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Central Asian security and cooperation: Rising China and the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization

A theoretical assessment of China’s behavior and possible intentions

Marieke Lomans

Master Politial Science: International

Relations

25-01-2015

Words: 5016

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Table of contents

1. Introduction pp.3

2. Cooperation in Central Asia: pp.4

An introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

2.1 Origins & goals of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) pp.4

2.2 China’s specific role and behavior in the SCO pp.5

3. Theoretical framework pp.7

3.1 Realist theory on China’s rise pp.7

3.2 Liberal institutionalism on China’s rise pp.9

4. Operationalization pp.11

4.1 Hypothesis pp.11

5. Analysis pp.12

6. Discussion pp.15

7. Literature pp.17

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1. Introduction

In the past two decades, China’s attitude towards multilateral institutions has changed.

Today, many scholars observe that multilateralism has enjoyed a higher profile in Chinese

foreign policy (Moore,2005). China participates in regional multilateral institutions, such as

the ASEAN, and has established institutions of its own. China’s most recent effort to develop

a multilateral framework of its own, has led to establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization in 2001. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is concerned with

economic cooperation and the creation of a security network between its member states:

Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan.

Between scholars, there is much debate on how to interpret the SCO and how to map its

intentions. There are both critics and admirers of the SCO, but much of the academic work

on the SCO is primarily sceptic. Regarding the goals of the participating parties and the goals

of the SCO as a whole, some critics argue that the establishment of the SCO might be an

anti-west balancing mechanism: “SCO nations also seek to establish what they call a “new

political and economic international order” that is “democratic, just and rational.” China and

Russia, the bloc's two leading powers, agree that such a “new order” should limit the U.S.

presence in Central Asia, which they see as their sphere of influence (VOA,2011:1)”. Many

analysts and academics portray the SCO as a mechanism that is established to balance the

US presence in the region and argue that the SCO is a geopolitical Russian-Chinese control

pad. Some even more sceptic academic classify the SCO and its structure as a new ‘Warsaw

pact’ that might be harmful to the West’s interest in Eurasia (Aris,2009:6). On top of this, an

often heard criticism against the SCO is its lack of democracy and poor advocacy for human

rights. Because of the fact that the members of the SCO do not have liberal democracies in

their nation-states, the SCO is often referred to as “an autocrats club” (Wall in Aris,2011:7).

Because of the lack of democratic governance of the member states, it is expected by many

scholars that de facto not much cooperation will take place and the system might be used as

a mechanism to conquer dissident movements (Splidsboel-Hansen in Aries, 2012:7). It is

therefore that “The SCO is a significant case study for International Relations theory, in

particular the growing literature on regionalism and regional organizations outside of the

West, as it illustrates how two major non-Western powers perceive and seek to develop a

framework for regional cooperation (Aris,2011:1).”

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This paper tries to contribute to the debate about how to interpret China’s behavior in the

SCO by connecting current observations from the works of other scholars to IR theory. By

examining their observations and testing them to theoretical assumptions, this paper

attempts to find out what IR theories would say about China’s intentions behind its work on

the SCO. The main question this paper would like to answer, is as follows:

Which theoretical approach to IR gives the best insight into the possible intentions behind

China’s behavior in the SCO?

First, this paper will elaborate on the origins of the SCO and China’s specific role and

behavior within the organizational framework. Second, in a theoretical framework, this

paper will go into detail about two grand IR theories: Structural Realism and Liberal

institutionalism. Third, this paper will derive hypotheses from the general assumptions that

these two theoretical approaches make about a state’s behavior. Fourth, in an analysis, this

paper will try to explore whether some of the assumptions made, fit with what is observed

by other scholars about China’s intentions behind its behavior in the SCO. Finally, in a

conclusion, possible findings will be discussed.

