W::HTD NATIONL'jcitf arnrrOil THE CCiJGQ

MEETINGS

Nos. 16 - 2k

December I960to February

ENGLISH

VOL. 3

UNIT!:!"} NATTON3

COHPffiEHPlAL Meeting Ho, 1.6|;i DecemberENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEON THE CONGO

Meeting; at United. Nations Headquarters <(, New York,on Monday, 5 December 1960JP at 2.JO P«

:ra«

60 51297

: 'W ..... sertainly have a quorum,, but I feel that

this Is a meeting; at which it would have been very desirable to have all of us

present* I am sorry especially that so far our friend,, the Minister of Nigeria,

has not been able to come, because he is of course very much a party to the

problem* However, I feel that we have to begin because several of you will have

to attend the General Assembly debate and. even speak in the General. Assembly this

afternoon*

I. feel, on the whole, that this must be a meeting which serves more an.

informative purpose than, that of discussion* There are various facts

which I would like to put before you and. which should be put before you,, and you

may wish to give them further .thought, and we may have to meet again,, Of course,

the trouble is that there is the General Assembly meeting the whole afternoon

and tonight,, and we will have the General Assembly colliding with this Committee's

work aloo tomorrow* Anyway, we will see how far we get.

If you. will permit me, I will start off myself with certain information and

certain comments as background for your discuss ion,. I may perhaps be permitted

to take the liberty to suggest that all of us keep in mind the time-table, and

especially the General Assembly time-table, so that we try to cut down interventions

to a minimum, just in order to see to it that we get the total picture -as clear

as possible, and. that we keep in mind that we may have to revert to a more

thorough debate at a somewhat later stage.

I guess that all of you would, expect me first of all to discuss the most

recent events in the Congo, the arrest of Mr* Lumumba and his detention.

You. will soon have a report from Mr. Dayal on the facts as known to

iiOj, including also the two messages I haws sent to President Kasavubu,

the latest one of last night. I would rather like to refer you. to that

report and to those documents than to try to sum up the situation, here myself*

The documents, of course, give a fuller and more accurate picture than is

possible off the cuff and orally., However,,, that is most definitely included in

what may come up for consideration today* So my putting it somewhat later in

my personal presentation of the situation does not mean any wish to push it aside,,

It is just that you will have the situation in that respect documented before

long, i Should, however, perhaps, on this point, mention that, apart from a

message from, the President of Mali, which has been circulated as a document, I

iliMNIlII

NR/pm

have only just received two cables from President Sekou Toure regarding the

same or related natters which, as they have not been circulated so far > ...... there

v&s ;i:].Ci tine for it— I may just read to you* 1 guess- that is perfectly in order

from the point of view of the Ambassador of Guinea* The first cable reads as

follows:

"People and Government of Guinea profoundly moved by Indignities

suffered by Premier Lumumba at hands of armed bands of Mobutu express

apprehension regarding attitude of the United Nations representatives in

Congo supporting arb itrary and illegal behaviour . Guinea reserves right

to seek other means of maintaining within strictly African framework the

people of the Congo in struggle -against all forms colonialism."

The second cable reads::

"Diplomatic missions UAR and Ghana expelled. arbitrarily from Congo*

Government Republic Guinea indignant at these illegal measures contrary to

international law and Charter United Nations .protests aga inst culpable

indifference UN representatives -Congo. We insist UN mission berestored and. measures taken against this illegal action*11

I do not wish to comment on the cables beyond perhaps saying that it is

necessary to remember what are the United Nations functions, which certainly

do not touch upon the relationships between Member countries*

'The ma -in- -item which naturally would come on our agenda, is the question about

the Conciliation Commission* You will remember that President Kasavubu, when he

was here a. little .more than a week ago, promised us as of the end of last week

to report on the stage reached in the 'preparation for the arrival of the

Commieaion.'-By that time —-and in fact -the same holds true today -»• no message

arrived from President Kasavubu* We are, however, informed that a message is

going to be signed today by hi in in Leopoldville • The information, comes through

Mr. Bomboko. However ,, the fact that there is no message cannot .;l.n -any "way bar

this Committee from considering the situation.,, 1 /guess ..it is«sa'fe-,tol say that

we will not get any -indication -of any progress ;in- the- preparations,! In fact).-

HR/pm(The Secretary-General)

recent events/ if anything, I guess, have moved us in a different direction*

The Committee will have to consider what it should do in the at>i;ie<::u::e of a

reply so far and in the presence of some new developments.

I would like to submit, for the consideration of this Committeef my own

view, which is that, irrespective of the reply, further steps should be taken

in implementation of the previous decision of the Advisory Committee, and the

proposal I want to submit for your consideration would be that the presiding

officers of the Commission proceed to Leopoldville in order to take into their

own hands the preparations,

, i illllllll!

AP/C.l-1,

(The Secretary-General)

I do not wish to give In any detail my reasons for this; I think they

should foe fairly obvious* However, I would believe that the members of the

Committee would like to think over what this might mean — the reasons for it,

the reasons against it*

I do not 'believe that in the present rather disturbed situation a

Commission of» in principle, fifteen, in practice, I guess some twelve would

find it a very useful exercise or very possible to operate,,, I do believe on

the other hand that the reasons why the United Nations should be present in a

form which represents something quite serious from the point of view of a

sense of responsibility end a genre of the rights of this Organization

are not weakened but strengthened by recent events,,

A possible compromise, might be the one I mentioned* Of course, if the

three presiding officers went, I do not 'believe that they should, take'cter

the functions of the Commission.1 They should thus not make the kind of effort

the Commission was supposed to make itself nor report,, as the Commission would have

done, but I believe that they could use their good offices for a preparation and

that their report should go to this Committee for a final decision on the

follow-up of their pioneer undertaking, if it is approved by this Committee.

My third point ie related to this question of the presiding officers going

and also to the Lumumba development. I would like to mention briefly and without

any elaboration that our relations to the powers in being in the Congo are

perhaps not those of co-operation and friendship. I do not believe that we are

passing now a phase where we receive the co-operation which we are entitled

nor even the kind of treatment,, in general terms, to which we should be entitled*

Saying; that, I mean, of course, that we are encountering increasing

difficulties to get an ear for what we want to say* That is true not only of

President Kasavubu, according to the decision of the General Assembly Head of

the delegation to the General Assembly, but also of Mr. Mobutu. That does

create problems for us which do require serious consideration, not in any sense

of drama, but in the sense that of course we must be very much aware of what

we are doing and under what conditions we serve and under what coKjiditions we

are willing to serve. And I think our conclusions from such a consideration

must be made known - find without any ambiguity - to those who are in power.

AP/cn 7

(The S e ere tary -Gems ral)

My fourth point on which I -would lite to brief you very quickly is the

status of our civilian operation,,, You may find that it is a bit out of line

with the general approach I ha e here, but it is not, because it will lead we

to some precision on the present Belgian role in the Congo* I think that an

indication of where we are in. the civilian operation is necessary as a

background for an evaluation of what I want to say about the Belgians ,,

I would invite Sir Alexander MacFarquhar to give us just the data on the

civilian operation under the terras of the Fund for the Congo.

When we last mentioned the civilian

operation in the Advisory CoLfli:d.ti.ae we were pass sing briefly from the emergency

situation, or trying to pass from the emergency situation, to more long-term

considerations* That has net got very far;, partly through lack of authority on

the Congo side and partly through, lack of finance,, The situation of the

United Nations Congo Fund,, as of today, is that we have pledges amounting to

$32.6 million from three African and ten other countries* Of that $12.6 million,

$3*3 million have actually been paid in 'by the United States, the United

Kingdom and New Zealand* On the other side of the sheet, on the expenditure

side, we had,, on Friday evening, to authorize an advance* of $3 million to the

Central, Bank to enable it to keep the Congo Treasury in funds* Adding that to

previous authorizations for personnel,, doctors, teachers, telecommunications

and transport services y our total authorizations at the moment are $1^ million,,

At this moment it is difficult to say accurately how much of that is a real.

commitment from which we cannot resile,, My own estimate is, and I think it

Is a high, one, to he on the cautious side, my own estimate, including the

$3* million dollars on Friday evening; is about $9 million.

Dux cash disbursements are, of course, much less,,, The major items in

these expenditures will be or have been education, health, telecommunications

and transport, work for the relief of unemployment, and the advance* to 'the

bank in support of the Treasury*

* Subsequently withheld.

AP/cn 8-10

Thig °n verv

modest scope so far permitted by the available funds and also,, in f ct, that

¥e are touching already the limits of what the Fund, unless increased, will

permit* That is to say,, we have no area of expansion as regards civilian

assistance, of the technical assistance type, under the Fund to the Congo* This

is of Importance ' because to the extent that that is a fact, with the very great

needs which are known and which have not been lessened since I presented my

appeal for the* $100 million, of course, ttoe present .authorities are likely to

turn to other sources for what t'tey need*

We have in this context made a rather careful study,, through our

representatives, of how far the Belgian technical assistance has extended, and

I would like to qualify it in terras of personnel,,

You have seen Brussels coming out ........ I think it was when Mr. Wigny was

here ...... making -one somewhat drastic comparison between the 2,000 plus Belgians

employed, technical assistance -wise, in the Congo .and our — whatever

figure he mentioned ....... two hundred or something like that,, Later, in fact, a

higher figure for the Belgians had been used by -Brussels, not less than

5,000, with the sane purpose. These figures are not confirmed from Congolese

sources* In fact, the Congolese information is in sharp contradiction to such

figures,,, Our own figures and estimates seem to indicate that if any comparison

is to be made, it has to be made on an entirely different basis, which still

leaves the Belgian element quite Important, although not so absurdly out of

.proportion, as for obvious reasons the publicity in Belgium has tried to make it.

BC/aJ 11

There are four groups of Belgians operating in the Congo, according to

our best inf ormat ion *

The first category consists of officials assigned, to central ministries

and working in the administrative buildings * These officials are estimated

to number between 55 and 70. They are distributed as follows ........ and I would

say that in a certain sense they come closest to what we would regard as our

own technical experts,,, which at the moment are more numerous, as Is known:::

Ministry of Health 5

.Ministry of Justice 3

Ministry of Information 3

Ministry of Finance 8

Ministry of Foreign Trcde 0

Ministry of Education • h

Fonc tion publ ique 0

Minis, try of Co-oidinati' on and Planning 7

Ministry of Labour 7 (estimated)

Mi ni s t ry o f C oiiimunl ca t io ns 10 - 1 5

Ministry of Agriculture 3 ( estimated)

Ministry of Public Works J-i- (estimated)

Ministry of Social Affairs 3 (estimated)

As may be seen,, that is a fairly solid, and very well distributed set-up.

The second category corns is ts of of fie ials as s igned to

and working in office buildings other than administrative* For this category

we have no estimates.

The third category is technicians and. staff employed by para-Statal

organizations, such as OTRACO, or employed as doctors,,, magistrates or teachers,,,

Although, no estimates are available, there are reliable indications that this

group is growing* In Leopoldville Province, same 200 teachers have returned,

and an undetermined number is to be found in other Provinces,. Specifically,,,

it should, be mentioned, that the return of Belgian diesel mechanics and. river

pilots for OTEACO has negated the need for United Nations personnel which was

very speedily introduced in July and August. It is also expected that the

return of Belgian civil aviation technicians may lead, or have lead,,, to the"

withdrawal of ICAO personnel who, since July, have kept aviation in the Congo

in operation*

BC/aJ 1S

The fourth category consists of Belgian advisers In the Ministries of

Provinces* It is reported that there is generally at least one adviser,

sometimes two or three, in each of the Provincial Ministries. Apparently

Commiss loners have protested to Provinc ial authorities concerning the

recruitment- of Belgian advisers without .Central Governmental authorization.

We have no information concerning Katanga* All those figures refer to

the react of the Congo,, It must, however, be assumed that the situation inKatanga remains unchanged.,,

In this connexion I should perhaps draw attention to what members of this

Committee have already seen In the papers ...... that is, a statement made on,

I think, Saturday by Mobutu to the effect that he has dropped the 'idea to hand

over to constitutional authorities on 1 January whatever authority he may wield,

and that Instead he Intends to establish the Coj.l|ge-dej omnissaj;resi as a

provisional Government,,, There is no Indication about the stand of the Chief

of State, who elone, of course, can in any sense of the word be authorized to

take such a step,,

That takes us to the final question in this respect, that of the ANC. Mow,,

since the time when the Army intervened politically ........ that is, since about

12 September ........ we have faced, with regard to the ANC,, what 1 regard as a

paradoxical situation,,, On the one hand,, if a situation of law and order,, in

the sense of the protection of human life and property,,, is to be maintained,

there must be a force available which is functioning. The United Nations troops

were put in because of the complete disintegration and breakdown of the ANC.

Short of bilateral military assistance, it would be through a Congolese takeover

of the maintenance of lav arid order that it would be made possible for the

United Nations troops to be withdrawn »*• and, indeed, I myself had hoped that

we should be able to start withdrawing; them early this autumn, after getting In

the first ARC units* For that reason, the world in general and we as its agent

have a very direct Interest in giving proper form, character and efficiency to an

orderly ANC, but, of course,, from, our point of view that must be an ANC which

Is outside politics, which is a loyal, instrument of the constitutional Government

maintaining law and order In the country*

BC/aj 13

However/ this very ANC,, 'which would be the instrument through which we

could switch over into a situation in which we could start to withdraw United

Nations troops, is at present the basis for political operations of which we all

are aware. On the one hand, we have the Mobutu declaration to which I have

referred,, and on the other hand,, the actions regarding Mr. Lumumba,, It is

quite obvious that that does create a very strange situation indeed,, because the

very means through which we can normalize the situation are the means by 'which an

abnormal situation has come to be maintained,,

I am not ready to go beyond stating the problem,. We are going rather deeply

into it on the Secretariat side,, and I may have a chance to revert to the subject,.

Those were the specific points I wished to mention* On the last point I

might simply state the factual, situation. Because of uncertainty about the

discipline. and loyalty of the ANC from the time it moved in on 7 July,

Congolese officials ........ after their Government called on the United Nations for

military and other ass:? stance in mid-July •»•••• were frequently given to mentioning

a role for the United Nations in reorganizing the ANC. This was true of

Mr. Lumumba, of Mr* Kasavubu, of all those with whom I or Mr. Bunche spoke,,

What they had in mind was that we should train the ANC and restore its discipline

and morale.,, In the early days of the United Nations operation , Brigadier Otu

of Ghana, by an informal, arrangement with the ANC officers at Camp Leopoldville,

acted in an informal advisory and. training capacity with the ANC troops stationed.

in Leopoldville . No formal approach on this matter was made by the Congolese

Government* However.,, as late as 22 August,, a letter was received from Mr. Lumumba j

the Prime Minister, requesting, as an indication of his Government's confidence

in the United Nations, that General Kettani of Morocco, the Deputy Commander of

the United Nations Force, be made available to the Congolese Government as military

adviser in a study to be made of the reorganization of the ANC. The request was

granted on the same date, on the understanding that Kettani would render his

service in the name of the United Nations and. 'would continue in. his position as

Deputy Commander of the United Nations Force,, General. Kettani. worked, out the

training programme, but, with the onset In the early days of September of the

political developments in the Congo., there was little or no implementation of that

programme « •'

BC/aJ(The Secretary-General)

Suggestions were also made to Congolese authorities by United Nations

officers about instituting a training programme for the ANC at Kitona, one of

the two bases* However, nothing has come of those suggestions,,, ALaosb

200 officers and men of the United Nations Force •••••- all of them Moroccans,, by

the way were assigned to the training programae* but late in November

United Rations headquarters in Leopoldville reported that the programme had been

in abeyance for a long perlod>since the trainees had failed to appear.

That is the factual situation which has to be referred to the paradox

regarding our relations to the ANC, the paradox that I have mentioned,,

I apologize for having taken the Committee's time in making thesebrief comments on important aspects of the Congo situation. "1 felt, however,

that I should do so at this stage because it is impossible at present to separate

these various elements to separate the question of the eventual departure

of the Conciliation Commission, or a group thereof, from the related question

of our relations to President Ka&avubu, Colonel Mobutu and others; from the related,

question of the extent to which we can provide civilian assistance and funds

for things which are non-political but very necessary for the Congolese people;

from the related question of'Mobutu's formal takeover; from the related question

of our relations and obligations in relation to the ANC. This is all part and

parcel of the same problem,,

DR/cw . 16

I guess, however, that this leads us 'back to what,,, In your view,, is

probably in a certain sense the most burning issue, the Lumumba one, but I

would like, however,,, to point out its relationship to what I have said, and its

relationship to what I regard it as, so to say, as a normal and automatic item

on our agenda of today, that is, the situation as regards the Conciliation

Commission.!,

IfejLjS&ifbSSJS J S. (lndia) • We have all heard with interest,Mr* Secretary -General, what you have had to say about what should, be the

normal functioning of the United Nations in the Congo • But I hope that you

will forgive us if other things obsess our minds*

I was in India at the time when the off icier s and men of Indian units in

the Congo were subjected, to severe maltreatment and. became the subject of

very heated, discussion and debate in our Parliaments,, Our public opinion is

deeply exercised about this matter* I mentioned something about this to you

this morning,,, but I have not had the occasion to say what has come in later,

which is after I entered this room* We are now in the position not merely of

maltreatment by the so-called Congolese Army, but also by Congolese civilians

end other civilians,, with gendarmes entering the houses of our nationals and

no doubt of other nationals, with a situation on anarchy existing*

The Secretary-General referred to civilian assistance « It is difficult

to explain to our people to whom the assistance is given in these circumstances*

The whole of what the Secretary-General said, while from a longer-term

point ii»f view and from the point of view of the responsibilities of the United

Nations Is so important., appears to be so unrealistic in the context; of the

conditions in the Congo.. I have here messages from my Government asking for

immediate attention to these problems and, as late as last night, more diplomatic

personnel have been manhandled and the United Nations forces are able to offer

no protection to them,, You all heard about the treatment of the Prime Minister,

about which some of us made representations to you*

DR/cw 17

We believe that 'we are in a position rather different from what we were

when we met _Bome. weeks', ago here* Whatever may have 'been the views \re expressed

at the time of the Assembly, the Assembly In. Its .wisdom- or otherwise has made

a decision to seat a delegation representing. the State of the Congo, which

means that. It has taken eome_ action,, which la. rather different from what it

used to be. Those being; the circumstances, it is no longer possible for us to

explain to our people how it can be that a state of anarchy should prevail and

that there should be no conformity with the law of nations or the membership

of the United Nations. It becomes more intimate when one's own nationals are

involved 'because you get more information.), It is not possible for democratic

parliaments^ public opinion and t"->.e fact that co-operation in these matters is*

given voluntarily by States to take a view which is less than asking for same

further step to be taken,,

While all these matters are to.be considered,, even including the question

of sending a delegation, on which. I do not propose saying anything; at the

moment,,, I think, we should discuss how the attention of the United Nations is to

be drawn to this matter. Let us assume for the moment -that the United Nations

presence was not in the Congo.. If a nation 'behaved this way towards other

nations, action certainly would be taken,, and it Is for us to consider this

afternoon whether the time has not come for the United Nations,, either the

Security Council or the Assembly or 'whatever it is, to take notice of these

facts because our sitting in this room in which I am communicating to you and

you are communicating with us has its. value, but it. appears to us that those

who are the sufferers, including the 'whole of the United Nations, have the

worst pf both worlds, while those who are the usurpers have the best of both

WOT Ids i, So it is our submission that while we have no desire to exaggerate

these facts, some attention has to be given to them and we are to consider

vhat ways and means are necessary,, It would be worthwhile considering whether

this situation, is not far more serious than tjbie one that impelled the Security

Council to call for an emergency meeting three or four days before the regular

session of the Aflsembly was meeting « '

DR/ew 16

Here are nationals of countries who have been Invited there by the United

Nat lone and who have responded spontaneously. The civilians in ths Congo and

their gendarmes are beating up people,, diplomatic personnel are being submitted

to indignities and ordinary courtesies of any kind are not being observed*

It is said that Mr* Kasavubu is recognized by all as the Head of State;

so do. we so recognise him* Our Ambassador is accredited to the Congo on that

basis. I will not go into the question of that particular relationship , but

the fact that he is so recognized also places upon him certain responsibilities*As a Member State recently admit ted,, and afterwards with a delegation appointed

by him being received, by the United Nations, the position is altered so

considerably that we have the right to ask the United Eat ions,, and particularly

those people who were responsible for these changes,, what steps they propose

to take,, Secondly, we also have to consider the more serious position that

may arise* tbrtain parties tell us that they are going to secede,, where

local, levies and formations come into existence, whether they are really

heading towards a. position of large-scale civil war or interventionism on one

aide or the other*

Part of the Secretary-General's report which refers to the presence

of the Belgians is very illuminating* I understood that one of the main

purposes of the United Nations being there was to see the Belgians out of the

place,,, But apparently they seem to have increased in numbers since we went

there, and they keep on increasing and we seem powerless to do anything* In

those circumstances I should like to think it out and ask the Committee whether

the whole of the Assembly,,, the whole of the United Nations should not take

responsibilities in these matters, whether they should take these things into

consideration,,! If the United Nations as an Organization is to suffer this

kind of treatment from a Member State, vbion awes it gratitude rather than

otherwise, then certainly actions have to be taken,, Therefore,, I should like

this matter to be taken into consideration*

My Government expects me to inform all of you ....... I will try to say this as

moderately, as possible ........ that the expulsion and the ill-treatment of diplomatici

personnel in the place, the treatment of civilians,, the treatment of other

personnel who are competent, as far as we are concerned,, and not on combat duty ......

