Post on 13-May-2023
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression
By
Matthew R. Conway
Working Paper – please do not cite without consulting
author.
Word Count: 15,068
25 August 2015
2 Matthew Conway
Replication data: https://www.dropbox.com/s/g2gomljk66izend/ConwayMatthew_Repdata.sav?dl=0If unavailable, please contact conwaymatt2@gmail.com
Abstract:
Repression and authoritarianism are seemingly inseparableconcepts, often defined in close relation to one another. Itis clear that some states are more repressive than others are,and a number of studies seek explanations. Some exploresituational variables, such as growth rates and conflictlevels, while others address institutional design, seeking toapply theories of a ‘democratic peace’ to the domestic arena.Beyond this, the existing literature offers scant informationrelating state repression and regime type. A review of theliterature reveals only two comprehensive studies on thematter: one author argues democratic institutions decreaserepression, while the other reappraises this study and findsideology is of overriding importance.
This study investigates these contradicting sets ofexpectations and poses a more holistic theory. Its primaryarguments rest on a key assumption: regimes have an objectivereason to repress, based on a complex cost-benefit analysisconcerning their intention to stay in power. Rather than asingle variable, this paper contends specific characteristicsinherent in a regime’s structure, its ideology, and capacityinfluence how a leader perceives the stability of theexecutive’s rule and its ability to use coercive force.Considering this, this paper theorises repression will
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 3
increase with greater real and perceived levels of instabilityand decrease as an executive’s authority becomes moreconstrained, all else equal.
The essay begins with a discussion on repression as a concept.Second, it seeks to explain what motivates leaders to repress,exploring ideological differences, regime preferences, andstructural diversity. The latter half of the paper containsthe empirical analysis’ foundation and results. This analysisreveals that leaders who are most insulated from checks andbalances, notably personalist regimes and those withpersonalist tendencies, are the most repressive. However,empirical analysis determines there is little distinctionbetween regimes that repress least.
Table of Contents1. Introduction 52. Deconstructing repression 9
2.1 Why leaders repress 93. Domestic actor sanctioning in the domestic arena 12
3.1 Regime types 12
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3.2 Regime structure and executive constraints 153.2.1 Mexico 183.2.2 Syria 20
3.3 Regime structure and executive constraints continued21
4. Regime preferences and repression 225. Coercive power and ability 296. Empirical analysis: hypotheses 31
6.1 Personalist dictators – vulnerable, violent, and unconstrained 32
6.2 Single-party regimes – constrained and ideological33
6.3 Military regimes – bellicose yet constrained 356.4 Monarchies – durable traditionalists 35
7. Research design 388. Statistical analysis 44
8.1 Results 468.1.1 Explanatory variable results 468.1.2 Regime type results 47
9. Conclusion 56A. Appendix 58B. References 61
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 5
1. Introduction
Repression and authoritarianism are seemingly inseparable
concepts. Global events and media testify to this: Frontline
documentaries offer rare glimpses into tyrannical North Korea;
Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström lambastes Saudi
Arabia for abusing women and minorities’ rights; and the
United States (US) sanctions Iran and Cuba for violating human
rights. Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia are all
perceived in these contexts as repressive and tyrannical, with
little nod to the distinctions between them. Meanwhile, Cold
War-style politics persist in propagating a dichotomous fight
of good (freedom) against evil (tyranny and repression) (Bush
2003).
These perspectives persist today in nongovernmental
organisations’ (NGO) human rights campaigns and governmental
diplomatic action (Bush 2003; Amnesty 2015). Even when
observers acknowledge some states to be more repressive than
others, they do not necessarily understand why.1 Some studies
show regime structure to play an integral role (Davenport
2007) while others claim their ideology is paramount (Møller &
1 Repression and coercion are used interchangeably in this paper.Realistically these are slightly different terms, though for the sake offluency this paper I approach them as synonymous.
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Skaaning 2014; Poe & Tate 1994). 2 The reasons have important
implications for NGO funding, diplomacy, and research. As
Davenport (2007) notes, knowing if and why one type of
government is more repressive allows socio-political activists
to target campaigns and governments to focus diplomatic
efforts.
The existing literature offers scant information relating
state repression and regime type, though it has made progress
in focusing on autocrat behaviour internationally and theories
concerning the incentives and constraints dictators face.3
These studies almost invariably note repression as an
authoritarian tactic leaders use to maintain or consolidate
their rule.4 However, in discussing regime stability and
autocracies’ efforts to maintain rule, most authors fail to
answer a number of important questions: Why do some
authoritarian regimes repress more and/or differently than
others? Is there a correlation between regime type and
2 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) define regime: “A regime is a set offormal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. Animportant element of this set of rules is the identity of the group fromwhich leaders can be chosen (e.g., in a professionalized military regime,the group from which leaders can be chosen is officers of very high rank).”3 E.g. Weeks 2008; 2011; Tullock 1987; Wintrobe 1998; Konrad & Skaperdas2007;2015; Fearon 19944 I will use the terms executive, leader, autocrat, and dictatorshipinterchangeably when referring generally to the leading individual or bodyin an authoritarian government
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 7
repression? This study builds upon existing literature, using
a quantitative approach, in order to answer these questions.
A number of authors attempt to find answers, though their
success varies. Indeed, the most prominent studies on
repression focus primarily on comparisons between democracies
and autocracies, solely military-based dictatorships or
single-party regimes (also known as machines) (Poe & Tate
1994; Davenport 2004), or variances in repression in a
dictatorship over time (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith & Siverson
2005; Rørbæk et al 2014).5 Others only focus on a single type
of repression, such as the violent or non-violent varieties,
or repression that limits either public or personal liberties
(Møller & Skaaning 2013). Taken together, these studies
produce a strong, albeit incomplete, base upon which to
understand repression. A review of the literature reveals only
two studies that posit comprehensive theories concerning the
relationship between regime type and repression. A third study
prominent study supplements these two with strong analysis of
disaggregated regime qualities including wealth and size.
Christian Davenport conducted the first prominent study
focusing on authoritarian regime structure and repression in
2007, building upon past studies that explore singular regimes5 E.g. Poe & Tate 1994; Davenport 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005;Rørbæk, et al. 2014
8 Matthew Conway
irrespective of others (e.g. military and leftist regimes in
Poe and Tate 1994).6 However, Davenport seems to consider a
regime’s structure only to the extent it is able to channels
and allows for dissent within its system, reducing the form
dissent takes and the need to repress it. With this logic, he
concludes single-party polities are the least repressive form.
While Davenport acknowledges repression incurs a number of
costs, he does not consider how different regimes may react to
these costs, and the effects these will have on different
leaders’ power. Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) paper challenges
Davenport’s main finding that single-party regimes are less
repressive overall, emphasising how Davenport neglected to
consider the strong ideological components of machines that
lead to increases in repression. The authors claim that these
components counterbalance any characteristics that may
moderate a single-party regime’s repressive tendencies. Møller
and Skaaning’s results are inconclusive concerning repression
of civil liberties and determine that regime type is an
unreliable indicator of this type of repression. Nevertheless,
personalist and military autocracies, they find, are more
6 The key focus of Davenport’s (2007) paper is to find a ‘tyrannicalpeace’, which he states to refer to a ‘least bad option’ in terms of staterepressiveness. Governments and non-governmental organisations would thenstrive to convert an autocracy to this sort before transitioning todemocracies, a more stable incremental approach to democratisation. Inaddition, these actors would be able to focus their efforts on the mostrepressive regimes. This is also a motivation for this study.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 9
violently repressive. Like Davenport’s study, the authors do
not consider how costs of repression differ between regimes,
and do not extend their analysis to consider each regime’s
domestic audience. I seek to reconcile the differences between
these studies and fill in the gaps where they exist. In a
third piece, while authors Bove, Platteau and Sekeris (2014)
do not approach regime type specifically, they produce a
substantive study analysing which qualities in an autocratic
regime are most associated with repression. This study
naturally complements any investigation into regime type and
helps inform how different regimes would handle costs to their
behaviour.
While these three studies provide valuable insight into
the relationship between authoritarianism and repression, they
do not provide a convincing explanation accounting for
differences between regimes, if any in fact exist. Moreover,
the very fact that they disagree is cause enough for further
analysis. This paper extends and seeks to clarify Davenport
(2007) and Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) arguments that regime
structure and ideology strongly influence a ruling elite’s
decision calculus. I diverge from all previous studies,
however, when I apply Weeks’ (2008; 2011) theories on
authoritarian audience costs to the domestic arena. I predict
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the more likely regime leaders are to bear the costs of
repression, the more likely they are to exercise restraint in
employing it. Other scholars hypothesise similarly, though
they either understate or misinterpret how repression affects
leaders. Drawing from Bove, Platteau and Sekeris (2014) and
others’ studies on incentives and constraints in regime types,
I will show an executive’s decision to repress is complex and
largely dependent upon a variety of factors unique to the
given regime type.7
I begin with a discussion on repression – its definitions,
variances, causes, and correlates. Second, I delve into
different theories seeking to explain what motivates leaders
to repress. While it is possible some autocrats are tyrannical
for its own sake, this paper will assume there is an objective
reason to repression based upon a complex cost-benefit
analysis concerning their intention to stay in power.8 This
explanation will include a section distinguishing between7 Also see Garnet & Regan 1996; Piazza 2015; Svolik 20138 I assume throughout this paper that the level of repression and theinitial choice to repress is the responsibility of a central decision-maker. Some may challenge the assumption that leaders can entirely controlthe intensity of force coercive actors exert or even its scope. Whilesecurity forces may act independently, I assume this central authority hasauthority over these actors and can ultimately control their behaviour(Garnet & Regan 1996). This may ignore a number of repressive incidents –e.g. isolated security force committed atrocities – though I suspect thesestrongly correlate with how likely the security forces are to incurpunishment for their unsanctioned actions. The extent to which an executiveallows his agents to operate without restriction is therefore an indicatorof how repressive a regime is willing to be.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 11
different types of regimes, arguing the diversity in
autocratic regime structures plays a pivotal role in
determining their behaviour. I supplement this argument in
discussing regime ideology and leadership preference. In the
latter half of the paper, I lay out my empirical analysis’
foundation and results.
2. Deconstructing repression
There seems to be little academic debate concerning the
definition of repression. To draw from Davenport (2000),
state-driven repression is ‘behavior that is applied by
governments in an effort to bring about political quiescence
and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form
of restriction or violation of political and civil liberties’
(pp.6). This behaviour entails applications of hard and soft
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power that impede citizens’ freedoms of speech, religion,
movement, and more; the term encompasses surveillance,
torture, disappearances, and mass killing (Davenport 2007).
This definition implies there are a number of strands of
repression.
