FEMA Office of Public Affairs, in coordination with EmergencyManagement Institute (EMI)

2.3 ESF #15 Training Program Objectives

2.3.1 ESF #15 Leadership Cadre is fully prepared to assume assigned positionswhen directed and in support of the FCO and JFO

2.3.2 ESF #15 staff is prepared for duties within the organization and in supportof the FCO and JFO.

2.3.3 Federal interagency ESF #15 deploying leadership and staff are fullyprepared to assume assigned positions.

2.3.4 State, territorial, and tribal counterparts have awareness of ESF #15functions and integration within the JIS and ICS.

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3.0 Training Program RequirementsESF #15 staff training requirements are detailed in Appendix I and discussed in thefollowing paragraphs. These requirements are based on existing and planned resources.

4.0 Training ResourcesSummarized below are training resources and supporting details.

4.1 Recommended Online CoursesThe below courses are recommended for all ESF # 15 leadership and staffpersonnel. Information on enrollment is at FEMA.GOV.

4.1.1 IS-100. Introduction to Incident Management4.1.2 IS-200. Incident Command System4.1.3 IS-700.a. National Incident Management System (NIMS)4.1.4 IS-702. NIMS Public Information Course4.1.5 IS-800.b. National Response Framework (NRF)4.1.6 IS-250. ESF #15/External Affairs

This course provides basic training on the concept and practicalapplication of the ESF #15 Standard Operating Procedures to supportFederal domestic incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. Thecourse is designed for all External Affairs staff (Public Affairs, Office ofLegislative Affairs, Community Relations, Intergovernmental Affairs, andPrivate Sector), regardless of duty station, as well as to staff in all otheragency divisions and Federal, tribal, State, local, military, and voluntaryagency partners.

4.2 EMI Training CoursesBoth resident and condensed field versions of External Affairs courses have beendeveloped to train leadership and functional staff in the tasks associated with theirassigned positions.

4.2.1 ESF #15 Leadership Course (E-729)This 4-day, scenario-driven course is open to representatives of all Federalpartners who might assume a leadership role when ESF #1 5 is activated.The course offers an overview of the roles and responsibilities assumed bythe various External Affairs components, as well as training in specific jobfunctions. The course includes presentations by a FCO and State andtribal representatives, training on reports and communications products,Writing and presentation workshops, a variety of leadership andpartnership exercises, and a comprehensive final exam set in the context ofa simulated large-scale disaster. Evaluation metrics are included.

A 2-day field version of this course (L-731) has also been developed,focusing less on leadership roles and more on the structure andfunctional responsibilities of ESF #15 and External Affairs. Thiscourse has been designed for regional and field use, providing staff

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already deployed to a disaster with a comprehensive trainingopportunity.

4.2.3 Basic Policy and Procedures Courses (Public Affairs E249, 1-385,Congressional E368)ESF #15 External Affairs training and exercises have now beenincorporated into the basic training modules for FEMA External Affairsstaff- both in resident and field courses. Practical exercises, including onespecifically focused on working with State and local partners, areincluded.

4.2.4 State & Local Public Affairs Courses (Basic G-290 & Advanced E388)ESF #15/External Affairs training will be incorporated into the AdvancedState & Local PIO course offered at EMI (beginning in March, 2007).

4.3 Federal/State/Local/Voluntary Agency Partner OutreachA scalable series of PowerPoint presentations have been developed and deliveredto Federal, State, local, voluntary agency, and private-sector partners nationwide.These include a complete 2-hour presentation, various abbreviated 1 -hourpresentations (including a version that provides a brief overview of all ExternalAffairs components, and several that focus on a specific component), and a 20-minute Executive Level Summary. Material is posted online for easy traineraccess.

4.4 Video/Video Teleconference (VTC)Scalable, digital versions of the ESF #15 External Affairs training have beendeveloped. The video is fully customizable, depending on the audience, and isavailable on-demand. Like the PowerPoint presentation, several versions havealready been created, including a 10-mrinute Executive Level Summary. Thevideo can be shown when a trainer is unable to make the presentation personally,yet can be available by teleconference to answer any questions in real-tine.Videos posted online for easy trainer access.

4.5 ExercisesPersonnel at all levels within the Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, andprivate sector participate in homeland security and all-hazards exercises. Many ofthese are conducted on a national scale, such as the National Level Exerciseseries. These exercises provide a superb means to train personnel on ESF #15procedures and respective staff assignments. DHS will use this SOP as theprimary planning document for all exercises.

4.6 Real-World TrainingReal-world events, and those that directly result hi activation of ESF #15, providean equally valuable opportunity for training of leadership and staff personnel.ESF #15 leadership should actively consider deploying available personnel to

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real-world incidents, if conditions permit, for training purposes. This should becoordinated with the FCO and JFO staff

4.7 Interagency CoordinationInteragency meetings, such as the Incident Communications Public AffairsCoordination Committee (ICPACC) meeting and related events will be used todiscuss ESF #15 processes, teamwork, and training needs. DHS OPA willcoordinate these during the quarterly meeting program.

4.8 Basic Guidance for Public Information Officers (PlOs/National IncidentManagement System INIMSI - FEMA 517/November 2007)This guidance document was developed in coordination with Federal, State, tribal,and local Public Information Officers (PIOs). The goal of this publication is toprovide operational practices for performing PIO duties within the ICS. It offersbasic procedures to operate within the JIS and establish an effective JIC -including integrating with Federal support and ESF #15.

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Appendix 1 to Annex Y to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsESF #15 Staff Training Requirements

ESF #15 Staff Training Requirements' -: -

ESF #15 HQ ESF #15 Leadership ESF #15

Staff Cadre Staff

'ONLINE COURSES

IS-100, Incident Mgmt R R RIS-200, ICS R R RIS-700, NIMS R R RIS-702, NIMS PIO R/O* R/O* R/O*IS-800, NRF R R R

2 *~~ NETC.RESIDENT TRAINING COUR.SES'" :1.

ESF #15 Leadership Course R RESF #15 Staff Course | 0

KevR-RecommendedO-Optional

Notes:*Optional for non-public affairs ESF #15 personnel

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Annex Z to Emergency Support Function #15 External AffairsAcronyms and Key Terms

AEAO Assistant External Affairs Officer (ESF #15)ADD Automated Deployment DatabaseAMS Aerial Measuring SystemAPO Accountable Property OfficerARF Assistance Request FormASD-HD Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland DefenseASPA Assistant Secretary for Public AffairsAT Annual TrainingBLOG WEB LOGCA Congressional AffairsCAT Crisis Action TeamC4 Command, Control, Communications and ComputersCDC Centers for Disease Control and PreventionCERT Cyber Emergency Response TeamCIP Critical Infrastructure ProtectionCOMC Communications CoordinatorCOML Communications Unit LeaderCOMT Communications TechnicianCOOP Continuity of OperationsCOP Common Operating PictureCR Conmmunity RelationsCSG Counterterrorism Security GroupDAE Disaster Assistance EmployeeDCE Defense Coordinating ElementsDCO Defense Coordinating OfficerDHS Department of Homeland SecurityDNI Director, National IntelligenceDOC Department of ComenrceDOD Department of DefenseDOI Department of InteriorDOS Department of StateDRF Disaster Relief FundDRG Disaster Readiness GroupDSCA Defense Support to Civil AuthoritiesEA Emergency AuthorityEAO External Affairs OfficerEAS Emergency Alert SystemECS Emergency Communications StaffECT-F Emergency Communications Team - FieldECT-N Emergency Communications Team - NationalEOC Emergency Operations CenterEOP Executive Office of the PresidentESF Emergency Support FunctionFCC Federal Communications CommissionFCO Federal Coordinating OfficerFECC Federal Emergency Communications CoordinatorFEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

Z-1

CK 508 of 3114

FIRST Federal Incident Response Support TeamFOC FEMA Operations CenterFRC Federal Resource CoordinatorFRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment CenterGETS Government Emergency Communications ServiceGIS Geographic Information SystemGSA General Services AdministrationHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human ServicesHLD Homeland DefenseHLS Homeland SecurityHSA Homeland Security AdvisorHSAS Homeland Security Alert SystemHSC Homeland Security CouncilHSIN Homeland Security Information NetworkHSPD Homeland Security Presidential DirectiveIAP Incident Action PlanICEPP Incident Communications Emergency Policy and ProceduresICP Incident Command PostICS Incident Command SystemIDT Inactive Duty TrainingIEC Interexchange CarrierILC Infrastructure Liaison CellIMA Individual Mobilization AugmenteeIMAAC Federal Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric CenterIMAT Incident Management Assistance TeamIMP Incident Management Plan

\IMPT Incident Management Planning TeamIOF Interim Operating FacilitiesIP Internet ProtocolIRCT Incident Response Coordination Team (HHS)ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis CenterIT Information TechnologyJOC Joint Operations Center (Law Enforcement)JDOMS Joint Directorate of Military SupportJFO Joint Field OfficeJIC Joint Information CenterJPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element (DOD)JS Joint StaffJTF Joint Task ForceJTRB Joint Telecommunications Resource BoardLFA Lead Federal AgencyLNO Liaison OfficerMA Mission AssignmentMATTS Mobile Air Transportable Telecommunications SystemMERS Mobile Emergency Response SupportMOA Memorandum of AgreementMOU Memorandum of UnderstandingMTSO Mobile Telephone Switching OfficeNARAC National Atmospheric Release Advisory CenterNICCL National Incident Communications Conference LineNCC National Coordinating Center

Z-2

CK 509 of 3114

NCP National Continuity ProgramNCRCG National Cybcr Response Coordination GroupNCS National Communications SystemNCSD National Cyber Security DivisionNCTC National Counter Terrorism CenterNDA Non-Disclosure AgreementNDAC Network Design and Analysis CapabilityNEMT National Emergency Management TeamNGB National Guard BureauNICC National Infrastructure Coordination CenterNIFC National Interagency Fire CenterNIICD National Interagency Incident Communications DivisionNIMS National Incident Management SystemNIPP National Infrastructure Protection PlanNIRSC National Incident Radio Support CacheNJIC National Joint Information CenterNLE National Level ExerciseNNSA National Nuclear Security AdministrationNOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationNOC National Operations CenterNRCC National Response Coordination Center (FEMA)NRF National Response FrameworkNS/EP National Security and Emergency PreparednessNSSE National Special Security EventNTIA National Telecormnunications and Information AdministrationNWIR Nuclear Weapons Incident ResponseNWS National Weather ServiceOA Operational AnalysisOMNCS Office of the Manager, NCSOPERIOD Operations PeriodOPLAN Operations PlanOSD Office of the Secretary of DefenseOSTP Office of Science and Technology PolicyPDD Presidential Decision DirectivePA Public AffairsPACOM Pacific CommandPAR Protective Action RecommendationPARRT Public Affairs Rapid Response Team - National Guard BureauPFO Principal Federal OfficialPICCL Private Sector Incident Communications Conference LinePOA Point of ArrivalPOP Points-of-PresencePP Planning and Production (ESF #15)PSA Protective Security AdvisorPSAP Public Safety Access PointsPSN Public Switched NetworkRAP Radiological Assistance ProgramRCC Regional Communications CoordinatorRD Regional DirectorRFA Request for Assistance (to DOD)RFF Request For Forces

Z-3

CK 510 of 3114

RFIRRCCSASECDEFSFLEOSCOSICCLSIOCSIPRNETSITREPSLOSHSOPSOUTHCOMSSASTASTU-IIITDYTS/SCITSPTTADUSACEUSFS.USNORTHCOMVIPRVTCWHOWPS

Request For InformationRegional Response Coordination CenterSituational AwarenessSecretary of DefenseSenior Federal Law Enforcement OfficerState Coordinating OfficerState Incident Communications Conference LineSpecial Incident Operations Center (FBI HQ)Secret Internet Protocol Router NetworkSituation ReportSea, Lake and Overland Surges from HurricanesStandard Operating ProceduresSouthern CommandSector Specific AgencySpecial Temporary AuthoritySecure Telephone Unit IIITemporary DutyTop Secret/Sensitive Compartmented InformationTelecommunications Service PriorityTemporary Tour of Active DutyU.S. Army Corps of EngineersUnited States Forest ServiceUnited States Northern CommandVisible Intermodal Protection ResponseVideo TeleconferenceWorld Health OrganizationWireless Priority Service

Z-4

CK 511 of 3114

ESF #15 SOP NOTES

CK 512 of 3114

From:Sent:To:Subject:

LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 5:07 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: FEMA watch standers at NRC

Bonnie Sheffield DayshiftKen Wierman NightshiftFEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

0700-15001500-2300

A:'**.*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY* * * * *"DO NOT- RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDEFRAL FAMILY

From: McDermott, BrianSent: Wednesday, March 23, 2011 8:25 AMTo: 'Greten, Timothy'Cc: LIA05 HocSubject: FEMA watch standers at NRC

It has been beneficial to have FEMA REP staff standing watch at the NRC Ops Center.

We are hearing plans to have three folks at a time in the center. I understand the need to double up watchstanders, in order to train new folks, however we don't have the space for three.

Would appreciate someone looking into this.

Thanks,Brian

Brian J. McDermott, DirectorDivision of Preparedness and ResponseOffice of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

(301)415-2334 Work[ (b)(6) Mobile

1

CK 513 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:05 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: NRC Emergency Operations Liaison


" R OFFICIAL USE ONLY.....DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAIVAI L1.

From: Coons, Albert [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 4:31 PMTo: LTA05 HocSubject: RE: NRC Emergency Operations Liaison

I will develop the schedule through the end of April for now. I will make sure you are not on the schedule for anyexercises or the NREP Conference.

Albert CoonsLead Program SpecialistHQ/NPD-THD-REPPFEMA202-212-2318

(b)(6) J(cell)703-305-0837 (fax)E-mail: albert.coons(.dhs.lov

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 4:29 PMTo: Coons, AlbertSubject: RE: NRC Emergency Operations Liaison

Mr. Coons,

The way it was explained to me they have operations scheduled here through 18 April however, they will continueoperation as long as they have representatives in Japan. Does this help?


CK 514 of 3114

"h' 'OR OFFICIAL USE& ONLY+*..

From: Coons, Albert [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 4:21 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: NRC Emergency Operations Liaison

KenCan you find out when they plan on ending our participation at the EOC? Vanessa was going to inquire but she never gotback to me.ThanksAl


(b)(6) ](cell)703-305-0837 (fax)E-mail: albert.coons&cdhs.pov

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 3:30 PMTo: Coons, AlbertSubject: FW: NRC Emergency Operations LiaisonImportance: High

Mr. Coons,

The schedule for 20-23 April. I have to speak at the NREP Conference that week.

Ken Wiennan Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

* •+++OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY •~


From: Wierman, Kenneth [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 2:55 PMTo: LIA0S HocSubject: Fw: NRC Emergency Operations LiaisonImportance: High

Kenneth L. Wierman Jr.Policy and Regulations UnitRadiological Emergency PreparednessFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) HeadquartersOffice: (202) 212-3711Blackberryl (b)(6)

kenneth.wierma nidhs.qov

2

CK 515 of 3114

Sent using BlackBerry

From: Coons, AlbertTo: Wierman, Kenneth; Sheffield, Bonnie; Nash Jr, Harry W; Broockerd, Larry; Halsey, Lashawn; Connell, Renae; Jeremy,David; Fontenot, Rebecca; Purvis, James; Wilt, Michael CCc: Quinn, Vanessa; Coons, AlbertSent: Tue Mar 22 14:47:43 2011Subject: NRC Emergency Operations Liaison

Attached please find a draft Shift Rotation Schedule for the NRC Emergency Operations Liaison. Please comment and getback to me as soon as possible. Mainly I would like to know if you are available on these days at these times.


(b)(6) I(cell)

703-305-0837 (fax)E-mail: albert.coons0.dhs..qov

3

CK 516 of 3114

FEMA Liaison Staff to NRC Emergency Operations

Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday

13-Mar 14-Mar 15-Mar 16-Mar 17-Mar 18-Mar 19-Mar

0700-1500 Wierman Wierman Wierman Sheffield Sheffield Sheffield1500-2300 Wierman Wierman Wierman Wierman Wierman Wierman

20-Mar 21-Mar 22-Mar 23-Mar 24-Mar 25-Mar 26-Mar

0700-1500 Sheffield Sheffield Nash Broockerd Broockerd Broockerd Broockerd1500-2300 Wierman Wierman Wierman Nash Nash Nash Halsey

27-Mar 28-Mar 29-Mar 30-Mar 31-Mar 1-Apr 2-Apr0700-1500 Connell Connell Connell Connell Wierman Wierman Wierman1500-2300 Halsey Halsey Halsey Sheffield Sheffield Sheffield Sheffield

3-Apr 4-Apr 5-Apr 6-Apr 7-Apr 8-Apr 9-Apr0700-1500 Wierman Sheffield Sheffield Sheffield Sheffield Connell Connell

1500-2300 Nash Nash Nash Nash Jeremy Jeremy Jeremy10-Apr 11-Apr 12-Apr 13-Apr 14-Apr 15-Apr 16-Apr

0700-1500 Connell Connell Purvis Purvis Purvis Purvis Sheffield1500-2300 Jeremy Fontenot Fontenot Fontenot Fontenot Wilt Wilt

17-Apr 18-Apr 19-Apr 20-Apr 21-Apr 22-Apr 23-Apr

0700-1500 Sheffield Sheffield Sheffield Wierman Wierman Wierman Wierman

1500-2300 Wilt Wilt Broockerd Broockerd Broockerd Broockerd Halsey24-Apr 25-Apr 26-Apr 27-Apr 28-Apr 29-Apr 30-Apr

0700-1500 Connell Connell Connell Connell Nash Nash Nash

1500-2300 Halsey Halsey Halsey Wilt Wilt Wilt Wilt

NRC Emergecny Operations Center

Address: 11545 Rockville Pike,Rockville, MD 20852

Contact: Joe Anderson - (301) 415-4114

CK 517 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:05 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: NRC Liaison ScheduleAttachments: image002.png; Shift Rotation _Draft.xlsx


******FOR OFFICIAL ,T-USE, ON,_LY, ******

DO NOT RELE... OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMI'vLY

From: Wierman, Kenneth [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 4:47 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Fw: NRC Liaison Schedule

Kenneth L. Wierman Jr.Policy and Regulations UnitRadiological Emergency PreparednessFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) HeadquartersOffice: (202) 212-3711Blackberry:1 (b)(6) Ikenneth.wiermanadhs..ov


From: Coons, AlbertTo: Wierman, Kenneth; Jeremy, David; Sheffield, Bonnie; Nash Jr, Harry W; Broockerd, Larry; Halsey, Lashawn; Connell,Renae; Purvis, James; Wilt, Michael CCc: Coons, Albert; Quinn, VanessaSent: Tue Mar 22 16:46:02 2011Subject: NRC Liaison Schedule

Please see changes in RED. I needed to change out some people. It is also attached.

CK 518 of 3114

13Mar 14Mar 1Mar. 16-ar 17-Mar 1_81-Mar 19-Mar

20Mar 1-- Mar 22- r 23-Mar _4--M.-r 25-M Lr 26-Mar

-bw ME.. MOMM~ NE6 1 d 101ebun

LIM =e NUhil ufllll W111111 INlU Kiwn N=.

SW.... .9 . .': "'...27-Mar 28-Mairý 29Mr 3Pa p1Mr 1 r 2- Apr~

-61 LM i Ri I maIn m l U - W

3-Apr ~4-Apr 15-Apr 6-p 7ZApr_ 8-Ar 94.Apr,

-O4 - _ _ MiN~ Mwmil g-'Igom 1 md- ... ... • • , _ _ _ _ -• -• ....

I,-Apr 11•• pr _12-Apr , 3-.Apr, ' , Ap• 15 ,,pr 16-Apr

__OMIu I almodl I* hilb uub Ftuub Pumb Uufdd___M JMM RdW M .h 2dM HI Wkl Wilt

______ 17-Apr, 18-Ar 19Ar 2-p 1Ar~~r 2-Apr

2. Ap 25- . iAr 2-Aprj, .27-Apr 28-Apr Q2-Apr.3.0lpm

1. ., p1 .W t .Awp awHN1M 1 MM. MM I Ufuh Ni-Wit

Albert CoonsLead Program SpecialistHQ/NPD-THD-REPPFEMA202-212-2318I (b)(6) )i(cell)703-305-0837 (fax)E-mail: albert.coons(,dhs.qov

2

CK 519 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:04 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Japan Earthquake Team 3-22-2011Attachments: Japan Earthquake Team 3-22-2011.doc

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wienian Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

* * * ***FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY***+**

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAt FAMILY

From: Wierman, Kenneth [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 2:50 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Fw: Japan Earthquake Team 3-22-2011

Kenneth L. Wierman Jr.Policy and Regulations UnitRadiological Emergency PreparednessFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) HeadquartersOffice: (202) 212-3711Blackberry] (b)(6)

kenneth.wiermanCa. hs..oov


From: Owens, TamaraTo: Ahlgrim, Bridget; Arszulowicz, John; Barker, Ronald; Barnes, Joshua; Broockerd, Larry; Butler, Lolita; Coleman-Marbury, Brenda; Collins, Richard; Connell, Renae; Coons, Albert; Darlington, Lisa; DeFelice, Anthony; DeGilio, Lou; Du,Jingtong; Eberst, William; Fiore, Craig; Flores, Kaori; Fontenot, Rebecca; Galloway, Clark; Gardner, Patricia; Gates,Russell; Gilder, David; Greten, Timothy; Hallett, Scott; Halsey, Lashawn; Hamilton, Lisa; Hammond, Odessa; Herring, Joe;Hobbs, Terry; Horton, Douglas; Horwitz, Steve; Howe, Michael; Jeremy, David; Kish, James; Marshall, Steve; Mauldin,Deborah; McSwain, Alonzo; Mingledolph, Juvart; Nash Jr, Harry W; Nevitt, Jason; Norville, Robert; Owens, Tamara; Page,Christopher; Purvis, James; Quinn, Vanessa; Ralston, Michelle; Sanders, Tami; Schafer, John; Scipio, Tanya; Seward,Andrew; Sheffield, Bonnie; Sherwood, Harry; Strother, Thomas; Taylor-Redman, Crystal; Tenorio, Pat; Turner, Sheila;Ward, Paul; Warnock, Thomas; Wierman, Kenneth; Wilt, Michael CSent: Tue Mar 22 14:48:44 2011Subject: Japan Earthquake Team 3-22-2011

Good afternoon all,

CK 520 of 3114

Attached Is the Daily Roster for JE (Japan Earthquake) Team. If you have any questionregarding the Japan Earthquake please contact assigned Team Leads.

Thank You

Juvart T.Mingledolph II

Lead Program SpecialistProfessional Continuity PractitionerBusiness Operations BranchTechnological Hazards DivisionNational Preparedness DirectorateFederal Emergency Management AgencyUS Department of Homeland Security

Office: 202-212-2332Mobile:L (b)(6)

Email: iuvart.minaledolhAdhs.aov

"Moving At The Speed Of Business"

2

CK 521 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 5:04 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW:


******FOR OltICIAL USM U ONLY*'

From: LIA08 HocSent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 12:43 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE:

Thanks, Harry.Rani

From: LIA05 HocSent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 10:41 AMTo: LIA06 Hoc; LIA08 Hoc; LIA04 Hoc; LIA01 Hoc; LIAll HocSubject: FW:

FYI

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wiernan Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-51871

******FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY "*

DO , NO0,T- XR ELEASE OUT.S. . ..E OF THE FEDERAL FAMULY

From: Fontenot, Rebecca [mailto: Rebecca. [email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 10:17 AMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Quinn, Vanessa; Sherwood, Harry; Feighert, Dan; Ralston, Michelle; Horton, Douglas; DeFelice, AnthonySubject: RE:

I was told that it is for Federal family only by Michelle Ralston. So please do not release the information to the public.

1

CK 522 of 3114

Sincerely,


From: Quinn, VanessaSent: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 10:14 AMTo: Fontenot, RebeccaSubject: FW:

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 8:11 AMTo: Sherwood, Harry; Quinn, Vanessa; Dan FeighertCc: Horton, Douglas; DeFelice, AnthonySubject:

Good Morning,

There is a question as to FEMA SITREP being available to the public. Can NRC Ops include this information with theinformation that is released to the Public?

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wiermian Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

-*****FOR OFFICIA-L-USE ONL-Y*+**DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TIlE FEDERAL FAAILY

2

CK 523 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:37 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Classified Commo Briefing on Fukushima


DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMIJLY

From: LIA01 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 4:07 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Classified Commo Briefing on Fukushima

From: LIA07 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 4:05 PMTo: LIA01 HocSubject: FW: Classified Commo Briefing on Fukushima

From: King, William [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 3:53 PMTo: LIA07 Hoc; Christensen, HaroldCc: King, William; Opoka, JamesSubject: Classified Commo Briefing on Fukushima

Several of us at DS FEMA V are interested in this briefing. We have access to our co-located DOD office that has a SIPRnet address. The SIPR net address is: 22.21.196.254 Please let me know if this is going forward, and the associatedlogistics.

William E. King, ChairRegional Assistance CommitteeChief, Technological Hazards BranchDHS FEMA [email protected]

CK 524 of 3114

From:Sent:To:Subject:Attachments:


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:37 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: SITREP: MARCH 21 (1600 EDT)SITREP 20110321_REPPJapanEarthquake.docx

0700-15001500-2300

A*"***** FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******DO NOT RE-LEASE OUTSIDE OF T •lE II FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Simpson, John [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 4:50 PMTo: Simpson, John; Horwitz, Steve; Colman, Steve; Thomson, Rebecca; Hammons, Darrell; Burnside, Conrad; King,William; Hammond, Lisa; McCabe, Ron; Feighert, Dan; Fiore, Craig; Connell, Renae; Seward, Andrew; Harworth, Joseph;Sheffield, Bonnie; LIA05 HocCc: Kish, James; Greten, Timothy; Quinn, Vanessa; Coons, Albert; Purvis, James; Hobbs, Terry; Berkey, Johanna;Hlavaty-LaPosa, Janet; Seward, Andrew; Connell, Renae; Howard, Mike; Howe, Michael; Sherwood, Harry; Ralston,Michelle; Spencer, Odis; Sheffield, Bonnie; Freeman, CarolSubject: RE: SITREP: MARCH 21 (1600 EDT)

SITREP for 21 MAR 11 (1600 EDT) is attached.

I

CK 525 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:37 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Commission Meeting: Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in

Japan


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYA A A "*


From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 2:07 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Re: Commission Meeting: Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan

Ok

Respectfully,

Michelle Ralston

(202) 280-9304

From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: Ralston, Michelle <[email protected]>Sent: Mon Mar 21 14:05:22 2011Subject: RE: Commission Meeting: Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan

We receive them at 0600 and 1700


**AAA:AFOR OFFICIAL ..USE ONLY'"T ••-.**

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THIE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto:[email protected]]

Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 2:01 PM

CK 526 of 3114

To: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Commission Meeting: Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan

Do you expect another status update soon?

Respectfully,

Michelle Ralston, MS, PMIPublic Affhirs, Stakeholder Outreach & Campaign PliumingProfessionmd Services & IntegrationTechnological Hazards I)ivisionProtection & National PreparednessDHS/FEMA1800 South Bell Street, Rrn. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk

(b)(6) Blackberr,(703) 305-0837 facsimile

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 7:14 AMTo: Dan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten;Vanessa E. Quinn; Albert Coons; Bill Webb; Conrad Burnside; Craig Fiore; Darrell Hammons; Lisa Hammond; RebeccaThomson; Ronald McCabe; Steve Colman; William KingCc: [email protected]: FW: Commission Meeting: Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan

A Commission meeting will be held on Monday, March 21, 2011 at 9:00 am EST. This is a public meeting andcan be viewed via webcast.

Please use the following link to access the webcast.

http://www.nrc.qov/lublic-involve/[ublic-meetin-qs/webcast-live.htmi

Feel free to notify interested stakeholders.


-k *,!- ll*+FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*. .

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE O- F THE FDER AL FkMILY-

From: OST05 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 7:10 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Commission Meeting: Briefing on NRC Response to Recent Nuclear Events in Japan

2

CK 527 of 3114

A Commission meeting will be held on Monday, March 21, 2011 at 9:00 am. This is a public meeting and canbe viewed via webcast.

Please use the following link to access the webcast.

http://www. nrc.qov/public-involve/public-meetings/webcast-live.html

Feel free to notify interested stakeholders.

Thanks,Cindy FlanneryState Liaison - Liaison TeamNRC Incident Response Center

CK 528 of 3114


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:37 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: BLAST FROM THE PASTimage001.gif

Bonnie Sheffield DayshiftKen Wierman NightsliiftFEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

0700-15001500-2300

******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Kauffman, JohnSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 3:25 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: BLAST FROM THE PAST

Ken,Good to hear from you. I was in the Ops Center for the midnight shift Saturday night... kind of slow.

I am up at Church Street, 2 nd floor, so not too convenient. Maybe you can stop in on your way to work oneday.

" USNJmIri'?nftnv Nbrftlramra

,John V. KauffinanSenior Reactor Systems EngineerUS NRC/RES/DRA/OEGIBWashington, DC 20555 Mail Stop: C-2A07MPhone: 301-251-7465Fax: 301-251-7410

Please visit the internal GIP web page or external GIP web page.

From: LIA05 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 3:18 PMTo: Kauffman, JohnSubject: BLAST FROM THE PAST

Dr. Doom,

CK 529 of 3114

FYI, I am working in the NRC Operations Center. Tell me where you are located and I will come and visit sometime whileI am here.

Bonnie Sheffield DayshiftKen Wiennan NightshiftFEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

0700-15001500-2300

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THlE FEDERAL FAMfiLY

2

CK 530 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:37 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Request from our Regional Administrator


****`....FORl• OkFFIeIL'k USEP a LY***** ......

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TIHE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: LIA11 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 2:49 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Request from our Regional Administrator

From: LIA01 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 1:54 PMTo: LIA08 Hoc; LIA06 HocCc: LIAll HocSubject: FW: Request from our Regional Administrator

This has been discussed at a high level by the EDO in the Commission briefing today, but I don't think this is a questionfor the Operations Center to answer.

FEMA HQ should have a copy of each IPMA. Annie Kammerer is working on a hazards index in Research, as discussed inthe Commission brief today, but this is in development still.

Please advise,

Ted,Federal Liaison Desk

From: LIA05 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 1:46 PMTo: LIA11 Hoc; LIA01 HocSubject: FW: Request from our Regional Administrator

Can you help me with this?

CK 531 of 3114

Our Regional Administrator is requesting information on the most likely threat/vulnerability to each of ournuclear power plants in this Region, whether it be from a natural hazard or terrorist/security threat. I have beenunsuccessful in getting this information for him. I started by asking NRC Region IV for the likelyenvironmental hazards (hurricane, flooding etc.) and I have been unsuccessful. I am aware of the InfrastructureProtection - Integrated Protective Measures Analysis (IPMA) report and this report primarily deals with the terrorismthreats. I have not been successful getting this either - I know it is classified.

I'n telling you about this because it is likely to come up on Friday when they have their briefing.

I am copying Bonnie Sheffield because I know she is working in the NRC Ops center on the day shift - maybe she hasseen something on the natural hazard part of his request.

I am a little frustrated on how to obtain and if I can even obtain the requested information.

Lisa HammondTechnological Hazards Branch ChiefNP Division, FEMA VI(940)898-5199


****-*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*****"

DO NOT RELEASE OUT-SIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Sheffield, Bonnie [mailto: [email protected]]Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 1:40 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Fw: Request from our Regional Administrator


From: Hammond, Lisa <[email protected]>To: Quinn, Vanessa <[email protected]>Cc: Sheffield, Bonnie <[email protected]>Sent: Mon Mar 2112:20:53 2011Subject: Request from our Regional Administrator

Our Regional Administrator is requesting information on the most likely threat/vulnerability to each of ournuclear power plants in this Region, whether it be from a natural hazard or terrorist/security threat. I have beenunsuccessful in getting this information for him. I started by asking NRC Region IV for the likelyenvironmental hazards (hurricane, flooding etc.) and I have been unsuccessful. I am aware of the InfrastructureProtection - Integrated Protective Measures Analysis (IPMA) report and this report primarily deals with the terrorismthreats. I have not been successful getting this either - I know it is classified.

I'm telling you about this because it is likely to come up on Friday when they have their briefing.2

CK 532 of 3114

I am copying Bonnie Sheffield because I know she is working in the NRC Ops center on the day shift - maybe she hasseen something on the natural hazard part of his request.

I am a little frustrated on how to obtain and if I can even obtain the requested information.

Lisa HammondTechnological Hazards Branch ChiefNP Division, FEMA VI(940)898-5199

3

CK 533 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:36 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Out of Office AutoReply:


. . ..OT.RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T"HE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Madden, Marc [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 12:09 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Out of Office AutoReply:

Folks,

I am out of the office today and won't be able to respond until Tuesday.

If you need immediate assistance, please contact my supervisor, Steve Burgess, at Steven.P.Burgess(t-vfema.gov.

Have a great day!

Marc Madden

CK 534 of 3114


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:36 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.


0700-15001500-2300

DO NOT RELEASE. OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: LIA01 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 10:28 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.

thanks

From: LIA05 HocSent: Monday, March 21, 2011 10:24 AMTo: LIA11 Hoc; LIA01 HocSubject: FW: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.

FYI

Bonnie Sheffield DayshiftKen Wiennan NightshiftFEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

0700-15001500-2300

DO NOT,,REEASE GUTSIDE'OF TIIE FEDERAL FA•HL•

From: Ward, Paul [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 9:35 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. Quinn; Ward,PaulSubject: RE: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.

It's really EPA's call. This should probably go to Ed Tupin and the Advisory Team over there

CK 535 of 3114

(b)(5)

Paulpaul.ward(cdhs..ov

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 6:46 PMTo: Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. Quinn; Ward, PaulSubject: FW: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.Importance: High

May want to have our HPS take a look at this. (b)(5)


**+*++FO 014WIIAL USE UN',LY**'•'•

DO NOT RELEASE .UTS..E OF THE FEDER~ FALHEY

From: LIA04 HocSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 6:42 PMTo: LIA01 Hoc; LIA11 Hoc; LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.

Federal Liaison and Ken:

I'm still awaiting a fact or summary sheet (as promised by Helen Sterling of DHS/CBP) on baggage/passenger screening

for rad isotopes. It has not yet arrived, and I have left her a message.

Any thoughts on the following...

Richard TurtilState Liaison - Liaison TeamIncident Response Center

From: Maier, BillSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 5:52 PMTo: LIA04 HocSubject: FW: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.

2

CK 536 of 3114

Not sure how to bin this. I suppose it goes into the "suggestions from state stakeholders" pile, but is more appropriatelydirected to DHS/TSA/CBP, would you agree? Not sure if he has submitted it to them since only 3 addressees are on theincoming message below and none are DHS.

My recommendation:

Forward to Federal Liaison for consideration of forwarding on to DHS.

Bill

From: Aubrey Godwin [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 3:09 PMTo: Maier, Bill; [email protected]; [email protected]: Request for emergency/temporay std for surveying passengers/baggage.

Please see attached.

ThanksAubrey GodwinAZ Radiation Regulatory Agency

<<Contamination.doc>>

3

CK 537 of 3114

REQUEST FOR PASSENGERIBAGAGE CONTAMINATION LMITS.

(b)(5)

CK 538 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:35 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Response - Aerial Monitoring Results


.'"f-FGR OFFiCiAL USE ONL ........

DO NOT RELEASE OUT01DE or TIlE FEDERAL FAAILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:14 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: OST02 HOC; FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: Response - Aerial Monitoring Results

No. I have not been on shift and have not received the results via Blackberry/email.

From: LIA05 HocTo: Weber, MichaelSent: Sun Mar 20 20:11:08 2011Subject: RE: query - Aerial Monitoring Results

Mr. Weber,

Do you have the AMS data from today? Thank you for your attention to this matter.


...... IAL U NLY.......DO NOT RELEASE OUTS1DE OF THE FEDERAL FAMRYi

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 4:48 PMTo: PMTO1 HocCc: OST02 HOC; LIA05 Hoc; Sheron, BrianSubject: query - Aerial Monitoring Results

CK 539 of 3114

The NRC has received this information from DOE through the Ops Center, correct? As I recall, DOE committed to sharing

this information twice daily at 0600 and 1800. Please advise.

From: Sheron, BrianSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 4:42 PMTo: Boger, Bruce; Wiggins, Jim; Weber, MichaelSubject: FW: Aerial Monitoring Results

See below. Is DOE providing us with this information through separate channels? If not, let me know and I'll

call DOE (J. Kelly) and request they provide it to the NRC RC.

From: Adams, Ian [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 4:14 PMTo: Aoki, Steven; [email protected]; DAgostino, Thomas; (b)(6) [email protected];

(b)(6) I Grossenbacher, John (INL);I (b)(6) Kelly, John E (NE); Koonin, Steven; Lyons,

Peter; McFarlane, Harold; [email protected]; Sheron, Brian; [email protected]; SCHU; Adams, Ian;Owens, Missy; Hurlbut, Brandon; [email protected]; Poneman, DanielSubject: Aerial Monitoring Results

Attached, please find the most recent measurements from last night's aerial monitoring flights.

Please do not forward this information or cc: anyone else as it is sensitive. However, please copy all the individuals on this emailwhen responding to this group so that everyone has the same information.

Thanks,

Ian AdamsOffice of the SecretaryDepartment of Energy(202) [email protected]

2

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AMS Measurements, DOE Team AMS Operations 17-18 March 2011

- Two missions using military C-12 aircraft (fixed wing)* Serpentine and parallel patterns in the reactor vicinity at an

altitude of 1000 ft.- UH-1 aircraft (helicopter)

* Flights over U.S. facilities, including Embassy and military bases,at an altitude of 500 ft.

* Plot interpretation- Areas exceeding EPA Emergency Phase PAGs are shown in red

and orange.- AMS data is presented as exposure rate 1 meter from the ground at

the time the measurements occurred.- All measured exposure rates are assumed to be due to ground

deposition. This is a conservative estimate because some of themeasured dose is airborne. Measurements of ground truth under theflight path will be taken during the next 24 hours.

CK 541 of 3114

Aeria MonioringResuls FJ U S I NIA DAI I

C.12AWD6

'18-ftmem

NotoPuMiDWAsibtio

tIax

~mum31tINP9T wwwmomg'jmmur

I s ~ .m i ftwommI se nl

CK 542 of 3114

Conclusions from AerialMeasurements

The greatest concentration of contaminated material islocated to the northwest of the accident site

* There is a narrow band to the northwest beyond 13 milesfrom the site where the integrated 4-day doses approachor exceed 1 Rem

* As of 18 March the aerial measurements have notcovered a large enough geographical location tocompletely map out the extent of the contamination

3

CK 543 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:35 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: SITREP: MARCH 20 (1600 EDT)Attachments: SITREP 20110320_REPPJapanEarthquake 1.docx


'ýFOR-OFFICIAL USE ONLY'~DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T-flE FEDERAL FAMELY

From: Sheffield, Bonnie [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, March 21, 2011 7:43 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Fw: SITREP: MARCH 20 (1600 EDT)


From: Simpson, John <[email protected]>To: Simpson, John <[email protected]>; Horwitz, Steve <[email protected]>; Colman, Steve<[email protected]>; Thomson, Rebecca <[email protected]>; Hammons, Darrell<[email protected]>; Burnside, Conrad <[email protected]>; King, William <[email protected]>;Hammond, Lisa <[email protected]>; McCabe, Ron <[email protected]>; Feighert, Dan<[email protected]>; Fiore, Craig <[email protected]>; Connell, Renae <[email protected]>; Seward,Andrew <[email protected]>; Harworth, Joseph <[email protected]>; Sheffield, Bonnie<[email protected]>Cc: Kish, James <[email protected]>; Greten, Timothy <[email protected]>; Quinn, Vanessa<Vanessa.Quinn @dhs.gov>; Coons, Albert <[email protected]>; Purvis, James <[email protected]>; Hobbs,Terry <Terry. [email protected]>; Berkey, Johanna <Johanna. [email protected]>; Hlavaty-LaPosa, Janet <[email protected]>; Seward, Andrew <[email protected]>; Connell, Renae <[email protected]>; Howard,Mike <mike. [email protected]>; Howe, Michael <Michael. [email protected]>; Sherwood, Harry<[email protected]>; Ralston, Michelle <[email protected]>; Spencer, Odis <[email protected]>;Sheffield, Bonnie <[email protected]>; Freeman, Carol (b)(6)

Sent: Sun Mar 20 15:51:37 2011Subject: RE: SITREP: MARCH 20 (1600 EDT)

SITREP for 20 MARCH is attached.

CK 544 of 3114

From:

Sent:To:Subject:

LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:34 PMFOIA Response.hoc Resource

FW: FW: HHS State/Territory 2011 Pacific Basin Earthquake/Tsunami Conference Call


0700-15001500-2300

DO NOT RELEASE OUT.SIDE OF - .IlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: OST02 HOCSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 7:35 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: FW: HHS State/Territory 2011 Pacific Basin Earthquake/Tsunami Conference Call

See enclosed.

From: LIA05 HocSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 7:34 PMTo: OST02 HOCSubject: RE: FW: HHS State/Territory 2011 Pacific Basin Earthquake/Tsunami Conference Call

Do you have the call in information? Thank you for your attention to this matter.


...... FO OFICIAL USE ONL.:*:'DO NOT RELEASE OUT.SI.DE OF THE FEDERAL FAIL-

CK 545 of 3114

----- Original Appointment -----From: OST02 HOCSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 7:29 PMTo: OS Secretarys Operations CenterCc: LIA05 Hoc; LIA01 Hoc; LIA08 HocSubject: Accepted: FW: HHS State/Territory 2011 Pacific Basin Earthquake/Tsunami Conference CallWhen: Tuesday, March 22, 2011 5:00 PM-6:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).Where: ASPR Main Conference Room - 638G

Ned Wright from the USNRC will be participating in this conference call.

Thank you

2

CK 546 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:34 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Re:

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshifi 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

.FGR,~ OFFHIeAL USE GNLT 1 '"~DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TFIlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Thomson, Rebecca [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 2:38 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Re:

Bonnie - tried calling you back. No answer. I do not have the # of NYSLt Gov. Did RI1 get it for you? R

From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: Thomson, Rebecca <[email protected]>Sent: Sun Mar 20 14:22:25 2011Subject:

Ms. Thomson,Sorry to bother you, but this is important

NRC is requesting information on the contact information for the State of New York, the Lt Governors' office numbers. Amessage was left and an email sent to Region II for the information.


A,1 IX%1K.1,% UJI lCK•_'k . U wJiP•• l ......D. 2O- NO AS USE "EOFLY*f E.. FEDERAL FAAI*L

CK 547 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:34 PM

To: FOIA Response.hoc Resource

Subject: FW: Friday's NRC Assessment to US Power Plants


.FOR OFFiCIAL USE13NV(-" .....

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Simpson, John [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 12:16 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Horwitz, Steve; Sherwood, HarrySubject: Friday's NRC Assessment to US Power Plants

Bonnie....is the content of this release available to FEMA....and can it be released outside the federal family?

From: Freeman, Carol [mailtc (b)(6)Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:35 AMTo: [email protected]: Partlow, Courtney; Haney, Elizabeth; Noecker, RobertSubject: Fw: SITREP: MARCH 19 (1600 EDT)

Hi John, Can you forward what the NRC sent to all US nuclear power plants on Friday - we have noted the relevant press

release below. We understand the notice provides a brief overview of how the earthquake and tsunami are understood

to have disabled several key cooling systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, and also hampered efforts

to return those systems to service. Not sure if this was in the SITREP yesterday? Good for us to have,and hopefully post

on a SharePoint site!

The press release:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-052.pdf

Also we are planning to have a team member watch the NRC webcast scheduled for 9am Monday morning and take

notes - especially of the Q and A.

If you see anything else today that we should pay particular attention to tomorrow morning please forward along.

Thanks. Carol

CK 548 of 3114

From: Simpson, John [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 08:25 AMTo: Freeman, CarolSubject: RE: SITREP: MARCH 19 (1600 EDT)

Hi Carol.

We're just a skeleton crew again today, so I'll be assembling the SITREP for Sunday with the help of some staff from

FEMA Region IV. Our hope is to push it out around 2:00 PM today because our late sources of information (FRPCC,IMAT, etc) will not have calls today. The responsibility will likely shift to the HQ staff again on Monday and I fly back toChicago on Tuesday to participate in the Dresden exercise.

I wish I could stick around to help implement changes to the obstacles of information flow we've identified, but Chicagois just a mouse click away! I'll see all of you tomorrow, though. Enjoy your Sunday.

From: Freeman, Carol [mailtot (b)(6)

Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 9:09 AMTo: Simpson, JohnSubject: RE: SITREP: MARCH 19 (1600 EDT)

Hi John, thanks so much for cc:ing me on this. Do I understand that Harry will be taking care of today's? I will plan toget in early on Monday (7:30) and then let's coordinate how you organized the documents used for Sit Rep and how wecan support going forward. Thanks. Carol

Carol Freeman I Vice President I 240.747.4901 (b)(6) ]

ICF Macro 1 11420 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852 I 240.747.5455 (f)

From: Simpson, John [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Saturday, March 19, 2011 4:44 PMTo: Horwitz, Steve; Colman, Steve; Thomson, Rebecca; Hammons, Darrell; Burnside, Conrad; King, William; Hammond,Lisa; McCabe, Ron; Feighert, Dan; Fiore, Craig; Connell, Renae; Seward, Andrew; Harworth, Joseph; Sheffield, BonnieCc: Kish, James; Greten, Timothy; Quinn, Vanessa; Coons, Albert; Purvis, James; Hobbs, Terry; Berkey, Johanna;Hlavaty-LaPosa, Janet; Seward, Andrew; Connell, Renae; Howard, Mike; Howe, Michael; Sherwood, Harry; Ralston,Michelle; Simpson, John; Spencer, Odis; Sheffield, Bonnie; Freeman, CarolSubject: RE: SITREP: MARCH 19 (1600 EDT)

1600 EDT 19 MAR 11 SITREP is attached.

2

CK 549 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:34 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Request for information

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wiernan Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

..... i•R O-fiAIAL UdýISE ? IfY.......

DO NOT RELEAE OUTSIDE OF THIE FED ERL FA MIL

From: LIA01 HocSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 12:55 PMTo: [email protected]: LIA05 HocSubject: Request for information

John

The information notice sent out by the NRC to its licensees was to make them aware of the situation of the Japanesereactors and to review mitigation strategies ordered after the 9/11 attack to maintain or restore core cooling and spentfuel cooling and the large loss of the facility due to fires, explosions from any causes.

This information notice did not require any response or status update back to the NRC, only to review existing strategiesand procedures.

Ned WrightNRC Federal Liaison

CK 550 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:33 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FO1A


*FOR oFFICiAL USE ONLY" "TR. NOT ..... fE ...... ..... FEDERAL .......

From: Quinn, Vanessa [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 11:16 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; Dan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; TimGreten; Vanessa E. QuinnCc: DeFelice, Anthony; Horton, Douglas; Kish, JamesSubject: RE: FOIA

Thanks Bonnie

From: [email protected] [mailto: prvs=053680d6a= [email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 10:54 AMTo: Dan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten;Vanessa E. QuinnCc: DeFelice, Anthony; Horton, DouglasSubject: FOIAImportance: High

Just received an update on the FOIA, it is for NRC and it components only, at this time. The official FOIA will be sent tous later for your review. At this time it is NRC only.


"FOR OFFC• . A• USE ,NP, YDONO fLLV.E USIDE OF THlE FEEA FA

CK 551 of 3114

I

From:

Sent:To:Subject:

Attachments:

Importance:

LUA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:34 PM

FOLA Response.hoc ResourceFW: On behalf of Timothy Greten, Deputy Director, FEMA THD/ FRPCC ExecutiveSecretariat: March 17th FRPCC Minutes

FRPCC Meeting Minutes 17Mar2011.docx

High

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wiennan Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

'FOR OFFIeAL .USE ONLY-*****DO NOT, RELEASE OUTSE . OF THE r ,' FEDERA FA,,X'Y

From: Quinn, Vanessa [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 12:10 PMTo: Sheffield, Bonnie; LIA05 HocCc: Quinn, VanessaSubject: FW: On behalf of Timothy Greten, Deputy Director, FEMA THD/ FRPCC Executive Secretariat: March 17thFRPCC MinutesImportance: High

Hi Bonnie:

Please let me know that you received them. Thanks

1

CK 552 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:33 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Meetings

Bonmie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

!I CMo iIAL USE ONL•Y•

-DO NOT RE'A~kS OUTT ~IEO ~EFDRLF~

From: Quinn, Vanessa [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:41 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Meetings

I think it is hard on all of us, but call me when you get a moment.

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:40 AMTo: Quinn, VanessaSubject: RE: Meetings

I am fine for now, maybe later in the week or so. How are you doing? This has to be hard on you.


......... OFFICIAL USE ONLY*****..


From: Quinn, Vanessa [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:32 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Meetings

Are you getting tired; would you like to have a day off?

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 8:15 AM

CK 553 of 3114

To: Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. QuinnCc: James. [email protected]: Meetings

FYI

Commission Meeting scheduled for Monday, March 21 (significant public/media attentionexpected) Bill Borchardt presenting - topics include supporting activities in Japan, justificationfor continued operation of U.S. facilities, and path forward for NRC staff.

No further information at this time.


...... OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*,..DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMLY

2

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Bonnie Sheffield DayshiftKen Wicrman NightshiftFEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:33 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: Invitation to a Forum on March 25th Chicago, ILimage001.png; image002.png; imageO03.png; imageO04.png; Invitation LetterJaczko.pdf

0700-15001500-2300

.*****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*-


From: Schmidt, RebeccaSent: Sunday, March 20, 2011 7:06 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Fw: Invitation to a Forum on March 25th Chicago, IL

From: Riley (OCA), TimothyTo: Schmidt, RebeccaCc: Powell, AmySent: Fri Mar 18 20:30:19 2011Subject: FW: Invitation to a Forum on March 25th Chicago, IL

Becky,Attached is the hardcopy of invitation to attend IL Forum from Senators Durbin and Kirk.

From: Hunt, Jasmine (Durbin) [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 8:28 PMTo: Riley (OCA), Timothy; Powell, AmyCc: Neimeyer, Sarah (Durbin); Walter, Sarah (Kirk)Subject: Invitation to a Forum on March 25th Chicago, IL

Hello,

Senators Durbin and Kirk would like to invite Chairman Jaczko to a public forum on Friday, March 25th in Chicago,IL to discuss the safety of the nuclear power plants in Illinois. They would like to hear his thoughts on how U.S.nuclear standards differ from those in Japan. The forum will be in a 'hearing' style format with questions for theSenators following a short opening statement from all the participants on the panel. Please let me know if you willbe able to attend.

CK 555 of 3114

Bests,Jasmine Hunt

Jasmine N. Hunt

Office of Senator Richard J. DurbinAssistant Majority Leader711 Senate Hart Office Buildingjasmine hunt(@durbin.senate.gov202.224.2152

Visit Senator Durbin's Website I Follow Senator Durbin:

1 To Joe

CK 556 of 3114

Sunitcdl ýtatts 6cna tcWASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 18, 2011

The Honorable Gregory JaczkoChairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Chairman Jaczko:

We would appreciate your participation in a public forum on the safety of nuclear energyand nuclear reactors at 1:00 pm on Friday, March 25th at the Everett M. Dirksen U.S. Courthousein Chicago, Illinois.

The tragic events in Japan following the 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami hasrenewed attention on the role of nuclear energy in Illinois and the safety precautions andmeasures in place at Illinois' nine nuclear power plants and stations.

Through this forum, we hope to hear from stakeholders and experts about the safetyfeatures at Illinois' nuclear power plants and preparedness for damage incurred by naturaldisasters such as tornado, earthquakes, and floods. The reactor units at the Quad Cities andDresden plants are the same design and approximate age of the units in the Fukushima Daiichiplant. Additionally, the Zion nuclear power station has spent nuclear fuel, the biggest concern atFukushima, along the shores of Lake Michigan. We would like to highlight any additionalprotective modifications that may have been taken at the plants after the Three Mile Islandaccident and the attacks on September 1 1 h 2001.

The courthouse is located at 219 S. Dearborn Street and the event will be in room 1418 at1:00 PM. As a (nuclear energy expert}, we would greatly appreciate hearing your opinions andviews on the matter and invite you to participate as a presenter. If you are able to participate,please prepare to make a brief oral statement, no more than five minutes, and remain forquestions following all panelist presentations. We understand that as the Chairman of theNuclear Regulatory Commission, your schedule is very busy and would greatly appreciate theattendance of a professional nuclear scientist for the NRC in lieu of your presence.

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I look forward to your participation on March 25th. To confirm your role, or if you haveany questions regarding the forum, please contact Jasmine Hunt at (202) 224-2152 or via emailat [email protected].

Sincerely,

014<IrRichard J. 1)urbin-United States Senator

Mark S. KirkUnited States Senator

CK 558 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:32 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: DHS IP LiaisonQUESTION


.... , OFFICIAL USE ONLY.', 4 *DO NOT RL E S.. USIDE OF TH.E FEDERAL FAMIL..

From: Brooks, Marc [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Saturday, March 19, 2011 6:29 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Nuclear SSASubject: Re: DHS IP LiaisonQUESTION

FEMA REP Liaison,

At approximately 8pm yesterday, DHS/IP received a communication from Mark Thaggard - NRC Liaison Team Directorseeking to finalize the deployment to NRC Operations Center, however, it is unclear if additional dialogue andcoordination ensued between Mr. Conklin and Mr. Thaggard.

Best,Marc

Marc A. Brooks, CPPChief, Nuclear Sector-Specific AgencyOffice of Infrastructure ProtectionDepartment of Homeland SecurityOffice: (703) 603-5116Blackberry:I (b)(6)

[email protected]

From: LIA05 Hoc [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Saturday, March 19, 2011 05:51 PMTo: [email protected] <[email protected]>Subject: DHS IP LiaisonQUESTION

Mr. Brooks,

CK 559 of 3114

Has anyone heard about DHS IP deploying a liaison to the NRC Operations Center? I understand that there were phoneconversations between Mr. Conklin and the Liaison Team Director yesterday and it is on an action list but no one can geta status.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.


0700-15001500-2300

****FOLRX IFFIIAL USE .. %.IFDO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

2

CK 560 of 3114

From: LUA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:31 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FEMA Staff in Crystal CityAttachments: TH Activities.docx


***" FOR OFFICIAL USE. . .... ....

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDiERAl L FAMILY

From: Sheffield, Bonnie [mailto: [email protected]]Sent: Saturday, March 19, 2011 12:29 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Fw: FEMA Staff in Crystal City


From: Sherwood, Harry <[email protected]>To: Simpson, John <[email protected]>; Sheffield, Bonnie <[email protected]>; Horwitz, Steve<[email protected]>; Ralston, Michelle <Michelle. [email protected]>Cc: Quinn, Vanessa <[email protected]>; Kish, James <[email protected]>; Greten, Timothy<[email protected]>; Seward, Andrew <[email protected]>; Feighert, Dan <[email protected]>Sent: Sat Mar 19 11:45:16 2011Subject: RE: FEMA Staff in Crystal City

Allcon,

Here is the ongoing status update as of 1100.

Feel free to use this and add to it as required.

Thanks,

Harry

From: Simpson, JohnSent: Saturday, March 19, 2011 11:24 AMTo: [email protected]; Horwitz, Steve; Ralston, MichelleCc: [email protected]; Sherwood, HarrySubject: FW: FEMA Staff in Crystal City

1

CK 561 of 3114

Bonnie....here are bullets that capture our involvement today. I'll look for the addressees to add to this list:

Media monitoring, situational awareness

Participation is teleconferences with our federal partners

Dialogue with Regional offices and RAC Chairs in response to questions from our state and local partners

Review and refinement of technologies to collect, analyze, and disseminate emergency information

Preparation of daily SITREP

From: Simpson, JohnSent: Saturday, March 19, 2011 11:14 AMTo: [email protected]: FEMA Staff in Crystal City

Bonnie....I spoke with Vanessa. Can we talk for a bit? My cell il (b)(6)

JOHN D. SIMPSON

2

CK 562 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:31 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Overtime/Comp Time for THDAttachments: FEMA Policy Scheduling Work 3000.2.pdf; FEMA OT- CT policy and guidance.doc; FEMA

Overtime Policy 3200-1.pdf


******FOR OFF!ICAL USE ONLV*ILDO NOT- RELEASE OUTSfIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Wierman, Kenneth [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Saturday, March 19, 2011 2:48 PMTo: LIA05 Hoc. (b)(6)

Subject: Fw: Overtime/Comp Time for THD

Kenneth L. Wierman Jr.Policy and Regulations UnitRadiological Emergency PreparednessFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) HeadquartersOffice: (202) 212-3711Blackberry (b)(6) Ikenneth.wierman(adhs.qov----------------------


From: Seward, AndrewTo: THD-EmployeesSent: Sat Mar 19 13:47:56 2011Subject: Overtime/Comp Time for THD

Good afternoon THD Team,

Per the direction at the Friday All Hands meeting, here is the guidance from THD Business Operations on how we willdocument time during this period of additional work related requirements.

The two most important items are as follows:

1. Document all official time worked in order to receive equitable compensation.2. Document all official time worked so THD can account for total Divisional hours. This is how we document "Total

THD Program Cost" in order to show "Return on Investment" to industry.

I

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Lets 1Vt start with; We are not officially in an "Emergency" as the President has not declared any such status for the US.Because of this we should not use the "Surge" account.

Please view the attached documents to have the explicit guidance from FEMA OCFO in regards to Overtime andCompensatory Time.Specifically view Table 1. of document "FEMA OT - CT policy and guidance".

In General:

1. If you are a GS-9 and above, you are generally not authorized to document time as "Overtime" unless we are ina declared "Emergency" situation (we are not). You can only document your time as Compensatory Time.

2. If you are a GS-8 and below, please refer to the Table 1 or to FEMA instruction 3200.1 for the guidance as youhave options.

Most of us should only have a few categories in our WebTa in conjunction with the additional time we are working tocover requirements:

1. Regular Base Pay2. Comp Time Earned3. Over time over 40 hours4. Or one of the particular "Travel"/"TDY" categories

Lastly: The last page of the attached "FEMA Overtime Policy 3200.1" is FEMA form 30-7 "Overtime Justification,Authorization and Certification" this form MUST be filled out, signed, and submitted to THD Business Operations Financeand Budget by ALL personnel documenting Overtime or Compensatory Time on a weekly basis (every Friday). This willallow the THD Finance and Budget team to track all additional hours worked and ensure appropriate funding is availableto compensate THD employees.

I hope this helps..

Semper Fi,

Andrew (Drew) SewardBusiness Operations ManagerDHS/FEMA/NPD/THD(o) 202-646-2254(c) (b)(6)andrew.seward I @dhs. gov

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FEMA OCFO Internal Policy and Procedural Information

Authorization/Approval and Recording of Overtime, Compensatory Time,and Credit Hours for Time and Attendance Purposes

OVERTIME/COMPENSATORY (OT/CT)TIME

In accordance with Agency policy, overtime and compensatory time must be directed andauthorized by management in advance of the hours being worked. Overtime work may berequired by Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) management to meet programrequirements; to assist another FEMA organization; or to support disaster and special eventactivities. OCFO procedures for authorizing and recording the hours worked in these situationsare described below. Table 1. is provided at the end of this section to illustrate how exempt/nonexempt employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) may be compensated - paidovertime vs. compensatory time - for the hours worked.

Non-disaster Overtime Work Funded by OCFO or Other FEMA Offices. Immediate supervisorsare authorized to approve overtime/compensatory time, and are responsible for certifying theactual number of hours worked by employees. All overtime work, whether paid orcomnpensatory, shall be approved only when it is absolutely essential because no otheralternatives are available to perform the required work.

Supervisors will direct/authorize the requirement for overtime-in advance-via email to theaffected employee(s). This notification will cite the date(s) the work is expected to be performedand provide an estinate of the total number of hours to be worked by the employee(s). Uponbeing notified, the employee(s) will submit an on-line webTA "premium pay" request reflectingtheir estimated premium pay hours, and the supervisor will approve the request prior to the workbeing performed. The on-line approval will automatically populate the timecard with theestimated hours. If the actual hours worked differ from the approved request (estimated), theemployee will manually modify the timecard accordingly in the "Edit T&A Data" feature andinclude the following statement in the Remarks box: "Timecard modified to record actualpremium pay hours worked."

Occasionally, other FEMA offices may seek support from the OCFO that would involveovertime. In these instances, immediate supervisors will obtain a formal email request for staffsupport from the program officials, along with the account code to be charged, beforedirecting/authorizing the overtime. Subsequently, immediate supervisors will requestverification from the program officials of the hours worked by OCFO employees.

Non-disaster premium pay is charged to the employees' "home accounts," unless it isrequested/funded by another FEMA organization.

Disaster Overtime Work Associated with Deployment or Response Team Activation. This typeof overtime work is directed through established emergency notification methods and verified byfield office or team management officials. Completed and signed NRCC, RRCC, or JFO hard-

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copy timesheets, which reflect actual hours worked, will serve as the authorizing documentationin lieu of on-line webTA "premium pay" requests. Employees, timekeepers, and supervisors willuse these timesheets to complete, validate, and certify timecards. In these situations, employeesmust manually enter the hours in the "Edit T&A Data" feature of webTA. "Disaster" overtimemust be paid and charged to the appropriate disaster accounts (surge or specific disaster).Compensatory time may not be claimed. Regular hours for PFT and CORE staff are alwayscharged to their "home" account.

Other. There may be limited, unique cases or positions where overtime, while not directed bythe supervisor, is necessary and ongoing due to external requirements. For such cases,employees must discuss the requirements with their supervisors and obtain general approval, viaemail, to work an estimated number of hours per week. This email will serve as a standingadvance approval of overtime until rescinded or the requirement no longer exists. It will alsoserve as the authorizing documentation in lieu of on-line webTA "premium pay" requests. Inthese situations, employees must manually enter the hours worked in the "Edit T&A Data"feature of webTA. A copy of the email overtime approval should be provided to the timekeeperfor their awareness and validation purposes.

Table I. OT/CT Compensation for FLSA Exempt/Nonexempt Employees

FLSA Exempt I FLSA NonexemptGenerally, GS-9 and above (or any positions Generally, GS-8 and below.below GS-9 designated exempt by Personnel).

Paid OT or CT (employee's choice) may be Generally, only paid OT may be authorized/authorized/approved, approved.

Employees GS-10 and above are entitled to CT Under certain circumstances employees may electonly, except for work performed in connection either paid OT or CT (refer to examples in FEMAwith a disaster. Instruction 3200.1).

All overtime work performed in connection with All overtime work performed in connection witha disaster must be paid OT. a disaster must be paid OT.

To use earned CT hours, employees must submit an on-line webTA leave request to theirsupervisor for approval.

CREDIT HOURS

In accordance with Agency policy, full-time/part-time employees on approved flexitour (variableworkday) schedules, may earn credit hours for work performed in excess of their normal dutyhours. Credit hours are voluntary and employee-initiated, but require the supervisor's approvalin advance. Employees interested in working credit hours should talk with their supervisor, andif not already on the flexitour schedule, submit FEMA Form 30-45, Request for Approval ofWork Schedule, for their signature. Once a flexitour schedule is approved, employees will needto ask their timekeeper to update the webTA profile to reflect the Variable Workday Schedule.Employees will submit an on-line webTA "premium pay" request reflecting their estimatedcredit hours for the pay period and the supervisor will approve the request prior to the work

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being performed. The on-line approval will automatically populate the timecard with theestimated hours. If the actual hours worked differ from the approved request (estimated), theemployee will manually modify the timecard accordingly in the "Edit T&A Data" feature andinclude the following statement in the Remarks box: "Timecard modified to record actual credithours worked."

Restrictions on credit hours include:

Maximum number of hours that can be earned: 2 per day or 20 per pay period.Maximum number of hours that can be carried over to the next pay period: 24.Cannot be earned on weekends.

> Cannot be converted to overtime or compensatory time.

To use earned credit hours, employees must submit an on-line webTA leave request to theirsupervisor for approval.

More detailed information on overtime, compensatory time, credit hours, and FLSA can befound on the intranet in FEMA Instruction 3200.1, Overtime Policy, and FEMA Manual 3000.2,Scheduling of Work. FLSA-related information also can be found via the internet atwww.opm.gov/flsa/fact/fact.htm.

If you have any questions concerning this memorandum, please contact Becky Perfect on202-646-2939.

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Department of Homeland SecurityWashington, D.C. 20472

Federal Emergency Management AgencyDirectives Management System FEM A

INSTRUCTIONNumber Date Organization

3200.1 January 18,2006 HRD

OVERTIME POLICY

1. Purose. This instruction establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FederalEmergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) policy on (a) overtime (paid and compensatory);(b) incorporates the minimum standards for employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act;(c) provides guidance with respect to overtime worked in connection with disasters; (d)provides guidance with respect to overtime worked in connection with official travel; and (e)describes the policy on employees performing work at home for which they will receivecompensation.

2. Applicability and Scope.

a. The provisions of this instruction apply to all full-time FEMA employees inheadquarters, regions, fixed facilities, and field establishments, regardless of the pay systemunder which they are paid; and

b. Intermittent or part-time employees of FEMA (exclusive of consultants and experts whoare paid at a daily rate) who are required to work in excess of 8 hours on a given day (or 9 hoursfor those employees on a Compressed Work Schedule (CWS)), or in excess of 40 hours in agiven work week.

3. Supersession. This instruction supersedes FEMA Instruction 3200.1, Overtime Policy, datedOctober 1, 1984.

4. References.

a. GAO Policy and Procedures Manual For Guidance of Federal Agencies, Title 6, Pay,Leave and Allowances.

b. FEMA Manual 3000.3, Program Guidance for Flexible Workplace Environment - FEMATelework Program, dated July 2000.

Distribution: J(AllPersHQFld), and http://cio.fema.net/rm/dmn/

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January 18, 2006 Janury 8, 006FEMIA Instruction 3200.1

c. FEMA Instruction 3250. 1, Time and Attendance, dated March, 1992.

d. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as amended (29 U.S.C. §201-219).

e. Title 5, United States Code (USC), Chapters 53, 55, and 61.

f. Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 550, 55 1, and 610.

5. Policy,

a. All overtime work, whether paid or compensatory time, shall be authorized only when it isabsolutely essential because no other alternatives are available to perform the required work.

b. When continuous coverage is necessary and feasible, tours of duty shall be adjusted orestablished on a shift basis rather than by ordering or approving overtime.

c. Travel shall be scheduled during the administrative workday whenever possible.

d. Overtime and compensatory time must be directed and authorized in advance by thoseofficials with delegated authority to approve overtime or compensatory time. Paragraph 8 belowdescribes specific approval and authorization requirements. Oral approval may be granted whenunforeseen work requirements occur. However, all overtime must be authorized in writing priorto submission of time and attendance reports.

e. No individual shall authorize his/her own overtime.

f. Managers and supervisors will have access to accurate time and attendance records forhours of paid overtime or compensatory time performed by their subordinates.

g. In rare instances, FEMA employees may be authorized to perform overtime orcompensatory work at home. Under these rare instances or emergency situations, only theirOffice or Division Director has the authority to grant exceptions. Requests for authorizations bythe Office or Division Director must be accompanied by supportive written documentationdescribing:

(1) The method to be used to ensure that the work hours claimed are, in fact,performed; and

(2) The specific work products to be completed that will demonstrate that the work wasactually performed.

