An evaluation of use of force during United Nationspeacekeeping operations.

Student Number: 701403

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Module Title: The United Nations, International Security & Global JusticeModule Code: 7117LAWPLModule Leader: Dr. Gary WilsonDate: 24th April 2015

‘Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it’

-Dag Hammarskjold, quoted from US Army Field Manualon Peace Operations (1994)

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Two major international organizations of the twentieth

century, The League of Nations (LON) and the United

Nations (UN) were both created as institutions to ensure

global catastrophes were avoided, similar to the likes of

which spurned their creations. LON was created following

World War 1, and was built on a model that placed the

sovereign states of Europe at its core, and the greater

world powers as dominant participants.1 Although not

deemed as an overall success, arguably the greatest

achievement of LON perhaps came when Italy invaded

Ethiopia in 1935, and the League was able to identify

Italy as the aggressor, condemned its actions and apply

sanctions as a consequence, the first time the 1 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security [CUP, 2006] 28

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international community acted through institutionalized

channels,2 creating a sense of international togetherness.

LON eventually failed when World War 2 began, however it

left a legacy that the international community had an

obligation to take a legal and moral standing to regulate

the conduct of signatory member states in the maintenance

of peace and security.

Article 1 of the Pact of Paris 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact)

addressed the condemnation of states that resorted to war

tactics in pursuit of a resolution to differences or

controversies with other states,3 and although this also

dramatically failed by World War 2, it showed the

intention and acceptance of states to seek more peaceful

resolutions to their international grievances with each

other. Despite its failings, some aspects of the LON

were taken into the United Nations Charter, most

obviously Article 1 of the UN Charter, which obligated

states to adopt peaceful approaches, and the maintenance

of international peace and security.

2 Ibid 293 Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928 viewed 15 March 2015 at < https://www.uni-marburg.de/icwc/dateien/briandkelloggpact.pdf>

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UN peacekeeping operations have now become, since the end

of the Cold War, a much more complex management of peace

operations designed to provide the building blocks for

long-term security and aid parties to create

institutional, material and ideational transformations

that are essential to make peace sustainable, the idea of

which could arguably derive from the legal and moral

obligations by states to maintain international peace and

security. The following essay will explore and evaluate

key stages in the evolution of peacekeeping, from

operations at the beginning of the Cold War in the 1940’s

until modern day deployments.

The legality of Peacekeeping: Chapter VII

Peacekeeping became a key activity on the United Nations

shortly after its establishment, and since the end of the

Cold War (1991) it has seen some evolutionary changes to

its operational functioning. Establishing a legal basis

for peacekeeping operations is difficult as there is

nothing specifically relating to peacekeeping in the UN

Charter. And when creating a peacekeeping operation, the

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UN have a tendency to steer away from referring to a

legal basis under which they are acting upon, however it

has been a common theme for UN resolutions to refer to

Chapter VII of the Charter since the ending of the Cold

War as authority for action.4

With reference to traditional operations, some academics

including former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold,

have referred to ‘Chapter VI ½ ’, stating that some

operations have succeeded the measures of Chapter VI, but

have not amounted to the military force of covered in

Chapter VII, blurring the distinction between the two.5

However, because there can be no legal authority derived

from a fictional piece of legislation, it has been argued

that if the United Nations feel that by carrying out an

action they can further the purpose of which the

organization was established, and because there are no

provisions to the contrary making any actions illegal,

they may find justification in conducting peacekeeping

4 Gary Wilson, The United Nations and Collective Security [Routledge Publishing,2014] 118 - 1195 See Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian International Law {OUP 2001] 163-218 & Gary Wilson, The United Nations and Collective Security [Routledge Publishing, 2014] 119

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via the assumption of Implied Powers,6 with Article 1

being a likely supporting source for this.

