Post on 18-Jan-2023
«Glocalized» attachmentsThe Centripetal strength of the State
Failure in EuropeMUHINDO Mughanda
Abstract
This paper discusses the idea that the globalization of attachments is a result of theincreasing failure of the Westphalian state. It argues that the «glocalization» ofattachments instead of being a result of state failure is rather a product of stateperformance. Such a statement is based on the idea that the performance of state isvery likely to create ambivalent effects on attachments unless we consider«glocalization» as the only authentic attachment in the era of globalization. On the onehand it may lead people to look outside (because they are effectively enabled). On theother hand however it may lead them to look inside (in order to protect what theyare/have). However, this ambivalent effect disappears if instead of considering onlyglobal and local we take into account «glocal» attachments. If the state performanceincreases both global and local attachments, it is likely to be also the explanation of«glocal» attachments. Using survey data from the Eurobarometer 73.1 (June-July 2009)to measure «glocal» attachments and the Failed States Index constructed by the Foundfor peace to measure the degrees of statehood, this expectation has been providedempirical support: there is a positive and significant effect of the latter on the former.Conversely, while the State performance exerts a centrifugal power on globalattachments, the State-failure has a kind of centripetal effect.
Key words: Globalization, «Glocal» attachments/identities, Statefailure, Europe
«Becoming a citizen of the world is often alonely business. It is, as Diogenes said, akind of exile—from the comfort of local truths,from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism,from the absorbing drama of pride in oneselfand one’s own». (Nussbaum 1996: 15)
I. Globalization, complex attachments and state failure
In the era of globalization, there seem to be a shared
consensus about the fact that social attachments have
become more and more complex. It becomes difficult to
challenge the idea that we are all «cosmopolitan locals»
(Hannerz 1990: 250). The only attachments making sense is
the glocal1 one in the sense that one locality folds inside
connections to other localities. This is not true only whenspeaking of mobile2 (Bauman 2000) [elite frequent flyers1 In order to define the link between local and global, Robertson(1992) speaks of “glocalization”. He believes, as many others, thatattachments cannot be defined by birth, social class and territory(Magatti and Bichi 2001: 84). In the global era points of attachmentsare chosen between univarsalism and particularism (Robertson, 1992).According to Bauman, this is no longer a world where you can tell astory that makes sense. Stories are no longer like rives but a seriesof pools and puddles (Bauman, 1995, 1995:2). It remains thealternative of managing ambivalence without trying mediation betweenpolarities and oppositions but navigating between multipleinterpretations. Peoples attachments are no longer a work of "knownarchitects of an ideal city" (Turaine, 1997: 84) but of "bricoleur"of limited and fragile combinations(Turnaturi, 1994:127). 2 The mobile are divided between the privileged elite of globetrottingwanderers or 'tourists' who consume other places but have homes to goto and the underprivileged or displaced 'vagabonds' who have neitherhomes nor access to such consumption (Bauman). Some cosmopolitanstoday are ‘elite frequent flyers’ who travel across national bordersfor business as well as for pleasure (Calhoun 2003). Others areimmigrants and refugees who cross borders out of economic necessity orpolitical persecution (Pollock et al. 2000).
(Calhoun 2003) and immigrants (Pollock et al. 2000)] but also
applies to non-immigrant people. Even if they do not travel
as much as frequent flyers and immigrants, their everyday
lives are penetrated by foreign people and objects that
have travelled from other places. Indeed, poor places are
crowded by foreigners working for International Non-
Governmental and governmental organizations. Richer places
are instead crowded by foreigners coming prevalently from
poor countries. Non-immigrants can no longer make do with
their everyday life without drawing on signifiers and
cultural idioms that travel across national borders. Foods,
clothing, appliances, and many other consumer products are
made entirely outside one’s own country, or at least
contain parts that are made abroad. These objects from
abroad make possible human interactions here and now, but
they carry inside times, spaces, and social relations that
exist outside the horizon of here and now. Turning one’s
clothing inside out, for example, one sees that it was made
abroad. What is closest to one’s bare skin can come from a
farthest place. «Glocal» attachments seem to be inevitable
when we consider that “immigrants-vagabonds” living totally
in new places maintain connections with places of origin
and immigrants’ elite-frequent flyers maintain their
hometowns where they spend most of their time. Non-
immigrants, instead combine their local attachments and
wider ones even though they have never been abroad. «[W]e
are all cosmopolitans» (Rabinow, 1986: 258) in the sense
that we are human actors embedded in networks of
attachments with people and objects that traverse national
borders. As Latour (2005:202) suggests, «In most
situations, actions will already be interfered with
heterogeneous entities that don’t have the same local
presence, don’t come from the same time, are not visible at
once». This leads to a kind of “de-spatialization” of
simultaneity ( Thompson 1998), the death of places (Bauman
2000) and perhaps more properly speaking the overabundance
of space (Augé 2000:121). The same phenomenon is referred
to as «glocalization», defining also the synthesis between
localities and non-localities. The dilatation of spaces
concerns particularly people’s sense of belonging which
have become, as we underlined above, «glocal». For
instance, it is straightforward that one can feel at the
same time Bavarian, German, European and citizen of the
world. «Glocalized» people keep their attachments to local
being also connected to wider and farer realities. What’s
behind these hybrid attachments? More than one explanation
has been provided. This paper concentrates only on the
hypothetical effects of state failure on the extension of
attachments. The very question this paper addresses is
whether the state-failure explains the
dilatation/multiplication of spaces of attachments.
