"Why Porphyry wrote Aristotelian Commentaries?", in B. Strobel (ed.), Die Kunst der philosophischen...

Forthcoming in B. Strobel (ed.), Die Kunst der philosophischen Exegese bei den antiken Platon-und Aristoteles Kommentatoren, Berlin/N.York 2014 (De Gruyter)

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George Karamanolis

Why did Porphyry write Aristotelian Commentaries?

I. Introduction

Porphyry made a name in antiquity for his commentaries on Aristotle. Boethius, who

set out to write a number of such commentaries,1 speaks of him as a great authority in

this respect2 and depends heavily on him. Later Platonists are clearly dependent on

Porphyry in their Aristotelian commentaries.3 This is particularly the case with regard

to Aristotle’s Categories. The relevant commentaries of Iamblichus, Dexippus,

Ammonius, and Simplicius are significantly indebted to Porphyry both on their

overall interpretative stance towards Aristotle’s treatise as well as on several

individual points of interpretation, although their authors rarely acknowledge their

extensive debts. Their dependence on Porphyry, however, does not amounts to full

agreement with his interpretation. In the case of Iamblichus, for instance, we notice a

number of critical divergences from Porphyry’s views.4 Such disagreements,

* The paper has benefited from the questions and the remarks of the participants of the conference. I am particularly grateful to Chris Noble for a set of critical remarks that helped me think some issues over and explain more. I am also indebted to Benedikt Strobel for his editorial care and for organizing a superb conference. 1 Boethius, De Interpretatione 2.14.19; see A. Kappelmacher, ‘Der schriftstellerische Plan des Boethius’, Wiener Studien 46 (1928), 215–25, H. Shiel, ‘Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1980, 349–72, S. Ebbessen, ‘Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator’, ibid. 373–92, and more recently T. Suto, Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic, Leiden 2012, esp. 233-236. 2 Porphyry is said to be gravissimus vir auctoritatis (Boethius, De syllogismo categorico 814C-816C; Porphyry fr. 113 Smith). 3 On Boethius’ dependence on Porphyry, see P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, Berlin/N. York 1973, vol. I, 120-130 and more thoroughly S. Ebbessen, ‘Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1980, 373-392. 4 See M. Griffin, ‘What has Aristotelian Dialectic to offer a Neoplatonist? A possible sample of Iamblichus at Simplicius On the Categories 12.10-13.12’, International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 6 (2012), 173-185. For an ample discussion of the differences between Porphyry and


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however, highlight even more the canonical role of Porphyry’s commentary, because

it transpires that the latter in one way or another served as the starting point for all

subsequent Platonist treatments of the Categories.5 The fortune of the Isagoge on the

other hand leaves no room for doubt about Porphyry’s impact as an Aristotelian

exegete.6 The Isagoge soon attracted several commentaries by fellow Platonists,

which indicates that it had become a standard introductory text to Aristotle’s

philosophy.7 It is no surprise, then, that the medieval Arabic tradition knows Porphyry

primarily in his capacity as an Aristotelian exegete (Ibn Al-Nadim, frs. 3a-e Smith).

Ancient and medieval philosophers appreciate a side of Porphyry which was clearly

important. But the question is why Porphyry invested some much of his philosophical

energy in Aristotelian exegesis. This is the question I would like to pursue.

Modern scholarship has not failed to appreciate Porphyry’s importance in the

Aristotelian exegetical tradition. It has long been claimed, with good reason, that the

tide of interpretation of Aristotle and especially of the Categories changes with

Porphyry in the Platonist camp.8 Indeed, Porphyry offers an interpretation that fends

off earlier Platonist objections to the effect that the doctrine of the Categories is at

odds with Plato’s metaphysical views and especially with Plato’s doctrine of

substance. Quite importantly, the tradition of Platonist critics of Aristotle’s Iamblichus on the understanding of the Categories see D. Taormina, Jamblique critique de Plotin et de Porphyre. Quattre études, Paris 1999. 5 Iamblichus’ dependence on Porphyry’s exegesis is attested by Simplicius, In Cat. 2.9-15. Dexippus follows Iamblichus (Simplicius, In Cat. 2.25-29) and Simplicius follows Iamblichus, as the following evidence suggests (Simplicius, In Cat. 61.19-62.6, 99.4-9, 106.28-107.4, 130.8-19). See further J. Dillon, Dexippus On Aristotle’s Categories, Ithaca 1990, 12. 6 There is some discussion regarding the subject matter and scope of the Isagoge. See J. Barnes, Porphyry Isagoge, Oxford 2003 and the review by R. Chiaradonna, ‘What is Porphyry’s Isagoge’, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 19 (2008), 1–30. 7 There are three extant commentaries of Porphyry’s Isagoge, those of Ammonius, Elias, and David. Both Elias and David claim that the Isagoge is useful for understanding philosophy as a whole (Elias, In Isag. 36.20-24, David, In Isag. 96.24-25). 8 See R. Sorabji, ‘The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle’, in Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, London 1980, 1-30 at 2, St. Ebbessen, ‘Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic: A Reconstruction’, in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Tranformed, op. cit., 141-171 esp. 141-143 and S. Strange, ‘Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the Categories’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987), 955-974.


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Categories includes Plotinus, who discusses Aristotle’s relevant views in Enneads

VI.1-3. To put it mildly, Porphyry appears to maintain that these Platonist criticisms

should not prevent us from appreciating the Categories because these criticisms

spring from a strictly ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, which in

Porphyry’s view does not do justice to its subject matter.9 According to Porphyry,

Aristotle’s subject matter in the Categories is words that signify, not kinds of being.

As I will explain later, this does not mean that Porphyry denies the ontological

implications of the Categories, but he does not think that its character is primarily

ontological. Porphyry’s interpretation of the Categories has been debated

significantly in the last two decades. I have sided with those who defend the view that

Porphyry gently but firmly departs from the earlier Platonist tradition and approaches

the Categories from a point of view that is new among Platonists.10 In a paper

published in 2004 I have gone a little further than that.11 I have argued that Porphyry

was the Platonist who initiated the charitable and systematic exegetical engagement

with Aristotle, being the first Platonist to write commentaries on Aristotle’s works,

that is commentaries of the kind Peripatetics such as Andronicus, Boethus, and

Alexander, had written.

I have adduced a number of arguments in support of this idea. Crucial as a

starting point is the evidence of Simplicius in the preface to his commentary on the

9 See S. Strange, ‘Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the Categories’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987), 955-974, R. Chiaradonna, ‘L’interpretazione della sostanza in Porfirio’, Elenchos 17 (1996), 55–94, idem, ‘Essence et prédication chez Porphyre et Plotin’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 82 (1996), 577–606. On the other hand the essential identity of Plotinus and Porphyry on the Categories is maintained especially by F. de Haas, ‘Did Plotinus and Porphyry disagree on Aristotle's Categories?’, Phronesis 46 (2001), 492-526. 10 See G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford 2006, 308-322. 11 G. Karamanolis, ‘Porphyry, the first Platonist Commentator of Aristotle’, in P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, M. Stone (ed.), Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, vols. 83.1-2), London 2004, vol. 1, 79-113.


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Categories (In Cat. 1.9-2.9).12 Simplicius reviews the exegetical tradition on the

Categories and he distinguishes, roughly speaking, three classes of writings: a)

exegetical treatises and short commentaries like those of Themistius, Porphyry’s short

commentary and the commentaries of Alexander and Herminus; b) questions

(ἀπορίαι) and objections (ἐνστάσεις) of Platonists such as Lucius and Nicostratus as

well as Plotinus’ critical examinations (ἐξετάσεις) in Enneads VI.1-3. Finally,

Simplicius singles out c) Porphyry’s ‘complete exegesis’ (ἐξήγησις ἐντελῆς; In Cat.

1.18) by which he refers to Porphyry’s long commentary Ad Gedaleium. The

evidence of Simplicius is important in that it suggests that the literary form of one’s

engagement with the Categories largely depends on one’s perception of, and attitude

to, the philosophical content of Aristotle’s work. The character of the writings of

Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus, for instance, is determined by their critical stance to

the doctrine of the Categories, as they understand it. And this, as far as we can tell, is

confirmed by the available evidence from their works.13 Τhe writing of commentaries

12 Πολλοὶ πολλὰς κατεβάλοντο φροντίδας εἰς τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίον, οὐ µόνον ὅτι προοίµιόν ἐστι τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας (εἴπερ αὐτὸ µὲν τῆς λογικῆς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ πραγµατείας, ἡ δὲ λογικὴ τῆς (5) ὅλης προλαµβάνεται δικαίως φιλοσοφίας), ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ περὶ ἀρχῶν ἐστι τῶν πρώτων, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ µαθησόµεθα λόγοις ἄλλοι δὲ κατ’ ἄλλην ὁρµὴν τὰς περὶ τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον πραγµατείας πεποίηνται, οἱ µὲν αὐτὴν µόνην τὴν λέξιν ἐπὶ τὸ σαφέστερον µεταθεῖναι προθυµηθέντες, ὥσπερ Θεµίστιός τε ὁ εὐφραδὴς καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτος, οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας (10) µέν, αὐτὰς δὲ µόνας ψιλὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους προτεινοµένας συντόµως ἀποκαλύπτειν ἐσπούδασαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν βιβλίῳ πεποίηκεν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἄλλοι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ζητηµάτων ἐφήψαντο µετρίως, ὡς ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Ἑρµῖνος καὶ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι, ὧν καὶ Μάξιµον ἐγὼ τίθηµι, τὸν Αἰδεσίου µὲν τοῦ Ἰαµβλιχείου µαθητήν, ἐν (15) δὲ τῷ εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ὑποµνήµατι πάντα σχεδὸν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνᾴσαντα· τινὲς µέντοι καὶ βαθυτέραις περὶ αὐτὸ διανοίαις κατεχρήσαντο, ὥσπερ ὁ θαυµάσιος Βόηθος. ἄλλοις δὲ ἤρεσεν ἀπορίας µόνας γράψαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόµενα, ὅπερ Λούκιός τε πεποίηκε καὶ µετ’ αὐτὸν Νικόστρατος τὰ τοῦ Λουκίου ὑποβαλλόµενος, σχεδόν τι πρὸς πάντα τὰ εἰρηµένα κατὰ τὸ βιβλίον ἐνστάσεις κοµίζειν φιλοτιµούµενοι, καὶ οὐδὲ εὐλαβῶς, ἀλλὰ καταφορικῶς µᾶλλον καὶ ἀπηρυθριακότως· πλὴν καὶ τούτοις χάρις, καὶ ὅτι πραγµατειώδεις τὰς (2.) πολλὰς τῶν ἀποριῶν προεβάλοντο καὶ ὅτι λύσεώς τε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἀφορµὰς καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν θεωρηµάτων τοῖς µεθ’ ἑαυτοὺς ἐνδεδώκασι. Πλωτῖνος δὲ ὁ µέγας ἐπὶ τούτοις τὰς πραγµατειωδεστάτας ἐξετάσεις ἐν τρισὶν ὅλοις βιβλίοις τοῖς Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος ἐπιγεγραµµένοις τῷ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίῳ προσήγαγε. µετὰ δὲ τούτους ὁ πάντων ἡµῖν τῶν (5) καλῶν αἴτιος Πορφύριος ἐξήγησίν τε ἐντελῆ τοῦ βιβλίου καὶ τῶν ἐνστάσεων πασῶν λύσεις οὐκ ἀπόνως ἐν ἑπτὰ βιβλίοις ἐποιήσατο τοῖς Γεδαλείῳ προσφωνηθεῖσι, πολλὰ καὶ τῶν Στωικῶν ἐκεῖ δογµάτων κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τοῦ λόγου προσιστορῶν. (Simplicius, In Cat. 1.1-2.9) 13 The evidence about Lucius and Nicostratus has been collected and discussed by A. Gioé, Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo d.C. Testimonianze e frammenti, Naples 2002. See also the classical article


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on the part of Peripatetics like Alexander, Herminus, and even Themistius is

motivated by their commitment to Aristotle’s doctrine in the Categories. Porphyry’s

writing of commentaries, which is of two kinds, short and long, must be, I argued,

analogously motivated by a positive evaluation of Aristotle’s doctrine.

