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A rapid review of the literature on migration

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This rapid review has been commissioned by the Cape Winelands District Municipality to provide background for the negotiation of an MOA in which key actors agree roles and responsibilities to monitor and minimise conflict between South Africans and foreign nationals and to effectively manage incidents should they occur.

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CONTENTS 1 Background .......................................................................................................................................... 2

2 Labour migration and cross border movement in historical context .............................................. 3

2.1 Citizen perspectives in receiver countries ................................................................................. 4

2.2 Urbanisation and migration in South Africa .............................................................................. 5

2.3 The changing face of mining ...................................................................................................... 5

2.4 Current South African migration trends .................................................................................... 6

2.5 Mapping social conflict associated with migration since 1994 .............................................. 6

3 Social violence in the Western Cape ................................................................................................. 8

4 Social conflict in the Cape Winelands ............................................................................................ 10

4.1 Learning from De Doorns ......................................................................................................... 10

4.1.1 Understanding the changing economic context in agriculture ..................................... 11

4.1.2 Managing conflict ............................................................................................................. 12

4.1.3 Counting the costs ............................................................................................................ 13

5 Towards a strategy to manage the risk of social conflict in the CWDM .................................. 14

5.1 Understanding informal economies and local relations of power .................................... 14

5.2 Identifying and addressing the roots of conflict .................................................................. 14

5.3 Engaging with key actors at local, provincial and national scale ..................................... 15

5.4 Institutional arrangements and capacity for implementation ............................................ 15

6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 16

7 References ....................................................................................................................................... 16

BACKGROUND Migration is a significant emerging theme in the literature on global development. According to the UN’s Population Division, there are now almost 200 million international migrants, more than double the figure recorded in 1980. Despite the increase in the numbers, global migrants still only constitute about 3% of the world’s population (UN-GCIM, 2005: 1). While these figures record movement of migrants between countries, internal rural-urban migration is also a significant factor in the global South.

Migration is a complex phenomenon with many different dimensions. It is important to understand that inter and intra African migration takes place in a context of extremely rapid urbanisation –

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currently the fastest in the world. This is creating cityscapes in which unplanned informal settlements are increasingly the dominant urban form.

A scan of the UN-HABITAT State of the World’s Cities Report (2008) highlights the following trends:

• By 2050, Africa is projected to have an urban population of 1.2 billion and will accommodate nearly a quarter of the world’s urban population.

• Much of the urban growth in Africa is concentrated in the capital cities. Between 1990 and 2000 big cities in Africa with populations of between one and five million such as Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Dakar, grew at 3.3 per cent, versus an average of 2.5 per cent for the developing world as a whole.

• Many of the fastest growing urban landscapes are swelled by the mass displacements triggered by armed conflict. Cities such as Luanda, Kinshasa, Khartoum and Monrovia have recorded sharp increases in their populations as a consequence of protracted wars in the countryside. In the Congo there have been an estimated 5.4 million conflict related deaths between 1998 and 2008, while another 30 African countries have experienced conflicts in the past few years (Pieterse, 2009).

• In 2005, six out of every ten urban residents in sub Saharan Africa were slum dwellers – nearly double the proportion of the rest of the developing world.

Migration between countries in Africa takes place in highly dynamic and contested social and economic environments characterised by sharp inequalities and significant poverty. However despite the prevalence and importance of migration the International Commission on Global Migration observes that it has yet to be substantively integrated as part of most national and international development agendas (UN-GCIM, 2005: 23).

Globally migrants frequently experience hostility and discrimination which UN-GCIM seeks to combat by systematic integration processes “actively supported by local and national authorities, employers and members of civil society...and informed by an objective public, political and media discourse on international migration” (UN-GCIM, 2005: 4).

In the three migrant receiving countries in Southern Africa – South Africa, Namibia and Botswana there is evidence of significant social hostility to migrants which we place in historical context below.

