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A desert squall:Anglo American planningfor military interventionin Iraq, July 1958 August1959Stephen BlackwellPublished online: 06 Dec 2006.

To cite this article: Stephen Blackwell (1999) A desert squall:Anglo American planning for military intervention in Iraq, July 1958 August1959, Middle Eastern Studies, 35:3, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/00263209908701276

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A Desert Squall:Anglo-American Planning for Military

Intervention in Iraq,July 1958-August 1959

STEPHEN BLACKWELL

The launch of Operation 'Desert Storm' against Iraq in 1991, and thesubsequent Anglo-American readiness to undertake punitive action againstSaddam Hussein, has some interesting precedents in the year following theestablishment of a republican regime in Baghdad in July 1958. Though theenigmatic figure of Brigadier Qasim and the looming backdrop ofSoviet-American confrontation provide a starkly different context, thecrises of 1958-59 had a formative impact on long-term Western policytowards the country, particularly with regard to pan-Arab nationalism andIraq's place in the Middle Eastern political system. Within the more generalsetting of the Cold War this period was also a significant turning point in the'Great Game' between East and West for strategic advantage, oil resourcesand client regimes in the region.

Though these factors imposed considerably greater constraints on thepossibility of military intervention, the episode also aids our understandingof the development of Anglo-American policy towards Iraq since 1945 andits relationship to inter-Arab politics. The transatlantic rupture over Suez in1956, an event of undisputed importance, tends to overshadow the closeAnglo-American co-operation over the Iraqi coup in July 1958 and itsimmediate aftermath.1 Recent historical attention has mainly focused on theIraqi coup within the context of the Anglo-American interventions in Jordanand Lebanon that followed.2 Initial Western reactions to the turmoil in Iraqwere conditioned by the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR), theunion of Egypt and Syria, in February 1958. This development, apparentlyinitiated by Cairo, was seen by London as the first concrete step towardsPresident Gamal Abdul Nasser's supposed goal of a pan-Arab superstate.3Also, from the perspective of Anglo-American relations, the interventionsin Lebanon and Jordan appeared to signify a transfer of Britain's traditionalregional dominance to its more powerful ally.

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.35, No.3, July 1999, pp.1-18PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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In the context of Middle Eastern politics the Iraqi coup was of greatersignificance than Suez in two senses: the independent stance of the newlyinstalled regime led by Abdul Karim Qasim both frustrated Nasser's questfor regional leadership and fragmented anti-Western nationalism as apolitical force.4 However, until this became clear in 1959, differences wereto surface in London and Washington's policy towards communist activityin republican Iraq. This article seeks to outline why Britain and the UnitedStates considered and then abandoned the idea of intervention in Iraq in1958 and 1959. It will be emphasized that although the two allies were oftendivided over specific issues a common perception of the Cold War threatensured that their respective Middle Eastern strategies remained broadly instep. These were to be reassessed in 1959 as it became clear that theperceived danger had receded as rivalry between the UAR and Iraq ensureda fragile regional stability. This leads to the second main argument: that theAnglo-American interventionist policy adopted over Jordan and Lebanonwas discarded as it became clear that Nasser was as virulent an anti-communist as an anti-imperialist and that his nationalist empathy withSoviet communism had been grossly over-estimated.

In 1957 the belief that the Middle East constituted the critical theatre of theCold War ensured a rapid restoration of close Anglo-American co-operationover the region after the events of the previous year. Despite theirdifferences over Suez London and Washington were in basic agreement thatthe Soviet Union was prepared to become involved in, or at least incite, alimited war in the Middle East. The most significant publicacknowledgement of this threat, President Dwight D. Eisenhower'sintroduction of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' in January 1957, pledged armedAmerican assistance to any regional regime threatened by communism.5This had become a distinct possibility following the abortive CIA coupattempt against the seemingly pro-Soviet regime in Syria in August 1957.The failure of this attempt threatened to herald an international crisis afterWashington gave a blunt warning that it was prepared to take further directaction to stem the growth of communism in the Middle East. Neverthelessit soon became apparent that the Americans had overstated the extent ofSoviet interference and the Syrian crisis was resolved by a combination ofregional diplomacy and Nasser's despatch of troops to support the Syrianregime.6 This scare, however, was enough to ensure that an Anglo-American summit in Washington in October agreed on a public 'Declarationof Common Purpose', which committed both countries to jointly exploreways to counter Soviet 'aggression or infiltration in the Middle East'.7

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MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, JULY 1958-AUGUST 1959 3

Following the Washington talks British and American policy hadfocused on how regional nationalism could best be conciliated and/orcountered. In October 1957 a highly secret Anglo-American working groupin Washington prepared a wide-ranging report that emphasized the need forpolitical, economic and propaganda measures in the Middle East. This wasdesigned to counter the prevalent Arab view, reinforced by the Suez andSyrian Crisis, of the West's aggressive intentions and Soviet goodwill.8 Themilitary dimension of this embryonic joint strategy was by far the mostproblematic issue. Though both sides agreed to consider every kind ofpractical measure to combat Soviet infiltration the next task of the jointworking group, contingency military planning for Jordan and Lebanon, sawserious Anglo-American disagreement. Washington's pessimism about thelong-term viability of King Hussein's regime in Jordan ensured that the jointplanning process had virtually ground to a halt by the beginning of 1958.9Though disturbances in Lebanon in May 1958 revitalized joint planning anoutline plan for an operation in the country, entitled 'Blue Bat', envisaged adivision of labour between British and American forces rather than a co-ordinated intervention.10 American caution on this issue stemmed fromWashington's sensitivities over Arab nationalist feeling towards the legacyof Suez." Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador in Washington, explainedto London that the State Department in particular suffered from a 'fear ofbeing seen alone with the British' in the Middle East.12