This is not surprising. As always with philosophers in antiquity, their choice

of a literary form is tightly related to philosophical content and is in itself

philosophically suggestive. This is the case also with the ancient philosophical

commentary; it is not a neutral literary form. It rather is a form that implies a didactic

character, which means that the source text was being taught either in a school context

or was studied by someone privately and asked for tutorial help. This character is

philosophically significant, because it indicates the commentator’s commitment to the

major tenets of the source text and his appreciation of its philosophical value. This of

course is the result of a certain interpretation. It is this interpretation that determines

the form in which the interpretation will be outlined and not the other way round. The

writing of a commentary does not allow for any kind of interpretation but is rather

dictated by a certain kind of interpretation, that is, one favorable to the assumed

doctrine of the commented text. There was still much room for differentation within

this kind of exegesis, as the commentaries of later Platonists show. This, I suggested,

is a kind of exegesis of Aristotle that was first launched by Porphyry among

Platonists. And this happened as the result of Porphyry’s new appreciation of

Aristotle.

Now the available evidence shows that Porphyry invested considerable time

and energy on the Aristotelian exegesis. Apart from his two commentaries on the

Categories, a short one by question and answer, extant today, and a longer one in of K. Praechter, ‘Nikostratos der Platoniker’, Hermes 57 (1922), 481-517 (consulted in the reprint in K. Praechter, Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim 1973, 101-137). The critical tradition to Aristotle’s Categories is reviewed also by P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, Berlin 1984, vol. 2, 509-601.


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seven books, of which we have only testimonies in Simplicius (frs. 45-74 Smith),14

Porphyry also wrote a commentary on the first four books of the Physics, also

excerpted by Simplicius, a commentary On Interpretation, that was used by Boethius

in his own commentary, while we have evidence of Porphyry’s engagement with the

Prior Analytics, the Sophistical Refutations, the Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics

Lambda. Recently Michael Chase, on the basis of evidence from Arabic sources, has

made the case that Porphyry also wrote a commentary on the Posterior Analytics.15

Porphyry’s engagement with these works of Aristotle is undeniable. The existing

evidence, however, is not conclusive as to the form of Porphyry’s engagement with

those works. It is unclear whether Porphyry wrote commentaries on all these works.

The writing of commentaries seems more likely to be the case for some of the above-

mentioned works of Aristotle. Boethius probably did use a Porphyrian commentary

on the Prior Analytics in his De syllogismo categorico16 and also one on De

interpretatione.17 Still, though, given the state of the evidence, it is difficult to reach

definite conclusions about the nature, the extent, and the scope of such Porphyrian

commentaries.

The crucial question to ask now is why Porphyry wrote all these commentaries

on Aristotle’s works. I said earlier that the literary form of the later ancient

philosophical commentary is shaped by its didactic purposes. If I am right about that,

14 Recently an unknown commentary on the Categories has been discovered in the celebrated Archimedes Palimpsest, which is arguably part of Porphyry’s long commentary on the Categories. See R. Chiaradonna, M. Rashed and D. Sedley, “A Rediscovered Categories Commentary”, OSAP 44 (2013), 129-194. 15 M. Chase, ‘Did Porphyry write a commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics? Albertus Magnus, al-Farabi, and Porphyry on per se Predication’, in P. Adamson (ed.), Classical Arabic Philosophy: Sources and Reception, London/Turin 2007, 21-38. 16 See Boethius, De syllogismo categorico 814C-816C (Porphyry fr. 113 Smith). 17 This is suggested by Boethius’ statement In de interpretatione II.7.5-9 (test. 75 Smith). ‘Cuius expositionem nos scilicet quam maxime a Porphyrio quamquam etiam a ceteris transferentes Latina oratione digessimus. Hic [sc. Porphyry] enim nobis expositor et intellectus acumine et sententiarum dispositione videtur excellere.’ Boethius’ commentary on De interpretatione has been recently translated by A. Smith, Boethius On Aristotle On Intepretation 1-3, 4-6, 2 vols., London 2010-11.


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the question then is why Porphyry wanted to teach Aristotle. We know from

Porphyry’s biography of Plotinus that Aristotle’s works were read in Plotinus’ circle

together with some Peripatetic commentaries like those of Alexander and this kind of

reading was part of a teaching procedure in Plotinus’ school (V. Plot. 14). This piece

of evidence makes my question more pressing. For since there was no shortage of

Aristotelian commentaries in circulation at the time of Porphyry and indeed from

experts in Peripatetic philosophy such as those of Andronicus, Boethus, Herminus, or

Alexander, why did a Platonist like Porphyry not follow Plotinus in merely using

them but also want to write his own? Was he dissatisfied with the earlier

commentaries and wanted to improve upon the existing exegetical tradition?

Although the question has not been explicitly answered in the affirmative in

modern scholarship, scholars often assume that Porphyry takes up a Peripatetic point

of view in his Aristotelian commentaries, that is, Porphyry agrees with Aristotle on a

given issue and defends his position.18 This is quite justified. It is particularly clear in

the case of Porphyry’s short commentary on the Categories, which is extant. Partisans

of this view point to the heavy use of the Peripatetic tradition that Porphyry makes.

Indeed Porphyry exhibits deep knowledge of the entire Peripatetic exegetical

tradition. His predominantly semantic interpretation of the Categories, for instance,

has its roots in the Peripatetic exegesis of Boethus, Andronicus, and Herminus.

Porphyry is ostensibly indebted to Andronicus also in his exegesis of De

Interpretatione, as we can gather from Boethius.19 Porphyry further draws on

Aspasius regarding Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (fr. 105 Smith) and on Adrastus on

Aristotle’s Physics (fr. 133 Smith). Besides, there is some evidence to suggest that

18 Thus, for instance, St. Ebbesen, ‘Porphyry’s Legacy to Logic’, in Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, op. cit., who maintains that Porphyry’s logic is Peripatetic. Similarly A. C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Oxford 1990. 19 On this matter see P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, Berlin 1973, vol. 1, 120-132.


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Porphyry commented on Theophrastus’ On Affirmation and Negation.20 Scholars then

tend to distinguish Porphyry with his more Peripatetic outlook and his more logical

interests, which comes out especially in his commentaries on the Categories, the De

Interpretatione, and the Isagoge, from the Platonist philosopher Porphyry, the author

of the Sententiae, On the Return of the Soul, Ad Gaurum and so on.21

Does this evidence, however, really show that Porphyry assumes a Peripatetic

point of view? Does it show that Porphyry is competing with Andronicus, Boethus,

and Herminus in expounding Aristotle’s Categories? But why should he have wanted

to do that in the first place given his commitment to Plato’s philosophy and to

Plotinus’ interpretation of it? Alone the evidence of Porphyry’s dependence on the

Peripatetic exegetical tradition cannot shed light on those questions. On the other

hand Porphyry was not only interested in Aristotle’s logic. The view that Porphyry

assumes a Peripatetic point of view with regard to logic does not do justice to the fact

the he extended his exegetical activity also on Aristotle’s physics and ethics, to say

the least.

Another answer that is sometimes offered to the question of why Porphyry

wrote Aristotelian commentaries by means of which he taught Aristotle, is that

Porphyry wanted to explain Aristotle specifically to Platonists. According to that

suggestion Porphyry assumes a Platonist point of view in his Aristotelian

commentaries, which means that does agree with Aristotle on a given issue but he

does so in a way that is influenced from, and bears on, Platonist philosophy.22 There

is some truth in this suggestion too. By the time that Porphyry wrote his

commentaries there had been two kinds of approaches to Aristotle in the Platonist 20 See the testimony of Boethius, De Interpretatione II.17.24-27 (test. 167 Smith). Porphyry draws on Theophrastus also in On Abstinence, as he himself indicates (On Abstinence II.5.3, II.7.3, 11.3, III.20). 21 Thus Barnes, Porphyry Isagoge, Oxford 2006, a view that is critically discussed by R. Chiaradonna, ‘What is Porphyry’s Isagoge?’ op. cit. 22 See A. De Libera and Ph. Segonds, Porphyre Isagoge, Paris 1998, p. xxxviii.


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camp. The first was that of Platonists like Nicostratus, Atticus, and Plotinus, who

were critical of Aristotle in various degrees, especially of his ontology, and instead

unanimously favored Plato’s relevant views. The second was the tradition of the

Peripatetic commentators like Andronicus, Boethus, and Alexander, who were

invariably approving of Aristotle’s views, although they often differed considerably in

their understanding of Aristotle, especially of his ontology and psychology. This

evidence shows two things. First, that those interested in discussing Aristotle did that

from a specific philosophical point of view, namely that of Platonic or Aristotelian

philosophy. Second, their engagement with Aristotle in either of the two traditions

was motivated by the wish to discuss philosophical questions like that of what

qualifies as ousia, as principle, or cause, and in their exegetical works, either

commentaries (Peripatetics) or critical treatises (Platonists), they advance their own

views on precisely these questions. This explains, at least partly, why ancient

commentators engage critically with the work of fellow commentators, namely

because they take interest in the philosophical views on substance, principles, form,

individuals, or the soul, that their fellow commentators outline in their commentaries.

If this is the case, then the question is what was Porphyry’s philosophical motivation

behind his engagement as commentator with Aristotle’s works given his Platonism.

An alternative view that is sometimes put forward is that Porphyry was

someone who tried to bridge Platonism and Aristotelianism in one way or another.23

And one way in which Porphyry did that was by teaching Aristotle’s logic to

Platonists as a preparation for Platonic philosophy and especially Platonic

23 Thus R. Beutler, ‘Porphyrios’, RE XXII.1 (1953), 275-313, A. Smith, ‘Porphyrian Studies since 1913’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 ) 1987, 717-773 at 754-5, L. Gerson, ‘Neoplatonism’, in C. Shields (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy, Oxford 2003, 303-324 at 314-5, Gerson, ‘The Harmony of Aristotle and Plato according to Neoplatonism’, in H. Tarrant and Dirk Baltzly (ed.), Reading Plato in Antiquity, London 2006, 195-221 at 196-7, 201-207. The attempt to bridge Plato and Arisotle may take the form of showing that they agree or that they supplement one another.


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metaphysics.24 This kind of answer, however, is not satisfactory either, for the

following two reasons. First, Porphyry’s Aristotelian exegesis is both selective and

systematic and neither of these two aspects are sufficiently explained in such a theory.

