PEACEKEEPING MODALITIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION-UNITED NATIONS(EU-UN) COOPERATION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS
V.O.S. OKEKE, [email protected]. Ph . No: 08033847373
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ANAMBRA STATE UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA
&
E.T. ANICHE, [email protected]. Ph. No: 07067554191
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIESFEDERAL UNIVERSITY OTUOKE (FUO), BAYELSA STATE, NIGERIA
Published in 2013 in:
Africa Peace Review, 11-12 (1): 1-22.
Abstract
The emerging partnership between the European Union (EU) and theUnited Nations (UN) in crisis management is clearly a desirabledevelopment. EU can contribute to the UN by providing vitalcapabilities, especially in rapid redeployment while the UN canconfer legality and legitimacy to EU operation thereby enablingthe Union to become fairly a global actor, not just economicallybut also politically. The EU’s commitment to UN peacekeeping
1
mission is truly one of foundations of the European Security andDefense Policy (ESDP). The study argues that the EU preferencefor participating in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-ledoperations impedes rather than enhances the EU-UN cooperation inconflict management.
Keywords: EU, UN, Peacekeeping, Conflict Management,Functionalism, and Neo-functionalism. Introduction
The constraints imposed by the changing and ever
demanding nature of peacekeeping have led the United Nations
(UN) to seek increased supports from regional organizations
such as the European Union (EU). Whilst the development of the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) logically led the
EU to revisit its relationship with the UN, both as a
legitimizing body and as the main peacekeeping implementer.
The convergence of these two trends has led to a genuine
inter-institutional rapprochement or EU-UN partnership to
conflict management. However, the relationship between the
European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) in the field
of conflict management has undergone major changes over the
last five years (Tardy, 2005).
The emerging partnership between the EU and the UN in
crisis management is therefore clearly a desirable
development. EU can contribute to the UN by providing vital
2
capabilities, especially in rapid redeployment while the UN
can confer legality and legitimacy to EU operations thereby
enabling the Union to become fairly a global actor, not just
economically but also politically. The EU’s commitment to UN
peacekeeping mission is truly one of foundations of the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Wonters and Ruys,
2001).
However, according to Hengari (2011) the UN Charter has
sufficient provision on Chapter VIII, Articles 52, 53 and 54
for meaningful collection and cooperation with regional
organizations. But despite the stated aims of devolving
responsibility to regional organizations in matters of
peacekeeping operation, these provisions did not find concrete
expression until after the end of the cold war. The impasse
was not just as a result of great power rivalry, but in part,
also the consequence of differing interpretations regarding
the primacy of the UN or regional organizations in the
resolution of disputes. These differences had their roots in
the then prevailing schools of thought preceding the founding
of the UN after the collapse of the Leagues of Nations.
Two schools of thought, the first represented by the
United Kingdom expressed a view in favour of regional
3
organizations becoming the bedrock of the post-war security
infrastructure, and the second represented by the United
States insisted on the primacy of UN in matters of peace and
security. The latter view prevailed when the US imposed Durban
Oak proposals formed the basis of the San Francisco Conference
in 1945. But it was Latin American countries that argued in
favour of regional security arrangements as a precondition for
accepting the UN Charter. However, there is the end of cold
war widespread acceptance for regional organizations to take
leadership in solving conflicts, and over the two decades,
there has been a greater need for regional organizations to
coordinate meaningfully with the UN as well as among one
another or between each other (Hengari, 2011).
The EU relationship with the UN, whether in opposition or
complementary is more advanced than that of any other regional
organizations. However, calls for closer cooperation do not
imply the cooperation of UN and regional organizations acting
in concert toward solving conflict in other parts of the
world. The provisions are by definition vague for a
supranational organization in general, it is the EU rather
than the UN that sets the agenda and defines the terms of the
UN-EU relationship which is characterized by a divide between
4
what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer. The EU-
UN rapprochement is being confronted with the simultaneous
reform processes of the two organizations which implies a high
degree of uncertainty surrounding both the overhaul of the UN
and the ratification of the European Constitution (July,
2005).