The military coup that took place in Baghdad on the morning of 14 July1958 led to the downfall of the most important pro-Western regime in theMiddle East. Iraq, as a major oil producer and the only Arab member of theBaghdad Pact, was considered a bastion of British regional power andWestern interests in general.13 The suddenness of the coup, and the brutalitythat accompanied the summary executions of the Iraqi royalty and PrimeMinister, Nuri al-Sa'id, was a severe shock to the British government:Harold Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, recalled that the 'loss of allour friends' was a 'devastating blow'.14 This initial reaction in London andthe belief that Cairo was behind the revolution was also shared by theAdministration in Washington. In the days following the coup Eisenhowerfelt that events in Iraq heralded a wave of Arab nationalist agitation thatwould sweep away the last vestiges of Western influence in the Middle East.American objectives had thus changed from 'quieting a troubled situation tofacing up to a crisis of formidable proportions'.15 The President's Secretaryof State, John Foster Dulles, was convinced of both UAR involvement andNasser's 'Hitlerite' ambitions to dominate the Arab world.16

In the immediate aftershock of the coup both London and Washingtonseriously considered the possibility of reversing the outcome by militaryforce. On receiving news of the events in Baghdad the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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in Washington instructed their planners to prepare contingency measures foran operation in the country.17 In London the Chiefs of Staff, urged on byDuncan Sandys, the Minister of Defence, asked their Joint planners todevise a two-pronged move on Baghdad by forces based in Jordan, Lebanonand the Gulf. The Planners, well aware of the disagreements among theChiefs over this blueprint for a full-scale land invasion of Iraq, argued thatit would take too long to prepare an operation and that the Iraqis wouldstrongly resist. With the Foreign Office also hostile to the proposal the ideawas quickly and quietly dropped.18 The government nonetheless pressedahead with Operation 'Fortitude', the British military intervention in Jordanaimed at supporting King Hussein while the Americans landed marines inBeirut. Though these were far more limited operations they were primarilyaimed at preventing the revolutionary virus from spreading elsewhere in theregion. The Defence Committee in London also felt that their forces, onceestablished in Jordan, could establish 'a foothold in the event of anysubsequent Anglo-American operations against Iraq'." However, whenSelwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, visited the United States forconsultations on 17 July the Administration ruled out any such move.20 Akey factor was the new Iraqi government's hasty reassurances about oilsupplies: Macmillan, assured that the 'new men' were Iraqi nationalistsrather than 'Nasserite' in their outlook, felt that Britain and the UnitedStates needed to be 'realists' in their reactions to developments in Iraq.21

Though the option of an immediate intervention in Iraq had been put onhold Lloyd, who saw Lebanon and Jordan as 'positions of strength', stillsought an agreed Anglo-American policy to 'hope that in course of timeopportunities for re-establishing our position in Iraq and elsewhere' mightarise.22 Eisenhower and Macmillan concurred that it was 'not really Jordanbut Iraq which is the real problem'.23 Within days of the coup the StateDepartment in Washington argued that early recognition was needed tostabilize the new government and safeguard Western interests in thecountry.24 On 22 July a special ministerial committee on the Middle Eastmet in London and agreed with the Foreign Office view that although someaccommodation with Arab nationalism was necessary Nasser could still becontained as long as the new Iraqi republic acted as a regional counterpointto the UAR.25 The prospect of playing off Baghdad against Cairo settled theissue. With the new government soon able to consolidate its authority bothBritain and the United States agreed to recognize the regime at the end ofJuly.26

The new leadership in Baghdad, the Iraqi Free Officers, consisted of aclique of little-known soldiers with no obvious connections to the mainopponents of the previous regime. These had consisted principally of thesocialist Ba'th party, though the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) had also

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emerged as an increasingly cohesive and popular organization in the mid-1950s.27 Although the military leaders of the Iraqi coup appeared to operateon the basis of a collective leadership, the Foreign Office quickly identifiedAbdul Karim Qasim as the main figure in the new government.28 In the firstfew months of the new republic the British embassy in Baghdadcharacterized Qasim as a 'naive idealist' who nevertheless possessed'considerable personal charm'. The presence of 'respectable' nationalistopponents of the previous regime within the new government also reassuredLondon.29 These considerations were important as the domestic politicalsituation was a major factor in the decision to recognize the newgovernment. The main fear was that Qasim's downfall would lead to a moreanti-Western regime and consequently a harder bargain over oil supplies.30

The likelihood of this increased in late 1958 as it began to appear as thoughQasim, though publicly claiming to be above the domestic political fray,was more favourably inclined towards the Iraqi communists than thenationalists.31

Qasim's indulgent attitude to the ICP produced differing reactions inLondon and Washington. The more up-beat British assessments of thesituation in Iraq in Autumn 1958 contrasted with increased Americanpessimism. In October the American embassy in Baghdad provided theState Department with a stark account of an absence of government, aninsecure leadership and a 'stagnant' economy.32 By the end of NovemberAmerican intelligence appraisals, though acknowledging that Qasimhimself was not a communist, revealed increasing concern about the growthof communist influence in Iraq.33 With regard to Qasim British policy, asexplained by Lloyd on 30 November, was based on the premise that 'ourbasic interest is to ensure that Iraq remains independent both of the UnitedArab Republic and of Communism'. A possible Iraqi alignment with theUAR constituted a 'hardly less menacing' prospect to the West than acommunist regime in Baghdad as it would renew regional tensions and posean increased threat to the Gulf. Though Lloyd was cautious about givingovert support the importance of British interests in Iraq meant that Qasimhad to be regarded as the 'lesser evil' than Nasser.34 These views were aconcise expression of British policy towards Iraq that met with the basicagreement of the State Department at this stage. Nevertheless the Britishembassy in Washington, aware that the Americans feared an imminentcommunist take-over in Baghdad, was in no doubt that the Americanswould see the 'success of pro-Nasser forces as preferable' if Qasimcontinued to flirt with the communists.35

