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THE FUNCTION OF AFRICAN UNION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping operations are a crucial instrument for the

international community to enable peace and security. The role of UN peacekeeping

was recognized in 1988, when United Nations peacekeeping forces received the

Nobel Prize.

Peacekeeping operations are deployed with the authorization of the Security

Council and the consent of the host government and/or the main parties to the

conflict. Peacekeeping has traditionally involved a primarily military model of

observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars. Today, it has

evolved into a complex model of many elements- military, police and civilian-

working together to help lay foundations of a sustainable peace.

In search for peace, the United Nations has been increasingly cooperating

with regional organizations and other actors and mechanisms provided for in Chapter

VIII of the Charter. It has worked closely with the Organization of American States

(OAS) in Haiti; the European Union (EU) in the former Yugoslavia and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone; and the African Union (AU) in

Western Sahara, the Great Lakes region and Darfur and a few more (asdf, 2008: 77-

81).

This paper will mostly deal with the African Union and its function in

peacekeeping operations.

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2. Africa and the United Nations

At the beginning of the nineteenth session, the General Assembly of the

United Nations decided the permanent representative of Ghana, Alex Quaison-

Sackey to preside over the session. This was only the second time in eighteen years

that a representative of an African state was chosen. At the San Francisco

Conference in 1945, the only African states that were independent and thus could

become the permanent members of the new international body were Egypt, Ethiopia,

and Liberia (these countries were joined by Libya). During the eleventh session

Ghana, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia were admitted to the UN, and almost two

years later Guinea joined the small group of Africans. In 1961, Sierra Leone became

the 100th member of the UN and there were already 24 African member states and

with the admission of Gambia before the close of the nineteenth session, the African

states will number 35 out of the total membership of 115. This increase in the

African membership has been a result of the dissolution of the French and British

colonial empires. Hence, it is not surprising to find that the majority of African

countries regard representation at the UN as their most important diplomatic

assignment (Karefa-Smart, 1965: 764).

During the first fifteen years of the UN, the twenty Latin American countries

formed the largest bloc in the UN and as a result they were able to have an important

role in mediating between the Great powers and to win for themselves valuable

concessions in elections to the major UN bodies’ important posts within the UN.

During this time, the African states had no such influence as a separate group. They

finally joined forces with the Asian countries to share their interests in economic

development, human rights, and the struggle against colonialism. Thus, after the first

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Asian-African Conference in Bandung, the African and Asian delegations began to

meet regularly at the UN and the Afro-Asian group was viewed unofficially as a unit

(Karefa-Smart, 1965:765).

After that, the African nations began to express themselves as a separate

entity. Therefore, after the admission of the first large aggregation of the newly

independent countries, the African delegations began to meet monthly at the UN. By

rotating the chairmanship, they followed a similar practice with the UN. They

couldn’t make binding decisions but exchanged views. At the Addis Ababa

Conference in May 1963, it was given a formal identity by the Organization of

African Unity (OAU) and the African UN delegations were authorized to establish a

secretariat and to cooperate with any other group that shared its objectives (Karefa-

Smart, 1965:765). With the 31 African countries, the Organization of African

Unity’s primary goals were the identity issues and interest, especially liberation and

integration. Its main interest was the liberation of white-ruled Africa, especially

southern Africa. In terms of identity, the foundation of the organization was a major

achievement. Security also was a major concern for the founders of the OAU, but

they viewed it in terms of state interests, especially territorial integrity, state

sovereignty, and the protection of boundaries (Makinda and Okumu, 2007:11-12).

2.1. The history of the African Union

Although it was established in 2001, the African Union came to life in July

2002. With 53 founding members (all African countries joined except Morocco) and

a wide-ranging agenda, the AU replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

and reflects a fundamental shift in thinking for African leadership (Holt, 2005:15).

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According to Makinda and Okumu, identity issues and new interests fueled the

creation of the AU. They state that in one sense “AU is a product of pre-OAU

debates but in another sense, it is a response to the globalization and democratization

that characterized post-Cold War changes in Africa and in the world as a whole”

(2007:28).

By the early 1990s, the West and the UN Security Council were not

responding quickly to African problems, particularly security matters, so the OAU

summit of 1990 decided to issue the declaration on the “Political and Socio-

Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the

World”. This declaration provided a framework for the African leaders to work

together towards the peaceful and rapid resolution of conflicts. It was through this

new mechanism that the OAU reacted to various conflicts, including those in

Angolia, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, the DRC, the

Ethiopian-Eritrean war, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sierra Leone.

According to the report from Victoria K. Holt with Moira K. Shanahan called

African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African

Union and ECOWAS, “African-led forces deployed to hot spots across the continent,

often arriving quickly after a crisis and effectively helping provide security to a

region…the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), and other African subregional organizations are developing more

ability to tackle regional peace and security problems”(2005:7). Nevertheless, the

persisting inadequacy and structural incapacity of the OAU led to a further

realization that Africa needed a new organization that could take risks and

responsibility in promoting development, peace, and security. It was against this

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background that the OAU extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999,

agreed on the establishment of the AU (Makinda and Okumu, 2007: 29-31).