One wonders, for instance, how a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics is justified. Why

should a Platonist like Porphyry want to expound this work and teach them to fellow

Platonists? One answer that the partisans of the above view offer is that Porphyry, like

later Platonists, assumed a certain interpretation of Aristotle that aligned his doctrines

with the assumed doctrines of the relevant works of Plato.25 But if this is the case, the

question is why a Platonist would want to study Aristotle. What would make Aristotle

an attractive course of philosophy for a Platonist at all?

Another answer is that Porphyry explores Aristotle’s philosophy with regard

to the sensible world, while he turns to Plato with regard to the intelligible world.26

But this is not completely true either. As we will see below, Porphyry talks about

Aristotle’s principles and causes in his commentary on the Physics, he talks about

concepts in his short Commentary on the Categories, and he is also inspired by

Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul in works like On the faculties of the soul.27 Of course

the soul does exist in the sensible world, but it is not a sensible entity for a Platonist.

Besides, Porphyry wrote a commentary also on Plato’s Timaeus, and in this he sets

out to explain the nature of the sensible world. But wven with regard to logic,

Porphyry’s assumed desire to teach logic to Platonists as a propaideutic to Plato, and

to use Aristotle’s treatises for that purpose, leaves unanswered the question of why a

24 Thus W. Theiler, ‘Ammonios und Porphyrios’, in Porphyre, Entretiens Fondation Hardt, vol. 12, Geneva 1965, 88-123 at 112, A. C. Lloyd, ‘The Later Neoplatonists’, in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1967 at 275-6, 281, R. Sorabji, ‘The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle’, in Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed, 1-30, at 2-3. 25 Thus Lloyd, ‘The Later Neoplatonists’, op. cit. 26 Thus Gerson, op. cit. n. 22. 27 For a discussion of Porphyry’s psychology and his stance to Aristotle’s relevant doctrine, see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?, op. cit. 287-303.


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Platonist should want to delve into the complexities of Aristotle’s theory of

predication and of syllogism in order to be able to understand Plato. If some training

in logic was needed for beginners in Plato, a work like the Isagoge would suffice. But

we see instead that Porphyry wrote a lot more than that. His exegetical work on the

Organon is as voluminous and detailed as the relevant work of a dedicated Peripatetic

like Alexander of Aphrodisias. And the question is why.

I have an alternative answer to offer. Porphyry, I would like to argue, engages

himself so profoundly with Aristotle’s works because he finds central issues in

Platonist philosophy being discussed also by Aristotle in very similar ways in treatises

such as the Categories, the De Interpretatione, the Physics, and the Posterior

Analytics. Porphyry, I suggest, considers these works being permeated by similar

philosophical commitments that can be detected in central Platonic dialogues, namely

commitments about kinds of knowledge, the language-to-reality relation, about

essence and definition, form and matter, principles and causes. What is more,

Porphyry finds in these works of Aristotle answers that Plato’s dialogues do not give,

or at least do not give in a clear way, yet these are answers inspired by Plato’s key

philosophical ideas. This means that Porphyry finds in these works of Aristotle the

evolution of some Platonic views that he considers an interesting Platonist

development. It is for these reasons, I think, that Porphyry writes commentaries on

Aristotle’s works. And in doing so, he takes a purely Platonist point of view, that is,

he abides with the main tenets of Platonist philosophy as he understands it.

There are two principal indications in favor of my suggestion. The first is that

in his Aristotelian commentaries, including the Isagoge, Porphyry often brings up

relevant views of Plato. In the Isagoge, for instance, he invokes Plato’s theory of

division in the Politicus and the Sophist when discussing Aristotle’s ten kinds of


12

predication (Isagoge 6.12-15).28 In his commentary on the Physics on the other hand

Porphyry makes references to the Sophist and to the Timaeus (Simplicius, In Phys.

134.14, 135.1-14, 136.33-137.7; fr. 134 Smith).29 More specifically, Porphyry brings

in the views that Plato outlines in the Sophist regarding non-being, which apparently

Porphyry identifies with matter, that is the receptacle of the Timaeus, which is without

form, as is specified in Timaeus 50d7.30 On the other hand, we find references to

Aristotle’s works also in Porphyry’s commentaries on Platonic dialogues, such as the

Sophist or the Timaeus, as we will see in some detail in the following. Such a practice

speaks in favor of the view that Porphyry sees Plato and Aristotle as discussing

similar topics, from similar perspectives, and with similar conceptual tools, and this is

why, I suggest, he often treats them jointly.

28 Δέκα µὲν οὖν τὰ γενικὼτατα, τὰ δὲ εἰδικώτατα ἐν ἀριθµῷ µέν τινι, οὐ µὲν ἀπείρῳ. τὰ δὲ ἄτοµα, ἅπερ ἐστι τὰ µετὰ τὰ εἰδικώτατα, ἄπειρα. Διὸ ἄχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων παρακελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι, κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ µέσου διαιροῦντας ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς⋅ τὰ δὲ ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾶν, µὴ γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήµην. (Ιsagoge 6.12-15) . 29 τὸν οὖν Πλάτωνά φασιν ἐνδοῦναι τῇ προτάσει τῇ λεγούσῃ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὂν οὐκ ὄν (καὶ γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν στάσιν καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ (15) ἕτερον ἐν Σοφιστῇ ἕτερα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναί φησι), τὸ δὲ οὐκ ὂν οὐδὲν οὐκέτι συγχωρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἕτερα τοῦ ὄντος, κἂν µὴ ὄντα ᾖ, ἀλλ’ ὅµως εἶναί φησι καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ µὴ ὂν εἰσάγει. (135.) Φησὶ δὲ ὁ Πορφύριος τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν λέγειν εἶναι, οὕτως µέντοι εἶναι ὡς µὴ ὄν. τὸ µὲν γὰρ ὄντως ὂν ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ ταύτην ὄντως εἶναι οὐσίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνωτάτω πρώτην ἄµορφον καὶ ἀνείδεον ὕλην ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ἐστὶν εἶναι µέν, µηδὲν δὲ εἶναι τῶν ὄντων. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς ἐπινοουµένη δυνάµει µὲν πάντα ἐστίν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδέν. τὸ δὲ (5) ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἀποτέλεσµα καθ’ ὅσον µὲν εἴδους µετέχει, κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναί τι καὶ προσαγορεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, καθ’ ὅσον δὲ τῆς ὕλης καὶ διὰ ταύτην ἐν συνεχεῖ ῥύσει καὶ µεταβολῇ τυγχάνει, πάλιν µὴ ἁπλῶς µηδὲ βεβαίως εἶναι. ἀντιδιαιρούµενος γοῦν αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ Τιµαίῳ φησί‘τί τὸ ὂν µὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόµενον µέν, ὂν δὲ (10) οὐδέποτε’. καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν εἶναι ἔφη, οὐ τὸ ὂν µὴ ὂν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν εἶναι ὄν· οὐ µὴν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀντικείµενα. τὸν µὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅµα καὶ µὴ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, µὴ ἵππον δὲ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν. Ὁ δέ γε Πορφύριος ὅτι µὲν οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς µὴ ὂν ὁ Πλάτων εἰσάγει, καλῶς ἐθεάσατο, ὅτι δὲ µὴ ὂν τὸ γενητὸν ὂν ἐν Σοφιστῇ φησι παραδιδόναι, (137.) περὶ οὗ λέγει ἐν Τιµαίῳ ‘καὶ τί τὸ γινόµενον µέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε’, τοῦτο ἐπιστάσεως ἄξιον εἶναί µοι δοκεῖ. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τῶν νοερῶν εἰδῶν διακρίσει τὸ µὴ ὂν ὁ Πλάτων ἀνευρίσκειν δοκεῖ. πότε γὰρ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ αἰσθητῶν ἔλεγε ταῦτα ‘τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἦ ῥᾳδίως πεισθησόµεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι µὴ παρεῖναι µηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ µηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεµνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἑστὼς εἶναι;’ (Porphyry In Phys. in Simplicius In Phys. 134.14-18, 135.1-14, 136.33-137.7; fr. 134 Smith). 30 There is a long tradition of describing the receptacle as formless, that goes back to Aristotle who describes the receptacle that identifies with matter (Physics 192a3-14) as ‘qualityless and formless’ (aeides kai amorphon; De Caelo 306b17-19). This is taken over by Antiochus (Cicero, Academica II.26) and Alcinous, Didascalicus 163.6.


13

This brings me to the second indication. If we look at Porphyry’s Aristotelian

commentaries closely, we realize that Porphyry does not merely set out to interpret

Aristotle, as is often claimed; he rather sets out to advance and justify his own

philosophical views, which we find in other works of his and which are characteristic

of Porphyry’s Neoplatonist philosophical outlook. One such a view that I discuss later

on in this paper, is that sensible individuals are combinations of qualities and that

matter is without qualities, a non-being. Even when the tone is largely exegetical, the

terms involved in Porphyry’s exegesis are far from neutral; they rather betray a

certain metaphysical perspective. One such example, as we will see, is Porphyry’s

view on concepts, which comes up both in his Aristotelian commentaries and in the

rest of his work. This fact suggests that in his Aristotelian commentaries Porphyry

does not set out to offer a mere interpretation of Aristotle’s text but he also channels

in them his own philosophical views on logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. And he

does so because he finds Aristotle discussing issues inherited by Platonist philosophy

from a point of view that he considers, not unjustifiably, as Platonist.

Before I illustrate Porphyry’s practice in detail, let me first say that this

practice and the underlying idea is not completely unknown in Platonism. Plutarch,

for instance, appears to take the view that Aristotelian works like the Categories and

the Topics are essentially Platonist in character, and this is why, I suggest, that he set

out to comment on the latter.31 A similar attitude can be detected in Alcinous’

Didascalicus.32 Porphyry, however, goes further than that. He agrees on the Platonist

31 See Plutarch, De animae procreatione in Timaeo 1023E, where Plutarch argues that Plato is the source of the Aristotelian categories. Plutarch wrote a work on Aristotle’s Topics, lost today, which comprised 8 books (Lamprias nr. 56) and he also speaks about that work in Quaest. Conv. 616D. See further G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement, op.cit. 86-87, 123-125. 32 Alcinous, Didascalicus 159.43-4 finds Aristotle’s categories implied in Plato’s Parmenides. The Anonymous in Theaetetum detects them instead in the Theaetetus (In Theaet. 68.7-22). On this tendency among later ancient Platonists see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement, op.cit. 21-24.


14

character of some of Aristotle’s works but this does not mean that Aristotle merely

recasts Plato’s views, as Plutarch and Alcinous appear to suggest, but also that

Aristotle developed philosophical views which go beyond what Plato had articulated

but still are in accordance with and inspired by Plato’s philosophy. For Porphyry

Aristotle’s works are Platonist in some attenuated sense, and this needs to be

explained. But it is because Porphyry considers Aristotle’s works Platonist in a sense

that he treats them in the same way that he treats Plato’s works. For the same reason

Porphyry advances in his Aristotelian commentaries his personal philosophical views

as he does in his other works. This is what I try to show in the rest of my paper.