2. Cooperation in Central Asia: An introduction to the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization

2.1 Origins & goals of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The origins of the current SCO can be traced back to the year 1996 when the “Treaty on

Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions” was signed by five countries in the Eurasian

Region in Shanghai. With this groundbreaking treaty China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

and Tajikistan committed themselves to the build-up of mutual trust and stability in border

regions, and the development of cooperative relations in political, security, diplomatic,

economic, trade and other areas (Globalsecurity,2014). This group is often referred to as the

“Shanghai five.” In 2001, on the first lustrum of the early treaty, the Shanghai five admitted

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Uzbekistan into their cooperation mechanism and decided to establish a more formal

institution: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization. From that moment onwards, the SCO

“has completed its organizational transition from the earlier Shanghai Five and established a

basis for further strengthening security cooperation (Mcdermott,2012:56).”

The emergence and establishment of this organization can be explained in the light of

various geostrategic and security related considerations of the participating states. First,

regarding energy, the interests of Russia and China, the two heavyweights within the SCO,

seemed to overlap. Russia and China are partners in the energy branch and both have

interest in the natural resources of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Russian state-

led Gazprom controls the pipelines that transport energy from these former Soviet republics

and China has an interest in obtaining good energy contracts and supply security from these

recourse rich countries (Chen,2012:35; Yun & Park, 2012,63). It is therefore logical that these

energy suppliers and China work together in an organization in order to realize supply

security for China and a guaranteed access to Chinese markets for the suppliers. Second,

regarding security related issues, the establishment of the SCO is a milestone in the process

of creating stability in Eurasia according to many authors (Baizakova,2013). It is therefore

that these scholars, when studying the SCO, predominantly focus on the study of security

related issues. The presence of unstable states and regions within the region, and new

arising destabilizing forces, such as terrorism, separatism and extremism, called for a new

approach to regional security (Baizakova,2013 ;Yun and park in Aris,2005:2). As a part of the

SCO, the RATS (Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of Shanghai) was established and integrated

into the SCO structure in 2004. The RATS is a permanent secretariat of the SCO and provides

a base for the 6 current parties of the SCO for collaboration on traditional and non-

traditional security issues. The RATS, for example, both facilitates collaboration on tackling

organized crime as joint military actions and operations (Aris,2009).

2.2 China’s specific role and behavior in the SCO

The SCO should be seen as a ‘pet project’ of the Chinese state. China has put most effort in

the establishment of the organization and is committed to make good use of it

(Huasheng,2013:436). Of all the SCO member states, China specifically is making active and

skillful use of the SCO in order to foster regional integration and cooperation in the area.

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This is a part of their “Good Neighbor Policy”. China makes sure that its officials regularly

attend or organize SCO summits, meetings, and conferences (Chung,2006:6). Apart from

that, Beijing is a political and visionary frontrunner within the SCO and invests a lot in the

organization. China has, for example, completely funded the entire permanent secretariat of

the SCO (Chung,2006 11,12).

Apart from that, China is able to test its position as a leader in the development of the

region, using the SCO as a testing facility (Yuan,2010). Nevertheless, it is argued by some

scholars that China does not formally want to lead the SCO (Huasheng,2013:347). This might

seem inevitable since China has a great influence on the organization. China is a political

supporter and has taken most of the initiative in coming up with ideas and concepts. This

has been referred to as the ‘Shanghai spirit’. On top of that, China is the top contributor to

the SCO in financial terms and funds economic projects of the other member states. It is,

apart from being the most active promoter of economic cooperation within the SCO, also

regarded as the economic ‘locomotive’, as Huasheng describes it in his work.

(Huasheng,2013:348).

In order to understand what this ‘pet project’ further means to China, among others in

terms of policy and geopolitical strategy, it is important to examine the Chinese strategy

within the SCO and within the Eurasian region. China’s strategy in the process of establishing

the multilateral SCO can be summarized in a set of policy foundations: “ The development

normal and friend-neighborly relationships with newly independent (former Soviet) states;

negotiate and resolve boundary disputes with three of them—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Tajikistan; expand economic ties with these countries; and seek their cooperation in

preventing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic separatist elements from spreading

into China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (Jundu and Guangcheng in Yuan, 2010) “.

