3

1. Table of contents

1. Table of contents………………………………………………....................3

2. Aim of the paper……………………………………….………………....…4

2.1. The specific questions of the paper………………………………….…4

3. Introduction…………………………………………………………….…...4

4. Communication and freedom of speech……………..….…………………..6

4.1. Freedom of expression: Broadcasting Communication………………..6

4.1.1. The liberalization of Broadcasting sector…………….……….…6

4.1.2. Legal framework……………………………………………...…7

4.1.3. Broadcasting communication and Press……………….………...7

4.2. Freedom of opinion…………………………………………………...11

4.2.1. Protest movements: 2O February Movement………..................11

4.2.2. Music: The rapper Mouad Belghouat …………………….…....13

4.3. Conclusion…………………………………………………………….14

5. Leadership In Morocco…………………………………………………....15

5.1. The King Mohammed VI……………………………………………..15

5.2. Prime minister and the surrounding of the palace………....……….....17

5.3. Conclusion…………………………………………………………….18

6. Bibliography………………………………….……………………………20

4

2. Aim of the paper

The aim of the paper is to provide an overview of and highlight the new

constitutional articles that cover the sector of communication and leadership

in Morocco and to see whether these articles and laws are activated in

reality or not, and to give an insight into the most important reforms

concerning communication and broadcasting field and leadership as well.

2.1 The specific questions of the paper

Are there laws that guarantee Freedom of Expression?

Are there laws that guarantee Freedom of Opinion?

Are these laws activated in reality?

What are the prerogatives of the King and that of the Prime Minister

under the new constitution?

How the king and the Prime Minister use these prerogatives, and

Is there any external intervention in the process of using these

prerogatives?

3. Introduction

Morocco's new constitution, adopted by referendum vote on 1 July 2011

as a part of a dynamic drive that is still in progress, in Morocco mainly to a

much larger extent in the Arab world, and that is commonly referred to as the

somewhat artificial generic term of "Arab spring", introduced a number of new

provisions and frameworks to the institutional landscape of Morocco, a

development that will certainly have a significant impact on the media

communication and leadership in Morocco.

5

The main articles of the new constitution address inter alia the guarantee

of better visibility and exposure for the opposition in public broadcasting media

(Article 10), including during electoral consultations (Article 19). They also

guarantee the freedom of expression, as well as the ability to freely publish and

disseminate opinions and ideas notwithstanding any explicitly stated legal

provision of a limitative nature to the contrary (Article 28)

Furthermore, the constitution sets out the rules and regulations of

organizing, regulating and controlling public media whilst guaranteeing the

principles of the linguistic and cultural diversity and respecting the political

pluralism of Moroccan society. The High Authority for Audiovisual

Communication (Known as HACA) stands as a guarantor for the respect of this

diversity and this pluralism (Article 165). Article 171, in turn, stipulates that an

organic law shall define the powers, composition and terms of governance of

the institutions and bodies mentioned in Articles 161 to 170, one of which

being the HACA.

The new constitution equally carries the premises of a profound

institutional reorganization which will no doubt structurally impact the

organization and regulation of public media, chiefly through a highly ambitious

extended regionalization policy of which the implementation mechanisms will

be set into motion during 2012.

On the other hand, the new constitution gave more permission to the

Prime minister. Article 47 obliged the king to appoint a prime minister from the

party that wins the most seats in the parliamentary elections. Previously, he

could nominate a technocrat in this position if no party has a decisive

advantage over the other parties in terms of the number of seats in

the parliament.

And the king is no longer "sacred" but the "integrity of his person" is

"inviolable" (Article 46). Also the high administrative and diplomatic posts

(including ambassadors, CEOs of state-owned companies, provincial and

6

regional governors), are now appointed by the prime minister in consultation

with the ministerial council which is presided by the king, previously the latter

exclusively held this power. Moreover, now, the prime minister is the head of

government and president of the council of government, he has the power to

dissolve the parliament; he or she can also preside over the council of

Government, which prepares the general policy of the state. Previously the king

held this position (Articles 46, 49).