This question arises when considering the point of
view of those sharing the long lasting belief that
individuals could only have some allegiance to one given
State (eg. Petoefi, 1871). Such a belief implies that
alternative identities to the national have to be
considered as anti-identity. Here can be mentioned the
leading work dealing with cosmopolitanism written by Merton
(1947). Indeed, trying to operationalize cosmopolitanism,
he identifies two types of community leaders, cosmopolitans
and locals. Cosmopolitans (or cosmopolites as they are
sometimes called) are attuned to the world beyond their
local community and locals are oriented toward the local
community. Hybrid attachments are not taken into account.
Cosmopolitanism is conceived as an anti-identity also by
Japperson who consider European identity as an elite
phenomenon, and, for all practical purposes, an ‘anti-
identity’ that really measures cosmopolitanism. The same
problem can be found in the ‘Moreno question’ developed by
Luis Moreno to measure the duality of identities. It has
been suspected not to be equipped to fully capture the
notion of European identity (see Bruter 2008), because it
presupposes a tension between national and European
identities. The same idea of cosmopolitanism as anti-
identity is embedded in the conception of globalization as
a result of failure of the Westphalia system (Strange). In
this perspective, the extension of points of reference for
identification is the expression of State-failure.
Different explanations to globalization of attachments
have considered that that people can have multiple
attachments that can exist side by side without necessarily
being in competition with each other (Risse 2004; Caporaso
and Kim 2009; Huyst 2008). Philosophical support to such a
way of thinking can be found in Lévinas (1999) when he
defines the face of the ‘other’ as constitutive of the
self. There can be no cosmopolitans without locals. This
way of thinking leads to consider that cosmopolitanism is
not necessarily a sign of rebellion against local
realities. It is not necessarily due to the state failure.
Considering side by side the two ways of looking at
cosmopolitanism, it is not so much clear whether state
failure plays a role in shaping non-national attachments.
The picture becomes more confusing when we account for the
fact that some cosmopolitans today are ‘elite frequent
flyers’ who travel across national borders for business as
well as for pleasure (Calhoun 2003). Others are immigrants
and refugees who cross borders out of economic necessity or
political persecution (Pollock et al. 2000). The first
cosmopolitanism is partly a result of state performance
while the second is clearly a result of state failure. The
question about the extent to which attachments different
from those linked to the state are a product of state
failure seems still open. This question makes further
sense when we consider that some scholars argue that the
sense of national identity might be diminished by
globalization, whereas others claim that nationhood and
national identity will persist even in the postmodern era
(M. D. R. Evans and Jonathan Kelley, 2002: 303-38)3.
