The paper
Transcript of The paper
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1. Table of contents
1. Table of contents………………………………………………....................3
2. Aim of the paper……………………………………….………………....…4
2.1. The specific questions of the paper………………………………….…4
3. Introduction…………………………………………………………….…...4
4. Communication and freedom of speech……………..….…………………..6
4.1. Freedom of expression: Broadcasting Communication………………..6
4.1.1. The liberalization of Broadcasting sector…………….……….…6
4.1.2. Legal framework……………………………………………...…7
4.1.3. Broadcasting communication and Press……………….………...7
4.2. Freedom of opinion…………………………………………………...11
4.2.1. Protest movements: 2O February Movement………..................11
4.2.2. Music: The rapper Mouad Belghouat …………………….…....13
4.3. Conclusion…………………………………………………………….14
5. Leadership In Morocco…………………………………………………....15
5.1. The King Mohammed VI……………………………………………..15
5.2. Prime minister and the surrounding of the palace………....……….....17
5.3. Conclusion…………………………………………………………….18
6. Bibliography………………………………….……………………………20
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2. Aim of the paper
The aim of the paper is to provide an overview of and highlight the new
constitutional articles that cover the sector of communication and leadership
in Morocco and to see whether these articles and laws are activated in
reality or not, and to give an insight into the most important reforms
concerning communication and broadcasting field and leadership as well.
2.1 The specific questions of the paper
Are there laws that guarantee Freedom of Expression?
Are there laws that guarantee Freedom of Opinion?
Are these laws activated in reality?
What are the prerogatives of the King and that of the Prime Minister
under the new constitution?
How the king and the Prime Minister use these prerogatives, and
Is there any external intervention in the process of using these
prerogatives?
3. Introduction
Morocco's new constitution, adopted by referendum vote on 1 July 2011
as a part of a dynamic drive that is still in progress, in Morocco mainly to a
much larger extent in the Arab world, and that is commonly referred to as the
somewhat artificial generic term of "Arab spring", introduced a number of new
provisions and frameworks to the institutional landscape of Morocco, a
development that will certainly have a significant impact on the media
communication and leadership in Morocco.
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The main articles of the new constitution address inter alia the guarantee
of better visibility and exposure for the opposition in public broadcasting media
(Article 10), including during electoral consultations (Article 19). They also
guarantee the freedom of expression, as well as the ability to freely publish and
disseminate opinions and ideas notwithstanding any explicitly stated legal
provision of a limitative nature to the contrary (Article 28)
Furthermore, the constitution sets out the rules and regulations of
organizing, regulating and controlling public media whilst guaranteeing the
principles of the linguistic and cultural diversity and respecting the political
pluralism of Moroccan society. The High Authority for Audiovisual
Communication (Known as HACA) stands as a guarantor for the respect of this
diversity and this pluralism (Article 165). Article 171, in turn, stipulates that an
organic law shall define the powers, composition and terms of governance of
the institutions and bodies mentioned in Articles 161 to 170, one of which
being the HACA.
The new constitution equally carries the premises of a profound
institutional reorganization which will no doubt structurally impact the
organization and regulation of public media, chiefly through a highly ambitious
extended regionalization policy of which the implementation mechanisms will
be set into motion during 2012.
On the other hand, the new constitution gave more permission to the
Prime minister. Article 47 obliged the king to appoint a prime minister from the
party that wins the most seats in the parliamentary elections. Previously, he
could nominate a technocrat in this position if no party has a decisive
advantage over the other parties in terms of the number of seats in
the parliament.
And the king is no longer "sacred" but the "integrity of his person" is
"inviolable" (Article 46). Also the high administrative and diplomatic posts
(including ambassadors, CEOs of state-owned companies, provincial and
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regional governors), are now appointed by the prime minister in consultation
with the ministerial council which is presided by the king, previously the latter
exclusively held this power. Moreover, now, the prime minister is the head of
government and president of the council of government, he has the power to
dissolve the parliament; he or she can also preside over the council of
Government, which prepares the general policy of the state. Previously the king
held this position (Articles 46, 49).
