PEACEKEEPING MODALITIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION-UNITED NATIONS(EU-UN) COOPERATION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS

V.O.S. OKEKE, PhDokekevos@yahoo.com. Ph . No: 08033847373

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ANAMBRA STATE UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA

&

E.T. ANICHE, PhDanicheet@fuotuoke.edu.ng. Ph. No: 07067554191

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIESFEDERAL UNIVERSITY OTUOKE (FUO), BAYELSA STATE, NIGERIA

Published in 2013 in:

Africa Peace Review, 11-12 (1): 1-22.

Abstract

The emerging partnership between the European Union (EU) and theUnited Nations (UN) in crisis management is clearly a desirabledevelopment. EU can contribute to the UN by providing vitalcapabilities, especially in rapid redeployment while the UN canconfer legality and legitimacy to EU operation thereby enablingthe Union to become fairly a global actor, not just economicallybut also politically. The EU’s commitment to UN peacekeeping

1

mission is truly one of foundations of the European Security andDefense Policy (ESDP). The study argues that the EU preferencefor participating in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-ledoperations impedes rather than enhances the EU-UN cooperation inconflict management.

Keywords: EU, UN, Peacekeeping, Conflict Management,Functionalism, and Neo-functionalism. Introduction

The constraints imposed by the changing and ever

demanding nature of peacekeeping have led the United Nations

(UN) to seek increased supports from regional organizations

such as the European Union (EU). Whilst the development of the

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) logically led the

EU to revisit its relationship with the UN, both as a

legitimizing body and as the main peacekeeping implementer.

The convergence of these two trends has led to a genuine

inter-institutional rapprochement or EU-UN partnership to

conflict management. However, the relationship between the

European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) in the field

of conflict management has undergone major changes over the

last five years (Tardy, 2005).

The emerging partnership between the EU and the UN in

crisis management is therefore clearly a desirable

development. EU can contribute to the UN by providing vital

2

capabilities, especially in rapid redeployment while the UN

can confer legality and legitimacy to EU operations thereby

enabling the Union to become fairly a global actor, not just

economically but also politically. The EU’s commitment to UN

peacekeeping mission is truly one of foundations of the

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Wonters and Ruys,

2001).

However, according to Hengari (2011) the UN Charter has

sufficient provision on Chapter VIII, Articles 52, 53 and 54

for meaningful collection and cooperation with regional

organizations. But despite the stated aims of devolving

responsibility to regional organizations in matters of

peacekeeping operation, these provisions did not find concrete

expression until after the end of the cold war. The impasse

was not just as a result of great power rivalry, but in part,

also the consequence of differing interpretations regarding

the primacy of the UN or regional organizations in the

resolution of disputes. These differences had their roots in

the then prevailing schools of thought preceding the founding

of the UN after the collapse of the Leagues of Nations.

Two schools of thought, the first represented by the

United Kingdom expressed a view in favour of regional

3

organizations becoming the bedrock of the post-war security

infrastructure, and the second represented by the United

States insisted on the primacy of UN in matters of peace and

security. The latter view prevailed when the US imposed Durban

Oak proposals formed the basis of the San Francisco Conference

in 1945. But it was Latin American countries that argued in

favour of regional security arrangements as a precondition for

accepting the UN Charter. However, there is the end of cold

war widespread acceptance for regional organizations to take

leadership in solving conflicts, and over the two decades,

there has been a greater need for regional organizations to

coordinate meaningfully with the UN as well as among one

another or between each other (Hengari, 2011).

The EU relationship with the UN, whether in opposition or

complementary is more advanced than that of any other regional

organizations. However, calls for closer cooperation do not

imply the cooperation of UN and regional organizations acting

in concert toward solving conflict in other parts of the

world. The provisions are by definition vague for a

supranational organization in general, it is the EU rather

than the UN that sets the agenda and defines the terms of the

UN-EU relationship which is characterized by a divide between

4

what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer. The EU-

UN rapprochement is being confronted with the simultaneous

reform processes of the two organizations which implies a high

degree of uncertainty surrounding both the overhaul of the UN

and the ratification of the European Constitution (July,

2005).