DB/cw 19-20

and there ere a number of them ....... what steps we can take in this matter,, whether

the time has come for immediate reference of these matters to the Assembly and

to place all the facts before them. There is a report due from the

Secretary -General which I understand is ready now,, and, I personally and my

delegation dp not think the circulation of these papers are adequate. in this

natter,, The thing; is too important for that purpose*

That is the kind of submission I wanted to make at this stage*

SLSS L S } May :i: be permitted to inform Mr. Krishna Menonand all the members of the Committee that there is,. first of all, the report

from the field on the Lumumba developments,,, There is, however,, another report,.

if I may call it a report,, brewing,,, which is a personal report of mine to which

I am devoting all the time I can possibly find for it; which really attempts

to take a hard Ipak at •where we are,, what this means and what conclusions must

be. drawn, from it,, That includes all the various points mentioned by

Mr. Krishna, Menon, as well as, of course, t]ie points to which I drew your

attention myself ;; they are linked together*

What you mentioned,, Sir, is of course one aspect of what I call the very

unsatisfactory relations to those in power* It is the most unpleasant one,

the most spectacular one, but of course the basic evil is not the. incidents and

the Indignities; the basic evil is why they come about .and hew they can be

permitted,, I will try to put a drill into that, if we can, and see what it

means for our operation. This much I think can be said now, without any

hesitation, and that is that from X days ago we are living in a situation which

is indeed very different from the assumptions. on which this operation was started

by the United Nations*

OR/rh 21

( Indooeeia) :, Our country is represented in force in

the Congo affair in as much as we have sent our troops there* A few days ago

President Sukarno expressed his concern about the situation; he was speaking about

the new imperialism which is developing in the Congo* This is an expression of

the deep concern of our country and our people about the Congo. As is known,,,

three or four times in previous meetings my delegation has insisted on the need

to send the Conciliation Commission to the Congo as soon as possible,, and new

there is a proposal from, your side., Mr* Secretary-General, to send some of the

Conciliation Commission to the Congo,, On the other hand,, I think it would be

better if the Conciliation Commission as such could go. If there are countries

which are not willing or not able to send, their people to the Congo, we can leave

it at that, but anyhow the countries who are now able and willing to take part

in the work of the Conciliation Commission can go together with some of the members*

I would like to propose to you and the Members of this Committee tiiat it ehould go.

There are other things I should like to mention in regard to the situation,

which is really deteriorating in the sense that the regime of Mobutu is getting

stronger,,, and I mean, physically stronger, not morally stronger,, What 1 am afraid

of is that there is behind this regime what I have always from the beginning called

the Belgian Intrigue,, and this is what we have to have in mind ........ we have to

prevent the Belgian intrigue from developing in the Congo, otherwise the fears

expevssed by President Sukarno will become realities.

MTjlJjjABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French):: I should like to thank

the Secretary-General for having brought to the notice of the Committee the two

messages from the Chief of my Government; I had intended to read them myself1, but

since the Secretary-General has done so I am relieved of this task., However.,, I

would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the last part of the first

message relating to the treatment inflicted upon our Minister in the Congo,,, The

message refers to this situation and points out that the Government of Guinea

wishes to reserve its right to seek other means of supporting the Congolese people

in its struggle against colonialism in all its forms, such other means in an

exclus i vely Af ri can framework „

22

(Mr. Caba, Guinea )

I believe this sentence is very significant'and it indicates -ihe position

now taken by my Government,, a position which has been stated repeatedly in this•;J* ' . .

Committ* :« We did not wish to'be intransigent, because we-did not wish to be',,

accompliceEI in an operation carried out in the Congo which would not be in harmonj-

with the wishes of the people of the Congo or of 'the people of Africa,, We have

always refuse compromise solutions because we know that as long as the legitimate

rights of .a people are being trampled upon the situation can only get worse and,

as has been rightly indicated, the situation has become dangerous.

There was opposition to the dispatch of the Conciliation Commission because

It was said, that the situation was not ready for the Conciliation Commission to

.go there as peaceful tourists,,, Recourse was had. to anarchy in order to eliminate

certain members of the Commission* Events have proved, us right,, What is now

Intended is to liquidate at all or any cost all the elements which might take a

stand and, fight for a just solution of the Congolese situation,, These are the

reasons which led, my Government to take this position, which is, essentially,

that there _ is a doubt as to the status of the United Nations representatives in.

the Congo,,,

In Ambassador Dayal|[s report it is clearly said that Mobutu cannot be

recognized as the lawful chief of the Government,, and that his so-c.al.led

Commissioners-General cannot be recognized as lawful authorities. But what we

fail to understand is that we should on the one'hand accept Mr. Mobutu and his

CommlBBloners and,, on the other hand, that we should accept a state of anarchy,,

This is what my Government has instructed me to ask you* We have there troops

and organizations on behalf of the United Nations; if in their presence the

situation grows worse and worse, well, logically,,, who is 'responsible if not the

United Nations? If today we ask the Congolese people what they think, they will

also express their doubts. The United Nations forces were called there to get

the Belgians out. The United Nations was invited to the Congo to protect

constitutional legality and constitutional legality has disappeared,, These are

the views of my Government and we feel certain that this Conciliation Commission,

which was refused, cannot now achieve any positive result as long as the

United Hat loos will not get out of this ambiguity;' ,

85-25

There is now every likelihood that President Kasavubu will send us a message

and say "The. .situation is very grave indeed, do not come*'"' We fail to see why we

should' not. go. there If. the situation. Is really serious. I believe the United Natic

is -in a very difficult •_ situation and the time has come for us, the members of this

Committee/ to make the necessary decisions, We must face the Congolese situation

and we must answer the following questions:. "Do we intend or not to prevent

•imperialism from re-establishing itself -In the Congo!1:1

A -decision is called for on this guest ion, but in any case what we do not

understand- is -that in the messages sent to President Kasavubu it is said that thePrime Minister should be tried according to law*

GSC/bg 26

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

But how do we speak of fair justice In connexion with the situation of the

Prime Minister while tbose who are guilty of genocide and those who brought about

a state of anarchy in the Congo are the people with whom we are dealing?

Now,, there were press reports that the day after the arrest of the

Prime Minister,, General von Horn lunched with Mr. Mobutu. Authorities not

recognized by our Organization are dealing with the United Nations. As long

as the United Nations will not take a clear stand against anarchy, the situation

can only worsen. The Commissioners General seem to exercise a de facto power,

and Mobutu,, who is not officially recognized., is committing all sorts of crimes

of genocide,.

I believe that if the Committee wishes to get out of this impasse,, if it

wants to do something, it should first do something to put an end to this

anarchy.

Unfortunately, in Africa today the prestige of the United Nations has been

considerably damaged. It is our responsibility to see to It that this prestige

Is not lost altogether,, We feel certain that we are sure to interpret here the

real feelings and views of the African people,,,

:1[ thinl-:: t:he others here on the list will

understand and grant me the right of reply,,

I did not wish to comment on the cables received., but as one accusation in

those cables has been repeated now by you,, Mr. Caba Sory, I think that it Is

correct for me to express my grave regret that it has been found reasonable to

make an attack on the integrity and the good, name of our representatives in the

Congo. I think that it is unnecessary,, just as well as deeply unjustified, The

matter probably goes back to a misunderstanding which I have not been able to

eradicate during all these months . To let the United Nations Force maintain law

and order does not mean that the United Nations Force has ever been charged by

the Security Council to uphold the Constitution or to assert certain rights under

the Constitution,,, What that would mean you can easily guess or Imagine if you

detach yourself from the situation in the Congo and look at some other recent

situations of coups d'etat or revolutions and, what the United Nations role would

have 'been in those cases. No names!! But it Is necessary to underscore that the

GSC/bg 2?

protection of life and property is nolf the same as the protection of any single

constitutional rule against whatever forces may develop within -a country,,! If that

•had been the task, the Security Council should .have. .said: it. The Security Council •

did not say it:; it said the opposite,, , : . ,., .'

It was alsb said that Belgian troops returned., I dp not know on what that

very far-reaching statement is in any way based.,, I do not know of anything' to thateffect, • • - • • • • " . . . . , • • • • .

I would like' to correct a couple of misunderstandings. The first one is the

reference iio the first of ray demarche to President Kasayubu, -the text- of which .

you will have this afternoon., if it is not already circulated. nJu

was not the phrase,,, It was & phrase requesting ""due process". Well, now,, due

process includes everything from arrest and distent ion on* Timt, is to say* it -was in

diplomatic terras a strong plea for the upholding of legality,, What our United

Nations troops cannot do by force of arms the Secretary~General can try to do by

diplomatic means, and appeal for due process does not in , any way imply that it Is

right to put anybody up to trial. The very fact, of arrest.may.be outside

due process 'of law. That is to say, it covers the whole .of the legality of the

'situation,, . . ,

I would, attempt, with your permission,, Mr. Caba Sory, to comment -also on a

couple of other' points ,, Let me say,, concerning the luncheon., that I believe

it is not 'unknown in this Organization that you have luncheons with, people with

wfcom you are in deep conflict,, because that may provide the .best. _ way to try to

straighten a few things out,, I have never heard that it was regarded as. an act

of special friendship or courtesy or condoning any kind of action.

There 'also are some other things which I would like .to. mention. . One lie; that

I do not think it Is vise or helpful in a situation which is difficult in itself ,

to exaggerate and go beyond what facto warrant, I do not know on what basis the

rather sweeping judgement 'was passed now 'that the present command of .the ANC had

engaged in far --reaching acts of genocide. I had at one time reason to raise that

question -myself In the Security Council,,, That was acts of genocide by bands _ which

had broken loose from the command, and X cannot put the responsibility for that

genocide on the leaders of the ANC,, Later actions to that effect may exist, but I

do not know* . ,. , .

GSC/bg 28-50

Finally, another point on which I would appeal to you is the one concerning

the authority of the United. Nations,, The authority of the United Nations among

African peoples depends very much on hew the United Nations actions are explained.

If it is used as a whipping boy,, well, to be sure,, its authority will be gone,,

But the first losers, I. am afraid., in Africa, will be those who use the United

Nations in that way,, I think, therefore.,, that the first duty of any Member of

the United Nations is to be very clear, very precise, in evaluations of the

United Nations in order, in their own best interests — and. I would, say in the

b ..... -it interests of Africa generally ...... to uphold that authority, r-ct to work

against it,

5£ji-SlSS2Sz§ASOT (Ghana); Your last point actually was going to be

the first point which I was going to make,, that as .Ambassador to the United.

Nations,, I have had. to defend to my Cabinet in Accra,, in July and. August,, certain

actions which have come under criticism in the Congo, that is, the operation in

the Congo,, The view which has been expressed by ordinary Gbanaiam.:; is that the

United Nations has a moral authority in the Congo., and. that on no account should

we undermine this Organization because of events in the Congo* That is one

point which I want to say to preface what I am going to say here,,

The news from the Congo is bad.,, It is having its repercussions all over,,

I do not know of any other African territories, but in my own 'country there has

been deep sorrow about the arrest of the Prime Minister of the Central Government,

at whose Instance the United Nations went to the Congo,

The point which I am asked, to make here is this: It does seem as if the

United Nations is becoming an umbrella under which all kinds of things are going;

on In Leopoldville and elsewhere in the Congo. The point which ray Government

wants me to emphasize is that the Force^pjuibliq^ie^ or the AWC as it is now called,,

is still not an organized force in the sense that it is in a position to. maintain

law and order,, If it is, then there is no justification at all for the United.

Nations to be in the Congo militarily.. In other .words, the present presence of

the United Nations in the Congo means that we are still trying to Implement the

Security Council resolutions .;; namely,, to help the Central Government to maintain

law and order,,

R8H/nb

If that Is BO, then t'l;iie argument li-i that every effort should 'be made now to

secure -tlie release 'of ifellme Minister Lumumba. We are saying this 'because if

Mr, Kasavubu, as Head of State and one of, the- two., parties- who, ' iti* fac / sent a

request. -for United 'Nat ions troops,, were., arrested tomorrow, we would make the same

demarche.: that Be should be released at once* Therefore, this1 is the fin-it request

I am -to make to" you,; Mr!. Secretary-General,- through ..the Advisory 'Committee,

because ,-,- after all.,, we are here to give. ady:;l.ce,, which may or nay not be taken.

Therefore, the first request I am to make, is that we -secure the' immediate release

of Primed Minister ''Lumumba. '.

I .an. .heartened,' Mr. "Secretary-General, by your . -iirierpretat Ion of the due

.proces.fr .of law; -'because when that was read in Ac era: the impression was that the

Prime Minister could be tried by Mobutu, the- bead of an army which in our opinion,

is is till .not responsible, responsible in the sense that-' it was this very same array

which ; brought about the intervention of ..Belgium, which in turn caused the

United -Nations to go in. So long as we jare there militarily > the conclusion, is

that the country is not organised in such a way that law and order can 'be

preserved,, Therefore, as I have said, I _ was., hearkened -b^ your 'interpretation of

the -due '.process of law,

That being the case, we consider that the arrest by the army of the Congo

of Premier Lumumba is illegal and, therefore.,,,, a J raa cjtey •' should liafiediately be

made for M.S release ; Consequently,, your suggestion, that possibly the presiding

officers of the Conciliation Commission should go .to the 'Congo to prepare the

.ground. .must be taken seriously., .but it, should; be taken . seriously

first request -we- have made/ tocauie the Prime Minister of the Congo Is one of the

two principal parties concerned in the. Congo, apart from the other' representatives

from the various provinces.,, such as Mr. Tshpmbe, ,:. Mr*: Kalcnji and: so on. We cannot

see any useful purpose for any Conciliation Commission .going in how 'unless the

idea of getting Mr. .Lumumba released is part of its Job, that is, in the terms

of reference which we have already approved here,, ••••*'

In conclusion, our view is that there is still lawlessness in the Congo. I

do not want to say anarchy,, 'because anarchy is a very wide term indeed* •But,,

definitely our presence In the Congo presumes that law and order has not obtained

in the Congo and,, therefore, it is our fluty under the Security Council resolutions

to maintain law and order,.

RSH/mh 32

I wanted to emphasize that point 'because many delegations, even here, do not

seem to appreciate the point that the very fact that we are discussing the Congo

means that the United Nations has a responsibility,,, If there were a coupjl' tat

in Ghana., Argentina, the United Arab Republic, the Sudan or Nigeria, If these

countries had differences of government,, that would not be our affair, but so long

as the United Nations is in the Congo and so long as we are discussing the

problem of the Congo, whether it be the problem of law and order or of getting

the civilian services and operations going, we have a very profound responsibility.

That is the point which I am to make here because it is very difficult to explain

to the ordinary African,,, in my country at least, how die Organization can be there

and just witness these things happening, such as the Prime Minister having his

hands 'bound,, his hair pulled and being maltreated, the same Prime Minister who,

together with the Head of State, asked us to go In*

This is the main point I have been asked to put forward here., namely, that

it should be seen to that Prime Minister Lumumba should be released as early as

possible,,

5SS-3 5S!SLSSS5Mis On 'that point;, you will see 'in the documentsthe second demarche of yesterday to President Kasavubu. I may put on record

something which some of you may know, but which not all of you may know,, This gives

a very good illustration of the character of the problem. A month ago,,

Mr. Glzonga and. those who followed him in Stanleyville, that Is to say, Lumumba's

representatives , arrested not only SongolOj but also several other parliamentarians ,

We could not use military means to get them released. - of course we cannot,. We

have been negotiating since then, but we have not managed to get them released,,

It is a sad commentary on events which confirms that there are some things we

cannot do. But you can also see the implications,

Mr. KjUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I

think, we need a certain, amount of time to discuss this question, and I shall

content myself now with making two observations .

RSH/oh 33-35

^

The situation in the Congo bae become very serious. There is a state of

anarchy there and the behaviour of Mr* Mobutu can only 'lead to the most serious

repercussions. The arrest' of Mr. Lumumba and the humiliations to -which he has

'been subjected are really shocking* We must not forget that Mr. Lumumba is a

member of Parliament, even if we do not recognize that he is Prime Minister, and,,

consequently, he enjoys parliamentary immunity. He cannot be treated in this way.

Therefore, I think., Mr. Secretary-General, that if you could make efforts to

get the jsjtatus guo restored it would be a good thing. That is to say., Mr. Lumumba

should be protected by the United Nations once again,, because I am very much afraid

that Mr. Lumumba, might be executed* We might get that news from one moment to the

next .,

Having said, that, I wish to say that in Le_Monde of 26 November I read that

on his way home Mr. Kasavubu in Paris said;;:• . . i . • • • . • . . • • '

11 1 refer mainly to my proposal to convene as soon as possible a

round-table conference to which I shall invite all the leaders without

exception; Mr. Lumumba, and Mr. Tshombe.11

That was said by Mr. Kasavubu in Paris Just after he left the United Nations

and, therefore,, Mr. Kasavubu, recognizes the political role played in his country

by Mr. Lumumba,,, It would really be unwise to adopt any measure which might affect

the life and freedom of Mr. Lumumba,,

I also think that measures must.be taken, diplomatically and otherwise, to.''»•..'' .'•••' ' - * • "• • • • ' ' .-' '•

put an. end. to the conduct of Mr. .Mobutu in the Congo and to the behaviour of his

army,, which is not only maltreating Congolese but. .also United Nations officials.,

If thus situation continues, we shall really have to consider what decision may

have to be taken, .

;!:!:! (Nigeria): I 'want to start mi;;,'1 statement 'by refiarriicig

this Cannmlttee to a short article that appeared In Th,e I'l'ew York Times this ][iiio:n:ilng

I 'Mill read :|.t out:l! lU,,i!:l,i Aides See Hopeful. Situation

'"Special to The Mew York Times,,

'''WAoHINGTOi:;!,, Dec,, j-i United State3 officials said today that the

arrei-it of former Prei-uli:::!!1' Lumuni'bi!!,,, follo¥ing tl:i,e seat in,;;; of President

Kasa.YULb-Li.'1 s delegation at the United J!!fatIons., gave the Kasavubu-Mobutu

regime a. good chance to establish an effective government in the Congo,,

':lRelief w;;i!!i e^resscd by some that Mr,, Li.ffi.i..n'b!!i, tiaiii cr;;:;, tr.re<::l alive,,It vas th.o'iiigh.t that e.s a prisoner he would 'be •& less;; effective rallyiniii;

• symbol for pra«»Caini;[i:u.Q:j;.st oppai-iltion than If he had 'been Is I lied« It was

aiiii-iuuiied that in. parading Mr,, Lui::iiimba th:ro-i:igh LeGpoldville'1 s African,

quarter In handcuffisi,.,, Coloosl Mo'butu hoped, to imdenilnii! the preiatlgii!:

of the former Premier,,"'

Nr,,, liiiecretary-G'eDeralj, reading this a;ad i-ieeing what we !;ia;w on, televisi01:11,,

1 'began to wonder 'iiihethi-jr,, when the United Nations voted here to liieat those

aa a licence for President Kasavubu., or for anybody else,, tO' mlsniiie such a

privilege and, heavy responi-ii'blllty,, 1 do not want to .11 ay anything derogatory

li:]i i!ii:i:i;y 'iiiiiiiy i!ii'i>oi.]i-|;i Pre;!ii;;i.!:l.i:;!];:it ]:(i:^!iia,',n.:il::iu,p Be cliitijiie: here^ a;i:i'!l, I -m\£i o:;:ie of t'lioii^e iii'hio

felt that as the Head of State we should give hlii as imich latitude ai-i posi-iible,,,

'based on the dignity of his office and the respect, that should he due to him,,

I C'Dnsidiiired him as a, man of taooour and. I :!:'clt ]::ie should 'be regarded as a, man wl:no

appreciated the full responsl'bllity of his office,,, Before he left he aEImured us

•l:il:!;iiii,ti 'by t-hji!: veek-endj, o:r ID t;h.e: oai.i.r'iiii'i;! of last ¥eek;, he •i-i'oi.Ll.dl 'Let ui;i '\\J.\CM 'i»il::iiii,t.

preparation11 were being made to receive the Conciliation Commliiisloni; and when he

addreai-ied UM> here he gave us the impression that he regarded the Conciliation

Coimlaalon n.s one of the various typem of aid that the United Nations Is trying

to> offer hi i i country in order to bring peace and tranq-allllty back again to

enable them to start the building of their nation,, It 'was in that spirit tliat I.,,

GO 'behalf of i:n;y delegation and the Qoverranent that I repreaent he re, felt that 'by

vIrtue o:!i' t.l:ii'ii! ]:i,ono'u:i:' tJt:n:i.t, !l:i.i!i,di heeo conferred. i:;ii::i \im Jiiiiii CI:]ia::Ln]:;i!!i:!:i. of the

Conciliation Caiimission,, justice :im;i!-it not only be done, 'l:n:it must appear to be done

Baisrefoire I ¥iu not piiiirtlclpatlMg 'one vay or the other in the debate on seating;or not seating the riapriiiiiieratatl-iMisiii he 'was introducing,, But even then,, there ¥iii,s

this point,, that he vi;i,s recognised lii,:;; the Head of State., not as tl:ie Head of

Covenini.entj, i;u::id the reprei-i.entatlvee of the Congo are ;rep:riii'i!iie:i:i.t:l.i::ig the Congolese

State here,, We all know that the headache we are having here today la 'because ofthe fact that there is no central government of the 'Republic of the Congo,, There

are Provlncliii,! G-overtanentia,, end I;ID far as I know they are Intact., 'but there la

no central government at the moment -with which the -United nations can treatconstitutionally,, And the pur pa me of the Conciliation C rarani s s 1 on was to go to

meet the leaders of the Congolese people,, -with 1:1, view to getting the centralmachinery established firmly,, It never occurred to ne that seating; the

:]:M!ip:i:^i:!i!iii!'ntat:l.iv-e,iii of the Republic of the Congo wins meant to 'be authority for others •••President Kasavubu or anybody else' to use this am a licence for abusing 'i-ihatevei

political poiiifer they may pa si;: ess,, Certainly a political offender i:i;.ay 'be

s.rrested,, 'but i-iurely he la entitled to a certain amount of elemental:1/ dignity andreapect that are due to any human, being;,, I. cannot 'believe the,t a person who was

treated so well 'by the august Assembly here ••• and you, Sir,, and aiyself had anInterview with him and ire gave him every respect due him 1 cannot believe hecould have forgotten the United Hati:::ni;i; i;io easily a,i!i to treat a rival ai;i ye maw

Mr 11 Luinuniba treated on television,, I say thii-i 'because I read he i-ilgned the warrant

!l:i.i!ii i|];,!ii,',ni!! tilic1 autharlty t'oi' the arrest,. !::iu]re]L;y l:i.e' oou.! :]! give authority fo:r til'i.e

arrei=it,, hut surely too he ahould have given ini-itructloniii that Mr,, Lum'bumba should

not 'be treated 'badly,, He ahould not have been allowed to be manhandled as he w:ia

manhandled,, And the -worst of it Is that so- called civilized people are so

Jubilant abaut it,, and. the greet display that Is made about this maltreatmeot !l!

think is not only appa^Lling,, to state it mildly,, 'but shocking,,

The other thing that touched i:n,e as tills dlsGusslan went o:n is that tifcie

Secretery»'(ireneral said here that the Security Council h.as not asked the troops in ]In the Congo to maintain th.e Constitution,, That may 'be so,, But surely,, when the

resolution said that they should maintain law and order,, I do not see how they

can. imalntaln law andl order in the Conga unless they caaintaln the law-i and the

Constitution that are In existence,, This •Constitution_,, although It is atemporary thing,, la the only guide-post that anybody has,, Anybody who acts at all

must act within the framework of that Constitution,,

;i;iiii.rllan:ie;i:i:tar;sr governniieirl:;?