4. Communication and Freedom of speech

4.1. Freedom of expression: Broadcasting communication

4.1.1. The liberalization of broadcasting sector

The liberalization of the broadcasting sector and the creation of the

HACA fall right within the context of true but intermittent progress and come

as a response to the expectations of those either directly or indirectly affected

by this reform.

By creating the HACA, Morocco became the first country in the Arab-Muslim

region to choose regulation as a mode of governance for the broadcasting

activity. The challenge, as experienced by professionals and by the institutional

structures involved, is to make sure that this liberalization becomes meaningful

and real (Aarab, 2013).

4.1.2. Legal framework

The freedom of broadcasting communication in Morocco is rooted in a

set of regulatory texts. It is therefore important to examine the role that these

texts, starting with the number one regulatory text, the constitution, allocate to

this issue and how they can serve as a foundation for this freedom.

7

Freedom of speech that consists of freedom of expression and opinion

(Wojciech, 2002, p. 58) is referred to in Article 9 of the Moroccan constitution.

Although the constitution makes no specific mention of the freedom of

broadcasting communication, it may be argued that broadcasting

communication is but one form of the freedom of expression. It is one of the

manifestations of this constitution principle and its scope of application extends

to the audio-visually supported media.

Although the principle of the freedom of broadcasting communication has not

been expressly provided for in the constitution, the fundaments of this freedom

and subsequently the end of the state monopoly and the liberalization of the

sector are embedded in primary law. Furthermore, Article 15 guarantees all

citizens the freedom of enterprise, a freedom that represents the foundation of

the right to invest in the broadcasting communication field, a matter that was

not possible under the regime of state monopoly. One might therefore contend

that maintaining state monopoly over the broadcasting communication sector

would be an anachronism in relation to freedom of enterprise.

On the constitutional front, lifting the state's monopoly, a measure

accompanied by the liberalization of the broadcasting activity, becomes a

means to close the gap between the reality of this sector and the essence of the

country's supreme law. By liberalizing broadcasting communication, Morocco

fell into step with the principles contained in its constitution (Aarab, 2013).

4.1.3. Broadcasting communication and Press.

In Morocco, the press enjoys some freedom to criticize the government

and the politically powerful. The Moroccan constitution provides for freedom

of expression, and in fact newspapers representing a spectrum of views from

socialist to nationalist to islamist do publish rather freely.

Since 1956, when Morocco gained its independence and colonial controls on

the press by France and Spain were lifted, the Moroccan newspapers have as a

whole shown a consistent willingness to criticize and debate the issues. The

8

government has not always tolerated this criticism and from time to time has

used various legal and political means against individual newspapers (William,

2004, p. 110).

Written press is governed by the royal decree of 15 November 1958 which was

profoundly modified in October 2002 by Law 77-00. To a large extent, these

provisions govern only written press and publishing except for the fourth

chapter which addresses the punitive aspect exclusively and deals with crimes

and offences that may be committed through the press or any other publishing

tool.

Broadcasting communication is considered one of the publishing tools through

which press offences may be committed. Article 38 punishes the provocation of

crime and offences and stipulates clearly that actions giving body to this

offence may be committed by 'various means of broadcasting communication'.

To determine the means that may be used in committing such acts, the other

articles of the same chapter also refer to the provisions of Article 38.

The media are therefore all subjected to the same punitive system, regardless of

the type or nature of the channel used. However, attention should be drawn to a

few nuances here. The most important of these lies in the determination of who

is liable and the extent of their liability. Contrary to the director of a

publication which is considered legally accountable for everything published in

his paper, even articles carrying the by-line of a third party (Aarab, 2013).

In this respect, Communications Minister Mustapha Khalfi said that “There

cannot be democratic development without a free and responsible press,”

Khalfi, who is also government spokesman, told at the opening of a two-day

seminar in Rabat on “Evaluating the freedom of the press.” attended by Human

Rights Watch (HRW) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) that “Morocco is

classed as the worst in north Africa”. Morocco ranked 138th out of a list of 179

countries in RSF’s last assessment, in 2011. Despite the freedom of expression

9

under the new constitution (Articles 25, 26, 27, 28), the authorities continue to

harass journalists and government critics under the severe criminal and press

code, HRW said. And The New York-based rights group recently accused the

government of “trying to control how journalists cover sensitive subjects.” It

referred to the closure since 2010 of Qatari satellite TV channel Al-Jazeera’s

Moroccan bureau, and the case of Omar Brouksy, an AFP journalist in Rabat

whose accreditation was withdrawn in 2011.

