Lecture: Peacekeeping, 2013-14

Lecture 6: Peacekeeping

European External Political Relations 2013-2014

Andreas Warntjen

Department of Public Administration

Structure of the lecture

• UN peacekeeping: Introduction and examples

• Deciding on war and peace

• Peacekeeping as a public good

• Does peacekeeping keep the peace?

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The UN and Peace

“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means …. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...“

(Art. 2 UN Charter) “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence … until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

(Art. 51 UN Charter)

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Keeping and enforcing peace

• Peacekeeping (Chapter 6 UN Charter)

– Impartial forces requested by conflict parties to settle “disputes” (Art. 34)

– Preference for bilateral efforts or mediation

– Recommendations by Security Council

• Peace enforcement (Chapter 7 UN Charter) – In cases of threat to or “breach of peace” (Art. 39)

– Security Council can authorize UN member states to use military force “to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Art. 42)

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Top contributors to UN missions Country Number of uniformed personnel

Pakistan 8,285

Bangladesh 7,941

India 7,864

Ethopia 6,594

Nigeria 4,777

Country Percentage of financial contributions

USA 28%

Japan 11%

France 7%

Germany 7%

UK 7%

Source: United Nations, Background Note Peacekeeping, 2013 https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf 5

Current UN peacekeeping missions

Source: UN, Department of peacekeeping missions, Fact sheet Peacekeeping 2014 https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml 6

Example: Golan Heights (UNDOF)

• Originally set up 1974

• Re-authorized every six months

• Overseeing ceasefire between Israel and Syria

• February 2014: 1,247 troops

• Main contributors: Fiji, India, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, Philippines

• Fatalities: 43

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Example: Cyprus (UNFICYP)

• Overseeing ceasefire between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (since 1974)

• Maintaining a buffer zone between the two parts of the island

• Supporting “good offices” of UN General-Secretarait

• Originally set up in 1964 • Mandated expanded in

1974 • February 2014: 857 troops

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Example: Kosovo (UNMIK)

• Established 1999 • Initially very broad functions

– Promoting autonomy – Providing civilian administration – Reconstruction of infrastructure – Protecting human rights

• NATO-led military presence (KFOR): – Demilitarization – Security

• Since independence of Kosovo (2008): security and human rights

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Example: 1st Gulf War (1991)

August 1990:

Iraq invades Kuwait

UN SC demands withdrawal of Iraqi forces

November 1990:

UN SC resolution (678) authorizing member states to use “all means necessary”

Votes: 12 yes – 2 no (Cuba, Yemen) – 1 abstain (China)

January 1991:

Air attacks by US-led multilateral coalition

February 1991:

Ground attack by US-led multilateral coalition

Iraq accepts UN resolutions

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Any questions?

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Deciding on War and Peace

• Security Council decides about peacekeeping (Art. 37) and peace enforcement (Art. 39)

• Composition (Art. 23)

– 5 permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States)

– 10 non-permanent members (elected, 2 year terms)

• Adopting resolutions requires 9 affirmative votes, including no dissenting vote from the permanent members (veto power)

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UN Security Council resolutions and Vetoes, 1946-2009

Source: Wallensteen, P. (2012) Understanding Conflict Resolution, London, Sage, Figure 9.1

1946 - 1989: Cold War paralysis Exception: Korea 1989 - 2001: A “new world order”? 1st Gulf War (1990/91) Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Darfur 2001 - present: Consensus lost? War against Terror 2nd Gulf War (2003)

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The use of veto power (P5, 1946-2012)

Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Vetoed Draft Resolutions in the United Nations Security Council 1946-2012, April 2014, Figure 1

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Any questions?

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Underprovision of peacekeeping

“Peace operations … are perennially under-staffed, underfunded and underequipped… Troop levels are based on what member states are willing to provide, not on any realistic assessment of need.”

(Page Fortna 2008: 76)

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Why fight for others?

Rational choice

Interest:

• Geopolitics (stability in the region)

• Future influence in the region

• Indirect effects (terrorism, refugees)

Constructivism

Norms and identity:

• Solidarity

• Helping strangers as a universal norm

• Spread of human rights concerns after WWII

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Peacekeeping as a public good

• Public goods – Non-excludable: noone can be prevented from

enjoying its benefits

– Nonrival in consumption: number of consumers does not diminish benefits for individuals

• Classical example: lighthouse

• Collective action problem: underprovision of public goods due to free-riding (using benefits without contributing)

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Overcoming collective action problems

• Lowering costs • Monitoring (international organizations) • Reciprocity and issue-linkage (international

organizations) • Privileged group: interest of sub-set of actors

sufficient to provide necessary resources unilaterally

• Constructivism: appealing to norms (solidarity, etc.)

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Any questions?

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Does peacekeeping work?

“The interesting question is not why [UN peacekeeping] fails, but why it succeeds. Failure is to be expected.”

(Howard 2008: 3, cited in Page Fortna 2008)

“… the distinct possibility that peacekeeping is irrelevant… Where there is already a strong peace and the belligerents support it wholeheartedly, war is unlikely to resume whether peacekeepers are present or not.”

(Page Fortna 2008: 77)

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No independent effect of peacekeeping?

No renewed conflict

Belligerents: Ceasefire is acceptable status quo

Presence of peacekeepers

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Possible causal mechanisms

Presence of peace-keepers

Sustained peace

Legitimacy

Morale

Aid

Monitoring Trust

Prevent abuse

Mediation Improved

communication

Deterrence Costs of

aggression

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Peacekeeping and the resumption of civil war since WWII

No more war War Total

Peacekeeping 55 (58%) 40 (42%) 95 (100%)

No peacekeeping 48 (64%) 27 (36%) 75 (100%)

Total 103 (61%) 67 (39%) 170 (100%)

Source: Page Fortna 2004, Table 1, own calculations

• Result: Negative effect of peacekeeping on sustained peace • Limits of bivariate and dichotomous analysis:

• Does not differentiate between short and long intervals of peace • Does not distinguish between types of peacekeeping misssions and

conditions of the missions (degree of hostility, resources, political will of international community/credibility of mission)

• Censoring effect

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Peacekeeping and the risk of re-newed conflict (Page Fortna 2004)

• Data: 115 spells of peace after civil wars (at least 1,000 battlefield deaths) between 1944 and 1997

• Control variables: type of conflict, decisive victory, duration of war, prior democracy, …

• Results – effect of peacekeeping

– Entire time period: renewed conflict 32% less likely

– Post-Cold War: renewed conflict 68% less likely

– Differences across type of peacekeeping missions

and sponsor (UN/non-UN)

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Any questions?

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References

BBC, Timeline – War in the Gulf http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/861164.stm Frieden, Lake, Schultz (2010) World politics, New York, Norton Olsen, M. (1965) The logic of collective action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press Page Fortna, V. (2004) Does peacekeeping keep peace?, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, pp. 269-292 Page Fortna, V. (2008) Does peacekeeping work? Princeton, Princeton University Press Wallensteen, P. (2012) Understanding conflict resolution, London, Sage

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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/861164.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/861164.stm

Lecture: Peacekeeping, 2013-14

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