Repression that restricts civil liberties refers to
government policies that restrict freedom of movement,
religion, speech, education, and work (Hibbs 1973). Violent
forms of repression are also referred to as physical integrity
violations. This type encompasses disappearances,
imprisonment, rape, murder, and political terror, among others
(Davenport & Armstrong 2004).9 While both types of repression
aim to deter or silence threats, there are important
differences between them: restrictions on civil liberties are
generally attempts to modify behaviour and attitudes in
raising the costs of dissent (Davenport 2007). Violent
repression, similarly, seeks to deter and silence threats
through eliminating those who may pose them (Poe & Tate 1994).
2.1 Why leaders repress
A large swath of literature investigates what motivates
governments and leaders to repress their citizens. The
findings are complex. The most persuasive line of reasoning9 Also see: Poe, Tate & Keith 1999, Poe & Tate 1994; Fjelde 2010
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 13
holds that repression is more likely when opponents directly
challenge the ruler’s power or the leader perceives an
imminent challenge, implying coercion is a pre-emptive measure
or reaction to dissent and political instability (Davenport
2007; Vreeland 2008).10 If the regime or its supporters did not
face any serious challenge, it would likely not use repressive
tactics for lack of reason to incur the potential costs; this
is especially true concerning violent tactics (Gurr 1988).
Continuing this logic, one can safely assume the more unstable
or vulnerable the executive perceives himself to be, the more
likely he is to repress.11 However, repression is not an
executive’s only form of socio-political control.
A second strand of research concerns ‘the authoritarian
bargain’, addressing alternatives to repression (Desai &
Yousef 2009). These studies maintain that authoritarian
regimes will resort to a form of coercion to rule if co-option
does not suffice (Wintrobe 2000). In other words, autocrats
rule through a combination of encouraging loyalty and
repression. This statement clarifies the ‘bargain’ to support
Gartner and Regan’s (1996) assumption that repression is a
continuous tactic that the ruling elite incrementally applies,10 This assumes a leader’s primary goal is to maintain power. See: Tullock198711 As leaders in modern authoritarian regimes are invariably male, I willuse ‘he/his’ to refer to the executive position rather than a genderneutral term.
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‘expecting that a little more repression might serve both to
placate domestic coalitions and sufficiently threaten the
political opposition….[A]t equilibrium, decision makers choose
the level of violence that maximizes their expected payoffs’
(pp. 280). Alternatives to repression include divide-and-rule
strategies, co-option (de Luca, Sekeris & Vargas 2014), power
sharing and bargaining (Morelli & Rohner 2013), or even
optimal succession rules (Bove et al., 2014; Konrad &
Skaperdas 2007; 2015). One can assume the existence of
alternatives varies based on the fact different types of
regimes have varying structures that dictate power sharing and
succession rules. This would increase the likelihood of
repression in some cases, as the expectation concerning
payoffs also varies. Considering the dynamics of the
‘authoritarian bargain’ and the leader’s perceptions of
stability, Davenport (2007) is correct in noting that ‘the key
to understanding why repression is used lies in comprehending
the factors that influence the political leader’s’ cost-
benefit analysis (pp. 488). The articles that seek to
understand the costs and benefits of repression are relatively
few, but substantive.
First, coercive force requires expensive resources such as
weapons, security forces, and an intelligence apparatus
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 15
(Davenport 2007; Bove et al., 2014; Hultquist 2013). These
costs increase with population and land mass/topography and of
course become relatively more expensive when a leader’s
economic resources decrease. There are also indirect economic
costs to repression. Francisco (1995) and Ross (2004)
separately show repressive tactics may bolster the opposition,
spurring a cyclical relationship between repression and
dissent. Meanwhile, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) note that
loss of life and assets in armed conflicts negatively affects
wealth generation. Escribá-Folch and Wright (2010), moreover,
observe that repression can trigger potentially destabilising
sanctions and international isolation. Finally, Svolik (2013)
and Acemoglu, Ticci and Vindigni (2010) show that repression
can cause the repressive agents to turn on the executive as
seen in Egypt and, to an extent, Syria since 2011. Perhaps the
most important factor influencing the political leader’s
decision to use repressive tactics concerns the leader’s
perception of the utility of repression, his ideological base,
and the likelihood that he will bear these costs. Jessica
Weeks’ (2008; 2011) research on autocratic audience costs and
a leader’s choices to initiate inter-state conflict seem most
relevant to this analysis, complemented by Davenport (2007)
and Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) studies.
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3. Domestic actor sanctioning in the domestic arena
Weeks’ (2005) essay on differing autocratic audience costs
has one main applicable point: ‘domestic actors can and will
coordinate to sanction the leader’ (pp. 5). As Weeks (2008),
Schelling (1963), and Fearon (1994) write, ‘audience costs’
refers to the idea that observers can determine the
credibility of a leader’s threats in international crises
based on his potential to suffer domestic consequences for
making empty threats. Investigating how domestic institutions
affect autocratic leaders’ decisions to initiate military
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 17
conflicts, Weeks (2011) similarly maintains that ‘institutions
in some kinds of dictatorships allow regime insiders to hold
leaders accountable for their foreign policy decisions’ (pp.
1). These theories have direct applicability to a leader’s
domestic policy.
Before delving into them however, it is important to
understand the differences between each regime type.
3.1 Regime types
In arguing that regime structure plays an integral role in
informing a leader’s decision whether to repress, it is
necessary to measure regime differences according to
conditions that may constrain a leader from repressing.
Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) classification of
autocracies is one of the most complete and useful datasets in
this regard.12 First, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz do not include
democratic polities, small states (fewer than 1,000,000
people), warlord ruled, foreign occupied and provisional
governments, or those that lacked control of over 50% of their
territory. Beyond that, their “definition of regimes
emphasizes the rules that: (1) identify the group from which
leaders can come; and (2) determine who influences leadership
12 Other studies that have used Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s classificationsinclude Weeks 2008; Davenport 2007; Møller & Skaaning 2014.
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choice and policy" (Geddes, et al. 2014 pp. 5). Coded regime
types used in this analysis include the following: monarchy,
personalist, military, single-party, indirect-military, party-
personalist, party-military, military-personalist, and party-
military-personalist.13 Geddes categorises countries according
to a series of yes/no questions: for example, whether the
leader controls appointments and the security apparatus or if
domestic institutions such as a politburo exist in more than
name (Geddes, et al. 2014). Corresponding with Weeks’(2008)
and Davenport’s (2007) analyses, I choose to use Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz’s regime set because each regime is
qualified primarily according to factors useful to assessing
the extent of differences in coercion across regime
classifications.
Single-party regimes are ‘those in which the party had
some influence over policy, controlled most access to
political power and government jobs, and had functioning
local-level organizations’ (Geddes 2003, pp 72).14 Accordingly,
these regimes have legislative bodies, which function as more
13 This study further diverges from previous ones in that others, notablyDavenport (2007), Bove, Platteau and Sekeris (2014) and Møller and Skaaning2014, did not include monarchies in their studies and generally grouphybrid regimes as a single type. (Geddes, Wright & Frantz 2014) alsoincludes oligarchies in their classification, though in my sample size thiswould only include South Africa between 1992 and 1994. I omit thisclassification for this reason.14 Also quoted in Weeks 2008 pp. 46
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 19
than ‘rubber-stamp’ organisations, whose members are
competitively elected from within the party. None of the
leader’s relatives holds high office in single-party regimes:
appointments to which party elites control. As such, the
leader lacks full autonomy and the elites will likely remain
in power if the leader leaves office.
Military regimes are ‘governed by an officer or retired
officer, with the support of the military establishment and
some routine mechanism by which high-level officers could
influence policy choice and appointments’ (Geddes 2003, pp
223-227).15 Similar to single-party regimes, a group of elites,
typically within a military officer council or junta, controls
leadership transfers. The leader also does not control the
armed forces, as the military hierarchy is preserved and thus
a security apparatus remains under the military’s purview.
According to Geddes (2003), ‘merit and seniority [are] the
main bases for promotion, rather than loyalty or ascriptive
characteristics’, and the leader does not have the ability to
murder or imprison dissenting officers at will (pp. 226).16
Also like single-party regimes, the military hierarchy will
not collapse if the leader loses power. Indirect-military rule
is similar to military rule, though differs in that ‘formal
15 Also quoted in Weeks 2008 pp. 4616 Also quoted in Weeks 2008 pp. 46
20 Matthew Conway
political leaders are chosen through competitive elections,
but the military either prevents parties that would attract
large numbers of voters from participating or controls key
policy choices’ (Geddes, et al. pp. 8).
Starkly diverging from these two types, personalist
regimes are perhaps the prototypical dictatorships. In entire
control of the security and intelligence apparatuses, the
leader oversees appointments to high office and can punish at
will those who fall out of his favour. Such punishment can
entail removal, demotion, imprisonment, and murder. As Weeks
(2008) notes, dictators such as Chile’s Pinochet ‘often used
their control over appointments to frequently rotate elites
through different officers so that they did not have an
opportunity to build an independent power base.’ (pp. 50)
Personalist dictators ensure a system in which elites’ power
is wholly dependent upon the survival of the leader. Hybrids
of military and single-party regimes feature the
characteristics of the first listed regime most prominently
(Geddes, et al. 2014).17
Finally, monarchies come in two general forms – dynastic
and non-dynastic – though Geddes, Wright and Frantz code them17 I will not explain the differences between the hybrid regimes here. Essentially, hybrid regimes are simply the first listed regime with tendencies from the second list regime. For more, see Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2013.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 21
together. Herb best differentiates between the two, arguing
that dynastic monarchies feature family members who share an
interest in maintaining the dynasty’s stability (Herb 1999).
Family members obtain power through seniority, though the
monarch heavily influences appointments as the chief
executive. The monarch also does not maintain full control of
the security apparatus. In this regard, dynastic monarchies
closely resemble single-party regimes (Herb 1999). Conversely,
non-dynastic monarchies feature many personalist
characteristics. Family members within non-dynastic regimes
are excluded from exercising true political power until they
inherit the throne, though the monarch will reward those most
loyal with high level positions that generally lack real
power. Like personalists, he exercises full authority over
security and coercive forces, and generally lacks
accountability compared to dynastic monarchs (Herb 1999). As
Herb’s distinction between dynastic and non-dynastic
monarchies is important to understanding different leaders’
behaviour, I modify Geddes data to account for this.18
Curiously, while the number of single-party and military
regimes has fluctuated considerably since the Second World
18 I use Conrad, Conrad & Young’s (2014) data on dynastic and non-dynasticmonarchies, from their paper. This data matches exactly with Herb’s wherepossible, though I use this instead of Herbs because his only accounts forMiddle Eastern monarchies, therefore excluding Swaziland and Nepal.