The EU approach to peacekeeping is closely modeled after
that of the UN, particularly as regard changing nature of
conflict that is less about sovereign borders and more about
human suffering. An independent report, that is,
Responsibility to Protect, presented to the UN suggests that
sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own
citizens from avoidable catastrophe like mass murder,
genocide, rape and starvation. But when they are unwilling to
do so, that responsibility must be borne by broader community
of states.
Here, we contend that the EU preference for participating
in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-led peacekeeping
missions impedes the EU-UN cooperation on conflict management.
Theoretical Framework
This study is essentially anchored on functionalism and neo-
functionalism of neo-liberal institutionalism. Functionalism as
5
international relations theory was formulated and developed by
David Mitrany in the aftermath of World War II. David Mitrany is
thus the proponent and chief exponent of functional theory of
international relations. Conventionally, the theory of
functionalism in international relations is thus based on the
hope that more and more common task will be delegated to such
specific functional organizations or agencies of United Nations
(UN) like World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc, and
each of these organizations will become supranational, that is
superior to its member governments in power and authority. In
this way, the World’s nations will gradually become integrated
into a single community within which war will be impossible
(Mitrany, 1948; 1966).
Classic functionalism as formulated by David Mitrany
envisaged the treatment of these international or supernatural
functions and services as technical matters, non-political in
nature and well removed from the clamour and pressures of
interest groups, nations and the masses of the population.
Classic functionalists like David Military hoped that highly
specific functional agencies would enter into direct contact with
the people they serve in each country. Their services would
somehow remain non-political, but they would win through their
6
performance both increasing elite acceptance and popular support
(Deutch, 1989; Echezona, 1998).
Similarly, Nweke (2000) posits that functionalism is not
just a theoretical formulation but a practical policy action as
well concerned with how best the world could be organized so as
the eliminate violent conflicts and wars, thereby enable great
powers and small states alike to focus on trade and development
co-operation rather than engage in divisive political and
ideological issues that evoke aggressive policies of
intervention, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and domination in
international relations. The fact remains that within the several
versions of the theory are to be found the essential kernel of
Mitrany’s new world model, namely that a progressive economic
integration would gradually eliminate sources of conflict and
build the foundation for political unification.
Rourke (1999) on his own describes functional co-operation
in the light of classical functional theory as composed of the
specialized agencies that deal with specific economic and social
problems. He further pointed out that there is expanding roles of
international governmental organization (IGOs) both in number and
on scope of activity. According to him, this is as a result of at
least three major reasons; (a) more and more common governmental
7
functions are being dealt with by IGOs (b) some of these
expanding roles are dealt with by creating new IGOs (c) the
increasing need for IGOs activity is leading existing IGOs to
take on a new functions beyond their initial roles. For example,
the scope of European Union (EU) activities is expanding beyond
its original economic focus to a wider range of political and
social concerns as well as developing an increasingly important
organizational structure.
In the same vein, other functionalists like Keohane and Nye
(cited in Burchill & Linklater, 2001) have demonstrated how
through membership of international organizations, states can
significantly broaden their conceptions of self-interest (i.e.
national interest) in order to widen the scope of co-operation
and compliance. Hence, compliance with the rules of these
organizations not only discourages the narrow pursuit of national
interests, it also weakens the meaning and appeal of state
sovereignty. Similarly, Williams (1989) states that there has
been a growing quest for greater structure as a result of the
fact that increasing political activity in the global system has
been channeled into international organizations. International
organizations have come to play a growing role in formulating
international policy. International governmental organizations
8
(IGOs), therefore, provide the framework within which
government(s) can achieve agreement about the elements of
international public policy.
Whilst, according to Okolie (2005: 202-216) “functionalism
in international relations is used to denote an approach to the
building of a supra-national community primarily through economic
integration”, hence it is closely associated with integration
theory. With the end of cold war functional theory of
international relations has staged a comeback, though not in its
orthodox or classical form as it has been re-interpreted and
refined since it was originally formulated by David Mitrany.