Aiciattuisr expreBsloni has been uined In the co-uriae of thim dim CUB si on,, aod that

:l.e i; :!:!;!;;.... l-!; ..;;;;!!::;!'!.;!;; •' As. far Biii I can rcimem'ber we were i:iot ^dependent then the

United lilatlonii! WHI-I In the Congo before -this regime reared its Ibead,, In other

word i n , , it 'iiniii.!;! not iii, ciii,se •w:l:i.iii!:n;! th'inre l::iJ!iu:l. !:>!:! en (i:i ^overmiiient i:!.i::id 1:l:].<en th-ere yai;i 1:1,

Cj:: ;!]:) d.^^tat; acid t;ti.e forui'iiir gavernii&Dt wii-iis throwi. out and a military government

took over and eatablliii'lied Itsiiel:!:',, In much a cn-une you -say that it. lia a fait

accampH., you. net them there,, But the point is that a new State waiii establiiiihed;

the authority that transferred power pretended to tre.;:]>:::fer the p:w:::r and In fact

got rid of one flection of It and tried, to re-eiiitabliiii'!:;. It:;:el:l:' wb.en there; wai-i

chaoB,, and an appeal wai-i made to the United Nations for assistance,, The United

!i!a;t:l.oniii went there to give aiiiBlsti-i-nce,,

To bmve alXdwd this situation'to grow to such a point that .It mm beeoiuias

a danger to the United Nations Itself is something;,, rethink,, that we have to

take very iiie:r:i.i::msly« It :i.iii ii'danigerous situation,, and this cancer,, iilti;i' 1 -would

eeull it,,,, would i:;io1;. haves' i;!;:rc>;in:;i ,i;i'o I;[II;K::]I 1:1:' there l!;;i!!id i::io't; been' s oni® Power or

e cini.al:) oi:l.;y assisting; it to grow,,, ' • "

Over and. over again 'In t]t:i:l.a Advisory Ccminittee,, wi;i have insisted that the

Belgians Must get out of the Conga* That la one of ohe1- very first thingS',. We

have bean acklng where they gat their money In the Congo;, wliera they-get their

finance i : i „ Where !i! 'Ihe United Kat :l. ons i:ii:u.Bt find oiilt vhere Mobut1:;''and. his arniy '

gat their i::i.cney to kaep tlieEi. going» 1 meaiij, this iiai e resconsiullity which the

Uviltiisd Nations cannot shirk: noi-r,, '

We exe barely two nicnths old'as an independent country,, and' we have been

aaked to send. pacpla,i, Willingly,,, even before :i.nd.epend.enca(), we did little thing!:!

for tha Congo when we were asked to do i:io,|, becayi-ie the e:id.i;itence of the Cohgo-

State 'ii!! very vital to our ovn e^ietence on the continent of Africa,,. That is

vhy all of 'i.i.s show so much'Interest there,, We have no territorial ambitions-,,

'lie (il.o not; 'Hi-inrl:; t;>o (!:!;>:;|::',iii.]::id. oui1 awn terrltoryj, we i:;l,!:!i not vejnt; to ii-sxplolt anybody,(,

We have no d.esire to intervene,, directly or indirectly;, in the affain-i of the

Congo-,. But surely we would not ' l ike Memberiii of the United. Nations to go behind

the United Nations a:nd to und.ermine the authority of the United. Nations,,

We may not say this thing; bluntlyj, but it ii-i quite glaringly clear that(), if

]!'[i::il:)'i.;i't;ii. i!i.nd. his regime did ]:;i<Dt> havus t,]::i<e support ot ii:!':i.i;ih.ii:!:i:' 'Belgiura oi1 i!iO\'.K\ other '

P ower 1-1 there,, he cculd not be do ing'what he is d.oing and' treating the United

Jfetlcnii! with this great Impunity n ' "

1 think this Committee should advise the Gacretary-ijeneral to use his good

offices perhaps to talk to i-iome of the members herej,1 particularly Belgium and

thosaothera who may be aiiisociated. with tham in one - f o r m or another,,, Tha i:|uai;itlon

is;: Bo wa all honai-itly eupport the United. Nations wlioleheartadly in tha effort

to re-establish peace and ord.er in the Congo'li Froi::i. my own obciervetlons in the

two Months that 1 have been repreiiientlng ray country here,, 1 do not think~sCM.

1 want to liiay that categorically!; 1 do not think so,,

la It because this'Advisory Cormlttee is composed of the Afro-Asian group

a.nd a pine :rf' tha more peaee'-loving; European :nationsi|( those that liave no rockets

(Mr,i 'Jajiiii,Wachulsiiji iN'ijjji'isria}

ie that the reason why they do not; want to recognize the Ccminittee as represeotati'n

of the United Nations nnd as a body set; up by the United Illations!!1

It seem-s to me that the bigger Powers just want to frustrate everything.,

1 woi.i.ld like to say thn.t here^ because that is the way it appears to me,, They

Power i s , i And what IB happening now is that we are graduaily accepting that ei.s

true* We have about 19,,000 soldiers under the United Ifetions flag,, and yet we

cannot maintain, law and ord,er,i Ke went there to maintain law and orderj, but we

'Cairnot maintain it; ,,

I am. suggesting tha.t(, if the troops have not be«:.;::; a inked to maintain and

uphold the existing constitution of the Congo,,, then the Security Council or the

General Aa sembly must be called so that this Day be made explicit,, so that the

Gecretary-'G'eneral may have authority to see to it,, ether wise _,, th. inga will get

ccrapletely out of hand,,. The present constitution.,, which is the frai:i;.ewo:i:vk|p will

l>e l::':i:'(::iki!:!]i:! completely i;).;[:n::l. there will, be total imi-irchy,, i:i.!!:n::l. 1;lii::i:i:i 1:h.i::!:i:'e will bis-i no

:l:':i:',iii.i:[i(ii!'wo:["jl!:. 'With which ;i/'C'i;i, c:an worki, Ond!!' it i.s known, that, the mlwsian. o:l:' l^hni!!

United Nations Is to uphold the constitution,, anything that Is outside that

constitutioni rnuiiit not be recognized at any costi(l and there should be no treating

with anybody who dceiii net act within that constituticn« So long as any action

i:iii 'w;ii:l:;][:i in tin?; ooniir!:, i t;'i.i.'l:. :i. c:n,, tl:i e IJn :i. ted. Wat :i. cn.s iiiiJl:i CJI.I.]..CL deal. wLth ::: i::ii:::ii:it; i.t.uti i c:i]:;ii:iil

a!.;it;]').o:i:' :i.t,,y l:>ut; i:]ii::i1:; with extra- coniii 1:. itn.i.t'i.oina i. en[,it;J:].o:i:' :i. t,y „

It is being suggested that 'I should go,, along with the other two off leers (),

to the OoQgOi, I welcome that,,, In f act,, that Is one of the very first things

we were thinking about,, !l!t hai-i never occurred to iLe thnt we will go to the

constitution and discovered, certain organs set up by. thii.t oonstltution,,, 17e agreed

that you have six Provincial Govern.tne;i:its and Provincial Legislatures,, you. have a

Jlilead of Statej, you have a Senate,, you have a House of E.epresentatives., Certainly,,

if these people are not accredited representatives of the Cong.0,, I do not know who

is or,, if these institutions are not the institutions that should really

represent the niachinery of liiovernoient and. the legislative powers 'of the Congo

¥i»! also find that the Parliament has 'been suspended hut t;hat,, under the

constltutionj the President 'may suspend it for only one month,, Me cannot do

:mo:re than that,, But the period of suspension has exceeded one1 ni.on.th i(, and 1 think:

that It is right and proper that the United Nations should oi-ill the attention

of the President of the Congo to the fact that the period hss expired and that

the continued suspension of the legislative houses of the Congolese Republic

cannot 'be in the best interests of the maintenance of law and order in that

State,,

1! think that these things imst be taken seriously and made clear,, and that

t;!h.(!i: Uniti-iid i)!i;i.1:; 1 \:w:is 'CMiiiuaot;. e on.'b'inu e I;::ide :l;'l;i:i 1 tel:y to :!:' 1 na;;:K:: e B.n a i:].i;i.:i:x::l:i !<:: ;(;; CM:: iety,,

The United. Nations has come to aid a young, nation that is trying to find its

feet.,, not to subsidise anarchy,, I think that the time has cone when we have to

'be rather firm,, In spite of what anybody may say,, If the United. Nations adopts that

attitudei(, I think that all the Powers that are contributing troops and

contributing money and all types of aid will toe reinforced in their determination

to come to the aid of the United Nations and., even if you call upon them to do

a little more,, they will be prepared to do it,, knowing that the intent ion is

to get this thlnijj; cleared up as quickly as possible so as to leave the

accredited Congolese .leaders to take over the reins of power in their own

country,,

But,, as I see thlsj, if this is allowed to drag on,, we will find that the

United Mat ions will foe tied down there and impotent,, and then the prestige of

the United nations will foe completely destroyed in the Congo„ While we are trying

to avoid the possibility of another Korea foe ing staged In the Congo.,, we must 'be

very careful that we do not destroy the United Nations in the Congo,, We are

getting!; t.o the point when the army of Colonel Mobutu can treat anybodyi(,

irrespective of what or whom he represents;: even the very body that is feeding

him or making It possible for him to exist,, to live with impunity,, can foully

anybody and kick him around,,

He f orderly said that he was going to hold power until Dee ember,, Wow he does

not want to give up power,, Of course,, he likes to exercise power he feels that

the world Is at his feet - and he would not like to give It up,,

I 'ii'oulLiill like to see tbii United. N'at 11:;i::n!i- iakiei a stand and,, :j[.f neeeiiisary,,

ilii;i.'ire Pre;Ei:Ulie:i:i.t KenaYu'bu an. ultlmiiiitiun•« lite haiii been :reeognlzed ei;i Head of

liiitate nobody ciuisetloMi that 'but bi;i: haiii- mot 'been reoogniMd SGI Head of

GoYernnient,, 'becaiiee tjciere is no ee nitre 1 poveraiMot,, It :!l.i;i Incumtoent on Mm

and i!i,ll the leaders of tne Congo to see 'to it that a central (I:ovi;i!;i:'ni]:ie]t:i1:; :l.i;i.

established. i;i,;ii, cij.:,:!.. :::lv;]..y ,i:i,i!! pq 1:11:11'ble i;i,Ti::l, t]t:ii!:i;!; IP^ii'iLiiiiinij!:!!::!'!:. reaig-seEibles ,, BO tbi-i/l:;

tlijii!: United, nations am. koo'iji th© 'body to treat •iiiltlh.j, and. this :n:iuia.t 'be cloae

'before the end of this iinontli.,!, It is oot a queiatlan'of allo'iiilcig t'hiis to go o-o

'beyond 'Deeecatoer and into the l!l'ew /learn !I!i:> .allo'w It to do so ¥G\:ild be .just to

fall liata the Jl:|ra;|:)' .of Colonel lto'bn;itu,i, He said tibat in::. ¥i3,B c'ii-ii:1:;;;;/!r:.g on till

December,, and. oow he 'heglniii to may he. will give Mmsell:1 an. Inideflnlte period,,

Ili'i:;*:!:1 iiiii 'I;;'!:)' lih'i:: i::us ][yl:; that i-illjiu-i.1!:.!';:!:!'], iii'O'ii.ld l>ii! to iiii,i::;i::;i::!;i;!t. defeata

Bo I feel that .the situation ]:u;i,i;i got bad enough and siliould not foe

e.llo'i'i'ed, to go beyond, this,,, As has 'been i-said,, we expect to hear fr;;ii:[], him,

tomorrow *, I coma Idler that he has 'broken hiin word,, and if he ham 'brotaiin :ii:l,i:i

•word 1 have QO reason •wihatiiioever to believe that he li;i going to.i-iend us

i:i,:i:i;yl;rh:!Lng oan.Btructlve „ ;i; •|;iii;i.]r|::ii::ii;i;ii:!I;;)'1 liiilli;:" ':!!1::!. 'l:.]::ni;! •\niiI:r:JL|!:)i.i;ii|. procesi-ies liiimil. 1:.!h»!;i

•ii'i!:i,:i:'loii.ii! ODiiit l::iod.!:i 1:,hi!:i;t;. 'W<!ii jniiicio]!!]!!]:!!:!!;!:!';:!;! :!. 'to 'l::n:i! pDirsiie d,, BO tl\a\\ tlbli-i 'l::i<;:n::l;y i:!:i;ii!!:in.C'1:- .

'toe- 'bleroed. 'by aniybod;/ far not glv:!l,i:ig llilna all the due resipeot.that he dese.rves,!,

liihi! (iilJL'd i::iot; wuA i!);n;;i':l:M::id;y to 'b !]i.ii!.i:iiii!! 'I:.!::!!!:! AdYlsory Coimlttee '1:1:1:' <l:;l:i|i:! !::!ec.]reta:i:y''<r6:i:i,'ii!:riiL!

or to say,, '"'when we wanted this .thing to 'be done,, you did not do ltjp and that . ,

le the reason ¥hy i-sonietblng went wrong,,"1 . 'We have, given him, every facility,,

•ifi'iiii l\awe |j!;l'in:::n him, iii'-irii-Mi''.^1 cyiTpo:!:"!:;!!.!:].;!,/!:;;;,!',, to mhow .that In;:: i.B &, statesiwi,!:;!,! ,1. w.\\.

dlse-ppolnited,,, He has let us down.,, am far as I. am. concerned,,,...

they do not want the United Natloniii to aeslBt tnenn to maintain law and order

In thiiiii Congo.,, !!l.':i!t. il:i!b)!i!;i]:i \im,y SOJP ix\ '\t\:hi.ch. cw.se th&. i:yl:.]'K:!:i:p St^ii'tiiiiii. '!aoi.:i]Lil 'be priiipiii.:!:'!!:!.!!!.

to pull on;it,„' It 'would 'be very dlsastrouB,, 'Then,, whether we like It or not,,

the United lilatlonis would hiiwe failed,, -We have gone In there,,, We oancot pull

out without reotlfylQg thlngiii „ Therefore,, I would say that if It li;i a i;|uestlon

of the Sec«!ta:]:7-'<!ren.era,;i.. feeling that there is a laclti: of power,, that it la

beyond. oy:r autihoritjir to maintaija. the constltatilon,,. .1 acn. i;i;ulte prepared .to go1 to

lih'iii CoDiiiijQ Mil:; any. time,, MB BOO.II i-iuiii I. have <[::lce,:ri::!;:l. i;;i;i;i i:ioi::ie of 'l:.]'i/e i:tii:i:,;|o:i:' ;i;iiro'fc'leKiiii!!

tha.t. I have 01:1 hand here at the moment ,„ But,, If we hm/ire not that authority.,,

'l:.l:ie:i:i. 1;;l:ie u:iii!!'[::ii.:i:':IL-l:;;y {"aunicl.! i::i:r liliie !;i;];:ii:i:i::::!i.;!;i,]L semelon of the Assembly iii!h.!:M.:ilc:l, 'l:>i;i:

limmmoned i::iow,, far one tilling,, to authorize the United Nations forces to maintain

t.lbe c::onj;i1:'ltu1;,lo;i:i, and.,, if I1!:; li-i necMsary,, to \mke u;i;i a sentence for

Interpretation of the maintenance o:l:' la¥ a:ad order,, to uphold the Congolese

coniiitltutlon.,, ii!K:i 'Ibwt t}'.\®y will ;k:n,c^!r •l;;!liiii,il:, tin;!::!.];1 Job li-i to i.;ij;:>l:io!l..i:l. t'bQ coni-itltutlon..!,

1:1 'i:l.oi!:!i!;; not matter who la affected i::i]::iii:i 'w&y OT the other,, I thlr.i^: the t±w.&. '\:\BB

com?. w'\v?.n 'iii'i:! Ci-Jin.ri.O'b ^LULovi i;i, {::'h.i;i.:li.;[:i :n;!:ex::t:l..o:[:i 1;.o ^M::."::^:!:]:' :::i:;. 'l:;!!' ;! eont'i/^nt ("d:1 Africa,,

It 'would be a illi-iease tlmt would a'ffciiot our own Stav;i:;;,, and we do not want It,,,

I felt that I Bliould i:iay this,, and I am sure that BOVWSI of insy collea,|:;:i;i:eii!.

