Regime type and the determinants of repression - working paper

Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression

By

Matthew R. Conway

Working Paper – please do not cite without consulting

author.

Word Count: 15,068

25 August 2015

2 Matthew Conway

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Abstract:

Repression and authoritarianism are seemingly inseparableconcepts, often defined in close relation to one another. Itis clear that some states are more repressive than others are,and a number of studies seek explanations. Some exploresituational variables, such as growth rates and conflictlevels, while others address institutional design, seeking toapply theories of a ‘democratic peace’ to the domestic arena.Beyond this, the existing literature offers scant informationrelating state repression and regime type. A review of theliterature reveals only two comprehensive studies on thematter: one author argues democratic institutions decreaserepression, while the other reappraises this study and findsideology is of overriding importance.

This study investigates these contradicting sets ofexpectations and poses a more holistic theory. Its primaryarguments rest on a key assumption: regimes have an objectivereason to repress, based on a complex cost-benefit analysisconcerning their intention to stay in power. Rather than asingle variable, this paper contends specific characteristicsinherent in a regime’s structure, its ideology, and capacityinfluence how a leader perceives the stability of theexecutive’s rule and its ability to use coercive force.Considering this, this paper theorises repression will

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Regime Type and the Determinants of Repression 3

increase with greater real and perceived levels of instabilityand decrease as an executive’s authority becomes moreconstrained, all else equal.

The essay begins with a discussion on repression as a concept.Second, it seeks to explain what motivates leaders to repress,exploring ideological differences, regime preferences, andstructural diversity. The latter half of the paper containsthe empirical analysis’ foundation and results. This analysisreveals that leaders who are most insulated from checks andbalances, notably personalist regimes and those withpersonalist tendencies, are the most repressive. However,empirical analysis determines there is little distinctionbetween regimes that repress least.

Table of Contents1. Introduction 52. Deconstructing repression 9

2.1 Why leaders repress 93. Domestic actor sanctioning in the domestic arena 12

3.1 Regime types 12

4 Matthew Conway

3.2 Regime structure and executive constraints 153.2.1 Mexico 183.2.2 Syria 20

3.3 Regime structure and executive constraints continued21

4. Regime preferences and repression 225. Coercive power and ability 296. Empirical analysis: hypotheses 31

6.1 Personalist dictators – vulnerable, violent, and unconstrained 32

6.2 Single-party regimes – constrained and ideological33

6.3 Military regimes – bellicose yet constrained 356.4 Monarchies – durable traditionalists 35

7. Research design 388. Statistical analysis 44

8.1 Results 468.1.1 Explanatory variable results 468.1.2 Regime type results 47

9. Conclusion 56A. Appendix 58B. References 61


1. Introduction

Repression and authoritarianism are seemingly inseparable

concepts. Global events and media testify to this: Frontline

documentaries offer rare glimpses into tyrannical North Korea;

Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström lambastes Saudi

Arabia for abusing women and minorities’ rights; and the

United States (US) sanctions Iran and Cuba for violating human

rights. Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia are all

perceived in these contexts as repressive and tyrannical, with

little nod to the distinctions between them. Meanwhile, Cold

War-style politics persist in propagating a dichotomous fight

of good (freedom) against evil (tyranny and repression) (Bush

2003).

These perspectives persist today in nongovernmental

organisations’ (NGO) human rights campaigns and governmental

diplomatic action (Bush 2003; Amnesty 2015). Even when

observers acknowledge some states to be more repressive than

others, they do not necessarily understand why.1 Some studies

show regime structure to play an integral role (Davenport

2007) while others claim their ideology is paramount (Møller &

1 Repression and coercion are used interchangeably in this paper.Realistically these are slightly different terms, though for the sake offluency this paper I approach them as synonymous.

6 Matthew Conway

Skaaning 2014; Poe & Tate 1994). 2 The reasons have important

implications for NGO funding, diplomacy, and research. As

Davenport (2007) notes, knowing if and why one type of

government is more repressive allows socio-political activists

to target campaigns and governments to focus diplomatic

efforts.

The existing literature offers scant information relating

state repression and regime type, though it has made progress

in focusing on autocrat behaviour internationally and theories

concerning the incentives and constraints dictators face.3

These studies almost invariably note repression as an

authoritarian tactic leaders use to maintain or consolidate

their rule.4 However, in discussing regime stability and

autocracies’ efforts to maintain rule, most authors fail to

answer a number of important questions: Why do some

authoritarian regimes repress more and/or differently than

others? Is there a correlation between regime type and

2 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) define regime: “A regime is a set offormal and/or informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. Animportant element of this set of rules is the identity of the group fromwhich leaders can be chosen (e.g., in a professionalized military regime,the group from which leaders can be chosen is officers of very high rank).”3 E.g. Weeks 2008; 2011; Tullock 1987; Wintrobe 1998; Konrad & Skaperdas2007;2015; Fearon 19944 I will use the terms executive, leader, autocrat, and dictatorshipinterchangeably when referring generally to the leading individual or bodyin an authoritarian government


repression? This study builds upon existing literature, using

a quantitative approach, in order to answer these questions.

A number of authors attempt to find answers, though their

success varies. Indeed, the most prominent studies on

repression focus primarily on comparisons between democracies

and autocracies, solely military-based dictatorships or

single-party regimes (also known as machines) (Poe & Tate

1994; Davenport 2004), or variances in repression in a

dictatorship over time (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith & Siverson

2005; Rørbæk et al 2014).5 Others only focus on a single type

of repression, such as the violent or non-violent varieties,

or repression that limits either public or personal liberties

(Møller & Skaaning 2013). Taken together, these studies

produce a strong, albeit incomplete, base upon which to

understand repression. A review of the literature reveals only

two studies that posit comprehensive theories concerning the

relationship between regime type and repression. A third study

prominent study supplements these two with strong analysis of

disaggregated regime qualities including wealth and size.

Christian Davenport conducted the first prominent study

focusing on authoritarian regime structure and repression in

2007, building upon past studies that explore singular regimes5 E.g. Poe & Tate 1994; Davenport 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005;Rørbæk, et al. 2014

8 Matthew Conway

irrespective of others (e.g. military and leftist regimes in

Poe and Tate 1994).6 However, Davenport seems to consider a

regime’s structure only to the extent it is able to channels

and allows for dissent within its system, reducing the form

dissent takes and the need to repress it. With this logic, he

concludes single-party polities are the least repressive form.

While Davenport acknowledges repression incurs a number of

costs, he does not consider how different regimes may react to

these costs, and the effects these will have on different

leaders’ power. Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) paper challenges

Davenport’s main finding that single-party regimes are less

repressive overall, emphasising how Davenport neglected to

consider the strong ideological components of machines that

lead to increases in repression. The authors claim that these

components counterbalance any characteristics that may

moderate a single-party regime’s repressive tendencies. Møller

and Skaaning’s results are inconclusive concerning repression

of civil liberties and determine that regime type is an

unreliable indicator of this type of repression. Nevertheless,

personalist and military autocracies, they find, are more

6 The key focus of Davenport’s (2007) paper is to find a ‘tyrannicalpeace’, which he states to refer to a ‘least bad option’ in terms of staterepressiveness. Governments and non-governmental organisations would thenstrive to convert an autocracy to this sort before transitioning todemocracies, a more stable incremental approach to democratisation. Inaddition, these actors would be able to focus their efforts on the mostrepressive regimes. This is also a motivation for this study.


violently repressive. Like Davenport’s study, the authors do

not consider how costs of repression differ between regimes,

and do not extend their analysis to consider each regime’s

domestic audience. I seek to reconcile the differences between

these studies and fill in the gaps where they exist. In a

third piece, while authors Bove, Platteau and Sekeris (2014)

do not approach regime type specifically, they produce a

substantive study analysing which qualities in an autocratic

regime are most associated with repression. This study

naturally complements any investigation into regime type and

helps inform how different regimes would handle costs to their

behaviour.

While these three studies provide valuable insight into

the relationship between authoritarianism and repression, they

do not provide a convincing explanation accounting for

differences between regimes, if any in fact exist. Moreover,

the very fact that they disagree is cause enough for further

analysis. This paper extends and seeks to clarify Davenport

(2007) and Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) arguments that regime

structure and ideology strongly influence a ruling elite’s

decision calculus. I diverge from all previous studies,

however, when I apply Weeks’ (2008; 2011) theories on

authoritarian audience costs to the domestic arena. I predict

10 Matthew Conway

the more likely regime leaders are to bear the costs of

repression, the more likely they are to exercise restraint in

employing it. Other scholars hypothesise similarly, though

they either understate or misinterpret how repression affects

leaders. Drawing from Bove, Platteau and Sekeris (2014) and

others’ studies on incentives and constraints in regime types,

I will show an executive’s decision to repress is complex and

largely dependent upon a variety of factors unique to the

given regime type.7

I begin with a discussion on repression – its definitions,

variances, causes, and correlates. Second, I delve into

different theories seeking to explain what motivates leaders

to repress. While it is possible some autocrats are tyrannical

for its own sake, this paper will assume there is an objective

reason to repression based upon a complex cost-benefit

analysis concerning their intention to stay in power.8 This

explanation will include a section distinguishing between7 Also see Garnet & Regan 1996; Piazza 2015; Svolik 20138 I assume throughout this paper that the level of repression and theinitial choice to repress is the responsibility of a central decision-maker. Some may challenge the assumption that leaders can entirely controlthe intensity of force coercive actors exert or even its scope. Whilesecurity forces may act independently, I assume this central authority hasauthority over these actors and can ultimately control their behaviour(Garnet & Regan 1996). This may ignore a number of repressive incidents –e.g. isolated security force committed atrocities – though I suspect thesestrongly correlate with how likely the security forces are to incurpunishment for their unsanctioned actions. The extent to which an executiveallows his agents to operate without restriction is therefore an indicatorof how repressive a regime is willing to be.


different types of regimes, arguing the diversity in

autocratic regime structures plays a pivotal role in

determining their behaviour. I supplement this argument in

discussing regime ideology and leadership preference. In the

latter half of the paper, I lay out my empirical analysis’

foundation and results.

2. Deconstructing repression

There seems to be little academic debate concerning the

definition of repression. To draw from Davenport (2000),

state-driven repression is ‘behavior that is applied by

governments in an effort to bring about political quiescence

and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form

of restriction or violation of political and civil liberties’

(pp.6). This behaviour entails applications of hard and soft

12 Matthew Conway

power that impede citizens’ freedoms of speech, religion,

movement, and more; the term encompasses surveillance,

torture, disappearances, and mass killing (Davenport 2007).

This definition implies there are a number of strands of

repression.