There is this tendency for scholars, especially from the West, to
anchor studies on regional (economic) integration on neo-
functionalism. Functionalism, neo-functionalism,
intergovernmentalism and complex interdependence theory are all
variants of neo-liberal institutionalism or theories of
integration which generally hold that in the midst of anarchy or
absence of overarching/supranational institutions, there is
cooperation in international system and order is facilitated
through international institutions, norms and regimes. The result
of this would be shifting upward of sovereignty from state to
regional or global level facilitated by merger of several states
9
into single state or ultimately a single world government or a
process by which supranational institutions replace national ones
in the long-run (Burchill & Linklater, 2005; Nweke, 2000;
Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008).
Neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas unlike functionalism of
David Mitrany is non-normative and describes or explains the
process of regional integration base on empirical data. Aside
being empirical, neo-functionalism unlike functional theory does
not focus primarily on global integration rather its primary
concern is on regional integration. In other words, functionalism
and neo-functionalism are both theories of supranationalism, but
while the former emphasizes global supranationalism, the latter
reifies regional supranationalism (Echezona, 1998; Burchill &
Linklater, 2005). Neo-functionalism is a theory of regional
integration in which integration is considered to be inevitable
process, rather than a desirable state of affairs that could be
introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the
involved states.
There are three main principles of neo-functionalism; (i)
the principle of positive spillover effects states that
integration between states in one sector, that is, economic
sector will eventually ramify into integration or co-operation in
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other sectors such as political, socio-cultural, security, etc.
(ii) the mechanism of a transfer in domestic allegiance which
assumes that as the process of integration gathers momentum in an
increasingly pluralistic domestic society of each state, interest
groups and other associations will transfer their allegiance or
loyalty away from national institutions towards the supranational
institution(s) when they begin to realize that their material
interests or well being can be better pursued through
supranational institution(s) than the pre-existing national
institutions; and (iii) principle of technocratic automaticity
which states that as integration hastens the supranational
institution(s) will take the lead in fostering further
integration as they become more powerful and more autonomous of
the member states (Haas, 1970; Echezona, 1998).
It is instructive to state here that these three main
principles of neo-functionalism embody John Galtung’s Staircase
Hypothesis/Strategy which involves the process of beginning with
limited domain (or memberships) and limited scope (or sectors or
area of cooperation) and gradually deepening the scope before
extending the domain. Deepening the scope means moving from the
initial areas of cooperation to other areas of cooperation or
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bringing in new sectors, whereas, extending the domain means
admitting new memberships.
While functionalism helps us to explain the roles of the
United Nations (UN) in conflict prevention, management and
resolution as well as post-conflict reconstruction and
reconciliation; neo-functionalism enables to explain the roles of
the European Union (EU) in conflict prevention, management and
resolution, particularly conflict management. Thus, functionalism
and neo-functionalism are suitable for explaining EU-UN
cooperation or partnership in conflict management in form of
peacekeeping missions or operations in conflict regions.
The United Nations (UN) and Conflict Management
The Charter of the United Nations (UN) gives the Security
Council the power and responsibility to take collective actions
to maintain international peace and security. As a result, the
international community usually depends on the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) to authorize peacekeeping operation. Most
of these operations are established and implemented by the UN
itself with troops serving under UN operation command. In other
cases, where direct UN involvement is not considered appropriate
or feasible, the UNSC authorizes regional organizations such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic
12
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union
(EU) or coalition of willing countries to implement certain
peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki, retrieved on 28/08/2011).