These Chinese keystones to their involvement and active role in the SCO establishment

derive from China’s Central Asian policy strategy. Apart from the establishment of the SCO,

this strategy consists of the following key areas: “border security; combating the East

Turkestan Islamic Movement; energy security; economic interests; and geo-political stability.

Despite this clear security mechanism the SCO provides for China, the SCO should not be

regarded as some sort of a military alliance, according to Beijing (Yuan,2010). Apart from this

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statement, it is obvious that the SCO is important to China because of the previously

mentioned energy security partnerships and economic cooperation within the region. Much

debate is going on between observers who argue that China’s primary interest lies in

security and those who argue that economy has the primacy. The main argument that

security has the primacy for China states that the economic cooperation within the SCO only

has a marginal contribution to the Chinese economy. This stands in sharp contrast with the

beliefs of the observers who argue economy has the primacy, because they believe that it is

only through economic cooperation that security problems within the region can be resolved

(Huasheng,2013:337). Huasheng argues that both economy and security can be a primary

interest of China since they do not necessarily exclude each other (Huasheng,2013:337).

3. Theoretical framework

One can look at the role of China in the SCO and the nature of the SCO from multiple

different IR perspectives. This paper first focusses on two general IR perspectives on the

behavior of powerful states, like China: a realist and a liberalist perspective. In the

subsequent paragraph, this paper will go in to detail about how to these two IR approaches

make assumptions about a state’s behavior.

3.1 Realist theory on China’s rise

Realism, a key theoretical approach to the study of IR can be regarded as a spectrum of

various ideas (Wohlforth 2008) which all derive from the conception that the world is an

anarchy where states try to survive by maximizing their gains in a zero-sum game (Goldstein

& Pevehouse,2008:19,20). Under this umbrella concept of realism, various schools of

thought can be stored. A modern take on the early Realist ideas of Morgenthau and Carr is

Neorealism, or Structural realism, developed by Kenneth Waltz. This Neorealism falls apart

into two streams: ‘offensive realism’ and defensive realism’ (Mearsheimer,2007). They both

have specific characteristics and both a slightly different view on the nature of China’s rise,

but have certain common denominators which will first be reviewed below.

Structural realism, which is the foundation for both ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realism, is

based on certain assumptions on the world order and the behavior of states. First, it argues

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that all states are forced to pursue power since the world order is a system where there is no

higher authority that watches over great powers, and there is no guarantee that no state will

attack another. In order strengthen itself, a state therefore tries to gain power and. Second,

the following assumptions are being made: 1) great powers are the main actors in the world,

2) and they operate in an anarchic system, 3) while they possess a certain offensive military

capability, 4) because they are uncertain about the intentions of other states, and 5) they

want to make sure that they will survive 6) by coming up with rational strategies to ensure

the prospect for survival (Meirsheimer,2007:73-75). Security is seen in this light as a zero-

sum game, which means that when one country’s security increases, another country’s

security is being jeopardized.

‘Defensive realists’ refer to this as the ‘Security dilemma’ (Feng & Ruizhuang,2006). They

argue that states rather seek security than power. In order to overcome this dilemma and

remain secure, states adopt policies that can be considered moderate. It is therefore that

defensive realists primarily classify great power states, such as China, as status-quo powers

(Rynning & Ringmose,2008). Apart from that, these ‘status-quo’ powers are likely to attempt

to minimize the security dilemma by fostering regional integration and pursue a multilateral

dialogue (Rynning,2011). However, the possibility of armed conflict is still there, according to

defensive realists (Kishner,2012:63).