The patched-up Anglo-American policy agreed in November was all butruptured by the events of the following month in Iraq. In his message to theBritish embassy in Washington on 30 November Lloyd made an oblique

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reference to American 'pique' at the British view that the West shouldconsider 'tipping off Qasim rather than merely showing a 'passive interestin his preservation'.36 London's awareness that trouble was brewing wasfurther indicated by a Foreign Office warning on 8 December that the Iraqigovernment 'might be going on the rocks'.37 These concerns become moreintelligible in the light of an anti-communist coup led by Rashid Ali, aprominent nationalist who had led an abortive pro-German coup against theBritish-backed regime in Baghdad during the Second World War. The ill-organized attempt was uncovered and broken up by Iraqi government forceson 10 December. In the following days Iraqi troops surrounded oilfieldswhile the British and American Embassies in Baghdad warned theirnationals to stay indoors.38

It is clear that the United States embassy in Baghdad was alsoforewarned about the details of the plot before 10 December. The embassyhad been approached several days beforehand by individuals claiming to berepresentatives of an alternative 'free officers movement' engaged in a planto overthrow the Qasim regime. The State Department in Washington,though understandably cautious, saw the planned coup as a potential'watershed in stopping Communist advances' in the Middle East andrecommended giving any new nationalist government 'generousassistance'.39 The equally alerted British had put a different interpretation onevents. The Foreign Office felt that the communist threat had helped to'drive the middle of the road nationalists over to the pro-UAR group, withthe result that a coup of some sort had not seemed at all unlikely'. Thoughthe United States took a more pessimistic view of Qasim's prospects theBritish government continued to hope that the Baghdad regime couldmaintain an independent course.40

The sketchy British accounts of the plot that are presently available denyany collusion in propping up Qasim but it is evident that this was notbelieved elsewhere.41 The failure of the attempt and the belief that theBritish had helped to frustrate the nationalists was an evident surprise to theAmericans who were astonished by the extent of London's support forQasim. The plotter's connections to the United States embassy led tointensified Iraqi hostility towards what were perceived as deliberateAmerican attempts to undermine the regime. William Rountree, anAssistant Secretary at the State Department already on a tour of the MiddleEast, felt obliged to proceed with a prearranged visit to Baghdad in order toprevent Iraqi communists claiming a propaganda victory.42 The subsequentvisit was marked by anti-American riots and a tense and unproductivemeeting with Qasim.43 The nature of Rountree's reception in Baghdad had aperceptible impact on Washington's already worried attitude to Iraq, to theextent that Eisenhower asked his advisers whether it was worthwhile

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supporting a UAR take-over of the country.44 The President's pro-Nasserinclinations at this stage reflected a shift in American policy in late 1958that was consolidated by the Rashid Ali coup attempt. As it had becomeclear that Nasser had not instigated the July coup relations with the UARhad begun to thaw, with the result of a tentative National Security Council(NSC) recommendation in October that the United States should seek to'normalize' relations with the UAR.45

After his hostile reception in Baghdad William Rountree's subsequentvisit to Cairo featured an 'interesting, frank and helpful' conversation withNasser on 15 December which further influenced Washington's re-evaluation. Nasser explained that the initial good relations between theUAR and Qasim after the July coup had deteriorated and he was nowconcerned over communist activities in Iraq. Though Nasser suspected thatthe United States aimed to encourage rivalry between himself and Qasim,Rountree was surprised to hear that the President regarded Iraq as a'common problem' and that the UAR would 'vigorously' oppose Sovietexpansionism in the Middle East.46 Though he held 'no illusions' aboutNasser's ultimate aim of leading the Arab world Rountree left Cairoconvinced that he was seriously concerned and that there was a 'conflict ofinterest' in Iraq 'between the UAR and the Soviet Union'. After hearing theAssistant Secretary's report of the meeting following his return toWashington Eisenhower concluded that Nasser had 'grown up a little'.47 TheAdministration's new favouritism towards the UAR President was bolsteredby the vigorous repression of communist activists in Egypt that commencedin December 1958. On 15 January 1959 the NSC discussed the possibilityof working with Nasser in order to prevent a communist take-over inBaghdad, though Dulles cautioned that, as far as the Americans alone wereconcerned, it was 'essential to keep our hands off Iraq'.48 Intelligencesources continued to warn that a 'determined' communist effort was beingmade in Iraq and that this could ultimately result in the nationalization ofthe Iraqi oilfields and the destabilization of the Gulf Sheikhdoms.49

Despite their spoiling role during the abortive Rashid Ali coup theBritish also began to come round to the American view that a Nasseritegovernment would be a lesser evil than a communist take-over in Baghdad.It is important to note that this tentative policy shift stemmed from aheightened communist threat rather than the failure of the nationalist plot.The new concerns largely resulted from the appointment of HumphreyTrevelyan, formerly the British Ambassador to Cairo during the Suez Crisis,to the Baghdad embassy at the end of 1958. Trevelyan's initial reports to theForeign Office gave an acute sense of impending chaos in Iraq. In his firstinterview with Trevelyan, on 27 December, Qasim was anxious to contrasthis trust of the British with his suspicion of the Americans. Though the Iraqi

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leader had sought to convey the impression that he was in firm control,Trevelyan was told privately by an Iraqi minister that many in thegovernment were fearful of Qasim's flirtations with the communists andeven favoured an Anglo-American intervention.50 This startling revelationappears to have shifted London's stance. The Defence Committee inLondon consequently agreed on 23 January 1959 that an Anglo-Americanoperation 'could in certain circumstances exercise a favourable influence onthe position in Iraq'.51