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FEMA Instruction 3200.1 January 18, 2006

h. Overtime or compensatory time should be supervised by a responsible person, or the workperformed on overtime or compensatory time sufficiently oriented to ensure that overtime isused efficiently.

i. Overtime will be paid to all employees who work for periods of less than one hour, in noless than 15 minute increments.

6. Positions.

a. FLSA exempts certain employees from minimum wage and overtime provisions. Suchexemptions include most Federal employees in grades GS-9 and above who occupy executive,administrative, and professional positions; most supervisory positions; and a few specializedtechnical positions.

b. In cases where grade does not determine exempt status, the FEMA Human ResourcesDivision will assist in determining which employees are FLSA nonexempt or exempt.

c. The general rule applied to determine whether a position is FLSA exempt or nonexempt isas follows:

(1) Positions in grade GS-8 or below will be nonexempt, and positions in grades GS-9and above will be exempt. Some positions between grades GS-7 and GS-1 1 may require aspecific determination by the Human Resources Division on an individual basis.

7. Concept of Suffer or Permit

a. FLSA places on managers and supervisors the responsibility to ensure that overtime is notworked by nonexempt employees under their supervision except when payment for suchovertime is intended. Under FLSA, a nonexempt employee becomes entitled to overtimecompensation (for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week) for all work which the employersuffers or permits to be performed.

b. Under this concept, any work performed by a nonexempt employee for the benefit of theagency, whether requested or not, is working time if the supervisor knows of or has reason tobelieve work is being performed.

c. Supervisors must ensure that nonexempt employees work only during their scheduledtours of duty unless overtime work is specifically authorized.

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January 18,2006 FEMA Instruction 3200.1

8. Authority to Authorize and Approve Overtime (Paid or Compensatory).

a. Paid overtime for employees and compensatory time for employees in grades GS-l 0 andabove that has been determined to be essential shall be authorized by the first line supervisor (butnot below Chief level).

b. Paid overtime and compensatory time for employees in grades GS- 10 and above shall beapproved only by the Director, Deputy Director, Director of Operations, Division Directors,Administrator, Office Directors, General Counsel, Regional Directors, and the FederalCoordinating Officers or Disaster Recovery Managers of a Disaster Field Office. In the absenceof the approving official, the person acting in that capacity shall approve overtime.

c. Refer to paragraph 11 below for guidance regarding levels of approval authority forovertime work at a disaster site.

9. Restrictions.

a. Paid overtime or compensatory time will not be ordered, permitted, or approved for:

(1) Voluntarily remaining during lunch periods or voluntarily remaining after hours toclean up the business of the day for an employee's personal convenience.

(2) Generation of a need for overtime by an employee's unauthorized absences duringregular work hours. Each authorizing official will assure that their employees are devotingnormal working hours to their job.

(3) Generally, paid overtime or compensatory time will not be authorized for anemployee who has been in a non-pay status (LWOP or AWOL) or on paid leave during the samework week.

10. Compensatory Time in Lieu of Paid Overtime.

a. The premium pay provisions of Title 5, United States Code, also cover those employeeswho are covered by FLSA. Usually, under FLSA, these nonexempt employees must becompensated for overtime work with overtime pay. However, under certain circumstances, thesenonexempt employees may elect either overtime pay or compensatory time.

Example 1:Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Total

Scheduled tour of duty 8 8 8 8 8 40Actual hours worked 10 6 8 8 8 40Overtime work 2 2

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FEMA Instruction 3200.1 January 18, 2006

Compensatory time off 2 2

The employee who performs 2 hours of overtime work under Title 5 on Monday may be grantedcompensatory time off from their scheduled tour of duty on Tuesday or any other workday duringthe remainder of the same workweek. FLSA has no effect if elected by the employee.

Example 2:Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Total

Scheduled tour of duty 8 8 8 40Actual hours worked 14 8 0 44Overtime work 6 12Compensatory time off 8 8

Overtime remaining atthe end of the work week 4

After the completion of work on Thursday, the employee has a total of 44 hours of work for theworkweek and has entitlement of 12 hours of overtime pay. The employee's request for 8 hoursof compensatory time off from the scheduled tour of duty on Friday of the same workweek maybe granted, but the employee must receive overtime pay for the 4 remaining overtime hours.

b. Employees in grades GS-9 and below, who are exempt from FLSA, will be eligible foreither overtime pay or compensatory time for overtime worked. Employees in grades GS-10 andabove will be entitled to compensatory time only for overtime worked, except as provided inparagraph 11 below. Compensatory time will be used as follows:

(1) Within 26 pay periods after being earned;

(2) Prior to the approval of annual leave; and

(3) In the amount of time equal to the overtime hours worked.

c. If compensatory time is not used within 26 pay periods, it is forfeited unless failure to useit is due to an exigency of the service beyond the employee's control. The employee's leaveapproving official will make this determination. The timekeeper will control the time limitationfor use of the hours.

d. Compensatory time will be allowed only to the extent that the comparable monetaryovertime rate will not exceed the maximum payable salary (Annual Pay Cat, Restrictions). Anyhours worked which cause the employee's gross pay to exceed this limit is performed withoutcompensation. However, the amount of compensatory time allowable for employees that are non-

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January 18, 2006 FEMA Instruction 3200.1

exempt under the FLSA, usually at grades GS-8 and below, is not restricted or limited by payablerates and is not subject to annual pay caps.

e. Federal Wage System employees are not entitled to compensatory time off as a substitutefor overtime pay according to Title 5, United States Code.

11. Overtime Worked in Connection with Disasters.

a. Since employees may be subjected to arduous conditions at disaster sites, care should betaken to deploy or employ adequate personnel to alleviate the necessity for approval of extensiveovertime hours. Excessive overtime may cause mental and physical fatigue, which can result inon-the-job accidents as illustrated in the Relative Frequency of Accidents Chart in Attachment A.

b. Overtime worked by FEMA employees while on duty at disaster sites must becompensated as paid overtime for work performed by both exempt and nonexempt employees,provided the overtime work is authorized in writing by the Federal Coordinating Officer, DisasterRecovery Manager, or the Regional Director.

c. The monetary reimbursement will be in keeping with 5 U.S.C §5547, which limits theamount of premium pay to which an employee is entitled to an amount that, in combination withthe employee's basic pay, does not exceed the rate of basic annual pay for a grade GS-15, step 10(including locality rate) employee, or that of an employee in level V of the Executive Schedule,whichever is greater. Title H1, Section 204 of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of1990 (5 U.S.C. §5547(b)), provides that employees who perform work in connection with anemergency that poses a direct threat to life or property, including a forest wildfire emergency, arenot subject to a biweekly maximum earnings limitation on premium pay. Instead, employeesdetermined to be performing work in connection with this type of emergency shall be paidpremium pay under the annual limitation not to exceed the rate for GS-15, step 10, includinglocality rate, or level V of the Executive Schedule, whichever is greater. This limitation does notapply to nonexempt employees.

d. Headquarters, regional office, and field office employees who are required to workovertime in response to disasters are eligible for paid overtime for work performed, but only tothe extent that the monetary reimbursement is in keeping with 5 U.S.C. § 5547. This limitationdoes not apply to FLSA nonexempt employees. (See paragraph 8 for authority to approveovertime.)

e. Credit hours may not be earned or approved in-lieu-of overtime pay for work performedin connection with a disaster.

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FEMA Instruction 3200.1 January 18,2006

12. Work While in Travel Status.

a. Travel time, whenever possible, should be scheduled during an employee's normalworking hours or administrative workday. It is recognized that in some cases, no amount ofagency planning or scheduling will prevent an employee from being required to travel outsideregularly scheduled work hours.

b. Time spent in travel status away from the official duty station of an employee is notconsidered to be hours of employment unless--:

(1) The time spent traveling is within the days and hours of the regularly scheduledadministrative work week;

(2) Involves the performance of work while traveling;

(3) Is incident to travel that involves the performance of work while traveling;

(4) Is carried out under arduous conditions; or

(5) Results from an event which could not be scheduled or controlled administratively.(For example, an employee may be required to travel on a non-workday, e.g., Saturday orSunday, to go to or from an administratively uncontrolled work situation.)

Each request for approval of overtime while in travel status should be considered on a case-by-case basis. The subsequently issued interpretations by FEMA and guidance at 5 CFR §551.422should be consulted prior to final determination on overtime eligibility.

c. With respect to employees who are exempt from FLSA, the time spent traveling is notconsidered hours worked, except when the conditions in paragraph 12.b (1), (4), or (5), above,apply.

d. With respect to FLSA nonexempt employees (i.e., employees who are covered by thatAct), in addition to time spent during the regularly scheduled administrative workweek [seeparagraph 12b(l)], any travel performed on Saturdays and Sundays which is during what wouldbe regular work hours (if it were a workday) is also work time for which the nonexemptemployee may be compensated as overtime.

e. Travel time is only those hours actually spent traveling between the employee's officialduty station and the point of destination, or between two temporary duty points, and for waitingtime which interrupts the travel. When a Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) is ordered toreport to a disaster site, the employee is considered to be in travel status from the time of thescheduled departure from the common carrier terminal, when common carrier is used.

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(1) Time in travel status begins with the scheduled time of departure from the commoncarrier terminal and ends upon arrival at the common carrier terminal located at the point ofdestination.

(2) When an employee travels by automobile from the employee's residence directly tothe point of destination, the time consumed will be considered time spent in travel status. Delayscaused by severe weather conditions and/or mechanical trouble beyond the control of the travelerare subject to administrative approval for overtime.

f. When a DAE is directed to report to a disaster site, it will be considered an unscheduledand administratively uncontrollable event. Therefore, DAEs traveling to or from a disaster sitewill receive compensation, including overtime, if applicable, for their time in travel status. Uponrelease and return home, DAEs will receive eight (8) hours of compensation for their day oftravel.

13. Call-Back Overtime. An employee who is called back to work at any time outside regularlydesignated administrative working hours must be paid overtime or granted compensatory time forat least 2 hours work. This does not apply to stand-by or on-call employees.

14. Holiday Compensation. An employee who works on a designated holiday will be paid attheir basic rate of pay for the first 8 hours(or 9 hours for CWS) worked, in addition to receivingpayment for their regularly scheduled hours of work. Work in excess of 8 (or 9 for CWS) hourswill be compensated at a rate equal to one and one-half times the employee's basic rate of pay.Total compensation can not exceed the biweekly salary for a GS- 15 step 10, subject to thestatutory limitation. The limitation does not apply to FLSA nonexempt employees, however.(See paragraph 10 above for policy and regulations concerning compensatory time in lieu ofovertime pay.

15. Compensatory Time Off for Religious Observances.

a. An employee whose personal religious beliefs require absence from work during certainperiods of time may elect to work overtime to offset the time absent in meeting that religiousobligation.

b. An employee who elects such overtime work will be granted equal compensatory time inlieu of overtime pay.

c. The overtime work must be performed within 2 weeks preceding or 2 weeks following theperiod of religious observance.

d. The authorizing officials for granting compensatory time off for religious observances arethose identified in paragraph 8 above.

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FEMA Instruction 3200.1 January 18,2006

e. Recordkeeping requirements for compensatory time for religious observances are set forthat 5 CFR §550.1002.

16. Computation of Paid Overtime Rates.

a. For employees with rates of basic pay equal to or less than the rate of basic pay for gradeGS-10, step 1, the overtime hourly rate is the employee's hourly rate of basic pay multiplied by1.5.

b. For employees with rates of basic pay greater than the basic pay for grade GS-10, step 1,the overtime hourly rate is the greater of: (1) the hourly rate of pay for GS-10, step 1, multipliedby 1.5 or, (2) the employee's hourly rate of basic pay.

c. For an employee covered by the FLSA (that is, a FLSA "nonexempt" employee), theovertime hourly rate is an amount equal to 1.5 times the hourly rate of the employee's regularpay, or such other overtime rate as may be otherwise authorized by Title 5, Code of FederalRegulations, whichever is greater.

d. Generally, in no pay period can an employee's paid compensation exceed the biweekly ratefor the maximum rate for a grade GS 15, step 10, subject to statutory limitations, but thislimitation does not apply to FLSA nonexempt employees. It also does not apply, except for theannual pay cap restrictions, when under a premium pay cap waiver. Employees determined to beperforming work in connection with an emergency shall be paid premium pay under the annuallimitation not to exceed the rate for GS-15, step 10, including locality rate, or level V of theExecutive Schedule, whichever is greater.

17. Authorizing and Certifying Overtime.

a. Requests for authorization for paid overtime or compensatory time shall be made onFEMA Form 30-07, Overtime Work Justification, Authorization, and Certification,, asillustrated in Attachment B-1. The form will then be routed through supervisory channels to theauthorizing official identified in paragraph 8. A separate FEMA Form 30-07 must be completedfor each appropriation chargeable for the expense (e.g., Salaries and Expenses (S&E) Fund or theDisaster Relief Fund (DRF).

b. After Parts I and II have been completed, and required authorized signatures have beenobtained, the original FEMA Form 30-7 shall be maintained by the employee's timekeeper withTime and Attendance (T&A).

c. Paid overtime and compensatory time, earned or used, will be recorded on the employee'stime and attendance report.

0

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d. The completed forms will be used to audit the time and attendance records and overtimereports. Failure to properly record time and attendance is a serious matter which can lead to graveconsequences for both supervisory and non-supervisory personnel alike. Intentional falsificationsare violations of Federal Law and are subject to fine and imprisonment or appropriatedisciplinary action.

18. Exceptions. Exceptions to the requirements of this instruction may be granted by theDirector or his or her designee.

19. Forms Prescribed. This instruction prescribes the use of the FEMA Form 30-07, OvertimeWork Justification, Authorization, and Certification, dated July 1991. This form may beobtained through the FEMA electronic forms website, accessible through the FEMA Intranethome page, or at httvp:Hcio.fema.net/. Hard copies may also be obtained from the PrintingPublications and Graphic Arts Section, Facilities Management and Services Division.

20. Inquiries. All questions regarding the provisions of this instruction should be directed to theHuman Resources Division.

R. David PaulisonActing Director, FEMA

AttachmentA-FEMA Form 30-07

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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCYOVERTIME WORK JUSTIFICATION, AUTHORIZATION AND CERTIFICATION

INSTRUCTIONSPart -Justflcation and Authorization (to be completed by the requesting office)

1. OrganizatIon-Name of organization In which overtime work Is to be performed.

2. Pay Period Ending-Enter ending date of pay period in which overtime work is to be performed.

3. S&E Fars Accounting Code-Enter accounting code to which overtime is to be charged.

4. Estimated No. of hours to be worked-Enter an estimate for the number of overtime hours to be worked.

5-6. SignaturelTitle of Requesting Offlclal and Date-The authorizing official for overtime Is the Immediate supervisor of the work to be performed.The form must be prepared prior to the date(s) on which the work is to be preformed, you except in emergency situations.

7. Justlflcation-Al overtime work must be justified. Ust reasons for requested overtime hours.

8-9. ,•nlat*reTlte of Approving Offlclal and Date-The approving official for overtime work is one of the following or designee: Director, Deputy Director,Executive Director, Associate Director, Administrator, Office Director. Superintendent or Regional Director. For overtime work performed at disaster field offices,the approving official is the Federal Coordinating Officer or Regional Director.

1. ORGANIZATION 2. PAY PERIOD ENDING 3. S&E ACCOUNTING CODE 4. ESTIMATED NO. OF HOURSTO BE WORKED

5. SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL 6. DATE

7. JUSTIFICATION

8. SIGNATURE AND TITLE OF APPROVING OFFICIALIN a WIMPiff

ow-09. DATE

Part U-Certification of Work Performed Undr Above Authorization

10. Name of Employe.-List name(s) of Employee(s) for whom overtime work is being requested. Form may be used to request overtime approval for morethan one employee.

11-3. Self explanatory

14. No. of hours worked-Enter the number of overtime hours emnloyee(s) actually worked.

15. No. of compensatory hours-Enter the number of overtime hours to be credited as compensatory time In lieu of paid overtime pay. (See FEMA Inaftcxton3200.1)

16. CertificatIon-The certifing official is the person for whom the overtime work was performed, generally the supervisor or designee, must sign and date form.certifying that employee(s) isted actually performed the overtime work authorized.

10. NAME OF EMPLOYEE 11. EMPLOYEE 12. GRADE 13. DATE(S) 14. NO. OF 15. NO. OF HOURSSOCIAL SECURITY WORKED HOURS COMPENSATORY

NUMBER WORKED

16. CERTIFICATIONI ceif that the employs) shown performed the Overtime work aufhorized above. In accordance with applicable laws and reguaO ns.

(607shmr &V Tifm d Cerbiv' ofrfjao

FEMA Form 30-7.4M REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION

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.. ..• •. .....•

Federl .Emergency Managem ent Agency

.Washington, D.C. 20472

FEB 9 19S..

MEMORANDUM• FOR: Associate DirectorsAdministrators-Inspector GeneralRegional Directors

Acting Director

• "U CT: ." - Compressed Wo0"k Schedules •

On November ;20, 1992, as the Director, 'ofce of .Human ResourcesManaaement, I for-warded a memorandum to -all employees advising themof the forme .7EIYA Director's a"Ppr.0val;.of 5/4-9 compressed work.scndules (8 nine-hour days,. eight-hour day, and .1 day off per

Day period)." FEM.rA-wide:-."-....sincethat ie, •significant• progress has been made.:in developing•

-.el-ated. 0olicies and-procedures. Based on the degree of. interest..-. - -xAuý -, .ee en a i e of

ex-pressed by emnproyees', . and. USIVe r-esen-atives of.".". .bar.inn uit..em yee, have.decided to~make 5_-9 Compressed

schedules available ZFEM-A-w'e efect.ive.Februarv 21, 1993, or as.. .. soon neeafter :as negotiations with union reDreentatives, arecomu 1 -te and recuired triing has.. been .onduced...

" The.cr-a L.policie s and vrocedures developed by. the Office of Human

Resources Management require agencywide. review and comment and will

.- be" orr-ded. =.for coordination. and concurrence under. separate cover...1:n the meantime, the policies: and procedures are beina adopted o•

an _n•...m basis to facilitat2 _imDlementation without .delav. A

co.DV .of the interim guidance.i.S attached.for your information."

o I the •Office of Human Resourcesl Management will conduct.a 2 n or managers1 sup evisors,.-and timekeepers during the next

•."..e. w s•.• in addition, b ~iefings will.be he'd. to "fami1iarize

•..:.emC- Cvee _ cow pressed schedule. particiation .recuirements..and..pocedures. You or memoers of. yOur Staff, will be contacted• ._ •IV... r_-ng the scheduling of.:these sessions

, 7.nv Oue~stions you may have ..concerning this matter should be-~ '-ct -o heOfica of. Human Resources Manaaements (202). 646-

S•..-..

CK 579 of 3114

@v

'-Federal Emergency Management Agency"Washington, D.C. 20472

FB 9.193

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate DirectorsAdministratorsInspector GeneralRegional Directorso fice Dire -Oto-sC

FROM: - .1 am TidballActing Director.

SUBJECT: Compressvd Wo,_k Schedules•

On November 20, 1992, as the Director, Office of Human Resources

Management, I forwarded a memorandum to. all employees advising them

of the former F::_A Director's approva. of 5/4-9 compressed work

schedules (8 nine-hour days, eight-hour day, and I day off perDav period) FEM•A-wide.

Since that time1 siani÷{cant progress has been made in developing

related .oolicies ando rocedures.. Based on the decree of interest

e,"D-essed by employees, managers, and exclusive representatives of

barcaininc unit emolovees, i have decided to make 5/4-9 compressed

schedules available FENMA-wide effective February 21, 1993, or as

soon .n ...-fter as negotiations with union rereosentatives are

comnDieted and reauired tra-ining has been ponducted.

The draft nolicies and procedures developed by the Office of HumanRescurces Management requie_ agenc-1idce review and comment and will

ne _orw_ _ded for coordination and concurrence under selarate cover.in the meantime, the policies and procedures are beina adopted oi

an interim basis to facilitate impoernentation without delay. A

copv of the interim cuidance is attached for your inorrmation.

Staff of the Office of Human Resources Management will conduct

training for managers, suo_._5-.5 and timekeepers during the next

.Few weeks . in addition, hriif'ng" 7ill be held. to familiarizeemor-.ovees wth. com.pressed schedui. Dartici-atzon__ recuirements and.'

procedures. You or memner.s of your staff will be contacted

cdrect7y regarding the scheduling of these eso.'-ny cuestions you may have concerning this matter should be

direcZed to the Offi ca of Human Resources Management- (202) 646-

{50ioSt a3ff4

CK 580. of 3114.

SCHEDULING OF WORK

INTEPJMA GUIANCE

Office of Human R~souices Mnenn.Offlcý- of Mivanagement Sri-ic;ýs

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FEMA Manual 30-00.2

Contents

ForewordContents Page Paragraph

Chapter 1 - General Information

PurposeApplicability and ScopeSupersessionAuthoritiesReferencesPolicyResponsibilities " - -,-

DefinitionsWork Schedule AdjustmentsLunch PeriodsAbsencesTravelTime AccountingForms Prescribed

!Chanter 2 - Traditional Schedule

GeneralRequirements and ExceptionsCredit HoursOvertime HoursHolidaysPay for Holiday Work

Chanter 3 - Flexitour Schedule

GeneralReauesting Flexitour SchedulesConsideration of Flexitour Schedule Reanests

Credit HoursOvertime HoursHolidaysPay for Holiday Work

Chapter 4 - Five/Four-Nine (5/4-9) Schedule

GeneralRequesting 5/4-9 SchedulesConsideration of 5/4-9 Schedule RequestsCredit HoursOvertime :IoursHolidaysPay for Holiday Work

CK 582 of 3114

Chapter 5 7 Guidance for Time and Attendance ReDorting

GeneralRole of SupervisorsRole of TimekeepersProcedures

Appendix A - DefinitionsAppendix B - FEMA BusinessAppendix C - Federal Holidays

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FEMJ Manual 3000.2

Chapter .

•. General Information

1-1. purpose. This manual establishes the Federal Emergency

Management Agency's (FEMA's) policy and procedures and assignsresponsibilities for establishing work schedules for FEMAemployees.

1-2. Applicability'and Scope.

a. . Coverage. This manual is applicable to FEMA employeesi . J.n headauarters, regions, and field establishments except tho-sespecifically excluded.

b. Exclusions.

(I) Intermittent employees, including DisasterAssistance Employees (DAE's) hired under the Robert T. StaffordDisaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, Title42, United States Code (USC), Section 5121 et sea;

(2) Employees who occupy firefighter positions and arescheduled to work 72 hours per week.

1-3. Suoersession. This manual supersedes FEMA Instruction30D0.2, Hours of Work, dated April 1], 1983, and FEMA Instruction3000..6., Flexitime Policy. dated March 23,'1987.

1-4. Authorities.

a. Title 5, USC 6101b. Title 5, USC 6120

1-5. Reference.

a. Federal Personnel Manual (FP-) Chanter 610b. FPM Supplement 990-2, Book 610

.FEMA Instruction 3200.1-; 0vertiMe--o ic- * ---.

d. FEMA Instruction 3300.3, Absence and Leave Policy.e. FEMA Instruction 3250.1, Time and Attendance

ý-6.. Policy. It is the policy of FEMA to establish workschedules that are in compliance with laws and regulations andthat ensure accomnlishment of the Agency's mission. Workschedules will be established, adjusted, and terminated,- asnecessary., to. carry out FENLA operations efficiently and

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

economically. In establishing work schedules, pertinentconsideration will also be given to needs of individual employeesas well as fair and eauitable treatment of other employees.

1-7. Responsibilities.

a. The Director, FEMA, is responsible for ensuring thatwork schedules are established to accomplish the mission of theAgency.

b. The Director, Office of Human Resources Management, isresponsible for the following:

(1) Providing technical advice and guidance on workschedule policies and procedures to managers, supervisors,employees, and timekeepers;

(2) Conducting periodic evaluations of flexitour andcompressed schedule programs;

(3) Making recommendations to the Director, FEMA, toterminate flexitour and/or compressed schedules when evaluationfindings indicate reduction in productivity, diminished level of'services furnished to the public, or increased operational costs(other than usual administrative costs); and

(4) Ensuring neootiation with exclusive-representatives of bargaining units.

c. The Associate Directors, Administrators, OfficeDirectors, Peaional Directors, and Heads of Field Establishmentsare responsible for the following:.

(1) Approving/disapproving participation in flexitouror compressed work schedules for oroanizational segments orgroups of employees assigned to identifiable functions withintheir organizational elements;

(2) Ensuring that traditional, flexitour, andtompressed work schedules a~ in~Mt~red 1i f=Lr hn -

equitable manner for all employees within their oroanizational

elements;

(3) Ensuring that established*work schedules withintheir organizational elements do not interfere with their missionaccomplishment or that of other organizations; and

(A) Participating in negotiations with exclusiverepresentatives before establishing, changing, or terminatingwork schedules of bargaining unit emnployees.

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

d. SuDervisors are responsible for the following:

(1) Establishing and approving work schedules of.subordinates;

(2) Maintaining an accurate Master.Work Schedule forall employees within the work unit using FEMA Form 30-53A, MasterWork Schedule;

(3) Ensuring adequate coverage during business hours;

.(4) Enforcing the procedures and requirements of thismanual;

(5) Providing written notification and explanation toemployees when requests for work schedule changes are denied;

(6) Except in emergency situations, providing writtenadvance notification to employees when it is necessary to suspendor change work schedules due to operational needs;

(7) Reviewing work schedules to ensure that the dutiesand reauirements of employees' positions are fulfilled;

(8) Establishing a time accounting method thatprovides affirmative or personal knowledge of each employee'sattendance and absences for the purpose of certifying time andattendance reports;

(9) investigating any time-reporting discrepanciesand initiating disciplinary action against employees for failureto comply with the requirements of this manual; and

(1O) Providing timekeepers with informationand

documentation concerning work schedules of employees.-

e. EmDlovees are resDonsible for the followina:

(1) Requesting approval of flexitour or five/four-nine'(5/4-9) work schedules,;. ..-- ..

(2) Adhering to approved work schedules until they arechanged or terminated;.

(3) Complying with the provisions set forth in thismanual and with established work schedule procedures of theorcanizational segment to which assigned;

(4) Accurately recordina their daily arrival anddeparture Limes on sign in/sign out sheets, if- aDropriate;

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

(5) Verifying the information on Time and AttendanceReports (T&A's); and

(6) Submitting requests for use of sick leave, annualleave, credit hours, and compensatory time as far in advance aspossible.

f. Timekeepers are responsible for:

(2) .Recording and reporting employee time andattendance in accordance with the provisions set forth in thismanual and FEMA Instruction 3250.1, Time and Attendance; and

(2) Maintaining time and attendance files for eachemployee, including a copy of approved work schedules foremployees who are on flexitour or 5/4-9 schedules.

2-8. Definitions. For purposes of this manual, terms usedherein are defined and have the meanings stated in Appendix A.

1-9. Work Schedule Adjustments.

a. Modification, suspension or termination of employeesl-work schedules may be necessary to meet organizational needs.Situations that may require modification, suspension, oftermination of an employee's work schedule include:

(1) Unexpected staff vacanciesi

(2) Disaster activities.;.

(3) Travel away from official duty station;

(4) Participation in training;

(5) Assignment on task force;

(6) Exercises; and,

- - .... - . -(7) Other situations or emergencies.where.ad~jns-tme~ntý-_ .-

is deemed necessary by the supervisor..

b. Supervisors will notify employees in writing at -least 2weeks in advance of planned changes in work schedules unless thechange is directly or indirectly related to emergency situations.In such cases, employees will be notified as far in advance aspossible.

c. Emoloyees may reguest changes in their wor- schedules.Such requests -must be submitted in writing at least 2 weeks prior

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

to the date of the requested change. 7f such requests are notreceived within this time frame, changes may be delayed.

d. Changes in work schedules may not be made in order tocreate an entitlement to payment Of premium pay nor to avoid anobligation for granting leave, holiday pay, or premium pay.

e. ExceDt in emergency situations, changes to workschedules will be made effective on the first day of a payperiod.

f. Employees may grieve, supervisory initiated workschedule adjustments and denial of employee requests for workschedule changes through the Agency's administrative grievanceprocedure. Bargaining unit employees must use negotiatedagreement procedures, where applicable.

1-710. Lunch Periods. , Work schedules must provide for a 30-minute lunch period each workday for employees who are requiredto work more than 5 hours per workday. Lunch periods should bescheduled during the middle of the workday and may not be.scheduled at the beginning or end of the workday. Becauseemployees receive no compensation for lunch periods, they must be

entirely free of the duties of their positions during thisperiod.

1-11. Absences. Employees must account for any periods ofabsence or tardiness that occur durina their normal duty hourswhen they are expected to be performinc w6rk. Such absences ortardiness must be charged to an apDropriate leave category, i.e.,sick leave, annual leave, leave without pay (LWOP), credit hours,or compensatory time off. In the case of infrequent andunavoidable tardiness, supervisors may excuse employees for up toI hour. Procedures for requesting lea-e are outlined in FE.AManual 3300-3, FEMvA Absence and Leave Policy.

1-12. Travel.

a. Except during emergencies and when events causingemployees to travel are not within the administrative contrLo. f .-

the Federal government, travel away from the official dutystation should be performed during an employee's normal dutyhours. Travel that is officially ordered and approved andperformed outside an employee's normal duty hours is, in manycircumstances, considered hours of work and, therefore, overtimework for which the employee must be compensated.

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

b. Supervisors may permit employees to continue their

assigned work schedule while on temporary duty or may requireemployees to follow the schedule of the temporary work site.

1-13.. Time Accounting.

a. Supervisors must establish a time accounting methodthat will provide the supervisor with affirmative or personalknowledge of each employee's entitlement to pay by showing thenumber of hours of duty, attendance, and nature and length ofabsences. This information is needed to certify time andattendance reports.

b. If a suoervisor's work schedule 'is the same as that ofall employees within the work unit, there may be no need torecord exact arrival and departure times. However, when thesupervisor's work schedule is not the same and the supervisorcannot certify time and attendance reports from personalknowledge, a time accounting method is required.

c. The accepted time accounting method in FEMA..1ssequential signing in by employees according to their arrivaltimes. FEMA Form 30-53B, Sign. in/Out Sheet, or similar sign-in/out, sheet may be used at the option of the super-Visor. Use ofother time accounting methods recuire prior approval of theDirector, Office of Human Resources Management.

1-14. Forms Prescribed. This manual prescribes use of thefollowing forms which are obtained from the Printino andPublications Division, Office of Administrative SuoDort:

a. FEINLA Form 30-44, Employee Work Schedule and CreditHour Control Sheet.

b. FEMA Form 30-45, Request for Approval of Work

Schedule.

c. FEMiA Form 30-53A, Master Work Schedule.

d. FEMA Form 30-35B, Sign-h--nTOft, Shee: -"

e. FEMA Form 30-7, Overtime Work Justification,Authorization and Certification.

f. Standard Form 71, Application for Leave.

CK 589 of 3114

FEMA Manual 3000-2I

ChaDter 2

'. Traditional Schedule

2-1. General. This chapter contains policies aand procedurespertaining to employees for whom traditional schedules areestablished.

2-2. Requirements and Excep)tions.

a. The basic workweek during which employees are requiredto be on duty within the administrative workweek is:

(1) Monday through. Fxiday,-8 hours per day, 4D hoursper week for full-time employees assigned to traditionalschedules; and

(2) Monday through Friday, but fewer than 40 hours perweek and/or B hours per day for part-time employees assigned totraditional schedules.

b. Except in the case of round-the-clock or continuouscoverage, full-time employees on traditional schedules arerequired. to perform work during hours that coincide with thebusiness hours of the FEMA activity to which assigned, includinga 30-minute lunch period during which employees are not permittedto perform work. (See Appendix B, FEMA Business Hours. forestablished business hours for each FEMA activity.)

c. Employees may request exception to traditionalschedules to voluntarily participate in flexitour or 5/4-9 workschedules.

2-3. Credit Hours. Employees on traditional schedules may notearn credit hours.2-4. Overtime Hours. For employees on traditional schedules,

overtime hours are all hours in excess of 8 hours per day or 40-hours per week that ar-r.fi iall--ord-e=nap~ed i- .- , .,. --

Advance by management.

2-6. Holidays. An employee on a traditional schedule is excused

from duty on a holiday that falls on a scheduled workday (unlessreauired to work) and is entitled to his or her basic rate of payfor that day, not to exceed 8 hours. Federal holidays are

identified in Appendix B, Holidays.

2-7. Pay for Holiday Work. Employees on traditional schedules

who are required to work on a holiday are entitled to pay at

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FEMA Manual 300D.2

their rate of basic pay PIES premium pay at the same rate forwork that is not in excess of 8 hours. Work in excess of 8 hourson a holiday is comphnsated as overtime work. An employee whoperforms work on a holiday is entitled to pay for a minimum of 2hours of holiday pay even though the employee may be required towork less than 2 hours.

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... .. :

FEMA Manual 3000.2

Chapter 3

Flexitour Schedule

3-1. General. This chapter contains procedures and requirementsfor and associated with establishing flexitour schedules.

3-2. Procedures for Requesting Flexitour Schedules. Employeesmay request exception to traditional work schedules tovoluntarily participate in a flexitour schedule, subject to

supervisory approval. Employees requesting a flexitour schedulemust:

a. Select arrival and departure times on the, quartzsr-hour,half-hour, or hour, within the flexible time band, and includingcore time;

b. Prepare a written request by completing FEŽA Form 30-45, Request for Approval of Flexitour Work Schedule; and

c. -Forward completed FEMA.Form 30-45 to the su-oervisor..

3-3. SuDervisory Consideration of Flexitour Schedule Requests.

a. Supervisors will consider all written requests forflexitour schedules and will provide a written response,approving or disapproving the flexitour schedule within 10workdays of receipt of request. Only if one or more of thefollowing would result from approval should a supervisor deny anemployees request:

(1) Substantial disruption in carrying out officefunctions;

(2) Increase in cost of operations (Other than usualadministrative costs);

(3) Reduction in productivity; or,

(4) Diminished level of services furnished to otherFEM_7A orcanizations or the public.

b. Supervisors will record the action taken and forwardthe signed FEMA Form 30-45 to the employee. if the request isdisapproved, supervisors must state the reason(s) fordisapproval. If approved, a copy of FEMA Form 30-45 must begiven to the employee's timekeeper.

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

3-4. Credit Hours.

a. Earning Credit Hours. Employees on approved flexitourschedules may earn credit hours for work performed in excess oftheir normal duty hours. Credit hours are voluntary andemployee-initiated, whereas overtime hours are ordered: andmanagement-initiated. Both require the supervisor's advanceapproval. However, credit hours do not constitute overtime workand may not be converted to overtime or compensatory time orotherwise entitle employees to premium pay. The followinglimitations apply to credit hours:

(1) Credit hours can be earned only between the hoursof 6:00 a.m. and an employee's estab'lished arrival time AND anemployee's departure time and 6:00 p.m. (Appropriatemodification should be made for shift workers on approvedflexitour schedules.)

(2) Credit hours may be earned in 1/4 hour increments,up to a maximum of 2 hours per day and 20 hours per pay period.

(3) A full-time employee.may not carry more than 24credit hours to the next pay period. A part-time employee may

-not carry more than 1/4 of the hours in his or her biweeklyflexitour schedule to the next pay period. For example, a part-time employee whose .schedule requires the employee to work 60hours per pay period may not carry more than 15 credit hours tothe next pay period.

b. Usinq Credit Hours. The following procedures apply tothe use of credit hours by employees on approved flexitourschedules:

(1) Employees must obtain supervisory approval beforeusing credit hours; and

(2) SF-72, ApIplication for Leave, must be used torecuest use of earned credit hours.

c. Accumulation, Forfei±-ýrean• Compensationm- - .

(1) Credit hours accumulated in excess of the limitsdescribed in subparagraph 3-4a(3) at the end of any pay perioda-re immediately and irrevocably forfeited without compensation orright to restoration.

(2) Employees will be compensated at their currentrate of basic pay for credit hour balances that do not exceed themaximum carry over balances described in subparagraph3-4a(3)upon:

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.°.

FEMA Manual 3000.2

(a) Termination of a flexitour schedule;

(b) Change to a non-flexitour schedule; or,

(c) Separation from the Agency.

d. Credit Hour Control. Credit hours worked each day mustbe recorded on FEMA Form 30-44, Employee Work Schedule and CreditHour Control Sheet. Supervisors must initial the control sheetfor the appropriate, day, indicating their approval of credithours worked. .

3-5. Overtime Hours. For employees on flexitour schedules,overtime hours are all hours in excess of & hours per day or 40hours per week that are officially ordered and approved inadvance by management.

3-6. Holidays. An employee on a flexitour schedule is excusedfrom duty on a holiday that falls on a scheduled workday (unlessrequired to work) and is entitled to bis or her basic rate of payfor that day. A part-time employee is entitled to pay only forthe number of hours the employee is scheduled to work on, thatday, up toa maximum of 8 hours.

3-7. Pav for Holiday Work. Employees on flexitour schedules who."are required to work on a holiday are entitled to pay at theirrate of basic pay Plus premium pay at the same rate for work thatis not in excess of 8 hours. Work in excess of 8 hours on aholiday is compensated as overtime work. . An employee whoperforms work on a holiday is entitled to pay for a minimum of 2hours of holiday pay, even- though the employee may be required towork less than 2 hours.

353

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FEMA Manual 3000.2Chapter 4

Five/Four-Nine (5/4-9) Schedule

4-1. General. This chapter contains procedures and requirementsfor and associated with establishing 5/4-9 schedules.

4-2. Procedures for Requestin- 5/4-9 Schedules. Employees mayrequest exception to traditional work schedules to voluntarilyparticipate in a 5/4-9 schedule, subject to supervisory approval.Day shift workers may not select arrival and departure timesbefore 6:00 a.m. or after 6:00 p.m. respectively. Employeesrequesting a 5/4-9 schedule must:

a. Select arrival and departure times for 8 9-hour daysand I 8-hour day and select a standard off day;

b. Prepare a written request by completing FEMA Yorm 30-45, Request for ADproval of 5/4-9 schedule; and

c. Forward completed FEMA Form 30-45 to the supoervisor-.

4-3. Supervisory Consideration of 5/4-9 Schedule Requests.

a. Supervisors will consider all written requests for 5/4-9 schedules and will vrovide a written response, approving ordisapproving the 5/4-9 schedule within 10 workdays of receipt ofrequest. Only if one or more of the following would result fromapproval should a supervisor deny an empl.6yees request:

(2) Substantial disruption in carrying out office

functions;

(2) increase in cost of operations (other than usual

administrative costs);

(3) Reduction in productivityZ; or,

(4) Diminished level of services furnished to otherFEKM organizations or the public. _.

b. Supervisors will record the action taken and forwardthe signed FEHA Form 30-45 to the employee. If the request isdisapproved, supervisors must state the reason(s) fordisapproval. If approved, a copy of FEM.A Form 30-45 must begiven to the employee's timekeeper.

4-4. Credit Hours. Employees on 5/4-9 schedules may not earn

credit hours.

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

4-5. Overtime Hours. For employees on 5/4-9 schedules, overtimehours are all hours in excess of the 5/4-9 schedule that areoff icially ordered and approved in advance by management.

4-6. Holidays. An employee on a 5/4-9 schedule is excused fromduty on a holiday that falls on a scheduled workday, unlessrecruired to work, and is entitled to his or her basic rate of -Davf or the number of hours the employee is 'scheduled to work on týatday. . Full-time employees are entitled to a designated or "inlieu of" holiday that falls on their. day off. When a holidayfalls on an employees scheduled Friday nonworkday, the precedingThursday is designated as the "in lieu of" holiday. When a'holiday falls on an employee's scheduled Monday nonworkday, thefollowing. Tuesday is designated as -the "in lieu of". holiday.When a holiday falls on a nonWDrkday of a -part-time- employee, heor she is NbT entitled to an in-lieu-of day for that holiday.

4-7. - Pay for Holiday Work. Employees on 5/4-9 schedules who arereguired to work on a holiday, or an in-lieu-of day/ are entitledto pay at their rate of basic Day plus premium Day at the samerate for hours ecmal to the number o.Lf hours normally scheduled.L.or that day.. Work in excess of normally scheduled hours forthat. day is compensated as overtime work. An employee whoTerforms work on a holiday is entitled to pay for a minimum of 2hours of holiday pay even though.. the emD!oyee mav be required to.work less than 2 hours.

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

Chapter 5

Guidance 'or Time and Attendance Reporting

5-1. General. This chapter contains procedures and requirementsfor recording and reporting work schedules and related time andattendance information and provides guidance for supervisors and

timekeepers.

5-2. Role of Suoervisors. Supervisors must review and approvethe time and attendance information reported for each employeeunder their supervision and must:

a. Ensure that timekeepers have the work scheduleinformation necessary to complete T&A's; and

b. Forward a copy of approved work schedules totimekeepers immediately upon modification, suspension, ortermination of a work schedule.

5-3. Role of Tiimekeepers.. Timekeepers must record and docume'ntthe time worked and leave taken by each employee during each payperiod and must:

a. Record the hours of work and leave for each employee ona daily basis on FEMA Form 30-50, Time and Attendance Worksheet;

b. Maintain accurate records and supporting documentation,including but not limited to supervisory approved work schedules,credit hour control sheets, leave applications, and overtime

authorizations; and

c. Prepare T&A's at the end of each pay period- using theU.S. Department of Agriculture's Personal Computer - Time andAttendance Remote Entry (PC-TARE) program.

5-4. Procedures.

a. The. following inmsructions pertaining to work schedulesmust be adhered to when completino FEMA Form 30-50..

(1) Complete Iine 2, Block 10, Compressed Schedule(CMP), as follows:

(a) Enter code "5" for employees on 5/4-9schedules;

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FEMLA Manual 3000.2

(b) Enter code "7" for employees on flexitourschedules;

(c). Enter code ".9" for the pay period in which anemployee on a flexitour or 5/4-9 schedule returns to a

traditional schedule; and

(d) Leave blank for employees on traditionalschedules.

(2). Record regular time worked and any credit hoursUSED by flexitour employees on Lines 3 through 13 as follows:

(a.) Rec-rd regular bours worked in accordance ......

with an employee's schedule using Transaction Code (TC) 01.

NOTE: Regular hours will be 5 8-hour days per week for employees

on traditional and flexible schedules and 8 9-hour days and.l 8-hour. day for employees on 5/4-9 schedules;

(b) Record any credit hours taken in Columns 2through 6 for the first week of the pay period and Columns 9 -

through 13 for the second week using TC 50; and

(c) Ensure that total regular hours worked andcredit hours taken equal 80 hours in a biweekly pay period,unless the employee has been in a non-pay status during the payperiod.

(3) Record credit hours EARNED. by employees .on.

flexitour schedules on Lines 15 and. 16, "other tize. Record. anycredit hours earned in the pay period in Columns I through 14using TC 29.

(4) Record. credit hours f orwarding balance, accrual,

use, and to date balance in leave section of form.

b. The following instructions must be adhered to when

preparing T&A's .using PC-TARE-

(1) Modi-Ey item 12, Alternate Work Schedule} of the- .-- -

PC-TARE Master Record when an employee's work schedule is chancedor terminated as follows.:

(a) Enter code "5" for employees on 5/4-9

schedules;

(b) Enter code "7" for employees on flexitourschedules; and

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

(c) Enter code "9" for the pay period in which anemployee on a flexitour or 5/4-9 schedule returns to atraditional schedu!6..

c. Supervisors should arrange work schedules to provideflexitour employees the opportunity to liquidate credit hourleave balances prior to leaving the Agency or changing to a non-flexitour schedule. When such change occurs, an employee will bepaid, at his or her current rate of pay, for no more than 24hours for full-time employees and no more than 1/4 of a part-timeemployees biweekly hours. To effect payment of credit hourbalances, supervisors should forward a request to the Office ofHuman Resources Management, Headquarters Personnel Operations

-- ~-. Division, or Field Personnel Operations Division-f or regional -.employees, with the following information:

(23 The number of credit hours to be paid;

(2) A copy of the final certified T&A coded "final"for separating employees OR a- copy of the certified T&A and acopy of the approved work schedule changing the employee to a..non-flexitour schedule; and

(3) The accounting code that is to be charged for the-payment.

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

Appendix A

Definitions

Administrative Workweek means a period of 7 consecutive calendardays established for leave and pay purposes. In FEMA, theadministrative workweek is Sunday through Saturday.

Reqularly Scheduled Administrative Workweek means the periodwithin the administrative workweek when employees are required tobe on duty on a regular and recurring basis. (A regularlyscheduled administrative workweek includes the basic workweekplus any overtime work that is regularly requir._d.)

Basic Workweek in FEMA is Monday through Friday. For most full-time employees, the basic workweek consists of 8 hours per day,40 hours per week. For part-time employees, the -basic workweekis less than 40 hours per week including the prescribed hours ofeach day and days of the week during which the employee isexpected to perform work on a regular basis.

Full-time Emolovees are those regularly scheduled to work 40-hours per week or 80 hours per biweekly pay period.

Part-time Emolovees are those regularly scheduled to work lessthan 40 hours per week or 80 hours per biweekly pay period.

tntermittent Emolovees are those mot regularly scheduled to workwho respond to duty in connection with some unscheduled activityor to assist with emergency operations.

Normal Duty Hours are hours that an employee is scheduled to workduring a biweekly pay period for which the employee is paid .athis or her basic rate of pay.

Traditional Schedule is a schedule that requires an employee to

be on duty during hours that coincide with the business hours ofthe FEN1A activity to which assigned and includes a 30-minute2unch period each day.- --

Flexitour Schedule is a schedule in which an employee selectsarrival and dep-arture times that are outside business hours of'the FEMA activity to which assigned but within the flexible timeband, and includes 8 hours of duty and a 30-minute lunch periodeach day.

Flexible Time Band means the hours before and after core hoursduring which employees may choose their arrival and departuretimes and earn credit hours. In FEMA, the flexible time band

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FEMA Manual 3000.2

includes the hours between 6:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. and between

the hours of 3:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m,

Core Time means those designated hours and days during the week

when an employee on a flexitour schedule must be present for workunless on an approved absence. In FEMA, the core timeis between the hours of 9:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. (local time),Monday through Friday.

Credit Hours are hours worked that are in excess of the scheduledhours and are earned' and used by an employee on a flexitourschedule to vary the length of a workday or workweek.

Compressed Schedule is a schedule inT bich 'he-biweekly 80-hourreauirement for a full-time employee is fulfilled in less than 10workdays. For a part-time employee, the biweekly reguirement ofLESS than 80 hours is completed in less than 10 workdays. Thecompressed schedule authorized within FEMA is a five/four-nine(5/4-9) schedule.

Five/Four-Nine (5/4-9) Schedule means a full-time employee mustwork 8 9-hour days, 1 8-hour day, and is entitled to 1 additionalnonworkday per pay period. For a part-time employee, the numberof hours that must be worked in a 9-day biweekly pay period isdetermined by the employee's immediate supervisor.

Overtime Hours are all hours worked in excess of the normal dutyhours that are officially ordered and approved in advance bymanagement. Overtime may be compensated as paid overtime orcompensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay in accordance withFEMYA Instruction 3200.1, Overtime Policy. Employees who performovertime work in connection with disasters receive overtime payand may NOT receive. compensatory time off in lieu of. overtimepay.

CK 601 of 3114

.. .-.

FEMA Manual 3000.2.

Appendix B

'S FEMA Business Hours

Activity

Headquarters

Region IRegion I

Region II

Region III

Region IVRegion.17

Region.VRegion V

Region VI

Recion VII

Region VIII

Region 'IX

Region X

Time Zone

EST

Office-Hours

8:30 - 5:00(Washington, D.C.)

(Boston, MA)(FRC-Maynard, Y-A)

(New York NY)

(Philadelphia, PA)

(Atlanta, GA)

(FRC Thomasville, GA)

(Chicago,.IL)(Battlecreek, MI)

(Denton, TX)

(Kansas city, mb)

(Denver, CO)

(San Francisco, CA)

(Bothell, VA)

ESTEST

ESTI

EST

ESTEST

CSTEST

CST

CST

MST

-PýT

'PST

EST

EST

EST

tsT

8:158:15

8:

8:30

8:308:30

8: 008:30

8 DD

8: 00

'7: 30

'7:30

7-.30

- 4:45- 4:45

5: 00

5:005:00

4:305: Do-

4:30

4:30

4:00

4: 00

4:00

National Emercency Training Center(Emmitsburg, XD)

In:ffo=ation Systems Technical D ivision(Olnev, ED)

Special FacilityI . - (Round Hill, VA)

ADP -Systems Development Division(Cý-a=jottesviile, VA)

8:OD 4:30

8:00 4:30

8:30 5:00

B-1

CK 602 of 3114

FEMA Manual 3000.2

Appendix C

Federal Holidays

New Years Day January 1

Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Birthday Third Monday in January

Inauguration Day* January 20 Each FourthYear After 1965

Washington's Birthday Third Monday in February

Memorial Day Last Monday in May

Independence Day July 4

Labor Day First Monday in September

Columbus Day Second Monday in October

Veterans Day November 11

Thanksgiving Day Fourth Thursday inNovember

Christmas Day December 25

Any other day designated as a holiday by Federal statute orExecutive order.

*District of Columbia metropolitan area employees only.

NOTE: For holidays that occur on a Saturday, the Fridayimmediately before is the legal holiday for Federal employees.For holidays that occur on Sunday, the Monday- immediately

-. ollowI--is the legal holiday for Federal employees-..• . '

C-I

CK 603 of 3114

From:

Sent:To:Subject:Attachments:

Importance:

LIA05 Hoc

Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:30 PMFOIA Response.hoc Resource

FW: Emergency Planning Zones v2.0

Emergency Planning Zones v2.0.pdf

High


0700-15001500-2300

******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL........00 -NO RELEAS ........ E OF•.,.- 9.-F TE FEDERAL F A .....

From: Purvis, James [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 11:46 PMTo: LIA05 Hoc; Ralston, Michelle; Horwitz, Steve; Sherwood, Harry; Simpson, John; Colman, Steve; Thomson, Rebecca;Hammons, Darrell; Burnside, Conrad; King, William; Hammond, Lisa; McCabe, Ron; Feighert, Dan; Fiore, Craig; Rice,John ; Hasemann, Brian; Price, John; Kinard, Richard; Robertson, Larry; Hecht, Randall; Naskrent, Gary; Flowerday,Scott; Calhoun, Nan; Valentine, Norm; Echavarria, Richard; Berkey, JohannaCc: Seward, Andrew; Greten, Timothy; Quinn, VanessaSubject: Emergency Planning Zones v2.0Importance: High

Please find attached Version 2.0 of the EPZ Info/fact sheet that went out earlier today. Again, this may be shared freelyboth internally and externally.

Version 2.0 now includes listings of relevant reference documents, POC information and DHS/FEMA branding.

Regards,

James H PurvisRadiological Emergency Preparedness ProgramTechnological Hazards DivisionDHS/FEMA Protection and National Preparedness Directorate1800 South Bell Street, Room 830Arlington, VA 20598-3025Office: (202) 212-2334Mobile:I (b)(6ilFax: (703) 305-0738iames.purvis(cdhs..ov

WARNING: This Communiqu6 is USE-ONLY (FOUO) and may contain PRIVACY SENSITIVE information. It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information. This information shall not be distributed beyond the original addressees withoutprior authorization of the orginator. This communication, along with any attachments, is covered by Federal and State law governing electronic communications and may

1

CK 604 of 3114

contain restricted and legally privileged information. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, use

or copying of this message Is strictly prohibited. If you have received this in error, please reply immediately to the sender and delete this message.

CK 605 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:30 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Public Meeting on Monday


ý*`*FOR O"FFICIAUL UISE ONL'Y****DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto:Michelle. [email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 8:42 PMTo: LIA05 Hoc; Seward, Andrew; Sherwood, Harry; Horwitz, Steve; Greten, Timothy; Quinn, VanessaSubject: Re: Public Meeting on Monday

ALCON:

I am sure they are already aware, but do you know if FEMA OPA is aware of this meeting?

Respectfully,

Michelle Ralston

(202) 280-9304

From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: Andrew Seward <[email protected]>; Harry Sherwood <[email protected]>; Michelle Ralston<Michel le.Ra [email protected]>; Steve Horwitz <[email protected]>; Tim Greten <[email protected]>;Vanessa E. Quinn <[email protected]>Sent: Fri Mar 18 20:22:46 2011Subject: Public Meeting on Monday

NRC PA,

They are worried that the media attendance at the public meeting on Monday may be overwhelming. If we are sendingsomeone they should probably get there early. If I hear of a change of arrangements, I will forward the information toyou.

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center

CK 606 of 3114

(301) 816-5187

**""**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*--DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAILY

l~v u lto• r TIE' EDE AL,• J-... ... l~tt,2

CK 607 of 3114

Fiwishim aiichi SImmary

.rP0roityL. Unit STATUS AS OF- 11200EDT, 03117/20111 ..(0100 JDT)'

Core Status Damaged, fuel 1/2 covered (JAIF). Radiation released. Sea water injection sufficientto cool core. (WANO)

1 3 Containment Primary Containment, some damage. Secondary Containment lost (visual).

Spent Fuel Pool 514 Bundles in SFP (GEH) Low Level (JAIF), Dumping water with helicoptersuspended (Casto 0420 EDT)

Spent Fuel Pool 1201 Bundles in SFP (GEH) Low level (JAIF), Damage to fuel rods suspected2- (JAIF) dumping water from helicopter suspended (Casto 0420 EDT)

Core Status damaged, fuel 2/3 covered (JAIF). Sea water inject enough to cool core (WANO)

Containment Primary Containment, some damage. Secondary Containment, Hole cut to reduceS 2 H2 buildup, steam coming from hole (visual).

Spent Fuel Pool 587 Bundles in SFP (GEH) No information on SFP status (JAIF).

Core Status damaged, 1/2 fuel covered (JAIF). Sea water inject enough to cool core (WANO)

4 1 Containment Primary Containment functional (JAIF) Secondary Containment lost (visual)

Spent Fuel Pool 292 Bundles in SFP (GEH) SFP Level unknown (JAIF).

Shutdown since 1/3/11. Core in RPV. SFP 950 Bundles (GEH), level down 40 cm in 5 hrs (0800,53/15/2011, IAEA) TEPCO plans to use operable DG @ Unit 6 to provide water to Unit 5

Shutdown since 8/14/10. Core in RPV. SFP 876 Bundles (GEH), level lower than normal. SFPU 6 reported to be heating up. (NHK) Unit EDG available.

7 N/ Common Spent Fuel Pool: 6,000 spent fuel bundles (GEH) Located on land side of Unit 47N/A (visual)

CK 608 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc



******FOR OFFelr l UTSE ON•Y*•***DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T .E FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Collins, Richard [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 12:13 PMTo: LIA05 Hoc; Collins, Richard; Ralston, Michelle; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn;Steve HorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

Mr. Peter Prassinos is the NASA POC for this committee. His contact information is below-

peter.g. [email protected]

202-358-1246

Bid ColiFEMA HQ-CCNPD/THD/FRPCC1800 South Bell St.. Rm. 855Arlington., VA 20598-3025OF (202) 212-4753 Bl{ (b)(6) ]FX (703) 305-0837

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 10:11 AMTo: Collins, Richard; Ralston, Michelle; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn; Steve HorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

Thank you!!!

FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

CK 609 of 3114

***"' -**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL.*.*..

From: Collins, Richard [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 10:07 AMTo: Ralston, Michelle; LIA05 Hoc; [email protected]; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E.Quinn; Steve HorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

I have just learned that the last FRPCC member representative for NASA is no longer with the agency but, I have madecontact with the Executive Assistant for the Chief of Staff who is working on identifying an alternate as we speak.

Rick 69o11WFEMA HQ-CCNPD/THD/FRPCC1800 South Bell St., Rni. 855Arlington, VA 20598-3025OF (202) 212-4753 BB[ (b)(6) FX (703) 305-0837

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto: Michelle. [email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 9:04 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; [email protected]; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn; Steve HorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

Who at NASA?

Respectfully.

Michelle Ralston, MS. PMIPublic All'airs, Stakeholder Outreach & CampaJign PlaningProfessional Services & IntegqratonTechnological Hazards DivisionProtecdion & National PreparednessDHS/FE•\A1800 South Bell Street, Rm. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk[ (b)(6) Blackberry(703) 305-0837 facsimile

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 9:03 AMTo: Ralston, Michelle; [email protected]; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn; SteveHorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

They need the contact for NASA.

FEMA REP Liaison2

CK 610 of 3114

NRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

****-*FR•OF FICILt USE ONtY" 'DO NOT RELEASE OUTSI DE OF Tf 1E FEDERA-L FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [maiito:[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 8:58 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; [email protected]; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn; Steve HorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

Rick,

Can you help with this?

Respectfi-lly,

Michelle Ralston, MS, PMIPublic Affairs, Stakeholder Outreach & Campaign PlanningProfessional SerVices & IntegrationTechnological Hazards DivisionProtection & National PreparednessDHS/FLN1A1800 South Bell Street, Rmn. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk

(b)(6) Blackberry(703) 305-0837 facsimnile

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 8:57 AMTo: Ralston, Michelle; [email protected]; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn; SteveHorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

Thank you for your fast response. Do we have a list of phones numbers for the members?


'*`*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'***DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THrE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 8:53 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; [email protected]; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn; Steve HorwitzCc: [email protected]: RE:

3

CK 611 of 3114

See attached.

Respectfllly,

Michelle Ralston, MS,. PNIIPublic ALUEirs, Stakeholder Outreach & Camppaign PlauningProlfessional Services & IntegrationTelihnolo"Icad [liards DLivisionProtection & Natiomd PreparcdnessDHS/FEMA1800 South Bell Street, Rm. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk

(b)(6) Blackberry(703) 305-0837 facsimile

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 8:51 AMTo: [email protected]; Tim Greten; Harry Sherwood; Andrew Seward; Vanessa E. Quinn; Michelle Ralston; SteveHorwitzCc: [email protected]:

It has been requested to have a list of FEMA Contacts for the FRPCC agenices. Can you provide me the list of the FRPCCcontact list for use in the NRC Operation Center?


******FOR OFF-ICI""AL", USE ONLY*****-


4

CK 612 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc



-- L-'÷ ÷FOR OFFICIAL ...USE.ON•Y•DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T.IE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Collins, Richard [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 10:13 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; Collins, RichardCc: Vanessa E. Quinn; Tim Greten; Andrew Seward; Harry SherwoodSubject: RE:

I will be sure to send them to you.

kick Col~lnFEMA HQ-CCN PD/T[I D,.TRPCC1800 South Bell St.. Rm. 855Arlington. VA 20598-3025OF (202) 212-4753 B (b)(6) FX (703) 305-0837

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 9:41 AMTo: Collins, RichardCc: Vanessa E. Quinn; Tim Greten; Andrew Seward; Harry SherwoodSubject:

Mr. Collins,

I am not sure what e-mail address you have for the NRC Ops Center, but you can send the notes, for the FRPCC, to meand I will forward them to the rest of the Ops Center. If you have a contact here that has requested them pleaseinclude me in the e-mail. Thank you!


CK 613 of 3114

******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*****-*DO NOT RtLEASE OUTS)E vOFr THlE FEDERAL FAMILY

2

CK 614 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:21 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - GOVERNMENT SECURITY NEWS ARTICLE ON GOVERNORS ORDERING NPP

SAFETY REVIEWSAttachments: image00l.jpg


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL•...*.**..

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF Tf!E FEDERA FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 8:37 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; OST02 HOCCc: Brenner, Eliot; Hayden, Elizabeth; Powell, Amy; Schmidt, Rebecca; Leeds, EricSubject: FYI - GOVERNMENT SECURITY NEWS ARTICLE ON GOVERNORS ORDERING NPP SAFETY REVIEWS

Governors order nuclear plant reviews, congress urges more actionThu, 2011-03-17 08:26 AMBy: Mark Rockwell

As concern over U.S. nuclear plant vulnerability grows in Congress, at leasttwo governors ordered safety reviews of nuclear power plants in their statesafter the Japanese earthquake and tsunami disasters.

On March 16, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo ordered a safety review ofa nuclear plant located near a seismic fault 35 miles north of Manhattan.Cuomo said the Indian Point Energy Center on the Hudson River in suburbanWestchester County will be reviewed. The plant is near a fault line, butscientists are in disagreement about the level of threat it poses.

On March 14, Florida Governor Rick Scott asked his state's Division of Rep. Gus Bli/rakis, (R-FL)

Emergency Management Director Bryan Koon to review emergency action plans for the state'sfive nuclear reactors in the face of natural or manmade disaster. There are three additionalfacilities within 100 miles of Florida's borders, Scott's office said.

Scott said Koon and his staff made a comprehensive review of the state's action plans theweekend following the earthquake in Japan and found them prepared. "The information I'vereceived shows that across state agencies, in conjunction with federal partners and utilityoperators, we are prepared for an effective and rapid emergency response," he said.

CK 615 of 3114

Some in the U.S. congress have expressed concern over U.S. preparedness for events similar tothose in Japan. The concern is showing up on both sides of the political spectrum. Rep. GusBilirakis, (R-FL) chairman of the Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on EmergencyPreparedness, Response and Communications also urged more action. He commended Gov.Scott's review orders and also plans a hearing on nuclear plant safety on March 17.

Bilirakis is holding a hearing on March 17 to address medical preparedness and response effortsto attacks or disasters involving nuclear plants, among other issues, said his office in astatement. Bilirakis' witness list includes Dr. Alexander Garza, Assistant Secretary of HealthAffairs with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Health Affairs.

Rep. Ed Markey, (D-MA) sent letters on March 14 to the White House urging wider distribution ofprotective Potassium Iodide pills and questioning the chain of government command during sucha nuclear crisis. According to news reports, Bilirakis also supports wider distribution of PotassiumIodide pills.

Sen. Joe Lieberman, a supporter of nuclear power in the U.S., has also urged caution. "It thinkthat we've got to kind of quietly -- quickly put the brakes on until we can absorb what hashappened in Japan as a result of the earthquake and the tsunami and then see what more, ifanything, we can demand of the new power plants that are coming on line," he said March 13 onCBS's "Face the Nation."

Bilirakis commended Gov. Scott's "proactive" review of emergency preparedness plans at thestate's nuclear plants on March 15. He urged other state leaders to ensure effective responseplans are in place for nuclear plants. "We must continue to review the response measures wehave in place, including the most efficient way to distribute aid during such an emergency," hesaid.

Mike

Michael WeberDeputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research,State, Tribal, and Compliance ProgramsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

301-415-1705Mail Stop 016E15

2

CK 616 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:21 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: log sheets


****FOR OFFIIA UE ONFY*--DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto:Michelle. [email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 18, 2011 8:25 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; Seward, Andrew; Sherwood, Harry; Horwitz, Steve; Greten, Timothy; Quinn, VanessaSubject: Re: log sheets

Daily, please.

Respectfully,

Michelle Ralston

(202) 280-9304

From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: Andrew Seward <[email protected]>; Harry Sherwood <[email protected]>; Michelle Ralston<Michelle. [email protected]>; Steve Horwitz <[email protected]>; Tim Greten <[email protected]>;Vanessa E. Quinn <[email protected]>; Horwitz, Steve <[email protected]>Sent: Fri Mar 18 08:14:54 2011Subject: log sheets

Do you want our log sheets:* daily" onceaweek" after the event,* not at all


*****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~*-ýDO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THlE FEDERAL FAMILY

CK 617 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:22 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - HOMELAND SECURITY NEWSWIRE REPORT ON STATUS OF THE FUKUSHIMA

NUCLEAR EMERGENCYAttachments: image0Ol.jpg


**4"*.*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYT*•***DO NOT RELEASE OUTSID.E OF TIlE FEDERAL FAMILY

.From: Weber, MichaelSent: Friday, March 18, 2011 8:40 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; OST02 HOCCc: Brenner, Eliot; Hayden, ElizabethSubject: FYI - HOMELAND SECURITY NEWSWIRE REPORT ON STATUS OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR EMERGENCY

I can't explain the goofy picture of fire boats fighting a fire at a petroleum refinery and passing it off as a picture of theboats filling the spent fuel pools, but....

Japan disaster

Nuclear crisis worsening; growing radiation leaks at reactors nos. 3, 4

Published 18 March 2011

The situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant appears increasingly dire, as efforts to cooloverheating reactors have failed; Japanese military fire trucks are now spraying water at the plant's no. 3reactor; earlier efforts on Thursday to use helicopters to dump water on the rods have failed; the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission chairman is particularly concerned about reactor no. 4 which houses spent fuel rods;spent fuel rods, placed in cooling tanks, are rapidly overheating as they are boiling away the water they aresubmerged in; the secondary containment unit at reactor no. 4 has been breached and radiation is now freelyleaking out of the plant; high radiation levels are hindering efforts to repair the reactors

CK 618 of 3114

Fireboats attempted to fill storage pools // Source: zimbio.com

The situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant appears increasingly dire, as efforts to cooloverheating reactors have failed.

In a desperate attempt, Japanese military fire trucks are now spravina water at the plant's no. 3 reactor. Earlierefforts on Thursday to use helicopters to dump water on the rods have failed. Japanese military helicoptersmade four passes dropping a total of 8,000 gallons of seawater on reactor no. 3 to little effect.

According to Japanese officials, the reactor needs about 12,000 gallons of water a day to keepfrom overheating.

It appears that the water missed the reactor and the military said that they had not noticed any decreases

in temperature.

Plans to drop water on the plant's no. 4 reactor have been postponed.

Gregory Jaczko, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman, is particularly concerned about reactorno. 4 which houses spent fuel rods.

The reactor was not active at the time of the massive 8.9 magnitude earthquake that shook Japan, but thesubsequent tsunami knocked out the power supply which kept cool water circulating around the spentfuel rods.

Even after a reactor is shut down, the fuel rods continue to produce large amounts of heat due to their highradioactivity. These spent rods are stored in large cooling tanks filled with cold water to keep themfrom overheating.

The tanks are usually forty-five feet deep and the fuel rods are typically stored in the lower fifteen feet of thepool. When the water pumps failed, the spent rods began to heat the water rapidly boiling it away.

The spent fuel rods at reactor no. 4 are particularly troublesome as they were only removed from the reactor inDecember 2010, and therefore generate more heat than the spent fuel at other reactors.

2

CK 619 of 3114

As the water boils, the steam generated carries radioactive particles that are eventually released into the air. Ifthe rods remain exposed and out of water for too long they will eventually melt and emit massive amountsof radiation.

These problems have been exacerbated by the fact that the secondary containment unit at reactor no. 4 hasbeen breached and radiation is now freely leaking out of the plant.

Officials are uncertain if there is any water left in the storage pool.

Yoshitaka Nagayama, a spokesman for Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, said, "Because we havebeen unable to go to the scene, we cannot confirm whether there is water left or not in the spent fuel pool atReactor No. 4."

High radiation levels have further complicated efforts to cool the plants.

Testifying before Congress on Wednesday, Jaczko said, "We believe that radiation levels are extremely high,which could possibly impact the ability to take corrective measures."

The peak levels of radiation there "would be lethal within a fairly short period of time," he said.

According to Hidehiko Nishiyama, deputy director-general of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency,radiation levels of approximately 250 millisievert an hour were detected 100 feet above the plant.

Radiation levels have dramatically risen and fallen over the past several days. On Tuesday the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) measured radiation levels as high as 400 millisieverts an hour before theyplunged to 0.6 millisievert an hour.

The World Nuclear Association says that 50 millisievert of radiation a year is the lowest dose at which there isevidence of cancer in humans. The average person receives about one to two millisieverts of radiation fromnatural sources like the sun a year.