The opposing school of thought, ‘offensive’ realism, differs from this perspective in the sense

that they argue that states are looking for opportunities to gain more power. They maximize

power, and their ultimate goal should be hegemony, because that is the ultimate way to

guarantee survival. John Mearsheimer is a good example of an ‘offensive realist’. His views

on the rising of states, such as the Chinese state, are somewhat pessimistic. Mearsheimer

questions whether China is able to rise peacefully and states that China is trying to counter

the US influence in the East Asian region and wants to become a regional hegemon

(Mearsheimer,2010: 381, 386,387). By becoming a regional power and hegemon, the

Chinese state is secured, because no other state will conquer the hegemon, and will seek to

prevent peer competitors from undermining their power (Kishner,2012:60). Offensive

realists thus regard states, like China, primarily as revisionist states (Rynning &

Ringmose,2008). However, the idea that powerful states such as China, want to ‘bid for

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hegemony’ is unrealistic, because the chance of survival of the state in that expedition is

marginal (Kishner,2012:61).

With regard to the existence of multilateralism, realists argue that multilateral cooperation

within institutions is merely false promises (Mearsheimer,1994). Realists believe that

institutions and multilateral organizations are reflections of the distribution of power in the

world. According to them, institutions only matter marginally, since they are not the cause of

peace, and they are based on self-interested calculations of great powers

(Mearsheimer,1994:7). States thus behave egocentric in multilateral organizations. They are

concerned about relative gains, since they regard the process of balancing power as vital to a

state’s security. A state therefore will make sure that it does better, or at least not worse,

than other states in a multilateral agreement (Mearsheimer,1994:9).

3.2 Liberal institutionalism on China’s rise

Liberal institutionalism completely opposes this view on the rise of China. In the first place,

they can be regarded as less pessimistic about whether China’s rise will be peaceful. This has

to do with the primary assumptions that liberal institutionalists make about the behavior of

states. First, they view state behavior as a game where the eventual behavior is determined

by the interplay with other states. This interplay takes place via institutions and in

organizations and states behavior is thus determined by its relation to one another (Ruggie

in Moravcsik,1997). These organizations will eventually foster cooperation and minimize

security risks (Moravcsik,1997).

Liberal institutionalists agree with Realists on the notion that states are unitary actors

rationally pursuing their self-interest within an anarchic system. They differ from realists on

the point that they do not believe this nature of the state and international system

ultimately leads to the conclusions that realists draw. Liberal institutionalists believe that

states cooperate with each other, because that is in their interest. The basis for cooperation

lies in reciprocity and creating a win-win situation. Through cooperation, mutual benefits

and gains can be achieved, and the risk that states will cheat or is taking advantage of

another state, is significantly reduced. Cooperation that leads to mutual gains is possible

when states create rules, expectations and ultimately institutions in order to promote

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cooperative behavior (Goldstein&Pevehouse,2008:54). For Liberal institutionalists, especially

economic multilateralism is vital, since it creates mutual interdependence and absolute

gains, which they regard more useful than relative gains (Mearsheimer,1994).

With regard to the rise of China, liberal institutionalists, like Snyder, argue that it is thanks to

China joining the West, reforming, and transforming from a closed door politics to an open

and partially integrated economy, that China’s rise has even been made possible

(Snyder,2013:226-228). Institutions and participation in international structures are

necessary to be successful for China. China’s rise will be a shift in terms of power transition,

but does not necessarily lead to conflict. According to Liberal institutionalist Ikenberry, it is

logical for China to integrate, because it is hard to overrun the established order. Apart from

that, it is beneficial for China to integrate in Western institutions since it provides them with

new possibilities and serves them with protection over their economic interests and

sovereignty (Ikenberry,2008:24,25,31). Liberal institutionalism also predicts that China is

going to be more active in the field of building its own institutions, such as the East Asia

Summit, in order to create economic benefits in the region and to portray itself as a reliable

and responsible partner (Goswami,2014;19). However, according to critics, this institution-

building by China does not necessarily mean that its intentions are solely noble: Major

powers create institutions and international practices to suit their interests, which could be

said to be major power practices to demonstrate their success as states. Similarly, with

internal institutions and practices, major powers aim to influence the processes of

international institutions to reflect their choices and preferences. They also dominate

international institutions in order to control the flow of information and the outcomes of

international policies. International institutions are also used to project their international

images and further their own ‘policy of prestige’ (Benjamin in Goswami,2012:21). This

suggests that it is important to study such Chinese institutions and Chinese intentions,

because it is not always clear what the Chinese state exactly wants to establish or achieve

through its newly founded institutions.