22 Matthew Conway
War, the number of monarchies has remained stable. While this
implies monarchies are inherently more durable than other
regime types, it is interesting to consider how it may also
speak to their insulation from international power politics;
single-party and military dictatorships appeared and fell in
large conjunction with US and Soviet geopolitical agendas
(Geddes, et al. 2014). A regime’s durability may also affect
its use of violent repression. Because regimes are more likely
to exercise coercive force in their youth to consolidate
power, one can expect repression to decrease with time, all
else equal (Møller & Skaaning 2014). In investing in
repression early on, executives are signalling to potential
opponents their ability and willingness to use force, allowing
them to lay off repression in their later years. There is
little reason to believe durability would affect the
restriction of civil liberties, however. Having rid itself of
challengers in its early years, it is likely the state would
continue to impose restrictions in order to maintain a high
cost of dissent, further preventing them from needing to
employ violent force against any new opposition movements.
3.2 Regime structure and executive constraints
Having outlined these distinctions, we can now consider
how differing structures influence an autocrat’s decision-
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 23
making calculus. Weeks’ (2008) hypotheses rest upon the idea
that domestic actors will sanction a leader for irresponsible
and undesirable behaviour, though actors’ abilities to
coordinate in order to sanction a leader vary across
autocratic regimes. Some dictatorships, especially personalist
regimes like that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, control all
aspects of the state apparatus, thus preventing elites from
influencing a leader’s behaviour significantly (Geddes 2003;
Weeks 2011). Others, like non-personalist regimes, typically
face powerful domestic audiences composed of regime elites
(Weeks 2008). Weeks primarily argues in her studies that a
regime’s likeliness to act aggressively abroad is inversely
related to the constraints the leader faces; Davenport (2007)
argues similarly in discussing the role of executive
constraints on repressive tendencies. Leaders with strong
incentives to preserve the favour of their supporters in their
domestic audiences will work more diligently to adhere to
their preferences—or risk punishment.
As I have noted above, repression comes with a number of
costs. Those interested in repressing generally do so in order
to preserve a status quo when the benefits of repression
outweigh the potential costs. Perceptions of benefits and
costs, however, may differ between an executive and his
24 Matthew Conway
domestic audience. Let us consider the potential outcomes
should an executive favour repression, though his domestic
audience does not given their likelihood to bear its costs. In
such a situation, most studies hold that if audiences perceive
their interests to be under threat and the costs of deposing
the leader do not exceed the benefits, they will punish the
leader for policy failures, often with removal; conversely,
they will reward leaders for success (Weeks 2011).
An audience’s ability to do so, of course, varies; Weeks
refers to their obstacles to check a leader as coordination
costs. ‘The situation most strongly resembles a coordination
game rather than a prisoner’s dilemma because no individual
wants to be the “odd one out”’(Weeks 2008, pp. 38). Therefore,
“her strategy depends on her expectations about the other
players’ actions” (pp. 38). As Weeks notes, individuals
fearing retaliation from the executive have incentive to
conceal their intentions to participate in an ouster. The
level of an elite’s fear fluctuates in tandem with an
executive’s ability to detect and punish disloyalty. Thus,
coordination costs vary from regime to regime.
Elites with the least ability to constrain a leader exist
within personalist and non-dynastic monarchies, where the
executive enjoys sole control of the state’s coercive and
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 25
political apparatuses (Weber 1997; Weeks 2011; Geddes, et al.
2014). Leaders can monitor their subordinates’ actions and
punish betrayal. Regardless, those within the regime generally
owe their position to the leader, so they would have no
incentive to oust the leader, as they would lose power
themselves (Chehabi & Linz 1998; Geddes, et al. 2014). Bratton
and van de Walle (1994) describe this well: ‘Recruited and
sustained with material inducements, lacking an independent
political base, and thoroughly compromised in the regime's
corruption, they are dependent on the survival of the
incumbent. Insiders typically have risen through the ranks of
political service and, apart from top leaders who may have
invested in private capital holdings, derive livelihood
principally from state or party offices’ (pp. 464).19
Aside from the moral implications of using repression, it
is unlikely that elites in personalist regimes would even
oppose repressive tactics, as they are not likely to bear
their costs; they prosper and fall in tandem with the leader
(Weeks 2008; Geddes 2003). If repression enriches and empowers
the executive, it would similarly benefit his supporters.
International sanctions and rebellion may deter elites from
repressive action, though no more or less than the executive.
Moreover, there is such a historically low probably that19Also quoted in in Geddes 2003 pp. 60.and Weeks 2008 pp. 47
26 Matthew Conway
personalists would lose power that they would feel comfortable
in exercising whatever power they would chose, repression
included (Geddes, et al. 2014).
While hybrid regimes are a mix of each regime, military
governments, single-party regimes, and dynastic monarchies
differ starkly from their more personalist counterparts
(Geddes, et al. 2014). Rulers in these states face strong
domestic audiences whose powerful positions allow them to
constrain and punish a leader. The intelligence, political,
and security apparatuses generally do not operate solely under
the executive’s authority, and as such, the leader is less
able to monitor, hire, and fire subordinates (Weeks 2008). In
military regimes, hierarchy determines one’s political career,
and officials in machines serve at the pleasure of the party,
not a president (Weeks 2008). Similarly, members of dynastic
regimes are interested in maintaining their dynasty’s health
(Herb 1999). Given their greater ability to coordinate in
order to oust an irresponsible leader, they will do so in
order to protect their family’s rule and remain in power
afterward.
Considering that coercion can trigger international
sanctions and costly rebellion, it is clear that intense
repression can threaten elites’ interests. Still, it is likely
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 27
in the elites’ best interests to repress the citizenry to a
certain extent as it allows them to maintain their privileged
position: it is the potential elite that need to be placated
and ensured of continued stability so can they have confidence
in their future economic and political future (Gartner & Regan
1996). Loss of control is an even more threatening concept.
Thus, where they are relevant and oppose repression, it is
likely that elites’ preferences have only moderating
influences or force repression to become more selective than
widespread. Speaking amorally, repression is only an issue to
domestic audiences to the extent that it threatens one’s
interests or the regime’s stability (Gartner & Regan 1996).
The following two case studies support this logic:
3.2.1 Mexico
The indigenous Zapatista Army of National Liberation
launched an insurgency in the southern Mexican state of
Chiapas on 1 January 1994, demanding social, cultural, and
land rights. At this time, Ernestio Zedillo was the leader of
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).20 When the
conflict first broke out, the PRI sent the armed forces to
Chiapas to put down the rebellion, and the belligerents
declared a ceasefire twelve days later. Chiapas remained20 Mexico was a single-party authoritarian regime at this time. (Geddes, etal. 2014)
28 Matthew Conway
relatively peaceful throughout the next year and the
government did not repress citizens in the area or maintain
martial law (Weller 2000). Meanwhile, Zedillo pressed for a
diplomatic and political solution ostensibly in order to avoid
international condemnation concerning the use of coercive
force and the suppression of indigenous rights (Weller 2000).
Zedillo and the PRI were additionally reluctant to begin a
costly war in Chiapas as Mexico was embroiled in a monetary
crisis; they risked setting off uncontrollable inflation and
wider domestic discontent (Press 1995).
Despite Zedillo’s and the PRI’s economic recovery
strategies, domestic and international confidence in the
government remained low (Weller 2000). Adding to this, the
Mexican government suffered a significant loss of external
reserves in the first half of 1994, and investors’ fears from
the Chiapas Conflict exacerbated the peso crisis (Truman
1996). An advisor on emerging markets to Chase Bank summarized
the situation in a January 1995 update: ‘While Chiapas, in our
opinion, does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican
political stability, it is perceived to be so by many in the
investment community. The government will need to eliminate
the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 29
national territory and of security policy’ and secure more
substantive investment (Roett 1995 para. 7).
After a year of significant capital loses, a major source
of discontent for the economic elite (the PRI’s main domestic
audience), the Mexican government reached a similar conclusion
and restarted a series of on-and-off-again military
engagements with the Zapatistas (Darling & Fineman 1995).
Throughout the next few years, the Mexican government waged a
counter-insurgency at the behest of the party’s elites,
allegedly propping up paramilitary groups and gangs in the
region while ignoring their highly repressive tactics
including displacement and murder (Weller 2000). The violence
peaked on 22 December 1997 with the Acteal Massacre, when the
paramilitary group Mascara Roja murdered 45 people, mostly women
and children (Thompson 1998). Following domestic and
international condemnation, which risked elites’ investments
and international relationships, the Mexican government scaled
back the intensity of its force and counter-insurgency
programme (Weller 2000).
3.2.2 Syria
30 Matthew Conway
Stories of Syria’s brutal civil war have been the focus of
front-page stories and legislative discussions nearly since
its beginning in March 2011.21 Allegations of chemical weapons
attacks are widespread, government forces drop cluster and
barrel bombs in residential areas, and at least 7.6 million
have fled their homes seeking refuge (UNOCHA 2015). Even
before the war began, however, the government held the country
under emergency rule: gatherings of more than five people were
banned, and security forces were empowered with the ability to
detain anybody they deemed threatening (Hinnebusch 2002).
Torture was allegedly endemic (HRW 2005). Given this climate,
when protests began on 15 March 2011 calling for democratic
reforms and the release of political prisoners, it is
unsurprising that security forces opened fire on citizens
(Fahim & Saad 2013). Those familiar with the al-Assad family –
who have ruled Syria since Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s
father, seized power in a coup in November 1970 – draw
connections between father and son. Al-Assad senior quashed an
Islamic uprising in February 1982 with gunships and artillery,
razing a city and killing thousands in what became known as
the Hama Massacre (Seale & McConville 1989).
21 Syria is coded as a party-personal-military regime since the beginning ofthe al-Assad reign. (Geddes, et al. 2014)
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 31
The al-Assads represent the Alawite religious group, a
minority offshoot of Shi’a Islam that comprises under 15
percent of Syria’s population (Seale & McConville 1989).
Politics under the al-Assads are secular, though competition
is highly sectarian. Given these two facts, both al-Assads
have isolated themselves from and have repressed all majority
factions in order to maintain power (Seale & McConville 1989).
The regime features strong personalist elements. While al-
Assad does not rule alone, those surrounding him are generally
‘yes-men’ (Hinnebusch 2002). Al-Assad holds a near-monopoly
over the security and intelligence apparatuses, whose ranks
Alawites dominate. A number of Sunnis occupy high-ranking
military positions, but they are constantly subject to Alawite
oversight (Hinnebusch 2002). Those loyal have strong incentive
to remain so, as promotions revolve around kinship and favour,
not merit. If they show disloyalty, the intelligence apparatus
would quickly identify their betrayal and act accordingly
(Hinnebusch 2002).