Repression that restricts civil liberties refers to

government policies that restrict freedom of movement,

religion, speech, education, and work (Hibbs 1973). Violent

forms of repression are also referred to as physical integrity

violations. This type encompasses disappearances,

imprisonment, rape, murder, and political terror, among others

(Davenport & Armstrong 2004).9 While both types of repression

aim to deter or silence threats, there are important

differences between them: restrictions on civil liberties are

generally attempts to modify behaviour and attitudes in

raising the costs of dissent (Davenport 2007). Violent

repression, similarly, seeks to deter and silence threats

through eliminating those who may pose them (Poe & Tate 1994).

2.1 Why leaders repress

A large swath of literature investigates what motivates

governments and leaders to repress their citizens. The

findings are complex. The most persuasive line of reasoning9 Also see: Poe, Tate & Keith 1999, Poe & Tate 1994; Fjelde 2010


holds that repression is more likely when opponents directly

challenge the ruler’s power or the leader perceives an

imminent challenge, implying coercion is a pre-emptive measure

or reaction to dissent and political instability (Davenport

2007; Vreeland 2008).10 If the regime or its supporters did not

face any serious challenge, it would likely not use repressive

tactics for lack of reason to incur the potential costs; this

is especially true concerning violent tactics (Gurr 1988).

Continuing this logic, one can safely assume the more unstable

or vulnerable the executive perceives himself to be, the more

likely he is to repress.11 However, repression is not an

executive’s only form of socio-political control.

A second strand of research concerns ‘the authoritarian

bargain’, addressing alternatives to repression (Desai &

Yousef 2009). These studies maintain that authoritarian

regimes will resort to a form of coercion to rule if co-option

does not suffice (Wintrobe 2000). In other words, autocrats

rule through a combination of encouraging loyalty and

repression. This statement clarifies the ‘bargain’ to support

Gartner and Regan’s (1996) assumption that repression is a

continuous tactic that the ruling elite incrementally applies,10 This assumes a leader’s primary goal is to maintain power. See: Tullock198711 As leaders in modern authoritarian regimes are invariably male, I willuse ‘he/his’ to refer to the executive position rather than a genderneutral term.

14 Matthew Conway

‘expecting that a little more repression might serve both to

placate domestic coalitions and sufficiently threaten the

political opposition….[A]t equilibrium, decision makers choose

the level of violence that maximizes their expected payoffs’

(pp. 280). Alternatives to repression include divide-and-rule

strategies, co-option (de Luca, Sekeris & Vargas 2014), power

sharing and bargaining (Morelli & Rohner 2013), or even

optimal succession rules (Bove et al., 2014; Konrad &

Skaperdas 2007; 2015). One can assume the existence of

alternatives varies based on the fact different types of

regimes have varying structures that dictate power sharing and

succession rules. This would increase the likelihood of

repression in some cases, as the expectation concerning

payoffs also varies. Considering the dynamics of the

‘authoritarian bargain’ and the leader’s perceptions of

stability, Davenport (2007) is correct in noting that ‘the key

to understanding why repression is used lies in comprehending

the factors that influence the political leader’s’ cost-

benefit analysis (pp. 488). The articles that seek to

understand the costs and benefits of repression are relatively

few, but substantive.

First, coercive force requires expensive resources such as

weapons, security forces, and an intelligence apparatus


(Davenport 2007; Bove et al., 2014; Hultquist 2013). These

costs increase with population and land mass/topography and of

course become relatively more expensive when a leader’s

economic resources decrease. There are also indirect economic

costs to repression. Francisco (1995) and Ross (2004)

separately show repressive tactics may bolster the opposition,

spurring a cyclical relationship between repression and

dissent. Meanwhile, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) note that

loss of life and assets in armed conflicts negatively affects

wealth generation. Escribá-Folch and Wright (2010), moreover,

observe that repression can trigger potentially destabilising

sanctions and international isolation. Finally, Svolik (2013)

and Acemoglu, Ticci and Vindigni (2010) show that repression

can cause the repressive agents to turn on the executive as

seen in Egypt and, to an extent, Syria since 2011. Perhaps the

most important factor influencing the political leader’s

decision to use repressive tactics concerns the leader’s

perception of the utility of repression, his ideological base,

and the likelihood that he will bear these costs. Jessica

Weeks’ (2008; 2011) research on autocratic audience costs and

a leader’s choices to initiate inter-state conflict seem most

relevant to this analysis, complemented by Davenport (2007)

and Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) studies.

16 Matthew Conway

3. Domestic actor sanctioning in the domestic arena

Weeks’ (2005) essay on differing autocratic audience costs

has one main applicable point: ‘domestic actors can and will

coordinate to sanction the leader’ (pp. 5). As Weeks (2008),

Schelling (1963), and Fearon (1994) write, ‘audience costs’

refers to the idea that observers can determine the

credibility of a leader’s threats in international crises

based on his potential to suffer domestic consequences for

making empty threats. Investigating how domestic institutions

affect autocratic leaders’ decisions to initiate military


conflicts, Weeks (2011) similarly maintains that ‘institutions

in some kinds of dictatorships allow regime insiders to hold

leaders accountable for their foreign policy decisions’ (pp.

1). These theories have direct applicability to a leader’s

domestic policy.

Before delving into them however, it is important to

understand the differences between each regime type.

3.1 Regime types

In arguing that regime structure plays an integral role in

informing a leader’s decision whether to repress, it is

necessary to measure regime differences according to

conditions that may constrain a leader from repressing.

Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) classification of

autocracies is one of the most complete and useful datasets in

this regard.12 First, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz do not include

democratic polities, small states (fewer than 1,000,000

people), warlord ruled, foreign occupied and provisional

governments, or those that lacked control of over 50% of their

territory. Beyond that, their “definition of regimes

emphasizes the rules that: (1) identify the group from which

leaders can come; and (2) determine who influences leadership

12 Other studies that have used Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s classificationsinclude Weeks 2008; Davenport 2007; Møller & Skaaning 2014.

18 Matthew Conway

choice and policy" (Geddes, et al. 2014 pp. 5). Coded regime

types used in this analysis include the following: monarchy,

personalist, military, single-party, indirect-military, party-

personalist, party-military, military-personalist, and party-

military-personalist.13 Geddes categorises countries according

to a series of yes/no questions: for example, whether the

leader controls appointments and the security apparatus or if

domestic institutions such as a politburo exist in more than

name (Geddes, et al. 2014). Corresponding with Weeks’(2008)

and Davenport’s (2007) analyses, I choose to use Geddes,

Wright, and Frantz’s regime set because each regime is

qualified primarily according to factors useful to assessing

the extent of differences in coercion across regime

classifications.

Single-party regimes are ‘those in which the party had

some influence over policy, controlled most access to

political power and government jobs, and had functioning

local-level organizations’ (Geddes 2003, pp 72).14 Accordingly,

these regimes have legislative bodies, which function as more

13 This study further diverges from previous ones in that others, notablyDavenport (2007), Bove, Platteau and Sekeris (2014) and Møller and Skaaning2014, did not include monarchies in their studies and generally grouphybrid regimes as a single type. (Geddes, Wright & Frantz 2014) alsoincludes oligarchies in their classification, though in my sample size thiswould only include South Africa between 1992 and 1994. I omit thisclassification for this reason.14 Also quoted in Weeks 2008 pp. 46


than ‘rubber-stamp’ organisations, whose members are

competitively elected from within the party. None of the

leader’s relatives holds high office in single-party regimes:

appointments to which party elites control. As such, the

leader lacks full autonomy and the elites will likely remain

in power if the leader leaves office.

Military regimes are ‘governed by an officer or retired

officer, with the support of the military establishment and

some routine mechanism by which high-level officers could

influence policy choice and appointments’ (Geddes 2003, pp

223-227).15 Similar to single-party regimes, a group of elites,

typically within a military officer council or junta, controls

leadership transfers. The leader also does not control the

armed forces, as the military hierarchy is preserved and thus

a security apparatus remains under the military’s purview.

According to Geddes (2003), ‘merit and seniority [are] the

main bases for promotion, rather than loyalty or ascriptive

characteristics’, and the leader does not have the ability to

murder or imprison dissenting officers at will (pp. 226).16

Also like single-party regimes, the military hierarchy will

not collapse if the leader loses power. Indirect-military rule

is similar to military rule, though differs in that ‘formal

15 Also quoted in Weeks 2008 pp. 4616 Also quoted in Weeks 2008 pp. 46

20 Matthew Conway

political leaders are chosen through competitive elections,

but the military either prevents parties that would attract

large numbers of voters from participating or controls key

policy choices’ (Geddes, et al. pp. 8).

Starkly diverging from these two types, personalist

regimes are perhaps the prototypical dictatorships. In entire

control of the security and intelligence apparatuses, the

leader oversees appointments to high office and can punish at

will those who fall out of his favour. Such punishment can

entail removal, demotion, imprisonment, and murder. As Weeks

(2008) notes, dictators such as Chile’s Pinochet ‘often used

their control over appointments to frequently rotate elites

through different officers so that they did not have an

opportunity to build an independent power base.’ (pp. 50)

Personalist dictators ensure a system in which elites’ power

is wholly dependent upon the survival of the leader. Hybrids

of military and single-party regimes feature the

characteristics of the first listed regime most prominently

(Geddes, et al. 2014).17

Finally, monarchies come in two general forms – dynastic

and non-dynastic – though Geddes, Wright and Frantz code them17 I will not explain the differences between the hybrid regimes here. Essentially, hybrid regimes are simply the first listed regime with tendencies from the second list regime. For more, see Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2013.


together. Herb best differentiates between the two, arguing

that dynastic monarchies feature family members who share an

interest in maintaining the dynasty’s stability (Herb 1999).

Family members obtain power through seniority, though the

monarch heavily influences appointments as the chief

executive. The monarch also does not maintain full control of

the security apparatus. In this regard, dynastic monarchies

closely resemble single-party regimes (Herb 1999). Conversely,

non-dynastic monarchies feature many personalist

characteristics. Family members within non-dynastic regimes

are excluded from exercising true political power until they

inherit the throne, though the monarch will reward those most

loyal with high level positions that generally lack real

power. Like personalists, he exercises full authority over

security and coercive forces, and generally lacks

accountability compared to dynastic monarchs (Herb 1999). As

Herb’s distinction between dynastic and non-dynastic

monarchies is important to understanding different leaders’

behaviour, I modify Geddes data to account for this.18

Curiously, while the number of single-party and military

regimes has fluctuated considerably since the Second World

18 I use Conrad, Conrad & Young’s (2014) data on dynastic and non-dynasticmonarchies, from their paper. This data matches exactly with Herb’s wherepossible, though I use this instead of Herbs because his only accounts forMiddle Eastern monarchies, therefore excluding Swaziland and Nepal.