The EU approach to peacekeeping is closely modeled after

that of the UN, particularly as regard changing nature of

conflict that is less about sovereign borders and more about

human suffering. An independent report, that is,

Responsibility to Protect, presented to the UN suggests that

sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own

citizens from avoidable catastrophe like mass murder,

genocide, rape and starvation. But when they are unwilling to

do so, that responsibility must be borne by broader community

of states.

Here, we contend that the EU preference for participating

in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-led peacekeeping

missions impedes the EU-UN cooperation on conflict management.

Theoretical Framework

This study is essentially anchored on functionalism and neo-

functionalism of neo-liberal institutionalism. Functionalism as

5

international relations theory was formulated and developed by

David Mitrany in the aftermath of World War II. David Mitrany is

thus the proponent and chief exponent of functional theory of

international relations. Conventionally, the theory of

functionalism in international relations is thus based on the

hope that more and more common task will be delegated to such

specific functional organizations or agencies of United Nations

(UN) like World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc, and

each of these organizations will become supranational, that is

superior to its member governments in power and authority. In

this way, the World’s nations will gradually become integrated

into a single community within which war will be impossible

(Mitrany, 1948; 1966).

Classic functionalism as formulated by David Mitrany

envisaged the treatment of these international or supernatural

functions and services as technical matters, non-political in

nature and well removed from the clamour and pressures of

interest groups, nations and the masses of the population.

Classic functionalists like David Military hoped that highly

specific functional agencies would enter into direct contact with

the people they serve in each country. Their services would

somehow remain non-political, but they would win through their

6

performance both increasing elite acceptance and popular support

(Deutch, 1989; Echezona, 1998).

Similarly, Nweke (2000) posits that functionalism is not

just a theoretical formulation but a practical policy action as

well concerned with how best the world could be organized so as

the eliminate violent conflicts and wars, thereby enable great

powers and small states alike to focus on trade and development

co-operation rather than engage in divisive political and

ideological issues that evoke aggressive policies of

intervention, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and domination in

international relations. The fact remains that within the several

versions of the theory are to be found the essential kernel of

Mitrany’s new world model, namely that a progressive economic

integration would gradually eliminate sources of conflict and

build the foundation for political unification.

Rourke (1999) on his own describes functional co-operation

in the light of classical functional theory as composed of the

specialized agencies that deal with specific economic and social

problems. He further pointed out that there is expanding roles of

international governmental organization (IGOs) both in number and

on scope of activity. According to him, this is as a result of at

least three major reasons; (a) more and more common governmental

7

functions are being dealt with by IGOs (b) some of these

expanding roles are dealt with by creating new IGOs (c) the

increasing need for IGOs activity is leading existing IGOs to

take on a new functions beyond their initial roles. For example,

the scope of European Union (EU) activities is expanding beyond

its original economic focus to a wider range of political and

social concerns as well as developing an increasingly important

organizational structure.

In the same vein, other functionalists like Keohane and Nye

(cited in Burchill & Linklater, 2001) have demonstrated how

through membership of international organizations, states can

significantly broaden their conceptions of self-interest (i.e.

national interest) in order to widen the scope of co-operation

and compliance. Hence, compliance with the rules of these

organizations not only discourages the narrow pursuit of national

interests, it also weakens the meaning and appeal of state

sovereignty. Similarly, Williams (1989) states that there has

been a growing quest for greater structure as a result of the

fact that increasing political activity in the global system has

been channeled into international organizations. International

organizations have come to play a growing role in formulating

international policy. International governmental organizations

8

(IGOs), therefore, provide the framework within which

government(s) can achieve agreement about the elements of

international public policy.

