PROGRAMME OF STUDY: Msc International DevelopmentCANDIDATE NUMBER: 18323UNIT NUMBER: POLIM3015UNIT TITLE: International Political EconomyUNIT TUTOR: Dr Jeffrey HendersonESSAY NUMBER: 4
TITLE: ‘Good governance’ remains the most effective means for eradicating globalpoverty. Discuss.
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WORD COUNT: 3865
The 1990s had seen a revival of multilateral initiatives for
poverty reduction. The climate of the time, particularly as
perceived from the International Financial Institutions (IFI), was
one full of hope regarding the potential for creating a world with
less poverty and more governability (Doornbos, 2010). Several
historic and cultural factors contributed to this change, which
bring a renovate consciousness about the multidimensionality of
the development process and new approaches to achieve poverty
reduction and sustainable growth. In this context, the recall on
good government – or governance – became the new mantra for a
generation of technocrats.
The main objective of this new development strategy was a complete
transformation of third world societies, recognising that the
precedent intervention of both recipient countries and donors had
failed to increase GDP per capita (Stiglitz, 1998). Focus on
institutions and empowerment of poor people was progressively
advisable as a key factors to stimulate growth (World Development
Report, 2001), and the link between “good governance” and poverty
reduction has become both a condition and an objective for
financial assistance (Santiso 2001).
Nevertheless, while the commitment on poverty reduction figure on
top of the list of concerns of World Bank, aid agencies and donor
governments, many argued that the normative aspect contained 2
nothing new (Kamruzzaman, 2009). The “good governance” recipe,
rhetorically combined with exclusion and inequality concerns,
seemed to provide a new narrative for international development,
but not a new effective policy framework (Fukuda-Parr, 2011).
Rather than being a shift from the failures of the neo-liberal
revolution to a more equitable paradigm of development, the anti-
poverty commitment of the Bank appeared as a means to complete
this transformation in Third World countries (Cammack, 2007). The
narrowness of the neo-liberal rhetoric, enriched with governance
concerns, remained at the core of the “good governance” discourse,
raising suspects about the degree importance of the poverty issue
among their promoter.
Furthermore, the effects on poverty relief were strongly disputed,
as a relationship between growth, redistribution and this set of
policies was not certainly proved (Khan, 2009). Therefore,
question arose whether or not “good governance” could be a
universal message for developing countries that wanted to face the
poverty challenge, as his program, beside uneven effects, did not
offer clear procedures to deal with different contexts.
This essay will assess that the “good governance” receipt as a
means to eradicate poverty presented strong limits. In the first
part, it provide a brief introduction of the subject, in order to
have a better understanding of the “good governance” set of
policies and his historical collocation. Then, through the
researches of Khan (2004, 2008, 2009), it will prove that the
“good governance” recipe present weak evidences regarding its
effect on poverty reduction. The paper concludes assessing that,
failing to consider alternatives and to promote pluralism, the
“good governance” message shows a continuity with precedent
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approaches, despite its well-known limits. The aim of this essay
is not to compare alternative methods for poverty relief. Rather,
it seeks to criticize the “good governance” discourse as a
universal paradigm for poverty reduction.
The second half of the 1990s sought a break with the IFI obsession
with privatization and deregulation as an ends in themselves
(Stiglitz, 1998). This change was urged by many factors, not
lastly the self-admitted controversial impact of the neo-liberal
inspired Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) (World Bank, 2005).
The consequences of those programs stimulated a careful re-
consideration by the development community on the aims and the
means of the international development agenda. The principal
outcomes of this reflection were a new chapter of conditionality
for capital mobilisation and a renovate interest for the poverty
issue (Doornbos, 2010).
The new consensus on what were “good policies” was influenced both
by the international context after the Cold War, and by the
renovate vivacity in the marketplace of the ideas outside the
Washington Beltway at the very end of the 1980s. The difficulties
arisen from the transition for socialist economies to market, and
the lesson learnt from the Asian crisis, underlined the importance
of institutional foundation (Shepard and Leitner, 2010).
Furthermore, the contribution of Amartya Sen's capability approach
as leading theoretical framework, together with the analytical
work on developing countries sponsored by the donor community in
the early to mid-1990s, resulted in a renovate awareness of the
development process (Fukuda-Parr, 2011). This new context provided
both a suitable conceptual framework to justify a deeper IFI
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intervention and a broad knowledge that assigned credibility to
such intervention (Doornbos, 2010).
