«Glocalized» attachmentsThe Centripetal strength of the State

Failure in EuropeMUHINDO Mughanda

Abstract

This paper discusses the idea that the globalization of attachments is a result of theincreasing failure of the Westphalian state. It argues that the «glocalization» ofattachments instead of being a result of state failure is rather a product of stateperformance. Such a statement is based on the idea that the performance of state isvery likely to create ambivalent effects on attachments unless we consider«glocalization» as the only authentic attachment in the era of globalization. On the onehand it may lead people to look outside (because they are effectively enabled). On theother hand however it may lead them to look inside (in order to protect what theyare/have). However, this ambivalent effect disappears if instead of considering onlyglobal and local we take into account «glocal» attachments. If the state performanceincreases both global and local attachments, it is likely to be also the explanation of«glocal» attachments. Using survey data from the Eurobarometer 73.1 (June-July 2009)to measure «glocal» attachments and the Failed States Index constructed by the Foundfor peace to measure the degrees of statehood, this expectation has been providedempirical support: there is a positive and significant effect of the latter on the former.Conversely, while the State performance exerts a centrifugal power on globalattachments, the State-failure has a kind of centripetal effect.

Key words: Globalization, «Glocal» attachments/identities, Statefailure, Europe

«Becoming a citizen of the world is often alonely business. It is, as Diogenes said, akind of exile—from the comfort of local truths,from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism,from the absorbing drama of pride in oneselfand one’s own». (Nussbaum 1996: 15)

I. Globalization, complex attachments and state failure

In the era of globalization, there seem to be a shared

consensus about the fact that social attachments have

become more and more complex. It becomes difficult to

challenge the idea that we are all «cosmopolitan locals»

(Hannerz 1990: 250). The only attachments making sense is

the glocal1 one in the sense that one locality folds inside

connections to other localities. This is not true only whenspeaking of mobile2 (Bauman 2000) [elite frequent flyers1 In order to define the link between local and global, Robertson(1992) speaks of “glocalization”. He believes, as many others, thatattachments cannot be defined by birth, social class and territory(Magatti and Bichi 2001: 84). In the global era points of attachmentsare chosen between univarsalism and particularism (Robertson, 1992).According to Bauman, this is no longer a world where you can tell astory that makes sense. Stories are no longer like rives but a seriesof pools and puddles (Bauman, 1995, 1995:2). It remains thealternative of managing ambivalence without trying mediation betweenpolarities and oppositions but navigating between multipleinterpretations. Peoples attachments are no longer a work of "knownarchitects of an ideal city" (Turaine, 1997: 84) but of "bricoleur"of limited and fragile combinations(Turnaturi, 1994:127). 2 The mobile are divided between the privileged elite of globetrottingwanderers or 'tourists' who consume other places but have homes to goto and the underprivileged or displaced 'vagabonds' who have neitherhomes nor access to such consumption (Bauman). Some cosmopolitanstoday are ‘elite frequent flyers’ who travel across national bordersfor business as well as for pleasure (Calhoun 2003). Others areimmigrants and refugees who cross borders out of economic necessity orpolitical persecution (Pollock et al. 2000).