Thus, before and after Hama in 1972, few, if any in the
elite were able to impose constraints on the al-Assads.
Regardless, it is unlikely they would have wanted to. Loyalty
was and is the only requirement for prosperity in the regime,
which subsists largely on oil rents, industry, and contraband
32 Matthew Conway
(Middle East 2015). Similarly, the repression at the start of
the Syrian civil war met little resistance from within the
regime. Economic elite that may have foreseen greater unrest
and wished to coordinate in order to oust al-Assad for his
repressiveness were unable to do so because of the potential
risks.
3.3. Regime structure and executive constraints continued
It is most likely that executives are aware of their
relevant elites’ abilities to sanction them; this structure
would condition them to behave in order to maintain these
elites’ favour. As mentioned above, Mexico employed repressive
tactics in order to reassure economic elites of their regime’s
stability, though relented when these tactics backfired.
Syria, conversely, had no strong domestic audience and was
able to repress dissent harshly and without fear of backlash;
even today, four years into the civil war, the al-Assad regime
is at little risk of losing power. Nonetheless, more than fear
of reprisal informs a leader’s decision to repress.
Understanding the risks inherent in an executive’s decision to
ignore his domestic audience’s preferences is important in
considering why regimes may employ repressive tactics at
different levels. Nonetheless, it is not the only factor. A
number of scholars argue the key to understanding executive
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 33
behaviour lies in the details of their ideology (Møller &
Skaaning 2014; Arendt 1951), capacity, and need to resort to
force (Weeks 2008; 2011).
4. Regime preferences and repression
The examination of the regime structures above helps shed
light on why regimes may exercise caution in repressing their
citizens. However, as repression has numerous alternatives,
what are leader and audience preferences in the first place?
Further examination of regime structure helps determine the
extent to which alternatives are possible and repression is
necessary.
A large amount of scholarship is devoted to understanding
different degrees of autocratic belligerence. Davenport’s
(2007) study is among them, which explores the role of
pluralism and political control in regime behaviour. Primarily
focused on comparisons between democracies and autocracies,
Davenport argues that a greater presence of democratic and
pluralistic institutions causally and directly relates to
34 Matthew Conway
lower repression. He writes, in ‘democratic political systems,
it is typically argued that authorities are less inclined to
engage in repression because they are able to use others
means’ of socio-political control (pp. 489). Democracies allow
opposition to express themselves through parties, lobbies, and
electoral participation, diminishing the state’s need for
repression. Autocracies, conversely, have structures that
preclude opposition influence, leaving the regime to eliminate
challengers with coercive force. Davenport (2007) observes in
more personalist systems, ‘the ruling clique represent the
only wielders of power within the government; without this
access, there is no [opposition] influence, and in this
tentative situation, repression would be used to proactively
eliminate challengers’ (pp 489.)
However, as written, his theory appears incomplete. A
legitimately plural structure may serve as a mechanism for
channelling opposition sentiment, though an opposition with
influence would still threaten a leader’s power and a regime’s
stability. An authoritarian leader without restrictions on his
ability to eliminate challengers would likely not stand for
such a threat. Moreover, Davenport does not elaborate on how a
regime may be able to control opposition if its structure
channels it through the political system. For his theory to
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 35
hold, the executive must have a reason not to repress this
threat, i.e. a check on his power. As written, it appears
Davenport maintains that authoritarianism relates directly to
repression. When one includes repression as a definitive
component of authoritarianism, as Davenport does, this is a
given.
Davenport (2007) could also be implying in his analysis
that, even if the regime does not allow any dissent to have
effect in its legislature, the illusion of discussion or
activism would placate any potential challengers. Though this
restriction of political rights would definitively be a form
of repression, it may lessen the regime’s need to eliminate
any potential challengers violently. According to such logic,
regimes would likely have higher respect for personal
integrity rights.22
Despite these drawbacks, there seems to be value in his
theory that a political structure that channels dissent
through a system will at least moderate repression.
Contemporary Russia is a good supporting example. Russian
President Putin’s United Russia party controls the majority of
the Kremlin; however, the party must operate within a defined
political system that includes opposition (Roxburgh 2012). In22 Davenport holds that single-party regimes are less repressive largelybased on this theory.
36 Matthew Conway
order to maintain the façade of democratic institutions, Putin
allows other parties to contest elections, though a number of
fraudulent electoral tactics, co-option of opposing political
policies, and sabotage ensure the opposition will not come to
power. While his policies limit potential challenging groups’
ability to dissent and organize, the fact they have a
legitimate presence in Russia’s domestic political scene
forces Putin to refrain from tactics that are more coercive
(Dutkiewicz 2011). Importantly, the Russian government
operates within a structure that constrains the executive.
Thus, regimes that feature greater structural constraints on
executive behaviour will likely be less repressive than those
that do not. The key distinction is that the regime is
constrained from repressing, not that its members lack desire.
Whether an alternative method of socio-political control is
considered repressive is then a semantic debate.
Davenport (2007) further argues, though with more depth,
that the intensity of repressive force increases as regimes
become more personalist in nature. Political isolation – a key
personalist trait – increases a leader’s vulnerability (or at
least his perception of it) to external threats. Other
scholars advance this same theory, adding that the lack of
political influence forces the opposition to adopt more
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 37
bellicose and unorthodox means of dissent (Bracic 2010).
Starting a vicious cycle, the leader will respond in kind.
While this reasoning raises concerns of endogeneity, reality
seems to reflect the cycle in places like Syria today.
Considering these arguments, it is appropriate to say a
combination of structural constraints, leader isolation, and
the presence of elite-imposed constraints influence an
executive’s behaviour. However, in some cases ideology is an
even more important determinant. In 1951, Hannah Arendt (1951)
drew a distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian
regimes, positing totalitarian regimes seek to dominate their
citizens’ lives completely as a prelude to world domination,
while authoritarian governments seek full political power
within their borders alone.23 Totalitarian regimes, Arendt
argues, protect and advocate for an in-group and eliminate
those within the out-group (e.g. ethnic Germans versus others
in Nazi Germany). Ideology and identity are integral, and
their tactics receive initial domestic support, as the public
perceives them to offer respite from instability (Arendt
1951). Conversely, all other authoritarian regimes simply use23 Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) do not code for totalitarian regimes inthe regime classification, nor are they measured in this study. I includethem in this discussion, however, in order to highlight the importance ofexecutive ideology in determining the level of repression – largelypolitical terror – in a regime. Past examples of totalitarian regimes arealmost exclusively personalist dictatorships, e.g. Russia under Stalin,Nazi Germany, China under Mao.
38 Matthew Conway
political terror as a means to attaining or sustaining power;
however, they often lack ideology. While Arendt does not
explicitly acknowledge it, other scholars show these regimes
to exist along a spectrum, rather than portray them as part of
a dichotomy (e.g. Geddes 1999; Rummel 1997).
Regime ideology does not have to include world domination
in order to influence a regime’s repressive tendencies.24 Who
exists within the in-/out-groups often determines who is
repressed in ideological regimes. For example, most
contemporary authoritarian monarchies impose a strict ideology
upon their citizens. This is most harshly present in dynastic
regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates that feature de jure or de facto discrimination
along sectarian lines. These regimes are disproportionately
repressive against those in the out-group. The ideal type of
non-dynastic monarchies differ from their counterpart simply
in having a larger out-group: these include Swaziland, and
Iran under the Shah. Their isolation compounds with ideology
(if they espouse one), rendering more people a threat to the
ruling in-group (Herb 1999). It is possible that widespread
24 Ideology is as a system of beliefs of theories that forms the basis oftheory or policy, in accordance with Arendt (1951). Preference is similar,though refers to tendencies and beliefs that exist outside of a system anddetermine actions, based more significant in one’s nature. E.g. Naziideology would entail creating a ‘master race’, though preferences woulddetermine how to attain it.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 39
ideology is more prevalent in dynastic monarchies because it
acts as a unifying force within the family and society.
Dynastic monarchies, which more closely resemble single-party
regimes, have a structure that demands unity and cohesion to
function (Herb 1999). As Wintrobe (1998) shows, machines are
better at creating loyalty than other autocracies because
their structure facilitates elite-bargaining and power-sharing
agreements.25 Their increased stability decreases the need for
coercion (Davenport 2007).26 As dynasticism is more stable, one
would expect these regimes to feature less repression in
general, especially of the violent sort.27
A regime’s ideology may also signal something about the
regime’s supporters and their preferences concerning
repression. Take Saudi Arabia, for example. The modern country
took shape in 1744, when the ruling al-Saud family allied
itself with the religious leader Muhammad idn Abd-al-Wahhab,
the founder of Wahhabism (Rentz & Facey 2004). The alliance’s
25 See also Gandhi & Przeworski 2006 pp. 1826 Also see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005; Fjelde 201027 However, there is a caveat to this. Some regimes that fiercely restrictcivil liberties may not need to repress their citizens violently as they donot provide them with any associational space to do so. The measure ofrepression in this sense is therefore somewhat subjective. Those whoadvocate a ‘give me liberty or give me death’ philosophy would find this tobe equally repressive as regimes which barrel bomb citizens. Others,however, would believe a regime that arbitrarily kills and imprisons itscitizens is certainly more repressive than one that prohibits certainbehaviours. This study separates the two types of repression in order toaccount for these philosophical differences.
40 Matthew Conway
power fluctuated through struggles against the Ottoman Empire
and other forces, though it finally formed modern-day Saudi
Arabia in 1932. Even though the Wahhabis and the al-Sauds have
had periods of violent conflict since their 1744 agreement,
their alliance ensures their success (Rentz & Facey 2004).
Their initial deal was simple: the Wahhabis, a strong
religious force, would assist the al-Sauds in conquering the
Arabian Peninsula through providing religious legitimacy and
unifying a fractured tribal populous. In return, the House of
Saud, a strong fighting force, would adopt Wahhabism as its
official policy, allowing the Wahhabi clerics official control
over Medina and Mecca, arguably Islam’s holiest sites (Nevo
1998).
Since then, the Houses of Wahhab and Saud have
intermarried many times over, and the Minister of Islamic
Affairs has always been an al-Wahhab descendent. As the al-
Sauds require the al-Wahhabs’ support to justify their
political rule, they must consider the clerics’ preferences.
Past conflicts between the two houses resulted in violently
destabilising unrest. The Ministry for the Propagation of
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, Saudi Arabia’s religious
police, is a manifestation of cooperation. Thus, ultra-
conservative Islamic principles are intolerantly pervasive
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 41
throughout the Kingdom. Those who adhere to Wahhabi principles
exist in relative comfort, while those who dissent – or are
simply oppressed under these principles – suffer (Nevo 1998).
In Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud advances Wahhabi principles
likely due to a combination of personal belief and desire to
maintain power. In this case, the regime’s domestic audience’s
power and their preferences, i.e. their ideology, are leading
determinants of the regime’s behaviour. Regimes that do not
feature these audiences may still hold repressive ideologies,
but while their citizens would suffer similar repression, it
would simply originate directly from a leader rather than his
audience.
Leaders’ preferences are similar to ideology. Weeks (2011)
argues concerning autocrats’ choices to initiate interstate
war that some leaders are more likely to view force as
effective and necessary than are others. She contends that
personalist leaders are generally more belligerent by nature:
‘one reason is that unlike elites in machines, who are
typically bureaucrats who have risen through the civilian
ranks, many personalist dictators, such as Stalin, Mao, Saddam
Hussein and Idi Amin attained their personal status through
violent means such as a revolution, civil war, or violent
coup’ (Weeks 2011, pp. 21). Gurr’s (1998) and Colgan’s (2010)
42 Matthew Conway
research support her claim that personalist leaders’ paths to
power taught them that force is often the best, if not only,
means of dispute resolution (Colgan n.d.).
Similarly, referring to military leaders’ beliefs about
the use of force in international affairs, Huntington (1957)
claims, ‘the military ethic views conflict as a universal
pattern throughout nature and sees violence rooted in the
permanent biological and psychological nature of men’ (pp.
64).28 Military leaders’ training conditions them to believe
that military force is not only appropriate and effective, but
also unavoidable. Posen (1984) refers to this as having become
‘functionally specialized’, forgetting that alternatives to
force may reach the same end (Snyder 1984). Furthermore,
Huntington (1957) claims that soldiers are trained to ‘view
with alarm the potency and immediacy of the security threats
to the state’ (pp. 66).29
Many scholars cite this as rational in discussions over
interstate warfare, and it appears natural to extend
Huntington’s claim to domestic policy. Davenport (2007) and
Poe and Tate (1995) do this, arguing that in military
governments, ‘repression would be increased along with, in
particular, those forms of repression that are most familiar28 Also quoted in Weeks 2011 pp. 1829 Ibid
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 43
to the armed forces – violations of personal integrity such as
torture, disappearance, and mass killing’ (Davenport 2007, pp.
491). Governments with direct control of the coercive forces,
moreover, would face fewer barriers to exercising them – even
if the chief executive lacks total control (Poe, Tate & Keith
1999).
Some disagree with this proposition. Huntington (1957)
argues that militaries often believe that the armed forces,
lacking the expertise, should not interfere with domestic
politics; Perlmutter and Bennet (1980) argue the same. This
does not entirely make sense, however. First, these theories
rest on observations either incorporating or largely including
regimes with strong civil-military relations, such as in the
US and Western Europe. These military actors act under
relatively significant civilian influence. Second, if Brecher
(1996) is right in arguing that leaders who are socialised to
view violence as normal behaviour will exert force in response
to ‘all situations of stress, internal or external’, these
scholars’ theories on military government behaviour abroad are
directly applicable at home (pp. 220).30 As the leader of the
30 Full quote: “The leaders of military regimes are the most likely to relyon violence, whatever the nature of the initial catalyst. Violence isnormal behavior for the military in power, for the military generallyachieves and sustains power through violence and tends to use thistechnique in all situations of stress, internal or external. They also seeviolence as legitimate and effective.” Also quoted in Weeks 2011 pp. 18
44 Matthew Conway
state, the military would view any domestic challenger as a
national security threat and would respond accordingly.
Huntington’s and others’ theories may hold concerning
military regime’s interference in domestic politics to an
extent. Weeks (2011) references Feaver and Gelpi (2004) as
providing evidence from survey data that American military
officers are only reluctant to use force when the objective is
to spread democracy or is humanitarian in nature. The military
exercised no such restraint concerning realpolitik questions
such as China’s rise or nuclear weapons; they were also
relatively unlikely to find merit in diplomatic tools. While
this is only one example, it implies that the military views
itself as only a security preservation force. As such, they
would not interfere with civilian behaviour beyond that which
may pose a threat to the state.31
31 As Weeks (2011) notes, the US is an appropriate example because, ‘as aliberal superpower, [it] is relatively unique among countries in itsability to use force to pursue non-security goals’(pp. 20). This allowsresearchers to speculate on military leaders’ preferences, given theability to choose how they exercise them.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 45
5. Coercive power and ability
I outlined in the previous sections that many factors
influence a leader’s decision to repress. Briefly summarised,
an executive’s decision is first informed through the
likelihood that he will incur the costs of his choice to
repress or not. The extent of his audience’s ability to
constrain him is often an indicator of this choice. Adding to
this, regimes with an ideology that advocates repressive
tactics against certain factions will also, in turn, likely be
more repressive overall. This situation can combine with the
former factor regarding audience costs, as in the case of
Saudi Arabia. Regime structures in which leaders are isolated
with densely consolidated power, such as in Syria under both
al-Assads, generally perceive higher levels of vulnerability
and, in turn, make greater use of coercive force to maintain
stability. Conversely, regimes like Putin’s allow a legitimate
role for opposition parties. As such, Putin cannot simply
violently eliminate these potential challengers; he must
employ alternative mechanisms to maintain control. Almost by
definition, these regimes will likely exhibit lower levels of
46 Matthew Conway
repression. Moreover, personalist and military leaders will
likely be more inclined to use repression; their role tends to
‘select’ for individuals who perceive force as the best tool
to eliminate threats. However, this keeps with the assumption
that states are fully capable of repressing to their desired
level.
As scholars are quick to point out, coercion is expensive.
States must purchase weapons, fund prisons, security forces,
and training programmes. Perhaps surprisingly, Hultquist
(2013) notes that collective repression is more cost-effective
and easier to impose than selective repression. While states
simply need to finance security forces to monitor that
citizens are adhering to policies which increase the cost of
dissent (such as limits on speech and mobility), targeted
violent repression requires a sophisticated intelligence
apparatus.32 Insurgents have the advantage of hiding in plain
site; their clandestine nature makes them difficult to
identify (Hultquist 2013). As such, Hultquist finds that
wealthy states with high coercive capability will be more
selectively repressive as a result. Given budget constraints,
many states choose to focus on building national militaries
that are meant to deter external threats with heavy artillery,32 A number of variables exacerbate the economic cost of repression. I willexplain these in depth in the next section when I describe the explanatoryvariables I account for in my analysis.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 47
aircraft, and tanks (Hultquist 2013). These are tools of war,
not counter-insurgency or socio-political control. As
Hultquist puts it, ‘Since most states lack the capacity to
distinguish between actual insurgents, their supporters, and
neutral civilians, and they must respond somehow, they rely on
what they may consider to be the next best thing: collectively
targeting the rebel recruitment pool’ (pp. 7). Guatemalan
President General Rios Montt’s infamous tactic arose from such
a situation: ‘The guerrilla is the fish. The people are the
sea. If you cannot catch the fish, you have to drain the sea’33
33 Montt’s quote references the Maoist tactic of identifying potentiallyrebellious populations and isolating them in order to spot insurgentactivity. Montt diverged from Mao in that after he identified thepotentially rebellious population, indigenous peoples, he ordered massslaughter in what is now known as the Guatemalan Genocide. Malaysia’s andSudan’s counter-insurgency tactics in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) andDarfur (2000s) are also prime examples.
48 Matthew Conway
6. Empirical analysis: hypotheses
The previous sections provide a theoretical rational for
investigating the relationship between regime type and
repression. While there are a number of studies that explore
this relationship, the two main studies, those of Davenport
(2007) and Møller and Skaaning (2014), have relatively
simplistic or incomplete analyses. Davenport primarily argues
repression corresponds with the extent to which autocracies
incorporate democratic institutions. Parties that channel
political dissent through their system need to repress less
because they have access to alternatives for socio-political
control. He touches upon variables that may influence a
leader’s decision to use force, such as how much control the
leader has over the security apparatus. However, he does not
explore regime ideology beyond arguing that single-party
regimes may emphasise bureaucracy and legality more than
others may. This would lead one to expect machines to repress
their citizens less arbitrarily.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 49
Møller and Skaaning (2013) take issue with this, stating
single-party regime ideology creates factions within society.
If a faction opposes the party line, the executive will
systematically repress the nonconformist behaviour. They argue
machines are no more or less likely to repress civil liberties
than other regimes, though their pluralist and bureaucratic
structure leads them to violate physical integrity rights
less. My analysis aligns with those of Davenport and Møller
and Skaaning by employing the same regression model, though I
diverge from them in a number of ways.
First, following Møller and Skaaning’s lead, I argue
ideology plays a significant role in regime calculus, though I
diverge from both authors in seeking to account for the extent
of an audience’s ability to impose costs upon a leader.
Furthermore, I argue a regime’s path to power – whether they
rose through a party, military hierarchy, or cunning as in
personalist regimes – strongly influences a leader’s
preference. I combine these arguments with Hultquist (2013)
and Bove, Platteau and Sekeris’ (2014) theories that wealth
determines how much a regime is capable of repressing. I also
argue, like Møller and Skaaning (2014) and Davenport (2007),
that a regime’s ability to channel dissent through the
political system influences their need to repress. However, I
50 Matthew Conway
do not attribute lower levels of repression to a leader’s
decision to pursue alternatives; rather, I maintain these
structures constrain the extent to which a leader would be
capable of repressing potential challengers. It is not that
they choose other avenues of socio-political control; rather,
they are forced to behave in accordance with their
constraints.
This theoretical foundation informs my hypotheses:
6.1 Personalist dictators – vulnerable, violent, and
unconstrained
There are several reasons to expect societies beneath
personalist dictators to experience the most repression.
First, personalist dictators, like military leaders, are
particularly likely to believe force is the most efficient and
necessary means to neutralise a threat. As a number of
scholars hold, personalist regimes will differ from single-
party governments because their leaders will often have
attained power through a series of violent events.34 Libya’s
al-Qaddafi and Syria’s al-Assad Senior are examples. This
lowers their perceptions of the costs of repression; they may
even see it as unavoidable.
34 E.g. Gurr (1998); Colgan (2010); Colgan (n.d.); Weeks 2011
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 51
Furthermore, as Davenport (2007), Geddes (2003), and Weeks
(2008; 2011) reason, personalists are the most isolated type
of leader. This has a number of implications. First, while the
leader may perceive costs to be low, there are few people
within the regime that may hold him accountable if they
disagree. The executive’s relatively greater ability to detect
dissent precludes elite’s ability to coordinate. This means
personalist leaders will only be concerned with international
sanctions, costly rebellions, and more to the extent that they
harm him; this could prolong and escalate any confrontation.
It is also unlikely elites would rebel in the first place
considering their power is often directly tied to that of
their leader.