The parallel projects of the “Human Development Report” and the
“Participatory Poverty Assessment” signed a first step toward a
new conception of the developmental process (Craig and Porter,
2001). Yet, Williamson, father of the term Washington Consensus,
argued that the job done by the Bretton Woods institutions was
letting questions like poverty and inequality as marginal issues
(Williamson, 1999). Furthermore, the rise of NGO pressure on IFI
around the failure of SAPs policies in term of impact on the poor
mobilised the civic society against the Washington institutions
(Hewitt, 2006). These two initiatives established by the World
Bank were very important in order to concretise this shift,
offering a way to integrate the Washington Consensus and the
deeply unpopular SAPs with vulnerability and exclusion concerns.
They aimed both to “to enrich the conceptualisation of poverty
through providing a multi-dimensional view” (Norton, 2001: p.13),
and “as a basis for a collaborative approach to poverty reduction
by country officials and the Bank” (World Bank, 1992, in Hanmer,
Pyatt and White, 1999: p.2).
This collaborative approach, as informational base for pro-poor
lending, evolved during the 1990s. A number of complementary
initiatives were launched, like the Poverty Action Plan, the
Comprehensive Development Framework, and the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers. Those presented three common striking features:
poverty understood as material deprivation, measurement and
mapping of poorness for a broad knowledge, mention of “governance
failure” on providing basic services (Craig and Porter, 2001). The
recall to the “good governance” as a means to eradicate poverty
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became both a condition and an objective for financial assistance
(Santiso 2001).
Although it is recognisable a shift in term of a broader and
better understanding of development process, of the advertised
renovate “pragmatism about instruments” (World Bank, 2004: pg.3)
one may take leave to doubt regarding how much the policy
framework has changed. Furthermore, controversies remained also
regarding the remedies that the “good governance” recipe
introduced for address poverty, as their effectiveness and
achievability are still not proven (Khan, 2009).
In order to assess if the “good governance” is an adequate means
for poverty relief it is useful to assess his principal features.
The “good governance” discourse, launched by donors to transform
what they perceived as “bad” economic in client countries, signed
a shift from the mantra of “get the prices right” to the new main
objective of “get the policies right” (Doornbos, 2010; Griddle,
2005). To the standard liberalisation strategies promoted by the
IFI, a number of reforms were added as a core component of
priorities to achieve what Khan called a “market-enhancing
governance”. The creation of a suitable environment for investment
within the amelioration of the public sector was the main
objective (Khan, 2008).
Although establishing the boundaries of the “good governance”
discourse is deeply problematic, as it touch virtually all aspects
of the govern management, it is possible to define it as the “set
of reforms referred to strengthening state capabilities to enforce
institutional rules that are important for economic and social
development” (Khan, 2009: p.7). These necessary governance
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capabilities included the enforcement of the rule of law,
protection of property rights, responsible public expenditures
management, achieving government accountability, decompression of
the bureaucratic apparatus, and effective participation in the
decisional process. Decentralisation and privatisation of
governmental enterprises were an essential part of the package,
and the introduction of private sector management styles in the
governmental organisation was emphasized. In addition, both
transparency and independence of the judiciary figured among the
pillars of the “good governance” discourse, as endemic corruption
ad scarce commitment to agreement were the World Bank mayor
concerns relating to the mismanagement of aid flows (Santiso,
2001).
Those were considered the necessary reforms to achieve the
benefits of economic integration, a good news for the whole
society. Rather than a desirables set of policies, these
adjustments were identified as a precondition for the “take-off”.
The aim was principally to improve imperfect institutions, which
regulatory burden and ineffectual policies constrained development
(World Bank, 2004).
To sum up, the “good governance” agenda was directed to enhance
the efficiency of the market through a reform of the state,
reducing transaction costs derived from misallocation of
resources, weak governance capabilities, rent seeking,
clientelism, and corruption, theoretically the source of
significant market failures (Khan, 2008). The pro-poor aspect of
this governance approach therefore was not a direct commitment
with the poor, but the establishment of a virtuous and efficient
government that is capable to ensure a market-led stable growth.