4. Communication and Freedom of speech
4.1. Freedom of expression: Broadcasting communication
4.1.1. The liberalization of broadcasting sector
The liberalization of the broadcasting sector and the creation of the
HACA fall right within the context of true but intermittent progress and come
as a response to the expectations of those either directly or indirectly affected
by this reform.
By creating the HACA, Morocco became the first country in the Arab-Muslim
region to choose regulation as a mode of governance for the broadcasting
activity. The challenge, as experienced by professionals and by the institutional
structures involved, is to make sure that this liberalization becomes meaningful
and real (Aarab, 2013).
4.1.2. Legal framework
The freedom of broadcasting communication in Morocco is rooted in a
set of regulatory texts. It is therefore important to examine the role that these
texts, starting with the number one regulatory text, the constitution, allocate to
this issue and how they can serve as a foundation for this freedom.
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Freedom of speech that consists of freedom of expression and opinion
(Wojciech, 2002, p. 58) is referred to in Article 9 of the Moroccan constitution.
Although the constitution makes no specific mention of the freedom of
broadcasting communication, it may be argued that broadcasting
communication is but one form of the freedom of expression. It is one of the
manifestations of this constitution principle and its scope of application extends
to the audio-visually supported media.
Although the principle of the freedom of broadcasting communication has not
been expressly provided for in the constitution, the fundaments of this freedom
and subsequently the end of the state monopoly and the liberalization of the
sector are embedded in primary law. Furthermore, Article 15 guarantees all
citizens the freedom of enterprise, a freedom that represents the foundation of
the right to invest in the broadcasting communication field, a matter that was
not possible under the regime of state monopoly. One might therefore contend
that maintaining state monopoly over the broadcasting communication sector
would be an anachronism in relation to freedom of enterprise.
On the constitutional front, lifting the state's monopoly, a measure
accompanied by the liberalization of the broadcasting activity, becomes a
means to close the gap between the reality of this sector and the essence of the
country's supreme law. By liberalizing broadcasting communication, Morocco
fell into step with the principles contained in its constitution (Aarab, 2013).
4.1.3. Broadcasting communication and Press.
In Morocco, the press enjoys some freedom to criticize the government
and the politically powerful. The Moroccan constitution provides for freedom
of expression, and in fact newspapers representing a spectrum of views from
socialist to nationalist to islamist do publish rather freely.
Since 1956, when Morocco gained its independence and colonial controls on
the press by France and Spain were lifted, the Moroccan newspapers have as a
whole shown a consistent willingness to criticize and debate the issues. The
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government has not always tolerated this criticism and from time to time has
used various legal and political means against individual newspapers (William,
2004, p. 110).
Written press is governed by the royal decree of 15 November 1958 which was
profoundly modified in October 2002 by Law 77-00. To a large extent, these
provisions govern only written press and publishing except for the fourth
chapter which addresses the punitive aspect exclusively and deals with crimes
and offences that may be committed through the press or any other publishing
tool.
Broadcasting communication is considered one of the publishing tools through
which press offences may be committed. Article 38 punishes the provocation of
crime and offences and stipulates clearly that actions giving body to this
offence may be committed by 'various means of broadcasting communication'.
To determine the means that may be used in committing such acts, the other
articles of the same chapter also refer to the provisions of Article 38.
The media are therefore all subjected to the same punitive system, regardless of
the type or nature of the channel used. However, attention should be drawn to a
few nuances here. The most important of these lies in the determination of who
is liable and the extent of their liability. Contrary to the director of a
publication which is considered legally accountable for everything published in
his paper, even articles carrying the by-line of a third party (Aarab, 2013).
In this respect, Communications Minister Mustapha Khalfi said that “There
cannot be democratic development without a free and responsible press,”
Khalfi, who is also government spokesman, told at the opening of a two-day
seminar in Rabat on “Evaluating the freedom of the press.” attended by Human
Rights Watch (HRW) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) that “Morocco is
classed as the worst in north Africa”. Morocco ranked 138th out of a list of 179
countries in RSF’s last assessment, in 2011. Despite the freedom of expression
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under the new constitution (Articles 25, 26, 27, 28), the authorities continue to
harass journalists and government critics under the severe criminal and press
code, HRW said. And The New York-based rights group recently accused the
government of “trying to control how journalists cover sensitive subjects.” It
referred to the closure since 2010 of Qatari satellite TV channel Al-Jazeera’s
Moroccan bureau, and the case of Omar Brouksy, an AFP journalist in Rabat
whose accreditation was withdrawn in 2011.