Second, the executive has direct control over the regime’s
coercive agents. With the fewest veto players and constraints
upon his power, a dictator will be able to act as he pleases.
The fact these executives are most likely to perceive
themselves as unstable ensures they will make use of this
power to eliminate any potential challengers. The opposition
has no ability to exercise power through any legitimate
system, so the executive is not forced to confront them in
government; dissenters must also adopt unorthodox means to
52 Matthew Conway
challenge the leader’s rule. Thus, repression is often the
leader’s only option to eliminate threats.
Finally, personalist regimes often do not feature the
ideology one would find in single-party regimes or dynastic
monarchies. Even in those with totalitarian tendencies like
North Korea, the executive’s ‘in-group’ is generally limited
to his inner circle. Everybody else is considered a
potentially opposing faction. When an ideology is present –
such as in Nazi Germany of Mao’s China – a lack of alternative
methods to interact with an ‘out-group’, or checks on an
executive’s power regulating this interaction, will likely
lead repression to be even more widespread.
Thus, I predict I will confirm Davenport (2007) and Møller
and Skaaning’s (2014) findings that personalist regimes will
be the most repressive of all, regardless of the type of
repression. Similarly, I expect hybrid regimes with
personalist tendencies to be more repressive than all others
save for full-out personalist dictatorships.
6.2 Single-party regimes – constrained and ideological
The level of repression in single-party regimes is the
strongest point of academic debate. I expect Davenport (2007)
is correct in predicting their bureaucratic system will have a
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 53
moderating effect on their use of repression. Unlike
personalists, executives in machines do not have sole
authority over the tools of repression, nor are they entirely
insulated from their costs. Indeed, the reality is quite the
opposite. Rulers in single-party regimes are most likely to
face consequences for slighting their domestic audience. Of
course, this does not necessarily mean they will avoid
coercion; it simply means if there is disconnect between the
leader and his supporters, the executive must consider his
audience’s preferences. This can lead to both a start and a
cessation of coercive tactics, as in Mexico during the
Zapatista Insurgency. Unlike military regimes, machines are
composed of civilians who are not pre-conditioned to use
violence. Their relatively meritocratic rise through the
bureaucracy likely will have left them a sense for the
potential alternatives to the use of force. Moreover, as
Wintrobe shows, machines’ structure facilitates elite-
bargaining and power-sharing agreements, precluding repression
in many cases. Their bureaucracy, as Davenport (2007)
maintains, likely will combine with their concern for legality
to deter party members to advocate for arbitrary restrictions
on citizens’ personal rights and integrity.
54 Matthew Conway
However, I side with Møller and Skaaning in highlighting
the role of ideology in a single-party regime. While a concern
for legality may lead machines to respect personal integrity
rights more often, their ideology often serves as a pretext
for repressing certain factions. This is not present in
military regimes as often. As Brooker (2000) notes, ‘[o]nly a
minority of even twentieth-century military regimes either
developed or borrowed an official ideology, with its abstract
commitment to sacred ideas, principles or goals. The party
dictatorships are much more ideology-prone and in fact it is
rare to find one that does not espouse an ideology of some
description’ (pp. 109).35 This ideology, as I noted above,
creates an in-group and out-group. The in-group can enjoy
rights within the party’s defined structure, though any
diverging factions or behaviours will face intolerance and
repression.
Therefore, I hypothesise single-party regimes will be the
most respectful of personal integrity rights. However, as
Møller and Skaaning (2014) finds, I predict they will repress
civil liberties no less than military groups and approximately
the same as monarchies. Hybrid regimes with single-party
components, including party-personalist, party-military, and
party-personal-military regimes, would then all be more35 Also quoted in Møller & Skaaning 2014 pp. 8
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 55
repressive than single-party regimes given the exacerbating
components of the other forms.
6.3 Military regimes – bellicose yet constrained
First, military controlled polities are similar to
personalist regimes in their leader’s perceptions of the use
of force. However, unlike personalist regimes, military
dictatorships disperse power through a hierarchy. The leader
does not usually have direct access to armed forces like a
personalist leader would, and if he uses coercive force
inappropriately he is likely to face consequences from his
domestic audience. This is similar to a machine, however a
military leader’s domestic audience is more likely to view
force as acceptable. Importantly, military regimes also differ
in lacking ideology. They may respond violently to threats
against the state, though they will likely not interfere in
civilians’ lives beyond the extent that will preserve national
security. It is possible, however, while military regimes have
a greater willingness to use force and repress their
citizenry, they have less of a need to (Davenport 2007). The
military’s sole presence, signalling a high capacity of hard
power, may act as a deterrent against any potential
56 Matthew Conway
challengers. Finally, military regimes do not allow any
civilian opposition influence in their system, and the
military hierarchy prevents many actors from voicing
objections to the system’s policies. As in personalist
regimes, opposition activity is generally illegal. Thus, the
regime’s alternatives to repression exist in between single-
party and personalist levels.
I anticipate military regimes will be less repressive than
personalist regimes, more repressive than monarchies and
single-party regimes concerning personal integrity rights,
though approximately equally as repressive of civil rights as
monarchies and machines.
6.4 Monarchies – durable traditionalists
Monarchies mirror a number of factors found in each regime
described above, often depending on how dynastic they are.
First, they reflect single-party characteristics through their
ideology; this is currently most commonly a form of Islam.
While machines’ ideologies are almost exclusively political,
monarchies are more likely to impose moral rules on their
citizens that may infringe upon civil liberties such as
speech, mobility, and religion. Second, dynastic monarchs rule
within constraints imposed by their family or an ally, who are
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 57
generally confident in their ability to remain in power should
they oust the leader. Their primary interest is the health of
the dynasty, and if the monarch threatens this, they may
mobilise to remove him. They differ from machines, however,
because the monarch is generally more isolated in power;
removing him comes with greater costs and risk. Monarchies
heavily rely on tradition and often invoke traditional
legitimacy, so removing a monarch would defy tradition and
potentially threaten stability (Weber 1956; Møller & Skaaning
2014).
Non-dynastic monarchies have an even weaker domestic
audience. They strongly resemble personalist regimes in this
aspect, and one would expect them to repress accordingly. As
they control appointments to all ministerial posts, they
control the security apparatus and can use it at will. Non-
dynastic monarchs have four traits in common with their
counterpart. First, they are durable. As I noted earlier, they
may have invested in repression in the past, allowing them to
forgo such tactics in the present (Møller & Skaaning 2014).
Second, their leader acquires power through a traditional
secession structure. This places monarchs in between machine
executives on one end and military and personalist executives
on the other. Through their seniority-based system, leaders
58 Matthew Conway
neither inherit the values of a merit-based structure nor one
that conditions an actor toward force. Third, they often
espouse a sectarian ideology, creating an out-group that is
more likely to receive the brunt of repression. Finally,
actors in monarchies do not permit space for the opposition,
substantially reducing the possibility that executives can or
be forced to take advantage of other means of socio-political
control.
Considering these factors, I expect monarchies in general
to repress less than personalist governments in all aspects,
though more than all others when it comes to civil liberties.
Their durability and preferences will likely have them repress
physical integrity rights less than military governments,
though more than single-party regimes. I expect dynastic
monarchies to be slightly more repressive than machines though
less so than military governments. Non-dynastic monarchies
will probably occupy a position slightly above military
regimes, though below personalists.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 59
7. Research design36
36 Replication data: https://www.dropbox.com/s/g2gomljk66izend/ConwayMatthew_Repdata.sav?dl=0 ifunavailable, please contact conwaymatt2@gmail.com
60 Matthew Conway
I measure repression, my dependent variable, using eight
ordinal measures in 116 authoritarian regimes across 88
different countries for the period 1992 to 2011 (1284 country-
years). This is the full range of years for which I have
relatively complete data for all variables and without having
to reconcile the difference in domestic and international
power dynamics during and after the Cold War.37 I present three
sets of ordered logit models. The first contains four general
regime types (military, monarchy, single-party, and
personalist). The second is a more specific set with Geddes,
Wright and Frantz’s hybrids (military, indirect-military,
military-personal, monarchy, single-party, party-military,
party-personal, party-personal-military, and personalist).
Finally, the third replaces ‘monarchy’ with its dynastic and
non-dynastic variants. The following table outlines each
regime type’s sample size:
37 Scholars frequently claimed the US and the Soviet Union’s geopoliticalcompetition determined power dynamics across the globe (e.g. Fukuyama1992). The drastic change in international politics following the fall ofthe Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union in 1992 hadan inarguable effect on domestic politics throughout the world. Someauthors, like Davenport (2007), attempt to reconcile this difference usinga set of control variables. Others, like Møller and Skaaning (2014), simplyincorporate observations of the differences across this period in theiranalysis. I believe it is important for this analysis to view the periodsin isolation. For one, the larger sample size of Cold War country years mayovershadow post-Cold War regime data if not controlled correctly. Inaddition to this, I find explanatory variable data is often unreliablebefore 1990. Restricting the sample to after 1992 therefore promises morereliability.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 61
Figures 1a and 1b. Descriptive statistics for regime types, hybrid and general
Considering the ordinal nature of each dependent variable,
the series of models below is comprised of data output from
ordered logit models with robust standard errors to control
for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. I use
personalist regimes as my base variable because I predict they
will be the most repressive and they are the most numerous
case, promising the most robust data.38 To measure civil
liberties, I employ a number of datasets, both general and
specific. I follow Davenport’s lead in using the Freedom House
(2015) Freedom in the World Index, though I supplement this
analysis with seven measures from the Cingranelli, Richards
and Clay (2014) Human Rights Data (CIRI) project.39 These
38 Davenport (2007) uses democracies as his base variable, reflecting hisprimary interest in comparing democracies and autocracies. Møller &Skaaning (2014) use single-party regimes as their base variable becausetheir primary interest is refuting Davenport’s findings.39 Munck & Verkuilen (2002) and Skaaning (2009) critically assess theFreedom House measures. Freedom House measures civil liberties andpolitical rights on two 1-7 scales, seven being the most repressive. I havecombined these two indices to create a combined score out of 14.
62 Matthew Conway
include measures of worker’s rights, women’s rights, freedom
of speech, freedom of movement, religious freedom, and
personal empowerment, a combination of the former six.40 I also
use CIRI’s physical integrity violations index in order to
measure levels of violent repression.41 In order to
operationalise the variables, I process and invert them so
larger numbers are indicative of greater repression (Piazza
2015).
