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Contesting Federalism in Iraq

Dissertation by: Jalal H. Mistaffa

Word Count: 20344

Submitted to the Department of Politics and

International Relations at Swansea University

2007-2008

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Abstract

Federalisms have been an effective tool in paving the way to satisfactory political

solutions in communities of multinational ethnicities. Being a state composed of multi

(ethnicities, religions, and cultures); Iraq has a constitution that has adopted federalism to

be the organiser of the various constituents living there. However, espousing and

implementing federalism in Iraq looks not an easy task to conduct and follow due to

miscellaneous reasons ranging from the lack of a democratic experience in Iraq’s modern

history to the existence of very controversial issues such as the yet unclear destiny of the

governorates and regions’ boundaries. Although not crystal clear what shape the Iraqi

upcoming federation will take, it is likely to be an asymmetrical and decentralised

federation that resorts to consociational solutions wherever and whenever the process

seems to be in trouble. Even though the chances of its success or failure might sound

quite equal, it is early to fairly judge the Iraqi blossoming federation.

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Contents of this Dissertation

Chapter One: Iraq (History, State, and Population) 1-1 A historical background

1-2 Iraq as a state

1-3 Populace Components

Chapter Two: Iraq and the Idea of Federalism 2-1 Iraq’s political options

2-1-1 Partition

2-1-2 Federalism

2-2 Federalism and Federation (general concepts)

2-3 Federalism and the Challenge of Multi-ethnic societies

2-3-1 How far can federalism accommodate multi-ethnic societies?

2-3-2 symmetrical or asymmetrical federalism

2-3-3 centralised and decentralised federalism

2-3-4 Consociational Democracy

Chapter Three: Making Sense of Federalism in Iraq 3-1 Making sense of the terms clarified in the previous chapter in regard to Iraq

3-2 Prospects for the Failure or Success of an Iraqi Federation

3-3 Current problems found facing the burgeoning Iraqi federation

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Introduction

Academically tackling a complicated issue such as contemporary Iraq, with various ethnicities,

religions and so on so forth, is not an easy issue to fully comprehend. Although multifaceted and

intricate, for me as an Iraqi from the north, this subject is very interesting, valuable worthwhile.

The importance of investigating the political future of Iraq lies in several factors. Firstly, it is the

first time in Iraq’s history as a modern state, the Iraqi people are deliberating and have a say in

deciding their future. Secondly, they have freely chosen federalism to be the political organiser

when they voted to and ratified the Iraqi Constitution (IC) in 2005. Thirdly, the IC has solely given

the topics and not gone far into the details, and that makes it prone to various interpretations

depending on diversity of viewpoints of a range of observers.

This dissertation is classified into three chapters, each dealing with necessary aspects of the subject.

The first chapter tries to sufficiently pave the way for the others and give the reader a historical

background of Iraq starting by talking shortly about its ancient history, Islamic history, and under-

Ottoman’s history. These are deemed to be vital for such a subject, in my opinion as an Iraqi,

provided that they were posited as the founding and corner stones of the new identity for the newly

established Iraq and as a common factor that would gather all the diversity in one unity. Iraq was

founded in 1920s under the mandate of the British colonial power. Since then unrest and political

instability seem to be among the defining features of the Iraqi state. I will follow Stansfield in his

way of dividing the history of the Iraqi state according to four key debates that are: the artificiality

debate, the identity debate, the dictator debate, and the state building and democratisation debate.1

The first debate focuses on the artificiality of the Iraqi state and that it was carved out by the colonial

powers and according to their preferences. Meanwhile, there was an urgent need to create an

identity that would glorify Iraqiness rather than any other identity. However hard the subsequent

1 Gareth Stansfield, IRAQ People, History, Politics (Polity Press 2007)

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Iraqi governments endeavoured to consolidate and solidify Iraqiness, they eventually failed due to

logical reasons mentioned in this dissertation; one of them is the third debate. Since its foundation,

Iraq passed through bitter experiments of having authoritarian regimes ruling that did not pay

attention to democratic elections and freedom of speech. All this created a culture of keeping

impulses for individual freedom curbed fiercely and violently. In addition, this control over every

aspects of individual life cannot be easily uprooted and may take several years accomplishing this

task. It needs reforms in the basic foundations and principles of the state. Iraq is a country of diverse

population to the extent that one may say about it: multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual and

multi-cultural. If it is to be run democratically, Iraq proves implausible to be administered by a

component due to its heterogeneous nature.

On the accusation of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction, the coalition forces led by

USA in 2003 launched air attacks on the basic institutions of the former Iraqi regime followed by

land assaults and in a period of time the Ba’th government collapsed. The Iraqi government would

have to be built from scratch and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was hold responsible to

overlay a plan for establishing a transitional government. Iraqis have had two main political options

to follow: secession (or partition) and federalism. Chapter two of this dissertation discusses, in detail,

both paths and outcomes in believing that partition is not a feasible and viable portion for several

reasons evidently and plainly clarified. Federalism, as this dissertation deliberates, can best suit

modern Iraq. However federalism and the terms associated with it such as consociation,

centralisation and decentralisation, and asymmetry and symmetry need to be sufficiently elucidated.

What form should the Iraqi federation take to satisfy the needs of its people to the maximum?

Should it be centralised or decentralised, symmetrical or asymmetrical? What about consociational

democracy? How can it be related with federalism? Does it have anything to offer to the Iraqis?

Chapter two tries to answer some of these questions when it gives details in regard to centralisation

and decentralisation, asymmetry and symmetry, their definitions and positive and negative sides.

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Lijphart reflects upon consociational democracy that has four basic principles: elite accommodation

or grand coalition, segmental autonomy, minority veto, and proportionality.2 In some cases, both

federation and consociation are the two sides of the same coin as Lijphart details. Consociation has

been relatively successful in some states for a long period of time such as Lebanon.

Chapter three makes sense of what has been mentioned and dealt with in chapter two when

applied on Iraq. What do centralisation and decentralisation have to give Iraq? The federalising

formula in Iraq, is it going to be asymmetrical or symmetrical? And what set of these will more

serve and suit contemporary Iraq? Does consociation make sense in Iraq and can it be an acceptable

political solution?

This dissertation mostly regards the IC as a reference point in studying and making sense of

the abovementioned terms. The Iraqi people overwhelmingly voted “yes” to the IC. According to the

IC, as a close examination identifies, the imminent federation is mostly to take a form of being

decentralised and asymmetrical. Decentralised because of several reasons among them is the wide

range of power granted to the regions in many aspects, for instance, managing the oil revenues.

Asymmetrical in that, the IC has allowed the regions to defer parts of their constitutionally granted

powers to the federal government but are not obliged and several other reasons.

Brendan O’Leary considers that all the suggestions put forward for giving the shape of the

future federation do not exceed being: either integrationist or consociational. Integrationists favour

a strongly centralised and symmetrical Iraq and prefer a federation founded on the bases of

territorial administrative governorates. However, he classifies consociational approaches in to two

categories: corporate consociation and liberal consociation. O’Leary believes that the IC has a

flavour of preferring liberal consociation and it is the most appropriate path to be regarded as

politically realistic and workable.

2 Arend Lijphart, “Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links”, (Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1979), 499-515

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However, some crucial question can be raised here concerning the likelihood of success and

failure. Is there a possibility of failure to a federation in Iraq or success is more likely? What are the

reasons behind the failure of a federation? Frank specifies three main goal-factors that may lead to

the failure or success of a federation which he calls as: primary, secondary, and tertiary.3 With the

existence of primary goal-factors the chance of a federation’s success is almost guaranteed,

however, if secondary goals do not pave the way to adopting the primaries, its chance of success

and failure might be equal. Furthermore, a federation based on tertiary goal-factors would be

almost a failure. However, O’Leary sees the issue of failure and success from another angle. In his

opinion, failure originates from one of the following: authoritarianism, coercion, maltreatment of

smaller nations, distributive conflicts, and centralizing coups.4 He seems more optimistic than

Frank. In the final section of my dissertation, I discuss some problems facing the nascent Iraqi

federation that should be handled wisely and open-mindedly, otherwise might have undesired

outcomes such as the issue of undecided boundaries, oil revenues, Kirkuk city quandary, and finally

security. In the conclusion, I put myself in the position of assessing some proposals offered by some

specialists and scholars namely O’Leary and Visser. In addition, the conclusion includes some hints

for future researches regarding federalism in Iraq. The final point, I will be discussing, is my opinion

concerning the success and failure of an Iraqi federation.

One problem I faced while writing this piece of work was the unavailability of sufficient resources

and academic works, especially, that a researcher cannot much rely on every single piece of writing

accessible due to the negative bias and partiality found in many of them. Only five years have passed

since toppling down the former dictatorial regime and this short period does not sound enough

neither to judge the federation process nor to write around it efficiently. This has been both of

3 Thomas M. Frank, “Why Federations Fail”, in Thomas M. Frank ed., Why Federations Fail, (New York University Press and University of London Press, 1968) 167-199 4 Brendan O’Leary, “Multi-national Federalism, Federacy, Power-Sharing & the Kurds of Iraq”, Cafritz Foundation Conference Center, George Washington University September 12, 2003.

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benefit and detriment to me at the same time. Beneficiary because it made me open-handed and

wide-minded to deal with it sometimes from my point of view and bad due to making my way

narrowed down to an extent that occasionally made me disappointed and dissatisfied.

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Chapter One: Iraq (History, State, and Population)

Iraq, currently, is bearing a transformational stage from absolutism and dictatorship into a would-

be fully-fledged democracy. Its modern history has witnessed many significant internal conflicts,

many of them bloody. The main reasons behind the clashes appear to be the complete denial of the

cultural rights of the components and the bad records of human rights violations and eventually

the totalitarian and absolute rule of the authorities and the successive governments in Iraq. In order

to understand the Iraqi state’s history of internal conflicts it is necessary first to offer a historical

background about Iraq. Chapter one of this dissertation will be dealing with some necessary

introductions such as Iraq’s history (ancient and modern), Iraq as a state, its diverse population.

1-1 Iraq in History

Marr believes that three elements in the history of Iraq have been very crucial in forming collective

memories of modern Iraq which are: the civilisation of ancient Mesopotamia, the Islamic conquests,

and the Ottoman Empire.5 The glories of the past have been taught in all stages of Iraqi schools

especially those of Mesopotamia and the Islamic era. Furthermore, the vitality of these two

mentioned periods is in that they are professionally utilised in the education system as identity

founders that all components of Iraq, despite their differences, share them6 and what grants

importance to the Ottoman Empire era is its aftermath political influence in regard to Iraq as a state.

The history of Iraq could be best traced back to the civilisations found long ago in an area known

as Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia, a Greek word, means “the land between rivers or two rivers” and

the two rivers are Tigris and Euphrates that mainly source from Armenia.7 If Herodotus could say

about Nile that “Egypt is a gift of the Nile” the same thing could be fairly said about Mesopotamia;

5 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Westview Press, 2004) 6 As an Iraqi student I was taught in school that all the components of Iraq share one history and one culture i.e. the history of

Mesopotamia and its civilisations and history of Islam. 7 Modern-day Turkey could be considered as the main source of the two rivers.

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had it not been for it many great civilisations such as Sumer, Akkad, Assur, and Babylon would not

have existed8. Mesopotamia included essentially modern-day Iraq and Syria and parts of Turkey

and Iran.9 I am chiefly interested in the part related to modern Iraq. In fact, within this particular

area emerged many great civilisations that unquestionably changed the course and life of the overall

human society and could be considered as the cradle of new modern life. One of the old Muslim

geographers known as Yaqut al-Hamawy wrote a precious book entitled “Mu’jam ul Buldan”10 in

which he relates the story of the Prophet Noah that used to live in Babylon, which is known today

in Iraq as Babil and is one of the yet populated cities.11 For the sake of better communication, people

living in Mesopotamia, around five thousand years ago, invented and progressed a sort of writing

to record and different types of information. “Mesopotamian scribes recorded daily events, trade,

astronomy, and literature on clay tablets. Cuneiform was used by people throughout the ancient

Near East to write several different languages.”12 In addition to the aforementioned, in a cave named

as Shanidar which lies close to a still populated town, Rawanduz, north of Iraq, Dr.Solecki, from

University of Michigan, discovered fragments and remnants of bones. He found bones of animals

and three human beings that after examination he believed that they would belong to Neanderthal

man species and to be 45,000 to 60,000 years old.13 Rich in heritage of civilisations, modern Iraq

is unique and has attracted people and archaeologists all over the world to come to explore and

excavate.

After that very ancient history, I engage in talking about the spread of Islam and achievements of

the Islamic era in Iraq. The Islamic monotheism religion started emitting its mission out of Arabia

8 Look at Map 1 below 9 Georges Roux, Ancient Iraq (Penguin Books, George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1964) 10 Yaqut Al-Hamawy, “Mu’jam u al-Buldan” (What is Unknown about Cities) (Dar al-Sadir, Beirut, Lebanon 1977). 11 Yaqut al-Hamawy al-Rumi was born in 1179 and died in 1228. “Mu’jam ul Buldan” is a very sophisticated book talking

thoroughly about the places Al-Hamawy visited during his lifetime. 12 The British Museum Website ( http://www.mesopotamia.co.uk/writing/home_set.html 30/5/2008) 13 Roux, Ancient Iraq

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soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. Ordered by the first Caliph14

and led by the renowned military leader Khalid bin al-Walid, the Islamic army conducted toward

Iraq which was by the time under the tight grasp of the Persian Emperor.15 After the death of the

first Caliph16, the second Caliph reinforced the Islamic army fighting in Iraq by sending extra troops

to help in forcing out and crushing the army of the Persian Empire. During the rein of Omar, the

second caliph, in the seventh century, Iraq was conquered and almost opened17 completely. One of

the great achievements of that era of Omar was building modern cities to be afterwards centres of

knowledge and scientific studies among them were “Basra and Kufa” which are still heavily

populated and have been influential locations.18 Kufa, later became the ruling place for Abbasids as

will be mentioned below, was built first in 628 by Sa’d bin Abi Waqqas who brought specialists

from Persia for this purpose and established the “Treasury House”.19 From 661 to 749, the Umayyad

dynasty grasped the authority over the Islamic Caliphate and Iraq as a part of that Caliphate came

under the control of the Caliph and witnessed many incidents such as the civil war until the Abbasid

gained control over the Caliphate that lasted from 750 till 1258.20 “At first the 'Abbasids ruled from

Al-Kufah or nearby, but in 762 al-Mansur founded a new capital on the site of the old village of

Baghdad. It was officially known as Madinat as-Salam ("City of Peace"), but in popular usage the

old name prevailed. Baghdad soon became larger than any city in Europe or western Asia. Al-

Mansur built the massive Round City with four gates and his palace and the main mosque in the