•iiir:I.l!l.. iiiiot :i][i:!Ln'[il. 1:1:' tl::n;::;y a.:!:1":!! i-uikke::!. 1:.i::i .go to the. Congo 1:.o f:l.,];:id. !:M.;i1:i tijie1 ;i;)oi:ilt:!1.0ini ii:i:n,(il.

in(;:!'!:! '\Amt can 'be done(l, l-l'lth thliii completed,, we can m;o tliniii:]:''!•! i:i,]::icl iiiee to It th®.t

tli'i.'!:! United ]ii|ii!i,1:.:ILon!:! works,,,

T};!!i May I may that I -am. In. very deep laympathy

vith 'wha-t 1 im.iii.eriiitand to be your 'l:iii;;.Bla phllai-iophy,, Mr* Mlnliiiter* The queii-itlon

liBi only how to translate it Into 'wiae action, and,, again. I would .i:ia;|i;, without

delayj: I agree w:l.1:.l::i you that this :l.!ii not a iiuestion for January., It lui a

quei:itlon. for the next cotiple of veeka,, In. facto But I would llhe to isay one

'\A'OTf\. Jii:ii!:it :!i.n order 1:.o i-iee tlie/b we iij;:','i:);lL,c[, :[i:Lli;!.un.!:l.e::!:'ii;rl;;!;i,]::ii:3[;!Ln.j;!;e ®j.\.c\. that you w<x :l:!'i;i.l]L;)r

brie fed „,

I ciiiiiiy have e:«:presii:ied Eiiyiiielf a l::lttle too briefly to- be clear on; this

conetltutlonal :l..iii.i;;iuen What I iinean la tha,t,, a,i>: a nia-tter of course,, -we uphold

the constitution in. the i-ienine that we live 'within the framework of the constItutlon,,

'but we cannot 'fanjlon^ the canatltutiani, We cannot use our military i:neai:i.i;i to

uphold It,,, Tilmt ie vhere,, I believe,, ¥e are at present,,,

1 :inade,, before^, 1:.]t:ii;i! Ci1:,;i:i^!:t:' i::ri:i!:ierva,tlon •il:.l::n:J;t i:>:l:' course i-i,];:i;y ::l.l;t;ilo;!i:t!;i,1:.lc o:r

political preasures 'which ve can exercise for the maintenance of the' conatitutlon

are perfectly in. orderB lt"!i;s/r o'biiiervatlaniii are limited to the functlonj!! of the

Force and limited to the fact that they cannot am i:n military force enforce the

rules of the coniiititutlon* That im all I irceant to aa-yn

AixHHl a fortalght ago T, aetaad. our /iriiiiii'y.i'.'i'.itiiii'iiiiiiit.iin.t.il.M'iiiiiiii to r.i»to HIS tho:ii;miigh.

an. liweGitl^atlon aa they oould aia to tte origin, of. tte fijiiads .used 'by yarloui-i

periiicinalltl'i!!!!!: In thiii C-ongo,, So far I haii'igi had no reply*,, As regardi-i .Belgium,,

I thlnls; that It la eno;i.igb,, 'without paai-ilng any Jud^Mnenta,, to note that the

(i!;!;;iilii:;;!;;!;;;;|;;!]!i;;..i» vhloh. ¥as a very far-reaching one,, that I made early In Qctoher hai-i

ao far not received any acceptance^ wuoh leiiis ony compliance,, The relations ¥lth

Belgium, 'by way of co-"operation,, for.thst reason,,, are at thci siiero.. line„

I have no rea,i!ion to go here Into the much broader prohl.ei];i ,of the big Powers

coimlnii!; Into the picture,, It Is soniethlnj;!; which we must always r^Kember that

the United fetlons la 'basically i-ionietlxiUig -irery new In the is It nation not. only1

In thli-i 'but In the world igiltuatloo and It seenis that the way far a:ny big

Power to a. recognition, of.' b:;i¥ t'te Unltisd Hatlorrs Is 'built- l:rr::o the Dporld .

pleture IB a longer one 'than for the other nations,,, The human reasons arB--

easi'l;;/'' iiKKteiiri-s'tooiil.,, It li;i nioin;! dilUiiiii.jiyj.iaJ.n'b'lri.gj, pei'hapiii v 'jiihait I.;w>Qv>:ild, 'ha'«!6 :to :

coaaflrii as w,|i' O'WB Impress ion what you. i-iald. aboii.i:t tte Congo |PI;I attltwk1; to- 'the

Uolted. Eilatloni;n., I teve iiiitarted ai!iiklniGl!..;n;ijri:sel;]!!1 If .the people of the Ccnigo

I no¥ iiiiean those in psiiiiiponiiilble posltloniii have e-irer., ,fro;ii:i the very teglnnlnii!;1 ' I ' • ' ' • . ' - . . J ' < ! ' • • • • • • •

until now,, unden-itood ¥hat .the U'olted Ifetlons Is,,, .They started trying to use

It as a tool .In fights ¥hlch vere none of our 'business,,, They ha-ire now reached

the stage where,, In niy v;Lew,r they .are atoui-ilng,, nore, than ahuslng,,. the United

Nations ;||,n. other ways,, it in unique .in the .United iNatlom-i experience;|l and I

think that !;ioi:ne very plalo laimg'imge 'without any InMbltlona. LEI strictlynecessary not only froni, the United Nations 'but from./the sister nations ah'd

other polltlclaniii on the African scene,, because certainly this is contrary not

pnl;^ to t-'he,Conj!J!!!:ii1l.ii!i Inter©i;i.ts. 'but- to, the .Interept-iii' of all the p'BQpliiii of Africa,,,

The irrilted liilatlo:nj;i. iDelng abuajied IB,.one place,, .1 aiisree. ent.lrr:i-l3r.Mlth:'M.r.ir .Caba BOIJuiieaina the lose of respect f or _.t'.|:ike. .Urdted HatloiM1. .eyerywlj-Bir/e.,,, ..limcl: >ipho ii^riiii. ttus-

loi!ie:ra!|' . , > . . ._ . : • •• . . . , ' . , : .I'lnally,, !|! ¥ould like to', say one word about .a pa:radox: which: w;i are faolng,,

It is a very grim one,, and It. Is one thing; 1 would have to try to 'bring out

:l,i::i i;:oi::u!!ili:l.e:rai:l, i;ii;i:i,::l, 1::n!ii,!lj;i,]::K>i;!ill, lii-ingii;ii!i;|;;/i;!- :l.n t>hi!ii;t :i:'i:!:po:i;'t i::i:f iitiln1!!!- ii:'!;::,! ;!:!: !.!;!:!,!;!; wlt:i,!l. 1:1 h I,

!!i;pc:i;!i;.'!!! ••".. iiniiipicjiirti <\'X' iii!t;i::i'ti!;!i][H!:!.i:i.1:>. 11:1:1;'.'iirhati!! '!!:!:!:" It; iiiiiiii-y hi!!: eaLliiiiiniiiji, .Qi::i the. iQiiii!!1 .

iG>:l!' prove r or type of a-uthority.,. or whatever youi wish to call it., in the Congo

would. ii:n;i! possible,, or;, rather,, ¥ou.ld i;in;irv:l.ve,, if the United MatiO'mii 'were

withdraw).,, because there is no basis far it* They would not be able to aiaiotaln

quiet in tbii! country _,, piii'otect; lives,, stop tribal warfare: and so on,, 111!hat is to

Bay,, the v'hale thliag would breakM For that reason.,, asii you have maid,, Sir,, we

ciiay be i-iald to 'big! in 1:1, seniiLe IE-I. screen 'behind which certain thingia happen to

•viii'Mch ^i© do not in any senae 'want to be partirBiSa, Ttet,, of course, da ens. not mean

that I consider the accusation,!-! of connivance or colluelon Justified,,, Thii-i is

a Bte.tement of fact;: if we 'were out,, the present s^nJ;;:;:m. would 'break,,, On the

other haad there ii-i the pa,radox if we were out, there would be anarchy,,, and

.lilsnarcl:ry in that situation would necei sa,:!:!.!;;!'' reopen all.. soji:'1:.!;i of conf ]..:!.,c'ts and

esp-ecially open the door to all sorts of developments 'which,, from the point of

view of Africa end the world, might be even worse,,, That isn to s-say,, we are

caught 'between two fires,,, Against all our instincts and our political philosophy,

\ire de fac'to hi;i/'/i;! come 'to is ere en ceiirli-aln. de^/elopiniien'ts of which we d:li-; appro ye.,,

On the other hand,, ill! at least am not ready to say that this is a. reason,

why the United Matloni-i should he withdrawn,, because that opens •i.i;i;> other vistas

which have: to> be ta!l!;en very seriously Into accotinti,

Tbliii ie a parallel to -'tnis paradox I miiEDtioDed 'before,,which is a niore

iil.etall.edref lect:U>n of the same 'basic diloriina., that is to, say,,, that on tha

ori'ii! side 'W'l!! must build'up the AHC If He are aver to ijj;et the iiiiti.iatlo';n.where we

can leave 'with a good eohsclence,. - 0:i:i. t!t:i.e othen:: !l:ia:n.d by 'building up the'AN'C.,,

on::: e .the enny has 'become ipolltiolzed ve are,, i-so to B^yf working againi;,t'our

O>|I:IL alms,, ; • . . = • . . .

• 1 eiiMuee Kiipielf for iHtier'TCnlng again 'but y::nir stateBiiiiint ¥ai;i one •

very rich In i-iubstanoe and 1 felt It was.-right for mi!! to make miy few observation!:;

jjr^ AJMI (Ireland);; I want, to Bay. that I have'to gr: for some tlmej,

bnt before 1 leave., in 'caiiie'-tbiir riieotiLng-mlgbt be orer by t'1'.;::: i,±':.ii I.'ireturivI want to make this suggeBtloii,, If the General Assembly were 'not In session,,

1 fetel that yoiij, Mi:1,, Lilecretary'-'Genera.!,, would have 'been In the Conmp before

now,, It :Ui impossible for you to ,^0,, I am sure,, 'within the next couple of weehi-i,

If Preiiildent Ka^avubn:! has .;not agreed, to the Conciliation. Coffin:! s si on going or

to the ChaIniian and the two, members of the Committee going;, 1 think It would

be important 'to send somebody., o-n your be half (l, to the'Ctfngo to explain the

i:ilt'ua;t:ILonc|1 to explain the .anxieties here regarding; the whole fn:ii;;-ure„, And 1

think, you should consider very carefully the sending of i-i. representative o'f

;;jiro'i;i:]:" CMiim.,, if1 tbiiii Cone Illation people are i::io'l;i iSii.cMiiniiijp.t.iiLbliiiiMi

Mr i, l:IAi!!iAI!![ (Pakliiitan):!; v.le are In a very serious liilt'uatlon,,, The

dlsousslO'n today has underlined the Initial question regarding; the task and

the responsibilities of the United, llfetlons in the Congo,, because what we do

now ¥lll set i:i. liiymtaol and a precedent for the fu'tui'e,,

louj, NXn Seeretary'-G'eneralj, Bald that conditionia In the Congo for the

Unl ted Dliat :|.<QI:]LB periisa i:mel. ¥er i:: alaKi'iat Intolerabl'iii and tbe refore '*iFi::! i;i hould disit e::n:[il;r

and lileoldii! -what tl:ie coodltioni-i. should be to enal::J.e the United Illfatlooii!. to

oontinue op'eratlng in the Congo.,, Other member!-! also commented on those

oondltlons„ It was suggested that the General Assembly should take note of

thes'ii! GODdltloniii. and decide ¥hat to do.|i particularly a.® IniteraatloQal lav andIntiiii irnatlo iiiiiJl. uaaige ver e. be ing dlsr'iiigard'iiidj, p&.ir trlciulairly iici resp'iiiot of -l:.l:]iiii!

treatJaent of our diplomats.(, etc»

I got the impression that the unsaid part of these speechee was that the

United Nations should take over the Congo« Therefore.,, I 'want to ask tl:i:i.iii

question;! What are we head:i.ng for? Tine use wards ••• and my own oppression was

un:inliii;taki;!.ble that were lisold ;l;i.er© were d.i:i,oiii;;'(:!.royisi Mordiii and. the;/ open up

dangerous pass:!.'!::j. 1:1.ties(), In my opinion,! For example,, It opens up the!

posslhility vhlch 'was referred to almost explicitly that If there Is a revolution

l:n. one country -and £1, parllameQtary goverMiient la. deposed,, however Immoral or

deKCTfiCl'L'Led tl:iat. .parliamentary |!;;ove:]:';n]:i]iei::i1:; :[];n;i.;y 'be • It, l:L!:i,i;i; li.!!i,]::>j;:><:;;n<;:'d in 1:-]t:n::!

Uolted Arab Hepublicj, you tnrew out Paroukj, we threw out a parliaaientsirygovernment;, of:;:sr countries have thro'wn out parliamentary governments In thesame tlmi;: w-.yjld that nei;i,n that a.nyone vho ha 1:1 a certain hazard or a certain

stake i:t:i. that p;;:.rt o.;;1 the ¥.::.r:i.d can appeal, to th.e United MationB;: l:lC'om.e In

and take over thlis country ii:.;-:id :m;c\ this co'Untr;;/1",. And. yet that Is the

:i. !::i<i:Mi!'!:!a;]::>i!Ji'l:)lii:! ::i.i:!];]:xre;:; K i,on „

I taiow people talk In anger,, people talk In pass:i.on; they do not talk.

eool;y.i! And yet that was the Impresiislon o:l:' a pension completely detached and

I'lith no ulterior motive In the Congo., This ras the Ineiiicapable linprew:;sIon

The only mandate -which you received,, Mr,, Seeretary-General from the

Security Council,, -was to- get the Belgians out_, n.nd nothing else,,

!Nb¥jp no one: l:ias more i^iy^rips.'l'i.'b;)!' t'hBR I. I::LS.VI;! i'cxr 1:>l::ie Congolese,., 'I'l:i<!:!;y

suffered,;; -we have suffered,, 1 said the last time that they are in the same

process through which many other countries have passed. But for us to talk

of restoration, of a particular form of government or to be Identified with

individuals or particular personalities and personages -would he a most dangerous

thlnjji;, :I-'<::I3!:' 'l:'-i'li:: United Kat::l,o.mii. tO' do,,, It, would 'be thB- e:nd. and the 'wreekiriiji; of

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:!i|.!:l IXllillill'b'iu:!! .

DR/rh 62

Mr. BARNES (Liberia): I thin!: it would be very useful if at future

meetings of this Committee we would have representatives of the Congo present

here. I think that this Commission is concerned principally with conditions in

the Congo and, since we already have a Congolese delegation accredited to the

United Nhticrj.c, it would be to our advantage for them to be here and to

underst-i d -t-hfj position of this Advisory Committee in connexion with the events

in their country. I think that it is very important that they should be here.

The SECRFTARY-GENEHAL; There is, of course, a general decision on the

matter, and :.'; is for the Committee to decide how it should be implemented.

There are nc' ri'ally discussions which the Conrnittee may wish to have on Its own.

There are other discussions in which I think your idea to use this possibility •

to get across to Leopoldville and to the lords and masters of the delegation

here the view, of the Committee would prove very useful and we may consider it

for tomorrow. But I would leave it in the hands of the members.

Mr n DIALLO (Mali) (interpretation from French): I shall not abuse your

time by taking up a discussion of the substance of the tragedy which is now

being enacted in the Congo. I should just like to say a few words to express

the profound anxiety that we feel concerning the recent events.

To begin with, the second point of the statement of the Secretary-General;

regarding the sending of the officers of the Conciliation Commission to the

Congo, I wish to say that my delegation is opposed to that idea because if the

Conciliation Commission in its entirety has not been able to go to the Congo, in

spite of the drama that is going on there, it is because Mr. Kasavubu has not

yet gtvon us an indication as to the appropriate time that this Commission shoulc

go there and because we have to have respect for the moral authority of

Mr. KaeQvubu

Nevertheless, at this time all of ue are troubled in our minds, because

Mr, Kasavubu had the occasion to express a certain hostility toward the idea of

the Commission's going to the Congo at all. If today we are still awaiting

Mr. Kasavubu^ word that we may go, it does not seem to me to be either opportun*

or politically wise to say that since Mr. Kasavubu is not prepared to receive tht

DR/rh 63

(Mr. Diallo, Mali)

entire Commission, we shall send out scouts in the person of the Chairman and two

other members of a general committee. Indeed, how do we know that Mr. Kasavubu

wishes to receive even this group? And, if he does wish to receive them, would

not, that be an implicit exclusion of the other members of the Commission?

My delegation considers that if we want to take up the problem of the Congo in

a seriov.T roaster, if we envisage the se'nding of a Conciliation Commission, the

whole cos/jositf.jn of the Commission should go there. 'We consider that if the

Commission does not wish to leave because of opposition, no discrimination would

be justified in chosing other members to the exclusion of still other members,

sending them w:'v*--h the idea that they can prepare the ground. Either the ground

is favourable end we can go to the Congo or else the ground is not favourable and

the Commission will stay here while the Congolese authorities disdain to accept

the whole Commission of the United Nations. That is the point of view of my

delegation on this particular point.

I would say that as regards tiba other points, and I will cay that here I am

speaking as an African, we have felt an extremely disagreeable and painful

anxiety, but now we are suffering in our flesh at the situation that has arisen

in the Congo.

I understood just a while ago, from the statement of the Secretary-General,

that he had asked for civil assistance to the amount' of $100 million and that if

we do not get those $100 million, we 'risk the possibility that the Congolese

authorities will go elsewhere to get them,' If I understood that correctly, I must

say that this has given rise to a very serious concern in my mind. Indeed, the

technical assistance now being given at the present time consists in having

United Nations officials in all the ministries and in all services both central

and provincial. We know that under the plan of information the radio services

are being run by United Nations officials. For several days now I have listened

to the Leopoldville radio. Its broadcasts are in English in a country where

nobody understands a word of English, From time to time there is a Congolese

record played and then one realizes be is in the Congo. '•

The officials, including Mr. Mobutu and his gang, are paid by'the' United Natior

and if we do not continue to pay, these gentlemen risk turning elsewhere* I do

not wish to comment on the substance of this concept, but I reserve the right to

express the opinion of the Republic of Mali on this. If such is the idea, I have

DR/rh 6 -65

(Mr. Diallo, Mali)

the feeling that that which we feared r?ould happen has come to pass in the Congo;

consequertly, we are confronted with extremely dangerous grounds where the cold

war has spread to the Congo and, if the United Nations does not go in one given

direction, I have the feeling that the Congo could go in an entirely different

direction* Thst is one further reason why we should act as swiftly as possible.

Mr- C?"ba ;,:o3sd a series of very important questions Just now, and I must

confess 'hat ti:« answers wnich he received have not satisfied me. Therefore, I

should like to remind the Committee, in the n&me of my delegation, that we learned

with much alarm that, after the unfortunate incidents connected with

Prime Minister. L'.anunba, thn Commander-iri-Chief of the United Nations troops

lunched with Colonel Mobutu in order to converse with him on the problems.

Of course, we

MW/bg 66

(Mr. Diallo, Mali)

However, we are not concerned here with diplomats; we are concerned with military

personnel, and after the incidents that had taken place we felt that it was clumsy

for this lunch to have been held and that it should be brought to the attention of

the Secretary-General.

The prcrtT_v;K of the arrest of the head of the Provincial Government of

LeopoldvjiJe 1~ another problem. When this news reached us we discussed sending

the Conciliation Commission there. Many representatives expressed their anxiety

about this and you calmed us by saying that the United Nations forces and services

hai intervened energetically vis-^-vis Colonel Mobutu to the effect that the

pe.rc-ons arrest should be freed at once. That situation concerned a

parliamentary ana pro/inciaL chief; today, however, we have the case of a

parliamentarian who is the P ime Minister of the Central Government, and energetic

intervention would have been very effective.

Colonel Mobutu is paid by the United Nations and it would be good to have him

know what the United Nations feels about this arrest of the Prime Minister. Even

if such intervention were to fail in its effect, it should be made* When we ask

that law should be applied, does that mean interference in internal affairs?

When you say that the due process of law must be followed and the courts used,

are you interferring in the domestic affairs of a country? As was pointed out jusi

now, the application of the law sircply implies here that a Member of Parliament

must not be arrested. In the case of Kamitatu we intervened, relying on the spiri".

of justice of the Congolese authorities.

These remarks, Mr* Secretary-General, arise from very serious anxiety in my

mind.

I believe it is worth noting that United States television personnel were

present when the Prime Minister of the Congo was mishandled, as we saw. That is

also a point that should be taken into account. Of course, we shall be told that

television is a private affair and not a governmental one, but I do think that it

is a point which should be noted.

MW/bg 6?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think there may have been a misunderstanding,

or else you happened to use the wrong word, These, various officials,.whom I

enumerated are Belgian officials,,not United Nations. That goes without saying...

A second point, is that I, did not mean, by pointing out the limits of our.

civilian operation, to build up any kind of threat; I only wanted us to look

coldly at the situation. There are needs which,we know are .very, very far-reaching,

first of all the needs of the Congolese people. Those needs we .cannot/meet and we

know that they .are always to be .met somehow.. .That is to say, the limitation of our

activities, is a fact ,which we must remember. I note it with considerable regret,

b u t there w e are. . . . . . . .

.. Mr... SNQUS3I (Morocco)(interpretation from.French): I wanted to draw the

attention of the Committee to the serious situation that now obtains in the,Congo.

I am delighted that the Minister from, Nigeria played his part here and I would pay

tribute^to the clarity with which he summed up the situation that now exists.

Our fears, expressed in the General Assembly and in the First Committee, as

well as in this Committee, have materialized. Not only has the Conciliation

Commission been unable to go to the .Congo, but it seems that our,recognition of

Mr. Kasavubu has given,him the.Reeling that he,is authorized to upset the

Constitution and to take, the kind of action he has taken. . ..

I would add that my .country, ever since .the independence of the Congo was

proclaimed,, has been following .tfce situation with much anxiety, and the recent

deterioration of the situation following upon the arrest of the Prime Minister in

particular. This arrest,: this humuliation. of the Prime Minister, is evidence.of

the incapacity .of Colonel .Mobutu and of his -desire .to see that the Constitution. . .

shall .not-.be recognized. Respect for the Constitution is the very basis and

foundation, of .public order. We think that it is the responsibility of the United

Nations, to deal with this, problem and if the orders given to Colonel Mobutu have

not been sufficiently explicit, we believe that it is urgently necessary for this

problem to be. ssubmitted clearly to the General Assembly so that it can be settled

once and.for all and so that the United Nations can work without ambiguity in the

Congo and .can defend the Constitution and public order there. . j

MW/bg 68

Mr. JHA (India): I would confine myself to the suggestion made by you,

Mr. Secretary-General, at the beginning of the meeting regarding the office

bearers of the Commission going to the Congo — the advance guard, I do not think

that you made a definite proposal; you put it to the Advisory Committee for

consideration and, as usual, you have made the suggestion with the idea of trying

to find a solution to the impasse.

Analysing this proposal, it seems to me that we have to be quite clear as

to the capacity in which these three gentlemen go. So far, all the Commission

hoe done is to meet here and appoint these officers — the Chairman, Vice-Chairman

and Rapporteur. They have considered certain incidental and logistic matters,

but nothing very serious has been considered by the Commission pertaining to its

sphere of work.