LABOUR MIGRATION AND CROSS BORDER MOVEMENT IN HISTORICAL

CONTEXT Labour migration and cross border movement to South Africa has undergone significant changes in the last two decades. Different categories of migration can be identified:

Migration categoryMigration categoryMigration categoryMigration category Distinguishing featuresDistinguishing featuresDistinguishing featuresDistinguishing features Contract mine migrationContract mine migrationContract mine migrationContract mine migration

This has grown out of the migrant labour system which dates back to the 1880’s. Historically labour migration to South Africa was tightly regulated through as series of labour contract

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agreements with neighbouring countries in Southern Africa.

VoluntaryVoluntaryVoluntaryVoluntary migrationmigrationmigrationmigration

After 1994 as South Africa became more integrated within SADC so new opportunities were created for cross border migration. As Crush et al (2005: 1) observe “Southern Africa is now a region on the move” This is consistent with global trends of increased migration and dispersed livelihood flows associated with globalising economies. A simple indicator of this increasing mobility is the numbers of people legally crossing border to visit South Africa from SADC countries. These rose from one million visitors per annum in the early 1990s to five million visitors in 2005 (Crush et al., 2005: 6).

Refugee migrationRefugee migrationRefugee migrationRefugee migration

Conflicts in Somalia, the DRC, Zimbabwe and other countries have created a stream of people seeking refugee and asylum status in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia.

Undocumented irregular migrationUndocumented irregular migrationUndocumented irregular migrationUndocumented irregular migration

Where opportunities for legal migration are restricted a significant parallel and deeply corrupt immigration market may be created. This provides fake Identity Documents and extorts bribes, protection money and sexual favours from undocumented migrants who are desperate to try to prevent their deportation.

CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES IN RECEIVER COUNTRIES The National Immigration Policy Survey conducted in 2001 highlighted that citizens across the region (from net immigration receiving countries South Africa, Botswana and Namibia) “consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens.”(Crush and Pendleton, 2004: 43)

A variety of factors have contributed to shaping citizen perspectives in receiver countries on presence and role of foreign migrants in the economy and social spaces. These include:

• Rapid urbanisation and accelerated rates of domestic rural urban migration alluded to above;

• Associated urbanisation of poverty, housing and services backlogs in urban centres;

• Changing labour processes in agriculture and mining which contribute to the externalisation and casualisation of labour;

• High rates of domestic unemployment;

• The high profile accorded to forced migration resulting from political and economic uncertainty in certain neighbouring states.

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URBANISATION AND MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA In 2001 Stats SA determined provincial urbanisation levels as follows. Four provinces (Gauteng (96%), Western Cape (90%), Northern Cape (80%) and Free State (75%)) had levels of urbanisation higher than the national urbanisation estimate of 56 per cent. The remaining provinces have much lower rates of urbanisation ( Limpopo (10%), Eastern Cape (38%), Mpumalanga (39%), North West (41%) and KwaZulu-Natal(45%) (Statistics South Africa, 2006). (Statistics South Africa, 2006)

Migration sources and trends vary considerably amongst the highly urbanised provinces. StatsSA cite Kok and Aliber (2005) to highlight the intensity of migration from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town among younger adults. More than 20 000 persons in the age group 20–24 years migrated to

Cape Town between 1992–1996 and 1996–2001, as compared to less than 5 000 migrants moving to the other cities over the same two periods.

To date most social conflict and tension has largely been confined to dense urban areas and informal settlements where both internal and foreign migrants seek access to the city and where housing and service backlogs are felt most acutely.

THE CHANGING FACE OF MINING With regard to the long established system of contract labour major shifts have been seen in the proportion of foreign workers employed on the mines. About 40% of the mining work force was recruited from neighbouring countries in the late 1980’s. The table below highlights changing mine labour recruitment patterns between 1990 and 2000.

SourceSourceSourceSource: TEBA in: TEBA in: TEBA in: TEBA in Crush et al (2005: 8)Crush et al (2005: 8)Crush et al (2005: 8)Crush et al (2005: 8)

The proportion of foreign migrants employed on the mines is reported to have risen to close to 60% in 2005. The shift is attributed to the downsizing in the South African mining industry which saw mining houses retrench proportionally more local workers, while retaining existing foreign mine workers.