22 Matthew Conway

War, the number of monarchies has remained stable. While this

implies monarchies are inherently more durable than other

regime types, it is interesting to consider how it may also

speak to their insulation from international power politics;

single-party and military dictatorships appeared and fell in

large conjunction with US and Soviet geopolitical agendas

(Geddes, et al. 2014). A regime’s durability may also affect

its use of violent repression. Because regimes are more likely

to exercise coercive force in their youth to consolidate

power, one can expect repression to decrease with time, all

else equal (Møller & Skaaning 2014). In investing in

repression early on, executives are signalling to potential

opponents their ability and willingness to use force, allowing

them to lay off repression in their later years. There is

little reason to believe durability would affect the

restriction of civil liberties, however. Having rid itself of

challengers in its early years, it is likely the state would

continue to impose restrictions in order to maintain a high

cost of dissent, further preventing them from needing to

employ violent force against any new opposition movements.

3.2 Regime structure and executive constraints

Having outlined these distinctions, we can now consider

how differing structures influence an autocrat’s decision-


making calculus. Weeks’ (2008) hypotheses rest upon the idea

that domestic actors will sanction a leader for irresponsible

and undesirable behaviour, though actors’ abilities to

coordinate in order to sanction a leader vary across

autocratic regimes. Some dictatorships, especially personalist

regimes like that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, control all

aspects of the state apparatus, thus preventing elites from

influencing a leader’s behaviour significantly (Geddes 2003;

Weeks 2011). Others, like non-personalist regimes, typically

face powerful domestic audiences composed of regime elites

(Weeks 2008). Weeks primarily argues in her studies that a

regime’s likeliness to act aggressively abroad is inversely

related to the constraints the leader faces; Davenport (2007)

argues similarly in discussing the role of executive

constraints on repressive tendencies. Leaders with strong

incentives to preserve the favour of their supporters in their

domestic audiences will work more diligently to adhere to

their preferences—or risk punishment.

As I have noted above, repression comes with a number of

costs. Those interested in repressing generally do so in order

to preserve a status quo when the benefits of repression

outweigh the potential costs. Perceptions of benefits and

costs, however, may differ between an executive and his

24 Matthew Conway

domestic audience. Let us consider the potential outcomes

should an executive favour repression, though his domestic

audience does not given their likelihood to bear its costs. In

such a situation, most studies hold that if audiences perceive

their interests to be under threat and the costs of deposing

the leader do not exceed the benefits, they will punish the

leader for policy failures, often with removal; conversely,

they will reward leaders for success (Weeks 2011).

An audience’s ability to do so, of course, varies; Weeks

refers to their obstacles to check a leader as coordination

costs. ‘The situation most strongly resembles a coordination

game rather than a prisoner’s dilemma because no individual

wants to be the “odd one out”’(Weeks 2008, pp. 38). Therefore,

“her strategy depends on her expectations about the other

players’ actions” (pp. 38). As Weeks notes, individuals

fearing retaliation from the executive have incentive to

conceal their intentions to participate in an ouster. The

level of an elite’s fear fluctuates in tandem with an

executive’s ability to detect and punish disloyalty. Thus,

coordination costs vary from regime to regime.

Elites with the least ability to constrain a leader exist

within personalist and non-dynastic monarchies, where the

executive enjoys sole control of the state’s coercive and


political apparatuses (Weber 1997; Weeks 2011; Geddes, et al.

2014). Leaders can monitor their subordinates’ actions and

punish betrayal. Regardless, those within the regime generally

owe their position to the leader, so they would have no

incentive to oust the leader, as they would lose power

themselves (Chehabi & Linz 1998; Geddes, et al. 2014). Bratton

and van de Walle (1994) describe this well: ‘Recruited and

sustained with material inducements, lacking an independent

political base, and thoroughly compromised in the regime's

corruption, they are dependent on the survival of the

incumbent. Insiders typically have risen through the ranks of

political service and, apart from top leaders who may have

invested in private capital holdings, derive livelihood

principally from state or party offices’ (pp. 464).19

Aside from the moral implications of using repression, it

is unlikely that elites in personalist regimes would even

oppose repressive tactics, as they are not likely to bear

their costs; they prosper and fall in tandem with the leader

(Weeks 2008; Geddes 2003). If repression enriches and empowers

the executive, it would similarly benefit his supporters.

International sanctions and rebellion may deter elites from

repressive action, though no more or less than the executive.

Moreover, there is such a historically low probably that19Also quoted in in Geddes 2003 pp. 60.and Weeks 2008 pp. 47

26 Matthew Conway

personalists would lose power that they would feel comfortable

in exercising whatever power they would chose, repression

included (Geddes, et al. 2014).

While hybrid regimes are a mix of each regime, military

governments, single-party regimes, and dynastic monarchies

differ starkly from their more personalist counterparts

(Geddes, et al. 2014). Rulers in these states face strong

domestic audiences whose powerful positions allow them to

constrain and punish a leader. The intelligence, political,

and security apparatuses generally do not operate solely under

the executive’s authority, and as such, the leader is less

able to monitor, hire, and fire subordinates (Weeks 2008). In

military regimes, hierarchy determines one’s political career,

and officials in machines serve at the pleasure of the party,

not a president (Weeks 2008). Similarly, members of dynastic

regimes are interested in maintaining their dynasty’s health

(Herb 1999). Given their greater ability to coordinate in

order to oust an irresponsible leader, they will do so in

order to protect their family’s rule and remain in power

afterward.

Considering that coercion can trigger international

sanctions and costly rebellion, it is clear that intense

repression can threaten elites’ interests. Still, it is likely


in the elites’ best interests to repress the citizenry to a

certain extent as it allows them to maintain their privileged

position: it is the potential elite that need to be placated

and ensured of continued stability so can they have confidence

in their future economic and political future (Gartner & Regan

1996). Loss of control is an even more threatening concept.

Thus, where they are relevant and oppose repression, it is

likely that elites’ preferences have only moderating

influences or force repression to become more selective than

widespread. Speaking amorally, repression is only an issue to

domestic audiences to the extent that it threatens one’s

interests or the regime’s stability (Gartner & Regan 1996).

The following two case studies support this logic:

3.2.1 Mexico

The indigenous Zapatista Army of National Liberation

launched an insurgency in the southern Mexican state of

Chiapas on 1 January 1994, demanding social, cultural, and

land rights. At this time, Ernestio Zedillo was the leader of

the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).20 When the

conflict first broke out, the PRI sent the armed forces to

Chiapas to put down the rebellion, and the belligerents

declared a ceasefire twelve days later. Chiapas remained20 Mexico was a single-party authoritarian regime at this time. (Geddes, etal. 2014)

28 Matthew Conway

relatively peaceful throughout the next year and the

government did not repress citizens in the area or maintain

martial law (Weller 2000). Meanwhile, Zedillo pressed for a

diplomatic and political solution ostensibly in order to avoid

international condemnation concerning the use of coercive

force and the suppression of indigenous rights (Weller 2000).

Zedillo and the PRI were additionally reluctant to begin a

costly war in Chiapas as Mexico was embroiled in a monetary

crisis; they risked setting off uncontrollable inflation and

wider domestic discontent (Press 1995).

Despite Zedillo’s and the PRI’s economic recovery

strategies, domestic and international confidence in the

government remained low (Weller 2000). Adding to this, the

Mexican government suffered a significant loss of external

reserves in the first half of 1994, and investors’ fears from

the Chiapas Conflict exacerbated the peso crisis (Truman

1996). An advisor on emerging markets to Chase Bank summarized

the situation in a January 1995 update: ‘While Chiapas, in our

opinion, does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican

political stability, it is perceived to be so by many in the

investment community. The government will need to eliminate

the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the


national territory and of security policy’ and secure more

substantive investment (Roett 1995 para. 7).

After a year of significant capital loses, a major source

of discontent for the economic elite (the PRI’s main domestic

audience), the Mexican government reached a similar conclusion

and restarted a series of on-and-off-again military

engagements with the Zapatistas (Darling & Fineman 1995).

Throughout the next few years, the Mexican government waged a

counter-insurgency at the behest of the party’s elites,

allegedly propping up paramilitary groups and gangs in the

region while ignoring their highly repressive tactics

including displacement and murder (Weller 2000). The violence

peaked on 22 December 1997 with the Acteal Massacre, when the

paramilitary group Mascara Roja murdered 45 people, mostly women

and children (Thompson 1998). Following domestic and

international condemnation, which risked elites’ investments

and international relationships, the Mexican government scaled

back the intensity of its force and counter-insurgency

programme (Weller 2000).

3.2.2 Syria

30 Matthew Conway

Stories of Syria’s brutal civil war have been the focus of

front-page stories and legislative discussions nearly since

its beginning in March 2011.21 Allegations of chemical weapons

attacks are widespread, government forces drop cluster and

barrel bombs in residential areas, and at least 7.6 million

have fled their homes seeking refuge (UNOCHA 2015). Even

before the war began, however, the government held the country

under emergency rule: gatherings of more than five people were

banned, and security forces were empowered with the ability to

detain anybody they deemed threatening (Hinnebusch 2002).

Torture was allegedly endemic (HRW 2005). Given this climate,

when protests began on 15 March 2011 calling for democratic

reforms and the release of political prisoners, it is

unsurprising that security forces opened fire on citizens

(Fahim & Saad 2013). Those familiar with the al-Assad family –

who have ruled Syria since Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s

father, seized power in a coup in November 1970 – draw

connections between father and son. Al-Assad senior quashed an

Islamic uprising in February 1982 with gunships and artillery,

razing a city and killing thousands in what became known as

the Hama Massacre (Seale & McConville 1989).

21 Syria is coded as a party-personal-military regime since the beginning ofthe al-Assad reign. (Geddes, et al. 2014)


The al-Assads represent the Alawite religious group, a

minority offshoot of Shi’a Islam that comprises under 15

percent of Syria’s population (Seale & McConville 1989).

Politics under the al-Assads are secular, though competition

is highly sectarian. Given these two facts, both al-Assads

have isolated themselves from and have repressed all majority

factions in order to maintain power (Seale & McConville 1989).

The regime features strong personalist elements. While al-

Assad does not rule alone, those surrounding him are generally

‘yes-men’ (Hinnebusch 2002). Al-Assad holds a near-monopoly

over the security and intelligence apparatuses, whose ranks

Alawites dominate. A number of Sunnis occupy high-ranking

military positions, but they are constantly subject to Alawite

oversight (Hinnebusch 2002). Those loyal have strong incentive

to remain so, as promotions revolve around kinship and favour,

not merit. If they show disloyalty, the intelligence apparatus

would quickly identify their betrayal and act accordingly

(Hinnebusch 2002).

Thus, before and after Hama in 1972, few, if any in the

elite were able to impose constraints on the al-Assads.

