Conference Proceeding on Design Management Overview of Dubai International Airport
Nikhil Mohan, 29th
October, 2013, Robert Gordon University
Design management has the key role to play in any project from the inception to the final completion
stage. Moreover, design also affects the usage of the structure as well (Lawson 1990). Project that is
considered for the case study is the Dubai International Airport Terminal 3 along with concourses and
permission to conduct this study has been taken from Department of Civil Aviation, Dubai (Appendix
- 1). Even the history of the airport since its start during 1937 is taken into account. It is a well-known
fact that Dubai is one among the world’s fastest growing business hub and tourist attraction. City
emerged from zero and the sand dunes supports sky scrapers including the world’s tallest building
‘Burj-Khalifa’. All these were made possible by the step by step planning process made by several
architects, designers, space planners and civil engineers.
Milestones in the Dubai International Airport have been mentioned in the Appendix - 2 which
overviews from 1959 to present since, expansion activities are still under progress to make the airport
first among the world. Cost, quality and time being the ‘Iron-triangle’ for any project, the main
attention was focussed towards that by the Client during the start of project. History of the aviation in
Dubai starts from 1937 while the Ruler of Dubai signed an agreement for monthly rental of an air
base and this continued for more than two decades. Finally, a proposal for construction of a new
airport was made in 1959 by Costain Group PLC, UK and the official opening took place on
September 30, 1960. The construction activities for most part of the airport took place smoothly until
Terminal – 2 completions. There were no such major issues faced in the design, time, cost and quality
since, proper planning was made to the maximum extent possible. (Basar 2007)
Fig 1 Location Map of Dubai International Airport (Source: Google Maps)
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Terminal – 3
Terminal – 3 of this International Airport in Dubai, United Arab Emirates became the world’s largest
airport terminal building soon after its opening on October 14, 2008 with an area of 1, 713, 000 m2
and passenger capacity of 60 million passengers. Operational and statistics which includes the
passenger, air freight and air craft movements have been mentioned in the Appendix - 3.
Dubai Airports CEO Paul Griffiths said:
“The growth in passenger traffic has been nothing short of phenomenal this year with a monthly
average of 5.4 million customers and we are set to exceed our target of 65.4 million for the year.
Dubai International’s total capacity increased to 75 million passengers per year when Concourse A
was opened in January 2013 and this will be followed by the opening of Concourse D in early 2015.
We continue to focus on improving our facilities and customer service as our infrastructure
development program keeps pace with our healthy traffic growth.”
(Source: Air Transport World, 2014)
This has a pretty long story of chaos to say right from the beginning of inception driving to feasibility,
construction and completion stages. Moreover, all the issues pertained from the design and
involvement of several companies. Client was in need of an extra ordinary airport building that would
one among the first in the world with respect to floor area and passenger handling capacity. This was
accomplished by the design team whereas, the operational stage failed and a resulted in a huge time
delay. As a result, the cost increased and constraints developed in terms of cost, time and
misinterpretation of design by the client and designers. Failure to manage the design capabilities was
mainly due to the design illiteracy and suffering from cost constraints.
Terminal – 3 constructions started on 2004 with an estimated budget of $4.0 billion and completion
by 2006 whereas, it was delayed by 2 years. The key factors responsible for the delay of the project
includes design, cost and global recession.
“The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the Global Financial Crisis and 2008 financial
crisis, is considered by many economists the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the
1930s. It resulted in the threat of total collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by
national governments, and downturns in stock markets around the world. In many areas, the housing
market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. The crisis
played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in
trillions of U.S. dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008–2012 global
recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The active phase of the crisis,
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which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas
terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing - a complete evaporation of liquidity”.
(Source: Wikipedia)
Emirates and Dubai Airports being the client collaborated with Greater Toronto Airports Authority
(GTAA) for the project. The allocated budget for the entire project was increased to $4.55 billion
towards the completion due to several factors like design management, client’s lack of control and
poor briefing on projects. This gave rise to fluctuations in the ideas for the designers and constraints
faced in terms of cost and time. These factors are discussed in detail giving prime focus on
determinants, generators and constraints.