On the strengthening of African Unity, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has

submitted two alternative proposals directly to the Sirte Summit, one for the

establishment of the United States of Africa (the USA model), and the other for the

Union of African States (the former Soviet Union model). The leaders discussed the

proposals made by Colonel Gaddafi and the predominant opinion was that Africa

was not yet ready for ad federation or confederation, as there were many preparatory

activities that had to be undertaken before these proposals could be actualized. At the

end of the debate, the leaders agreed that an African union be established in

conformity with the ultimate objectives of the OAU and the treaty establishing the

African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) (Kioko, 2003: 810). The purpose of

the Extraordinary Summit was to amend the OAU Charter, to increase the efficiency

and effectiveness of the OAU. The theme of the Sirte Summit was “Strengthening

OAU capacity to enable it to meet the challenges of the new millennium”. The Sirte

Declaration aimed at:

Effectively addressing the new social, political and economic realities

in Africa and the world;

Fulfilling the peoples’ aspirations for greater unity in conforming with

the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty Establishing the

African Economic Community;

Revitalizing the Continental Organization to play a more active role in

addressing the needs of the people;

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Eliminating the scourge of conflicts;

Meeting global challenges; and

Harnessing the human and natural resources of the continent to

improve living conditions

In general the African Union objectives are different and more comprehensive than

those of the OAU. The aims of the OAU are

to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states;

to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a

better life for the peoples of Africa;

to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence,

to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa;

to promote international cooperation.

Comparatively, the objectives of the African Union are

to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries

and the peoples of Africa,

to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its

Member States,

to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the

continent,

to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest

to the continent and its peoples

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encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter

of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;

promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation

and good governance;

promote and protect human peoples’ rights in accordance with the

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant

human rights instruments;

establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play

its rightful role in the global economy and in international

negotiations;

promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural

levels as well as the integration of African economies;

promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living

standards of African peoples,

coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future

Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the

objectives of the Union;

advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all

fields, in particular in science and technology; and

work with relevant international partners in the eradication of

preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the

continent.

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As can be seen in the objectives, the establishment of the AU is a challenge to

move away from the overly state-centric character of the OAU and as a result, the

lack of civil participation. The AU Constitutive Act shows a serious departure from

the OAU Charter according prominence to human rights in the continent. Among the

14 objectives of the AU, at least 6 address human rights issues directly or impliedly

(Nmehielle, 2003: 434). The OAU was in principle a political organization that also

discussed matters of economic and social concern, the AU should be an organization

aimed at economic integration and social development which should lead to political

unity1. However Nsongurura Udombana, as cited in Nmehielle, didn’t believe that

any meaningful advancement in human rights protection in the continent will be

brought by the AU and he observed that:

“The AU Treaty is an old wine in a new skin; and the AU is a reincarnation of

the OAU. As such, it is not likely to take human rights seriously-even though

it is greatly desired-…to hope that many of the present crops of rulers in

African will respect human and peoples’ rights is as foolish and futile as

hoping to have iced water in the middle of the Sahara. The adoption of the

AU Treaty has more to do with the hysteria of globalization that the euphoria

of unity or, for that matter, human rights”(2003:417).

The Constitutive Act to establish the Union was signed at the OAU summit in

Lome, Togo, in July 2000, the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the Union took

place in the Lome Summit (2000), drawing the road map for the implementation of

the AU happened in the Lusaka Summit (2001), launching the AU and convening the

1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union took place in the Durban

Summit (2002)2.

1 http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm

2 http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell

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The AU also inherited from the OAU several unresolved intra-state crises

that have tested its credibility. (Makinda and Okumu, 2007:29-31).

2.2. Key Organs of the African Union

The main bodies in the AU are as follows: Two bodies are primarily

responsible for the AU peace and security agenda today, the Peace and Security

Council (PSC) and the AU Commission:

The Peace and Security Council: The PSC is designed as the main decision-making

body, much like the UN Security Council. The day-to-day work on peace and

security issues is conducted by the AU Commission, a role that parallels that of the

UN Secretariat. Several entities are designated to support the PSC: the Commission;

an African Standby Force (including a Military Staff Committee); a Panel of the

Wise; a Continental Early Warning System; and a Special Fund. (Holt,2005,17-18).

The Council under Article 7 of the Protocol can authorize peace missions,

recommend to the Assembly that the AU intervene in certain situations in respect of

grave crimes, including crimes against humanity, impose sanctions on

unconstitutional changes in government and ‘follow-up, within the framework of its

conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of

democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights

and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international

humanitarian law by Member States (Murray,2004:37). This body can intervene in

conflicts to protect the security of the continent. It has fifteen member states, elected

for two or three year terms, with equal voting rights. The PSC is also overseeing the

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establishment of a permanent African security force, the AU Standby Force3. The

African Standby Force concept which carries out peace support operations under

Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, approved in 2003, is a priority for the

PSC as the primary means of future AU peace operations. The ASF is envisioned

with civilian and military components stationed in their home countries and ready for

call-up and deployment. The ASF is being designed in two phases. The first phase,

originally to be completed in 2005, aims to give the AU capacity to offer advice to

political missions and manage the strategic requirements of co-deployment. The

second phase is scheduled for completion in 2010 and builds on AU capacity to

manage observer missions (Holt, 2005:17-18). The force will operate at three

possible levels: as an African Force under the AU; as a Regional Brigade at the level

of a Regional Mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution; or at

the level of a lead nation intervening on behalf of the African Union (Kioko, 2003:

823-4).

The AU Commission: Ten commissioners holding individual portfolios who

manage the day-to-day tasks of the AU and implement AU policies. The

Commission reports to the Executive Council.

The Assembly, comprised of heads of state. It meets at least once a year and is the

AU's main decision-making body. Assembly members elect an AU chairperson, who

holds office for one year.