Whilst, according to Okolie (2005: 202-216) “functionalism

in international relations is used to denote an approach to the

building of a supra-national community primarily through economic

integration”, hence it is closely associated with integration

theory. With the end of cold war functional theory of

international relations has staged a comeback, though not in its

orthodox or classical form as it has been re-interpreted and

refined since it was originally formulated by David Mitrany.

There is this tendency for scholars, especially from the West, to

anchor studies on regional (economic) integration on neo-

functionalism. Functionalism, neo-functionalism,

intergovernmentalism and complex interdependence theory are all

variants of neo-liberal institutionalism or theories of

integration which generally hold that in the midst of anarchy or

absence of overarching/supranational institutions, there is

cooperation in international system and order is facilitated

through international institutions, norms and regimes. The result

of this would be shifting upward of sovereignty from state to

regional or global level facilitated by merger of several states

9

into single state or ultimately a single world government or a

process by which supranational institutions replace national ones

in the long-run (Burchill & Linklater, 2005; Nweke, 2000;

Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008).

Neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas unlike functionalism of

David Mitrany is non-normative and describes or explains the

process of regional integration base on empirical data. Aside

being empirical, neo-functionalism unlike functional theory does

not focus primarily on global integration rather its primary

concern is on regional integration. In other words, functionalism

and neo-functionalism are both theories of supranationalism, but

while the former emphasizes global supranationalism, the latter

reifies regional supranationalism (Echezona, 1998; Burchill &

Linklater, 2005). Neo-functionalism is a theory of regional

integration in which integration is considered to be inevitable

process, rather than a desirable state of affairs that could be

introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the

involved states.

There are three main principles of neo-functionalism; (i)

the principle of positive spillover effects states that

integration between states in one sector, that is, economic

sector will eventually ramify into integration or co-operation in

10

other sectors such as political, socio-cultural, security, etc.

(ii) the mechanism of a transfer in domestic allegiance which

assumes that as the process of integration gathers momentum in an

increasingly pluralistic domestic society of each state, interest

groups and other associations will transfer their allegiance or

loyalty away from national institutions towards the supranational

institution(s) when they begin to realize that their material

interests or well being can be better pursued through

supranational institution(s) than the pre-existing national

institutions; and (iii) principle of technocratic automaticity

which states that as integration hastens the supranational

institution(s) will take the lead in fostering further

integration as they become more powerful and more autonomous of

the member states (Haas, 1970; Echezona, 1998).

It is instructive to state here that these three main

principles of neo-functionalism embody John Galtung’s Staircase

Hypothesis/Strategy which involves the process of beginning with

limited domain (or memberships) and limited scope (or sectors or

area of cooperation) and gradually deepening the scope before

extending the domain. Deepening the scope means moving from the

initial areas of cooperation to other areas of cooperation or

11

bringing in new sectors, whereas, extending the domain means

admitting new memberships.

While functionalism helps us to explain the roles of the

United Nations (UN) in conflict prevention, management and

resolution as well as post-conflict reconstruction and

reconciliation; neo-functionalism enables to explain the roles of

the European Union (EU) in conflict prevention, management and

resolution, particularly conflict management. Thus, functionalism

and neo-functionalism are suitable for explaining EU-UN

cooperation or partnership in conflict management in form of

peacekeeping missions or operations in conflict regions.

The United Nations (UN) and Conflict Management

The Charter of the United Nations (UN) gives the Security

Council the power and responsibility to take collective actions

to maintain international peace and security. As a result, the

international community usually depends on the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC) to authorize peacekeeping operation. Most

of these operations are established and implemented by the UN

itself with troops serving under UN operation command. In other

cases, where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate

or feasible, the UNSC authorizes regional organizations such as

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic

12

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union

(EU) or coalition of willing countries to implement certain

peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki, retrieved on 28/08/2011).