Determinants
Aéroport de Paris International (ADPi), France being the main design consultant for the Terminal – 3
projects who made the innovative and ground-breaking design for the new terminal in the shape of an
airplane wing and 1 km in length. Concourse 3 being a part of same terminal was designed by
different team of Dar Al-Handasah which lead to several difficulties in inter-linking the main terminal
to the concourse. Both designers were forced to conduct several meetings, model analysis, site visits
and interactions with client thereby consuming a major amount of time. However, with all these ideas
and design, the final shape was released.
Initial area planned for the concourse was not accepted by the client and further recommendation was
made to create a satisfactory design in all aspects. These situations lead the designers to rethink on
several perspectives in order to attain the most accurate area required to handle the maximum
passenger capacity. Client’s intention was very clear when they denied the initial proposal of
designers and endorsed them to provide more area. Since, Dubai is one of the growing business hubs
for most of the countries in the world and number of air routes being large to anywhere in the world,
the airport intended as well should have high capacity to handle the passengers.
The roof for the terminal was very complex because of its curved design and the span. With due
respect to the understanding of complexity in the roof, client appointed a new team solely for the roof
structure. This give rise to a major issue which pertained soon after the civil engineering contractor
was appointed for only the concrete construction, reinforcement and water proofing for a contract
value of $545 million. The chances of conflict among contractors for roof and civil was too high.
Above all these factors, lack of knowledge to understand the design concept prevails among most of
the contractors and that routine was clearly visible in this project as well.
Dubai has the largest driverless metro rail in the world which connects several parts of the city and
avoids traffic congestions in the road. Client proposed in the due course of completion of Terminal 3
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to link the airport with the metro network by introducing a foot over bridge with automatic conveyors
to the Terminal.
Generators
Client, designers and contractors were clear on their objectives but, in different perspectives.
Inclusion of several companies to complete a single project often becomes chaotic and difficult to
manage. The situation in this case was also no way different from the above scenario or even worse.
The number of meetings conducted by making the client involve would be one of the largest
compared to any major projects in the world.
Performances graph on passenger capacity (Fig 2) shows the tremendous increase of the 0.04 million
in 1960 to 47.2 million in 2010. This huge difference was considered towards the completion of the
project and even a provision was made to handle up to 60 million passengers. The terminal has
1,713,000 m2 (18,440,000 ft
2) of floor area and 15,000m² (161,400ft²) of retail space with the steel
frame roof and glass facades.
Paul Griffiths, CEO, Dubai Airports told in an interview;
“With Concourse 3 construction going ahead as planned and with some adjustments within our
existing facilities, including Terminal 2, we will be able to increase Dubai International's capacity to
80 million per year. This will bring us closer to the capacity of the world's biggest airport, Atlanta,
which has a capacity of around 89 million.” (Source: Gulf News)
Fig 2 Performance Graph – Passenger Handling Capacity (Source: DAFZ)
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Connecting the terminal area to the concourse was the first issue attended since, in no shape of the
roof allowed easy access to the concourse. The section shown in the Fig 3 clearly states the
complexity in section to make use of the area. Initial proposal was to provide lifts and escalators
together in central area to bifurcate the retail sections for view from single perspective. Model
analysed with this design aspect concluded that by following this will lead to congestions in the both
ends were the curvature of the roof obstructs the easy movement.
Fig 3 Cross-section showing complexity of roof (Source: ADPi)
Final discussions with the designer and the client confirmed to add the escalators and lifts opposite to
each other so that maximum area is utilised in the lounge. This even created a better aesthetic view
from every point. The designers dedicated most of the time for the contractor to understand the design
concept. Even with several failures in the capturing of the concept by the contractor, the client let
them on-board. The decision was made by considering the fewer amounts of time available and
increase in cost of materials that was estimated earlier.
The plan for introducing a connection with the metro and terminal made redesign for the front
elevation of the airport since, previous plans were to introduce a multi-level car parking space in the
whole area proposed. This ultimately transformed the entire design plan and a new location was
selected for the car parking.