Jaczko warned that resolving the crisis could "take time, possibly weeks."

Officials are also closely monitoring spent fuel pools at reactors no. 3, 5, and 6 where water levels may havedropped as well.

Mike


301-415-1705Mail Stop 016E15

3

CK 620 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:21 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Seismic regulations summarization


******FErR OFFICIAL USE OILYLI**

DE) NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

----- Original Message -----From: Weber, MichaelSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 8:41 PMTo: LIA05 Hoc; OSTO1 HOCSubject: Fyi - Seismic regulations summarization

----- O rig ina l M essage - ....

From: Sheron, BrianTo: Kammerer, Annie; Case, Michael; Richards, Stuart; Ake, Jon; Murphy, AndrewCc: Weber, MichaelSent: Thu Mar 17 20:28:21 2011Subject: RE: Seismic regulations summarization

OK. Can you e-mail Pete Lyons early tomorrow an let him know that the one-pager will be coming but it will around COB.

From: Kammerer, AnnieSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 7:52 PMTo: Sheron, Brian; Case, Michael; Richards, Stuart; Ake, Jon; Murphy, AndrewCc: Weber, MichaelSubject: RE: Seismic regulations summarization

I have sent the Q&As.

Unfortuately, there's not much on our regs in the Q&As yet. However, Jon and I had already discussed the need for afact sheet on seismic regulation in the "additional informaiton" section of the document because we are starting to getsome questions.

CK 621 of 3114

Jon will lead the work to put together the information for Steve tonight. As you note, it's important to run it by NRR (andNRO). So, we'll send it to Meena, Kamal, Nilesh and Goutam tomorrow so that they can all review. If anyone else comesto mind, please let us know. I hope that the deadline of "tomorrow" is COB, instead of first thing.

Also, just FYI, we have been asked by NRR/DORL and OPA to pull a subset of Q&As together for a public release. This isto support several public meetings in the regions next week. We have to get it to OPA by COB tomorrow so that theycan bless it. Those poor guys in the regions are getting pummeled.

Cheers,Annie

From: Sheron, BrianSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 6:51 PMTo: Case, Michael; Richards, Stuart; Kammerer, Annie; Ake, Jon; Murphy, AndrewCc: Weber, MichaelSubject: Seismic

1.) Secretary Chu at DOE is scheduled to be interviewed on 5 talk shows Sunday morning. He has requested a 1 pagesummary of our seismic regulatory requirements. I gave him the 3/16 version of your seismic Q&A package andsuggested his staff could screen it and perhaps pull out pertinent info on our regs, however, I haven't read it yet anddon't know to what extent it does or doesn't discuss our regulatory requirements. Can you quickly pull together a 1-2page summary of our seismic regulatory requirements, run them by NRR if possible, and then e-mail them to Pete Lyonsat DOE ([email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>). He needs them tomorrow. PleaseCC me.Remember, he is just looking for a high level summary sufficient to answer likely questions he might get during theinterviews.

2.) Can you please e-mail the latest version of your seismic Q&As to Mike Weber.

Thanks.

CK 622 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:20 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - GOOD NEWS! Senate Passes the 3-Week CR Extension


*****"-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T..E FEDERAL FAMIL-Y

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 6:52 PMTo: Bowman, Gregory; Brock, Kathryn; Campbell, Andy; Carpenter, Cynthia; Dorman, Dan; Frazier, Alan; Haney,Catherine; Krupnick, David; McCrary, Cheryl; Miller, Charles; Moore, Scott; Sheron, Brian; Uhle, Jennifer; Zimmerman,RoyCc: PMT01 Hoc; RST01 Hoc; OST02 HOC; LIA05 Hoc; HOO HocSubject: FYI - GOOD NEWS! Senate Passes the 3-Week CR Extension

We just wanted to let you know that the Senate just passed the 3-week extension to the CR (through Friday, April8). Attached below is a statement by the White House Press Secretary.

THE WHITE HOUSEOffice of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEMarch 17, 2011

Statement by Press Secretary Jay Carney on Senate Passage of the Three-Week ContinuingResolution

Today, the Senate passed a short-term funding bill that avoids a government shutdown and givesCongress the time to find common ground on a measure to take us through the end of the fiscalyear. Continuing to fund our government in two or three week increments adds uncertainty to oureconomy and distracts us from other urgent priorities facing our nation. Now is the time forDemocrats and Republicans to come together and find a long-term solution that cuts spendingwithout impeding our ability to win the future. We all agree we want to cut spending, which is whywe have already met Republicans halfway. But we will continue to oppose harmful cuts to criticalinvestments in education, innovation, and research and development that we need to grow oureconomy and create jobs - as well as oppose additions to the bill that have nothing to do with fiscalpolicy. The President is optimistic that Congress can get this done.

1

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From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:20 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: White House Briefing Call with the Western States and Pacific Territories Governors

at 1900 EDT


****FOR OFFICI[AL USE ONLY" 4 *DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMIL

From: Quinn, Vanessa [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 6:40 PMTo: Fiore, Craig; Hammons, Darrell; LIA05 Hoc; Seward, Andrew; Sherwood, Harry; Ralston, Michelle; Horwitz, Steve;Greten, Timothy; Quinn, Vanessa; Twiss, PatrickCc: Coons, Albert; Webb, Bill; Burnside, Conrad; Feighert, Dan; Hammond, Lisa; Thomson, Rebecca;[email protected]; Colman, Steve; King, WilliamSubject: RE: White House Briefing Call with the Western States and Pacific Territories Governors at 1900 EDT

(b)(5) Thanks

From: Fiore, Craig [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 6:34 PMTo: Hammons, Darrell; [email protected]; Seward, Andrew; Sherwood, Harry; Ralston, Michelle; Horwitz, Steve;Greten, Timothy; Quinn, Vanessa; Twiss, PatrickCc: Coons, Albert; Webb, Bill; Burnside, Conrad; Fiore, Craig; Feighert, Dan; Hammond, Lisa; Thomson, Rebecca;[email protected]; Colman, Steve; King, WilliamSubject: RE: White House Briefing Call with the Western States and Pacific Territories Governors at 1900 EDT

(b)(5)

From: Hammons, Darrell [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 3:26 PMTo: [email protected]; Seward, Andrew; Sherwood, Harry; Ralston, Michelle; Horwitz, Steve; Greten, Timothy; Quinn,Vanessa; Twiss, PatrickCc: Coons, Albert; Webb, Bill; Burnside, Conrad; Fiore, Craig; Feighert, Dan; Hammons, Darrell; Hammond, Lisa;Thomson, Rebecca; [email protected]; Colman, Steve; King, William; Hammons, DarrellSubject: Re: White House Briefing Call with the Western States and Pacific Territories Governors at 1900 EDT

Is this the call with the goverors? Is it invitation only or can we provide the call in number to our state EM partners?

I

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From: prvs=0505f6d80= LIA05. [email protected] <prvs=0505f6d80= LIA05. [email protected]>To: Andrew Seward <Andrew.Seward [email protected]>; Harry Sherwood <[email protected]>; Michelle Ralston<Michelle. [email protected]>; Steve Horwitz <[email protected]>; Tim Greten <[email protected]>;Vanessa E. Quinn <[email protected]>Cc: Albert Coons <[email protected]>; Bill Webb <[email protected]>; Conrad Burnside<[email protected]>; Craig Fiore <[email protected]>; Dan Feighert <[email protected]>; DarrellHammons <[email protected]>; Lisa Hammond <[email protected]>; Rebecca Thomson<[email protected]>; Ronald McCabe <[email protected]>; Steve Colman <[email protected]>;William King <[email protected]>Sent: Thu Mar 17 18:22:23 2011Subject: White House Briefing Call with the Western States and Pacific Territories Governors at 1900 EDT

There is a 1900 EDT "First Strategic Coordinated Call" coordinated through the White House National Security Staff(NSS). The number is 1-800-288-8967 and the Passcode is[ (b)(6) . The Agenda is as follows:

IntroductionsBriefing Update : Inter Governmental Agencies (IGAs)Reactor Situation in Japan - DOEHumanitarian Affects on US Citizens - State DepartmentDiscussion on Monitoring - EPAPotential health Effects- HHSOpen Discussion


******FOR OFFICIAL USE . ....,+-

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAM.LY

2

OK 625 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:19 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: KI Distribution to Specific States


****'FOR0FF eIhUSE ON tV**-DO.. NT R L.AS O•tS• I O.F TIlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Milligan, PatriciaSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 5:42 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Re: KI Distribution to Specific States

Who in FEMA gets this?Sent from my NRC BlackberryPatricia A Milligan, CHP RPh

I- (b)(6) I

From: LIA05 HocTo: Milligan, PatriciaCc: Andrew Seward <[email protected]>; Harry Sherwood <[email protected]>; Michelle Ralston<[email protected]>; Steve Horwitz <[email protected]>; Tim Greten <[email protected]>; VanessaE. Quinn <[email protected]>Sent: Thu Mar 17 15:46:29 2011Subject: KI Distribution to Specific States

Ms. Milligan,

Could you please provide to FEMA the actual distribution (by State) of potassium iodide? Thank you for your attentionto this matter.


*****lORO lF.CIAL USE ONLY******DO NOT RELEASE OUTSDEF L Y

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1/14/2013

130 mg 65 mgDate 130 tablets Date 65 mg tablets

STATE mg ordered ordered ordered ordered TOTAL PILLS

10,121,824 3,091,220 12,811,594.00

Alabama 3/4/2002 • 0 5/24/2004 266O• 137,870

Arizona 2/12.2002 -7000 4/20/2004 , 10,400Arkansas 0California 12/16/2002 t39;4,4._3California 8/20/2002 "4 M,'0,r 2. 1 6/18/2004 4299,520, 759,532Connecticut 2/14/2002 f I8_ 449,988Delaware 12/30/2002 5 __ _ _

Delaware 5/2/2002 4Delaware 3/26/2002 9.7-407ý4 2/9/2004 125,•000kN. 99,074Florida 3/4/2002 4178000, 4/20/2004 42001000,-.. 984,000Georgia 0Illinois 0Iowa 0Kansas 0Louisiana 0Maryland 2/1/2002 •1610 5/24/2004 •351040 196,040Maryland-continue 5/20/2004 '7000 7,000Massachusetts 2/1/2002 1550,-2201 550,220Michigan 0Minnesota 5/16/2006 1234680 1,234,680Mississippi 3/26/2003 V20',0060 1/16/2004 ?5,O00 25,006Missouri 0Nebraska 0New Hampshire 2/12/2002 #50T000N 4/20/2004 i01Q420 452,420New Jersey 4/1/2002 122i008• 5/24/2004 815 -200• 873,208New York 2/1/2002 .200101,0 1/31/2004 4288000' 1,488,010North Carolina 4/15/2003 2300,%006•.____North Carolina 7/15/2002 4rý7231240':. 4/20/2004 *i181%820: 905,060Ohio 5/30/2002 IV639,002.g, 639,002Pennsylvania 7/11/2002 -592q,,760._ 1,929,760

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1/14/2013

Prarie Island Trbe 0South Carolina 12/16/2002 ,748,076; 748,076Tennessee 2/24/2005 i4461480, 446,480

Texas 0Vermont 2/26/2002 , 92,764Virginia 7/31/2002 0 8/7/2006 73,000 733,002Washington 0West Virginia 4/20/2004 90.2# 4/20/2004 *20-00* 50,002Wisconsin 0

0

4 4 I + 4

4 4 I + 4

4 4 I + 4

4 4 I + 4

4 4 + 4

4 4 I + 4

4 4 I + 4

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From: LIAO5 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:18 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: EPZ talking point


DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T11E FEDERAL FAMILY

From: LIA11 HocSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 10:56 AMTo: LIAO5 HocSubject: FW: EPZ talking point

From: McIntyre, DavidSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 10:53 AMTo: LIA1l HocSubject: FW: EPZ talking point

From: McIntyre, DavidSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 11:15 PMTo: Sheehan, NeilSubject: EPZ talking point

The 10-mile EPZ reflects the area expected to be affected by design basis accidents at nuclear power plants,and we are confident that it would be adequate even for severe accidents. However, the 10-mile zone wasalways considered a base for emergency response that could be expanded if the situation warranted. Thesituation in Japan, with four reactors experiencing exceptional difficulties simultaneously, creates the need toexpand the EPZ beyond the normal 10-mile radius.

We have said from the beginning of this crisis that the NRC would analyze this situation for any lessons that

can be derived to improve our oversight of U.S. nuclear power plants. Emergency protection planning will bepart of that review.

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LIA05 Hoc

Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:18 PM

FOIA Response.hoc Resource

FW: Sitreps

17 Mar 11 DOS Situation Report No. 12.pdf; 2011marl7femanatlsitrep.pdf; HHS

SITREP 003 2011 Pacific Basin Earthquake Tsunami.pdf; 16 Mar 11 USACE Japan

Operational Update 4.pdf; DOE JapanEarthquakeResponse_03162011_1800v2 Final

(2).pdf; NOC Phase 1 - Awareness 0330-11 Update Report 19 Earthquake - Tsunami -

Japan (0600 EDT 17 Mar 11).pdf; Senior Leadership Brief Earthquake - Tsunami - Japan

(0600 EDT 17 Mar 11).pdf


*****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"*DO NOT RELEASE OUTSfIDE OF THlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto: Michelle. [email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 9:40 AMTo: LIA07 Hoc; LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Sitreps

Federal Family sharing only, please.

Respectfullv,

Michelle Ralston, MS. PMIPublic Avfthirs, Stakeholdcr Outreach & CGunpaign PlanningProlessional Services & IntegrationI'echlnological Hazards IivisionProtection & National PreparednessDI-IS/FEMA1800 South Bell Street, Rm. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk

(b)(6) Blackberry(703) 305-0837 facsinfilc

From: Barnes, JoshuaSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 9:32 AMTo:I (b)(6) I Ralston, Michelle;

1

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(b)(6) ; Sherwood, HarrySubject: Sitreps

2

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USACE Operational Update #4, 16 1700 MAR 2011 - Japan Earthquake

a. Situation: At 12:46 AM EST 11 MAR 2011 (2:46 PM Japan Time), a 9.0earthquake hit off the eastern coast of Honshu, Japan. The earthquake'sepicenter was approximately 80 mile east of Sendai, Japan, and approximately231 miles northeast of Tokyo, Japan. USACE is responding to the situation inJapan through both analysis and forecasting as well as direct support from theUSAGE Pacific Ocean Division Japan District to United States Forces - Japan.The Japan District sent an officer forward to work with the disaster assessmentteam sponsored by the United States Army Japan. Through the efforts of thisteam and the collaborative planning efforts of USACE, United States ForcesJapan and Pacific Command a number of RFIs are in development at theUSACE reach back operations center. USACE continues to monitor the situationin Japan and develop courses of action that would support a request forassistance. We are looking at specialties such as safety (emergency response,recovery, deployment, contaminated debris), health physics, debrismanagement, power generation, and un-watering.

USACE Activities:

HQs.- Developed and issued FRAGO #11 with respect to USAGE response

activities and planning.- Continues to hold daily conference calls with POD.- Identifying potential SMEs and cadre for deployment if required.- Generating a database of structural, environmental, contaminated debris

management and nuclear power generation specialists--relative to nuclearpower generation and radioactive materials/debris.

- UROC responding to 7 RFIs.

POD (Pacific Ocean Division)- Providing one person from POJ to support USF-J forward Disaster

Assessment Team based upon an existing MOU.- POD providing one person to augment POJ EOC

FEMA Activities:- The FEMA National IMAT-East has activated to support U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency in the movement of radiation monitors toOCONUS locations in AK, GU, and HI.

- No requests for USACE support at this time.

Department of State Actions:- A Japan Task Force has been established at the Department of State.

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No requests for USACE support at this time.

Secretary of Defense:- Signed a Memo for the PACOM commander authorizing disaster relief

operations in Japan using DOD OHDACA funding not to exceed $35million.

USAID Actions:- Deployed a DART team to Japan with 2x urban search and rescue teams

(sent to Tokyo and Misawa).- Response management team activated to monitor the situation.- No request for USACE support at this time.

Other: None

Next 24 Hrs: The UOC will continue to monitor the situation as it develops

Approved by:

MAJ Paul PattersonUSACE Operations Center202-761-1001

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

$EXECUTIVE SECRETARIATOperations Center

SITUATION REPORT No. 12Japan Earthquake TFJPO1

Thursday, March 17, 20110600 EDT, 1100 Tunis

(b)(5)

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(b)(5)

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National Situation

FEMA Report

As of 5:30 a.m. (EDT) Thursday, March 17, 2011

This information is provided as a public service. Information presented is considered public information and may bedistributed or copied. Use of appropriate byline/photo/image credits is requested. Published daily by the FEMA NationalWatch Center (NWC). Available on the internet at: http://www.fema.gov/emersencv/reports/index.shtm. For questions orcomments, contact the NWC (staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week) at 202-646-2828 or fema-nwcadhs.gov.

Significant National WeatherNortheastMainly dry Thursday across theregion. Rain with a possibility ofsnow mixing in by Friday morningacross areas of northern Maine.

SouthWarm and dry conditions willcontinue in the Southern Plains, TheLower Mississippi Valley over tothe Southeastern coast through theweekend. Day time temperatureswill remain well above normal withmild overnight low temperaturesexpected. Winds will becomeincreasingly breezy in the afternoonthe next couple of days.

MidwestAcross the Northern and Central Plains chances for some light showers should continue into Fridayalong with a good deal of clouds, but both will decrease by afternoon. Temperatures in the region havereached well into the 60s and even low to mid 70s in the Central Plains. The Mississippi River Valleywill support high temperatures in the 70s as far north as the Upper Great Lakes.

WestA wintry mix of precipitation to persist across the Pacific Northwest, Intermountain West and RockyMountain Chain bringing a round of light to moderate snowfall to the region until Friday morning.The heavier activity should commence by Friday evening with much of northern California expectingmoderate to heavy rain/snow. (National Weather Service, Hydrometeorological Prediction Center, and variousmedia sources)

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Japan Earthquake and Tsunami - FEMA ResponseUrban Search and Rescue (US&R)Two U.S. Urban Search and Rescue Teams (VA-TF1 from Fairfax County, VA and CA-TF2 from LosAngeles County, CA) are participating with other international teams conducting Urban Search &Rescue operations in areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. On March 16 the twoteams, working with teams from the UK and China, completed a survey of an area in the south ofOfunato City, but did not detect any survivors. The teams are now beginning a new assignment inKamaishi City in Iwate Prefecture, utilizing canines and listening devices to detect survivors.

National IMA T- EastFEMA has activated the National IMAT-East (N-IMAT-E) to provide logistical, technical andcontingency planning support of US EPA's air monitoring mission and to establish future operationalplanning capability to support domestic preparedness requirements. N-IMAT-E coordinatedtransportation support in the deployment of radiation monitors to Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. Fivemonitors are in Alaska, two monitors are expected to arrive in Guam today and two monitors arescheduled to arrive in Hawaii Saturday, March 19. In addition, four monitors remain on standby inPortland, OR and two monitors are on standby in Seattle, WA.

Impact of Tsunami on West CoastOn March 11, 2011 Oregon, California and Hawaii were impacted by a tsunami that was generated bythe magnitude 9.0 earthquake near the east coast of Honshu, Japan. In Hawaii the tsunami causeddamage to small boat harbor facilities, roads and some homes throughout the State. The Governor ofHawaii signed a disaster proclamation on March 12, 2011. Many harbor bottoms are littered withsunken debris composed of dock components and sunken vessels. HI State Civil Defense deployedteams to assess damage to harbors, roads homes and resorts on the islands of Oahu, Maui and Hawaii.Hawaii County Civil Defense reported damage to pump stations, water lines, beach parks, and coastalhighways. HI EOC continues to operate at Level 3 - Operations and Planning Cell Activation, tomonitor local damage assessments.

California's Governor today issued an emergency proclamation for Mendocino and San Luis ObispoCounties following the earthquake-triggered tsunami. This follows the emergency proclamation issuedby the Governor for Del Norte, Humboldt, San Mateo, and Santa Cruz Counties on March 11, 2011.The tsunami water surge inundated California beaches, ports and harbors; destroyed infrastructure andpublic and private property, and necessitated the evacuation of residents in the affected areas. Watersurge continues to threaten the coastal counties of the State. FEMA Region IX PDA teams areconducting Joint PA PDAs for 4 counties in California as a result of the tsunami damage that occurredMarch 11.

The Governor of Oregon declared a state of emergency Tuesday, March 15 for Curry County. Damagewas reported in the port of Brookings, where much of the infrastructure was destroyed, including 80percent of the docks, a public hoist for unloading fishing boats, and a seawall. FEMA Region X PDAteams are conducting Joint IA and PA PDAs for Curry County in OR as a result of the tsunami thatoccurred March 11, 2011. PDAs began Tuesday and are scheduled to be completed today, March 17.U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is providing damage assessment support in Curry Countyand the Port of Brookings at the request of Region X. The port will remain closed until USACE canconduct surveys for obstacles.

Spring Thaw - River Ice Flooding UpdateFor the third consecutive year, forecasters predict major flooding along the Red River of the North,which forms the state line between eastern North Dakota and northwest Minnesota. Warmtemperatures will continue to cause snowmelt and ice jams in Montana, North Dakota and South

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Dakota. Warmer temperatures are expected to initiate snowmelt on the White River in Nebraska andSouth Dakota. Combined with forecast rain events, this melt could cause significant rises in rivers andstreams.

A large swath of the North Central United States is at risk of moderate to major flooding this spring.This area extends from northeastern Montana through western Wisconsin and along the MississippiRiver south to St. Louis. There is an above average risk of flooding across portions of the Northeast,including Southern New England and parts of eastern NY State. Other areas of the Midwest primed formajor flooding include Devils Lake in North Dakota, the Milk River in Northeastern Montana, theJames and Big Sioux Rivers in South Dakota, the Minnesota River, and the Mississippi River from itsheadwaters near St. Paul, Minnesota, downstream to St. Louis. For more information see the Ice JamDatabase: https://rsais.crrel.usace.arny.mil/iceiamn/ (USACE)

IllinoisThe Ohio River at Cairo, (Alexander County) is at major flood stage and is expected to crest nextweek. No significant impacts have been reported. The Ohio River at Grand Chain (Pulaski County) isat major flood stage and is expected to crest this weekend. The Illinois River is at moderate flood stageat Havana, (Mason County), and at Beardstown (Cass County) and is expected to recede to minorflood stage by the end of next week. No significant impacts have been reported.

IndianaThe White River is at moderate flood stage at Petersburg (Pike County). Areas along the river areexpected to recede to minor flood stage early next week. No significant impacts have been reported.

IdahoThe Weiser River Snowmelt Flooding - Flood Warning remains in effect until Friday morning for thenear Weiser in Washington County, west-central Idaho. Snowmelt and intense periods of rainfall havesent the Weiser River to 12 feet; flood stage is 9.5 feet and the river is expected to recede todaythrough Friday morning when it is expected to drop below flood stage. Lowland flooding is occurringtoday for riverside residential and commercial streets and county roads in and near Weiser Noevacuations have been ordered and light sandbagging by residents is reported.

WashingtonFlood Warning - Flood Warning will remain in effect through Thursday for the Skokomish River nearPotlatch in Mason County. The river crested at 17.2 feet overnight; flood stage is 16.5 feet. Floodingof pasturelands and nearby roads occurs at flood stage.

South DakotaMultiple jams have formed and released along the White River including a jam near White River thatled to moderate flooding. The river is expected to remain above flood stage through Friday.

MontanaMultiple ice jams on the Musselshell River combined with snow melt runoff has caused minorflooding. As the Yellowstone River has begun to run, numerous ice jams, some over 10 miles long, areimpacting low lying areas. Jams have formed West of Terry, at Glendive where extensive lowlandflooding occun'ed and near Hathaway, which led to extensive lowland flooding and high watersurrounding several structures.

State ActivationsThe Tennessee State EOC remains activated to Level IV (Localized Emergency/Active Missions andMonitoring) due to previous/potential severe weather. The Minnesota State EOC is partially activatedto Level III (Monitoring) and staffed with Logistics personnel to monitor the potential spring flooding.(National Weather Service and FEWA Regions)

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Earthquake ActivityVanuatuThe USGS reports that a Magnitude 6.5 earthquake occurred at 8:48 p.m. EDT Wednesday night offthe coast of Vanuatu, approximately 48 miles northwest of Port-Vila, Vanuatu and 1,169 milesnortheast of Brisbane, Australia. The earthquake occurred at a depth of 16 miles. Media reportsindicate that several hundred people may have felt strong shaking which could potentially result inlight to moderate damage. There were no reports of damage or injury. (PTWC, WCATC, USGS)

Governor's Request LettersNew Mexico DR - Severe Winter StormNorth Dakota EM - Potential for Severe FloodingIllinois DR - Severe Winter Storm and SnowstormMissouri DR - Severe Winter Storm and SnowstormSouth Dakota DR - Imminent threat of spring floodingIndiana DR - Severe Winter StormWashington DR - Severe Winter Storm

Flooding, Landslides & Mudslides

Joint Preliminary Damage Assessment Activity

Date RequestedFebruary 22, 201.1February 25, 2011February 28, 2011March 1, 2011March 11, 2011March 1.4, 2011March 14, 2011

I1 NJSeverc Storms

Flooding3/10-3/11 2011

IA 4 4 0 Began 3/16

End TBDPA 4 4 0

Severe Storms, IA 4 3 1

IV TN Flooding & Flash Began 3/15Flooding PA 13 8 5 End 3/18

2/28-3/3/2011 . A 13 8 5

Severe WinterVI OK Storm PA 2 0 0 To Begin 3/17

2/8 -10,2011 End TBD

Tsunami Began 3/143/11/2011 End TBD

IA 1 0 1 Began 3/2White Swan Fire Completed 3/16

2/12/2011 PA 1 1 0 Began 3/2End 3/16

X OR Tsunami PA I 1 0 Began 3/153/11/2011 End 3/17

41

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Activation Levels

Region I Watch/Steady State Maynard MOC (24/7)

Region II Watch/Steady State 24/7

Region III Watch/Steady State 24/7

Region IV Watch/Steady State 24/7

Region V Watch/Steady State 24/7

Region VI Watch/Steady State Denton MOC (24/7)

Region VII Watch/Steady State 24/7

Region VIII Watch/Steady State Denver MOC (24/7)

Region IX Watch/Steady State 24/7

Region X Watch/Steady State Bothell MOC (24/7)

JOn-Call and Deployed TeamsI Teams I Status II

National NMAT EAST

National IMAT CENTRALNational IMAT WEST

Region I IMAT

Support of EPAFY11 Auth: 16 / PFT: 8 (50%)

Supporting Thunderbolt Exercise - IN

No VSAT-MERS Backup (May)Type III supporting 1953-DR-ME

Region II IMAT Type III supporting 1957-DR-NY

Region III IMAT

Region IV IMATRegion V IMAT

Region VI IMAT

Region VII IMAT

Region VIII IMAT

Region IX IMAT

Region X IMAT

Recovery-Galveston, TXVSAT inoperable - ETR 3/18; Type 11supporting 3317-EM-MO

Type II ND/Tvye III SD on Standby

Type III supporting 1952-DR-CA

Tvye III supporting 1956-DR-OR

I Oflier FFAIA Ncitloiial J'eamsHurricane Liaison TeamNRCCNational Watch CenterDEST

~1

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Open Field Offices & Designated Counties as of 03/17/2011

m ,..dC-. Magor Decs: 1090 ~ftA"w~u*M. 4 Enmeiency Decs: 2

MWO tS"ý322ltt 1tf

6i

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HHS SITUATION REPORT: EMG Printer Friendly View Pagel of8

HHS/EMG 003

Situational ReportIncident Type ~ Location of Incident Dt tto

Incident Type (City & State) Dut onEarthquake/Tsunami Japan/Pacific Ocean Washington, DC

Operational Period Hazards: FLOODING03/12/2011 11:00 EDT -

03/13/2011 11:00 EDT

Organizational StructureSee HHS ICS 207

Positions / Personnel Assigned1st Shift 2nd Shift

Staff Member Telephone Staff Member TelephonePosition Number Number

EMG Manager Michael Vineyard

Operations Chief Joe Lamana 202-619-7800 Randall DellNDMS Chief Pam EvansPlanning Chief Leon LarsonLogistics Chief Jimmy Phillips

Admin/Finance Chief David Dolinsky 202-494-1619

Human ServicesSOC Lead Robert Bozzo 202-619-7800SOC Senior Watch LCDR Bruce Dell 202-619-7800OfficerSOC Watch Officer Daniel Connally 202-619-7800

SOC Watch Officer LCDR Fajardo 202-619-7800

8. Executive Summary/Summary of Critical Issues: (may besubdivided by location if multiple deployment sites)Incident Site Weather Conditions

Location Current Next 24-48 hrs Next 72 hoursSendai, Japan Mostly Cloudy. High: Chance of rain during the Chance of rain during the

57 OF, Low: 37 IF. day, chance of snow in the day, chance of snow in theWinds from W 6 - 12 evening. High: 45 OF, Low: evening. High: 41 OF,mph. 30% chance of 34 OF. Winds from E 6 Low: 27 IF. Winds from NWprecipitation mph. 90% chance of 10 - 13 mph. 60% chance

precipitation of precipitation

Significant Weather That May Impact on OperationsWeather

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&sitd i aR44Eg.f.. 3 1/13A201

HHS SITUATION REPORT: EMG Printer Friendly View Page 2 of 8

I-IIS •SF 8 1'ational/International Phase 1-Awareness2011 Pacific Basin Earthquake / Tsunami

CURRENT SITUATIONFEDERAL RESPONSE OVERVIEW (significant changes in operational situation /planned or anticipated events next 24 hours)

USA:

" USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrived in Japan and is coordinatingthe US response effort.

" U.S. USAR teams, 1 from Fairfax (Task Force-1 [will arrive 2230 EDT, 13 Mar]) and 2from Los Angeles (Task Force-2 [arrived]) deployed to Misawa, Japan.

" USS Ronald Reagan positioned off the Miyagi coast and the flag ship's Carrier StrikeGroup will join the vessel and other US Naval assets to assist in relief efforts.

" US Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) issued an advisory to Japanese citizensand Pacific foreign nationals stranded in the US as a result of the earthquake andtsunami; advisory permits possible 30-day extension for authorized US stay.

" FEMA Region IX RRCC returned to Watch/Steady-State." US Embassy Tokyo preparing a Warden Message for US citizens; no evacuation orders

are anticipated." Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Operations Center at 24/7.

Japan:

* GoJ declared a nuclear emergency after the explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi NuclearPower Plant (160 miles north of Tokyo). Sea water injections into the primarycontainment vessel and necessary pressure venting actions underway to cool plantreactors due to failed reactor unit cooling systems. At this time, containment remainsintact.

" Nuclear Regulatory Commission deployed two nuclear specialists to assist in monitoringefforts.

" Extensive damage to gas and electrical infrastructure, leaving 4 million customerswithout electricity. Japan news (Japan Times) reports temporary power outages to gointo effect Monday to prevent a massive blackout for the following prefectures: Tokyo,Gunma, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Yamanashi and the eastern half ofShizuoka.

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&sitQ iica 4tAElf 34/113A2011


US Damage:

* Hawaii: No significant damage reported; no Critical Infrastructure Key Resources (CIKR)impacts reported.

" California: No significant damage reported; no CIKR impacts reported." Alaska: No significant damage reported; no CIKR impacts reported." Guam: No damage reported; no CIKR impacts reported." Oregon:

o 1 confirmed fatality in Brookings Harbor; 2 USCG H-65 helicopters assisted in thesearch.

o Oregon State Police rescued 4 people swept away by approaching waves; two near

the mouth of the Pistol River; two in Depoe Bay." All US airports are reported open; no damage or injuries reported.

HHS RESPONSE OVERVIEW(significant changes in operational situation / planned oranticipated events next 24 hours)

" HHS demobilizing all deployed personnel and returning caches to warehouses." Participating in USAID and DoS calls; providing consult on medical counter measures." ESF #8 conference call conducted at 12:00 EST.

HHS PRIORITIES

" Safe return to home station of HHS personnel and equipment caches" Monitoring requests for assistance and technical support/consultation

CHALLENGES:No unmet challanges at this time.

Security, Force Protection, and Intelligence:No issues.

[HHS RESPONSE - MEDICAL OPERATIONS (Teams, Units & Facilities)

TEAM or UNIT AVAILABILITY AND OPERATIONS STATUS (reflect ALL public health & medicalforces even if redeployed. If redeployed type "redeployed" under GRID column):

Total Number of HHS personnel deployed:

NDMS/OFRD Teams/Task Force/Strike Teams

Team CurrentTeam Nam Location Destination Status

Name Status

Not Listed REC Reg 10, EngagedRRCCBothell,WA

Mission: David Kerschner

Comments:

Personnel # of Personnel1

Tota l: 1

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&sitrCioPc4Ef. 3 /1A42011


Not Listed

Mission:

REC's Region 9,RRCC,Oakland, CA

Jerry Fenner

Kevin Sheehan

Engaged

Comments:


Total: 2

Not Listed RIST Reg 9 RRCC, EngagedOakland, CA

Mission: CAPT Rochelle Young, OFRD, working at Reg 9 RRCC

Comments:


Total: 1

NDMS MO1 St Louis, MO Travis AFB, CA Demobilizing

Mission: will stage at Travis AFB in anticipation of medical support to2011 Pacific Basin Eqrthquake/Tsunami response.

Comments: (27) Deployed to Travis AFB. (21) Activated in-place at Homebase due to not being able to. get flights.

Personnel # of PersonnelNDMS 48

Total: 48

NDMS ALRT Home Station Travis AFB, CA

Mission: Logistic support to IRCT and DMAT

Comments:14 Loggies to Travis AFB, CA

2 Loggies to Frederick Warehouse, MD

1 Loggie to HHS Warehouse, Mira Loma, CA

Demobilizing

Personnel # of Personnel

NDMS 17Total: 17

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&sitQ'ic• Ep. 3 1/1A201 I


IRCT IRCT West Home Station Travis AFB Demobilizing

Mission: Provide command, control, coordination for ESF#8 assetsdeployed in support of 2011 Pacific Basin Earthquake/Tsunami

Comments:


Total: 14

NDMS TX 1 Home station Demobilized

Mission:

Comments:

Personnel # of PersonnelNDMS 35

Total: 35

NDMS SC 1 Home Station Demobilized

Mission:

Comments:


Total: 35

NDMS FL 1 Home Station Demobilized

Mission:

Comments:


Total: 35

NDMS FL 4 Home Station Demobilized

Mission:

Comments:

Personnel # of Personnel

35

Total: 35

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&sit io6icd4•E.f. 3j/l' 13 1


NDMS

Mission:

Comments:

VA 1 Home Station Demobilized


Total: 35

Health InfrastructureNONE REPORTED

BED AVAILABILITY AND OPERATIONAL STATUSNational HAvBed Report

CIVILIAN/HAvBED

NONE REPORTED

CIVILIAN SPECIAL NEEDS FACILITIES

NONE REPORTED

FMS/DMAT

NONE REPORTED

VA

NONE REPORTED

DOD/National Guard

EMR Summary

01 Triage Category II Age Group I Diagnostic Category

0 19 soNon - 6- - - age Mental

Location Urgent Urgent Emergent 5 18 49 64 65+ Injury Acute Chronic Health OB/GYN

No records to display.

Total:

Comments:

~1=ARF/MA, RFA, Status

ARF/MA STATUS(all medically related ARFIMAs being worked. Current Status should be Active,

Complete, or Being Assessed)

ID ARF/MA# BRIEF DESCRIPTION CURRENT COMMENTS____ __ ___ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ STATUS _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

7220SU- To activate HHS to the NRCC in the1306 MP-HHS- Activate HHS to the NRCC Open amount of $5,000.

1___ 04 1__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&sitf-/Iioid6Y4LEpf. 3 1/11Ao0,I


13077220SU-MP-HHS-

05

Activate HHS to the R9RRCC

Open

To activate HHS to the R9 RRCC andsupport for a FEMA IMAT if neededin the amount of $50,000.

For HHS purposes at this time, themission is to be used for thoseworking in the R9 RRCC only.

13087220SU-MP-HHS-

06

Provide emergencymedical assistance

Open

To provide emergency medicalassistance in response to thetsunami activation in the amount of$500,000.

For HHS purposes, this mission is tocover all travel, salaries, andlogistics related to those assetsdeployed to Travis AFB.

A request for additional funds($100K) to be added to this MApending.

Requests for Assistance/Emergency, Disaster, and Presidential Declarations(Status of Event Related Declarations)

NONE REPORTED

Emergency Response Issues(Emeroencv Suonort Functions (ESF) 1.6.814 (On lv thos.e artiva ted are li~ted) s------- r- ~,-,,

ESF 1 - Transportation STATUS:

ESF 6 - Mass Care STATUS:

ESF 8 - Health & Medical STATUS:.

ESF 14 - Public STATUS:Information

HHS RESPONSE

HHS RESPONSE - HUMAN SERVICESHHS RESPONSE - OP/STAFFDIVs

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURENONE REPORTED

[HHS/EMG Operations Report

Staff Reports

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&siti--0ii64I54Epf. 31/ 134 o 11

HHS SITUATION REPORT: EMG Printer Friendly View Page 8 o178

9. Operations Report

All deployed team members (DMAT, IRCT, and LRAT) demobilizing today. Last personscheduled to arrive at home airport at 23:40.

o IRCT Demob plan approved; finalizing Demob Order* ESF #8 call Monday at 11:00; will continue to monitor DoS and USAID conference calls.

Last Updated By: Joe Lamana (Mar 13 2011 1:05PM) Updated By: Joe Lamana

Phone or Email: 202-619-7800

10. Admin I Finance: Resource Status (may be subdivided by location if multipledeployment sites)

A+F is working with R9 REC to increase the $500k mission to $600k to cover additional costs.Nothing else significant to report.

Last Updated By: WatchOfficer (Mar 13 2011 1:11PM) Updated By: Watch Officer

Phone or Email: [email protected]

12. Logistics Report: Supply status, Logistical Support Issues, etc.

All of the equipment has been demobilized and departed Sacramento/Travis AFB enroute toMira Loma, CA to be off loaded and stored back in the warehouse. The ETA to the UPSWarehouse is 1200 PST.Last Updated By: Jimmy Phillips (Mar 13 2011 8:28AM) Updated By: Jimmy Phillips

Phone or Email: 202-619-7843

13. VA Report

No change from previous situation report. The DVA is standing by to assist if needed.Last Updated By: Mabley (Mar 13 2011 11:26AM) Updated By: Mabley

Phone or Email: [email protected]

Additional Comments:

Prepared By: EMG Ops Approved By: Joe Lamana

Supporting DocumentationUpload Date Download Description

No records to display.

https://soc.hhs.gov/sitrep/hhs sitrep view emg.aspx?roll button=yes&siQtif iic 4 MQEp 31/1342o1

NOC Phase 1 -Awareness 0330-11 Update Report 19Earthquake-Tsunami - Japan

Earthquake - TsunamiPacific Ocean

Epicenter Coordinates: 38.510,142.790UNCLASSIFIED

17 MAR 2011OifnO nDT

Unit6-UndamagedSpent Fuel Pool

Temp. IncreasingUnit 6

Unit o-Stables Coolnno

Ur-Conteinment dM Is suspected

Unit 3-Status of spent fuel pool unclear

-Helicopter operations underwayLegend

O Epicenter

* Fukushima DaichiNuclear Power Plant

U.S. Embassy

UNCLASSIFIED

Unit 4Status of spent fuel pool unclear

-Water Cannon operations

TimelDate of Report: 0600 EDT 17 Mar 11 Report prepared by: DHS - National Operations Center

CK 650 of 3114

U NOLASS'EDIFOR OFFICIAL USE,,_ .ON..

DHS Senior Leadership Brief:Earthquake-Tsunami-Japan

0600 EDT 17 March 2011Updates in bold blue

Current Situation

* DOS reports 5,178 (+901) fatalities and 8,193 (+719) missing. Embassy Tokyo hasreceived no reports of U.S. citizen fatalities.

" On 16 March, the Department of State authorized the voluntary departure of eligiblefamily members of U.S. government personnel in Tokyo, Nagoya, and Yokohama.

" The Initial plan calls for 4 charter flights; one from Narita to Taipei, Taiwan and threefrom Haneda to Seoul, South Korea to depart Japan 17 March. DOS expects up to 900passengers. Consular teams are at airports to assist with departure; buses havebeen reserved to move people to airports.

* US Force Japan (USFJ) is working Military Air transport for DoD dependants. Primaryhub will be Yokota Air Base with some flights possibly coming out of Misawa AirBase. U.S. Embassy Tokyo has chartered 14 buses which will leave Sendai for Tokyo,18 March.

* GOJ authorities has expanded the evacuation zone up to 50 miles from theFukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

* Department of Energy (DOE) completed an Aerial Measuring System (AMS) sortieover Fukushima Daiichi on 17 March. Plume analysis is being assessed.

• The NRC continues to affirm its 13 March scientific judgment that no harmful radiation isexpected to reach the U.S., even with worsening conditions in Japan.

• All airports in Japan, except Sendai Airport, continue to operate; however, ground

transportation is unreliable due to gasoline and electricity shortages.

Nuclear Reactor Status

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

* The NRC reports restoration of electrical power is underway to the Fukushima DaiichiNuclear Power Plant. On 17 March, Japanese helicopters continue water drops andwater cannons continue to pour seawater on the troubled units.

" Unit 1: The core is damaged and partially uncovered. Sea water injections continue andthere is stable cooling. The spent fuel pool level is decreasing. There is no further risk oftotal meltdown in this Unit as long as the core remains covered with seawater.

* Unit 2: The core is damaged and core cooling is reported to be unstable. Sea waterinjections continue and the spent fuel pool level is decreasing. In an effort to reducehydrogen gas build up, a hole has been cut in the upper portion of the secondarycontainment wall.

1

U- N'-t1'-I-K 651 of 3114

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

* Unit 3: The core is damaged, sea water injections continue and there is stable cooling. Thespent fuel level is decreasing and TEPCO is concerned the fuel pool may be uncovered, butis maintaining structural integrity. Over-flights were unable to confirm if any waterremains in the pool; the NRC reports the pool may be drained.

* Unit 4: NRC reports a total water loss from the spent fuel pool with no ability to retain waterin the pool. All fires in this Unit are reported to be extinguished and are not believed to havebeen caused by a hydrogen explosion.

* Units 5 and 6: Reactors are stable and the spent pool is reported to be increasing in

temperature.

Requests for U.S. Assistance from GOJ

* There are no unmet requests for U.S. Government assistance at this time.

International Support

* A British search and rescue (SAR) team joined the USAID 144-person and 12-canine UrbanSearch and Rescue (USAR) teams. They are operating from the Sumita, Iwate Prefecture.

* Canada's 17-member Disaster Victim Identification Team will arrive 17 March.

DHS Support

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

" Deployed sensitive Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) used to scan all maritime cargo,express consignment, and mail arriving from Japan at seaports and international mail andexpress consignment facilities.

* Providing passive screening of incoming passengers at U.S. airports for radiation as amatter of routine business. As part of protocols implemented after 9-11, all CBP officerswear radiation pagers that alert officers to the presence of radioactivity. These protocolswere designed to interdict individuals carrying radioactive material for nefarious purposes,not for health purposes.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

* Establishing protocols to identify vessels or cargo that may be exposed to excessiveradiation due to previous port calls or transit routes through the Pacific.

" Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center - Pacific Area is tracking vessels with heightenedexposure risk. The information will be disseminated through Intellipedia for use inestablishing contingency plans if the vessel plans to enter the U.S.

" Monitoring and assessing reports on possible radiation contamination from Japan to theU.S. Marine Transportation System.

2

U'''"'S"F'r'IORvre'r'''vA r'UK 652 of 3114

UNtLAbbll-ILUMirUr UII-HUIAL UbL UNLY

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

* Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Radiological Air Monitoring Units are beingtransported to Hawaii and Guam with scheduled arrival dates of 17 March and 19March, respectively. Two units are being sent to each location.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

I issued an amendment to the Model Security Program for Japan Airlines, which authorizesthem to transport humanitarian relief cargo on passenger aircraft through 30 June.

Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C)

* DHS OneNet has 11 sites that remain out of service due to a combination of power outagesand undersea cable degradation. Network restoration efforts are ongoing for the affectedsites.

Office of Health Affairs (OHA)

* Exposure from the reactor, reactor material, or released radioactivity from the plant poses apotential health risk only to the exposed individual. A person exposed to with radiationradioactive material does not pose a risk to other persons if properly decontaminated. TheFukushima accident has so far resulted in radiation doses to the public much less than theNRC's safety limit of the general public (100 mrem). The IAEA and others have verifieddoses greater than 40,000 mrem in an hour at specific location within the reactor complex.Even short-term exposure to such levels can cause serious medical consequences.

* OHA is coordinating with Health and Human Services (HHS) and Centers for DiseaseControl and Prevention (CDC) on screening of incoming passengers from Japan.Initial indications show that radiation screening to protect public health is notneeded. If a passenger from Japan was found to be contaminated the individualwould be referred to the local public health department.

Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP)

* Providing radiological preparedness, response and health subject matter expertise toassist the DNDO in its efforts to perform worst case estimates of the impact on theU.S. and its territories.

Interagency Domestic Actions

• All departments and agencies should be prepared to describe their preparednesscapabilities and response plans for a similar radioactive release in the U.S.

3

UNCLASSIFI_.DFOR OFFICIAL US K 653 of 3114

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Department of Defense (DoD)

(b)(5)

Department of Energy (DOE)

* A radiation monitoring team arrived in Tokyo on 16 March and established a liaisonwith the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. The team installed air sampling equipment on theroof and sampling has begun.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

* EPA continues to keep all RadNet data available in the current online database and isworking with federal partners to deploy additional radiation monitoring capabilities toparts of the western U.S. and U.S. territories.

Health and Human Services (HHS)

a HHS is prepared to transfer potassium iodine to the GOJ, if requested.

Department of State (DOS)

* U.S. Embassy Seoul forwarded 5,000 doses of potassium iodide from U.S. ForcesKorea contingency stock to Embassy Tokyo.

" A 145-person Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is coordinating their efforts withthe United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC).

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

* Winds out of the southwest at 10 mph blowing offshore through 19 March.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

* 11 NRC experts supporting USAID response efforts are in Japan.

* NRC analysts continue to support Japan's protective actions by reviewing radiation datarelated to the damaged Japanese nuclear reactors.

4

uNc, ASSIDIOR OFFICIAL US ON'K 654 of 3114



LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:18 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: ESF 15 Info Update (scroll) Japan ReactorsESF 15 Info Update (scroll) Japan Reactor Crisis.doc

0700-15001500-2300

*.****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**•DO NOT RELEASE OUTS.DE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Ralston, Michelle [mailto:Michelle. [email protected]]Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 9:40 AMTo: LIA05 Hoc; LIA07 Hoc; Quinn, Vanessa; Greten, Timothy; Burnside, Conrad; Calhoun, Nan; Colman, Steve; Feighert,Dan; Fiore, craig; Hammond, Lisa; Hammons, Darrell; Hlavaty-Laposa, Jan ; King, William; McCabe, Ron; Thomson,Rebecca; Webb, BillCc: a (b)(6) Berkey, Johanna;Bischof, Bill; Bruns, Ingrid; Cullen, William R; Hecht, Randall; Hower, Andrew; O'Boyle, Seamus; Shull, Mark; Wilgus,HelenSubject: FW: ESF 15 Info Update (scroll) Japan Reactors

FYI...Federal Family sharing only, please.

Respectfully,

Michelle Ralston, MS, PMIPublic A ffairs, Slakeholder Outreach & Campaign PlanningProfessional Services & IntegrationTechnological Hazards DivisionProtection & National PreparednessI)HSi/FEMA1800 South Bell Street, Rm. 828Arlington, VA 22202(202) 212-2310 desk

(b)(6) I Blackberry(703) 305-0837 facsimile

From: Barnes, JoshuaSent: Thursday, March 17, 2011 9:32 AMTo:[ (b)(6)

(b)(6) Sherwood, HarrySubject: ESF 15 Info Update (scroll) Japan Reactors

1; Ralston, Michelle;

1

CK 655 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:16 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Screening at Airports and State inquiries


*****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY-"DO ..... RELAS ............... FEDERAL FAMILY.

From: LIA04 HocSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:58 PMTo: OST05 Hoc; Barker, Allan; Browder, Rachel; Erickson, Randy; Logaras, Harral; Maier, Bill; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft,Doug; Trojanowski, Robert; Woodruff, Gena; Flannery, Cindy; Lukes, Kim; Noonan, Amanda; Rautzen, William; Rivera,Alison; Ryan, Michelle; Turtil, Richard; Virgilio, RosettaCc: Piccone, Josephine; LIA11 Hoc; LIA0I Hoc; LIA05 Hoc; Akstulewicz, Brenda; Deavers, Ron; Nguyen, Quynh;Bonaccorso, Amy; Virgilio, Rosetta; Collins, Elmo; Dean, Bill; Heck, Jared; McCree, Victor; Satorius, MarkSubject: Screening at Airports and State inquiries

We have received several requests through the RSLOs regarding the screening of planes/passengers/baggage landing in

the U.S. from Japan. We have a contact, Helen Sterling I (b)(6) ), with DHS/Customs and Border Protection.

They (DHS/CBP) are developing a sheet on just this topic she anticipates will be released tomorrow. As soon as the State

Liaison receives her document, which she indicates will be releasable to the public, we will forward to everyone on to:

and cc:

RSLOs: Inquiries have come in from several States, including HI (Eckerd) and TN (Crosslin).

Richard TurtilState Liaison - Liaison TeamIncident Response Center

CK 656 of 3114


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:16 PM


FW: fyi - Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept

statement


0700-15001500-2300

******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY***...DO NOT RELEASE OUTSE OF TH, E FEDERAL FAMfIY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:00 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: HOO HocSubject: fyi - Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

Here's is another record to be retained for our response to the Japanese earthquake and tsunami.

From: Batkin, JoshuaSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:24 PMTo: Brenner, Eliot; (b)(6) 1; '[email protected]'; Burnell, Scott; '[email protected]';Weber, MichaelCc: Coggins, AngelaSubject: Re: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

Yes. NRC putting out the data with our release. Clear direction to do so given from the Chairman.

Joshua C. BatkinChief of StaffChairman Gregory B. Jaczko(301) 415-1820

From: Brenner, EliotTo: (b)(6) ' [email protected]'<[email protected]>; Burnell, Scott; '[email protected]' <[email protected]>Cc: Batkin, Joshua; Coggins, AngelaSent: Wed Mar 16 12:21:34 2011Subject: Re: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

(b)(5)

Eliot BrennerDirector, Office of Public Affairs

CK 657 of 3114

US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtecting People and the Environment301 4158200C1 (b)(6)

Sent from my Blackberry

From: Shapiro, Nicholas S. < (b)(6) >To: Brenner, Eliot; '[email protected]' <[email protected]>; Burnell, Scott; '[email protected]'< [email protected]>Sent: Wed Mar 16 12:16:24 2011Subject: Re: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

And nrc is putting out the data right?

From: Brenner, Eliot <Eliot. [email protected]>To: Shapiro, Nicholas S.; '[email protected]' <[email protected]>; Burnell, Scott <Scott. [email protected]>;'[email protected]' <[email protected]>Sent: Wed Mar 16 12:11:41 2011Subject: Re: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

Scott: (b)(5).Eliot BrennerDirector, Office of Public AffairsUS Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtecting People and the Environment

301 4158200C:l (b)(6)Sent from my Blackberry

From: Shapiro, Nicholas S. (b)(6) >To: '[email protected]' <[email protected]>; Burnell, Scott; '[email protected]'<[email protected]>; Brenner, EliotSent: Wed Mar 16 12:10:04 2011Subject: Re: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

(b)(5)

From: Hammer, Michael A <[email protected]>To: Burnell, Scott <[email protected]>; Klevorick, Caitlin B <[email protected]>; Brenner, Eliot<Eliot. Brenner@ nrc.gov>Cc: Shapiro, Nicholas S.Sent: Wed Mar 16 12:07:18 2011Subject: RE: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

(b)(5)

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

2

CK 658 of 3114

From: Burnell, Scott [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:06 PMTo: Klevorick, Caitlin B; Brenner, EliotCc: Hammer, Michael A; (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

Hi Caitlin;

(b)(5)

Scott

From: Klevorick, Caitlin B [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:03 PMTo: Burnell, ScottCc: Hammer, Michael A; (b)(6)

Subject: Seeking clarification FW: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

(b)(5)

Thanks

From: Burnell, Scott [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 10:48 AMTo: Shapiro, Nicholas S.; Hammer, Michael ACc: Brenner, EliotSubject: RE: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

Nick, Michael;

Here's our finalized statement, to go out following State's release:

NRC PROVIDES PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON U.S. GUIDELINES

The NRC no longer concurs with the existing protective action measures recommended by the Japanese

government for evacuation to 20 miles and sheltering out to 30 miles from Fukushima. Under the guidelines for

public safety that would be used in the United States under similar circumstances, the NRC would recommend

that residents within 50 miles of the affected site evacuate.

Among other things, in the United States protective actions recommendations are implemented when

projected doses could exceed I rem to the body or 5 rem to the thyroid. A rem is a measure of radiation

3

CK 659 of 3114

dose. The average American is exposed to approximately 620 millirems, or 0.62 rem, of radiation each year

from natural and manmade sources.

In making protective action recommendations, the NRC takes into account a variety of factors that

include weather, wind direction and speed, and the status of the problem at the reactors.

From: Brenner, EliotSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 10:43 AMTo: Burnell, ScottSubject: Re: emergency review needed on this draft state dept statement

(b)(5)

Eliot BrennerDirector, Office of Public AffairsUS Nuclear Regulatory CommissionProtecting People and the Environment301 415 8200C1 (b)(6)Sent from my Blackberry

4

CK 660 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:16 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - Recommendation for high prioritization of Aerial Measurement System


JTXLk-• USt tL" USE ONLY*. **DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T..E FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:03 PMTo: LIA05 Hoc; PMTO1 HocCc: ETO0 HocSubject: FYI - Recommendation for high prioritization of Aerial Measurement System

For our records in responding...

From: Miller, ChrisSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:59 PMTo: McDermott, Brian; Weber, MichaelSubject: Fw: Recommendation for high prioritization of Aerial Measurement System

From: Cherry, Ronald C <[email protected]>To: Miller, Chris; Alan Remick <[email protected]>Cc: LIA08 Hoc; [email protected] <[email protected]>; Lyons, Peter <Peter.Lyons@Nuclear. Energy.gov>; KoichiUchida <[email protected]>; Connery, Joyce <[email protected]>; Aoki, Steven <[email protected]>;Poneman, Daniel <Daniel. [email protected]>; DAgostino, Thomas <Thomas. [email protected]>; Mustin,Tracy <[email protected]>; Carlson, Nicholas <[email protected]>; AlIdridge, David<David .AlIdridge@NNSA. Doe.Gov>; Hoffman, Patricia <[email protected]>; Koonin, Steven<Steven. [email protected]>; Miller, Neile <[email protected]>; Krol, Joseph<[email protected]>; Johnson, Shane <[email protected]>; Kelly, John E (NE)<[email protected]>; McGinnis, Edward <[email protected]>; Duncan, Aleshia<[email protected]>; OConnor, Rod <[email protected]>; Bryan, William<[email protected]>; Williams, Melvin <[email protected]>; Hurlbut, Brandon<[email protected]>; Anderson, Margot <[email protected]>; Mueller, Stephanie<[email protected]>; LaVera, Damien <[email protected]>; Reynolds, Tom<Tom. [email protected]>; Hunsaker, Christopher <Christopher. Hu [email protected]>; Koontz, Thomas<[email protected]>; Leistikow, Dan <[email protected]>; Zubarev, Jill E<[email protected]>Sent: Wed Mar 16 11:37:20 2011Subject: RE: Recommendation for high prioritization of Aerial Measurement System

1

CK 661 of 3114

Current schedule is the AMS will fly Thursday, March 17, at 9 am Japan time.

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Miller, Chris [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 4:38 PMTo: Cherry, Ronald CCc: LIA08 Hoc; '[email protected]'Subject: Recommendation for high prioritization of Aerial Measurement System

Ron,

Below is USNRC rationale for deployment of the DOE aerial measurement system. We believe this is a high priority to

enable gathering essential data for the determination of informed protective action recommendations, including thosefor US citizens. We would appreciate your action to help expedite this system's deployment.

DOE aerial measurement system can provide useful information that helps officials understand the event that hasoccurred, refine protective actions, and characterize the nature of the radioactive release.

Fixed wing aircraftaerial measuring system:

Can rapidly map residual fall out pattern and intensity of contaminated materials that may havedeposited after plume passage

Can define expanded evacuation and sheltering areas for both plume and post plume phase

Can obtain isotopic information which also helps to refine the source term as well as protective action

guidelines.Can identify areas of concern for agricultural products and potential food embargos

Dose rate values over the Fukushima site and offsite

Please let us know if you need additional information regarding this rationale. Thank you very much for your assistance

in this matter.

Chris Miller

USNRC

301-816-5100

2

CK 662 of 3114

From:

Sent:To:Subject:

LIA05 Hoc



FW: PUBLIC INQUIRY CONTACTS IN OPA

Bonnie Sheffietd Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

***-"*FOR OFFICIAL UOSE

From: OST05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 2:54 PMTo: LIA04 Hoc; LIA12 Hoc; LIA07 Hoc; LIA01 Hoc; LIA02 Hoc; LIA03 Hoc; LIA05 Hoc; LIA06 Hoc; LIA08 Hoc; LIA09 Hoc;LIA10 Hoc; LIA11 HocCc: Harrington, Holly; Akstulewicz, Brenda; Deavers, Ron; Bonaccorso, AmySubject: PUBLIC INQUIRY CONTACTS IN OPA

In the event you have not already received this message, per NRC's Office of Public Affairs, please forward by email anypublic Qs and contact information you receive and are unable to answer to the following individuals -Ron.DeaverscDnrc.gov and [email protected] - with a cc to Holly. [email protected] [email protected]

RosettaState Liaison

NRC Operations Center

1

CK 663 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:15 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Update from DHS/FEMAAttachments: THDHQStaff(1).xlsx


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~*-DO...T.....ASE OUTSIDE OF• THIE ....... FAMILY

From: Sheffield, Bonnie [mailto: [email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 2:51 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Update from DHS/FEMA

I also thought we might need this.

Ver7y Resetfllye4

Program Specialist (Emergency Management)Policy and Regulations UnitU.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMATechnological Hazard DivisionRadiological Emergency Preparedness Program1800 S. Bell StreetArlington VA.20598-3025202 212 2120 office

(b)(6) blackberry703 305 0837 fax

From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 2:43 PMTo: Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; Michelle Ralston; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. QuinnCc: Sheffield, BonnieSubject: Update from DHS/FEMA

Is there anything significant to pass on from DHS and/or FEMA?

FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center

(301) 816-5187

CK 664 of 3114

******FpIR OFFICIAL USE ONLY****ý*DO NOT .RELEASE OU"SIDE OF TH.E FEDERAL FAMILY

U U lUI -- tL•L ttJI-L•/-•.O~-,•U U OIL~ix U[' II]_.tl'l•.lllJa2

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From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:16 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS ARTICLE ABOUT JAPANESE NUCLEAR

EMERGENCYAttachments: image00l.jpg


ý***-*FOR OFIFIC-AIAL UeSE ONL3V*4 *

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TIlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:29 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Burnell, Scott; McIntyre, DavidSubject: FYI - HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS ARTICLE ABOUT JAPANESE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY

Japan's nuclear crisis increasingly dire

Published 16 March 2011

Japan's ongoing nuclear saga took a decided turn for the worse on Tuesday when a third explosion at anuclear reactor may have cracked the containment unit protecting it, causing large amounts of radiation to leakout; the government requested assistance from the IAEA on Tuesday and teams were dispatched to helpmonitor radiation and human health; citizens within a thirteen mile radius of the Fukushima Daiichi power plantwere evacuated and 140,000 residents within a twenty mile radius have been advised to stay indoors; officialsalso established a twenty mile no-fly zone around the power plant; officials in Tokyo reported that radiationlevels were ten times their normal levels; experts say that these increased exposure levels do not pose animmediate threat to people, but the long-term effect remains unknown; the Tokyo Electric Power Company isconsidering using helicopters to pour cold water on top of overheating rooftops covering spent fuel rods; asmall crew of fifty technicians at the badly damaged power plant is bravely fighting through high radiation levelsand fires to contain the three reactors

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Post-event image of Fukushima Daiichi plant // Source: globalvoicesonline.org

Japan's ongoing nuclear saga took a decided turn for the worse on Tuesday when a third explosion at anuclear reactor may have cracked the containment unit protecting it, causing large amounts of radiation toleak out.

The explosion occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which has already suffered fromtwo explosions.

A small crew of fifty technicians at the badly damaged power plant is bravely fighting through high radiationlevels and fires to contain the three reactors. The reactors have suffered a partial meltdown and crews areracing to prevent a full meltdown occurring and to stop spent uranium fuel rods from bursting into flames.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a statement expressing their concern that the latestexplosion may have damaged the reactor's containment unit.

"After explosions at both Units 1 and 3, the primary containment vessels of both Units are reported to be intact.However, the explosion that occurred at 04:25 UTC on 14 March at the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2 may haveaffected the integrity of its primary containment vessel. All three explosions were due to an accumulation ofhydrogen gas," the IAEA statement read.

Citizens within a thirteen mile radius of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant were evacuated and 140,000residents within a twenty mile radius have been advised to stay indoors.

Iodine tablets have also been distributed to evacuation centers, but no decision has been made on whether tobegin administering them.

Officials also established a twenty mile no-fly zone around the power plant.

The Japanese government requested assistance from IAEA on Tuesday and teams were dispatched to helpmonitor radiation and human health.

IAEA notes that radiation levels decreased after an initial spike from the recent blast.

According to the agency, "At 00:00 UTC on 15 March a dose rate of 11.9 millisieverts (mSv) per hour wasobserved. Six hours later, at 06:00 UTC on 15 March a dose rate of 0.6 millisieverts (mSv) per hourwas observed."

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Officials in Tokyo, roughly 150 miles south of the plant, reported that radiation levels were ten times theirnormal levels.

Experts say that these increased exposure levels do not pose an immediate threat to people, but the long-termeffect remains unknown.

Lee Tin-Lap, a toxicologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, sas, "You are still breathing this into yourlungs, and there is passive absorption in the skin, eyes and mouth and we really do not know what long-termimpact that would have."

Wind has been sending the radioactive debris out to the Pacific Ocean, rather than towards otherJapanese cities.

The Tokyo Electric Power Company, which operates the reactors, said that it is considering using helicoptersto pour cold water on top of overheating rooftops covering spent fuel rods.

A company spokesman said, "The only ideas we have right now are using a helicopter to spray water from

above, or inject water from below."

"We believe action must be taken by tomorrow or the day after," they added.

Early Tuesday morning hydrogen gas bubbling up from chemical reactions caused by overheating spent fuelrods at reactor no. 4 generated a powerful blast that opened a twenty-six foot wide hole in the outer building.

After a separate explosion at reactor no. 2, which ruptured the inner containment unit, an estimated 750workers were evacuated. Fifty workers stayed behind to keep the reactors from overheating.

The explosion resulted in a massive surge of radiation that was 800 times greater than the recommendedhourly exposure limit in Japan.

The small crew is taking shelter whenever possible in the reactor's heavily shielded control room, while theystruggle to keep pumping hundreds of gallons of seawater a minute into damaged reactors that are rapidlyboiling the water away.

In a somber address to the nation, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan said, "The possibility of furtherradioactive leakage is heightening."

"We are making every effort to prevent the leak from spreading. I know that people are very worried but I wouldlike to ask you to act calmly."

Mike


301-415-1705Mail Stop 016E15

3

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:15 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Event Response - Communications and Qs&As

Attachments: imageOOl.png


****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******DO NOTF RE:LEAS:E OUTFSIDE OF THlE FEDER*L FAMHIL

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:04 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FYI: Event Response - Communications and Qs&As

NRR coordination on communication.

From: Leeds, EricTo: Collins, Elmo; Satorius, Mark; McCree, Victor; Dean, BillCc: Virgilio, Martin; Weber, MichaelSent: Wed Mar 16 18:01:24 2011Subject: FYI: Event Response - Communications and Qs&As

See below - we've upped our ante and are doing our best to support the regions.

Eric J. Leeds, DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

301-415-1270

From: Nelson, RobertSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 3:13 PMTo: Lew, David; Wert, Leonard; Pederson, Cynthia; Howell, ArthurCc: Glitter, Joseph; Leeds, Eric; Boger, Bruce; Ruland, William; Meighan, Sean; Nguyen, Quynh; Thomas, Eric; Thorp,JohnSubject: Event Response - Communications and Qs&As

I've been assigned as the NRR Communications Coordinator for matters dealing with our response to theevents in Japan.

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1. I understand that you were recently sent the Chairman's Qs&As. I understand that EOC meetings arebeginning next week and the regional staff need to be prepared for stakeholder questions that will ariseregarding the events & our plants. Are these Qs&As sufficient? If not, what additional areas do youwant addressed?

2. Please identify a POC in your region that my team & I can coordinate with on communications issues.3. I understand that a concern was raised about the Ops Center contacting a family member and that a

protocol is needed for such contact. I'm working on it.4. We will likely formulate a "tiger team" to prepare responses to written inquiries. I'll keep you advised.5. Communications with the regions, particularly those requesting information regarding specific plants,

should be coordinated thru my team. If you have concerns in this regard, please contact me.

R.A. Nelson

Robert A. NelsonDeputy DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor LicensingOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

c*U.S.NRCE-ltbuPero3CdwEm*rne30

~]E-mail: robert.nelson@)nrc.pov I 'a Office: (301) 415-1453 1 Cellj (b)(6) J& Fax: (301) 415-21021

2

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:16 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE ARTICLE ON GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR A

LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY


*~**FOR FFICIAL USE ONLY~+****-.DO OT RELEASE OUTSE E OF THE FEDERAL FAffLY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:26 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Leeds, Eric; McDermott, Brian; Wiggins, Jim; Evans, Michele; Virgilio, Martin; Burnell, Scott; McIntyre, DavidSubject: FYI - GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE ARTICLE ON GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR A LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAREMERGENCY

This article takes NRC to task for being a weak regulator.

A Japan-reactor repeat in the United States could cost thegovernment dearly

By Jim Tankersley National Journal March 15, 2011

An American nuclear power-plant accident similar to the ongoing disaster in Japan wouldleave taxpayers on the hook for billions, and perhaps hundreds of billions, of dollars in healthand economic damage claims, risk experts estimate.

Federal law puts most nuclear-accident liability on the shoulders of taxpayers, but regulatorshave not enforced safety standards vigorously enough to fully safeguard against those risks,economists Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther wrote in a 2009 p that warned ofexcessive taxpayer exposure to the risks of nuclear catastrophe.

Heal, a professor at Columbia University, and Kunreuther, of the Risk Management andDecision Processes Center at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business,acknowledge that the risks and costs of a nuclear accident in the United States are difficult toquantify. But they say that the upper-end damage estimates of a full core meltdown arealmost "unimaginable."

The prospect of such an accident, while low, suddenly seems more imaginable in the wake ofthe simultaneous failures of three reactors at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear PowerStation, following the 8.9-scale earthquake and massive tsunami that struck the country onFriday.