The downturn in the mining industry has had knock on effects for internal interprovincial migration. For example as remittance rates have fallen for Eastern cape households with a family member

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formerly employed on the so poverty levels have increased stimulating the migration of other household members in search of opportunities in other provinces.

CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN MIGRATION TRENDS The Wits Forced Migrations Studies Programme (2009a) highlights the following trends:

• Internal migration represents by far the largest volumes of population movement and therefore poses the greatest challenges regarding government planning and service provision.

• There are no reliable statistics regarding cross border migration and many commonly quoted estimates (e.g. regarding undocumented migrants or Zimbabweans) are not based on solid evidence.

Estimates below are based on the Department of Home Affairs’ administrative statistics (2008) and on FMSP’s estimated projections based on national census data which projected that at the end of 2008 there were:

CategoryCategoryCategoryCategory Estimated numbersEstimated numbersEstimated numbersEstimated numbers NotesNotesNotesNotes

Recognized refugees 43 850 Cumulative since 1994

Recognized asylum seekers 276 000 Cumulative in-process applications

Economic migrants issued with individual work permits

32 344 Not including those on corporate permits

People deported from South Africa

312 733 In 2007/8.

Total foreign population 1.6 – 2 million Documented and undocumented combined. Zimbabweans account for between a million and 1.5 million of this total

Source Source Source Source –––– Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009)Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009)Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009)Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009)

MAPPING SOCIAL CONFLICT ASSOCIATED WITH MIGRATION SINCE 1994 Conflict between South Africans and foreign migrants is not a recent phenomenon. As the table below highlights there have been simmering tensions and outbreaks of conflict since 1994.

YearYearYearYear EventEventEventEvent 1994199419941994 There were widespread national protests at the perceived threat of foreign migrants

entering South Africa. A campaign dubbed Buyelekaya (Go back home) targeted foreigners in Alexandra

township in Gauteng. In Hout Bay Namibians working in the fishing industry were attacked by locals claiming that they were “stealing their jobs.”

1995199519951995 The HSRC claimed in a flawed research study that there were 5-8 million “illegal

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aliens” in South Africa. This report was only withdrawn in 2001 1996199619961996 Violent conflict breaks out in Imizamo Yethu in Cape Town. Two foreign nationals

and two South Africans are killed The South African government gives permanent residence to 124,000 SADC

nationals who had been living in SA without papers for five years or more. This process marked by demonstrations and protests

1997199719971997 Conflict between South African and foreign hawkers in Johannesburg In December the Cape Town Refugee Forum claims that 20 immigrants have been

killed in the city as a result of xenophobia during the past year 1998199819981998 Five foreign nationals killed in two separate incidents in Johannesburg South African Human Rights Commission, the National Consortium on Refugee

Affairs and UNHCR launch the Roll back Xenophobia Campaign Home Affairs reports that 141,000 Mozambicans and 28, 548 Zimbabweans

deported 1999199919991999 The South African government gives permanent residence to 91 000 Mozambican

nationals who had been living in SA for 10-15 years Home Affairs releases White paper on International Migration. Document is widely

criticised and remains stuck in Cabinet and Parliament for three years Foreign nationals accused of criminal activity are attacked in Ivory Park – two are

burnt to death by ‘necklacing’, three are seriously injured 2000200020002000 Operation Crackdown launched which results in the arrest 7000 people on suspicion

of being “illegal aliens” of whom 20% were found to be living legally in the country COSATU releases a statement condemning xenophobia 2001200120012001 Contestation over number of foreigners living illegally in South Africa. Home Affairs

repeats claims that over seven million undocumented migrants are in the country. SAMP argues numbers grossly exaggerated. SA Statistics agrees and HSRC withdraws its 1995 report

A migration study commissioned by the provincial department of Local Government and Housing found that the Western Cape received some 48000 people each year which represents an increase due to in-migration of more than one per cent of the total population. The main reasons are the perceived better job opportunities, more accessible and effective infrastructure, and superior quality of life available in the Western Cape. (PGWC, 2002). These migrants were largely from the Eastern and Northern Cape. The same report noted that “the phenomenon of foreign African residents in the province is a new one... though... it appears that numbers are not large.”

Violent clashes between South Africans and foreigners reported in Johannesburg and Milnerton in Cape Town. Four people are killed.