When these three gentlemen go to the Congo, they will be g>ing without any

mandate as to the manner in which the Commission's work should be carried out

because, naturally, the Commission will begin its substantive work, at any rate,

only after it has reached Leopoldville, has made an independent survey of the

situation as far as practicable, and perhaps contacted the Head of State and some

others, because only after this process can the Commission be in a, position to

start the work entrusted to it. If the three office bearers go, naturally they

will not have had any kind of mandate as to the work or the method of work to be

followed by the Commission, and in this case the method of work, in my opinion,

is as important as the work itself because it is to bring about a process of

conciliation in the Congo. So it is possible that they may be placed in a very

difficult position. They may say something about which they will not have had,

in theory at any rate, a mandate from their body. They will not be able to consult

their colleagues. Unprecedented situations may arise, and perhaps they themselves

will be placed in a rather embarrassing position. Of course, if it were the idea

that they should go two or three days before the remainder of the Commission, that

is a good idea, but to detach them from the rest of the Commission, leaving the

latter to go perhaps at a later indefinite date, or not at all, it might be

difficult to sustain both from the point of view of constitutionality and from the

point of view of the proper conduct of the work of the Commission.

MW/bg 69-70

• ' (Mr, Jha, India)

The situation as we see it is this. There is the Conciliation Commission

cooling its heels — if I may use that expression, not disrespectfully, in .

New York — and we are waiting for a communication from President Kasavubu, which

he has promised to us. In his meeting with us he was good enough to say that he

accepted the Commission as a. kind of assistance , as a part of ttie assistance that

the United Nations has offered to the Congo, All that was very good to hear. ..

We felt that the way would open soon for the Commission to go to the Congo and

try its hand at conciliation, which everybody recognizes, is the only way in which,

the problems of the Congo can be solved, .

GSC/mh 71

(Mr. Jba^ India)

They have very definite terms of reference; a mandate which permits them to work

with comparative flexibility, but yet, their direction properly defined and their

aims properly understood.

Now, we have all this here. President Kasavubu has not sent us the answer.

Your guess may be perfectly correct, that when we get the answer it may be a lemon.

We are placed in a very difficult position,and I think that we have got to take

this situation much more seriously. The Commission is an instrument of the

United Nations, It was constituted under a resolution which was a unanimous

resolution. The Advisory Coiamittee was a convenient body to whom the General

Assembly entrusted this mantLats. If this Commission is prevented from going, it

is really an obstruction to the processes of the United Nations -- very legitimate

processes, rights which the United Nations has under its arrangement with the

Government in terms of its original request received, in accordance with the

Security Coivacil resolution, and in terms of the General Assembly resolution.

I would say that either the Commission should go as a whole and function as

a Commission or it does not go at all; and if it does not go at all, then the

matter cannot rest there, because the matter has got to be considered by the

General Assembly in the larger context, because it is an obstruction to the

General Assembly, to the United Nations processes, and it is for the General Assembly

to decide. Of course, you will have to consider it initially, because they will

be guided very much by your advice, Mr. Secretary-General, as to what should be

done, because then, in that case, we are stymied at every step. We have sent our

nationals: they are insulted, subjected to indignation. When I say we, not only

us; there are many countries who have sent their nationals, and they are in the

same position: they are insulted.

When we want to send a Conciliation Commission, which has been accepted in

principle, it is not allowed to go. Nothing that the United Nations vants to do

legitimately is it alloved to perform. A very difficult situation arises.

This matter is already before you, I know, and it has also been referred to

by some of the members this afternoon. We have got to take a hard look, as you

said, at the whole situation. I think we cannot go on dilly-dallying much longer.

We have got to get a response from President Kasavubu and then decide whether

we send the Commission to the Congo or not. When the Commission goes there, the

GSC/mh 72(Mr. Jha, India)

whole Commission goes. We must make arrangements in advance for the proper

protection for the Commission. If more troops have to be deployed in Leopoldville,

ve must do that. There is no question but that the full authority of the United

Nations must be behind this .Commission in every way -- protection of life, security,

Its authority within its terms of reference should not be challenged. It should

receive co-operation from the Congolese Government, and it should be able to

perform its task without any obstruction. We may have to decide that irrespective

of what Mr. Kasavubu writes, or we may have to send the matter back to the

General Assembly.

Although I appreciate the suggestion that you made, I feel there may be

difficulties in it, because it may really detach the three office bearers from

the rest of the Commission and put them in a very uncomfortable position.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: In clarification, I would say, and I believe

it will. t?e clear from the record, that I regard them, of course, as a forerunner

to the Commission, and the only reason why I submitted to the possibility of the

presiding officers going first was that if we are facing serious obstacles, a big

group will find it more difficult to manoeuvre than a small group; that is to say,

it is a kind, of wedge approach that I have in mind. But I fully recognize the

validity:of the arguments on the other line just presented by you, sir.

. Mr* CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General,' ' • ; ! . • . ' '

before stating the attitude of my delegation on your suggestion and that just made

by another delegation, I want to clarify a point connected with the moral authority

of the United Nations in the Congo and in Africa generally. I have the impression

that, after my intervention, there was the impression that, far from promoting the

authority of the United Nations, certain States Members, by their actions, were

undermining that authority, or, at least, were not supporting 13bat authority in the

action of the United Nations j.n the Congo.

We have already explained our thoughts on this matter in several meetings of

the Security Council. We feel to reinforce the authority of the United Nations

and to increase its authority it is necessary to have the courage to denounce its• • \weaknesses and, proceeding from these weaknesses, find measures of strengthening

GSC/mh 73-75

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

authority. That is how we should co-operate and aid the United Nations in the

Congo and elsewhere. It is not in questioning the policies inaugurated by the

irresponsible Commissioners General, it is not in admitting that these

Commissioners General can do anything they like in the Congo, it is not in

admitting that Colonel Mobutu -- whom the American Press calls every morning

"the strongest man" — can obstruct the operations of the United Nations, that one

reinforces the authority of the United Nations.

I think that what does not help the United Nations, what diminishes the

prestige of the United Nations, is the action of those who take the line that

Mobutu can do anything he wants, that the command of the Commissioners General in

the Congo, that the Katanga authorities, can do anything they like, and so on.

That is what damages the authority of the United Nations.

But we,.who are in the forefront of those who say the United Nations

must improve its methods in the Congo are very well.placed, and our consciences

are clear in saying and affirming everywhere that we are contributing to the

strengthening of the United Nations in Africa.

Now I want to say a word regarding the sending of the Conciliation Commission.

I shall not dwell upon that subject at length, because we have stated our position

in the Advisory Committee and in the General Assembly. I simply want to draw the

attention of the Committee to a fact. At the beginning, when we asked the

Secretary-General to provide us with a memorandum before the terms of reference

were drawn up, the thought/was to send an emissary or an envoy who would report

as to the way in which the Commission might be composed and sent. We discarded

that idea, and then other delegations pointed to the need to send an emissary,

and the Advisory Committee rejected that idea. That is why I shall not agree with

the representative of Ireland, who suggests the sending of a representative of

the Secretary-General. He already has a representative on the spot,

Ambassador Dayal; he has military representatives, too, who follow the evolution

of the situation closely. These can convey to us the climate prevailing in the

Congo and help us in taking our decision. So, the suggestion from our colleague\

from Ireland has already been discarded three weeks ago. It is useless also to

send the officers of the Conciliation Commission. What would they do there,

frankly? The officers cannot make contact with the second part of the problem*

They cannot get in touch with the parliamentarians. They will simply say to

Kasavubu, as was rightly said by the representative of Nigeria, that ha has

RSH/mr 76

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

I think that the Committee understands very well that, we have lost time, and

that President Kasavubu, whom we have honoured here, has undermined the authority

of United Nations. There was a .resolution adopted asking that a commission be

sent. We established a commission and worked out the terms .of reference to

guide its actions, and President Kasavubu opposes this decision of the General

Assembly. It is for us to say to the General Assembly that we have used all the

means at our disposal and that we l ave even made the travel arrangements for the

members of the Commission. We had the. representatives of fifteen countries come

to New York for this purpose, but they have now had to rejoin their Governments,

and an affront; has been delivered to this Commission and, through us, to the

General Assembly by this.delay.

It is for us to take a position on this. There can be no question of sending

officers of the Commission. That would be a retreat b;; the United Nations which

would inevitably diminish its prestige. Let us therefore, avoid these

tergiversations, as was said by the representative of India. Let us take a

radical decision.

In conclusion, my delegation would suggest for the consideration of the

Secretary-General that we must immediately envisage measures to ensure that the

Prime Minister of the Congolese Republic regains his freedom and that United

Nations continues to protect him. That is an important point and, if we win it,

it may help us to resolve the Congolese problem. We have to ensure that the

popular will of the Congolese finds full expression and we should not allow any

indignities to,be suffered by its representatives while United Nations

representatives are in the Congo. Means must be considered for ensuring that

this undisciplined army led by Mobutu is disarmed. So long as this army continues

as it does, arresting, imprisoning and even striking representatives of United

Nations, we shall not have an easy time in continuing our action.

We must, therefore, neutralize that army and neutralize the man who is

claiming to protect the interests of the Congolese people. In this way, I think

we should be able to restore calm, particularly in Leopoldville, and once that is

done, we could say to President Kasavubu that we are in the Congo following an

appeal made by the Central Government* That Government no longer exists, but we

have now a Parliament with which we can discuss. For a month now1 we have

RSH/mr 77

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

emphasized the need to re-open Parliament, and in this we agreed with the

Secretary-General of United Nations. Every representative here emphasized the

urgency of restoring Parliament, but that was even abandoned. We no longer have

an agent with whom we can talk in the Congo, Ambassador Dayal has made it clear

he does not recognize the General Commissioners; he does not recognize Mobutu.

We all recognize the Head of State, of course, because there is a State but

where is the Government? Therefore, we are in the Congo without any body with

whom we can negotiate or talk. By restoring Parliament, we would get for ourselves

a party with whom we could talk, and we would thus resolve the crisis.

It has been said here that we must ensure the freedom and protection of those

who enjoy parliamentary immunities in the Congo. If Parliament is to be convened

tomorrow, we must be sure that the members of that organ will be free and that

they will not have any reason to fear arrest Or arbitrary ill-treatment.

These are the views of my delegation. We have reached an exceedingly

critical point. If the people of the Congo arise and revolt, then the United

Nations will be in a most dramatic situation. So far, the Congolese people have

remained silent, believing that the United Nations was their only hope, but if,

confronted by this flagrant injustice, the people arise, then I believe that the

whole of Africa will end by expressing its indignation. As was said in the

plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the First Committee, Africa will

no longer accept a second form of domination. It is on this note that I would end.

Mr. THIAM HAEIB (Senegal) (interpretation from French); The

interventions of certain representatives have shown that there is opposition to

the sending of the officers of the Commission, on the one hand, and to the sending

of the Commission as a whole, on the other. In my opinion, it was agreed that we

should send a Conciliation Commission to the Congo because we thought it would be

possible to bring about a rapprochement of the different view points and to bring

together the antagonistic view points in the Congo. But this procedure means that

no conciliation or agreement is possible without the effective participation of

Mr. Lumumba, because he represents a political force which is real in that

country, divided as it now is.

Hence, with regard to this idea of sending the officers of the Commission,

we might proceed by two stages. The first stage would consist of the sending of

RSH/mr 78

(Mr. Thiam Habib, Senegal)• ' ' * . ' • . - ' , .

the officers to the Congo so that they could obtain there the liberation of

Mr. Lumumba* Afterwards, and this would be /the,.consequence of the first step,

the officers, having obtained the liberation of..Mr. Lumumba, that would.certainly

lead to a relaxation of tension, at any rate, the beginning of a relaxation which

would make it possible for the who;le of t^e Commission to go .to the Congo.

Therefore, my delegation proposes now,,that we make this .suggestion, which is

conciliatory in its intent and which I thi,nk may prove effective. That is my

proposal.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I feel that we have been discussing the

situation under a very great handicap,. that., of the absence of the documents which

you, Mr. Secretary-General,, have promised to circulate to us. Unless we have the

report of the Special Representative we.will not know exactly what the situation

is in the Congo.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That report is concerned solely with the

arrest and detention of Mr. Lumumba; that is to say, it does not throw any light

in general terms on the situation.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): We have all been blaming President Kasavubu

for not keeping his promise. Let me recall that last time we were discussing

this matter I asked whether President Kasavubu was in a position to persuade his

colleagues to invite the Commission and, in case he could not persuade them,

whether he could overrule them. You. Mr. Secretary-General, and the Minister

of Nigeria, trusting in his good faith, both said you were confident that we would

get that invitation and that the Commission would go. It has come to pass that

the invitation has not come. I do not know to what extent the President really

is exercising power,

We have been talking here in terms of the Constitution, in terms of the

Parliament, in terms of all those good things of life, forgetting one thing, that

the gentleman called Mobutu has taken over power. He has an army behind him,

according to Ambassador Abib, a well organized army. However, my friend from

Guinea has said that it is not a well organized army. However, he has an army

behind him and when there is an army, I am afraid that the Parliament does not

RSH/mr 79-80

(Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

have the same physical strength as an army. Therefore, it is no use our

discussing the situation in terms of how the Constitution has been disregarded

or defied, for the simple reason that there is non-constitutional government, a

de facto government in power. It has force behind it, and it is exercising that

force.

But we would like to know what is the position of President Kasavubu now

in the Congo. Does he exercise any power? Has he even the semblance of power?

Is he recognized as the Head of State? We know he ifc the Head of State, but not

of the Government. The head of the Government is Colonel Mobutu, rightly or

wrongly, constitutionally or unconstitutionally. We must take cognizance of the

fact that he has the army behind him and anybody who does not obey him is shot,

and nobody likes to be shot. But the important, basic, physical fact is that

Colonel Mobutu is in control of the country, and, therefore, the question is

whether President Kasavubu did really make an effort to invite this Commission

and whether he was overruled by the people who exercise the real power.

TL/pm 81

(Mr, Hasanj Pakistan)

Without that knowledge I do not think it is fair^or 'justified for us to

lay the blame at his door* You said last time that he was an honourable man, and

so did'the representative of Nigeria; so we should not say that we are

disappointed in him or not disappointed in him for the simple reason that we

do not know what his own position in the country is.

Now then, as regards the sending of the Commission: it was said here and

said here many times, despite our protest, that Kasavubu or no Kasavubu, whether

he agrees or does not agree, we will send the Commission. All right — now he

has not invited the Commission, so we have two courses before us: to stick to

that decision, that very'strong and powerful decision that we will send the

Commission, or -- and this is our other choice, Sir — we might decide to send

three persons instead of the whole Commission. Now, my own submission would be

that to send three persons instead of the whole Commission might be infra dig«,

for that msans that we are not in a position to send the Commission and we will

therefore step down and send a small part of the Commission in the hope that

they will be able tp persuade Kasavubu or anybody else who is in 'control, to

accept"the Commission. So therefore, my submission would be: Let us send the

Commission. That is the purpose for whish the Commission was intended. If there

had been a parliament --and ray friend from Guinea believes that there is no

parliament -- and if there have been a government — and all of us believe there

is no government -- there would have been no need to send a Commission. A

commission is necessary because there is no organized government, because

conditions are chaotic, because there is terrible anarchy and because we do not

know who is in control. That is why we need a commission.

I agree with my friend Ambassador Jha, that in using only three persons we

shall be in a very awkward position. They could do one of two things: either

they would continue to be in that embarrass ing position, doing nothing; or they

would act on behalf of the whole Commission, thus arrogating to themselves the' ' ' • ' • ' 'function of the entire Commission -- and if they do not act correctly they will

be endangering the General Assembly or the Advisory Committee,

Therefore, Sir, my own 'submission would be, "Whenever you think iti

appropriate and suitable, whether tomorrow or in a week or in a fortnight,

whenever you do want to send this Commission, send it whole, do not send it in

parts.

TL/pm 82

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; In regard to one thing you said,

Ambassador Hasan, I wish to recall what I said at the beginning, that we are

informed that President Kasavubu is supposed to sign some kind of reply today.

What made me be doubtful was that he has not even announced that he would be

delayed with his reply.

I cannot pronounce myself, of course, at all on what authority

President Kasavubu exercises at present. I think, however, there is one

correction one can safely make regarding the military situation. I believe it

is probably unjustified to say that Colonel Mobutu is the authority because he

controls the Army, and that the Army is well organized. I think it is.more'

correct to say that he builds his power on some units of the Army which are to

be found in Leopoldville, and that we can resolve the question of the

organization of the Army, in objective terms, simply by noting that they have

no officers.

Mr. Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I apologize,

Mr, Secretary-General, for having been away from the meeting for a few minutes.

I think that the evolution of the situation in the Congo during these last

days, this last week, has been very dramatic and that once again it has been

emphasized that the situation is very tense, very difficult and capable of

evolving into something much more serious than it now is. I think that it would

be useful for the Conciliation Commission to leave as soon as possible so as to

be on the spot and try, by persuasion, to bring about some kind of clarification

of the situation and, if possible, a rapprochement. I think it is never too late

to bring about a reconciliation, however grave the situation may be. Perhaps as

a first stage they may be able to achieve the .liberation of Mr, Lumumba and his

restoration to a normal position, pending a provisional or a final settlement

leading to a more stable situation in the country, pending, in turn, a

reconvening of Parliament, which we all desire, under circumstances which will

provide safety for all members of the Parliament*

If we have to wait for Mr. Kasavubu's reply -- which, according to the

information you have given us, Mr. Secretary-General, is expected either today

or tomorrow — we can do that. But I think we should decide that the

Commission should set out quite definitely on a certain fixed date. Then we have

TL/pm 83-85

(Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

the suggestion that you made, Mr, Secretary-General, that the officers of fhe

Comission should go out ahead in order to prepare for one work of the

Commission and perhaps prepare the atmosphere. I think that is an excellentv . idea. If the officers of the Commission could be in Leopoldville in two or

three days, I think that would help considerably to improve the atmosphere and

restore peace and hope to some extent pending a final resolution of the

situation.

I think that is a very positive idea. Although we all regret that we have

been rather slow in taking our decision in this Committee, we have proceeded

slowly because one or another of us was influenced by some scruple regarding the

composition or the nature or the form of the Commission, its methods of

procedure, and so on. We were concerned also to do what we could to comply with

the desires of the Head of State as expressed here. But I think,now that we see

the situation is urgent and that a solution is urgently necessary, it is useful

to take a final and definite decision to proceed.

If there is a reply, an affirmative reply tomorrow, then we could decide

to send the whole Commission. Or let me be precise: even if there is a negative

reply tomorrow from President Kasavubu, then the officers would leave and would

fix a time, which would be as soon as possible, for the rest of the Commission

to follow to Leopoldville.

Of course, I do not wish to envisage for the time being the other aspects

of the problem that have been emphasized here in connexion with the Congolese

situation, because I think those aspects fall within the competence of either

the Security Council or the General Assembly rather than of this Advisory

Committee . This Committee is only a committee which is seeking to help the

Secretary-General by giving advice on the means of implementing the resolutions

of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Other-aspects of the matter

& are very serious and concern our Governments in very precise terras; but thesen A aspects fall within the competence of the Security Council and the General Assembly,

^ and each of us will appreciate the desirability of calling for a meeting of the

General Assembly or the Security Council in order to define more precisely the

instructions to be given to the Secretary-General in the light o£ the

situation.

HA/cn 86

The SECRETARY. HiENERAL; It may be that this is the time for some

stock-taking* After all, we have been meeting for some three hours now,

I believe that, in a sense, the representative of Tunisia crystallized

my own thinking very well. As a matter of course, in case of an affirmative

reply, I would not have any hesitation at all --on the contrary, it would be

in line with my thinking — that the whole Commission should go at once, • My

own thinking from the beginning was also • reflected in what was said about the

presiding officers going-even in case of a negative reply. However, I noted

that there are very strong misgivings in various quarters about the wisdom of

dispatching the Bureau alone, without a clear-cut line also on the Commission

in general. It was said that, if the Bureau preceded the Commission by some

two or three days, or something-like that, that might be all right; but, if

there was a possibility that the Bureau was a kind of agent, and that there

would not be any follow-up, that might put us in a very embarrassing position

and those sent in a rather awkward kind of situation.

Under such circumstances, I should not like to sum up this discussion bysaying that I could register unanimity or a inajority advice of the Committee

as regards the sending of the Bureau, matters being what they now are, I am

sure, however, that I register correctly the situation in the Committee if 1

say that there is a strong feeling indeed that, irrespective of the

reaction,we must proceed with the Commission. We do not know what will happen

if we announce such a decision in-the Congo --but that is another matter. We

should not vacillate on that point.

However, I said at the beginning that I felt that all of you, and certainly

I myself, might like to think over the matter overnight> because it is a

somewhat momentous decision. There is the other fact that, if this information

which we have received through Mr, Bomboko concerning the sending of a reply

is correct, we"should have that reply within twenty-four hours, I am sure. And,

if you will permit a somewhat frivolous expression, if there is a certain lack

of manners on the other side of the table in this case, that is no reason for us to

be lacking in manners, and I do not think that we should announce a decision of

this Committee to the authorities in the Congo without having had the patience

HA/cn 87(The Secretary-General)

to see whether this indication is correct or not, that is to say, without having

at least waited for the reply announced as being sent today.