In this regard, HRW regional director Sarah Leah Whitson again criticized
Morocco’s decision to discredit Brouksy, and denounced the practice of
punishing, including with jail terms, journalists convicted of insulting senior
officials referring to the case of Rachid Nini and Chekib El Khiari, a human
rights defender and journalist, who was serving a three-year prison sentence
imposed in 2009 after he spoke out against corruption (Amnesty.org, 2012).
Concerning the case of Rachid Nini, the President of the Moroccan League for
Human Rights, Abdelkader El Alami said:
"I consider Nini’s prosecution legally unfounded from the beginning. The
conditions for a fair trial were not guaranteed either, and openly disrespected
the press code, despite its imperfections, and which we’re still advocating to
change.
And while Morocco is undergoing major changes for a democratic future
where rule of law and respect for civil liberties would prevail, a journalist is
being prosecuted for the mere act of audacious and bold and criticism of the
status quo and rampant corruption in the administration, through his columns.
I can only condemn this unjust sentence, which has resulted from an unfair
trial which had no legal foundations." (National Press Club, 2011)
“The Moroccan government is not the truth police, nor should it act as the truth
police. It’s up to the consumers to decide whether they find a report credible or
not,” HRW regional director Sarah Leah Whitson said. “What is truly insulting
is the efforts of the Moroccan government to decide what its citizens can and
can’t say, who its citizens can and can’t insult.” She added (Morocco world
News, 2012).
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Furthermore, in a statement to Al-massae, Moroccan National Press Syndicate
(SNPM) Secretary-General Younes M'Jahed criticized HACA for not
activating the laws of the new constitution, referring to preventing journalists
from their right to information, which totally contradicts Article 27 that
guarantee the right to information be it in the possession of public
administration, and elected institutions, bodies in charge of the functions of
public utility (Almassae, 2012).
On the other hand, Morocco's first annual report on press freedom did not
mention any physical or moral attack on Moroccan journalists. The report also
claimed that no publication was banned or censored during the past year, and
no journalist was sent to prison. It also noted the efforts to improve working
conditions for journalists. It mentioned an agreement between the
communications ministry and the Moroccan National Press Union (SNPM)
concerning the introduction of a joint mechanism on the protection of
journalists (Benmehdi, 2013); but on the contrary, the government continued to
restrict freedom of the press through the legal system. Government-provided
figures for the year showed that 154 journalists or media outlets faced criminal
or civil charges, an increase from previous years (state.gov, 2013). This report
ignored Rachid Nini who was sent to jail in 2011, and Fatima Ifriki who was
threatened to be killed if she didn't quit writing in March 2013 after she
criticized the palace surrounding. Concerning this point, the Moroccan
columnist Nadia Jamilli said that Moroccan journalists are under huge
pressures coming from different directions, and that “The freedom of the press
is very relative and the independence of journalists is most often trumped by
the interests of political and economic decision-makers.” (Benmehdi, 2013)
4.2. Freedom of opinion
4.2.1. Protest Movements : 2O February movement
During the so called "Arab Spring", Morocco saw a first major
manifestation of political discontent on February 20, 2011, when youth
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movements organized demonstrations throughout the country, starting the
"February 20 Movement for change" which rallied human rights and other civil
society organizations. In Rabat, these demonstrations were peaceful and
apparently tolerated by the authorities, but protesters and the police clashed in a
number of other Moroccan cities and international human rights organizations
have repeatedly criticized the use of police violence to contain protests in 2011
(Thomas et all, 2013, P. 196).
On many occasions security forces were reported to have attacked the
protesters, causing at least one death and many injuries. Hundreds of protesters
were detained. Most were released, but some were tried and received prison
sentences (Amnesty.org, 2012). A Moroccan court on September 12, 2012,
sentenced five activists of the pro-reform February 20 Movement to prison
terms, and one to a suspended term, for assaulting and insulting police officers
after what may have been an unfair trial.