For example, the EU approach to peacekeeping is closely
modeled on that of the UN, particularly as it has conformed to
the changing nature of conflict that is less about sovereign
borders and more about human suffering. An independent report,
that is, Responsibility to Protect, presented to the UN suggests
that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own
citizens from mass murder, rape, genocide, starvation, but when
they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must
be borne by the broader community of states. The UN with its
universal mandate and legitimacy is uniquely placed to advance
global solutions to common challenges. The UN peacekeeping
missions have more than doubled in number compared to the
organization’s first forty years, and the EU has followed the
lead (http://www.eurunion.org/news/eunewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping,
retrieved on 28/08/2011)
Consequently, Tardy (2005) writes that through its Security
Council, the UN is the legalizing and legitimizing body for peace
operations and the only organizational that can authorize the use
13
of force in international relations. But despite its
establishment in 1945, the UN was not involved in peacekeeping
operations until 1948, just three years of its establishment. In
other words the first UN involvement in peacekeeping mission
known as First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was
between 1948 and 1967 in Egyptian-Israeli Wars which include Suez
crisis and Six-Day War. The UN has till date been involved in
over 68 peacekeeping missions globally of which 52 of the
missions had been completed, while 16 peacekeeping missions are
currently deployed. Out of the 52 peacekeeping missions
completed, 20 were in Africa making a total of 28 UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa alone. The modern peacekeeping therefore
dates back to 1948 at the launch of the first United Nations
Mission, that is, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO),
which still operates in the Middle East today. For instance,
according to Tardy (2005:49-68):
14
With 16 missions as at March 2005, and around67,000 military personnel and civilian policedeployed, the UN counts more people inpeacekeeping operations than all regional andsub-regional organizations put together. Such alevel of deployment, combined with the
For details of the UN current deployment of peacekeeping
missions in different regions of the World see Table 1 below.
Table 1: The UN Current Deployment of Peacekeeping Missions
S/
No
Year Name of Operation Location Conflicts
1. 1948 United Nations Truce
Supervision
Organization (UNTSO)
Middle
East
Monitors the
various
ceasefires and
assists UNDOF and
UNIFIL2. 1949 United Nations
Military Observer
Group in India and
Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
Kashmir,
Pakistan
Indo-Pakistan War
of 1947
3. 1964 United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP)
Cyprus Cyprus Dispute
4. 1974 United Nations
Disengagement
Observer Force
(UNDOF)
Golan
Heights
Agreed withdrawal
by Syrian and
Israel forces
5. 1978 United Nations Lebanon Israel invasion
15
Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNFIL)
of Lebanon and
2006 Israel-
Lebanon conflict6. 1991 United Nations
Mission for the
Referendum in Western
Sahara (MINURSO)
Western
Sahara
Moroccan
occupation of
Western Sahara
7. 1999 United Nations
Interim
Administration
Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK)
Kosovo Kosovo War
8. 2003 United Nations
Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL)
Liberia Second Liberia
Civil War
9. 2003 United Nations
Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA)
Afghanist
an
War in
Afghanistan
10. 2004 United Nations
Operation in Cote
d’Ivoire (UNOCI)
Cote
d’Ivorie
Civil War in Cote
d’Ivorie
11. 2004 United Nations Haiti 2004 Haiti
16
Stabilization Mission
in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
rebellion
12. 2005 United Nations
Mission in the Sudan
(UNMIS)
Sudan Second Sudanese
Civil War
13. 2006 United Nations
Integrated Mission in
Timor-Teste (UNMIT)
East
Timor
2006 East Timor
Crisis
14. 2007 United
Nations/African Union
Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID)
Sudan Darfur Conflict
15. 2010 United Nations
Organization
Stabilization Mission
in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
(MONUSCO)
Congo Second Congo War
16. 2011 United Nations
Interim Security
Force for Abyei
(UNISFA)
Sudan South Kordofan
conflict
17
17. 2011 United Nations
Mission in the
Republic of South
Sudan (UNMISS)
South
Sudan
Second Sudanese
Civil War
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_peacekeeping missions,retrieved on 28/08/2011.
The European Union (EU) and Conflict Management
Right from its formation, the European Union has been
engaged in crisis management and conflict prevention conceived as
a means to end war in Europe through institutional integration
and a voluntary pooling of sovereignty. The EU today continues
to strive for peace, security and prosperity across the European
continent, and even beyond. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been
developing a credible foreign and security policy designed to
contribute meaningfully to peacekeeping through international
crisis management operations around the globe. The EU and its 27
member states together with the United Nations and others
involved in peacekeeping are currently engaged in innovative
mission to secure, maintain and build peace throughout the world
(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved
on 28/08/2011).
18
Thus, the European Union strives for stability, security and
prosperity at home and in its relation abroad by supporting a
sustainable peace as the first step in meeting these objectives
as well as in ensuring that states emerging from conflict can
rebuild their democratic institutions and rejoin the comity of
nations as active, functioning states. Consequently, the EU
launched its first military peacekeeping operations under
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Concordia, on March
31, 2003 at the explicit request of the FYROM government. The aim
was to contribute to a stable, secure environment, and to support
implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement which
ended hostilities between armed ethnic Albania groups and the
country’s security forces
(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eurnewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved
on 28/08/2011).