II. Theory and Methods
Our point is that «glocalization» of attachments
instead of being a result of state failure depends on state
performance4. Indeed, performing States empower5 their
citizens (Fox and Gershman 2000; Knight et al, 2003). Such
an empowerment includes the opportunity for citizens of
performing states to hold transnational experiences that
foster people’s openness and tolerance and ‘the
intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole’
(Robertson 1992: 8). It also creates sets of certainties
about the community people belong to (enjoying services)
and socio-economic conditions as well. The individual
empowerment provided by good performance of the state leads
3 Edensor insisted that the globalization process might enhancenational identity because people experience the influence ofglobalization on the basis of national character and enrich theirnational culture by domesticating what globalization brings (Sasaki,Y. M. Kim, 2002).4 This idea has been somewhat sustained by Bauman, from another pointof view. Indeed, he states that the need for archaic certainties leadsto give weight to local attachments while the seduction of freedomfrom history and places leads to keep doors open (Bauman 2000). Thismeans that the explanation of hybrid attachments resides in attractionfor local certainties and un-local spaces of freedom. It seemsstraightforward that the state performance is likely to shape localand wider attachments as well. 5 “Empowerment is a multi-dimensional social process that helps peoplegain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power(that is, the capacity to implement) in people, for use in their ownlives, their communities, and in their society, by acting on issuesthat they define as important.” (Nanette Page and Cheryl E. Czuba1999)
therefore to local and global attachment as well. This is
particulary convincing when we consider also that
performing states are also those attracting migrants from
several countries. This provides people (even those who
have never been abroad) the opportunity to experience what
they have in common with other people. At the sametime
however, they fear to loose their certainties (about
culture and economic conditions). Here, once again the good
performance of the state leads to cosmopolitanism and
localism (Figure 1).
As a result, larger groups of global attachments are
likely to be registered in well performing countries.
However in the same country, knowledge of the complexity of
the world will lead to look for certainties. This leads to
the defense of local particularities. It goes without
saying that state performance creates a kind of ambivalent
relationship. This ambiguity about the role of statehood on
localism and cosmopolitanism desapears if instaed of
studying localism and cosmopolitalism separately
(considering them as unconectable realities) we examine
«glocalism» for it embeds both attachments. In this case
glocal attachments instead of being a product of the state-
failure are rather determined by good performance of the
state.
Our point is based on the fact that, using secondary
data from the Eurobarometer 73.1, we realize that the state
remains the privileged point of reference followed
respectively by the region, the continent and the world.
Here seems confirmed the idea that people feel more
attached to communities (imagined or not) that intervene
the most in their daily lives. This is probably due to the
fact that when people compare the intervention of local and
regional institutions, those of the central state are
probably assigned relevant role in dealing with people’s
problems. More interestingly when we look at hybrid
attachments, we account for the fact that people feeling
regional and national are far more than those feeling
regional and European or regional and citizens of the word.
This confirms the fact that the far a community is, the
less the attachment. The closer community, that is, the
State is also likely to be relevant in shaping their
attachments.
In order to control empirically the above displayed
hypothesis we concentrate on the «glocalization» in
European countries6. The reason why we focus on Europe is
its scientific saliency. Indeed, if identities refer
largely to ‘imagined communities’ some of them are more
imagined than others. The «glocalism» combining local and
global is likely to be only imagined and irrelevant in
people’s evaluations. «Glocalism» combining local and
6 We consider «Glocalized», people keeping their attachments to localbeing also connected to wider realities. In other words, «Glocalized»citizens are those feeling local and regional; those feeling nationaland global; and those feeling local and citizens of the world etc.Maximizing the special distance we risk dealing with irrelevantspheres in popular evaluations. Taking therefore local and global asreference point is very scientifically risky.
regional is instead more likely to be salient for
Europeanism exerts both relevant effects on people’s daily
life. Furthermore, the European level for the analysis of
«glocalization» is relevant for noticeable distances emerge
when to take into account «glocalized» people (those
feeling both regional and European7). The «glocalism»
combining regional and European attachments is the only one
representing a kind of synthesis of different attachments.
All the others are either cumulative or similar. Among
people feeling both regional and European there are about
20% less than those feeling only regional and about 5
percent less than those feeling only European. For what
concerns Europeanized (those feeling both national and
European), there seem not to be a great difference between
those feeling only European. When we look at
«glocalization», globalization and cosmopolitanism, we
account for the fact that if there is a huge difference
between regional, national and hybrid attachments, such a
difference is not noticeable if we compare percentages of
hybrid attachments and global attachments. Finally,
nationalized people (those feeling both regional and
national), are more than those feeling regional and those
feeling national separately, we can here speak of
7 We use survey questions from recent Eurobarometer surveys (71.3,June-July 2009) about feeling European or regional. After havingextracted percentages of people having answered positively to theanswer about the sense of belonging, we built cross tabs taking inwhich we consider couple of levels of identity with a certain distancefrom local. We then considered «glocal» those who fall in theintersection point.
cumulative phenomenon (Figure 2). Here can be noticed en
passant that local and wider attachments are not competing.
Attachments are either cumulative or synthetic.
Nationalization, globalization are cumulative attachments
while «glocalization» is a synthetic one.