A Casablanca court sentenced them to up to 10 months in prison despite their
claim, from the moment they emerged from police custody, that they had been
tortured into signing false confessions, the sole evidence against them. The
court refused to summon any of the officers who claimed to have been
assaulted to appear in court, and heard no witnesses who identified the
defendants as having committed any infractions. The defendants plan to appeal.
“The court sent protesters to jail on the basis of confessions allegedly obtained
under torture, while refusing to summon the complainants to be heard in court,”
said Eric Goldstein, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human
Rights Watch. “Morocco can guarantee fair trials only when courts seriously
investigate allegations of coerced confessions and dismiss as evidence any
confessions the police obtained improperly.”
The new constitution and the law prohibit such practices especially arbitrary
arrest, detention or torture (articles 22, 23), although police used both practices.
Police did not always observe due process. According to the OMP and
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members of various NGOs, including the Moroccan Organization for Human
Rights (OMDH), the AMDH, and the Association of Victims of Grave Human
Rights Abuses (ASVDH), police did not always identify themselves when
arresting suspects nor did they consistently obtain warrants. Police reportedly
held some detainees without charging them. and the government denied that it
used torture. However, numerous NGO reports and media articles alleged that
members of security forces tortured and abused individuals in their custody,
particularly during pretrial detention.
The law against torture requires judges to refer a detainee to a forensic medical
expert when the detainee or his or her lawyer requests it or if judges notice
suspicious physical marks on a detainee. The government reported that as of
September public prosecutors and magistrates had requested expert medical
examinations for 19 individuals, compared with 31 requests in 2010. Media
and human rights NGOs documented cases in which the anti-torture law
provisions were not implemented (state.gov, 2013).
After the adoption of the new constitution, the protesters chanted strong anti-
monarchy slogans but remained peaceful; participants told Human Rights
Watch that the police surged to disperse the protesters. They arrested the six
defendants, put them in a police van, and took them to the local police station.
Leïla Nassimi, a February 20 activist who said she still has back pain from a
beating in a police wagon, described her arrest and mistreatment to Human
Rights Watch:
"The demonstration was already over, people were still there but beginning to
leave. I was sitting in a café when I saw the police moving in, so I got up to
see what was happening. The police grabbed me and put me in the back of
their van. Inside the van, policemen started beating me right away. Each time
they added someone to the wagon, they beat everyone inside again. They
drove us to the Anassi station of the judicial police in Sidi el-Bernoussi. At the
station, they did not beat me but I saw what they did to the others in the
hallways, before they took us to separate offices: they were slapping them,
pulling down their pants, ordering them to shout, “Long live the king!” [One
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slogan of the February 20 Movement is “Long live the people.”] If they
refused, the police beat them some more."
While assaulting an individual police officer is a legitimate criminal charge
(Article 21, 22), criminalizing insults to the police as a public institution
violates the right to freedom of expression, Human Rights Watch (2012) said.
“When Moroccan courts begin adequately addressing allegations of the use of
torture to obtain evidence, and ensure that the accused have the opportunity to
question complainants and all relevant witnesses in court, they will not only
ensure fairer trials, but also signal to the police that they need to actively use
Communication and stop using improper methods to extract confessions,”
Goldstein said (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
4.2.2. Music: The rapper Mouad Belghouat
The new Constitution guarantees the freedom of opinion in all
its forms without the state’s prior approval. In article 25, individuals
are encouraged to express their political views, even though
such views might criticize the government or the system as a whole.
However, the sentencing of a rapper on May 11, 2012 to one year in
prison for “insulting the police” shows the gap between the strong free-
expression language in Morocco’s 2011 constitution and the continuing
intolerance for those who criticize state institutions. The sentence was
handed down one week before the opening of the international
Mawazine music festival in Rabat, which is held under the patronage of
King Mohammed VI.
Mouad Belghouat, better known as “al-Haqed” (the sullen one), has
been in pretrial custody since March 29 2012 because of his rap song
“Kilab ed-Dowla” (Dogs of the State), which denounces police
corruption, and a YouTube video set to the song.
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Belghouat attracted wide notice when police arrested him in an earlier
case in September 2011 and charged him with sbeating a pro-
government protester in a street altercation. His trial in Casablanca
attracted crowds of supporters, who claimed that the case was a set-up.
