Conference Proceeding on Design Management Overview of Dubai International Airport

Nikhil Mohan, 29th

October, 2013, Robert Gordon University

Design management has the key role to play in any project from the inception to the final completion

stage. Moreover, design also affects the usage of the structure as well (Lawson 1990). Project that is

considered for the case study is the Dubai International Airport Terminal 3 along with concourses and

permission to conduct this study has been taken from Department of Civil Aviation, Dubai (Appendix

- 1). Even the history of the airport since its start during 1937 is taken into account. It is a well-known

fact that Dubai is one among the world’s fastest growing business hub and tourist attraction. City

emerged from zero and the sand dunes supports sky scrapers including the world’s tallest building

‘Burj-Khalifa’. All these were made possible by the step by step planning process made by several

architects, designers, space planners and civil engineers.

Milestones in the Dubai International Airport have been mentioned in the Appendix - 2 which

overviews from 1959 to present since, expansion activities are still under progress to make the airport

first among the world. Cost, quality and time being the ‘Iron-triangle’ for any project, the main

attention was focussed towards that by the Client during the start of project. History of the aviation in

Dubai starts from 1937 while the Ruler of Dubai signed an agreement for monthly rental of an air

base and this continued for more than two decades. Finally, a proposal for construction of a new

airport was made in 1959 by Costain Group PLC, UK and the official opening took place on

September 30, 1960. The construction activities for most part of the airport took place smoothly until

Terminal – 2 completions. There were no such major issues faced in the design, time, cost and quality

since, proper planning was made to the maximum extent possible. (Basar 2007)

Fig 1 Location Map of Dubai International Airport (Source: Google Maps)

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Terminal – 3

Terminal – 3 of this International Airport in Dubai, United Arab Emirates became the world’s largest

airport terminal building soon after its opening on October 14, 2008 with an area of 1, 713, 000 m2

and passenger capacity of 60 million passengers. Operational and statistics which includes the

passenger, air freight and air craft movements have been mentioned in the Appendix - 3.

Dubai Airports CEO Paul Griffiths said:

“The growth in passenger traffic has been nothing short of phenomenal this year with a monthly

average of 5.4 million customers and we are set to exceed our target of 65.4 million for the year.

Dubai International’s total capacity increased to 75 million passengers per year when Concourse A

was opened in January 2013 and this will be followed by the opening of Concourse D in early 2015.

We continue to focus on improving our facilities and customer service as our infrastructure

development program keeps pace with our healthy traffic growth.”

(Source: Air Transport World, 2014)

This has a pretty long story of chaos to say right from the beginning of inception driving to feasibility,

construction and completion stages. Moreover, all the issues pertained from the design and

involvement of several companies. Client was in need of an extra ordinary airport building that would

one among the first in the world with respect to floor area and passenger handling capacity. This was

accomplished by the design team whereas, the operational stage failed and a resulted in a huge time

delay. As a result, the cost increased and constraints developed in terms of cost, time and

misinterpretation of design by the client and designers. Failure to manage the design capabilities was

mainly due to the design illiteracy and suffering from cost constraints.

Terminal – 3 constructions started on 2004 with an estimated budget of $4.0 billion and completion

by 2006 whereas, it was delayed by 2 years. The key factors responsible for the delay of the project

includes design, cost and global recession.

“The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the Global Financial Crisis and 2008 financial

crisis, is considered by many economists the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the

1930s. It resulted in the threat of total collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by

national governments, and downturns in stock markets around the world. In many areas, the housing

market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. The crisis

played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in

trillions of U.S. dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global

recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The active phase of the crisis,

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which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas

terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing - a complete evaporation of liquidity”.

(Source: Wikipedia)

Emirates and Dubai Airports being the client collaborated with Greater Toronto Airports Authority

(GTAA) for the project. The allocated budget for the entire project was increased to $4.55 billion

towards the completion due to several factors like design management, client’s lack of control and

poor briefing on projects. This gave rise to fluctuations in the ideas for the designers and constraints

faced in terms of cost and time. These factors are discussed in detail giving prime focus on

determinants, generators and constraints.