In this regard, HRW regional director Sarah Leah Whitson again criticized

Morocco’s decision to discredit Brouksy, and denounced the practice of

punishing, including with jail terms, journalists convicted of insulting senior

officials referring to the case of Rachid Nini and Chekib El Khiari, a human

rights defender and journalist, who was serving a three-year prison sentence

imposed in 2009 after he spoke out against corruption (Amnesty.org, 2012).

Concerning the case of Rachid Nini, the President of the Moroccan League for

Human Rights, Abdelkader El Alami said:

"I consider Nini’s prosecution legally unfounded from the beginning. The

conditions for a fair trial were not guaranteed either, and openly disrespected

the press code, despite its imperfections, and which we’re still advocating to

change.

And while Morocco is undergoing major changes for a democratic future

where rule of law and respect for civil liberties would prevail, a journalist is

being prosecuted for the mere act of audacious and bold and criticism of the

status quo and rampant corruption in the administration, through his columns.

I can only condemn this unjust sentence, which has resulted from an unfair

trial which had no legal foundations." (National Press Club, 2011)

“The Moroccan government is not the truth police, nor should it act as the truth

police. It’s up to the consumers to decide whether they find a report credible or

not,” HRW regional director Sarah Leah Whitson said. “What is truly insulting

is the efforts of the Moroccan government to decide what its citizens can and

can’t say, who its citizens can and can’t insult.” She added (Morocco world

News, 2012).

10

Furthermore, in a statement to Al-massae, Moroccan National Press Syndicate

(SNPM) Secretary-General Younes M'Jahed criticized HACA for not

activating the laws of the new constitution, referring to preventing journalists

from their right to information, which totally contradicts Article 27 that

guarantee the right to information be it in the possession of public

administration, and elected institutions, bodies in charge of the functions of

public utility (Almassae, 2012).

On the other hand, Morocco's first annual report on press freedom did not

mention any physical or moral attack on Moroccan journalists. The report also

claimed that no publication was banned or censored during the past year, and

no journalist was sent to prison. It also noted the efforts to improve working

conditions for journalists. It mentioned an agreement between the

communications ministry and the Moroccan National Press Union (SNPM)

concerning the introduction of a joint mechanism on the protection of

journalists (Benmehdi, 2013); but on the contrary, the government continued to

restrict freedom of the press through the legal system. Government-provided

figures for the year showed that 154 journalists or media outlets faced criminal

or civil charges, an increase from previous years (state.gov, 2013). This report

ignored Rachid Nini who was sent to jail in 2011, and Fatima Ifriki who was

threatened to be killed if she didn't quit writing in March 2013 after she

criticized the palace surrounding. Concerning this point, the Moroccan

columnist Nadia Jamilli said that Moroccan journalists are under huge

pressures coming from different directions, and that “The freedom of the press

is very relative and the independence of journalists is most often trumped by

the interests of political and economic decision-makers.” (Benmehdi, 2013)

4.2. Freedom of opinion

4.2.1. Protest Movements : 2O February movement

During the so called "Arab Spring", Morocco saw a first major

manifestation of political discontent on February 20, 2011, when youth

11

movements organized demonstrations throughout the country, starting the

"February 20 Movement for change" which rallied human rights and other civil

society organizations. In Rabat, these demonstrations were peaceful and

apparently tolerated by the authorities, but protesters and the police clashed in a

number of other Moroccan cities and international human rights organizations

have repeatedly criticized the use of police violence to contain protests in 2011

(Thomas et all, 2013, P. 196).

On many occasions security forces were reported to have attacked the

protesters, causing at least one death and many injuries. Hundreds of protesters

were detained. Most were released, but some were tried and received prison

sentences (Amnesty.org, 2012). A Moroccan court on September 12, 2012,

sentenced five activists of the pro-reform February 20 Movement to prison

terms, and one to a suspended term, for assaulting and insulting police officers

after what may have been an unfair trial.