However, the most likely sources appear to stem from

Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Within Chapter VI,

Articles 33 and 34 provide examples for the peaceful

settlement of disputes7 and for the investigation by the

Security Council of disputes or situations that may lead

to ‘international friction or give rise to dispute’8 so

that the council can attempt to maintain international

harmony. Although Article 33 provides for the peaceful

methods approach, Article 36 (1) then provides the

Council with the opportunity to ‘recommend for

appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment,’9 however

it should be observed that this does not explicitly say

that the use of force is permitted. Chapter VI does not

give provisions for ‘peacekeeping’ but have been linked

more to traditional peacekeeping operations as they allow

for only peaceful methods, only sanctioning the use of

6 Wilson (n.4) 1257 United Nations Charter [1945] Article 338 United Nations Charter [1945] Article 349 United Nations Charter [1945] Article 36 (1)

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force in self-defense. Post Cold War operations have

increasingly allowed for the use of force beyond self-

defense, which has distanced the relationship between

peacekeeping and Chapter VI and moved more towards its

association with Chapter VII, as this give the Security

Council more legal clearance for military actions. So

much so that the Security Council stated in their

resolutions for Yugoslavia and Somalia that it was acting

under the authority of Chapter VII, which was the

beginning of this post Cold War trend. Articles 39 to 42

are the primary references that may give birth to a

peacekeeping operation since the Cold War. Article 39

allows for the Security Council to determine an existing

threat to international peace and to also make

recommendations on how to maintain or restore that

peace,10 while Article 40 obligates the conflicting

parties to comply with applied peacekeeping measures.11

Article 41 gives the council power to decide upon not

forceful peace methods12 and Article 42 allows for force

to be used against non-consenting parties if it is deemed10 United Nations Charter [1945] Article 3911 United Nations Charter [1945] Article 4012 United Nations Charter [1945] Article 41

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necessary,13 which is increasing used post Cold War, but

goes against the principles of traditional peacekeeping,

as force would only of been considered by the Security

Council after having been provided with the consent of

the involved parties.

One fundamental issue discussed by Katherine Cox, is that

authorizing the use of force during peacekeeping missions

is not compatible with the principles of consent or

impartiality, as it is usually authorized to fulfill one

part of a mandate, but in doing so it can undermine and

jeopardize others.14 Cox also raises questions as to the

legal authority of the use of force, and says that if it

not clear in mandates and resolutions then difficulties

may arise about what is an ‘acceptable’ level of force to

conduct. ‘Anticipatory’ self-defense is also highlighted

as being potentially problematic, with the requirements

of necessity and proportionality need to be taken into

consideration.15

13 United Nations Charter [1945] Article 4214 Katherine E. Cox Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations andthe Use of Force 27 (2) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy [1999] 26915 Ibid 270

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Traditional (first generation) Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping evolution began during the Cold War, and

possibly one of the primary reasons the Security Council

was unable to invoke itself under Chapter VII of the

Charter was due to constant veto’s from members of the

Council as per their right under Article 27(3) of the

charter. From 1945 until 1985, Article 27(3) was invoked

279 times, and from 1946 until 1970 it was almost

exclusively used by the USSR, however since 1970 the main

user has been the USA.16 During 1948 and 1988, 15

peacekeeping operations were established,17 with 5 still

existing today. Traditional or ‘first generation’

peacekeeping operations were intended to respond to

interstate conflicts by stationing unarmed or lightly

armed UN military personnel between hostile parties so

that a truce may be monitored, troop withdrawal was

supervised or that a ‘buffer zone’ was established during

the advancement of political negotiations.18 The first

16 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force [OUP 2008] 25517 Ibid 261-26218 Michael W. Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, Chapter 19 Peacekeeping Operations in Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws (Ed), The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations [OUP 2007] 325

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peacekeeping operations deployed were limited in UN

activity as their involvement was purely observational,

only making sure that truce agreements were maintained

between conflicting parties.