Determinants

Aéroport de Paris International (ADPi), France being the main design consultant for the Terminal – 3

projects who made the innovative and ground-breaking design for the new terminal in the shape of an

airplane wing and 1 km in length. Concourse 3 being a part of same terminal was designed by

different team of Dar Al-Handasah which lead to several difficulties in inter-linking the main terminal

to the concourse. Both designers were forced to conduct several meetings, model analysis, site visits

and interactions with client thereby consuming a major amount of time. However, with all these ideas

and design, the final shape was released.

Initial area planned for the concourse was not accepted by the client and further recommendation was

made to create a satisfactory design in all aspects. These situations lead the designers to rethink on

several perspectives in order to attain the most accurate area required to handle the maximum

passenger capacity. Client’s intention was very clear when they denied the initial proposal of

designers and endorsed them to provide more area. Since, Dubai is one of the growing business hubs

for most of the countries in the world and number of air routes being large to anywhere in the world,

the airport intended as well should have high capacity to handle the passengers.

The roof for the terminal was very complex because of its curved design and the span. With due

respect to the understanding of complexity in the roof, client appointed a new team solely for the roof

structure. This give rise to a major issue which pertained soon after the civil engineering contractor

was appointed for only the concrete construction, reinforcement and water proofing for a contract

value of $545 million. The chances of conflict among contractors for roof and civil was too high.

Above all these factors, lack of knowledge to understand the design concept prevails among most of

the contractors and that routine was clearly visible in this project as well.

Dubai has the largest driverless metro rail in the world which connects several parts of the city and

avoids traffic congestions in the road. Client proposed in the due course of completion of Terminal 3

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to link the airport with the metro network by introducing a foot over bridge with automatic conveyors

to the Terminal.

Generators

Client, designers and contractors were clear on their objectives but, in different perspectives.

Inclusion of several companies to complete a single project often becomes chaotic and difficult to

manage. The situation in this case was also no way different from the above scenario or even worse.

The number of meetings conducted by making the client involve would be one of the largest

compared to any major projects in the world.

Performances graph on passenger capacity (Fig 2) shows the tremendous increase of the 0.04 million

in 1960 to 47.2 million in 2010. This huge difference was considered towards the completion of the

project and even a provision was made to handle up to 60 million passengers. The terminal has

1,713,000 m2 (18,440,000 ft

2) of floor area and 15,000m² (161,400ft²) of retail space with the steel

frame roof and glass facades.

Paul Griffiths, CEO, Dubai Airports told in an interview;

“With Concourse 3 construction going ahead as planned and with some adjustments within our

existing facilities, including Terminal 2, we will be able to increase Dubai International's capacity to

80 million per year. This will bring us closer to the capacity of the world's biggest airport, Atlanta,

which has a capacity of around 89 million.” (Source: Gulf News)

Fig 2 Performance Graph – Passenger Handling Capacity (Source: DAFZ)

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Connecting the terminal area to the concourse was the first issue attended since, in no shape of the

roof allowed easy access to the concourse. The section shown in the Fig 3 clearly states the

complexity in section to make use of the area. Initial proposal was to provide lifts and escalators

together in central area to bifurcate the retail sections for view from single perspective. Model

analysed with this design aspect concluded that by following this will lead to congestions in the both

ends were the curvature of the roof obstructs the easy movement.

Fig 3 Cross-section showing complexity of roof (Source: ADPi)

Final discussions with the designer and the client confirmed to add the escalators and lifts opposite to

each other so that maximum area is utilised in the lounge. This even created a better aesthetic view

from every point. The designers dedicated most of the time for the contractor to understand the design

concept. Even with several failures in the capturing of the concept by the contractor, the client let

them on-board. The decision was made by considering the fewer amounts of time available and

increase in cost of materials that was estimated earlier.

The plan for introducing a connection with the metro and terminal made redesign for the front

elevation of the airport since, previous plans were to introduce a multi-level car parking space in the

whole area proposed. This ultimately transformed the entire design plan and a new location was

selected for the car parking.

Constraints

The delays made in design approval and decision making resulted in contractor mobilisation to 2005

which showed a delay of a year. General contractor was a joint venture by Al Habtoor Engineering,

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Dubai, UAE, Murray & Roberts, South Africa and Takenaka Corporation Dubai, UAE and Cleveland

Bridge & Engineering Middle East LLC, Dubai was appointed for the civil and structural steel works

respectively by the client without any discussions with the designers. The project continued with quiet

a high speed during the start but slowed down when it came to connection of the roof structure.