The Executive Council, comprised of foreign affairs ministers of individual states.

The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly.

3 http://www.cfr.org/africa/african-union/p11616#p5

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Pan-African Parliament, begun in 2004 to "ensure the full participation of African

peoples in governance, development, and economic integration of the Continent."

This body debates continent-wide issues and advises AU heads of state. It currently

has advisory powers only, but there are plans to grant it legislative powers in the

future.

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Established in 2005,

ECOSOCC seeks to build partnerships between African governments and civil

society. It includes African social groups, professional groups, NGOs, and cultural

organizations. The 150-member General Assembly was launched in September 2008,

replacing the ECOSOCC's initial interim structure.

The Court of Justice. In 2004, the AU agreed that the regional African Court on

Human and Peoples' Rights would be merged with the Court of Justice. As of August

2009, the merger of the two courts was still in process.

The Financial Institutions. The AU charter names three bodies: the African Central

Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Investment Bank. Of these, only

the African Investment Bank has been established, but it is not yet functional. It will

be headquartered in Tripoli, Libya.4

2.3.The relation with and the role of the United Nations

The United Nations is the only international organization with the right to

decide on enforcement action, Article 53 of the UN charter clearly states that

4 http://www.cfr.org/africa/african-union/p11616#p5

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“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional

arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no

enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional

agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”.

Chapter VII of its Charter allows the Security Council to take enforcement action in

cases of a threat to or breach of international peace and security. According to Kioko,

the AU was given the right to decide on intervention outside the UN framework by

its Constitutive Act, if this is the case, then what the role of the UN in such

interventions would be is a matter of question. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states

that:

“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any

state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United

Nations.”

The AU is classified by the United Nations as a regional organization within the

meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, whilst the regional

mechanisms, such as ECOWAS, are recognized as sub-regional organizations.

However, the AU will also lead to political and socio-economic integration as

member States progressively cede their sovereignty (2003: 820). According to

Franke,

“Geographically internalizing responsibility for peace operations never was

intended as a real alternative to traditional UN missions in the first place. To

maintain would be to misinterpret Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and to

ignore the inherent institutional shortcomings and limitations of regional

institutions. Instead, the idea of regionalizing such responsibility must be

understood as an emancipative and complementary rather than a

supplementary effort, enabling the international community to more quickly

address more conflicts in a more comprehensive manner by building on the

strengths and compensating for the weaknesses of both types of

organization”.5

5 http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a185.pdf

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It should be regarded as a labor-division, because only this way the international

community can address all conflicts in Africa in a serious manner and it is mutually

beneficial in terms of strengths and weaknesses of both organizations. While the

regional organizations are able to deploy faster than the United Nations and are able

to adopt a more robust approach to peace enforcement , only the UN has the

capability to pull together the various components needed to form a complex

integrated peace building response that can address the long-term post-conflict

reconciliation and reconstruction needs of the conflict zones. Moreover, only the UN

has the resources to sustain peace operations over longer periods of time.

Consequently, after the situation has been stabilized by an African organization

(ECOWAS, SADC or the AU), a comprehensive hybrid model in which UN takes

over mission seems desirable (Franke, 10).

While deciding on intervention, the AU has to seek the authorization of the

UN Security Council as it’s required under the Article 53 of the UN Charter. When

questions were raised as to whether the Union could possibly have an inherent right

to intervene other than through the Security Council, they were rejected. This caused

a frustration with the slow pace of reform of the international order, and with

instances in which the international community tended to focus attention on other

parts of the world. Furthermore, shortly after the OAU Assembly of Heads of State

and Government had adopted the Ouagadougou decision defying the sanctions

imposed by the Security Council on Libya in connection with the Lockerbie crisis,

the signing process of the Constitutive Act took place. The leaders have shown

themselves willing to push the frontiers of collective stability and security to the limit

without any regard for the authorization of the Security Council. Some commentators

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stated that the intervention by the NATO in Kosovo in 1999 was not authorized by

the UN Security Council and thus was illegal although the UN Secretary provided

valid explanations for the legitimization for NATO action. Similarly, when the

Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) organized peacekeeping

forces for Sierra Leone and Liberia, it took the decision and put it into effect without

consulting the UN. It would appear that the UN Security Council has never

complained about its powers being extorted because the interventions were in

support of popular cases and were carried out partly because the UN Security

Council had not taken action or was unlikely to do so at that time. In the case of

ECOWAS peace enforcement operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the major part

of the cost was picked up by the regional superpower Nigeria. The cost of

interventions will be quite high, and the African Union which is not a financially

self-sustained organization has to involve and work with the international community

at large and the UN in particular for its operations to succeed. The average cost of

sustaining peacekeepers is estimated at US$ 130 per day excluding equipment,

transportation, ordnance, so this means that there will be an enormous burden on the

shoulders of the AU to call upon the UN to carry out its responsibility for

international peace and security (Kioko, 2003:821-2).

While the interventions in Burundi, Liberia and Darfur have shown that a

division of labour between the United Nations and African organizations can work,

many related issues still require clarification. For example, a doctrine of co-existence

and cooperation needs to formalize the legal, operational and financial details of

regionalizing peace operation responsibility in Africa while also ensuring that the

additional burdens for African states are kept as light as possible. Otherwise, large

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UN troop contributing countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and

Zambia may find it difficult to maintain their current deployment levels in UN peace

operations and to participate meaningfully in sub-regional standby brigade initiatives

(Franke, 2006: 13).