II. Names, things, and concepts. Porphyry on the Categories.

I will start with Porphyry’s commentaries on the Categories. I will first set out to

outline Porphyry’s interpretation of this work. Then on the basis of that I will move to

identify the Platonist concerns that motivated Porphyry’s engagement with the

Categories and also to show how his interpretation connects with his overall Platonist

philosophical position.

Porphyry differs from earlier Platonists, including Plotinus, in that he argues

for a predominantly semantic interpretation of the Categories, while they assume a

strictly ontological one, according to which Aristotle deals in the Categories with

kinds of being, like substance, quality, and quantity. On the latter interpretation

Aristotle is vulnerable to the Platonist criticism that he leaves out intelligible beings

such as the transcendent Forms, which for the Platonists qualify as substance par

excellence while sensible individuals are substances only in a secondary sense,

namely to the extent that they participate in the intelligible Forms. On this Platonist


15

interpretation, even if Aristotle confines himself to the sensible world and his kinds of

being apply exclusively to it, it is a mistake on his part to leave out intelligible beings

such as Forms, since for Platonists the Forms are the causes of sensible individuals.

Porphyry on the other hand opts for an interpretation that was popular among

Peripatetics, according to which Aristotle’s subject matter in the Categories is not

kinds of being but rather words that signify (In Cat. 58.5-6). Let me explain this.

Porphyry’s starts his short commentary on the Categories with an argument in

favor of the title ‘categories’, as opposed to titles like ‘on the genera of being’ that

earlier Platonist critics assumed. The term ‘kategoria’, Porphyry argues, is used for

simple words that signify something we can point to, like ‘stone’, ‘animal’, ‘white’

(In Cat. 56.5-14).33 This means, Porphyry suggests, that in the Categories Aristotle

examines a subset of words that signify, namely those that signify sensible things,

things we point to, like ‘stone’, ‘animal’, ‘white’, and he does not examine those

signifying names like ‘verb’, ‘animal’ (i.e. the word), ‘genus’ (genos), ‘species’

(eidos; In Cat. 56.34-58.20). Porphyry considers the first class of words, those of first

imposition (thesis), more basic than the latter, those of second imposition (In Cat.

58.1-5), and it is the former, Porphyry argues, that Aristotle examines in the

Categories and divides into ten classes of predication (katêgoriai), while he focuses

on the second class of words in De Interpretatione (In Cat. 58.32-36).

Let me note briefly here that the distinction between two classes of words that

we find in Porphyry has its roots in the Cratylus, although it was first explicitly

33 Τὸ οὖν τῆς κατηγορίας ὄνοµα κείµενον ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἐπὶ δικαιολογίας ἐλεγκτικῆς, τῆς διὰ λόγων µηνύσεως, λαβὼν αὐτὸς τὰς τῶν λέξεων τῶν σηµαντικῶν κατὰ τῶν πραγµάτων ἀγορεύσεις κατηγορίας προσεῖπεν. ὥστε πᾶσα ἁπλῆ λέξις σηµαντική, ὅταν καθ᾽ οὖ σηµαίνηται πράγµατος ἀγορευθῆ τε καὶ λεχθῇ, λέγεται κατηγορία, οἷον ὄντος πράγµατος τοῦδε τοῦ δεικνυµένου λίθου, οὗ ἁπτόµεθα ἢ ὃ βλέποµεν, ὅταν εἴπωµεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅτι τόδε λίθος ἐστίν, ἡ λίθος λέξις κατηγορία ἐστι. σηµαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε πρᾶγµα καὶ ἀγορεύεται κατὰ τοῦ δεικνυµένου πράγµατος λίθου. (Porphyry, In Cat. 56.5-14).


16

formulated by the Stoics, who draw on the Cratylus in this respect.34 It corresponds to

the distinction in Cratylus between the first names (τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόµατα) that signify

things we point to, which are primary or more basic in language, and names

composed by names or secondary names (Cratylus 421a-422e). Socrates defends the

correctness of both kinds of names, but it is the former kind that matters most,

because, as Socrates claims, the rest of names were made by imitation of the primary

ones (Cratylus 427cd).35 The Platonist origin of this distinction is important for my

purposes in the following sense. Porphyry attributes to Aristotle a distinction that

originates in, or at least can be projected back onto, Plato. For Porphyry this is

important for paying attention to Aristotle’s Categories and discuss his relevant views

in some detail, which is unlike what Plutarch and Alcinous did. This is not an isolated

case; rather Porphyry does this quite often. Let me give another example.

In the beginning of his commentary on the Physics Porphyry sets out to

explain the kind of inquiry that pertains to the natural philosopher, which, Porphyry

claims, is different from that of the metaphysician (ὁ ἀναβεβηκώς; Simplicius, In

Phys. 9.10- 27; fr. 119 Smith). Their difference, Porphyry claims, lies in the fact that

they rely on different principles (ἀρχαί). This comment is invited by Aristotle’s

remark at the beginning of his Physics, where he claims that all branches of

knowledge have their own principles, causes, and elements, and there is a need to

specify the principles of natural science (Physics 184a10-15). Porphyry then goes on

to distinguish kinds of principles and kinds of causes.36 These include the four causes

34 For the formulation see Sextus, Adv. Math. I.143.4, IX.241-2, Simplicius, In Cat. 40.6, 187.7. See A. Long, ‘Stoic linguistics, Plato’s Cratylus, and Augustine’s De dialectica’, in D. Frede and B. Inwood (ed.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age, Cambridge 2005, 36-55. I owe the references to M. Griffin’s paper, ‘What does Aristotle Categorize?’, op. cit. 35 For a discussion, see F. Ademollo, The Cratylus of Plato, Cambridge 2011, 257-312. 36 Ὁ µέντοι Πορφύριος ἕνα µὲν τρόπον ἀρχὴν λέγει, φησίν, ὅθεν ἡ (25) πρώτη κίνησις γίνεται· ἔστι δὲ τοιαύτη ἡ ἀφ’ οὗ ὡς ὁδοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· οὕτω δὲ καὶ νεὼς µὲν τρόπις, οἰκίας δὲ θεµέλοις· τούτῳ δὲ τῷ σηµαινοµένῳ ἀντίκειται ἡ τελευτή· ἕτερον δὲ τρόπον ὡς τὸ ὑφ’ οὗ, ὡς ἡ φύσις τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ ἡ


17

of which Aristotle speaks in the Physics. Quite noticeably, though, Porphyry presents

Plato as having added two more causes on Aristotle’s four causes, namely the Forms,

which operate as the model (παράδειγµα) for everything that comes to be and is thus

called paradeigmatic cause, and also the instrumental cause (ὀργανική), that by

means of which something comes to be. Porphyry’s presentation implies that Aristotle

inherited his principles from Plato and he left out two of them. The implication is that

Plato’s set of principles is richer than that of Aristotle but also that the causal schemes

of Plato and Aristotle are complementary. Now this evidence does not only suggest

that Porphyry finds in Aristotle elements of Plato’s philosophy like the distinction

between primary and secondary names and kinds of causes I mentioned earlier.

Porphyry, I suggest, detects in Aristotle a development of these Platonist views,

which is philosophically interesting per se. Aristotle, for instance, appears to develop

a classification of kinds of significant words that is missing in Plato. And he also

applies in an explicit way his scheme of causes in order to explain what comes into

being, and this articulated causal scheme is again missing in Plato.

Let me go back to Porphyry’s interpretation of the Categories. Porphyry

proceeds to divide the ten classes of significant words or classes of predication into

τέχνη τῶν τεχνητῶν· ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον ἀθλήσεως ἡ νίκη· κατ᾽ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἀρχὴ λέγεται, ἐξ οὗ πρῶτον (30) ἐνυπάρχοντος γίνεταί τι, ὡς οἰκίας λίθοι καὶ ξύλα ἀρχὴ ὡς ὕλη· ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ µορφὴ καὶ τὸ σχῆµα καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος. ἀλλ’ὁ µὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ µόνον θεασάµενος εἶδος τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τὸ χωριστὸν ἐννοήσας εἶδος τὴν παραδειγµατικὴν ἀρχὴν προσεισήγαγε· τετραχῶς οὖν ἡ ἀρχὴ κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ἐξ οὗ (11.) ὡς ἡ ὕλη ἢ τὸ καθ ὃ ὡς τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ὑφ οὗ ὡς τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ δι ὃ ὡς τὸ τέλος. κατὰ δὲ Πλάτωνα καὶ τὸ πρὸς ὃ ὡς τὸ παράδειγµα καὶ τὸ δι οὗ ὡς τὸ ὀργανικόν· ὁσαχῶς δὲ ἡ ἀρχὴ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ αἴτιον· καὶ τῷ µὲν ὑποκειµένῳ ταὐτὸν ἄµφω, τῇ δὲ ἐπινοίᾳ διαφέροντα· ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἀρχή, φησὶν ὁ Πορφύριος, ἐπινοεῖται καθὸ προηγεῖται, τὸ δὲαἴτιον καθὸ ποιεῖ τι καὶ ἀποτελεῖ τὸ µεθ ἑαυτό, ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰτίου δυνάµει ἀρχικοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς δυνάµει τελικῆς· διὸ καὶ προηγεῖται ἡ᾽ ἐπίνοια τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπινοίας· τοσαυταχῶς δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν αἰτίων λεγοµένων οὐ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλαι (10) µὲν γενέσεως ἀρχαί, ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον ἢ ἕν τι τῶν στοιχείων ὃ ἕκαστοι τῶν φυσικῶν ἐθεάσαντο. ἄλλαι δὲ γνώσεως ἀρχαὶ αἱ ἄµεσοι καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι προτάσεις· καὶ ἄλλαι µὲν οὐσίας ἀρχαὶ ὡς τὸ πεπερασµένον καὶ ἄπειρον ἔλεγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἢ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον· πράξεως δὲ ἀρχαὶ ἢ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ τέλος. (15) (Porphyry, In Physica, in Simplicius, In Phys. 10.24-11.14; fr. 120 Smith). For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?, op. cit. 272-277.


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two kinds, substance (ousia) and accident (symbebêkos; In Cat. 71.25-72.29). Words

like ‘man’ and ‘white’ signify substance and accident respectively in statements like

‘Socrates is a man’ and ‘Socrates is white’. Accordingly, Porphyry suggests, there are

two kinds of predication, essential and accidental. Accidents like ‘white’ are in a

subject (hypokeimenon) and cannot exist separately from it, while terms ‘man’ or

‘animal’ are predicated or said of a particular, like Socrates, and signify substance, as

they tell us what Socrates essentially is. For Porphyry Aristotle’s view, according to

which terms that indicate genera or species signify secondary substances while terms

indicating individuals like Socrates signify primary substances on the grounds that

individuals exist naturally while genera or species exist only insofar as individuals do,

is justified on the grounds that in Porphyry’s view Aristotle sets out to deal with

predicates that signify things we point to, and these things are particulars. For,

Porphyry suggests, Aristotle speaks of words like ‘animal’ or ‘man’ as predicates of,

or as allocated to (katatetagmenos) something, not outside predication.37 Moreover,

Porphyry argues, by ‘particular substance’ (atomos ousia) is not meant an individual

but a class of individuals; the word ‘man’, for instance, he argues, refers to the entire

class of men on the basis of which we come to conceive (ἐνοήσαµεν) man (In Cat.