14 Caliph or in the exact Arabic pronunciation “Khalifa” literally means “Successor”. This term if used with the Arabic word “Rashid-

guided” it refers simply to one of the first four Caliphs who are in order (Abu-Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali). Al-Khilafa al-Rashida,

literally the guided Caliphate, refers to the period that the above four mentioned caliphs ruled Muslims which all together continued

about 30 years. 15 Abdul-Aziz Al-Shinnawy, The Islamic Openings, (Um Al-Qura, Egypt 2002), 41 16 The first caliph passed away with an unaccomplished duty to open up the Iraqi land, however, succeeded by Omar, the second

caliph, who endeavoured his utmost to fulfil the mission his predecessor started. 17 Muslim Scholars prefer to use the word “opening lands” instead of “conquering or invading”. The former implies more kindness

and freedom-granting than the latter two terms. 18 Islamic University In Madinah website (http://www.iu.edu.sa/edu/syukbah/hu4_3.htm 1/6/2008) 19 Hasan M. Hama Karim, Kurdistan la bar Dam Ftuhaty Islamida, 4th Edition (Nusar Press and Print, Kurdistan, 2006) The title could

be translated as (Kurdistan, Face to Face with the Islamic Openings) 20 University of Princeton website (http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/itl/denise/umayyads.htm 1/6/2008)

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centre. This Round City was exclusively a government quarter, and soon after its construction the

markets were banished to the Karkh suburb to the south.” 21 In 1258 the Mongols attacked and

invaded Bagdad. The Abbasid Caliphate was destroyed and large numbers of people were killed and

even the caliph himself, al-Musta'sim, was captured and then killed, and the 500-year-old

authority of the Abbasid dynasty came to an end. “In 1400, with the aid of war elephants acquired

in India, Tamerlane and his men seized Aleppo. They then moved on to storm Damascus and

Baghdad”22 Tamerlane’s dynasty used to rule Baghdad almost until the Ottomans came onto the

stage and forced them out of Baghdad in 1534. During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, on what

is now recognized as Iraq, the area enjoyed a sort of autonomy and self rule, until the introduction

of a new system known as Tanzimat- organisations in the middle of nineteenth century that tried

to centralise power. Granting some autonomy to subjects of the empire resulted in stability for most

parts of it and led to agreement with the Ottoman Empire. A brief examination of how the Ottomans

did that may shed light on some aspects of the persistent of instability in the new Iraq since its

foundation. The Ottoman Empire divided modern-day Iraq into three23 Vilayets24. Ethnically, Mosul

Vilayet composed of unquestioned and overwhelming Kurdish speakers known as Kurds living with

other ethnicities like Arabs25. However, Baghdad Vilayet comprised of mainly Arabs, the same as

Basra Vilayet. In terms of religious denomination, the majority of the three Vilayets’ population were

Muslims – Sunni or Shi’i. Yet, a significant segment of the population, who had other faiths, lived

in Iraq such as Christians, Jews, Yazidies and Sabias. I will deal with their proportions later in this

dissertation. “The key to Ottoman control over Iraq was that it offered partial autonomy within an

21 Angelfire website (http://www.angelfire.com/nt/Gilgamesh/abasid1.html 1/6/2008) 22 University of Calgary website (http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/oldwrld/armies/tamerlane.html 1/6/2008) 23 Look at Map 2 24 Vilayets were territorial administrative divisions under the authority of the Ottomans; however, some prefer to use the English word

“province” such as Tripp in his book mentioned below in footnote no.29. 25 According to Chaliand in his book “Kurdish Tragedy”, Kurds were the majority in Mosul Vilayet and they accounted for 58% of the

population whereas Arabs were 23% and others were 19%.

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imperial system that preserved an adequate amount of administrative uniformity across vast

stretches of territory”.26

In the Kurdish areas of Mosul Vilayet many semi-autonomous authorities functioned and they were

called “Princedoms”27 or “Emirates”28 or “Principalities”29. There existed more than one of these

semi-autonomous entities such as Princedom of Baban that ruled Sulaimanya and Princedom of

Soran, and Princedom of Ardalan and so on so forth.30 Due to the constant rivalry and historical

enmity between Safavids Empire in Iran and the Ottoman Empire, the latter tried to establish a

delicate balance between central control and autonomy urging the population not to vow allegiance

to the Safavids especially in Basra with a majority of Shi’a. The main demands of the Ottoman

Empire from these semi-autonomous authorities embedded in some points such as proclaiming

allegiance and pledge to the Ottomans, admitting its sovereignty by using the coinage system,

praying for the Sultan in symbolic occasions like Friday prayer, tributes should be sent to Istanbul,

and having Ottoman’s appointees within the ruling circle.31

In such a decentralized way of ruling, the Ottomans maintained their power and guaranteed the

loyalty of at least the majority of its subjects for long periods of time. Consequently, the Ottomans

ruled Iraq till the end of the WWI in 1918 when the ally forces defeated the Ottomans and Iraq

eventually fell under the mandate of Britain. The British launched the project of building a new

coined state named Iraq as I deal with in the next section.

1-2 Iraq as a State

26 Nouri Talabani, “Ethnic cleansing in Iraqi Kurdistan” in MacDonald G., Charles and O’Leary, Carole eds. Kurdish identity : Human Rights and Political Status (Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 2007) 27 Muhammad Hamabaqi, Mirnshinakany Baban u Ardalan u Soran la Balganamay Qajaryda 1799 -1847. (Aras Press and Publishing, Hawler 2002) The title in English is “Princedoms of Baban, Ardalan, and Soran in Qajarian Documents from 1799 to 1847” 28 Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, shaikh and state : the social and political structures of Kurdistan (London : Zed Books, 1992) 29 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 2nd Edition, (Cambridge University Press 2007), 10 30 Hamabaqi, Mirnshinakany Baban u Ardalan u Soran… 31 Tripp, A history of Iraq, 9

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More than five years have passed since the Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) in 2003, yet Iraq and its

citizens are still undergoing and suffering from political, economical and security instability. Some

blame the American for that and some the Iraqis themselves while others blame either the former

Iraqi Regime or even go deeper into blaming the history of establishing Iraq as a state in 1920s.

However I incline toward what Gareth Stansfield has observed in his recent work.32 He traces what

has been happening in Iraq, from verging toward civil war, insecurity, political unrest and so on so

forth, back to four points that he calls “four key debates”. These four points, in his opinion, “have

been and remain prominent in the expansive discussion about Iraq’s formation, history, society,

politics, and indeed, future”.33 The four key debates are:

1- The artificiality debate: by using the term “artificial” he refers to the Iraqi State’s origin as

being merely a creation of the imperial powers and especially Britain after the World War I

and announcing victory over the Ottoman Empire. So many scholars do principally agree

with his opinion among them G. Chaliand34 and R. S Simon who named a chapter of his

book “The Creation of a State”35 should be mentioned. Anderson and Stansfield believe that

Iraq was assembled “according to great power (mainly British) strategic calculations rather

than with a view to creating a coherent, functional, self-sustaining state.”36 Commenting on

the fabrication of the Iraqi State, Polk writes “Consider first Iraq as a state. Much has been

made of the statement that Iraq is “artificial”. That is true… Briefly, Iraq became a state at

the end of the First World War, not by its own actions but as guided by the British

Government”37. Against all the aforementioned scholars, R. Visser stands and claims that the

identity of Iraq, as comprising the three Ottoman Vilayets of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, was

32 Gareth Stansfield, IRAQ People, History, Politics 33 Stansfield, IRAQ People, History, Politics 34 Gerard Chaliand, The Kurdish Identity, Translated into English by Philip Black (Zed Books Ltd London and New Jersey an association with UNRISD 1994) 51. 35 Reeva S Simon, Iraq between Two World Wars (Colombia University Press 1986) 36 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq, Dictatorship, Democracy or Division, (Palgrave Macmillan 2005), 13 37 William Polk, Understanding Iraq (I.B.Tauris &Co Ltd 2006)

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older than what scholars believed to be the creation of imperialism. He believes that the wide

contention and consideration of modern scholarship regarding that “Iraq” was an identity

imposed on peoples who were not familiar with it at all does not stand up to scrutiny. He

argues that Persian travellers in the eighteenth century mentioned “Iraq” and Basra

historians of the early twentieth century utilised expressions like “Basra and all of Iraq”.

Furthermore, he writes “modern administrators in Mosul of 1890s referred to their city as

‘part of the region of Iraq’.”38 However, accepting what Visser raised against the general

belief of the scholars does not sound simple and faultless. In order to make his argument

more persuasive, Visser should have an answer to a point such as the following. It is true

that Muslim geographers mentioned Iraq in their works yet not with territories of the

created Iraq. According to al-Hamawy the well-known Muslim geographer Iraq’s

nomenclature was due to its closeness to the shores of Euphrates and Tigris and he even

records that “Iraq is solely Babylon as mentioned beforehand”39 and what he refers to as

Babylon is “it is a district that includes Kufa and Hilla”40. The beginning of World War I in

1914 witnessed the onset of a plan to carve up the Ottoman Empire by taking over Basra by

the British army and it took them three years to capture Baghdad in 1917. According to

Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 Mosul Vilayet was awarded to the French with Syria and in

return the British were granted Basra and Baghdad Vilayets. After Russia’s withdrawal from

the war, the British realised their mistake in offering the oil-rich Mosul to the French and

took it over in 1918. In April 1920 in a conference in San Remo Iraq was assigned as

Mandate to the United Kingdom. The same year but in November Abdul-Rahman al-Gailani

formed the first Iraqi Government and was positioned as president.41 “The Council of

38 Reidar Visser, “Introduction” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield eds., An Iraq of its Regions Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy. (Hurst Publishers Ltd, 2007), 1-10 39 Al-Hamawy, Mu’jam ul Buldan 1977, Volume 4, Page 95 40 Al-Hamawy, Mu’jam ul Buldan 1977, Volume 1, Page 309, 41 Philip W Ireland, Iraq, a Study in Political Development (Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1937)

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Ministers as the first Iraqi institution set up under the Mandate reflected the tensions in

Britain’s approach between the need to give autonomy to the population of Iraq and the

desire to retain control.”42 In 1920 and against the British Mandate a revolt took place almost

all over Iraq. ‘Inside Iraq, rising anti-British sentiment had been fanned by the nationalists

in Baghdad, the Shi’i religious leaders of the holy cities, and disaffected mid-Euphrates tribal

leaders’.43 On 27 August 1921, Faisal was installed as the King of Iraq. The majority of the

aforementioned scholars agreed on the artificiality of Iraq and that would consequently lead

to an identity dilemma that will be discussed in the second debate.

2- The identity debate: the second of the four major debates centres on the issue of identity.

Stansfield observes that, among the western academic literature, Iraq’s political mobilisation

has two prominent models. First, one that essentially concentrates upon vertical cleavages

in society and offers the vitality of communal association, whether sectarian or ethnic.

Secondly, another approach that contends that horizontal cleavages such as class and

socioeconomic statues are more powerful than ethnicity and religion ties. However,

Stansfield himself believes that none of these two, in isolation, could be a ground for a

satisfactory explanation.44 Due to the artificiality of the coined Iraqi State many dilemmas

mushroomed facing the Iraqi State. Among them the fiercest was how to create a common

and familiar identity that could possibly replace the various identities ranging vertically

from ethnicity and religious denominations to class and socioeconomic horizontally. After

13 years of hard and constant endeavours by the Kingdom to create such an identity, King

Faisal admitted his explicit failure in creating such an identity when he summoned the

following speech: “In Iraq…there is still no Iraqi people, but unmanageable masses of human

beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal…connected by no common tie… The circumstances

42 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq (Hurst & Company, London 2003) 43 Marr The Modern History of Iraq 44 Stansfield IRAQ People, History, Politics

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being what they are, the immenseness of efforts needed for this cannot be imagined”. 45

Needless to say that the speech necessitates no comment. Simon comments on Iraq’s

establishment by saying “there was no focus of the nationalist identification at the time of

Iraq’s creation”. 46 Diversity could best describe the issue of identity in Iraq. Iraq is a

multiethnic, multi-religious and multicultural state. The estimates prove that none of these

elements that compose the Iraqi State, whether ethnicities or religions, might rule Iraq

without a real power sharing and representation, except for dictators. The proportion and

percentage of each make Iraq impossible and implausible to be run and led by a single

component,47unless coercively. In terms of ethnicity, there live Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens and

Persian speakers. Regarding religions, you find Muslims (Sunni or Shi’i), Christians

(Chaldean Church, Assyrian Christians, Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic,

Jacobite, Protestants, and Latin Catholic), Yazidies, and Sabians.48 Each of those elements

mentioned could be sub-divided into different sorts of affiliations such as loyalty to clans or

even to tribes that seem sometimes more powerful than, say, ethnicity. Although the real

proportion of each mentioned above is unclear due to the non-existence of a dependable

census at least since 1957, none of these groups could claim the overwhelming majority.

The dilemma of unsatisfactory identities and unfilled appetites have constructed more than

a predicament to all the pushed-in components of Iraq, may be, in some cases, except for

the Sunnis. The Shi’is were unfairly represented, though, they composed more than half of

the population. Although they were the majority in Iraq in 1920s even after the official

annexation of Mosul Vilayet into Iraq, Shi’a were not endowed with effective roles neither

45 Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq… 17 46 Simon, Iraq between Two World Wars 47 The proportion of each is rather bleak and inaccurate, however, in this very dissertation I will bring about different censuses

conducted since the establishment of the Iraqi State. 48 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq

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in the Ministers’ Cabinet nor in lower posts in then Governorates.49 Even more complex than

Shi’a problem of political power sharing and representation was the Kurdish dilemma. Being

distinctive from the other parts of Iraq in terms of language and culture, Kurds were

promised an independent state by the then super powers. The Treaty of Sevres was ratified

between the victorious Allied Forces and the defeated Ottoman Empire in August 1920.

Article 62 clearly acknowledges the right of the Kurds to establish their own entity.50 But in

three years and in another treaty known as Lausanne aborted the dream of the Kurds and

determined an undesired end to their aspirations. Polk comments that “The Treaty of

Lausanne, signed July 24, 1923 recognized the Turkish state but made no mention of the

Kurds. Oil made Kurdistan Iraqi”.51 Thus the forceful and unwilling integration of the Kurds

into Iraq and the deprivation of the Shi’a majority population from practising power sharing

caused more than a quandary in the future of the newly founded Iraqi state.