It is, therefore, not by accident that the EU’s earliest
peacekeeping activities were in Europe’s own backyard, in the
Western Balkans when war broke out in the former Yugoslavia. The
EU without a formalized intervention capacity tried
unsuccessfully to broker a diplomatic settlement but could only
intervene as part of UN peacekeeping efforts, and subsequently,
under US leadership as part of a NATO force. The EU Concordia’s
19
250 lightly armed military personnel that took over from NATO,
however, helped former Yugoslavia (FYROM) to become a peaceful
and democratic country where an international security presence
is no longer needed. Concordia was completed on December 15, 2003
and was succeeded by an EU-led police mission, Proxima
(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletter/EUFocus-peacekeeping, retrieved on
28/08/2011).
Perhaps the best example of EU’s comprehensive approach to
peacekeeping can be found in the Western Balkans where countries
that were mired in devastating conflict in the early 1990’s are
now at various stages on the road to EU membership. European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military operations in both
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) have contributed to a safe, secure environment,
supported by police missions that shared expertise and best
practices to develop a professional effective police force. The
missions in Western Balkans demonstrate the strong emphasis that
the EU places on its political autonomy which makes it to somehow
distance itself from the UN. For example, obtaining a UN mandate
for ESDP operations does not appear to be a requirement as long
as these operations are deployed in Europe with the consent of
host state and are of a non-coercive or a civilian nature. Other
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examples of operations not created by UNSC resolution in Europe
include EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while
outside Europe, the three civilian operations in Georgia (EUJUST
THEMIS), Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA) and Iraq (EUJUST LEX) are good
examples (Tardy, 2005).
From the Western Balkans to Africa, from West Asia to
Southeast Asia and beyond, the EU’s ESDP missions have helped
saves lives, protect the vulnerable and achieve greater
stability. Ranging from military actions to police and role of
law operations, EU missions are deployed autonomously or to
complement those of the UN, NATO, and the Africa Union (AU). EU
member states also contribute force to other international
peacekeeping activities. The European Security Strategy (ESS)
adopted in December 2003 presents the EU vision of a stronger
international society based on well functioning international
institutions and a role based international order, the military
crisis management operations do not depend upon a standing EU
army but rather on troops drawn from dedicated national forces.
The initial goal was for member states to be able to
cooperatively deploy a force of up to 60,000 within 60 days, and
sustain the deployment for up to one year. To address the current
and future need for more rapid deployments, the EU augmented its
21
military capabilities by developing 13 battle groups, which will
be in service by 2010. Each battle group consists of
approximately 1,500 troops that can be deployed within 15 days
for up to four months, either as a stand-alone force or as an
advanced force preparing for a large multinational peacekeeping
effort. The two battle groups are already permanently on standby
for six-month periods, providing the capacity to undertake two
concurrent rapid-respond operations. The member states
contributions to the required troop commitments have been
confirmed through the first half of 2011. Future military needs
will be coordinated by the EU’s European Defense Agency, which is
charged with improving European defense capabilities in the field
of crisis management and sustaining the ESDP now and in the
future. Since 2003, the EU has also managed the African Peace
Facility (APF), designed to provide the AU and other regional
organizations with the resources to mount effective peacekeeping
operations. From its starts through 2010, the EU is providing
more than 550 million euro in funding for the APF
(http://www.eurunion.org/News/eurnewsletters/ EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved
on 28/08/2011). For details on EU peacekeeping military
operations see Table 2 below:
22
Table 2: The EU Peacekeeping Military Operations Year Mission Name Country Contingen
ts
Role
2003 EUFOR
Concordia
Former
Yugoslavia
Republic of
Macedonia
(FYROM)
350
troops
Supported the
implementation of
the August 2001
Ohrid Framework
Agreement ending
hostilities between
armed ethnic
Albania groups and
FYROM security
forces. 2003 EUFOR
Artemis
Democratic
Republic of
Congo (DRC)
1,800
troops
Helped the UN
Mission in DRC
(MONUC) stabilize
the security
conditions and
improved the
humanitarian
condition in Bunia2004 EUFOR Althea Bosnia and 2,500 Ensures compliance
23
Herzegovina
(BiH)
troops with the 1995
Dayton Peace
Accord, provides
deterrence against
future conflict and
enhances security
and public safety. 2006 EUFOR DR
Congo
Democratic
Republic of
Congo (DRC)
2,300
troops
Assisted the UN
Mission in DR Congo
(MONUC) in securing
the region during
the historic
electoral process
in 2006.2008
-
2009
EUFOR
Chad/Central
African
Republic
(CAR)
Chad/Central
African
Republic
(CAR)
3,700
troops
Contributes to a
wider international
and
multidimensional
presence under UN
auspices.Source: http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/Eufocus-Peacekeeping,
Retrieved on 28/08/2011.