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Heal and Kunreuther sketch a deadly and expensive example of how bad a U.S. nuclearaccident might be: A meltdown at the Indian Point nuclear-power station 25 miles north ofNew York City, they write, could eventually kill some 64,000 people - damage that theycalculate at $384 billion - and inflict $50 billion to $100 billion in economic costs. Nightmarescenarios involving lost nuclear material that ends up in terrorists' hands, or the long-termevacuation of New York City, would dramatically increase the costs.

The Price-Anderson act limits private liability for those costs to $375 million for an individualcompany, plus $12.6 billion from an industry liability pool, leaving taxpayers on the hook forthe rest. That transfer of liability creates conditions for moral hazard - an incentive for anelectric utility, in this case, to take on too much risk because the utility would not bear the fullcosts of a catastrophic event.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is supposed to be taxpayers' guard against that risk. But,Heal and Kunreuther write, it's far from clear that regulators have done the job adequately:"There is empirical evidence that the NRC does not aggressively pursue and penalizemismanagement of nuclear-power stations, and that the federal authorities are not sensitiveto the increase in potential costs associated with siting near densely populated areas."

In a phone interview on Monday, Heal gave the NRC a "5 out of 10" on a regulatory ratingscale and raised concerns over whether the agency had adequately prepared for thepossibility of a large American earthquake shaking a nuclear facility. In California, home totwo working nuclear plants, Heal said that a massive radiation release would inflict damage"in the billions and billions of dollars."

U.S. regulators must quickly learn the still-unfolding lessons from the Japanese plant failures,he said, including whether plant operators there took any safety shortcuts.

"The priority in this country now is to focus very heavily on reactors that are in a seismiczone," Heal said, adding, "The NRC is supposed to be our guarantee against moral hazard.But if the NRC isn't keeping its game up to scratch, the risk from moral hazard istremendous."

Mike

.Michael WeberDeputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research,State, Tribal, and Compliance ProgramsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

301-415-1705Mail Stop 016E15

2

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From:


LUA05 Hoc



FW: FYI - 4 points on protecting us personnel and actions needed for Dai-ihi reactors

Recommendations.doc


*****FeR OFFICIAL USE .NLY*****.DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMIL.

----- Original Message -----From: Weber, MichaelSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:30 PMTo: LIAO5 HocCc: HOO HocSubject: FYI - 4 points on protecting us personnel and actions needed for Dai-ihi reactors

For retention in our records on this response.

----- Original Message -----From: Miller, ChrisSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:29 AMTo: Miller, Chris;J (b)(6) Jaczko, Gregory; 'Daniel.Poneman@l hq.doe.gov';

F (b)(6) 'roosj @ state.gov'; 'Stein bergJ [email protected]'; (b)(6) 1;I(b)(6) I

[ (b)(6)

Cc: Weber, Michael; Virgilio, Martin; Borchardt, Bill; McDermott, Brian; Mamish, Nader; Miller, ChrisSubject: 4 points on protecting us personnel and actions needed for Dai-ihi reactors

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1.

2.(b)(5)

3.4.

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:16 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - Release of INPO Event Report Level 1 -- Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station

Fuel Damage Caused by Earthquake and Tsunam

Attachments: INPO Event Report (IER) L1-11-1.pdf

Importance: High

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wiernan Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center

(301) 816-5187

**'***FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******DO NO. RELEASE OUTS. DE OF . T.E FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:32 PMTo: RST01 Hoc; LIA05 HocSubject: FYI - Release of INPO Event Report Level 1 -- Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused byEarthquake and TsunamImportance: High

From: Wittick, BrianSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 7:42 AMTo: Nguyen, Quynh; Meighan, Sean; Andersen, James; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael; Muessle, Mary; Williams, Donna;Merzke, DanielCc: OIP DistributionSubject: FW: Release of INPO Event Report Level 1 -- Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused byEarthquake and TsunamImportance: High

Attached please find the INPO Level 1 Event Report

Brian WittickExecutive Technical Assistant for ReactorsOffice of the Executive Director for OperationsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission301-415-2496 (w);d (b)(6 ) J (C)

From: Mortensen, George K (INPO) (mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 6:10 AMTo: Boger, Bruce; Wittick, Brian

1

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Subject: FW: Release of INPO Event Report Level 1 -- Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused byEarthquake and TsunamImportance: High

Bruce,Attached is the INPO Event Report - Level 1 (previous SOER level document) released by INPO to U.S. utilities

yesterday. Please be advised that this voluntarily provided document is copyrighted and Limited Distribution, and is notreleaseable to the public (even under FOIA requests) as it has been granted exclusion from FOIA under the previousAffidavit sent and accepted by the NRC.

Please contact me with any specific questions, we are sending the document to you directly to expedite the normaldocument routing process through NRC's Operating Experience branch. It is my understanding that a copy was also sentyesterday (from Bill Webster) to the EDO.

Best Wishes!George MortensenINPO - External Relations Program Manager

2

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I


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:15 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: Offer of information from FEMA


0700-15001500-2300

From R OFFICIAL USE ONLYHDO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TiE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: OST05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 5:03 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Offer of information from FEMA

From: Logaras, HarralSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 4:51 PMTo: LIA04 Hoc; OST05 HocSubject: Offer of information from FEMA

Please call me, I would like to discuss an offer of information from FEMA.

Sincerely,

Harral LogarasU. S. NRC Region IIIRegional Government Liaison630-829-9659

Link to the Award Winning NRC Information Digest http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-

collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v22/sr1350v22.pdf

Link to NRC Fact Sheets and Brochures http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/

1

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LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:14 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: State Liaison Signing on in Op Center


0700-15001500-2300

ASledeaMr, USE :2YPMDO NOt RELEASEX~r OJUTSIDffE, OF TF~fE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: LIA04 HocSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 1:21 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FW: State Liaison Signing on in Op Center

From: Barker, AllanSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 10:16 AMTo: LIA04 Hoc; Browder, Rachel; Erickson, Randy; Logaras, Harral; Maier, Bill; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug;Trojanowski, Robert; Woodruff, GenaCc: Heck, Jared; Pederson, Cynthia; Lynch, JamesSubject: RE: State Liaison Signing on in Op Center

Amanda,

Good Morning, I have had two inquiries on the same issue, from State government contacts in Wisconsin andOhio, asking if folks arriving from Japan are going through a screening process, actually getting measured forradiation, and if contaminated, what is the follow-up process. Also, what organization is conducting thescreening?

Thanks .............. Allan

From: LIA04 HocSent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 5:58 AMTo: Barker, Allan; Browder, Rachel; Erickson, Randy; Logaras, Harral; Maier, Bill; McNamara, Nancy; Tifft, Doug;Trojanowski, Robert; Woodruff, GenaSubject: State Liasion Signing on in Op Center

Good morning everyone, I the State Liaison desk is now staff in the Operations Center.

Is everyone doing okay this morning? Any issues?

CK 678 of 3114

Amanda Noonan

State Liaison - Liaison TeamIncident Response Center

CK 679 of 3114


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:13 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: FYI - Assistant Secretary Level SVTC on Japan Earthquake - March 16, 2011 -8:00-9:00am16 March 0800 Japan IPC SVTC Agenda.pdfAttachments:


0700-15001500-2300

÷*'-**FOR OFFICIAL . ..SE ONLY*.•*-•,,

DO NOT RELEAS-E, "U 1OULJT.D OF• TlE11. FEDERA.L FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 6:40 PMTo: ET01 HocCc: LIA05 Hoc; Virgilio, Martin; Dorman, DanSubject: FYI - Assistant Secretary Level SVTC on Japan Earthquake - March 16, 2011 - 8:00-9:00am

Here is the agenda for tomorrow morning's call at 0800, which I have been asked to attend.

OK 680 of 3114

IV.

V.

VI.

Japanese Earthquake and Pacific Tsunami ResponseIPC-Level SVTC

DATE: March 16, 2011LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 8:00 - 9:00 a.m.

AGENDA

Introduction/Update on Due-Outs ....................... NSS

Brief Seismic and Weather Update ................ USGS/NOAA

Nuclear Reactor Update ............................ NRC/DOE

Humanitarian Response Update ..................... USAID/DOD

Economic Impact ................................... Treasury

Next Steps/Summary ...................................... NSS

CK 681 of 3114


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:14 PMFOIA Response.hoc Resource

FW: STATUS

Bonmie Sheffield DayshiftKen Wierman NightshiftFEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

0700-15001500-2300

Sub OFFetCIL USE ONLY*****DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF ToE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Sheffield, Bonnie [mailto: [email protected]]Sent: Wednesday, March 16, 2011 12:09 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Re: STATUS

Thank you


From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: [email protected] <[email protected]>Sent: Wed Mar 16 12:05:51 2011Subject: STATUS

Ms. Sheffield,

I am logged back in and I left the instructions.


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.*-,+.

1

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From: AdvanceNotifications ResourceSent: Friday, April 01, 2011 10:27 AMTo: Ragland, RobertSubject: FW: ShipmentsAttachments: image001.png

I'm about to send you a bunch from the Advance Notifications Inbox.

Kris Jamgochian

From: Owens, JaniceSent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 10:48 AMTo: Collins, ChiquitaCc: Shepherd, Jill; Mayros, Lauren; Horn, Brian; AdvanceNotifications Resource; Foreign ObligationsSubject: Shipments

Lori Southern, Cameco called and said they were cancelling the transshipment from Canada through the US toJapan and will be notifying you. (I received her email.)

Dan Noss, AREVA expects to be able to provide us with more information today on the shipment scheduled toarrive in Tokyo. He is also waiting for more information on the operational status of the Nuclear Fuel IndustriesLtd. (NFI) fuel fabrication facilities. His understanding is that NFI Kumatori is or will be operational soon andthat NFI Tokai was shut down and possibly damaged, but he did not know to what extent

(b)(5)

Thank you for contacting OIP regarding the advance notifications you received. We will keep each other

posted as this unfolds.

Janice

Janice E. OwensBranch Chief, Export Controls and International OrganizationsOffice of International ProgramsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission301-415-3684301-415-2395 (fax)Ja nice.Owens(anrc.qov

SU.S.NRCth.d 5- ,,,a P.&d-,y C-I.a,

CK 683 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:11 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: 2pm calls daily with USAID, Hill staff


...... OR OFRIAAL USE ON.LY*.DO N09F REES OUTSD OF THE•u • FED)ERAL FAMIL-Y

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 7:45 PMTo: Powell, AmyCc: LIA05 Hoc; LIA03 Hoc; Virgilio, MartinSubject: Response - 2pm calls daily with USAID, Hill staff

Certainly. I'm on tomorrow and Thursday. Marty is on Wednesday and Friday.

From: Powell, AmyTo: Virgilio, Martin; Weber, MichaelCc: Schmidt, RebeccaSent: Mon Mar 14 19:42:47 2011Subject: 2pm calls daily with USAID, Hill staff

Mike and Marty,

For the duration of this week, USAID is coordinating conference calls to provide updates to Congressional stafffrom the federal partners working on efforts to assist and monitor events in Japan. Marty joined me today(thank you); these calls will continue through Friday, each day at 2prm. Would one of you (I understand thatyou are alternating schedules a bit to spot each other) be available through the end of the week for thesecalls? We can hold them in the Ops Ctr to make it easier for you.

Please let me know - thanks!

Amy

Amy PowellAssociate DirectorU. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOffice of Congressional AffairsPhone: 301-415-1673

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From: LIA05 HocSent Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:10 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Nuke plant owner in Japan didn't plan for an 8.9 magnitude earthquake


*-"-'***FOR- OFFICIAL USE ONLY*****DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TH.E FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 3:24 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Burnell, ScottSubject: FYI - Nuke plant owner in Japan didn't plan for an 8.9 magnitude earthquake

From: GSN Homeland Security Insider <[email protected]>To: Weber, MichaelSent: Mon Mar 14 08:40:39 2011Subject: Nuke plant owner in Japan didn't plan for an 8.9 magnitude earthquake

] .. .

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Monday, March 14, 2011

Nuke plant owner in Japan didn't plan for an 8.9 magnitude earthquake

The possibility that an earthquake could cause cataclysmic damage to a nearbynuclear power plant is certainly not a new idea to top execs at the TokyoElectric Power Company (TEPCO), which operates the Daiichi and Daini powerstations located in the region hit by the devastating earthquake and tsunami onMarch 11.

In fact, ever since the major Niigata-Chuetsu-Oki earthquake struck Japan onJuly 16, 2007, TEPCO began implementing a series of measures to strengththe Kashiwazaki-Kariwa power station (located 16 kilometers from that earlier earthquake's epicenter),and started a program to apply the same safety initiatives to the Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Dainiplants as well. More

DoD prepares earthquake response

--Although the Japanese government hasn't officially asked for assistance in'F" dealing with the aftermath of the 8.9 magnitude earthquake and tsunami on

March 11, the Department of Defense said U.S. assistance is currentlybeing readied in case such a request comes.

"We are assessing the situation and positioning forces so that they areready to respond and provide disaster relief if directed," Navy CommanderLeslie Hull-Ryde said in a statement issued by the Defense Department the

morning of March 11. The DoD said U.S. ships - including an aircraft carrier strike group - werepreparing to depart for the stricken area.

The request for assistance from Japan would come through the U.S. State Department. More

Pentax Pair 2 lenses now see clearly through heat, haze and

n] -[] shimmeringPentax lenses with the company's PAIR (Pentax AtmosphericInterference Reduction) technology were created for difficultsecurity applications such as desert military operations, bordersecurity, seaports and other homeland security applications. In amajor 2011 breakthrough, the PAIR 2 technology now enables the;lens to see through heat, haze and shimmering -- a huge boon

when you want to "see the threat before it sees you".

See the video featuring Pentax sales engineer Luis Aquilar

Washington offers earthquake assistance, FEMA warns on approaching tsunami

As government officials in Washington scrambled to help Japan in the a...aftermath of one of the most powerful earthquakes in history, the FederalEmergency Management Administration (FEMA) warned U.S. states andterritories in and along the Pacific Ocean to brace for possible tsunamis.

The earthquake, centered off the east coast of Japan under the seaunleashed a 30 foot tsunami that swept inland along the Japanese coast.Early reports said as many as 300 bodies had been found along the coast.The death toll is expected to rise, possibly significantly.

The White House sent out a statement early on March 11 offering condolences and assistance to Japan,while U.S. emergency agencies prepared warnings and readied response for tsunamis generated by themassive temblor. More

2

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Federal government spending funds to ready itself for another tsunami

The U.S. Government has been trying to prepare itself in recent months for anotherEli destructive tsunami by hiring a firm to deploy a tsunami measuring buoy off the

coast of Chile, by awarding a contract to the University of Washington's PacificMarine Environmental Laboratory to model tsunami hazards in the United States,and by getting ready to upgrade facilities maintained by the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) in Hawaii and the Pacific area.

Of course, none of those actions allowed the federal government to predict theearthquake that struck Japan on the morning of March 11, or fully anticipate thedamages that the resulting tsunami could inflict in Hawaii, the Pacific islands, or theWest Coast of the United States. More

Detecting tsunamis 20,000 feet below the sea

The first word the U.S. Government heard about the tsunami that was formedwhen an earthquake struck Japan on the morning on March 11 came when apressure sensor sitting in about 20,000 feet of water on the bottom of thePacific Ocean sent an acoustic signal to a tsunami buoy floating directly aboveit, on the surface of the water, which then transmitted an alert signal, viasatellite, to the National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) located in Mississippi.

That tsunami buoy, one of 39 maintained around the world by the NDBC, simultaneously sent the samealert to two U.S. Tsunami Warning Centers - one based in Hawaii and the other located in Alaska. Thosewarning centers are actually responsible for assessing the size and the potential impact of the tsunamisthey monitor, Helmut Portmann, the director of the National Data Buoy Center told Government SecurityNews on March 11. More

Army officers disciplined over Ft. Hood shootings

The U.S. Army has ordered disciplinary actions against nine unnamed officers for failingFx] to do anything about the radicalization of accused Ft. Hood shooter Maj. Nidal Hasan

that led to a mass shooting in 2009 at the Texas installation that killed 13.

Army Secretary John McHugh "initiated adverse administrative action against nineofficers for administrative and leadership failures relating to the career" of Hasan,according to an Army statement on March 10.

The Army didn't identify the officers, but said the degree of discipline would vary depending on eachofficer. More

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Paradigm lands $49 million DR deal with DoD

A blanket purchase agreement that could be worth as much as $49 million was awardedby the U.S. Department of Defense on March 10 to Paradigm Holdings, of Rockville, MD,a provider of IT and cyber security solutions to federal agencies.

While there is no guaranteed minimum on the agreement, the company will be competingon delivery orders capped in the aggregate at $49 million.

Under the deal, Paradigm will provide disaster recovery software solutions throughout thedepartment including the defense secretary's office, all military departments, unified

ElF

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commands, inspector general's office, office of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the Coast Guard,

mrockwell(Qsn maq azine .com

Special Correspondent forIT and Cyber-securityJohn P. Mello, Jr.ipmello~cqsnmaoazine.com

Art DirectorMark Kaplanmkaolan~alsnmaqazine.com

GSN's Daily HomelandSecurity Insider is publishedevery business day.

Copyright © 2011All rights reserved.

World Business Media,LLC233 Spring Street, Suite 801New York, NY 10013(212) 344-0759

To subscribe, please visit:www.gsnmagazine.com

If you know someonewho might like to receive thisnewsletter, please use the"forward e-mail" button below.

For advertising rates andspecifications, please contactEd Tyler, our publisher, atetvler~psnmaqazine.com

commands, inspector general's office, office of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the Coast Guard,NATO and the intelligence community. More

Anti-virus software maker looking for testers

EL One of the oldest names in anti-virus software, G Data, will be launching a newversion of its Internet security software in April but before it does, it's looking forcomputer jockeys to download a free version of the program and give the companysome feedback about it.

New features in the offering for Windows-based PCs include performance of systemscans when a computer is idle, a backup and recovery module and a cloud-basedchecksum database.

G Data, which has offices around the world and is sold in more than 80 countries, was founded inGermany in 1985. The previous version of its Internet security software received the gold seal of approvalfrom independent testing firm AV-Comparatives for on-demand and proactive malware recognition. More

TSA chooses HMS to support its Entrust encryption certificates

TSA has awarded a contract worth $117,508 to HMS Technologies, Inc., ofMartinsburg, WV, a service-disabled veteran-owned small business, to provide serviceand support to maintain more than 230 Entrust Certificates that encryptcommunications between TSA's servers and Web browsers.

n_ ______

TSA decided to stick with the Entrust Certificates it already owns, rather than run a newcompetitive procurement and shift to a different encryption provider.

"Selecting another brand other than Entrust will require extensive re-engineering,implementation, training, Certification and Accreditation (C&A), testing, and documentation that wouldresult in an additional cost of $506,188 to the Government," said TSA, in a document explaining itsprocurement strategy. More

HSDBC issues monograph on 'Preparedness' and launches conversation series

S...... The Homeland Security & Defense Business Council launched on March 10 its"National Conversation Series on the State of Homeland Security," and released itsseventh monograph in its 9/10/11 Project, focusing on how far the public and privatesectors have come in preparing for all hazard events.

"Preparedness," when considered in the context of national security, was pretty simpleat one time, said the Council in a news release it issued on March 10. We protect ourborders and we maintain a military as a deterrent or a force against foreignaggression. Today, preparedness extends to all manner of natural and man-made

disasters, wherever they may occur, and virtually everything is now a matter of national as well as localconcern. More

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King hearings: A polarized flop

By David Schanzer

The biggest problem with the King hearings into domestic radicalization is that fromthe beginning their purpose has not been clear. Is there anyone in the Muslimcommunity or the government in denial that radicalization of some Muslim Americansis a security problem? No.

Are there any rational people who believe that disparaging the Muslim Americancommunity and blaming it collectively for the acts of a few will improve this problem?No again.

There would have been nothing wrong if King had accurately defined theradicalization problem as a dangerous ideology that, thankfully, affects relatively few

Muslim Americans, and called hearings to explore ways Muslim Americans, non-Muslim Americans andlaw enforcement could work together to address this problem. Had he done this, the hearings could havebeen a productive exercise, as were prior hearings run by Senator Joe Lieberman and former U.S.Representative Jane Harman. More

Forward e-mail

This email was sent to [email protected] by qsnqcisnmagazine.com IUpdate Profile/Email Address I Instant removal with SafeUnsubscribe TM I Privacy Policy.Government Security News I 233 Spring Street I Suite 801 I New York I NY 1 10013

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:11 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: LLW Forum Flash: US Gov't Preparing Response to Japanese Request for Assistance


"".-,FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY-`*"'DO NOT.......... OUTSIDE OF-, HE FED)ERALb ..... "LY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 7:43 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Brock, KathrynSubject: FYI - LLW Forum Flash: US Gov't Preparing Response to Japanese Request for Assistance

From: [email protected] <[email protected]> -

To: [email protected] <[email protected]>Sent: Mon Mar 14 19:18:21 2011Subject: LLW Forum Flash: US Gov't Preparing Response to Japanese Request for Assistance

InternationallJapan

US Government Preparing Response to Japanese Request for Assistance

Earlier today, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a press release stating that the Japanese government hasformally asked for assistance from the United States as it continues to respond to nuclear power plant cooling issuestriggered by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. As part of a larger U.S. government response, NRC is consideringpossible replies to the request, which includes providing technical advice.

In addition, NRC Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko and Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Poneman briefed reporters at the WhiteHouse today on the U.S. response to events in Japan. This briefing will constitute the agencies' sole media appearancefor Monday. For additional information, please refer to the White House's transcript of their remarks.

NRC has already dispatched two boiling-water reactor (BWR) experts to Japan as part of a U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) team to assist with the disaster. The experts are currently in Tokyo offering technicalassistance. USAID is the federal government agency primarily responsible for providing help to countries recovering froma disaster.

NRC has been monitoring on a 24-hour-a-day basis the Japanese reactor events via its Headquarters Operations Centerin Rockville, Maryland. Yesterday, the agency issued a press release stating in part that the United States is "notexpected to experience any harmful levels of radioactivity" from the small releases from the Japanese reactor event.

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The NRC will not comment on hour-to-hour developments at the Japanese reactors, as this is an ongoing crisis for whichthe Japanese have primary responsibility.

Japan experienced issues at several nuclear power plants following an estimated 8.9 magnitudeearthquake and tsunami off the eastern Japanese coast on Friday, March 11, 2011. Thereafter, NRCmonitored conditions at various U.S. nuclear power plants, spent fuel storage installations, andnuclear materials sites. Personnel at all locations have informed the NRC that conditions remainsafe.

For background information on generic operations at a boiling-water reactor, including an animatedgraphic, please visit the NRC's web site at www.nrc.qov.

March 14, 2011

Todd D. Lovinger, Esq.Executive DirectorLLW Forum, Inc.(202) 265-7990

The preceding information was provided to you on behalf of the LLW Forum, Inc. It may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written approval ofthe organization's Executive Director. To view other communications and documents of the LLW Forum, Inc., visit the LL W Forum's web site athttp:/Aww.llwforum.orgJ.

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From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:10 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - MOX Alert - TVA, Energy Northwest & Exploding Japanese MOX Reactor


*****FOR OFFICIAL USE pNLYV*-ýDO NOTF RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMIL-V

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 3:13 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FYI - MOX Alert - TVA, Energy Northwest & Exploding Japanese MOX Reactor

From: (b)(6)

To:I (b)(6)

Sent: Mon Mar 14 10:48:46 2011Subject: MOX Alert - TVA, Energy Northwest & Exploding Japanese MOX Reactor

MOX Alert - Energy Northwest and TVA MOX Plans & Exploding Japanese MOX Reactor

Energy Northwest, TVA and DOE officials have remained virtually silent about secret plans to use experimental weapons-grade plutonium fuel (MOX) in the Columbia Generating Station. It is noted that the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 explodingreactor is partially loaded with a first batch of reactor-grade MOX, thus making radioactive release potentiallyworse. Weapons-,qrade MOX has never even been tested in a boiling water reactor (BWR) and DOE is planning to use itin the GE Mark I design (Browns Ferry and Fukushima Daiichi 1-3 reactors) and GE Mark II (CGS). We will continueefforts to reveal information about this program to the US public.

Tom ClementsFriends of the Earth

top of homepage - Salem, OR

http://salem-news.com/

http://salem-news.com/articles/march14201 l/nuke-reactor-wash.php

Mar-14-2011 03:05

Secret Plan Exposed to Use Surplus Weapons Plutonium in Washington State Nuclear Reactor

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Salem-News.com

FOIA Documents Reveal Energy Northwest Plans Plutonium Fuel (MOX) Experiments While Seeking to ControlInformation Leaks to the Media.

See original Feb. 3, 2011 news release on Friends of the Earth website:Secret Plan Exposed to Use Surplus Weapons Plutonium in Washington State Nuclear Reactorhttp://www.foe.orq/secret-plan-exposed-use-surplus-weapons-plutonium-washinqton-state-nuclear-reactor

distributed nationally:

from Experts Comment on U.S. Implications of Japanese Reactor Crisis

March 14, 2011

http://www.foe.org/experts-comment-us-implications-iapanese-reactor-crisis

MOX section:

As in Japan's Fukushima Unit 3, the use of plutonium fuel (MOX) in U.S. reactors poses special radiation andsafety risks. One of the Japanese reactors under risk of continued fuel melting or explosion is now operating for thefirst time with part of the core being plutonium fuel. This plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, shipped from Europe andinserted in Fukushima Unit 3 in September 2010, poses greater risks than traditional uranium fuel. MOX, made fromplutonium which is capable of being used in nuclear weapons, is harder to control during reactor operation and results in amore serious radiation release in the event of an accident. The plutonium in the MOX is a result of the reprocessing ofJapanese spent fuel and that reprocessing program. MOX use has long been opposed by public interest groups due tosafety, cost and non-proliferation concerns.

Tom Clements, Southeastern nuclear campaign coordinator, Friends of the Earth, said: "In the U.S., the Department ofEnergy is considering use of MOX fuel in the Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry reactors, of the same agingMark I boiling water reactor design as Fukushima Unit 3. Analysis by the Tennessee Valley Authority of unsafe MOX fuelmade from surplus weapons plutonium must be halted and the $850 million request related to this in President Obama'sFY2012 must be rejected. The cost of the MOX plant now under construction at the Department of Energy's SavannahRiver Site has skyrocketed from $1.4 billion in FY 2004 to $4.9 billion in FY 2009 and has become a program driven byspecial interests that profit from it."

See http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/2011/03/us plutonium disposition .html andhttp://www~foe.org/secret-plan-exp~osed-use-surplus-weapons-p~lutonium-washinqton-state-nuclear-reactor.

Contact Tom Clements at 803-834-3084 (landline).

2

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:11 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI- Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 LinkAttachments: Natural Phenomena Limitations.wpd


~******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF TH.E .FEDE. L FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 3:44 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Burnell, Scott; Brenner, EliotSubject: FYI- Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 Link

From: Leeds, EricTo: Grobe, Jack; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, MichaelCc: Nguyen, Quynh; Ruland, William; Skeen, David; Brown, Frederick; Brenner, Eliot; Collins, Elmo; Dean, Bill; Satorius,Mark; McCree, Victor; Schmidt, Rebecca; Boger, BruceSent: Mon Mar 14 15:38:43 2011Subject: FW: (Action) Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 Link

FYI - I've asked Quynh Nguyen to work with the Ops Center to create a share-point site to house our Q&As from theJapanese quake and tsunami. Attached is a list of Q&As we created during the last tsunami, which we shouldconsider. The regions requested Q&As to support their EOC meetings next week with members of the public. I'd like tohave something completed by the end of the week for the regions.

Eric J. Leeds, DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission301-415-1270

From: Boger, BruceSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 9:21 AMTo: Leeds, EricSubject: FW: (Action) Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 Link

FYI-this is a knowledge management challenge. We've collected information in the past, but we have to drag

it out and it's not available in the Ops center.

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From: King, MarkSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 7:23 AMTo: Boger, Bruce; Brown, Frederick; Thorp, JohnCc: Thomas, EricSubject: RE: (Action) Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 Link

I think the attached is what Bruce is referring to - a natural phenomena limitations document. See attached.

From: Boger, BruceSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 7:20 AMTo: Brown, Frederick; King, Mark; Thorp, JohnCc: Thomas, EricSubject: RE: (Action) Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 Link

Great. Thanks. This is a start. I still remember something that was created to provide some plant-specificprotection information. (e.g., Diablo Canyon has some tsunami protection). I believe we explored west coastplants for tsunamis and east coast plants for hurricane flooding protection. If you can't find it easily (or ifBruce's gray matter failed again), please reach out to the west coast plant PMs to see what tsunami protectionthey have. I suspect we'll receive some cards and letters. Thanks again.

From: Brown, FrederickSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 7:10 AMTo: King, Mark; Thorp, JohnCc: Thomas, Eric; Boger, BruceSubject: RE: (Action) Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 Link

Thanks Mark

From: King, MarkSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 7:08 AMTo: Thorp, John; Boger, BruceCc: Brown, Frederick; Thomas, EricSubject: RE: (Action) Tsunami Fact Sheet - NUREG issued in March 2009 Link

We had a NUREG issued on this subject back in March 2009.

TSUNAMI HAzARD AssESSMENT-AT N_ UCLEAR POWER PLANT SITES IN -rTHE UN-NITED- STATES OFAMERICAClick link to view: [NUREGICR-69661

http:fpbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0915/ML091590193.pdf

From: Thorp, JohnSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 6:57 AMTo: Boger, BruceCc: Brown, Frederick; King, Mark; Thomas, EricSubject: RE: (Action) Tsunami Fact Sheet

We'll look for it; If we don't find it quickly, we'll start producing one. (Mark King, please start looking)

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I take it we would define & describe the tsunami phenomena, then address which nuclear stations in the U.S.are located in areas subject to tsunami waves, and describe what we can regarding the design of plants towithstand tsunami impacts?

Thanks,

John

From: Boger, BruceSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 6:48 AMTo: Thorp, JohnCc: Brown, FrederickSubject: Tsunami Fact Sheet

I seem to recall that OpE developed a tsunami fact sheet? Should we dust it off?

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Summary of Current Regulations, Guidance, and Activities related to NRC Reviewof Tsunami Hazard Analyses for New NPPs in the United States

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers and assessestsunami and tsunami-like phenomena under its tsunami hazard and risk assessmentprotocols. To perform a tsunami hazard and risk assessment, the NRC uses a hierarchicalframework and a variety of technical approaches as appropriate for each of the varioussource types. Currently NRC guidance on tsunami uses a deterministic approach basedon assessment of the Probable Maximum Tsunami (PMT). This annex describes thecurrent approach NRC staff use in the review of license applications.

The NRC is moving towards risk-informed approaches and guidance across the agency.Probabilistic approaches can be proposed as a basis for review by the licensee. Currentstate-of-the-art practice in the U.S. uses probabilistic approaches to determine tsunamihazard on the Pacific coast. Probabilistic tsunami hazard assessment (PTHA) methodsare an area of active research within the NRC and are currently viable on the Pacific coast.Currently a lack of information on the rate of activity of tsunamigenic sources that mayaffect the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the U.S. preclude the practical use of probabilisticmethods.

Regulations and Regulatory Guidance

NRC regulations related to tsunami hazard assessments, as provided in the Code ofFederal Regulations (CFR), include the following:

1. 10 CFR Part 100, as it relates to identifying and evaluating hydrological featuresof the site. The requirements to consider physical site characteristics in siteevaluations are specified in 10 CFR 100.20(c) for new applications.

2. 10 CFR 100.23(d) sets criteria to determine the siting factors for plant designbases with respect to seismic induced floods and water waves at the site.

3. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, for CP and OLapplications, as it relates to consideration of the most severe of the naturalphenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area,with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time inwhich the historical data have been accumulated.

4. 10 CFR 52.17(a)(1)(vi), for early site permit (ESP) applications, and 10 CFR52.79, for combined operating licenses (COL) applications, as they relate toidentifying hydrological site characteristics with appropriate consideration of themost severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for thesite and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy,quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.

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Regulatory Guide 1.59 (1977) briefly discussed tsunami as a source of flooding. Thisregulatory guide is currently being updated. However, the update of this guide will notinclude tsunami-induced flooding. NRC staff is currently preparing a new regulatoryguide focused on tsunami hazard assessment and risk.

Section 2.4.6 of the NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) NUREG 0800 (NRC, 2007)describes review procedures and acceptance criteria for tsunami hazards currently usedby NRC staff.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is responsible fordeveloping standards of accuracy for tsunami simulation models for the U.S. federalgovernment and for conducting research to support the National Tsunami HazardMitigation Program. In 2007, NOAA provided the NRC with a state-of-the-art report ontsunami hazard assessment in the U.S. which, along with NUREG/CR-6966, forms thebasis for the current NRC review approach.

In 2006, the NRC initiated a long-term research tsunami research program. This program,which includes cooperative work with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) andthe National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), was designed both tosupport activities associated with the licensing of new nuclear power plants in the U.Sand to support development of new regulatory guidance.

Additional supporting documentation is available as described in the sections below.

The Application of the Hierarchical Approach

A hierarchical approach acceptable to NRC staff is described in NUREG/CR-6966. Asnoted in this document, a hierarchical-assessment approach consists of a series ofstepwise, progressively more refined analyses that are used to evaluate the hazardresulting from a specific phenomenon. In the case of tsunami, this approach is defined bythree steps that answer the following questions:

1. Is the site region subject to tsunamis?2. Could the plant site be affected by tsunamis?3. What is the risk to safety of the plant caused by tsunamis?

The first step, which is essentially a regional screening test, is performed to determinewhether or not a site can be screened out based on its proximity to a water body capableof producing a tsunami or tsunami-like effect. If the region in which a site is located isnot subject to tsunamis, no further analysis for tsunami hazards is required. This findingshould be supported by region-specific evidence. If this cannot be conclusively shown,the second step, below, is required.

The second step can be regarded as a site-screening test. This step determines whetherplant systems important to safety are exposed to hazards from tsunami. The methodsused to perform site-specific hazard assessments, including the calculation of site-specific

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run-up elevations, are described later in this Annex. It may be possible to determine that,even though the general site region is subject to tsunami hazards, all safety-relatedsystems are located at an elevation above the calculated maximum wave run-up.

The third step assesses the risk to a facility that may exist if the elevation of the safety-significant structures, systems and components (SSC) cannot be conclusively shown toexceed the calculated tsunami run-up. This step requires the most refined and complexanalysis.

Areas of Review by NRC Staff

NRC Staff review the technical areas summarized below. These review areas aredescribed in more detail in the current version of the NRC SRP (NUREG 0-800), whichis available for download at the NRC's online reading room.

1. Historical Tsunami Data. The staff reviews historical tsunami data, includingpaleotsunami data. Historical data may help in establishing the frequency ofoccurrence and other useful indicators such as the maximum observed run-upheight. The NOAA National Geophysical Data Center collects and archivesinformation on tsunami sources and effects to support tsunami modeling andengineering for the U.S. government and should be used as a key source of data.International sources that are relevant to plants exposed to trans-oceanic tsunamishould also be investigated.

2. Probable Maximum Tsunami. Currently, NRC staff reviews applications foradequacy based on deterministic assessment of a Probable Maximum Tsunami(PMT), as noted in Regulatory Guide 1.59 (1977). The staff reviews the PMTwith respect to the identification of the source mechanisms, the characteristics ofthese source mechanisms, and the simulation of the wave propagating towards theproposed plant site. A discussion of tsunamigenic sources is provided later in thisAnnex.

3. Tsunami Propagation Models. The staff reviews the computation models used inthe hazard analysis. Elements of tsunami modeling are discussed in more detaillater in this Annex.

4. Wave Run-up, Inundation, and Drawdown. The staff reviews the run-up causedby the PMT. An appropriate initial water surface elevation for the body of waterunder consideration, before the arrival of the tsunami waves, should be assumed.similar to that recommend for storm surges and seiches by ANSIIANS-2.8-1992.For example, to estimate the highest tsunami wave run-up at a coastal site, the90 th percentile of high tides must be used as the initial water surface elevationnear the site. To estimate the lowest drawdown caused by receding tsunamiwaves, the 10 th percentile of the low tides may be used

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Any inundation indicated by the assessment should be considered in the floodingdesign bases of the plant and may necessitate flooding protection for some safety-related SSC. Staff also reviews drawdown caused by tsunami waves and how itmay affect the safety-related intakes, if they are used in the plant design and areexposed to the effects of the tsunami. The staff also reviews the duration of thedrawdown to estimate the time during which a safety-related intake may beaffected. The suggested criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.27 apply when the watersupply comprises part of the ultimate heat sink.

It should be demonstrated that the extent and the duration of the inundation andthe drawdown caused by the tsunami waves are adequately established for thepurposes of the plant design bases.

5. Hydrostatic and Hydrodynamic Forces. The staff reviews the hydrostatic and thehydrodynamic forces on the safety-related SSC caused by the tsunami waves.Because the tsunami occurs as a train of waves, several incoming and recedingwave cycles should be considered. Local geometry and bathymetry cansignificantly affect the height, velocity, and momentum flux near the locations ofthe safety-related SSC. The suggested criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.26 applywhen the water supply comprises part of any water-cooled ultimate heat sink.

It should be demonstrated that hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces caused by thetsunami waves are adequately established for the purposes of the plant designbases.

6. Debris and Water-Borne Projectiles. The staff reviews the likelihood of debrisand water-borne projectiles carried along with the tsunami currents and theirability to cause damage to the safety-related SSC. The suggested criteria ofRegulatory guide 1.27 apply when the water supply comprises part of the ultimateheat sink. It should be demonstrated that any possibility of damage to the safety-related SSC from debris and water-borne projectiles is adequately established forthe purposes of the plant design bases.

7. Effects of Sediment Erosion and Deposition. The staff reviews the sedimentdeposition during the tsunami, as well as the erosion caused by the high velocityof flood waters or wave action during the tsunami and its effect on foundations ofthe safety-related SSC, to ensure that these are adequately established for thepurposes of the plant design bases. Any potential erosion and sedimentdeposition should not affect safety-related functioning of the exposed SSC. Thesuggested criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.27 apply when the water supplycomprises part of the ultimate heat sink.

8. Consideration of other Site-Related Evaluation Criteria. 10 CFR Part 100describes site-related proximity, seismic and non-seismic evaluation criteria forpower reactor applications. Subpart A to 10 CFR Part 100 addresses therequirements for applications before January 10, 1997, and Subpart B is for

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applications on or after January 10, 1997. The staff's review will includeevaluation of pertinent information to determine if these criteria are appropriatelyused in postulation of worst-case tsunami scenarios.

Tsunamigenic Source Characterization

Tsunami hazard along the United States coastlines comes from two predominant sourcecategories; landslides and seismic sources. Sources in these categories exist in both thenear- and far-field. A regional assessment of tsunamigenic sources should be carried outto determine all sources that may generate the PMT at the proposed plant site. Thesource mechanisms considered in the assessment should include earthquakes, submarineand sub-aerial landslides and volcanoes. The characteristic of the sources that are usedfor the specification of the PMT should be conservative.

The landslide sources should be characterized using the maximum volume parameterdetermined from seafloor mappings or geologic age dating of the historical landslides. Aslope-stability analysis should be performed to assess the potential tsunami generationefficiency of the candidate landslides. The tsunamigenic source types caused by volcanicactivity considered in the PMT assessment should include pyroclastic flows, submarinecaldera collapse, explosions, and debris avalanches or flank failures.

To support license activities related to new reactors, the NRC has initiated a long-termtsunami research program. As part of this program, the United States Geological Survey(USGS) has provided a report summarizing the tsunamigenic source mechanisms in theAtlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico (ten Brink et al 2008). The sources detailed inthis report are used by the NRC staff as a starting point for tsunami assessment forproposed sites located near these water bodies. Research is on-going in this area andadditional references and source characterizations may become available in the future.

Tsunami Modeling Methods

As part of the licensing process, the staff reviews the computational models used in thetsunami hazard analyses. Tsunami propagation models should be used, such as thoseused by NOAA that are published in peer-reviewed literature and are verified usingextensive testing.

The staff reviews propagation of the PMT waves from the source towards the proposedsite. If appropriate, the shallow water wave approximate should be used to simulatepropagation of the PMT waves in deep waters. The simulation of the propagation of thePMT waves in shallow waters, where the shallow water wave approximation is not valid,should use non-linear wave dynamics approaches.

The staff reviews the model parameters and the input data used to simulate thepropagation of the PMT waves towards the site. The model parameters should be

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described and their conservative values should be chosen. All other data used for modelinput should be described and their respective sources noted. Usually bathymetry andtopography data archived and maintained by NOAA/NGDC, and the USGS, and the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers are sufficient for sites in the U.S. However, some sites mayrequire additional data.

NOAA has the responsibility to develop standards of accuracy for tsunami simulationmodels for the U.S. federal government and to conduct research to support the NationalTsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. NOAA, through USAID funding, has developedan interface tool, the Community Model Interface for Tsunami (ComMIT), that allowsindividuals and institutions to make use of NOAA seismic source models, tools, andresults. This publically-available interface tool, when applied by an appropriately trainedanalyst and coupled with high-quality local bathymetric information, is a useful tool toundertake tsunami hazard analyses at many locations both within and outside the U.S. Itis highly recommended than any analyst using the tool should first perform thebenchmark test problems provided on the NOAA website.

The NRC intends to use the NOAA ComMIT tool, as appropriate, and will continue towork with NOAA to enhance NRC practices and guidance in the future. For landslide-related tsunamigenic sources alternate methods and tools are required. Development ofguidance on landslide-based tsunami modeling is ongoing.

References for Annex:

The below references are available either through the NRC ADAMS system using theML ascension number (if shown), or through the NRC reading room. Both can beaccessed through the NRC website located at http://www.nrc.gov

10 CFR Part 50. Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10, Energy, Part 50, "DomesticLicensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."

10 CFR Part 52. Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10, Energy, Part 52 "Early SitePermits; Standard Design Certifications; and Combined License for Nuclear PowerPlants."

10 CFR Part 100. Title 10, Energy, Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria."

ANSIIANS-2.8-1992, "Determining Design Basis Flooding at Power Reactor Sites" (notavailable at NRC site)

Gonzalez, F.I., Bernard, E., Dunbar, P., Geist, E., Jaffe, B., Kanoglu, U., Locat, J.,Mofjeld, H., Moore, A., Synolakis, C., and Titov, V., (2007), "Scientific and TechnicalIssues in Tsunami Hazard Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Sites," NOAA TechnicalMemorandum OAR PMEL- 136, Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Seattle, Washington.

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NOAA National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC), (2007) NOAA/WDC HistoricalTsunami Database at NGDC, URL: http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/tsu db.shtml

NOAA Community Model Interface for Tsunami (ComMIT) download anddocumentation are available at http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/ComMIT/

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (2009), "Tsunami Hazard Assessment at NuclearPower Plant Sites in the United States of America." NUREG/CR-6996, PNNL-17397.Available for download at the NRC reading room.

Ten Brink, U.S, Twitchell, D., Geist, E.L., Chaytor, J., Locat, H., Lee, B., Buczkowski,B., Barkan, R., Solow, A., Andrews, B., Parsons, T., Synett, P., Lin, J., and M. SansoucyAtlantic and Gulf of Mexico Tsunami Hazard Assessment Group (2008), "Evaluation ofTusnami Sources with the Potential to Impact the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coasts: AnUpdated Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," U.S. Geological SurveyAdministrative Report, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. (ML082960196)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1977), "Design Floods for Nuclear Power Plants."Regulatory Guide 1.59, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1976), "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear PowerPlants." Regulatory Guide 1.27, Revision 2, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2007), "Standard Review Plan for the Review ofSafety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," LWR Edition, Office of NuclearReactor Regulations, Washington, D.C.

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Attachment Natural Phenomena Limitations.wpd(16454 bytes ) cannotbe converted to PDF format.

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From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:09 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: LLW Forum Flash: US Not Expected to Experience Harmful Radioactivity re Japan


******FOR OFFICIAL U ONLY-""DONOT REL S "POrUTSID OIfl %F THE1j FEDERAL FAMIIL)YL

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 12:18 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Fyi - LLW Forum Flash: US Not Expected to Experience Harmful Radioactivity re Japan

From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: [email protected] <[email protected]>Sent: Sun Mar 13 23:28:03 2011Subject: LLW Forum Flash: US Not Expected to Experience Harmful Radioactivity re Japan

International/Japan

U.S. Not Expected to Experience Harmful Levelsof Radioactivity from Damaged Japanese Plants

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Energy, and other federalagencies are coordinating to provide whatever assistance the Japanese government requests as theyrespond to conditions at several nuclear power plants following the earthquake and tsunami this pastFriday, March 11,

Federal agencies are monitoring radioactive releases and predicting their path. Earlier today, NRCissued a press release stating in part as follows:

"All the available information indicates weather conditions have taken the small releases from theFukushima reactors out to sea away from the population. Given the thousands of miles between thetwo countries, Hawaii, Alaska, the U.S. Territories and the U.S. West Coast are not expected toexperience any harmful levels of radioactivity."

NRC's Maryland-based headquarters Operations Center has been operating on a 24-hour basis sincethe beginning of the emergency in Japan. Two NRC officials with expertise in boiling water nuclear

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reactors have deployed to Japan as part of a U.S. International Agency for International Development(USAID) team. USAID is the federal government agency with primary responsibility for providingassistance to countries in the aftermath of a disaster.

"We offer our condolences to all those in Japan affected by these tragedies," said NRC ChairmanGregory Jaczko. "We have some of the most expert people in this field in the world working for theNRC and we stand ready to assist in any way possible."

NRC will not provide information on the status of developments at Japan's nuclear reactors, however,as this is an ongoing crisis for which the Japanese have primary responsibility. Persons interested inadditional information are encouraged to check the NRC web site or blog for the latest information onNRC actions. Additional sources of information are as follows:

USAID: www.usaid.govU.S. Department of State: www.state..qovFederal Emergency Management Agency: www.fema.govWhite House: www.whitehouse.,qovNuclear Energy Institute: www.nei.govInternational Atomic Energy Agency: www.iaea.orq/press

Japan experienced issues at several nuclear power plants following an estimated 8.9 magnitudeearthquake and tsunami off the eastern Japanese coast on Friday, March 11, 2011. Thereafter, NRCmonitored conditions at various U.S. nuclear power plants, spent fuel storage installations, andnuclear materials sites. Personnel at all locations have informed the NRC that conditions remainsafe.

For background information on generic operations at a boiling-water reactor, including an animatedgraphic, please visit the NRC's web site at www.nrc..qov.

March 13, 2011

Todd D. Lovinger. Esq.Executive DirectorLLW Forum, Inc.(202) 265-7990

The preceding information was provided to you on behalf of the LLW Forum, Inc. It may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written approval ofthe organization's Executive Director. To view other communications and documents of the LLW Forum, Inc., visit the LL W Forum's web site athttpi/www.llwforum.org/.

2

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LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:10 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: Interagency Meeting on Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami - March 14, 2011, 4:00pm,White House Conference Center Truman RoomInteragency Meeting on Japan Agenda 03142011.docxAttachments:

Bonnie Sheffield DayshiftKen Wiermian NightshiftFEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

0700-15001500-2300

DO NOT RLEASE OUTSIDE OF .... T2k1 FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Monday, March 14, 2011 3:03 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Borchardt, BillSubject: Heads Up - -Interagency Meeting on Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami - March 14, 2011, 4:00pm, White HouseConference Center Truman Room

I presume that NRC is already aware and attending this meeting.

From: Wiggins, JimTo: McDermott, Brian; Virgilio, Martin; Evans, Michele; Weber, Michael; HOO HocSent: Mon Mar 14 13:21:32 2011Subject: Fw: Interagency Meeting on Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami - March 14, 2011, 4:00pm, White HouseConference Center Truman Room

Fyi and action

From: Landau Zachary L.To:l

(b)(6)(b)(6)

(b)(6)

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(b)(6)

Sent: Mon Mar 14 13:03:02 2011Subject: Interagency Meeting on Japanese Earthquake/Tsunami - March 14, 2011, 4:00pm, White House ConferenceCenter Truman Room

All,

The NSS will host an interagency meeting on the ongoing crisis in Japan today at 4:00pm. Request Assistant Secretary orDeputy Assistant Secretary level participants who are well versed in their department/agencies relief efforts andchallenges attend in White House Conference Center Truman Room. Agenda attached and pasted below.

Agenda

S(b)(5)

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3.4. (b)(5)

5.

Please pass RSVP's or questions to me at, (b)(6) You will not need to send WAVEs information, but doremember to bring a USG photo ID.

V/r,Zach

Zach LandauResilience Directorate

National Security Staff

(o)(c) (b)(6)

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INTERAGENCY MEETING ON JAPANESE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI

DATE: March 14, 2011LOCATION: WHCC Truman Room

TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

AGENDA

I.o

II,

II:

IV

V.

(b)(5)

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From:

Sent:To:Subject:

LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:09 PM


FW: Japanese Nuclear Plant Problems Continue


*****--•-FOR OFFICIAJ L USE ONLY-**`--*U"~ il" I1 IVUI.I-i3123 %.JUI JI.A.I IIJ. 'I Iu~~. PJIL

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 7:44 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FYI - Japanese Nuclear Plant Problems Continue

Email from the Health Physics Society to its members regarding the situation at Fukushima-Daiichi.

From: HPS Headquarters <[email protected]>To: Weber, MichaelSent: Sun Mar 13 17:49:29 2011Subject: Japanese Nuclear Plant Problems Continue

Japanese Nuclear Plant Problems Continue

Current News (httnp://hps.org/newsandevents/societynews.html)

13 March 2011Japanese Nuclear Plant Problems Continue

1

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As you are well aware the Japanese experienced the worst earthquake in their history, followed bya devastating tsunami. These natural disasters have had a serious impact on several Japanesenuclear reactors, principally those at the Fukushima Daiichi site. Although the Health PhysicsSociety has little expertise in nuclear power plant safety, we are concerned about radiationexposures associated with these reactor problems and desire to keep our members and theconcerned public advised on current events associated with the Japanese nuclear plants.Consequently, we are recommending that the following sources of useful information. Although wecannot verify the accuracy of all the information that you may find, we believe these sources aregenerally reliable and trustworthy. As events unfold and the potential radiation exposures becomebetter known, we hope to be able to share additional information with you regarding radiationsafety.

* Nuclear Regulatory Commission (http://www.nrc.gov/),* International Atomic Energy Agency (http://www.iaea.org/),* World Health Organization (http://www.who.int/en/),* American Nuclear Society (htt2://www.new.ans.org/),* International Radiation Protection Association (http://www.irpa.net/),* National Academy of Sciences (http://www.nationalacademies.org/),• Nuclear Energy Agency (http://www.oecd-nea.org/) and• Environmental Protection Agency (http://www.epa.gov/)

Additionally, you will find a Facebook icon on our home page that will direct you to the HealthPhysics Society News Caf6 where we try to post the latest breaking news items, including onespertinent to the Japanese nuclear situation.

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From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:08 PM

To: FOIA Response.hoc Resource

Subject: FW: TEPCO Earthquake Information Update as of March 14, 0200(JST) - Fukushima

Daini Unit 1 is now under cold shutdown

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500

Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300

FEMA REP Liaison

NRC Operations Center

(301) 816-5187

.******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**.*

DO NI•T RELEASE O.UUTSIDE L uTHE FEDERAL FAMILY

----- Original Message -----

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 4:22 PM

To: LIA05 HocSubject: FYI -TEPCO Earthquake Information Update as of March 14, 0200(JST) - Fukushima Daini Unit I is now under

cold shutdown


From: Grobe, Jack

To: Leeds, Eric; Borchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael

Sent: Sun Mar 13 15:59:42 2011

Subject: Fw: TEPCO Earthquake Information Update as of March 14, 0200(JST) - Fukushima Daini Unit I is now under

cold shutdown

FYI - Info from GEH - about 2 hours old.

Jack Grobe, Deputy Director, NRR


From: Nichols, Craig (GE Power & Water) <[email protected]>

To: Grobe, Jack; Crowthers, Michael H. (GE Infra, Energy, Non-GE) <[email protected]>; Schiffley, Frederick (GE

Infra, Energy, Non-GE) <[email protected]>

Sent: Sun Mar 13 15:45:32 2011

Subject: FW: TEPCO Earthquake Information Update as of March 14, 0200(JST) - Fukushima Daini Unit I is now under

cold shutdown

Just got this from TEPCO.

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Thank you, Craig

From: //f - _ [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of [email protected]: Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:48 PMTo: [email protected]: TEPCO Earthquake Information Update as of March 14, 0200(JST) - Fukushima Daini Unit 1 is now under coldshutdown

Dear Friends,

Please find TEPCO's Fukushima-Daini NPS update as of 2:00am, March 14.

At Unit 1, the reactor is now under cold shutdown. This has been completed and cooling of the reactor has beencommenced at 1:24 am, Mar 14th.

Contacts:

TEPCO Washington Office 202-457-0790

Kenji Matsuo, General Manager

Yuichi Nagano, Deputy General Manager,

Masayuki. Yamamoto, Manager, Nuclear Power Programs

Press Release (Mar 14,2011)

Plant Status of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (as of 2:00 am March 14th)

Unit 1 (shut down at 2:48pm on March 11th)

2

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- Reactor is shut down and reactor water level is stable.

- Offsite power is available.

- At 8:19am, Mar 12th, there was an alarm indicating that one of the control rods was not properly inserted, however, at10:43am, Mar 12th the alarm was spontaneously called off. Other control rods has been confirmed that they are fullyinserted (reactor is in subcritical status)

- Status of main steam isolation valve: closed

- Injection of water into the reactor is done by Make-up Water Condensate System.

- We do not believe there is leakage of reactor coolant in the containment vessel at this moment.

- At 5:22am, Mar 12th, the temperature of the suppression chamber exceeded 100 degrees. As the reactor pressuresuppression function was lost, at 5:22am, Mar 12th, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15,clause 1 has occurred.

- We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partialdischarge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. This preparation work started at around9:43am, Mar 12th and finished at 6:30pm, Mar 12th.

- Restoration work in reactor cooling function that was conducted to achieve reactor cold shutdown has been completedand cooling of the reactor has been commenced at 1:24 am, Mar 14th.




- Control rods are fully inserted (reactor is in subcritical status)



- We do not believe there is leakage of reactor coolant in the containment vessel.

- At 5:32am, Mar 12th, the temperature of the suppression chamber exceeded 100 degrees. As the reactor pressuresuppression function was lost, at 5:32am, Mar 12th, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15,clause 1 has occurred.

3

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- We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partialdischarge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. This preparation work started at around10:33am, Mar 12th and finished at 10:58pm, Mar 12th.

- Restoration work in reactor cooling function is in progress to achieve reactor cold shutdown.




- Control rods are fully inserted (reactor is in subcritical status)



- We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partialdischarge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. The preparation woke started at around12:08pm, Mar 12th and finished at 12:13pm, Mar 12th.

- Reactor cold shutdown at 12:15pm, Mar 12th




- At 0:43PM, there was a signal indicating that one of the control rods may have not properly inserted. However, weconfirmed that it was inserted completely by another signal. We will inspect the reason of this.




- In order to cool down the reactor, injection of water into the reactor had been done by the Reactor Core IsolationCooling System, however, At 6:07am, Mar 12th, the temperature of the suppression chamber exceeded 100 degrees. Asthe reactor pressure suppression function was lost, at 6:07am, Mar 12th, it was determined that a specific incidentstipulated in article 15, clause 1 has occurred.

4

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- We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partialdischarge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. The preparation woke started at around11:44am, Mar 12th and finished at around 11:52am, Mar 12th.

- Restoration work in reactor cooling function is in progress to achieve reactor cold shutdown.

Indication from monitoring posts installed at the site boundary did not show any difference from ordinary level.

No radiation impact to the external environment has been confirmed. We will continue to monitor in detail thepossibility of radioactive material being discharged from exhaust stack or discharge canal.

5

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:08 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Japan


OROFFHC1AL USE ONLY*-**DO NOT RELEASE OUTSDBE OF TH.E FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 3:07 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Virgilio, MartinSubject: FYI - Japan

From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: Grobe, JackCc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>;[email protected] <[email protected]>; Jaczko, Gregory; Borchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael; Leeds,EricSent: Sun Mar 13 14:58:52 2011Subject: Re: Japan

Jack,

Thanks. We are offering the full support of the BWROG to TEPCO and GEH-I. We will stay in touch. I'm sure that this willalso be a major point of discussion at our meeting in May.

Regards,

Ted

Ted SchiffleyChairman, BWR Owners' Group (BWROG)Sent from my Blackberry Wireless Device.

From: Grobe, Jack <[email protected]>To: Schiffley, Frederick P. II:(GenCo-Nuc)Cc: '[email protected]' <[email protected]>; '[email protected]' <[email protected]>;'[email protected]' <[email protected]>; Jaczko, Gregory <[email protected]>; Borchardt, Bill<[email protected]>; Virgilio, Martin <[email protected]>; Weber, Michael <[email protected]>; Leeds,

1

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Eric <Eric. [email protected]>Sent: Sun Mar 13 13:51:51 2011Subject: Re: Japan

Thanks Ted. We sent a couple folks to Japan yesterday. I will provide your offer to folks manning our operations center.You should also use your own contacts in Japan and offer whatever assistance you can directly. The best compilation ofinformation regarding what is happening that I have seen is what Joe Colvin issued from ANS. Please keep in touch.Jack Grobe, Deputy Director, NRR

From: [email protected] <[email protected]>To: Grobe, JackCc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>;[email protected] <[email protected]>Sent: Sun Mar 13 09:32:29 2011Subject: Japan

Jack,

Please let us know if you need any support from the BWROG. You can contact me, Mike Crowthers (BWROG Vice Chair), or CraigNichols (GEH/BWROG Program Manager). We will provide support as needed and will also be available, if necessary, as anadditional point of contact with GEH.

Regards,

Ted

Ted SchiffleyChairman, BWR Owners' Group (BWROG)Sent from my Blackberry Wireless Device.

This e-mail and any of its ati ents mayconý Exelon Corporation proprietary information, which is privileged, confidential ubject to copyrightbelongin ,the Exelon Corporation family of Companies. This e-mail is inten solely for the use of theindividual or en-it ot which it is addressed. If you are not the intended r il ent of this e-mail, you are herebynotified that any disse ation, distribution, copying, or action ta in relation to the contents of andattachments to this e-mail is ctly prohibited and ma be wful. If you have received this e-mail in error,please notify the sender immediatel d permanentl ete the original and any copy of this e-mail and anyprintout. Thank You. "

**This e-mail and any of its attachments maycontain Exelon Corporation pro ary information, whic rivileged, confidential, or subject to copyrightbelonging to the Exeon C ration family of Companies. This ail is intended solely for the use of theindividual or e ich it is addressed. If you are not the intende lent of this e-mail, you are herebynotified that an ssemination, distribution, copying, or action taken in relati the contents of andattachmen o this e-mail is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have rec ed this e-mail in error,plea otify the sender immediately and permanently delete the original and any copy of this e-mail and anyprintout. Thank You. *

2

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:08 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: NRC IS RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY OUTSIDE of the United States


****FOR OFFIIA SE ONEY*DO NOT- RELEASE OUTSIDE OF• TIM,,,., -E......... FAMIfLY

From: Operations Center BulletinSent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 11:12 AMTo: OST02 HOCSubject: FW: NRC IS RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY OUTSIDE of the United States

THIS IS NOT A DRILL

The NRC is coordinating its actions with other Federal agencies as part of the U.S. government response tothe events in Japan. The NRC is examining all available information as part of the effort to analyze the eventand understand its implications both for Japan and the United States. The NRC's Headquarters OperationsCenter in Rockville, MD has been stood up since the beginning of the emergency in Japan and is operating ona 24-hour basis.

NRC Incident Responders at Headquarters have spoken with the agency's counterpart in Japan and offeredthe assistance of U.S. technical experts. Two officials from the NRC with expertise on boiling water nuclearreactors have deployed to Japan as part of a U.S. International Agency for International Development (USAID)team. USAID is the Federal government agency primarily responsible for providing assistance to countriesrecovering from disasters.

U.S. nuclear power plants are built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes andtsunamis. Even those plants that are located outside of areas with extensive seismic activity are designed forsafety in the event of such a natural disaster. The NRC requires that safety significant structures, systems,and components be designed to take in account the most severe natural phenomena historically estimated forthe site and surrounding area.

The NRC will not provide information on the status of Japan's nuclear power plants. For the latest informationon NRC actions see the NRC's web site at www.nrc.gov or blog at http://public-bloc.nrc-aateway.qov.

Two important reminders:

It is possible that some of us will be requested by colleagues in another country to provide technical advice andassistance during this emergency. It is essential that all such communications be handled through the NRCOperations Center. Any assistance to a foreign government or entity must be coordinated through the NRC

1

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Operations Center and the U.S. Department of State (DOS). If you receive such a request, contact the NRCOperations Officer (301-816-5100 or via the NRC Operator) immediately.

If you receive information regarding this or any emergency (foreign or domestic) and you are not certain thatthe NRC's Incident Response Operations Officer is already aware of that information, you should contact theNRC Operations Officer (301-816-5100 or via the NRC Operator) and provide that information.

Other Sources of Information:

USAID - www.usaid.govU.S. Department of State - www.state.,ovFEMA - www.fema.qovWhite House - www.whitehouse..ovNuclear Energy Institute - www.nei.orgInternational Atomic Energy Agency - www.iaea.orq/press

No response to this message is required.

THIS IS NOT A DRILL

2

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From: LJA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:07 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Two comments from tonight


****FOR OFFICIAL USE OL~DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMIL

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 1:03 AMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Morris, Scott; Dorman, DanSubject: FYI - Two comments from tonight

From: Giitter, JosephTo: Weber, MichaelSent: Sat Mar 12 00:49:38 2011Subject: Fw: Two comments from tonight

Mike- Please see the second item.

From: Polickoski, JamesTo: Giitter, Joseph; Nelson, RobertCc: Markley, MichaelSent: Fri Mar 11 23:44:17 2011Subject: Two comments from tonight

Joe,

Two quick comments from tonight that I'll pass to you for what it's worth:

1. First, the lack of awareness of the TEPCO press releases is disconcerting considering the level of detail below:

"Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station:Units 1 to 4: shutdown due to earthquake• The national government has instructed evacuation for those local

residents within 3km radius of the periphery and indoor standby for thoselocal residents between 3kn and 10km radius of the periphery.* At present, we have decided to prepare implementinq measures to reduce

the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air1

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containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety.These measures are considered to be implemented in Units I to 4 andaccordingly, we have reported and/or noticed the government agenciesconcerned."

This is the second major call without the awareness level.

2. Next, though I understand, the US response is currently "engineering" support, I hope that USAID and DOS are notforgetting the in-country and established US nuclear infrastructure presence at the Yokosuka Naval Base. To be a nuclearaircraft carrier capable port requires large capital assets to support emergencies and ship engineering maintenanceperiods (EDG's, demins, etc.). Equipment that would most certainly be useful to the area north of the base is already incountry and is already quality certified as nuclear grade. More importantly it's owned by US resources that can physicallymove it there with the aircraft and amphib carrier assets in theater. I know this may seem obvious, and I apologize if Iam speaking out of turn, but the urgency of this issue compelled me to write this email.

Thanks for listening,Jim

2

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From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:08 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: FYI - Good Photos on AOL Photo Form


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ,NLY***.**

DO NOT RELEASE O.TSIDE OF TIHE FEDERAL FAMIL.

----- Original Message----From: Weber, MichaelSent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 2:13 PMTo: LIA05 HocCc: Virgilio, Martin; Brenner, EliotSubject: FYI - Good Photos on AOL Photo Form

Good afternoon. You probably know, but AOL Photo Forum has some good photos of the explosion and damagedreactor building at Fukushima Daiichi-Unit 1.

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:07 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Earthquake Impact


******FOR OFFICIAL USE INLY**!**

DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OFTHE FEDERAL FAMILY

----- Original Message -----From: Weber, MichaelSent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 12:07 PMTo: Sheron, BrianCc: LIA05 HocSubject: Response - Earthquake Impact

Thanks, Brian.

----- Original Message -----From: Sheron, BrianTo: Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael; Borchardt, Bill; Leeds, Eric; Uhle, JenniferSent: Sat Mar 12 11:40:14 2011Subject: FW: Earthquake Impact

See below. Not sure if you have this level of information.

From: Bari, Robert A [[email protected]]Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 8:03 AMTo: [email protected] (b)(6)

Cc: Horak, William C; Braverman, Joseph I; Hofmayer, Charles H; Sheron, Brian; Genzer, Peter ASubject: RE: Earthquake Impact

Dear Shunsuke

Thank you for this. It helps to now understand the course of events, so far.

Yesterday I was interview by ABC News in NYC about the event at the reactors. The discussion was quite general onprotection of plants during earthquakes.

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Very early this morning (4 AM EST) I was called by the newsman about the evolving situation as they understood it. I wasabout to do a formal interview with them via skype from my home when they informed me that they were switchingtheir news coverage to a horrible bus accident in NYC that killed several people. They said that they would get in touchwith us at a later time.

I am now studying your scenario and may have some additional questions in a subsequent email.

I understand that the reactors are BWR Mark I with RCIC. Is that correct?

I will not share any of your information with the press unless you say that it is OK.

Best regards,

Bob

----- Original Message -----From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Saturday, March 12, 2011 7:07 AMTo: Bari, Robert A; I (b)(6)

Cc: Horak, William C; Braverman, Joseph I; Hofmayer, Charles H; Sheron, BrianSubject: RE: Earthquake Impact

Dear Bob

Thank you very much for your kind email. We are still in the midst of the fight for cooling down the core of the plants,experiencing after shock almost every hour since the main shock yesterday.

Enclosed please find my personal note on the current situation at the site, just for your information.

Yours,Shunsuke Kondo

Current ( 15:30 of 2011/03/12) Situation of Fukushima Daiichi (IF, six units) and Fukushima Daini (2F, four units) NuclearPower Plants Hit by Touhoku-chiho Taiheiyou-oki Earthquake (TT-EQ) on March 11, 2011

The TT-EQ caused automatic shutdown of all operating units of iF, i.e. unit 1, 2, 3 and 2F, i.e. uniti, 2, 3, 4.Simultaneously, the off-site powers to these units were lost due to the damage of many fossil and some of hydro powergenerating stations in the network with which these units were connected. Furthermore, most of the emergency dieselgenerators (EDGs) of these units could not continue operation due to lack of cooling caused by extraordinary highTsunami. In essence these units were put into the situation called "total blackout".

The regulatory authority recommended every operator to prepare so-called (severe) accident management procedureand features that should be followed in such situation ten years ago and currently all operators have this procedure as apart of operation manual. Therefore TEPCO team has started the operation to cool the core based on this procedure.

The team was faced with difficulty in the execution, however, as the vital power source was not available also due to theflooding of the building: this power source is important as it is to supply power to sustain I&C system that is used tomonitor plant status and operate motor-operated valve (MOV) necessary in this operation.

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Therefore TEPCO gathered power supply trucks, DC batteries and fire-fighting engines from available sources near-byand the team started their fight to minimize the probability of occurrence of large-scale release, utilizing them.

IF Unit 1: Although RCIC is available to remove heat from the core, the reactor water level has decreased gradually tothe level below the top of active core possibly due to some leakage from RPV boundary (containment pressure is nowalmost equal to RPV pressure) and the radiation level around the unit started to rose gradually at around 4:00 AMtoday.

The team has started the water injection using fire-fighting car or fire engines to stabilize core condition and challengedto open the valves in the fscrubbing venting line under high radiation condition. As Iodine and Cesium are recognized inthe environment in parallel, though quite minor, the government asked evacuation to the people within 10 km from theplant as a precaution. We were very lucky that the wind direction was from land to sea at this time.