A Casablanca court sentenced them to up to 10 months in prison despite their

claim, from the moment they emerged from police custody, that they had been

tortured into signing false confessions, the sole evidence against them. The

court refused to summon any of the officers who claimed to have been

assaulted to appear in court, and heard no witnesses who identified the

defendants as having committed any infractions. The defendants plan to appeal.

“The court sent protesters to jail on the basis of confessions allegedly obtained

under torture, while refusing to summon the complainants to be heard in court,”

said Eric Goldstein, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human

Rights Watch. “Morocco can guarantee fair trials only when courts seriously

investigate allegations of coerced confessions and dismiss as evidence any

confessions the police obtained improperly.”

The new constitution and the law prohibit such practices especially arbitrary

arrest, detention or torture (articles 22, 23), although police used both practices.

Police did not always observe due process. According to the OMP and

12

members of various NGOs, including the Moroccan Organization for Human

Rights (OMDH), the AMDH, and the Association of Victims of Grave Human

Rights Abuses (ASVDH), police did not always identify themselves when

arresting suspects nor did they consistently obtain warrants. Police reportedly

held some detainees without charging them. and the government denied that it

used torture. However, numerous NGO reports and media articles alleged that

members of security forces tortured and abused individuals in their custody,

particularly during pretrial detention.

The law against torture requires judges to refer a detainee to a forensic medical

expert when the detainee or his or her lawyer requests it or if judges notice

suspicious physical marks on a detainee. The government reported that as of

September public prosecutors and magistrates had requested expert medical

examinations for 19 individuals, compared with 31 requests in 2010. Media

and human rights NGOs documented cases in which the anti-torture law

provisions were not implemented (state.gov, 2013).

After the adoption of the new constitution, the protesters chanted strong anti-

monarchy slogans but remained peaceful; participants told Human Rights

Watch that the police surged to disperse the protesters. They arrested the six

defendants, put them in a police van, and took them to the local police station.

Leïla Nassimi, a February 20 activist who said she still has back pain from a

beating in a police wagon, described her arrest and mistreatment to Human

Rights Watch:

"The demonstration was already over, people were still there but beginning to

leave. I was sitting in a café when I saw the police moving in, so I got up to

see what was happening. The police grabbed me and put me in the back of

their van. Inside the van, policemen started beating me right away. Each time

they added someone to the wagon, they beat everyone inside again. They

drove us to the Anassi station of the judicial police in Sidi el-Bernoussi. At the

station, they did not beat me but I saw what they did to the others in the

hallways, before they took us to separate offices: they were slapping them,

pulling down their pants, ordering them to shout, “Long live the king!” [One

13

slogan of the February 20 Movement is “Long live the people.”] If they

refused, the police beat them some more."

While assaulting an individual police officer is a legitimate criminal charge

(Article 21, 22), criminalizing insults to the police as a public institution

violates the right to freedom of expression, Human Rights Watch (2012) said.

“When Moroccan courts begin adequately addressing allegations of the use of

torture to obtain evidence, and ensure that the accused have the opportunity to

question complainants and all relevant witnesses in court, they will not only

ensure fairer trials, but also signal to the police that they need to actively use

Communication and stop using improper methods to extract confessions,”

Goldstein said (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

4.2.2. Music: The rapper Mouad Belghouat

The new Constitution guarantees the freedom of opinion in all

its forms without the state’s prior approval. In article 25, individuals

are encouraged to express their political views, even though

such views might criticize the government or the system as a whole.

However, the sentencing of a rapper on May 11, 2012 to one year in

prison for “insulting the police” shows the gap between the strong free-

expression language in Morocco’s 2011 constitution and the continuing

intolerance for those who criticize state institutions. The sentence was

handed down one week before the opening of the international

Mawazine music festival in Rabat, which is held under the patronage of

King Mohammed VI.

Mouad Belghouat, better known as “al-Haqed” (the sullen one), has

been in pretrial custody since March 29 2012 because of his rap song

“Kilab ed-Dowla” (Dogs of the State), which denounces police

corruption, and a YouTube video set to the song.

14

Belghouat attracted wide notice when police arrested him in an earlier

case in September 2011 and charged him with sbeating a pro-

government protester in a street altercation. His trial in Casablanca

attracted crowds of supporters, who claimed that the case was a set-up.