SAHRC winds up Roll back Xenophobia campaign citing lack of funding 2002200220022002 Parliament passes a new Immigration Act 2004200420042004 Two people are killed and fifty two families displaced near Rustenberg after clashes

between South Africans and Shangaan speakers 2005200520052005 Reports of attacks on Somalian refugees and Zimbabweans in the Free State 2006200620062006 Thirty spaza shops run by Somali shop owners forcibly closed in Knysna Two Zimbabweans killed in an informal settlement in Pretoria Violence in Plettenberg Bay, the Cape Flats, Diepsloot, Zamdela, and Masiphumelele

claims more than 20 lives countrywide and injures many more people. 2007200720072007 The Somali community claims that 400 Somalis have been killed in the last ten

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years and 40 Somalis killed in the Western Cape in past six months Violence reported in Port Elizabeth, Motherwell, Scheizer-Reneke, Khutsong, Delmas,

Mossel Bay 2008200820082008 Widespread violence reported in major centres across the country MarchMarchMarchMarch Worcester: A large group of Zwelethemba informal settlement residents

destroy foreign-run shops and leave a large number of foreign nationals homeless.

April/MayApril/MayApril/MayApril/May Widespread violence in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal prompts President Mbeki to call out the army. Violence spreads to towns in Western cape and to Cape Town

MayMayMayMay Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula states that the death toll stands at 56 with 342 foreign-owned shops looted and 213 burned down. Tens of thousands more have been displaced.

2009200920092009 In February 2009 the NPA reported that 1,627 people were originally arrested in relation to the violence. A total of 469 cases were opened of which 105 had been finalised, with 70 guilty verdicts. Convictions were mostly for theft and assault, By this date there had been no reported convictions for rape or murder (CORMSA, 2009: 35) In February 2009 7 Zimbabweans were burnt to death in their shacks in the De Doorns area (Forced Migration Studies Programme, 2009b) This was reportedly a consequence of a clash between Sotho nationals and Zimbabweans unrelated to tensions between South Africans and foreign nationals.

NNNNovember ovember ovember ovember 2009200920092009

Social conflict breaks out in De Doorns again. Initially it was estimated that 3600 people had been displaced. However after registration the official number of IDPs at the safety site established in the town was around 1200.

Source: Adapted Source: Adapted Source: Adapted Source: Adapted from www.from www.from www.from www. www.benkhumalowww.benkhumalowww.benkhumalowww.benkhumalo----seegelken.de/dokumente/XENOPHOBIAseegelken.de/dokumente/XENOPHOBIAseegelken.de/dokumente/XENOPHOBIAseegelken.de/dokumente/XENOPHOBIA----TIMELINE.pdfTIMELINE.pdfTIMELINE.pdfTIMELINE.pdf ((((n.dn.dn.dn.d)))) and other sourcesand other sourcesand other sourcesand other sources

SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HEARINGS The SAHRC (which had previously been associated with campaigns to roll back xenophobia which were wound up in 2001 citing lack of funding ) conducted an investigation into the 2008 violence. In a detailed report they prepared a comprehensive set of recommendations to range of government departments including the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (DCoGTA), the Department of Human Settlements, (DHS) the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development( DoJCD) and the Department of Social Development (DSD) as well as the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), Local and Provincial Government, the SANDF, SAPS, Treasury and several other structures.

These recommendations included the need for the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC to develop a national-level evaluation and action plan to address obstacles to local, provincial and national responses to social conflict disasters coupled with amendment of the National Disaster Management Framework to incorporate social conflict disaster risk (South African Human Rights Commission, 2009: 12)

SOCIAL VIOLENCE IN THE WESTERN CAPE The 2010 Risk and Development report for the Western Cape (Holloway et al., 2010) notes that the widespread attacks against foreign nationals in May 2008 “escalated into one of the most complex emergencies ever seen in South Africa”. The City of Cape Town estimated its expenditure in

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response to the conflict to have exceeded R200 million rand. The full cost of the crisis in the Province as a whole has yet to be accurately calculated.

The table below indicates the extent of the social displacement recorded in the Western Cape by the 27th May 2008.