(Calhoun 2003) and immigrants (Pollock et al. 2000)] but also

applies to non-immigrant people. Even if they do not travel

as much as frequent flyers and immigrants, their everyday

lives are penetrated by foreign people and objects that

have travelled from other places. Indeed, poor places are

crowded by foreigners working for International Non-

Governmental and governmental organizations. Richer places

are instead crowded by foreigners coming prevalently from

poor countries. Non-immigrants can no longer make do with

their everyday life without drawing on signifiers and

cultural idioms that travel across national borders. Foods,

clothing, appliances, and many other consumer products are

made entirely outside one’s own country, or at least

contain parts that are made abroad. These objects from

abroad make possible human interactions here and now, but

they carry inside times, spaces, and social relations that

exist outside the horizon of here and now. Turning one’s

clothing inside out, for example, one sees that it was made

abroad. What is closest to one’s bare skin can come from a

farthest place. «Glocal» attachments seem to be inevitable

when we consider that “immigrants-vagabonds” living totally

in new places maintain connections with places of origin

and immigrants’ elite-frequent flyers maintain their

hometowns where they spend most of their time. Non-

immigrants, instead combine their local attachments and

wider ones even though they have never been abroad. «[W]e

are all cosmopolitans» (Rabinow, 1986: 258) in the sense

that we are human actors embedded in networks of

attachments with people and objects that traverse national

borders. As Latour (2005:202) suggests, «In most

situations, actions will already be interfered with

heterogeneous entities that don’t have the same local

presence, don’t come from the same time, are not visible at

once». This leads to a kind of “de-spatialization” of

simultaneity ( Thompson 1998), the death of places (Bauman

2000) and perhaps more properly speaking the overabundance

of space (Augé 2000:121). The same phenomenon is referred

to as «glocalization», defining also the synthesis between

localities and non-localities. The dilatation of spaces

concerns particularly people’s sense of belonging which

have become, as we underlined above, «glocal». For

instance, it is straightforward that one can feel at the

same time Bavarian, German, European and citizen of the

world. «Glocalized» people keep their attachments to local

being also connected to wider and farer realities. What’s

behind these hybrid attachments? More than one explanation

has been provided. This paper concentrates only on the

hypothetical effects of state failure on the extension of

attachments. The very question this paper addresses is

whether the state-failure explains the

dilatation/multiplication of spaces of attachments.

This question arises when considering the point of

view of those sharing the long lasting belief that

individuals could only have some allegiance to one given

State (eg. Petoefi, 1871). Such a belief implies that

alternative identities to the national have to be

considered as anti-identity. Here can be mentioned the

leading work dealing with cosmopolitanism written by Merton

(1947). Indeed, trying to operationalize cosmopolitanism,

he identifies two types of community leaders, cosmopolitans

and locals. Cosmopolitans (or cosmopolites as they are

sometimes called) are attuned to the world beyond their

local community and locals are oriented toward the local

community. Hybrid attachments are not taken into account.

Cosmopolitanism is conceived as an anti-identity also by

Japperson who consider European identity as an elite

phenomenon, and, for all practical purposes, an ‘anti-

identity’ that really measures cosmopolitanism. The same

problem can be found in the ‘Moreno question’ developed by

Luis Moreno to measure the duality of identities. It has

been suspected not to be equipped to fully capture the

notion of European identity (see Bruter 2008), because it

presupposes a tension between national and European

identities. The same idea of cosmopolitanism as anti-

identity is embedded in the conception of globalization as

a result of failure of the Westphalia system (Strange). In

this perspective, the extension of points of reference for

identification is the expression of State-failure.

Different explanations to globalization of attachments

have considered that that people can have multiple

attachments that can exist side by side without necessarily

being in competition with each other (Risse 2004; Caporaso

and Kim 2009; Huyst 2008). Philosophical support to such a

way of thinking can be found in Lévinas (1999) when he

defines the face of the ‘other’ as constitutive of the

self. There can be no cosmopolitans without locals. This

way of thinking leads to consider that cosmopolitanism is

not necessarily a sign of rebellion against local

realities. It is not necessarily due to the state failure.

Considering side by side the two ways of looking at

cosmopolitanism, it is not so much clear whether state

failure plays a role in shaping non-national attachments.

The picture becomes more confusing when we account for the

fact that some cosmopolitans today are ‘elite frequent

flyers’ who travel across national borders for business as

well as for pleasure (Calhoun 2003). Others are immigrants

and refugees who cross borders out of economic necessity or

political persecution (Pollock et al. 2000). The first

cosmopolitanism is partly a result of state performance

while the second is clearly a result of state failure. The

question about the extent to which attachments different

from those linked to the state are a product of state

failure seems still open. This question makes further

sense when we consider that some scholars argue that the

sense of national identity might be diminished by

globalization, whereas others claim that nationhood and

national identity will persist even in the postmodern era

(M. D. R. Evans and Jonathan Kelley, 2002: 303-38)3.

II. Theory and Methods

Our point is that «glocalization» of attachments

instead of being a result of state failure depends on state

performance4. Indeed, performing States empower5 their

citizens (Fox and Gershman 2000; Knight et al, 2003). Such

an empowerment includes the opportunity for citizens of

performing states to hold transnational experiences that

foster people’s openness and tolerance and ‘the

intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole’