3- The dictator debate: this pivot of Stansfield’s work deals with the transformation of the

successive Iraqi regimes from authoritarianism to totalitarianism. Authoritarianism as

defined by Juan Linz as “political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism:

without elaborate and guiding ideology (but distinctive mentalities); without intensive nor

extensive political mobilisation (except some points in their development): and in which a

leader (or occasionally a small group) exercise power within formally ill-defined limits but

actually quite predictable ones”.52 Whereas totalitarianism defined by Arendt is “the

permanent domination of each single individual in each and every sphere of life” and

49 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq (Princeton University Press, 1994) 50 Cilicia Website (http://www.cilicia.com/armo_sevres.html 15/3/2008) Article 62 from Treaty of Sevres states “A Commission sitting

at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft

within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas

lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier

of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3)”. 51 Polk, Understanding Iraq 52 Stansfield IRAQ People, History, Politics

19

developed by Schapiro, the definition expanded to have five features which are:

“personalised rule by a leader, the subjugation of the legal order, control over private

morality, continuous mobilisation, and legitimacy based upon mass support”.53

Authoritarianism emerged fundamentally, according to Stansfield, from three interlinked

and intermingled factors summarised as firstly, the rise of military in the political life of Iraq,

secondly is the consistent communalisation of political life and finally, the growth of Arab

nationalism in reaction to British intrusion in Iraq’s internal affairs. Beside Iraq’s

unquestioned need to a powerful army that could defend the nascent state, the Iraqi army,

founded on 6th January 1921, was established four two main reasons. Firstly, the British

suffered from the financial hardship that followed the end of WWI. In consequence and in

order not to spend more, they founded the Iraqi army as a replacement and substitution for

their home-heading army. Secondly, the army should perform as a catalyst to any internal

or external threats attempting in dethroning the King or departing the country. Even the

King himself depended heavily on the officers that were profoundly educated under the

Ottoman system of education described by Simon as “they were young men; their average

age in 1921 was in the low thirties. Most were lower middle class Sunni Arabs…products

of Ottoman military and bureaucratic education…dependant upon the government for

position and livelihood.”54 The army, especially in 1930s, became an instrument that scared

people more that, as it should be, making them feel safe. The first who suffered on the hands

of the army after Iraq’s independence were the Assyrians that were attacked on accusations

of attempting to disintegrate Iraq in 1933.55 Then in 1935 the army brutally crushed

sporadic Shi’a revolts.56 In March 1936 a Kurdish revolt in the north was brutally and

53 Stansfield IRAQ People, History, Politics 54 Simon, Iraq between Two World Wars 55 Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq… 24 56 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq

20

ruthlessly crushed by the army.57 A military coup took place in 1936 and from that period

up to 1941 the military forced seven cabinets to step aside and later in 1958 mercilessly

eradicated the royal family.58 The Ba’th party, from holding power in Iraq through a

coup in 1968, relied on its hard power59 and coercion, although; when necessary it could

easily turn to utilising its soft power.60 The March Manifesto signed in 1970 was merely a

production of soft power and dialogue between Kurds, represented by Mala Mustafa

Barzany, and the Ba’th regime, represented by Saddam Hussein. However, when the regime

gained adequate power and economically stood on its feet, started depending on hard power

and military by firstly abolishing the Manifesto and then attacking the Kurds. The regime

could not accommodate ethnic diversity unless through its hard power and led many brutal

and crushing campaigns against Arabs (especially Shi’a), Kurds and others among them one

should mention only as instances “Anfal Campaigns in 1988, bombarding Halabja Town

with chemical weapons in 1988, and crushing south uprising in 1990”. The Ba'th Party was

first founded by two French-educated Damascus teachers, Michel 'Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar,

in 1947. Their ideology was a mixture of nationalism, political idealism, and extreme radical

action characterized in the slogans of the Party: unity, freedom, and socialism.61 From the

1970s, Stansfield argues, Iraq was undergoing some effective transformation from

authoritarianism to totalitarianism under Ba’th regime. The transformation inaugurated

with the nationalisation of Iraqi oil in 1972 with aim of making the state self-reliant. That

step, in turn, led to an immense development in Iraq’s economy and made the state less

57 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 87 58 Stansfield IRAQ People, History, Politics 59 Brooke A Windsor, Hard Power, Soft Power Reconsidered (http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol1/no3/pdf/50-56_e.pdf

25/12/2007) Windsor suggests that “hard or command power — the ability to change what others do through coercion”. 60 Kalathil, Shanthi. Soft Power, Hard Issues (Reports of the 2005 Aspen Institute, Roundtable on Public Diplomacy and the Middle

East and the Forum on Communications and Society) Kalathil defines soft power as “nonmilitary power that is capable of attracting,

rather than coercing, others through intangibles such as policies, values, and culture.” 61 Kelidar, A. Review, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vo l.11, No 2, (Apr., 1980), pp. 275-276.

21

dependable on tax levying and then less contact with people. With the financial relief the

state began to employ people within its services and most of the people depended on it for

their livelihood62. People with no affiliation to and membership in Ba’ath Party received

fewer services. Affiliation to any party beside Ba’ath was considered as treason and then the

punishment would certainly be death. People were unwillingly forced to join Ba’th Party63.

Many different security networks were established to spy on every “doubtful” move by

anybody and people were hanged and executed with a simple accusation by any of the spies.

My father used to tell me not to speak against Saddam and Ba’th because even the walls

would spy on us. I still remember one of the mottos that was inscribed on walls of schools

and everywhere which was “When Saddam says (has any opinion), it is what people should

say”.64 Saddam’s picture was simply to be put everywhere.

4- The state building and democratisation debate: in his last debate Stansfield brings about the

issue of authoritarian regimes once removed by external powers and replaced by prescribed

democracies. A key question he asks is that “whether the process of regime change and

(attempted) democratization in a globalized world enhances the consolidation of multi-

ethnic states, or instead acts as a catalyst in their fragmentation and possible collapse”.65 Iraq

has been undergoing an unpredictable transformation from the Ba’th totalitarian and

authoritarian regime to almost a fully fledged democracy, at least on paper. Ethnicity

as defined by Heywood is “the sentiment of loyalty towards a distinctive population, cultural

group or territorial area… (and ethnicity) is understood as a form of cultural identity, albeit

62 In 1927-31 the economy of Iraq relied mainly on levying tax which constituted 81%. This figure dropped down to 27% in 1950s

and then to 11.5% in 1974. Employees figure in the government in 1968 was 276,605, however; more than doubled in 1978 to

become662, 856. (Stansfield, IRAQ People, History, Politics) 63 I myself was forced to join the Ba’th Party when I was only 15, a student in the Intermediate School. However, my friends and I

brought excuses for not joining in and signing because no one dared to openly reject, but later we realised that they signed on

behalf of us! 64 In Arabic it was “اذا قال صدام, قال الشعب” 65 Stansfield IRAQ People, History, Politics

22

one that operates at a deep and emotional level”.66 In an era where globalisation is underway,

is there a place for terms such as “sentiment of loyalty, territory, and cultural identity”? This

question will not be answered in this dissertation, however; it seems vital to remember that

what has been taking place after 2003 in Iraq is unarguably a sort of revival of territorial,

cultural and ethnical controversies. Iraq after OIF has been going under the process of

rebuilding the country on different bases rather than those of the Ba’th regime. The

disintegration of that authoritarian regime and substituting it with a democratic one

necessitates what Sharp calls “Handling success responsibly”.67 According to Sharp those

who plan for grand strategies such as disintegrating dictatorships should be fully aware of

some points. The first is that they should, prior to action, estimate the possible and desired

ways in which a successful struggle might best be accomplished to prevent the rise of a new

dictatorship. Secondly, they should endeavour to ensure the steady and gradual

establishment of a long-lasting democratic system. Thirdly, supporters of democracy should

determine how the transition from the dictatorship to the interim government should be

dealt with at the end of the struggle. Fourthly, it should be taken seriously into account that

which sections of the old government should be abolished completely due to their inherent

anti-democratic character and which ones need only democratic reformation. Fifthly,

planners should profoundly keep in mind not to create political emptiness and void for that

may open the gate to chaos or a new dictatorship. Sixthly, when its power disintegrates,

thought should be given in advance to determine the policy toward high officials of the

dictatorship. For example, are the dictators to be brought to trial in a court? Are they to be

permitted to leave the country permanently? Seventhly, “specific plans for the transition to

democracy should be ready for application when the dictatorship is weakening or collapses.

66 Andrew Heywood, Politics, 2nd Edition (Palgrave Foundation 2002), 168 67 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy, a conceptual framework for liberation (The Albert Einstein Institution 1993), 51

23

Such plans will help to prevent another group from seizing state power through a coup

d’état.”68 Finally, plans should be underway that guarantee the foundation of a democratic

constitutional government that assures full political and personal. “The changes won at a

great price should not be lost through lack of planning.”69 However what the coalition forces

led by US army brought to Iraq was ultimately the lack of the most of the abovementioned

points and this clarifies the reason behind someone such as Peter Galbraith to entitle his

book “The End of Iraq. How American Incompetence Created a War without End” in which

he states “the Bush Administration’s grand ambitions for Iraq were undone by arrogance,

ignorance, and political cowardice. In not preparing for the collapse of law and order, the

Administration ignored the warnings of experts and of Iraqis and seemed to assume that

Iraq’s police and bureaucrats would report for work the day after Saddam fell…”70

1-3 Populace Components

Iraq is a multiethnic, multi-religious and multicultural state and far from being homogenous. The

successive governments failed mainly and simply for the reason that they adopted an authoritarian

system that led them to employ a systematic process of assimilating the Kurds and other minorities.

Nouri Talabani relates “successive Iraqi governments, especially after the coup d’état of July, 1968

led by the Baath Party, have openly followed a policy designed to change ethnic character of the

region. Among the measures taken were the expulsion of the Kurdish civil servants, teachers, and

employees of the oil company to the south of Iraq and their replacement by Arabs”.71

68 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy, a conceptual framework for liberation, 51 69 Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy, a conceptual framework for liberation, 51 70 Peter Galbraith, The End of Iraq. How American Incompetence Created a War without End (Simon & Schuster 2006), back of the

book. 71 Talabani, “Ethnic cleansing in Iraqi Kurdistan”

24

The real proportion of each component in Iraq is unclear due to the non-existence of a dependable

census at least since 195772; none of these groups could claim the overwhelming majority. The

British authorities carried out the first census in Iraq before the Mandate and published the results

in 1919 and the figures came out as below: Shi’a Arabs were 1,492,000 which was %55, the Sunni

Arab were 520,000 which was about %19, Kurds were 496,000 which was about %18, Jews were

86,000, Christians were 87,000 and other minorities were 42,000.73 However, these figures vary

according to different authors. According to estimates, the minimum and maximum of Iraq’s

nationalities and sects are as follows: Arabs are between 75 to 80 percent. Kurds are between 15 to

23 percent. Turkmens are between 3 to 10 percent. Assyrians and Chaldeans are between 3 to 5

percent. Sunnis comprise 32 to 37 percent from the overall population whereas Shi’is make up 60

to 65 percent.74 According to Marr, and also CIA Fact Book,75 Arabic speakers constitute 75 to 80

percent of the population whereas Kurdish speakers 15 to 20 percent.76 Opposite to all these figures,

Albayan Magazine published, according to estimates by the Iraqi Government in 1996, that the

Sunnis are unquestionably the majority in Iraq. Relying upon some calculations, Albayan Magazine

stated that the Sunnis in Iraq compose 53 percent of the total population and the Shi’a population

constitutes only 43 percent and the others 4 percent.77 On the same line, Albainah Website attempts

to disprove what Al-Nafisi, mentioned above, stated concerning Shi’a being the majority in Iraq.

Accordingly, the Sunnis constitute the majority in Iraq and to prove this claim it depends on some

estimates. The first estimate was prepared by “Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq” in 1997 that said

Sunnis outnumbered Shi’s by 819,950 people. Secondly, according to an estimate by ex-Ministries

72 Brendan O’Leary, “Power Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy” in O’Leary, McGarry & Salih eds., The Future of Kurds in Iraq (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005) 47-91 73 Abdulla Al-Nafisi, The Role of Shi’a in Political Development of Modern Iraq, 2nd Edition (Dar al-Salasil Press, Kuwait 1990) (written

in Arabic) 74 O’Leary, “Power Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy” 75 Central Intelligence Agency CIA (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html#People 12/6/2008) 76 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq 77 Abu Oways Al-Baghdadi, “AL Haqiqa al Kamila li A’dad Sukkan I l ‘raq”, Albayan Magazine, November/December 2005, no.218

25

of Trade and Planning the Sunnis are 58 percent and the Shi’is are 40 percent78. The latter two

views agree upon that the claims of Shi’is being the majority was first issued by Hanna Batatu, the

Jewish writer that fell mistaken by the Shi’is Governorates outnumbering the Sunni’s. In fact none

of these aforementioned estimates proves to be accurate enough to be settled as a firm ground for

academic research. Iraq’s demography looks exactly as O’Leary described it as a “minefield”.79 The

reasons behind the different figures could be traced back to:

a- The non-existence of a reliable census in Iraq at least since 1957 or some say 1947.

b- A systematic assimilation process named as (Arabisation) followed by successive

governments in Iraq in an attempt to affecting the demography of Iraq.

Worth mentioning here is an estimate about the most problematic city in Iraq in terms of

controversy over claims of its possession by Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens which is Kirkuk, a city lies

in the north of Iraq. The issue of Kirkuk will be mentioned in the next chapters. The disputes over

Kirkuk appears to be so serious that an act in the permanent Iraqi Constitution (IC) entitled as 140

and an act in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) entitled 58 are devoted to determine its

destiny. A systematic and well-studied Arabisation process was taking place until the fall of the

previous regime and since 1930s. As a result the demography of the area witnessed effective

changes that might lead to ethnic clashes in the future. Depending upon 1947 estimate, as in chart

(1) below in the bibliography, Kurds in Kirkuk constituted the majority if the boroughs of the city

are included. In the city of Kirkuk, the Turkmens were 45.306, Kurds were 40.047 and Arabs were

27.127. In the areas outside the city that belonged to Kirkuk Governorate Kurds were 147.546 while

the Arabs were 82.493 and Turkmens were 30.065. The total population of Kurds was 187.593,

whereas the total of Arabs was 109.620, and Turkmen’s total was 83.371. The overall of Kirkuk’s

78 Hasan Al-Rashidi “Raddan ‘ala Nnafisi” Albainah Website (http://www.albainah.net/index.aspx?function=Item&id=1718 15/5/2008) 79 O’Leary, “Power Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy”

26

population was 388.839. Consequently, the percentage of Kurds was 48.24; Arab’s percentage was

28.19, Turkmen’s percentage was 21.44, and the others were 2.13.80

In concluding this very chapter, it is worth pointing out that the three subjects dealt with here are

very important before shifting to the issue of discussing federalism in relation to Iraq. The history

of Iraq, starting from ancient periods such as Mesopotamia and ending with the foundation of the

modern day Iraq, has been playing an effectual role in deciding upon its identity. Some, as argued

in this chapter, believe that Iraq, as an entity with certain boundaries, was in existence long before

WWI, as opposite to those who consider Iraq a misshaped creation of colonial powers for their mere

selfish interests. The modern history of Iraq can be identified by political disorder and

dysfunctionality of the state. Democracy was the least thought of and worked for by the successive

Iraqi governments. Consequently, this has led to the lack of reciprocal recognition of the various

components’ rights and to an undesired hegemony of certain people and this in return resulted in

the unavailability of a chief factor in the success of federalism in Iraq which is having the mutual

rights of each, individual or group, well comprehended. The population being mono, bi, or multi

(ethnic, religion, culture, and language) is very crucial in deciding upon the shape that any

federation in any part of the world would take. Therefore, the specified section for “populace

components” will expectantly contribute in shaping the expected Iraqi federation.

80Iraquna Website ( http://www.iraq-na.com/index.php?sec=news&act=view_news&id=17812 13/4/2008)

27

Chapter Two: Iraq and the Idea of Federalism After explaining the basic needed information regarding the historical background, populace

component, and Iraq as a state, it is now possible to address the issue of Iraq’s political options after

ousting Saddam’s regime. A political void and emptiness was created and had to be filled out, and

looting had its hand over so many places such as museums. To end this anarchy rationally the

peoples of Iraq were confronting and head to head with several choices. Why did they vote for a

constitution that entrenched federalism in its very first article and shunned other options? What is

federalism? What sort of classifications and terminologies are there when dealing with federations

that will later on contribute in the debates regarding a federation in Iraq? The following is an

attempt to tackle such wonders.