Decision making being the key factor in any project to ascertain the pace and complete according to

the schedule failed in most of the areas.

Client’s interest to increase the concourse area was expressed during the pre-construction stage which

ultimately leads to the increase in cost as shown in the Fig 4. Even though, designers attended the

issue in a well-planned and organized manner in order to eliminate the delays incurred due to this

change but, were not successful to the planned extent. Quick and speedy execution of the work was

demanded by the client at all points of execution and changes were also made in design in main areas

as well. The contractors and designers were in no way able to appreciate the client’s requirement in

certain areas and that took several days to persuade the client on the negative outcomes of these

deviations.

Fig 4 Scope of change and cost (Source: Code of Practice for Project Management)

Roof material used for the project was GRP (Glass Reinforced Plastic) made available by Armstrong

Metal Ceiling Group Europe. The entire structure fabricated included 218,400 m2 of metal ceilings

and walls. It had 29 designers in 2 design teams to implement the whole the roof lining, interior, wall

cladding and ceiling. They developed a model illustrating the complexity of the structure and the

curvature of the roof in detail which made the client to understand the final output. There were

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numerous detailed sections connecting the roof which starts from one end at ground level and ends in

the other.

Interview with Bruce Neave from Murray & Roberts:

“During the construction of Terminal 3, Concourse 2, 218 400 m2 of metal ceilings and walls were

produced by Armstrong, which corresponds to an area of around 30 football fields. Discover in a

conversation with Bruce Neave, the project director from Murray & Roberts, South Africa, why

Armstrong was awarded the contract for the ceilings and walls.” (Source: Armstrong Project Report)

Despite of detailing all the complexities involved in the roof, the construction team faced many

technical issues in placing the roof with level to each floor which again resulted in revisions and

thereby leading to time consumption.

With increased market cost of materials towards the end of the project and global recession added the

major cost constraint. It is worth mentioning about a factor which affected the project indirectly that is

construction of world’s tallest building ‘Burj-Khalifa’ during the same time of airport project. ‘Burj-

Khalifa’ being the prestigious project for the country, government was not ready to accept any delay

in completion even if that was due to the global crisis. This lead most of the cash flow to that project

and that made delay in payment for the contractors on time for the airport project because client

involved was same for both. (Murel and O’Connell 2011)

Major unexpected drawback in the terminal construction showed its face towards the end which made

the project literally ‘full stop’. This hindrance was due to the unsuccessful implementation of the roof

base by the contracting team. The situations lead to selection of an alternative contracting company

exclusively for roof base construction. The company emerged in full speed by keeping the time factor

in every step and were completely successful in the job. But, even then the change of contractor at the

last instant of a project obviously makes delay which was about half a year. The change in design for

the metro shows the clear illiteracy and improper management from client and designer. This in turn,

resulted in the unforeseen delays and an additional cost for construction.

After the completion of structure and implementing all the equipment’s, the snagging and handing

over was not possible due to lack of knowledge in the new systems for the team. This was made

possible by a programme named Operational Readiness, Activation and Transition (ORAT) carrying

out world’s largest airport trails. ORAT was made successful by consulting various stakeholders to

understand their roles in each phase of the project and running 60 trails over a period of 6 months with

3500 volunteers. Finally, the project was completed to full extent with a delay of 2 years from

estimated completion time. (Murel and O’Connell 2011)

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Quality

Dubai International Airport Terminal – 3 faced numerous delays and high cost since its start towards

the completion. However, the client focused mainly on the quality of the building since and was not

ready to compromise in the aspect of quality. This was the only area in the project were all the

perspectives of client, designer and contractor showed the similarity. Hence, the result showed a

building with no quality failure. Client needed the implementation of Information Communication

Technology (ICT) in the airport to link all the features through computer networks and was made

possible by a specially assigned IT contracting company. They made a central system which linked all

the key areas of the airport including aviation, security, mechanical, electrical, logistics,

communication, operations and maintenance thereby, making a fully operational ICT enabled airport

in all aspects. (Khanna 2013)

Lessons

The over-rising lessons of this well-intentioned project dogged by difficulties include the following;

1. Failure to establish a realistic brief

Client’s brief was explained to the design team but the inclusion of two teams for the same

project made more complications. Idea fetched by each designer varied and that lead to

different conclusions. (Allinson 1997)

2. Failure to manage the lines of authority

Number of contractors appointed for each activity is most common in all the major projects.