2.4. Objectives of African Union

Unlike its predecessor, which sought unity only among African states, the AU

makes the pledge to build “ a united and strong Africa” and to establish partnerships

between governments and business, in addition to achieving “greater unity and

solidarity” among states and African peoples. Holt also shares the same idea by

stating that “the OAU, which emphasized the principles of national sovereignty and

non-interference, lacked both the statutory authority and capacity to intervene in

matter related to peace and security. The AU, which embraces international

cooperation and recognizes the primacy of the UN Charter in peace and security, has

also adopted a wider field of engagement options, from mediation to using force to

intervene in specific circumstances” (2005: 15). So it can be said that the AU is

better designed to respond the conflicts than the OAU. The organ that has been given

these responsibilities is the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC)

which comprises the African civil society organizations (Makinda and Okumu, 2007:

35).

The AU Constitutive Act pledges to defend the sovereignty, territorial

integrity, and independence of member states. The AU aims to promote “peace,

security, and stability on the continent”. If the AU organs defined peace, security

primarily in terms of the protection of the state boundaries, the ruling elites and

territorial integrity the AU approach would not differ much from that of the OAU.

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However, if they defined peace and security primarily in terms of the protection of

the people and the preservation of their values, norms, and institutions, the AU

approached the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan between 2003 and early 2007

suggested that state interests took priority over the responsibility to protect suffering

humanity. The AU also pledges to “promote democratic principles and institutions,

popular participation and good governance”. This is a major departure from the

OAU, which did not take democratic governance seriously. Since its formation, the

AU has assumed an increasing role in the observation and monitoring of elections.

However, there have been criticisms about the results of some of the AU election

reports. One of the most embarrassing moments for the Union took place in May

2005 when it refused to observe the Ethiopian elections but went ahead and endorsed

the election results, which were widely believed to have been tampered with. As a

result of the statement of the deputy Chairperson endorsing the elections as “free and

fair”, riots rocked Addis Ababa for days and led to a number of deaths and thousands

of arrests (Makinda and Okumu, 2007, 35-36).

Another objective of the AU is to “promote and protect human and people’s

rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights” and

other human rights instruments. This is a major normative development in the AU’s

approach to governance. However, the continuing violation of human rights in

Darfur and Zimbabwe in 2007 has raised questions as to whether the AU has the

capacity to pursue this goal conclusively and consistently. In addition, the AU aims

to establish the necessary conditions that enable Africa to play a greater role in the

global economy, and to promote sustainable development at the economic, social,

and cultural levels (Makinda and Okumu, 2007, 37).

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The AU also aims to advance the development of Africa “by promoting

research in all fields, in particular in science and technology.” This objective is being

met through the department headed by the Commissioner for Human Resources,

Science, and Technology, and through relevant Specialized Technical Committees.

The successful pursuit of this objective is crucial to Africa’s sustainable

development. However, there is little evidence that Africa is investing adequately in

research and knowledge creation (Makinda and Okumu, 2007, 37).

3. Security and Peace building

Security and peace have been in the current agenda in Africa. The creation of

the African Union (AU) raised hopes that African governments and civil society

organizations would be able to deal with insecurity problems more quickly and

effectively. However, the continuing problems in Sudan’s Darfur region, Zimbabwe,

and Somalia have led to a growing disillusionment about the AU’s capacity to bring

about rapid change (Makinda and Okumu, 2007, 75). On the other hand, although the

AU face fundamental gaps in planning and management capacity to lead peace

operations and successfully deployed troops in peace operations, they are not yet

self-sustaining and require outside logistical support. It is reliant on external sources

to finance much of its headquarters and operations, since it lacks sufficient funding

from its member states (Holt, 2005: 2).

Since the 1980s, Africa has witnessed many wars, conflicts, and crises. Many

of these have taken place within states. Some intra-state conflicts have crossed the

borders and exerted pressure on neighboring countries. For example, Rwanda’s

conflict severely affected Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),

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Tanzania, and Uganda. Similarly, Somalia’s conflict continues to affect Djibouti,

Ethiopia, and Kenya. African states have also witnessed different levels of terrorism-

both local and transnational. Some of the wars, conflicts, and other sources of

insecurity have continued into the twenty-first century. For example, the civil war in

southern Sudan (started in 1983 and not resolved until early 2005). Before the

conclusion of this war, another conflict erupted in the Darfur region in 2003. The

civil war in Somalia, which started in the late 1980s and intensified following the

overthrow of former dictator Siad Barre in 1991, had not been resolved by early

2007. Somalia was invaded by Ethiopia on Christmas Eve in 2006. Moreover, the

civil war in the DRC, which started in the mid-1990s, continued into 2007,

notwithstanding the fact that the country held its first free presidential elections in

late 2006. In Algeria, a civil war which erupted in 1992 when the military intervened

in politics and nullified the general elections, has continued into the twenty-first

century (Makinda and Okumu,2007, 76).

The AU was established partly for the purpose of finding solutions to these,

and similar, problems. Article 3(f) of the Constitutive Act states that one of the

Union’s aims is to “promote peace, security, and stability.” In addition, Article 4(e)

states that one of the AU’s principles is the “Peaceful resolution of conflicts among

member states.” Moreover, the Constitutive Act, under Article 4(h), gives the Union

the right to “intervene in a member state…in respect of grave circumstances, namely

war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” Thus, the AU has a mandate to

help resolve inter-state and intra-state conflicts, deal with terrorist threats and engage

in peace building activities. (Makinda and Okuumu, 2007, 77-8).