90.31-91.7). The following passage is important in this regard.

Ὅτι περὶ Σωκράτους µόνον πεποίησαι τὸν λόγον, οὗ ἀναιρεθέντος ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ

ζῷον µένει, δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς ποιεῖσθαι τὸν (30) λόγον, ἀλλ’ εὖ εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὐκ

ἔστιν ἄτοµος οὐσία ὁ εἷς τῶν κατὰ µέρος ἀλλ’ οἱ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἄνθρωποι πάντες, ἐξ

ὧν καὶ ὁ κοινῇ κατηγορούµενος ἄνθρωπος ἐπενοήθη, καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον ζῷα, δι’ ἃ

τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούµενον ἐνοήσαµεν ζῷον. ἃ δὴ καὶ αἴτια τοῖς κοινῇ κατηγορουµένοις

ἐστὶ (91.) τοῦ εἶναι· παρὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ἵππον

οὔτε ὅλως ἔστι νοῆσαι ζῷον. εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν καθ� ἕκαστον αἰσθήσεως ἐπὶ τὸ κοινῇ τῇ

37 See also Porphyry’s comment in his longer commentary in Simplicius, In Cat. 53.4-9 (fr. 56 Smith).


19

διανοίᾳ ἀφικνούµεθα, ὅπερ οὐκέτι τόδε τι νοοῦµεν ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, εἰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον

ἀναιρεθῇ ζῷα, οὐκέτι οὐδὲ τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούµενον κατ’ αὐτῶν ἔσται. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ

σηµαντικαὶ λέξεις (5) τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ πρότερα τὰ ἄτοµα κατωνοµασµέναι, εἶτα ἀπὸ

τούτων ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ ἡ διάνοια µετῆλθεν. (Porphyry, In Cat. 90.29-91.7)

Because you are speaking about Socrates alone, who can be eliminated while man and

animal both remain, but you ought not to speak merely about a single man: you must

recognise that individual substance does not mean just one of the particulars, but rather

all of the particular men, from whom we conceive the man that is predicated in common,

and all the particular animals, through which we think the animal that is predicated in

common. These are the cause of the being of the common predicates. For it is not

possible to think of ox or man or horse or animal in general apart from the particulars.

But if it is from the perception of particulars that we come to conceive of the common

predicate, which we no longer think of as a ‘this’, but as a ‘such’, then if the particular

animals are eliminated, what is predicated in common of them will no longer exist either.

Also, expressions that signify beings are applied initially to individuals, and it is from

them that our thought proceeds to the common items. (Dillon trans.)

This is a remarkable passage for many reasons. Quite importantly it shows that

Porphyry is concerned here not only with predication and with the kind of substance

involved in it but also with how we form concepts of things and what role these

concepts play in getting to know things. This is not an issue that Aristotle examines in

the Categories. Porphyry, however, appears to be privileging this issue in his longer

commentary, the Ad Gedaleium. Although our evidence is limited, it gives us reasons

to believe that Porphyry talked there about the role that νοήµατα, that is, concepts,

play in the human cognitive process. In his report about the possible subject matter of

the Categories, Simplicius tells us that according to Porphyry’s Ad Gedaleium ‘the

aim [of the Categories] is about the simple and most general parts of speech which


20

signify simple things and the simple concepts which exist in conjunction with these

simple things’ (Simplicius, In Cat. 10.17-19; fr. 46 Smith).38 A statement to a similar

effect occurs also in Ammonius’ commentary (Ammonius, In Cat. 9.14-19). This

does not make the philosophical outlook of Porphyry’s longer commentary on the

Categories substantially different from that of the shorter one, since we find reference

to how we form concepts of things in the latter too. Porphyry’s interest in the

formation and the role of concepts in cognition is attested also in other parts of his

work. There is a very interesting section on exactly this issue in his commentary on

Ptolemy’s Harmonics (11.1-14.31 Düring) that has attracted quite some scholarly

attention recently.39 What is open to discussion there is how exactly the process of

concept formation that is described should be understood. It is debated whether

Porphyry implies the extraction of form from matter and how this enmattered form

relates to the relevant transcendent idea. For our purposes, however, it is important to

stress that Porphyry finds in Aristotle’s Categories elements that are relevant for his

long-standing interest in concepts.

This evidence brings up the question I touched upon earlier, namely what

attracted Porphyry’s attention to the Categories. What was his motivation to write his

commentaries and adopt the interpretation he did? Clearly Porphyry did not undertake

such an enterprise only in order to elucidate Aristotle’s treatise to students of

philosophy like Chrysaorios or Gedaleios. Neither did he do it in order to defend

38 Περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ γενικωτάτων τοῦ λόγου µορίων εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν τῶν τὰ ἁπλᾶ πράγµατα σηµαινόντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν πραγµάτων ἁπλᾶ νοήµατα (Simplicius, In Cat. 10.17-19; reporting on Porphyry, In Cat. ad Gedaleium). 39 Porphyry’s views on concepts and their bearing on his theory of knowledge are discussed by H. Tarrant, Thrassylan Platonism, Ithaca and London 1993, 127-143, M. Chase, ‘Porphyry on the Cognitive Process’, Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010), 385-405, and C. Helmig, Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition, Berlin/N.York 2012, 171-183, and R. Chiaradonna, ‘Concetti generali, astrazioni e forme in Porfirio’, in Ch. Erismann (ed.), De la logique à l’ontologie. Études sur la philosophie de Porphyre et son influence durant l’Antiquité tardive et le haut Moyen Âge (forthcoming),


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Aristotle against Platonist critics or in order to add Aristotle’s logic to the Platonist

philosophical curriculum, as is sometimes argued.40 Of course he does all these, but

he also does more than that, as the passage I cited earlier on human cognition of

universals shows. Porphyry outlines his philosophical views on matters that he

considers important, such as the status of universals and the formation of concepts.

Before I come to these matters, let us first consider whether Porphyry gives us a clue

regarding the reasons that attracted him to the Categories.

In his discussion of the purpose of Aristotle’s Categories at the beginning of

his commentary, Porphyry suggests that Aristotle’s classification of significant terms

into ten classes of entities saves us from the infinity of terms that would be necessary

for the infinity of entities (In Cat. 58.3-15).41 I agree with Bodeus that the γαρ is

needed there, for the clause is meant to voice a justification of the Aristotelian

classification. Porphyry takes Aristotle to be suggesting an isomorphism between

names and things, between language and reality, in the sense that there are as many

kinds of significant words as there are kinds of beings. As Porphyry says: ‘since

beings are comprehended by ten generic differences, the words that indicate them

have also to be ten in genus and are themselves so classified’ (In Cat. 58.12-14). But

in what sense is this fact important? How is the classification of words interesting for

a Platonist like Porphyry? In a nutshell the answer is that Porphyry sees here some

connection with Platonist metaphysics. Let me explain this. 40 Thus A. Lloyd, ‘The later Neoplatonists’, op. cit. 321-322. 41 ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ πρόθεσις τοῦ βιβλίου περὶ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν λέξεων τῆς παραστατικῆς τῶν πραγµάτων· ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ φωνῶν σηµαντικῶν ἁπλῶν, (5) καθὸ σηµαντικαί εἰσι τῶν πραγµάτων, οὐ µὴν τῶν κατὰ ἀριθµὸν ἀλλήλων διαφερόντων ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ γένος· ἄπειρα µὲν γὰρ* [Bodéüs inseruit] σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ πράγµατα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθµόν. ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰς κατὰ ἀριθµὸν πρόκειται διελθεῖν λέξεις· ἑκάστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθµὸν σηµαίνει τῶν ὄντων· ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τῷ ἀριθµῷ πολλά ἐστιν ἓν ὄντα τῷ εἴδει ἢ τῷ γένει, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων (10) καὶ τῶν σηµαινουσῶν αὐτὰ λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εὕρηται περιλαµβανοµένη εἰς τὸ γράφεσθαι. εἰς δέκα τοίνυν γενικὰς διαφορὰς περιληφθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ δηλοῦσαι ταῦτα φωναὶ γεγόνασι κατὰ γένη καὶ αὐταὶ περιληφθεῖσαι. δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ γένει δηλονότι, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει. (Porphyry, In Cat. 58.3-15)


22

At some point in his commentary Porphyry argues that a definition explains

what something is, as names also do (In Cat. 63.7-9). The idea is that words help us

know the world around us. If we know what the words signify, we are in a position to

say what kind of thing it is. For when we predicate something of x, we say what x is,

but only one kind of possible answer qualifies as definition, namely that which gives

the ousia of x, while that which gives the accident(s) of x does not. The close

connection between definition that needs to make reference to the essence of a thing

and the question of how we get to know that thing is central in Plato and Porphyry

naturally inherits it. The problem of the relation betwenn names and things arises in

the Phaedo, for instance, where Plato investigates the question of how predicates

apply to things, and he suggests that we need to relate names to Forms in order to

explain how the former have meaning and how we learn a language, while he also

claims that our judgments about sensible entities require reference to Forms (Phaedo

75b5-6). Phaedo suggests that when a sensible object partakes in (µεταλαµβάνοντα) a

Form, it also has the name of that Form (τὴν ἐπωνυµίαν; ibid. 102b). This means that

names capture the essences of things.

The question how exactly Forms are linked to names is further investigated in

the Cratylus. Plato applies the method of division in order to determine how names

signify. After dividing the letters of the alphabet, Socrates says that we now must

divide all beings on which names are to be imposed, that is, to divide beings in kinds

and impose names on them rather on individual beings.42 And later on in his career

Plato has in the Sophist the eleatic Stranger raising the question of division in kinds

from a similar point of view, when he says that kinds of beings mix with each other in

an analogous way that some letters fit with each other and others not. The knowledge 42 Καὶ ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα διελώµεθα, τὰ ὄντα εὖ πάντα αὖ οἷς δεῖ ὀνόµατα ἐπιθεῖναι, εἰ ἔστιν εἰς ἃ ἀναφέρεται πάντα ὥσπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν αὐτά τε καὶ εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν εἴδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις (Cratylus 424d).


23

of which kinds of being mix with each other is said to characteristic of the

philosopher/dialectician (Sophist 253ae).43

Porphyry appears to have written commentaries both on the Cratylus and the

Sophist, which indicates his preoccupation with the kind of questions just mentioned.

The commentary on Cratylus is unfortunately lost without traces, but the commentary

on the Sophist was used by Boethius in his De divisione, as he himself makes clear

(De divisione 876D), and we can catch glimpses of it in Boethius’ work.44 A word of

caution is needed here of course, given the second-hand evidence we have about it.

There are a number of striking parallels between Boethius’ rephrasing of Porphyry’s

comments on the Sophist and Porphyry’s remarks in his commentaries on the

Categories, and such parallels suggest Porphyry as the main source.