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This view was based mainly on the arithmetical relation between
income growth and poverty reduction, a concept that was embedded
in the international development consensus crystalized by the IFI
policies (Dollar and Kraay, 2000). Although capitalist development
and poverty reduction were, to some degree, obviously compatible,
the “good governance” approach as the most effective means to
eradicate poverty was strongly disputed (Cammack, 2007; Craig and
Porter, 2001). Moreover, the advertised effect on growth received
several critics (Khan, 2009; Khan, 2004).
In his paper “Governance, Growth and Poverty Reduction” (2009), Khan
assessed that the “good governance” strategy for addressing
poverty failed to provide strong evidence to support a causal
relationship between this set of policies, income growth and
poverty reduction. In his opinion, the principal obstacles were
the structural and fiscal constraints that those countries
suffered internally. He explained that if poor countries focused
exclusively on “good governance” reforms, were unlikely to attain
significant improvement in their growth rate (Khan, 2009). In
support of this assessment, noticeable was the comparison that he
made between high-growth and low-growth developing countries.
Taking in analysis corruption and institutional quality indexes,
he did not find significant correlations in their score on “good
governance” and economic development. Countries with sustained
growth rate often did not have better “good governance”
capabilities. This statement was particularly true regarding the
experience of Asian countries like Indonesia or Malaysia. Although
they were some of the best economic performers of the 1990s, they
scored the same as Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, countries that not
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enjoyed similar economic growth. Therefore, the expectation that
implanting the “good governance” recipe in developing countries
was possible to achieve automatically sustainable growth was
unlikely to be met (Khan, 2004).
Furthermore, in order to challenge the implications between “good
governance” and poverty reduction, Khan proposed a cross-country
analysis on income distribution and governance capabilities. In
this case, a very week positive relationship showed up from his
work. Even if “good governance” policies allowed the poor to
protect their right better, the evidences on the effect on
distribution was poor (Khan, 2009). Grindle underlined similar
concerns. She argued that, even if most of the prescriptions of
the “good governance” agenda were laudable goals, few of the
reform commitments were directly linked to poverty reduction
purposes. As she explained, optimal results were conditional to an
effective participation of the poor in the political arena.
Therefore, poverty relief might be advanced more effectively by
focusing less on institutional reforms and more on political
integration of the vulnerable members of the society (Grindle,
2004).
Generally, those prescriptions showed little attention for equity
and redistribution, prioritising different sectors and market
failures. The desirability mix of growth and redistribution was
obviously a political judgement, thus a prohibited field for Word
Bank expertise. However, the developed world nations spent a
substantial amount of their GDP for redistributing scope. The
ranges varied from about 15 per cent in the United States to 35
per cent in Northern Europe countries (Van Hoesen, 2000). This
consideration found strong support also in the epistemic
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community, where the Nobel Prize Laureate Tinbergen declared:
“Redistribution is the core political issue of the 20th century”
(Van Hoesen, 2000: p.8). Whatever the political orientation might
be, the alleviation of poverty through a function of growth and
redistribution provided a number of insights that were hardly
deniable. As pointed out by Khan, poverty reduction could be
faster with improved redistribution combined with steady growth of
per capita income (Khan, 2009). Therefore, more equally
distributed income, a feature often neglected in Third World
countries, should be a prominent content for an effective poverty
reduction agenda.
Nonetheless, the “good governance” standards were very influenced
by the views of the Western donor community. Monolithic
assumptions were still at the core of the development strategy.
This rigidity contributed to the formation of a series of
interlocking policy criteria that have been prominent in the World
Bank initiatives and, more broadly, in the international
development agenda (Doornbos, 2010). Hence, the “good governance”
discourse failed to promote greater pluralism about the means and
to found alternative solutions for improve his effectiveness in
different contexts. Moreover, their promoters seems to be more
interested to try to conciliate elements of the neo-liberal
rhetoric with poverty concerns rather than provide a new policy
framework.
Many scholars have often criticised the narrowness of the policy
framework proposed by the “good governance” discourse for poverty
relief. Indeed, the lessons learned from the continuous financial
crisis of the 1990s and the failure of the frequently-renegotiate
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lending of the SAPs led to a change in the way that the World Bank
considered the complementarity of market and state. However, a
continuity was recognizable between both approaches.
Liberalisation and privatisation were advisable once again as core
elements for drove development, an assumption strictly connected
with the well-known neo-liberal policy package imposed by the IFI
during the 1980s.