UNEF I & II

United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was deployed

between 1956 to 1967 following the Suez crisis during

which Israel, backed by UK and France, attacked Egypt and

occupied Sinai and the Gaza Strip.19 The UNEF I mandates

in Resolutions 998 and 100020 were designed to ‘secure and

supervise’ the ceasefire in place along with the

withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, and

would later serve as a ‘buffer’ between these two

states.21 This mandate would also prove to be used as a

template for future first generation peacekeeping

operations. UNFICYP was created ‘to prevent a recurrence

of fighting’ between Greek and Turkish factions in

19 Middle East – UNEF 1: Background viewed 17 March 2015 < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr1.html>20 United Nations Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its First Emergency Special Session from 1 to 10 November 1956 A/3354 [1956]21 Wilson (n.4) 126

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Cyprus.22 This was to be done via patrolling functions,

the supervision of the ceasefire and the creation of a

buffer zone between factions, all of which remains to

this day. Other operations to follow on from the UNEF I

mandate are UNIPOM (1965) to supervise a ceasefire

between India and Pakistan,23 and UNEF II (1973), which

was deployed under the same functions as UNEF I.24

When sanctioning peacekeeping operations during the Cold

War era, the United Nations did not associate their

actions under any legal basis. Instead, peacekeeping

operations where designed and set out under the model of

three principles, referred to by some as ‘The Holy

Trinity’ of peacekeeping,25 which are the Consent of the

parties involved, the Impartiality of the UN towards

these parties and the use of force by UN troops is only

permitted in self-defense.26 These three principles were

enunciated by Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold via a

22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 (S/Res/5575) [1964]23 United Nations Security Council Resolution 211 (S/RES/211) [1965]24 United Nations Security Council Resolution 340 (S/Res/340) [1973]25 Alex Bellamy & Paul Williams Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd Ed) [Polity Press, 2010] 17326 Principles of UN Peacekeeping viewed 18 March 2015 < http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml>

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report following the UNEF I operation27 and with the

exception of ONUC in the Congo, these can be applied to

all Cold War operations.28 During the early stages of

peacekeeping, the Security Council’s permanent members

did not contribute any troops to the operations due to

the strained international relationships of the Cold War,

and during UNEF I it was decided not use troops from

nations who would also have a special interest in the

operation,29 however the limited use of troops from the

permanent members relaxed as time passed and tensions

reduced. Maintaining impartiality was not difficult for

peacekeepers, given their limited functions and when

peacekeepers would enter a region, they typically did so

when the conflicting parties had agreed upon a ceasefire

deal reducing the likelihood of needing to use force in

self-defense. The consent from the conflicting parties

was also obtained and respected, with an example of this

coming in 1967 when Egypt withdrew its consent and put a

27 UNEF: Summary Study of the Experienced derived from the establishment and operation of the force: Report of the Secretary-General A/3943 [1958] para 11-49 viewed 19 March 2015 < http://legal.un.org/repertory/art22/english/rep_supp2_vol2-art22_e.pdf>28 Wilson (n.4) 12829 Gray (n.16) 262

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halt to UNEF I, respecting the authority of the host

state.

Congo: ONUC

Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC, 1960-1964)

would prove to put strain on the functional operating of

peacekeeping, mostly because the UN abandoned the core

principles of peacekeeping during this time. Civil

unrest followed independence from Belgium in 1960, and

the original mandate for ONUC aimed to help the

government to maintain peace and order and to oversee the

safe removal or Belgian troops, with the mandate not

making any reference to an allowance for the use of force

by peacekeeping troops with the exception of self

defense.30 In 1961, the UN became a party to the conflict

when the situation worsened and the Security Council

issued Resolution 161, which was not formally passed

under Chapter VII, but was written with connection to

Article 39 stating that ‘the danger of civil war

constituted a threat to international peace and

30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 143 (S/Res/143) [1960]

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security’.31 The mandate was expanded to allow for a more

broader interpretation by stating that troops may ‘take

all appropriate measures…to prevent the occurrence of

civil war in the Congo, including…the use of force, if

necessary, in the last resort,’32 this obviously going

beyond the limitation of only using force for means of

self defense. Resolution 169 then encouraged the use of

force to end an attempted secession in the Katanga region

and to combat foreign mercenaries operating within the

region,33 and to support this, the UN increased

peacekeeper numbers up to 20,000.