The main independent variable this paper suggests is
rather difficult to pin down. Indeed, state failure is
often referred to looking at the state capacity (service
delivery and military capacity) as well as the state
legitimation. Although there is an abundance information
and analysis on fragile states and levels of statehood8,
consensus seems to be met in considering the following
general traits of state fragility: weak capacity to provide
public security, rule of law, and basic social services;
low levels of democracy and civil liberties; legitimization
and criminalization of the state; rising factionalism;
8 One early example was the State Failure Task Force (since 2001 knownas the Political Instability Task Force, or PITF) established in 1994to assess and explain the vulnerability of states to instability andfailure (Political Instability Task Force, George Mason University,available at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ pitf/index.htm). It has beenfollowed by a number of other projects to measure, compare, and rankaspects of state failure, vulnerability, and performance, includingthe World Bank Governance Matters Project (World Bank, “GovernanceMatters, Worldwide Governance Indicators,” available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.), the aforementioned Fund forPeace Failed States Index, the Brookings Institution’s Index of StateWeakness (Brookings Institution, “Index of State Weakness,” availableat www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_v weak_states_index.aspx)., andthe Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation,“Index of African Governance,” available at www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index). The most common approach toconceiving state fragility has been to categorize states according totheir degree of fragility or failure.
poor, socially uneven, and declining economic performance;
inability to manage political conflict; extensive
interference by external actors; and, in some but not all
cases, outbreaks of armed insurgencies. All these aspects
of state failure as included in the Failed State Index
constructed by the Fund for Peace.
The other dependent variables, following the
explanations displayed by Figure1, which are also kinds of
intervening variables between state performance and
«glocal» attachments, will be measured as follows.
Certainty and uncertainty have been referred to looking at
percentages of people who declared to have finished paying
the house/flat they are living in; percentages of people
who are still paying for the flat and percentages of people
who claim not to trust institutions (particularly the
government, political parties and the parliament).
Awareness about local and global has been referred to
taking into account percentages of internet users9.
International seduction/openness has been looking at
considering percentages of people claiming that cultural
diversity is a value. Percentages of people declaring
necessary to hold ancestors and national traditions in
order to get citizenship rights have been used as proxy
measures of awareness of locality. The propensity to
protect local prerogatives has been referred to using the
9 ICTs have accelerated the process of transformation of spatial andtemporal coordinates of experience. They have created a kind ofsimultaneity without spaces. (Thompson 1998:51)
percentages of people registering anti-immigrant attitudes
as a proxy measure. Here have been taken into account those
considering migrants as threatening and useless people.
III. Findings and discussion
The above displayed reasoning goes against the idea that
globalization of attachments is a product of state failure.
«Glocalization» of attachments seems rather to be an effect
of state performance. Partial empirical support to such a
statement has been provided when looking at the variability
across European countries of the levels of «glocal»
attachments and levels of state failure. We observe that
«Glocal» attachments tend to be diffused in countries with
lower levels of state-failure as Figure 3 shows. A
bivariate correlation analysis displayed in Table 1
provides partial empirical support to what have been
hypothesized in Figure 1. Indeed, in countries with better
scores of statehood, we find higher proportion of people
with social certainties having finished paying for the flat
they are living in. In these countries, people seem to have
thinks to protect. This is perhaps the reason why we find
negative association between «glocal» attachments and
social certainties. We account for the right contrary when
we consider percentages of people that are still paying for
the flat/house they live in. Higher percentages of these
people are registered in countries with higher scores of
the Failed State Index and more «glocalized» ones. Such a
relationship seems causal and strong when we run a linear
regression analysis considering the percentage of
«glocalized» people as the dependent variable and the
levels of state failure as the main independent variables.
The other independent variables are those included in the
model trying to explain the eventual link between
«glocalization» of attachments and levels of state failure
(Figure 1).
In addition, mistrust in institutions register higher
percentages in countries with worse scores of statehood
(high FSI) and low percentage of «glocalized» citizens.
When it comes to look at connections between statehood,
awareness and «glocalization», we account for the fact that
levels of media exposure are not significantly associated
to both statehood and «glocalization». The same reasoning
applies when considering local attachments used as a proxy
measure of the awareness of locality. It registers
significant association with neither statehood nor
«glocalization».
When it comes to consider the links between
international seduction, levels of state hood and
«glocalization», we account for the fact that it is in
countries with better scores of statehood that we find
higher percentage of people considering cultural diversity
as a value and higher percentages of «glocalized» citizens.