The team has succeeded to open the valves in the venting line at around 14:00 and then the containment pressurestarted to decrease significantly. As for the water level in RPV, though it was decreasing at first irrespective of theinjection of the water but then has been stabilized though it is significantly below the top of the core.

It is under discussion to use sea water as makeup water after the exhaustion of water in fire-fighting water tank.

It was reported at 15: 35 that the Reactor Building of 1F1 was ruptured after a rather strong earthquake with the soundof explosion and that the level of radiation at the site boundary was suddenly doubled from 500 micro Sv/hr of that afterventing operation to lmSv/hr. The explosion is considered due to explosion of hydrogen leaked from the primarycoolant boundary caused by the impact of the earthquake.

The team decided to complete the preparation to perform this type of feed and breed (F&B) operation in parallel withmaking their best to recover sea-water line, as key operation in these situation is the F&B operation utilizing venting lineuntil we can recover the operation of sea water system as a heat sink and can use ECCS system.

Accordingly, in the cases of iF Unit 2 & 3, though reactor water level is above the top of the core and core makeupsystem (either by RICI or HPCI) is in operation, containment venting is in preparation in case the channel to the ultimateheat sink (seawater) is not resumed.

Also in the case of every units of 2F, containment venting is in preparation though offsite power is now available as thepath to UHS (sea) is not established.

In the case of IF 4, 5, 6, they were not in operation they were in shutdown state for refueling and maintenance outage.

From: Bari, Robert A [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 10:19 PMTo: i-rA ( ' ) (shunsuke.kondo) ; ir- .1 (& ' -9TM •.M )

Cc: Horak, William C; Braverman, Joseph I; Hofmayer, Charles H; Sheron, BrianSubject: Earthquake Impact

Dear Shunsuke

Please accept my sympathy as you and the Japanese people endure this unfortunate tragedy.

Brookhaven stands ready to provide appropriate assistance as you might request.

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As you know, we have a long-standing program on Japan-US cooperation on seismic safety for nuclear plants withsponsorship by the USNRC.

Sincerely,

Bob

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:06 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: long term station blackout scenario overview


* * * .'--" FOR OFFIl"AL USE ONLY*l•DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Weber, MichaelSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:42 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FYI - long term station blackout scenario overview

From: Brenner, EliotTo: Uhle, Jennifer; Sheron, BrianCc: Gibson, Kathy; Tinkler, Charles; Weber, MichaelSent: Fri Mar 11 18:35:11 2011Subject: RE: long term station blackout scenario overview

Thanks muchly.

From: Uhle, JenniferSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 6:30 PMTo: Sheron, Brian; Brenner, EliotCc: Gibson, Kathy; Tinkler, Charles; Weber, MichaelSubject: long term station blackout scenario overview

Eliot,

As discussed, here is some information on the scenario that we modeled in our SOARCA study for PeachBottom. It was developed by Charlie Tinkler who is the RES expert in severe accidents. Peach Bottom is aBWR with a torus type containment and a Reactor Core Isolation Condenser. We are not sure of the exactdesign of the Japanese plants or their condition, so some of our assumptions may not be valid. Based on ourmodeling of Peach Bottom, we have calculated no early fatalities (assumes successful evacuation), and evenassuming the event occurs, a very small latent cancer fatality risk on the order of 1 x 104 perperson. Obviously this is our best estimate which involves detailed knowledge of operator action and plantcondition and design, so care should be used when citing it as an estimate for the Japanese plants.

Brian and my bberry numbers are provided below.

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Jenniferl (b)(6)

BrianI (b)(6)

Thanks,

Jennifer

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From:


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 4:06 PMFOIA Response.hoc ResourceFW: Test from McGinty, LIA05cr6966.pdf


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*.*...DO NOT RELEASE OUTSfIDE OF THE FEDERAL FANULY

From: Franovich, MikeSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 8:02 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: RE: Test from McGinty, LIA05

Tim,

See attached. Comprehensive report but doesn't barrel down to the plant-specific protection levels/capabilitieson the west coast. Plants on west coast expect no more than approx. 10 foot Tsunami as a maximum typeevent but are protected to three times that level, from what I recall.

Mike

From: LIA05 HocSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:43 PMTo: Franovich, MikeSubject: Test from McGinty, LIA05

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US.NR CUnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

NUREG/CR-6966PNNL-17397

Tsunami Hazard Assessment atNuclear Power Plant Sites in theUnited States of America

Final Report

Office of New Reactors

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AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALSIN NRC PUBLICATIONS

NRC Reference Material

As of November 1999, you may electronically accessNUREG-series publications and other NRC records atNRC's Public Electronic Reading Room athttp://www.nrc.qov/readin,q-rm.html. Publicly releasedrecords include, to name a few, NUREG-seriespublications; Federal Register notices; applicant,licensee, and vendor documents and correspondence;NRC correspondence and internal memoranda;bulletins and information notices; inspection andinvestigative reports; licensee event reports; andCommission papers and their attachments.

NRC publications in the NUREG series, NRCregulations, and Title 10, Energy, in the Code ofFederal Regulations may also be purchased from oneof these two sources.1. The Superintendent of Documents

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A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment isavailable free, to the extent of supply, upon writtenrequest as follows:Address: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Some publications in the NUREG series that areposted at NRC's Web site addresshttp://www.nrc.,ov/reading-rrn/doc-collections/nuregsare updated periodically and may differ from the lastprinted version. Although references to material foundon a Web site bear the date the material was accessed,the material available on the date cited maysubsequently be removed from the site.

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Copies of industry codes and standards used in asubstantive manner in the NRC regulatory process aremaintained at-

The NRC Technical LibraryTwo White Flint North11545 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852-2738

These standards are available in the library forreference use by the public. Codes and standards areusually copyrighted and may be purchased from theoriginating organization or, if they are AmericanNational Standards, from-

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Legally binding regulatory requirements are statedonly in laws; NRC regulations; licenses, includingtechnical specifications; or orders, not inNUREG-series publications. The views expressedin contractor-prepared publications in this series arenot necessarily those of the NRC.

The NUREG series comprises (1) technical andadministrative reports and books prepared by thestaff (NUREG-XXXX) or agency contractors(NUREG/CR-XXXX), (2) proceedings ofconferences (NUREG/CP-XXXX), (3) reportsresulting from international agreements(NUREG/IA-XXXX), (4) brochures(NUREGIBR-XXXX), and (5) compilations of legaldecisions and orders of the Commission and Atomicand Safety Licensing Boards and of Directors'decisions under Section 2.206 of NRC's regulations(NUREG-0750).

DISCLAIMER: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government.Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any employee, makes any warranty, expressed orimplied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of anyinformation, apparatus, product, or process disclosed in this publication, or represents that its use by such thirdparty would not infringe privately owned rights.

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*U.S.NRCUnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

NUREG/CR-6966PNNL-17397

Tsunami Hazard Assessment atNuclear Power Plant Sites in theUnited States of America

Final Report

Manuscript Completed: March 2009Date Published: March 2009

Prepared byR. Prasad

Pacific Northwest National LaboratoryP.O. Box 999Richland, WA 99352

E. Cunningham, NRC Project ManagerG. Bagchi, NRC Technical Monitor

NRC Job Code J3301

Office of New Reactors

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ABSTRACT

We describe the tsunami phenomenon with thefocus on its relevance for hazard assessment atnuclear power plant sites. Chapter 1 includes anoverview of tsunamis and mechanisms that gener-ate tsunamis. Three tsunamigenicmechanisms-carthquakcs, landslides, andvolcanoes-are considered relevant for hazardassessment at nuclear power plant sites. Wesummarize historical tsunami occurrences,including descriptions of source mechanisms anddamages caused by these events. Historicallandslides and potential landslide areas in earth'soceans are described. We describe thehierarchical-review approach to tsunami-hazardassessment at nuclear power plant sites inChapter 2. The hierarchical-review approachconsists of a series of stepwise, progressivelymore-refined analyses to evaluate the hazardresulting from a phenomena at a nuclear powerplant site. We reconmnend that the hierarchical-review approach employ a screening analysis todetermine if a site is subject to tsunami hazardbased on the presence of a tsunamikenic sourceand the location and elevation of the site. Thescreening analysis is expected to ensure thatanalysis and review resources are not wasted atsites with little potential of exposure to tsunamis.Chapter 3 describes the effects tsunami waves mayhave at a nuclear power plant site. These effectsresult in hazards that may directly affect the safety

of a plant's structures, systems, and components.Structures, systems, and components important tothe safety of a plant should be adequately designedand, if required, protected from these hazards.Chapter 4 describes data required for a detailedtsunami-hazard assessment and sources of thesedata. We recommend using existing resources andpreviously completed tsunami-hazard assessments,if available and appropriate. Detailed tsunami-hazard assessment at a nuclear power plant site

should be based on the probable maximumtsunami. Chapter 5 defines the probablemaximum tsunami, its determination at a site, andsubsequent hazard assessment. We point out thata tsunamigenic source that produces probablemaximum tsunami hazards at a site may not bedetennined a priori. It may be necessary toevaluate several candidate sources and thetsunamis generated from them under the mostfavorable tsunamigenic source and ambient

conditions. The set of hazards obtained from allsuch scenario tsunamis should be considered todetermine design bases of the plant structures,systems, and components. Chapter 6 describesinternational practices by Japan and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency, which arereviewed for completeness. The appendixprovides a stepwise guide to site-indcpcndentanalyses for tsunami-hazard assessment.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This NUREG does not contain information collection requirements and, therefore, is not subject to the requirementsof the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for infonnation or aninformation collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

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FOREWORD

The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 led the NRC to take the initiative to examine its criteria fornuclear plant siting evaluation against tsunami hazards. Site evaluation against tsunami hazards, asincorporated into the Standard Review Pan, was determined to be comprehensive; however, it needed tobe updated to incorporate current understanding of tsunami sources, modeling near shore and on-shorewave surge, draw-down, erosion and other associated effects. In 2005, the National Tsunami HazardReduction Program was initiated by the President, and the current study was conducted by the PacificNorthwest National Laboratory in collaboration with the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory(PMEL) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to ensure that NRC'sguidance on site evaluation against tsunami hazards are consistent with the National Program.

The focus of this study has been to examine tsunami hazards at nuclear power plant sites, to reviewoffshore and onshore modeling of tsunami waves, to describe the effects of tsunami waves on nuclearpower plant structures, systems, and components, to develop potential approaches for screening sites fortsunami effects, to identify the repository of historic tsunami data, and to examine the ways to approachsite safety assessment for tsunami for an NRC reviewer.

NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) has initiated a comprehensive research program onsource characterization, modeling, tsunami effects and probabilistic hazard framework, as appropriate.The RES program is intended to fill in the information gaps that exist on tsunami sources for the Atlanticand the Gulf coast areas of the continental United States, and limited characterization of submarinedeposits that can slide and cause landslide induced tsunami. Results from the RES program, combinedwith technical tsunami modeling software from NOAA PMEL will enable comprehensive tsunami hazardassessment at future nuclear power plant sites following the site safety assessment approach describedhere.

" e .E •to• Divi ion of Sit • nvironmental Reviews

e of New Rectors

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CONTENTS

A b stract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

F orew ord ...................................................................... v

Executive Sum m ary .............................................................. xi

A cknow ledgm ents ............................................................... xiii

I Tsunami and Other Tsunami-Like W aves ......................................... I

1.1 Introduction ........................................................... I

1.2 D efinition ............................................................. 3

1.3 M echanism s ........................................................... 3

1.3.1 E arthquakes ................................................... 3

1.3.2 L andslides .................................................... 8

1.3.3 V olcanoes .................................................... 12

1.4 Som e Historical Occurrences .............................................. 13

1.4.1 1958 Lituya Bay Landslide and Tsunami ............................ 13

1.4.2 1980 Spirit Lake Debris Flow and Tsunami .......................... 14

1.4.3 1946 A leutian Tsunam i .......................................... 14

1.4.4 1929 Grand Banks Landslide and Tsunami ........................... 15

1.4.5 1964 Valdez Arm Landslide and Tsunami ........................... 15

1.4.6 1960 Chile Earthquake and Tsunami ................................ 16

1.4.7 The "Orphan" Tsunami of 1700 ................................... 16

1.4.8 1963 Vaiont Reservoir Landslide and Tsunami ........................ 18

1.4.9 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami ............................. 19

1.5 Landslides in Earth's Oceans .............................................. 19

1.5.1 The Pacific O cean .............................................. 20

1.5.2 The Gulf of M exico ............................................. 22

1.5.3 The Atlantic O cean ............................................. 23

2 Hierarchical Hazard Assessment Approach ........................................ 29

2.1 Introduction ........................................................... 29

2.2 Regional Screening Test ................................................. 29

2.3 Site Screening Test ...................................................... 30

2.4 Detailed Tsunami Hazard Assessment ....................................... 32

2.5 Site Investigation ....................................................... 33

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.2.5.1 Historical Tsunami Records ....................................... 33

2.5.2 Paleotsunam i Evidence .......................................... 34

2.5.3 Regional Tsunami Assessments .................................... 34

2.5.4 Site-Specific Tsunami Mechanisms ................................. 35

2.5.5 Site-Specific D ata .............................................. 35

3 Effects of Tsunami at a Nuclear Power Plant Site ................................... 37

3.1 Introduction ............................................................ 37

3.2 Flooding D ue to Runup .................................................. 37

3.3 Dry Intakes During Drawdown ............................................ 37

3.4 Scouring ............................................................. 37

3.5 D eposition ............................................................ 38

3.6 Hydrostatic and Hydrodynamic Forces ...................................... 38

3.7 D ebris and Projectiles ................................................... 38

3.8 T idal B ores ............................................................ 39

4 Databases and Data Collection .................................................. 41

4.1 Introduction ........................................................... 4 1

4.2 Topography and Bathymetry .............................................. 41

4.2.1 Topography D ata ............................................... 41

4.2.2 Bathym etry D ata ............................................... 42

4.3 Tides and Sea-Level Anomalies ............................................ 43

4.4 Tsunami Wave Heights, Runup, and Drawdown ............................... 43

4.5 N ear-Shore Currents ..................................................... 43

4.6 Seism ic D ata ........................................................... 44

4.7 G eophysical D ata ....................................................... 45

4.8 Paleotsunam i D ata ...................................................... 46

5 Probable M aximum Tsunami ................................................... 49

5.1 Introduction ........................................................... 49

5.2 D efinition ............................................................. 49

5.3 Determination of Probable Maximum Tsunami at a Nuclear Power Plant Site ........ 50

5.3.1 Tsunamigenic Mechanisms and Sources ............................. 50

5.3.2 Source Param eters .............................................. 50

5.3.3 Initial W avefo rm ............................................... 51

5.3.4 W ave Propagation Simulation ..................................... 52

5.3.5 The NOAA Center for Tsunami Research Tsunami Propagation Database 53

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5.4 H azard A ssessm ent ..................................................... 54

5.4.1 H igh W ater Level ............................................... 54

5.4.2 Low W ater Level ............................................... 54

5.4.3 Scouring Near Safety-Related Structures ............................ 55

5.4.4 Deposition Near Safety-Related Structures ........................... 55

5.4.5 Forces on Safety-Related Structures ................................ 55

5.4.6 Debris Accumulation ............................................ 57

5.4.7 Projectiles .................................................... 57

5.5 Com bined Effects ....................................................... 58

6 International Practices ........................................................ 59

6.1 Introduction ........................................................... 59

6 .2 Japan ......... ........................................................ 59

6.3 International Atomic Energy Agency ....................................... 66

7 R eferences ................................................................. 7 1

Appendix A - Tsunami Hazard Assessment at a Hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant Site ......... A. I

FIGURES

1-1 A far-field oceanic tsunam i .................................................. 1

1-2 A near-field oceanic tsunami .............................................. 2

1-3 A tsunami in an inland water body ............................................ 3

1-4 Vertical component of displacement due to a shallow dipping thrust ................. 5

2-1 The D LZ screening rule .................................................... 31

6-1 Conceptual illustration of design tsunami (JSCE, 2002), adapted with permission ....... 60

6-2 Schematic representation of tsunami wave overflow of offshore structures (JSCE, 2002),

adapted w ith perm ission .. .. ............................................... 63

6-3 Schematic representation of tsunami overflow of coastal structures (JSCE, 2002),

adapted w ith perm ission .................................................... 64

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TABLES

1-1 Runups recorded at various locations for the 1960 Chile tsunami...................

5-1 Drag coefficients for ratios of width to depth (w/ds) and width to height (xv/h)

[adapted from FEMA (2005)] ............................................

5-2 Value of dynamic pressure coefficient, Ci,, as a function of probability of exceedance

[adapted from FEMIA (2005)] ............................................

5-3 Impact durations for selected construction materials [adapted from FEMA (2005)]....

17

56

57

58

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmmission (NRC)Office of New Reactors (NRO) is responsible forthe licensing and regulatory oversight of civiliannuclear power reactors and research reactors in theUnited States. Commission Paper SECY-06-0019(Reyes 2006) described how reccnt developmentswithin the United States and abroad havecontributed to increased interest in licensing andconstruction of new reactors. Nuclear energy isalso encouraged by the 2005 Energy Act, whichcontains a provision for U.S. Government standbysupport for any delays due to NRC reviews. In theStaff Requirements Memorandum, dated May 10,2005, from the April 6, 2005, CommissionBriefing on Status of New Site and ReactorLicensing, the Commission requested that the staffupdate licensing-guidance documents, includingthe Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800(NRC 1996) to support new reactor licensing. ThePacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)assisted the NRC in updating the SRP. Theupdated SRP was released by the NRC in March,2007 (NRC 2007).

Licensing of nuclear power plants is regulated byTitle 10 of Code of Federal Regulation (CFR)Parts 50, 52, and 100. Appendix A to 10 CFR Part50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear PowerPlants, contains criterion 2 (GDC 2), whichrequires that structures, systems, and componentsimportant to safety be designed to withstand theeffects of natural phenomena, including tsunamis.A series of regulatory guides (RG) provide guid-ance to licensees and applicants on implementingspecific parts of the NRC's regulations, techniquesused by the NRC staff in evaluating specificproblems or postulated accidents, and data neededby the staff in its review of applications forpermits or licenses. An update to RG 1.59 (NRC

1977) was expected to include guidance forassessment of tsunamis as a flooding hazard, butwas never completed. An update to RG 1.59 iscurrently underway.

In the wake of the December 26, 2004, Sumatraearthquake and its accompanying tsunami thatresulted in widespread loss of life and property inthe Indian Ocean region, hazards posed bytsunamis have emerged as some of the most severecaused by natural phenomena. One operatingnuclear power reactor was shut down during thistsunami, and, therefore, international nuclearpower plant operators and reviewers felt the needto review the approach towards tsunami-hazardassessment for existing and proposed sites. ThePresident of the United States launched aninitiative to improve domestic tsunami-warningsystems, and its first instalhnent was signed intolaw on May 11, 2005 (STC 2005). In April, 2006,the NRC requested technical assistance fromPacific Northwest National Laboratory in thedevelopment of new guidance documents fortsunami-related hazards at nuclear power plantsites, consistent with the President's initiative.

Section 2.4.6 of the SRP (NRC 2007) describesreview procedures and acceptance criteria forprobable maximum tsunami (PMT) hazards.However, technical guidance related to methodsand data required for tsunami-hazard assessment isnot the focus of the SRP. The National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has theresponsibility to develop standards of accuracy fortsunami-simulation models and to conductresearch to support the National Tsunami HazardMitigation Program. NOAA's responsibilitieswere reaffirmed on December 20, 2006, when thePresident signed the Tsunami Warning andEducation Act. NOAA's Pacific Marine Environ-mental Laboratory (PMEL) operates the NOAA

Center for Tsunami Research (NCTR). NCTR's

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objectives include the development and imple-mentation of improved models to increase thespeed and accuracy of operational forecasts andwarnings, and development of improved methodsto predict the impacts of tsunamis on coastal

communities and infrastructure. To leverage theextensive technical expertise and regulatoryauthority that NOAA has and PNNL's experiencewith reviewing the first three Early Site Permitapplications, PNNL and NRC agreed to develop

guidance for tsunami-hazard assessment using aset of two documents-this report, prepared byPNNL, that focuses on the review guidancerelevant for NRC staff and a PMEL-p.reparedNOAA Technical Memorandum titled "Scientificand Technical Issues in Tsunami HazardAssessment of Nuclear Power Plant Sites"(Gonzilez 2007) to serve as the technical basis.As tsunami-simulation models arc developed,standardized, and released by PMEL for use by thetsunami community, the NOAA TechnicalMemorandum will be updated to include the state-of-the-art in tsunami-hazard assessment.

A hierarchical approach is recommended forreview of tsunami hazards at nuclear power plantsites. An initial screening should be performed toestablish if the site is free from tsunamis. Ageneral rule based on horizontal distance (D),longitudinal distance along a stream from anestuary (L), and elevation (Z) of structures,systems, and components (SSC) important tosafety could be used to reasonably demonstratethat a plant may be safe from any tsunami hazards.Because tsunami runup and drawdown, and theassociated hazards, are highly site-specific, a priori

numerical limits on D, L, and Z cannot beestablished. Site-specific analysis of datacombined with sound engineering judgment maybe used to justify that detailed tsunami hazardassessment at the site may not be required. It is

expected that the majority of the sites located farfrom the shoreline may be screened out. If theinitial screening indicates that tsunami hazards areof concern, a detailed assessment of probablemaximum tsunami (PMT) hazards should beperformed. Generally, it may not be possible to apriori determine the tsunamigenic source andassociated parameters that will result in PMThazards at a site. Therefore, a set of candidatetsunamis generated by all possible tsunamigenicsources should be simulated to determine theworst hazard at the site. Because tsunami-wavecharacteristics are highly dependent on near-shorebathymctry and geometry of inlets, bays, andcoves, the hazards are expected to be highlyspatially variable in the near-shore area. Maps ofworst-case PMT-wave characteristics and hazardmetrics should be compiled from the scenariotsunami simulations and used to determine designbases and any required protection for affected SSCimportant to safety.

At this time, efforts at NOAA PMEL areunderway to develop a comnunity tsunami-modeling system. The standards, criteria, andprocedures for evaluation of tsunami numericalmodels have been published by NOAA inTechnical Memorandum OAR PMEL-135. Thecommunity tsunami-modeling system wouldgreatly aid the estimation of PMT hazards.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Early and enthusiastic support for the initiative forthis study was provided by Dr. Brian Sheron,Director of RES, Mr. Michael Mayfield, Director,Division of Engineering, NRO, Dr. NileshChokshi, Deputy Director, Division of Site andEnvironmental Reviews, NRO and Dr. EddicBernard, Director, PMEL, NOAA.

The author wishes to sincerely acknowledgetechnical discussions, guidance, and suggestionsprovided by Mr. Lance Vail, PNNL. Commentsprovided by Mr. Goutam Bagchi, Dr. HosungAim, Dr. Christopher Cook, Dr. Ann Kammerer,and Mr. Mark McBride, all of NRC, helpedimprove this report. Dr. Frank Gonzflez andDr. Vasily Titov, both of NOAA PMEL,graciously provided comments on technicalaspects of tsunamis.

Mr. Stuart Saslow, Ms. Janie Vickerman,Ms. Julie Hughes, Mr. Kevin Ghirardo, and Ms.Liz Davis, all of PNNL, provided excellent projectsupport. Editorial review of this report wasperformed by Ms. Sheila Bennett and Ms. AngieAguilar, PNNL.

Financial support from the Division of NewReactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation, and later, the Office of New Reactors,NRO, of the NRC is gratefully acknowledged.Preparation of this report would have beenimpossible without the continued guidance andsupport of Mr. Goutam Bagchi, the NRCTechnical Monitor.

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1 TSUNAMI AND OTHER TSUNAMI-LIKE WAVES

1.1 Introduction

The word tsunami is a Japanese word that literallymeans "harbor ('tsu') wave ('nami')." A tsunamiis a series of water waves that propagate from thepoint of generation (the location of thetsunamigenic source) toward the shore. Typically,the term tsunami refers to an oceanic tsunamicaused by the initiation of the tsunami waves dueto the vertical displacement of the water columnby some submarine tsunamigenic source.However, tsunami or tsunami-like waves can alsobe generated in inland water bodies by sources thathave appropriate tsunamigenic characteristics.

Tsunamis can be severely destructive toinfrastructure, human life, and the economylocated near the coast. These waves can travelgreat distances in the form of gravity waves withlittle loss of energy. The waves increase inamplitude as they reach shallow water near theshore. The waves may inundate large areas

onshore depending on local bathymetry andtopography. The hydrostatic and hydrodynamicforces associated with the waves can damagestructures. The structures on land may also beimpacted by water-borne debris and projectiles.

Tsunamis are of great interest to nuclear powerplants located near a shoreline that may beaffected by tsunamis. Tsunami hazards that mayaffect safety should be considered in the siting ofthe plant. The design of the SSC important tosafety should also consider tsunami hazards toensure that the threat posed to the plant and,subsequently, to public health and safety areadequately mitigated in the design bases.

There are three distinct "phases" of a tsunami, asillustrated in Figure 1-1. A far-field tsunami isone for which the source is located more than625 mi (1000 km) from the area of interest.

Figure 1-1. A far-field oceanic tsunami.

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Little energy is lost during propagation of thetsunami waves, and the speed at which thesewaves travel can be estimated based on the theoryof shallow-water waves. The propagation phase ofthe tsunami waves can be approximated well withlinear theory. The final phase of the tsunami is theinundation phase, where the waves enter shallowerwaters near the shore, shorten in wavelength, andincrease in amplitude. Nonlinear effects become

significant during the inundation phase and cannotbe neglected. The amplification of the wavedepends on the local, near-shore bathymetry. Thegeometry of the shoreline- combined withbathymetry-can also lead to reflection,refraction, trapping of waves, and other

interactions that may further modify the charac-teristics of the tsunami waves. The runup isdefined as the maximum ground elevation that thetsunami waves reach above a datum.

Figure 1-2 shows a near-field oceanic tsunami.The source for a near-field tsunami is generallyless than 625 mi (1000 km) from the area ofinterest. Due to the proximity of the source to theshore, the waves arrive at the area of interestquickly, which may limit the time available forevacuation or protective actions.

Figure 1-2. A near-field oceanic tsunami.

Figure 1-3 shows a tsunami generated in an inlandwater body, such as a lake or a man-made reser-voir, initiated by a seismic source beneath thewater body. Other causes, like hillslope failuresand subaerial landslides, may also be appropriateas a source mechanism for tsunami-like wavesgenerated in inland water bodies. Hillslope failureis the term generally used to describe a slope

failure caused by increased pore-water pressurethat results in loss the of sheer strength in the soiland may lead to sliding along weakened layers.Subaerial landslide is the term generally used todescribe a landslide that starts above the surface ofthe water body and impacts the water body,generating a tsunami-like wave.

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Figure 1-3. A tsunami in an inland water body.

1.2 Definition

The National Oceanographic and AtmosphericAdministration defines tsunamis as "...a series ofvery long waves generated by any rapid, large-scale disturbance of the sea."

The International Tsunami Information Center ofthe Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commis-sion-a part of the United Nations Educational,Scientific, and Cultural Organization--definestsunamis as "...a series of traveling waves ofextremely long length and period, usuallygenerated by disturbances associated withearthquakes occurring below on near the oceanfloor."1

For the purposes of this report, we adopted thefollowing definition:

A tsunami is a series of water waves generatedby a rapid, large-scale disturbance of a waterbody due to seismic, landslide, or volcanictsunamigenic sources.

Note that this definition is not limited to oceanictsunamis. Landslide sources may include sub-marine and subaerial slides and ice falls. Volcanicsources include the effects of pyroclastic flows

and caldera collapse. The effects of a calderacollapse may be similar to a submarine or asubaerial landslide, depending on the location andthe characteristics of the event.

1.3 Mechanisms

Tsunamis are generated by rapid, large-scaledisturbance of a body of water. Therefore, onlygeophysical events that release a large amount ofenergy in a very short time into a water bodygenerate tsunamis. The most frequent cause oftsunamis is an earthquake. Less frequently,tsunamis are generated by submarine and subaeriallandslides, by pyroclastic flows and calderacollapses during volcanic eruptions, meteoriteimpacts, and by ice falls.

1.3.1 Earthquakes

The most frequent source of tsunami generation isa submarine earthquake. Earthquakes primarilygenerate tsunamis through vertical displacement ofthe floor of the water body that results in asimultaneous (often assumed identical) displace-ment of the overlying water column. Because ofthe tsunami-generation sequence associated withearthquakes, dip-slip earthquakes are moreefficient at generating tsunamis than strike-slip

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earthquakes. However, Tanioka and Satake(1996) show that it is possible for a strike-slipfault to generate major tsunamis under certain

conditions where horizontal displacement of asteep slope leads to a significant vertical displace-

ment of the water column.

To generate a major tsunami, a substantial amountof slip and a large rupture area is required.Consequently, only large earthquakes with mag-nitudes greater than 6.5 generate observabletsunamis. The controlling source parameter thatdetermines tsunami severity is the seismicmoment, M0, defined as

Mo =,uDA

where I is the shear modulus or rigidity, D is the

average slip, and A is the rupture area. Momentmagnitude of the earthquake, M,., is computedthrough the empirical relationship

= 2 [io0(Mo)- 9.05]

The generation of the tsunami from an earthquakeevent is carried out in three steps:

1. fault rupture modeling2. calculation of coseismic displacements3. calculation of initial wave field.

Fault-rupture modelingThe most commonly used rupture model is basedon elastic dislocation. Elastic dislocations underthe assumption of uniform slip are called Volterradislocations. For a given earthquake magnitudeM., rupture area A, and shear modulus It, it ispossible to estimate an equivalent uniforn slip.However, Geist (2005) explains that literaturedemonstrates that the assumption of uniform slipimplies that the deformation is concentrated at the

edges of the rupture. Relaxation of theuniform-slip assumption to allow for variable slipin the dip direction for a dip-slip fault results in

concentration of the deformation near the center of

the rupture zone and substantially higher verticaldisplacements (Geist and Dmowska 1999), leadingto a greater initial tsunami wave height.

The less frequently used rupture model is based oncrack theory (Geist and Dmowska 1999), in whicha uniform static stress drop, rather than a uniformslip, is specified. The seismic moment and theuniform stress drop are related by (Lay andWallace 1995)

Mo = 31" AO" W 2 L

where Ac- is the uniform static stress drop, W is

the width of the rupture, and L is the length of therupture.

Analysis of seismic-waveform data and othertheoretical and numerical studies of rupture

dynamics have shown that slip distribution isstrongly heterogeneous, such that the slip distri-bution can rarely be considered uniform andconforms to the crack theory only in certain cases(Yomogida 1988). For far-field tsunamis, theeffects of slip distribution are attenuated by thetime the tsunami reaches the site. However, fornear-field tsunamis, care should be taken to use anappropriate rupture model because slipheterogeneity has a significant effect on tsunami-wave heights. For an arbitrary slip distribution,

discretized cells of uniform dip-slip and the pointsource expressions of Okada (1985) can be used.Geist and Dmowska (1999) show the effects ofslip heterogeneity modeled using discretized cellson the local tsunami wave field.

Calculation of coseismic displacementsCoseismic displacement of the floor of the waterbody can be estimated using analytical expression

of Okada (1985) for homogeneous earth structureand a rectangular planar fault for cases where therupture is represented by a Volterra elastic

dislocation. Analytic expressions for coseismicdisplacements have been developed for crackmodels of rupture using Chebyshev polynomials(Dmowska and Kostrov 1973; Rudnicki and Wu

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1995). In general, a heterogeneous slip field canbe discretized into cells of planar, uniform slipusing the point source expressions of Okada(1985). These techniques apply to planar faults ina homogeneous elastic medium only.

For non-planar faults, Jeyakumaran et al. (1992)and Jeyakumaran and Keer (1994) developedanalytical expressions that use triangular disloca-tions and curved slip zones. For non-planar faults

in heterogeneous medium, numerical techniques,like finite elements, or boundary elements mayalso be used (Yoshioka et al. 1989; Zhao el al.2004).

Calculation of initial wave fieldThe vertical component of the coseismic displace-ment of the floor of the water body dominatestsunami generation. Therefore, dip-slipearthquakes are more efficient in tsunamigeneration. Tanioka and Satake (1996) also show,however, that tsunamis can be generated undercertain conditions by earthquakes in which

horizontal displacement is large relative to thevertical displacement. Figure 1-4 shows asituation where the displacement occurs on ashallow dipping thrust. The horizontal movementof the upper plate to the left of its original positionresults in a significant vertical component,generating a tsunami wave. Tanioka and Satake(1996) report this situation for the June 2, 1994,Java, Indonesia, earthquake of M, 7.8, whichgenerated a tsunami with a maximum runup of37 ft (11.3 m).

If a strike slip fault results in horizontal displace-ment of a steep slope, a tsunami may also begenerated by the vertical component of thedisplacement. Tanioka and Satake (1996)proposed this mechanism for the November 14,1994, Mindoro earthquake of M, 7.1 thatgenerated a tsunami with a maximum runup of24 ft (7.3 in) in the Phillipines.

Figure 1-4. Vertical component of displacement due to a shallow dipping thrust.

The vertical component of the displacement dueonly to the horizontal movement of the slope isexpressed as (Tanioka and Satake 1996)

9H dHUh =Ux +Uy-

dX y

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where x and y denote horizontal dimensions, u, andUy are the horizontal displacements, H is the water

depth measured positive downward, and Uh is thevertical component of the displacement measuredpositive upward. The total vertical displacement ofthe floor of the water body for a fault motion thatalso has a vertical displacement, u,. is therefore

u. + u,. Depending on the characteristics of thefault and slope displacement, Uh may contribute

significantly to the total vertical displacement of thefloor of the water body. Tanioka and Satake (1996)suggest that this phenomenon may explain some ofthe tsunamis generated by the so-called tsunamiearthquakes that are relatively small in magnitudeyet generate major tsunamis.

The time during which the rupture takes place andresults in displacement of the bottom of the water

body can be considered instantaneous relative to thepropagation speed of tsunamis. Therefore, theinitial tsunami wavefield mimics the vertical-displacement field of the bottom of the water body.Wavelength components of the vertical-displacement field that are less than approximatelythree times the water depth are attenuated throughthe water column, but this phenomenon is mostly aconcern in shallow and surface faulting. The initialdisplacement of the water surface can be assumedidentical to that of the bottom of the water body

under the assumption that water is an

incompressible fluid.

Source parametersEarthquake source parameters for tsunamigeneration are related to the characteristics of thedislocation. These parameters fall into two generalcategories: those that scale with the magnitude ofthe earthquake and those that relate to materialproperties of the rupture zone.

Magnitude distributionThe frequency distribution of the magnitude ofearthquakes is given by the Gutenberg-Richter

(G-R) power law (Kagan 2002):

Iog[N(Mw )] = a - bMlw

where N(M,.) is the number of earthquakes withmagnitudes greater than M,,, and a and b areparameters of the power law function. The slopeof the distribution (b) has been fairly well estab-lished in literature, but there is considerable debateon how to specify the tails of the distribution. The

distribution is truncated on the high end becauseof the requirements of the preservation-of-energyprinciple. Kagan (2002) described four commonforms of the size distribution for large-magnitudeearthquakes. There are essentially threeapproaches to define the shape of the G-Rdistribution for large magnitudes: (I) thecharacteristic model, which assumes that thelargest earthquake occurs at approximately thesame location and at approximately the samemagnitude; the G-R distribution is specified up tothe magnitude of the largest aftershock of thecharacteristic earthquake (Wesnousky 1994); (2) aregionally modified G-R relationship; acontinuous distribution where the right tail of thedistribution falls off rapidly at a rate greater thanthe G-R slope, b; and (3) a globally modified G-Rrelationship that is based only on tectonic

boundary type (Bird and Kagan 2004). Somestudies (Kagan and Jackson 1991, 1.995; Rong etal. 2003; Okal et al. 2006) indicate that thecharacteristic model may not be valid. There issome concern that regionally modified G-Rrelationships may suffer because of a lack of

sufficient earthquake data to reliably estimate theirparameters. Because of this, Bird and Kagan(2004) proposed a global G-R relationship basedonly on tectonic boundary type. Also, forsubduction zones, the comer magnitude(a) is very

high (9.58_o048 ). Thus, unless proven otherwise,

it should be assumed that earthquakes withmoment magnitude greater than 9 can occur. Birdand Kagan (2004) provide the corner magnitude

for oceanic convergent boundaries as 8.04. 0.52

(a) The slope of the G-R relationship increases forearthquakes of magnitudes greater than the cornermagnitude, resulting in a rapid falloff of thedistribution.

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Fault dimensionsFault dimensions consist of the rupture length, therupture width, and the slip amount (more accu-rately, the distribution of the slip amount).Although the dimensions of the rupture scale with

seismic moment, past a certain magnitude, thewidth of the rupture saturates. The saturation widthdepends on the frictional stability of the rupturezone, which varies with depth (Scholz 1990).Rupture length and slip may continue to increaseafter the saturation of the rupture width with acorresponding increase in seismic moment.General scaling relationships for rupture dimensionare available (Geller 1976; Kanamori and Anderson1975; Wyss 1979).

DipDip is the angle between the fault plane and thehorizontal plane. It is generally determined fromgeophysical studies or from analysis of past events.

StrikeStrike is the geographic orientation usually given asa compass direction of the fault plane. It is alsodetermined from geophysical studies or fromanalysis of past events.

Slip vectorSlip vector refers to the direction and amount of theslip during the earthquake. Relative motionbetween the plates at a convergent boundary almostalways has an oblique component that results in acompression component as well as a shear ortranscurrent component of strain (Soofi and King2002). The orientation of this relative motion canattain any value between 0' and 90', called theangle of obliquity. Generally, oblique convergenceresults in strike-slip and dip-slip components,thereby partitioning the slip into these twodirections. The amount of slip partitioning controlsthe orientation of the slip vector along the interplatethrust. In cases of a fully slip-partitionedsubduction zone, the earthquake has a pure thrustmechanism that has the maximum tsunamigenicefficiency.

Slip distributionAs discussed above, the amount of slip along therupture can be highly variable. The slip hetero-geneity can have a significant effect on near-fieldtsunami amplitudes, but its effects are significantlydampened in the far field. Slip-distributionmodels that account for heterogeneity aregenerally based on self-affme properties of rupturedynamics (Andrews 1980; Mai and Beroza 2002).The average slip for these models is estimatedfrom the overall seismic moment, and the falloffof the seismic wavenumber spectrum is estimatedfrom far-field displacement spectrum observed onseismograms. Andrews (1980) showed that a slip-distribution spectrum that decays as kV in the wavenumber (k) domain is consistent with the widelyobserved e)2 decay (Aki 1967) in the frequency(o) domain. Herrero and Bernard (1994) proposedthe "k-square" model, in which the slip-distribution spectrum decays as k- beyond acomer wavenumber, k.. The comer wavenumberwas related to fault length. These slip-distributionmodels can be used to generate a suite of scenariopatterns of slip distribution, which has been usedin ground-motion studies (Berge et al. 1998;Somerville et al. 1999.) and may also be used intsunami source models.

Mai and Beroza (2002) point out that models ofslip distribution based on self-affinity are essen-tially fractal and, therefore, contain no characteris-tic length scale to describe the size of asperities.Somerville et al. (1999) found that the number ofasperities and their size increase with seismicmoment. They suggested that it may be possibleto constrain the simulated slip-distribution patternsfrom a "k-square" model using the correlation ofthe size and the number of asperities with theseismic moment.

There is also an indication that slip may exhibitlarger fluctuations than that predicted by theAndrews (1980) model. Lavallc ct al. (2006)suggests that random variables from the LUvydistribution may be suitable for generatingscenarios under these circumstances.

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Shear modulusShear modulus is the constant of proportionality inHooke's Law that relates shear stress to shearstrain. It is also described as the initial linear slopeof the stress-strain curve for shear. There is a largevariation in the value of the shear modulus due tothe large variety of types of rocks that are present insubduction zones. Shear modulus can be measured(Saffer et al. 2001) or deduced from earthquakesource-time functions (Bilek and Lay 1999, 2000).

The variation of shear modulus with depth wasshown to have a large effect on tsunamigenicpotential of earthquakes: Okal (1988) showed,using a theoretical study, that a one tenth seismicmoment located in low-rigidity sedimentary rocksresulted in an order-of-magnitude increase in theinitial tsunami amplitude. This phenomenon mayalso explain tsunami earthquakes that arc relativelysmall in magnitude yet generate large tsunamis. Ifthese earthquakes are located at a shallower depthnear the trench, and the subduction zone consists oflow-rigidity material, four conditions favorable to amore efficient and greater tsunami generation arepossible:

1. release of seismic moment in low-rigidity rocksincreases slip compared to the same momentrelease in a higher-rigidity material

2. shallow rupture initiation increases thepossibility of the rupture of the floor of thewater body, which also tends to increase theslip

3. shallow focal depth increases the coseismicdisplacement

4. greater water depth near oceanic trenchesresults in greater amplification of the tsunamiwaves during shoaling.

1.3.2 Landslides

There are two broad categories of landslides:(1) submarine or subaqueous landslides that areinitiated and progress beneath the surface of thewater body and (2) subaerial landslides that areinitiated above the water and impact the water bodyduring their progression or fall into the water body.

The movement of a large mass of the slide or theimpact of the fall displaces the water in thedirection of the movement and can lead to genera-tion of a tsunami wave on the surface of the waterbody. Once the initial wavefield is generated, itpropagates outward from the source region. Areview of submarine landslides is given byHampton et al. (1996).

Source typesLandslides occur in several ways, depending onthe geologic composition of the slope, steepness ofthe slope, triggering mechanism, and pore-waterpressure. There are five classes of slope move-ment (Varnes 1978): (1) falls, (2) topples,(3) translational and rotational slides, (4) lateralspreads, and (5) flows. Depending on the location,material properties, and properties of the trigger, acombination of these movements may occur.These combined movements are called complexslope movements.

The initial tsunami-wave generation is affected bythe type and the time history of the slope move-ment. Therefore, it is important to identify' theseparameters of the landslide in the area of interest.In a given area, several types of landslide eventsmay occur that are capable of generating tsunamis.For example, in Alaska, destructive local tsunamishave occurred due to subaerial landslides (e.g.,Lituya Bay in 1958) and as a result of submarinelandslides in Valdez Arm of the Prince WilliamSound that were triggered by the 1964 GreatAlaska earthquake. In southern California,tsunamis have been generated in the geologic pastby submarine mud flows in Santa Barbara Channeland by debris avalanches in Palos Verdes.

Subaerial landslides have also occurred in inlandlakes (a tsunami-like wave in Spirit Lake causedby debris flow after eruption and collapse ofMount St. Helens dome in 1980) (Waitt andPierson 1994) and man-made water-storagereservoirs (a tsunami-like wave in VaiontReservoir in Italy caused by a massive hillslopefailure and resulting landslide into the reservoir)(Kiersch 1964; Hendron and Patten 1985).

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Submarine landslidesSeveral mechanisms can trigger a submarinelandslide. The most common of these is anearthquake, such as the 1929 Grand Banks (Fineet al. 2005), 1946 Aleutian (L6pez and Okal 2006),1964 Valdez (Lee et al. 2003), and the 1998 Papua,New Guinea, (Satake and Tanioka 2003) tsuna mis.Often, landslides triggered by an earthquake, canoccur very shortly after the earthquake such that thegenerated tsunami is affected by both sourcemechanisms (Johnson and Satake 1997; Satake andTanioka 2003; L6pez and Okal 2006). Many of theevents in the National Geophysical Data Centertsunami catalog that are attributed to landslides mayhave such a composite source. In other instances,the slope failure may occur several hours after thetriggering earthquake (Seed et al. 1975).

Tsunami generation mechanismTsunami generation from landslides can, inprinciple, be modeled similar to that from anearthquake. The physics of the slide are used toestimate the displacement of the overlying watercolumn to determine the initial tsunami wavefield.A series of papers by Jiang and LeBlond (1992,1993, 1994) describe the physics of submarinemudslide and the waves it generated. Heinrichet al. (.200 1 ) used granular material to simulate slidedynamics.

Onset of shear failure of a slope under normal stresscan be described by the Mohr-Coulomb failurecriterion:

Z = c'+(o- u) tano

where r is the shear stress, c' is the cohesion of theslope material, a is the normal stress, u is the porepressure, and ýp is the angle of friction (reposeangle). The analysis of mass movement afterfailure can be analyzed using models proposed inliterature (e.g., Imran et al. 2001).

Landslide tsunamigenic sources have twoproperties that are different from the earthquakesources: (1) landslide-generated tsunamis have avery strong directivity in the direction of mass

movement, and (2) the source cannot beconsidered to generate an instantaneousdisplacement of the still-water level due to thetime it takes for the slide to evolve, during whichthe characteristics of the surface waves areaffected. Because of the time-dependent nature ofsource evolution, a completely coupled model(e.g., Jiang and LeBlond 1994) or a kinematicmodel (Lynett and Liu 2002) is generally preferredfor modeling of landslide-generated tsunamis.

Initial wave characteristicsThe outgoing wave from the landslide sourcepropagates in the direction of the slide with itsamplitude affected by the terminal velocity of themovement (Trifunac et al. 2002, 2003). Thecharacteristics of the baekgoing wave depends onthe acceleration of the slide and appears as adepression wave approaching the shore. Twoparameters of the slide primarily affect tsunamigeneration: the volume and time history of theslide.

Volume distributionThe frequency distribution of submarine landslidevolume follows a power law similar to that forterrestrial landslides (issler et al. 2005; ten Brinket al. 2006). The volume distribution is particu-larly important in estimating the large landslides;however, care should be exercised in the estima-tion because a large slide may be a composite ofmultiple smaller failures (Lee et al. 2004). It isalso important to evaluate how the slide wasdisplaced (Locat et al. 2004) and to be able todistinguish submarine landslides from sedimentwaves (Lee et al. 2002).

The tail of the landslide volume distribution alsofollows the general upper-truncated power-lawform (Burroughs and Tebbens 2005), similar to themodified Gutenberg-Richter distribution forearthquake magnitudes. It is not clear whether thetruncation is a result of physical limitation onmaximum size of landslides or of insufficientobservations of large events. However, factors(i.e., downslope length of the continental shelves)may help limit the maximum size of submarine

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landslides. Assumptions also need to be madewhile converting observed submarine landslideextent to volume.

Locat and Lee (2002) compiled a global database ofknown submarine landslides that included volumeand run-out distance.

Slide speed and accelerationTsunami generation from submarine landslide isgreatly affected by the time history of the slidemovement: the near-field tsunami amplitude issensitive to the initial acceleration, and the far-fieldtsunami is sensitive to the maximum velocity of theslide (Trifunac et al. 2002, 2003). The initial waveheight may also be influenced by the depth of thecenter of mass of the slide (Murty 1979). There is alack of direct observation of submarine-landslidedynamics, particularly in its tsunamigenic stages.

Landslide speed may be determined from physical

modeling of landslide dynamics (Locat et al. 2004).In the absence of physical modeling, lack of directobservation limits the landslide dynamics to bemodeled using a single parameter, such as its speedor duration. Likely, bathymetric slope and basefriction are important parameters that affectlandslide speed. Most modeling studies use speedsin the range of 66-246 ft/sec (20-75 m/sec).Maximum tsunami-wave amplitude results whenthe terminal speed of the slide matches the phase

velocity (C = VJh ) of the tsunami waves.

Cohesiveness and fluidityThe tsunami generated by a submarine landslide isalso affected by the relative rigidity of the slidemass during the failure. More rigid slides thatbehave more like a. single mass have greaterefficiency at generating a tsunami than slides thatquickly disintegrate into turbidity flows.

Geomorphological analysis can help identify thetype of initial failure, and laboratory analysis ofcore samples may assist in the determination of theproperties of the slide material.

Investigation oj'tsunamnigenic landslidesInvestigation of tsunamigenic landslides in the

area of interest may involve several steps:

I. identification of the area of interest2. literature review of existing documentation in

the area of interest3. compilation of existing seafloor and coastal

data (e.g., multibeam, seismic, cores, etc.);actual Geologic Long-Range Inclined Asdic(GLORIA, a side-scanning sonar system thatproduces digital images of the seafloor)images may be an excellent starting point inthe U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) area(Schwab et al., 1993;http://coastalniap.marine.uses.g-ov/,loria/).(See Section 2.4.)

4. preparation of an inventory of mass move-ments and corresponding slide properties

(volume, shape, material properties, type offailure, etc.)

5. identification of source area

6. detailed investigation of characteristic slides,including geotechnical testing to estimatematerial properties

7. retrospective analysis of historical slides toestimate their tsunamigenic potential

8. detailed tsunami analysis from landslides:slope failure analysis, post-failure slide

dynamics, and tsunami generation.

Subaerial landslidesThe geographical areas where subaerial landslidesoccur are more restricted than those wheresubmarine landslides occur. Subaerial landslides,by definition, start on land and then impact a waterbody. Therefore, their occurrence is generallylimited to areas of steep coastal or shorelinetopography. One exception to this limitation isdebris flow that originates away from the shoresbut reaches and impacts the water body (e.g., thedebris flow from 1980 collapse of the Mount St.Helens dome into Spirit Lake).

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The impact velocity of subaerial landslides can besignificantly greater than those for submarinelandslides. However, typically, subaerial landslidesdisplace less water than submarine slides; thus, thegeographical extent of their damage is morelimited.

Many of the largest subaerial landslides aretriggered by earthquakes (e.g., the 1958 Lituya Baylandslide) and some by classic hillslope failuremechanisms under wet conditions (e.g., the 1963Vaiont Reservoir landslide) (Kiersch 1964;Hendron and Patten 1985).

Tsunami generation mechanism

Subaerial landslides can be classified into twocategories (Walder et al. 2003): (1) those that startnear the shore and have substantial run-out underwater (release-at-shore type) and (2) those that starthigher up, such that a substantial portion of theirrun-out is over the land (initial-velocity type). Thephysical parameter that distinguishes these twotypes of subaerial landslides is the slide impactFroude number (the ratio of slide velocity at entryto the long-wave phase velocity of the tsunamiwaves).

The tsunami-generation mechanism for the release-on-shore subaerial landslide is very similar to thatof submarine landslides. The tsunami waves aregenerated primarily due to the displacement of thewater. On the other hand, tsunami waves frominitial-velocity-type subaerial landslides aregenerated primarily due to the impact of the slidewith the water (Heinrich 1992).

initial wave characteristicsDue to similarities of the tsunami-generationmechanism in release-on-shore subaerial landslidesand submarine landslides, these landslides can betreated similarly in terms of initial wavecharacteristics.

The hydrodynamics of the impact of a fast-movingmass on water is very complex. Fritz et al. (2003a,2003b, 2004) carried out laboratory studies, andMader and Gittings (2002) performed full, three-

dimensional Navier-Stokes hydrodynamicsmodeling of impacts on the water body. Thesestudies suggest that near the site of the impact,complex flow separation and crater formationoccurs. Near-field wave characteristics of thesestrongly non-linear waves is described by Fritz etal. (2004). Lynett et al. (2006) suggestedmodifications to standard hydrodynamics theoryfor full, three-dimensional modeling of release-on-shore subaerial landslide-generated waves wherethe slide is not completely submerged in water.Walder et al. (2003) derived scaling relationshipsto estimate the near-field hydrodynamic responsewhile treating the "splash zone" as a black boxbecause of the complexity and turbulent nature ofthe flow.

Source parametersThe source parameters associated with subaeriallandslides are the impact Froude nunber and thedensity and the dimensions of the slide. Heinrichet al. (1998) also suggested that the frontal shapeof the slide also has an effect on wave generation.It is also likely that cohesiveness of the slidematerial has a significant effect on wavegeneration.

Ice fallsAn overview of the glacial processes that mayresult in large masses entering water is describedby Richardson and Reynolds (2000). Theseprocesses include snow and ice avalanches. Iceavalanches are categorized into frontal-blockfailure (calving when the front of the glacier is inwater), ice-slab detachment, and ice-bedrockfailure (in which part of the bedrock is included inthe failure). Tinti et al. (1999) described ahistorical example of approximately 6 ft (2 m)waves generated in a lake by a frontal-blockfailure 247,000-565,000 ftW (7000-16,000 m3) involume in the western Italian Alps.

Ice avalanches moving downslope will behave

similar to initial-velocity subaerial landslides, andlikely primary source parameters are volume andimpact Froude number. Calving will behave as atopple entering the water. Maximum volume of

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ice avalanches in the European Alps is given inHuggel et al. (2004).

1.3.3 Volcanoes

Tsunamis can occur due to a variety of mechanismsassociated with active and Holocene-age volcanoesthat are located in or near the oceans or otherbodies of water. The 1883 Krakatau and mid-17thcentury BC Santorini tsunami events are ascribed tovolcanic activity.

Source typesBegdt (2000) lists the following source typesassociated with volcanic activity:

1. pyroclastic flow into the water2. submarine caldera collapse

3. submarine explosion4. debris avalanches and flank failures.

Less-common mechanisms include rapid seafloorinflation (Satake and Kanamori 1991; Kanamoriet al. 1993) and coupling of the ocean with atmos-pheric shock waves (Begdt 2000). A combinationof several source types may also be a factor in thetsunami generation due to volcanic activity (e.g.,1883 Krakatau and mid-17th century BC Santorinievents). No submarine volcano is continuouslymonitored by a volcano observatory (Begdt 2000).

Pyroclastic flowsPyroclastic flows consist of debris flows and

avalanches of hot, gas-rich material that quicklyflows downslope. Pyroclastic flows are producedby explosive volcanic eruptions. When thepyroclastic flow reaches the water, the hot materialseparates into a dust cloud of hot ash and gas and adenser material. This dense material can generate atsunami (Legros and Druitt 2000; Watts andWaythomas 2003), and is thought to be the mostefficient tsunami generator of several mechanismsinvestigated (Watts and Waythomas 2003).

This mechanism is similar to the subaeriallandslides and avalanches. The tsunami events thathave been generated by pyroclastic flow include the

1997 Montserrat (Lesser Antilles) event (Heinrichet al. 1998) and the 3500-years-before-presentAniakehak events (Waythomas and Neal 1998;Watts and Waythomas 2003). The primary source

parameters, similar to the subaerial landslidesource mechanism, are the impact Froude number,density, and dimensions of the tsunamigenicportion of the flow.

Submarine caldera collapse

Caldera collapses that occur under water result in asudden depression of the water surface thathydrodynamically evolves into tsunami waves(Latter 198 1; Gray and Monaghan 2003).Examples of tsunamis generated by caldera

collapses are Santorini (Gray and Monaghan 2003)and the 1883 Krakatau (Nomanbhoy and Satake1995) events, although both are thought to havegenerated tsunamis by a combination of volcanicmechanisms, one of which is caldera collapse.Gray and Monaghan (2003) performed laboratoryexperiments and numerical modeling toinvestigate the mechanism of wave generation andpropagation caused by a caldera collapse. Their

study found that the primary source parameterswere caldera dimensions, fixed wall height, andthe cavity depth after the collapse.

Submarine explosionsAlthough large submarine hydromagmatic explo-sions are possibly limited by large hydrostaticpressures on volcanoes (Beg6t 2000), regionallydestructive waves caused by explosive eruptionshave occurred in the past (the 1883 Krakatauevent, Nomanbhoy and Satake 1995). Belousovet al. (2000) describe tsunamis generated inKarymskoye Lake in Kamchatka, Russia, by a1996 subaquatic explosive eruption. Newhall andSelf (1982) proposed the volcanic explosivityindex (VEI), which is a relative measure of thesize or magnitude of explosive volcanic eruptions.VEI can be linked to the potency of an explosionand, consequently, its tsunamigenic potential.

Debris aalanches and flank failuresVolcanoes have produced some of the largest

debris avalanches (Locat and Lee 2002) and,

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consequently, have the potential to generate severetsunamis. Some historical examples of tsunamievents generated by debris avalanches and flankfailures arc the 1741 Oshima, Japan (Satake andKato 2001), the 1782 Unzen, Japan, the 1883Augustine, the 1888 Ritter Island (Ward and Day2003), the prehistoric Nuuanu and Wailaulandslides off the Hawaiian islands (Satake et al.2002) and off Stromboli (Tinti et al. 2000), and the1981 Spirit Lake from Mount St. Helens domecollapse and debris avalanche (Waitt and Pierson1994).

Avalanches can be triggered by volcanic activity ormay occur during the erosional phase, but theyoccur most commonly from sector or flankcollapses (Ui et al. 2000). Volcanic rockscommonly have greater cohesion than material thatis primarily elastic, such as mud slides. Thisproperty may also increase the tsunamigenicpotential of debris avalanches.

The tsunami generation from flank failures occursthrough a combination of mechanisms. Volcanicspreading results in over-thrusting along ad6collement on the edge of the volcanic flank(Lipman et al. 2002, 2003; Morgan et al. 2003),which results in a very shallow thrust fault similarto subduction thrusts due to earthquakes. A largeearthquake on the base d6collement may result inlarge-scale slumping on the hanging wall, such ason the south flank of Hawaii (Cannon et al. 2001).Klein et al. (2001) indicated that the volcanic flankregions of Hawaii are the most seismically activeregions. Most of the far-field energy of the tsunamifrom the 1975 Kalapana flank earthquake was dueto the earthquake; however, regionally, theconcomitant landslide also added to the tsunamiamplitude (Ma et al. 1999). The 1 868 Kauearthquake along the southern flank of Hawaii alsogenerated a far-field tsunami (Klein et al. 2001).Combining the tsunami displacement fields fromindividual mechanisms for such events may berequired.

1.4 Some Historical Occurrences

This section describes some of the historicaloccurrences of tsunamis caused by variousgeophysical and seismic mechanisms. Theseevents were selected to demonstrate severalaspects of tsunami generation and analysis: (1) toillustrate the diversity of locations, includinginland water bodies; (2) to illustrate the sourcemechanisms, including earthquakes, earthquake-induced submarine and subaerial landslides,hillslope failure, and volcanic activity; (3) toillustrate the difficulties associated with deter-mination of the source mechanism, especiallywhen observed data are limited, and (4) toillustrate the use of paleotsunami records inidentification of the source.

1.4.1 1958 Lituya Bay Landslide and

Tsunami

Lituya Bay is located in southeastern Alaska(Miller 1960). This bay is narrow at 9 mi (14 kin)long and 2 mi (3.2 kin) wide at its widest point.Lituya and Crillon glaciers flow into the Gilbertand Crillon inlets, the two arms at the head of thebay, respectively. These two arms of the bay arepart of a great trench along the Fairweather fault.Outer parts of the bay have gentle slopes. How-ever, the inner parts of the bay are fjord-like withsteep slopes rising 2200 ft (670 m) to 6000 ft(1828 in).

An earthquake with M,=8.3 occurred on theFairweather fault on July 7, 1958. The earthquakecaused a large landslide on the northeast slope ofthe Gilbert Inlet. The landslide started at analtitude of approxinmately 3000 ft (914 in). Theestimated volume of the landslide was more than1 billion ft3 (30 million m3). The landslide causedthe water in the Gilbert Inlet to surge onto theopposite slope with the runup reaching a height of1720 ft (524 in). Miller (1960) also reported thatseveral such large waves have occurred in LituyaBay; the 1958 wave was the highest in terms ofrunup. The other four waves that occurred in1854, 1974, 1899, and 1936 were all less than

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490 ft (149 m) in terms of runup. The 1958 LituyaBay tsunami runup is the largest documented in theNGDC tsunami runup catalog.

1.4.2 1980 Spirit Lake Debris Flow and

Tsunami

On May 18, 1980, Mount St. Helens erupted after afew-months-long activity that resulted in a bulge(or cryptodome) on the north part of the mountain.A moderate earthquake caused the entire northflank of the dome to collapse (Waitt and Pierson1994), although some argue that the earthquake wascaused by the debris avalanche (Kanamori et al.1984). The initial landslide consisted of twoseparate slide-blocks that removed about 0.6 mi (1kin) of the dome. Sudden depressurization because

of removal of the overburden resulted in anexplosive expansion of the cryptodome, followedby a pyroclastic density current with front speedexceeding 313 mph (500 klr/hr) (Waitt and Pierson1994). Within 5 minutes of the earthquake andcollapse of the flank, the density currents hadspread 16 to 28 km (10 to 17.5 mi) from the source.

The toe of the pyroclastic density flow reachedSpirit Lake and entered it at approximately156 mph (250 km/hr), filling the lake with sedimentand generating a tsunami by displacing the water inthe lake (Waitt and Pierson 1994). The watersurface of Spirit Lake was raised from 3199 ft(975 m) to 3406 ft (1038 m). The tsunami runupson the west and east arms of the lake were 820 ft(250 m) and 738 ft (225 in) above the originalwater surface elevation.

According to the NGDC tsunami runup catalog, therunups reported in the Spirit Lake are the secondand the third largest ever observed, smaller onlythan the 1958 Lituya Bay event.

1.4.3 1946 Aleutian Tsunami

On April 1, 1946, near the Aleutian trench off theUnimak Island in the eastern Aleutian Islands, anearthquake of moderate surface magnitude., M,=7.4,generated a destructive Pacific-wide tsunami.

Researchers agree that this earthquake is oneexample of a tsunami earthquake, one thatgenerates a tsunami disproportionately largecompared to its surface magnitude. The tsunamigenerated a runup of 115 ft (35 .m) on UnimakIsland, Alaska, and a runup of 55 ft (16.8 m) inHawaii. The Scotch Cap lighthouse on UnimakIsland was completely destroyed and five peoplewere killed. The tsunami resulted in 159 deaths inHawaii, five in Alaska, two in Marquesas Islands,and one in California.

The precise tsunami-generation mechanism of thisevent has been a subject of much debate in theresearch literature. A landslide component in thegeneration of the tsunami was suggested by Sykes(1971) and described in detail by Kanamori(1985). The landslide component was laterde-emphasized (Johnson and Satake 1997), but notconclusively ruled out. Tanioka and Seno (2001)suggested that an uplift caused by displacement ofan accretionary deposit near the trench, in additionto the uplift caused by the underthrusting fault,could explain observed tsunami waveforms both inthe near-field (Unimak Island) and in the far-field(Hawaii and the U.S. Pacific coastline). Fryer etal. (2004) argued that a single landslide sourcewas responsible for this tsunami event based onthe highly directive nature of the tsunami waves inthe far field, rapid decay of the tsunami wave inthe lateral direction, and period of the waves.Using United States Geological Survey (USGS)Geological Long Range Inclined Associationimagery, they also identified a candidate landslideon the Aleutian shelf that is 15.6 mi (25 kin) wide,40.6 mi (65 kin) long, and has a volume of

48.8-73.2 mi3 (200-300 km3). L6pez and Okal(2006) used more recently available seismic dataand concluded that a very slow rupture accountsfor the large far-field tsunami amplitudes, and a

concomitant landslide is necessary to explain thelarge near-field runup at Scotch Cap.

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1.4.4 1929 Grand Banks Landslide andTsunami

On November 18, 1929, an earthquake of M,,=7.4occurred on the southern edge of the Grand Banks,about 175 mi (280 kin) south of Newfoundland.The Grand Banks are a group of underwaterplateaus off the coast of Newfoundland on theNorth American continental shelf. The earthquakecaused a large landslide that turned into a turbiditycurrent, flowing more than 625 mi (1000 km) to theeast (Fine et al. 2005). The turbidity currentseverely damaged trans-Atlantic telegraph cables.Although all of the cables along the continentalslopes were broken, none on the continental shelfwas damaged.

The area of the submarine landslide coincided withthe epicenter of the earthquake. Later, ocean-floormappings and timings of the cable breaks wereused to estimate the area of the landslide atapproximately 7813 mi2 (20,000 kin2). Theestimated volume of this landslide was 48.8 mi3

(200 kin3). The landslide generated a trans-Atlantictsunami that was observed as far as the AzoresIslands and Portugal. The tsunami was alsorecorded on tide gauges at Atlantic City, NewJersey, and Charleston, South Carolina. Thetsunami resulted in 27 deaths in Newfoundland andone in Nova Scotia.

The runups reported in the NGDC tsunami runupdatabase for the 1929 Grand Banks tsunami were23 ft (7 m) in Taylor's Bay, 15.4 ft (4.7 mn) inPlacentia Bay, and 15 ft (4.57 m) at Burin and PortAu Bras, all in Newfoundland. On the U.S.Atlantic coast, recorded runups were a foot (0.3 m)at Ocean City, Maryland, and 2.2 ft (0.68 in) atAtlantic City, New Jersey. The 1929 Grand Bankstsunami is notable for a couple of reasons: it wasone of the very few catastrophic tsunamis to occurin the Atlantic, and it was one of the very fewtransoceanic tsunamis generated by a landslide.

1.4.5 1964 Valdez Arm Landslide andTsunami

On March 27, 1964, the second-largest earthquakeon record, with M,=9.2, occurred in PrinceWilliam Sound in Alaska at the boundary of thePacific plate, subducting beneath the NorthAmerican plate. The epicenter was approximately6.25 mi (10 kin) east of the mouth of CollegeFjord, and approximately 56 mi (90 kin) west ofthe town of Valdez (old Valdez). The depth of theearthquake was about 15.6 mi (25 km). The areaaffected by the vertical deformation due to theearthquake was estimated to be approximately100,000 mi2 (250,000 km2). The average slip wasestimated to be 14.4 ft (9 in).

The great earthquake resulted in several subaerialand submarine landslides on and near the Alaskancoast. The town of Valdez was built on uncon-solidated deltaic deposits. During the earthquake,the sediments under the waterfront area near thetown liquefied under seismic vibrations, and alarge section of the delta, approximately 4000 ft(1219 m) long by 600 ft (183 in) wide, collapsedinto the bay and generated a local tsunami. Thecombined effects of the earthquake and the localtsunami destroyed the waterfront, including thefacilities of the Valdez port. The earthquake alsogenerated a tsunami that reached Valdez severalhours later. The runups from the local tsunamiwere 170 ft (51.8 m) at the Valdez Inlet, 113 ft(34.4 in) at Kings Bay, 100 ft (30.5 m) at Aialik,and 79 ft (24.2 in) at Blackstone Bay, all inAlaska. The maximum runups due to the trans-Pacific tsunami generated by the earthquake inWashington State was 15 ft (4.5 m) at WreckCreek; that in Oregon was 11.5 ft (3.5 mi) atBandon; at Depoe Bay, Nehalem River, and atYaquina Bay, that in California was 28.9 ft (8.8 m)at Van Damme State Park, and that in Hawaii was16 ft (4.9 m) in Waimea Bay, Oahu, Hawaii. Thedamage at the old Valdez town was so great thatthe town was moved from its old location to a newarea. The new town is located at a higherelevation and on more-stable ground.

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The earthquake also caused major damage inSeward, Alaska, at the head of Resurrection Bay,along the east side of the Kenai Peninsula. Anapproximately 0.6-mi- (1-km-) long section of thewaterfront began sliding toward the sea, caused bylarge-scale offshore landslides, within one minuteof the strong ground shaking. This area containedthree large docks, many oil tanks, and a railroadyard. Pipes from the oil tanks ruptured and the oiltanks overturned causing a fire. The offshorelandslides generated a tsunami 32.8 ft (10 m) inheight that struck south of Seward, causingextensive damage. Seismically generated tsunamiwaves, also 32.8 ft (10 m) high arrivedapproximately 30 minutes later, and causedadditional damage. In all, 13 deaths in werereported in Seward. The NGDC tsunami runupdatabase lists a runup of 27.2 ft (8.3 m) for Sewardfrom the earthquake and landslide-generatedtsunami.

This event is one example in which the earthquakeground motion occurred coincident with the localtsunami generated from the subaerial landslide intothe bay. The damage, therefore, was a combinedeffect of both earthquake ground motion and theflood wave.