This gave contradictions to the principles of

peacekeeping, as what started out as a traditional

peacekeeping mission quickly morphed into a military

operation, using tactics and strategies indistinguishable

from a military campaign that divided the Security

Council.34 Although authorizing the use of force in the

Congo backfired dramatically for the UN, a significant

31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 161 (S/Res/161) [1961]32 Ibid para 133 United Nations Security Council Resolution 169 (S/Res/169) [1961]34 Simon Chesterman, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations [NY University School of Law 2004] 8

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doctrinal advancement was made during UNEF II, although

this is considered to be a traditional peacekeeping

operation still. The then Secretary-General Kurt

Waldheim issued new guidelines for the use of force

stating ‘self-defense would include resistance to

attempts by forceful means to prevent (UNEF II) from

discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security

Council.’35 This showed that the UN realized that serious

improvements were required from the experienced of the

Congo and this then formed a new basis for peacekeeping

operation. This has been criticized however as being

possibly too broad,36 and allowing the UN troops to force

in a variety of different situations.37

Second and Third Peacekeeping Operations: (Post Cold War)

Since the operation in the Congo, UN peacekeeping

missions were limited to observation roles and it wasn’t

until in Somalia (1993) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994-

1995) that the UN decided to use force again on a

significant scale. The end of the Cold War and the

35 Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Security Council Resolution 340 [1973] UN DOC S/11052/Rev.136 Chesterman (n.34) 937 General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations UN Department of PeacekeepingOperations UN DOC UN/210/TC/GG95 [1995] 20

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debatable legality of Operation Desert Storm of coalition

forces against Iraq allowed for further evolution to the

operational functioning of peacekeeping missions, and the

failings of Article 43 of the Charter meant that the

Council instead took the approach of delegating their

powers.

Somalia: UNOSOM

In Somalia, UN actions were requested by the countries

representatives, because there was no functioning

government in place, following civil war and famine that

killed an estimated 350,00 people in 1992, resulting in

Resolution 733 from the council. Resolution 733 called

for an immediate ceasefire, created an arms embargo and

resulted in the creation of the UNOSOM I mission under

Resolution 751.38 This mission caused a blurring on the

differences between peacekeeping and enforcement action,

as the UN attempted to take on a wider role in the re-

creation of civil society,39 with the Secretary-General

outlining the adoption of a new UN role in his Agenda for

38 Bellamy & Williams (n.25) 22439 Gray (n.16) 281

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Peace.40 In this report, the new concept of ‘peacemaking’

was described, were Article 40 would be used by UN forces

to enforce methods to ensure peace, rather than to merely

observe measure that were already in place. This quite

obviously went against the gain of the principles of

consent from involved states, UN impartiality and the

requirement that troops be lightly armed, only to use

force in self-defense, generating criticism. Like

Yugoslavia, the operation in Somalia also did not operate

under Chapter VII of the charter. From the beginning,

the UN found it difficult to effectively deploy itself

due to continued disagreements from Somalia factions and

objections to the peace enforcement approach taken by the

UN in Somalia.41 In an attempt to re-establish itself,

the Council passed Resolution 794, which gave authority

to the Secretary-General and cooperating member states to

‘use all necessary means to establish as soon as

possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief

40 An Agenda for Peace Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 A/47/277-S/2411141 The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping (3rd Ed) [United Nations Department of Public Information 1996] 292-293

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operations in Somalia.’42 The resolution also provided

the legal basis for Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF), led by the

USA in an attempt to bring such an environment to

Somalia. However, despite the huge display of force

delivered by the US, this operation also encountered

difficulties, mainly because the Secretary-General and US

military commanders struggled to agree on what

constituted as a ‘safe environment.’43 As this operation

ended, UNOSOM II began, with a recommendation from the

Secretary-General before its official creation that

troops be given the right to use force, leading to the

passing of Resolution 814 stating ‘Acting under Chapter

VII...UNOSOM II [should] assume responsibility for the

consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure

environment throughout Somalia…and…to organize a prompt,

smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.’44

This was a first, as it became the first operation to be

organized and commanded by the UN mandated under Chapter

VII and the first since ONUC to allow force beyond self-

42 United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 (S/RES/794) [1992]43 Bellamy & Williams (n.25) 22444 United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (S/RES/814) [1993]