Yet, Hewitt defined the “good governance” discourse as
ethnocentric and too conditional on capitalism. Furthermore, many
NGO criticize the co-optation of the concept for a scope that goes
beyond the pure commitment on poverty alleviation (Hewitt, 2006).
In this regard, Cammack offered a similar view. As he pointed out,
the Bank understanding of poverty reduction was related mainly to
the “promotion of strategies that would increase productivity of
labour competitiveness around the world” (Cammack, 2007: p.194),
in order to “generalise and facilitate proletarianisation and
capitalist accumulation on a global scale” (Cammack, 2007: p.190).
Avoiding pluralism, its devotion to poverty relief was selective
and single-minded, aiming to educate the poor rather than
emancipate them. In Cammack opinion, “the World Bank anti-poverty
program, far from being a shift away from the neo-liberal
revolution, was and is a means to complete it” (Cammack, 2007: p.
192). In this view, the commitment on poverty was conditional upon
a broader goal: the acceptance of the policy framework proposed by
the IFI in the precedent universalising initiatives.
The continuity with precedent approaches was underlined also by
Fukuda-Parr. As he explained, IFI economists drew mainly on the
literature of New Institutional Economics and Structuralism, which
provide a policy framework perfectly compatible with neo-classical
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economics and neo-liberalism. They just focused on a more
pragmatic vision about policy-making. Macroeconomic stability and
economic growth were perceived not only as a necessary means for
development, but also as a sufficient condition for addressing
poverty (Fukuda-Parr, 2011). Therefore, the change on the
architecture of international development affected only slightly
the instruments and the contents, namely conditionality and neo-
liberalism. Even if the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and
the Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PSRP) have replaced the
SAPs as condition for capital mobilisation, in his opinion the
most evident change regarded mainly the narrative provided by the
IFI intervention to the cause of poverty (Fukuda-Parr, 2011). As
Craig and Porter explained, poverty reduction strategy had offer a
way to redeem publicly the IFI from the past unpopular approaches,
while at the same time “the link between liberalisation and
openness and poverty continued to trumpeted” (Craig and Porter,
2001: p. 16). Moreover, the claim of the World Bank to detain the
monopoly of “development knowledge” led to a strong intrusiveness
that succeeded only partially to implement the often-advertised
process of ownership and participation (Kamruzzaman, 2009; Khan
and Sharma, 2003). Both Kamruzzaman and Hewitt argued that rather
than a philanthropic effort to eradicate poverty, the World Bank’s
“good governance” discourse have to be understood as a means to
increase the control over aid-recipient countries as well as over
the international development agenda more broadly (Kamruzzaman,
2009; Hewitt, 2006).
Narrow and doctrinaire prescriptions only raised suspect about the
real purpose of pro-poor services of the “good governance”
discourse, which could place potentially damaging structures on
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countries choice of opportunity (Craig and Porter, 2001).
Therefore, universalisation was a big limit for this approach,
which often failed to find optimal and specific poverty-relief
policies in the complex mosaic of developing countries societies.
The question of how universal was “good governance” standard put
up by the donor community remained a controversial issue. The
“good governance” prescriptions were advised to every country that
wanted to undertake a serious commitment against poverty. As
stated by Collier and Dollar, “rapid poverty reduction in low-
income countries depends primarily on these countries improving
their own policies and institutions” (Collier and Dollar, 2001:
p.1787). However, as argued by Hermes and Lensink, effective
policies for different countries relied on different level of
development. Good policies for a low-developed country might
differ substantially from a high-developed one. This is
particularly true for delicate arguments like liberalisation
(Hermes and Lensink, 2010). The “new” consensus at the World Bank
to foster development and address poverty was not based on
allowing countries more freedom of choice on means and objective,
but by deepening the intervention, fixing the policy framework,
and attaching a broad range of conditionalities (Cammack, 2007).
Rather than promote locally and specifically focused set of
political economic understandings, paying attention to the “local
knowledge” already cited by Rodrick (Rodrick, 2000), permitted
variations in the institutional set-up were very limited (Craig
and Porter, 2001).
Furthermore, the reforms that “good governance” promoters
mentioned would be difficult for any government to undertake.