The defense team contended that there were many inconsistencies in

the account provided by Belghouat’s alleged victim. In January, the

court convicted Belghouat of the assault, sentenced him to the four

months he had already served in pretrial detention, and released him.

On July 1, 2011, Moroccans voted in a referendum to approve a

constitution proposed by King Mohammed VI that affirms freedom of

expression. Article 25 states: “Freedom of thought, opinion and

expression in all its forms are guaranteed. Freedom to create, publish,

and display literary and artistic materials and scientific and technical

research are guaranteed.” However, Morocco has yet to revise the

repressive articles of the press and penal code that seem contrary to the

new constitution, and the courts continue to apply these articles to

punish peaceful speech (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

4.3. Conclusion

The new constitution has enshrined freedoms of expression; although a

new Press Code reforming punishment for repression and press intimidation

has not yet been adopted. Reform of the Justice sector still remains a challenge,

although the constitution included substantial reforms including strengthening

the independence of the judiciary and respect for the legal rights such as access

to legal advice and the presumption of innocence. A new High Court will

oversee the guarantees accorded by the constitution. The Constitution also

protects witnesses, victims and complaints in the fight against corruption. The

new constitution recognises human rights and fundamental freedom and the

council adopted a new Protocol preventing torture.

15

On the other hand, in fact, the right to not be subjected to torture or other cruel

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 22, and the right not

to be subjected to arbitrary arrest in Article 23, and the right to equality before

the law in Article 2, were not respected when the police arrested Rachid Nini,

Elhakked and tortured 20 February movement members. So, under the new

constitution journalists and others continued to face prosecution and

imprisonment for publicly criticizing state officials or institutions, or for

reporting on politically sensitive issues, and laws that are enshrined in the new

Constitution have not yet applied in reality.

5. Leadership in Morocco

5.1. The King Mohammed VI

Before 2011 Morocco was governed by the 1996 constitution, which

gave the King tremendous power, including the authority to appoint all senior

government officials, high-ranking military officers, and the prime minister,

without consideration of parliamentary electoral results. The King was also

given the power to initiate legislation, enabling him to pass some significant

reforms, such as the Mudawana (the revised family code that granted more

rights to women) (Kenneth, 2011, p. 197).

However, the response of the king Mohammed VI was surprisingly fast; in

March, he acceded to the demonstrators' demands by announcing a series of

reforms, including the drafting of a new constitution. This document was

overwhelmingly approved in a July 1, 2011 referendum, in which participation

was respectable despite a call by Arab Spring movement leaders to boycott the

vote. This new constitution, although it does not yet give the country a Western

style constitutional monarchy, represents a far more substantial step toward a

more democratic system than did the previous constitution. Nevertheless, the

16

King held onto many of his privileges, and critics quickly pointed out that he

was simply buying time before another wave of pressure could mount. Even if

the Moroccan King's initiative is seen as merely clever, However, it is a fact

that no other Arab leader has dared to react in similar fashion. Arnold

Hottinger, a leading expert on the Arabian world, characterizes the Moroccan

experience as follows: "if everything were to work (straightforwardly) and no

interior controversy (were to arise), Morocco could be ruled in a democratic

way under the new constitution. But disputes and power struggles will be

unavoidable. The King reserves his right to intervene and to decide. This is

certainly prudent and it serves the stability of the country. The democratic walk

on a tightrope is carried out with a safety net. But how tightly this safety net

will restrict the acrobats on the tightrope depends on how much freedom of

action the ruler will grant to his representatives and to his courtiers" (Hottinger,

2011). Overall, therefore, this new constitution is a telling sign of the

ultimately irresistible potency of the trend toward empowering the people.

Under the new constitution, the King Mohammed has managed to saty above

the fray during the Arab Spring and previous bouts of unrest. This is largely a

product of his dual position as head of state and religious leader (Emir al-

mu'minun, or commander of the faithful) and his vast network of patronage in

the form of makhzen (literaly, "storehouse," but meaning the network of elites

and regime allies). The King therefore has a unique source of legitimacy. He

does not need to resort to fear and coercion the way some of his regional

compatriots must. The King's religious role was further entrenched in the latest

constitution, where a new article formalized his role as head of the religious

establishment. All in all, he has succeeded in separating his image from that of

the corrupt political institutions. While public opinion regarding the parliament,

judiciary, and other government institutions is very low, with regime opponents

and ordinary citizens accusing the government of massive corruption and

clientalism, public opinion of the King remains high (Kenneth, 2011, p. 197).