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4. Operationalization

In order to make predictions about China’s intentions behind its behavior in the SCO in the

light of IR theory, it is necessary to formulate concrete expectations. A real measurement of

China’s intentions is proven to be very difficult. A search for China’s true intentions is always

subjected to ambiguous observations and a lack of real ‘insider information’ on Chinese

politics. It is therefore that this paper wants to examine which theoretical assumptions

about a powerful state’s behavior lie closest to the observed behavior and suspected

intentions of China in the SCO.

4.1 Hypothesis

If the assumptions of realists are to be correct, then China would seek to be a regional

hegemon through the use of force and arms buildup. The SCO could then just be a façade to

hide China’s intentions and China would have no real interest in the SCO, other than

maximizing its relative gains. If China uses the SCO as a façade to hide its ambitions of

becoming a hegemon then we would have to observe that China is trying to pursue power in

the region, seeks relative gains, and is cooperating within the SCO framework because of

rational, self-interested calculations.

A hypothesis that can be derived from this is as follows:

H1. If the intentions behind China’s behavior in the SCO are in line with the theoretical

assumptions of realists, it is expected that China will try to maximize its relative gains,

merely pursues self-interest in agreements, and seeks to balance its power in the region.

If the assumptions of Liberal institutionalists are to be correct, then China would seek to

minimize security risks, view cooperation through the framework as in their- and the other’s

interest, and is making agreements and deals that are based on win-win and absolute gains.

Apart from that, it should be observed that China will attempt to foster rulemaking.

H2 If the intentions behind China’s behavior in the SCO are in line with the theoretical

assumptions of liberal institutionalists, China is pursuing absolute gains within the SCO,

seeks to shape rules and norms, and uses the SCO as a reciprocal mechanism to create

interdependence.

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5. Analysis

Between observers, authors and analysts there is much debate on the real intentions of

China, its behavior, and its motivations behind the SCO. When reviewing the literature on

China and the SCO, one strikes upon a great variety of analysis and opinions, in which some

evidence for both hypotheses can be found.

When it comes to economic cooperation, and the quest for mutual benefits and mutual

gains, there evidence that supports the argument that China is trying to foster multilateral

cooperation and mutual benefit through interdependence. Small indications can be found in

the large expenditures the Chinese state has made on SCO projects that merely benefit the

other SCO member states. The Chinese president, for example, has lobbied for a railroad and

highway infrastructure running through the Eurasian territories to improve the

infrastructure in Kazakhstan and surrounding countries. Also, China offered a $900 million

credit to the SCO member states, invests highly in Kazakhstan’s economy, and has signed an

energy agreement with Uzbekistan worth $600 million (Chung,2006). By granting these

credits and investing in these member states, the Chinese state makes itself and the

receiving states interdependent while they commit themselves to long term cooperation

(Chung,2006).

Within the SCO, China is regarded as the leader in the formulation of theoretical guidelines

for the SCO, because it has promoted concepts like the ‘the Shanghai Spirit’ and the ‘New

Outlook On Security” (Pan in Song,2013). These concepts form the basis of the SCO

institutional norms and are inspired by existing international norms, work form scholars, and

adapted to China’s domestic norms (Song,2013). By developing these concepts into norms

and guidelines, China wanted to stimulate solidarity between the SCO members states

(Aris,2009:479), because there is some belief in the mutual benefits of cooperation, shared

norms and shared interests. Many authors argue that namely these shared interests, such

as the fights against threat by Islamic radicalism, internal poverty and ethnic conflict, are

highly contributing factors in the formation and deepening of the SCO, because all member

states are affected by these problems (Song,2014).

