PROGRAMME OF STUDY: Msc International DevelopmentCANDIDATE NUMBER: 18323UNIT NUMBER: POLIM3015UNIT TITLE: International Political EconomyUNIT TUTOR: Dr Jeffrey HendersonESSAY NUMBER: 4

TITLE: ‘Good governance’ remains the most effective means for eradicating globalpoverty. Discuss.

1

WORD COUNT: 3865

The 1990s had seen a revival of multilateral initiatives for

poverty reduction. The climate of the time, particularly as

perceived from the International Financial Institutions (IFI), was

one full of hope regarding the potential for creating a world with

less poverty and more governability (Doornbos, 2010). Several

historic and cultural factors contributed to this change, which

bring a renovate consciousness about the multidimensionality of

the development process and new approaches to achieve poverty

reduction and sustainable growth. In this context, the recall on

good government – or governance – became the new mantra for a

generation of technocrats.

The main objective of this new development strategy was a complete

transformation of third world societies, recognising that the

precedent intervention of both recipient countries and donors had

failed to increase GDP per capita (Stiglitz, 1998). Focus on

institutions and empowerment of poor people was progressively

advisable as a key factors to stimulate growth (World Development

Report, 2001), and the link between “good governance” and poverty

reduction has become both a condition and an objective for

financial assistance (Santiso 2001).

Nevertheless, while the commitment on poverty reduction figure on

top of the list of concerns of World Bank, aid agencies and donor

governments, many argued that the normative aspect contained 2

nothing new (Kamruzzaman, 2009). The “good governance” recipe,

rhetorically combined with exclusion and inequality concerns,

seemed to provide a new narrative for international development,

but not a new effective policy framework (Fukuda-Parr, 2011).

Rather than being a shift from the failures of the neo-liberal

revolution to a more equitable paradigm of development, the anti-

poverty commitment of the Bank appeared as a means to complete

this transformation in Third World countries (Cammack, 2007). The

narrowness of the neo-liberal rhetoric, enriched with governance

concerns, remained at the core of the “good governance” discourse,

raising suspects about the degree importance of the poverty issue

among their promoter.

Furthermore, the effects on poverty relief were strongly disputed,

as a relationship between growth, redistribution and this set of

policies was not certainly proved (Khan, 2009). Therefore,

question arose whether or not “good governance” could be a

universal message for developing countries that wanted to face the

poverty challenge, as his program, beside uneven effects, did not

offer clear procedures to deal with different contexts.

This essay will assess that the “good governance” receipt as a

means to eradicate poverty presented strong limits. In the first

part, it provide a brief introduction of the subject, in order to

have a better understanding of the “good governance” set of

policies and his historical collocation. Then, through the

researches of Khan (2004, 2008, 2009), it will prove that the

“good governance” recipe present weak evidences regarding its

effect on poverty reduction. The paper concludes assessing that,

failing to consider alternatives and to promote pluralism, the

“good governance” message shows a continuity with precedent

3

approaches, despite its well-known limits. The aim of this essay

is not to compare alternative methods for poverty relief. Rather,

it seeks to criticize the “good governance” discourse as a

universal paradigm for poverty reduction.

The second half of the 1990s sought a break with the IFI obsession

with privatization and deregulation as an ends in themselves

(Stiglitz, 1998). This change was urged by many factors, not

lastly the self-admitted controversial impact of the neo-liberal

inspired Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) (World Bank, 2005).

The consequences of those programs stimulated a careful re-

consideration by the development community on the aims and the

means of the international development agenda. The principal

outcomes of this reflection were a new chapter of conditionality

for capital mobilisation and a renovate interest for the poverty

issue (Doornbos, 2010).

The new consensus on what were “good policies” was influenced both

by the international context after the Cold War, and by the

renovate vivacity in the marketplace of the ideas outside the

Washington Beltway at the very end of the 1980s. The difficulties

arisen from the transition for socialist economies to market, and

the lesson learnt from the Asian crisis, underlined the importance

of institutional foundation (Shepard and Leitner, 2010).

Furthermore, the contribution of Amartya Sen's capability approach

as leading theoretical framework, together with the analytical

work on developing countries sponsored by the donor community in

the early to mid-1990s, resulted in a renovate awareness of the

development process (Fukuda-Parr, 2011). This new context provided

both a suitable conceptual framework to justify a deeper IFI

4

intervention and a broad knowledge that assigned credibility to

such intervention (Doornbos, 2010).