2-1 Iraq’s political options

The Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 lasted for less than a month and resulted in the complete

removal of Ba’th officials from power. Hypothetically, the Iraqi people have had several choices to

play. Amongst them I would like to briefly debate two of them in this chapter. Firstly, they could

continue with the de facto state81 that existed then in Iraqi Kurdistan and make it a partition of the

country into at least two states. Secondly, they had alternatively the opportunity to prevent the state

from fragmentation by adopting federalism. Wanche adds another possibility that she calls “A

Return to the Situation that Prevailed before 1991” and believes that “this outcome could result if

an initial positive development in the country derails and the regime of Baghdad refuses to

accommodate Kurdish demands and overturns any agreement between the federal or central

government and the Kurds. If such a government remains pro-American, Washington is likely to

81 Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq… 172

28

do little to advance Kurdish interests”.82 I will not discuss this scenario for several reasons: firstly,

the Kurds never accept such a situation and would launch a comprehensive rebellion that would

be in any case bloody and uncontrollable. Secondly, it seems illogical and morally unjustified for

the American to remove a dictator and replace it with another, taking into consideration all the

money they have spent and troops victimised in achievement of that purpose, and this was not an

option desired by the US itself.

2-1-1 Partition: According to O’Leary partition in a general sense “is the division of an entity into

parts”83, yet he defines political partition as a process that “objectively divides a previously unified

territorial entity into two or more parts, which may be marked with borders, codified in new maps,

and operationalized, for example in demarcated lines, perhaps accompanied by fences, walls, paint

or barbed wire, or punctuated with official posts where passes or passports may be demanded.”84

O’Leary believes that political partitions share that they are fresh borders cut across a national

homeland and are to resolve or regulate national, ethnic or communal conflicts, however; they can

be classified into four paths:

National or multinational partitions

external or internal partitions

the agents promoting, supporting and implementing them; and

prior political status of the partitioned entities85

There existed a de facto separation of Kurdistan Region since 1991 after the Raparin (Uprising)

when the Iraqi Government withdrew all its offices from there and left the new Kurdish parties all

by themselves. In order not to be suppressed as the Shi’a were in the south by the Iraqi regime, US

82 Sophia Wanche, “Awaiting Liberation: Kurdish Perspective on a Post-Saddam Iraq” ” in Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry and Khalid

Salih, The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 186-194 83 Brendan O’Leary, Analysing Partition: Definition, Classification and Explanation (Centre for International Borders Research & Institute for British-Irish Studies, Working Paper No. 27, 2006) 84 O’Leary, Analysing Partition: Definition, Classification and Explanation 85 O’Leary, Analysing Partition: Definition, Classification and Explanation

29

forces created a safe zone for the Kurds. Aware of the fact that they were now in position of power

and had to be held responsible for the living of their own people, the Kurds managed the first

democratic election in the history of their country and established a parliament and Kurdistan

Regional Government (KRG). Kurds ruled themselves since 1991 and held more than one election.

After OIF many individuals and scholars put forward suggestions on portioning Iraq at least into

two states as it will be discussed below in this section. Anderson and Stansfield consider some

observations for the Iraq’s political future. Both arguably suggest the two-state as problem solving

and convincingly debate that for Iraq to avoid the two-state outcome and remain as a united Iraq

there should exist two unlikely points. On one hand, the Arab population must be willing to accept

a degree of autonomy to the Kurds that have never been granted or imagined. On the other hand,

the Kurds from their side must have full faith and put their full trust in an Arab-dominated central

government that will keep the promises granted to Kurds and not renege on them when it can.

Anderson and Stansfield believe that the creation of an independent Kurdish State would have

advantages and it resolves more problems than it creates, yet, both assume that even demarcating

the borders would not be an impossible task as the only problem would be Kirkuk. Anderson and

Stansfield consider that Kirkuk city should be included in Kurdistan State, however, its oil need not

be. Regarding the response of Turkey to the creation of the Kurdistan State, Anderson and Stansfield

believe that it would be more beneficial for Turkey than harmful. The only fear of Turkey is on the

Kurds of its own not to be urged to ask for secession. On one hand, the Kurds of Iraq when granted

an independent state would not be so stupid to risk it for some sentimentalism of supporting their

brethren in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey by then would be empty-handed to re-approach the

issue of its Kurds and better its human rights records and eventually step toward joining EU.86

86Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq… 220

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Gelb87 puts forward a clear and crucial plan for the future of an Iraq that its security is worsening

and exacerbating more than progressing and the pressures from inside USA is excessively huge for

withdrawal. He names it “the three-state plan” and describes the plan as “The only viable strategy,

then, may be to correct the historical defect and move in stages toward a three-state solution: Kurds

in the north, Sunnis in the center and Shiites in the south.”88 He discusses that this idea remained

unpopular before because the integrity of Iraqi soil should have been preserved against the perils

of the Islamic Iran and then continues “But times have changed. The Kurds have largely been

autonomous for years, and Ankara has lived with that. So long as the Kurds don't move precipitously

toward statehood or incite insurgencies in Turkey or Iran, these neighbors will accept their

autonomy. It is true that a Shiite self-governing region could become a theocratic state or fall into

an Iranian embrace. But for now, neither possibility seems likely.”89 Furthermore he makes clear

that the main three constituencies of Iraq (Kurd, Shi’a Arab, and Sunni Arab) are genuinely distinct

in many ways and says “A strategy of breaking up Iraq and moving toward a three-state solution

would build on these realities. The general idea is to strengthen the Kurds and Shiites and weaken

the Sunnis, then wait and see whether to stop at autonomy or encourage statehood.”90

For the Kurdish people living in Iraq this option had to be taken seriously into consideration and

implemented in line with the creation of the Iraqi state. Iraqi Kurds were granted the choice of

seceding from Iraq whenever they would feel like it to join the Kurdistan State that would have been

established according to Sevres Treaty. After stating that if within a year from the treaty’s coming

into force the Kurds proved with a majority that they wanted a separate state they would be granted

87 Leslie H. Gelb, a former editor and columnist for The Times, is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. 88 Leslie H. Gelb, The Three-State Solution, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) website,

(http://www.krg.org/articles/print.asp?anr=6466&lngnr=12&rnr=73 2/5/2008) 89 Gelb, The Three-State Solution 90 Gelb, The Three-State Solution

31

with no objection, Article 64 of the Sevres Treaty states “…If and when such renunciation takes

place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such

an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto

been included in the Mosul vilayet.”91 The Kurdish dream of independence was abolished with

Ataturk signing the Treaty of Lausanne in July 24, 1923 which did not mention the Kurds at all.

After that date the Kurds of Iraq willingly or unwillingly, even when they were at their peak of

power in 1970 when March Manifesto was produced, did not demand separation from Iraq. The

question that should be raised here is why the Kurds, especially after the consolidation of the Iraqi

State in 1930s, have never stipulated or even proposed partition from Iraq? The answer for this

enquiry could be manifold and should be studied and considered more profoundly, however,

briefly, the reasons might be summarised in some points:

1- The failure and disappointment of some endeavours toward independence, and the

inhumane and brutal way they were crushed, deprived the Kurds from having the guts to

propose it. Examples are several amongst them we should include “the Republic of Muhabad

founded by Qazi Muhammad in the Iranian part of Kurdistan in 1945 and the Revolution

of Sheikh Sa’edi Piran in the Kurdish part of Turkey in 1925”. Both attempts failed and the

leaders were ruthlessly executed.92

2- When declaring partition and independence the political and economical support of the

superpowers on stage has become somehow a non-abandoned necessity. When Kosovo

declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, the American Administration was

among the first congratulators followed by some other European countries despite some, in

vein, constant efforts from Russia and Serbia not to let it go. The same could not happen to

the Kurds. The Kurds in Iran in 1945 and in 1970 in Iraq tried their luck in trusting then

91 Cilicia Website, 2008 92 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, Third Edition (I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004)

32

superpowers USSR and USA, yet both failed them and consequently what was gained with

pain scattered with an anti-Kurdish attitude from the great powers. Mas’ud Barzany,

currently the President of Kurdistan Region, explained shortly after he had returned from

his trip to Turkey and Europe in February and March 1992 that: “The situation in the world

today is such that it will not permit any changes in regional borders. Nor will it stand for

any partitioning. Therefore…the Iraqi Kurds should not swim against the international tide.

We should act with wisdom ... [and] bear in mind that there is a wide gap between our

wishes and our rights on the one hand and what we can achieve on the other”.93 Not to be

out of consideration, Iraqi Kurdistan is surrounded by three states that have a significant

number of Kurds which are Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Each of these countries has fears of an

independent state in Iraqi Kurdistan that may have negative effects, in their opinions, on

their Kurds and may urge them to violently demand secession and join the would-be

established state or even ask for a state of their own.

2-1-2 Federalism: Iraq is home to multi-ethnoreligious groups that have been living on its soil long

before its creation as a state in 1920s. As stated in the above sections that the history of Iraq could

be easily recognised by the features of political and ethnic instability that it has been passing

through since then. Power unarguably concentrated in the hands of a handful of people and their

henchmen. The Iraqi military establishment, instead of being an instrument to defend against

external threats, was exploited, monopolised, and utilised to brutally crush any internal opposition

and to liquidise those who dared to speak out against the wishes of the authorities. The political

dilemma loose its obscurity and vagueness when estimates relate that since the foundation day of

Iraq as a Mandate state in 1921 until 1941, 28 Ministry Cabinets assumed power which rates for

93 Michael Gunter, “A de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, (1993), 295-319

33

more than one cabinet for each year.94 Furthermore, from the year 1941 until 1958, the situation

appeared more miserable and the political instability exacerbated with 30 Ministry Cabinets

assuming power.95 All together in a period of 37 years fro 1921 to 1958, Iraq witnessed the

establishment of 58 Cabinets of Ministers which accounts for 1.57 per year. Although the Sunni

Arabs in Iraq did not reckon for more than a quarter of the population, the were unquestionably

the overwhelming majority in all the cabinets established that could simply indicate that Shi’a

Arabs, Kurds and other components were unfairly underrepresented. Consequently, this led to fierce

and violent clashes between the sections of Iraq, especially the Kurds, and it created nationalistic

sentiment and passion that headed toward the foundation of some Kurdish political parties based

on ideas pivoted around cultural and political rights of the Kurds, yet unfruitful due to the

subsequent governments’ negligence of that issue. Arabisation was in progress since the foundation

of Iraq, however, intensely carried out by the Ba’th regime under the authority of Saddam Hussein

“Relations between Arabs and Kurds have historically provided the greatest source of tension in

Iraq. The Iraqi government has not only consistently excluded Kurds from positions of power but

also tried to assimilate them into the country. As part of a program of Arabization, Saddam’s

government tried to assimilate non-Arabs by preventing them from publicly speaking in their own

languages or being schooled in them and by pressuring them to adopt Arab names and to declare

themselves as Arabs in official government documents, including identification papers and national

censuses.”96 The situation in the Shi’a south was not far better than the Kurdish north.

In October 4, 1992 the Kurdish elected parliament decreed a statement in which it adopted

federalism as the relation organiser between Kurdistan Region and Iraq that should adopt a

democratic parliamentary system that respects international human rights.97 Prior to any debates

94 Simon, Iraq between Two World Wars 95 Matthew Elliot, ‘Independent Iraq’: The Monarchy and British Influence 1941-1958 (Tauris Academic Studies, 1996) 96 Dawn Brancati, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 2004) 97 Iraqi Kurdistan National Council’s statement issued in October 4, 1992 (the Kurdish Version)

34

over the form that Iraq’s Federalism should take, I would like to mention that both, the Transitional

Administrative Law (TAL) in 2004 and the permanent Iraqi Constitution (IC) in 2005, have

entrenched the principle of federalism as a relation organiser between the different Iraqi sects and

ethnicities, the form that the federation should adopt is not specified and left to later enactment.

This has opened the way for everyone to suggest, in harmony with permanent Iraqi Constitution

(IC), yet all of them remain solely as suggestions that could be benefitted from duly. Moreover, there

exist many other problems in the IC that make the even later enactments more difficult and I will

discuss them in the next chapter. Furthermore, any federative suggestions should aim at

guaranteeing stability, precluding the re-emergence of a dictatorship, and enhancing pluralism and

offering public services sufficiently and equally. The question that should be raised here is whether

federalism can be a stabiliser and be the ideal solution for an Iraq of diverse, but suppressed,

ethnicities? This dissertation will consistently attempt to answer these questions.

2-2 Federalism and Federation (general concepts)

Becoming more popular and attaining extra vitality in the political arena especially since the 1960s,

federalism has become the most viable political path for states of a multilayer of ethnicities or

religions. Its popularity was due to six reasons as Watts mainly points them out as: firstly, the

increasingly global economy that has set centrifugal economic political forces free and resulted in

weakening the traditional nation-state; secondly, new developments in technology have generated

models of organisation with decentralised hierarchies including non-centralised networks that

influence the attitudes of people regarding non-centralised political organisation; thirdly is the

collapse of the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Fourthly, the

spread of human rights values have led to an increasing pressure for citizen participation through

meaningful local self-government. The fifth is the resurgence of confidence in Europe’s federal

evolution as a result of progress in the Single European Act. The final reason is the resilience of the

35

classical federations that have shown a degree of flexibility and adaptability in responding to

changing conditions.98

Proudhon, considered to be one of doctrinaires of the modern federalism99, believed that

fundamentally political order could rest in two opposing principles that are; authority that initiates

obedient faith and liberty that concludes in free reason. Accordingly, the principal of authority -

familial, patriarchal, magisterial, theocratic, tending to hierarchy, centralisation, absorption- is

given by nature, whereas, the principal of liberty -personal, individualist, critical, the instrument of

dividing, choosing, arranging- is supplied by the mind. He states “all political constitutions, all

systems of government, including federations, fall within the scope of the formula, the balancing of

authority and liberty, and vice versa.”100

Derivatives like “Confederation” and “Federation” and other components of the language of

federalism originated from the Latin word “foedus”, genitive “foederis”, “which means an alliance

among individuals or collectivities aiming at the promotion of both specific and common

interests”101 or it simply means pact, contract, treaty, agreement, alliance.102 Elazar traces the roots

of federation and federal idea back to the Bible as he considered that the first usage of the word

federal was for theological purposes to “define the partnership between man and God described in

the Bible”.103

Riker interprets federalism as a “bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of

constituent government for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise

98 Ronald L Watts, “Contemporary Views on Federalism” in Bertus De Villiers ed., Evaluating Federal Systems, (Juta & Co, Ltd and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), 1-29 99 Preston King, Federalism and Federation, (Croom Helm. London and Canberra, 1982), 20 100 Pierre J. Proudhon, The Principle of Federation, (Translated by Richard Vernon, University of Toronto Press, 1979). 101 Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman, “The Revival of Federalism in Normative Political Theory” in Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne

Norman eds., Theories of Federalism, Palgrave McMillan, 2005, 1-21 102 Proudhon, The Principle of Federation

103 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism, ( The University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa and London, 1991), 5

36

armies”104. In his opinion, some conditions should exist in the bargain and all the parities involved

should be willing to abide by when made. The conditions are: firstly, the politicians who desire to

expand territorially must offer concessions to the rules of the constituent units. Secondly: those who

accept the bargain and give up some independence for the sake of union are willing to do so for

some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity.105

In this contemporary era, the terms associated with the word federal, such as “federalism”,

“federation”, and “confederation” and “federacy” have resumed many debates and received various

definitions. However, it should be seen as vital to have clear scholarly-put definitions in mind when

dealing with an issue like federalism, even scholars could not yet gather on a single and decisive

definition for each term. Both terms, federalism and federation, have been yet the main focus of

scholars and researchers. Villiers writes “For some, the distinction between “federalism” as a

normative and philosophical concept, involving the advocacy of the federal idea, while “federation”

is viewed as a descriptive term referring to a particular type of institutional relationship”.106

However, Elazar when writing about the variety of federal arrangements classifies federations,

unions, consociations, confederations, asymmetrical federal arrangements, leagues, and local and

non-governmental federalism under the same title.107 Proudhon observes federation and defines it

as “an agreement by which one or more heads of family, one or more towns, one or more groups of

towns or states, assume reciprocal and equal commitments to perform one or more specific task,

the responsibility of which rests exclusively with the officers of the federation”108 and he sees that

in a federal system participants would undertake bilateral and commutative obligation in addition

to making their contract reserve more rights, more liberty, more authority, more property than they

104 William Riker, Federalism. (Little, Brown And Company INC. 1964) 105 Riker, Federalism

106 Watts, “Contemporary Views on Federalism”, 7 107 Elazar, Exploring Federalism 108 Proudhon, The Principle of Federation

37

abandon.109 In Proudhon’s definition it becomes clear that he sees federation as a descriptive term

leading to mutual interests of the parties involved. King has exactly the same tendency and considers

that federalism is often offered and developed as a political philosophy which seeks diversity in

unity and this term is utilised and used to primarily serve as an ideology. He observes federalism as

at least having three different mobilizational orientations and calls them ideologies which are first:

centralist, second: decentralist, and finally: balance.110

However, elaborating King’s definition of the term “federation”, Smith summarises King’s

conception of federalism as containing four essential features:

1. “Its representation is preponderantly territorial.