24
The EU-UN Cooperation and Conflict Management
The EU member states are attached to the centrality and
legitimizing power of the UN Security Council, and EU as such has
gained some political clout within UN bodies beyond the role
played by the Commission in economic and development affairs. At
the financial level, the EU states’ shares of the UN regular and
peacekeeping budgets are very high with respectively 37.75
percent and 39 percent. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (EUPM) and Operation Artemis in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) constituted real tests for the EU-UN
relationship. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the EU
took over the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) with the
objective of ensuring a smooth transition from UN to EU
responsibility (Tardy, 2005).
Tardy (2005) notes that the EU involvement in the DRC was of
a fundamentally different nature such that in the summer of 2003,
the EU conducted its first autonomous military operation in the
Northeastern part of the DRC, that is, Ituri city of Bunia. This
occurred at the request of the UN, under a UN mandate, and as a
temporary endeavour eventually taken over by a reinforced
component of the UN operation, that is, MONUC, Ituri Task Force.
EU and UN activities were therefore intimately linked throughout
25
the planning and the deployment of the operation. Operation
Artemis, officially called Interim Emergency Multinational Force
(IEMF), was formally created by UNSC Resolution 1484 of May 30,
2003 and by the Council Joint Action of June 5, 2003. The
Security Council resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and authorized the member states participating in the
force to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate. The
UNSC formally created the force, but subcontracted its
implementation to the EU with no subordination of any sort
between the two institutions. The UNSC only requested the
leadership of the force to report regularly to the Council
through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of its
mandate.
Tardy (2005) further asserts that notwithstanding the
shortcoming of EU-UN cooperation as shown by operation Artemis,
it constituted a major breakthrough in relations between the two
institutions by forcing them to work together, and therefore to
become better acquainted. Also, Operation Artemis brought
institutionalization of EU-UN cooperation a step further with the
signature on September 24, 2003 of the Joint Declaration on EU-UN
cooperation on crisis management by the UN Secretary-General and
the EU presidency. The declaration took note of the recent
26
developments in EU-UN cooperation and identified four areas where
further cooperation could be explored such as planning, training,
communication and best practices. A joint consultative mechanism
named Steering Committee was establish at working level to
enhance coordination in these four areas and to follow through
with the implementation of the Joint Declaration. Since September
2003, the Steering Committee has met twice a year and points of
contact have been established or developed at different levels of
the two secretariats as work has been conducted on training
standards and modules. The UN personnel have participated in EU
training courses; and a continued dialogue on planning and EU-UN
operation cooperation has taken place, as in the EU-UN exercise
of April 2005.
However, Tardy (2005) has identified since main modalities
of EU-UN cooperation revolving around the degree of involvement
of the EU in a given conflict management activity, be it UN-led
or UN-mandated; and lay emphasis on the following three factors,
the nature of the conflict management activity, that is, military
or civilian, the sequence of EU and UN deployments, that is,
simultaneously or subsequently, and the degree of EU and UN
member states assets’ deployment within a UN operation. The six
modalities include the clearing house process, the stand-alone
27
model, the bridging model, the take-over process, the standby
model, and the modular approach.