The parallel projects of the “Human Development Report” and the

“Participatory Poverty Assessment” signed a first step toward a

new conception of the developmental process (Craig and Porter,

2001). Yet, Williamson, father of the term Washington Consensus,

argued that the job done by the Bretton Woods institutions was

letting questions like poverty and inequality as marginal issues

(Williamson, 1999). Furthermore, the rise of NGO pressure on IFI

around the failure of SAPs policies in term of impact on the poor

mobilised the civic society against the Washington institutions

(Hewitt, 2006). These two initiatives established by the World

Bank were very important in order to concretise this shift,

offering a way to integrate the Washington Consensus and the

deeply unpopular SAPs with vulnerability and exclusion concerns.

They aimed both to “to enrich the conceptualisation of poverty

through providing a multi-dimensional view” (Norton, 2001: p.13),

and “as a basis for a collaborative approach to poverty reduction

by country officials and the Bank” (World Bank, 1992, in Hanmer,

Pyatt and White, 1999: p.2).

This collaborative approach, as informational base for pro-poor

lending, evolved during the 1990s. A number of complementary

initiatives were launched, like the Poverty Action Plan, the

Comprehensive Development Framework, and the Poverty Reduction

Strategy Papers. Those presented three common striking features:

poverty understood as material deprivation, measurement and

mapping of poorness for a broad knowledge, mention of “governance

failure” on providing basic services (Craig and Porter, 2001). The

recall to the “good governance” as a means to eradicate poverty

5

became both a condition and an objective for financial assistance

(Santiso 2001).

Although it is recognisable a shift in term of a broader and

better understanding of development process, of the advertised

renovate “pragmatism about instruments” (World Bank, 2004: pg.3)

one may take leave to doubt regarding how much the policy

framework has changed. Furthermore, controversies remained also

regarding the remedies that the “good governance” recipe

introduced for address poverty, as their effectiveness and

achievability are still not proven (Khan, 2009).

In order to assess if the “good governance” is an adequate means

for poverty relief it is useful to assess his principal features.

The “good governance” discourse, launched by donors to transform

what they perceived as “bad” economic in client countries, signed

a shift from the mantra of “get the prices right” to the new main

objective of “get the policies right” (Doornbos, 2010; Griddle,

2005). To the standard liberalisation strategies promoted by the

IFI, a number of reforms were added as a core component of

priorities to achieve what Khan called a “market-enhancing

governance”. The creation of a suitable environment for investment

within the amelioration of the public sector was the main

objective (Khan, 2008).

Although establishing the boundaries of the “good governance”

discourse is deeply problematic, as it touch virtually all aspects

of the govern management, it is possible to define it as the “set

of reforms referred to strengthening state capabilities to enforce

institutional rules that are important for economic and social

development” (Khan, 2009: p.7). These necessary governance

6

capabilities included the enforcement of the rule of law,

protection of property rights, responsible public expenditures

management, achieving government accountability, decompression of

the bureaucratic apparatus, and effective participation in the

decisional process. Decentralisation and privatisation of

governmental enterprises were an essential part of the package,

and the introduction of private sector management styles in the

governmental organisation was emphasized. In addition, both

transparency and independence of the judiciary figured among the

pillars of the “good governance” discourse, as endemic corruption

ad scarce commitment to agreement were the World Bank mayor

concerns relating to the mismanagement of aid flows (Santiso,

2001).

Those were considered the necessary reforms to achieve the

benefits of economic integration, a good news for the whole

society. Rather than a desirables set of policies, these

adjustments were identified as a precondition for the “take-off”.

The aim was principally to improve imperfect institutions, which

regulatory burden and ineffectual policies constrained development

(World Bank, 2004).

To sum up, the “good governance” agenda was directed to enhance

the efficiency of the market through a reform of the state,

reducing transaction costs derived from misallocation of

resources, weak governance capabilities, rent seeking,

clientelism, and corruption, theoretically the source of

significant market failures (Khan, 2008). The pro-poor aspect of

this governance approach therefore was not a direct commitment

with the poor, but the establishment of a virtuous and efficient

government that is capable to ensure a market-led stable growth.

7

This view was based mainly on the arithmetical relation between

income growth and poverty reduction, a concept that was embedded

in the international development consensus crystalized by the IFI

policies (Dollar and Kraay, 2000). Although capitalist development

and poverty reduction were, to some degree, obviously compatible,

the “good governance” approach as the most effective means to

eradicate poverty was strongly disputed (Cammack, 2007; Craig and

Porter, 2001). Moreover, the advertised effect on growth received

several critics (Khan, 2009; Khan, 2004).