2. This territorial representation is characteristically secured on at least two sub-

national levels (which King refers to as ‘local’ and ‘regional’ governments).

3. The regional units are incorporated electorally or perhaps otherwise, into the

decision procedure of the national centre.

4. The incorporation of the regions into the decision procedure of the centre can only

be altered by extraordinary constitutional measures, not for example resort to a

simple majority vote of the national legislature or by autonomous decision of the

national executive.”111

2-3 Federalism and the Challenge of Multi-ethnic societies

Iraq, as stated above, has a heterogeneous population and far from being homogenous. According

to the above debates, partition and unitary (dictatorial) state do not demonstrate sufficient viability

and feasibility to be considered as realistic and doable solutions for modern-day Iraq. Here,

federalism shows up as a normative and practical political path that may possibly ease the tensions

109 Proudhon, The Principle of Federation 110 Preston King, Federalism and Federation, (Croom Helm, London & Canberra, 1982), 21 111 Graham Smith, “Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice”, in Graham Smith ed., Federalism,

The Multiethnic Challenge, (Longman, London and New York, 1995) 1-28

38

and satisfy the inevitable needs of most of the Iraqis. Some questions should be raised here that

appear to be fundamental in addressing the Iraqi complicated issue. How far federalism can tackle

and successfully deal with multi-ethnic societies? What are symmetrical or asymmetrical and

centralised or decentralised federalisms? Can, what is termed as, consociational democracy offer

any political incentive that might lead to peaceful coordination of all society components? In the

remaining part of this chapter, I try to offer some explanations and answers regarding these

questions.

2-3-1 How far can federalism accommodate multi-ethnic societies?

Auclaire writes “Today it seems that the idea of assimilating national groups has finally been

abandoned. History has shown that a sense of membership in a national group is often stronger

than affiliation to the country. As a result, the nation state that so many have striven to build over

the past few centuries is giving way to the multinational state.”112 That is true especially when one

witnesses the increasing number of countries, such as Iraq, that step willingly or unwillingly toward

recognizing minority rights and work on integrating them in the decision making process by paving

the way for implementing federalism. Now in the world, there exist roughly 25 federal states that

all together represent 40 per cent of the world’s population. They include some of the largest and

most heterogeneous states such as India. India’s system of government, while it can be complex, has

been working as one of the feasible and long-lasting federations in the world. Although not easy

and mostly surrounded by risks and perils, Iraq is now on its way to become a federal state as it is

determined by the Iraqi Constitution (IC). Because of the uniqueness of each federal state in terms

of federal institutions, culture, ethnicity and population, no model of federation should be

completely taken for granted to be an archetype for Iraq. However, this does not imply that the

experience of others should be neglected and left behind. “…among the federal countries of the

112 Celine Auclair. “Federalism: its principles, flexibility and limitations” Federations, Vol.5, No.A-1, Autumn 2005, 3-5

39

world, we can share knowledge and find many different approaches to particular challenges. From

both successes and the failures of these approaches, there is much that can be learned to make

future federal governments succeed”.113

Elazar considers that federalism could be utilised as an effective instrument in dealing with issues

such as conflict resolution and political integration.114 Humanity nowadays is experiencing severe

political discords and disharmony whose sources mainly lie in ethnic, national, and racial claims

and the denial of other’s culture, language. Elazar observes “the federal principle offers one possible

resource for resolving these problems… consequently federalism is a phenomenon that provides

many options for the organisation of political authority and power; as long as proper relations are

created, a wide variety of political structures can be developed that are consistent with the federal

principles”.115 Many other scholars prefer a positive opinion regarding federalism as the most

appropriate and suitable mechanism for holding a country together with an overall ethnic and

cultural satisfaction. Among them is Kymlicka who believes that federalism is very valuable in

accommodating national minorities, yet, makes a comparison between the Communist types of

federations and the democratic ones. Kymlicka writes “democratic federations (as opposed to

Communist federations) have been surprisingly successful in accommodating minority

nationalisms. Both historic multination federations, like Switzerland Canada, and more recent

multination federations, like Belgium and Spain, have not only managed the conflicts arising from

their competing national identities in a peaceful and democratic way, but have also secured a high

degree of economic prosperity and individual freedom for their citizens”116. This remark proves

true when examples of divided communist countries, for nationalistic reasons, emerged in 1990s

starting from the break-up USSR. Although federalism can accomplish the goal of accommodating

113 Carl Stieren, “Federalism and the politics of change”, Federations, Vol.5, No.A-1, Autumn 2005 114 Elazar, Exploring Federalism,11 115 Elazar, Exploring Federalism 116 Will Kymlicka, “Federalism, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism” in Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman eds., Theories of Federalism,

(Palgrave McMillan, 2005) 269-292

40

diversity and create unity from it, Smith reminds us that inter-ethnoregional tensions have the

potential to result in the break-up of a federation.117

2-3-2 symmetrical or asymmetrical federalism

Two concepts should be briefly clarified here that are symmetry and asymmetry in federalism.

Tarlton defines both terms as “the notion of symmetry refers to the extent to which component states

share in the conditions and thereby the concerns more or less common to the federal system as a

whole. By the same token, the second term, the concept of asymmetry expresses the extent to which

component states do not share in these common features.”118 Although he mentions the relation

among states, the same notions can be applied on relations between provinces and regions with the

federal government. Whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, it is about the participation and

integration of social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics of the federal system. To give

only two examples of symmetrical federalism, the American and Australian models could be

presented where constitutionally all the component states in each country have the same privilege

and power. However, many other states could be considered as asymmetrical such as Canada and

Spain. From the above examples, it proves true to construe that symmetrical federalism best suits

mono-national states, however, asymmetrical federalism is rather implemented by multinational

states119. Among the reasons behind adopting asymmetrical federalism one can refer to the desire

of national minorities to be formally and constitutionally introduced as different from the majority

nationalities. McGarry writes “the demand for asymmetry is often a question of statues as much as

functionality: minority nations tend to resist the idea that their nation’s unit is the equivalent of one

of the majority nation’s provincial units, and seek to promote the notion of the state as a pluri-

117 Smith, “Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice”, 9 118 Charles Tarlton, “Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 27, No.4, (Nov., 1965), 861-874 119 Alfred Stephan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model” in Karmis and Norman eds., Theories of Federalism, (Palgrave

McMillan, 2005) 255-268

41

national partnership rather than a multi-provincial partnership.”120 Hague and Harrop observe

that asymmetric federalism is to be seen as a natural response to cultural and power differences

between regions within a federation.121 However, endeavouring to constitutionally entrench

asymmetrical federalism might create and be followed by some problems. On one hand, a wave of

instability will develop as the less previlaged states; provinces or regions may protest and seek

equality with the more previlaged ones.122 On the other hand, the issue of whether granting greater

autonomy of jurisdiction to some regions, provinces or states should affect their representation in

the federal governments judiciary institutions.123 Despite these problems, McGarry believes that

one technique proves useful in this case which is “for dealing with a minority’s desire for asymmetry

without compromising provincial equality, is to offer power to all provinces with the expectation

that the minority’s will take this up. In Canada this approach has resulted in Quebec being the only

province to have its own pension plan and collect its own income taxes”.124

2-3-3 centralised and decentralised federalism

Federalism could be different in the degree of powers allotted to each of the center and the

periphery. Centralisation is defined as “The concentration of political power or government

authority at the national level.”125 Whereas decentralisation is defined as “The expansion of local

autonomy through the transfer of powers and responsibilities away from national bodies”126

According to Elazar federalism is generally based upon a framework which can be easily seen in

the division of power between the federal government on one hand and the constituent

120 John McGarry, “Canadian Lessons for Iraq” in Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry and Khalid Salih, The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 92-115 121 Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Governments and Politics: An Introduction, 6th Edition, ( Palgrave McMillan, 2004), 229 122 Hague and Harrop, Comparative Governments and Politics: An Introduction, 230 123 Watts, “Contemporary Views on Federalism” 124 McGarry, “Canadian Lessons for Iraq” 2005 125 Andrew Heywood, Politics, 2nd Edition (Palgrave Foundations, 2002), 158 126 Heywood, Politics 158

42

governments on the other, yet, he believes that there exists a confusion between both

decentralisation and noncentralisation that are sometimes erroneously interchangeably used. He

observes that the word decentralisation implies the existence of a governmental system in which

“the diffusion of power is actually a matter of grace, not right”127 and in noncentralisation “power

is so diffused that it cannot be legitimately centralised or concentrated without breaking the

structure and the spirit of the constitution.”128 The power delegated from the center to the periphery

might be substantial as it is the case with the American states, or might be marginal or unsubstantial.

Duchacek makes an important observation that decentralisation process can be concluded as the

authority’s commitment to unity does not encourage them to offer and grant some degree of within

limits decided by the central authority and such conclusion might be a response to “local pressures

or need for greater flexibility…or represents the central authority’s ideological commitment to

pluralism.”129 Both centralisation and decentralisation have some advantageous. The states with a

central government have their reasons that urge them more toward it and those adopting

decentralisation have theirs as well. Heywood clarifies both cases starting from the positive sides of

centralisation that he summarises in four points. First, National unity: it is solely and exclusively the

central government that can articulate the interests of all the components and various parts as a

nation not on ethnic, sectional or regional bases.

1- Uniformity: uniformity in law and public orders and regulations can only be

achieved properly when there is a central government that works on one system

throughout the overall country that in turn helps people to easily mobilise

geographically.

127 Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 34 128 Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 34 129 Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism, the Territorial Dimension of Politics, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC., 1970), 112

43

2- Equality: the central governments can recognise inequalities that result from some

areas being more socially in need than others and attempts to reasonably fill the

gap.

3- Prosperity: the central government can manage to impose a single currency, tax

and spending policies that consequently lead to economic prosperity with a single

vision in mind to provide what the country needs most.

After, Heywood comes to count the benefits of decentralisation in four points:

1- Participation: establishing a decentralised government with local authorities, results in

creating more opportunities for citizens to take part in the political life of their

community.

2- Responsiveness: local governments and authorities are usually closer to people and their

needs and that inevitably strengthens the government’s accountability and

responsiveness to the specific and general interests of the community.

3- Legitimacy: decisions that will be made within local government will be seen by local

communities as more intelligible and then legitimate.

4- Liberty: “…decentralisation protects liberty by dispersing government power, thereby

creating a network of checks and balances. Peripheral bodies check central governments

as well as each other.”130

2-3-4 Consociational Democracy

Consociational democracy could be considered as an effective mechanism to be implemented on

multiethnic societies and “is widely practised in managing cultural conflicts applicable as much to

federal societies (e.g. Belgium, Canada, Switzerland) as it is to societies which are non-federal and

130 Heywood, Politics, 158-159

44

where ethnic groups are not geographically concentrated (e.g. Holland).”131 Elazar inclines to the

concept that consociational regimes are the outcomes of “a compromise achieved out of necessity

among camps which, if they had their way, would seek domination or elimination of each other but

which have come to recognize that the internal balance of power in the polity does not permit that

to happen”132. Lijphart conceptualised consociational democracy and wrote about it intensively. He

observes that consociational democracy may be outlined as encompassing four principles that are.

First, Grand coalition: it refers basically to the idea that political leaders of each segment and

component of society all together jointly run the government and the country and can be also called

“power-sharing” principle”. Furthermore, this principle sharply contrast government-versus-

opposition pattern of majority rule. Second, Segmental autonomy: this principle means that decision

making process should be dispersed among the segments and elements of the society as much as

possible. This principle can be featured as minority rule over majority rule and complements the

previous principle of grand coalition. The elites can decide if the issue concerns the community in

all, however, when it concerns a specific segment it can decide by and for itself. Third, Minority

veto: This principle can effectively serve the purpose of not letting the minority to be outvoted by

the majority in decision-making process if it was not in their interest. Finally, Proportionality is the

last principle which serves “the basic standard of political representation, civil service

appointments, and the allocation of public funds. It contrasts sharply with the winner-take-all

character of majority rule.”133

Boase considers consociational democracy as a type of asymmetrical federalism that is devised to

moderate the bluntness democracy in a culturally and linguistically divided society.134 According

131 Smith, “Mapping the Federal Condition: Ideology, Political Practice and Social Justice” 15 132 Daniel J. Elazar “Federalism and Consociationalism: A Symposium”, (Publius, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1985), 17-34 133 Arend Lijphart, “Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 3, (September 1979), 499-515 134 Joan Price Boase, “Faces of Asymmetry: German and Canadian Federalism”, in Bertus De Villiers ed., Evaluating Federal Systems, (Juta & Co, Ltd and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), 90-110

45

Lijphart a consociation, when it is territorially based, is a federation. He reckons three conditions

for a consociation to be a federation which are: Firstly, “The segments of the plural society must be

geographically concentrated…Secondly, the boundaries between the component units of the

federation must follow the segmental boundaries as much as possible. As a result, the component

units of the federation will be highly homogeneous as far as their segmental composition is

concerned…, and finally, the other federal principles must be applied.”135 He means bicameralism

and a written constitution.

Consociational democracy, when studied, some problems are found within it that can be best

summarised in two points:

1- Consociation might be easily destroyed if the grand coalition elites turn against it.

Elazar comments that “Empirically, it seems that the moment enough people in

the polity are no longer committed to the various camps, the consociational

regime itself loses all meaning for them.”136

2- It consequently leads to the absence of democracy as “Absence of opposition, a

predominance of elites, and mass political apathy do not suggest democratic

vitality.”137

Despite what is said to be the deficits of consociational democracy, many countries have adopted

this system of government. Netherlands were the first countries joined in consociational way from

1917 to 1967, Austria from 1945 to 1966, Belgium since 1918, Malaysia from 1955 to 1969 and

Lebanon from1943 to 1975 and since 1989.138

Summarising the findings of this chapter, it can be said although the idea of secession and partition

is logically rejected and rebuked by the Iraqis for many reasons; it still remains an open option for

135 Italicised by the Lijphart, Lijphart, “Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links” 136 Elazar “Federalism and Consociationalism: A Symposium” 137 Rudy B. Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy”, (Annual Reviews of Political Science, 2000. Vol.3), 509–536 138 Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy”

46

the future if the federalism and the federation process fail to respond to the needs of all. However,

for the current stage federalism appears to be the demand of most of the ruling parties in Iraq, what

shape it does or should take is yet to be sufficiently contemplated.

