Lecture: Analyzing negotiations, 2013-14
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[email protected] Lecture 8: Analyzing International Negotiations Andreas Warntjen Department of Public Administration European External Political Relations 2013-2014 1
Transcript of Lecture: Analyzing negotiations, 2013-14
Lecture 8:
Analyzing International
Negotiations
Andreas Warntjen
Department of Public Administration
European External Political Relations
2013-2014
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Structure of the lecture
• Using utility diagrams to analyze
negotiations – Basic set-up
– Negotiator’s dilemma
– Nash Bargaining Solution
– Issue-linkage
• An introduction to spatial models
• Using spatial models to analyze negotiations – The impact of domestic politics (two-level games)
– Issue-linkage
– Misrepresenting preferences
Utility diagrams: basic set-up
• Outcomes can be completely represented
in terms of utility
• Utility of outcomes differ across actors
• Reserve level: utility an actor receives
from the Best Alternative to Non-
Agreement (BATNA)
• Actors only agree to proposals that make
them better off than the alternative (e.g.,
unilateral action or status quo) [email protected] 3
Negotiator’s dilemma
• Joint interest in reaching agreement
(creating surplus of trade/coordination of
policies)
• Diametrically opposed interests regarding
distribution of surplus
• Tactics aimed at increasing share of trade
(e.g., misrepresentation of preferences)
might jeopardize overall agreement
Nash Bargaining Solution
• Pareto-optimal outcome (no other
outcome would increase utility of an actor
without decreasing it for another one)
• Equal bargaining power: split the
difference
Issue-linkage
• Individual agreements might not be
attractive for both parties
• Issue-linkage: combining proposals might
be attractive for both
• Example: Single Market (high utility for
Germany) + CAP (high utility for France)
• Sidepayments: compensating one actor
for utility losses
Structure of the lecture
• Using utility diagrams to analyze negotiations – Basic set-up
– Negotiator’s dilemma
– Nash Bargaining Solution
– Issue-linkage
• An introduction to spatial models
• Using spatial models to analyze negotiations – The impact of domestic politics (two-level games)
– Issue-linkage
– Misrepresenting preferences
The spatial metaphor
• Policy outcomes and preferences for
policies can be represented on a
continuum or as a point in a multi-
dimensional space
• Left-right dimension is a common
metaphor in descriptions of political
positions
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Uni-dimensional spatial models Example I: Positions of actors (here: political
parties) with regard to the level of state intervention/regulation
No regulations ●
Complete
regulation
● ● Communists Social Democrats Liberals
Example II: Positions of policies (e.g., laws or treaties) with regard to the level of European Integration
No integration Complete
integration
● ● ● Rome SEA Maastricht
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Multidimensional policy space
Example III: EU Treaty Negotiations at
Maastricht More
integration ●
Germany
0
● UK
More
regulation
●
SQ
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Basic assumptions
• Actors are rational
– utility-maximizing
– consistent
• Actors do not accept an agreement if it
makes them worse off than no agreement
(i.e., status quo or unilateral action)
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Indifference Curve
● A
● z
● y
● x
More
integration
More regulation
A is indifferent between
x, y, and z
Assumption 1= Same scale for both dimensions
Assumption 2=No difference in importance attached to dimensions
Equal distance=indifference
indifference curve
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Preferred-To Set
● A
● ● sq x y
●
A prefers y to sq and sq to x
(proximity equals greater utility)
A prefers all policies lying within
the circle (e.g., y) to sq and
prefers sq to all policies lying
outside the circle (e.g., x) indifference curve
More
integration
More regulation
Preferred-to set
Preferred-to-set=set of policies an actor prefers to a given policy
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Winset of the Status Quo
Two actors (A, B), unanimity rule
● ● A
● sq
B w(sq)
Winset of the status quo (W(sq))=set of outcomes that can defeat the status quo
More
integration
More regulation
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Structure of the lecture
• Using utility diagrams to analyze negotiations – Basic set-up
– Negotiator’s dilemma
– Nash Bargaining Solution
– Issue-linkage
• An introduction to spatial models
• Using spatial models to analyze negotiations – The impact of domestic politics (two-level games)
– Issue-linkage
– Misrepresenting preferences
Spatial models and negotiations
● ● A‘s ideal
point
● Status quo
B‘s ideal
point
Preferred-to-set for B
relative to SQ
Preferred-to-set for A
relative to SQ
Two actors (A, B) both of which have to agree
(both are veto players, unanimity)
Win-set of SQ (intersection of veto players’
preferred-to-sets):
Set of policies that can defeat the SQ
Indifference curve
(A, sq)
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The impact of domestic politics
(two-level games) The outcome is determined by
• Preferences of domestic actors and their power
– Costs of keeping the status quo
– Key constituents of government (‘personal security’)
• Domestic institutions
– Number of veto players
– Political system and influence of societal groups
• Decision rule on the international level (usually
unanimity)
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Domestic ratification constraints Example:
Germany
CDU/FDP government
SPD needed for ratification
(Bundesrat) – smaller winset
●
SQ
● D
● SPD
● FDP
●
CDU
● Maastricht
Economic integration
Political
Integration
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Playing games at two levels II
more less
International Level
more less
Domestic Level:
Country I (interest groups)
more less
Domestic Level:
Country II (coalition government)
International Negotiations on Climate Change
●
SQ
●
SQ
●
SQ
●
Business
●
Cons.
●
Society
●
Soc.
●
Gov I
●
Gov II
●
Gov I
●
Gov II
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Playing games at three levels
more less
International Level
more less
European Level
●
SQ
●
International Negotiations on Climate Change
SQ
●
MS1
● ● ● ● ● ●
MS2 MS3 MS4 MS5 MS6 MS7
EUun EUqmv
● ●
Decision rule in the EU
more less
Domestic Level: MS3
●
Business
●
Society Government
●
Political system, preferences and
power of domestic groups
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Issue-linkage I
One dimension, conflictual preferences
► empty winset=no agreement
● ●
A
●
sq B
Issue-linkage II Second dimension=common interest,
agreement is possible
● ●
A
● sq
B
References
Odell, John (2000) Negotiating the World Economy. Cornell
UP (Ch. 2: Strategies and Outcomes)
Scharpf, F. (1999) Games real actors play, Boulder,
Westview, Ch. 6 (Negotiated Outcomes)
Warntjen, Andreas (2011a) Bargaining, in Dowding (ed.):
Encylopedia of Power, London, Sage
Warntjen, Andreas (2011b). Veto player, in K. Dowding:
Encyclopedia of Power, London, Sage