In his paper “Governance, Growth and Poverty Reduction” (2009), Khan

assessed that the “good governance” strategy for addressing

poverty failed to provide strong evidence to support a causal

relationship between this set of policies, income growth and

poverty reduction. In his opinion, the principal obstacles were

the structural and fiscal constraints that those countries

suffered internally. He explained that if poor countries focused

exclusively on “good governance” reforms, were unlikely to attain

significant improvement in their growth rate (Khan, 2009). In

support of this assessment, noticeable was the comparison that he

made between high-growth and low-growth developing countries.

Taking in analysis corruption and institutional quality indexes,

he did not find significant correlations in their score on “good

governance” and economic development. Countries with sustained

growth rate often did not have better “good governance”

capabilities. This statement was particularly true regarding the

experience of Asian countries like Indonesia or Malaysia. Although

they were some of the best economic performers of the 1990s, they

scored the same as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, countries that not

8

enjoyed similar economic growth. Therefore, the expectation that

implanting the “good governance” recipe in developing countries

was possible to achieve automatically sustainable growth was

unlikely to be met (Khan, 2004).

Furthermore, in order to challenge the implications between “good

governance” and poverty reduction, Khan proposed a cross-country

analysis on income distribution and governance capabilities. In

this case, a very week positive relationship showed up from his

work. Even if “good governance” policies allowed the poor to

protect their right better, the evidences on the effect on

distribution was poor (Khan, 2009). Grindle underlined similar

concerns. She argued that, even if most of the prescriptions of

the “good governance” agenda were laudable goals, few of the

reform commitments were directly linked to poverty reduction

purposes. As she explained, optimal results were conditional to an

effective participation of the poor in the political arena.

Therefore, poverty relief might be advanced more effectively by

focusing less on institutional reforms and more on political

integration of the vulnerable members of the society (Grindle,

2004).

Generally, those prescriptions showed little attention for equity

and redistribution, prioritising different sectors and market

failures. The desirability mix of growth and redistribution was

obviously a political judgement, thus a prohibited field for Word

Bank expertise. However, the developed world nations spent a

substantial amount of their GDP for redistributing scope. The

ranges varied from about 15 per cent in the United States to 35

per cent in Northern Europe countries (Van Hoesen, 2000). This

consideration found strong support also in the epistemic

9

community, where the Nobel Prize Laureate Tinbergen declared:

“Redistribution is the core political issue of the 20th century”

(Van Hoesen, 2000: p.8). Whatever the political orientation might

be, the alleviation of poverty through a function of growth and

redistribution provided a number of insights that were hardly

deniable. As pointed out by Khan, poverty reduction could be

faster with improved redistribution combined with steady growth of

per capita income (Khan, 2009). Therefore, more equally

distributed income, a feature often neglected in Third World

countries, should be a prominent content for an effective poverty

reduction agenda.

Nonetheless, the “good governance” standards were very influenced

by the views of the Western donor community. Monolithic

assumptions were still at the core of the development strategy.

This rigidity contributed to the formation of a series of

interlocking policy criteria that have been prominent in the World

Bank initiatives and, more broadly, in the international

development agenda (Doornbos, 2010). Hence, the “good governance”

discourse failed to promote greater pluralism about the means and

to found alternative solutions for improve his effectiveness in

different contexts. Moreover, their promoters seems to be more

interested to try to conciliate elements of the neo-liberal

rhetoric with poverty concerns rather than provide a new policy

framework.

Many scholars have often criticised the narrowness of the policy

framework proposed by the “good governance” discourse for poverty

relief. Indeed, the lessons learned from the continuous financial

crisis of the 1990s and the failure of the frequently-renegotiate

10

lending of the SAPs led to a change in the way that the World Bank

considered the complementarity of market and state. However, a

continuity was recognizable between both approaches.

Liberalisation and privatisation were advisable once again as core

elements for drove development, an assumption strictly connected

with the well-known neo-liberal policy package imposed by the IFI

during the 1980s.

Yet, Hewitt defined the “good governance” discourse as

ethnocentric and too conditional on capitalism. Furthermore, many

NGO criticize the co-optation of the concept for a scope that goes

beyond the pure commitment on poverty alleviation (Hewitt, 2006).