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defense.45 UNOSOM II inevitably got drawn into fractious

politics, and found it difficult to persuade mercenaries

and warlords to enter into disarmament agreements. After

militia had managed to kill over 50 troops in a single

attack, Resolution 837 was passed which effectively

placed peacekeepers in a state of war.46 What started out

as a ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operation escalated into

a warzone, a far cry from the original objective. As all

measures appeared to fall flat, so too did the resolve of

the contributing states, firstly as the USA, ordered by

President Bill Clinton, pulled out its troops by March

1994. This order was followed by other contributing

states withdrawing their forces, behaviors that could be

deemed as damage control. By February 1994, the UN

adopted a ‘scaled-down’ mandate before a full withdrawal

in 1995.47 Unsurprisingly, these UN interventions have

not left a positive legacy, with the operation being

labeled as ‘under-manned, under-sourced and under-

funded,’48 and the effects of ‘robust’ peacekeeping

45 Trevor Findlay The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations [OUP 2002] 18446 Bellamy & Williams (n.25) 22647 Chesterman (n.34) 1148 Wilson (n.4) 134

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measures having also stained the principles of UN

peacekeeping.

Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR

The Agenda for Peace was also evident in the UN’s approach to

the conflict in former Yugoslavia, were again, the

boundaries of traditional peacekeeping and enforcement

had been blurred. UNPROFOR was established in 1991, and

again like UNOSOM it was originally intended as a

traditional operation, with the first 16 resolutions

being passed without reference to Chapter VII, however

the operation still commenced in Croatia followed by

Bosnia without the establishment of a ceasefire or the

consent of the parties.49 Entering into the region

without an actual peace to keep, UNPROFOR set up safe

areas around Bosnian towns in order to protect civilians

via self-defense50 while NATO took ‘all necessary

measures, through the use of air power’51 to aid the

protection of the safe zones after several more passed

resolutions allowed for the use of force. The security 49 Gray (n.16) 28250 United Nations Security Council Resolution 836 (S/RES/836) [1993]51 Ibid para 10

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of these areas was eventually breached however, and as

Simon Chesterman points out, ‘the United Nations had

failed to learn the two lessons of Somalia: that absolute

impartiality was the keystone to a peacekeeping

operation…and that the UN command provided an unworkable

structure for the alternative to peacekeeping: an

enforcement action.’52 Which is a fair observation

considering that similar mistakes were made in such a

short space of time. Many of the lessons learned, from

Bosnia in particular, were regurgitated from the Congo

and Somalia operations, but some were different. One

that occurred in Somalia, but was made much clearer by

the Bosnian mission was that the use of force should

never become an alternative of a replacement for a

strategic plan laid out to address an ongoing

international crisis. Trevor Findlay writes that the

Security Council, while responding to events occurring on

the ground, made obviously improvised and rapidly

changing decisions through a high output of resolutions

that entrusted UNPROFOR with more complex objectives that

suggested a blend of traditional peacekeeping, ‘wider’ 52 Chesterman (n.34) 11

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peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.53 Between 1992 and

1995, the Council passed 32 resolutions that mixed

authorizations derived from both Chapters VI and VII,

leading to operational confusion for peacekeepers on the

ground.54 Bosnian-Serbs were also skeptical of the

relationship between NATO and its more aggressive

approach via air campaign and UNPROFOR, with its non-

threatening methods, and failed to distinguish a

difference between the two. The idea of UNPROFOR’s

impartiality was also rejected by Bosnian-Serbs, making

it increasingly difficult to establish peaceful talks.55

The main lesson however was that peacekeeping and peace-

enforcement cannot be deployed positively within the same

conflict. The original mandate found in Resolution 743

stated that peacekeeping operations were intending to

create an environment so that negotiations could be for

the overall peace of the region,56 but this changed and

was expanded when Resolution 807 was passed which incited

Chapter VII, although did not did not use language

53 Findlay (n.45) 26354 Ibid 26355 Ibid 26356 United Nations Security Council Resolution 743 (S/RES/743) [1992]

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authorizing force.57 China however abstained from this,

claiming that it derailed from the principles of

peacekeeping operations and feared that it would drag the

UN into an armed conflict, which proved to be the case.58

Resolution 836 however recited Chapter VII and gave the

authority to use force, which has been linked to Article

42 of the Charter. As the ongoing difficulties for

UNPROFOR continued, NATO airstrikes and Dayton peace

talks eventually brought some stability.