MunicipalityMunicipalityMunicipalityMunicipality Number displacedNumber displacedNumber displacedNumber displaced City of Cape TownCity of Cape TownCity of Cape TownCity of Cape Town 20,418 DrakensteinDrakensteinDrakensteinDrakenstein 730 Saldana BaySaldana BaySaldana BaySaldana Bay 590 OverstrandOverstrandOverstrandOverstrand 226 GeorgeGeorgeGeorgeGeorge 150 KnysnaKnysnaKnysnaKnysna 200 TheewaterskloofTheewaterskloofTheewaterskloofTheewaterskloof 100 TotalTotalTotalTotal 22,414 People displaced in the Western Cape: Source People displaced in the Western Cape: Source People displaced in the Western Cape: Source People displaced in the Western Cape: Source ((((Holloway et al 2010: 50Holloway et al 2010: 50Holloway et al 2010: 50Holloway et al 2010: 50))))

Holloway et al (2010: 52) characterise social violence as a new type of hazard from the perspective of:

• scale – how many people were affected and the spatially dispersed nature of the displacement

• the prolonged duration which stretched out over a period of months

• the involvement of new and diverse sets of actors including international humanitarian assistance partners and a broader range of organisations active in South African civil society

• the diverse languages, cultural norms and backgrounds of those affected

The report cautions that “although the 2008 crisis is over and the safety sites have closed, the risk of violence and displacement has not disappeared. Since 2008, there have been incidents of xenophobia-related violence reported in De Doorns, as well as continuing, sporadic attacks on foreign nationals and their businesses elsewhere” (Ibid: 55).

INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO XENOPHOBIC CONFLICT The City of Cape Town (2010) has developed a “strategic plan to quell Xenophobic conflict”. The plan highlights the obligations of the South African government to the international convention and protocols relating to the status of refugees. The City observes that while “local government does not have a direct legal mandate with respect to refugees and immigrants the city has been proactive in designing programs to try and quell the violence, normalise situations and reintegrate the displaced.”(City of Cape Town, 2010: 1)

The strategy seeks to prevent outbreaks of social conflict by addressing the specific risk factors which trigger conflict. It includes a focus on:

• Developing conflict risk assessment skills of local community leaders

• Developing local dispute resolution capabilities

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• Education programmes which enable dialogue and awareness of policy relating to refugees and foreign migrants

• Improving co-operation and synergies between different stakeholders

• Developing partnerships between foreign migrants and local entrepreneurs.

SOCIAL CONFLICT IN THE CAPE WINELANDS As noted above much of the social conflict between South Africans and foreign migrants has been urban based. This changed with the conflict in De Doorns where there was a specific focus on Zimbabwean nationals working as seasonal workers on farms.

LEARNING FROM DE DOORNS The Wits Forced Migrations Studies Programme (FMSP) makes the following observations about the social conflict in De Doorns:

• It represents the first large scale displacement of foreign nationals since the national wave of xenophobic violence of May 2008;

• It selectively targeted Zimbabweans despite the presence of other foreign nationals (e.g. Lesotho nationals) living and working in the same area; and

• It indicates the continuing challenge by South African authorities to develop effective early warning, prevention and disaster response mechanisms. (Forced Migration Studies Programme, 2009b)

FMSP expresses some scepticism about the reasons for the conflict “commonly invoked” by local stakeholders and commentators. These included:

• The alleged preference of local farmers’ preference for foreign workers as they are seen as a source of cheap labour;

• The role of labour brokers who were allegedly importing people from Zimbabwe;

• The presence of a Home Affairs satellite office which was said to have attracted foreigners to the area.

It seems that Zimbabwean workers have a reputation for productivity and a willingness to work overtime as they seek to remit money to their families back home. Many Zimbabwean migrants have a much high level of education than the local populace. In a 2009 study which interviewed Zimbabwean migrants in De Doorns seven of the seasonal workers interviewed had completed their O levels, one had completed his A levels and two had University degrees (Theron and Bamu, 2009: 26).