47

Chapter Three: Making Sense of Federalism in Iraq In the previous chapter I have discussed issues such as symmetrical and asymmetrical, centralised

and decentralised, and consociational federalism. This chapter starts with an attempt to connect

and apply these concepts with respect to the case of Iraq and evaluate their appropriateness in

easing the tense and stepping forward toward perpetual peace in Iraq. What future federation will

be the optimum and most advantageous for the Iraqis? The sort of federation waiting to be

implemented, should it be symmetrical or asymmetrical, centralised or decentralised? Does

consociational democracy hold the key to stability in Iraq?

3-1 Making sense of the terms clarified in the previous chapter in regard to Iraq

Some scholars and writers have been consistently writing about Iraq, based upon their experience

and lookout of the current situation in Iraq, and the federal form that should be implemented to

stabilise the country in terms of politics, economics, and security.139 Some of those who have taken

part in the debate regarding the future federation of Iraq have suggested a symmetrical and

centralised sort of federalism. Others put forward plans that connote a sort asymmetrical and

decentralised form of federalism. That Iraqi federal system would be a symmetrical or an

asymmetrical one is still not clear, however, the existence of a historically and linguistically distinct

nation from Arabs, Kurds, mostly tells the story of an asymmetrical federation. As noted before,

multi-ethnic states such as Canada and Spain have successfully utilised asymmetry, whereas;

mono-ethnic states have their economy and politics developed due to adopting symmetry. Due to

the existence of yet only one constitutionally admitted region in Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, it might

be hard to clearly envisage asymmetry. However some processes and hints are underway in Iraq

could be signs and marks of asymmetry; among them O’Leary mentions the constitutional admission

139 Among them one should mention Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, Reidar Visser, and Gareth Stansfield.

48

of Kurdistan region as the yet sole region in Iraq that has been recognised as it was before 2003 as

free Kurdistan. Kurdistan’s prior status, as being ruled by the Kurds, is constitutionally regularised

and its National Assembly is recognised by the same name. It is the only area that is dominated by

non-Arab speakers that are Kurds, and the sole entity that has been granted its own exclusive

jurisdiction in internal affairs.140

O’Leary inclines towards being a pluralist who prefers an asymmetrical, decentralized, and pluri-

national sort of federation, rather than integrationist dispositions that prefer a symmetrical,

national, and centralised federation, to be implemented in Iraq and regards that convincingly as

feasible and suitable.141 Democratising states in general, according to O’Leary and McGarry, have

two opposite choices and paths to take, although the nomenclature differs depending on various

interpretations. They consider that the two basic choices for managing ethnic, national, and

religious diversity can be reasonably managed. Suggesters may seek to construct “a single all-

embracing public identity through "integration" or try to accommodate dual or multiple public

identities through "consociation." These are the two dominant, broad-based prescriptions that are

offered for addressing the conflict in Iraq… Iraq's new Constitution, ratified in 2005, reflects a

"liberal" form of consociation that accommodates Iraq's democratically mobilized communities.”142

Integrationist states might featured as those which (a) endeavour to construct a single central

identity that submits to “nation-building” (b) believe that conflicts are inevitable outcomes of

“group-based partisanship and recommend a state that is impartial, meritocratic, and that promotes

equal citizenship through a bill of individual rights”143 (c) prefer political parties with non-ethnic

rhetoric and background (d) rebuff proportional electoral systems, which smooth the progress of

fragmental demands, and back the discouragement of the cultural differences’ mobilization and

140 O’Leary, “Power Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy” 141 O’Leary, “Power Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy” 142 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription” International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 5, (October 2007). 143 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription”

49

necessitate the existence of winners who attain majority or plurality broad-based support (e)

incline towards having unitary centralized states established, or a federation that would be founded

and constructed on nonethnic criteria, and rebut and invalidate any group-based form of

autonomy, either territorial or non-territorial.144

Democratic states that attempt to accommodate ethnicities found on their soils recognize dual or

multiple public identities through consociation. Consociation accommodates groups by: (a)

involving communities in executive institutions (b) promoting proportionality throughout the

states’ different organisations (c) granting autonomy of either the territorial or non-territorial

communalities (d) utilising minority vetoes, at least in those realms that minorities regard as

important.145 Those who favour consociational approaches in solving political dilemmas for

ethnically diverse countries can be classified into two main points of view. Some adopt what is

known as "corporate consociation" and others favor what they call "liberal consociation.” “A

corporate or predetermined consociation accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria,

such as ethnicity or religion, on the assumption that group identities are fixed and that groups are

both internally homogeneous and externally bounded. This thinking indeed privileges such

identities at the expense of those group identities that are not accommodated, and/or at the expense

of intragroup or transgroup identities.”146 “A liberal or self-determined consociation, by contrast,

rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are

based on ethnic or religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities. Liberal consociations

also take care to ensure that the rights of individuals as well as groups are protected.”147

Those who favor integration for Iraq stress the commonalities Iraqis share and argue for "nation

building." The integrationists who call for a strong centralised unitary state in Iraq see several

144 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription” 145 O’Leary, “Power Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy” 146 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription” 147 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription”

50

reasons behind their appeal such as: preserving the integrity of Iraq and holding it together from a

possible fragmentation, finishing off the insurgency that erupted after the American invasion in

2003, advance the public services equally to every corner in the country, a fair distribution of the

natural resources found in some parts of the country and to make the US withdrawal safer and less

costly as the believe that a strong centralised Iraq would certainly create a strong army that could

replace the coalition forces. The rationale that underlies the Integrationists’ presuppositions is that

they mainly see Iraq's current problems originated from sectarianism and ethnocentrism which are

recently made rather than being rooted in history of Iraq. Stemming from the previous viewpoint,

they surmise that the U.S.-led coalition came to Iraq with a superficial and reversive reading of the

country that downplayed the cross-cutting ties that tie Iraqis together.148 Integrationist ideas may

well find supporters and backers among some Sunni political parties that think of the past

dominance they had enjoyed as Sunni Arabs and those who deny Shiites being the majority. A

paradox is showing up here which is the support of the Sunni Arabs to a centralised state, whereas

they definitely know that they do not compose far more than 25% of the total population as

mentioned in chapter one. Two reasons may come to mind simultaneously: firstly, the nostalgia for

the lost power they enjoyed since the creation of Iraq and a second realistic and logical reason

which is the oil revenues that locate chiefly in the Kurdish north and the Shi’ite south.149 The

surrounding Arab states and Turkey, as well, prefer the integrationist position and their reasons

behind that position are based on different considerations. For Turkey it certainly does not

encourage far behind territorial federalism for its fear of the Kurds residing therein and that they

may demand independent as their brethrens in Iraq. However, for the Arabs it is more the notion of

148 Yahia Said, “Federal Choices Needed” Al-Ahram Weekly, Mar. 2-8, 2006 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/784/sc6.htm May 28,

2007 149Robert A. Levine, Iraq: The federalist solution http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/19/opinion/edlevine.php 2/6/2008

51

the one non-separated Arabic nation that geographically extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the

Persian Gulf and they fear that a Kurdish state would be another Israel.

Among the integrationists, some think that a federation based on the eighteen territorial

administrative governorates would be the best guarantee in avoiding any chances of the

disintegration of Iraq as a state. Proponents of this stance argue that unless a federation operates

the eighteen territorial administrative governorates’ system, there would be no more Iraq.

Territorial federalism “involves the delineation of sub-unit boundary lines with the deliberate intent

of to divide up, or ‘crack’ otherwise ethnically homogenous territorial concentrations”150 Anderson

points out the purpose behind territorial federalism as manufacturing ‘pluralism’ which he defines

as “the fragmentation and dispersal of political power”151. Pluralism may engender political stability

owing to some elements found as outcomes of its implementation such political parties’ moderated

demands and mobilisations, and no permanent party exclusion from the game of winning and

losing political power and access to public goods. However, some deep rooted flaws could evidently

be found that effectively obstruct the way of applying the eighteen territorial administrative

governorates federation. Here, it seems vital to mention the most important ones:

1- The territorial administrative governorates’ federation is constitutionally an invalid

solution. In both, the Transition Administrative Law (TAL) and the permanent Iraqi

Constitution (IC), several articles can be easily found that clearly and unarguably prove

it unworkable, impracticable and unlawful. Some discussions in this regard may

respectively verify this claim. Article 116 from IC states “The federal system in the

Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, as well

as local administrations”. This article gives a comprehensive definition for the Republic

150 Liam Anderson, “The Non-Ethnic Regional Model of Federalism” in Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield eds., An Iraq of its Regions Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? (Hurst Publishers Ltd, 2007), 224 151 Liam Anderson, “The Non-Ethnic Regional Model of Federalism”, 224

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of Iraq that should consist not only of local administrations and governorates but also

regions. Furthermore, the IC points out even the way regions can be formed and

formulated as in article119.152 In addition to what is aforementioned the IC evidently

and has already recognised the existence of the region known as Kurdistan in article 117

which articulates “First: This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the

region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. Second: This

Constitution shall affirm new regions established in accordance with its provisions.”

McGarry and O’Leary comment on the integrationist attitudes regarding this issue “Iraq's

recently enacted Constitution deviates from the model of eighteen governorates by

recognizing Kurdistan, which comprises three governorates at present as well as

fragments of others, as an established federal region. Integrationists have generally come

to accept this as an immovable fact, though hardly enthusiastically.”153 Consequently,

one can confidently assert that that a federation in Iraq that is based on the 18

governorates is constitutionally null and void.

2- The second crucial problem that can inexorably be found when implementing the

integrationist approach is the changes and adjustments in the governorates’ boundaries

taken place since the early stages of the Iraqi state’s foundation in an attempt, by

subsequent Iraqi governments, to alter the demography of some areas of the country.

This process was meant to assimilate the Kurds and Arabise them.154 Within these

procedures new governorates were carved out such as Duhok in 1969 and many towns

were re-identified and unwillingly annexed to other governorates, such as Chamchamal

152 Article 119 reads “One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a region based on a request to be voted on in

a referendum submitted in one of the following two methods: First: A request by one-third of the council members of each

governorate intending to form a region. Second: A request by one-tenth of the voters in each of the governorates intending to form

a region.” 153 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription” 154 Chapter one of this dissertation mentions the assimilative endeavours of successive Iraqi governments in an effort to wipe out the

Kurdish people living mainly in the north of Iraq and alter their identity.

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that was a part of Kirkuk but joined with Sulaimanya governorates, in order to

demographically alter the original composition of the affected areas. For this very reason

and endeavouring to amend what went wrong before, the Kurds have keenly demanded,

from the federal government, to make up for the past. The Kurdistan Regional

Government (KRG) via its Parliament ratified its own Constitution on August 22, 2006.

The KRG Constitution in Article 2 explains the meaning of the Kurdistan Region by saying

“First: Kurdistan-Iraq, consists of Duhok Governorates that includes its current

administrative boundaries and its administrative boundaries before 1968, and Kirkuk,

Sulaimanya, and Hawler Governorates with Akre, Shexan, Shangar, Tala’far, Tilkef, and

Qaraqush Districts, and the Sub-districts of Zummar, Bashiqa, Askikalak in Ninewah

Governorate, both Districts of Khanaqin and Mandali in Dyala Governorate, and Districts

of Badra and Jassan in Wasit Government with its 1968 administrative boundaries.

Second, for defining the administrative border of Kurdistan Region, Article 140 of the

Iraqi Constitution would be depended.”155 As we can see some of these areas claimed as

Kurdish are now parts of Sunni Arab governorates, who principally do not perceive

federalism except as a path to disintegration, such as Dyala and Mosul which makes the

case more complicated. Article 140 from the IC has been entrenched as an effective

instrument to amend what went wrong before. Article 140, an extension to article 58 of

the TAL, from the IC recommends “normalization and census and concludes with a

referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their

citizens”.156

155 The Constitution of Kurdistan Regional Government

http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?rnr=232&lngnr=13&smap=04030000&anr=13876

(13/05/2008) 156 Later when writing about problems that face and found facing the Iraqi federation, I am going into more details regarding these

articles and discuss the yet unresolved quandary of Kirkuk that might possibly result in Iraq’s federation failure if tackled and dealt

with incorrectly.

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3- Territorial federalism operates deliberately and persistently to create cross-cutting

cleavages and reassure the extant cracks within a state and in return this unavoidably

leads to divides in the historically and geographically undivided mass of land. The real

dilemma in taking such steps and that might result in disorder and dissatisfaction of a

large portion of a society is when this would be achieved against the will of the people

concerned. The Kurds in Iraq have continuously struggled since 1920s to create an entity

that they would rule by themselves and that could preserve their culture and language.

Therefore, hypotheses such as purposeful and deliberate creation of cross-cutting

cleavages will unquestionably outcome in and produce chaos and bewilderment.

Anderson comments on territorial federalism by calling the logic behind it “divide and

conquer” strategy that has been adopted by imperial powers and dictators throughout

history.157 Owing to these points and flaws found in implementing territorial

administrative federalism, one can affirm its ultimate inappropriateness for the case of

contemporary Iraq.

Corporative and liberal consociation approaches might better suit Iraq in its current features and

composite. Jelloun writes “An Iraqi consociational patriotism is the compromise solution to the

opposite, federal versus unitary, state projects for future Iraq…. It is the way to go for stopping the

increasing Kurdish greed, on the one hand, and the Arabist cramp-like obstinacy, on the other

hand.”158 Corporate consociation is based on privileging groups with different ethnicities or

religions as mentioned beforehand. Accordingly, Iraq would be divided at least into three regions

or areas. Considering ethnicity, Kurds speak a predominantly different language from the Arabs

and concentrate in certain areas north of Iraq; therefore they deserve to have a region by their own.

157 Liam Anderson, “The Non-Ethnic Regional Model of Federalism”, 235 158 Mohammed Ben Jelloun, “What's Consociational Patriotism? From Lebanon to Iraq” http://www.swans.com/library/art11/jelloun2.html 29/6/2008

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Religiously, Shi’is are a distinct sect from the Sunnis and enjoy some private principles and, as well

as the Kurds, concentrate in certain areas in south of Iraq. As a result, three regions would be

formulated out of Iraq. Anderson has used another term for the same notion and purpose which is

“ethnic federalism” in which “sub-unit boundary lines are drawn to coincide with the geographic

distribution of ethnicities, a popular, though controversial to the problem of governing ethnically

divided states”159. Kaufmann believes that civil wars and ethnic clashes can only be avoided when

“opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves”.160 This coexists and

underlies what Senator Joseph Biden suggested to unravel the Iraqi political impasse which he

named “the Five Point Plan”.161 In brief, the points can be summarised as:

1- Establishing one Iraq with three regions “Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd”

2- Sharing oil revenues

3- Convening international Conference and enforcing regional non-aggression pact

4- Responsibly planning for US troops’ withdrawal

5- Increasing reconstruction assistance and creating job programs.