Let me give a couple of examples. Porphyry apparently addressed the issue of

how genus is distributed into species. Boethius claims that this happens with respect

to quality, that is, we move from animal to man through the addition of the quality of

rationality (Boethius, De divisione 879b).45 A similar point occurs also in Porphyry’s

Isagoge (3.9-15) and in his short commentary (In Cat. 65.25-28).46 Both Porphyry

and Boethius deal similarly with the use of general and special predication, both of

43 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταὐτὰ µείξεως ἔχειν ὡµολογήκαµεν, ἆρ᾽ οὐ µετ᾽ ἐπιστήµης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς µέλλοντα δείξειν ποῖα ποίοις συµφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται; καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων συµµειγνύσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ δι᾽ὅλων ἕτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αἴτια (Sophist 253bc). 44 On Boethius’ De Divisione see now the new critical edition with prolegomena and commentary by J. Magee, Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii De Divisione Liber, Leiden 1998 (Philosophia Antiqua vol. 77). 45generis vero distributio qualitate perficitur. Nam cum hominem sub animali locavero tunc qualitate divisio facta est, quale namque animal est homo idcirco quoniam quadam qualitate formatur, unde quale sit animal hom interrogatus aut “rationale” respondebit aut certe ‘morale’ (Boethius, De divisione 879b). 46 ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐρωτᾶν ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπός φαµεν ὅτι λογικόν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ὁ κόραξ φαµὲν ὅτι µέλαν· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ µὲν λογικὸν διαφορά, τὸ δὲ µέλαν συµβεβηκός· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτηθῶµεν, ζῷον ἀποκρινόµεθα· ἦν δὲ ἀνθρώπου γένος τὸ ζῷον. ὥστε τὸ µὲν κατὰ πλειόνων λέγεσθαι τὸ γένος διαστέλλει αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ’ ἑνὸς µόνου τῶν ἀτόµων κατηγορουµένων ἢ ὡς ἰδίων, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖσθαι χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῇ συµβεβηκότων, ἃ οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν κατηγορεῖται ἕκαστον ὧν κατηγορεῖται. οὐδὲν ἄρα περιττὸν οὐδὲ ἐλλεῖπον περιέχει ἡ τοῦ γένους ῥηθεῖσα ὑπογραφὴ τῆς ἐννοίας (Porphyry, Isagoge 3.9-15).


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which answer the question ‘what is it?’, as Aristotle specifies in Topics 102a31-35

and in Categories 2b31-34.47 If this is so, it turns out that Porphyry made the same

point about general and special predication in his commentary on the Sophist as well

as in his Aristotelian exegetical writings. And he did that because he apparently

believed that this is a view that Plato and Aristotle share. Similar is the following

case. The ontological dependence of species on genus (but not vice versa) occurs both

in the De divisione and in Porphyry’s short commentary on the Categories (De

divisione 879c; In Cat. 77.27-28, 90.5-21).48 Such parallels do not merely show that

Porphyry’s Platonist and Aristotelian commentaries have common elements, but also

that the commentator is motivated by specific philosophical concerns like the

relations between kinds of beings, like genera, species, and individuals, and that he

appreciates the common method of division that in his view both Plato and Aristotle

follow in their investigations. What is more, Porphyry apparently finds in Plato and

Aristotle some similar philosophical views which emerge in his commentary on the

Sophist as well as in the Isagoge and in his short commentary on the Categories. It

may be for such reasons that Porphyry paid close attention to Aristotle’s works; they

develop Platonic ideas in ways that continue Plato’s philosophy.

47 See Barnes, Porphyry Introduction, op. cit. 85-92. 48 Amplius quoque genus omne naturaliter prius est propriis speciebus, totum autem partibus propriis posterius.…hinc quoque illud vere dicitur: si genus interimatur statim species deperire [ἀναιρεῖται], si species interempta sit non peremptum genus in nature consistere. (Boethius, De divisione 879c) ἔστιν ἔν τινι καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐν τῷ γένει τὸ εἶδος καθάπερ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· περιέχεται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ὑπὸ τὸ γένος. ἔστιν ἔν τινι ὡς γένος ἐν τῷ εἴδει· µετέχει γὰρ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡς µετεχόµενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἔστιν ἔν (30) τινι ὡς τὸ ἐν τέλει εἶναι· ἐν γὰρ τῷ εὐδαιµονεῖν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὰ πάντα ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἔστι δὲ ἄλλο ἔν τινι τὸ ἐν τῷ κρατοῦντι, ὡς λέγοµεν ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ εἶναι τὰ πράγµατα. ἄλλο δὲ πάλιν ἔν τινι τὸ ὡς ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶδος καθάπερ ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ἡ µορφὴ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος κἀν τῷ σιδήρῳ τὸ σχῆµα τῆς µαχαίρας κἀν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ ἐπιστήµη κἀν τῷ σώµατι τὸ χρῶµα. Ἐν οἷς, φησίν, εἴδεσιν αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι λεγόµεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς εἴδεσί πως τὰ ἄτοµά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐπὶ πλέον λεγοµένοις τὰ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον λεγόµενα περιέχεσθαι λέγεται. ταῦτά τε οὖν τὰ εἴδη τὰ περιέχοντα τὰς ἀτόµους οὐσίας καὶ τὰ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν γένη τὰ περιέχοντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴδη εἴη ἂν δεύτεραι οὐσίαι οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ζῷον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον. δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται οὐσίαι λέγονται οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὰ ὅµοια. (Porphyry, In Cat. 77.27-32, 90.5-10).


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III. Ontological and epistemological implications of Logic

A closer look at Porphyry’s commentaries on the Categories and the Physics confirms

that for Porphyry Aristotle continues Plato’s inquiry and develops Plato’s line of

thought. This is what I will try to illustrate in this section.

I have just mentioned the role that quality plays in the distribution of genus

into species. But this is a certain kind of quality. Porphyry appears to distinguish

between essential and accidental quality, so to speak. The heat in Socrates is an

accidental quality, whereas the heat of fire is part of what makes fire what it is. The

qualities of the second kind are said to be ‘completing of substance’ (συµπληρωτικαὶ

τῆς οὐσίας; Porphyry, In Cat. ad Gedaleium fr. 55 Smith).49 Porphyry makes this

49 Ἀποροῦσι δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Λούκιον καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ µὴ ὡς µέρος λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ… ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπορίαν λύων ὁ Πορφύριος ‘διττόν, φησίν, ἐστὶν τὸ ὑποκείµενον, οὐ µόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἥ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη, ἣν δυνάµει καλεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, πρῶτόν ἐστιν τοῦ ὑποκειµένου σηµαινόµενον, καὶ δεύτερον, ὃ κοινῶς ποιὸν ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται· ὑποκείµενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκός ἐστιν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης τοῖς ἐπιγινοµένοις ἢ κατηγορουµένοις κατ’ αὐτῶν. πολλὰ οὖν, φησίν, τῶν ἐγγινοµένων ὡς µὲν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείµενον ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον πᾶν χρῶµα καὶ πᾶν σχῆµα καὶ πᾶσα ποιότης ἐν ὑποκειµένῃ ἐστὶν τῇ πρώτῃ ὕλῃ, οὐχ ὡς µέρη αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατα χωρὶς αὐτῆς εἶναι· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου ὑποκειµένου οὐ πᾶν χρῶµα οὐδὲ πᾶσα ποιότης ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ, ἀλλ’ ὅταν µὴ συµπληρωτικαί εἰσι τῆς οὐσίας. τὸ γοῦν λευκὸν ἐπὶ µὲν τοῦ ἐρίου ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς χιόνος οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ, ἀλλὰ συµπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς µέρος, καὶ ὑποκείµενον µᾶλλόν ἐστιν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ θερµότης τῆς µὲν τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίας µέρος ἐστίν, ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ δὲ γίνεται τῷ σιδήρῳ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται ἐν τῷ σιδήρῳ ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ σιδήρου φθορᾶς. ὁ τοίνυν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ δεύτερον ῥηθὲν ὑποκείµενον ἐνταῦθα λαβὼν τὸ κατὰ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ τὴν ἄτοµον οὐσίαν, ὅπερ µήτε ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ εἶναί φησιν µήτε καθ’ ὑποκειµένου τινὸς λέγεσθαι, εἰκότως πᾶν τὸ µὴ οὐσιωδῶς ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ λεγόµενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ συµβεβηκέναι, ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ τούτῳ εἶναί φησιν, ὥσπερ τὴν θερµότητα ἐν τῷ σιδήρῳ· τὰ δὲ συµπληρωτικὰ ὡς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς θερµότητα τοῦ µὲν πυρὸς µέρος ἂν εἴποι, ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ δὲ τῇ ἀποίῳ ὕλῃ’. πρὸς δὲ ταύτην οἶµαι τὴν λύσιν εἰπεῖν εὔλογον, ὅτι εἰ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ τοῦτο µόνον ἐστὶν τὸ γινόµενον καὶ ἀπογινόµενον, οὐκέτι ἐν δύο τούτοις τῷ τε ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ περιείληφεν πάσας τὰς κατηγορίας· εἰ γὰρ τὸ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ µὴ πᾶσαν ποιότητα, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπείσακτον µόνην, οὐ πάντα ἂν εἴη τὰ γένη παρειληµµένα. ἢ χρὴ λέγειν ὅτι αἱ µὴ ἐπείσακτοι ποιότητες, ἀλλὰ συµπληρωτικαὶ τῆς οὐσίας, µέρη τῆς οὐσίας οὖσαι, καὶ αὐταὶ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συµπεριλαµβάνονται· τὰ γὰρ µέρη τῆς οὐσίας οὐσίαι κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη. καὶ ἴσως διὰ τοῦτο τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ εἶπεν ὑποκείµενον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειµένῳ, ἵνα καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας περιλάβῃ ποιότητας. (Porphyry In Cat. in Simplicius In Cat. 48.1-33; fr. 55 Smith).


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point while commenting on Aristotle’s two kinds of predication, ‘being in a subject’

and ‘being said of a subject’ (Cat. 1a24-25). At this point Porphyry takes the

opportunity to discuss the term ‘subject’ (hypokeimenon) and he distinguishes two

senses of it; one sense of ‘subject’ is that of qualityless matter (ἄποιος ὕλη), while

another sense of ‘subject’ is that illustrated by Socrates. It is with regard to the second

kind of subject that Porphyry distinguishes between essential and accidental quality.

His suggestion is that not every quality is in a subject, but this depends whether this is

of the first or the second kind. ‘White’ is in a subject in some cloth but is not in a

subject in snow; there rather is part of the substance.

Neither of these distinctions occur in Aristotle, however. And neither of them

are ontologically neutral. The distinction between essential and accidental quality

stems from Porphyry’s view that sensible substances are mere conglomerations of

qualities, a view we find earlier in Plotinus.50 Porphyry like Plotinus believes that

sensible entities, unlike intelligible ones, do not have essences, but they are made up

of qualities. Yet some qualities account for what something is, while others do not.

But this point, as I said, applies to ‘subject’ in the sense of individual substance.

Porphyry is surely justified to speak of subject in this sense in his commentary on the

Categories. One wonders, though, why Porphyry refers to qualityless matter, in such

a commentary.