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The term peace building is used to encompass various activities that are

designed to create the capacity that can sustain democratic processes, the respect for

human rights and the rule of law, poverty alleviation, and the provision of access to

health, education, and other basic needs (Makinda and Okumu, 2007, 79). In

addition, the Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace is the

culmination of an evolution of UN doctrine and an adjustment of the instruments

used to maintain the peace since the organization was formed in 1945 (Doyle and

Sambanis, 2006: 11).The document also recommended a number of measures to

strengthen and streamline United Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping processes,

and it discussed the changing roles of UN peacekeeping in the modern world

(Langholtz, 2010,23). In it, Boutros-Boutros Ghali refers to peace building as: “our

aims must be… to stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts:

rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife;

and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war”6

Makinda and Okumu comments this saying as a reference to capacity building,

societal transformation, and reconciliation among parties in dispute (2007,79). In his

1995 report Improving Preparedness for Conflict and Peace-keeping in Africa,as

cited in Franke’s7 (2006:2) article, the Secretary General was more specific:

The founders of the United Nations, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of

the United Nations, envisaged an important role for regional

organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It

is increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot address every

potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub-

regional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in

taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to

assist the United Nations in containing them.

6 http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439

7 http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a185.pdf

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The AU has always been expected to restore problems such as hunger,

famine, ethnic crises, political uprisings, economic deprivation in order to avoid war,

conflict and insecurity. “Apart from terrorism, Africa has witnessed extensive

violence and warfare in several countries since the creation of the AU. Although

violent conflicts in Africa are not new, they have drawn special attention due to the

fact that they are intense and extensive in scope, highly destructive, and produce

large numbers of civilian victims and refugees. For instance, the war in southern

Sudan claimed more than two million deaths. In the Rwandan genocide of 1994, an

estimated one million people perished in about two months. Violence in Africa has

taken various forms ranging from genocide, as in Rwanda and Darfur between 2003

and 2007, to interpersonal violence. Besides their extremism in brutality, armed

conflicts in Africa have also been characterized by warlordism, the targeting of

vulnerable groups, such as children, women and refugees, using children as soldiers,

state sponsorship of violence and war economies (Makinda and Okumu, 2007,79-

83).

4. Case Studies

The African Union operationalized its Peace and Security Council in 2003.

Soon after, the African Union launched its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi.

The AU deployed its second operation, a ceasefire monitoring force in Darfur, in

June 2004. The ambitious AU agenda also includes development of subregional

brigades to comprise its proposed African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. In Sudan,

The AU has led an observer force in Darfur, as the United Nations planned for a

broader peace operation in the southern part of the country (Holt, 2005: 8-9).

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4.1. Case study: Somalia

By 1990, Somalia had become a good example of what was becoming known

as a “failed state”-a people without a government strong enough to govern the

country or represent it in international organizations; a country whose poverty,

disorganization, refuge flows, political instability, and random warfare had the

potential to spread across borders and threaten the stability of other states and the

peace of the region (Kirkpatrick, 2007:60). Somalia’s 6.8 million people have been

living with anarchy since the government of President Siad Barre was overthrown in

1991 and a civil war broke out, dividing the country into fiefdoms controlled by rival

warlords, with arms, ammunition and explosives flowing freely across its borders in

breach of a UN embargo. In order to ceasefire in the capital Mogadishu, in April

1992 the Security Council established the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to

monitor ceasefire, provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and

supplies; and escort delivery of humanitarian supplies. But the deteriorating security

situation led the Council in December to authorize member states to form a Unified

Task Force (UNITAF) to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.

According to Doyle and Sambanis, as stated in their book Making War and Building

War (2008:153), UNITAF met almost no opposition because the mass of the people

welcomed the relief, and the warlords knew it was temporary, there was no threat to

their power. In March 1993, the Council established UNOSOM II to complete

UNITAF’s efforts to restore peace, but the escalation of inter-clan fighting confirmed

that there was no peace to keep (asdf, 2008: 104). As quoted from Menkhaus,

(1997:43) more than thirty-five local, regional, and international initiatives to foster a

negotiated peace from 1991 to 1995 failed to produce effective peace (Doyle and

22

Sambanis, 2008: 154). Following the deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers, UNOSOM II

was withdrawn in March 1995. United Nations Somalia peacekeeping operations are

important for Turkey because it contributed to the peacekeeping operation with a

troop under the control of a Turkish commander8. In 2002, a national reconciliation

conference sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

led to agreement on a cessation of hostilities and on structures and principles to

govern the national reconciliation process and this process bore Transitional Federal

Government with a five year term, and a Transitional federal Parliament with 275

members (12% of whom would be women). In 6 December 2006, the Security

Council authorized IGAD and all AU member states to establish a protection and

training mission in Somalia. Its mandate was to monitor progress in implementing

agreements; to maintain security in Baidoa; to protect members and infrastructure of

the Transitional Federal Institutions and Government; training their security forces to

provide their own security; and help re-establish Somalia’s national security forces.

On 20 February 2007, with hundreds of thousands fleeing heavy fighting in

Mogadishu, the Security Council, authorized the AU to establish a wider operation,

known as AMISOM, for an initial period of six months. Replacing IGAD mission, it

was authorized to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate, which included:

supporting the safe passage and protection of those involved with the process of

dialogue and national reconciliation; protecting the Transitional Federal Institutions;

assisting with the re-establishment and training of all- inclusive Somali security

forces; and helping to create security for the provision of humanitarian assistance. On

20 August, the Council extended AMISOM for an additional 6 months, but in

8 www.tasamafrika.org/pdf/yayinlar/Numan-Hazar-TR.pdf

23

November, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported that deploying such a mission

was neither realistic nor viable (asdf, 2008:104-5) although the UN’s political envoy

worked to encourage an inclusive political process that could stabilize the

inexperienced transitional government (Year in Review, 2007: 3) .