In this regard, Cammack offered a similar view. As he pointed out,

the Bank understanding of poverty reduction was related mainly to

the “promotion of strategies that would increase productivity of

labour competitiveness around the world” (Cammack, 2007: p.194),

in order to “generalise and facilitate proletarianisation and

capitalist accumulation on a global scale” (Cammack, 2007: p.190).

Avoiding pluralism, its devotion to poverty relief was selective

and single-minded, aiming to educate the poor rather than

emancipate them. In Cammack opinion, “the World Bank anti-poverty

program, far from being a shift away from the neo-liberal

revolution, was and is a means to complete it” (Cammack, 2007: p.

192). In this view, the commitment on poverty was conditional upon

a broader goal: the acceptance of the policy framework proposed by

the IFI in the precedent universalising initiatives.

The continuity with precedent approaches was underlined also by

Fukuda-Parr. As he explained, IFI economists drew mainly on the

literature of New Institutional Economics and Structuralism, which

provide a policy framework perfectly compatible with neo-classical

11

economics and neo-liberalism. They just focused on a more

pragmatic vision about policy-making. Macroeconomic stability and

economic growth were perceived not only as a necessary means for

development, but also as a sufficient condition for addressing

poverty (Fukuda-Parr, 2011). Therefore, the change on the

architecture of international development affected only slightly

the instruments and the contents, namely conditionality and neo-

liberalism. Even if the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and

the Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PSRP) have replaced the

SAPs as condition for capital mobilisation, in his opinion the

most evident change regarded mainly the narrative provided by the

IFI intervention to the cause of poverty (Fukuda-Parr, 2011). As

Craig and Porter explained, poverty reduction strategy had offer a

way to redeem publicly the IFI from the past unpopular approaches,

while at the same time “the link between liberalisation and

openness and poverty continued to trumpeted” (Craig and Porter,

2001: p. 16). Moreover, the claim of the World Bank to detain the

monopoly of “development knowledge” led to a strong intrusiveness

that succeeded only partially to implement the often-advertised

process of ownership and participation (Kamruzzaman, 2009; Khan

and Sharma, 2003). Both Kamruzzaman and Hewitt argued that rather

than a philanthropic effort to eradicate poverty, the World Bank’s

“good governance” discourse have to be understood as a means to

increase the control over aid-recipient countries as well as over

the international development agenda more broadly (Kamruzzaman,

2009; Hewitt, 2006).

Narrow and doctrinaire prescriptions only raised suspect about the

real purpose of pro-poor services of the “good governance”

discourse, which could place potentially damaging structures on

12

countries choice of opportunity (Craig and Porter, 2001).

Therefore, universalisation was a big limit for this approach,

which often failed to find optimal and specific poverty-relief

policies in the complex mosaic of developing countries societies.

The question of how universal was “good governance” standard put

up by the donor community remained a controversial issue. The

“good governance” prescriptions were advised to every country that

wanted to undertake a serious commitment against poverty. As

stated by Collier and Dollar, “rapid poverty reduction in low-

income countries depends primarily on these countries improving

their own policies and institutions” (Collier and Dollar, 2001:

p.1787). However, as argued by Hermes and Lensink, effective

policies for different countries relied on different level of

development. Good policies for a low-developed country might

differ substantially from a high-developed one. This is

particularly true for delicate arguments like liberalisation

(Hermes and Lensink, 2010). The “new” consensus at the World Bank

to foster development and address poverty was not based on

allowing countries more freedom of choice on means and objective,

but by deepening the intervention, fixing the policy framework,

and attaching a broad range of conditionalities (Cammack, 2007).

Rather than promote locally and specifically focused set of

political economic understandings, paying attention to the “local

knowledge” already cited by Rodrick (Rodrick, 2000), permitted

variations in the institutional set-up were very limited (Craig

and Porter, 2001).

Furthermore, the reforms that “good governance” promoters

mentioned would be difficult for any government to undertake.

13

Governance reforms could take decades to be put in place and to

produce effective results. As stated by Naim, “the difficulty

paradox, is that any country that is capable of meeting such

stringent requirements is already a developed country” (Naim,

2000: p.96). Carrying out those reforms, in a politically and

financially weak environment, could seriously undermine source of

support from different sector of the society, and therefore the

opportunity to enjoy the supposed benefits for the poor (Grindle,

2004). In addition, Santiso underlined that, as long as the policy

rule was based on macroeconomic variables such as reducing

government expenditures, the process of enhancing a well-organised

public sector might be compromised. In this regard, the World Bank

did not offered clear procedures that were able to deal with such

problems. Many practical details needed to be worked out (Santiso,

2001).