For example, the EU approach to peacekeeping is closely

modeled on that of the UN, particularly as it has conformed to

the changing nature of conflict that is less about sovereign

borders and more about human suffering. An independent report,

that is, Responsibility to Protect, presented to the UN suggests

that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own

citizens from mass murder, rape, genocide, starvation, but when

they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must

be borne by the broader community of states. The UN with its

universal mandate and legitimacy is uniquely placed to advance

global solutions to common challenges. The UN peacekeeping

missions have more than doubled in number compared to the

organization’s first forty years, and the EU has followed the

lead (http://www.eurunion.org/news/eunewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping,

retrieved on 28/08/2011)

Consequently, Tardy (2005) writes that through its Security

Council, the UN is the legalizing and legitimizing body for peace

operations and the only organizational that can authorize the use

13

of force in international relations. But despite its

establishment in 1945, the UN was not involved in peacekeeping

operations until 1948, just three years of its establishment. In

other words the first UN involvement in peacekeeping mission

known as First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was

between 1948 and 1967 in Egyptian-Israeli Wars which include Suez

crisis and Six-Day War. The UN has till date been involved in

over 68 peacekeeping missions globally of which 52 of the

missions had been completed, while 16 peacekeeping missions are

currently deployed. Out of the 52 peacekeeping missions

completed, 20 were in Africa making a total of 28 UN peacekeeping

operations in Africa alone. The modern peacekeeping therefore

dates back to 1948 at the launch of the first United Nations

Mission, that is, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO),

which still operates in the Middle East today. For instance,

according to Tardy (2005:49-68):

14

With 16 missions as at March 2005, and around67,000 military personnel and civilian policedeployed, the UN counts more people inpeacekeeping operations than all regional andsub-regional organizations put together. Such alevel of deployment, combined with the

For details of the UN current deployment of peacekeeping

missions in different regions of the World see Table 1 below.

Table 1: The UN Current Deployment of Peacekeeping Missions

S/

No

Year Name of Operation Location Conflicts

1. 1948 United Nations Truce

Supervision

Organization (UNTSO)

Middle

East

Monitors the

various

ceasefires and

assists UNDOF and

UNIFIL2. 1949 United Nations

Military Observer

Group in India and

Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

Kashmir,

Pakistan

Indo-Pakistan War

of 1947

3. 1964 United Nations

Peacekeeping Force in

Cyprus (UNFICYP)

Cyprus Cyprus Dispute

4. 1974 United Nations

Disengagement

Observer Force

(UNDOF)

Golan

Heights

Agreed withdrawal

by Syrian and

Israel forces

5. 1978 United Nations Lebanon Israel invasion

15

Interim Force in

Lebanon (UNFIL)

of Lebanon and

2006 Israel-

Lebanon conflict6. 1991 United Nations

Mission for the

Referendum in Western

Sahara (MINURSO)

Western

Sahara

Moroccan

occupation of

Western Sahara

7. 1999 United Nations

Interim

Administration

Mission in Kosovo

(UNMIK)

Kosovo Kosovo War

8. 2003 United Nations

Mission in Liberia

(UNMIL)

Liberia Second Liberia

Civil War

9. 2003 United Nations

Assistance Mission in

Afghanistan (UNAMA)

Afghanist

an

War in

Afghanistan

10. 2004 United Nations

Operation in Cote

d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

Cote

d’Ivorie

Civil War in Cote

d’Ivorie

11. 2004 United Nations Haiti 2004 Haiti

16

Stabilization Mission

in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

rebellion

12. 2005 United Nations

Mission in the Sudan

(UNMIS)

Sudan Second Sudanese

Civil War

13. 2006 United Nations

Integrated Mission in

Timor-Teste (UNMIT)

East

Timor

2006 East Timor

Crisis

14. 2007 United

Nations/African Union

Mission in Darfur

(UNAMID)

Sudan Darfur Conflict

15. 2010 United Nations

Organization

Stabilization Mission

in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo

(MONUSCO)

Congo Second Congo War

16. 2011 United Nations

Interim Security

Force for Abyei

(UNISFA)

Sudan South Kordofan

conflict

17

17. 2011 United Nations

Mission in the

Republic of South

Sudan (UNMISS)

South

Sudan

Second Sudanese

Civil War

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_peacekeeping missions,retrieved on 28/08/2011.