Included in every regression are a set of explanatory
variables that are frequently found to influence repression,
stability or conflict.42 Like Bove, Platteau and Sekeris
(2014), I log-transformed all positive and continuous
40 The freedom of movement and women’s rights measures are combinations offour CIRI idiocies measuring freedom of domestic and foreign movement andwomen’s political and economic rights. I also convert the empowerment indexto a scale of 10, from its original 14, before inverting it to avoidheteroscedasticity. Please see the CIRI Master Coding Guide for furthervariable details: Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. ChadClay. 2014. "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset."http://www.humanrightsdata.com . Version 2014.04.14.41 I find Davenport’s (2007) and Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) use of thePolitical Terror Scale (PTS) is inappropriate for investigating regime typeand repression for one key reason. In compiling data from AmnestyInternational, US State Department, and occasionally Human Rights Watchreports, the PTS factors characteristics that determine regime type intoits coding, such as constraints an executive may face in exercising lethalforce. This may have caused Davenport’s and Møller and Skaaning’s analysesto yield erroneously correlated data concerning physical integrity abuses.CIRI’s physical integrity scale, conversely, simply measures governmentsponsored activity including political imprisonment, murders, torture, etc.This measure should yield results that are more accurate. See Wood andGibney (2010) for more.42 Please see individual data sources as cited for specific explanatoryvariable details. Alternatively, reference the replication data.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 63
explanatory variables in order to reduce the influence of
outliers and decrease variance. Figure 2 provides descriptive
statistics for each dependent and explanatory variable.
First, I employ standard variables frequently found within
the human rights violations/repression literature. These
variables initially include World Bank data on population
density, total population, and gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP), the latter time
lagged one year to account for delayed effects (Population
density 2015; Total Population 2015; GDP 2015). This follows
Davenport’s (2007) reasoning that ‘greater population and
poverty increase socio-economic stress, which in turn
increases the perceived need for socio-political control’ (pp.
12). Next, I include variables that may influence levels of
political dissent and state perceptions of stability: the sum
of civil and ethnic violence and war in the state, the number
of bordering states, and the sum of all armed conflicts in
bordering states. I source all of this data from the Polity IV
Project (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2014). I expect increases in
these variables to correlate positively with increases in
repression. I also include control variables that may
influence a state’s capacity to exert force upon its citizens,
including the Bonn International Center for Conversion Global
64 Matthew Conway
Militarization Index (Grebe 2014), the World Bank’s measure of
the state’s land area in square kilometres (Land Area 2015),
and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003a) data measuring the amount of
mountainous terrain in a country. Greater military capacity
and presence in a society may increase the potential for
coercion, and I expect a larger and mountainous landmass to
hinder a state’s attempt to control all of its territory. This
would allow rebellious groups more space to mobilize and
render coercion more difficult and expensive.
Next, the World Bank’s data on a state’s natural resource
income as a percentage of its GDP is relevant to both of these
themes (Total Natural Resources 2015). Greater wealth should
decrease poverty, though its concentration in the state would
increase its ability to coerce. This variable is the source of
significant debate, however. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find
natural resource wealth induces conflict, which is in line
with Garfinkel and Skaperdas’ (2007) claim that the presence
of natural resources incentivises actors to fight more
fiercely in order to control it. Furthermore, Ross (2004)
explains how the presence of natural resources can trigger
violent state repression. On the opposite end of the debate,
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Besley and Persson (2011) show
that natural resources increase a state’s capacity and thus
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 65
have a pacifying effect. Nonetheless, others show how oil
discoveries increase authoritarianism and military spending in
autocracies, increasing a state’s ability to repress (Tsui
2011; Cotet & Tsui 2013). While a state’s decision to repress
may hinge on its capacity, as Bove, Platteau and Sekeris
(2014) point out ‘[w]ealthier autocrats…may not have
incentives in letting the country plunge into civil war,
especially in…economies that are not very resilient to violent
conflict’ (pp. 21). Natural resource wealth, therefore, may
moderate a state’s repressiveness, especially violent
varieties, which are more likely to trigger rebellion.
Finally, I include three variables concerning a state’s
demographics: the World Bank data on a state’s male population
as a percentage of the whole (Population, Female 2015) and
measures of ethnic and religious fractionalisation (Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 2003).43 Each of
these three traits concerns the homogeneity of the population.
The relationship between diversity and conflict – and
therefore stability, a key determinant of repression – is the
focus of a divided set of literature. Collier (2000) finds the
likelihood of civil unrest decreases with greater diversity,
refuting Easterly and Levine’s (1997) conclusion that ethnic43 The World Bank data concerning male population was unavailable at thetime of research, so I instead collected data on the female population andsubtracted the percentage from 100
66 Matthew Conway
diversity fuels instability. Another school of thought argues
long-standing, ‘deep’ ethnic and religious cleavages render
some countries more conflict prone and unstable than others.44
Meanwhile, Basedau and colleagues show horizontal inequalities
are often present in religiously and ethnically diverse
societies (Basedau, Pierskalla, Struver & Vullers 2015), and
Gubler and Selway (2012) find that horizontal inequalities are
a strong determinant of civil war. Considering the numerous
studies that highlight the overwhelming role of men in dissent
(Moser & Clark 2001), armed conflict (Melander 2005), and
governance (Plumper & Neumayer 2006), in addition to
Huntington’s (1996) claim that societies with a high
proportion of men will be prone to civil violence, it is clear
that these three variables deserve a place in this analysis.
Figure 2 contains descriptive statistics for all explanatory
variables:
44 E.g. Huntington (1996), Ignatieff (1993), nihan (1993), Rabushka &Shepsle (1972); Smith (1986)
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 67
Figure 2. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables
68 Matthew Conway
I set up a supplementary analysis regressing Polity IV’s
indices measuring the number of executive constraints upon a
leader and the competitiveness of political participation in
order to underscore the relationship between executive
constraints, political competitiveness and repression.45 This
strategy also diverges from Davenport, who includes them
within his initial regressions. I choose not to do this for a
similar reason that I forgo using the Political Terror Scale:
the characteristics measured in these two indices directly
influence Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) coding scheme.
Including these variables raises concerns of multicollinearity
and risks the reliability of the results.
45 Please see the Polity IV Project Dataset Users’ Manual for an in-depthexplanation of these variables (Marshall, et al. 2014).
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 69
8. Statistical analysis
Figures 3 and 4 depict the average levels of repression
per regime type across the twenty-year period in
question, explanatory variables excluded:
Figure 3. Specific Regime Types – Most repressive bolded and italicised. Dynastic
and non-dynastic monarchies are not included in this measurement and are only
included for reference purposes.
70 Matthew Conway
Figure 4. General Regime Types – Most repressive are bolded and italicised.
Figure 3 suggests the difference in repressiveness between
states ranges drastically depending on the type of repression.
This is a slight divergence from Møller and Skaaning’s (2014)
study, which finds repression levels, excluding explanatory
variables, vary negligibly.46 Figure 3 contrasts with this in
expressing much larger standard deviations. Figure 4, which
measures the four general regime types – military, monarchy,
single-party and personalist – is more in line with Møller and
Skaaning’s in deviating much less.
Monarchies stand out in Figure 3 and 4 as the most
repressive regime type in three and six of the measurements,
respectively, though only marginally so. Dynastic monarchies
46 Davenport (2007) does not do such an analysis
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 71
also defy expectations in being more pacific than non-dynastic
monarchies.47 In both figures, however, military style regimes
are easily the most violently repressive. On the opposite end
of the spectrum, Figure 4 confirms Davenport’s finding that
single-party regimes are the least repressive group, though by
an unconvincing amount. Indirect-military regimes hold the
bottom place in Figure 3 in all save women’s rights and
freedom of movement, though considering their small sample
size it is important to note machines follow up on four cases,
including Freedom House and the physical integrity score.48
Party-military regimes, as theory would predict, are slightly
more repressive. In no instance are personalist regimes the
most repressive type. Interestingly, they are least repressive
in three cases in Figure 4: worker’s rights, the CIRI
empowerment index, and freedom of religion. These absolute
measures of repression support Davenport’s (2007) findings47 This is likely because non-dynastic monarchies include Jordan andMorocco, which are both highly stable and constitutionally regulated, evenif to a small extent. Thus, even as they are technically non-dynastic, thestate has numerous alternatives to repression, less of a need to repress,and greater executive constraints. This highlights a major critique ofmacro-analyses such as this one. While 1284 country-years is a sizeablesample, specific classifications such as indirect-military, dynastic, andnon-dynastic monarchies restrict this size to two to five countries in somecategories, adding far more weight to individual country attributes to thedetriment of general regime type characteristics. Conversely, generalregime types, such as single-party (to include all single-party leaninghybrids) tend to ignore a number of important regime type characteristicsthat would help inform an analysis. See the Appendix for the explanatoryfactors concerning the hybrid monarch models48 Indirect-military regimes in the analysis include El Salvador and Guatemala, from 1992-1994 and 1992-1995, respectively.
72 Matthew Conway
that single-party regimes are the least repressive and Møller
and Skaaning’s (2014) that monarchies are the most repressive
of civil liberties, though least repressive of physical
integrity rights.
The following statistical analysis will test whether or
not these absolute measures withstand the inclusion of
explanatory variables.
8.1 Results
The data in Figures 3 and 4 provide rough confirmation of
a number of theories above, specifically those concerning
monarchies as the least violently repressive and single-party
regimes as the least repressive overall, constituting a
‘tyrannical peace’, in Davenport’s words (2007, pp. 1). Figure
5 shows the relationship between executive constraints and
competitiveness of political participation, as measured in
Polity IV (Marshall, et al. 2014). Figures 6 and 7, meanwhile,
reveal the results of the empirical analysis. Each figure
contains eight models investigating the relationship between
regime type and a different variety of repression.
8.1.1 Explanatory variable results
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 73
The first set of explanatory variables discussed above –
total population, population density, and lagged
GDP/capita/PPP – slightly defy expectations. Population
density is positively correlated with repression and is highly
significant, but lagged GDP/capita/PPP fluctuates. GDP is
positively correlated with labour, speech, and religious
freedoms, though negatively so with the Freedom House Index
and physical integrity rights as Bove, Platteau and Sekeris
(2014) found. Total population is significant, though is
negatively correlated with repression on all fronts. This
suggests increased population density heightens perceptions of
political control, not population growth. Interestingly,
increases in the male population are related to increases in
repression; this is especially true concerning restrictions in
women’s rights. Ethnic and religious fractionalisations are
generally insignificant, buy are highly significant and
negative against the Freedom House Index and, in the case of
religious fractionalisation, physical integrity.
Variables reflecting levels of political dissent and
related to state perceptions of stability – the number of
bordering states and the number of conflicts in and around the
state – are all highly significant and positive. Similarly,
the amount of mountainous territory and landmass are
74 Matthew Conway
significant and positive, implying states with a large and
difficult territory to police will feel more insecure and thus
more likely to exercise coercive methods to increase control.