Although, each point individually deserves conversing and focusing, the first point is very vital as a

political suggestion for Iraq and for accommodating ethnic diversities and persuading a historically

deprived people. He details the first points and subdivides it into three pivots. He suggests to:

1- “Federalize Iraq in accordance with its constitution by establishing three largely

autonomous regions, Shiite, Sunni and Kurd, with a strong but limited central

government in Baghdad.

2- Put the central government in charge of truly common interests: border defense, foreign

policy, oil production and revenues.

159 Liam Anderson, “The Non-Ethnic Regional Model of Federalism”, 210 160 Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”, International Security, vol. 20, no.4, spring 1996 161 Joseph Biden, “A Five Point Plan for Iraq”, (http://www.planforiraq.com , 5/4/2008)

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3- Form regional governments, Kurd, Sunni and Shiite, responsible for administering their

own regions”162.

This plan was generally rejected by the Sunni Arabs who considered it as the partition of the

country.163 Yet, Biden replied by confirming that “The Plan is not Partition. In fact, it may be the

only way to prevent a violent partition, which has already started, and preserve a unified Iraq. We

call for a strong central government, with clearly defined responsibilities for truly common interests

like foreign policy and the distribution of oil revenues.”164

Corporate consociation is not flawless. Some critiques have been directed at it that seem to be well

hitting the target. Anderson puts forward three different sets of criticisms and problems that face

corporate consociation or what he calls “ethnic federalism”. Firstly, problems relating to drawing

boundary lines in order to purely divide various ethnicities. It frequently proves to be a difficult if

not impossible task to separate out ethnicities concentrated in different geographical areas in such

a way that each group takes over a consistent and contiguous piece of territory. In Iraq any attempt

of this kind looks impossible and implausible taking into consideration that Kurds do not only live

in the north of Iraq but also in the central areas of the country; for example, the capital city,

Baghdad, includes a significant amount of Kurds. There is also a crucial number of Sunnis living in

Basra and Basra is not purely Shi’a. Shi’is, living everywhere in Iraq, could be found in north middle

and south of the country. Drawing boundary lines may result in two other predicaments for the

trapped in minorities: trapped in minorities will be vulnerable to repression and caught ‘behind

enemy lines’ if the mentioned approach is to be implemented in the aftermath of inter-ethnic

conflicts on one hand, and on the other hand, if the rival groups know about the ultimate division

that will take place, there is a danger that elements within these groups will try to maximise their

162 Biden, “A Five Point Plan for Iraq” 163 Watching America Website, ( http://www.watchingamerica.com/sotaliraq000002.shtml , 29/6/2008) 164 Biden, “A Five Point Plan for Iraq”

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gains from territory at the expense of each other utilising different methods such as forcing out

indigenous people from their homelands and ethnic cleansing.

Secondly, there are problems concerning the functionality and dysfunctionality of the institutions

suggested to positively activate the federation processes after boundary lines are drawn. Nothing

could guarantee that such systems and institutions would ultimately lead stability in the region.

What could possibly cause dysfunctionality are the outcomes of this corporate consociation that

could be summarised in:

a- These procedures give priority to ethnic identities and thus ethnic tension might

be elevated and promoted. Parties with ethnic backgrounds may take the

leadership that drum up and stimulate ethnic tensions.

b- The disappearance of moderate parties, as for the sake of attracting more

nationalistic voters, parties would attempt to raise sensitive nationalistic issues.

Finally, ethnic federalism has a very “poor track of survival”. “The basic argument is that ethnic

federalism fuels secessionist tendencies by reinforcing, or even creating, ethnic identities, and by

providing ethnicities with access to resources necessary to mount a secession bid”.165 For the reasons

mentioned above one could say that corporate consociation, or what Anderson called ethnic

federalism, is also not faultless and without deficiencies. However, according O’Leary, McGarry,

and Anderson the last resort is “liberal consociation” or in the latter’s term “regional federalism”.

In utilisation of this last mentioned political solution, one can successfully avoid and overcome the

negative sides of the other aforementioned two and foster their strong points. In territorial and

ethnic federalism, ethnicity was the mere axle and measurement around which both operate.

Deliberate creation and reassurance of cross-cutting cleavages in order to divide and make

ethnicities heterogeneous is the way territorial federalism works whereas ethnic federalism mainly

165 Liam Anderson, “The Non-Ethnic Regional Model of Federalism”, 220

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hinge on drawing boundary lines for the purpose of separating out various ethnicities. Regional

federalism adopts other criteria rather than mere ethnicity. Knight defines regionalism as “the

awareness of togetherness among a people of a relatively large area… a regionalism thus is

recognizable only when it represents but a part of a larger territorial unit, the latter being the areal

extent of a political system”.166 What seems vital to the regional federalism approach is the first part

of the definition which certifies that an area should be called region when its people have a feeling

and awareness of togetherness and that there is something that binds all of them within a certain

scope of land. It does not necessarily rely on ethnicity as the sole criterion in deciding the political

fate of a people; however, it can be one of them. A region may categorically be identified by its

historical background, climate, language, culture, or religion or any other factor. Liberal

consociation adds another idea which is rewarding whatever salient political identities emerge. The

preferences of concerned peoples and their votes should be fully respected. According to regional

federalism and liberal consociation, regions such as Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra could be established

due to their history, or regions like Kurdistan could be formulated owing to having a different

language, climate and culture, or regions based on religious preferences could be formed.

Furthermore, Visser considers the historical legacies to be a key solution and should not be

underestimated. However, in his opinion, only Kurdistan Region and Iqlim al-Janub (Basra, Maysan,

and Dhi Qar, the old vilayet of Basra) have historical legacy. He then gives the possibilities available

for founding regions with historical backgrounds and expectedly newly established regions and the

problems that might arise as consequences of the process.167

166 David B. Knight, “Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism”, Annals of the Association of American

Geographers, Vol. 72, No. 4, (December 1982), 514-531

167 Reidar Visser, Historiae Website, http://historiae.org/Federalism-from-Below.asp (10/3/2008)

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One might find clear clues in the Iraqi constitution that it supports this approach or as O’Leary and

McGarry believe the constitution to have a flavor of liberal consociation.168 The following points

back the already made claim:

1- The IC has already admitted the official existence of Kurdistan Region and the

inability of the capital Baghdad to amalgamate with other governorates to form a

region but it remains as a region or a governorate by itself. The first part of Article

117 states “This Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region

of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.” Depositing

this article in the constitution was in line with the Kurds’ preference in having

their own region. Due to many reason, the Capital cannot be amalgamated with

any other governorates as the third part of article 124 states “The capital may not

merge with a region.”

2- The IC allows governorates to form a region with other governorates or join

another region or stay as they are as a part of the federal government. Article 119

articulates “ One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a

region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum submitted in one of the

following two methods: First: A request by one-third of the council members of

each governorate intending to form a region. Second: A request by one-tenth of

the voters in each of the governorates intending to form a region.” Article 122

part 2 details the former act.169 Here, preference is granted to citizens living in

governorates to form a region by themselves or join another.

168 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription” 169 Article 122 part 2 states “Governorates that are not incorporated in a region shall be granted broad administrative and financial

authorities to enable them to manage their affairs in accordance with the principle of decentralized administration, and this shall be

regulated by law.”

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3- Article 123 allocates the power of transferring some of the governorates’ powers

to the federal government if they wish to when it says “Powers exercised by the

federal government can be delegated to the governorates or vice versa, with the

consent of both governments, and this shall be regulated by law.”

All of the aforementioned points might be considered as clues on the IC’s support of liberal

consociation or regional federalism. This approach can satisfy the political demands of different

Iraqi sects and ethnic groups. It is able, for it is constitutionally approved as mentioned above, to

convince and persuade those who ask for a region such as Kurds and part of the Shi’ia and those

who prefer other options. Furthermore, it guarantees that no one component can impose its

preferences on others. O’Leary and McGarry write “The Constitution allows decisions regarding

both decentralization and centralization to be taken now or later. Sunni Arab-dominated Iraq can

choose centralization now and opt for more autonomy later, should it find that centralization means

unacceptable intrusions from Shi'a-controlled security services or a Shi'a-Kurdish--dominated

army. Such flexible asymmetry is desirable, and particularly so in contexts, as in Sunni Arab and

Shi'a Arab parts of Iraq where, arguably, there has not been enough experience of democratic

politics to test long-run preferences, and when it is not certain how a decentralized or centralized

Iraq will evolve.”170

3-2 Prospects for the Failure or Success of an Iraqi Federation

Although, the making of an Iraqi federation is still an ongoing process, some factors may likely

increase the possibility of failure and others may boost the chance of success. The new-born

federation out of multiple of ethnicities with multiple-purposes, if not properly and sufficiently

worked and provided for, may face quandaries not easy to overcome and may have unwanted

170 McGarry and O’Leary, “Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription”

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outcomes. Some writers have been focussing on this crucial issue of federations’ survival or

breakup. Dealing with and studying four failed federations(West Indies, Central Africa, East Africa,

and Malaysia), Frank debates the main and common indications and causes behind their statues of

failure and reasonably pointed out the deficiencies.171 For his analysis, Frank depended on realising

the goals and factors underlie the establishment of federations in general and classified them into:

primary, secondary and tertiary. He defined tertiary as “goal-factors give rise to a federal condition

which can be described as bargain-striking…to prevent a clash of disparate racial or economic

interests, or take advantage of some temporary coincidence of interests to secure an immediately

achievable objective”172, and secondary as “goal-factors give rise to a federal condition which can

be described as a genuine coalition in which a profound coincidence of parallel interests is

advanced through cooperation and merger”173, and finally primary as “goal-factors give rise to a

federal condition which elevates the federal value above all other political values…”174. Frank

mentions some primary factors such as supremacy of political federal value that aims at making a

federation for the sake of its own, secondary factors such as common language, similar values,

complementary economies, and common colonial heritage that result in a federation for mutual

advantage, security against attack, and more roles in international affairs. He lastly classified tertiary

factors as ethnic balance, hope of earlier independence, and colonial power’s need to rid itself, all

with the goals of preventing tribal friction, and independence. Frank deducted some hypotheses

from investigating four failed federations: firstly, secondary factors may be useful or may even be

necessary for a federation to succeed, however, not sufficient to assure it. Secondly, to ensure

success, primary goals should be seriously taken as an end in itself among the leaders and peoples

of the federating units and should all be ideologically committed to them. Finally, if political

171 Thomas M. Frank, “Why Federations Fail”, 167 172 Thomas M. Frank, “Why Federations Fail”, 171 173

Thomas M. Frank, “Why Federations Fail”, 171 174 Thomas M. Frank, “Why Federations Fail”, 173

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commitment was given to short-term goals based on tertiary factors, such as securing

independence, so as long as they were attainable, federations would unquestionably fail.

Examining the hypotheses on Iraq, one might say that most Iraqis share values like religion,

however, whether they are Sunni or Shi’a may matter. Muslims, including Shi’a or Sunni, comprise

the absolute majority of Iraq. Both sectors vary linguistically and culturally but passed through an

unfair representation in politics, especially in their modern history and these could be considered

as discouragements to the federation idea. An influential segment of the Iraqis, Sadrists and Sunni

Arabs in general, do believe that federalism disintegrates Iraq and consequently should be abducted

and avoided, let alone taking it as an end goal and that decreases the chance of a likely Iraqi

federation. Kurds, who compose around 20%, as mentioned in chapter one, of the Iraqi population,

long for an independence, which they consider as a due right, which they missed or forced to miss

and should have had it when others had it in 1920s. Kurds judge it as unfair and morally

unjustifiable that superior power failed to grant them what the wished for, whereas, smaller nations,

in terms of population and geography, were granted independence. This feeling is common and

undeniable among the Kurds. As a result, many Kurds believe that the time is due to declare

independence and establish their own “Kurdistan”, and make their old dream come true. Although,

the Kurdish political leadership best realises that it is absolutely impossible to ask for independence

today, they are under pressure from some independent educational elites and media to take more

serious steps toward the Kurdish dream and it has been widely accused as unpatriotic to the Kurdish

national case.175 Accordingly, this factor may mean that the Iraqi federation is more prone to failure

rather than success.

O’Leary looks at the matter from a different angle and prospective. Experimenting multi-nation

federations, he concludes that they tend to decline if there exists:

175 An observer can easily find clues in private and independent media in Kurdistan Region on that issue.

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1- Coercion: nations forced to live together rather than being willingly inclined to it, such

as the constituent republics of the Soviet Union.

2- Authoritarianism: states, when undemocratic in their history, when transferring to

democracy and establish democratic institutions will be faced with secession tendencies,

such as Slovenia and Croatia’s secessions from Yugoslavia.

3- Maltreatment of smaller nations: when unresolved tensions remained between the largest

dominant nation and smaller nations for instance Malays and Chinese.

4- Distributive conflicts: economic development and distributive failures such as

Czechoslovakia.

5- “Centralizing coups, putsches or maneuvers: Breakdown was often preceded by

authoritarian attempts to centralize the federations, e.g. the conduct of Serbian politicians

in Yugoslavia.”176

Commenting on the above points in relation to contemporary Iraq, the following can be pointed

out. First of all, in a referendum in 2005, the people of Iraq overwhelmingly voted for the IC which

has principally entrenched federalism in his first articles. Only in some governorates the votes

against it was high, however, was not strong enough to abort the constitution from being ratified

that tacitly means people of Iraq have not been coerced to abide by it. Referendum is added as

proof.177 Secondly, the IC has guaranteed the obsolescence of authoritarianism in Article one which

states that “The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which

the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this

Constitution is a guarantor of the unity of Iraq.” Thirdly, for diminishing repression and oppression

on every individual in Iraq and treating all equally, bills of rights are firmly confirmed in IC.

176 Brendan O’Leary, “Multi-national Federalism, Federacy, Power-Sharing & the Kurds of Iraq” 177 KRSO website http://www.krso.net/oldsite/anjamakani_refrandomK.htm 18/3/2008

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Fourthly, with the decision of dismantling the Iraqi army by CPA and the hard work to create

modern Iraqi police force, the chance of centraliser’s coup has decreased gradually and effectively,

however not guaranteed. On the basis of these points O’Leary’s outlook looks more optimistic rather

than pessimistic regarding the future of the Iraqi federation.

3-3 Current problems found facing the burgeoning Iraqi federation

The blossoming Iraqi federation, if its survival is desired, has to rationally cope with

contemporary quandaries that may virtually cripple the process of democratisation and federalism

in Iraq. If stultified this once, it sounds unlikely that soon another chance for overcoming

dictatorship and establishing democracy will appear in the horizon. Among the dilemmas now in

progress, at stake, and advancing forward to be an axe destructing what has been constructed since

2003, one can identify:

1- The issue of undecided governorate boundaries and amending the demographical and

geographical maladjustments took place during the rein of the Iraqi successive

governments, especially, the ex-regime of Ba’ath.

2- The most problematic case, that should be handled too carefully to the satisfaction of all

its basic and founding elements and what is known as a small Iraq for its cosmopolitan

nature, is the city of Kirkuk that lies south of Erbil city, the capital of Kurdistan Region,

and north of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq.

3- The oil revenue quandary that yet awaits to be decidedly and decisively agreed upon.

However, the IC has devoted some articles to this subject; they all need crystal clear

enactments.