The European Union (EU) and Conflict Management

Right from its formation, the European Union has been

engaged in crisis management and conflict prevention conceived as

a means to end war in Europe through institutional integration

and a voluntary pooling of sovereignty. The EU today continues

to strive for peace, security and prosperity across the European

continent, and even beyond. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been

developing a credible foreign and security policy designed to

contribute meaningfully to peacekeeping through international

crisis management operations around the globe. The EU and its 27

member states together with the United Nations and others

involved in peacekeeping are currently engaged in innovative

mission to secure, maintain and build peace throughout the world

(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved

on 28/08/2011).

18

Thus, the European Union strives for stability, security and

prosperity at home and in its relation abroad by supporting a

sustainable peace as the first step in meeting these objectives

as well as in ensuring that states emerging from conflict can

rebuild their democratic institutions and rejoin the comity of

nations as active, functioning states. Consequently, the EU

launched its first military peacekeeping operations under

European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Concordia, on March

31, 2003 at the explicit request of the FYROM government. The aim

was to contribute to a stable, secure environment, and to support

implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement which

ended hostilities between armed ethnic Albania groups and the

country’s security forces

(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eurnewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved

on 28/08/2011).

It is, therefore, not by accident that the EU’s earliest

peacekeeping activities were in Europe’s own backyard, in the

Western Balkans when war broke out in the former Yugoslavia. The

EU without a formalized intervention capacity tried

unsuccessfully to broker a diplomatic settlement but could only

intervene as part of UN peacekeeping efforts, and subsequently,

under US leadership as part of a NATO force. The EU Concordia’s

19

250 lightly armed military personnel that took over from NATO,

however, helped former Yugoslavia (FYROM) to become a peaceful

and democratic country where an international security presence

is no longer needed. Concordia was completed on December 15, 2003

and was succeeded by an EU-led police mission, Proxima

(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletter/EUFocus-peacekeeping, retrieved on

28/08/2011).

Perhaps the best example of EU’s comprehensive approach to

peacekeeping can be found in the Western Balkans where countries

that were mired in devastating conflict in the early 1990’s are

now at various stages on the road to EU membership. European

Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military operations in both

Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM) have contributed to a safe, secure environment,

supported by police missions that shared expertise and best

practices to develop a professional effective police force. The

missions in Western Balkans demonstrate the strong emphasis that

the EU places on its political autonomy which makes it to somehow

distance itself from the UN. For example, obtaining a UN mandate

for ESDP operations does not appear to be a requirement as long

as these operations are deployed in Europe with the consent of

host state and are of a non-coercive or a civilian nature. Other

20

examples of operations not created by UNSC resolution in Europe

include EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while

outside Europe, the three civilian operations in Georgia (EUJUST

THEMIS), Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA) and Iraq (EUJUST LEX) are good

examples (Tardy, 2005).

From the Western Balkans to Africa, from West Asia to

Southeast Asia and beyond, the EU’s ESDP missions have helped

saves lives, protect the vulnerable and achieve greater

stability. Ranging from military actions to police and role of

law operations, EU missions are deployed autonomously or to

complement those of the UN, NATO, and the Africa Union (AU). EU

member states also contribute force to other international

peacekeeping activities. The European Security Strategy (ESS)

adopted in December 2003 presents the EU vision of a stronger

international society based on well functioning international

institutions and a role based international order, the military

crisis management operations do not depend upon a standing EU

army but rather on troops drawn from dedicated national forces.