Constraints
The delays made in design approval and decision making resulted in contractor mobilisation to 2005
which showed a delay of a year. General contractor was a joint venture by Al Habtoor Engineering,
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Dubai, UAE, Murray & Roberts, South Africa and Takenaka Corporation Dubai, UAE and Cleveland
Bridge & Engineering Middle East LLC, Dubai was appointed for the civil and structural steel works
respectively by the client without any discussions with the designers. The project continued with quiet
a high speed during the start but slowed down when it came to connection of the roof structure.
Decision making being the key factor in any project to ascertain the pace and complete according to
the schedule failed in most of the areas.
Client’s interest to increase the concourse area was expressed during the pre-construction stage which
ultimately leads to the increase in cost as shown in the Fig 4. Even though, designers attended the
issue in a well-planned and organized manner in order to eliminate the delays incurred due to this
change but, were not successful to the planned extent. Quick and speedy execution of the work was
demanded by the client at all points of execution and changes were also made in design in main areas
as well. The contractors and designers were in no way able to appreciate the client’s requirement in
certain areas and that took several days to persuade the client on the negative outcomes of these
deviations.
Fig 4 Scope of change and cost (Source: Code of Practice for Project Management)
Roof material used for the project was GRP (Glass Reinforced Plastic) made available by Armstrong
Metal Ceiling Group Europe. The entire structure fabricated included 218,400 m2 of metal ceilings
and walls. It had 29 designers in 2 design teams to implement the whole the roof lining, interior, wall
cladding and ceiling. They developed a model illustrating the complexity of the structure and the
curvature of the roof in detail which made the client to understand the final output. There were
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numerous detailed sections connecting the roof which starts from one end at ground level and ends in
the other.
Interview with Bruce Neave from Murray & Roberts:
“During the construction of Terminal 3, Concourse 2, 218 400 m2 of metal ceilings and walls were
produced by Armstrong, which corresponds to an area of around 30 football fields. Discover in a
conversation with Bruce Neave, the project director from Murray & Roberts, South Africa, why
Armstrong was awarded the contract for the ceilings and walls.” (Source: Armstrong Project Report)
Despite of detailing all the complexities involved in the roof, the construction team faced many
technical issues in placing the roof with level to each floor which again resulted in revisions and
thereby leading to time consumption.
With increased market cost of materials towards the end of the project and global recession added the
major cost constraint. It is worth mentioning about a factor which affected the project indirectly that is
construction of world’s tallest building ‘Burj-Khalifa’ during the same time of airport project. ‘Burj-
Khalifa’ being the prestigious project for the country, government was not ready to accept any delay
in completion even if that was due to the global crisis. This lead most of the cash flow to that project
and that made delay in payment for the contractors on time for the airport project because client
involved was same for both. (Murel and O’Connell 2011)
Major unexpected drawback in the terminal construction showed its face towards the end which made
the project literally ‘full stop’. This hindrance was due to the unsuccessful implementation of the roof
base by the contracting team. The situations lead to selection of an alternative contracting company
exclusively for roof base construction. The company emerged in full speed by keeping the time factor
in every step and were completely successful in the job. But, even then the change of contractor at the
last instant of a project obviously makes delay which was about half a year. The change in design for
the metro shows the clear illiteracy and improper management from client and designer. This in turn,
resulted in the unforeseen delays and an additional cost for construction.
After the completion of structure and implementing all the equipment’s, the snagging and handing
over was not possible due to lack of knowledge in the new systems for the team. This was made
possible by a programme named Operational Readiness, Activation and Transition (ORAT) carrying
out world’s largest airport trails. ORAT was made successful by consulting various stakeholders to
understand their roles in each phase of the project and running 60 trails over a period of 6 months with
3500 volunteers. Finally, the project was completed to full extent with a delay of 2 years from
estimated completion time. (Murel and O’Connell 2011)
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Quality
Dubai International Airport Terminal – 3 faced numerous delays and high cost since its start towards
the completion. However, the client focused mainly on the quality of the building since and was not
ready to compromise in the aspect of quality. This was the only area in the project were all the
perspectives of client, designer and contractor showed the similarity. Hence, the result showed a
building with no quality failure. Client needed the implementation of Information Communication
Technology (ICT) in the airport to link all the features through computer networks and was made
possible by a specially assigned IT contracting company. They made a central system which linked all
the key areas of the airport including aviation, security, mechanical, electrical, logistics,
communication, operations and maintenance thereby, making a fully operational ICT enabled airport
in all aspects. (Khanna 2013)
Lessons
The over-rising lessons of this well-intentioned project dogged by difficulties include the following;
1. Failure to establish a realistic brief
Client’s brief was explained to the design team but the inclusion of two teams for the same
project made more complications. Idea fetched by each designer varied and that lead to
different conclusions. (Allinson 1997)
2. Failure to manage the lines of authority
Number of contractors appointed for each activity is most common in all the major projects.