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Governance reforms could take decades to be put in place and to
produce effective results. As stated by Naim, “the difficulty
paradox, is that any country that is capable of meeting such
stringent requirements is already a developed country” (Naim,
2000: p.96). Carrying out those reforms, in a politically and
financially weak environment, could seriously undermine source of
support from different sector of the society, and therefore the
opportunity to enjoy the supposed benefits for the poor (Grindle,
2004). In addition, Santiso underlined that, as long as the policy
rule was based on macroeconomic variables such as reducing
government expenditures, the process of enhancing a well-organised
public sector might be compromised. In this regard, the World Bank
did not offered clear procedures that were able to deal with such
problems. Many practical details needed to be worked out (Santiso,
2001).
Priority and perception on “good governance” necessarily differed
among countries. Nevertheless, the Western-dominated views on good
policies often were presented as having universal value, tending
to aim to objectives that were not linked to addressing poverty.
For example, although Uganda has been one of the leading examples
of “good governance”, where poverty reversed dramatically, from
56% in 1992-93 to 35% in 2000, it did not find support to get
international recognition for an alternative to multi-partyism
system (Doornbos, 2010). However, considering the best performers
in poverty reduction worldwide, was immediately clear that the
“good governance” agenda was not the only means for poverty
alleviation, nor necessarily the most effective one. China
economic reforms, which unlashed market forces under the aegis of
Communist Party, reduced in twenty years the number of extremely
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poor from more than 600 million to slightly more than 200 million
(World Bank, 2004). Another one often-cited example in the same
geographical area was Vietnam, which pursued a successful state-
oriented process of development cutting its income poverty rate
from 58% to 37% in just six years (1993-1999) (World Bank, 2004;
Shepard and Leitner, 2008).
In general, there seems limited imagination in the overall “good
governance” recipe to promote different strategies for poverty
reduction. Without recurring to the old-fashioned dirigisme, a
number of initiatives could be added in order to potentiate the
role of institutions for a greater pro-poor commitment. Commercial
strategies that aim to add values locally to local raw materials,
more attention to income distribution, technological partnership
between states, and, more broadly, enhancing competitive
advantages basing on local resources and local competences, could
foster positive trade-off for vulnerable groups. Moreover,
considerations about the history and the culture of singular
countries should be improved, in order to assess more carefully
specific needs (Grindle, 2007).
While the “good governance” set of policies was easy to support as
a desirable objective for poor countries, his plausibility of
significantly reducing poverty though his agenda did not find
strong empirical evidence, especially if compared with good
performers that followed unorthodox paths. In his researches, Khan
proved that its effect on growth and on redistribution are
contradictory. Moreover, Grindle underlined that most of the
policy prescription are unrelated with poverty alleviation.
Therefore, support the argument that the “good governance” recipe
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remain the most effective means for poverty reduction is an
arguable task. The aim of this essay has been to show the
ambiguities and the potential challenges that the “good
governance” discourse arise. What is clear is that there are no
easy answers for the poverty problem, nor universal solutions.
Undoubtedly, as a top-down IFI dominated technocratic approach,
the “good governance” agenda did not enjoy widespread legitimacy.
The narrowness of his policy framework, together with a certain
degree of continuity with precedent failing approaches, raised
doubt upon both the effectiveness to deal with different context
and the degree of importance that the poverty reduction cause
assumed among the donors community. Demonstrate the link between
improved governance and poverty reduction more carefully should be
an important duty for the “good governance” agenda supporters.
Furthermore, IFI expertise should be able to promote non-standard
strategies that better fit the economic, political and social
conditions prevalent on recipient countries. Devoid the historical
differences between developing countries has been one of the most
relevant limit of the “good governance” approach to poverty
reduction. An analysis on which different ingredient of this
agenda were more suitable in different context is necessary.
Therefore, a less doctrinaire and more diverse and plural
approach, which applied priorities on a country-by country basis,
is strongly advisable. The “good governance” recipe has been
translated from the developed North to the underdeveloped South as
a pre-packaged idea, without considering difficulties in his
implementation or the different impact that these policies can
have in different economic or social conditions. A decentralised
approach to promoting local productive capacity, more attention on
16
redistribution and an additional effort to reduce the
technological divide can be important add-on to foster the poverty
relief aspect of these policies.
In general, the “good governance” discourse is an optimal basis to
build an effective pro-poor strategy. Nevertheless, considering
the approaches followed by the worldwide top performers in the
poverty reduction, think outside the “good governance” box should
be an imperative for everyone that want embed the poverty
challenge as a pivotal component of the international development
agenda.
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