Regardless, it is unlikely they would have wanted to. Loyalty

was and is the only requirement for prosperity in the regime,

which subsists largely on oil rents, industry, and contraband

32 Matthew Conway

(Middle East 2015). Similarly, the repression at the start of

the Syrian civil war met little resistance from within the

regime. Economic elite that may have foreseen greater unrest

and wished to coordinate in order to oust al-Assad for his

repressiveness were unable to do so because of the potential

risks.

3.3. Regime structure and executive constraints continued

It is most likely that executives are aware of their

relevant elites’ abilities to sanction them; this structure

would condition them to behave in order to maintain these

elites’ favour. As mentioned above, Mexico employed repressive

tactics in order to reassure economic elites of their regime’s

stability, though relented when these tactics backfired.

Syria, conversely, had no strong domestic audience and was

able to repress dissent harshly and without fear of backlash;

even today, four years into the civil war, the al-Assad regime

is at little risk of losing power. Nonetheless, more than fear

of reprisal informs a leader’s decision to repress.

Understanding the risks inherent in an executive’s decision to

ignore his domestic audience’s preferences is important in

considering why regimes may employ repressive tactics at

different levels. Nonetheless, it is not the only factor. A

number of scholars argue the key to understanding executive


behaviour lies in the details of their ideology (Møller &

Skaaning 2014; Arendt 1951), capacity, and need to resort to

force (Weeks 2008; 2011).

4. Regime preferences and repression

The examination of the regime structures above helps shed

light on why regimes may exercise caution in repressing their

citizens. However, as repression has numerous alternatives,

what are leader and audience preferences in the first place?

Further examination of regime structure helps determine the

extent to which alternatives are possible and repression is

necessary.

A large amount of scholarship is devoted to understanding

different degrees of autocratic belligerence. Davenport’s

(2007) study is among them, which explores the role of

pluralism and political control in regime behaviour. Primarily

focused on comparisons between democracies and autocracies,

Davenport argues that a greater presence of democratic and

pluralistic institutions causally and directly relates to

34 Matthew Conway

lower repression. He writes, in ‘democratic political systems,

it is typically argued that authorities are less inclined to

engage in repression because they are able to use others

means’ of socio-political control (pp. 489). Democracies allow

opposition to express themselves through parties, lobbies, and

electoral participation, diminishing the state’s need for

repression. Autocracies, conversely, have structures that

preclude opposition influence, leaving the regime to eliminate

challengers with coercive force. Davenport (2007) observes in

more personalist systems, ‘the ruling clique represent the

only wielders of power within the government; without this

access, there is no [opposition] influence, and in this

tentative situation, repression would be used to proactively

eliminate challengers’ (pp 489.)

However, as written, his theory appears incomplete. A

legitimately plural structure may serve as a mechanism for

channelling opposition sentiment, though an opposition with

influence would still threaten a leader’s power and a regime’s

stability. An authoritarian leader without restrictions on his

ability to eliminate challengers would likely not stand for

such a threat. Moreover, Davenport does not elaborate on how a

regime may be able to control opposition if its structure

channels it through the political system. For his theory to


hold, the executive must have a reason not to repress this

threat, i.e. a check on his power. As written, it appears

Davenport maintains that authoritarianism relates directly to

repression. When one includes repression as a definitive

component of authoritarianism, as Davenport does, this is a

given.

Davenport (2007) could also be implying in his analysis

that, even if the regime does not allow any dissent to have

effect in its legislature, the illusion of discussion or

activism would placate any potential challengers. Though this

restriction of political rights would definitively be a form

of repression, it may lessen the regime’s need to eliminate

any potential challengers violently. According to such logic,

regimes would likely have higher respect for personal

integrity rights.22

Despite these drawbacks, there seems to be value in his

theory that a political structure that channels dissent

through a system will at least moderate repression.

Contemporary Russia is a good supporting example. Russian

President Putin’s United Russia party controls the majority of

the Kremlin; however, the party must operate within a defined

political system that includes opposition (Roxburgh 2012). In22 Davenport holds that single-party regimes are less repressive largelybased on this theory.

36 Matthew Conway

order to maintain the façade of democratic institutions, Putin

allows other parties to contest elections, though a number of

fraudulent electoral tactics, co-option of opposing political

policies, and sabotage ensure the opposition will not come to

power. While his policies limit potential challenging groups’

ability to dissent and organize, the fact they have a

legitimate presence in Russia’s domestic political scene

forces Putin to refrain from tactics that are more coercive

(Dutkiewicz 2011). Importantly, the Russian government

operates within a structure that constrains the executive.

Thus, regimes that feature greater structural constraints on

executive behaviour will likely be less repressive than those

that do not. The key distinction is that the regime is

constrained from repressing, not that its members lack desire.

Whether an alternative method of socio-political control is

considered repressive is then a semantic debate.

Davenport (2007) further argues, though with more depth,

that the intensity of repressive force increases as regimes

become more personalist in nature. Political isolation – a key

personalist trait – increases a leader’s vulnerability (or at

least his perception of it) to external threats. Other

scholars advance this same theory, adding that the lack of

political influence forces the opposition to adopt more


bellicose and unorthodox means of dissent (Bracic 2010).

Starting a vicious cycle, the leader will respond in kind.

While this reasoning raises concerns of endogeneity, reality

seems to reflect the cycle in places like Syria today.

Considering these arguments, it is appropriate to say a

combination of structural constraints, leader isolation, and

the presence of elite-imposed constraints influence an

executive’s behaviour. However, in some cases ideology is an

even more important determinant. In 1951, Hannah Arendt (1951)

drew a distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian

regimes, positing totalitarian regimes seek to dominate their

citizens’ lives completely as a prelude to world domination,

while authoritarian governments seek full political power

within their borders alone.23 Totalitarian regimes, Arendt

argues, protect and advocate for an in-group and eliminate

those within the out-group (e.g. ethnic Germans versus others

in Nazi Germany). Ideology and identity are integral, and

their tactics receive initial domestic support, as the public

perceives them to offer respite from instability (Arendt

1951). Conversely, all other authoritarian regimes simply use23 Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) do not code for totalitarian regimes inthe regime classification, nor are they measured in this study. I includethem in this discussion, however, in order to highlight the importance ofexecutive ideology in determining the level of repression – largelypolitical terror – in a regime. Past examples of totalitarian regimes arealmost exclusively personalist dictatorships, e.g. Russia under Stalin,Nazi Germany, China under Mao.

38 Matthew Conway

political terror as a means to attaining or sustaining power;

however, they often lack ideology. While Arendt does not

explicitly acknowledge it, other scholars show these regimes

to exist along a spectrum, rather than portray them as part of

a dichotomy (e.g. Geddes 1999; Rummel 1997).

Regime ideology does not have to include world domination

in order to influence a regime’s repressive tendencies.24 Who

exists within the in-/out-groups often determines who is

repressed in ideological regimes. For example, most

contemporary authoritarian monarchies impose a strict ideology

upon their citizens. This is most harshly present in dynastic

regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United

Arab Emirates that feature de jure or de facto discrimination

along sectarian lines. These regimes are disproportionately

repressive against those in the out-group. The ideal type of

non-dynastic monarchies differ from their counterpart simply

in having a larger out-group: these include Swaziland, and

Iran under the Shah. Their isolation compounds with ideology

(if they espouse one), rendering more people a threat to the

ruling in-group (Herb 1999). It is possible that widespread

24 Ideology is as a system of beliefs of theories that forms the basis oftheory or policy, in accordance with Arendt (1951). Preference is similar,though refers to tendencies and beliefs that exist outside of a system anddetermine actions, based more significant in one’s nature. E.g. Naziideology would entail creating a ‘master race’, though preferences woulddetermine how to attain it.


ideology is more prevalent in dynastic monarchies because it

acts as a unifying force within the family and society.

Dynastic monarchies, which more closely resemble single-party

regimes, have a structure that demands unity and cohesion to

function (Herb 1999). As Wintrobe (1998) shows, machines are

better at creating loyalty than other autocracies because

their structure facilitates elite-bargaining and power-sharing

agreements.25 Their increased stability decreases the need for

coercion (Davenport 2007).26 As dynasticism is more stable, one

would expect these regimes to feature less repression in

general, especially of the violent sort.27

A regime’s ideology may also signal something about the

regime’s supporters and their preferences concerning

repression. Take Saudi Arabia, for example. The modern country

took shape in 1744, when the ruling al-Saud family allied

itself with the religious leader Muhammad idn Abd-al-Wahhab,

the founder of Wahhabism (Rentz & Facey 2004). The alliance’s

25 See also Gandhi & Przeworski 2006 pp. 1826 Also see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005; Fjelde 201027 However, there is a caveat to this. Some regimes that fiercely restrictcivil liberties may not need to repress their citizens violently as they donot provide them with any associational space to do so. The measure ofrepression in this sense is therefore somewhat subjective. Those whoadvocate a ‘give me liberty or give me death’ philosophy would find this tobe equally repressive as regimes which barrel bomb citizens. Others,however, would believe a regime that arbitrarily kills and imprisons itscitizens is certainly more repressive than one that prohibits certainbehaviours. This study separates the two types of repression in order toaccount for these philosophical differences.

40 Matthew Conway

power fluctuated through struggles against the Ottoman Empire

and other forces, though it finally formed modern-day Saudi

Arabia in 1932. Even though the Wahhabis and the al-Sauds have

had periods of violent conflict since their 1744 agreement,

their alliance ensures their success (Rentz & Facey 2004).

Their initial deal was simple: the Wahhabis, a strong

religious force, would assist the al-Sauds in conquering the

Arabian Peninsula through providing religious legitimacy and

unifying a fractured tribal populous. In return, the House of

Saud, a strong fighting force, would adopt Wahhabism as its

official policy, allowing the Wahhabi clerics official control

over Medina and Mecca, arguably Islam’s holiest sites (Nevo

1998).

Since then, the Houses of Wahhab and Saud have

intermarried many times over, and the Minister of Islamic

Affairs has always been an al-Wahhab descendent. As the al-

Sauds require the al-Wahhabs’ support to justify their

political rule, they must consider the clerics’ preferences.

Past conflicts between the two houses resulted in violently

destabilising unrest. The Ministry for the Propagation of

Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, Saudi Arabia’s religious

police, is a manifestation of cooperation. Thus, ultra-

conservative Islamic principles are intolerantly pervasive


throughout the Kingdom. Those who adhere to Wahhabi principles

exist in relative comfort, while those who dissent – or are

simply oppressed under these principles – suffer (Nevo 1998).

In Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud advances Wahhabi principles

likely due to a combination of personal belief and desire to

maintain power. In this case, the regime’s domestic audience’s

power and their preferences, i.e. their ideology, are leading

determinants of the regime’s behaviour. Regimes that do not

feature these audiences may still hold repressive ideologies,

but while their citizens would suffer similar repression, it

would simply originate directly from a leader rather than his

audience.

Leaders’ preferences are similar to ideology. Weeks (2011)

argues concerning autocrats’ choices to initiate interstate

war that some leaders are more likely to view force as

effective and necessary than are others. She contends that

personalist leaders are generally more belligerent by nature:

‘one reason is that unlike elites in machines, who are

typically bureaucrats who have risen through the civilian

ranks, many personalist dictators, such as Stalin, Mao, Saddam

Hussein and Idi Amin attained their personal status through

violent means such as a revolution, civil war, or violent

coup’ (Weeks 2011, pp. 21). Gurr’s (1998) and Colgan’s (2010)

42 Matthew Conway

research support her claim that personalist leaders’ paths to

power taught them that force is often the best, if not only,

means of dispute resolution (Colgan n.d.).

Similarly, referring to military leaders’ beliefs about

the use of force in international affairs, Huntington (1957)

claims, ‘the military ethic views conflict as a universal

pattern throughout nature and sees violence rooted in the

permanent biological and psychological nature of men’ (pp.

64).28 Military leaders’ training conditions them to believe

that military force is not only appropriate and effective, but

also unavoidable. Posen (1984) refers to this as having become

‘functionally specialized’, forgetting that alternatives to

force may reach the same end (Snyder 1984). Furthermore,

Huntington (1957) claims that soldiers are trained to ‘view

with alarm the potency and immediacy of the security threats

to the state’ (pp. 66).29

Many scholars cite this as rational in discussions over

interstate warfare, and it appears natural to extend

Huntington’s claim to domestic policy. Davenport (2007) and

Poe and Tate (1995) do this, arguing that in military

governments, ‘repression would be increased along with, in

particular, those forms of repression that are most familiar28 Also quoted in Weeks 2011 pp. 1829 Ibid


to the armed forces – violations of personal integrity such as

torture, disappearance, and mass killing’ (Davenport 2007, pp.

491). Governments with direct control of the coercive forces,

moreover, would face fewer barriers to exercising them – even

if the chief executive lacks total control (Poe, Tate & Keith

1999).

Some disagree with this proposition. Huntington (1957)

argues that militaries often believe that the armed forces,

lacking the expertise, should not interfere with domestic

politics; Perlmutter and Bennet (1980) argue the same. This

does not entirely make sense, however. First, these theories

rest on observations either incorporating or largely including

regimes with strong civil-military relations, such as in the

US and Western Europe. These military actors act under

relatively significant civilian influence. Second, if Brecher

(1996) is right in arguing that leaders who are socialised to

view violence as normal behaviour will exert force in response

to ‘all situations of stress, internal or external’, these

scholars’ theories on military government behaviour abroad are

directly applicable at home (pp. 220).30 As the leader of the

30 Full quote: “The leaders of military regimes are the most likely to relyon violence, whatever the nature of the initial catalyst. Violence isnormal behavior for the military in power, for the military generallyachieves and sustains power through violence and tends to use thistechnique in all situations of stress, internal or external. They also seeviolence as legitimate and effective.” Also quoted in Weeks 2011 pp. 18

44 Matthew Conway

state, the military would view any domestic challenger as a

national security threat and would respond accordingly.

Huntington’s and others’ theories may hold concerning

military regime’s interference in domestic politics to an

extent. Weeks (2011) references Feaver and Gelpi (2004) as

providing evidence from survey data that American military

officers are only reluctant to use force when the objective is

to spread democracy or is humanitarian in nature. The military

exercised no such restraint concerning realpolitik questions

such as China’s rise or nuclear weapons; they were also

relatively unlikely to find merit in diplomatic tools. While

this is only one example, it implies that the military views

itself as only a security preservation force. As such, they

would not interfere with civilian behaviour beyond that which

may pose a threat to the state.31

31 As Weeks (2011) notes, the US is an appropriate example because, ‘as aliberal superpower, [it] is relatively unique among countries in itsability to use force to pursue non-security goals’(pp. 20). This allowsresearchers to speculate on military leaders’ preferences, given theability to choose how they exercise them.


5. Coercive power and ability

I outlined in the previous sections that many factors

influence a leader’s decision to repress. Briefly summarised,

an executive’s decision is first informed through the

likelihood that he will incur the costs of his choice to

repress or not. The extent of his audience’s ability to

constrain him is often an indicator of this choice. Adding to

this, regimes with an ideology that advocates repressive

tactics against certain factions will also, in turn, likely be

more repressive overall. This situation can combine with the

former factor regarding audience costs, as in the case of

Saudi Arabia. Regime structures in which leaders are isolated

with densely consolidated power, such as in Syria under both

al-Assads, generally perceive higher levels of vulnerability

and, in turn, make greater use of coercive force to maintain

stability. Conversely, regimes like Putin’s allow a legitimate

role for opposition parties. As such, Putin cannot simply

violently eliminate these potential challengers; he must

employ alternative mechanisms to maintain control. Almost by

definition, these regimes will likely exhibit lower levels of

46 Matthew Conway

repression. Moreover, personalist and military leaders will

likely be more inclined to use repression; their role tends to

‘select’ for individuals who perceive force as the best tool

to eliminate threats. However, this keeps with the assumption

that states are fully capable of repressing to their desired

level.

As scholars are quick to point out, coercion is expensive.

States must purchase weapons, fund prisons, security forces,

and training programmes. Perhaps surprisingly, Hultquist

(2013) notes that collective repression is more cost-effective

and easier to impose than selective repression. While states

simply need to finance security forces to monitor that

citizens are adhering to policies which increase the cost of

dissent (such as limits on speech and mobility), targeted

violent repression requires a sophisticated intelligence

apparatus.32 Insurgents have the advantage of hiding in plain

site; their clandestine nature makes them difficult to

identify (Hultquist 2013). As such, Hultquist finds that

wealthy states with high coercive capability will be more

selectively repressive as a result. Given budget constraints,

many states choose to focus on building national militaries

that are meant to deter external threats with heavy artillery,32 A number of variables exacerbate the economic cost of repression. I willexplain these in depth in the next section when I describe the explanatoryvariables I account for in my analysis.


aircraft, and tanks (Hultquist 2013). These are tools of war,

not counter-insurgency or socio-political control. As

Hultquist puts it, ‘Since most states lack the capacity to

distinguish between actual insurgents, their supporters, and

neutral civilians, and they must respond somehow, they rely on

what they may consider to be the next best thing: collectively

targeting the rebel recruitment pool’ (pp. 7). Guatemalan

President General Rios Montt’s infamous tactic arose from such

a situation: ‘The guerrilla is the fish. The people are the

sea. If you cannot catch the fish, you have to drain the sea’33

33 Montt’s quote references the Maoist tactic of identifying potentiallyrebellious populations and isolating them in order to spot insurgentactivity. Montt diverged from Mao in that after he identified thepotentially rebellious population, indigenous peoples, he ordered massslaughter in what is now known as the Guatemalan Genocide. Malaysia’s andSudan’s counter-insurgency tactics in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) andDarfur (2000s) are also prime examples.

48 Matthew Conway

6. Empirical analysis: hypotheses

The previous sections provide a theoretical rational for

investigating the relationship between regime type and

repression. While there are a number of studies that explore

this relationship, the two main studies, those of Davenport

(2007) and Møller and Skaaning (2014), have relatively

simplistic or incomplete analyses. Davenport primarily argues

repression corresponds with the extent to which autocracies

incorporate democratic institutions. Parties that channel

political dissent through their system need to repress less

because they have access to alternatives for socio-political

control. He touches upon variables that may influence a

leader’s decision to use force, such as how much control the

leader has over the security apparatus. However, he does not

explore regime ideology beyond arguing that single-party

regimes may emphasise bureaucracy and legality more than

others may. This would lead one to expect machines to repress

their citizens less arbitrarily.


Møller and Skaaning (2013) take issue with this, stating

single-party regime ideology creates factions within society.

If a faction opposes the party line, the executive will

systematically repress the nonconformist behaviour. They argue

machines are no more or less likely to repress civil liberties

than other regimes, though their pluralist and bureaucratic

structure leads them to violate physical integrity rights

less. My analysis aligns with those of Davenport and Møller

and Skaaning by employing the same regression model, though I

diverge from them in a number of ways.

First, following Møller and Skaaning’s lead, I argue

ideology plays a significant role in regime calculus, though I

diverge from both authors in seeking to account for the extent

of an audience’s ability to impose costs upon a leader.

Furthermore, I argue a regime’s path to power – whether they

rose through a party, military hierarchy, or cunning as in

personalist regimes – strongly influences a leader’s

preference. I combine these arguments with Hultquist (2013)

and Bove, Platteau and Sekeris’ (2014) theories that wealth

determines how much a regime is capable of repressing. I also

argue, like Møller and Skaaning (2014) and Davenport (2007),

that a regime’s ability to channel dissent through the

political system influences their need to repress. However, I

50 Matthew Conway

do not attribute lower levels of repression to a leader’s

decision to pursue alternatives; rather, I maintain these

structures constrain the extent to which a leader would be

capable of repressing potential challengers. It is not that

they choose other avenues of socio-political control; rather,

they are forced to behave in accordance with their

constraints.

This theoretical foundation informs my hypotheses:

6.1 Personalist dictators – vulnerable, violent, and

unconstrained

There are several reasons to expect societies beneath

personalist dictators to experience the most repression.

First, personalist dictators, like military leaders, are

particularly likely to believe force is the most efficient and

necessary means to neutralise a threat. As a number of

scholars hold, personalist regimes will differ from single-

party governments because their leaders will often have

attained power through a series of violent events.34 Libya’s

al-Qaddafi and Syria’s al-Assad Senior are examples. This

lowers their perceptions of the costs of repression; they may

even see it as unavoidable.

34 E.g. Gurr (1998); Colgan (2010); Colgan (n.d.); Weeks 2011


Furthermore, as Davenport (2007), Geddes (2003), and Weeks

(2008; 2011) reason, personalists are the most isolated type

of leader. This has a number of implications. First, while the

leader may perceive costs to be low, there are few people

within the regime that may hold him accountable if they

disagree. The executive’s relatively greater ability to detect

dissent precludes elite’s ability to coordinate. This means

personalist leaders will only be concerned with international

sanctions, costly rebellions, and more to the extent that they

harm him; this could prolong and escalate any confrontation.

It is also unlikely elites would rebel in the first place

considering their power is often directly tied to that of

their leader.

Second, the executive has direct control over the regime’s

coercive agents. With the fewest veto players and constraints

upon his power, a dictator will be able to act as he pleases.