FSMP found no evidence that foreign migrants were paid less than the minimum wage. This is corroborated by Theron and Bamu (2009) who found no complaints about underpayment in the valley. To the contrary this latter study indicates that there is some evidence to suggest that the “most vulnerable section of the workforce, migrants employed on a seasonal basis” were in fact “earning at a higher rate than seasonal workers resident on farms and indeed many permanent workers.”(Theron and Bamu, 2009: 31) In this setting they argue that there is a real competition

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between strata of the working class for scarce job opportunities. This is also aggravated by competition between contractors and labour brokers who act as labour intermediaries in an increasingly externalised labour market to place seasonal workers on farms.

FMSP also examined allegations that Zimbabwean workers were targeted because they would not associate with a planned strike for better wages. However again there was little evidence to support this. Theron and Bamu highlight the acute weakness of trade union organisation. However they did express concern about the establishment of a Home Affairs satellite office on private land which they found to be irregular. In the light of the findings of Theron and Bamu, it sems reasonable to infer that the presence of this facility would have substantially pushed up conflict risk in the area.

Overall FMSP have argued for a more in depth look at the underlying causes which they single out as:

• Competition between groups of labour brokers to secure labour broking contracts;

• The alleged Involvement and complicity of publicly elected councillors in contractor conflicts for economic and political reasons;

• The lack of political and administrative power of municipalities in relation to commercial farmers within their jurisdiction.

UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING ECONOMIC CONTEXT IN AGRICULTURE Research undertaken by Phuhlisani (de Satgé et al., 2010) suggests that the social conflict in De Doorns needs to be located within the context of wide reaching changes in the agricultural sector in the Cape Winelands since 1994.

The deregulation of agriculture in South Africa which started nationally prior to 1994 created opportunities for some but significant challenges for many producers. Farmers producing for export markets in the wine and fruit sectors have had to manage a complex set of variables in order to contain costs. At the same time their compliance obligations expanded both in respect of national labour and tenure security while they were also required to meet stringent export standards.

While the combination of national legislation and export certification requirements have resulted in positive pressure to improve living and working conditions on farms they have also prompted farmers to restructure farming enterprises to reduce costs. Cost cutting measures have included increased investment in mechanisation and mechanical harvesters which has provided additional impetus to the wider trend of the rationalisation and casualisation of labour.

Between 1993 and 2002 CWDM farm income increased by 27% in real terms (after inflation), yet regular employment fell by 2%. During the same period use of casual or seasonal labour increased by 45% for the same period. This was significantly higher than the Provincial increase of 27%.While this suggests an overall increase in agricultural work opportunities in the District; it illustrates a significant shift in the character of labour demand. (Murray, 2010: 5)

One of the main changes in the labour process was the use of contractors and labour brokers, colloquially referred to as ‘spanners’ to source casual workers. In a survey of 50 farms in 2010

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While 55% of farmers still source their seasonal labour on an individual basis, almost 40% now employ the services of labour brokers.(Poole and Eigelaar-Meets, 2010)

In the wine sector there has been a marked increase in mechanical harvesting. In 1995 a total of 95 machines were recorded for the whole industry. A year later this figure already stood at 144 - an increase of 52 %. In the 1997 survey of 104 farms, 36 % of producers made use of mechanical harvesters (Ewert et al, 1998). A VinPro spokesperson recently estimated that as many as 50% of growers made use of mechanical harvesters. One harvester may replace as many at 70 workers per 12 hour shift.(Murray, 2010)

This contextualises the increasing use of casual or seasonal labour which is sourced from labour brokers. This also provides the setting for the increasing use made of migrant workers from other countries including Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

A reported undersupply of workers in some sectors at peak season is opening up the labour market to the hiring of migrant workers from other countries such as Lesotho and Zimbabwe. Securing access to sources of casual labour which are regarded as productive and reliable by labour brokers and employers has contributed to contestation over local casual labour market share

FMSP (2009b) cites Porchia Adams (Agri Wes-Cape Corporate Communications Manager), who provided figures for seasonal employment in the De Doorns area

Seasonal work recruitment figures: De DoornsSeasonal work recruitment figures: De DoornsSeasonal work recruitment figures: De DoornsSeasonal work recruitment figures: De Doorns South Africans from De South Africans from De South Africans from De South Africans from De DoornsDoornsDoornsDoorns