The propensity to protect local prerogative (measured here
using by percentages of people holding anti-immigrant
attitudes) is associated with both statehood and
«glocalization». In countries where percentages of people
holding anti-immigrant sentiments are higher, there we find
also worse score of statehood and lower percentages of
«glocalized» citizens.
Even if a multivariate regression analysis such
technique is not particularly appropriate for the small
number of observations (22) we are taking into account, it
assigns the relationship between statehood and
«glocalization» a causal meaning. In order to control the
spuriousness of the relationship and strengthen the model
we run six different models increasing this way the number
of predictors. Notwithstanding, we account for the
centrifugal strength of the statehood. In the very first
model, we consider only the measure of knowledge, education
and general awareness (media exposure) and discover that it
has positive effects on «glocalization». Its effects loose
significance when in a second model we introduce variables
measuring openness (international seduction). We instead
find positive effects of cultural openness on
«glocalization». The significance of these effects will
disappear when in a third model we will introduce variables
measuring individual and social uncertainties. These
variables do not exert significant effects on
«glocalization». The variables measuring openness reacquire
significance one running the forth model in which we
introduce variables about local attachments. The latter
influence negatively «glocalization» and provide
significance to variables measuring social uncertainty
(mistrust in institutions). Variables measuring local
attachments will lose their significance once we introduce
in the last model measures of state failure. State failure
exerts negative effects on «glocalization» together with
personal and social certainty/uncertainties. In case this
result will be confirmed considering larger number of
observations, it will be considered that glocalization of
attachments, instead of being a product of state-failure is
rather linked to good levels of state-performance.
Conclusive remarks
Who maintains that globalization is an effect of
state-failure considers that the state performance exerts a
kind of centrifugal influence on people attachments. It
leads them to look outside the center. At the contrary
those claiming that globalization has created a kind of
return to the local assign the State a kind of centripetal
influence on people attachments on people attachments,
whatever its performance. This paper has tried to provide
a kind of synthesis to this diatribe. Moving from the
conviction that attachments are nothing but inevitably
hybrid, it maintains that the «glocal» level of analysis is
the appropriate one to assess the direction of the effect
of the State performance or failure on attachments in the
era of globalization. Furthermore and more interestingly it
shows that the influences the state exerts on attachments
are neither centrifugal nor centripetal. What is likely to
be observed is that state performance leads to «glocal»,
that is it strengthens local attachments and wider ones.
Figure 1. State failure and «glocalized» attachments 10
10 This hypothesis implies that levels of «glocalized» attachmentsdepend on good levels of state performance. The later creates such alink because it is correlated with certainties and uncertainties aboutidentity and socio-economic conditions. It widens knowledge about theworld and subsequent openness that creates awareness about localityand leads to protect local certainties. Such a protection is madenecessary when the state performance attract migrants from othercountries. Such a product of the seduction power of the stateperformance leads to openness but also to the tendency to protectlocal certainties.
Figure 2. Local, national, «glocal» and global identities in Europe (Mean percentages), N=33 Countries
Figure 3. «Glocalized» citizens, where?
Table 1. Certainty, uncertainty and loci of sense of belonging (correlation analysis)(N=22)
Figure 4. «Glocalization» and State failure in Europe
Table 4. Glocalization, a bivariate logistic analysis
B S.E. Wald df Sig.Exp(B)
Cultural diversity is a value 0.095 0.040 5.540 1 0.01
9 1.099
Citizen of the world 1.367 0.027
2597.975 1 0.00
0 3.926
Have finished to pay for the flat 0.297 0.03
1 94.357 1 0.000 1.346
Still paying for the apartment 0.489 0.03
8 166.479 1 0.000 1.631
Migrants threatening people 0.039 0.028 1.857 1 0.17
3 1.039
Migrants useless people -0.223 0.030 55.436 1 0.00
0 0.800
Holding national traditions, citizenship 0.411 0.02
9 196.628 1 0.000 1.508
Holding ancestors, citizenship 0.159 0.04
1 15.420 1 0.000 1.173
Negative evaluation national economy -0.124 0.03
3 14.146 1 0.000 0.884
Negative evaluation job opportunities -2.054 0.14
0 214.784 1 0.000 0.128
Negative expectation about economy 0.001 0.03
1 0.000 1 0.982 1.001
Negative expectation about job opportunities 0.058 0.03
2 3.278 1 0.070 1.060
Mistrust in institutions -0.339 0.036 87.422 1 0.00
0 0.713
Nagelkerke R Square 0.117Cox & Snell R Square 0.164N 30304
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