4- The most crucial issue, that has been facing the political process in Iraq and

undoubtedly delayed it, is security. Iraqi people are suffering heavy losses and bitter

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consequences as a result of the lack of safety and tranquillity in their daily life. Violence,

sectarianism and civil war do not let the Iraqis to have some space to think about

political future of their home and in some areas the only thing the family waits for is to

see their breadwinner coming back home safe and sound.

The four abovementioned points are the main challenges that the current Iraqi government and

political parties have to effortlessly endeavour to tackle and ameliorate. As a constitutional solution

to the first point, no clear articles have embarked upon correcting what was done by successive

Iraqi governments. Each constituency regards at this issue in its own way. The only article that is

devoted to some aspects of this problem is article 140 from IC that should be worked upon under

the shade of article 58 from the TAL178. However, certainly, even the implementation of article 140

178 Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) states:

(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act

expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s practices in altering the demographic

character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration

in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To

remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps:

(1) With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi

Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their

homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation.

(2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of

the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation from the

state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive

compensation for the cost of moving to such areas.

(3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force migration out of their regions and

territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories.

(4) With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons the right to determine

their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.

(B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the

Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the

permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall

unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is

unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international

person to be the arbitrator.

(C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a

fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified This resolution shall be consistent

with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.

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is very controversial among the parties concerned, particularly regarding the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

The second part of article 140, especially addressing Kirkuk, says “ The responsibility placed upon

the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the

Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in

accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and

census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the

will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.” Accordingly, three

sequential steps should be carried out for the amendment to be realistic that are normalisation,

census, and finally a referendum. Normalisation means the return of Kurds to their properties and

homes in Kirkuk and the voluntary return of settler-Arabs brought in under Saddam Hussein’s

Arabisation programme to their original place. The settler-Arabs are encouraged to return to their

original towns and are offered some financial compensation. “They receive 10 million Iraqi Dinars

(about 8,000 US dollars) and some land in their places of origin, and are given compensation for

cancelled agricultural contracts. So far 7,500 settler families (families, not individuals) have taken

the compensation package, and 5,000 Kurdish families have moved back.”179 The problem that took

place in implementing article 140 is the expired deadline put in IC. The deadline, which is 31st of

December 2007, has been formally extended for another six months agreed upon by those parties

in power, however, even that has not made any change. The UN Assistance Mission in Iraq UNAMI

interfered led by the UN delegate De Mestura who is currently working on developing a three stage

plan that attempts to satisfy the needs of all.

In regard to oil revenues and the distribution of this vital source of income, the Iraqi Federal

Government and KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) are still negotiating the terms and the

conditions to in accord with the constitution. Article 111 states “Oil and gas are owned by all the

179 Sarah McCarthy (MP), David Anderson (MP), Eric Joyce (MP) and Gary Kent (APPG Kurdistan Region Administrator), “The Kurdistan Region: Future Prospects”, UK parliamentary fact-finding visit to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq 9 – 15 February 2008, (published June

2008).

67

people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.” The first part of article 112 gives more details.180

These two articles have been very controversial in detailing the exact nature and limitations of the

powers of the federal government and KRG regarding oil contracts and yet negotiations are going

on.

The issue of security has had its own stake in creating obstacles and blocking the political path since

the early days of OIF. Insurgency groups have effortlessly worked on worsening the security as far

as possible in order to achieve their goals which can be summed up in toppling down the current

rulers, forcing the coalition forces out of Iraq, and establish their own favoured type of government.

Two of these groups have been mainly effectual and capable of obstructing the process even after

the IC ratification in 2005 which are Al-Mahdi Army, purely Shi’a, and Al-Qaida in Iraq, purely

Sunni. However, lately, Iraq has witnessed a period of security and a reduction in the numbers of

explosions and suicide bombers. The Iraqi Government has taken many serious measures and some

vital steps toward uprooting the al-Qaeda in Iraq. Many factors explain the reduction in violence

“One of the more remarkable changes has been the realignment of tribal elements in Anbar, known

as the Sahwat, and of former insurgents, collectively known as the (Sons of Iraq)”181 The

establishment of a semi-organisation named as Sahwa or Sahwat (Awakening) among the tribes of

the areas which suffered under al-Qaeda control could be considered as the most effective

counterinsurgency step taken by the Iraqi Government and Coalition Forces lately. The success of

this attempt comes from the fact that those who had supported or at least were silent about the

deeds of al-Qaeda could no more tolerate it and the financial back up they receive could not be

simply rejected. The three forces (Coalition Forces, Iraqi Forces and Sahwa forces) working together

180 The first part of article 112 states “The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall

undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in

proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, specifying an allotment for a specified period for the damaged

regions which were unjustly deprived of them by the former regime, and the regions that were damaged afterwards in a way that

ensures balanced development in different areas of the country, and this shall be regulated by a law.” 181 Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape. Crisis Group Middle East Report N°74, 30 April 2008

68

have endeavoured to force out al-Qaeda from Iraq or at least weakening them to the degree that

would no more be active. Overall, the military campaign has quietened areas that had become

mostly violent and inaccessible, such as Anbar and several Baghdad neighbourhoods. Regarding Al-

Mahdi Army, after sever clashes with the government and coalition forces; it has mainly resorted

to political participation and involvement in the government institutions such as parliament. The

Mahdi Army has demonstrated more flexibility toward the political process in Iraq and it

differentiates between the Iraqi Government and the Coalition Forces. It seeks no compromise

regarding the issue of the Coalition Forces staying in Iraq for a longer time, yet considers the ruling

government as partners and has announced ceasefire with it although sometimes unilaterally.

These progressions, in terms of security, seen on the ground proves to have a great role to play in

taking the debates to be around federal issues, such as the disputed territorial areas and oil revenues’

issue, rather than focusing merely on curbing and crushing the insurgency groups. This can be

considered as an important step in deciding the fate of federalism in Iraq, would it be whether

successful or a failure. As far as I am concerned, this advancement could be seen as helping in

further deepening the debates about federalism and discussing the pending political issues more

comprehensively and preparedly that might in turn strengthen the possibility of successfulness.

69

Conclusion

A turbulent transformational period from a fully-fledged and absolute dictatorship to democracy

seems to be the condition of contemporary Iraq. Five years have passed since Iraqi Operation

Freedom yet not a single day reaches sunset with zero casualties. Part of the problem might be an

outcome of the vague and undecided political future. In my dissertation I have referred to federalism

and federation as a possible, or better to say, the most appropriate political solution for modern Iraq.

The practicality and functionality of the idea are yet to be proved on the ground. McGarry mentions

Canada’s federalism and federation as the best archetype to be implemented or at least be taken as

a lesson for Iraq. The reasons for that choice materialize in some comparisons made by the author

between Iraq and Canada in terms of constituencies. Ethnically, both countries comprise of two big

components, English and French in Canada, and Arab and Kurd in Iraq. Even statistically, the French

constitute about one fifth of the population in Canada, the same as the Kurds in Iraq. In terms of

culture including language, Kurds are different from Arabs in Iraq, the same way as the French are

different from English in Canada.182 However, regarding this suggestion, one could mention some

aspects and crucial differences that make McGarry’s comparison somewhat less applicable:

1- The mistrust and unfaithfulness that has been created between the various

elements composing Iraq, as a result of totally unfair representation and

repressions inflicted upon some discriminated people in Iraq, cannot be easily and

fast healed. Tyranny and oppression ruled Iraq from early stages of the state’s

foundation that made people utterly lose the feeling of belonging, faithfulness and

loyalty to those in power and the country, as well.

2- The culture of democracy and respecting the will of the peoples and individuals

of Iraq were absent from the scene and Iraqis did not have experiences and

contacts regarding basic principles of democracy such as free and fair elections,

182 McGarry, “Canadian Lessons for Iraq”, 94

70

freedom of speech, freedom of press and so on so forth. Such ideas are only about

six years old up to now except for the fragile and sub-democratic experience of

Kurdistan Region which has been there since 1991. Consequently, all this

increases the difficulty and harshness of soon fostering and acclimatizing with

federal ideas. However, here I should mention that in the advent of the

establishment of the new Iraqi state and even before the nomination of Faisal as

the King of Iraq in 1921, citizens of Basra Vilayet and in a petition suggested to

Persi Cox the British High Commissioner in Iraq, with signatures of 4500 of its

citizens, among them were officials and noblemen and religious men, on behalf

of the Vilayet, demanded federalism to their Vilayet. However, their project was

unsurprisingly rejected by Cox and Baghdad’s officials for unrealistic reasons

such as leading to the fragmentation of Iraq’s unity.183 Had it been taken seriously

into consideration, certainly the project might have fundamentally changed the

history of Iraq and would have been effected the region in general.

Reidar Visser from Norwegian Institute for International Affairs recommends the Spanish model for

Iraq and believes it to be the only federalism compatible with Iraq among 25 existing federations of

the world. He considers the Spanish federalism that started from bottom to top through initiatives

at the municipal level has led to a stable Spain. The Iraqi Constitution has entrenched federalism in

various acts of it and given a bottom to top power to the governorates to establish regions of their

own, excluding Baghdad, the Capital. The motivations that lie behind his proposal indicate that he

has deeply studied Iraq in terms of its constituencies culturally and historically. Spain, until the

death of Franco, lived under a fully-fledged dictatorship that suppressed and repressed population.

Basque and Catalan regions had desire for independence and struggled to achieve their goal, the

same as Kurdish people did since the last century. Spain has achieved most of her economic and

183 Hamabaqi, Muhammad. Mirnshinakany Baban u Ardalan u Soran la Balganamay Qajaryakanda la Salani 1799 ta 1847

71

political goals when federalism has been implemented as fully as possible. However; the main

substantial difference was simply neglected is that the regional territories in Iraq are not as clear

and plain as they were in Spain. Any attempts aiming at redefining the territorial boundaries should

be accompanied by providing deeply historical studies depending on documents that concentrate

on the boundaries and estimates of the Ottoman Empire era and onwards.

For the sake of creating a meaningful, satisfying and effectual federation in Iraq some points should

be seriously taken into consideration:

1- Federations would most likely be successful if they did not have international

interventionist neighbours.184 The problem with Iraq lies in having its neighbours mostly,

to different degrees, interfering in its affairs, especially, Iran and Turkey. Turkey’s

interposing deems to be for some reasons such as: firstly, the existence of Turkish

minorities in Iraq and the claim of protecting them from the oppression of the Kurds,

secondly, Turkey’s historical claim of Mosul Vilayet, and finally, having a large number

of Kurds living in Turkey that might be politically encouraged, when witnessing the

success of their brethrens, to further their demand to even include and conclude in

secession. Iran, as well, has many reasons that give it an excuse to boldly interfere in

Iraq’s affairs such as, proving to the world that it has become the power that cannot be

forgotten about and that should have a crucial role at least in the Middle East.

2- Some of the educated and political elites view and consider federalism for Iraq as a fierce

attempt that has the aim of partitioning the integrity of the Iraqi land. What makes the

case more challenging and problematic is the number and influence of those that adopt

this idea. Some political parties and even fronts have understood or intentionally

espoused such concepts for the sake of attaining more in the political process. Here it

seems crucial to have an effective plan for further explaining the benefits of federalism

184 O’Leary, “Multi-national Federalism, Federacy, Power-Sharing & the Kurds of Iraq”

72

and this should be burdened on the governments and political parties in power. This aim

can be achieved via actively operating track two diplomacy. The term track two

diplomacy refers to unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary

groups or nations and aims at developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and

organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their

conflict.185 It mostly depends on the participation of non governmental personnel such

as NGOs, independent political elites, and educated academics by holding seminars and

workshops for all Iraqis.

3- “Nations in federations, like citizens and consumers are confronted with decline in the

quality of states or private organisations, may be conceived of as having three choices:

exit, voice, or loyalty”.186 The government of Iraq has the duty of further developing the

country and better the basic economical services or people will think of other choices

like “exit” rather than “voice” or “loyalty”. Consolidating democratic principles and fair

distribution of revenues lead various elements to consider “voice” before any other

options and may result in solidifying “loyalty”.

In my dissertation I have tried to cover as wide issues as possible concerning Iraq and its upcoming

federation, however, I could not do that, as I wished to, due to limitedness in terms of the scope of

this sort of works. Furthermore, and for future researches and investigation, one can deal with and

discuss some more ideas in regard to this subject such as, the role of UN in deciding the destiny of

controversial issue like boundaries and oil revenues, the way that future regions in Iraq will be

formed and formulated especially when it is known that natural resources are not equally divided

in all governorates and the middle of Iraq has the least of oil, the political and economical problems

185 Esra C. Gürkaynak, “Track Two Diplomacy from a Track One Perspective: Comparing Perceptions of Turkish and American Diplomats”

International Negotiation 12 (2007), 57–82

186 O’Leary, “Power-Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy”

73

that will happen when a city like Basra decides to be a region by itself and does not merge with any,

and so on so forth.

The actual position I incline to take in this dissertation is that the model of federalism advocated in

the IC, though not entirely free of flaws, closely approximates to a model of federation that may

succeed in Iraq. However, there are challenges both historical and those created by the post-

invasion context, as suggested in the latter sections of Chapter 3 and here in the Conclusion, that

may yet dictate that the proposed system of federalism may not succeed. I think that the model of

federalism advocated by the IC is appropriate and could possibly succeed (all other things being

equal), however; one should mention that the bargaining process would be rather a hard task and

time-consuming and the federation may take several years to take shape due the vagueness of terms

such as sovereignty187 of the state and the various interpretation for such terms made by different

parties. Furthermore, some minor clashes might take place especially between Kurds and

government forces as a result of what is mentioned in the latter sentence. However, if these likely

clashes are dealt with and wisely avoided by all sides, including the US and coalition forces, might

result in the federation’s success.

187 Some individuals and political parties in Iraq consider federalism and granting more powers to the regions is scratching and

harming Iraq’s sovereignty and definitely leads to secession.

74

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81

Maps:

Map (1) Mesopotamia and Civilisations existed there

Map (2) shows the three Vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra

82

Charts:

Chart (1) Kirkuk’s population according to 1947 estimate

83

Table (2): Referendum Results

Referendum Results on December 25, 2005

Total No Yes No % Yes % Governorate

259,919 252011 7908 96.96% 3.04% Anbar

543,779 29,572 514,207 5.44% 94.56% Babil

2,120,615 472852 1647763 22.30% 77.70% Baghdad

691,024 27,524 663,500 3.98% 96.02% Basra

389,198 3390 385808 0.87% 99.13% Duhok

476,980 232443 244537 48.73% 51.27% Dyala

830,570 5,319 825,251 0.64% 99.36% Erbil

264,674 9063 255611 3.42% 96.58% Karbala

542,688 201262 341426 37.09% 62.91% Kirkuk

254,067 5615 248452 2.21% 97.79% Misan

185,710 2508 183202 1.35% 98.65% Muthanna

299,420 12522 286898 4.18% 95.82% Najaf

718,758 395,889 322,869 55.08% 44.92% Mosul

297,176 9,698 287,478 3.26% 96.74% Al-Qadisiya

510,152 417,066 93,086 81.75% 18.25% Salahuddin

723,723 7,513 716,210 1.04% 98.96% Sulaimanya

463,710 13,201 450,509 2.85% 97.15% Thiqar

280,128 12,047 268,081 4.30% 95.70% Wasit

9,852,291 2,109,495 7,742,796 21.41% 78.59% Total