The fact these executives are most likely to perceive

themselves as unstable ensures they will make use of this

power to eliminate any potential challengers. The opposition

has no ability to exercise power through any legitimate

system, so the executive is not forced to confront them in

government; dissenters must also adopt unorthodox means to

52 Matthew Conway

challenge the leader’s rule. Thus, repression is often the

leader’s only option to eliminate threats.

Finally, personalist regimes often do not feature the

ideology one would find in single-party regimes or dynastic

monarchies. Even in those with totalitarian tendencies like

North Korea, the executive’s ‘in-group’ is generally limited

to his inner circle. Everybody else is considered a

potentially opposing faction. When an ideology is present –

such as in Nazi Germany of Mao’s China – a lack of alternative

methods to interact with an ‘out-group’, or checks on an

executive’s power regulating this interaction, will likely

lead repression to be even more widespread.

Thus, I predict I will confirm Davenport (2007) and Møller

and Skaaning’s (2014) findings that personalist regimes will

be the most repressive of all, regardless of the type of

repression. Similarly, I expect hybrid regimes with

personalist tendencies to be more repressive than all others

save for full-out personalist dictatorships.

6.2 Single-party regimes – constrained and ideological

The level of repression in single-party regimes is the

strongest point of academic debate. I expect Davenport (2007)

is correct in predicting their bureaucratic system will have a


moderating effect on their use of repression. Unlike

personalists, executives in machines do not have sole

authority over the tools of repression, nor are they entirely

insulated from their costs. Indeed, the reality is quite the

opposite. Rulers in single-party regimes are most likely to

face consequences for slighting their domestic audience. Of

course, this does not necessarily mean they will avoid

coercion; it simply means if there is disconnect between the

leader and his supporters, the executive must consider his

audience’s preferences. This can lead to both a start and a

cessation of coercive tactics, as in Mexico during the

Zapatista Insurgency. Unlike military regimes, machines are

composed of civilians who are not pre-conditioned to use

violence. Their relatively meritocratic rise through the

bureaucracy likely will have left them a sense for the

potential alternatives to the use of force. Moreover, as

Wintrobe shows, machines’ structure facilitates elite-

bargaining and power-sharing agreements, precluding repression

in many cases. Their bureaucracy, as Davenport (2007)

maintains, likely will combine with their concern for legality

to deter party members to advocate for arbitrary restrictions

on citizens’ personal rights and integrity.

54 Matthew Conway

However, I side with Møller and Skaaning in highlighting

the role of ideology in a single-party regime. While a concern

for legality may lead machines to respect personal integrity

rights more often, their ideology often serves as a pretext

for repressing certain factions. This is not present in

military regimes as often. As Brooker (2000) notes, ‘[o]nly a

minority of even twentieth-century military regimes either

developed or borrowed an official ideology, with its abstract

commitment to sacred ideas, principles or goals. The party

dictatorships are much more ideology-prone and in fact it is

rare to find one that does not espouse an ideology of some

description’ (pp. 109).35 This ideology, as I noted above,

creates an in-group and out-group. The in-group can enjoy

rights within the party’s defined structure, though any

diverging factions or behaviours will face intolerance and

repression.

Therefore, I hypothesise single-party regimes will be the

most respectful of personal integrity rights. However, as

Møller and Skaaning (2014) finds, I predict they will repress

civil liberties no less than military groups and approximately

the same as monarchies. Hybrid regimes with single-party

components, including party-personalist, party-military, and

party-personal-military regimes, would then all be more35 Also quoted in Møller & Skaaning 2014 pp. 8


repressive than single-party regimes given the exacerbating

components of the other forms.

6.3 Military regimes – bellicose yet constrained

First, military controlled polities are similar to

personalist regimes in their leader’s perceptions of the use

of force. However, unlike personalist regimes, military

dictatorships disperse power through a hierarchy. The leader

does not usually have direct access to armed forces like a

personalist leader would, and if he uses coercive force

inappropriately he is likely to face consequences from his

domestic audience. This is similar to a machine, however a

military leader’s domestic audience is more likely to view

force as acceptable. Importantly, military regimes also differ

in lacking ideology. They may respond violently to threats

against the state, though they will likely not interfere in

civilians’ lives beyond the extent that will preserve national

security. It is possible, however, while military regimes have

a greater willingness to use force and repress their

citizenry, they have less of a need to (Davenport 2007). The

military’s sole presence, signalling a high capacity of hard

power, may act as a deterrent against any potential

56 Matthew Conway

challengers. Finally, military regimes do not allow any

civilian opposition influence in their system, and the

military hierarchy prevents many actors from voicing

objections to the system’s policies. As in personalist

regimes, opposition activity is generally illegal. Thus, the

regime’s alternatives to repression exist in between single-

party and personalist levels.

I anticipate military regimes will be less repressive than

personalist regimes, more repressive than monarchies and

single-party regimes concerning personal integrity rights,

though approximately equally as repressive of civil rights as

monarchies and machines.

6.4 Monarchies – durable traditionalists

Monarchies mirror a number of factors found in each regime

described above, often depending on how dynastic they are.

First, they reflect single-party characteristics through their

ideology; this is currently most commonly a form of Islam.

While machines’ ideologies are almost exclusively political,

monarchies are more likely to impose moral rules on their

citizens that may infringe upon civil liberties such as

speech, mobility, and religion. Second, dynastic monarchs rule

within constraints imposed by their family or an ally, who are


generally confident in their ability to remain in power should

they oust the leader. Their primary interest is the health of

the dynasty, and if the monarch threatens this, they may

mobilise to remove him. They differ from machines, however,

because the monarch is generally more isolated in power;

removing him comes with greater costs and risk. Monarchies

heavily rely on tradition and often invoke traditional

legitimacy, so removing a monarch would defy tradition and

potentially threaten stability (Weber 1956; Møller & Skaaning

2014).

Non-dynastic monarchies have an even weaker domestic

audience. They strongly resemble personalist regimes in this

aspect, and one would expect them to repress accordingly. As

they control appointments to all ministerial posts, they

control the security apparatus and can use it at will. Non-

dynastic monarchs have four traits in common with their

counterpart. First, they are durable. As I noted earlier, they

may have invested in repression in the past, allowing them to

forgo such tactics in the present (Møller & Skaaning 2014).

Second, their leader acquires power through a traditional

secession structure. This places monarchs in between machine

executives on one end and military and personalist executives

on the other. Through their seniority-based system, leaders

58 Matthew Conway

neither inherit the values of a merit-based structure nor one

that conditions an actor toward force. Third, they often

espouse a sectarian ideology, creating an out-group that is

more likely to receive the brunt of repression. Finally,

actors in monarchies do not permit space for the opposition,

substantially reducing the possibility that executives can or

be forced to take advantage of other means of socio-political

control.

Considering these factors, I expect monarchies in general

to repress less than personalist governments in all aspects,

though more than all others when it comes to civil liberties.

Their durability and preferences will likely have them repress

physical integrity rights less than military governments,

though more than single-party regimes. I expect dynastic

monarchies to be slightly more repressive than machines though

less so than military governments. Non-dynastic monarchies

will probably occupy a position slightly above military

regimes, though below personalists.


7. Research design36

36 Replication data: https://www.dropbox.com/s/g2gomljk66izend/ConwayMatthew_Repdata.sav?dl=0 ifunavailable, please contact [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


60 Matthew Conway

I measure repression, my dependent variable, using eight

ordinal measures in 116 authoritarian regimes across 88

different countries for the period 1992 to 2011 (1284 country-

years). This is the full range of years for which I have

relatively complete data for all variables and without having

to reconcile the difference in domestic and international

power dynamics during and after the Cold War.37 I present three

sets of ordered logit models. The first contains four general

regime types (military, monarchy, single-party, and

personalist). The second is a more specific set with Geddes,

Wright and Frantz’s hybrids (military, indirect-military,

military-personal, monarchy, single-party, party-military,

party-personal, party-personal-military, and personalist).

Finally, the third replaces ‘monarchy’ with its dynastic and

non-dynastic variants. The following table outlines each

regime type’s sample size:

37 Scholars frequently claimed the US and the Soviet Union’s geopoliticalcompetition determined power dynamics across the globe (e.g. Fukuyama1992). The drastic change in international politics following the fall ofthe Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union in 1992 hadan inarguable effect on domestic politics throughout the world. Someauthors, like Davenport (2007), attempt to reconcile this difference usinga set of control variables. Others, like Møller and Skaaning (2014), simplyincorporate observations of the differences across this period in theiranalysis. I believe it is important for this analysis to view the periodsin isolation. For one, the larger sample size of Cold War country years mayovershadow post-Cold War regime data if not controlled correctly. Inaddition to this, I find explanatory variable data is often unreliablebefore 1990. Restricting the sample to after 1992 therefore promises morereliability.


Figures 1a and 1b. Descriptive statistics for regime types, hybrid and general

Considering the ordinal nature of each dependent variable,

the series of models below is comprised of data output from

ordered logit models with robust standard errors to control

for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. I use

personalist regimes as my base variable because I predict they

will be the most repressive and they are the most numerous

case, promising the most robust data.38 To measure civil

liberties, I employ a number of datasets, both general and

specific. I follow Davenport’s lead in using the Freedom House

(2015) Freedom in the World Index, though I supplement this

analysis with seven measures from the Cingranelli, Richards

and Clay (2014) Human Rights Data (CIRI) project.39 These

38 Davenport (2007) uses democracies as his base variable, reflecting hisprimary interest in comparing democracies and autocracies. Møller &Skaaning (2014) use single-party regimes as their base variable becausetheir primary interest is refuting Davenport’s findings.39 Munck & Verkuilen (2002) and Skaaning (2009) critically assess theFreedom House measures. Freedom House measures civil liberties andpolitical rights on two 1-7 scales, seven being the most repressive. I havecombined these two indices to create a combined score out of 14.

62 Matthew Conway

include measures of worker’s rights, women’s rights, freedom

of speech, freedom of movement, religious freedom, and

personal empowerment, a combination of the former six.40 I also

use CIRI’s physical integrity violations index in order to

measure levels of violent repression.41 In order to

operationalise the variables, I process and invert them so

larger numbers are indicative of greater repression (Piazza

2015).