4.2. Case study: Burundi, 2003

Violent conflict between Hutu and Tutsi factions led to intervention by an AU

force with troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique In April 2003, the

AU authorized deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), comprising

up to 3500 troops, including 120 military observers.9 AMIB augmented and

transformed the 700 South African troops who had been deployed in 2001 to protect

political leaders during the transition. In Burundi, AMIB helped stabilize parts of the

country and contribute to creating the conditions suitable to UN deployment. AMIB

was tasked with a mandate it could not possibly fulfill and its resources were not

aligned with its requirements, but slow decision-making on the part of donors

delayed AMIB’s deployment. The mission lacked the requisite financial resources,

operational and institutional capacity as well as training and expertise to fulfill its

mandate and to provide meaningful protection to civilians (Powell, 2005, 54).But the

Mission suffered from a serious lack of funds and logistics support. With legislative

elections scheduled to take place before 31 October 2004, the AU requested that

AMIB be taken over by the United Nations10

(asdf, 2008: 90-1; Powell and

Baranyi,2005:3).

9 http://www.cfr.org/africa/african-peacekeeping-operations/p9333#

10 http://www.unicankara.org.tr/today/2.html#2g

24

However the AU's intervention in Burundi in 2003, in which an AU

peacekeeping force of some 3,000 troops was deployed as a bridging force until a

larger UN force arrived, is widely acknowledged as a success. In June 2004, the AU

force was absorbed in a UN force of 5,650. Experts say the AU force was crucial to

maintaining security during cease-fire negotiations11

.

ONUB’s deployment in June 2004 built on AMIB’s resources and initial

contributions. Deployed with significantly more resources and at a more advanced

stage in the peace process, ONUB has helped expand the space for elections and

peacebuilding. Yet participants suggested that severe human rights violations

continue and that the elections could paradoxically undermine democratic

consolidation. They also suggested that the government and the international

community are only beginning to address longer-term peacebuilding challenges such

as truth, justice and national reconciliation, security sector reform and poverty

reduction. It is not clear if the AU or other African institutions will play significant

roles in aspects of peacebuilding where financial resources are key (Powell and

Baranyi, 2005:3).

4.3.Case Study: Sudan- Darfur, 2003

By early 2007, the conflict in Darfur region of Sudan had killed 200.000

people and uprooted 2.5 million more, it was in a situation with crimes and crimes

against humanity. As the International Criminal Court began to address the matter,

the Security Council, on 31 July 2007, established the first-ever hybrid force

involving the United Nations, and the largest UN peacekeeping operation ever - The

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It combines

11 http://www.cfr.org/africa/african-union/p11616#p5

25

UN forces with those of the former African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in a

new, comprehensive operation aimed at bringing peace to that troubled part of the

World. Its mandate includes, in general, facilitating human access throughout Darfur

and helping promote respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental

freedoms, broaden and deepen peace process (asdf, 2008: 101-3).

When Darfur crisis captured international attention in 2003, it was the AU

that was called upon to lead negotiations between the Sudanese government and the

rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation

Movement. The AU’s efforts culminated in the signing of a Humanitarian Ceasefire

Agreement in April 2004 and the deployment of 60 ceasefire monitors and 300

soldiers to protect them. This protective force grew to over 7000 by September 2006.

After many delays and a series of rounds, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in

Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2006. The AU was invited by a government which lacks the

capacity to protect civilian population. The AU’s deployment of AMIS (African

Union Mission in Sudan) faced many problems. There were few countries which

have trained soldiers. There was no peace agreement to implement. The countries

were reluctant to be donors, because they wanted to put their troops at less risk. The

AU lacked equipment and had only a few vehicles and tents, and no aircraft. Rwanda

and Nigeria had offered to send troops. When Rwanda wanted to send 300 soldiers,

their deployment was put off due to accommodation conditions, also Nigeria that

being the lead nation caused the delay. The troops were being deployed without rules

of engagement and a force agreement. This came to light when three US Air Force

cargo planes transporting Rwandan soldiers and equipment to Darfur were denied

permission to land in Sudan (Makinda and Okumu, 2007:84-5).

26

However, some experts say that like many of the peacekeeping operations

that came before it, the Darfur mission has failed because the force is not big enough

and the mandate is too limited12

. Peacekeeping experts note three requirements for a

successful operation: a defined mandate (as stated above) and peace plan, stable

funding and troops, and a commitment to fulfilling the operation’s mandate. The AU

force in Darfur lacked all three, due to UN Security Council divisions13

. During the

operation, peacekeeping soldiers provided by the African Union (AU) as part of the

deal were killed and aid convoys looted14

.

Deployed under a very limited mandate, AMIS couldn’t deal with violent

militias who were committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.