This is not an isolated case of a reference to qualityless matter in the context

of Porphyry’s commenting on the Categories. We find a similar reference in a

scholium of Simplicius that probably derives from Porphyry’s Commentary to

50 For a disucssion of this issue in Plotinus and with references to texts and bibliography see G. Karamanolis, ‘Plotinus on quality and immanent Form”, in R. Chiaradonna and F. Trabattoni (ed.), Philosophy of Nature in Neoplatonism, Leiden 2009, 79-101.


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Categories ad Gedaleium and was published in 1987 by Sten Ebbesen.51 There

Simplicius jointly describes Alexander’s and Porphyry’s treatment of the relation

between the categories of quantity, relation, and quality and goes on to outline

Porphyry’s treatment of matter, where the latter distinguishes between prime matter,

qualityless body, and qualities. It is not entirely clear what the point of Porphyry’s

comment here is. If we look, though, at one of Simplicius’ reports of Porphyry’s

position in his longer commentary on the Categories, we notice some interesting

similarities with the preserved comment (Simplicius, In Cat. 158.27-33; fr. 67 Smith).

Simplicius tells us that Porphyry wanted to justify the order of the categories of

quantity, relation, and quality by arguing that the latter results from the combination

of quantity and relation. The comment goes on to say, presumably still reflecting

Porphyry’s comment, also Plato’s construction of the soul in the Timaeus (36ab)

happens through the application of musical quantities which are combined in a certain

proportion that results in a certain kind or quality of soul. The upshot is that for both

Aristotle and Plato the combination of quantity and relation brings about quality, so

the treatment of quality justifiably follows that of quantity and relation in Aristotle.

Simplicius’ report does not shed light, however, to Porphyry’s reference to

qualityless matter in the scholium mentioned above. A clearer reference to qualityless

matter occurs, though, in Porphyry’s commentary on the Physics. Porphyry brings up

the issue of non being and claims that according to Plato this exists as non-being. And

51 πολλοὶ ἑτέρως πως εἶπον προταγῆναι τὰ πρός τι τοῦ ποιοῦ. ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος δεικνὺς ὅτι φυσικῇ τάξει προετάγησαν τοῦτο πιστοῖ µὲν καὶ τὸν Ἐµπεδοκλέα παριστῶν δοξάζοντα πρώτως µὲν στοιχεῖα δ, ἐν οἷς εὐθὺς τὸ ποσόν. εἶτα συνερχόµενα καὶ εἰρηνεύοντα, ἐν ὧ ἡ σχέσις ἐν ᾗ τὰ πρός τι, τὸν νοητὸν ἀνελθεῖν* διάκοσµον. νεῖκος δὲ πάλιν σχόντα, ὅπερ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητάς ἐστιν ἐν ᾧ τὸ ποιόν, τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀναφαίνεσθαι**. ὁ δὲ Πορφύριος τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἀνείδεον ὕλην φησὶν πρώτως προβῆναι εἰς ἄποιον σῶµα. καὶ σὺν τούτῳ εὐθὺς ἅµα τριχῇ διαστατόν, µῆκος βάθος καὶ πλάτος, ἐν οἷς τὸ ποσόν. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις συµφυῶς τὸ µεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἅπερ τῶν πρός τι. καὶ τότε εἰς ποιότητας (Schol. in ms Laurentianus 72.15 [13th c.]; fol. 22) * ἀνελεῖν cod. ἀνελθεῖν Ebbesen ** ἐµφαίνεσθαι cod. ἀναφαίνεσθαι Ebbesen See S. Ebbesen, ‘Boethius as an Aristotelian Scholar’, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles Werk und Wirkung, Berlin/New York 1987, 286-311, at 309-311.


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he mentions as an example of such entity shapeless and formless matter (ἄµορφον καὶ

ἀνείδεον ὕλην; Simplicius, In Phys. 135.1-12; fr. 134 Smith) making reference to

Timaeus 27d, that is, to the beginning of Timaeus’ speech where he introduces the

issue of the coming into being of sensible entities. Apparently Porphyry discusses

matter, that is, qualityless matter, in conjunction with the quality that matter lacks.

And as the passage from the commentary in Physics shows, matter is considered as

non-being and something that comes into being when matter receives qualities or

logoi in Porphyry’s terms. The latter constitute the formal cause that is one of the

causes that account for the coming into being, as Porphyry suggests in his comment of

the beginning of Aristotle’s Physics (fr. 120 Smith) that I discussed earlier.

Porphyry’s views on matter and quality and the coming into being of sensible

entities is tightly related to the view that Porphyry takes on cosmogony, which he

expounds primarily in his commentary on the Timaeus.52 In his view creation consists

in the timeless flow of logoi from the divine mind.53 For Porphyry, who follows

Plotinus in this regard, sensible entities are made up of forms or logoi and only they

qualify as being, while matter as such is a non-being. Porphyry denies that matter is

the cause of disorder in the world, which is what earlier Platonists like Numenius

affirmed,54 and he even denies that matter should be first rendered suitable for

52 Porphyry also wrote a treatise on matter, allegedly in 7 books, from which we have one fragment (fr. 236 Smith). Porphyry appears to be taking over from Moderatus on this regard. On Porphyry’s views on matter and cosmogony see Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?, op. cit. 277-284 and A. Smith, ‘The Significance of ‘Physics’ in Porphyry. The problem of Body and Matter’, in J. Wilberding and C. Horn (ed.), Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature, Oxford 2012, 30-43. 53 αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος ἀχρόνως ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης παραγίνεται τῷ ὑποκειµένῳ, πάντων ἐξαιρεθέντων τῶν ἐµποδών. καὶ εἰ µηδὲν ἦν καὶ τούτοις ἐµπόδιον, τό τε εἶδος ἀθρόως ἂν τῇ ὕλῃ προσῆγον…τί θαυµαστὸν τὸν δηµιουργὸν αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν τὸ πᾶν ὑπόστασιν παρέχεσθαι τῷ αἰσθητῷ, ἀύλως µὲν παράγοντα τὸ ἔνυλον, ἀναφῶς δὲ ἐκτείνοντα τὸ ἁπτόν, ἀµερῶς δὲ ἐκτείνοντα τό διαστατόν; (Porphyry, In Timaeum fr. LI Sodano p. 38.11-29, in Proclus, In Tim. I.396.2-18). Cf. Ζεῦς δὲ καθὸ νοῦς, ἀφ᾽ οὗ προφέρει πάντα και δηµιουργεῖ τοῖς νοήµασιν…λόγοις σπερµατικοῖς ἀπετέλει τὰ πάντα (Porphyry De cultu simulacrorum in Eusebius P.E. III.9.3; fr. 345.43-51 Smith) 54 Cf. Numenius fr. 52 Des Places and the discussion in G. Karamanolis, ‘Numenius’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2013 (revised), section ‘Metaphysics’.


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acquiring the forms, as perhaps Atticus suggested.55 For Porphyry there is nothing

intermediate between forms, logoi, and matter. For Porphyry these logoi are on the

one hand qualities of the sensible things that constitute a sensible entity and on the

other thoughts or concepts of the divine mind. They must be identical with the

νοήµατα of which Porphyry talks in Sententiae 43, when he speaks about the activity

of the intellect.56 There Porphyry argues for the identity of the intellect with its

thoughts, the νοήµατα, which account for the multiplicity of the intellect, and this in

turn suggests to Porphyry that the intellect cannot be the first principle, given its

plurality.

As we have seen earlier on, however, for Porphyry it is not only the divine

mind that has νοήµατα, but also the human one. Porphyry speaks of what we think of

(νοοῦµεν), the objects of our thinking, in a number of passages. In a passage from his

short commentary on the Categories that has been much debated in scholarship,

Porphyry deals with the way we come to think of common predicates or universals.57

He first claims that it is impossible to think of (νoοῦµεν) ox, man, or horse in general

(ὅλως) apart from particulars (καθ᾽ἕκαστον), and he proceeds to claim that ‘it is from

the perception of particulars that we come to conceive of the common predicate,

which we no longer think as a ‘this’, but as a ‘such’ (τοιόνδε), than if the particular

55 Proclus, In Tim. I.394.16-19 (missing from the collection of Atticus fragments by Des Places). See W. Deuse, Untersuchungen zur mittelplatonischen und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre, Wiesbaden 1983, 241-2 and A. Smith, ‘The Significance of ‘Physics’ in Porphyry. The problem of Body and Matter’, op. cit. 36-37. 56 Ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ πάντων· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς, πρὸ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἕν. ὅτι δὲ πολλὰ ὁ νοῦς δῆλον· νοεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ νοήµατα οὐχ ἓν ὄντα, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα ὄντα παρ’ ἐκεῖνον. εἰ οὖν ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, ἐκεῖνα δὲ πολλά, πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ νοῦς. (5) Ὅτι δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τοῖς νοητοῖς, οὕτως δείκνυται· εἰ γάρ τι ἔστιν ὃ θεωρεῖ, ἤτοι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχων τοῦτο θεωρήσει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ κείµενον. καὶ ὅτι µὲν θεωρεῖ δῆλον· σὺν γὰρ τῷ νοεῖν εἴη ἂν νοῦς, ἀφαιρεθεὶς δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν ἀφῄρηται τῆς οὐσίας. δεῖ τοίνυν ἐπιστήσαντας τοῖς πάθεσιν ἃ (10) συµβαίνει περὶ τὰς γνώσεις ἀνιχνεῦσαι τὴν ἐκείνου θεωρίαν. γνωστικαὶ δὲ δυνάµεις ἐν ἡµῖν ἀθρόον αἴσθησις, φαντασία, νοῦς. (Porphyry, Sententiae 43.1-12). Cf. Plotinus, Enn. V.3.3. See also the discussion in L. Brisson (ed.), Porphyre Sentences, Paris 2005, vol. 2, 752-755. 57 See M. Tweedale, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Views on Universals’, Phronesis 29 (1984), 279-303 and R. Bodéüs, Porphyre Commentaire aux Catégories d’Aristote, Paris 2008, 249-251.


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animals are eliminated, what is predicated in common with them will no longer exist

either’ (In Cat. 91.2-5). Porphyry talks about concepts also when he argues that words

like ‘man’ refer to the entire class of men on the basis of which we come to conceive

(ἐνοήσαµεν) man (In Cat. 90.31-91.1). And in a fragment from his long commentary

on the Categories he distinguishes the concept (ἐπίνοια) of the allocated predicate

from that of the non-allocated one (fr. 56 Smith).

This evidence brings us back to Porphyry’s theory of concepts. There are

apparently differents kinds of them and there is an issue regarding the relation

between universals and concepts. I do not want to enter into the details of all that.

Some aspects of his theory are relatively clear, however. In his commentary on

Ptolemy’s Harmonics Porphyry suggests that it is our faculty of phantasia that grasps

the sense image, that is, the form that is immanent in a thing, and stores it in the soul

as concept.58 Further in the same text Porphyry tells us that ‘the intellect comes to be

of that of which there is knowledge and concept of the form (eidos) that has provided

matter its entire shape’. Now, the shapes of morphê that we grasp and store as

concepts are derived from the divine intellect, since, a I said, the coming into being of

everything in the world amounts to the flow of the logoi from the divine intellect.