The initial goal was for member states to be able to

cooperatively deploy a force of up to 60,000 within 60 days, and

sustain the deployment for up to one year. To address the current

and future need for more rapid deployments, the EU augmented its

21

military capabilities by developing 13 battle groups, which will

be in service by 2010. Each battle group consists of

approximately 1,500 troops that can be deployed within 15 days

for up to four months, either as a stand-alone force or as an

advanced force preparing for a large multinational peacekeeping

effort. The two battle groups are already permanently on standby

for six-month periods, providing the capacity to undertake two

concurrent rapid-respond operations. The member states

contributions to the required troop commitments have been

confirmed through the first half of 2011. Future military needs

will be coordinated by the EU’s European Defense Agency, which is

charged with improving European defense capabilities in the field

of crisis management and sustaining the ESDP now and in the

future. Since 2003, the EU has also managed the African Peace

Facility (APF), designed to provide the AU and other regional

organizations with the resources to mount effective peacekeeping

operations. From its starts through 2010, the EU is providing

more than 550 million euro in funding for the APF

(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eurnewsletters/ EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved

on 28/08/2011). For details on EU peacekeeping military

operations see Table 2 below:

22

Table 2: The EU Peacekeeping Military Operations Year Mission Name Country Contingen

ts

Role

2003 EUFOR

Concordia

Former

Yugoslavia

Republic of

Macedonia

(FYROM)

350

troops

Supported the

implementation of

the August 2001

Ohrid Framework

Agreement ending

hostilities between

armed ethnic

Albania groups and

FYROM security

forces. 2003 EUFOR

Artemis

Democratic

Republic of

Congo (DRC)

1,800

troops

Helped the UN

Mission in DRC

(MONUC) stabilize

the security

conditions and

improved the

humanitarian

condition in Bunia2004 EUFOR Althea Bosnia and 2,500 Ensures compliance

23

Herzegovina

(BiH)

troops with the 1995

Dayton Peace

Accord, provides

deterrence against

future conflict and

enhances security

and public safety. 2006 EUFOR DR

Congo

Democratic

Republic of

Congo (DRC)

2,300

troops

Assisted the UN

Mission in DR Congo

(MONUC) in securing

the region during

the historic

electoral process

in 2006.2008

-

2009

EUFOR

Chad/Central

African

Republic

(CAR)

Chad/Central

African

Republic

(CAR)

3,700

troops

Contributes to a

wider international

and

multidimensional

presence under UN

auspices.Source: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/Eufocus-Peacekeeping,

Retrieved on 28/08/2011.

24

The EU-UN Cooperation and Conflict Management

The EU member states are attached to the centrality and

legitimizing power of the UN Security Council, and EU as such has

gained some political clout within UN bodies beyond the role

played by the Commission in economic and development affairs. At

the financial level, the EU states’ shares of the UN regular and

peacekeeping budgets are very high with respectively 37.75

percent and 39 percent. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and

Herzegovina (EUPM) and Operation Artemis in the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC) constituted real tests for the EU-UN

relationship. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the EU

took over the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) with the

objective of ensuring a smooth transition from UN to EU

responsibility (Tardy, 2005).

Tardy (2005) notes that the EU involvement in the DRC was of

a fundamentally different nature such that in the summer of 2003,

the EU conducted its first autonomous military operation in the

Northeastern part of the DRC, that is, Ituri city of Bunia. This

occurred at the request of the UN, under a UN mandate, and as a

temporary endeavour eventually taken over by a reinforced

component of the UN operation, that is, MONUC, Ituri Task Force.

EU and UN activities were therefore intimately linked throughout

25

the planning and the deployment of the operation. Operation

Artemis, officially called Interim Emergency Multinational Force

(IEMF), was formally created by UNSC Resolution 1484 of May 30,

2003 and by the Council Joint Action of June 5, 2003. The

Security Council resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the

UN Charter and authorized the member states participating in the

force to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate. The

UNSC formally created the force, but subcontracted its

implementation to the EU with no subordination of any sort

between the two institutions. The UNSC only requested the

leadership of the force to report regularly to the Council

through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of its

mandate.