For that reason, my suggestion would be — I am sorry to burden you any

more than I have already burdened you, but we are badly in need of the kind of

advice which you are giving — that I have your permission to convene the

Committee for a meeting again tomorrow afternoon. I think that is necessary.

Pending such a meeting, I would not like to formalize any decision of the

Committee at this moment. That will also give you time to study the report, and

all of us will have the opportunity to crystallize our thinking somewhat more

clearly.

If that is satisfactory, I thank you, and we will meet again tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 5»35 P»m.

CONFIDEKriAL Meeting No. 176 December 1960ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Tuesday, 6 December I960, at 2.30 p.m.

160-51 86

HR/aj

The 3TOSEARY-GENERAL: Before turning to the main subject for

consideration today, that is to say, the Conciliation Commission, I would like

to raise one or two points which may be considered minor, but which, I think,

do merit our serious attention.

At an earlier stage in the work of this Committee, we discussed the question

of relations with the Press and there was a unanimous opinion that these

meetings be closed; there should not be any stories told to the Press • If we

wanted to inform the Press about anything, that would be done by a Press

communique setting out what had happened. It has proved very difficult indeed

to have this rule observed, and there are a few recent exceptions from the rule

which I think'merit your serious attention.

-In1-a recent issue of Afrique-Action there was a reprint of a considerable

part of the records of the meetings of this Committee. These were correct

reprints;:that is to say, the texts which had been given to some delegation

were handed to the editors. •

• I have my views on that, but after all, I do regard leaks which are correct

as infinitely less damaging than leaks that are-incorrect.

Most of you, I presume, have read an article which appeared in'a prominent

paper this morning, by a correspondent whom most of us know, which gave a

detailed account of what he supposed happened here yesterday. It was a leak —

and a very solid one — from what he called "a reliable source". It was

a leak because the fragments of truth were in it and every single fragment

was misrepresented and misunderstood.

BC/cw 3

(The Secretary-General)

I think it did harm to the work of this Committee. I think it did harm to

what we aye trying to achieve. I think it did harm to the Organization and to

the Congo.

. The story of responsibility starts, of course, with the one who had the

talk. The next stage in the story of responsibility concerns the reporter.

This responsibility rests on the shoulders of the reporter who, whatever the

reason, misunderstood so badly or reproduced so absurdly what he had understood.

I think that this must be a reminder to us all of the need to remember

where our first responsibility lies "— that is, to the Congo and to this

Organization. A repetition of the incident can do nothing but harm to us all.

If one has a sense of humour — and I still have some left — one may find

the matter very amusing. I am afraid that that is a superficial reaction.

For that reason, I think that we must, so to speak, renew our previous agreement

that information is not given to the Press unless we have approved that step.

Perhaps I may add one observation, in a fit of cynicism, as it were. If someone

feels that he should inform someone on the Press side, would he please check

what the person on the Press side has written so that black is not turned white,

and vice versa^

That was perhaps an aside, but I feel that I have expressed what the

majority of the Members of this Organization and of this Committee really do think

about the matter*

I do not know if any member of the Committee wishes to say anything on

this subject. The Press is, of course, in the curious position that, while a

representative or a government or a member of the Secretariat can be freely

criticized in public, that is not permissible when it comes to the Press. For

that reason, we have to protect ourselves by other means -- and first of all by

discretion*

Members will have observed that*a meeting of the Security Council has been

requested by the Soviet Union. The meeting will take place some time tomorrow*

So far there has been no definite word from the President about when he wishes

the meeting to take place$ it will be either in the morning or in the afternoon*i

Members may also have seen the Soviet statement to the Press, which is to be one

of the two documents before the Security Council, the other document being the

report received yesterday from me.

BC/cw k

(The Secretary-General)

I think that the members of the Committee would like, in their deliberations

here today, to keep in mind this development and the fact of a Security

Council debate tomorrow* It may be that it can serve somewhat to shorten our

discussion, since I suppose that none of us would like to anticipate another

debate in a regular and major organ of the Organization.

To end my little initial story, and before inviting members of the

Committee to make observations, I should like to say one word about our main

subject* I have given quite serious thought to what we discussed yesterday,

and I should like today to turn into a positive proposal what was a suggestion

from my side yesterday for the Committee's consideration. Upon thinking

matters over, I am sure that we-should be right in establishing a United

Nations political presence in Leopoldville, and I am sure that it would be

unwise for all twelve members of the Conciliation Commission to go»; What, then,

is the compromise except<the one I have indicated?

I should like to read out a cablegram received from Mr. Dayal in response

to a report on what happened here;

"Deeply disappointed at Advisory Committees reluctance to despatch

even as. an interim measure the Bureau of the Conciliation Commission.

Its arrival at this,Juncture would have been an earnest sign of the

determination of the Commission to proceed'with its long-deferred task.

It. would have helped overcome and perhaps circumvent the delaying tactics

here, and it could have kept the Commission and Committee informed of the

day-to-day, situation as affecting its responsibilities."

The other point, in.Mr. Dayal!s cablegram refers to the Kasavubu letter.

It will be remembered that Mr• Dayal had been informed yesterday, through

Mr. Bomboko, that a letter was to be signed as of yesterday. In this respect

the cablegram reads:MWe are today informed" --

and that is today, Tuesday —

"that Mr. Kasavubu is expected back tonight and that the promised letter

will be delivered tomorrow".

BC/cw 5

(The Secretary-General)

Finally, I should like to draw the Committee18 attention to certain news

releases on the tickers of UPI, Reuters and other news agencies regarding

various statements of Colonel Mobutu, partly concerning the treatment of

Mr. Lumumba and partly concerning what we have not done or have done. I do

not think I need burdenow records by reading these out. They take the usual

line* They are Just another Illustration of the fact that relations between

Colonel Mobutu and the United Nations could be better. The main point in the

statements is that what we have said about the treatment of Mr, Lumumba is

unwarranted and implies another obvious attempt to blacken the regime.

Those were tne points I wished to raise by way of introduction.

I would now ask whether any member of the Committee would like to speak.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like first

to refer to the question of information nn our meetings being communicated to

the Press, and particularly to. the article which appeared in Afrique action,

a newspaper printed in Tunisia. I have seen the article; it contains comprehensive

excerpts from the verbatim records of the meetings of this Committee• Since

this newspaper, as I have said, is printed in my country, I should like to clear

the Tunisian delegation of any responsibility in this connexion by informing

the Secretary-General and the members of the Committee that an inquiry has been

opened in Tunisia concerning the source of the information* As soon as I have

the results of the inquiry, the aim of which is to find out the source of the

information which has been published and which, in my opinion, gravely prejudices

the work of our Committee, I shall certainly inform the Committee.

MW/pm. . A . : ; ...••.-. 6

. (Mr, Slim, Tunisia) : ;,.

Now I should like to come bo the substantive matter, namely, your prdposal

that we send to the Congo, if not the Conciliation Commission, at least the

officers of the Commission. It seems to me that, taking into account the

events and the possibility of the situation growing worse, considering also that

so far. we have had no reply from Mr* Kasavubu although we had expected to have

it by the end of last week, considering that there still seems to be hesitation

over there as regards the future work of the Conciliation Commission — in the

light of all these considerations, my delegation believes that i"t would be very

useful indeed if at least the officers of the Conciliation Commission could go

as soon as possible to Leopoldville as forerunners of the Commission, which will

join them as soon as the Chairman of the Commission advises that this should be

done,. If we cannot find quick and positive solutions to the present chaotic '

situation, and in the light of the recent arrest and ill treatment of

Mr. Lumumba, I believe that this action could help to remedy the situation, to

bring-it more in line with normality and law--- if-not Congolese law, at least

the principles of human rights as inscribed in'the Charter and in other *

international documents. Perhaps 'that would be a useful start for the

Commission!s work. . . . - • • • ' • - . - - • , • • • • •

Therefore, my delegation feels that-your suggestion, now made'as a formal

proposal, is most useful and we support it.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): I thank -you and

I take note of the explanation which you have been good enough to offer us on the

action taken by the Tunisian Government in order to Investigate this indiscretion,

which I, did never believe to be of Tunisian origin. < • •

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): ' I am afraid that I have nd comments to

make about the leakage in Afrique Action — which, I understand, is a paper put

out in Tunisia — or about the leakage which we have just seen ih the

New York Times. It is rather unfortunate, but again, we can only appeal to the

conscience of members here to refrain from what I would call such ungentlemanly

actions. It is really unfortunate that some members of our Committee, or any

people who come to our. meetings, divulge what we discuss here. In fact, this

article in the New York Times, which I have just seen, came very near to

MW/ptn 7

(Mr, Quaison-Sackey-j Ghana)

revealing exactly what we discussed here. It is most unfortunate, and I can only

appeal to all of us here to try, as far as possible, to refrain from such

unwarranted and such ungentlemanly actions.

To come to the proposal which you made yesterday, I think I said, on behalf

of my delegation, that we had no objection to your proposal, provided that we are

given the assurance that Prime Minister laimumba is released from prison and are

guaranteed that action will be taken for his immediate release.

Talking it over with some members of the Committee, I have come to the

conclusion that, definitely, the Conciliation Commission should go, but possibly

not the whole Commission. Ghana is prepared to stand down, not to go, because

there is at least opposition against us. That is a fact which must be

acknowledged and, therefore, we shall not go. But I feel that if at least seven

members of the Conciliation Commission will go immediately with the bureau,

that will save the situation. This point of United Nations political presence

which you talked about,to us is very vital, and I would suggest that, in

addition to the officers of the Commission, the representatives of the Sudan,

India, Indonesia, Morroco and Tunisia should join the bureau to go to the

Congo. I have mentioned these five other members because I know that there is

something against the United Arab Republic also, something against Guinea, and

although I have not mentioned Liberia —

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There is something against everybody

obviously.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I can see that if we do send five in

addition to the other three, we shall have a small Commission, forming this

United Nations political presence as you called it. If the bureau alone goes —

and the bureau, after all, is composed of the officers of the Commission --it

will be necessary for them to be supported by a few members, who are, I understand,

here and are itching to go to the Congo.

Hierefore, my proposal would be that, in addition to the bureau, let us send

the representatives of the Sudan, India, Indonesia, Morocco and Tunisia,

MW/pm 8-10

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: May I ask you one question? We are rather| «»««l««^^«»«»»^"«M«»M»««»»«MM»«««»M«l»

Informal here; would you mind your proposal being phrased as a proposal that the

bureau and those of the Commission who volunteer should go? That would

avoid a rather obnoxious kind of picking and choosing with the kind, of overtone

which I mentioned as a reality and tried to joke away, because there isobviously something to be said about everybody, including the Secretary-Qeneral,

as you know. .

Mr, QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I am prepared to withdraw my proposal and

to fall in line with yours. ,

Mr. JHA (India): I am glad that you raised the point about the.

leakages to the Press because this has become quite a problem. After all, when

we meet in this Committee we like to speak freely; otherwise there is no point

in meeting, and I think that you yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, agree that the

exchange of views in a closed meeting, in the manner in which we have been

having them, is extremely useful for everybody, including perhaps yourself.

If the Press starts publishing details, whether right or wrong — worse if it is

wrong, but not so bad if it is right, though even that could be bad—then there

is a great inhibition in speaking. Members might not like to speak because this

is a very delicate situation in the Congo; emotions are high, and none of us .

would like to speak if the speaking means that we foul our relations with other

countries and with the Congo, So it is a very important point. I think that

your appeal is very well founded, and I believe that, here and now, we must

pledge ourselves, all of us who are here, not to divulge anything to the Press.

That brings me to my other point, I would suggest that your Department of

Public Information talk with members of the Press -- particularly with the New York

Times/which has given detailed accounts — and, as far as possible, without

infringing on the freedom of the Press,suggest to them not to do anything which

might make the task of this Committee and its members more difficult.

Secondly — this is a suggestion which I made earlier -- I would propose

that while we are discussing matters, you would ask some of the competent band

of lieutenants sitting behind you to be good enough to jot down about half a page,

not writing down what was said, but mentioning the subjects, not necessarily

even putting down the conclusions unless we want them put in. That paper should be

handed over to the Press by you or by one of your assistants as the meeting

concludes. I tbink that would be a healthy practice.

GRR/bg 11

(Mr. Jba, India)

Otherwise, all sorts of speculations will arise. Such a practice would be

to our advantage because all the world will know that the Advisory Committee is

discussing matters of importance and this may have a salutary effect. Of course,

the wording of this press statement will have to be very carefully worked out,

but I am sure we can trust the Secretary-General's assistants to do that and of

course the text will be read out before the meeting breaks up. That would be my

suggestion. Referring to the New York Times article, I do not think it is quite

accurate; it says that Lumumba is supported by so and so, but we are not here

as anybody's supporters. We have made it clear time and again, and we express

our opinions in the light of the responsibility that we feel we have as members

of the Organization. Speaking for my delegation, we are neither pro Lumumba

nor pro Kasavubu nor pro anybody; we speak only for ourselves and for our country.

That is a completely wrong angle to give. Of course, I have no illusions that

even if we issue a press statement at the end of our meeting we shall be able to

rectify the ingrained tendency of some of the newspapers here, but nevertheless

it would be an honest effort which might have its effect.

The second point with which 1 wish to deal concerns the question of the

Conciliation Commission's departure for the Congo. I have listened with great

interest and attention to the proposal made by the representative of Ghana,

and it seems to me that if we split up the Commission, according to whatever

formula,-- and here I agree that the formula you, Mr. Secretary-General, have

suggested is better than the formula he suggested, and he in fact has withdrawn

his --we shall be creating implications that are not altogether desirable, I

do not think it would be possible to do something which in fact means the

reconstitution of the Commission. We have decided on a fifteen-nation Commission,

whether that decision was right or wrong; some might argue that the Commission

should have been smaller, but that was the decision and I would not like to give

the impression that under the pressure of circumstances and developments in the

Congo, or whatever else it might be, we have now had second thoughts and wish to

exclude certain countries which might not be very acceptable to the Government in

the Congo. ,

GRR/bg 12

(Mr. Jha, India)

I think that any such implication should be avoided. Of course, if it is

decided that the Commission should go in two instalments, the first consisting

of the, office holders plus certain others who may volunteer to go or whom the

Committee itself may decide as a matter of•convenience should go earlier, and a'

second instalment to go a little later, here agiain I would like a date to be

fixed. In that way the implication I have referred to will not arise. 'Otherwise,

I see considerable difficulty in this whole idea.

I think it is very important for the Commission itself and for this Committee

at this stage to show what I might call some solidarity of thinking and of action.

We have this fifteen-nation Commission, we think it is a good Commission, 'and-if

it is true that not every member of the Commission is of the same mind, that is

perhaps a good thing and will strengthen the' Commission, If all members were of

one shade of opinion it would not be a 'good Commission' and we think we should stick

to- it. I would not like the Commission to be'truncated in any way nor would I

like the impression to be given that this Advisory1 Committee has" had se*cond

thoughts and is now thinking-of a composition which might: be -acceptable to xsertain

groups, parties or authorities. ' ;

My own suggestion would be .-of bourse we are thinking aloud at the moment;

it is a difficult matter •'*•- that the office bearers "plus certain others should go

as a first part of the Commission. A date should be fixed for that. The 'second

part may go a few days later, but we should also fix a date for'them. I do not :

think there will be any justification for leaving in doubt the date of departure

of the remainder of the members. In that way, we can perhaps achieve the

objectives which you, Mr. Secretary-General, had in mind. From various points of

view, that was a very good idea, and at the same time we should maintain what'I

might call the solidarity of the Commission as regards the Advisory Committee's

approach to this whole idea of a Conciliation Commission.

Mr, CABA (Guinea)(interpretation from French): Together vith my

colleagues, I should like to say something about the leaks which have come from

this Committee, from certain members of the Committee who have given the press

all our documents, whereas at the beginning of this Committee's work it was agreed

that the distribution of documents should be confined to members only.

GRR/bg 13

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

This meant that our documents were to be strictly confidential, and I believe

that the suggestion made by the representative of India to give the press even a

vague idea of our work would be a wise solution. It might prevent the press from

going into greater detail and really digging into our work. At this moment, outside

the hall representatives of the Press are waiting until the members of the

Committee walk out. They have only to get hold of a member and ask what went on,

who said what and what decisions were taken. I personally never wished to take

part in such machinations and therefore I think we should be very careful so that

the press may not contribute to creating contradictions among the members of this

Committee. Such contradictions can only serve to complicate matters here, in the

Congo and in the Secretariat. My delegation will see to it that our work remains

strictly confidential in the interests of the United Nations.

Now, with respect to the Commission — I apologize, I am not a member of the

Conciliation Commission — the despatch of the Commission devolves on this

Advisory Committee. Since we have the duty, as I said yesterday, to safeguard

the prestige of the United Nations in the Congo and elsewhere, I sincerely believe

that it would be ill advised either to send the officers alone or the officers

accompanied by several members. I apologize to the representative of Ghana, but

I feel that his suggestion actually perverts and even compromises to a certain

extent the prestige of our Organization.

Why should we hesitate to send the whole Commission at once? Because the

President of the Republic has shown some reluctance? Yes or no, do we respect

the General Assembly's decisions? Yes or no, has the Committee unanimously

decided to send the Commission? The members of the Commission have their tickets

in their pockets. Everything was put in train so that these persons could go to

the Congo. We have withdrawn from that position. Yesterday, the representative

of Nigeria said that President Kasavubu had actually deceived the Committee. If

we hesitate further, it is because we are taking account of President Kasavubu's

demands*

GRR/bg llf-15

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

.We were awaiting the document last week.. Yesterday we were told that his

letter would be signed that evening. Today, we are told that he is expected in

I opoldville and it is only upon his return there that he will eign the reply.

And we are certain that that reply will be negative.

.tliilHiltlktl

GSC/cn 16

(Mr • Caba, Guinea)

Now, since we know it will be negative, what are we waiting for? My delegation

sees no point in sending Just a part of the Commission. In other words, the

Committee should take a decision, set the date for the departure of the Commission,

and indicate its terms of reference in advance, taking into account yesterday's

discussion and today's, to the effect that it would not be possible for the

Commission to go to the Congo and meet only one party, one side. Therefore,it

is clear terps of reference; in other words, both parties should be confronted

and involved. This is the opinion of my delegation on the suggestion which has

Just been made by the Secretary-General, on the one hand, proposing that the

officers of the Committee go, and, on the other hand, by the representative of

Ghana, proposing that the Bureau be strengthened by sending voluntary members

of the Commission.

The SECRETARY "GENERAL: Ambassador Jha called upon my very capable and

able lieutenants in back of me, in the course of this discussion, to try to make a

draft or something to be presented to the Press. The representative of Guinea

has now joined with your proposal, Mr. Jha, and I think it is worth trying. Let

me add the sad observation that I do not think that we will ever eradicate the idea

that this is a fight between two persons where everybody takes sides. The bullfight

approach to politics seems to be very deeply ingrained in the journalists1 minds.

On this point which was now raised, you may perhaps permit me to intervene,

the point concerning the Commission. You may perhaps permit me to intervene not

with a proposal, but just by throwing out a suggestion which might make it easier

to find a common line* It would be that the decision at which we may arrive

today — and I would hope we do — be that at such-and-such a date the Commission

should go, but prior to that we wish the Bureau, and such other members as are

free to go, to go. That is to say, the leading note in the decision would be the

sending of the Commission, and the other would be subordinated as a kind of

procedural arrangement. That would meet my point*

OSC/cn , 17

(The Secretary-General)

I should like to make one thing clear to my friend, Mr. Caba Sory, and

that is that if I propose the Bureau, and not the rest, it is not beca-use of

any wish to fall into line with the particular tastes of any one person. We

do not change our neckties to suit anybody*s taste; but simply because I felt

that a twelve or fifteen-man committee in a very confused situation would find

it more difficult to operate than a small group. That is my only reason; not

the wish to exclude anyone.

Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): The first observation I would like to make is

to completely absolve my delegation from any responsibility for the publication

that has appeared in the Press. .

Unfortunately, I have not had the time to attend the previous meetings since

some time ago, but notwithstanding, I have tried to follow closely what has been

going on here. I am, however, somewhat concerned about what has been going on

with reference to the sovereignty of the Congo. All talks that have emerged

recently seem to disregard wholly the sovereignty of the Congo. Everyone seems

to feel that Kasavubu is of no consequence, Mobutu is of no consequence; that

the only person who is of consequence is Lumumba.

Now, I think we should take a very serious view of this situation so as not

to do something that may baomsraog and become a precedent affecting other States

in time. All States have their own skeletons in their respective cupboards, and

we must be very, very careful what we do. Otherwise, somebody will begin to

point to the defects that exist elsewhere, and when we establish a precedent and

it boomerangs, we may want to step out of it tomorrow, I want to point this out

seriously, because the question of sovereignty here is being ignored.

Now, this fact should be borne in mind, that Mobutu, whether we are prepared

to accord him any recognition or not, is there, and he is acting, and he is doing

something, The United Nations has to make up its mind either to deal with Mobutu

and Kasavubu or to fight them. The way we seem to be moving, it seems as though

we are definitely determined to go to war with them. Here we seem to find the

reports coming out in the Press definitely opposed to anything Mobutu, I readi

carefully this morning the report that appeared in the Times» The previous

reports that have been coming to the Secretary-general that have appeared in

OSC/cn 18-20

(Mr. Johnson, Liberia)

the Press have been definitely anti-Mobutu. This establishes a very serious

precedent, because I do not see how we can, as the United Nations, expect to

go to the Congo and work with men over there if already we are at variance on

their activities out there.