AMIS could only undertake traditional peacekeeping operations which respect the

principles of impartiality, neutrality, and consent. AMIS also lacked basic skills in

peace building, confidence building. The morale of the AMIS personnel was very

low because of the frustrations from both Sudan and the AU headquarters. For

instance, Sudan often refused to give fuel to the AU monitors while its attack

helicopters were in the air. Another factor in Darfur conflict is Sudan’s diplomatic

skills. When the AU was making decisions on Darfur, Sudan was a member of the

Peace and Security Council (PSC) and one of the most powerful members in the

Union. Sudan’s power in the AU is derived from its commitment to the Union and

partly from its membership of the AU assembly. Sudan is one of the top ten

contributors to the Union’s budget, so the AU couldn’t make displeasing decisions or

undertake action without Sudan’s consent. Also Russia and China protected Sudan

12

http://www.cfr.org/africa/african-peacekeeping-operations/p9333# 13

http://www.cfr.org/africa/aus-responsibility-protect/p11621 14

http://www.economist.com/node/5246682

27

whenever UN Security Council attempted to adopt strict measure to address the

problem in Darfur. The AU couldn’t provide security or protect thousands of

vulnerable civilian populations in areas which were beyond humanitarian reach. With

its limited mandate, it couldn’t manage to disarm the Janjaweed militia as demanded

by UN Security Council Resolution 1556 of July 30, 2004. Also, 7.000 AMIS force

was not a suitable size for protecting civilians in a region of Darfur’s size. It should

have been more (around 44.000 troops). The proper equipment such as helicopters,

remotely piloted vehicles, and night-vision devices should have been provided and a

security agreement that included a no-fly zone, safe passage routes for returnees and

displaced populations, disarmament of Janjaweed militia, and protection of

humanitarian workers and convoys. Darfur failure showed that the AU did not learn

from AMIB (AU Mission in Burundi), however many lesson could have been drawn

from AMIB on how to deploy faster and effectively, acquire adequate funding, better

coordination between units and between the military and the political units of the

mission, better coordination from the AU headquarters, better information sharing

while operating AMIS. This suggests that the AU lacks an effective process for

evaluating the operation while the mission is in process (Makinda and Okumu, 2007:

85-7).

4.3.1.The EU’s role in the Darfur Crisis

In 1994 French President Francois Mitterrand as quoted in The Washington

Post called for Africans “to resolve their conflicts themselves and organize their own

security”, although his statements represent a general view about employing regional

28

or sub regional organizations to conduct operations, the EU couldn’t keep away from

the conflicts taking place in Africa15

.

As mentioned above, in 2003, fighting broke out between two local rebel

groups -- the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and

Equality Movement (JEM) -- on the one side, and Arabic speaking militia (the

Janjaweed) supported by the Government of Sudan (GoS), on the other. The conflict

escalated progressively causing a major humanitarian crisis affecting 2.45 million

people, including undetermined human losses; destruction of villages, crops and

livestock; 1.85 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees who fled

across the border to neighboring Chad; heightened vulnerability, as testified by the

large caseload of deaths by diseases that under normal circumstances are

preventable.

The EU focus on its foreign security policy tends to lean towards Africa with

particular focus on strengthening the African Union so that it can respond to crises

and offer support through the African Peace Facility (APF). Throughout the tragedy,

many EU member states have acted either bilaterally or along with others on the

issue of Darfur, in particular, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands and France. In the early

1990s, the EU did not engage in a development cooperation, so financial engagement

in the region wasn’t strong. When the huge amount of refugees began to move to

Chad, EU began to send financial aid through the UNHCR. This was not part of a

large policy shift in the EU at the time, as there was no CNN effect or Darfur NGO

pressure groups to make the EU react boldly. A proper reaction happened in

February 2004, and the EU Commission began to mobilize funding. While the US

15

http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a185.pdf

29

described the situation in Darfur as genocide, the EU stated that there was no

situation of genocide, and EU was criticized because of this comment. However, the

case was that EU member states bow to the judgment of the EU. The EU has

fashioned a foreign policy mechanism by which inaction is virtually automatic, even

in the face of genocide. Also the EU looks to the UN as the mainstay of decisions on

international intervention in conflicts, and the UN hadn’t described the situation in

Darfur as genocide either, furthermore the EU has been limited politically by the

Sudanese administration’s resistance to personnel and actors from Europe. The EU

strongly supported UN-led efforts to bring peace to Sudan, but for various political

reasons, couldn’t act alone. The EU has sought to provide long-term humanitarian

and development assistance. The European Parliament oversees European Security

and Defense policy in terms of the budget for external operations. The missions

related to Darfur include EU support to AMIS II as well as the ESDP mission-

EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Some commentators state that in EU there is a recognition that

member states tend to prioritize their neighborhood where they see a conflict

threatening their interests and territory rather than far away countries. Hence, at the

request of the AU, the EU agreed to support action for AMIS II. The aim of the AU

mission was to uphold the principle of African ownership and back the AU and its

political, military and police efforts aimed at addressing the situation in Darfur.

However, there was resistance from both the AU and the Sudanese Government of

National Unity (GoNU) (supported by some Arab states) for deployment of

international personnel to Darfur. The EU financed the bulk of the AMIS with a total

contribution of €305 million, including €38.5 million via voluntary contributions

from eight EU member states. With this financial contribution, AMIS represents the