Included in every regression are a set of explanatory

variables that are frequently found to influence repression,

stability or conflict.42 Like Bove, Platteau and Sekeris

(2014), I log-transformed all positive and continuous

40 The freedom of movement and women’s rights measures are combinations offour CIRI idiocies measuring freedom of domestic and foreign movement andwomen’s political and economic rights. I also convert the empowerment indexto a scale of 10, from its original 14, before inverting it to avoidheteroscedasticity. Please see the CIRI Master Coding Guide for furthervariable details: Cingranelli, David L., David L. Richards, and K. ChadClay. 2014. "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset."http://www.humanrightsdata.com . Version 2014.04.14.41 I find Davenport’s (2007) and Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) use of thePolitical Terror Scale (PTS) is inappropriate for investigating regime typeand repression for one key reason. In compiling data from AmnestyInternational, US State Department, and occasionally Human Rights Watchreports, the PTS factors characteristics that determine regime type intoits coding, such as constraints an executive may face in exercising lethalforce. This may have caused Davenport’s and Møller and Skaaning’s analysesto yield erroneously correlated data concerning physical integrity abuses.CIRI’s physical integrity scale, conversely, simply measures governmentsponsored activity including political imprisonment, murders, torture, etc.This measure should yield results that are more accurate. See Wood andGibney (2010) for more.42 Please see individual data sources as cited for specific explanatoryvariable details. Alternatively, reference the replication data.

http://www.humanrightsdata.com/


explanatory variables in order to reduce the influence of

outliers and decrease variance. Figure 2 provides descriptive

statistics for each dependent and explanatory variable.

First, I employ standard variables frequently found within

the human rights violations/repression literature. These

variables initially include World Bank data on population

density, total population, and gross domestic product (GDP)

per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP), the latter time

lagged one year to account for delayed effects (Population

density 2015; Total Population 2015; GDP 2015). This follows

Davenport’s (2007) reasoning that ‘greater population and

poverty increase socio-economic stress, which in turn

increases the perceived need for socio-political control’ (pp.

12). Next, I include variables that may influence levels of

political dissent and state perceptions of stability: the sum

of civil and ethnic violence and war in the state, the number

of bordering states, and the sum of all armed conflicts in

bordering states. I source all of this data from the Polity IV

Project (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2014). I expect increases in

these variables to correlate positively with increases in

repression. I also include control variables that may

influence a state’s capacity to exert force upon its citizens,

including the Bonn International Center for Conversion Global

64 Matthew Conway

Militarization Index (Grebe 2014), the World Bank’s measure of

the state’s land area in square kilometres (Land Area 2015),

and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003a) data measuring the amount of

mountainous terrain in a country. Greater military capacity

and presence in a society may increase the potential for

coercion, and I expect a larger and mountainous landmass to

hinder a state’s attempt to control all of its territory. This

would allow rebellious groups more space to mobilize and

render coercion more difficult and expensive.

Next, the World Bank’s data on a state’s natural resource

income as a percentage of its GDP is relevant to both of these

themes (Total Natural Resources 2015). Greater wealth should

decrease poverty, though its concentration in the state would

increase its ability to coerce. This variable is the source of

significant debate, however. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find

natural resource wealth induces conflict, which is in line

with Garfinkel and Skaperdas’ (2007) claim that the presence

of natural resources incentivises actors to fight more

fiercely in order to control it. Furthermore, Ross (2004)

explains how the presence of natural resources can trigger

violent state repression. On the opposite end of the debate,

Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Besley and Persson (2011) show

that natural resources increase a state’s capacity and thus


have a pacifying effect. Nonetheless, others show how oil

discoveries increase authoritarianism and military spending in

autocracies, increasing a state’s ability to repress (Tsui

2011; Cotet & Tsui 2013). While a state’s decision to repress

may hinge on its capacity, as Bove, Platteau and Sekeris

(2014) point out ‘[w]ealthier autocrats…may not have

incentives in letting the country plunge into civil war,

especially in…economies that are not very resilient to violent

conflict’ (pp. 21). Natural resource wealth, therefore, may

moderate a state’s repressiveness, especially violent

varieties, which are more likely to trigger rebellion.

Finally, I include three variables concerning a state’s

demographics: the World Bank data on a state’s male population

as a percentage of the whole (Population, Female 2015) and

measures of ethnic and religious fractionalisation (Alesina,

Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg 2003).43 Each of

these three traits concerns the homogeneity of the population.

The relationship between diversity and conflict – and

therefore stability, a key determinant of repression – is the

focus of a divided set of literature. Collier (2000) finds the

likelihood of civil unrest decreases with greater diversity,

refuting Easterly and Levine’s (1997) conclusion that ethnic43 The World Bank data concerning male population was unavailable at thetime of research, so I instead collected data on the female population andsubtracted the percentage from 100

66 Matthew Conway

diversity fuels instability. Another school of thought argues

long-standing, ‘deep’ ethnic and religious cleavages render

some countries more conflict prone and unstable than others.44

Meanwhile, Basedau and colleagues show horizontal inequalities

are often present in religiously and ethnically diverse

societies (Basedau, Pierskalla, Struver & Vullers 2015), and

Gubler and Selway (2012) find that horizontal inequalities are

a strong determinant of civil war. Considering the numerous

studies that highlight the overwhelming role of men in dissent

(Moser & Clark 2001), armed conflict (Melander 2005), and

governance (Plumper & Neumayer 2006), in addition to

Huntington’s (1996) claim that societies with a high

proportion of men will be prone to civil violence, it is clear

that these three variables deserve a place in this analysis.

Figure 2 contains descriptive statistics for all explanatory

variables:

44 E.g. Huntington (1996), Ignatieff (1993), nihan (1993), Rabushka &Shepsle (1972); Smith (1986)


Figure 2. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables

68 Matthew Conway

I set up a supplementary analysis regressing Polity IV’s

indices measuring the number of executive constraints upon a

leader and the competitiveness of political participation in

order to underscore the relationship between executive

constraints, political competitiveness and repression.45 This

strategy also diverges from Davenport, who includes them

within his initial regressions. I choose not to do this for a

similar reason that I forgo using the Political Terror Scale:

the characteristics measured in these two indices directly

influence Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) coding scheme.

Including these variables raises concerns of multicollinearity

and risks the reliability of the results.

45 Please see the Polity IV Project Dataset Users’ Manual for an in-depthexplanation of these variables (Marshall, et al. 2014).


8. Statistical analysis

Figures 3 and 4 depict the average levels of repression

per regime type across the twenty-year period in

question, explanatory variables excluded:

Figure 3. Specific Regime Types – Most repressive bolded and italicised. Dynastic

and non-dynastic monarchies are not included in this measurement and are only

included for reference purposes.

70 Matthew Conway

Figure 4. General Regime Types – Most repressive are bolded and italicised.

Figure 3 suggests the difference in repressiveness between

states ranges drastically depending on the type of repression.

This is a slight divergence from Møller and Skaaning’s (2014)

study, which finds repression levels, excluding explanatory

variables, vary negligibly.46 Figure 3 contrasts with this in

expressing much larger standard deviations. Figure 4, which

measures the four general regime types – military, monarchy,

single-party and personalist – is more in line with Møller and

Skaaning’s in deviating much less.

Monarchies stand out in Figure 3 and 4 as the most

repressive regime type in three and six of the measurements,

respectively, though only marginally so. Dynastic monarchies

46 Davenport (2007) does not do such an analysis


also defy expectations in being more pacific than non-dynastic

monarchies.47 In both figures, however, military style regimes

are easily the most violently repressive. On the opposite end

of the spectrum, Figure 4 confirms Davenport’s finding that

single-party regimes are the least repressive group, though by

an unconvincing amount. Indirect-military regimes hold the

bottom place in Figure 3 in all save women’s rights and

freedom of movement, though considering their small sample

size it is important to note machines follow up on four cases,

including Freedom House and the physical integrity score.48

Party-military regimes, as theory would predict, are slightly

more repressive. In no instance are personalist regimes the

most repressive type. Interestingly, they are least repressive

in three cases in Figure 4: worker’s rights, the CIRI

empowerment index, and freedom of religion. These absolute

measures of repression support Davenport’s (2007) findings47 This is likely because non-dynastic monarchies include Jordan andMorocco, which are both highly stable and constitutionally regulated, evenif to a small extent. Thus, even as they are technically non-dynastic, thestate has numerous alternatives to repression, less of a need to repress,and greater executive constraints. This highlights a major critique ofmacro-analyses such as this one. While 1284 country-years is a sizeablesample, specific classifications such as indirect-military, dynastic, andnon-dynastic monarchies restrict this size to two to five countries in somecategories, adding far more weight to individual country attributes to thedetriment of general regime type characteristics. Conversely, generalregime types, such as single-party (to include all single-party leaninghybrids) tend to ignore a number of important regime type characteristicsthat would help inform an analysis. See the Appendix for the explanatoryfactors concerning the hybrid monarch models48 Indirect-military regimes in the analysis include El Salvador and Guatemala, from 1992-1994 and 1992-1995, respectively.

72 Matthew Conway

that single-party regimes are the least repressive and Møller

and Skaaning’s (2014) that monarchies are the most repressive

of civil liberties, though least repressive of physical

integrity rights.

The following statistical analysis will test whether or

not these absolute measures withstand the inclusion of

explanatory variables.

8.1 Results

The data in Figures 3 and 4 provide rough confirmation of

a number of theories above, specifically those concerning

monarchies as the least violently repressive and single-party

regimes as the least repressive overall, constituting a

‘tyrannical peace’, in Davenport’s words (2007, pp. 1). Figure

5 shows the relationship between executive constraints and

competitiveness of political participation, as measured in

Polity IV (Marshall, et al. 2014). Figures 6 and 7, meanwhile,

reveal the results of the empirical analysis. Each figure

contains eight models investigating the relationship between

regime type and a different variety of repression.

8.1.1 Explanatory variable results


The first set of explanatory variables discussed above –

total population, population density, and lagged

GDP/capita/PPP – slightly defy expectations. Population

density is positively correlated with repression and is highly

significant, but lagged GDP/capita/PPP fluctuates. GDP is

positively correlated with labour, speech, and religious

freedoms, though negatively so with the Freedom House Index

and physical integrity rights as Bove, Platteau and Sekeris

(2014) found. Total population is significant, though is

negatively correlated with repression on all fronts. This

suggests increased population density heightens perceptions of

political control, not population growth. Interestingly,

increases in the male population are related to increases in

repression; this is especially true concerning restrictions in

women’s rights. Ethnic and religious fractionalisations are

generally insignificant, buy are highly significant and

negative against the Freedom House Index and, in the case of

religious fractionalisation, physical integrity.

Variables reflecting levels of political dissent and

related to state perceptions of stability – the number of

bordering states and the number of conflicts in and around the

state – are all highly significant and positive. Similarly,

the amount of mountainous territory and landmass are

74 Matthew Conway

significant and positive, implying states with a large and

difficult territory to police will feel more insecure and thus

more likely to exercise coercive methods to increase control.