5701 64%

South Africans from South Africans from South Africans from South Africans from surrounding townssurrounding townssurrounding townssurrounding towns

894 11%

ZimbabweansZimbabweansZimbabweansZimbabweans 1558 18% BasothoBasothoBasothoBasotho 630 7% TOTALTOTALTOTALTOTAL 8783 100% Table adapted from Table adapted from Table adapted from Table adapted from Wits Wits Wits Wits Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009Forced Migration Studies Programme (2009b)b)b)b)

Overall South Africans make up 75% of the seasonal labour force in De Doorns. According to AgriWesKaap there are 5337 permanent workers employed in the De Doorns area “of whom almost all are South Africans”.

The combination of job shedding and casualisation of agricultural labour coupled with an influx of displaced people from Zimbabwe and other countries in the region requires the CWDM to develop a localised understanding of changing agricultural labour processes and to continually monitor their implications for local development planning, service delivery and conflict risk.

Overall this suggests that the District and Local Municipalities need to develop much more systematic and localised understanding of changing agricultural labour processes and their implications for local development planning, service delivery and conflict risk.

MANAGING CONFLICT IN DE DOORNS A PGWC report (2010) provides an analysis of events following the outbreak of violence in De Doorns which is summarised below.

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The outbreak of social conflict in De Doorns which took place between 14th -17th November 2009 resulted in displaced foreign nationals being accommodated in a tent settlement on the rugby fields.

A Secretariat headed by the Speaker of the Breede Valley Municipality was established which brought together representatives of the Department of the Premier, South African Human Rights Commission and the Breede Valley Municipality. Administrative assistance was provided by the Public Participation Unit in the Department of Provincial Local Government. The secretariat was responsible for managing the aftermath the initial conflict, establishing the camp and overseeing its eventual closure.

Foreign nationals were reluctant to leave the safety camp. A standoff ensued between the camp occupants and the municipality. The Office of the Premier appointed a mediation and reintegration team to break this deadlock and negotiate closure of the camp with the foreign nationals and the Breede River Municipality in De Doorns.

In July mediators interviewed foreign nationals to identify repatriation, relocation and reintegration options and conducted interviews with local stakeholders to better understand the nature of the dispute between the Municipality and the camp residents.

Three options were agreed as follows:

• Repatriation with transport assistance from IOM and payment of R1200 • Relocation to any place within the borders of South Africa with payment of R1200 • Reintegration into the local community and payment of R1200

OptionsOptionsOptionsOptions Number of peopleNumber of peopleNumber of peopleNumber of people RepatriationRepatriationRepatriationRepatriation 30 RelocationRelocationRelocationRelocation 5 ReintegrationReintegrationReintegrationReintegration 191 226226226226 Source: PGWC report 2010Source: PGWC report 2010Source: PGWC report 2010Source: PGWC report 2010

Most displaced foreign nationals opted to be reintegrated into the community.

COUNTING THE COSTS The local municipality incurred costs in excess of R2 million rand during this period while the costs incurred by other actors in addressing the consequences of the violence and associated displacement have yet to be calculated.

DEVELOPING EVIDENCE BASED ASSESSMENTS OF CONFLICT RISK The complexity of social and labour relations in De Doorns calls for a research and evidence based assessment of conflict risk. Currently the studies which have been done examining the employment of foreign migrants in agriculture are small scale and impressionistic. More detailed

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research is required to better understand these trends and the nature of the associated social conflict risk

TOWARDS A STRATEGY TO MANAGE THE RISK OF SOCIAL CONFLICT IN

THE CWDM The literature highlights the highly dynamic and multidimensional nature of migration. In the Western Cape there are complex intersections between internal and foreign migrants in contested social and economic spaces. These are characterised by informality, rising unemployment, poverty and inequality. An additional set of pressures contributes to social tensions in agricultural towns in the Cape Winelands where large numbers of people are already restricted to seasonal labour opportunities.