This conclusion largely reflected the 'hawkish' attitude of DuncanSandys who retained the strongly interventionist stance that he had adoptedduring the previous year's crisis. However, the hard line taken by theMinister of Defence was not shared elsewhere in Whitehall. The JointIntelligence Committee, reflecting Foreign Office opinion, warned that amilitary intervention in Iraq would meet Iraqi opposition, internationalcondemnation and risk Soviet intervention.52 On the instructions of Sandysthe Chiefs nevertheless drew up an outline plan designed to serve as thebasis of an Anglo-American operation if the Cabinet approved a move intoIraq. The plan, similar in many respects to the measures considered in July1958, outlined the basic requirements as two brigades of American troopsto land in Baghdad while a similar sized British force moved into Basra.The combined force required 28 days to assemble and would be placed ontwo days' standby pending approval to intervene. The Chiefs, mindful of therole of propaganda during the Suez Crisis, also argued that any initial airattacks should seek to destroy Iraqi radio stations. Sandys enthusiasticallypromoted the plan and argued that a large part of the Iraqi army woulddefect to the intervening forces and that Arab opinion would welcome theoverthrow of a pro-communist government in Baghdad. The main problemwas the amount of time needed for the required forces to be built up to asufficient level.53

However, in a meeting of the Defence Committee in London on 17February, considerable opposition to Sandys' views was expressed. SeveralCommittee members felt that it was 'open to question whether suchintervention would ever be realistic from the political point of view', thoughit was agreed that the matter could be tentatively raised with Washington.54

The Foreign Office, aware of the opposition of the Joint Planners and theJoint Intelligence Committee to the plan, felt that the American attitude wascrucial. In the case of a Nasser-sponsored regime seizing power in Baghdadan Anglo-American intervention would 'bring the whole Arab worldagainst us [sic]'. Though officials agreed that joint Anglo-Americandiscussions on contingency measures were needed the scenario presentedby Sandys represented 'most unlikely circumstances'.55 The debate inLondon reflected the fact that although intervention was widely viewed as

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an unrealistic option, the government did not want to appear to be draggingits heels if Washington decided to take a tough line.

The plain fact was that both Britain and the United States had no realisticplans for putting a substantial land force in Iraq by early 1959, even thoughMacmillan and Dulles had previously agreed that the interventions inLebanon and Jordan had exposed limitations in the existing joint planningstructures.56 Despite this top-level blessing progress remained slow in late1958 due to the caution of the American Joint Chiefs and disagreementsover a political framework for future military operations. Iraq itself was notincluded among the countries considered by a joint planning group meetingin London until after the Rashid Ali coup attempt.57 As the Chiefs of Staffbecame increasingly concerned about Iraq the Cabinet's committee on theMiddle East agreed on 11 March 1959 to seek the improved co-ordinationof military planning with the United States.58 The visit of Macmillan andLloyd to Washington for talks during 19-22 March, though primarilyconcerned with the Berlin dispute and East-West relations, gave them anopportunity to raise the issue. Though discussions revealed that the Britishstill held greater suspicions of Nasser than the Americans, both sides agreedin principle to strengthen the joint planning process with regard to Iraq andthe Gulf.59

The Washington meeting took place against a background of events inIraq that appeared to indicate a determined communist offensive in thecountry. In early March the Baghdad government's brutal suppression of anationalist uprising in Mosul in northern Iraq coincided with theincreasingly high public profile of the Iraqi Communist Party.60 The UAR'sintelligence apparatus was involved with the Mosul plot but let down therebels after they were promised armed assistance.61 On 15 March, in aspeech in Damascus, Nasser denounced the Iraqi regime's policy assignifying 'red dictatorship and bloodshed'. He also specifically rejected thecommunist ideology, which in his view represented 'atheism andsubservience'.62 The contrasting attitudes of Nasser and Qasim to theSoviets were further highlighted when, on 16 March, Iraq signed aneconomic agreement with the Soviet Union which provided for adevelopment loan. Qasim's decision to leave the Baghdad Pact rapidlyfollowed the March disturbances, and American intelligence sources alsoreported increased Soviet arms deliveries to the Iraqi government.63 By theend of the month it appeared to the Eisenhower Administration that pro-communist forces were in the ascendancy. The newly appointed UnitedStates Ambassador to Iraq, John D. Jernegan, felt that Mosul was the 'lastgasp' of the nationalists and suggested a boycott of Iraqi oil by the UnitedStates, Britain and France in order to bring the Baghdad government to heel.The sense of crisis in Washington was reflected in Jernegan's ominous

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warning that 'it looks as if 1959 will be the year of the Bear in Iraq'.64

On 1 April Gordon Gray, Eisenhower's Special Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs, complained about the sense of drift in Administrationpolicy towards the country, Gray being particularly concerned about whathe perceived as the State Department's complacency.65 On the following daythe NSC, though encouraged by Nasserite propaganda attacks oncommunism in the region, were still cautious on the question of workingwith Cairo as 'planning with Nasser to start something in Iraq' would leadto accusations of 'colonialism and imperialism'. Grey failed to convince theCouncil that military intervention was a justifiable risk at that stage,although it was agreed that this option could not be ruled out in the future.66