(Robertson 1992: 8). It also creates sets of certainties

about the community people belong to (enjoying services)

and socio-economic conditions as well. The individual

empowerment provided by good performance of the state leads

3 Edensor insisted that the globalization process might enhancenational identity because people experience the influence ofglobalization on the basis of national character and enrich theirnational culture by domesticating what globalization brings (Sasaki,Y. M. Kim, 2002).4 This idea has been somewhat sustained by Bauman, from another pointof view. Indeed, he states that the need for archaic certainties leadsto give weight to local attachments while the seduction of freedomfrom history and places leads to keep doors open (Bauman 2000). Thismeans that the explanation of hybrid attachments resides in attractionfor local certainties and un-local spaces of freedom. It seemsstraightforward that the state performance is likely to shape localand wider attachments as well. 5 “Empowerment is a multi-dimensional social process that helps peoplegain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power(that is, the capacity to implement) in people, for use in their ownlives, their communities, and in their society, by acting on issuesthat they define as important.” (Nanette Page and Cheryl E. Czuba1999)

therefore to local and global attachment as well. This is

particulary convincing when we consider also that

performing states are also those attracting migrants from

several countries. This provides people (even those who

have never been abroad) the opportunity to experience what

they have in common with other people. At the sametime

however, they fear to loose their certainties (about

culture and economic conditions). Here, once again the good

performance of the state leads to cosmopolitanism and

localism (Figure 1).

As a result, larger groups of global attachments are

likely to be registered in well performing countries.

However in the same country, knowledge of the complexity of

the world will lead to look for certainties. This leads to

the defense of local particularities. It goes without

saying that state performance creates a kind of ambivalent

relationship. This ambiguity about the role of statehood on

localism and cosmopolitanism desapears if instaed of

studying localism and cosmopolitalism separately

(considering them as unconectable realities) we examine

«glocalism» for it embeds both attachments. In this case

glocal attachments instead of being a product of the state-

failure are rather determined by good performance of the

state.

Our point is based on the fact that, using secondary

data from the Eurobarometer 73.1, we realize that the state

remains the privileged point of reference followed

respectively by the region, the continent and the world.

Here seems confirmed the idea that people feel more

attached to communities (imagined or not) that intervene

the most in their daily lives. This is probably due to the

fact that when people compare the intervention of local and

regional institutions, those of the central state are

probably assigned relevant role in dealing with people’s

problems. More interestingly when we look at hybrid

attachments, we account for the fact that people feeling

regional and national are far more than those feeling

regional and European or regional and citizens of the word.

This confirms the fact that the far a community is, the

less the attachment. The closer community, that is, the

State is also likely to be relevant in shaping their

attachments.

In order to control empirically the above displayed

hypothesis we concentrate on the «glocalization» in

European countries6. The reason why we focus on Europe is

its scientific saliency. Indeed, if identities refer

largely to ‘imagined communities’ some of them are more

imagined than others. The «glocalism» combining local and

global is likely to be only imagined and irrelevant in

people’s evaluations. «Glocalism» combining local and

6 We consider «Glocalized», people keeping their attachments to localbeing also connected to wider realities. In other words, «Glocalized»citizens are those feeling local and regional; those feeling nationaland global; and those feeling local and citizens of the world etc.Maximizing the special distance we risk dealing with irrelevantspheres in popular evaluations. Taking therefore local and global asreference point is very scientifically risky.

regional is instead more likely to be salient for

Europeanism exerts both relevant effects on people’s daily

life. Furthermore, the European level for the analysis of

«glocalization» is relevant for noticeable distances emerge

when to take into account «glocalized» people (those

feeling both regional and European7). The «glocalism»

combining regional and European attachments is the only one

representing a kind of synthesis of different attachments.

All the others are either cumulative or similar. Among

people feeling both regional and European there are about

20% less than those feeling only regional and about 5

percent less than those feeling only European. For what

concerns Europeanized (those feeling both national and

European), there seem not to be a great difference between

those feeling only European. When we look at

«glocalization», globalization and cosmopolitanism, we

account for the fact that if there is a huge difference

between regional, national and hybrid attachments, such a

difference is not noticeable if we compare percentages of

hybrid attachments and global attachments. Finally,

nationalized people (those feeling both regional and

national), are more than those feeling regional and those

feeling national separately, we can here speak of

7 We use survey questions from recent Eurobarometer surveys (71.3,June-July 2009) about feeling European or regional. After havingextracted percentages of people having answered positively to theanswer about the sense of belonging, we built cross tabs taking inwhich we consider couple of levels of identity with a certain distancefrom local. We then considered «glocal» those who fall in theintersection point.

cumulative phenomenon (Figure 2). Here can be noticed en

passant that local and wider attachments are not competing.

Attachments are either cumulative or synthetic.

Nationalization, globalization are cumulative attachments

while «glocalization» is a synthetic one.