17

The new constitution is, however, more liberal in that the King's person will be

merely "untouchable" and no longer "holy". It is also worth noting that this

constitutional disposition does not necessarily conflict with the idea of

separation of religion and state (Hans et all, 2012, p. 274).

5.2. The Prime minister and the palace surrounding

The official constitution reforms approved by an overwhelming

majority of voters in the Jule 1 referendum provide for many

significant changes to the Moroccan political system. Even if

implemented, they would not make Morocco a constitutional

monarchy, but if they are actually honoured in spirit and letter, they

might be an important step on a longer path that could take Morocco to

that destination. However, no one has suggested that there might be

additional reforms.

Under the new constitution the prime minister will become head of the

executive branch and will take on further powers, including full

responsibility for the government and civil service. The prime minister

will be chosen by the king from the political party with a majority in

the parliament. This is a new stipulation: in the 1996 constitution, the

prime minister was appointed by the king and, with one exception, was

always a member of the regime's inner circle. The new constitution

also gives more power to the parliament and expands the areas in

which it can pass legislation. However, the king remains commander of

the armed forces and retains the power to select the regional governors

who hold a significant amount of political power (Kenneth, 2013, p.

198).

Although, the King has supreme power, Morocco Prime minister has taken

advantage of his prerogatives so as to make reforms in reality. "We are in the

process of taking small... but decisive steps," Benkirane told the French

television channel on the side-lines of the World Forum for Democracy in

18

Strasbourg.

The Arab Spring "set the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt on fire, and ours was

scalded. It was because of that that we had a new constitution, that we had

elections and that a party once harassed and marginalised" was voted to power,

he said. On the other hand, Benkiran didn't hide the fact that the king is still the

commander. "In Morocco, the king is the head of state and ... the head of the

council of ministers, in which I am the head of the government. He is therefore

my boss," Benkirane said, while stressing that he had his own "prerogatives."

(Arabonline.org, 2012)

Moreover, He is usually interrupted by some powerful figures close to

the palace. Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane spoke out after his

government's plan to reform state-run television that was criticised by

the palace surrounding. "The Arab Spring is not over yet," Benkirane

told a PJD gathering in Rabat, according to remarks carried on Monday

by local newspapers. "It (the Arab Spring) is still wandering about and

may feel like coming back," he added. "In this country, even the

monarchy itself needs citizens who seek reform ... Kings are not always

surrounded by the right kind of people, they can actually be surrounded

by foes who become the first to desert them."

5.3. Conclusion

King Mohammed VI retains supreme political power in Morocco, but

has taken some liberalizing steps with uncertain effects. In 2011, following

popular demonstrations that echoed unrest elsewhere in the region, the king

proposed a new constitution that may provide greater independence to the

Prime Minister, the legislature, and the judiciary. It was overwhelmingly

approved in a public referendum. The moderate Islamist Justice and

Development Party (PJD) is leading the government for the first time after

winning a plurality of seats in November 2011 legislative elections. While the

party has been legally recognized for two decades, its leaders continue to

19

grapple with their transition from outsider opposition status to the day-to-day

responsibilities of running the government amid an economic downturn and

responding to vast and divided expectations. The PJD’s campaign promises to

crack down on corruption and cronyism may also place it on a collision course

with pro-palace elites. Therefore, Benkirane told The Associated Press in an

interview before elections that the Makhzen, the code word for the royal

establishment that controls all, must realize that the old games must change in

the face of a new political environment. "The Makhzen (referring the palace

surrounding) will have to become a bit reasonable. It must understand that it

can sacrifice the political parties and the PJD, but that will not resolve the

problem," he said.

20

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نقابة الصحافة تنتقد "الهاكا" و مدة انتداب أعضاءها (, 2102صحيفة المساء, )دجنبر

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