The flirtation with the idea of enlisting Nasser to help thwart a communisttake-over in Iraq indicated the intensity of Washington's concern. Althoughthe NSC had been reluctant to sanction any sudden move the various policyoptions considered can be gleaned from the freer discussions of middle-ranking officials. On April 16 the NSC Planning Board speculated about thepossibility of finding a pretext for Turkish military intervention in Iraq.Measures considered also included a graduated boycott of Iraqi oil and abuild up of supplies from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran, accompanied by'a little "black propaganda" aimed at letting the Iraqis know what was goingon ... If they started acting more reasonable [sic], we could quietly turn onthe tap again'. The Planning Board also considered a suggestion that theCIA be authorized to work with pro-Western elements in the country,though the Agency pointed to the scarcity of potential human 'assets' inIraq. It was nevertheless clear that both the Joint Chiefs and Intelligenceservices favoured a 'more forward policy' towards the country.67 On thefollowing day General Twining, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told aNSC meeting that the Administration should immediately approvepreparations for military intervention in the Middle East. Though Twining'srequest was not approved the NSC authorized the establishment of a specialinter-departmental committee in Washington to monitor the situation inIraq.68

Though they had been anxious to plan for a possible communist coupearlier in the year, the British took a more relaxed view of the potentialthreat to Qasim in April 1959. This partially arose from the furthercomplication of Qasim's unexpected request for British arms in January.Though London felt that arms supplies could help to maintain influencewith Baghdad it was obviously an incongruous course to take in view of theplans for intervention.69 However, Selwyn Lloyd argued in the aftermath ofMosul that the Iraqi leader must 'not ... yet be written off as a tool of theCommunists', and that despite Nasser's probable hostility arms suppliescould help to counter Soviet and communist influence in the country.™ The

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apparent contradiction between the decision to supply arms even thoughQasim seemed to be increasingly dominated by the communists wasexplained by the position of the Iraqi army. Trevelyan, in contrast to theAmerican embassy in Baghdad, was confident that anti-communist armyofficers would move against the government if it leaned too far towards theleft.71 Thus the supply of arms, in addition to bolstering Qasim's position,would also help the army to support or overthrow the government asnecessary.

British oil interests in the Gulf and the omnipresent factor of Nasser alsoexplained the government's continued ambivalence over Qasim. Thecontinued support for Qasim becomes intelligible when considered in thecontext of a paper produced later in the year by the Foreign Office, whichargued that as Qasim had emerged as a regional rival to Nasser 'both ... mayprefer to see the UK in power in the Gulf rather than each other'. Though itwas 'regrettable to come back to the old "divide and rule" maxim' thedisadvantages weighed 'fairly light in the scale against our more solidinterests'.72 Macmillan himself agreed that, as an Iraq dominated either bythe Soviets or the 'fundamentally unreliable' Nasser would pose a gravedanger to the Gulf, it was important that the regime in Baghdad maintainedits middle course.73 From Baghdad Trevelyan also warned that a refusal overarms would lead to Qasim concluding that the British had slavishlyfollowed American advice and adopted a pro-Nasser policy.74 After weeksof intense debate the Cabinet decided on April 20 to supply arms to Iraq, thekey point being made that as there was 'little prospect of establishingcordial relations with Egypt ... it was no disadvantage to us that thetraditional antagonism between Iraq and Egypt should continue'. TheCabinet, aware that the actual delivery of any arms to Iraq would take atleast a year, agreed that Qasim could purchase weapons withoutpreconditions.75

While the arms issue was debated in London the American StateDepartment, in contrast to the Joint Chiefs and the CIA, found itselfincreasingly in agreement with British doubts over intervention in Iraq.Stuart Rockwell, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, comparedthe situation to that of Syria in 1957 when American hostility to theDamascus government helped to rally anti-Western nationalist sentiment inthe region. There was also the chance that drastic measures such asboycotting Iraqi oil could provoke a response from the Soviet Union. Inview of the 'limited' options Rockwell advocated a cautious policy andclose Anglo-American co-operation, the later requirement being especiallyimportant in the event of the communists actually gaining power inBaghdad. A low-key approach was also appropriate given that Nasser'sdrive against communism was likely to be more effective than one

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originating in the West.76 The British at this time also reaffirmed theimportance of keeping in step with their American allies. Macmillan agreedwith Lloyd's suggestion in April that Britain should seek a 'detente' in itsrelations with Nasser. Though ostensibly aimed at facilitating negotiationson issues left over from the Suez Crisis, London was above all anxious toalign its policies with Washington on communist infiltration in the region.77

The anti-nationalist backlash in Iraq after the Mosul revolt and thepolarization of the opposing parties in the country ensured that the situationremained critical. Lloyd told the Cabinet on 5 May that civil war could stillbreak out and that his officials were discussing the situation with theirWashington counterparts.78 At this point the British argued that thecontinuing uncertainty over Iraq meant that the most urgent problem wasKuwait and the Gulf.79 However, the State Department, anxious to avoidoffending Nasser, remained unenthusiastic about participating in anyseparate operation in the area.80 In contrast to this the Americans were keento keep their options open over Iraq and, in the face of British doubts,refused to rule out the possibility of intervention if there actually was acommunist take-over.81 That some sort of covert action in Iraq was beingconsidered in Washington in late May was indicated by developing contactsbetween Kurdish elements in the country and American intelligenceoperatives based in Iran.82 Washington's apparent renewal of a tough linenow caused Macmillan to wonder whether the British were being over-cautious, though this in fact revealed more about his anxiety to keep alliedpolicy in line than any renewed enthusiasm within Whitehall forintervention.83

During the summer of 1959 the Americans, though still intenselyconcerned about Iraq, ruled out any immediate planning for a jointintervention by Anglo-American land forces despite continued Britishrequests. The pattern remained the same: though the State Department wasprepared to sanction planning for joint 'theatre plans' the American militaryrepresentatives in London had no authority to develop actual jointoperations in the Middle East.84 The debate on the merits of intervention inIraq was in fact rendered increasingly academic by the ebbing of thecommunist threat to the Iraqi regime. In mid-June the British embassy inBaghdad had reported that a split between Qasim and the communists wasincreasingly apparent.85 Fears of a take-over in Baghdad receded in theaftermath of the disturbances at Kirkuk in July, an event that gave Qasim theopportunity to crack down on the indigenous communist movement andsignal the end of the period of 'Red Terror' in the country.86