These observations suggest that China is indeed pursuing economic cooperation and is trying

to shape a norm-based institutional framework, which is quite in line with Liberal

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Institutionalist’s assumptions. However, other authors argue that these observations are

wrong interpretations of China’s behavior. According to them, both China and the other SCO

member states are just self-interested and are not really concerned with the real,

substantive development of the SCO institutional framework: “All of the SCO member states

seek only their own interests. Any cooperation of the SCO in itself vis-à-vis surrounding states

has been limited to diplomatic words, regardless of “9-11.” ….In a sense, the SCO is a kind of

symbol of Chinese multilateral diplomacy since 1996 and China hopes to appeal to and widen

the SCO, whose name originates from a Chinese city (Akihiro,2012:260). They also argue that

“China’s main purpose with the SCO is to control energy resources in the region, rather than

combat radical Islamic and separatist” and creating a security network. (Song,2013: 667).

This basically means that China is only using the SCO as a framework in which it can make it

self-interested calculations. There are also indications that other SCO states are wary about

Beijing’s true intentions in the Eurasian region and are therefore cautious to entangle

themselves with deals and agreements (Bulkeley,2007).

Apart from that, China seems to be dominant in in the SCO, both in economic terms as in

terms of political vision (Quingguo,2007:121). Chung argues that the SCO is “an obvious tool

for enhancing Chinese power and influence in Central Asia, Beijing has every incentive to

push for the institutionalization of the organization (Chung,2006:10)”. The previously

mentioned norm and value making by China world in this sense mean that the Chinese vision

does not entail an institutional development, but is an effort to dictate the cooperation

mechanism’s member state. This is supported by the belief of most authors that the SCO is

mainly a Chinese initiative (Chung, 2006; Jia, 2007; Pan, 2009 in Song,2013). China has little

other opportunities to play as a leader in a multilateral organization in Eurasia, because the

other countries in that region already have established older multilateral mechanisms.

Therefore China has strong incentives to promote the SCO. The Eurasian region is of great

economic and resource significance for China. Song argues that the energy resources and

trade possibilities in the region are the main causes of China’s enthusiasm and that “the SCO

is primarily a Chinese attempt to promote its power and security in the region

(Song,2013:669)”. According to him, China is also using soft power to balance against others

that might have interest in the region, such as the US, because “Chinese policymakers have

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sufficient reason to be concerned about US intentions in the region and to suspect that there

is a planned US strategy of encirclement against China”(Song,2013:669).

Because China wants to keep the peace and is not looking for any confrontation, the soft

balancing takes place through joint-military exercises against terrorism, carried out by the

SCO member states. For China, these exercises, which can only be carried out through the

SCO, are a way to demonstrate the world that the SCO member states have the capabilities

of securing the region on their own and thus do not need US interference there. This view is

closely ties to the “ New Outlook On Security” norm, proposed by China, which states that a

mutual security system within that region can only be based on cooperation (Song,2013).

However, when it comes down to real achievements, neither China, nor the other SCO states

seem to aim for high goals. Apart from that, according to some, the SCO does not have a

really ambitious strategy (Song,2014). So far, the SCO has very little notable achievements in

economic and security cooperation. There are some framework agreements, but concrete

plans to implement them are not being developed. As noted before, energy security plays a

substantive role in China’s incentives to develop the SCO, but observers note that, regarding

concretization of plans, there are no substantive achievements either. Free-trade is a taboo

and security cooperation marginal, since China’s sparring partner, Russia, seems to use the

SCO only instrumentally and is not committed to functional cooperation. There is also no

consensus among the SCO members about an energy cooperation framework and in the

meanwhile, China is pursuing bilateral energy deals with the SCO member states, using the

multilateral SCO as a cover-up for bilateral agreements and contracts (Song,2014:97,98).

