Lecture: The EU in the World, 2013-14
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1 Lecture 4: The EU in the World Andreas Warntjen Department of Public Administration EU External Political Relations 2013/2014
Transcript of Lecture: The EU in the World, 2013-14
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Lecture 4:
The EU in the World
Andreas Warntjen
Department of Public Administration
EU External Political Relations
2013/2014
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Structure of the lecture
• Evolution of EU foreign policy
• Speaking with one voice?
• The future development of the Union
• EU enlargement and the European
Neighborhood policy
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Evolution of EU foreign policy European Defence Community fails
(1954)
Treaty of Rome (1957): Common Commercial Policy
European Political Cooperation (1970)
Maastricht Treaty (1993): Common Foreign/Security Policy, EU can request WEU assets
Amsterdam Treaty (1997): High Representative, constructive abstentions/possibility of QMV
EU launches first military operation in Macedonia (2003)
Brussels Treaty (1948)
NATO (1952)
West European Union (1954)
END OF COLD WAR
WEU can use NATO assets (1994)
NATO air strikes in FRY (1995)
NATO air strikes in FRY (1999)
European Council agrees that EU should take over WEU functions (1999)
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Explanations of European
integration
• Neo-Functionalism/Supranationalism – Low politics first
– „Spill-over‟
– Interest of supranational institutions
• Liberal Intergovernmentalism – Member state interests
• Realism – Security externalities
– Balance of power
Neo-Functionalism
Interdependence
(initially in economic
Sectors) Functional pressure
Political pressure Delegation of sovereignty
-pooled sovereignty
-creation of supranational
actors
Functional spill-over
Political spill-over/‟shift of loyalties‟
Supranationalism
Trans-border
transactions and
communications
Need/pressure for
supranational rules
Supranational Insti-
tutionalization
•EC/EU rules
•EC/EU organizations
•Transnational society
Shapes debates
(‘loop of institutionalization’)
„… as integration proceeds, member states
become less and less pro-active, and more and
more reactive to changes in the supranational
environment to which they belong.‟ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997: 301)
„… intergovernmental bargaining more often than
not is responsive to the interests of a nascent,
always developing, transnational society.‟ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997: 307)
Supranationalism
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Liberal Intergovernmentalism
European Integration determined by
• National preference formation
– Costs and benefits for domestic actors
– Usefulness of international institutions
• Interstate bargaining
Liberal Intergovernmentalism
National Preference
Formation Interstate Bargaining Outcome
„Groups articulate pre-
ferences, governments
aggregate them.‟ (Moravscik 1993: 483)
• Interdependence and
uncertainty
•EC „grand bargains‟
are coordination games
•Bargaining power
• Pooling sovereignty
through majority rule
•Delegation to supra-
national actors
•Distributional effects
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LI and EU foreign policy
„The difficulty of mobilizing interest groups
under conditions of general uncertainty
about specific winners and losers permits
the position of governments… to reflect
the ideologies and personal
commitments of leading … politicians, as
well as interest-based conceptions of
the national interest.‟ (Moravcsik 1993: 494)
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Realism
• Bipolar world order (Cold War) provided stability for early
European Integration (limited to low politics)
• End of Cold War
– Embedding Germany in an „ever closer Union‟ (→Maastricht)
– Fear of instability in Eastern Europe
– Balkan wars demonstrate lack of European capabilities (and US
interest)
– Balanced multipolarity in Europe alleviates relative gains
concerns
• US global dominance (unipolarity)
– Less attention given to European affairs
– Balancing
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Structure of the lecture
• Evolution of EU foreign policy
• Speaking with one voice?
• The future development of the Union
• EU enlargement and the European
Neighborhood policy
The EU in international
organizations International Organization EU Status
World Trade Organization Full member
Food and Agricultural Organization Full member
G20 Full member
G7/8 De facto full member
International Labor Organization Observer
United Nations Observer
International Monetary Fund No formal status (MS are represented)
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Source: Keukeleire and Delroux (2013), The Foreign Policy of the European Union, London, Palgrave
The EU at the UN One voice…
• Coordination of policies
• Statements on behalf of
the Union
• High voting cohesion
… unless it really
matters? Division on highly salient
topics, e.g.,
• Libya (Germany abstains)
• Iraq war (France and
Germany against, Great
Britain in favour)
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EPC Maastricht Amsterdam
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60
80
100
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010Jahr
All EC/EU
OAS
Voting Cohesion of the EU at the UN General Assembly
„Old Europe“ vs. „New Europe“?
„Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe…. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany on this, they're with the United States. “
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
22 January 2003
Source: http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=133Nein
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18
40
60
80
100
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010Year
EU15 EU27
Convergence of EU-15 and Candidate Countries, 1952-2008
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Structure of the lecture
• Evolution of EU foreign policy
• Speaking with one voice?
• The future development of EU foreign
policy
• EU enlargement and the European
Neighborhood policy
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Obstacles to integration
• Public good provision
– Collective action problems
• Distributional consequences
– Conflict management=coordination game?
• Disagreement on policy
– Preference heterogeneity
– Number of veto players
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Public good provision
• Security is a public good
• Example: troop deployment to Afghanistan
• Collective action problem: undersupply of
public goods
• Prisoner‟s dilemma
– Collective interest in cooperation
– Distrust
– Defection is individually rational
Institutional development: the
Lisbon Treaty
Representation of the EU in Foreign Policy
• High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – Nominated by member states (QMV), approval of
Commission President (and EP)
– „Double-hatted‟ • Vice-President of Commission
• Presides over Foreign Affairs Council
• President of the European Council – Elected for 2,5 years by member state governments
(QMV)
Finally one voice?
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Hermann van Rompuy
President, European Council
Catherine Ashton
High Representative of the Union
Vice-President, European Comission
“The President of the European Council … shall ensure the external repre-
sentation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security
policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative…” Article
15 TEU (Lisbon)
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Structure of the lecture
• Evolution of EU foreign policy
• Speaking with one voice?
• The future development of EU foreign
policy
• EU enlargement and the European
Neighborhood policy
27 http://www.economist.com/node/622764
Why did the EU-15 member states
approve of Eastern enlargement?
Liberal intergovernmentalism
• Geopolitical stability
→ border states in favour
• Trade
→ competitive states in
favour
• CAP/regional funds
→ EU-15 recipients opposed
►Why no veto by less compe-
titive EU-15 states, who do not
share a border with Eastern
Europe?
Constructivism
• (Re-)uniting Europe as the
defining goal of European
integration
• Norms of solidarity
• EU=community of values
→ Enlargement to „most
European‟ states only/
first
►Combination of rational
choice and constructivism?
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The effects of enlargement
• Conditionality: membership subject to
Copenhagen criteria (democracy, human
rights, free market)
• Democratization of Eastern Europe
– because of conditionality?
– because of increased transnational contacts?
• Turkey: will membership perspective
induce further democratic reforms?
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European Neighborhood Policy
• Goal: spreading democracy, good governance
and free markets
• Financial and technical support as well as
access to EU market conditional on
improvements in good governance
• No (explicit) membership perspective
• 16 partner countries, including Egypt, Georgia
and Ukraine
• Can ENP induce major reforms in partner
countries? 30
References
Keukeleire and Delroux (2013), The Foreign Policy of the European Union, London, Palgrave
Lavenex, Sandra and Schimmelfennig (2011) „EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from
leverage to governance?‟, Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 885-909
Moravcsik, Andrew (1993) Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal
intergovernmentalist approach, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 31, Issue 4, pages 473–
524
Moravcsik, Andrew and Milada Vachudova (2003) „National Interests, State Power and EU
Enlargement‟, East European Politics and Society, Vol. 17., No. 1, pp. 42-57
Reuters, UN Council approves no-fly zone over Libya, 17 March 2011
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/17/us-libya-un-idUSTRE72G97D20110317
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) European Integration and Supranational Governance, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol. 4, Issue 3, pp. 297-317
Schimmelpfennig, Frank (2001) „The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union‟, International Organization, Vol. 55. No.1, pp. 47-80
Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) „Costs, Commitment, and Compliance. The Impact of EU Democratic
Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia, and Turkey‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp.
495-517
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