Tardy (2005) further asserts that notwithstanding the

shortcoming of EU-UN cooperation as shown by operation Artemis,

it constituted a major breakthrough in relations between the two

institutions by forcing them to work together, and therefore to

become better acquainted. Also, Operation Artemis brought

institutionalization of EU-UN cooperation a step further with the

signature on September 24, 2003 of the Joint Declaration on EU-UN

cooperation on crisis management by the UN Secretary-General and

the EU presidency. The declaration took note of the recent

26

developments in EU-UN cooperation and identified four areas where

further cooperation could be explored such as planning, training,

communication and best practices. A joint consultative mechanism

named Steering Committee was establish at working level to

enhance coordination in these four areas and to follow through

with the implementation of the Joint Declaration. Since September

2003, the Steering Committee has met twice a year and points of

contact have been established or developed at different levels of

the two secretariats as work has been conducted on training

standards and modules. The UN personnel have participated in EU

training courses; and a continued dialogue on planning and EU-UN

operation cooperation has taken place, as in the EU-UN exercise

of April 2005.

However, Tardy (2005) has identified since main modalities

of EU-UN cooperation revolving around the degree of involvement

of the EU in a given conflict management activity, be it UN-led

or UN-mandated; and lay emphasis on the following three factors,

the nature of the conflict management activity, that is, military

or civilian, the sequence of EU and UN deployments, that is,

simultaneously or subsequently, and the degree of EU and UN

member states assets’ deployment within a UN operation. The six

modalities include the clearing house process, the stand-alone

27

model, the bridging model, the take-over process, the standby

model, and the modular approach.

The clearing house process involves coordination of national

contributions to UN-led operation through a framework by which

member states could on voluntary basis exchange information on

their contribution to a given UN operation. The stand-alone

model, preferred by the EU, involves conducting operation under a

UN-mandate by the EU at the request of the UN or as an EU

initiative, which when created would have no link with the UN

structure. EU acts as a sub-contractor of the UN or the UN acts

only as the mandating body of the EU such as in operation Althea

in BiH. The bridging model represents a situation or corresponds

to a new trend in peace operations by which regional

organizations, like EU, deploy first to a crisis zone for a

limited period before the UN takes over for a longer term. The

take-over process is a situation where EU takes over peacekeeping

mission from UN. It reflects a situation where EU takes over UN

peacekeeping operation or UN handing over peacekeeping mission to

EU. The stand-by model involves reserving peacekeeping forces

provided by EU as back up to support the UN operation in a

situation where an EU operation is deployed simultaneously with a

UN operation. The modular approach of a possible EU-UN

28

cooperation is one in which the EU would contribute to an UN

operation by providing one component to the operation which is

otherwise, UN-led. This approach is favoured by the UN but

resented by the EU.

Consequently, while EU member states are major contributors

to UN-mandated peace operations, they contribute very little to

UN-led operations. For example, as of March 2005, EU member

states accounted for 6.52 percent of UN troops, a percentage that

decreases to 2.24 percent for UN operations in Africa, the

continent where peacekeeping needs are by far the greatest. For

well known political and military reasons with origins in the UN

peacekeeping records of early 1990s, Western states in general

have become reluctant to participate in UN-led operations, and

have over the last ten years favoured regional organizations like

EU and NATO, or coalition of states for their crisis management

activities. Also, the general reticence of the European states to

place troops under UN command, in addition to their skepticisms

about the reliability of the UN structure in general, are

concerns that are echoed within the EU itself and its politico-

military structure, and that both negatively impact on the EU-UN

relationship as the key principle of the EU decision-making

autonomy makes subordination to the UN difficult (Tardy, 2005).