1.4.6 1960 Chile Earthquake and Tsunami

On May 22, 1960, the largest recorded earthquake,of Mw=9.5, occurred off the coast of south-centralChile, in the Nazca subduction zone, where theNazca plate is subsiding below the South Americalplate. The total rupture length, over a period ofdays, was approximately 625 mi (1000 km), one ofthe longest ever reported. The earthquakegenerated a trans-Pacific tsunami. The tsunamicaused 61 deaths and $75 million in damages inHawaii. In Japan, the tsunami resulted in138 deaths and $50 million in damages. Thirty-twodeaths were reported in the Philippines from thetsunami. The U.S. Pacific Coast sustained $500million damage. The near-field tsunami devastatedthe Chilean coast. More than 2000 deaths,3000 injuries, 2 million homeless, and S550 millionin damages were reported in southern Chile.

The earthquake caused widespread land deforma-tion along much of the fault. A subsidence ofapproximately 6.6 ft (2 m) occurred in the coastalmountains; uplifts of 1.6 ft (0.5 m) were observedalong the foothills of the Andes, and offshoreislands were raised up to 19.7 ft (6 m). ThePuyehue volcano erupted two days after theearthquake. Several landslides near Tralcanmountains blocked San Pedro River that drainsRifiihue Lake, the lowest of the seven lakes thatreceive inflow from Enco River. Due to theblockage, water in Rifiihue Lake started to riserapidly and would have resulted in a catastrophicflood downstream if it had overtopped the 78.7-ft-(24-m-) high dam, affecting several towns and the

city of Valdivia. An effort was undertaken by themilitary, an electric utility company, and aneconomic-development organization of thegovernment to control the waters in Rifiihue Lake.Several drainages to the other lakes were dammedto reduce inflow into the lake chain. The maindam was lowered from 78.7 ft (24 m) to 49.2 ft(15 m) to allow approximately 106 billion ft3

(3 billion M3) of water to drain from the lake

gradually. The work took two months tocomplete. For this event, the NGDC databasereported the following tsunami runups shown inTable 1-1.

1.4.7 The "Orphan" Tsunami of 1700

Accounts of flooding from a tsunami in January,1700, exist in Japanese documents written at thattime (Atwater et al. 2005). The described effectsof the tsunami include villagers fleeing to higherground, damage to salt kilns and fishing shacks,drowned crops, water flooding a castle moat andentering a government storehouse, houses andbuildings that were washed away, and a fire.There was no advance warning of an earthquakepreceding the tsunami. In fact, no accountmentioned associated shaking, and two accountsnoted the lack of an earthquake warning. By the1990s, this tsunami had become Japan's best-documented tsunami of unknown origin. Therunups from the 1700 tsunami in Japan wereestimated to range from about 6.6 ft (2 m) to more

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Table 1-1. Runups recorded at various locationsfor the 1960 Chile tsunami.

Location Maximum Runup

Australia 5.6 It (1.7 m)

Chile 82 ft (25 m)

Japan 21 ft (6.4 m)

Mexico 8.2 ft (2.5 m)

New Zealand 13.1 ft (4 m)

Papua New Guinea 5.9 ft (1.8 m)

Peru 5.6 ft (1.7 m)

Pitcairn Islands 40 ft (12.2 m)

Russia 15.4 ftl (4.7 m)

Samnoa 16 ft (4.9 m)

United States Up to 35 ft (10.7 m)

Montague Island, Alaska 7.5 ft (2.29 m)

Cresent City.. California 5.5 ft (1.68 m)

Princeton, California 7.25 ft (2.21 m)

Stinson Beach, California 5 f1 (1.52 m)

Ahihi Bay, Maui, Hawaii 8.9 ft (2.7 m)

Anakuaa Point, Kauai, Hawaii 9.8 ft (3 m)

Aweoweonui, Hawaii 10.8 ft (3.3 m)

Coconut Island, Hilo, Hawaii 15 fit (4.6 m)

Haena, Kauai, Hawaii 13.5 ft (4.1 m)

Hana Bay. Maui, Hawaii 15 ft (4.6 m)

Hilo, Hawaii 35 ft (10.7 m)

Honolulu Landing, Oahu, Hawaii 14.1 ft (4.3 m)

Honuapo, Hawaii 17 ft (5.2 m.)

Kaalualu Bay, Hawaii 17 ft (5.2 m)

Southeastern coast of Hawaii 17 f1 (5.2 m)

Depoe Bay, Oregon 5.9 ft (1.8 m)

Seaside, Oregon 4.9 ft (1.5 in)

Willapa Bay, Washington 2 ft (0.61 m)

than 16.4 ft (5 m) (Satake et al. 2003; Tsuji et al.1998) on the eastern Japanese coast.

Because there was no mention of a nearby earth-quake in the Japanese documents for the 1700tsunami, researchers in the 1990s attempted to findits source far away from Japan. Potential sources

around the Pacific Rim, other than Cascadia,conflicted either with the year of occurrence of thetsunami or with the wave heights and runups

estimated for the tsunami. South Americancatalogs were used to identify sources of tsunamisobserved in Japan in 1687 (Callao earthquake),1730 (Valparaiso earthquake), and 1.751

(Concepci6n earthquake). The 1952 Kamchatkaearthquake, which was the third largest of the 20thcentury, produced wave heights comparable to the1.700 tsunami only in the north of Japan. Thesecond largest earthquake of the 20th century, the1964 Alaska earthquake that produced thedevastating tsunami in Valdez Arm of PrinceWilliam Sound, had a strong directivity away fromJapan and produced wave heights of less than 3 ft(1 m) in Japan. The Cascadia source for the 1700tsunami was proposed by Satake et al. (1996), whonot only were able to find evidence to support thedate of occurrence of this great source earthquake,but also, remarkably, the hour. Satake et al.(1.996) also estimated that the moment magnitudeof this Cascadia earthquake was most likelyapproximately 9. They presented arguments infavor of this opinion based on the estimated waveheights on the coast of Japan for the 1700 tsunami,and based on numerical simulations of a trans-Pacific tsunami with the source in Cascadia. Also,

an earthquake of M,,= 8 .2 that occurred on October4, 1994, off the Kuril Islands near Japan producedtsunami heights less than 1 ft (0.3 m) on thePacific Coast of the United States. Satake et al.(1996) suggested that, reciprocally, a source inCascadia that produced wave heights greater than6.6 ft (2 m) on the east coast of Japan would haveto be significantly larger than M!I=8.2.

As the study of plate tectonics and giant earth-quakes (those of M,>9) advanced during the1960s through the 1980s, much debate took placeregarding the nature of seismicity in the Cascadia.Efforts were undertaken in the late 1980s toidentify geological evidence of past giant earth-quakes in the area (Atwater 1987).

Subduction zones are characterized by down-warping of the subducting place and bulging of the

overriding plate as stress builds up at the interplateboundary. During earthquakes, the leading edgeof the overriding plate breaks free, releasing thestress; the seaward portion of the overriding platesprings up and the continental side subsides. Theeffect of the seaward, upward springing creates theleading tsunami wave by upward displacement of

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the water colunm. The leading positive wave

travels away from the continental side of thesubduction zone. On the continental side,

subsidence results in an initial depression of thewater column that is frequently observed as the

initial withdrawal of the sea before the arrival of thefirst (positive) tsunami wave. The subsidence onthe coast results in previously dry coastal landbecoming submerged by sea water in a very shortperiod of time. The effects of a tsunami that followthe earthquake may also lead to deposition of sandor mud layers. In the late 1980s, geologistsinvestigated bays and river mouths along thePacific Coast. At nearly every site, they foundevidence that land had dropped. The evidenceincluded groves of dead tree trunks of western redcedar that stand in tidal marshes, termed ghost

forests. Also, thousands of tree stumps buried inthe marshes were seen exposed by flowing water inthe banks of tidal streams. The investigation also

found buried remains of tidal marshes. In sedimentcores, investigators found muddy tidal deposits onpeaty marsh soils, which supports evidence of pastearthquakes in Cascadia.

Geologists in the 1980s and 1.990s also foundevidence of tsunamis that consisted of sand sheetsnear bays and mouths of rivers. The sand sheetstaper inland and contain microscopic siliceousshells of marine diatoms. In alternating layers ofsand and mud, the researchers found that, at mostsites, sand arrived just before tidal mud begancovering freshly subsided soil. This evidence ledthem to conclude that the sand was brought in by atsunami of nearby origin. The sequence of eventsput forth was that an earthquake on the interplateboundary abruptly generated a local tsunami and, atthe same time, lowered the adjoining coast; thesubsequent near-field tsunami created sanddeposits. Using radiocarbon dating and tree-ringinterpretation, researchers estimated that nearly allsites firom southern British Columbia to northernCalifornia along the Pacific Coast had mostrecently subsided within the past 400 or 500 years,and that the southern Washington coast hadsubsided after 1680 (Atwater et al. 2005).

Researchers also attempted to detect differences intiming of the earthquake-induced subsidenceamong the sites. Differences in timing wouldindicate different source earthquakes and wouldalso limit the size of the ruptures. Radiocarbondating of dead plants and tree-ring patternmatching did not narrow the timing to more than afew decades. The evidence did not conclusivelyprove either hypothesis of Cascadia rupture; asingle giant rupture and earthquake that wouldrequire all dates to coincide or a series of smallerearthquakes during a few decades. However, thetime window of either of these two Cascadia

events was indeed reduced to the period of1695-1720. The research of Satake et al. (1996)finally brought the evidence from Cascadiatogether with the written records from Japan toconclude that the parent earthquake of the1700 orphan tsunami was a giant earthquake inCascadia.

The evolution of our understanding with respect tothe 1700 tsunami is an excellent example ofpaleotsunami research complemented by oldrecords and anecdotal evidence.

1.4.8 1963 Vaiont Reservoir Landslide

and Tsunami

On October 9, 1963, a massive landslide occurredon the southern hillslope of the reservoir behindVaiont Dam, located about 100 mi from Venice,Italy (Kiersch 1964). The landslide was caused byshear failure of the overlying limestone along thin

clay layers under increased pore pressure. Thelandslide area was 1.25 mi (2kin) long and 1 mi(1.6 km) wide. The total estimated volume of theslide was 8.4 billion ft3 (238 million M3

).

The landslide filled the reservoir 1.25 mi (2 km)upstream from the dam completely to a height of574 ft (175 m) above the original water level. Thelandslide speed was reported as reaching50-100 ft/sec (15-30 rm/s). The tsunami wave

generated by the slide ran up more than 850 ft(260 m) above the original reservoir water level.The tsunami wave also overtopped the dam by an

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estimated 328 ft (100 m) and flowed downstream.The height of the flood wave approximately I mi(1.6 km) downstream from the dam was estimatedto be 230 ft (70 m).

1.4.9 2004 Sumatra Earthquake andTsunami

On December 26, 2004, the fourth largest recordedearthquake of M,.=9.1 occurred off the westerncoast of northern Sumatra in the Indian Ocean.Stein and Okal (2007) presented an analysis thatmay revise the moment magnitude of thisearthquake to M,=9.3 , making it the second largeston record, after the great 1960 earthquake in Chile.The earthquake occurred due to the subduction ofthe Indian plate below the Burma microplate, whichis a sliver plate between the Indian and the Sundaplates. This earthquake was the first giant (M,>9)earthquake since the 1964 Alaska earthquake.

The USGS reported the epicenter at 3.3 0 N,

approximately 155 mi (255 km) south-southeast ofBand Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia. The ruptureprogressed north to about 70 N, with a total rupturelength of approximately 750 mi (1200 kin), and therupture zone was reported to be approximately125 mi (200 km) wide with an average slip of 36 ft(11 m) (Stein and Okal 2007).

This earthquake generated a devastatingtransoceanic tsunami that traveled across the globe.The runup measured in Crescent City, California,was 2 ft (0.61 in); that at Atlantic City, New Jersey,was 0.75 ft (0.23 in); and that at Trident Pier,Florida, was 1.1 ft (0.34 mn). The near-field tsunamiin Sumatra devastated the coastline, with amaximum runup of 167 ft (50.9 m) at Labuhan onthe northwest coast of Sumatra. The tsunamitraveled across the Indian Ocean and affectedseveral countries, including India [maximum runupof 31.4 ft (9.56 in)], Malaysia [maximum runup of13.1 ft (4 m)], the Maldives [maximum runup of14.5 ft (4.43 in)], Myanmar [maximum runup of 9.5ft (2.9 m)], Somalia [maximum runup of 31.2 ft(9.5in)], Sri Lanka [maximum runup of 37 ft (11.3 m)],and Thailand [maximum runup of 64.2 ft (19.57

in)]. The tsunami caused approximately 300,000deaths and unprecedented damage in countriesaround the Indian Ocean, with Indonesiaaccounting for more than228,000 fatalities.

The Madras Atomic Power Station, a conmnercialnuclear power plant owned and operated by theNuclear Power Corporation of India Limited(NPCIL), and located near Chennai, India, wasaffected by the tsunami generated by the 2004Sumatra earthquake (NPCIL 2007). At approxi-mately 9:15 pm local time on December 26, 2004,the condenser cooling pumps of Unit 2 of theinstallation were affected due to flooding of thepump house and subsequent submergence of theseawater pumps by tsunami waves. The turbinewas tripped and the reactor shut down. The unitwas brought to a cold-shutdown state, and theshutdown-cooling systems were reported asoperating safely. Unit I of the installation wasshut down for refurbishment at the time of thisevent. After detailed inspection of the plant by theNPCIL and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Boardof India, the plant resumed normal operations onJanuary 2, 2005. Adjacent to the Madras AtomicPower Station, a prototype fast-breeder reactorwas under construction at the time of the 2004tsunami. Work on the concrete raft at the bottomof the excavated pit was in progress when thetsunami waves flooded the pit. Most of theworkers were safely evacuated due to the alertnessof supervisors; however, there was one fatality.The tsunami waves deposited debris and sedimentin the pit over the partially poured concrete. Thepit was subsequently dewatered, and the debriswas removed before construction resumed.

1.5 Landslides in Earth's Oceans

The understanding of submarine landslides is arecent development spurred by availability ofhigh-quality seafloor mapping data [e.g., theUSGS GLORIA mapping effort of the USGSstarted in 1984]. GLORIA is a side-scanningsonar system that produces digital images of theseafloor. The intensity of backscattered sound is a

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function of the gradient, the surface roughness, andthe texture of the seafloor. Raw GLORIA datawere processed to correct for geometric andradiometric distortions and mosiacked to produce20 by 2' images of the survey area. Sixteen imageswere produced for the Gulf of Mexico, 21 for theAtlantic coast, and 36 for the Pacific Coast.

Another tool for mapping the bathymetry of the

seafloor is the use of multibeam sonar system(Hughes-Clarke et al. 1996). Multibeam sonarsfirst became available in 1971, but hardware to dealwith the large volumes of data produced by thesesystems and the limitations of positioning systemsavailable at the time precluded their general use.Since then, many such systems have becomeavailable and rapid processing of the dataadvanced. Initially, these systems were used forindustrial applications, such as surveys of offshoreplatform sites and pipeline route corridors. Thevalues of this tool for bathymetric surveys wasrecognized with time.

GLORIA imagery has been used to identifysubmarine landslides near the Hawaiian islands(Lipman et al. 1988; Moore et al. 1989, 1994a, b),mapping of features of the continental slope in theGulf of Mexico (Rothwell et al. 1991) andlandslides (Twichell et al. 1993), and investigationof landslide zones in the Atlantic (Booth et al.1993; McGregor et al. 1993; O'Leary et al. 1987;O'Leary 1993; Popenoe et al. 1993; Schwab et al.1991, 1993).

1.5.1 The Pacific Ocean

McAdoo et al. (2000) present results of amorphometric analysis of submarine landslides offthe coasts of Oregon, California, Texas, and NewJersey. They used multibeam bathymetry data, inaddition to GLORIA images, to identify scars leftby submarine landslides. Widespread evidence ofslope failure and submarine landslides was found ineach of the four margins investigated. Properties ofthese landslides were measured or estimated usingmultibeam bathymetry and GLORIA images. Theparameters of the landslides measured by the

authors included latitude, longitude, area, depth ofthe headscarp of the landslide, and runout lengthof the landslide. The volumes of the landslideswere estimated using the thickness of the slidesand assuming a wedge geometry for the slides.The authors presented a table of parameters for theinvestigated submarine landslides (see Table 1 ofMcAdoo et al. 2000).

This table included 20 submarine landslides in the

Oregon margin with slide areas ranging from0.4 mi 2 (I kin') to 93.4 mi2 (239 kin2). Depth tothe headscarp for these slides ranged from 1800 ft(549 m) to nearly 9600 ft (2924 in). The estimatedvolumes for the Oregon margin landslides rangedfrom less than 0.02 mi 3, or 3.6 billion ft3 (0.1 kin 3),to 10.4 mi3 , or 1527.3 billion ft3 (42.5 kin3). Therunout lengths varied from less than 0.6 mi (1 kin)

to 13.8 mi (22 kin).

In the California margin, 25 submarine landslideswere identified by McAdoo et al. (2000) thatranged in area from 2.7 mi2 (6.8 kin2) to 205 mi 2

(525 km2). Depth to the headscarp of these slidesranged from 2707 ft (825 in) to 8914 ft (2717 in).

The estimated volumes of the landslides rangedfrom 0.05 mi3, or 7.2 billion ft3 (0.2 km3), to6.7 mi 3, or 991.9 billion ft3 (27.6 kin3). The runoutlengths varied from 1.7 mi (2.7 kin) to 31.9 nmi(51 kmn).

Mass movement features in the Monterey Bayregion of the central California coast are described

by Greene and Ward (2003). Multibeam bathy-metric data collected by the Monterey BayAquarium Research Institute show mass wasting

occurring along the northern slope of the SantaBarbara basin. Similar data collected by theUSGS offshore from Long Beach, California,show a large debris avalanche. A small landslidewas reported that occurred at the head of theMonterey Canyon during the 1989 Loma Prietaearthquake. A small tsunami, approximately 1.6 ft(0.5 in) high, was generated from this event.Extensive mass wasting, including larger land-slides, covering an area of

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184 mi2 (470 km2), are identified on the continentalslope of the Monterey Bay region. Individuallandslides range in size from small 0.4 .in2 (1. kin-)to very large-comparable to the size of theMonterey Bay-and exceed 8.5 mi3 or1258 billion ft3 (35 kin3) in volume.

Greene and Ward (2003) reported simulatedtsunamis from three identified landslides. The

Ascension Canyon landslide is located at a depth ofapproximately 1969 ft (600 in), is 0.94 mi (1.5 kin)long, 1214 ft (370 m) wide, and about 164 ft (50 m)thick. According to Greene and Ward (2003)

modeling, the initially generated tsunami wave wasnearly 6.6 ft (2 m) high. The runup was calculatedto be 9.8 ft (2.98 in) on the coast near Davenport,well below the 32.8 ft (10 in) high coastal cliffs.The runup on the Monterey Peninsula wasestimated to be 1.7 ft (0.52 mi), and those at SantaCruz and Moss Landing were estimated to be 4.4 ft(1.34 m) and 1.2 ft (0.36 in).

The second landslide used by Green and Ward(2003) to simulate a tsunami was the TubewormSlump in the Monterey Canyon. The slide area was6.3 mi2 (16 kin 2) with a runout of 984 ft (300 m)and a volume of 0.6 mi3 or 86 billion fW3 (2.4 kin 3).The first arrival of the tsunami waves at theMonterey Peninsula was a 3.3-ft (1-mi) highpositive wave, and that at Santa Cruz was a 6.6-ft(2-m) deep trough.

The third tsunaniigenic landslide used by Greene

and Ward (2003) was a large mass-movement fieldexceeding 35 mi2 (90 km 2) in area in the MontereyMeander. The mass movement is composed of

several retrogressive slumps and debris flows. Inthe event of a hypothetical large failure in this area,the authors estimated that tsunami waves couldreach .heights of 36.1 ft (11 m) in the Montereyarea, 26.2 ft (8 in) at Moss Landing, and 6.6 ft (2m) at Santa Cruz.

Lee et al. (2003) describe case studies of threesubmarine landslide environments: ResurrectionBay, Alaska; Commencement Bay, Washington;and the Los Angeles margin near Palos Verdes,

California. These submarine landslides and mass-movement sites were identified on recentlyavailable multibeam-sonar data.

The Resurrection Bay landslide, which occurredduring the great 1964 Alaska earthquake, gene-rated local tsunamis that devastated the waterfrontat Seward, Alaska (see Section 1.4.5).

Commencement Bay is located near Tacoma,Washington. The Puyallup River flows into thebay, carrying meltwater from the glaciers ofMount Rainier, including large quantities ofglacial silt leading to the growth of a delta at anaverage rate of 1.6 mi (2.5 kin) per 1000 years(Dragovich et al. 1994). The high sediment-accumulation rate leads to high excess pore-waterpressure, creating favorable conditions for slope

failure. Two failures have been recorded in thepast (Gardner et al. 2001), one in 1894, without aprecursor earthquake, and another in 1992 duringthe Nisqually earthquake. The 1894 failureresulted in a tsunami reported to be 10 to 20 ft(3 to 6 m) high. The 1992 event did not cause anytsunami. Lee et al. (2003) identified a number offeatures on the multibeam bathymetry map ofCommencement Bay, including large sedimentlobes off the mouth of the Puyallup River. They

also mapped a 1.25-mi (2-kmi) long submarinechannel and identified it as the 1894 landslide.The channel is 1476 ft (450 in) wide at its head.

The submarine-landslide field located to the south

of the Palos Verdes Peninsula has been known fora long time, but the details of the morphologybecame available recently using multibeambathymetric surveys (Gardner and Mayer 1998;

Gardner et al. 1999). Two landslides wereidentified on the multibeam imagery. One of thelandslides was dated using radiocarbon techniques

and found to be approximately 7500 years old.The age of the other landslide is unknown.Landslide debris was identified as far as 6.3 mi (10kin) from the base of the slope, indicating thelandslides had considerable momentum. Lee et al.(2003) concluded that both landslides wereprobably tsunamigenic. Locat et al. (2004)

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developed a simplified model of the landslide andsimulated a tsunami based on this event. Theamplitude of the tsunami was not estimatedprecisely because of umcertainty in landslide sourceparameters.

1.5.2 The Gulf of Mexico

In the Gulf of Mexico, 25 submarine landslideswere identified by McAdoo et al. (2000) with areasranging from 3.8 mi2 (9.6 knm2) to 2152 mi2

(5509 kim2). Depth to the headscarp of theselandslides varied from 397 ft (121 m) to 7871 ft(2399 in). The estimated volume of these land-slides ranged from 0.2 mi3, or 28.7 billion ft3

(0.8 kin 3), to 37.2 mi3, or 5470 billion ft3

(152.2 kin 3). The runout lengths varied from 1.9 mi(3 km) to 104 mi (167 km). Tripsanas el al. (2003)described the slope instabilities in the BryantCanyon area in the northwest Gulf of Mexico.Bryant Canyon acts as a conduit for the transport ofsediment from the Mississippi River to the abyssalplain of the Gulf of Mexico.

Ten Brink et al. (2008) conducted a recent literaturesurvey to identify landslide sources in the Gulf ofMexico. They described three distinct geologicprovinces in the Gulf of Mexico Basin: a carbonateprovince, a salt province, and a canyon-to-deep-sea-fan province. Salt that originally underlayLouisiana, southern Texas, and offshore of the Bayof Campeche in Mexico was eroded andsubsequently deposited during the earlydevelopment of the basin. Subsequently, sedimenteroded off the North American continent wasdeposited over the salt and the overburden causedthe salt to migrate seaward. At present, the saltunderlies large parts of the northern Gulf of Mexicoand the southwest corner of the Gulf of Mexico inthe Bay of Campeche. The Sigsbee Escarpment isa cliff located south of Louisiana and Texas thatmarks the seaward limit of the salt. The depositionof the salt was followed by fonnation of carbonatereefs along much of the margin of the Gulf ofMexico Basin. At present, the reef system isexposed along the Florida Escarpment and theCampeche Escarpment. The escarpments stand

approximately 4900 ft (1500 m) above the abyssalplain with gradients locally as steep as 200.Sediment from erosion by North American riversdelivered sediment into the basin that resulted inthe creation of a series of deep-sea fans. Three ofthese fans are the Bryant Fan, Mississippi Fan, andEastern Mississippi Fan. The Mississippi Fan isthe largest and covers most of the eastern part ofthe gulf.

Landslides have occurred in each of the threeprovinces of the Gulf of Mexico Basin (ten Brinket al. 2008). Landslides in the carbonate provincehave occurred both on the steep Florida andCampeche Escarpments as well as on gentlerslopes above the escarpments. A large talusdeposit(") was identified at the base of theCampeche Escarpment, but its full extent and theamount of material of an individual failure isunknown. Talus blocks are also observed alongthe base of the southern Florida Escarpment.Talus deposits at heads of some box canyons areless than 6 mi2 (15 ki 2) in area. Large collapsescars along the central part of the West FloridaSlope are present. The entire slide scar is approxi-mately 75 mi (120 kin) long and 19 mi (30 km)wide and may have a total volume of 244 mi 3

(1000 kin3). The slide, located at approximatelythe same latitude as Tampa, Florida, may have hadat least three generations of failure. Anotherextensive area of collapse was mapped in thesouthern portion of the West Florida slope thatmay be 6-11 mi (10-17 kin) long.

Ten Brink et al. (2008) did not find any publishedreference to landslides in the salt province in theBay of Campeche. Detailed bathymetric mappingof the northern Gulf of Mexico revealed a uniquemorphology consisting of relatively small circularbasin features 2.5-20 mi (4-33 kmi) wide withareas of 2-122 mni 2 (5-312 kmi2). The GLORIAimagery has identified 37 landslides in the saltprovince and along the base of the SigsbeeEscarpment. The largest of these landslides is

(a) Sloping mass of rock debris deposited at the baseof a cliff.

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located in the northwest part of the Gulf of Mexicoand is approximately 71 mi (114 km) long, 33 mi(53 kin) wide, and 879 mi2 (2250 kin-) in area.

A large landslide complex, approximately 9000 mi2

(23,000 kin2) in area, was identified in the upperportions of the Mississippi Fan (ten Brink et al.2008). The total volume of the deposits have notbeen estimated accurately. The Eastern MississippiFan also has a relatively large landslide thatpartially buries the canyon at the head of the fanand is approximately 96 mi (154 kin) long, 14 mi(22 kin) wide, and 941 mi 2 (2410 kin2) in area.

The characteristics of submarine landslides in theGulf of Mexico are not well understood due to alack of data in certain regions. The age, style, anddistribution of landslides is still incomplete. TenBrink et al. (2008) recommended that age dating,compilation of multibeam bathymetry data, andmapping of the Campeche Bay area are required torefine understanding of submarine landslides in theGulf of Mexico. Until further research isundertaken and completed, tsunami-hazardassessment for landslide sources in the Gulf ofMexico should be carried out on a case-by-casebasis.

1.5.3 The Atlantic Ocean

In the Atlantic Ocean, a giant submarine landslidecomplex known as the Storegga landslide complex,(Bryn et al. 2003), is located off the coast ofNorway. The slide is gigantic, 854 miP or126 trillion ft3 (3500 kin3) in volume, 35,156 mi 2

(90,000 km2) in area, 10,547 mi2 (27,000 kmi2) inslide-scar area, with 281 mi (450 kin) long runout.The slide is characterized by several strata of buriedmass movements that occur on parallel slip surfacesin marine clay layers (Bryn et al. 2003). Theseslides have occurred on a semi-regular basis duringthe past 500,000 years, in good agreement with thecycles of main continental-shelf glaciation. Thetrigger mechanism is believed to be seismic activity

associated with glacioisostatic rebound..a) The mostrecent of the Storegga slides, believed to .haveoccurred around 8200 years ago, also generated atsunami that reached surrounding coasts(Bondevik et al. 1997).

In the Faroe Shetland Channel, located betweenthe Faroe Islands and Shetland Islands in theAtlantic, a slide known as the Afen slide was firstrecognized on Towed Ocean Bottom Instrument(TOBI) side-scanning sonar data. The data wasacquired for the Atlantic Frontiers EnvironmentalNetwork (AFEN). The maximum width of thisslide is 1.9 mi (3 kin), and the length of the scourand debris lobe is 7.5 mi (12 kin) (Bulat 2003).Wilson et al. (2003) used the TOBI imagecompiled by Bulat (2003), the British GeologicalSurvey regional seismic survey data, andgeotechnical data obtained from sediment coreswithin the slide area to assess phases, modes, andcharacteristics of the Afen slide.

In the continental margin off the coast of NewJersey, McAdoo et al. (2000) identified13 submarine landslides that ranged in area from2 mi2 (5 kin 2) to 24.2 mi 2 (62 kin 2). Depth to theheadscarp of these landslides varied from 4675 ft(1425 in) to 7051 ft (2149 in). The estimatedvolume of these landslides ranged from 0.07 mi,or 10.8 billion ft3 (0.3 kin3), to 1.3 mi3 , or187 billion ft3 (5.2 kin 3). The runout lengthsvaried from 1.6 mi (2.5 kmn) to 13.1 mi (21 kin).

Ward and Day (2001) described the potentialcollapse of the Cumbre Vieja volcano on theisland of La Palma which is in the Canary Islands,off the west coast of Morocco. The Cumbre Viejavolcano has been the most active volcano in theCanary Islands during the last 125,000 years. Itoccupies the southern one-third of the La PalmaIsland, with slopes of 15 to 20 degrees. The flank-failure scenario described by Ward and Day(2001) involves a single N-S rift under the west

(a) The uplifling of land once depressed under theweight of glacial ice (Ranalli, 2001).

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flank of the volcano. The detachment fault(a)

surfaced as a west-dipping normal fault along thecrest of the volcano during its 1949 eruption. Thescrap extends 2.5 mi (4 kmi) and has a maximumoffset of 13.1 ft (4 in). The fault has been inactivesince 1949. Ward and Day (2001) postulated that afuture eruption near the top of the Cuinbre Viejawill trigger a flank failure. Based on geologicalevidence from existing lateral-collapse scars,bathymetric and imaging sonar surveys of La Palmaand other locations, and comparisons with otherflank failures of volcanoes (Mount St. Helens), theauthors estimated the future dimensions of the slideblock could be 9.4-12.5 mi (15-20 kmi) in widthand 9.4-15.6 mi (15-25 kin) in length. The authors

suggested that the mean thickness of the slide blockcould range from 0.6 mi (1 kin) to 1.2 mi (2 kin).Based on these dimensions, Ward and Day (2001)estimated that the volume of a future flank failurecould range from 36.6 mi3, or 5391 billion ft3

(150 kin3), to 122.1 mi3, or 17,969 billion ft3

(500 kin').

Ward and Day (2001) considered the worst-case

slide block of 122.1 mi3 or 17,969 billion ft3

(500 km3) in volume that break away and falls intothe ocean and slide for 37.5 mi (60 kin) until itreaches flat ocean bottom at a depth of 13,123 ft(4000 in). The authors proposed a maximumrunout velocity of 328 fl/s (100 m/s). The authorsnoted that the chosen runout velocity was

substantially less than the tsunami celerity, aminimum of approximately 459 ft/s (140 m/s),corresponding to the ocean depth near the La Palmaslide in excess of 6562 ft (2000 in). The tsunamisimulations carried out by Ward and Day (2001)resulted in a 2953-ft (900-mi) high dome of waterrepresenting the initial waveform, slightly less thanthe mean thickness of the sliding block. The

simulation resulted in 32.8-ft (10-m) high waves inNewfoundland and those of 65.6-82 ft (20-25 in)

height on the Florida coast.

(a) Parallel zones of weakness inside a volcano alongwhich subsidence often occurs.

Mader (2001) described another attempt to modelthe tsunami generated from a worst-case flank

failure of the Cumbre Vieja volcano. Physicalmodeling of the slide moving as a single block byHerman Fritz, using the experimental setup

described by Fritz ct al. (2001), indicated an initialwavcform with a 2133 ft (650 in) wavehcight, a18.8-25 mi (30-40 kin) wavelength, and a3-4 minute period. The wave was described as anintermediate wave and not a shallow-watertsunami wave. The wave would disperse signifi-cantly as it propagated away from the source in theAtlantic. Mader (2001) simulated the tsunamiacross the Atlantic using the nonlinear shallow-water model SWAN (Mader 2004) that includesCoriolis and frictional effects. The author notedthat using a shallow-water wave model to describethe propagation of intermediate waves would onlyprovide an estimate of the upper limit of theamplitude and the period of the waves. A10-minute Atlantic bathymetry generated from the2-minute Mercator Global Marine Gravitytopography of the earth was used in the tsunami

simulation. The initial waveform was a 2133 ft(650 in) high, with a 12.5 mi (20 km) radius. Themaximum simulated tsunami wave heights atdeep-water locations off the eastern coast of theUnited States was 9.8 ft (3.0 in) at a water depth of9587 ft (.2922 in) east of Washington, D.C.

Mader (2001) also estimated the effect ofdispersion on the propagation of the tsunamicaused by the Cumbre Vieja flank failure using theZUNI model (Mader 2004) that solves two-dimensional time-dependent Navier-Stokesequations for incompressible flow. The authorconcluded, based on the results of the ZUNIsimulations, that the tsunami wave heights off thecoast of the United States would be less than I inand, even after amplification of the tsunami wavesdue to shoaling, the waves would not present amajor hazard.

Pararas-Carayannis (2002) critically evaluated theCumbre Vieja flank-failure tsunami-simulationstudies regarding three aspects: (1) if the massivevolcanic collapses could occur as postulated, (2) if

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the source dimensions and initial modelingparameters were correctly evaluated from propercoupling mechanisms, and (3) if the modelingstudies were properly validated. The last of thethree was impossible to ascertain because historicalrecords of a tsunami generated by massive flankfailures of island stratovolcanoes is documented.

A review of present volcanic flank instabilities andflank collapses in the past (Pararas-Carayannis2002) revealed massive slides that occurred in theCanary Islands (Day et al. 1999), Cape Verde (Dayet al. 1999; Elsworth and Day 1999), the HawaiianIslands (Moore et al. 1989, 1994a; Moore andClague 1992; Lipman 1995), and other places.These events are documented in literature.However, the mechanisms of these prehistoricfailures are not completely understood. Islandstratovolcanoes appear to slide along their basesmore frequently, and occasional locking of theseslides may trigger large slope failures orearthquakes. Cumbre Vieja is composed of layersof pillow lavas interspersed with pyroclasticmaterial (Pararas-Carayannis 2002).

The island of La Palma was formed by threestatovolcanoes that rise several thousand feetabove the sea floor. The volcano Taburiente lies tothe north, and the central and southern parts of theisland were formed by the volcanoes CumbreNueva and Cumbre Vieja. More than half of thesubaerial volume of the island was removed bylandslides and erosion during the past1 million years (Pararas-Carayannis 2002). TheCumbre Nueva giant landslide, 48.8 mi3 ,7187 billion ft3 (200 kin 3), in volume, occurredapproximately 560,000 years ago (Carracedo et al.1999) that removed material in the west-central partof the island. The island is composed of two mainrock layers separated at an elevation of

approximately 1400 ft (427 m) above mean sealevel (Pararas-Carayannis 2002). The thickness ofpillow lavas ranges from 32.8 to 1148 ft (10 to350 in). The upper layer consists of basaltic lavasand pyroclastic materials. Extensive erosion hastaken place on the north part of the island, and to alesser extent on Cumbre Vicja's flanks. Pararas-

Carayannis (2002) concluded that the existicbasaltic flows and dikes would significantly limitthe volume of any future slope failure, and anysuch failure would either occur in steps orcontained by ring dikes. The author did not findany evidence of a massive failure of the westernflank of Cumbre Vieja along a deeper detachmentsurface. There is no extensive fault system alongCumbre Vieja's rift zone. The 13.1 ft (4 m) offsetnear the summit was suggested to be along adetachment fault by Ward and Day (2001).However, Pararas-Carayannis (2002) found noseismic or geologic data to support this sugges-tion; the offset could also have resulted fromsuperficial gravitational settling or from collapseof a magmatic chamber.

Pararas-Carayannis (2002) evaluated themonolithic block movement of the Cumbre Viejaflank failure suggested by Ward and Day (2001).Flank collapses of island stratovolcanoes can betriggered by isostatic load adjustments, erosion,build-up of gaseous, hydrothermal, or magmaticpressure, violent eruptions, or collapse ofmagmatic chambers. An evaluation of the forcesneeded to cause the massive failure along adetachment surface suggested by Ward and Day(200.1) was carried out by Pararas-Carayannis(2002). A force close to the base of the mass, or atleast near the center of the mass, is needed totrigger a monolithic collapse due to exceedance ofthe shear strength along a slide plane. Pararas-Carayannis (2002) found that a force needed tomove a 122. 1 mi 3, or 17,969 billion ft3 (500 kin3),monolithic block is unrealistic. There is also noevidence of significant magmatic-chambercollapse along the crest of Cumbre Vieja (Pararas-Carayannis 2002). The erosion on volcanicislands results in deposition of unconsolidatedsediments. Large accumulations of these uncon-solidated deposits can slide under gravity due toground motion during earthquakes. On the LaPahlna Island, large amounts of sedimentarymaterial, primarily gravel mixed with basaltic lavahas accumulated on the western slope due toerosion of the Taburiente caldera, where a large

surface landslide can occur due to a large

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earthquake, with the existing volcanic dikesproviding some stabilization to these sediments(Pararas-Carayannis 2002). The author concludedthat a large monolithic-slope failure of thedimensions suggested by Ward and Day (2001) isunlikely. A review of some other mechanisms alsoresulted in the same conclusion (Pararas-Carayannis 2002).

Pararas-Carayannis (2002) also evaluated the slidekinematics proposed and used by Ward and Day(2001) for their mega-tsunami simulation. Theauthor found that the slide was assumed to be amonolithic rotation along a detachment fault ratherthan a turbulent flow of pyroclastic and pillow-lavamaterial of large sizes. The monolithic-slide modelalso ignored the effect of cohesion among theparticles within the mass that would resistmovement and the effects of water turbulencebehind the mass that would slow down the slidevelocity. Rotational movement along a detachmentfault should also be characterized by a reduction inslope with depth, which was not accounted for inthe slide model of Ward and Day (2001). Themaximum speed of the Grand Banks slide wasestimated (Fine et a]. 2005) at about37.5-62.5 mi/hr (60-100 km/hr). It consisted ofunconsolidated deposits rapidly moving downslopeas a turbidity current. Ward and Day (2001) used amaximum slide speed of 328 ft/s (100 m/s), or225 mi/hr (360 km/hr), far in excess of themaximum speed of the Grand Banks slide. Pararas-Carayannis (2002) argued that the mostly large-sized particles composed of pyroclastics and pillowlava of Cumbre Vieja cannot move as fast asturbidity currents.

Pararas-Carayannis (2002) stated that the tsunamigeneration and propagation model used by Wardand Day (2001) used several assumptions thatresulted in overestimation of the tsunami waveheights. The initial waveform was estimated byWard and Day (2001) based on a monolithic122.1 mi 3, o" 17,969 billion ft3 (500 kin3), blockmoving rapidly with a maximum velocity of328 ft/s (100 .m/s) for 37.5 mi (60 kin) until itreached flat ocean bottom at a depth of 13,123 ft

(4000 in). Pararas-Carayannis (2002) argued thatincorrect assumptions leading to exaggeratedsource dimensions, slope instabilities, and slidespeeds resulted in overestimation of initialtsunami-source parameters. The tsunami-propagation model used by Ward and Day (2001)treated the wave as a shallow-water wave,ignoring the amplitude attenuation away from thesource (Pararas-Carayannis 2002). Also, as statedby Mader (2001), even the slide following themassive flank collapse proposed by Ward and Day(2001), with its overstated source dimensions, willonly generate a short-period wave with amaximum period of approximately 3 to 4 minutes,which will behave as an intermediate wave ratherthan a shallow water wave. Shallow-water wavesundergo a geometric spreading, but not thesignificant wavelength-dependent dispersion(Pararas-Carayannis 2002) that characteristicallyaffects shorter-period waves.

Wynn and Masson (2003) pointed out that theunderstanding of the initial stages of a landslide,which influence its tsunamigenic characteristics, islimited. Therefore, models of landslide-generatedtsunamis remain highly dependent on poorlydefined landslide parameters. The authors suggestthat this understanding may be improved bystudying the turbidite("a deposits that are directlylinked to known volcanic-island landslides.

Wynn and Masson (2003) obtained piston coresfrom two sites in the Agadir Basin, located about187.5 mi (300 km) north of the Canary Islands, ata water depth of approximately 14,764 ft(4500 in). In the core sequences, the two youngestturbidites rich in volcanic material are correlatedwith the two most recent landslides on the CanaryIslands. The correlations were made using datingof the turbidites, mineralogy of the turbidites,geochemical data, and analysis of seafloormorphology to define pathways of the turbidity

(a) Sedimentary deposits formed by turbidity currentsin deep water at the base of the continental slopeand on the abyssal plain, first described by Boumna(1962).

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currents. Both sequences showed layered depositswith layers of fine particles located higher in thesequences. The layer near the bottom, whichcontained the coarsest material, was the thickest.The two turbidites were separated from otherturbidites by well-defined layers of pelagic orhemipelagic(a) sediment layers indicating separationof the deposition time of the turbidites of1000 years or greater. Within each turbidite, nopelagic or hemipelagic sediment layers occur.Bioturbation(b) occurs in both turbidites, and theextent of bioturbation decreases downward withinthe turbidite. Based on these observed features ofthe turbidites, Wynn and Masson (2003) concludedthat the layers within the turbidites were notseparated by substantially large time intervals, and,therefore, are all linked to the same turbidity-flowevent. Wynn and Masson (2003) tentativelysuggested that the layers within the turbiditeslinked to Canary Island landslides representmultiple stages of failure of a single landslideevent. The turbidite correlated to the El Golfolandslide on the northwest flank of the El Hierroisland exhibited three layers; the turbiditecorrelated to the Icod landslide on the north flankof the Tenerife island showed nine layers. Theauthors interpreted the three layers of the firstturbidite as indicative of a three-stage failure of theEl Golfo landslide, and the nine layers of thesecond turbidite as indicative of a nine-stage failureof the Icod landslide. The authors also examinedand discounted other possible explanations forlayering of the turbidites, including flow reflectionfrom basin margins or seamounts, flow surging oreddy formation, and transport through multiplechannels. The authors also estimated that eachlayer would take at least two days to deposit based

on an analysis of the grain sizes, the thickness ofthe layers, and the settling velocity of fine-grainedsediment.

Wynn and Masson (2003) also attempted to assessthe mechanism that created the individual turbiditycurrents that resulted in the layering of the(Masson et al. 2002), an argument could be madethat the sediment was deposited by a single event.

As demonstrated by the surnmary of currentresearch literature, the study of tsunamigeniclandslides, although advancing rapidly, is notsufficiently mature to provide readily applicableengineering solutions. Each phase of a tsunamigenerated by a landslide should be studied with thehelp of experts in this area on a case-by-case basis,as required at a proposed nuclear power plant site.

(a) Pelagic sediments are of marine origin thataccumulation in deep abyssal plains far fromterrestrial sources of sediments; hemipelagicsediments consist of both terrestrial and marinesediments and occur closer to the continents.

(b) Bioturbation refers to the mixing of benthic floraand fauna with sediment particles.

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2 HIERARCHICAL HAZARD ASSESSMENT APPROACH

2.1 Introduction

A hierarchical-assessment approach consists of aseries of stepwise, progressively more refinedanalyses to evaluate the hazard resulting from aphenomena at a given nuclear power plant site. Ifthe safety of a nuclear power plant can be demon-strated by a simple and bounding analysis, theresources and time required by more-refinedassessment methods can be saved. However, thesimpler analysis should meet the requirements ofGDC 2 and all other applicable NuclearRegulatory Commission regulations.

With respect to tsunamis, the hierarchical-hazard-assessment approach could be considered as aseries of three steps:

1. Is the site region subject to tsunamis?2. Is the plant site affected by tsunamis?3. What are the hazards posed to safety of the

plant by tsunamis?

The first step above can also be regarded as aregional screening test. If the site region is notsubject to tsunamis, no further analysis for tsunamihazards is required. Absence of credibletsunamigenic sources in the site region may resultin a determination that the site region is notsubject to tsunamis. However, this finding shouldbe supported by region-specific evidence. If theanswer to the first question is affirmative orundetermined-based on available information-an analysis of the tsunami hazard is required (i.e.,the second step of the hierarchical-assessmentapproach should be performed).

The second step can be regarded as a site-screening test. This step determines whethersafety system control important to safety of theplant are exposed to hazards from tsunamis. Itmay be possible to determine that, even though thegeneral site region is subject to tsunamis, the plant

itself is sited and designed in such a way that itssafety is not affected. For example, if all SSCimportant to safety of the plant are located at anelevation above the maximum wave runup due tothe PMT, more specific tsunami-floodingassessment may not be needed for the site.

The third step is the most refined assessment, inwhich site-specific analyses are carried out todetermine hazards posed by the PMT to the SSCimportant to safety of the plant and to determinewhether any protection is required. This stepinvolves postulation of PMT source mechanisms,estimation of PMT source characteristics,initiation of the PMT wave, propagation of thePMT wave from the source toward the site, andestimation of tsunamni hazards at the site.

The term tsunami typically relates to an oceanictsunami generated by submarine seismic,landslide, or volcanic sources. However, tsunami-like waves can also be generated in inland waterbodies by subaerial landslides and seismic causes[e.g., the 1811-1812 tsunami-like waves caused

by the New Madrid earthquakes on the MississippiRiver (Lockridge et al. 2002); the potential of atsunami caused by earthquakes in Lake Tahoe(Ichinose et al. 2000); the tsunami in Spirit Lakeduring the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St.Helens (USGS 2007)]. The regional screening testshould consider the likelihood of occurrence of atsunami or a tsunami-like wave in a water bodynear the nuclear power plant site.

2.2 Regional Screening Test

A regional survey and assessment of tsunamigenic

sources should be perforned to determine thepotential that a tsunami may pose a hazard to thesite. Significant hazards to the site may arise bothfrom near-field and far-field tsunamis. The

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regional survey and assessment should include allpotential far-field sources and mechanisms thatgenerate tsunamis.

Nuclear power plant sites in the United States cangenerally be classified into two categories: coastalsites (located on or near a coastline) and inlandsites (located at significant distance from thecoastline). Coastal sites should consider hazardsfrom oceanic tsunamis; inland sites shouldconsider the possibility of a tsunami-like wave inwater bodies in the region.

The regional screening test involves the followingsteps:

1. a comprehensive search for historical andpaleotsunami records in the region

2. in the absence of historical tsunami records, acomprehensive search for potentialtsunamigenic sources and the potential fortsunami generation in nearby water bodies.

Sources of historical and paleotsunami data aredescribed in Chapter 4, Databases and DataCollection, of this report. A comprehensive searchof these national and international (where needed)data repositories should be carried out to list allhistorical tsunamis that occurred in the region.When available, wave height, inundation extent,runup, and drawdown associated with these eventsshould be described. Paleotsunami data and infer-ences drawn by experts from these data shouldalso be included in the report because these data-sets extend the historical record and may includeevents more severe than those actually recorded.

The fact that no historical tsunami records can befound for a region does not necessarily result in aconclusion that the region is free of tsunamihazards. A comprehensive search for potentialtsunamigenic sources that may create a tsunami inregional water bodies should be carried out. Anexample of such a study is described by Gonzdlezet al. (2003).

2.3 Site Screening Test

One possible way to answer the question in thesecond step of the hierarchical-assessmentapproach described above is to use a site-screeningtest to compare the location of the plant site withthe area affected by tsunamis in the region.Figure 2-1 shows three possible locations of aplant located near a coast. Location 1 could besafe if the horizontal extent of inundation causedby the probable maximum tsunami was less thanthe horizontal distance (D). The horizontal extentof inundation varies depending on thecharacteristics of the tsunami waves, shoreline,and beach geometry and topography, and theeffective obstruction to the inland flow of tsunamiwaves on the shore. According to the NGDChistorical tsunami database (NGDC 2007), themaximum horizontal extent of inundation is listedas 3.4 mi (5.5 kin) for the December 26, 2004,Indian Ocean tsunami on the island of Sumatra,Indonesia. Anecdotal evidence indicates that themaximum extent of horizontal inundation on theisland may have reached 5.0 mi (8.0 kin).

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Figure 2-1. The DLZ screening rule.

Location 2, located on a river near an estuary,could be safe if the backwater effects or boresinduced by the PMT affected areas in extent lessthan the longitudinal distance (L) measured alongthe river. Bores can be induced by a tsunami(Koch and Chanson 2005) and were observed in

Hawaii in 1946, in Japan in 1983 and 2003, and inThailand, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka in 2004. Borespropagating upstream from the mouth of a rivermay be caused by tsunamis under favorablehydraulic conditions and can travel upstreamseveral tens of miles (km) from the estuary

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(Chanson 2005). Bores are similar to travelinghydraulic jumps that move upstream. Thedownstream part of the bore is characterized bysubcritical flow with greater depth of flow and theupstream part is supercritical. The river should beable to support supercritical flow to form the bore.

Location 3, a site located on the coast, could besafe if the runup caused by the PMT did not reachits grade elevation (Z) and all SSC important tosafety of the plant are located at or above thisgrade elevation. In the NGDC historical tsunamidatabase, the runup is defined as the maximumground elevation that the tsunami waves reachinland from the shore. The maximum runupreported in the NGDC historical tsunami runupdatabase, 1720 ft (524 m), is associated with themassive 1958 Lituya Bay subaerial landslide[more than I billion cubic ft (30 million cubic m)in volume] and tsunami (Miller 1960). Thedatabase contains runup heights of 820 ft (250 m)and 738 ft (225 m) above the surface of the SpiritLake on the west and east arms of the lake causedby the collapse of the upper 1500 ft (460 m) of thedome of Mount St. Helens and subsequent giganticdebris fall into the lake (Waitt and Pierson 1994).The Lituya Bay slide occurred on one slope of anarrow bay, causing the unusually high runup onthe opposite slope. The enormous debris fall fromcollapse of the Mount St. Helens dome was thecause of the unusually high runups in Spirit Lake.Oceanic tsunamis have caused runups as high as328 ft (100 m) in Indonesia (Banda Sea earthquakeand tsunami of 1674). The maximum runupcaused by the 2004 Sumatra tsunami was 167 ft(50.9 in), observed on the Sumatra island.

The preceding discussion clarifies that the severityof tsunami hazards is strongly affected by localcharacteristics. Therefore, accurate estimation ofhazards posed by tsunamis to a nuclear powerplant site requires site-specific analyses.However, it is also clear that unusually hightsunami runups have only been recorded forunusually rare events (e.g., Lituya Bay and SpiritLake tsunamis). If these extremely rare events areexcluded, even the largest historical tsunamis do

not exceed runup of approximately 328 ft (100 m)and do not inundate areas more than a few miles(kmi) inland from the shore. Also, tsunami-induced bores do not travel more than a few tensof miles (kin) upstream from the mouth of a river.Therefore, it may be possible to screen sites basedon a combination of historical record, site-specificgeophysical and topographical data, and soundengineering judgment. Detailed site-specifictsunami hazards assessments should be completedfor sites that would be affected by tsunamis andfor sites for which a conclusive determinationcannot be made that they are free of tsunamihazards.

A situation similar to that shown in Figure 2-1may also exist for inland sites located near a bodyof water in which a tsunami may be caused byseismic, landslide, or volcanic sources. The DLZrule may still be applied to the inland sites todetermine if the site is safe from the hazards posedby tsunamis.

2.4 Detailed Tsunami HazardAssessment

If the site-screening test does not establish thesafety of the nuclear power plant site from hazardsposed by tsunamis, a detailed assessment of thesehazards should be undertaken to ensure that theplant design bases adequately account for thesehazards.

A companion to this report is the National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration Pacific MarineEnvironmental Laboratory (PMEL) TechnicalMemorandum OAR PMEL-136, titled "Scientificand Technical Issues in Tsunami HazardAssessment of Nuclear Power Plant Sites"(Gonzmilez et a]. 2007), which describes the state-of-the-art in tsunami-hazard assessment, includingdata sources, paleotsunami identificationapproaches, and tsunami propagation andinundation simulation. Gonzdlez ct al. (2007)should be used as a reference for technical basesfor a detailed tsunami-hazard assessment.

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2.5 Site Investigation

For a detailed tsunanmi-hazard assessment at a siteof interest, a thorough investigation is needed toestablish the history of tsunamis at a given nuclearpower plant site and to collect site-specific datarequired for estimation of the hazard metrics.These investigations should lead to the determina-tion of historically recorded tsunamis and com-pilation of known pro-historical records. Ananalysis of all tsunami data should be carried outto determine the potential mechanisms that maygenerate a tsunami capable of affecting the site.The analysis should also specify tsunami char-acteristics and the corresponding damage at thesite. The frequency and severity of tsunamis at thesite from historical and prehistorical data shouldbe estimated.

Because both near- and far-field tsunamis requireinvestigation, the compilation of historicalobservations and prehistorical data may need toaccess international databases as well as thosearchived and maintained in the United States.

2.5.1 Historical Tsunami Records

The first step in site investigation is establishingthe history of tsunamis at and near the proposedsite. All available historical data related totsunamis should be collected. Where available,these data should include information regarding

I. date and time of occurrence2. source mechanism3. source location4. source parameters5. wave height on bottom pressure gauge and

tide records6. tidal records or ambient water levels at the

time of tsunami arrival7. tsunami runup8. tsunami inundation (horizontal distance the

waves reached from the shore)9. damages caused.

The NGDC historical tsunami database is the mostcomprehensive compilation of tsunami events.The database should be searched for historicalevents in the vicinity of the site. The NGDCtsunami database also provides metadata regardingthe tsunami events and references to where theseevents were first reported or analyzed. The meta-data often hold much additional information aboutthe nature of tsunami observation, the sourcemechanism, and damages caused by the event. Acareful review of the metadata and references citedshould also be compiled for the site of interest.

Some of the tsunami-like events are also listed asseiches in the NGDC database. These events canbe selected using the "type of measurement"search criteria set to "seiche." Tsunamri eventscaused by volcanic activity are cross-linked to theNGDC volcanoes database, which can provideadditional information regarding the tsunamigenicvolcanic activity.

Seismic activity can trigger landslides, andtsunamis can be generated by both these sourcemechanisms and may arrive at a site within a shortperiod of time. The NGDC database should bequeried for such events, and all references listed inthe metadata should be searched to determine thesequence of events. These records, even ifanecdotal, can provide significant informationregarding concurrence of source mechanisms andconsequent enhancement of tsunami impacts at thesite.

Based on the collected historical data, tsunamiactivity at and near the site should be thoroughlydescribed. This description should list allobserved source mechanisms, the ranges of sourceparameters and characteristics, the ranges oftsunami runup and inundation, and the extent ofdamage suffered.

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2.5.2 Paleotsunami Evidence

Because the recorded history of tsunamis in theUnited States is relatively short; there areinsufficient data related to, indeed even completeabsence of, tsunami activity, depending on thelocation of the site. The problem is exacerbatedbecause large and destructive tsunamis arerelatively infrequent events. One way to supple-ment the relatively short observed record is theevidence provided by paleotsunami data (seeChapter 3 of Gonz6lcz et al. 2007).

At this time, no central database of paleotsunamiinformation for use in the United States exists.One such effort is described by Peters et al. (2003)that focuses on the Pacific Northwest coast and thetsunamis originating in the Cascadia subductionzone.

It may be necessary to carry out a site-specific datacollection to seek geologic evidence of tsunamisnear the proposed nuclear power plant site. Ingeneral, sites within approximately 62.5 mi(100 km) of the coast should be searched fortsunami and boulder deposits in locations likely topreserve tsunami deposits, such as coastal marshesand shallow lakes. However, expert assistancemay be needed for this search and subsequentinterpretation of the candidate deposits (Gonzfilezet al. 2007).

2.5.3 Regional Tsunami Assessments

A regional tsunami-hazard assessment, previouslycarried out by other responsible agencies, may beavailable for areas that are frequently subject totsunamis. A thorough search should be carried outto identify and evaluate the applicability of suchassessments to the proposed nuclear power plantsite. Most tsunamni-hazard-assessment studies arecarried out from the point of view of floodinghazard from inundation and potential for loss oflife and damage to property and infrastructure.The tsunami hazards assessment for a nuclearpower plant site needs to address several aspectsof the hazard from tsunamis (see Chapters 3 and 5

of this report). The existing regional tsunami-hazard assessment may be used as a starting pointfor a more focused site-specific assessment.

Gonzdlez et al. (2006) describe a pilot study oftsunami hazards to update Federal EmergencyManagement Agency flood hazards maps forSeaside, Oregon (see Appendix D of Gonzalezet al. 2007).

The Goiizdlez et al. (2006) study was carried outfor the area near the towns of Seaside and Gearharton the Oregon coastline. This area was chosen forthe study because it is similar to many coastalcommunities and because there was a strong localinterest in such a study. The study developed twoinundation maps, one for the 100-year-return-period tsunami and the other for the 500-year-return-period tsunami. The components of thestudy were:

1. source specification: based on literaturereview and consultation with tsunami experts,a database of quantitative probabilistic modelsof local and far-field earthquake tsunamisources in the Cascadia, Alaska-Aleutian, andPeru-Chile subduction zones was developed

2. data acquisition: a paleotsunami depositmapping and interpretation study was carriedout, along with acquisition of historicalrecords and eyewitness accounts

3. model development: a new, high-resolutiondigital elevation model (DEM) based on thelatest available topography, bathymetry, andtidal information was developed. A site-specific tsunami inundation model wasdeveloped and tested with available tsunamiobservations, including paleotsunami data,historical records, and eyewitness reports

4. probabilistic tsunami hazard estimation5. study-specific database development6. analysis and interpretation of tsunami impacts.

In the context of tsunami-hazard assessment atproposed nuclear power plants for determinationof safety, a similar procedure may need to beadopted, with the notable exception of the use of a

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PMT in the place of a chosen return period tospecify the design tsunami and the correspondingprobabilistic hazard estimation. Also, theGonzdilcz ct al. (2006) study only used earthquakesources for tsunami generation. The tsunami-hazard assessment at a proposed nuclear powerplant site will also need to include landslide andvolcanic sources.

As illustrated above, regional tsunami-hazardassessment studies should be carefully evaluatedto ascertain their applicability to tsunami-hazardassessment at a proposed nuclear power plant site.These studies can serve as a starting point, andmay provide valuable sources of data focused onthe needs of the safety determination at the site.

2,5.4 Site-Specific Tsunami Mechanisms

For a proposed nuclear power plant site, athorough search should be undertaken to catalogsources of all known (observed historical tsunamievent or thoroughly analyzed and agreed-onpaleotsunami record) and proposed (based onpaleotsunami evidence) tsunami events at and nearthe site. These sources should include both near-and far-field sources. All three tsunamigenicsource mechanisms should be investigated.

For each source mechanism, a list of candidatetsunamigenic sources should be created.Information on source parameters should becollected using literature surveys and contactingagencies and organizations with relevant expertise.Experts in the relevant fields may need to beconsulted for estimation of parameters when nopublished values exist. Sources known to havegenerated tsunamis in the past should already beavailable from the compilation of historicaltsunami records reconmmended by Section 1.4.1.The observed tsunami data and known orestimated parameters of these known sourcesshould be used to validate tsunami-simulationmodels.

In addition to compiling the parameters (known orestimated), particular attention should be given to

the orientation of the source with respect to theproposed nuclear power plant site. The orientationof the source, particularly landslides, can stronglyaffect the directivity of the tsunami waves.Therefore, even a relatively moderately strongtsunamigenic source may result in a greater hazardto the site than a stronger source that is notoptimally oriented to the site of interest.Similarly, particular attention should be paid tosources near the site because any generatedtsunami waves from these sources would havelittle attenuation compared to waves that travel tothe site from a great distance. Source parametersthat are important for tsunami generation andsubsequent hazard estimation are described inChapter 5 of this report.

2.5.5 Site-Specific Data

Site-specific geospatial and geophysical data arerequired for accurate simulation of the near-shoredynamics of tsunami waves and the estimation oftsunami-hazard metrics. A selection of thesehazard metrics are described in Section 5.4 of thisreport. Site-specific geospatial data that arerequired for accurate simulation of the tsunami-wave dynamics primarily consist of fine-scalemaps of near-shore topography and bathymetry.Data sources for topography and bathymetry aredescribed in Section 4.2 of this report. Site-specific geophysical data are related tospecification of tsunamigenic source charac-teristics and to estimation of tsunami-hazardmetrics. Tsunamigenic source characteristics aredescribed in Section 5.3 of this report.

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3 EFFECTS OF TSUNAMI AT A NUCLEARPOWER PLANT SITE

3.1 Introduction

Tsunamis can result in a severe hazard to safety-related cooling-water systems as well as other SSCimportant to safety of a nuclear power plant. Theprimary effect of the tsunami waves on a plant siteis flooding (directly from tsunami waves, or frombackwater effects or tidal bores caused upstreamfrom the mouth of a river, depending on thelocation of the site) and loss of cooling water (dueto dry intakes during drawdown caused bereceding tsunami waves). However, there are alsoseveral other effects, mainly from hydrodynamicforces that can cause severe damage to structuresand the foundations of these structures. If any ofthese structures are safety-related, they should bedesigned to withstand these effects or be protectedadequately from these effects to ensure the safety ofthe nuclear power plant.

3.2 Flooding Due to Runup

The most obvious hazard from a tsunami isflooding. As the tsunami waves approach theshoreline, they increase in amplitude and reduce inwavelength. The waves, depending on localbathymetry and topography, can inundate signifi-cantly large areas inland from the shoreline. Themaximum ground elevation that the inundatingwaves reach is called the runup.

The protection from flooding effects of tsunamiwaves can be provided in a manner similar toother flooding mechanisms: either the SSCimportant to safety can be located above themaximum runup due to the PMT or adequateflooding protection for the SSC important to safetycan be provided to ensure that function is notcompromised. Belts of trees and mangrovesprovide barriers to tsunami by effectivelyincreasing frictional resistance to wave runup.

The feasibility and effectiveness of such measuresshould be investigated.

3.3 Dry Intakes During Drawdown

During recession of the tsunami waves (alterna-tively, approach of the depression wave), waterlevel at the shoretine is lowered. The amount oflowering depends on local bathymetry. The arealextent of recession can be significantly large.Nuclear power plants that depend on an intake orintakes that are located offshore for their safety-related cooling water needs should ensure that themaximum extent of recession and the accomp-anying lowering of the water level near the intakelocation do not result in dry intakes.

Protection from receding tsunami waves can beprovided in a manner similar to other low-watermechanisms: either the safety-related intakes canbe located sufficiently away from the shorelineand in deeper waters that the recession and theaccompanying lowering of the water level doesnot result in dry intakes, or alternative sources ofsafety-related water supply can be made availablethat are independent of the water body that isaffected by the receding tsunami waves.

3.4 Scouring

The behavior of the tsunami waves in shallowwaters near the shore is very complex. Tonkinet al. (2003) carried out experiments to investigatethe scouring cffects of tsunamis around cylindricalstructures. They found that the scouring at thefront (facing the oncoming waves) of the cylindercould be explained by a standard shear-stressmodel. However, they also observed rapidscouring in the sand substrate at the back of thecylinder at the end of the tsunami drawdown,when flow velocity was decreasing rapidly. This

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rapid scour created the largest and deepest scourholes. The investigators proposed that theobserved scour at the back of the cylinder may beexplained by considering the effects of porepressures in the substrate during the tsunami. Therapidly decreasing water level at the end of thetsunami drawdown may create large-pore pressuregradients, resulting in a buoyant force on thesubstrate. When these buoyant forces are largeenough to decrease the effective normal loadsubstantially and result in loss of shear strength,even low-flow velocities of the tsunami currentsmay result in rapid scouring. In extreme cases, acomplete loss of shear strength may occur, leadingto liquefaction of the substrate.

A nuclear power plant that locates any safety-related structures, particularly a safety-rclatcdintake structure, where tsunami currents maypotentially result in scouring and the resultingdamage to the foundations of such structures,should ensure that the structures are adequatelydesigned to resist the scouring forces of tsunamis.An obvious alternative is to provide a source ofsafety-related cooling water that is independent ofthe water body experiencing the tsunami and,therefore, is not exposed to the scouring effects oftsunamis.

3.5 Deposition

Tsunami currents near the shoreline are highlyturbulent, capable of carrying debris and sediment.As the waves recede, the sediment and debris canbe deposited at and near the shoreline. For anuclear power plant, all SSC important to safetyshould be located and designed such that they arenot affected by the deposition of debris andsediment fiom tsunami waves and currents.

3.6 Hydrostatic andHydrodynamic Forces

Hydrostatic force acts laterally on structures. Itcan result from standing water resulting fromtsunami inundation or from interaction of tsunami

water moving slowly and encountering thestructures.

Hydrostatic forces will. also be experienced byintake structures that are located offshore. Theintake structure may experience a cyclic hydro-static loading as tsunami waves pass over it. Thehydrostatic pressure during the passage of a crestwill be higher and lower during passage of atrough due to normal still-water level (Yeh et al.2005).

Hydrodynamic forces result from rapidly movingwater and its interaction with structures. On-shorestructures may experience impacts on the sidesfacing the oncoming wave, drag forces on thesides, and suction on the downstream end of thestructure (Ych et al. 2005).

Ych et al. (2005) provide a set of generalizedexpressions for wave and flood loads on struc-tures. These include expressions for hydrostaticforce, buoyant force, hydrodynamic force, surgeforce, impact force, and breaking-wave forces.Loading combinations are also described.Evaluation of tsunami loadings on a reinforcedconcrete building is also provided (see theappendix in Yeh et al. 2005).

3.7 Debris and Projectiles

Tsunamis are capable of dislodging and trans-porting a wide range of debris from sediment tolarge boulders (Mastronuzzi and Sanso 2000) toother water-borne projectiles (automobiles, trees,boats, etc.). Debris and projectiles can compoundthe impacts on structures. Yeh et al. (2005)describe the behavior of water-borne projectiles.Projectiles are considered to impact the structuresat the same elevation as the water-surface level.The uncertainty in the estimation of the duration ofthe impact is thought to be the most likely cause oferrors in the estimation of the impact forces. Theduration of impact forces, however, are affectedprimarily by the natural frequency of the structures(Chopra 1995).

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Adequate design criteria should be employed forSSC important to safety exposed to impacts fromwater-borne debris and projectiles. An alternativeis to locate SSCs so that they will not be exposedto water-borne debris and projectiles.

3.8 Tidal Bores

Tidal bores are similar to traveling hydraulicjumps that move upstream from the mouth of theriver. They are generally caused by a rapid andlarge change in the downstream water-surfaceelevation (Chanson 2005; Koch and Chanson2005).

Tidal bores can be induced by a tsunami (Kochand Chanson 2005), and were observed in Hawaiiin 1946, in Japan in 1983 and 2003, and inThailand, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka in 2004. Tidalbores propagating upstream from the mouth of a

river may be caused by tsunamis under favorablehydraulic conditions and can travel upstreamseveral tens of miles (kin) from the estuary(Chanson 2005). The downstream part of the boreis characterized by subcritical flow with greaterdepth of flow, and the upstream part is super-critical. The river should be able to supportsupercritical flow to form the bore.

The effect of a tidal bore propagating upstream to

a nuclear power plant site is similar to a floodwave propagating downstream. This may result inflooding of the site depending on the height of thebore. Bores dissipate as they travel upstream. Ifthe site is sufficiently far away from the estuary,the bore may not flood the site. Siting andprotection criteria for tidal bore are similar tothose for other flooding mechanisms.