Porphyry makes this clear in several passages, and he argues that this transmission of

logoi or forms is not to be thought as a process but as something that happened with

58 oὕτω καὶ αὕτη τοῦ πράγµατος ἅπασαν τὴν µορφὴν ἐκλογιζοµένη, ὁπόταν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀκριβώσῃ, τότε ἀπέθετο ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ εἶδος. καὶ τοῦτο ἦν ἡ ἔννοια, ἧς ἐγγενοµένης τε καὶ βεβαιωθείσης ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήµης ἐγγίνεται διάθεσις, ἀφ’ ἧς ὥσπερ ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς ὁ νοῦς ἀναφαίνεται οἷόν περ ὄψις ἀκριβὴς εἰς τὴν προσβολὴν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ὄντως ὄν. καὶ διὰ µὲν τῆς ἀντιλήψεως ἀρξαµένης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ µαθούσης τὸ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐνυπάρχον εἶδος, διὰ δὲ τῆς ὑπολήψεως, ὅτι τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ταὐτὸ τῷ δείξαντι τὸ δειχθὲν παραδεξαµένης· διὰ δὲ τῆς φαντασίας ὅτι καὶ τοιόνδε προσεξειργασµένης κατὰ τὸν εἰκονισµόν, ὁποῖον ἦν τὸ ἐκτός· διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐννοίας ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου µετελθούσης εἰς τὴν ἄυλον ἀπόθεσιν τοῦ εἴδους, µεθ’ ἣν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ βέβαιον προσλαβοῦσα ἡ ἐπιστήµη καθαρὸν τὸν ἔπειτα καθόλου νοῦν ἐπιβλητικὸν λαµβάνει. διὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς γίνεται ἐκείνου, οὗ ἐπιστήµη καὶ ἔννοια τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ παρέχοντος τὴν ὅλην µορφὴν τῇ ὕλῃ. καὶ ἔστι τὸ γινόµενον τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις, ἀπὸ κοίλης γλυφῆς δακτυλίου ἐναποτυπωθέντος καὶ ἐναποµαχθείσης τῆς σφραγῖδος µετεώρου, πάλιν αὖθις ἀπ’ ἐκείνης τυπώσειεν εἰς ἑτέραν ὕλην τὴν σφραγῖδα. (Porphyry, In Ptol. Harm. 14.1-18)


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no lapse of time (ἀθρόως; Porphyry, In Timaeum in Proclus, In Tim. 396.2-18; fr. LI

Sodano p. 38.11-29, cited in n. 52). A testimony of Simplicius suggests that Porphyry

brought up a similar case of coming into being also in his commentary on the Physics

(Simplicius, In Phys.106.27-107.25; fr. 131 Smith).59 Simplicius may be paraphrasing

and summarizing Porphyry here, but several of his phrases look remarkably

Porphyrian. We are told, for instance, that some sensible things begin their change in

the sense of alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) altogether (ἀθρόως), that is, he explains, all their

parts change simultaneously. Simplicius explains that in this case the term ἀθρόως

does not mean ‘without lapse of time’ (ἄχρονον) but rather ‘the simultaneity in the

change of all parts together’ (τὸ ὁµοῦ πάντων τῶν µερῶν). Apparently Simplicius

is aware of the use of ἀθρόως that Porphyry makes with regard to the world’s coming

into being in the Timaeus. We see, then, that Porphyry applies one conceptual tool,

the idea of simultaneity, in two different senses: first, the sense of timeless

simultaneity that applies to coming into being of the world and, second, the sense of

homogeneous simultaneity of change that applies in the alteration of sensible entities.

Τhe former applies to change that happens as a result of God’s presence, the latter not.

The former is invoked in Porphyry’s commentary on Timaeus, the latter in his

commentary on the Physics. Porphyry wrote commentaries on both these works

59 ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀλλοιούµενα γίνεσθαι λέγεται καὶ γένεσίς τίς ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις (γίνεται γὰρ λευκὸν ἐκ µέλανος καὶ θερµὸν ἐκ ψυχροῦ), ἐπὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γινόµενον ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγµα, ἀλλ’ ἔνια καὶ ἀθρόως καθ’ ὅλα τὰ µέρη αὐτῶν (30) ἄρχεται ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὡς ἔχει τὰ πηγνύµενα, ὧν οὐκ ἀπό τινος µέρους ἡ κατὰ τὴν πῆξιν ἄρχεται µεταβολή, ἀλλ’ ὅλα ἀθρόως ἄρχεται τῆς πήξεως καὶ προκόπτει κατ’ αὐτὴν ἀθρόως πάντα, τοῦ ἀθρόου ὡς οἶµαι οὐ τὸ (107.) ἄχρονον δηλοῦντος, ὡς Πορφύριος ἤκουσε, καὶ πειρᾶται ἄχρονον κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὁµοῦ πάντων τῶν µερῶν. ἡ γὰρ πῆξις καὶ ὁ φωτισµὸς τοῦ ἀέρος οὐκ ἄχρονος γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἔχει τὴν κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀρχὴν τόδε τοῦ χρόνου τὸ µέρος, ἀθρόα δὲ πάντα πάσχει τὰ µόρια τὸ πάθος· ἢ ὁτιοῦν µέρος ἀθρόως ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ αὐτὸ ἐπ’ ἄπειρον ὂν (5) διαιρετὸν καὶ οὐ κατὰ µόριόν τι πρῶτον πάσχον, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Ζ ταύτης τῆς πραγµατείας δείξει λέγων ‘οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ µεταβεβληκότος ἐστί τι πρότερον ὃ µεταβέβληκεν’. ἔτι δὲ σαφέστερον ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ βιβλίῳ ταῦτα γέγραφεν ‘ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλοιώσεως ὁποιασοῦν· οὐ γὰρ εἰ µεριστὸν εἰς ἄπειρον τὸ ἀλλοιούµενον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, (10) ἀλλ’ ἀθρόα γίνεται πολλάκις ὥσπερ ἡ πῆξις’. (Porphyry, In Phys. in Simplicius, In Phys. 106.27-107.25; fr. 131 Smith)


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apparently because he perceived in them a number of similarities that extent from the

subject matter, to the method, and to more specific philosophical views that are taken.

Now one might still be tempted to think that Porphyry turns to Plato when he

speaks about the intelligible world and to Aristotle when the sensible world and its

phenomena come to play. This, however, is not quite right. For a Platonist like

Porphyry the intelligible world is present in the sensible one and accounts for its

existence and the existence of everything in it. As Plotinus shows in treatises like

Enneads I.6, III.8, and V.8, the sensible world exists and is of a certain kind because

it is informed and illuminated by the intelligible world.60 Sensible entities exist

because of the Forms that are immanent in them and give them identity. These are the

enmattered divine logoi, the thoughts in God’s intellect on the one hand, and also the

the forms that we, humans, abstract from sensibles, when we are perceive them, we

store in our soul, and by means of which we cognize them.

If this is so, it turns out then that Porphyry maintains an ontological relation

between perceptibles and intelligibles such that the former can be thought of by

humans and further communicated to others. Porphyry actually tells in his

commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics that ‘human reason imitates the demiurgic

reason that governs the way forms become instantiated in matter’ (In Ptol. Harm.

12.18-20). And he further tells us that, by articulating a linguistic expression, we

come to give shape to a concept. When we use significant words of the first

imposition we capture in the form of concepts, the logoi of the sensible entities, which

we further communicate them to others by means of language.61 It seems, then, that

there is some correspondence between the divine thoughts or concepts and the human 60 See further J. Rist, Plotinus. The Road to Reality, Cambridge 1967, 53-65 and D. O’Meara, An Introduction to the Enneads, Oxford 1993, 88-99. 61 Riccardo Chiaradonna, ‘Porphyry and Iamblichus on Universals’, op.cit. p. 153 makes a similar, albeit more moderate claim, I believe, when he says that ‘Porphyry identified the universal synonymous predicates with the abstractions of immanent incorporeal forms’.


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concepts. Both are the same logoi or forms. The difference is that God generates

them, while humans only capture them and cognize them. This, however, means that

there is according to Porphyry an isomorphism between the way the world is created

and organized and the way we conceive it, we understand it, and we talk about it.

This takes us a step further from the isomorphism between words and things,

between language and reality, to an isomorphism between the intelligible and the

sensible world. It is because Porphyry takes the view that there is an isomorphic

relation between intelligibles and perceptibles in the way I outlined above that he

keeps referring in his two commentaries on the Categories to qualities, concepts, and

matter. In them he covers one side of this relation, that between names, things and

human concepts. In his commentary on the Sophist on the other hand Porphyry

discusses the relation between Forms, that is being, and matter, that is, non-being.

This investigation bears heavily on the issue of how things come to be, which he

explores in his commentaries on the Physics and the Timaeus. The evidence from

Porphyry’s commentaries suggests that to his eyes Aristotle continues the inquiry into

topics that Plato first broached and deals with them in ways that constitute a

development of Plato’s thinking.

IV. Why commentaries?

If it is the case that in his Aristotelian commentaries Porphyry takes the opportunity to

advance his views on traditional Platonist questions for which he finds Aristotle’s

works highly relevant, one may still ask why he did not write treatises on these topics.

As we know, Porphyry did write a number of treatises on philosophical topics as well.

We know that he wrote treatises on matter, on principles, on incorporeals, on sense


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perception (op. 26, 27, 28, 35 Smith), and also on the faculties of the soul (frs. 251-

255) and on what is up to us (frs. 268-271).

Platonists and Peripatetics of this age have two complementary and

interconnected tasks to carry out; one is to take positions on crucial philosophical

questions, the other is to articulate charitable and sophisticated intrepretations of the

texts of their school authorities. This, however, is one project rather than two. This is

because the philosophical positions of later Platonists and Peripatetics are crystallized

in dialogue with the texts of their school authorities. This makes their task difficult,

complex and demanding, because their philosophical views must be such that they do

justice to the sophistication, the caliber, and the philosophical outlook of their school

authorities. One difficulty here is to remain close to the spirit of the classical

philosophers. This is the challenge that Plotinus too is facing, when he appeals to the

wish (βούληµα) of Plato. It is this wish for loyalty to the spirit of the classical texts, I

suggest, that drives Porphyry to write commentaries. After all, only if one studies

Aristotle’s texts closely enough, one can realize their Platonist background and the

Platonist concerns that underly them.

V. Conclusion

Let me summarize the argument of this paper. I have argued that Porphyry wrote

commentaries on works of Aristotle because he found these works to represent an

elaboration on and a development of, Plato’s philosophy. This is a development in the

sense that Aristotle centers on philosophical issues which Plato first explored and he

did so in a manner and with a method inspired by Plato, which is why Aristotle often

takes views similar to those of Plato. Porphyry does not deny that Aristotle often


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explores new territory; this is actually one reason why Porphyry devotes so much

energy in studying and expounding Aristotle. What Porphyry does deny is that

Aristotle contradicts the essence of Plato’s philosophical views. This is not something

that Pophyry argues out in his commentaries. This view rather lies in the background

and is implicit. The point of Porphyry’s Aristotelian commentaries is the same that

applies to his writing of Plato commentaries. That is, Porphyry in his commentaries

sets out to substantiate his views on philosophical topics like causation, cosmogony,

matter, the nature of linguistic items and their relation to things, concept formation

and so on with reference to the texts of the Platonist tradition in philosophy. And this

tradition, Porphyry thinks, crucially include also Aristotle.

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