The defense team contended that there were many inconsistencies in
the account provided by Belghouat’s alleged victim. In January, the
court convicted Belghouat of the assault, sentenced him to the four
months he had already served in pretrial detention, and released him.
On July 1, 2011, Moroccans voted in a referendum to approve a
constitution proposed by King Mohammed VI that affirms freedom of
expression. Article 25 states: “Freedom of thought, opinion and
expression in all its forms are guaranteed. Freedom to create, publish,
and display literary and artistic materials and scientific and technical
research are guaranteed.” However, Morocco has yet to revise the
repressive articles of the press and penal code that seem contrary to the
new constitution, and the courts continue to apply these articles to
punish peaceful speech (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
4.3. Conclusion
The new constitution has enshrined freedoms of expression; although a
new Press Code reforming punishment for repression and press intimidation
has not yet been adopted. Reform of the Justice sector still remains a challenge,
although the constitution included substantial reforms including strengthening
the independence of the judiciary and respect for the legal rights such as access
to legal advice and the presumption of innocence. A new High Court will
oversee the guarantees accorded by the constitution. The Constitution also
protects witnesses, victims and complaints in the fight against corruption. The
new constitution recognises human rights and fundamental freedom and the
council adopted a new Protocol preventing torture.
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On the other hand, in fact, the right to not be subjected to torture or other cruel
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 22, and the right not
to be subjected to arbitrary arrest in Article 23, and the right to equality before
the law in Article 2, were not respected when the police arrested Rachid Nini,
Elhakked and tortured 20 February movement members. So, under the new
constitution journalists and others continued to face prosecution and
imprisonment for publicly criticizing state officials or institutions, or for
reporting on politically sensitive issues, and laws that are enshrined in the new
Constitution have not yet applied in reality.
5. Leadership in Morocco
5.1. The King Mohammed VI
Before 2011 Morocco was governed by the 1996 constitution, which
gave the King tremendous power, including the authority to appoint all senior
government officials, high-ranking military officers, and the prime minister,
without consideration of parliamentary electoral results. The King was also
given the power to initiate legislation, enabling him to pass some significant
reforms, such as the Mudawana (the revised family code that granted more
rights to women) (Kenneth, 2011, p. 197).
However, the response of the king Mohammed VI was surprisingly fast; in
March, he acceded to the demonstrators' demands by announcing a series of
reforms, including the drafting of a new constitution. This document was
overwhelmingly approved in a July 1, 2011 referendum, in which participation
was respectable despite a call by Arab Spring movement leaders to boycott the
vote. This new constitution, although it does not yet give the country a Western
style constitutional monarchy, represents a far more substantial step toward a
more democratic system than did the previous constitution. Nevertheless, the
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King held onto many of his privileges, and critics quickly pointed out that he
was simply buying time before another wave of pressure could mount. Even if
the Moroccan King's initiative is seen as merely clever, However, it is a fact
that no other Arab leader has dared to react in similar fashion. Arnold
Hottinger, a leading expert on the Arabian world, characterizes the Moroccan
experience as follows: "if everything were to work (straightforwardly) and no
interior controversy (were to arise), Morocco could be ruled in a democratic
way under the new constitution. But disputes and power struggles will be
unavoidable. The King reserves his right to intervene and to decide. This is
certainly prudent and it serves the stability of the country. The democratic walk
on a tightrope is carried out with a safety net. But how tightly this safety net
will restrict the acrobats on the tightrope depends on how much freedom of
action the ruler will grant to his representatives and to his courtiers" (Hottinger,
2011). Overall, therefore, this new constitution is a telling sign of the
ultimately irresistible potency of the trend toward empowering the people.
Under the new constitution, the King Mohammed has managed to saty above
the fray during the Arab Spring and previous bouts of unrest. This is largely a
product of his dual position as head of state and religious leader (Emir al-
mu'minun, or commander of the faithful) and his vast network of patronage in
the form of makhzen (literaly, "storehouse," but meaning the network of elites
and regime allies). The King therefore has a unique source of legitimacy. He
does not need to resort to fear and coercion the way some of his regional
compatriots must. The King's religious role was further entrenched in the latest
constitution, where a new article formalized his role as head of the religious
establishment. All in all, he has succeeded in separating his image from that of
the corrupt political institutions. While public opinion regarding the parliament,
judiciary, and other government institutions is very low, with regime opponents
and ordinary citizens accusing the government of massive corruption and
clientalism, public opinion of the King remains high (Kenneth, 2011, p. 197).