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4 DATABASES AND DATA COLLECTION

4.1 Introduction

In the United States, tsunami records are archivedby the NGDC, which is one of the three environ-mental data centers within the National Environ-mental Satellite, Data, and Information Service.The NGDC also operated World Data Centers forMarine Geology and Geophysics and Solid EarthGeophysics. Together, WDC and NGDC acquire,process, and distribute global marine and terres-trial data. They also have a role in post-event datacollection of tsunami sources and effects thatsupports modeling, engineering, planning, andeducational goals.

The primary access to the NGDC data archive isvia the internet at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov. Thiswebsite archives data on natural hazards(earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanoes), marinegeology and geophysics (including ocean drillingdata, well logs, grain size data, and sedimentthickness), and bathymetry and topography data[including combined bathymetry and topographydatasets, multibeam data, National Ocean Service(NOS) hydrographic surveys, and global reliefdata (ETOPO2, ETOPO5, etc.)].

4.2 Topography and Bathymetry

One of the most important datasets for use intsunami modeling is bathymetry and topography.Tsunami waves travel at different speeds in watersof different depths, and, therefore, the wave frontis modified as the waves propagate in a waterbody with varying depth. In deep waters wherethe tsunami waves have long wavelengths, the grid

points needed to resolve the wavelength innumerical models can be spaced far apart; there-fore, a relatively low resolution relief data may beused (e.g., the 2 and 5 arc-second digital globalrelief datasets ETOPO2 and ETOPO5) without

compromising the accuracy of model predictions.However, in shallower waters, the wavelength of

the tsunami waves shorten. Thus, accurate andhigh-resolution relief data are needed (e.g., high-resolution NOS surveys) to resolve the wave andto ensure accuracy of model predictions.Topography data may be even more importantbecause inundation models typically have the mostuncertainty in their predictions.

4.2.1 Topography Data

Digital topography data have traditionally beencreated, verified, and distributed by the USGS(http://edc.usgs.gov/geodata/). The USGS topo-graphy data are available at 1:24,000 scale for

7.5-min quadrangles. The digital data are alsoavailable at 32.8-ft (10-m) horizontal resolution

with a nominal vertical accuracy of 3.3 ft (1 m).Traditionally, USGS digital topographic data donot extend below the surface of the water intowater bodies. Areas covered by the water bodiesare typically shown at some nominal constantelevation above the mean sea level.

Currently, the best quality digital topographic datacan be created using airborne light detection andranging (LiDAR) technology. LiDAR is an activeimaging system similar to a radar. It transmitslaser pulses to a target and measures the time forthe signal to be reflected back to the sensor. TheLiDAR-mapping flights are usually flown ataltitudes of 1000-6500 ft (300-2000 m) and usenear-infrared light (1.045-1.065 gm). Areasapproximately 70 percent of the altitude in widthcan be covered. Horizontal resolutions as small as2.5 ft (0.75 m) with a horizontal accuracy ofapproximately 3.3 ft (1 m) can be obtained. Thevertical accuracy can be approximately 0.5 ft(0.1 5 m). However, in many cases, dedicatedLiDAR mapping may be required to obtain suchdata, and costs can be significant.

The NOAA Coastal Services Center (CSC)

acquires high-resolution topographic data usingremote sensing under the topographic-change

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mapping project since 2001 (see the website athttp://www.csc.noaa.eov/crs/tcm/). The topo-graphic-change mapping project followed theAirborne LiDAR Assessment of Coastal Erosion(ALACE) project, a partnership between theNOAA CSC, the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration Observational Sciences Branch,and the USGS Center for Coastal Geology, thatcollected LiDAR data along the U.S. coastlinefrom 1996 until 2000 using the NASA AirborneTopographic Mapper sensor. The NOAA CSC

distributes digital elevation data derived from twosensing technologies: LiDAR and IfSAR orInSAR, the Interferometric Synthetic ApertureRadar, which uses radar pulses. The data can be

found at the CSC website(htt:i/manps.csc.noaa.goviTCM/).

4.2.2 Bathymetry Data

Digital global relief data are available from theNGDC at two resolutions: 2 arc-seconds(ETOPO2v2 dataset published in June 2006) and5 arc-seconds (ETOPO5). The dataset covers thewhole globe from -900 to +900 in latitude and -1800 to +1 80' in longitude. Both the cell-centered version (where the cell boundaries arelines of even minutes of latitude and longitude,centered on intersections of lines of odd minutesof latitude and longitude; a grid of 5400 rows and10,800 columns) and the grid-centered version(where the cell boundaries are lines of odd minutes

of latitude and longitude centered on intersectionsof lines of even minutes of latitude and longitude;a grid of 5401 rows and 10,801 columns) areavailable. Subsets of these datasets may be usedfor tsunami propagation modeling for far-fieldtsunamis.

The NOS hydrographic database (NOSHDB) ismaintained by the NGDC and is located at the itswebsite(http://w,w.-ingdc.noaa.gov/mgg/bathv-netry/hydro.html). The NOSHIDB provides extensivecoverage of coastal waters and exclusive economiczones of the United States and its territories.Initially, the database was created by digitizing the

sheets of hydrographic surveys completed between1851 and 1965. Since 1965, NOS survey vesselshave acquired data digitally. The database isavailable for interactive search and download onthe internet athttp://map.ngdc.noaa.gov/website/mgninos hydro!viewer.htm. The database may also be obtained asa stand-alone set of DVD-ROMs or CD-ROMswith included search software. Data for the near-shore inundation modeling domain may be

downloaded for creation of a computational gridfor a particular site. Depending on the capabilitiesof the tsunami-simulation software, NOSHDBdata may be used to create nested grids within theETOPO2v2 grid for propagation and inundationsimulations.

The NGDC is also developing high-resolution

combined bathymetry and topography DEM forapplications of the Method of Splitting Tsunamis(MOST) model(http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mge/inundation/tsunami/Reneral.html). These DEMs are beingdeveloped using the best digital available datafrom federal and state agencies, academicinstitutions, and private companies.

Various sources of data are merged and supple-

mented when required by additional hand-digitized data. A set of quality-control checks iscarried out for consistency of the final DEM toremove artifacts. Several DEM grids on the East

Coast (Virginia Beach, Virginia; Savannah,Georgia; Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; CapeHatteras, North Carolina; San Juan and Mayaguez,Puerto Rico), the coast of Alaska (Dutch Harborand Sand Point), the Gulf Coast (Panama City,Florida), and the West Coast (Port San Luis,California) are already completed. The cell size ofthese DEMs is 1/3 arc-sccond [approximately32.8 ft (10 m)].

Multibeam bathymetry data are available from theNGDC, which is the national archive in the United

States(http://www.ngdc.noaa. gov/mp,,bathyrnetry/multi

beam.html). The NGDC database contains over

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1.6 million nautical miles (3 million kin) of shiptrackline data and hydrographic multibeam surveydata. Bathymetric grids, three-dimensionalimages, and data can be downloaded from theNG.DC. Several other sources of multibeam data

also exist: the Canadian marine multibcambathymetric data(http://gdr.nrcan.ic.ca/multibath/index e.php), theWoods Hole Oceanographic Institution multibcambathymetry data(http://mbdata.whoi.edu/inbdata.html), and theMarine Geoscience Data System(http://www.marine-geo.ort/).

Bathymetry data collected using LiDAR andIfSAR by the NOAA CSC are available from theCSC (http://maps.csc.noaa.goviTCM/) archivedfrom the ALACE project and the continuingtopographic-changc mapping projcct. Anevaluation of various publicly available globalbathymetry datasets is presented by Marks andSmith (2006).

4.3 Tides and Sea-Level Anomalies

The Center for Operational OceanographicProducts and Services (CO-OPS) located withinNOAA's NOS collects, archives, analyzes, anddistributed a variety of oceanic and coastal data,including historical water-level data via theNational Water Level Program (NWLP). TheNWLP consists of a network of long- and short-term water-level stations. There are 175 long-termstations, 261 coastal stations, and 55 Great Lakesstations for which tide data are available athttp://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/station retrieve.shtml?tvpe=Tide+Data. The database also containshistorical tide data from stations located all overthe world. Data can be retrieved for more than2700 historical stations.

4.4 Tsunami Wave Heights,Runup, and Drawdown

The NGDC tsunami-source-event database islocated on the Internet at the website

http://www.ngdc.noaa.govihazard/tsu.shtml. Thetsunami-source-event database is global in extentand contains information on tsunamis, includingsource description and location, date and time ofoccurrence, event magnitude, water height, andcorresponding damages. The database can besearched online for source type, source location,time periods of interest, runup location, and effectsof the tsunami. More than 2300 events are listedin the tsunami-source-event database.

The NGDC tsunami-runup database is located onthe Internet at the websitehttp://www.ngdc.noaa. 4ov/hazard/'tsu db.shtml.

Similar to the tsunami-source-event database, thetsunami-runup database is global in extent. Itcontains each runup reported for all tsunamis inthe tsunami-source database as a separate entry.For each runup, date and time, country, location,maximum water height, inundation distance,tsunami source parameters, and effects of tsunamirunup are stored. More than 9200 runup eventsare listed in the database.

The databases allow several search parameters thatcan be effectively used to search for historicaltsunami information for a location of interest.Metadata stored along with each record alsoincludes a short description and lists references foreach event and rumup. Drawdown is not reportedin the database. Typically, drawdownobservations are difficult to obtain from post-eventsurveys and are generally inferred from eyewitnessaccounts or, in rare circumstances, from remote-sensing images.

4.5 Near-Shore Currents

Near-shore currents can be classified as tidal andnon-tidal currents. Tidal currents are periodic and

follow the tide cycle. Non-tidal currents or oceancurrents include permanent currents in oceaniccirculatory systems. Tidal current data aremeasured at several locations on the U.S. coast-lines by NOS using Physical OceanographicReal-Time System (PORTS), available fromNOAA

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(http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/station retrieve.shtml?type=Current+Data).

Ocean currents are organized flows that persistover a time period in a geographical location in theocean. These currents transport water, heat,chemicals, and organisms from one part of theocean to another. Wind is one of the primaryforces that drive these currents. Wind creates asurface stress, causing water particles to move.Over large distances, the flow is affected by theCoriolis force. Another cause of oceanic currentsis difference in water density, which depends ontemperature, salinity, and the pressure ofsurrounding water. The density differences causewhat is known as thermohaline flow in the oceans.Some data related to open ocean currents arearchived at the University of Miami RosenstielSchool of Marine and Atmospheric Science(http://oceancurrents.rsmas.miami.edu/).

4.6 Seismic Data

The NGDC earthquake database is located on theInternet at the websitehttn: //www nr~. ndnoaa.ntwt •oihazrd/ea Irthnlk shtml.

The NGDC earthquake-intensity database containsinformation on more than 23,000 U.S.earthquakes, including their locations, magnitudes,focal depths, and reported damages. Theearthquakes listed in this database span the period1638 to 1995.

The NGDC also distributes a global CD-ROMdatabase of over 4 million earthquakes from2100 B.C. to 1995 A.D. Online databases can beinteractively searched as required for a particularapplication.

few. At night some awakened. Dishes, windows, anddoors disturbed: walls make creaking sound.Sensation like heavy truck striking building.Standing motorcars rock noticeably.

V. Felt by nearly everyone; many awakened. Somedishes, windows. etc., broken; a few instances ofcracked plaster; unstable objects overturned.Disturbance of trees, poles, and other tall objectssometimes noticed. Pendulum clocks may stop.

Vi. Felt by all; many frightened and run outdoors. Someheavy furniture moved: a few instances of fallenplaster or damaged chimneys. Damage slight.

VII. Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible inbuildings of good design and construction slight tomoderate in well built ordinary structures:considerable in poorly built or badly designedstructures. Some chimneys broken. Noticed bypersons driving motor cars.

VIII. Damage slight in specially designed structures;considerable in ordinary substantial buildings, withpartial collapse; great in poorly built structures. Panelwalls thrown out of frame structures. Fall ofchimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments.walls. Heavy furniture overturned. Sand and mudejected in small amounts. Changes in well water.Persons driving motor cars disturbed.

IX. Damage considerable in specially designed structures;well-designed frame structures thrown out of plumb;great in substantial buildings, with partial collapse.Buildings shifted off foundations. Ground crackedconspicuously. Underground pipes broken.

X. Some well-built wooden structures destroyed: mostmasonry and frame structures destroyed with founda-tions; ground badly cracked. Rails bent. Landslidesconsiderable from river banks and steep slopes.Shifted sand and mud. Water splashed over banks.

XI. Few, if any (masonry), structures remain standing.Bridges destroyed. Broad fissures in ground.Underground pipelines completely out of service.Earth slumps and land slips in soft ground. Rails bentgreatly.

XII. Damage total. Waves seen on ground surfaces. Linesof sight and level distorted. Objects thrown upwardinto the air.

It contains data on more than 5000 destructiveearthquakes since 2150 B.C. in a catalog ofsignificant earthquakes. A significant earthquakeis defined as an earthquake that resulted inmoderate damage (SI million or more), amagnitude of 7.5 or more, 10 deaths, a modifiedMercalli intensityla) of X, or a tsunami.

(a) The modified Mercalli intensity is given in Romannumerals ranging from I to XII. The values on theintensity scale are based on a subjective descriptionof the effects of the earthquake:

1. Not felt except by a very few under especiallyfavorable circumstances.

11. Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upperfloors of buildings. Delicately suspended objects mayswing.

Ill. Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upperfloors of buildings, but many people do not recognizeit as an earthquake. Standing motor cars may rockslightly. Vibration like passing truck. Durationestimated.

IV. During the day felt indoors by many, outdoors by

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Global earthquake data are also archived at theUSGS National Earthquake Information Center(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/neic/index.php). The database contains information onearthquakes from 2000 B.C. through the currentweek because it is updated dynamically. Thedatabase can be searched interactively on thewebsite as required for a given site or region.

4.7 Geophysical Data

In addition to tsunami and earthquake databases,the NGDC also archives a volcano database(http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/volcano.shtml).The significant-volcanic-eruptions databasecontains information on more than 400 eruptionsdating from 1750 B.C. The volcano-locationdatabase contains information on more than1500 volcanoes. The tsunami database is cross-linked with the volcano database, indicating whichobserved tsunamis have a volcanic-source mecha-nism. The volcano database contains the volcanic-explosivity index, which is one of the sourceparameters for a tsunamigcnic volcanic event.

Offshore tsunami waves are measured primarilyby bottom pressure gauges that record data in real-time. In the 1980s, NOAA PMEL developeddeep-ocean tsunameters for early detection andmeasurement of tsunami waves and application ofthis information to a warning system. This projectwas called Deep-ocean Assessment and Reportingof Tsunamis (DART; seehttp://nctr.pmel.noaa.geov/Dartindex.html). ADART system consists of a bottom pressurerecording (BPR) system connected to a surfacebuoy for real-time reporting of recorded data. Thesystem can detect tsunami waves as small as0.4 in. (1 cm). In December 2006, there were25 fully functioning DART locations, 20 in thePacific Ocean (including five along the U.S. WestCoast and seven along the southern Alaska coastand Aleutian Islands), four in the Atlantic, and onein the Gulf of Mexico. There arc an additional 14locations planned for future DART deployment.

The edited BPR data from the DART system andhistorical BPRs are available from the NGDC forthe period 1986 to 2004. Real-time DART dataare available from the NOAA National Data BuoyCenter (http://vww.ndbc.noaa.gov/dart.shtml).

Currently, no databases (global or regional) areavailable that catalog submarine landslides andtheir characteristics. As described in Section 2.4of this report, extensive site-specific geological,seismic, and geotechnical data, some usingadvanced imaging techniques, may be needed tocompletely characterize submarine landslides.The interpretation of these datasets is also anadvancing area of research. As more accurate andhigher-resolution bathymetry and submarinegeophysical data are compiled, offshore historicallandslides and zones of potential landslides can bemore readily identified (see Mayer 2006; Marksand Smith 2006). The NGDC tsunami-runupdatabase can be searched using the cause of thetsunami parameter set to the mechanism ofinterest. Tsunami runups that are attributed tolandslides sometimes contain data regarding thelandslide properties, including extent and volume.

The NGDC also archives a grain-size database ofsea-floor sediments. The database contains over17,000 sea-floor samples from the Outer Con-tinental Shelf Enviromnental Assessment Program(OCSEAP), academic institutions, and the U.S.Navy. The metadata include the name of thecollecting institution, the ship, the cruise, thesample identifier, the location, the date of collec-tion, the water depth, the sampling device, themethod of analysis, the weight of the sample, thesampling interval, and the raw-weight percentages.Some of the samples also have texture information(percentage of sand, silt, and clay) and statisticalmeasures of grain size, such as mean, median,standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of thegrain-size distribution. The NGDC grain-sizedatabase can be interactively searched at thewebsitehttp://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg grainsize/index.jsp . For example, a search off the West Coast of

the United States, bounded by a rectangle with

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latitudes ranging from 32'N to 44°N andlongitudes ranging from 122°W to 130'W,returned four matching cruises and 22 samples.

4.8 Paleotsunami Data

Tsunamis deposit sediment in the runup zone.These deposits can be overlain by sedimentsbrought to the site by other mechanisms and, overa long period of time, may get buried in the soilprofile. The NGDC is compiling a database ofpaleotsunami data (see Appendix A of Gonzdlezct al. 2007). However, no central repository ofpaleotsunami data exists at this time.

Prehistoric tsunamis have been identified based onthe deposits in the Pacific Northwest (Atwater andMoore 1992; Benson et al. 1997; Peters et al.2003), in Kamchatka (Pinegina and Bourgeois,2001; Pinegina et al. 2003), in Japan (Nanayama etal. 2003), in the North Sea (Dawson et al. .1988),and in Hawaii (Moore 2000; Moore et al. 1994a,1994b). Peters et al. (2003) compiled a databaseof deposits related to tsunamis in the Cascadia.This database contains the location andsedimentological properties from 59 sites locatedin the Pacific Northwest, starting in northernCalifornia and extending to Vancouver Island,British Columbia. The database references52 published studies until the year 2002 thatdescribe these tsunami deposit sites. Theindividual studies cited in the report use severaldifferent criteria to distinguish tsunami deposits,which usually manifest as anomalous sand layersin coastal mashes and lacustrine sediments, fromsand layers deposited by other processes, such asriver flooding or storm surges.

Preliminary identification of tsunami deposits iscarried out by searching for layers of sand orcoarse-grained material in outcrops and sedimentcores from environments where deposition of sandlayers is unusual, such as in coastal marshes and inlakes (Peters et al. 2003). Tsunamis can transporta variety of sizes of sediment, ranging from sandparticles to large cobbles and boulders. Sandlayers can also be deposited by other processes,

such as storm surges or river flooding, in theseenvironments. Usually, a combination of keyfactors related to the deposited layer are used todistinguish it as a tsunami deposit. These keycharacteristics include biological markers, spatialdistribution of the deposits, sediment characteris-tics, and geochemistry. The presence of marinemacro and microfossils is used to infer a marinesource for the sediment layer. Progressivelyinland thinning and finning of the deposited layeris often used to suggest a marine surge rather thanriver flooding as the mechanism responsible forthese deposits. Composition and texture of sandgrains can be compared with upriver deposits todistinguish the mechanisms responsible for thesedeposits. Geochemical indicators, such asbromine enrichment, have also been used toindicate marine source of the deposits.

Usually, it is more difficult to distinguish storm-surge deposits from those due to tsunamis becauseboth contain marine macro- or microfossils, havesaltwater chemistry, and progressively thin andfine inland from the shore. The distance from theshore of the deposits, the presence of severalrelatively thick normally graded&') layers that mayindicate several high-energy tsunami waves, andthe presence of rip-up clasts that also indicate highenergy of the tsunami waves are used to distin-guish deposits of tsunami origin.

Association of the sand layer with paleoseismicityis also used to link a sand layer to a tsunamisource. Coseismic coastal subsidence mayaccompany great earthquakes on subduction zones(Atwater 1996). A buried tsunami sand layer maybe deposited over a layer of marsh peat, which isthen overlain by tidal mud after subsidence.

The database compiled by Peters et al. (2003)contains data on the age, number of deposits,sedimentary characteristics, and identifyingfeatures of the Cascadia tsunami deposits.

(a) Normal grading of a sediment layer refers toupwards fining in contrast to inverse grading thatrefers to an upwards coarsening of sediments

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Although the focus of the database is on tsunamisoriginating in the Cascadia subduction zone, datarelated to transoceanic tsunamis have also beenincluded. However, the authors stated thattsunami deposits located in the Puget Sound areathat are not believed to be of Cascadia origin wereexcluded.

The database is presented as a spreadsheet and ageographic information system coverage. Thedatabase includes the following informationrelated to each reported deposit:

I. location: the name of the place where thetsunami deposit is located, including the nameof the state

2. catalog number: an arbitrary serial number3. site number: a number assigned to the

deposits, in ascending order with latitude4. core/section/secondary location: individual

cores from a site that are listed separately areidentified using a core number, or the sectionor secondary location number used by thereferenced study

5. latitude and longitude6. depositional setting: such as a lake, coastal

marsh, freshwater marsh, etc.7. physiographic setting: such as head of inlet,

coastal lake or marsh, etc.8. inundation distance: inland from the shore9. inundation reference: such as open coast,

upriver, etc.10. elevation above mean sea level11. barrier elevation: elevation of a barrier that the

tsunami must have crossed to lay the deposit12. observation/sampling method: method used to

collect the data, such as observation from andoutcrop, the type of coring device used, etc.

13. number of cores/sampling localities at a site14. number of subsidence events associated with

great earthquakes on the Cascadia subductionzone, irrespective of their association withtsunamis

15. number of tsunami events documented at thesite

16. whether coseismic subsidence was present17. number of tsunami deposits at a site that are

associated with coseismic subsidence18. number of tsunami deposits at a site that are

not associated with coseismic subsidence19. event number referring to the tsunami or

subsidence, from youngest to oldest20. tsunami event number, from youngest to

oldest21. subsidence event number, from youngest to

oldest22. amount of subsidence23. age of deposition in radiocarbon years before

present (usually reported relative to 1950A.D.)

24. age range: the range of possible ages incalendar years before present (present taken as1950 A.D.)

25. correlated date: the date of the event thedeposit is correlated to by the author, orotherwise accepted

26. method used to determine the age of deposits27. thickness of the tsunami deposit28. maximum thickness29. geometry: gradient, landward thinning, and

continuity of the deposit30. number of tsunami deposit layers31. layer thickness32. layer characteristics, such as texture, grading,

etc.33. underlying and overlying material34. lower and upper contacts that bound the

deposit35. grain size range, distribution, and description36. textural gradient in the horizontal direction,

such as landward fining or fming away fromthe channel

37. textural gradient in the vertical direction38. sorting, which is a measure of the variability

of grain sizes in the deposit39. other sedimentary properties described by

authors of the original report40. minerological composition of sediment grains,

such as presence of quartz, feldspar, or lithics41. inclusions, such as plant material, shells,

mnicrofossils, artifacts, etc.42. flow direction as indicated by the deposit43. microfossils, such as forams and diatoms44. chemical evidence

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45. additional description pertaining to thedeposits, the site, or publications that do not fitother categories

46. reference, including type and date ofpublication

47. a reference map of the location.

At this time, no similar sources of paleo-tsunamidata arc known that describe other regions of the

United States. It may be necessary to collect site-specific data using the same methods andapproaches described above. The list of char-acteristics given above may be used as a startingpoint of the inventory of site-specific paleotsunamicharacterization.

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5 PROBABLE MAXIMUM TSUNAMI

5.1 Introduction

Consideration of tsunamis in determination ofsafety of a nuclear power plant is required byTitle 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2,Design bases for protection against naturalphenomena, which states:

Structures, systems, and components impor-tant to safety shall be designed to withstandthe effects of natural phenomena such asearthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods,tsunami, and seiches without loss of capa-bility to perform their safety functions. Thedesign bases for these structures, systems, andcomponents shall reflect: (1) Appropriateconsideration of the most severe of the naturalphenomena that have been historicallyreported for the site and surrounding area,with sufficient margin for the limitedaccuracy, quantity, and period of time inwhich the historical data have been accumu-lated, (2) appropriate combinations of theeffects of normal and accident conditions withthe effects of the natural phenomena and(3) the importance of the safety functions to beperformed. (Emphasis added.)

The PMT is not estimated using a probabilisticapproach. It is, on the contrary, a deterministicapproach that incorporates ideas of transpositionand maximization, similar to the methods adoptedby the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-istration National Weather Service Hydrometeoro-logical Reports for estimation of ProbableMaximum Precipitation (Schreiner and Riedel1978). At this time, sufficient observed dataregarding tsunamis, particularly large tsunamis,and their effects are not available to support acomprehensive probabilistic tsunami-hazardanalysis or PTHA (e.g., see Geist and Parsons2006) at all probable nuclear power plant sites in

the United States to arrive at a set of design bases.In the future, as more data are collected andscientific methods advance, PTHA may become aviable tool to assess tsunami hazards and tospecify these design bases.

A complete PMT assessment is only required ifthe hierarchical-hazard-assessment approachdescribed in Chapter 2 of this report results in adetermination that the site region and the site arcsubject to tsunami hazards, or that the result of thehierarchical assessment is inconclusive that thesite is not subject to hazards from a tstmami.

5.2 Definition

For the purposes of this report, we have adoptedthe following definition of the PMT:

PMT is that tsunami for which the impact atthe site is derived from the use of bestavailable scientific information to arrive at aset of scenarios reasonably expected to affectthe nuclear power plant site, taking intoaccount (1) appropriate consideration of themost severe of the natural phenomena thathave been historically reported for the site andsurrounding area, with sufficient margin forthe limited accuracy, quantity, and period oftime in which the historical data have beenaccumulated; (2) appropriate combinations ofthe effects of normal and accident conditionswith the effects of the natural phenomena; and(3) the importance of the safety functions to beperformed.

The salient points of this definition of a PMT arc(1) it allows use of the best available scientificmethods and data, (2) it accounts for the limitedperiod of time in which tsunami data have beencollected in the United States, (3) it allows forsufficient margin in design bases to account for thelimited accuracy and quantity of observed data,

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and (4) it allows for accounting of the importanceof the safety functions to be performed by theaffected SSC.

5.3 Determination of ProbableMaximum Tsunami at aNuclear Power Plant Site

The Standard Review Plan (USNRC 2007)describes PMT hazards and the approach fordctermination of safety of a nuclear power plant.The areas of review for a nuclear power plantsiting include historical tsunami data, the PMTincluding relevant source mechanisms, tsunamipropagation and inundation models, wave runup,inundation, and drawdown, hydrostatic andhydrodynamic forces, debris and projectiles, andeffects of sediment erosion and deposition. Thefollowing subsections describe the approaches andmethods for determination of the PMT andhazards posed by it at the nuclear power plant site.

5.3.1 Tsunamigenic Mechanisms and

Sources

For determination of the PMT, three mechanismsshould be considered: earthquakes, landslides, andvolcanoes. Regardless of a site being coastal orinland, if it is located near a water body that cansupport generation of a tsunami or a tsunami-likewave triggered by any of the three mechanisms, a

PMT assessment should be carried out.

Because both near- and far-field sources should beconsidered for determination of the PMT, thesearch area for tsunamigenic mechanisms can bequite large, especially for sites located on thecoasts. This search should review all availablesources of historical and prehistorical data andcreate a list of tsunamigenic sources for allmechanisms that may be relevant for the nuclearpower plant site.

It may not be possible to a priori determine whichtsunamigenic source may generate the PMT.Several candidate sources and the tsunamis

generated from them may require evaluation underthe most favorable tsunamigenic source andambient conditions. Deterministic tsunamipropagation and inundation modeling can becarried out with appropriately conservative sets ofsource parameters to evaluate the final PMT for agiven nuclear power plant site.

5.3.2 Source Parameters

For determination of the PMT, conservative valuesand ranges of source parameters should bespecified. This ensures that the design bases of thenuclear power plant will not be exceeded. Acomprehensive search of historical and prehis-torical records should be undertaken to identifypotential tsunanmigenic sources relevant to thenuclear power plant site. It is possible that forsome tsunamigenic mechanisms and sources, acorresponding historical or prehistorical tsunamimay not be identified, in part due to the relativelyshort period of record. However, for such mecha-nisms and sources, their maximum tsunamigenicparameters may be estimated and a deterministichydrodynamic modeling used to assess theirpotential impact at the nuclear power plant site.

Determination of source parameter values asso-ciated with the three mechanisms may requireexpert opinion supplemented with historical casestudies and available historical data. An exampleof such a study is given by Gonzdilez et al. (2003).

The following source parameters for each of thesource mechanisms should be determined.

EarthquakesThe source parameters for a tsunamigenicearthquakes are

1.2.3.

4.5.

location (latitude, longitude, and depth)moment magnitude, M,fault dimensions (rupture length andwidth)dipstrike

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6.7.

slip distributionshear modulus.

5.3.3 Initial Waveform

LandslidesThe source parameters for a submarine landslideare

1. slide location (latitude and longitude)2. slide orientation (directivity)3. slide volume4. slide speed and acceleration5. cohesiveness of the slide material.

The source parameters for a subaerial landslide,including ice falls, in addition to those listed abovefor submarine landslide are

I. density of slide material2. impact Froude number.

VolcanoesThe source parameters for a tsunamigenicpyroclastic flow are

1. location2. orientation3. density of the flow material4. dimensions of the flow5. impact Froude number.

The source parameters for a caldera collapse are

1. location2. orientation3. caldera dimensions4. fixed wall height5. cavity depth after the collapse.

The source parameters for a submarine volcanicexplosion are

1. location2. volcanic Explosivity Index.

The source parameters for tsunamigenic-debrisavalanches and flank failures are similar to thosefor submarine and subaerial landslides.

The tsunamigenic mechanism results in thedisplacement of the water surface, which is theinitial tsunami waveform. This initial waveformevolves hydrodynamically into the train of wavesthat propagates from the source toward the site.For short-duration mechanisms (i.e., when theduration of source dynamics is much smaller thanthe period of the tsunami waves), the couplingbetween the source and the initial waveform canbe neglected without significantly affecting theproperties of the tsunami waves. This approach issuitable for earthquake-generated tsunamis. Theformulation of Mansinha and Smylie (1971), latermodified by Okada (1985), based on an elasticearth crust may be used to specify the initialwaveform. The Okada formulation is a closed-forn analytical expression and applies to point andfinite rectangular sources, suitable for computingan average slip for the entire fault plane. For morecomplex ruptures, a slip-distribution model maybe needed. One way to construct a complexrupture pattern is to divide the fault plane in aseries of smaller faults, each of these individuallydescribed by an Okada formulation. Usually, thedisplacement pattern of the bottom is assumed toalso apply to the water surface and, therefore, alsospecifies the initial waveform of the tsunami.

The velocity of landslides can often be comparableto the phase velocity of the tsunami wavesgenerated by it. Explicit landslide models shouldbe employed in such cases (e.g., Titov andGonzilez 2001). Some examples of landslidemodels applied for tsunami generation aredescribed by Jiang and LeBlond (1992), Watts(1998), and Fine et al. (1999).

Because the volcanic mechanisms that generatetsunamis are often similar to submarine andsubaerial landslides, explicit models of initialwavefonn generation firom volcanic sourcemechanisms may be needed.

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5.3.4 Wave Propagation Simulation

Oceanic tsunamisTsunamis generated by large earthquakes havelong wavelengths due to the large spatial scale ofthe seismic source. The tsunami wavelengths canrange from tens to hundreds of miles. The tsunamiwavelength is large compared to the depth of thewater [the deepest point in Earth's oceans is theMariana Trench in the Pacific at 6.8 mi(10.9 km)], and, therefore, tsunami waves arecalled long waves or shallow water waves, thelatter term referring to the shallowness of thewater compared to the wavelength.

Although closed-form expressions are availablethat describe some properties of the tsunami (e.g.,the propagation speed of the tsunami in deepocean, which can be used to approximatelydetermine the time of arrival of a far-field tsunamiat a given site), detailed behavior of tsunami-wavedynamics can only be detennined using numericalsimulations.

Two community numerical models are available:(t) the Method of Splitting Tsunami (MOST)developed originally at University of SouthernCalifornia (Titov 1997; Titov and Synolakis 1997)and since implemented, maintained, and improvedat NOAA's Pacific Marine EnvironmentalLaboratory (Titov and Gonzflez 1997); and (2) theset of models (TSUNAMI-N 1, TSUNAMI-N2,and TSUNAMI-N3 for simulation of near-fieldtsunamis and TSUNAMI-F l and TSUNAMI-F2for simulation of far-field tsunamis) developed byImamura and colleagues (Imamura et al. 2006).These models have the advantage of widespreaduse in the tsunami-modeling community and havebenefitted from comparisons with observedtsunami data and subsequent updates to the modelformulations.

Summary of the MOST modelThe MOST model is a suite of numerical programsthat simulate all three phases of the tsunami:generation by an earthquake, propagation acrossthe ocean, and runup.

Tsunami generation is simulated using the faultplane model of Okada (1985). This modelassumes an incompressible water layer overlies anelastic half space that represents the crust of theearth.

The MOST model uses non-linear shallow-waterwave equations, including Coriolis terms,expressed in a spherical coordinate system.Dispersion of the tsunami waves, which is aneffects of the dependence of wave celerity on thefrequency of component waves, is handled bytaking advantage of the numerical dispersioninherent in a finite difference scheme as suggestedby Shuto (1991). This dispersion scheme allowsMOST to use non-dispersive governing equations.The governing equation are (Titov and Gonzmlez1997)

(uh)2 + (vhcos0)oRcos0

ut + R-s + VUt + ghRo - Rdo + fvRcoso R Rcoso5 Rcosob

uvL wo gho gd0Vt +R+ = -fu

Rcoso R R R

where 2 denotes the direction along the longitude,V' denotes the direction along the latitude, t denotestime, h(2, ýo, t) is the amplitude of the wave, d(O, (p,t) is the depth of undisturbed water, u(2, (p, t) is thedepth-averaged velocity in the direction of thelongitude, v(0, (p, t) is the depth-averaged velocityin the direction of the latitude, R is the radius ofthe earth, g is the acceleration due to gravity,f=2wsin•0 is the Coriolis parameter, co is theangular velocity of the earth, and subscripts 2, (p,and t denote partial derivatives with respect tothose space and time dimensions. A more detaileddescription of the model can be found in Gonzdlezet al. (2007).

Summary of the immamura modelsTwo general classes of tsunami models, one for

near-field tsunamis (TSUNAMI-NI, TSUNAMI-

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N2, and TSUNAMI-N3) and the other for far-fieldtsunamis (TSUNAMI-Fl and TSUNAMI-F2)were described by UNESCO (1997) and Imamuract al. (2006).

The near-field tsunami models use a cartesiancoordinate system, and the far-field tsunamimodels use a spherical coordinate system. Bothsets of models are based on the non-dispersive,nonlinear, shallow-water wave-governingequations similar to that used by the MOSTmodel; the far-field models also incorporate theCoriolis terms in their governing equations. Bothsets of models use a finite-difference discretizationscheme to solve the governing equations over acomputational grid.

TSUNAMI-N 1 uses linear approximation of thenonlinear shallow-water wave equations with aconstant computational grid. TSUNAMI-N2 useslinear approximation in deep waters and theshallow-water wave equations in shallow watersand for computing runup, both over a constantcomputational grid. TSUNAMI-N3 uses linearapproximation of the nonlinear shallow-waterwave equations with a varying computational grid.

TSUNAMI-Fl model uses linear approximation ofthe nonlinear, shallow-water wave equations tosimulate propagation of the tsunami in deep oceanusing a spherical coordinate system. TSUNAMI-F2 model uses linear equations, but also includescoastal runup simulations.

Tsunamis in other water bodiesExcept for the very last stages of runup on theshore, when the tsunami wave steepens to such anextent that breaking may occur, the tsunami can beconsidered a long wave (Titov and Synolakis1997). Therefore, tsunami-like waves in otherbodies of water may also be simulated using themodels described above. The main differencebetween oceanic tsunamis and tsunami-like wavesin other water bodies may be the source mecha-nism. Landslides and hillslope failures may bemore likely to generate tsunami-like waves inwater bodies other than oceans. Under these

circumstances, a source model may be needed todescribe the initial tsunami generation fromlandslides, hillslope failures, and debris ava-lanches (i.e., subaerial landslides). The initialwaveform predicted by these source models maybe used to specify the initial conditions for thetsunami propagation and inundation models, suchas those described above.

5.3.5 The NOAA Center for Tsunami

Research Tsunami Propagation

Database

Characteristics of far-field tsunamis generated byan earthquake source depend mainly on a fewsource parameters, like the location andmagnitude-assuming some typical displacementmechanism (Titov et al. 1999; Gica et al. 2006).Also, linear approximation of the shallow-waterwave equations has been found to be applicable indeep ocean. Therefore, a set of unit sources-located along the tsunamigenic subduction zonescan be used to construct a tsunami-propagationscenario from an earthquake of given magnitudeand a given location by linearly combining thenumerical solution from all unit sources-isneeded to describe an earthquake of interest.

This approach was used to construct a forecastdatabase of precomputed propagation solutions forunit sources around the Pacific and a preliminarydatabase in the Atlantic. Details of the definitionof these unit sources is described by Titov et al.(1999; 2005) and Gica et al. (2006). The sourceparameters for the unit sources in the Pacific arespecified using the latest estimates of theseparameters in the corresponding subduction zones(Kirby et al. 2006). A similar effort is alsounderway to define unit sources in the Atlanticthat are of relevance to the U.S. coastline.

One potential use of the NOAA Center forTsunami Research (NCTR) tsunami-forecastdatabase is to provide boundary conditions tonear-shore inundation models. This approach ofseparating the inundation modeling (which is sitedependent) and the modeling of generation and

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propagation is an attractive approach. The NCTRtsunami database can provide robust and verifiedestimates of tsunami propagation. Near-shore datacollection for parameterization of a tsunamiinundation model and estimation of hazardmatrices can be carried out on case-by-case, site-specific requirements. However, this approach isavailable only for earthquake sources in thePacific and is being developed for Atlanticsources. Submarine landslide and volcanicsources are not treated similarly. Also, thisapproach may not work for inland water bodies.

5.4 Hazard Assessment

The effects of a tsunami at a nuclear power plantsite are described in Chapter 3 of this report. Inthis section, hazards, and specifically metrics thatdescribe these hazards and can be used in thespecification of design bases of the nuclear powerplant, are described.

The effects of tsunamis on the shoreline can be

highly variable depending on the characteristics ofthe tsunami, including its directivity and wave-length, the interaction of the tsunami waves withoffshore and near-shore bathymnetry, and thegeotechnical characteristics of the near-shoresubstrate. Due to these geospatial variations andthe highly nonlinear behavior of the tsunamiwaves near the shoreline, the severity of varioushazards from different tsunamis may be different.Consequently, the most severe occurrence of aparticular tsunami hazard at a site may result from

a set of tsunamis, not from a particular tsunami.Because the goal of the tsunami-hazards assess-ment is to determine the most severe hazard at a

site, hazard assessment from a set of PMTs may berequired. Therefore, tsunami-hazard assessmentshould consider a set of candidate PMTs for whichhazards at the site should be determined. Thehazard that is the most severe among this set ofcandidate PMTs should be used.

5.4.1 High Water Level

Flooding is the most obvious of the hazards from a

tsunami. The runup, which is defined as themaximum ground elevation that the tsunami wavesreach above a standard datum, is the metric used todefine the high-water level. Ambient waterconditions, such as high tide, can affect the high-water level.

The runup is obtained as an output from theinundation model. Significant progress has beenmade in the recent past to improve the immdationmodels, especially with regard to validation ofmodel predictions with observed runup data (Titovand Synolakis 1997). Model predictions of runupscan be in disagreement with observations, often bya large margin and especially with regard to themaximum observed runup along the coastline(Titov and Synolakis 1997). Some of the errorsmay be attributed to insufficient resolution of localbathymctric and topographic data.

Along with the maximum runup, the areal extentof the tsunami runup should also be considered.The uncertainties in model prediction of runupalso extend to the prediction of areal extent of

flooding during tsunami inundation.

Due to significant uncertainty that still exists inpredictions from inundation models, care should

be taken in application of these models and use oftheir predictions to specify design bases withrespect to the locations of SSC important to safetyas well as their grade elevations. Where possible,inundation models should be verified with locallyavailable runup data. Sufficient margins should be

provided for these uncertainties in all design basesthat may be derived from such simulations.

5.4.2 Low Water Level

Low-water level can lead to a dry intake, compro-

mising the safety of a nuclear power plant if theintake is used to provide safety-related coolingwater. The drawdown, which is defined as theminimum water-surface elevation caused by thetsunami waves at the shoreline, is the metric used

to describe low-water level. Ambient conditions,such as low tide, can affect the low-water level.

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The drawdown, similarly to the runup, is predictedby the inundation model. Because of uncertaintyinherent in the predictions from the inundationmodels, arguments similar to those for runup alsoapply to the drawdown. In addition, it is moredifficult to obtain accurate measurements ofdrawdown caused by a tsunami because theselocations are under water during normal condi-tions. Usual techniques, like high-water marks orelevation of debris lines used to infer runupsduring post-tsunami surveys, are not applicable.Accurate measurements of drawdown mainlyrelies on eyewitness accounts, photographs, or

satellite imagery. Therefore, validation ofdrawdown predictions from inundation models ismore difficult than that for runups.

Due to the reasons described above, care should betaken in interpretation of drawdown predictionsfrom inundation models, and sufficient marginsshould be provided in all design bases that may beaffected by these predictions.

5.4.3 Scouring Near Safety-Related

Structures

Tonkin et al. (2003) proposed a scour enhance-ment parameter A, defined as the fraction of thebuoyant weight of the sediment grains that issupported by the pore-water pressure gradient.They provided an expression for A as a function ofthe depth of the substrate given

asA(ds) =A 1- 4i2erfc 2d

where Yb is the buoyant specific weight of the

saturated soil, d. is the movable soil depth, c, is thecoefficient of consolidation, AP is the peak surfacepressure that decreases linearly to zero over thetime period AT, and i2erfc[o] is the second integralof the complementary error function. Tonkin et al.(2003) found that the scouring occurred to a depthsuch that the estimated value of A was 0.5.

The condition that any enhanced scour may takeplace is obtained by letting d,-0, which yields the

following expression (Tonkin et al. 2003):

2 APA(O)= T 7b c AT

The expressions above may be used to estimate ifany enhanced scouring near safety-relatedstructures is expected to occur during tsunamiinundation and drawdown. The foundations ofsafety-related structures should be designed toprotect against scouring. An alternative optionmay be to site all safety-related structures in areasthat are not exposed to enhanced scouring causedby tsunami waves.

5.4.4 Deposition Near Safety-Related

Structures

No models of sediment transport during tsunamishave been established. On a case-by-case basis,site-specific determination of sediment transportand accumulation, and their effects on SSCimportant to safety, should be undertaken. AllSSC important to safety should be sited such thatsediment accumulation would not result in loss oftheir functionality.

5.4.5 Forces on Safety-Related Structures

Hydrostatic forceThe hydrostatic force, fh, per unit width on a wallthat is not overtopped by the tsunami waves isgiven by Yeh et al. (2005):

fh = 2 g 2g

wherep is the density of water, g is the accelera-tion due to gravity, h is the water depth, and up isthe component of water velocity normal to thewall. The force acts horizontally at a distance hRabove the base of the wall, with hR given by thefollow expression (Yeh et al. 2005):

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hR jh+ JNotice that the hydrostatic force also includes avelocity head component, in contrast withtraditional definition of hydrostatic forces. Thevelocity head is included because inundating waterduring tsunami runup will typically have asignificant velocity component.

HIydrodynamic forceThe parameters of tsunami flow that are importantto assess dynamic effects (Gonzdlez et al. 2007)are total flow depth,

h=d+ 7,

where d is the still water depth and q is the localamplitude of the tsunami; the tsunami currentspeed,

V= U2 +V2

where u and v arc velocity components in the twohorizontal directions in a reference coordinatesystem; the acceleration of tsunami current in thedirection of the flow,

dVdt'

where t refers to the time dimension; the inertialcomponent,

hdVdt

and the momentum flux,

Kanoglu and Synolakis (2006) investigated theevolution of two simple waveforms on a simplesloping beach and found that even for wave runupover simple geometries, the points of maximumdepth of inundation and maximum flow velocityare not the same. They also found that thelocation of the point of maximum velocitydepends on the incoming waveform. Therefore,care should be exercised in interpreting a fewdynamic parameters estimated from inundationmodels.

The hydrodynamic force, or the drag force, Fd, ona structure in the tsunami flow field is given byYeh et al. (2005):

Fd = 1 PCd Aup2

where Cd is the coefficient of drag and A is theprojected area of the structure on a plane normal tothe flow direction. Appropriate values of thecoefficient of drag are provided by FEMA (2005)and reproduced here in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Drag coefficients for ratios of widthto depth (w/ds) and width to height (w/h)

[adapted from FEMA (2005)].

Ratio (w/d, or w/h) C,

1-12 1.25

13-20 1.3

21-32 1.4

33-40 1.5

41-80 1.75

81-120 1.8

>120 2.0

hV2

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Wave forcesBreaking wave forces on vertical piles andcolumns is given by FEMA (2005):

12

Fbkrp =1pgCdb D Hb2

2

where D is the diameter of the pile or column, H,is the breaking-wave height, and Cdb is the

breaking wave drag coefficient. FEMA (2005)recormnends Hb = 0.78 d,, where d, is the designstillwater-flood depth. The recommended value of

Cdb is 2.25 for square or rectangular piles andcolumns and 1.75 for round piles and columns(FEMA 2005).

Breaking-wave forces on vertical walls is given byFEMA (2005) based on two cases: (1) where thewave breaks against a wall that encloses dry space

behind it, and (2) where the stillwater level is sameon both sides of the wall. The estimation equation

for fb,,, the total breaking wave force per unitwidth of the wall, is

F2S=(1.1 CP +2.41)p g ds2 for case 1

f (1.1 Cp+1.91)pgds forcase2

where CP is the dynamic pressure coefficient(Table 5-2 below).

Table 5-2. Value of dynamic pressure coefficient, Cp, as a function of probability of exceedance[adapted from FEMA (2005)].

CP Building Type Probability of Exceedance

1.6 Accessory structure, low hazard 0.5

2.8 Coastal residence 0.01

3.2 High-occupancy building or critical facility 0.001

5.4.6 Debris Accumulation

No models have been established for debrisaccumulation during tsunamis. On a case-by-casebasis, site-specific determination of debristransport and accumulation, and their effects onSSC important to safety, should be undertaken.All SSC important to safety should be sited suchthat debris accumulation would not result in lossof their functionality.

5.4.7 Projectiles

The impact force, F1, on the structures at the water

level is given by Yeh et al. (2005):

=dUb

F, =m ab=Md =mudt ti

where m is the mass of the impacting projectile, a,is the acceleration of the impacting projectile, ub isthe velocity of the impacting projectile, u, is theapproach velocity assumed equal to flow velocity,and t, is the duration of impact. FEMA (2005)provides durations of impact for different con-struction materials (Table 5-3).

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Table 5-3. Impact durations for selected construction materials [adapted from FENLA (2005)].

Type of Construction Impact Duration (see)Material Wall Pile

Wood 0.7-1.1 0.5-1.0

Steel Not applicable 0.2-0.4

Reinforced concrete 0.2-0.4 0.3-0.6

Concrete masonry 0.3-0.6 0.3-0.6

Large objects transported by the tsunami waves,such as boats, may turn into projectiles impactinga structure at a height above the surface of thewater level. These potential impacts should bestudied carefully to specify the impact location onthe structure and appropriately modify the designbases. The assumption that debris velocity isequal to flow velocity may be accurate for smallobjects, but may overestimate the debris velocityof large objects (FEMA 2005).

5.5 Combined Effects

At the time a tsunami arrives at the nuclear powerplant site, ambient conditions may affect itsproperties. For example, at a coastal site, tides canaffect the ambient highest and lowest water levels.From a design perspective, a low-tide level (e.g.,the 90% exceedance low tide) should be combinedwith the drawdown from the tsunami to arrive atthe low-water level. Similarly, a high-tide level(e.g., the 10% exceedance high tide) should becombined with the runup to arrive at the high-water level.

In the presence of offshore submerged currents,the effects of these currents on the propagation andinundation of tsunami waves should beconsidered. It may be desirable to include theeffects of such currents in the tsunami propagationand inundation models themselves to account for

any dynamic interaction between the current-flowfield and the tsunami-wave field.

For near-field earthquake-generated tsunamis, theeffects of the earthquake may need to be consid-ered in combination with those of the tsunami.For example, ground motion due to the earthquakemay be an additional precursor to a potentialliquefaction of the soil near the foundation ofsafety-related structures that are subsequentlyinundated and scoured by tsunami waves. Undersuch circumstances, the stresses from the earth-quake ground motion should be considered inaddition to the buoyant forces due to the tsunami-wave action to arrive at the design-basis lique-faction potential.

The effects of a tsunamigenic event to triggeranother tsunamigenic event should also beconsidered. For example, a severe earthquake maygenerate a tsunami by vertical displacement of thewater column in a water body and may also triggera subaqueous landslide that may generate aseparate tsunami. The two tsunamis may combineconstructively to produce far larger tsunamievents. Some researchers suggest that theseconcomitant tsunamigenic events may explainsome of the so-called tsunami earthquakes wherethe generated tsunami is abnormally largecompared with the size of the tsunami expectedbased on the earthquake magnitude alone.

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6 INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES

6.1 Introduction

This section presents a review of accepted inter-national practices for tsunami hazard assessment atnuclear power plant sites.

6.2 Japan

Tsunami-hazard assessment is a necessity fornuclear power plant sites in Japan. Consequently,Japanese tsunami-hazard-assessment approachesare some of the most advanced in the world. Theassessment method for the tsunami hazard atJapanese nuclear power plants is described by theJapanese Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE) (2002).

The Japanese assessment approach only describesearthquake-induced tsunamis. Volcano- andmeteorite-induced tsunamis are consideredinfrequent events in comparison with earthquakesand are excluded from consideration. The hazardcaused at the nuclear power plant site is alsolimited to estimation of high- and low-water levelscaused by the design tsunami.

The design tsunami is defined as one that causesthe maximum water rise or fall at the nuclearpower plant site. The design water level is definedas the sum of water level caused by the designtsunami in combination with an appropriate tidalcondition.

Even though Japan has the most extensivehistorical database of tsunamigenic earthquakes,significant uncertainty in source parameters exist.To account for this uncertainty, JSCE requires aparametric study, varying the source parameterswithin a reasonable range to numerically simulatea number of scenario tsunamis. The tsunami ortsunamis that cause the maximum water rise or fallat the site are selected as design tsunamis.

Design tsunamis are verified by comparing thewater level it produces with the water levelscorresponding to all recorded and numericallysimulated historical tsunamis at the site.Additionally, the envelope of scenario tsunami-water levels in the vicinity of the site shouldexceed all recorded or simulated historicaltsunami-water levels. An illustration of the designtsunami-concept is shown in Figure 6-1. Thenumerical models used for simulation of scenariotsunamis to estimate water levels at the site areverified using historical tsunami observation.

Scenario tsunamis (thin black curves inFigure 6-1) may produce maximum or minimumwater levels at points different from where the siteis located along the coastline in response todirectivity of the earthquake source andbathymetry along the wave-propagation path fromthe source to the coastline that modifies thewaveform. The scenario tsunami that results inthe maximum of minimum water level at the site(thick black line in Figure 6-1) is the designtsunami. Verification of the design tsunami isbased on two criteria: (1) the design tsunamishould produce a more severe water level than allhistorically recorded tsunami water levels and allnumerically inferred water levels from historicalknown tsunamis at the site (thick black curveenveloping vertical bars at the site in Figure 6-1),and (2) the envelope of scenario tsunamis (thickred line enveloping all high water levels producedby scenario tsunamis in Figure 6-1) shouldproduce more-severe water levels than allhistorically recorded tsunami water levels and allnumerically inferred water levels from historicallyknown tsunamis in the vicinity of the site. Bothnear- and far-field sources are considered fordetermining design tsunamis.

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Envelope of Scenario Tsunamis

A-

M'U

I

I IiI I I I,o Simulated Tsuna'mis

7e§re&snamis. Distance along ;the coiastline 6-

Figure 6-1. Conceptual illustration of design tsunami (JSCE, 2002), adapted with permission.

Standard fault model and scenario earthquakesA standard fault model is defined as an appropriateearthquake model for a site that is used innumerical tsunami simulations. The standard faultmodel is chosen based on careful examination ofhistorical tsunamigenic earthquakes and otherinformation regarding seismic activity that arerelevant for a given site.

The fault motion is modeled using a rectangular,uniform slip fault plane that is described usingnine parameters:

1. latitude of the reference point2. longitude of the reference point3. Depth of upper edge of the fault plane

4. fault length5. fault width6. slip amount7. strike direction8. dip angle9. slip angle.

Scenario earthquakes are specified by varyingtheir respective fault motion parameters within areasonable range of the baseline parameter set, thatof the standard fault model. Fault motion

parameters whose variations can be probabilis-tically quantified are varied one standard deviationfrom their baseline, standard fault model value.

Numerical tsunami simulationThe governing equations used in numericaltsunami simulations are depth-averaged hydro-dynamic equations that describe the tsunami wavepropagation in two dimensions. The linear versionof the governing equations may be used when theratio of wave height to water depth is sufficientlysmall. Nonlinear equations should be used whenthe ratio of wave height to water depth is not smalland nonlinearity of the governing equations cannotbe ignored. The equation of motion in this caseincludes an unsteady term, a pressure term, abottom-friction term, and an advection term thatfacilitate modeling of the steepening of the wavefront as it propagates in shallower waters. Adispersion term may also be needed if thecurvature of the tsunami waves increases duringpropagation.

Generally, for simulation of nearshore-tsunanipropagation, when the water depth is less than656 ft (200 in), nonlinear governing equations areemployed. The recommendation is to use an

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explicit finite difference scheme with a staggeredleapfrog method for discretization of the govern-ing equations. Two methods are specificallyrecommended: the Goto and Tanaka mcthods.Both methods use the staggered leapfrog scheme.The Goto method uses a conservation-typeadvection term, whereas the Tanaka method uses anonconscrvation-type advection scheme. Frictionterm in Goto method is based on a Manningapproach, whereas the Tanaka method uses ageneral friction term. Horizontal eddy viscosityterm is used in the Tanaka method, but isintroduced in the Goto method if thoughtnecessary. The Goto method uses a first-orderupstream-difference scheme with associatedaccuracy of first order for the advection term,whereas the Tanaka scheme uses the Lax-Wendroff scheme with second-order accuracy.

The depth-averaged two-dimensional hydro-dynamic equations may not be appropriate for usein runup simulation if the local topography nearthe maximum runup location possesses steepslopes of a small valley. These conditions wereencountered near the village Monai on OkushiriIsland during the Hokkaido Nansei-Oki tsunami.In such cases, a model based on nonlinear three-dimensional governing equations may becomenecessary.

Far-field propagation of a tsunami can beconducted using the linear version of thegoverning equations because the wave height issmall compared to water depth during transoceanicpropagation of the waves. If the initial tsunamiprofile has a wide range of frequency components,wave velocity varies slightly for these frequenciesin deep water, causing shorter waves to arrive aftera longer delay. The use of the dispersion termbecomes essential to reproduce this effect. Forfar-field tsunamis that travel transoceanic

distances, the Coriolis force due to earth's rotationshould also be considered in the governingequations.

Initial conditions for tsunami simulationsFor modeling of tsunami waves propagation, theinitial disturbance of the water surface due to theamount of vertical slip is needed. JSCE usuallydetermines the distribution of the vertical slipusing the Mansinha and Smylie (1971) method,which assumes that elastic properties of the earth'scrust near the fault are isotropic and homogeneous(i.e., Poisson Ratio v is 0.25 and Lame's constants,u and 2 are equal). If the conditions of isotropyand homogeneity cannot be assumed, JSCErecommends using the Okada (1985) method,which is more general.

Fault motions that generate large tsunamis arcassumed to last from several tens to approximately120 seconds. Fault durations of this order are notsignificantly different than an instantaneousdisplacement of the seafloor in terms of thenumerical simulation of the tsunami waves.Dynamics of the slip should be considered ifC. TL is greater than 0.04, where C is the tsunamiwave velocity, T,, is the duration of the faultmotion, and L is the wavelength of the tsunamiwave in the direction of the width of the faultplane.

The initial water-surface elevation is set equal tothe vertical slip amount if fault motion is con-sidered essentially instantaneous. The initialwater-surface elevation is the still-water elevationif a dynamic vertical slip amount is used tocharacterize the tsunamigenic effect of a long-duration fault motion. In both cases, the depth-integrated initial flux is set to zero.

Boundary conditions for tsunami simulationsThree general boundary conditions are needed intsunami wave-propagation simulations: (1) the

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offshore boundary condition, (2) the onshoreboundary condition, and (3) the overtlowboundary condition.

Offshore boundary conditions are specified atboundaries through which the tsunami waves passunaltered. It is rather difficult to prescribeboundary conditions that eliminate all reflection ofoutgoing waves back into the computationaldomain (see Chapter 5 in Vreugdenhil 1994). The

conventional method is to use discharge flux for aprogressive wave at the boundary based on themethod of characteristics (Aida 1969, 1970, 1974;Iwasaki and Yo 1.974). The free-transmission-boundary condition can also be specified using avirtual complete reflecting wall at the openboundary (Hino and Nakaza 1988; Imamura 2001)with careful placement of the wall to achieveaccuracy. The latter method for specification ofan open-boundary condition is applicable onlywhen the incidence angle of the waves on theboundary is nearly normal. Both boundaryconditions are applicable for tsunami waves

coming into the computational domain, acondition that is required for near-field computa-tion of a tsunami generated in the far field.

Onshore boundary conditions are specified at the

coastline. The nature of the boundary conditiondepends on whether runup on the land isconsidered. If tsunami runup is not considered, acomplete reflection-boundary condition isspecified by setting the discharge flux at thecoastline to zero. This condition is applied onlywhen water depth near the coastline is sufficient sothat the tsunami rundown does not expose the

bottom. If tsunami runup is considered, or if thewater depth near the coastline is shallow,boundary conditions related to the runup front areused. The shore topography is approximatedusing a series of steps normal to the shoreline. Atevery time step of the numerical solution, thelocation of the tsunami front is determined basedon computed water depth in computational gridcells. The method of Iwasaki and Mano (1979) isused in which (1) the tsunami front is assumed tobe located at the boundary of the cell in which thecomputed sum of wave height and still-waterdepth is positive and the cell in which thecomputed sum is zero or negative, (2) the totalwater depth at the cell boundary for calculation ofthe discharge flux is taken as the sum of the still-water depth at the boundary and the higher waveheight of the two neighboring cells, (3) the

discharge flux is estimated assuming that the slopeof the water surface can be approximated to thefirst order by the slope from the water level at thewave front to the bottom depth of the neighboringcell, and (4) when the total water depth approacheszero, the advection term is neglected.

Overflow boundary conditions are specified whenthe tsunami waves overtop a structure such asbreakwaters, dikes, or revetments (Figure 6-2). Ifthe structure is modeled as part of the groundtopography, the onshore boundary conditions forrunup computations are used. If the structure islocated offshore, usually placed at the boundary ofa grid cell in the discretization, two formulae areused depending on whether the structure isoffshore or at the coastline.

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Figure 6-2. Schematic representation of tsunami wave overflow of offshore structures (JSCE,2002), adapted with permission.

For offshore structures, the formula by Honma(1940) is used to compute the discharge over thestructure for complete and incomplete overflows:

q =p~ h1 V~ hii

q =2.6p h2 2~g (h1 -h_2)

when h2 < 2 h,3

when h2 > 2h3

condition is imposed at the structure allowingcomplete reflection of the tsunami waves.

For structures that are located at the coastline, thedischarge on the top of the structure is estimatedusing the broad-crested weir formula (Aida 1977):

q = 0.6 hx/gA-h

where b is the depth of water measured from thetop of the structure and Ah is the drop in waterlevel on the top of the structure from its originalposition (Figure 6-3).

where h, and h2 are the water depths measuredfrom the top of the structure in the front and theback of the structure, p=0.35, and g is theacceleration due to gravity. When the waves donot flow over the structure, a no-flow boundary

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WINS 1Ah

Figure 6-3. Schematic representation of tsunami overflow of coastal structures (JSCE, 2002),adapted with permission.

Spatial grid considerationsJSCE (2002) described several considerations forchoosing the size of the spatial grid for use in thenumerical simulation of tsunamis, which arcdescribed as adequate to obtain sufficient accuracywhen used with a staggered leapfrog scheme fordiscretization of governing differential equations:

1. In the tsunami source region, the grid sizeis determined based on dimensions of thesource region and the spatial scale of thetsunami; as a rule of thumb, grid sizeequal to 1/20th of one wavelength of thetsunami is used.

2. In the tsunami propagation region, the gridsize is determined based on refraction oftsunami waves caused by seafloorbathymetric features and the spatial scaleof the tsunami; in regions of simplebathymetry, grid size 1/20th of onewavelength of the tsunami may suffice;however, in regions where refractiondominates, grid size as small as 1/100th ofthe tsunami wavelength may be required.

3. In shallow waters near the coast, thespatial grid size is determined based onspatial scale of the tsunami, slope of theseafloor, bathymetry and coastal topo-

graphy, and size and shape of coastalstructures. Coastal areas with simplebathymetry and topography and whereeffects of coastal structures arc insignifi-cant, grid sizes varying from approxi-mately 328 ft (100 m) at a water depth of164 ft (50 m) or less to approximately82 ft (25 m) approaching the coastlinemay be sufficient. In the presence of portsand harbors, grid size less than 1/5th ofthe port entrance width may be necessary.Grid size less than 1/100th of the tsunamiwavelength may be necessary in V-shapedbays where the ratio of the tsunamiwavelength to the length of the bay is lessthan 6.

4. In the tsunami runup zone with simplebeach topography, the following criterionis used:

AxagTx -7x10-4

when Manning's coefficient of roughness,n=0.03, is used, or

AxagT2 -4x10-4

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if the friction term is not considered in thegoverning equations, where Ax is the gridcell size, a is the slope of the beach, and Tis the period of the tsunanLi waves.

Computational time stepThe computational time step in the numericalscheme is determined from considerations ofstability. Usually, the time steps are set to satisfythe Courant-Friedrichs-Lewy (CFL) condition,which requires that the time step, At, should not belarger than the travel time of the wave over onegrid cell:

AxA t

<

,2 g hmax

where hm.,, is the maxilmum water depth. In ageneral case, where different grid-cell sizes areused in different regions of the computational.domain, the time step is chosen such that the limitset by the CFL condition for the largest grid-cellsize is not exceeded. In practice, however, thechosen time step for the tsunami simulation issmaller than the limit set by the CFL conditionbecause of two reasons: to ensure that numericalerrors are controlled, and to ensure that the timestep is appropriate during high-speed currentduring the tsunami run-down when flow velocitymay become greater than the wave celerity.

Bathymetric and topographic dataThe latest available, high-resolution bathymetrydata is recommended for use in the tsunamisimulations. Generally, recent advances in echo-sounding techniques and their application toextensive areas provide high-quality bathymetrydata. For far-field tsunami simulations, global-

scale bathymetry datasets are required. The5-minute and 2-minute gridded global-reliefdatasets are used.

Topographic data in the inundation area isprepared according to the latest availabletopographical maps. Numerical maps of the

Geological Survey Institute and Japan Map Center

are utilized. Changes are topography is alsoconsidered. Careful consideration of disparategeorefrencing of global and Japanese datasets isalso carried out to maintain consistency betweendatasets.

Application of the Japan approach to otherlocationsPreliminary results from the application of theJapan approach for estimation of tsunami-waveheights were described at the workshop,"Workshop on the Physics of Tsunami, HazardAssessment Methods and Disaster Risk Manage-ment (Theories and Practices for ImplementingProactive Countermeasures)," held May 14-18,2007 in Trieste, Italy. The workshop was jointlysponsored by the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) and the Abdus Salam Inter-national Center for Theoretical Physics. SeveralIAEA member countries had expressed interest in2006 to begin applying the JSCE approach totsunami-hazard assessment at coastal nuclearpower plant sites. The availability of the JSCE(2002) document has facilitated the implementa-tion of the method 'in locations other than Japan.

Preliminary results from the application of themethod to a coastal nuclear power plant site inIndia were presented. Two other locations, inPakistan and in Egypt, were in early data-collec-tion phase at the time of this writing. Theconclusion drawn thus far from these earlyattempts to adopt the JSCE approach point to thereliance of the JSCE approach on the availabilityof a substantially large historical database oftsunami observations. These observations shouldcontain tsunami-source characteristics (the JSCEapproach only deals with earthquake sources) aswell as tsunami runup information at or near thesite of interest. At this time, few places outsideJapan meet the data requirements needed torigorously apply the JSCE approach. The IAEAmember countries will continue to collect moredata and attempt to adapt the JSCE approach totheir locations of interest.

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6.3 International Atomic EnergyAgency

The International Atomic Energy Agency

publishes a set of standards for safety evaluationsof nuclear power plant sites. These standards aredivided into Safety Fundamentals, Safety Require-ments, and Safety Guides, supplemented bytechnical reports and preliminary technicaldocuments, called TECDOCs, that containillustrative examples.

The Safety of Nuclear Installations, Safety SeriesNo. 110 (IAEA 1993), in the Safety Fundamentalsseries, presents basic concepts and principlesunderlying the regulation and safe managementand operation of nuclear power installations.Chapter 5 of this document focuses on technicalaspects of safety of nuclear installations, includingthose related to siting, design and construction,and operation and maintenance of the installation.Site Evahlation.jbr Nuclear Installations (IAEA2003a), in the Safety Requirements series, presentsthe requirements that are based on the conceptsand principles documented in the fundamentalsseries and must be met to ensure safety of anuclear installation. Chapter 3 of this documentlists tsunamis as one cause of flooding, theevaluation of which is a requirement under theIAEA guidelines. Flood HazardJbr NuclearPower Plants on Coastal and River Sites (IAEA2003b), in the Safety Guide series, providesrecommendations to meet the requirementsestablished in the Safety Requirements series(IAEA 2003a) with respect to flood hazards,including those caused by tsunamis, in the siteevaluation for nuclear power plants that may belocated on coastal and river sites.

IAEA (2003a) requirements state that the region inwhich a candidate site is located should beevaluated for potential for tsunamis. If such apotential exists, prehistorical and historical datashould be collected. The frequency of occurrence,magnitude, and height of regional tsunamis shouldbe estimated based on analysis of the collectedprehistorical and historical data and comparison ofthe site region with similar regions that may havebeen studied in greater detail with regard totsunamis. The hazards at the site should bedetermined based on physical and analyticalmodeling, where applicable. Coastal effects, such

as the amplification of the waves due to shoalingand other coastal effects, should be considered.

IAEA (2003b) defines coastal sites as those thatare located in open coastal regions and onenclosed or scmi-enclosed bodies of water andwhose hydrological responses cannot be comparedto those of a small lake. Open coastal regions aredefined as those areas of land that are directlyexposed to a major body of water. Enclosedbodies of water includes lakes and reservoirs.Semi-enclosed bodies of water include lagoons,estuaries, gulfs, fjords, and rias.