Eisenhower's visit to Britain in August gave the British a finalopportunity to pursue Anglo-American co-operation on military planningfor the Middle East. In a meeting with Selwyn Lloyd on 28 August

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Christian Herter, sympathetic to Lloyd's request that both countries shouldbe in a position to respond as they had done in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958,nonetheless refused to give a firm commitment.87 This polite rebuttaleffectively marked the end of any prospect of an Anglo-American invasionof Iraq. It was clear that while the Americans appeared to blow hot and coldover the issue, the British were now more concerned about contingencymeasures to protect the Gulf oil fields. Though Anglo-American discussionson planning for the Middle East were to continue after late 1959 the Britishhad been frustrated in their attempt to secure a concrete Americanundertaking. For Washington these differences of policy, and the half-hearted American approach to the issue of joint planning, were motivatedboth by a desire to avoid becoming bogged down in a commitment to policethe Gulf and the need to keep political options open with regard to Arabnationalism.88 A policy of cultivating at least the tacit co-operation of Nasseragainst regional communists was unlikely to be served by demonstrations ofmilitary force in the region.

By early 1960 the fragile regional balance of power served British andWestern interests well, though officials in London were aware that thevulnerability of the Qasim regime could lead to an instant collapse of theexisting policy. The Foreign Office nevertheless acknowledged Cairo'ssuspicion that 'we have some vested interest in Qasim and are backing himblindly ... because the main purpose of our policy is still to divide the Arabworld and he is an uncommonly handy instrument for this purpose' ,89 Allthis signified that Britain, in the last resort, would have to abandon itsexpedient support of Qasim if it looked likely that a pro-Soviet communistregime would be established in Baghdad. The Americans in turn sought tostay in step with the British over Iraq and the Gulf while also mendingfences with the UAR.90 A NSC discussion paper produced in June 1960noted that the emergence of Qasim had led to a 'slow down in Nasser'sdrive for hegemony in Arab affairs' and that Iraq's uneasy stability shouldbe encouraged as long as the communists no longer posed a threat.91

The 1958 revolution in Iraq, which initially appeared to signal theirresistible progress of pan-Arab radicalism, in fact represented an apogeethat was quickly followed by a fragmentation of the regional nationalistmovement so feared by the West. The apparent urgency of the communistthreat to Iraq in early 1959, and the mercurial role adopted by Nasser,ensured that Britain and the United States did not immediately exploit thechanged situation. The question of Anglo-American military intervention inIraq, and the significant differences that emerged among the policy-makingelites on both sides of the Atlantic, reflected the complicated pressures on

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the Qasim regime and its bewildering changes of position. In London theenthusiasm of the Chiefs of Staff for joint planning for Iraq met withForeign Office objections, while in Washington the State Department,anxious to avoid a repeat of the Syrian crisis in 1957, vetoed the Pentagonand the CIA over their enthusiasm for direct action in Iraq. In the event themore subtle approach adopted by Washington after mid-1959 belatedlyacknowledged the British view that the discreet encouragement of regionalrivalries would undermine any drive towards Arab unity. The regionaldevelopments in the months following the revolution in Baghdad had alsoconfirmed that Nasser, in spite of his still-considerable influence, was notthe all-pervasive demonic power that London and Washington had believedhe was. Nevertheless the extent of Nasser's power meant that the AmericanAdministration was obliged to consider him as an ally in the Cold Warstruggle for the Middle East.

Though Britain and the United States maintained productive politicalco-operation over Iraq, from a military perspective relations had been lessharmonious, with the British Chiefs of Staff unable to tie down theirAmerican counterparts on the issue of joint planning. London's approachwas basically disingenuous: while privately nervous about intervention inIraq, the government encouraged joint planning on the basis thatWashington might be drawn into the protection of Britain's special positionin the Gulf. From the American point of view the absence of detailedmilitary co-ordination had its practical reasons but there was also theunderlying assumption that the United States could not afford to become tooobviously involved with the British in the region. The EisenhowerAdministration, seeking to build up political capital with the 'Third World',was consistently wary of being tainted with Britain's political and economiccolonialism in the Gulf.

Britain's support for Iraqi independence was largely inspired by anintense dislike for the UAR President, a legacy of the bitterness engenderedby the Suez Crisis. The survival of Qasim's regime ensured that Nasser'sambitions were checked and that a delicate regional balancing act wassustainable. The subsequent British intervention in Kuwait in 1961, aresponse to Qasim's threat to annex the Sheikhdom, was a quirky andperipheral event in the context of the mainstream of Middle East affairs.Though the intervention was significant in terms of Britain's developing'east of Suez' strategic role, its impact elsewhere was limited with theexception of the further isolation of Qasim in Arab eyes. As British troopswere withdrawn from Kuwait in September 1961 the Syrian army coup thatled to Damascus seceding from the UAR was seen by the Foreign Office asa far more serious threat to regional stability.92 The 'phantom crisis' of 1959reinforces the view that Anglo-American policies for fighting the Cold War

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in the Middle East were not constructed in a vacuum and were subject to thefluctuating patterns of regional politics. In the case of Iraq in 1958-59, theintertwined factors of the power struggle in Baghdad, Nasser's pan-Arabnationalism and the Soviet flirtations with Qasim pulled London andWashington along in their wake. In contrast to the crises over Suez in 1956and Syria in 1957, however, the leaders of the Anglo-American alliancesought to roll with the Arab nationalist punches and utilise the rivalriesbetween the major Middle Eastern states.