The main independent variable this paper suggests is

rather difficult to pin down. Indeed, state failure is

often referred to looking at the state capacity (service

delivery and military capacity) as well as the state

legitimation. Although there is an abundance information

and analysis on fragile states and levels of statehood8,

consensus seems to be met in considering the following

general traits of state fragility: weak capacity to provide

public security, rule of law, and basic social services;

low levels of democracy and civil liberties; legitimization

and criminalization of the state; rising factionalism;

8 One early example was the State Failure Task Force (since 2001 knownas the Political Instability Task Force, or PITF) established in 1994to assess and explain the vulnerability of states to instability andfailure (Political Instability Task Force, George Mason University,available at http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/ pitf/index.htm). It has beenfollowed by a number of other projects to measure, compare, and rankaspects of state failure, vulnerability, and performance, includingthe World Bank Governance Matters Project (World Bank, “GovernanceMatters, Worldwide Governance Indicators,” available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.), the aforementioned Fund forPeace Failed States Index, the Brookings Institution’s Index of StateWeakness (Brookings Institution, “Index of State Weakness,” availableat www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_v weak_states_index.aspx)., andthe Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation,“Index of African Governance,” available at www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index). The most common approach toconceiving state fragility has been to categorize states according totheir degree of fragility or failure.

poor, socially uneven, and declining economic performance;

inability to manage political conflict; extensive

interference by external actors; and, in some but not all

cases, outbreaks of armed insurgencies. All these aspects

of state failure as included in the Failed State Index

constructed by the Fund for Peace.

The other dependent variables, following the

explanations displayed by Figure1, which are also kinds of

intervening variables between state performance and

«glocal» attachments, will be measured as follows.

Certainty and uncertainty have been referred to looking at

percentages of people who declared to have finished paying

the house/flat they are living in; percentages of people

who are still paying for the flat and percentages of people

who claim not to trust institutions (particularly the

government, political parties and the parliament).

Awareness about local and global has been referred to

taking into account percentages of internet users9.

International seduction/openness has been looking at

considering percentages of people claiming that cultural

diversity is a value. Percentages of people declaring

necessary to hold ancestors and national traditions in

order to get citizenship rights have been used as proxy

measures of awareness of locality. The propensity to

protect local prerogatives has been referred to using the

9 ICTs have accelerated the process of transformation of spatial andtemporal coordinates of experience. They have created a kind ofsimultaneity without spaces. (Thompson 1998:51)

percentages of people registering anti-immigrant attitudes

as a proxy measure. Here have been taken into account those

considering migrants as threatening and useless people.

III. Findings and discussion

The above displayed reasoning goes against the idea that

globalization of attachments is a product of state failure.

«Glocalization» of attachments seems rather to be an effect

of state performance. Partial empirical support to such a

statement has been provided when looking at the variability

across European countries of the levels of «glocal»

attachments and levels of state failure. We observe that

«Glocal» attachments tend to be diffused in countries with

lower levels of state-failure as Figure 3 shows. A

bivariate correlation analysis displayed in Table 1

provides partial empirical support to what have been

hypothesized in Figure 1. Indeed, in countries with better

scores of statehood, we find higher proportion of people

with social certainties having finished paying for the flat

they are living in. In these countries, people seem to have

thinks to protect. This is perhaps the reason why we find

negative association between «glocal» attachments and

social certainties. We account for the right contrary when

we consider percentages of people that are still paying for

the flat/house they live in. Higher percentages of these

people are registered in countries with higher scores of

the Failed State Index and more «glocalized» ones. Such a

relationship seems causal and strong when we run a linear

regression analysis considering the percentage of

«glocalized» people as the dependent variable and the

levels of state failure as the main independent variables.

The other independent variables are those included in the

model trying to explain the eventual link between

«glocalization» of attachments and levels of state failure

(Figure 1).

In addition, mistrust in institutions register higher

percentages in countries with worse scores of statehood

(high FSI) and low percentage of «glocalized» citizens.

When it comes to look at connections between statehood,

awareness and «glocalization», we account for the fact that

levels of media exposure are not significantly associated

to both statehood and «glocalization». The same reasoning

applies when considering local attachments used as a proxy

measure of the awareness of locality. It registers

significant association with neither statehood nor

«glocalization».

When it comes to consider the links between

international seduction, levels of state hood and

«glocalization», we account for the fact that it is in

countries with better scores of statehood that we find

higher percentage of people considering cultural diversity

as a value and higher percentages of «glocalized» citizens.