Deregulation in the agricultural sector has exposed agricultural producers in the viticulture and deciduous fruit sectors to intensified global competition for export market share. Agricultural employers are constantly trying to find ways to contain costs and limit compliance responsibilities. This has resulted in increasing mechanisation; labour shedding, casualisation and feminisation of agricultural labour.

In an economic climate where labour is increasingly outsourced, foreign migrants and local residents can find themselves in competition for jobs. However the relationship between foreign migrants and local residents has other dimensions. For many foreign migrants represent a source of revenue. Foreign migrants need accommodation. They pay rents to local people in return for the opportunity to construct a backyard shack. They may pay the site owner for service charges. They need work and represent an economic resource for local labour brokers who stand to profit from hiring out workers with a reputation for high productivity and a willingness to work overtime in order to earn money to remit cash and goods to relatives in their home country. These relationships are delicately balanced and as recently history shows may be easily disturbed.

UNDERSTANDING INFORMAL ECONOMIES AND LOCAL RELATIONS OF POWER The development of a realistic strategy to monitor migration and manage conflict risk between foreign migrants and local people requires that we develop:

• a much more fine grained understanding of the social and economic dynamics in the different localities where foreign migrants stay

• the contributions that migrants make to the local economy

• the contestation which may develop amongst South Africans as they seek to derive benefits from foreign migrants in particular localities

IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT An improved understanding of local informal economies and relations of power may help to better identify conflict risk. However social risk has multiple roots and we must be wary of privileging the economic dimensions. We need to grasp the roots of social prejudice. This requires us to also examine relationships between South Africans of different racial groups. Where relations may be strained between South Africans the manufacture of the threat of “a foreign other” may be used to

15

manufacture local unity. This can become a source of political capital for those seeking to expand a local support base in a closely contested political environment. This requires enforcement of strict ethical codes by incumbent and aspirant bearers of political office.

The RADAR, FMSP, and City of Cape Town documents propose a variety of measures to help avoid outbreaks of severe violence in the future:

• strengthening the NGO sector

• empowering community leaders

• improved communication and transparency about services rendered to combat perceptions that foreign nationals receive preferential treatment

• promoting dialogue and conciliation in at-risk communities;

• effective regulation of informal businesses

• regulation and monitoring of the selling/renting RDP houses for use as business premises by foreign nationals

• improving the monitoring of violence ‘hotspots’;

• Intelligence led clamp downs on active incitement and tacit condonation of violence against foreigners;

• Demonstrating that perpetrators of violence and breaches of human rights will be held accountable;

• Ensuring that relevant government institutions have clear roles and responsibilities which will enable them to effectively intervene to prevent and stop violence and respond effectively to complex social emergencies.

ENGAGING WITH KEY ACTORS AT LOCAL, PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL SCALE Social conflict is a multidimensional problem and requires engagement with a variety of actors across different scales. This demands wide-ranging consultation about roles and responsibilities and the identification of lead agencies to:

• Actively integrate migration into local development planning;

• Conduct locality based research and evidence based conflict risk assessment

• Communicate agreed strategies and approaches to all parties;

• Ensure that labour and tenure security legislation and immigration/ refugee/asylum laws and procedures are effectively implemented

• Monitor and prevent social conflict and communicate changing indices of conflict risk

• Respond effectively to threats of hot conflict to protect lives and property

• Investigate and hold perpetrators accountable where conflict breaks out

• Manage relief and conciliation processes for post conflict reconstruction

• Evaluate and continually improve the management of conflict risk.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CAPACITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION The social and financial costs incurred as result of conflict in 2008 and 2009 in the Western Cape and the Cape Winelands District Municipality underscores the need for the principles and

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agreements developed above need to be anchored in clear institutional arrangements and backed by dedicated capacity and budgets.

CONCLUSION This rapid review has attempted to provide some context and background to the dialogue which will begin through a series of workshops in the Cape Winelands commencing on the 1st March 2011. It highlights the complex and multidimensional nature of the elements which drive up the risk of social conflict between foreign migrants and South Africans in particular social and economic settings. The rapid review also highlights the patchy and generalised nature of our knowledge about the lives and livelihoods of foreign migrants in South Africa which needs to be better understood.

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