The clearing house process involves coordination of national
contributions to UN-led operation through a framework by which
member states could on voluntary basis exchange information on
their contribution to a given UN operation. The stand-alone
model, preferred by the EU, involves conducting operation under a
UN-mandate by the EU at the request of the UN or as an EU
initiative, which when created would have no link with the UN
structure. EU acts as a sub-contractor of the UN or the UN acts
only as the mandating body of the EU such as in operation Althea
in BiH. The bridging model represents a situation or corresponds
to a new trend in peace operations by which regional
organizations, like EU, deploy first to a crisis zone for a
limited period before the UN takes over for a longer term. The
take-over process is a situation where EU takes over peacekeeping
mission from UN. It reflects a situation where EU takes over UN
peacekeeping operation or UN handing over peacekeeping mission to
EU. The stand-by model involves reserving peacekeeping forces
provided by EU as back up to support the UN operation in a
situation where an EU operation is deployed simultaneously with a
UN operation. The modular approach of a possible EU-UN
28
cooperation is one in which the EU would contribute to an UN
operation by providing one component to the operation which is
otherwise, UN-led. This approach is favoured by the UN but
resented by the EU.
Consequently, while EU member states are major contributors
to UN-mandated peace operations, they contribute very little to
UN-led operations. For example, as of March 2005, EU member
states accounted for 6.52 percent of UN troops, a percentage that
decreases to 2.24 percent for UN operations in Africa, the
continent where peacekeeping needs are by far the greatest. For
well known political and military reasons with origins in the UN
peacekeeping records of early 1990s, Western states in general
have become reluctant to participate in UN-led operations, and
have over the last ten years favoured regional organizations like
EU and NATO, or coalition of states for their crisis management
activities. Also, the general reticence of the European states to
place troops under UN command, in addition to their skepticisms
about the reliability of the UN structure in general, are
concerns that are echoed within the EU itself and its politico-
military structure, and that both negatively impact on the EU-UN
relationship as the key principle of the EU decision-making
autonomy makes subordination to the UN difficult (Tardy, 2005).
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The general absence of European states from UN-led
operations has to be compared with their presence in UN-mandated
operations. This present a situation where UN-led operation is
relatively poor, ill-equipped and with weak political backing,
whereas the ones led by coalition of states or regional
organizations are politically and militarily better supported. In
relative terms, though, the EU is the regional organizations that
have gone the furthest in its relationship with the UN, and it is
as well the one that offers the most promising perspectives of
cooperation at both the military and civilian levels. The UN
welcomes the EU’s efforts and is willing to take advantage of the
EU crisis management policy. Yet the UN aspires to include such a
policy as much as possible into its broader framework and calls
for a more direct EU participation in UN-led peacekeeping
operations.
However, over the last past five years, the EU has
significantly increased its operational contribution to
international crisis management through autonomous and UN
Security Council mandated ESDP operations in countries such as
the DRC, Chad/CAR and the Western Balkans. The EU helps lessen
the burden on UN peacekeeping capacities that are stretched close
to the limit. According to the European Security Strategy (ESS)
30
strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its
responsibilities and to act effectively are European Union top
priorities. The EU is one of the most significant donors to the
UN operations, funding almost 40 percent of the UN budget, 20
percent of UN operation and approximately half of the UN member
states’ contributions to the organization’s funds and programmes
(http://www.eurunion.org/news/eunewsletters/EUFocus-Peacekeeping, retrieved
on 28/09/2011).
Thus, we conclude that the EU preference for participating
in UN-mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-led operations impedes
rather than enhances the EU-UN cooperation in conflict
management. This is because the European Union (EU) favours the
stand-alone model and resents the modular approach, while United
Nations (UN) prefers modular approach.
Conclusion and Recommendation
In the course of this study therefore we arrived at the
conclusion that the EU preference for participating in UN-
mandated peacekeeping missions to UN-led peacekeeping missions
impedes rather than enhances the EU-UN cooperation on conflict
management. We noted that this is because the European Union(EU) favours the stand-alone model and resents the modular
approach, while United Nations (UN) prefers modular approach. On
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the basis of this conclusion, we recommend that the European
Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) should work out an
acceptable modality for cooperating in both UN-mandated and UN-
led peacekeeping missions in order to synergize in conflict
management.
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