Priority and perception on “good governance” necessarily differed

among countries. Nevertheless, the Western-dominated views on good

policies often were presented as having universal value, tending

to aim to objectives that were not linked to addressing poverty.

For example, although Uganda has been one of the leading examples

of “good governance”, where poverty reversed dramatically, from

56% in 1992-93 to 35% in 2000, it did not find support to get

international recognition for an alternative to multi-partyism

system (Doornbos, 2010). However, considering the best performers

in poverty reduction worldwide, was immediately clear that the

“good governance” agenda was not the only means for poverty

alleviation, nor necessarily the most effective one. China

economic reforms, which unlashed market forces under the aegis of

Communist Party, reduced in twenty years the number of extremely

14

poor from more than 600 million to slightly more than 200 million

(World Bank, 2004). Another one often-cited example in the same

geographical area was Vietnam, which pursued a successful state-

oriented process of development cutting its income poverty rate

from 58% to 37% in just six years (1993-1999) (World Bank, 2004;

Shepard and Leitner, 2008).

In general, there seems limited imagination in the overall “good

governance” recipe to promote different strategies for poverty

reduction. Without recurring to the old-fashioned dirigisme, a

number of initiatives could be added in order to potentiate the

role of institutions for a greater pro-poor commitment. Commercial

strategies that aim to add values locally to local raw materials,

more attention to income distribution, technological partnership

between states, and, more broadly, enhancing competitive

advantages basing on local resources and local competences, could

foster positive trade-off for vulnerable groups. Moreover,

considerations about the history and the culture of singular

countries should be improved, in order to assess more carefully

specific needs (Grindle, 2007).

While the “good governance” set of policies was easy to support as

a desirable objective for poor countries, his plausibility of

significantly reducing poverty though his agenda did not find

strong empirical evidence, especially if compared with good

performers that followed unorthodox paths. In his researches, Khan

proved that its effect on growth and on redistribution are

contradictory. Moreover, Grindle underlined that most of the

policy prescription are unrelated with poverty alleviation.

Therefore, support the argument that the “good governance” recipe

15

remain the most effective means for poverty reduction is an

arguable task. The aim of this essay has been to show the

ambiguities and the potential challenges that the “good

governance” discourse arise. What is clear is that there are no

easy answers for the poverty problem, nor universal solutions.

Undoubtedly, as a top-down IFI dominated technocratic approach,

the “good governance” agenda did not enjoy widespread legitimacy.

The narrowness of his policy framework, together with a certain

degree of continuity with precedent failing approaches, raised

doubt upon both the effectiveness to deal with different context

and the degree of importance that the poverty reduction cause

assumed among the donors community. Demonstrate the link between

improved governance and poverty reduction more carefully should be

an important duty for the “good governance” agenda supporters.

Furthermore, IFI expertise should be able to promote non-standard

strategies that better fit the economic, political and social

conditions prevalent on recipient countries. Devoid the historical

differences between developing countries has been one of the most

relevant limit of the “good governance” approach to poverty

reduction. An analysis on which different ingredient of this

agenda were more suitable in different context is necessary.

Therefore, a less doctrinaire and more diverse and plural

approach, which applied priorities on a country-by country basis,

is strongly advisable. The “good governance” recipe has been

translated from the developed North to the underdeveloped South as

a pre-packaged idea, without considering difficulties in his

implementation or the different impact that these policies can

have in different economic or social conditions. A decentralised

approach to promoting local productive capacity, more attention on

16

redistribution and an additional effort to reduce the

technological divide can be important add-on to foster the poverty

relief aspect of these policies.

In general, the “good governance” discourse is an optimal basis to

build an effective pro-poor strategy. Nevertheless, considering

the approaches followed by the worldwide top performers in the

poverty reduction, think outside the “good governance” box should

be an imperative for everyone that want embed the poverty

challenge as a pivotal component of the international development

agenda.

17

REFERENCESCammack, Paul, (2004), “What the World Bank means by poverty

reduction, and why it matters”, New Political Economy, 9:2, pp.189-211.

Craig, David and Porter, Doug, 2001, Poverty Reduction Strategy

Papers: A New Convergence. What Does it Miss, and What Can Be

Done. In: “Regional Conference on National Poverty Reduction Strategies”,

December 2001, Hanoi, VN.