30

biggest African-led peace operation financed by the APF so far. The support

continued until 31 December 2007 when AMIS handed over to the African

Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Despite the AMIS

support operation, the intervention by the EU in Darfur was always going to be

difficult due to both GoNU objections, which rendered any additional intervention

illegal, but also a lack of will of EU member states. Many EU member states were

also not keen on a long term commitment, preferring a “bridging” operation which

would see the mission pass to the UN eventually, the EU turned its attention in

October 2007 to the issue of internally displaced people, so EUFOR Tchad/RCA was

established in January 2008 acting in accordance with United Nations Security

Council Resolution 1778 (2007), and mandated to uphold security and protect aid

corridors for the refugees. The mission was handed over to the UN operation on

March 2009. The mission was criticized due to the lack of size, equipment

capabilities and mandate, so it didn’t make a significant difference. Although, some

commentators saw EUFOR as a more humanitarian than political mission, EU

managed to enhance security in some areas. The EU Commission deals with

political relations with the country and undertakes programming for most EU

financial instruments and development cooperation. The main legal document

relevant to development assistance to Sudan is the revised Cotonou Agreement,

which encompasses not only development cooperation, but also economic and trade

cooperation, and importantly the political dimension. Financing under the Cotonou

Agreement is channeled through the European Development Fund. The EU needs to

focus on Africa and recognizes this from both a stability and moral point of view.

The European public in Mediterranean countries in particular view this as necessary

31

to attempt to combat challenges such as drug trafficking and boat refugees,

phenomena which affect the stability of not just the EU, but the whole globe. The EU

cannot afford to decrease its commitment to the AU, and attempts to strengthen

relations have developed into providing support through such instruments as the

Africa Peace Facility (APF) which was created in 2004 under the 9th

EDF with the

objective of supporting peace, security and stability and providing the preconditions

for sustainable development in Africa. However, relations on the question of

peacekeeping are not smooth. The AU has scolded the EU over the deployment of

support to AMIS II. The resistance posed problems for EU efforts to assist with the

Darfur crisis. There were difficulties in relations with the GoNU such as

procrastination, indecision over allocating land for AU HQ and barracks. The EU

also expected too much from the AU. The EU has acknowledged the need for better

planning, the AU isn’t ready to build capacity, without EU support to AMIS, there

wouldn’t have been a mission. According to critics, the EU has not done enough, if it

wants to make a real change, it should do more than band aid solutions of

humanitarian aid. Aid must be combined with a political solution for Sudan,

otherwise the EU is simply a life-support system for a “life with no end and purpose”

(Gya, 2009: 10-20).

4.4.Case study: Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 2003

Congo is one of the most difficult challenges for the UN. It is a huge country

at the center of Africa and its collapse into civil war and internal chaos was heard

around the continent. Nearly four million people have died as a result of the conflict.

Only a most tenuous ceasefire and political agreement is in place to end the violence.

Competition for natural resources – gold, diamonds, other raw materials – is intense,

32

so it attracts not only neighboring countries but multinational corporations and some

enterprises. The U.N. committed initially a U.N. force too small and with too limited

a mandate to achieve its objectives. Only gradually, over time, has the size of the

force been expanded to a target of 16,700. Still no more than 13,900 are in place. In

the interim, attacks on civilians occurred and terrible human rights violations were

committed. A special non-U.N. intervention was needed until MONUC could be

expanded and its mandate strengthened. MONUC has more recently succeeded in

bringing order to some parts of the eastern region, but not yet all. Intervention by

Rwandans and perhaps Ugandans or their surrogates adds to the difficulties of the

situation. The conditions under which U.N. peacekeepers operate today is also

different than what was envisaged when peacekeeping was first developed. U.N.

peacekeepers are no longer safe from attack. Indeed, just under 2,000 U.N.

peacekeepers have been killed around the world. MONUC has lost more than 50

members.”16

4.5.Case study: Algeria

The majority of Africa’s wars have been intra-state, so in the early part of the

21st century, the African security agenda has been shaped largely by the war on

terror, the OAU, in July 1992, adopted a Declaration Against Extremism to enhance

the cooperation among African states to deal with “manifestations of extremism” and

terrorism. After the terrorist attacks in USA in 2001, after the adoption of UN

security council resolution 1373, African states have been made to implement

counter-terrorism measures that are beyond the local demands. Algeria is among the

African states that have suffered from terrorist problems for many years, have faced

16 http://www.cfr.org/world/monuc-case-peacekeeping-reform/p7881

33

terrorist problems for many years because of governance structures and policies

especially after nullyfying the general elections. The problem outlasted the OAU and

as these countries’ counter-terrorism strategies couldn’t manage to enhance security

the African Centre on the Study and Research on Terrorism, established in Algiers in

2004 by the AU has been hoped to serve as a vital tool for coordinating counter-

terrorism measures in Africa (Makinda and Okumu, 2007: 82-3).

5. The Barriers of the AU

According to Stephanie Hanson, the AU faces huge organizational and

financial barriers. It took many years for similar regional institutions in Europe, Asia,

and Latin America to establish themselves and the AU faces the additional

challenges of endemic poverty and civil conflict among many of its member states.

In addition, the AU relies on regional economic communities that are also weakly

organized. "None of these states can really produce very much," says Collins (as

cited in Hanson’s article), "They look at the bureaucracy and they are less likely to

give." As of the 2006 Banjul Summit, only twelve countries had paid their 2006

contributions13

.

Others say AU reform and peacekeeper deployment is also subject to the will

of its strongest leaders. At Banjul, leaders including Zimbabwean President Robert

Mugabe blocked the AU from adopting a much-anticipated democracy charter that

34

would have strengthened the electoral process, ended military coups, and stopped

constitutional changes to allow presidents to stay in office17

.

It seems that the African Union which is the key unit in the continent has a

long way to establish a stable peace, security and prosperity in the region, and needs

more intra-state logistic support rather than external support in order to achieve the

goals.

17

http://www.cfr.org/africa/african-union/p11616#p5