The Militarization Index is generally insignificant, though it
is positive and significant concerning restrictions of
religious freedoms. However, lagged state natural resource
income as a percentage of GPD is highly significant and
positively correlated with repression in all models except
concerning religious freedom, implying that state wealth is a
factor in its decision to repress, supporting Bove, Platteau
and Sekeris’ (2014) and Hultquist’s (2013) findings.49 Finally,
Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) prediction that state durability
would negatively correlate with physical integrity violations
is reflected in the model, however it is positive and
significant when run against civil liberty-related repression
types.50 This supports my theories concerning repression in
monarchies.
8.1.2 Regime type results
As expected, the models regressing executive restraints
and repression reveal states with unlimited executive
authority are the most repressive; those whose executives
subordinated or entrenched in a party, such as found in a49 Bove, Platteau & Sekeris 2014 and Hultquist 200?50 Møller & Skaaning 2014
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 75
single-party regime, are the least repressive. Also
unsurprising are the results concerning competitiveness of
political participation: those ranked ‘transitional, moving
toward or from competition’ are the most violently repressive,
though least concerning civil rights. As these regimes also
happen to be the least stable, this makes sense. Following
similar logic, it is also expected that ‘factional – parochial
or ethnic based’ cases are the second most repressive overall.
Regimes with ‘suppressed’ and limited competition are the
least repressive; while those that allow no opposition are the
most repressive concerning speech and the Freedom House Index
measuring civil liberties and political rights. The former
includes single-party regimes, while the latter most
prominently features personalists.
76 Matthew Conway
Figure 5. Order logit models - executive constrains and competitiveness ofpolitical participation51
With respect to the grouped regime type models,
personalist regimes are statistically the most repressive of
all forms, with monarchies overall the least; military and
single-party fluctuate in the middle depending on the form of
repression. Interestingly, this ranking partially breaks down
when I incorporate Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) hybrid
regime types into the analysis. The subsequent models
51 See Figure 12 in appendix for figure’s explanatory variables
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 77
incorporating hybrid regimes push personalist regime types to
the second or fourth place in terms of repressiveness.
Instead, party-personal regimes are consistently the most
repressive. The results concerning dynastic and non-dynastic
monarchies are mixed, though monarchies as a group are
definitively the most repressive of women’s rights. Beyond
that, monarchies are the least repressive of each regime type
concerning civil liberties and physical integrity rights. This
is a direct contradiction to Davenport’s (2007) findings,
though strong support for Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) theory
concerning regime durability.
Figure 6. Order logit models with hybrid monarchies52
52 See Figure 13 in Appendix for the full figure’s explanatory variables.
78 Matthew Conway
While machines are certainly less likely to repress in any
model compared to personalist regimes, each model shows that
military regimes are less repressive. An important caveat here
is that the addition of personalist elements to a regime type,
as coded in the hybrid regimes, renders that regime type among
the most coercive. Hence, the most repressive regime in the
grouped types is personalist, and similarly the top three most
repressive, regardless of the form of coercion, are military-
personal, party-personal, and personalist governments.
Interestingly, non-dynastic monarchies are generally more
repressive than single-party and military regimes, though
despite their personalist elements they are still less
repressive than dynastic monarchies. This suggests that
ideology plays a more important role in repression than
executive constraints, though it is important to consider how
the small sample size for these two monarchy types influences
the results. As I noted earlier, the fact that Jordan and
Morocco, two constitutionally constrained, albeit autocratic
states, make up the majority of non-dynastic country years is
likely a reason for the unexpected results. This highlights
the importance of country-level effects.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 81
Figure 8. Order logit models with military, monarchy, single-party, and
personalist regimes53
Indeed, a key concern in forming this analysis was that
regime type might turn out to be a proxy for democracy, moving
from personalist governments as the most autocratic to single-
party regimes as the least. As conventional wisdom holds, the
most autocratic states are often the most repressive (e.g.
Davenport 2007; Poe & Tate 1994). With this in mind, it makes
sense that personalist regimes and hybrid regimes with
personalist traits are the most repressive. In order to test
for this, I follow Weeks’ (2008) lead and take two approaches.
First, I re-analyse the data in an ordered logit model with
the Polity IV autocracy scores to determine how the level of
executive authority may explain a state’s repressive53 Explanatory variables remained largely unchanged. Please see the Appendixfor Figure 14 with explanatory variables
82 Matthew Conway
tendencies; the most autocratic score, 10, is the base
variable.54 The results indicate authoritarianism marginally
trends toward repression as prior research has confirmed,
though it is not consistently an inverse relationship. This
suggests there is more inherent in the relationship between
regime type and repression than authoritarianism. Figure 9
depicts these results.55
Figure 9. Repression and the Polity IV autocracy score – 0 (dem) - 10 (auth)
54 Polity IV’s Polity score measures executive authority on a 21-point scalefrom -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) representingkey qualities in executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority,and political competition. Their autocracy score is a variance of this andsimply marks every ‘democratic’ score as 0. This will increase the samplesize and highlight the influence of authoritarianism in the analysis(Marshall, et al. 2014)55 The freedom of speech and religion models yielded invalid results withparameter estimates trending toward infinity. These are omitted.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 83
As a further robustness check, I again replicate Weeks’
methods and average each regime type’s Polity score to see if
one category is more authoritarian than another is. The
results, depicted in Figure 10, show authoritarianism is
evenly dispersed throughout the dataset. While personalist
dictatorships and hybrid regimes featuring personalist traits
are highly autocratic, party-military regimes and monarchies
have the highest average scores. This indicates regime type is
not a proxy for authoritarianism, nor is authoritarianism the
sole factor needed to determine repression levels.
Figure 10. Average polity scores in sample by regime 1992-2011
84 Matthew Conway
An additional concern is that a number of highly
repressive cases are skewing the data. In order to test for
this, I run another set of ordered logit models with the
regime categories specified in Figure 10, though this time I
omit the top ranked Freedom House and CIRI physical integrity
rights abusers: China (single-party), Eritrea (party-
personal), Myanmar (military), Iraq (personalist), Sudan
(personalist) and North Korea (party-personal). Figure 11
depicts these results. Removing these six states from the
analysis has little effect on the results. In both robustness
checks for the Freedom House Index and the physical integrity
scale, personalist regimes and hybrids remain the more
repressive forms, while the military governments, monarchies,
and single-party regimes remain the least. The only difference
is personalist regimes lose their significance in the Freedom
House model, and party-personal regimes gain significance and
rise two ranks to become the most violently repressive
regimes.
Figure 11. Freedom House and physical integrity score comparison – originaland check
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 85
To summarize, I find, clearly and consistently, state
characteristics including size and topography directly
influence a state’s ability to control its population;
numerous other variables, including population density and the
incidence of war and violence, further support my theory that
perceptions of state stability directly influence an
executive’s decision to repress his citizens. The data
suggests his ability to do so further augments this. Finally,
I extend Bove, Platteau and Sekeris’ (2014) conclusion that
oil wealth affects the level of state sponsored repression to
general natural resource wealth, building upon Ross’s
hypotheses and showing that this wealth affects all types of
repression. The clearest and most useful conclusion from this
analysis is a leader’s decision to use coercive tactics is a
function of his perception of stability, his freedom to exert
force at will – influenced by the number of constraints on his
behaviour – and his capacity to do so.
9. Conclusion
Repression seems to be an inseparable component of
autocracies; indeed, media, governments, and academics often
refer to repression as an authoritarian tendency or autocratic
behaviour. A number of studies investigate the logic behind
these references and find authoritarianism and repression
86 Matthew Conway
often do increase in tandem. Researchers hardly apply scrutiny
more specifically. As a large swath of the literature
testifies, democracies are clearly less repressive than
autocracies. However, how does repression vary between non-
democratic forms of government? To increase stability, regimes
increase their coercive capacity, restrict freedoms to raise
the cost of dissent, and violently eliminate challengers as
they arise, in turn consolidating power and deterring future
opposition. I argue specific characteristics inherent in a
regime’s structure influence how a leader perceives the
stability of his rule and his ability to use coercive force.
These characteristics are the primary factors that inform an
executive’s decision to repress.
Considering these traits, I predicted repression will
increase with greater real and perceived levels of instability
and decrease as an executive’s authority becomes more
constrained, all else equal. Compounding this analysis is
regime preferences toward repression. I further maintained
regimes whose elites are ‘conditioned’ to view repression as
an efficient and necessary form of socio-political control
will be more inclined to coercion. I also theorised ideology
will create an out-group in society, which the state is likely
to repress and lead to overall increases in repression.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 87
My results confirm these theories, showing the least
constrained and isolated leaders – personalists – are overall
the most repressive. Furthermore, violent repression increases
in states with greater (perceived) instability, as indicated
by the explanatory variables concerning armed conflict, state
size and topography, and the competitiveness of political
participation. Unsurprisingly, civil liberty restrictions are
specifically more likely to increase with denser populations
and decreased political competitiveness.
My findings are slightly at odds with the two most
impactful studies on the subject to date. First, Davenport’s
(2007) study finds single-party regimes ‘possess some of the
characteristics of democracies which reduce state repression,
incorporating a greater population into the political process’
and thus allowing the government to pursue alternative forms
of socio-political control (pp. 500). While conventional
wisdom supports this finding, Moller and Skaaning (2014)
partially contradict it when they incorporate ideological
leanings into their analysis, finding single-party regimes are
no more likely to repress civil liberties than any other,
though they are less likely to repress physical integrity
rights. This is also my conclusion. Finally, both find
personalist regimes are likely to repress the most, but it is
88 Matthew Conway
important to note neither author considers in their analysis
the costs which an executive is likely to incur for ‘reckless’
behaviour in the eyes of his domestic audience. Thus, while we
reach similar findings, we do so from different paths.
While the utility of findings considering general regime
type is arguably of limited value at the micro-level, the
analysis of disaggregated factors including executive
constraints and basic regime structure provide a basis from
which diplomats and advocates can seek to influence repressive
states. The absolute measures of repression shown in Figures 3
and 4 underscore the fact that regime classification is
ultimately a stand-in for a number of traits. While regimes
within the same category are the most similar, they are
nonetheless unique in their own right. As Davenport (2007)
writes, while it would be inappropriate to become complacent
with a specific type of autocracy, knowing which
characteristics aggregate to form a ‘lesser of evils’ from a
human rights standpoint permits actors to strive toward a
least repressive option when not all solutions are equally
attainable (Davenport 2007). This may not immediately create
durable domestic peace, but it certainly assists those
searching for it.
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 89
A. Appendix.
Figure 12. Order logit models - executive constraints and competitiveness of
political participation – explanatory variables
Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 91
Figure 14. Order logit models with military, monarchy, single-party, and
personalist regimes with explanatory variables
92 Matthew Conway
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