Dollar, David and Collier, Paul, 2001, “Can the World Cut Poverty in Half?

How Policy Reform and Effective Aid Can Meet International Development Goals”, World

Development, 29:11, pp.1787-1802.

Dollar, David and Aart, Kraay, 2001, “Growth is Good for the

18

Poor”, Policy Research Working Paper Series 2587, The World Bank, Washington

D.C., US.

Doornbos, Martin, 2010, “Good Governance': The Rise and Decline of

a Policy Metaphor?”, The Journal of Development Studies, 37:6, pp. 93-108.

Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, 2011, “Theory and Policy in International

Development: Human Development and Capability Approach and the

Millennium Development Goals”, International Studies Review, 13:1, pp.122-

132.

Grindle, Marilee S., 2004, “Good Enough Governance: Poverty

Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries”, Governance, 17:4,

pp.525-548.

Grindle, Marilee S., 2007, “Good Enough Governance Revisited”,

Development Policy Review, 25:5, 553-574.

Hanmer, Lucia C., Pyatt, Graham, and White, Howard, 1999, “What do

the World Bank’s poverty assessments teach us about poverty in

Africa?”, Development and Change, 30, pp. 795-823.

Hermes, Niels, and Lensink, Robert, 2010, “Changing the Conditions

dor Development Aid: A New Paradigm?”, The Journal of Development Studies,

37:6, pp.1-16.

Hewitt, Vernon, 2006, “A Cautionary Tale: Colonial and Post-

Colonial Conceptions of Good Government and Democratisation in

Africa”, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 44:1, pp.32-48.

19

Kamruzzaman, Palash, (2009), “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers

ans the Rhetoric of Participation”, Development in Practice, 19:1, pp.

61-71.

Khan, Mohsin S. and Sharma, Sunil, 2003, “IMF Conditionality and

Country Ownership of Adjustment Programs”, The World Bank Research

Observer, 18:2, pp.227-248.

Khan, Mushtaq H., 2004, “State Failure in Developing Countries and

Institutional Reform Strategies”, In: Tungodden, Bertil, & Stern,

Nicholas & Kolstad, Ivar, 2003, “Toward Pro-Poor Policies. Aid,

Institutions, and Globalization. Annual World Bank Conference on

Development Economics”, Oxford University Press and World Bank, pp.165-195,

Oxford University Press, New York, US.

Khan, Mushtaq H., 2008, “Governance and Development: The

Perspective of Growth-Enhancing Governance”, In: “Diversity and

Complementarity in Development Aid: East Asian Lessons for African Growth”, GRIPS

Development Forum/National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies,

pp.107-152, Tokyo, J.

Khan, Mushtaq H., 2009, “Governance, growth and poverty reduction”,

DESA Working Paper, 75, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,

United Nations.

Naím, Moíses. 2000. “Washington Consensus or Washington

Confusion?”, Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace (Spring), pp.86-103.

20

Norton, Andy. 2001. “A rough guide to PPAs: An introduction to

theory and practice”. Overseas Development Institute, London, UK.

Santiso, Carlos. 2001. “Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The

World Bank and Conditionality”, The Georgetown Public Policy

Review, 7:1, pp.1-22.

Sheppard, Eric, and Leitner, Helga. 2010. “Quo Vadis

Neoliberalism? The Remaking of Global Capitalist Governance After

the Washington Consensus”, Geoforum, 41:2, 185-194.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1998. “Towards a New Paradigm for Development:

Strategies, Policies, and Process”, Prebisch Lecture, UN Conference on

Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva.

van der Hoven, Rolph. 2000. “Assessing Aid and Global Governance.

Why Poverty and Redistribution Objectives Matter”, Employment

Paper, Geneva, CH.

Williamson, John. 1999. “What Should the Bank Think about the

Washington Consensus?”. The World Bank Research Observer, 15:2, p.251-

264.

Wolfensohn, James D. and Bourguignon, François. 2004. “Development

and Poverty Reduction, Looking Back, Looking Ahead”. Prepared for the

2004 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF-Washington D. C., US.

World Bank. 2001. “World Development Report of 2000/2001:

21

Attacking Poverty”. OUP for World Bank, Washington D.C., US.

World Bank. 2005. “Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a

Decade of Reform”. World Bank, Washington D.C., US.

Rodrick, Dani. 2000. “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What

They are and How to Acquire Them”. NBER Paper No. 7540, Washington

D.C., US

22