Continuing Challenges of Peacekeeping Operations

The late 1990’s saw a reevaluation of the UN’s approach

and operational methods during peacekeeping missions.

The Brahimi Report presented the UN with recommendations

for reform, suggesting that peacekeeping should remain

separate from enforcement, and that the three principles

of consent, impartiality and the use of force on in self-

defense should remain at its core, although the principle

of ‘impartiality’ needs to be made more distinct from

57 United Nations Security Council Resolution 807 (S/RES/807) [1992]58 Gray (n.16) 283

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‘neutrality.’ 59 The report also acknowledged that

mandates needed to be made clearer with achievable

objectives in order to avoid both confusion between

ground troops and failure in achievement of peace and

security. Mandates since the Brahimi Report are still

allowing for powers to going beyond the earliest

peacekeeping operations, but not as far as the mandates

issued for UNOSOM II or UNPROFOR. However, with 9 out of

12 mandates between 1998 and 2006 having been established

under Chapter VII and not being entirely clear as to the

authority allowed on the use of force, the Security

Council would appear to still have room for improvements

as it apparently struggles to fully learn the

consequences of past operations.60

The have been recommendations for doctrine to be

developed on peacekeeping detailing operating procedures.

Member states have been reluctant to allow this to become

a reality however, enforced by the states that adhere to

59 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) United Nations Document A/55/305-S/2000/80960 Wilson (n.4) 138

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a strict divide between peacekeeping and enforcement,61

which was empathized with the General Guidelines for Peacekeeping

saying that ‘peacekeeping and the use of force (other

than in self-defense) should be seen as alternative

techniques and not adjacent points on a continuum.’62

Findlay adds to the idea of an official doctrine by

saying that in Bosnia, rebels would not have been

influenced by a peaceful approach but that because of the

confusion over the authority on the use of force, troops

did not apply themselves befitting of the situation at

hand.63 He then further suggests that to avoid this,

replacing the line between peacekeeping and enforcement

by creating separate mandates for Chapter VI and Chapter

VII missions and applying whichever best applies to the

situation at hand.64

Conclusion

61 Chesterman (n.34) 1762 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines [2008] viewed 26 March 2015 < http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf>63 Findlay (n.45) 27164 Ibid 360-361

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After the failure of the League of Nations, the United

Nations has obviously been a much more stable

institution, but has not been without its faults. In its

attempts to create or keep global harmonization, it has

developed and evolved its peacekeeping operations the

better suit the complex situations that it is presented

with, as it has learnt that there are much more to

resolving armed disputes between states or parties than

it originally anticipated. The use of force in ONUC and

UNOSOM should of provided the UN with evidence that

aggression from the ‘peacekeeper’ only led to a

contradiction in the values of the operation, confusion

amongst troops, and resentment from involved parties

which seemingly fueled the conflict further. Chesterman

pointed out that peacekeeper impartiality was key, and on

the basis of these operations, that point may be

difficult to argue against. There has been a clear

evolution of peacekeeping requirements and involvement

from Traditional to the 2nd and 3rd generations. However,

seemingly disregarding the cornerstones principles of

Traditional peacekeeping in that evolution may have been

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an error by the UN. Change an adaptability to the modern

era of conflict is ideal, however it could be said that

without a legal document to officially outline

peacekeeping, errors may yet still occur. Findlay’s

recommendation for mandates on peacekeeping, or two

mandates (one for each of Chapter VI and Chapter VII) may

be the best move forward to ensure that peacekeeping

remains just that.

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