But, when the client appoints all the contractors, it creates chaos and the total organisation

and reporting structure is affected. (Allinson 1997)

3. Failure to follow suitable procurement strategy

The design and build or construction management procurement strategy would have been

taken into account so as to avoid the direct involvement of the client in every part of the

project. This mainly creates difference in opinion and misinterpretation of the ideas.

4. Misconception on ‘control’

Control over any project states the behaviour of the project as whole and team working within

it. The increased amount of contracting companies reporting to the client will make any

project suffer to the worst extent and thereby resulting in a failure which has the least chance

to reequip. (Allinson 1997)

5. Poor communication

Designer and contractor lacked the proper communication which in turn resulted in the wrong

implementation of the design idea and rework in the entire design leading to delay in the

completion. (Jerrard and Hands 1990)

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6. Perceived risk

Project faced unexpected risks in several areas including cost due to global crisis and delay in

completion due to other major projects. This practice must be minimised by giving equal

importance to all the projects and avoiding the changes in design repeatedly by the client.

(Jerrard and Hands 1990)

Conclusion

The case-study of Dubai International Airport Terminal – 3 investigates clearly the key determinants,

generators and constraints associated with the project from inception to completion. The quality of the

project has also been considered to analyse the failures but, there was no visible quality issues in the

project. Cost and time were the major constraints in the project which lead to increase in cost and

delay of the entire project. Project strategy selected failed in many areas throughout the project since,

change in design was the most common thing revealed by the client in almost all the levels. Decision

making by the client and inefficiency in selection of contractors showed a drastic consequence in the

overall project. The lessons learned from this project will act as ‘knowledge’ for the similar type of

projects and outlines the methods to recover from all the negative factors. Although, with all these

issues the project completed its final stage and is one among the best airports in the world as client

was in need for.

Bibliography

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KHANNA, A., ed., 2013. The superlative city: Dubai and the urban condition in the early

twenty-first century. Cambridge: Aga Khan Programme Book Series

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Britain, GB: Butterworth Architecture

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applications. 1st ed. Oxon: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

ALLINSON, K., 1997. Getting there by design. Oxford: Architectural Press

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reach their traffic objectives. Research in Transportation Business and Management, 1(1),

pp. 36-46.

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Appendix 1

Milestones (1959-2013)

1959 Construction of Terminal 1 Started

1960 First airfield officially opened

1963 Construction of Asphalt runway started

1965 New runway opened with taxiways, hangers, navigational aids

1966

Inauguration of airport with first big jets of Middle East

1969

Served 9 airlines to 20 destinations

1970

Plan of new terminal building (3 storeys, 110 m long & 13,400 sq. mt.)

1972

Completed airport fire stations and generators

1973

Long-range surveillance system commissioned

1976

Hangar style building constructed

1978

Expansion of airport restaurant, transit lounge and kitchen completed

1980

Became member of Airports Council International (ACI)

1984

Second Runway opened 3 months ahead of schedule

1990

Series of aircraft flew between Europe and Southeast Asia nonstop due to effect of Soviet

Union breakup and availability of Russian airspace

1997 Development of new master plan for Terminal 2, Concourse 1 and Terminal 3 (Phase 1 and

Phase 2)

1998

Terminal 2 fully operational

2000

Concourse 1 opened

2003

Reconfiguration of runway system part of phase 2

2004

Expansion of apron and taxiways

2004

Construction of Terminal 3 started phase 2

2005

Dubai Flower Centre for import and export of flowers with special facility

2006

Planned year of completion for Terminal 3 delayed

2008

Construction of Terminal 3 completed (delay 2 years)

2009

Terminal 2 expanded to take 5 million passengers annually

2012

Terminal 2 airport capacity of 80 million passenger

2013 Construction of Cargo Mega Terminal Started with expected completion by 2018 (Capacity 3

million tonnes cargo per year)

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Appendix 2

Operations and Statistics – Dubai International Airport

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Appendix 3

Photographs showing progress of construction activities

Photographs: Dubai International Airport in 1969 (Above) and Expansion during 1998 (Below)

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Photographs: Terminal -3 in 2005 (Above) and Completed Terminal -3 in 2008 (Below)

Photo Courtesy: Hisham Al Faizal, Department of Civil Aviation, Dubai