NOTES

1. The available literature on the Suez Crisis is vast and constantly expanding. For backgroundon the broader aspects of the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East during the1950's see W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London,1991); Ritchie Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the MiddleEast, 1945-62 (London, 1996); Nigel John Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problemof Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59 (London, 1996); PeterL. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacyin the Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, 1991); Tore Tingvold Petersen, 'Anglo-AmericanRivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957', InternationalHistory Review, Vol.XIV, No.l (Feb. 1992), pp.71-91.

2. Ritchie Ovendale, 'Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanonin 1958', International History Review, Vol.XVI, No.2 (May 1994), pp.284-303; Nigel JohnAshton, 'A Great New Venture? - Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East and (heResponse to the Iraqi Revolution, July 1958', Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol.4, No.l (March1993), pp.59-89.

3. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm: Memoirs 1956-1959 (London, 1971), pp.505-6.4. For the relationship between the Cold War and Middle Eastern politics during this period see

Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.) The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford, 1997) andFawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and InternationalPolitics, 1955-67 (Boulder CO, 1994).

5. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957(Washington DC, 1958), pp.6-16.

6. David W. Lesch, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East(Boulder Co., 1992), pp.104-214; Douglas Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: the UnitedStates and Syria, 1945-58', Middle East Journal, Vol.XLIV (Winter 1990), pp.51-75.

7. Alistair Home, Macmillan 1957-1986: The Official Biography, Volume Two (London, 1989),pp.56-7.

8. Public Records Office, London, PREM 11/2521, Letter from Morris to Hayter, 11 October;Top Secret Enclosure, Anglo-American Middle East Working Group Report (Paper XVIII).

9. PREM 11/2521, No. 2333, Caccia to Lloyd, 9 November 1957.10. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, p. 154.11. Foreign Relations of the United Stales 1958-60 (henceforth cited as FRUS), Vol.XI, No. 60,

Special National Intelligence Estimate, 5 June 1958, pp.93-8.12. Home, Macmillan, 1957-86, p.94.13. Wm. Roger Louis, 'The British and the Origins of the Iraqi Revolution', from Robert A.

Feraea and Wm. Roger Louis, The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social ClassesRevisited (London, 1991), pp.31-61.

14. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p.511.15. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (London, 1966),

p.269.

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16. FRUS 1958, Vol.XII, No.30, Memorandum of a Conference, 23 July 1958, pp.98-100.17. Frederick W. Axelgard, 'United States Policy toward Iraq, 1946-1958', PhD Dissertation,

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University, 1988), p.241.18. Michael Carver, Out of Step: Memoirs of a Field Marshall (London, 1989), pp.280-2.19. Public Records Office, London, CAB 131/20, D(58)37th Meeting, 15 July 1958. For an

account of the British intervention in Jordan see Lawrence Tal, 'Britain and the Jordan Crisisof 1958', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.l (Jan. 1995), pp.39-57.

20. Public Records Office, London, FO 371/133823, V1078/12, 'Turkey and Iraq', Record of aConversation between Dulles and Lloyd, 18 July 1958.

21. PREM 11/2368, Nos. 4792 and 4794, Macmillan to Lloyd, 18 July 1958.22. PREM 11/2368, No. 1955, Macmillan to Lloyd, 18 July 1958.23. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XI, No. 193, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 18 July 1958, p.329.24. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.130, Rountree to Dulles, 23 July 1958, pp.331-3.25. Ovendale, Transfer of Power, p. 193.26. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p.528.27. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton,

1978), pp.709-807; Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London, 1969), pp.20-32.28. PREM 11/2368, 'The Revolution in Iraq', Hoyar-Millar to Macmillan, 19 July 1958.29. FO 371/133067, EQ1012/2, 'Leading Personalities in Iraq in 1958', Report by Crawford, 15

December 1958; Sam Falle, My Lucky Life (Book Guild, Sussex, 1996), pp.123-4.30. FO 371/133120, EQ1531/36, 'Iraq Petroleum Company', Minute by Combs, 24 October

1958.31. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.847-65; Falle, My Lucky Life, pp.153-4.32. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No. 138, Gallman to State Department, 14 October 1958, pp.344-6.33. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No. 144, Cumming to Dulles, 25 November 1958, pp.353-4.34. PREM 11/2735, No.8516, Lloyd to Caccia, 30 November 1958.35. PREM 11/2735, No.3247, Hood to Lloyd, 1 December 1958.36. PREM 11/2735, No.8516, op cit.37. FO 371/133120, EQ1531/47, 'Iraq Petroleum Company', Minute by Stevens, 8 December 1958.38. Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem (New York, 1969) pp.127-35.39. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No. 145, State Department to Gallman, 4 December 1958,

pp.355-6.40. FO 371/132922, EB1O393/31, No.3781, Lloyd to Burrows, 10 December 1958.41. Humphrey Trevelyan, who replaced Michael Wright as British Ambassador to Iraq in

January 1959, does not deal directly with the Rashid Ali coup attempt in his memoirs butdoes acknowledge that many Iraqis subsequently believed that the British were working withthe communists to support Qasim against Nasser. See Humphrey Trevelyan, The Middle Eastin Revolution (London, 1970), p.139 and Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problemof Nasser, p. 196.

42. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.147, Gallman to Dulles, 11 December 1958, pp.357-58.43. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.150, Rountree to Dulles, 16 December 1958, pp.361-63.44. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.151, Discussion at the 391st Meeting of the NSC, 18 December

1958, pp.363-4.45. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.51, 'US Policy toward the Near East (NSC 5820/1)', NSC

Report, 4 November 1958, pp. 187-99; Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem ofNasser, p. 195.

46. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XIII, No.229, Rountree to Dulles, 15 December 1958, pp.505-09.Nasser said that the British had 'played [the] Communist game' by tipping off Baghdadabout the Rashid Ali Coup.

47. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XIII, No.230, Memorandum of a Conference, 23 December 1958,pp.509-11; FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.154, Rountree to Dillon, 22 December 1958,pp.368-71; ibid, No.155, Discussion at 392nd Meeting of the NSC, 23 December 1958,pp.372-4.

48. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No. 157, 393rd Meeting of the NSC, 15 January 1959, pp.375-7.49. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.161, Special National Intelligence Estimate, 17 February 1959,

pp.381-8.

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50. PREM 11/2735, No.2128, Trevelyan to Foreign Office, 27 December 1958; ibid, Letter fromTrevelyan to Stevens, 1 January 1959.

51. CAB 131/21, D(59)lst Meeting, 23 January 1959.52. Public Records Office, London, AIR 8/1959, COS(59)36, 'Military Intervention in Iraq',

COS Memorandum, 10 February 1959.53. Ibid.; AIR 8/1959, Minutes of a Meeting between Sandys and the COS, 11 February 1959;

DEFE 32/6, COS(59)50, Confidential Annex, 11 August 1959.54. CAB 131/21, D(59)4th Meeting, 17 February 1959.55. FO 371/140956, EQ1071/13, 'Military implications of possible Anglo-American

intervention in Iraq', Note by the Foreign Office, [undated] February 1959.56. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, USA (henceforth cited as DDEL), Telegram

from Dulles to Eisenhower, 27 July 1958, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 10.57. Public Records Office, London, DEFE 11/216, JPS187/23/9/58, 'Meeting of United

Kingdom Element, US/UK Planning Group, with Dickson on 22 September 1958', Annex;ibid., Dickson to COS Committee, 2 October 1958; DEFE 4/115, JP(59)Note 1, 'UnitedKingdom/United States Planning Studies on the Middle East', Note by the Directors ofPlans, Annex, 2 January 1959; ibid., COS(59)3, 8 January 1959.

58. DEFE 5/89, COS(59)40, 'US/UK Planning on the Middle East', COS Memorandum, 16February 1959; CAB 134/2230, ME(M)(59)4th Meeting, 11 March 1959.

59. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.62, Memorandum of a Conversation, 22 March 1959,pp.217-18; DDEL, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 24, 'Anglo-AmericanTalks: March 1959', agreed minute.

60. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 164-77; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 866-89.61. Andrew Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-1961

(London, 1995), pp. 154-6.62. 'The Times', 23 March 1959.63. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.63, Editorial Note, pp.218-19.64. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No. 166, Jemegan to Dulles, 26 March 1959, pp.395-98; ibid.,

No. 167, Jernegan to Dulles, 28 March 1959, pp.399^00.65. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.169, Paper by Gray for the NSC, 1 April 1959, pp.401-2.66. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.170, Discussion at the 401st Meeting of the NSC, 2 April 1959,

pp.402-6.67. DDEL, White House Office; NSC Staff, Special Staff File Series, Box 4, 'The Situation in

Iraq-Comments and Questions', 16 April 1959.68. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.176, Discussion at the 402nd Meeting of the NSC, 17 April

1959, pp.423-37.69. CAB 131/21, D(59)8th Meeting, 'Arms for Iraq', Memorandum by Lloyd, 11 February 1959.70. PREM 11/2735, No. 1049, Lloyd to Burrows, 26 March 1959.71. PREM 11/2735, No.1739, Hoyar-Millar to Caccia, 31 March 1959.72. FO 371/143701, ZP19/3, 'Planning For the Persian Gulf, Minute by Wilding, 3 June 1959.73. PREM 11/2735, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 1 April 1959.74. PREM 11/2735, No.337, Trevelyan to Lloyd, 11 April 1959.75. CAB 128/33, CC(59)24, 20 April 1959; Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution, p.153.76. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No. 173, 'Situation in Iraq', Paper by Rockwell, 15 April 1959,

pp.414-22.77. PREM 11/4173, Lloyd to Caccia, 14 April 1959; Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the

Problem of Nasser, pp.203—4.78. CAB 128/33, CC(59)28, 5 May 1959.79. CAB 131/21, D(59)5th Meeting, 12 May 1959.80. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.356, Memorandum from Rountree and Smith to Dillon, 30 June

1959, pp.788-9.81. PREM 11/4317, No.1248, Caccia to Lloyd, 22 May 1959.82. PREM 11/4317, No.605, Trevelyan to Lloyd, 21 May 1959.83. PREM 11/4317, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 17 June 1959.84. CAB 131/21, D(59)9th Meeting, 23 July 1959; DEFE 11/216, 'Discussions with US-JCS;

US/UK Planning - Middle East', Minute from House to Mountbatten, 14 August 1959.

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85. PREM 11/4317, No.752, Trevelyan to Lloyd, 13 June 1959.86. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp.912-25; Falle, My Lucky Life, p.155.87. PREM 11/2753, Record of a Conversation between Lloyd and Herter, 28 August 1959.88. FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.71, National Intelligence Estimate, 25 August 1959, pp.230-2.89. FO 371/150850, V1015/1, Draft letter by Stevens, [undated] January 1960.90. Ovendale, Transfer of Power, pp.242-3.91. DDEL, 'US Policy Towards the Near East', NSC Planning Board Briefing Note, 1 June

1960, White House Office Series, Office of the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, NSCSeries (Briefing Notes), Box 13; FRUS 1958-60, Vol.XII, No.89, 'US Policy Toward theNear East (NSC 6011)', NSC Report, 19 July 1960, pp.262-73.

92. Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way: Memoirs, 1959-1961 (London, 1973), p.386. See alsoOvendale, Transfer of Power, pp.217^tl.

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