29

The general absence of European states from UN-led

operations has to be compared with their presence in UN-mandated

operations. This present a situation where UN-led operation is

relatively poor, ill-equipped and with weak political backing,

whereas the ones led by coalition of states or regional

organizations are politically and militarily better supported. In

relative terms, though, the EU is the regional organizations that

have gone the furthest in its relationship with the UN, and it is

as well the one that offers the most promising perspectives of

cooperation at both the military and civilian levels. The UN

welcomes the EU’s efforts and is willing to take advantage of the

EU crisis management policy. Yet the UN aspires to include such a

policy as much as possible into its broader framework and calls

for a more direct EU participation in UN-led peacekeeping

operations.

However, over the last past five years, the EU has

significantly increased its operational contribution to

international crisis management through autonomous and UN

Security Council mandated ESDP operations in countries such as

the DRC, Chad/CAR and the Western Balkans. The EU helps lessen

the burden on UN peacekeeping capacities that are stretched close

to the limit. According to the European Security Strategy (ESS)

30

strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its

responsibilities and to act effectively are European Union top

priorities. The EU is one of the most significant donors to the

UN operations, funding almost 40 percent of the UN budget, 20

percent of UN operation and approximately half of the UN member

states’ contributions to the organization’s funds and programmes

(http://www.eurunion.org/news/eunewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved

on 28/09/2011).

Thus, we conclude that the EU preference for participating

in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-led operations impedes

rather than enhances the EU-UN cooperation in conflict

management. This is because the European Union (EU) favours the

stand-alone model and resents the modular approach, while United

Nations (UN) prefers modular approach.

Conclusion and Recommendation

In the course of this study therefore we arrived at the

conclusion that the EU preference for participating in UN-

mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-led peacekeeping missions

impedes rather than enhances the EU-UN cooperation on conflict

management. We noted that this is because the European Union(EU) favours the stand-alone model and resents the modular

approach, while United Nations (UN) prefers modular approach. On

31

the basis of this conclusion, we recommend that the European

Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) should work out an

acceptable modality for cooperating in both UN-mandated and UN-

led peacekeeping missions in order to synergize in conflict

management.

References

Aniche, E.T. (2010) “World Bank and Reforms in Nigeria (1999-2007): An Appraisal”, Journal

of Liberal Studies, 13 (1): 143-165. Burchill, S. & Linklater, A. (eds.) (2005) Theories of InternationalRelations, New York:

Palgrave.Deutch, K.W. (1989) The Analysis of International Relations, EnglewoodCliff: Prentice-Hall

Inc. Echezona, N. (1998) International Politics in the Post Cold War Era, Awka:Meks Publishers.

Goldstein, J. S. & Pevehouse, J. C. (2008) International Relations, NewYork: Pearson

Longman.Haas, E. (1970) “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections

on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-theorizing” in InternationalOrganization 24(3).

32

Hengari, A.T. (2011) “EU-UN Partnership in Military ConflictManagement: Whither the African Union SecurityInfrastructure”, An African Journal of Conflict Resolution (AJGR).

http://www.eurunion.org/news/eunewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved on28/08/2011.

http://enwikpedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_peacekeeping_missions,retrieved on 28/08/2011.

Narosseloff, A. (2004) “EU-UN partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and prospects’ in International Peace Institutes (IPI).

Mitrany, D. (1948) “The Functional Approach to World Organization” in International Affairs,

24 (3).Mitrany, D. (1966) A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quandrangle

Books.

Nweke, G. A. (2000) “Functionalism and the New World Order: TheDwindling Options for

Africa” in African Political Science Review (APSR) 1(1). Rourke, J.T. (1999) International Politics on the World Stage,New York: McGraw-Hills

Publishers.Tardy, T. (2005) “EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A PromisingRelationship in a

Constrained Environment”, the European Union.The EU Focus, November 2008, A publication of The European Union(EU).Williams, M. (ed.) (1989) International Relations in the Twentieth Century: AReader, London:

33

Macmillan Educational Books.Wonters, J. and Ruys, T. (2001) “The European Union, the United

Nations and Crisis Management: The Road to Partnership,”Institute for International Law Working Paper No. 80 July.

34