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The new constitution is, however, more liberal in that the King's person will be
merely "untouchable" and no longer "holy". It is also worth noting that this
constitutional disposition does not necessarily conflict with the idea of
separation of religion and state (Hans et all, 2012, p. 274).
5.2. The Prime minister and the palace surrounding
The official constitution reforms approved by an overwhelming
majority of voters in the Jule 1 referendum provide for many
significant changes to the Moroccan political system. Even if
implemented, they would not make Morocco a constitutional
monarchy, but if they are actually honoured in spirit and letter, they
might be an important step on a longer path that could take Morocco to
that destination. However, no one has suggested that there might be
additional reforms.
Under the new constitution the prime minister will become head of the
executive branch and will take on further powers, including full
responsibility for the government and civil service. The prime minister
will be chosen by the king from the political party with a majority in
the parliament. This is a new stipulation: in the 1996 constitution, the
prime minister was appointed by the king and, with one exception, was
always a member of the regime's inner circle. The new constitution
also gives more power to the parliament and expands the areas in
which it can pass legislation. However, the king remains commander of
the armed forces and retains the power to select the regional governors
who hold a significant amount of political power (Kenneth, 2013, p.
198).
Although, the King has supreme power, Morocco Prime minister has taken
advantage of his prerogatives so as to make reforms in reality. "We are in the
process of taking small... but decisive steps," Benkirane told the French
television channel on the side-lines of the World Forum for Democracy in
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Strasbourg.
The Arab Spring "set the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt on fire, and ours was
scalded. It was because of that that we had a new constitution, that we had
elections and that a party once harassed and marginalised" was voted to power,
he said. On the other hand, Benkiran didn't hide the fact that the king is still the
commander. "In Morocco, the king is the head of state and ... the head of the
council of ministers, in which I am the head of the government. He is therefore
my boss," Benkirane said, while stressing that he had his own "prerogatives."
(Arabonline.org, 2012)
Moreover, He is usually interrupted by some powerful figures close to
the palace. Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane spoke out after his
government's plan to reform state-run television that was criticised by
the palace surrounding. "The Arab Spring is not over yet," Benkirane
told a PJD gathering in Rabat, according to remarks carried on Monday
by local newspapers. "It (the Arab Spring) is still wandering about and
may feel like coming back," he added. "In this country, even the
monarchy itself needs citizens who seek reform ... Kings are not always
surrounded by the right kind of people, they can actually be surrounded
by foes who become the first to desert them."
5.3. Conclusion
King Mohammed VI retains supreme political power in Morocco, but
has taken some liberalizing steps with uncertain effects. In 2011, following
popular demonstrations that echoed unrest elsewhere in the region, the king
proposed a new constitution that may provide greater independence to the
Prime Minister, the legislature, and the judiciary. It was overwhelmingly
approved in a public referendum. The moderate Islamist Justice and
Development Party (PJD) is leading the government for the first time after
winning a plurality of seats in November 2011 legislative elections. While the
party has been legally recognized for two decades, its leaders continue to
19
grapple with their transition from outsider opposition status to the day-to-day
responsibilities of running the government amid an economic downturn and
responding to vast and divided expectations. The PJD’s campaign promises to
crack down on corruption and cronyism may also place it on a collision course
with pro-palace elites. Therefore, Benkirane told The Associated Press in an
interview before elections that the Makhzen, the code word for the royal
establishment that controls all, must realize that the old games must change in
the face of a new political environment. "The Makhzen (referring the palace
surrounding) will have to become a bit reasonable. It must understand that it
can sacrifice the political parties and the PJD, but that will not resolve the
problem," he said.
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Retrieved March, 2013, from Google books database.
نقابة الصحافة تنتقد "الهاكا" و مدة انتداب أعضاءها (, 2102صحيفة المساء, )دجنبر
0791العدد . بهيأة مستقلةوتطالب