But, when the client appoints all the contractors, it creates chaos and the total organisation
and reporting structure is affected. (Allinson 1997)
3. Failure to follow suitable procurement strategy
The design and build or construction management procurement strategy would have been
taken into account so as to avoid the direct involvement of the client in every part of the
project. This mainly creates difference in opinion and misinterpretation of the ideas.
4. Misconception on ‘control’
Control over any project states the behaviour of the project as whole and team working within
it. The increased amount of contracting companies reporting to the client will make any
project suffer to the worst extent and thereby resulting in a failure which has the least chance
to reequip. (Allinson 1997)
5. Poor communication
Designer and contractor lacked the proper communication which in turn resulted in the wrong
implementation of the design idea and rework in the entire design leading to delay in the
completion. (Jerrard and Hands 1990)
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6. Perceived risk
Project faced unexpected risks in several areas including cost due to global crisis and delay in
completion due to other major projects. This practice must be minimised by giving equal
importance to all the projects and avoiding the changes in design repeatedly by the client.
(Jerrard and Hands 1990)
Conclusion
The case-study of Dubai International Airport Terminal – 3 investigates clearly the key determinants,
generators and constraints associated with the project from inception to completion. The quality of the
project has also been considered to analyse the failures but, there was no visible quality issues in the
project. Cost and time were the major constraints in the project which lead to increase in cost and
delay of the entire project. Project strategy selected failed in many areas throughout the project since,
change in design was the most common thing revealed by the client in almost all the levels. Decision
making by the client and inefficiency in selection of contractors showed a drastic consequence in the
overall project. The lessons learned from this project will act as ‘knowledge’ for the similar type of
projects and outlines the methods to recover from all the negative factors. Although, with all these
issues the project completed its final stage and is one among the best airports in the world as client
was in need for.
Bibliography
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Appendix 1
Milestones (1959-2013)
1959 Construction of Terminal 1 Started
1960 First airfield officially opened
1963 Construction of Asphalt runway started
1965 New runway opened with taxiways, hangers, navigational aids
1966
Inauguration of airport with first big jets of Middle East
1969
Served 9 airlines to 20 destinations
1970
Plan of new terminal building (3 storeys, 110 m long & 13,400 sq. mt.)
1972
Completed airport fire stations and generators
1973
Long-range surveillance system commissioned
1976
Hangar style building constructed
1978
Expansion of airport restaurant, transit lounge and kitchen completed
1980
Became member of Airports Council International (ACI)
1984
Second Runway opened 3 months ahead of schedule
1990
Series of aircraft flew between Europe and Southeast Asia nonstop due to effect of Soviet
Union breakup and availability of Russian airspace
1997 Development of new master plan for Terminal 2, Concourse 1 and Terminal 3 (Phase 1 and
Phase 2)
1998
Terminal 2 fully operational
2000
Concourse 1 opened
2003
Reconfiguration of runway system part of phase 2
2004
Expansion of apron and taxiways
2004
Construction of Terminal 3 started phase 2
2005
Dubai Flower Centre for import and export of flowers with special facility
2006
Planned year of completion for Terminal 3 delayed
2008
Construction of Terminal 3 completed (delay 2 years)
2009
Terminal 2 expanded to take 5 million passengers annually
2012
Terminal 2 airport capacity of 80 million passenger
2013 Construction of Cargo Mega Terminal Started with expected completion by 2018 (Capacity 3
million tonnes cargo per year)
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Appendix 3
Photographs showing progress of construction activities
Photographs: Dubai International Airport in 1969 (Above) and Expansion during 1998 (Below)