Of course, at the outset of this Advisory Committee, Mr. Secretary-General,

you will recall that I tried to impress upon the members the necessity of the

United Nations intervention in the Congo, and at that time, Mr. Lumumba was in

power. Of course, I received no support then. Now we are moving the other way

and we are saying that willy-nilly, the United Nations must go there and, some

say, disarm all the Congolese soldiers, take over things and virtually put the

Congo under a Trusteeship. That is not what this Organization is saying, but

that is being put in another area, which I feel that if we embark upon, we shall

be doing so to very serious regrets in the future.

RSH/mr 21

(Mr, Johnson. Liberia)

The question before us is, Congo or tumunjbaT We are all friends of Lumumba

from the personal point of view, and we would like to see justice, order, law and

humanity prevail in the Congo, but we must be very careful how we intervene in

this situation, because I would not like the United Nations or any other body to

come to my country and tell us what we are supposed to do there, without our

consent. We have accorded Kasavubu recognition, and whether we like it or not,

he is the titular head of the Congo. You will agree with me that sometimes we

hear such wonderful reports about what Mobutu is doing, and sometimes when we get

it through the United Nations channels there is nobody there with whom you should

deal, nobody of consequence, and this has worried me somewhat.

I feel that our interest should be to get the Congo moving in the way that it

should move, but the way we have gone on now, everybody knows and the world knows

that the majority of this Conciliation Commission is interested only in the

re-establishment of Mr. Lumumba as head of the Government of the Congo. We all

know that. If you want me to be specific, I can do that, and I think I can do it

with the approbation of everybody here. We have gone that far* We all know it,

and for that reason, I think that when it comes to the sending of this Commission

we should be very, very careful whom we send now, under the existing

circumstances*

• . Personally, I would go to the extent of suggesting an independent group, a

group entirely independent of what we have been doing here, be selected, either

by the Secretary-General or by the General Assembly, or by any other group, to go

there. It is true that we have appointed a Commission but if we, as sentient

beings, see or feel that they will not be accorded the reception they deserve as

a Commission when they go there, I think we should try to find a better way out.

I would summarize by saying that we should stop and think about the

sovereignty of the Congo in anything that we may wish to impose upon Kasavubu

and Mobutu. From,my personal observations, again through the Press, everything

that Mobutu has been doing he has been doing under the aegis of President

Kasavubu. In everything that he has done, he has been an instrument in

Kasavubu's hands. Since Kasavubu cannot do it, he has been used effectively to

do it, so we must reckon with fciin. If we do not want to fight we must

accept him as the titular head of the Congo, and we must be very icareful not to

RSH/mr 22

(Mr* Johnson, Liberia)

establish a precedent that will boomerang and choke some of the independent

States of Africa, because in this stage of our development there are many things

that we may do with which the outside world may not agree. We are doing many

things, and we have to be very careful* There is not a State anywhere that does

not have its own skeleton in its cupboard.

We are interested in Mr. Lumumba as a person. We want to do everything to

accord to him the dignity, the respect that human beings should have, but in the

process we must be very careful not to step on the sovereignty of those who are

administering affairs in the Congo,

Finally, I would absolve my delegation from any responsibility for the

publicity that is taking place.

Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I should like

first of all to associate myself with the idea voiced by the representative of

India, namely, that between two evils we have to choose the lesser, and the

lesser evil would be to give some information to the Press. But even this is

double-edged. We could give them some food to satisfy their hunger. That would

be alright, but the protracted discussions in our Committee and in the General

Assembly -- not only protracted, but sometimes contradictory — are not very

appropriate food for international opinion. The somewhat undecided and confused

aspect of some of these discussions would not enhance the prestige of our

meetings or of the General Assembly. Therefore, to sum up, I believe it would be

a good idea to give something to the Press, but it would be still better to give

them decisions; otherwise we would be rendering poor service to ourselves.

Without any real cause, we would be spreading an image which would not be

advantageous to the United Nations. Therefore, if we have to make a choice, we

should have a short and appropriate communique.

Further, in view of this confused and nebulous character of some of these

discussions, we must say that the only term that would describe the Congo

situation is that of a paradox. A sovereign State normally is not one that has

armed forces from fifteen other States on its territory, it is not a State divided

by an internal lack of understanding and external intrigue, a State where

paratroopers from the recent colonial Power do not come to trample under foot the

dignity and order, a State where financial security has not been rendered illusory,

if not dangerous, by a crime more serious than the crisis itself.

RSH/mr

(Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

Consequently, the sovereignty of the Congo is very much in our minds, but

this is something that needs to be re-established because, in the actual situation

we have rather a paradox. I am sorry that I have to go back to the origin of all

these things and recall the origin of the situation, but otherwise our work would1

be incoherent and only gome cohesion and consistency in our thought could remedy

our rather confused discussions and actions in the recent past, here arid in the

Congo... , . . . . . . . . . . .; ... . • ... • -. ••'•••• • •'•' ••• ' ;/ •'•'-

TL/mh 26(Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

Therefore, I would like to recall three things. First, there was colonialism,

followed "by a deceptive independence which, so far as the Belgians were concerned,

was a mockery. The people rose, and then there was a new Belgian invasion. And

the result of all this is an internal conflict.

This is a description of the situation as we have it. The United Nations,

of course, refused to bow before colonialism, and that gave rise to hope. The

United Nations set out to re-establish order and legality — which means government,

the President of the Republic, and the Parliament; that is pretty clear. But in

their impatience, some representatives of the Congolese Government, supposedly

sovereign, have done certain things which, perhaps, displeased certain Powers. It

is not our business to pass judgement on these acts, but we can observe the

intervention of these Powers which comes in addition to the open intervention of

Belgium.

Today, if there is a term to describe the recent situation, it is

"arbitrariness" and "arbitrary". We have at the present time in the Congo a

wholly arbitrary situation in the conduct of governmental business. Therefore,

there is a task to be done which only the Conciliation Commission in its full

membership can perform in the service of the Congo and of the United Nations. The

inconsistencies of the General Assembly, the procrastination of the

Advisory Committee, make a mockery of the United Nations action. It is a mockery

when great Powers can come before the General Assembly and take attitudes contrary

to those which were theirs a few days before. This is a great source of sadness

for all the Powers represented here. We do not wish to be tools and pavne in the

hands of the great Powers. But what we wish to see protected is the love of freedom

everywhere. We are faced here with a Congo situation, but a similar situation

could arise in the Middle East, in Europe, anywhere; and it is only freedom that

we want to defend. This is all that matters to us.

Therefore, the Conciliation Commission should go there, and they should bear

in mind that they will be confronted with a crisis due first and foremost toforeign intervention. Today certain other Powers would like to see things upside

down: they see the internal Congolese situation as the source of all the trouble,

and would like us to believe so. But we refuse; we refuse to confdse cause and

effect. We must not forget the true causes, which lie in foreign intervention.

TL/mh - 27(Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

This Conciliation Commission must not be reduced in number or in any way

crippled. If it is crippled, it should not go there at all, because it will in

this way be favouring one trend of opinion as against another, and the United Natic

will show themselves to be weak if first they announce they will send a commission

of fifteen and then say that they have modified the membership and reduced the

commission.

Now, of course, we know that as a rule delegations consult their Governments

before making decisions, and we would not like to act frivolously. We must continu

tenaciously along the same lines which stem from our original basis, that is to

say, to re-establish normal life in the Congo under the rule of law and order.

It is a clear responsibility for the United Nations, and it is unfortunate if,

in seeking a remedy for the Congo situation, we are reduced to seeking remedies

for the United Nations, if the United Nations is contaminated by the Congo crisis.

Now, why^is it that the United Nations has a clear responsibility and must act

consistently with its previous decision? Here I am speaking as the representative

of Morocco, and not for any other delegation» The Congo experience which filled

us with hope for whatever progress could be achieved through the United Nations

does not permit anything other than success or failure: by its resolution this

hope will stand or fall. There is a clear relationship between the question of

the Congo and the United Nations; there must be no attempt to separate one from

the other, no conflict or antagonism must be allowed to arise.

We are also against any question of personalities in this problem. This is

why in our statements we prefer to operate with X and Y rather than to speak of

Mr. Kasavubu or Mr. Lunumba.

But a normal situation must be re-established. If there was some hope at j

the beginning, unfortunately that hope is turning to bitterness. The

Secretary-General himself will remember the joy with which the African States,

in our earlier meetings, co-operated with him. Today this sentiment has become

bitterness. The enthusiasm is still there, but it is getting increasingly painful

to keep it pure. The great Powers can influence the course of history for a time,

but they cannot settle any problem, they can only blur the contradictions.

Belgium was confronted with an attitutde of courageousness for which we praised

the Secretary-General. But we have seen that nothing has happened, and that

TL/mh 28-30

(Mr, Benaboud, Morocco)

Belgium, aware of some mysterious support it enjoys, has adopted an attitude of

contempt for the United Nations as represented by the Secretary-General* And

their attitude is not without couplications on the international plane. We have

the example of the breaking-of f of diplomatic relations with Ghana, and also

certain measures taken by the United Arab Republic. All this shows that foreign

intrigues are a reality. Some of them are hidden, others are on the surface; but

these intrigues do exist. Prom this we can see clearly the task of the

Conciliation Commission. The Conciliation Commission must first eliminate all

the artificial obstacles set up in its path, all of which clearly are of foreign

origin. The Commission must proceed in its full composition and it must proceed

to act quickly.

Now, with regard to the Press, which is outside this room, we believe -- and

this is in reply to our friend from Liberia, whose statements we always listen to

with attention --we believe we can describe our attitude as based on three

points: first, we must pursue a disinterested and earnest course of effort in order

to normalize the situation in the Congo; second, we must maintain the dignity and

prestige of the United Nations, both of which have been gravely Jeopardized by

the contradictions of the General Assembly itself; and third, we must act

objectively, freeing our thinking from the influence of personalities* But the

real problem is still the secessionist movement and the presence of the Belgians,

whether in uniform or not; and it is of equal importance to maintain the dignity

and prestige of the United Nations,

TOB/rh 31

(Mr* Benaboud, Morocco)

Second, I think that we should not waste much more time. We have seen that

certain representatives who came^all the way from their countries to work in

this Conciliation Commission have now returned home with•the impression that all

this was not reaJJy serious, and that perhaps the lack of seriousness was

intentional In some -quarters. This might not be very grave in itself) "but it

will no doubt have most serious effects on the United Nations. Either the

United Nations suc'ceeds, or it moves towards failure. Therefore,.,as I say, I

believe that no more time should be wasted, and, furthermore, I should1like tb'

appeal to my colleagues that we keep our discussions strictly confidential.

That would help us, and it -would be in our own interests because much of our

discussion-has been rather fruitless. • '

Third, the Conciliation Commission/should' enter into contact with the

people themselves. Sometimes we forget the people behind the foreign intriguer

who wishes to get'involved in this internal crisis. Let us not forget that the

people IB now on the brink of civil war'. There is no mofTe time to be lost. And

that is a clear task for the Conciliation Commission too. k

Finally, I should be happy to see a date set for the departure of the

Conciliation Commission in the course of this meeting.

Mr. -IOUTFI -(United Arab Republic) (interpretation from Blench): it shall

be very brief••' I support what has been said concerning the secrecy df our ~

meetings. I think it is much wiser for the Press not to know what is going on

here, and I agree-with the idea of Ambassador Jha that we might have a Press

release every now and then, despite the fact that I personally do not think that

it will be very useful because the Press is not interested in seeing' a release

in which it is told that a discussion was held about the departure of the

Conciliation Committee* The Press does not care about that very much. What it

wants to know is what the members said, who was against whom, who wants the

Commission to go, and so on. That is what the Press wants to know. But we could

still issue a Press release if it were thought that it would be useful to do so.

With regard to the proposals made concerning the departure of the

Conciliation Commission, my Government, for one, as I have informed the

Secretary-General, feels that it would be useless to to part of that Commission

FGB/rh 52

(Mr, Loutfi, United Arab Republic)

for reasons with which you are familiar, namely, because it is difficult to

conciliate at this time. Nevertheless, we will agree with anything which our

colleagues may decide to do, and I am confident that when it gets to the Congo

the Commission will get into contact with the parties involved in the conflict.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): What you have said, Mr. Secretary-General, has

made us all feel terribly guilty about the leakage to the Press. As I

generally read only the headlines in the newspapers I was, in fact, ignorant of

this story until about ten minutes ago when I re id it. I suppose that you do

not expect each one of us to say, "Sir, I did not do it", but I certainly say

that I did not. The style is so poor that I would consider it certainly not in

keeping with the richness of my own style.

I am a little pained to hear disdainful references being made to the

sovereignty of the Congo. Neither I nor anyone else would want to go into the

theories of sovereignty, but we have, many of us, attained sovereignty very

recently ourselves, and therefore it behoves us.to sympathise with a country

which is passing through a terrible time, and not to refer to that country

disdainfully.

My own relationships with the Congo are very different. It is an

Asian-African country, and I have the greatest sympathy with it and, therefore,

as I have said, would feel very pained to hear any single word which might

indicate that anyone was impugning the sovereignty of the Congo. Financial

bankruptcyi according to any theory in the world, does not impugn the sovereignty

of a country. Even some great Powers have been in very grave financial distress,

and yet they have been sovereign. Similarly, foreign troops have been in many

countries without their sovereignty being in any way affected* In fact, if I am

not mistaken, there are united Nations troops even now on the cease-fire line

between India and my own country. And United Nations troops are in other

countries, but yet our sovereignty has not been affected.

We come to the United Nations for assistance just for that reason -- because

the United Nations assistance or United Nations troops do not affect our

sovereignty. That is why we come to the United Nations* Otherwise we would

seek that assistance bilaterally.

FGB/rh 33

(Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

I have been saying, with tiresome repetition, that we may be left out of

this Conciliation Commission. But friends here, colleagues here, comrades here

did not agree. They said that the Commission should be — as we decided

ultimately to have it — a Commission of fifteen Asian-African members of this

Advisory Committee, and we acquiesced. But now the suggestion has been made that

it should be cut down to five or six or seven or eight. I have stated my own

personal views about the composition of this Commission so many times that almost

everyone knows them, so that I do not have to apologize for that particular

aspect of my views. However, if we were now to accept the suggestion to

curtail the strength and the numbers of the Commission it might appear that

some interested people were seeking to give it a uniform complexion — that they

wanted a smaller Committee of, as I say, a particular composition to suit a

particular purpose. Therefore, my advice would be to leave the Commission as it

is. But as you yourself suggested, Mr. Secretary-General, very wisely as usual,

we might give people the option, and if anyone wishes to drop out let the

country or the representative concerned do so. But let us not take here a

decision that the membership shall be curtailed or that any particular country,

because of any particular reason, shall be excluded from the Commission which,

after weeks of turmoil, discussion and argument here, we ultimately decided to

compose in the manner in which we did compose it. So my advice would be — quite

detachedly and impersonally, in the sense of national impartiality — that we

should not change the composition of the Committee.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I wanted to intervene again precisely to

disabuse the minds of some of my distinguished friends here who think that my

proposal was meant to change the composition of the Conciliation Commission.

No, my proposal was a follow-up of your suggestion yesterday, Mr. Secretary-General,

that a bureau should go on and prepare the ground, and I think that the bureau

should go in addition to the other members of the Commission whom I mentioned.

My idea was that there should be this tactical and purely procedural action, but

that the rest of the Commission in time should follow. My suggestion was not

meant to suggest a change of the Conciliation Commission in any way*

FGB/rh 5 -35

(Mr* Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

That is the first point which I thought I must make clear. I have already

withdrawn my suggestion and am fully in line with yours — that the bureau,

together with such others, as are prepared to go along, should go to prepare

the ground and generally to feel the pulse of the place, in order to allow the

second batch, at a time fixed by us, also to go to the Congo*

HR/cw 36

" " (Mr* Quaison-Sackey. Ghana)

• i • • . •I see that the representative of Liberia, Mr,. Johnson, has gone, but he

made so many points which should have gone unsaid. . I am not prepared 'to cross

swords with anyone now; therefore, I will stop here.

Mr,. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): I would Just like to intervene

very1 shortly. In the intervention of the representative of Liberia--

Ambassador Johnson, I believe — he made very sweeping remarks when he said

inter alia that everybody here is interested in establishing or upholding

Mr. Lumumba. I may not be quoting his exact words, but the records are there*

I hope that the representative of Liberia did not include my delegation

in that, sweeping statement. We, the Federation of Malaya, are a very new

country. We are one of the youngest Members of this Organization. Our troops

are in the Congo because we have deemed fit to answer the call of the United

Nations, and we feel that,as a Member of this Organization, if we can in a

modest way do anything to serve the cause of peace in order to bring happiness

to a troubled world, we will always try to do our best. That is why we have

our troops in the Congo, and because of that we are represented in this

Advisory Committee.

I hope that nobody here will even dream that the Federation of Malaya,

which is 1,QQQ miles further away from the Congo than Pakistan, is taking sides

in the drama which is now being acted in the Congo. That is my first point.

The second point, regarding the sending of the Conciliation Commission —

whether we go in a small body first or send the whole Commission or reduce its

number, and so on -- here again, we, "being a member of this Committee and in a

sense a very small contributor to the United Nations effort, the Federation of

Malaya will be agreeable to any course or decision that the majority of the

Advisory Committee may deem fit to advise, •

Mr. ALEMAYEHOU (Ethiopia): May I, first of all, associate myself

with the regret expressed here by many'Members with regard to the leakage

to the Preaa of vhat we have said here in this Committee. It is an unfortunate

situation that what has been said here in this Advisory Committee has been

divulged to the Press, and I believe that the suggestion of the representative of

HR/cw 37(Mr, Alemayehou. Ethiopia)

India, and supported by others, that what should be given to the Press should

be prepared in advance and approved^is really a good procedure. It would,

perhaps, prevent the Press from writing whatever they thought, interesting to

the general public rather than to the interest of the Congo• Usually, when

the Press does not have something concrete, they would construct or invent what

they would like to say, so it is really a good suggestion that has been made,

and my delegation, of course, concurs with that view.

With regard to the despatch of the Conciliation Commission, the members

of the Advisory Committee will recall that I held the view that the whole

membership of the Conciliation Commission should go to the Congo, I supported

that view because, as I said yesterday, I think that once the United Nations

General Assembly or the Security Council has taken a certain measure, it must

show persistence, it must show strength, otherwise the aggression or the

courage of this other side would always be greater, in comparison to the retreat

which we made. The more we retreat, of course, the more advances the other side

would make, so I think it would be advisable — within reasonable limits, of

course — for the United Nations to show a certain firmness in what they have

deemed advisable and useful. That is why I said that once the United Nations

has decided to send a Conciliation Commission it has to maintain that position

if it is not to be considered weak.

My view is that the whole membership should go, but if the majority of

the Advisory Committee here would prefer to send the Bureau first, my delegation

would bow to the decision of the majority, but our preference would be that the

whole membership of the Commission should go*

It has been suggested that some of us have supported one personality and

another part of us have supported another personality in the Congo. We have

stated time and again that we have no choice, that we have no preference for

one individual as against another, and that is the position which we still

maintain* But while maintaining this position we must recognize that there is

a fact which is now prevailing in the Congo. . These personalities are individuals*

There is Mobutu, Kasavubu, Lumumba and others* If we have to send this

Conciliation Commiasion this -Commission will have to deal with these pereons*

HR/dw 38-UO

(Mr, Alemayehout Ethiopia)

It it in bringing together and reconciling the viewpoints of these Individuals

that ve hope good will come out of all these trying enterprises that have beentaken over by the United Nations.

;.••/•'•»'"*•• • • • '• ' ' ' • . • - • ' • ' , . . - -' ' Therefore, we should, not disregard this, and for that reason I think

the safety of Mr* Lumumba, as veil as others, is necessary if we areto succeed. The safety of these individuals, be it Mr, Lumumba or others,

is necessary, so everything must be done in order to make our mission a success*

As I said yesterday -- and I repeat -- the sooner we despatch ,this

Commission the better* Had we sent this Commission before, perhaps the

present situation would not have been created* The more we wait here the more

difficult will be the situation in the Congo, and in order to avoid such;,

difficulties I think it would be very helpful if we send the Commission a? soon.as possible* It would prevent some undesirable and unnecessary deterioration

of the situation in the Congo, and that would also be helpful to the United ....Nations* These are the views which I would like to pass to the Committee. ;

HA/aJ in

Mr* BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I regret to

have to speak again, but I should like to clarify one point.

We said that the situation in the Congo is dominated by paradoxes. The

Congo being a sovereign State, that sovereignty in law should not be eritlclecdfbut in fact it has been trampled upon by Belgium and by those who are helping

Belgium, whether from nearby or from far away, geographically speaking.