The Militarization Index is generally insignificant, though it

is positive and significant concerning restrictions of

religious freedoms. However, lagged state natural resource

income as a percentage of GPD is highly significant and

positively correlated with repression in all models except

concerning religious freedom, implying that state wealth is a

factor in its decision to repress, supporting Bove, Platteau

and Sekeris’ (2014) and Hultquist’s (2013) findings.49 Finally,

Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) prediction that state durability

would negatively correlate with physical integrity violations

is reflected in the model, however it is positive and

significant when run against civil liberty-related repression

types.50 This supports my theories concerning repression in

monarchies.

8.1.2 Regime type results

As expected, the models regressing executive restraints

and repression reveal states with unlimited executive

authority are the most repressive; those whose executives

subordinated or entrenched in a party, such as found in a49 Bove, Platteau & Sekeris 2014 and Hultquist 200?50 Møller & Skaaning 2014


single-party regime, are the least repressive. Also

unsurprising are the results concerning competitiveness of

political participation: those ranked ‘transitional, moving

toward or from competition’ are the most violently repressive,

though least concerning civil rights. As these regimes also

happen to be the least stable, this makes sense. Following

similar logic, it is also expected that ‘factional – parochial

or ethnic based’ cases are the second most repressive overall.

Regimes with ‘suppressed’ and limited competition are the

least repressive; while those that allow no opposition are the

most repressive concerning speech and the Freedom House Index

measuring civil liberties and political rights. The former

includes single-party regimes, while the latter most

prominently features personalists.

76 Matthew Conway

Figure 5. Order logit models - executive constrains and competitiveness ofpolitical participation51

With respect to the grouped regime type models,

personalist regimes are statistically the most repressive of

all forms, with monarchies overall the least; military and

single-party fluctuate in the middle depending on the form of

repression. Interestingly, this ranking partially breaks down

when I incorporate Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s (2014) hybrid

regime types into the analysis. The subsequent models

51 See Figure 12 in appendix for figure’s explanatory variables


incorporating hybrid regimes push personalist regime types to

the second or fourth place in terms of repressiveness.

Instead, party-personal regimes are consistently the most

repressive. The results concerning dynastic and non-dynastic

monarchies are mixed, though monarchies as a group are

definitively the most repressive of women’s rights. Beyond

that, monarchies are the least repressive of each regime type

concerning civil liberties and physical integrity rights. This

is a direct contradiction to Davenport’s (2007) findings,

though strong support for Møller and Skaaning’s (2014) theory

concerning regime durability.

Figure 6. Order logit models with hybrid monarchies52

52 See Figure 13 in Appendix for the full figure’s explanatory variables.

78 Matthew Conway

While machines are certainly less likely to repress in any

model compared to personalist regimes, each model shows that

military regimes are less repressive. An important caveat here

is that the addition of personalist elements to a regime type,

as coded in the hybrid regimes, renders that regime type among

the most coercive. Hence, the most repressive regime in the

grouped types is personalist, and similarly the top three most

repressive, regardless of the form of coercion, are military-

personal, party-personal, and personalist governments.

Interestingly, non-dynastic monarchies are generally more

repressive than single-party and military regimes, though

despite their personalist elements they are still less

repressive than dynastic monarchies. This suggests that

ideology plays a more important role in repression than

executive constraints, though it is important to consider how

the small sample size for these two monarchy types influences

the results. As I noted earlier, the fact that Jordan and

Morocco, two constitutionally constrained, albeit autocratic

states, make up the majority of non-dynastic country years is

likely a reason for the unexpected results. This highlights

the importance of country-level effects.

80 Matthew Conway

Figure 7. Ordered logit models with hybrid regimes


Figure 8. Order logit models with military, monarchy, single-party, and

personalist regimes53

Indeed, a key concern in forming this analysis was that

regime type might turn out to be a proxy for democracy, moving

from personalist governments as the most autocratic to single-

party regimes as the least. As conventional wisdom holds, the

most autocratic states are often the most repressive (e.g.

Davenport 2007; Poe & Tate 1994). With this in mind, it makes

sense that personalist regimes and hybrid regimes with

personalist traits are the most repressive. In order to test

for this, I follow Weeks’ (2008) lead and take two approaches.

First, I re-analyse the data in an ordered logit model with

the Polity IV autocracy scores to determine how the level of

executive authority may explain a state’s repressive53 Explanatory variables remained largely unchanged. Please see the Appendixfor Figure 14 with explanatory variables

82 Matthew Conway

tendencies; the most autocratic score, 10, is the base

variable.54 The results indicate authoritarianism marginally

trends toward repression as prior research has confirmed,

though it is not consistently an inverse relationship. This

suggests there is more inherent in the relationship between

regime type and repression than authoritarianism. Figure 9

depicts these results.55

Figure 9. Repression and the Polity IV autocracy score – 0 (dem) - 10 (auth)

54 Polity IV’s Polity score measures executive authority on a 21-point scalefrom -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) representingkey qualities in executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority,and political competition. Their autocracy score is a variance of this andsimply marks every ‘democratic’ score as 0. This will increase the samplesize and highlight the influence of authoritarianism in the analysis(Marshall, et al. 2014)55 The freedom of speech and religion models yielded invalid results withparameter estimates trending toward infinity. These are omitted.


As a further robustness check, I again replicate Weeks’

methods and average each regime type’s Polity score to see if

one category is more authoritarian than another is. The

results, depicted in Figure 10, show authoritarianism is

evenly dispersed throughout the dataset. While personalist

dictatorships and hybrid regimes featuring personalist traits

are highly autocratic, party-military regimes and monarchies

have the highest average scores. This indicates regime type is

not a proxy for authoritarianism, nor is authoritarianism the

sole factor needed to determine repression levels.

Figure 10. Average polity scores in sample by regime 1992-2011

84 Matthew Conway

An additional concern is that a number of highly

repressive cases are skewing the data. In order to test for

this, I run another set of ordered logit models with the

regime categories specified in Figure 10, though this time I

omit the top ranked Freedom House and CIRI physical integrity

rights abusers: China (single-party), Eritrea (party-

personal), Myanmar (military), Iraq (personalist), Sudan

(personalist) and North Korea (party-personal). Figure 11

depicts these results. Removing these six states from the

analysis has little effect on the results. In both robustness

checks for the Freedom House Index and the physical integrity

scale, personalist regimes and hybrids remain the more

repressive forms, while the military governments, monarchies,

and single-party regimes remain the least. The only difference

is personalist regimes lose their significance in the Freedom

House model, and party-personal regimes gain significance and

rise two ranks to become the most violently repressive

regimes.

Figure 11. Freedom House and physical integrity score comparison – originaland check


To summarize, I find, clearly and consistently, state

characteristics including size and topography directly

influence a state’s ability to control its population;

numerous other variables, including population density and the

incidence of war and violence, further support my theory that

perceptions of state stability directly influence an

executive’s decision to repress his citizens. The data

suggests his ability to do so further augments this. Finally,

I extend Bove, Platteau and Sekeris’ (2014) conclusion that

oil wealth affects the level of state sponsored repression to

general natural resource wealth, building upon Ross’s

hypotheses and showing that this wealth affects all types of

repression. The clearest and most useful conclusion from this

analysis is a leader’s decision to use coercive tactics is a

function of his perception of stability, his freedom to exert

force at will – influenced by the number of constraints on his

behaviour – and his capacity to do so.

9. Conclusion

Repression seems to be an inseparable component of

autocracies; indeed, media, governments, and academics often

refer to repression as an authoritarian tendency or autocratic

behaviour. A number of studies investigate the logic behind

these references and find authoritarianism and repression

86 Matthew Conway

often do increase in tandem. Researchers hardly apply scrutiny

more specifically. As a large swath of the literature

testifies, democracies are clearly less repressive than

autocracies. However, how does repression vary between non-

democratic forms of government? To increase stability, regimes

increase their coercive capacity, restrict freedoms to raise

the cost of dissent, and violently eliminate challengers as

they arise, in turn consolidating power and deterring future

opposition. I argue specific characteristics inherent in a

regime’s structure influence how a leader perceives the

stability of his rule and his ability to use coercive force.

These characteristics are the primary factors that inform an

executive’s decision to repress.

Considering these traits, I predicted repression will

increase with greater real and perceived levels of instability

and decrease as an executive’s authority becomes more

constrained, all else equal. Compounding this analysis is

regime preferences toward repression. I further maintained

regimes whose elites are ‘conditioned’ to view repression as

an efficient and necessary form of socio-political control

will be more inclined to coercion. I also theorised ideology

will create an out-group in society, which the state is likely

to repress and lead to overall increases in repression.


My results confirm these theories, showing the least

constrained and isolated leaders – personalists – are overall

the most repressive. Furthermore, violent repression increases

in states with greater (perceived) instability, as indicated

by the explanatory variables concerning armed conflict, state

size and topography, and the competitiveness of political

participation. Unsurprisingly, civil liberty restrictions are

specifically more likely to increase with denser populations

and decreased political competitiveness.

My findings are slightly at odds with the two most

impactful studies on the subject to date. First, Davenport’s

(2007) study finds single-party regimes ‘possess some of the

characteristics of democracies which reduce state repression,

incorporating a greater population into the political process’

and thus allowing the government to pursue alternative forms

of socio-political control (pp. 500). While conventional

wisdom supports this finding, Moller and Skaaning (2014)

partially contradict it when they incorporate ideological

leanings into their analysis, finding single-party regimes are

no more likely to repress civil liberties than any other,

though they are less likely to repress physical integrity

rights. This is also my conclusion. Finally, both find

personalist regimes are likely to repress the most, but it is

88 Matthew Conway

important to note neither author considers in their analysis

the costs which an executive is likely to incur for ‘reckless’

behaviour in the eyes of his domestic audience. Thus, while we

reach similar findings, we do so from different paths.

While the utility of findings considering general regime

type is arguably of limited value at the micro-level, the

analysis of disaggregated factors including executive

constraints and basic regime structure provide a basis from

which diplomats and advocates can seek to influence repressive

states. The absolute measures of repression shown in Figures 3

and 4 underscore the fact that regime classification is

ultimately a stand-in for a number of traits. While regimes

within the same category are the most similar, they are

nonetheless unique in their own right. As Davenport (2007)

writes, while it would be inappropriate to become complacent

with a specific type of autocracy, knowing which

characteristics aggregate to form a ‘lesser of evils’ from a

human rights standpoint permits actors to strive toward a

least repressive option when not all solutions are equally

attainable (Davenport 2007). This may not immediately create

durable domestic peace, but it certainly assists those

searching for it.


A. Appendix.

Figure 12. Order logit models - executive constraints and competitiveness of

political participation – explanatory variables

90 Matthew Conway

Figure 13. Order logit models with hybrid monarchies – explanatory variables


Figure 14. Order logit models with military, monarchy, single-party, and

personalist regimes with explanatory variables

92 Matthew Conway

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