The propensity to protect local prerogative (measured here

using by percentages of people holding anti-immigrant

attitudes) is associated with both statehood and

«glocalization». In countries where percentages of people

holding anti-immigrant sentiments are higher, there we find

also worse score of statehood and lower percentages of

«glocalized» citizens.

Even if a multivariate regression analysis such

technique is not particularly appropriate for the small

number of observations (22) we are taking into account, it

assigns the relationship between statehood and

«glocalization» a causal meaning. In order to control the

spuriousness of the relationship and strengthen the model

we run six different models increasing this way the number

of predictors. Notwithstanding, we account for the

centrifugal strength of the statehood. In the very first

model, we consider only the measure of knowledge, education

and general awareness (media exposure) and discover that it

has positive effects on «glocalization». Its effects loose

significance when in a second model we introduce variables

measuring openness (international seduction). We instead

find positive effects of cultural openness on

«glocalization». The significance of these effects will

disappear when in a third model we will introduce variables

measuring individual and social uncertainties. These

variables do not exert significant effects on

«glocalization». The variables measuring openness reacquire

significance one running the forth model in which we

introduce variables about local attachments. The latter

influence negatively «glocalization» and provide

significance to variables measuring social uncertainty

(mistrust in institutions). Variables measuring local

attachments will lose their significance once we introduce

in the last model measures of state failure. State failure

exerts negative effects on «glocalization» together with

personal and social certainty/uncertainties. In case this

result will be confirmed considering larger number of

observations, it will be considered that glocalization of

attachments, instead of being a product of state-failure is

rather linked to good levels of state-performance.

Conclusive remarks

Who maintains that globalization is an effect of

state-failure considers that the state performance exerts a

kind of centrifugal influence on people attachments. It

leads them to look outside the center. At the contrary

those claiming that globalization has created a kind of

return to the local assign the State a kind of centripetal

influence on people attachments on people attachments,

whatever its performance. This paper has tried to provide

a kind of synthesis to this diatribe. Moving from the

conviction that attachments are nothing but inevitably

hybrid, it maintains that the «glocal» level of analysis is

the appropriate one to assess the direction of the effect

of the State performance or failure on attachments in the

era of globalization. Furthermore and more interestingly it

shows that the influences the state exerts on attachments

are neither centrifugal nor centripetal. What is likely to

be observed is that state performance leads to «glocal»,

that is it strengthens local attachments and wider ones.

Figure 1. State failure and «glocalized» attachments 10

10 This hypothesis implies that levels of «glocalized» attachmentsdepend on good levels of state performance. The later creates such alink because it is correlated with certainties and uncertainties aboutidentity and socio-economic conditions. It widens knowledge about theworld and subsequent openness that creates awareness about localityand leads to protect local certainties. Such a protection is madenecessary when the state performance attract migrants from othercountries. Such a product of the seduction power of the stateperformance leads to openness but also to the tendency to protectlocal certainties.

Figure 2. Local, national, «glocal» and global identities in Europe (Mean percentages), N=33 Countries

Figure 3. «Glocalized» citizens, where?

Table 1. Certainty, uncertainty and loci of sense of belonging (correlation analysis)(N=22)

Table 2. «Glocalized» citizens , Why? (N=22), OLS

Figure 4. «Glocalization» and State failure in Europe

Table 4. Glocalization, a bivariate logistic analysis

  B S.E. Wald df Sig.Exp(B)

Cultural diversity is a value 0.095 0.040 5.540 1 0.01

9 1.099

Citizen of the world 1.367 0.027

2597.975 1 0.00

0 3.926

Have finished to pay for the flat 0.297 0.03

1 94.357 1 0.000 1.346

Still paying for the apartment 0.489 0.03

8 166.479 1 0.000 1.631

Migrants threatening people 0.039 0.028 1.857 1 0.17

3 1.039

Migrants useless people -0.223 0.030 55.436 1 0.00

0 0.800

Holding national traditions, citizenship 0.411 0.02

9 196.628 1 0.000 1.508

Holding ancestors, citizenship 0.159 0.04

1 15.420 1 0.000 1.173

Negative evaluation national economy -0.124 0.03

3 14.146 1 0.000 0.884

Negative evaluation job opportunities -2.054 0.14

0 214.784 1 0.000 0.128

Negative expectation about economy 0.001 0.03

1 0.000 1 0.982 1.001

Negative expectation about job opportunities 0.058 0.03

2 3.278 1 0.070 1.060

Mistrust in institutions -0.339 0.036 87.422 1 0.00

0 0.713

Nagelkerke R Square 0.117Cox & Snell R Square 0.164N 30304

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