IAEA (2003b) recommends that flooding resultingfrom a PMT be considered for a coastal site. Itdefines the PMT as "... the hypothetical tsunamihaving that combination of characteristics whichwill make it the most severe, in terms of flooding,that can reasonably be expected to occur at thesite." Tsunamigenic sources that should beconsidered in site evaluation include earthquakes,landslides (including submarine landslides),

submarine volcanoes, and falling ice. At a riversite, floods resulting from large waves induced byvolcanoes, landslides, and avalanches in water

basins should be considered.

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Preliminary investigationPreliminary investigation related to floodingshould be carried out at the site selection stage toestablish the potential of flooding at the candidatesite based on examination of available historicaldata and application of empirical and approximatemethods to estimate the extreme flood (IAEA2003b).

Catalogs of historical tsunamis should be searchedto determine whether the site is subject totsunamis. The potential for both near- and far-field sources to generate a tsunami that may affectthe candidate site should be investigated. Nearbytide-gauge records may be used to estimate themaximum recorded tsunami wave heights. Basedon coastal configuration, the correlation oftsunami effects at the site and that at the tide-gauge location may be established.

Preliminary estimates of the height and extent ofthe extreme wave should be made from analysis ofcollected historical data, bathymetry characteris-tics, and consideration of a conservative referencewater level. Maps prepared for land-use planningand flood emergencies, aerial photographs andsatellite imagery, and any available PMT studiesin coastal areas may also be used for preliminaryscreening of the site.

If the preliminary investigation results in theconclusion that the site is potentially affected bytsunamis, a detailed study should be carried out toestablish design bases for the proposed plant(IAEA 2003b).

Data collectionFor a detailed tsunami-hazard assessment, adiverse set of data is needed. This data setincludes hydrological, oceanographic andhydrographic, seismic, and geophysical data:

1. locations and hydrological characteristicsof all nearby bodies of water, includingstreams, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, estuaries,gulfs and fjords, and oceans

2. hydrological and topographical charac-

teristics of the site showing natural andartificial drainage features and anyproposed changes

3. tides, sea-level anomalies, and waterlevels of nearby bodies of water

4. bathymetry of water bodies, particularlythe near-shore region

5. locations and details of offshorestructures, such as seawalls or breakwaters

6. near-shore currents induced by tide andwind

7. littoral drift8. historical tsunami data, particularly

tsunamis recorded at the site9. seismic and geological data to determine

source parameters10. historical and potential future sites of

subaerial and submarine landslides11. volcanoes, including submarine-volcanic

activity12. sediment characteristics of the seafloor

near proposed plant structures.

Detailed topographic and bathymetric maps areneeded for tsunami-hazard assessment. If suchdata do not exist for the area near the plant site,surveys should be performed to prepare such mapsor collect data from available survey methods.Detailed topographic data are needed in thetsunami-inundation zone. Detailed bathymetrydata is needed from the shoreline out to a waterdepth of approximately 98-164 ft (30-50 m).Topographic and bathymetric maps or othersources of these data, such as digital elevation ordepth data, should be combined at the shoreline tocreate a seamless map or dataset.

Simulation of tsunami wavesIAEA (2003b) recommends that the PMTgenerated from the worst-case tsunamigenic-source parameters should be determined. Bothnear- and far-field sources should be considered.Historical records of tsunamis, if available, should

be used to validate the predictions of the numericalmodels used for simulation of the tsunami waves.

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For submarine earthquake-generated tsunamis, thedisplacement of the sea floor should be estimatedbased on the assumption that the fault movementoccurs in a semi-infinite elastic homogeneousmedium. The fault movement is characterized byits location, depth, and length, and the width anddislocation of the fault plane. The initial tsunamiwaveform should be assumed to be the same as thestatic vertical displacement of the sea floor.Application of more sophisticated techniques thatconsider heterogeneity of fault movement shouldbe carefully validated.

For landslide-generated tsunamis, dynamics of themass movement should be determined to estimatethe initial tsunami wavefonn. The parameters thatdescribe the landslide dynamics include thevelocity, the duration, and the discharge of themass movement. For tsunamis generated byvolcanic activity, IAEA (2003b) recommnends thatthree generation mechanisms should be con-sidered: the impact of rocks falling into the waterafter ejection, an underwater explosion that mayresult in a rapid rise of the water surface, and acaldera collapse. Characteristics of the volcanicmechanisms should be used to estimate the initialtsunami waveform. The simulation of the tsunamican be carried out in a manner similar to that forthe earthquake-generated tsunami.

Far-field tsunamis may be treated as long linearwaves while accounting for the Coriolis forceduring the propagation phase. The initial tsunamiwavefield consists of many component frequen-cies that propagate at different celerities. For atsunami that travels long distances, the differencein speed of component frequencies results indispersion of the waves. IAEA (2003b) recom-mends a parameter Pa, which may be used todetermine if dispersion effects should be con-sidered in simulation of waves for a far-fieldtsunami:

a (_6h) 1/3a

where h is water depth, a is the horizontaldimension of the tsunamige.nic source, and R is thedistance from the tsunamigenic source to the site.If the value of P,, is larger than 4, frequency-dependent dispersion effects may be neglected andlinear governing equations with accounting of theCoriolis force may be used. Otherwise, linearizedBoussinesq equations that include the first-ordereffects of frequency-dependent dispersion and theeffects of the Coriolis force should be used.

The long-wave approximation for near-fieldtsunamis may not be applicable since short-periodcomponents may also be significant near thetsunamigenic source. IAEA (2003b) recommendsthat simplifying assumptions for near-fieldtsunami should be carefully and criticallyexamined and should be used only if they can bedemonstrated to provide conservative results.IAEA (2003b) recommends that for a water depthexceeding 656 ft (200 mi), linear long eaveequations are applicable. For shallower regions,the shallow-water-wave theory with a term forbottom friction included in the governingequations should be used.

IAEA (2003b) recommends that near-shoremodification of tsunami waves should besimulated using shallow-water equations,including the effects of bottom friction. Largeoscillations of the water surface due to resonanceof the tsunami waves with natural frequencies ofthe water body in the near-shore region shouldalso be investigated. IAEA (2003b) recormnendsthat tsunami runup be estimated from availableapproximate theories of the phenomena or fromempirical relationships with careful considerationof the ranges of validity of the assumptionsinherent in these approaches.

Tsunami impactsBottom shear caused by strong tsunami currentsmay be significant in shallow waters. The safetyof plant structures may be affected by erosion anddeposition of sediments by the tsunami currents,such as failure of a breakwater due to erosion ordeposition of sediment at a safety-related cooling-

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water intake. IAEA (2003b) recommends that adedicated analysis of these effects should beconducted. Measurement of sediment charac-teristics near the proposed locations of SSCimportant to safety may be required to make anassessment.

IAEA (2003b) recommends that three forms oftsunami waves should be considered in estimationof wave forces on structures:

1. non-breaking waves, which result in thetsunami acting as a rapidly rising tide

2. tsunami waves breaking far from theshoreline, which result in the tsunamiwaves developing into fully formed boresbefore reaching the shore

3. tsunami waves breaking near the shore-line, when the tsunami waves act aspartially formed bores.

Both static and dynamic forces due to the threeforms of the tsunami waves should be estimatedon the structures of the nuclear power plant.

Combined events criteriaIAEA (2003b) recommends that appropriatecombinations of extreme events with referencewater levels (tides) and wind waves should betaken into consideration. Although preciseestimation of the numerical probability that a

given level of severity is exceeded by eachseparate event or by some combination of theseevents, conservative values of the probability thatthe given level of severity will be exceeded byeach separate event and the likelihood thatseparate events may occur together in acombination should be estimated (IAEA 2003b).Further, reasonable values of the probability that agiven level of severity may be exceeded by acombination of events should be estimated.Careful consideration of the duration of separateevents in the combination is also required. Ingeneral, the greater the number of independent orpartially dependent events in the combination, thelower the combined exceedance probability.IAEA (2003b) also notes that consideration of anexcessive number of events in combination mayresult in overly conservative design bases and thatconsiderable cngineering judgement may benecessary in selecting appropriate combinations.

IAEA (2003b) recolmmends that tsunamis beconsidered in combination with waves caused bywinds with a shorter recurrence interval. Fordeternination of the runup, an ambient high-tidelevel should also be considered. IAEA (2003b)does not mention combining effects of seismicground motion with the hazards from aconcomitant tsunami.

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Washington Division of Geology and EarthResources, Open File Report 2005-4.Yomogida K. 1988. "Crack-Like Rupture ProcessObserved in Near-Fault Strong Motion Data."Geophysical Research Letters 15:1223-1226.

Yoshioka S., M. Hashimoto, and K. Hirahara.1989. "Displacement Fields due to the 1946Nankaido Earthquake in a LaterallyInhomogeneous Structure with the SubductingPhilippine Sea plate - A Three-Dimensional FiniteElement Approach." Tectonophysics 159: 121-136.

Zhao S., R.D. Muiller, Y. Takahashi, andY. Kaneda. 2004. "3-D Finite-Element Modelingof Deformation and Stress Associated withFaulting: Effects of Inhomogeneous CrustalStructures." Geophysical Journal International157:629-644.

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Appendix A

Tsunami Hazard Assessment at

a Hypothetical Nuclear Power Plant Site

This appendix provides a set of guidelines that will be applicable to most nuclear power plant sites in theUnited States. It presents the primary steps required to carry out tsunami hazard assessment at ahypothetical nuclear power plant site. These steps are not all-encompassing because many of theactivities and analyses that need to be carried out are site-dependent and site-specific.

A.1 Preliminary Data Collection and Site Screening

The tsunami hazard assessment at a nuclear power plant is carried out using a hierarchical approach (see

Chapter 1. of this report). The first step of this approach is to establish whether the region is subject totsunamis. If it is found that the general region is subject to tsunamis, a further search for the site itself isconducted to determine the effect of the tsunamis on the site itself.

A.1.1 Is the Site Region Subject to Tsunamis?

A search of the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) tsunami database is carried out to determinewhether any historical tsunami events were reported at or near the site. The NGDC database can besearched using the following parameters

* Runup Country: USA* Runup State: the state where the proposed nuclear power plant is to be located

at http://www.iidc.noaa.gov/nidc/struts/fol'i?t= 101650&s= 167&d= 166. The NGDC database also canbe searched for tsunami sources that may affect the site using the NGDC search athttp:/!www.nodc.noaa.vnov/indc/struts/fonn?t=1 01650&s=70&d=7 using similar search parameters.

At the time this report was written, a search of the NGDC database for runups in California returned503 records. A similar search for Florida, New Jersey, and Texas returned 9, 20, and 3 records,respectively. The NGDC search of the tsunami sources for California returned 130 records. Thecorresponding tsunami record search for Florida, New Jersey, and Texas returned 5, 11, and 3 records.The runup locations are plotted in Figure A-I. Erroneous and doubtful tsunami runup reports areincluded in the NGDC database and may show up in the searches. For example, of the 503 tsunami runuprecords returned for California, 24 are labeled as being erroneous, 28 are labeled as being veryquestionable, and 14 are labeled as being questionable. Similarly, of the 130 records for tsunami runupsin California, 18 are labeled as being erroneous, 20 are labeled as being very questionable, and 14 arelabeled as being questionable. The tsunami source locations are plotted in Figure A-2.

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Figure A-i. Tsunami runup locations in selected states (from the NGDC tsunami database).

Tsunami Source Locations

Figure A-2. Tsunami source locations for reported runups in selected states.

The NGDC tsunami database also contains records and sources of inland tsunami-like waves that haveoccurred in lakes and rivers. A search for tsunami runups in Washington State returned 88 records,including two waves in Spirit Lake caused by the debris flow from the collapse of Mount St. Helen'sdome during its 1980 cruption. A search for tsunami runups in Missouri returned two events, both relatedto the 1811-1812 New Madrid earthquakes that caused waves in the Mississippi River.

The NGDC database also reports seiches induced by tsunamis and meteorological forcing. For example,a tsunami runup search for Michigan returned four events; the source for one, a ground swell or wave inthe Detroit River, is listed as unknown, and the other three events arc attributed to meteorologicallyinduced seiches in Lake Huron or to an offshore landslide.

Based on results from searches of the NGDC tsunami database, it can be determined if the general regionhas been subjected to tsunamis or to tsunami-like waves.

A.1.2 Is the Plant Site Affected by Tsunamis?

Based on data from the NGDC tsunami database, an assessment is made regarding the degree to whichthe proposed site itself is affected by tsunamis. It is possible that even though the region is subject totsunamis, the site itself may be safe. This is essentially a site screening step.

Historical tsunami data and other geophysical, topographical, and hydrological data are necessary to carry

out site-screening. These data include the following:

I. List of historical tsunamis and associated runups2. Map of the proposed site and its vicinity3. Map of potential tsunamigenic sources

4. Topographic and bathymetric maps5. Geologic and geotechnical maps6. Hydrological setting of the site7. Onshore and offshore soil and substrate characteristics.

The list of historical tsunamis, the associated wave characteristics, and information regarding theirsources should already be available from the search conducted to identify tsunamis in the general regionof the proposed nuclear power plant. The location of the proposed nuclear power plant site and itsrelation with the physiographic characteristics of the region should be evaluated from a map that has

sufficient resolution. The topographic and bathymetric maps provide baselinedata for interpretation ofrunup characteristics of the tsunami waves. The hydrological setting of the site allows the interpretation

of the interaction of tsunami waves with nearby water bodies such as an estuary, a natural or man-madeembayment, or other coastal structures.

The above data should be critically evaluated to answer the following questions:

1. Can a tsunami wave run up to the proposed grade elevation of the nuclear power plant?2. Can tsunami waves inundate a sufficient distance from the shoreline to affect proposed facilities

of the nuclear power plant?

3. Can tsunami waves interact with near-shore geometry to result in resonance?

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4. Can tsunami waves be expected to lead to severe erosion near the proposed nuclear power plantfacilities?

5. Can tsunami waves severely affect local communities and infrastructure?

It may be necessary to assemble an interdisciplinary team of experts to evaluate the data and to answer theabove questions. At this site-screening stage, it may not be necessary to precisely estimate the impactsfrom tsunamis quantitatively. However, a thorough qualitative description can result in a very goodestimate of the amount of effort required to carry out a complete tsunami hazard analysis. This evaluationcan also indicate if the site is exposed to severe tsunami hazards and if the considerable effort to carry outa subsequent complete tsunami hazard assessment is worthwhile.

Based on the evaluation of the degree of impact from tsunamis at the proposed site, a decision can bemade to proceed with a detailed tsunami hazard assessment to provide the bases for the design and theprotection of the SSC of the plant.

A.2 Site Investigation and Data Collection

To proceed with a detailed tsunami hazard assessment at the proposed nuclear power plant site, thepreliminary data collected for site screening needs to be supplemented by additional site investigation anddata collection. These data collection efforts may include paleo-tsunami investigations, compilation ofbathymetry and topography, collection of high-resolution nearshore bathymetry, characterization ofgeophysical properties of the nearshore substrate, and tide or other water level records.

A.2.1. The Tsunami Record

If the historical tsunami record at the proposed site is relatively short, a paleo-tsunami investigation todetermine the existence and severity of prehistorical tsunamis should be considered. As a first step,paleo-tsunami databases such as the one developed by Peters et al. (2003) should be searched to locatedata that may already be available from previous efforts. Paleo-tsunami experts should be contacted todetermine whether more recent data collection efforts are underway.

If paleotsunami data are not readily available for the proposed nuclear power plant site, a site-specificpalco-tsunami investigation should be considered. Chapter 5 of this report lists the pieces of informationmeasured or interpreted from the paleo-tsunami deposits. It may be necessary to obtain expert help tocarry out paleotsunami surveys, data collection, and interpretation.

A.2.2 Bathymetry and Topography

For simulation of the propagation of the PMT waves and the inundation caused by the waves, good-quality bathymetry and topography data are needed. A search should be conducted to determine whethera combined bathymetry and topography data set is available for the proposed nuclear power plant site orits vicinity. This search may save much of the effort needed to create this data set from raw bathymetryand topography data sources (see Chapter 5 of this report).

The extent of spatial coverage needed for tsunami simulation depends on several factors: (1) whether thetsunami source is near-field or far-field, (2) whether pre-computed tsunami wave heights from far-fieldsources are available (e.g., from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Center for

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Tsunami Research [NOAA NCTR] database), and (3) the geometry of the shoreline. Global bathymetrydatasets may be used for tsunami propagation modeling from far-field sources if precomputed tsunamiwave heights from these sources are not available. The use of a global bathymetry data set may also benecessary in near-shorc inundation modeling that uses the NOAA NCTR pre-computed offshore tsunamiwave heights depending on the offshore distance at which these wave heights are provided.

The resolution of the near-shore bathymetry and topography data may be critical for accurate simulationof the propagation and inundation of the tsunami waves. Available data sources described in Chapter 5 ofthis report should be used to collect the best available bathymetry and topography data from the NGDC,the National Ocean Service (NOS), and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Airborne remote-sensing

technologies, like LiDAR and IfSAR, provide the best quality topographic data. Topographic and

bathymetric data derived from Light Detection And Ranging (LiDAR) and Interferometric SyntheticAperture Radar (IfSAR) systems can be obtained from the NOAA Coastal Services Center (CSC) (see

Chapter 5 of this report). In absence of NOAA CSC coverage, it may be necessary to carry out dedicateddata collection and processing.

A high-quality combined bathymetry and topography data set should be created by merging the availableonshore and offshore elevation information. Several spatial interpolation techniques are available ingeographic information system (GIS) software and can be used to create grids from irregularly spacedpoint data or from elevation contour lines. The final grid for tsunami modeling should be created with allcells set to non-zero elevation values because an elevation value of zero could cause anomalies in sometsunami inundation models (Gonzdlez et al. 2006). A solution suggested by Gonzdlez et al. (2006) is touse a small positive value for land grid cells (e.g., 0.01 m) and a correspondingly small negative value forwater grid cells (e.g., -0.01 m). The final Digital Elevation Model (DEM) grid should be checked forconsistency using known features on land and offshore.

A.2.3 Geophysical Data

Bottom pressure gauge data from available locations within the tsunami propagation and inundationregions should be obtained from the NGDC. Water column height data obtained for the month of January2007 at a DART station off the coast of San Francisco are shown in Figure A-3.

Tides or water surface elevation data are needed to specify antecedent conditions before the arrival of thetsunami. Historical tide data available from the NOAA Center for Operational Oceanographic Productsand Services (CO-OPS) Tides and Currents website should be obtained. For example, Figure A-4 showsthe tide data for the month of January 2007 at the San Francisco station.

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260 NM Northwest of San Francisco, CA

4266.0

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Figure A-3. DART water column height data for January 2007 at Station 46411.

SanFrancisco, CA Tide Gauge -Station 9414290

- Predicted- Verified

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Figure A-4. Tide-level data at San Francisco station 9414290.

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A statistical analysis of historical tide data should be carried out to determine the appropriate tide levels at

specified exceedance probabilities. For example, the low tide level at the 90-percent exceedanceprobability level could be used for the antecedent water level to determine the minimum tsunami water

surface elevation during rundown, and the high tide level at the 10-pcrcent exceedance probability levelcould be used as the antecedent water level to determine the maximum tsunami water surface elevationduring runup.

Tidc-lcvel data are also uscful during validation of tsunami models. The data can be used to verify

whether the model predictions of tsunami wave heights compare well with observed water levels at theselocations. If possible, data from several tide gauges at different locations along the propagation path of afew historical tsunamis should be used to assess the accuracy of the simulations.

Information regarding soil grain size distribution should be obtained from the NGDC. A search of the

NGDC grain-size database for the bounding rectangle ranging in latitudes from 32°N to 44°N andranging in longitudes from 122°W to 130'W returned four cruises and 22 samples. Table A-I lists theresults of this search.

Table A-1. Search results from the NGDC grain size database.

Dataset Contributor Scientist Ship Cruise

01995001 LDEOt Horn Robert Conrad RCI0

09005007 NAVOCEANO Rehoboth D-5

09005039 NAVOCEANO Loomis Unknown L.I. 446

09005043 NAVOCEANO Loomis Unknown L.I. 450tLamont-Doherty Earth Observatory

4U.S. Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory

Three tab-delimited files can be exported from the database search that contain cruise and sample data,interval data, and weighted percentage data for each data set. The first few records of the cruise andsample export file from a data set arc shown in Table A-2.

The locations of these samples should be plotted on a map to determine whether they are appropriate for

use in tsunami hazard analysis at the proposed nuclear power plant site. If the number of samples is

found to be insufficient or the locations of the samples are found to be inappropriate to derive anyconclusions about the grain-size distributions near the proposed nuclear power plant site, a site-specificdata collection effort may be needed to determine these properties.

Soil properties like buoyant specific weight, coefficient of consolidation, and others may be required todetermine the hazard from tsunamis. Because such data usually is not expected to be available fromrepositories, it would need to be obtained using site-specific surveys. The properties that need to bedetermined from site-specific investigation will depend on the hazard indices being estimated or hazardmodels being used.

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Table A-2. Exported cruise and sample file from the NGDC grain-size database search fordataset ID 01995001.

#USDOC/NOA.A!NESDIS/National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC)#World Data Center for Marine Geology and Geophysics, Boulder#Seafloor Sediment Grain Size Database#Data Set WDCMGG00127#U RL http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/geology/size.html#file created: 12-MAR-07 as a sample level export#questions to: Carla.J.Mooreqnoaa.gov#phone: 303-497-6339 fax: 303-497-6513#address: NOAA/National Geophysical Data Center# 325 Broadway Code E/GC3# Boulder. Colorado USA 80305-3328

# MGG01995001

# Institution: Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (LDEO)# Title: Acoustic Provinces of the North Pacific Based on Deep Sea Cores# Report: Technical Report No. 3. CU-3-67 NAVSHIPS N00024-67-C-1 186

# Set id: FE00502# Authors: D.R. Horn# Ships: Vema, Robert Conrad# Cruises: 20,21.104 Areas: North Pacific# Funding: Navy-misc.# Project:# # of samples: 248# Cruise dates: April 1,1964- August 31,1966# Devices: 248 cores# Analyses: 248 texture, 245 engineering properties.

# Formats: Available in .pdf form. Grain size data in digital form# # mnicrofiche: 2# # pages paper: 49# ---------------------------------

rnggid ship cruise sample device datecollected lat Ion waterdepth core length sanple-conmnents01995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10156 core, piston 19660516 22.3333 157.8167 540201995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10157 core, piston 19660517 24.7667 159.1333 568201995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10158 core, piston 19660518 28.1167 160.6 589201995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10159 core, piston 19660519 31.2167 162.3 589401995001 Robert Conrad RC10 RC10160 core, piston 19660520 32.4667 159.8333 462101995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RCI0161 core, piston 19660521 33.0833 158 358701995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10162 core, piston 19660522 31.4167 158.8 391301995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10163 core, piston 19660522 32.7167 157.5 355001995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10164 core. piston 19660523 31.7333 157.5 376601995001 Robert Conrad RCIO RC10166 core, piston 19660523 31.8333 157.3333 3792

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The NGDC also archives data obtained during the Ocean Drilling Program and the Deep Sea DrillingProject. These data sets contain information about grain-size distribution, particle density, porosity, andother geophysical and geochemical parameters. These data sets should also be investigated to determinetheir applicability to the proposed site.

A.2.4 Tsunami Sources

Three distinct categories of tsunami sources should be considered for the proposed nuclear power plantsite:

1. Known sources of historical tsunamis2. Potential sources determined by a palcotsunami study3. Sources that may generate a tsunami-like wave in a nearby inland water body.

A search of the NGDC tsunami source database should be conducted to determine the sources ofhistorical tsunami events at and near th& proposed nuclear power plant site. As an example, Figure A-2shows the tsunami source locations for the runup events for the states of California, Texas, Florida, andNew Jersey. The data from the NGDC database should be processed to exclude erroneous entries, andtsunami experts should be consulted to determine whether any of the questionable tsunami sources arecredible for the proposed nuclear power plant site.

If a paleotsunami study was carried out, either a review of an existing effort or a site-specific one,conclusions regarding potential tsunami sources that may affect the proposed site and its vicinity shouldbe considered.

The hydrological and topographical setting of the site should be thoroughly evaluated to determinewhether a tsunami-like wave in a nearby water body may result in a hazard at the proposed site. Themechanisms that may generate a tsunami-like wave in nearby inland water bodies include hillslopefailures (similar to subaerial landslide), subaqueous landslides, and earthquakes. These sources should becomprehensively documented with regard to their tsunamigenic potential.

A.3 Specification of the PMT

The PMT is the most severe tsunami that can reasonably occur at a site. Because the severity of tsunamisthat reach a site of interest is controlled not only by the severity of the source mechanism but also by thebehavior of the tsunami waves during propagation and inundation, it is generally not possible to a prioridetermine the PMT source (Gonzdlez et al. 2007) for a specified site. However, parameters of similarsources can be used to determine several candidate PMTs. These candidate PMTs should be furtherevaluated to determine the most severe impact at the site.

Three source mechanisms of tsunami generation need to be considered: earthquakes, landslides (subacrialand submarine), and volcanoes. Table A-3 lists the source parameters for the three source mechanismsthat can be used to determine the most severe source for the respective mechanisms.

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Table A-3. Source parameters that control the severity of generated tsunamis.

Source Mechanism Source Parameters

Earthquakes Magnitude, depth, vertical displacement,proximity to the site, orientation

Landslides Proximity to the site, volume, slope stability,material properties, speed and acceleration

Volcanoes Proximity to the site, VE1, pyroclastic flowI __ Iproperties, caldera size and depth

The most severe tsunamigenic earthquake should be determined by evaluating both near and far-fieldearthquake zones. For example, for the West Coast of the United States, earthquake zones including theCascadia subduction zone (where the Juan de Fuca Plate is subducting below the North American Plate;see Figure A-5), and subduction zones marked by the Aleutian trench (where the Pacific Plate issubducting below the North American Plate), the Kurile trench (where the Pacific Plate is subductingbelow the Okhotsk Plate), the Japan trench (where the Pacific Plate is subducting below the Eurasianplate), the Philippine trench (a complex tectonic activity zone where the Eurasian and the Philippineplates are converging), the Bougainville trench (northeast of Bougainville, the largest of the SolomonIslands and a province of Papua New Guinea, where several micro-plates are interacting with the PacificPlates), and the Peru-Chile trench (where the Nazca Plate is subducting below the South American Plate)should be investigated. The maximum moment magnitude that can reasonably be expected to occur at therelevant earthquake zones should be determined. For each earthquake zone, a list of candidate PMTearthquakes should be compiled with conservatively estimated source parameters that maximize thetsunamigenic potential of the earthquakes. For example, an earthquake that results in a greater verticaldisplacement will have a greater tsunamigenic potential than one with a smaller vertical displacement,even if both had the same magnitude. Similarly, an earthquake closer to the site may result in a largertsunami because dispersion of the generated waves could be minimal. The relative orientation of therupture zone to the site can significantly affect the directivity of the tsunami waves; therefore, a smallerearthquake that is optimally oriented to the proposed site can cause a more severe tsunami at the site.

Landslides often cause tsunamis that are locally severe but may be significantly weaker in the far-field.Therefore, the proximity of a tsunamigenic landslide to the site is very important. The stability of a slopeshould be considered to determine possible landslide locations that may pose a tsunami hazard to theproposed site. The tsunamigenic parameters for a landslide source are the volume, the speed andacceleration of the slide, and the cohesiveness of the slide material. Conservative estimates of sourceparameters should be made. Historical or known landslides as well as potential landslides should beevaluated based on their respective tsunamigenic source characteristics. The landslides that have thegreatest potential to cause a severe tsunami should be selected in the candidate PMT landslides.

Tsunamis generated by volcanic activity in the vicinity of the proposed site should be evaluated, and theirtsunamigenic source parameters (listed in Table A-3) should be conservatively estimated. Tsunamis fromfar-field sources may be of concern to the proposed site if the activity involves possible caldera collapseor large flank failures. These far-field volcanoes should be evaluated with respect to

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Tectonic Plate Boundaries Of The World

Figure A-5. Tectonic plate boundaries of the world.

their tsunamigenic potential and the possibility of the generated tsunamis to reach the site. Based on anevaluation of their tsunamigenic potential, candidate PMT volcanic sources should be selected.

All candidate PMT sources listed using the procedure described above should be used in tsunamigeneration, propagation, and inundation simulations. Hazards from all of these tsunami simulationsshould be evaluated to arrive at the hazards posed to the proposed site, as described below.

A.3.1 Scenario Tsunamis

Scenario tsunamis are those obtained from a set of different source parameters for each postulatedcandidate PMT source. For example, for earthquake sources, the source parameters for each candidatePMT should be varied within a reasonable range that is realistically possible to obtain scenario tsunamis.The NCT.R database, when available for the postulated earthquake-induced PMT, should be consulted toconstruct the scenario tsunamis by varying the location and number of unit sources. For each postulatedearthquake-induced PMT, a set of tsunamis should be obtained using the NCTR tsunami-forecastingdatabase approach. Each of these scenario tsunamis should be propagated to the site using site-specifictsunami-propagation models, and inundation effects should be modeled using site-specific inundationmodels. Tsunami hazards should be estimated for each scenario tsunami. The most severe hazard amongthe scenario tsunamis for all candidate PMTs for all tsunamigenic mechanisms should be specified as thesite characteristic related to tsunamis.

A.4 Simulation of Tsunami Waves

For all scenario tsunamis, generation, propagation, and inundation modeling should be carried out. Itmay be possible to use the precomputed offshore tsunami wave heights from the NCTR tsunami forecastsdatabase to set boundary conditions for inundation models for earthquake sources. However, if theNCTR forecast database does not contain precomputed scenarios applicable to the proposed site, acomplete tsunami generation, propagation, and inundation modeling study may be required. Precomputedoffshore tsunami wave heights for sources other than earthquakes may not be feasible. Tsunamis fromthese sources would need to be simulated on a case-by-case basis.

A tsunami modeling system, capable of modeling the three phases, generation, propagation, andinundation, should be used to simulate the scenario tsunamis from each candidate PMT source selectedabove. The tsunami modeling system should reflect the state-of-the-art in tsunami science. The tsunamimodeling system may be composed of different models that may be appropriate for the three phases of thetsunami. The modeling system may also include different models that are appropriate for different sourcemechanisms. However, all of the separate components of the modeling system should be properlyvalidated and verified using appropriate data, or shown to be accurate using site-specific data. Standardsfor evaluating tsunami models are described by GonzAlez et al. (2007, Appendix C). For tsunami hazardassessment at proposed nuclear power plant sites, criteria for evaluating tsunami models that specificallydeal with verifying model predictions against historical tsunami observations are especially important.To reduce the effort involved with several separate validation and verification studies, use of acommunity-accepted modeling system is recommended.

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A.4.1 Generation

For each scenario of the postulated candidate PMT earthquakes, the initial tsunami waveform should beestimated conservatively. For earthquake sources, the Okada (1985) formulation could be used to specifythe initial waveform. If the postulated rupture is highly heterogeneous, the Okada (1985) formulationmay be used with the rupture subdivided into several cells within which the slip distribution could beassumed to be uniform.

Landslide and volcanic sources may need source-specific models of mass movement and tsunamigeneration. Experts should be consulted to properly define and constrain tsunami generation models ofthese sources with help from source surveys and model validation. For both of these sources, thecoupling of the generated tsunami wave with the dynamics of the mass movement should be carcfuillyinvestigated. If the coupling does not result in matching the speed of the mass movement with the speedof the tsunami waves, the reasons for this mismatch should be documented.

It is also possible that concurrent tsunamigenic sources need to be considered during a tsunamigenicevent. For example, a tsunamigenic earthquake may generate a tsunami by vertical displacement of thewater column and also may cause a subaqueous landslide that subsequently generates another tsunami.These concurrent events also should be evaluated as a potential PMT event, especially if it is possible thatthe separate effects of the concomitant events may combine to produce a more severe tsunami. It is alsopossible that the initial waveforms from the concomitant tsunamigenic sources may be located atsignificant distances from each other in space as well as in time. The potentially different locations anddirectivity of concomitant tsunamis may result in significantly altered wavefields with potential impact onthe required extent of the modeling domain.

A.4.2 Propagation

The propagation of the generated tsunami waves from the source location toward the site should also bemodeled. The spatial extent of the modeling domain should be sufficient to account for the effects of thebathymetry, the underwater mounts and ridges, and the presence of islands. The boundary conditionsshould be carefully specified (see Chapter 6 of this report). For cases where concomitant tsunamis arepostulated (such as when a tsunamigenic earthquake triggers a landslide that also generates a tsunami),the model simulations should be set up to account for the separate tsunami sources.

The precomputed offshore tsunami wave heights from the NCTR tsunami forecast database may be usedto reduce the effort of setting up and simulating an extensive area from the source to the proposed site.The precomputed offshore tsunami wave heights may be used to specify boundary conditions for asignificantly smaller modeling domain. Currently, only earthquake sources can be modeled using the unitsource approach, as demonstrated by the NCTR tsunami forecast database.

The propagation model should be chosen based on its acceptance in the tsunami modeling conmnunity. Ifa model other than a widely accepted and validated one is used, the reason for this selection should bedocumented, and the performance of the model should be clearly demonstrated using observed tsunamiwave heights and travel times.

The waves from the candidate PMT sources should be simulated for a sufficiently long duration to ensurethat all potentially large waves in the train of the tsunami waves have been simulated.

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A.4.3 Inundation

During the inundation phase, the nonlinearity of the governing equations cannot be ignored. A model thatuses nonlinear governing equations should be used. Near-shore geometry, bottom friction, andinteraction of the tsunami waves with offshore and onshore structures can significantly affect the behavior

of the tsunami waves in the inundation phase and therefore have a significant impact on the estimation ofthe metrics describing the hazards from the tsunami waves. Therefore, the model used to simulate theinundation phase should be validated and verified against site-specific observations. If site-specific

observations are not available at the proposed site, model verification at similar sites may be used.

The simulations of the inundation phase of the scenario tsunamis for each candidate PMT should becarried out to obtain the maximum runup elevation, the spatial extent of runup, the minimum drawdownelevation, the spatial extent of drawdown, and the velocity and momentum. fields.

A.5 Estimation of Hazards from the PMT

Based on the results from the inundation model for each scenario tsunami for all postulated candidatePMTs, the most severe hazard metrics should be determined, including the following:

1. 'high-water level: a map of the highest water surface elevation2. low-water level: a map of the lowest water surface elevation3. potential for scouring: a map of the scour-enhancement parameter described in Chapter 54. deposition: a map of areas susceptible to deposition from tsunami wave action5. forces: a map of the velocity field that may be used to estimate forces described in Chapter 56. debris accumulation: a map of areas susceptible to debris accumulation7. projectiles: a map of the impact forces expected from a postulated worst-case projectile

The maps obtained above should be specified as site characteristics related to tsunamis at the selected site.

These site characteristics should be used to specify design bases for all SSC that are important to safetyand that may be exposed to tsunami hazards.

References

Gonzilez F.1, E. Geist, C. Synolakis, D. Areas, D. Bellomo, D. Carlton, T. Homing, B. Jaffe, J. Johnson,U. Kanoglu, H. Mofjeld, J. Newman, T. Parsons, R. Peters, C. Peterson, G. Priest, V. Titov, A. Venturato,J. Weber, F. Wong, and A. Yalciner. 2006. Seaside, Oregon Tsunami Pilot Studv-Modernization ofFEM4 Flood Hazard Maps, NOAA OAR Special Report, NOAA/OAR/PMEL, Seattle, Washington.

Gonzflcz F.I., E. Bernard, P. Dunbar, E. Geist, B. Jaffe, U. Kanoglu, J. Locat, H. Mofjcld, A. Moore,C. Synolakis, and V. Titov. 2007. Scientific and Technical Issues in Tsunami Hazard Assessment of

Nuclear Power Plant Sites. NOAA Technical Memorandum OAR PMEL-136, Pacific MarineEnvironmental Laboratory, Seattle, Washington.

Okada U. 1985. "Surface Deformation due to Shear and Tensile Faults in a Half-Space,." Bulletin of the

Seismological Society ofAmerica 75(4): 1135-1154.

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CK 846 of 3114

Peters B., B. Jaffe, G. Gelfenbaum, and C. Peterson. 2003. Cascadia tsunami Deposit Database. U.S.Geological Survey Open-File Report 03-13, and electronic database and GIS coverage [URL:http://geopubs.wr.usgs. ,ov/open-file/ofO3-13/j. Accessed March 12, 2008.

A.16

CK 847 of 3114

NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER(9-2004) (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol.. Supp., Rev.,NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, if any.)

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG/CR-6966(See instructions on the reverse) PNNL-17397

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

Tsunami Hazard Assessment at Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United States of America MONTH YEAR2 2009

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

J3301

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

Rajiv Prasad, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Technical

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

Not Applicable

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division. Office or Region. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. and mailing address; ff contractor,provide name and mailing address.)

Pacific Northwest National LaboratoryP.O. Box 999Richland, WA 99352

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC. type 'Same as above; if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.and mailing address.)

Division of New Reactor LicensingOffice of New ReactorsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTESElinor Cunningham, NRC Project Manager; Goutam Bagchi, NRC Technical Monitor

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

We describe the tsunami phenomenon with the focus on its relevance for hazard assessment at nuclear power plant sites.Three tsunamigenic mechanisms-earthquakes, landslides, and volcanoes-are considered relevant. We summarize historicaltsunami occurrences, source mechanisms and damages caused by these events. Historical landslides and potential landslideareas in earth's oceans are described. The hierarchical-review approach to tsunami-hazard assessment consists of a series ofstepwise, progressively more-refined analyses to evaluate the hazard at a site. The hierarchical-review approach employs ascreening analysis to determine if a site is subject to tsunami hazard based on presence of a tsunamigenic source and thelocation and elevation of the site. The screening analysis ensures that resources are not wasted at sites with little potential ofexposure to tsunamis. Tsunami hazards that may directly affect structures, systems, and components important to the safety ofa plant. Therefore, these structures, systems, and components should be adequately designed and, if required, protected. Werecommend using existing resources and previously completed tsunami-hazard assessments, if available and appropriate.Detailed tsunami-hazard assessment at a nuclear power plant site should be based on the probable maximum tsunami. Wedefine the probable maximum tsunami, its determination at a site, and subsequent hazard assessment. A tsunamigenic sourcethat produces probable maximum tsunami hazards at a site may not be determined a priori. Therefore, several candidatesources and the tsunamis generated from them under the most favorable tsunamigenic source and ambient conditions shouldbe evaluated. The set of hazards obtained from all such scenario tsunamis should be considered to determine design bases ofthe plant structures, systems, and components. We describe international practices by Japan and the International AtomicEnergy Agency. The appendix provides a stepwise guide to site-independent analyses for tsunami-hazard assessment.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Tsunami unlimited

Tsunami-like waves 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

paleotsunami (This Page)

source mechanism unclassifiedrunup (This Report)

drawdown unclassifiedscouringhierarchical hazard assessment approach 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

Probable Maximum Tsunamicombined effects 16. PRICE

NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

CK 848 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:06 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: ALSO: Test from McGinty, LIA05


*****'FOR OFFICIAL USE"ON• Y*****DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THlE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: Franovich, MikeSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 8:03 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: ALSO: Test from McGinty, LIA05

Rani is available to help out the liaison team (passing her message along).

From: LIA05 HocSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:43 PMTo: Franovich, MikeSubject: Test from McGinty, LIA05

CK 849 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:07 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Region 4


******FER OFFIeIAL USE ONLYT****

De NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF T. E FEDERAL FAMIL.

----- Original Message -----From: McGinty, TimSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 10:16 PMTo: Blount, Tom; LIA05 Hoc; Howell, LindaSubject: Region 4

When R4 stood down today, they designated Linda Howell as the contact for followup and overall event cognizance. Itwould be helpful to keep her in the loop on NRC response activities (and it also serves to keep R4 apprised. Tim

Sent from my NRC blackberryTim McGintyF (b)(6)

CK 850 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:05 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Action (1 hope)Attachments: US Plant Design Safe Shutdown Earthquake.pdf


.*****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.*.*•

D) NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

----- Original Message -----From: McGinty, TimSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:13 PMTo: Blount, TomCc: LIA05 HocSubject: Fw: Action (I hope)

Sent from my NRC blackberryTim McGinty

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----From: Thomas, EricTo: McGinty, Tim; Hall, Randy; Giitter, Joseph; Nelson, Robert; Howe, AllenCc: Ross-Lee, MaryJane; Brown, FrederickSent: Fri Mar 11 13:25:50 2011Subject: RE: Action (I hope)

Here is something I found. Will keep looking under Hurricane docs.

Eric

Eric ThomasU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNRR/DIRS/[email protected] (office)

CK 851 of 3114

(b)(6) (mobile)


From: McGinty, Tim

Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 1:13 PM

To: Hall, Randy; Guitter, Joseph; Nelson, Robert; Howe, Allen

Cc: Ross-Lee, MaryJane; Brown, Frederick; Thomas, Eric

Subject: Fw: Action (I hope)

DORL - see below. Can u help? Tim

Sent from my NRC blackberry

Tim McGintyE (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----From: Ross-Lee, MaryJane

To: McGinty, Tim; Thomas, Eric; Thorp, John

Cc: Brown, Frederick; Hiland, Patrick; Manoly, Kamal

Sent: Fri Mar 11 13:09:01 2011Subject: RE: Action (I hope)

I have seen something like this. It might be connected with hurricanes. I think DORL maybe worked on it?

Mary Jane Ross-Lee (MJ)

Chief, RTR Projects Branch

OWFN 12H5US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

U Direct: 301-415-3281

Mobile: (b)(6)

M e-mail: [email protected]

----- Original Message -----From: McGinty, Tim


To: Thomas, Eric; Thorp, John

Cc: Ross-Lee, MaryJane; Brown, Frederick; Hiland, Patrick; Manoly, Kamal

Subject: Action (I hope)

The Chairman recalls, as a result of our previous EQ in Japan activities, that we created a "matrix" of key parameters

(seismic design criteria, EAL thresholds, tsunami related information regarding UHS elevations and capabilities).

He has asked, simply, for us to find the summarized matrix for use this weekend, as he anticipates getting calls for this

type of info.

Do we have it? Can you get it abd send it? Due today. If not, call me in the ET room in the ops center.

Thanks Tim

2

CK 852 of 3114

Sent from my NRC blackberryTim McGinty

(b)(6)

CK 853 of 3114

Nuclear Power Plant Desiqn for Natural Phenomena

The NRC regulations require that nuclear power plants be designed to withstand the effects ofnatural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami. Nuclearpower plant design reflects consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have beenhistorically reported for the plant site and surrounding area. The design also provides sufficientmargin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data havebeen accumulated. Additionally, the design considers the appropriate combinations of theeffects of the natural phenomena with the effects of normal and accident conditions at the plant.

Each nuclear power plant is, therefore, designed to a specific magnitude or strength of a naturalphenomenon that is appropriate for the plant site and surrounding area. For example, a nuclearpower plant in Texas or Florida (where earthquakes are of small magnitude and rarely occur)would not be designed for the same earthquake loading as a nuclear power plant in California(where earthquakes are more severe and common).

The attached table shows some examples of design values of natural phenomena for theWaterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford-3), the River Bend Station (River Bend),South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP), Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1 (Wolf Creek),Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant ,Units 1 and 2 (Diablo Canyon), Duane Arnold EnergyCenter (Duane Arnold), and Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (Grand Gulf).

CK 854 of 3114

TABLE 1 -Comparison of Plant-Specific Design Values for Selected Natural Phenomena

PLANT EARTHQUAKE TORNADO WIND SPEED SUSTAINED FLOOD TSUNAMI/Storm Surge(ground (mph) WIND height above grade height above grade (ft)

acceleration, g) (mph) (ft)

SSE' SSE Translational Tangential(horz.) (vert.) Speed (mph) Speed

(mph)

Waterford-3 0.10 0.07 60 300 200 at 30 ft. 15.5 14.5

RiverBend 0.15 0.10 70 290 100at30ft. N/A2 N/A3

STP 0.10 0.07g 70 290 125 at 30 ft. 23 N/A3

Wolf Creek 0.20/ 0.20/ 70 290 100 at 30 ft. N/A2 N/A5,6

0.12' 0.121

Diablo 0.20 0.13 43 157 801 N/A2 N/A2

Canyon

Duane Arnold 0.12 0.10 60 300 105-1451 12 N/A5

Grand Gulf 0.15 0.10 70 290 90 at 30 ft. N/A N/A3

1 Safe Shutdown Earthquake2 Maximum flood level or tsunami/storm surge is below grade

I Tsunami is not a credible event in the Gulf Coast4 Power-block/non-power-block

Not a coastal plantRemote from large bodies of waterGust factor of 1.1 will applyDepending on height

CK 855 of 3114

DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE INTENSITY AND MAGNITUDE

MAX. POTENTIAL EARTHQUAKE AT SITENUCLEAR PLANT INTENSITY MAGNITUDE EPICENTRAL (3) DESIGN SSE PEAK SOIL

BY LOCATION STATE MMI Scale (1) Richter Scale DISTANCE, miles ACCLN, g (1,2) CONDITIONNEW YORKFitzpatrick VI 4.9 0 0.15 SoilGinna I VIII, IX.X 6,7 60,90 0.2 RockIndian Point 2, 3 VII 5.5 0 0.15 RockNine Mile Point I IX.X 7 50 0.11 RockNine Mile Point 2 VI 4.9 0 0.15 Rock

DELAWARE (No Nuclear Plant)Salem 1, 2 (NJ- nearest plant) VII.VIII 5.8 0 0.2 Deep Soil

CONNECTICUTMillstone 1, 2,3 VII 5.5 0 0.17 Rock

VERMONTVermont Yankee VI 4.9 0 0.14 Rock

OHIODavis Besse I VII 5.5 0 0.15 RockPerry 1 VII 5.5 0 0.15 Rock

GEORGIAHatch 1, 2 VII 5.5 0 0.15 Deep SoilVogtle 1, 2 VII.VIII 5.8 0 0.2 Deep Soil

TENNESSEESeqouyah 1,2 VIII 6.1 0 0.18 RockWatts Bar 1 VIII 6.1 0 0.18 Rock

CALIFORNIASan Onofre 2, 3 IX.X 7 5 0.67 RockDiabolo Canyon 1, 2 X-XI 7.5 3 0.75 Rock

(1) MMI -Modified Mercalli Intensity; SSE . Safe Shutdown Earthquake(2) The design SSE peak accelerations shown are conservative for the site max. potential earthquake intensity(3) '0' epicentral distance means the max. potential earthquake was assumed to occur adjacent to the sit(

CK 856 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:06 PMTo: FOTA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Response - situation in Japan


*****.FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******


----- Original Message -----From: Weber, MichaelSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:41 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Response - situation in Japan

----- Original Message -----From: Jaczko, GregoryTo: Lyons, Peter <[email protected]>; Connery, Joyce <[email protected]>; Poneman, Daniel<[email protected]>; DAgostino, Thomas <[email protected]>Sent: Fri Mar 11 19:23:21 2011Subject: RE: situation in Japan

Thanks, Pete. we will continue to put out what we have been providing to you and others with whatever confirmedinformation we have. I'll forward this to folks in the ops center who are keeping track of information.

----- Original Message -----From: Lyons, Peter [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 7:14 PMTo: Connery, Joyce; Poneman, Daniel; DAgostino, Thomas; Jaczko, GregorySubject: situation in Japan

Here is a bit more from the assistant to Suzuki.(b)(5)

pete

----- Original Message -----From: Y.Sagayama [mailto:[email protected]]

CK 857 of 3114


To: Lyons, Peter

Subject: RE:

Dear Pete,

I only get the information by TV. Japanese TV said Fukushima plant is under severe condition without cooling.

The pressure of containment vessel goes up, so the pressure valve will be released. But now it is not succeeded to open

the valve.I can get much information I will inform you.

Best regards,

Yutaka

Yutaka SagayamaJapan Atomic Energy Agency

2-1-8,Uchisaiwai-cho,Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo,JAPAN,

T100-8577

Tel:+81-3-3592-2348

Fax:+81-3-3592-2112

Cell phone.1 (b)(6)

E-mail:sagaya ma.yutaka @jaea.go.jp

E-mail(Cell phone) (b)(S)


From: Lyons, Peter [mailto:[email protected]]


To: '[email protected]'

Subject: Re:

Thanks Yutaka

Please advise whatever you can share! We are ready to help including equipment ready for plane deployment with few

hours notice!

Pete

---- Original Message -----

From: Y.Sagayama <[email protected]>

To: Lyons, Peter

Sent: Fri Mar 11 09:18:03 2011

Subject: RE:

Dear Pete,

At this moment, no more.

Best regards,Yutaka

Yutaka Sagayama

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

2

CK 858 of 3114


T 100-8577

Tel:+81-3-3592-2348

Fax:+81-3-3592-2112

Cell phone[ (b)(6)

E-mail:[email protected]

E-mail(Cell phone)[ (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----From: Lyons, Peter [mailto:[email protected]]

Sent: Friday, March 11, 2011 11:15 PMTo: '[email protected]'

Subject: Re:

Thanks yutaka

Any more news????

Pete

----- Original Message -----From: Y.Sagayama <[email protected]>

To: Lyons, Peter

Cc (b)(6)Sent: Fri Mar 11 09:12:29 2011

Subject: RE:

Dear Pete,

The address of Dr. Suzuki is nor correct. So I sent your message their correct address.

Correct addresses:

[email protected]

[email protected]

Best regards,Yutaka

Yutaka Sagayama

Japan Atomic Energy Agency


T 100-8577

Tel :+81-3-3592-2348

Fax:+81-3-3592-2112

Cell phone:1 (b)(6)

E-mail:sagaya ma.yutaka @jaea.go.jp

E-mail(Cell phone)t (b)(6)

3

CK 859 of 3114

----- Original Message -----From: Lyons, Peter [mailto:[email protected]]


To: '[email protected]'; '[email protected]'; '[email protected]'

Cc: 'Y.Sagayama'; (b)(6)

Subject:

Dr. Suzuki and Dr. KondoWe are watching with alarm the situation in Japan. If you can identify ANY assistance needed in the nuclear plants inJapan, please advise and I will do my best to secure our government's resources.Very best wishesPete Lyons

Dr. Sagayama - please relay this message to Dr. Suzuki and Dr. Kondo if I have used incorrect emails.Thanks-Pete

CK 860 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 4:04 PMTo: FOIA Response.hoc ResourceSubject: FW: Status: Naval Assets

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshift 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301.) 816-5187

****--'FOR OFF1CIALAI USE! ONLV`***-DO NOT RE ....... OUSD ........ FEDERAL .......

From: Marshall, JaneSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 10:55 AMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: FW: Status: Naval Assets

From: McDermott, BrianSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 10:53 AMTo: Marshall, JaneSubject: Fw: Status: Naval Assets

Brian

Brian McDermott301-415-7475 (direct)

(b)(6) Jmobile)

From: Leeds, EricTo: Quichocho, Jessie; McGinty, TimCc: Blount, Tom; Boger, Bruce; Weber, Michael; Virgilio, Martin; Borchardt, Bill; McDermott, Brian; Evans, Michele;Mamish, Nader; Wittick, BrianSent: Fri Mar 11 10:15:39 2011Subject: Status: Naval Assets

All -

Please see below email from Jesse on status of Naval assets. I've requested that Jesse stay in touch with events throughthe Op Center and continue to coordinate and supply info to our counterparts at Naval reactors.

Eric J. Leeds, Director

CK 861 of 3114

Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission301-415-1270

From: Quichocho, JessieSent: Friday, March 11, 2011 9:52 AMTo: McGinty, TimCc: Blount, Tom; Leeds, Eric; Boger, BruceSubject: Status: Naval AssetsImportance: High

I received a call from the Matthew Napoli, Technical Director for Foreign Affairs NAVSEA 08.

Report as follows:

In Japan, all assets are under control. No issues.

In Guam, ships were unmoored no issues on equipment.

They would like open communications with NRC on the status of the plants in Japan. They heard evacuationsare occurring and that some facilities do not have cooling. They would like to be aware of any events thatoccur that may affect their assets.

Would it be possible to include NR in our communications or at a minimum provide them information as part ofupdates?

Thanks,Jessie

2

CK 862 of 3114


LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 2:40 PMLIA06 Hoc; LIA08 Hoc; LIA01 Hoc; LIAll HocFW: Status of Approval from Ethics Officer

Importance: High

FYI,


***•**F OFFICIAL USE ONLY*.*.. .DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

From: LIA05 HocSent: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 2:40 PMTo:I (b)(6)Cc: Dan Feighert; 'Andrew Seward'; 'Harry Sherwood'; John Simpson; 'Lisa Hamilton'; 'Michelle Ralston'; 'RebeccaFontenot'; 'Steve Horwitz'; 'Tim Greten'; 'Vanessa E. Quinn'Subject: Status of Approval from Ethics OfficerImportance: High

[ (b)(6) J

The NRC is waiting to find out if you have approached your Ethics Officer regarding your participation on working with

representatives from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) in response to the incident in Japan.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.****DO NOT RELEASE OUTSDE OF TH.E FEDERAL FAINLY

Jl~l.J IUI k./ I .•1.131• lkJP 11•

CK 863 of 3114

From:Sent:To:Attachments:

LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 11:32 AMCoons, AlbertComputer Name for Ops Center.docx

Per your request. Do you need something from the Liaison team?


******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*-**ýDO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THLE FEDERAL FAMILY

CK 864 of 3114

Liaison Team Computer Assignments for Japanese Response

Computer Name Assigned DeskLIA06 Lt DirectorLIA08 Lt CoordinatorLIA04 State Liaison Desk 1OST05 State Liaison Desk 2LIA09 Lt Technical Advisor

LIA05 FEMA Liaison To The NRC

LIA01 Federal Liaison Desk 1

LIAll Federal Liaison Desk 2

LIA12 Congressional Liaison Desk

LIA03 International Liaison Desk 1

LIA02 International Liaison Desk 2

LIA10 International Liaison Desk 3 (Interpreter)

CK 865 of 3114

From:

Sent:To:

LIA05 HocWednesday, March 30, 2011 6:51 AMDan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Lisa Hamilton;Michelle Ralston; Rebecca Fontenot; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. QuinnReoccurring Daily Actions and Calls Rev 17Reoccurring Daily Actions and Calls Rev 17.docx

Subject:Attachments:

I

CK 866 of 3114

Reoccurring Daily Actions and Calls

-Time (EDT) Description Lead Team Action/Purpose of the Call0230 Input for SIT REP All Team Directors Submit input to EBT Coordinator0300 RST/PMT call with Japan RST/PMT Daily update for Site Team and HQ (convenient time for the

Team (arranged by the HOO Site Team)I (b)(6) 1

0600 One Pager ET, Response Advisor Provide input to EBT Coordinator0600 Status update & 2 All Team Directors Provide input to EBT Coordinator for development of

pager/Sit Rep (BRIEFING Agency briefing documentsONL Y-not a call)

0600 Congressional Update Taken From Status Update0715 Chairman's brief ET Update chairman and staff during turnover

(arranged by HOO)

0730 TAs & CAs briefing ET ET Director lead(830 Saturday's only) ** (arranged by HOO) -briefed Commission TAs and ODs( b)(6) I

Deputy Secretaries (as ET White House lead (-Chairman participates)scheduled) -interagency discussion

0900 RST Status Call with RST Update status of Reactors and SFPsINPO

0930 UK/Canada/France Call RST/PMT Information Exchange. Focused on Operational issues** (arranged by HOO) (Combining PMT call from 1400 for Dose issues. Starting 3/28)

BridgerM1000 INPO/Industry Consortium ET High-level Coordination Call

(arran ed byHD( b)(6)

1100 ESF8-(Public Health & LT HHS Secretarys Operations Center leadMedical Services) (Conference number provided -interagency discussion NOTE call will be held on MNV/F

by HHS) schedule only - no calls on Tues or Thurs.,

1100 Technical Coordination RST Technical discussionwith Industry Consortium (arranged by HOO)

I (b)(6) I1100 Radiological Status & "Radiological Status & Implications" call between NRC, NEI,!

Implications Call (new call Arranged by NEI EPA, DOE, OSTP. NEI or OSTP will set up the bridge line.,proposed to start 3128)

1230 NTAG teleconference PMT Director to lead Nuclear Technical Advisory Group -email sent out daily(chaired by NSS) with phone # and pass code

4400 IIaalP,'/9 PIIIT led !' T Wad Gag! @ 0030 *r Oprational :2',o,"* .* 1 lnformation sharing on current and projected dose

March 29, 2011 2230hrs Reoccurring Daily Actions and Call Rev 17 M: LT/Reoccunring Calls Rev 17

CK 867 of 3114


1400 USAID LT/OCA USAID lead NOTE-this call only on Tues and Thurs now-interagency discussion

1400 NARAC PMT DOE lead** (arranged by HOO) -Interagency discussion of dose models

1400 Advisory Team White House/PMT Call with the White House to help with coordination andensure PMT/White House is aware of current informationCall: 866-561-4509; Pin: (b)6)

Pin #: (b)(e)

1500 One Pager ET, Response Advisor Provide Input to EBT Coordinator1500 Congressional call OCA & OCA lead -Audience is Congressional staff who have or are

NRC Go-To Team near a plant; Oversight committees; House &Senate(Leeds, M.Johnson, Sherron, leadershipB.Boger, etc)800-593-7189

1515 Chairman's brief ET(arranged by HOO)

1600 Input to Status Update All Team Directors Provide input to EBT Coordinator1700 HHS call with 50 states LT/State Liaison Meeting occurs each Tuesday and Thursday evening, as

and federal partners organized by HHS (N.Natarajan). HHS provides bridge lineday of call

1700 DOE Science Panel RES Brian Sheron and Richard Lee, out of the box solutions.1800 RST/PMT cal with Japan RST/PMT Daily update for Site Team and HQ (convenient time for the

Team (arranged bythe H00) SiteTeam)t (b)(6)1800 Status update & 2 EBT EBT developed agency briefing documents

pager/Sit Rep(BRIEFING ONLY-not acall)

1830 Chairman's Call with Chairman/Chuck Brief on statusChuck Casto

2000 re-initiated 3/29 Call with Industry ET ET Led High-level discussions with industry and NRC SiteConsortium (daily) '(arranged by HOD TeamI (b)(6) IJ(XXXX)

2M000 TAm & •. P •nf E4 fTria,,nr leoed_ __,_ _ ......__,,__nt_ _ riefed Commiszonn TAs and Q'z

2100 PMT call with Japan PMT Daily update for Site Team and HQ (convenient time for the

March 29, 2011 2230hrs Reoccurring Daily Actions and Call Rev 17 M: LT /Reoccurring Calls Rev 17

CK 868 of 3114


Team (arranged by the HOO) Site Team)I (b)(6 .

2130 DOS LT DOS lead** (arranged by HOO) .Interagency discussion

2200 One Pager ET, Response Advisor Provide Input to EBT Coordinator2200 Chairman's brief by email ET Update chairman using one-pager

41

March 29, 2011 2230hrs Reoccurring Daily Actions and Call Rev 17 M: LT /Reoccurring Calls Rev 17

CK 869 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Tuesday, March 29, 2011 4:47 PMTo: Dan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Lisa Hamilton;

Michelle Ralston; Rebecca Fontenot; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. Quinn

Cc: Albert Coons; Bill Webb; Conrad Burnside; Craig Fiore; Darrell Hammons; LisaHammond; Rebecca Thomson; Ronald McCabe; Steve Colman; William King

Subject: HHS Conference Call with 50 State Reps

The conference call information is as follows:

1700 HHS call with 50 states and LT/State Liaison Meeting occurs each Tuesday and Thursdfederal partners organized by HHS (N.Natarajan). HHS prc

call

Toll Free Number (888) 972-6711Passcode:I (b)(6)


******FOR OFFIUAL USE ONLY*-**DO NOTF RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

CK 870 of 3114

From: LIA05 HocSent: Tuesday, March 29, 2011 10:00 AMTo: Feighert, Dan; Coons, Albert

Have you heard anything about the radiation issues in PA or other states?


* OR-OFRE EO * *****

DO NOTRELEASE ,,OU I.TSIDE OF THlE FEDERAL FAMILY

CK 871 of 3114

From:

Sent:To:

LIA05 HocMonday, March 28, 2011 4:58 PMDan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Lisa Hamilton;Michelle Ralston; Rebecca Fontenot; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. QuinnNRC Public Meeting on Japan Response

High

Subject:

Importance:

FYI,

04/14/11 Briefing on Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Radiological Consequences andPotential Health Effects(PUBLIC MEETING)9:00 A.M.


******FOR OFFIAL USE ON.LY***.DO NOT RX ELEAS E OUTSrDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

1

CK 872 of 3114

From: LIA05 Hoc

Sent: Monday, March 28, 2011 3:46 PMTo: Dan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Lisa Hamilton;

Michelle Ralston; Rebecca Fontenot; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. QuinnCc: Ward, Paul; [email protected]: FW: NRC logo in plume map

FYI,

Do not let this happen to us.


**"*FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY-'***• *

From: ET05 HocSent: Monday, March 28, 2011 1:18 PMTo: CS_IRTCc: Brenner, Eliot; Burnell, Scott; Couret, Ivonne; Harrington, Holly; Hayden, Elizabeth; Landau, Mindy; McIntyre, David;Medina, Veronika; Blount, TomSubject: NRC logo in plume map

Remove attributions to the NRC from the plume map. This map was not provided through any official or knownunofficial channels of the NRC.

http://www.sovereignindependent.com/?s=nrc

Thanks,

Ops Center

CK 873 of 3114

From:Sent:To:Attachments:

LIA05 HocMonday, March 28,20112:17 PMDan FeighertFEMA Liaison Duties and Responsibilities2.docx

This is still a draft .but this is what I have so far.

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wiermian Nightshift 1500-2300FEMIA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

*****FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY****DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THlE FEDERALb FAMILY

1

CK 874 of 3114

To: FEMA Liaison Contact List; [email protected]

Mr. Chris Miller brought this to my attention and wanted Mr. Kish to be aware of the meeting.

03/29/11 9:00 A.M. Briefing on Small Modular Reactors(PUBLIC MEETING)(Contact: Stephanie Coffin, 301-415-6877)Webcast

Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland

Bonnie Sheffield Dayshift 0700-1500Ken Wierman Nightshifi 1500-2300FEMA REP LiaisonNRC Operations Center(301) 816-5187

******FOR OFF...A L USE ONLY.. **....


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From:

Sent:To:

LIA05 HocSunday, March 27, 2011 2:55 PMDan Feighert; Andrew Seward; Harry Sherwood; John Simpson; Lisa Hamilton;

Michelle Ralston; Rebecca Fontenot; Steve Horwitz; Tim Greten; Vanessa E. QuinnVersion 7 of Reocurring Status CallsReoccurring Daily Calls Rev 7.docx

Subject:Attachments:

Please find the attached. HHS now hosts a call to all 50 States on Tuesday and Thursday Evening.


*** ***FOR OFFICIAL d USEor, ONL.. ''DO NOTI ' RELEASE OUTS1IE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

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Reoccurring Daily Calls

-Time (EDT) Description Lead Team Action/Purpose of the Call0300 RSTIPMT call with Japan Team LT Daily update for Site Team and HQ (convenient

Arranged by the HO~s time for the Site Team)(b)(6) 1

0600 Status update & 2 pager/Sit Rep EBT EBT developed agency briefing documents(BRIEFING ONLY-not a call)

0600 Pumping Rig discussions RST Discussions regarding the pumping projectw/INPO& Bechtel (arranged by HOO's)

I (b)(6) I0715 Chairman's brief ET Update chairman and staff during turnover

(arranged by HOOs)0730 TAs & CAs briefing ET ET Director lead

*arraned b HOD's) -briefed Commission TAs and ODs

Deputy Secretaries (as scheduled) ET White House lead (-Chairman participates)-Interagency discussion

0900 INPO call with RST RST Share technical information0930 UK/Canada/France Call RST Information Exchange. Focused on Operational

•* (arranged by HOO's) issues (PMT call @ 1400 for Dose issues)Bridg((b)(6 _ __

1000 Call w/Consortium (daily) ET ET led•* (arranged by HOO's) -Discussions with Industry

1100 ESF8-(Public Health & Medical LT HHS Secretarys Operations Center leadServices) (conference number provided by -Interagency discussion

HHS1100 Technical Coordination with RST Technical discussion

Industry Consortium Arranged by HOOsI (b)(6) , ,

1230 NTAG teleconference (chaired by Nuclear Technical Advisory Group -email sent outNSS) daily with phone # and pass code

1400 UK/Canada/France Call PMT PMT led (RST led call @ 0930 for Operational•* (arranged by HOO's) issues)

Bridge(b6 -Information sharing on current and projected dose1400 USAID LT/OCA USAID lead

-Interagency discussion1400 NARAC PMT DOE lead

•* (arranged by HOO's) -Interagency discussion of dose models

March 24, 2011 12:20pm Reoccurring Daily Calls Rev 7 M: LT /Reoccurring Calls Rev 7

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Reoccurring Daily Calls

1500 Congressional call OCA & OCA lead -Audience is Congressional staff whoNRC Go-To Team have or are near a plant; Oversight committees;

(Leeds, M.Johnson, Sherron, House &Senate leadershipB.Boger, etc)800-593-7189 (b)

1515 Chairman's brief ETArranged by HOOs

1700 HHS call with 50 states and LT/State Liaison Meeting occurs each Tuesday and Thursdayfederal partners evening, as organized by HHS (N.Natarajan). HHS

provides bridge line day of call1700 DOE Science Panel RES Brian Sheron and Richard Lee, out of the box

solutions.1800 Status update & 2 pager/Sit Rep EBT EBT developed agency briefing documents

(BRIEFING ONLY-not a call)2000 TAs & CAs briefing ET ET Director lead

** (arranged by HOO's) -briefed Commission TAs and ODs2130 DOS LT DOS lead

**(arranged by HOO's) -Interagency discussion2200 Chairman's brief by email ET Update chairman using one-pager

March 24, 2011 12:20pm Reoccurring Daily Calls Rev 7 M: LT /Reoccurring Calls Rev 7

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From: Hamilton, Lisa <[email protected]>Sent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 2:35 PMTo: LIA05 HocSubject: Out of Office AutoReply: NRC "One Pager" for Today

I will be out of the office Monday, March 28th and returning Tuesday, April 4th. I will have limited access to email, but will respond

as quickly as possible. Thanks and have a great day!

Lisa

1

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LIA05 HocSunday, March 27, 2011 11:23 AMSheffield, BonnieNRC SITREPS

Just a heads up. NRC moved the Japanese Electronic Data folder into the Japanese EQ and Tsunami folder. Everything'sstill there, just a little harder to find. if you have any problems, give me a call tomorrow morning at the office, I'll bethere.

LB


J******FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY******DO NIOT R-ELEASE OUTSIDE OF TIREFDRLFML

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From: LIA05 HocSent: Sunday, March 27, 2011 9:18 AMTo: [email protected]; Ward, PaulSubject: Question

How much of a factor is "hold" times from the time a core melts until containment failure? I know that hold time makesa difference but don't remember how much. No hurry for a response, just curious.

Larry


0700-15001500-2300

******FOR OUVIY IFFICDIAL UlSE ONLY*l*.DO NOT RELEAMSEE O.UTSIDE OF THE FEDERAL FAMILY

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From: Collins, Richard <[email protected]>Sent: Friday, March 25, 2011 6:38 PM

To: LIA05 Hoc

Subject: Out of Office AutoReply: Ms. Decair,

I will be out of the office on 3/25/2011 to 4/4/2011. 1 will be checking email periodically during this time for issues that require a

more timely response. I may be reached by blackberry if needed.

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ML13283A131.pdf - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Documents

Transcript of ML13283A131.pdf - Nuclear Regulatory Commission