These last observations all merely point towards a pattern of behavior that is in line with the

assumptions realists would make about the Chinese state and the SCO. It thus becomes clear

that for both theoretical approaches some of their assumptions might be in line with the

reality of the SCO case.

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6. Discussion

Normally, one would argue that Structural realism and Liberal Institutionalism would

compete with each other. However, in the case of China and the SCO, they complement

each other since they both can reveal interesting thoughts on China’s intentions and

behavior. The benefit of using grand IR theories is that they are broadly applicable and that

they are well-structured sets of expectations. Regarding the study of a state’s behavior, they

are easy to comprehend, because they have a well-structured reasoning. However, the

problem with these theories, namely realists ones, is that they are generally inflexible when

it comes to explaining new phenomena. Apart from that, with a case like the study of Chinas

behavior it would be good to complement the grand IR theories with some more critical

schools of thought that develop China-specific models.

To conclude this paper, it should be remarked that regarding the assessment of Liberal

Institutionalism and Realism, there do not seem to be any winner in the debate between

them. There are some authors, who argue that both realist assumptions and liberal

institutional assumptions can reveal some of the Chinese intentions. Zhao, for example,

argues that “China's participation in regional economic and security cooperation is

motivated first of all by the calculation of China's domestic interests to create a peaceful

peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability, particularly its frontier

security and prosperity”(Zhao,2011). Especially because of fears about ethnic nationalism

and border conflicts, China has lost its wariness about multilateralism and cooperation

(Zhou,2011:55). Zhou further argues that China’s further regional strategy and is based on

both the realist assumption that its position should be enhanced in the management of

relations with the U.S and Japan, and the liberalist thinking that advantage must be taken of

interdependence to foster domestic economic development and stability at the borders

(Zhou,2011:58). This is an observation that implies that a synthesis between realism and

liberal institutionalism is maybe possible when looking at China’s behavior as a regional

superpower.

Both theoretical approaches thus provide some insight in China’s intentions and behavior

within the SCO, but since there is so much debate amongst observers about the SCO, it is

hard to draw strong conclusions. Some argue that the SCO is an unambitious organization

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that does not concretely establish anything, while others view at as a high potential

framework for cooperation in which China is a frontrunner and main investor. For both

hypotheses there is some evidence. However, this evidence is very thin and based on

external observations of experts, which is partially speculative. It is hard to grasp China’s

behavior and reveal its intentions since it shows such ambiguous behavior. It is, for example,

possible that China is pursuing absolute gains and is in favor of mutual benefits. But on the

other hand, China could hide its pursuit after relative gains by showing to the world that it is

constraining itself by creating regimes and institutions. Nevertheless, scholars should

continue to analyze and conceptualize China’s behavior, its intentions and its newly crafted

institutions in order to continue the debate about the rise of China.

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7. Literature

Aris, S. (2009). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation:‘Tackling the Three Evils’. A Regional

Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?. Europe-Asia

Studies, 61(3), 457-482.

Aris, S. (2011). Eurasian regionalism The Shanghai cooperation organisation / (Critical studies

of the Asia-Pacific). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Baizakova, K. (2013). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Role in Countering Threats

and Challenges to Central Asian Regional Security. Russian Politics and Law, 51(1), 59-79.

Bulkeley (2007), "The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Chinese Foreign

Policy and Strategy Toward Central Asia" IREX Silk Road Symposium 2007 Executive

Summary

Chen, X. (2012) “Central Asian Factors in Energy Relationship between China and Russia”,

Asian Social Science, 8 (7), pp. 33-39.

Chung, C. P. (2006). China and the institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization. Problems of Post-Communism, 53(5), 3-14.

Feng, L., & Ruizhuang, Z. (2006). The typologies of realism. The Chinese Journal of

International Politics, 1(1), 109-134.

Globalsecurity, (2014) Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm

Goldstein, J. S., Pevehouse, J. C., & Sernau, S. (2008). Principles of International Relations.

Pearson Longman.

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