We said that the United Nations action must be swift in order to re-establish

sovereignty and unity* ' •

We have heard many judicious remarks, in particular those made yesterdayby the representative of Senegal, who said that the liberation of Mr. Lumumbawould be a necessary assistance to the work of the Conciliation Commission anda step toward unity and understanding. We should like to associate ourselveswith this very judicious remark. We can also say that Mr. Lumumba, sinceeverybody speaks of Lumumba here, has as much right to our respect as anybodyelse. He is a sincere patriot, and so ardent a patriot that he displeased

many people and is now in @QOX We know that he was a leader who was invited

to rtakhington, Rabat, and elsewhere. We would not like to appear to be making

a turnabout because of foreign intrigue.

I believe that the majority of the members of this Committee — I apologize

if I have to express this idea, and this is to give support to the

representative of the Federation of Malaya -- would wish to act for the good

of the Congo, and the good of the Cong} is the unity of all available energies

in the Congo, and these energies are represented by persons. Therefore we

are for conciliation and the union of the personalities. This is also the

reason why we wanted to eliminate personalities from this discussion, why we

preferred to speak of Mr. X and Mr. Y,

If it is alleged that this Committee inclines in favour of one or the

other, that is not true. It is the contrary of what we are trying to do here.

We know that the office of the President of the Republic is not in dispute, that

the principle of lawful government ia not in dispute. Therefore, what matters

is not to fall into the trap of foreign intrigue and not to deviate from our

straight line.

HA/aJ 42(Mr. Benaboudj Morocco)

If you take all that has been stated by our delegation on the record, you

will see that there was one guiding Idea which was atated and developed in "

the light of the circumstances* The main idea is to re-establish normal'

conditions -- and this, without submitting to any foreign influence. What

ye vieh is" law and order, dignity, and the consolidation of sovereignty.

Our adtion is aimed at restoring sovereignty. If this sovereignty was jeopardized

and affected, it vag'by foreign intrigue and by the violence of the Belgian

forces, by violations on the part of the Belgian forces. " '

I'shbuld like to repeat that it is necessary that we do not leave this

conference room without' setting a date for the departure of the Conciliation

Commission,

HA/aJ 43

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): I vaa not here at the beginning of the meeting

but, from what I have gathered so far, Mr. Secretary-General, you have

remarked about the leakage to the Press of what has been done here. That seems

to be a disease of all committees. We have the same complaint in every group

in, which ve meet. The Press does not seem to be at all scrupulous: if they

are not able to get the news, they manufacture the news. Thus, we had the

"news* that Mr. Lumumba was to be shot at 2 o'clock. Where they got-that, I

do not know. It created quite some consternation.

I am sorry that this has happened. As the representative of Pakistan

has said, it is useless to have each representative say: nl did not give out

the news". That would be pointless. But I think that we here, as people of

responsibility, should be careful about what we give to the Press, because

what is given to the Press is what the whole world comes to know, and that

can affect any situation.

I have heard — I do not know how true it is — that a member of my

delegation said that everybody here supports Mr. Lumumba, I can assure you

now that that is not the view of my Government at all, and it is not the

view of our delegation at all. When it came to the seating of a representative

of the Congo, we abstained. We felt that, as a member of the Conciliation

Commission, we should not compromise ourselves either to Mr, Lumumba's faction

or to Mr. Kasavubu!s faction. How could we be neutral and bring about

conciliation if we had already committed ourselves to one side or the other?

As regards the departure of the Commission, I am anxious for the Commission

to go. But we must bear this in mind: We cannot enter a man's house if he

refuses to allow us in. We have asked Mr, Kasavubu to receive this Commission*

He has said that it is necessary for him to make preparations, I do not think

he has yet told us that these preparations have been completed. Unless we

want to create embarrassment for the Commission, whether it is the full

Commission or, a.s has been suggested, only the officers, we should not place them

in an awkward position. What will the Commission do in the Congo if the

Government there is not prepared to accept it? And you know, Mr. Secretary-General,

that conditions in the Congo are in such turmoil that immunity is-not now

accorded even to United Nations officials. I wonder what will happen if these

representatives are not accepted by the Government, and who will see to it that

they are immune from attack. It would create a very embarrassing position

"f"

HA/aj 1 .1*5(Mr. Cooper, Liberia)

to send the Commission until we get some inkling from the Government there ;

that it is prepared to see ,the Commission. It would be pointless to set a

date and have these gentlemen from various countries go there and be snubbe4-or ill-treated. i .

Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): First of all, in regard to the leakage to ,

the Press: As everybody else lias mentioned it, I would like to say a few words

about it. At our first meeting, there was unanimous agreement that no information

should be given out individually by those participating in these meetings*

As far as, my delegation is concerned, that, agreement has been valid all along

and continues -to be valid as long as it stands. .... .

. Secondly, I agree with you, Mr. Secretary-General, that the time has come

when we have to establish a political presence in the Congo, and I agree with

the proposal that we should send the members of the Bureau to • the Congo as ... '.soon as practical. If members of the Conciliation Commission, who volunteered

to go immediately can Join that group, from practical .and other - points of viev,I. have no objection. Nor have I any objection to having the re t.of the group,Join those;forerunners as soon as possible. But I should like to repeat whatthe representative of Sudan has said repeatedly, and what.the-Secretary-General

has also said: . This is a human problem, we have a great responsibility toward

the inhabitants of the Congo, and my delegation agrees that.action should betaken as soon as possible in the form of sending at least the members of ..the

Bureau as soon as that is possible.

AP/pm 1*6

Mr, CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Mrt Secretary-General,

yesterday, when it was announced that there had been published the report of the

Special Representative of the United Nations in the Congo on the arrest of the

Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, we had informed our Government about

this and we added that we were awaiting this report with a great deal of

impatience. Now, we have it before us. My delegation would like to ask two

questions in the Advisory Committee on che Congo.

My first question is the following: Ever since the beginning of the crisis

in the Congo, with what authorities has the United Nations been dealing with in

the Congo? My Government would like some clarification on this point. Because,

looking at the report of Mr. Dayal, the United Nations messages -- protesting,

although timidly, the arrest of Mr. Lumumba -- are addressed to a general

commissioner. We should like to know what are the norms which guide the United

Nations in addressing itself to such irresponsible parties, as they were

described by Mr. Dayal in his report which is found in A/U-557.

Secondly, we really should like to know what are the functions of the

Advisory Committee? Because, in so far as we know, at present we have not taken

any valid decision whatsoever which could be appreciated by the United Nations.

The only decision which was greeted with a great deal of enthusiasm by the

General Assembly was the setting up of the Conciliation Commission.

Preparations were made from an administrative point of view and from the

political point of view; concerning this, I believe this was done upon the

adoption of the terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission. As a result

of hesitation, the departure of this Committee was held up. Now, here we

have two meetings during which opinions are still being expressed from

different points of view; some delegations have even told us to reconsider

the membership of the Commission, a suggestion which my delegation was

flabbergasted to hear. Soon there will be other delegations that will get

ready to leave this Commission. Already, Mali, Guinea and the United Arab Republic

do not see any point in the Commission at the present state of circumstances

in the Congo. The more we continue to hesitate and to discuss the whole matter,

the Commission will break even before the departure date is made known.

AP/pm 1*7

(Mr* Caba, Guinea)

We should like to know what are the terms of reference of the Advisory

Committee, how can we take any decision which would be appreciated by the

General Assembly? We must not remain within these halls for our responsibilities

to be committed vis-'a-vis the Republic of the Congo. Sincerely, my

Government fails to understand that the Advisory Committee, which has been

legally set up, which is capable of taking decisions concerning the Congolese

crisis, has met and only heard a few divergent opinions expressed by

representatives and then broke up without taking any decision. The Security

Council is to meet tomorrow and specifically, I do not know what is the

proposal of our Committee to the Security Council, to say: "We have taken

such and such a stand concerning the most recent crisis".

Yesterday we said that the responsibility of the United Nations is very

much affected because of the most recent events in the Congo, We will say

this in any United Nations organ.

But I should like to have some clarification on these two points which

my delegation has asked of the Secretary-General who is the Chairman of the

Advisory Committee,

AP/pm 1*8

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; On the first point, the real demarches have been

addressed to the person'whom, the representative of Guinea also recognizes

is the Chief of State of the Republic of the Congo and who is the head of

the delegation to the United Nations. There were preliminary demarches made

through Mr. Bomboko who, as you may remember, is also a member of the

recognized delegation of the Republic of the Congo to the United Nations. But

quite apart from that position I think that we cannotf so to say, climb down

to the position of non possumus -- that we cannot do anything because we

refuse to approach those who have the de facto responsibility. What should

we have done in the case of Songolo and other parliamentarians vho vere •

arrested in Stanleyville,- apart from reproaching those who were responsible •

for their arrest? We had no legal position whatsoever. What should we have

done— nothing? Because there were no people, at any rate, in a formal

responsible position. I think that is the reply lean give to the question of

the legality of the situation.

As regards this Committee, I do not quite understand the question of the

representative of Guinea nor can I fully, so to say, disentangle his position. On

the one side, I think, that you show reasons fcr and show a certain Impatience

with the lack of a positive decision of this Committee* On the other hand,

you recall as we know,that your Government, like the Government of another nation

represented here, has withdrawn from the Commission because they do not see any

use in sending the Commission. This Committee is a consultative Committee where

we try to arrive at a consensus on what best serves the United Nations operation

in implementation of the Security Council decisions. The situation is a1

rapidly changing one and I do not think that this Committee has any reason to

blame itself for following the development and taking into account the

changes in the situation, in its deliberations and in its conclusions as they

are reached. The Committee cannot find itself under any kind of prestige pressure-

I think it would be very wrong if it did — which would force it to take action

which is against its best judgement as to what best serves the interest of the

Congo in the situation which it has to face at a given moment. It must for

that reason have the humility to change stands and to look ridiculous to the

Press-and to be criticized for vacillating. I think it is a much more respectable

AP/pm 49-50

(The Secretary-General)

attitude than one of taking stiff stands, refusing to look realities in the face

and maintaining those stands irrespective of what we feel about it.

The Committee has, and I think we should recall it, a mandate from the

General Assembly to assist as appropriate the authorities in the Congo in order

to help them to resolve their difficulties. There is no word from the General

Assembly — and 1 must repeat that, because it is sometimes forgotten -- saying

that this Committee should send the Commission. St should assist && appropriate/

and "as appropriate" refers both to the means and to the timing. Under its

mandate from the General Assembly, I therefore feel that the Committee is

perfectly right in/ so to say, looking at the time question, looking at the entire

question in the way it has done* ' . '

(The Secretary-General)

If the situation had been stable and we had seen only changes of opinion

here, then I would fully share the concern about, so to speak, the stand and

character of the Committee. However, it is not the basic attitude of this

Committee which has changed: it is the situation to which the Committee must

adjust its actions. I do not believe that the Committee as such owes any kind

of report to the Security Council tomorrow. I think that this Committee acts

in a way corresponding to its sense of responsibility under its mandate from the

General Assembly. But, just as this Committee wishes to take into account the

fact that there will be a Security Council debate tomorrow, so the Security

Council, I am sure, will be very interested in having a clear view of where the

Committee stands for the moment as regards sending the Conciliation Commission —

and this refers both to the time-table of the despatch of the Commission and the

way in which that may be staged.

Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I shall not say anything about the leaks,

because I think that everyone is only too well aware of what goes on here. The

Press people can gather any document anywhere in the United Nations very easily.

I am therefore not at all surprised that these leaks have taken place. The only

thing that surprises me is that the complete verbatim records of the meetings

of the Advisory Committee are not published in the Press, because it is not

difficult to gather these things and give them to the newspapers to publish.

The members of this Committee were elected to serve here. I would say for

myself, my delegation and my Government that we do not hold a brief for anyone.

We support neither Kasavubu nor Lumumba. But we do recognize facts. And the

fact here is that two human beings exist who lead factions on the Congolese

political scene and that both came to power through a compromise. Those of us

who read about the results of the elections know that no one obtained an over-all

majority and that is why no one was able to form a government. Lumumba was

asked to form a government; he could not; Kasavubu tried to form a government;

he could not. It was by a compromise between the two -- and, I suppose, their

followers, in co-operation with the other leaders of the other factions in the

Congo — that a government was formed. According to the newspapers, one of the

BC/bg 52

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

major compromises arrived at was that Kasavubu should be the President and Head

of State and Lumumba should be the Prime Minister. That gave solidity to the , .. , -

Congo State immediately after it was granted independence by Belgium. But, ; sopn

afterwards,' Belgium instigated Katanga's secession — at. least that is what we

have read in the newspapers. , , ,

''Now, 'th'e representative of Liberia made a statement to the effect that the

majority of the members of the Conciliation Commission seemed to support the idea of

bringing Lumumba back to power. I wish to say, on the basis of conversations I

have had with other members of the Conciliation Conraicsion, since it was appointed,

that that statement'is not at all accurate. Th£ majority of the members of the

Conciliation Commission are supporters of neither A nor B. Having observed what

has gone on in the United Nations since I came here, and on the basis of facts,

I am quite satisfied that Lumumba's cause is supported by one of the great Powers

in the United Nations and some African States, and that the cause of Kasavubu• • •' ' . ' < * *•

and his group is supported by one of the great Powers in the United Nations and

some African States. Thus, it is like the kettle calling the pot black, or

like both of them sitting on the same fire and collecting carbon.

One need only read the records of the debates in the General Assembly to

see the truth of what I have just stated. I therefore think that one only

deceives oneself in maintaining that there is one particular person who is being

supported and another who is not being supported. We saw in the General Assembly

that one faction wanted to seat its representatives and the other faction wanted

to seat its representatives. It is only those of us who have not committed

ourselves one way or the other who can viev this matter objectively.

I would say very seriously that, whatever we do, we must recognise that

Lumumba is the leader of the largest single group in the Central Legislature.

I may not like his politics; I may like his politics, I may not like his face;

I may like his face. But the fact is that he is the leader of that group. Now,

I asked Mr. Dayal at one time how many parties there were, and he said that

there were about twenty. Out of the 135 members, Lumumba leads about thirty-five;

another person leads about thirty; another, about twenty; another about thirteen;

another, about eleven — and then we come to those who lead themselves and

constitute parties. Any political set-up that does not take into .consideration

BC/bg 53.55

(Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

this composition and leadership, which has been produced by the Congolese people

themselves, will not be realistic.

President Kasavubu himself said during his Press Conference in New York that

he intended to summon a round-table conference to which he would invite all the

political leaders, including Lumumba. That was published widely in the newspapers.

Now, is Lumumba to be invited to a round-table conference after he is dead? I

repeat that I am supporting no one's politics. My only concern is that the fact

that the United Nations recognized the position of President Kasavubu as the Head

of State should not be used to Justify the destruction of a rival. We should be

failing in our duty if we allowed such a thing to happen. If our task is to

reconcile, we must reconcile divergent views and opposing interests, and one of our

first duties — whether or not the Commission goes — must be to see to it that

one of the prominent leaders of Congolese political opinion is not destroyed as

a result of our negligence. No one would ever forgive us if that happened.

DR/cn 56

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku> Nigeria)

I may dislike Lumumba's politics; I may not have anything to do with

him as a person, but he is entitled to live even if he is not the Prime Minister

or anyone else; he is entitled to live in the Congo. He went to prison just

as Kasavubu did, in the cause of Congolese liberation; both of them went to

jail. • .

I think that the hands of the great Powers have gone too far in the affairs

of the Congo and that it is time for the smaller Powers, as I said before, to

bring the weight of their numbers to bear in this matter. I should like this

Advisory Committee to assist the Secretary-General, to make sure that we are

not going to reconcile the living and the dead, that any reconciliation or any '

visitation to the Congo must be a matter that has to deal with the living, and

not the living and the dead, because it seems to me that the cause that is being

pursued now is only an attempt to eliminate one of the potent forces there.

I am not suggesting for one moment that when matters take their proper

turn Lumumba may come up or may not come up -- I do not know who will come up.

If I had my way, I think that the only thing that is possible at the mordent is

a national government there. We had the same experience in Nigeria and we

solved the problem. But it seems to me that some of the Congolese leaders do

not seem to know their right hand from their left hand. They do not seem to

realize .that people are using them as pawns in the game of international

politics and international vested interests, but I do not want to be drawn into

this. ;

Thus one of the very first jobs that this Advisory Committee must do for

the sake of the future of the Congolese State and the Congolese people — not

so much for Lumumba or Kasavubu -- is to make sure that nothing happens to

Lumumba because — and I say this in all seriousness -- if we do not stop that

we may find that the supporters of Lumumba, if they find that their leader is

dead, will hunt Kasavubu and they will hunt Mobutu and then you will see

slaughter and you will find that the leaders will be mowed down. To avoid that

type of bitterness which may result in the destruction or the decapitation of

the leadership of the Congolese State, I think that the United Nations would

be serving the Congolese people — not Kasavubu, not Lumumba but the people they

have gone to help -- the people to whom they are sending monejj to whom they are

DR/cn 57

(Mr* Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

sending medical aid, to whom they are sending all sorts of assistance in order

to re-create their society. These are the people we are helping and if they

destroy their leadership, on what are we going to build? It is not only the

Congo alone that we lose, Africa will lose too. That is my principal concern

here. The Congolese leadership must not be allowed to destroy itself. Surely

Kasavubu and his followers in the Government do want some opposition. Are we

trying to install a dictatorship? If we have decided that we intend to install

a dictatorship, then tell me and I will resign from this Advisory Committee

straight away because I will be no party to it. My country is not a dictatorship;

there is freedom of expression and fundamental human rights are entrenched in our

Constitution. We have those things in my country. I cannot be a party to a

situation that means using political power to liquidate an opponent. If you want

to liquidate your opponents go to the polls and do so; that is what is happening

here, V/e all believe that, our institutions are based on it. If there is any

Power here that encourages that type of thing, I think that that Power does not

have the United Nations spirit and the Advisory Committee on the Congo must not

encourage this.

A certain question was asked of the Secretary-General by the representative

of Guinea, why correspondence is exchanged with certain people in the Congo or

why they are acknowledged, and of course the Secretary-General pointed out that

it is a question of fact and he made reference to people who are arrested in

Stanleyville. Naturally if you want to get people out, you have to deal with

those who have them in costody. But things have changed since those incidents

occurred.

The President of the Republic of the Congo has come here and asked that his

representatives should be recognized by the United Nations and they have been

seated. All the Members of the United Nations recognize him as the Head of State,

and he is the channel through which the United Nations acts at the moment, and I

think that it is right and proper that this should be so. We must go from the

known to the unknown. Therefore, all responsibilities must go through him and\he must shoulder his responsibility squarely. But I am not so sure that by

respecting the Head of State we are entitled by any stretch of the imagination

to recognize Colonel Mobutu or to treat with him.

DR/cn 58-60

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

' In this respect, I,should like to comment on the Commissioners "because -.

if ttie United Nations Conciliation Commission goes there, it mupt recognize . ,,

that this body of men is an existing fact. However, in my opinion, they do not .

constitute'the legitimate Government of the central authority. They are an

ad hoc body, but that is not the Central Government of the Republic of the

Congo, and therefore the United Nations cannot legitimately deal with them.

In other words, the Head of State still owes this body a debt, seeing to, it that

a properly constituted Government is formed -- whether with Lumumba or without ..

Lumumba, that does not seem material to me. All that we want is that,there

should be a Congolese central government. If we had found that, there would

have been no argument about whose -face we would like to see and whose face we

would not like to see. If they are killing themselves under their laws and

their constitution properly instituted, nobody will quarrel with that. If.and

when they talk about a trial, one has a qualm of conscience as we are not sure ,

that it is a proper judiciary set-up and we do not know the process of law that

will be followed. Is it martial law, what type of martial law? As one

representative said here ,in making a case about the Commission's being wary

about going, it seems that the simple immunities that international law confers ,

on diplomatic representatives, even on the United Nations, does not seem to hql<J..

water in the Congo now. Therefore when the Commission goes,, the United flfationa

must make arrangements that, even if the situation is such that the immunities.

cannot be guaranteed by the Congolese authorities, the United Nations must

share it and must be able to give immunity and protection to its own servants

because when we go there we go as servants of the United Nations.

Mtf/mh 61(Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

That must be assured; and President Kasavubu must be made to understand. It

is not a matter of my going there and being told that because he does not want me

to come, therefore I am running a risk. If that is the position and the United

Nations wants me to go, if it is not able to give me protection it should tell me,

and I shall tell my Government and it will send me a bodyguard to go with me. I

am going to do a job and I am not afraid of going there, but if the United Nations

has no one available, I shall certainly tell my Government to supply a bodyguard

and I shall get it. There is a job to be done and it is going to be done; that is

all. But they must be made to understand that if the United Nations has a job of

work to do, it is going to be done -- call it inspection, call it anything. You

have got troops there, you have got civilians, you have also got missionaries

there. Even if you do not go into their affaire, you have a right to go, to

inspect the establishments there and see what is happening and report back. So

call it anything you like, but that is the position as I see it.

So, nir, my point in that respect is that I think we have done right all

along in acting Judicially so that nobody could blame us for flouting the

authority of the people of the Congo, A discussion was started on the question

of sovereignty or no sovereignty. Certainly I would be the last to suggest that

the sovereignty of any State should be infringed, but surely it was the sovereign

Congolese State that invited the United Nations to come to help it to restore law

and order. Nobody will suggest that the United Nations went there arbitrarily.

Law and order have not been restored yet. If that had happened, the sovereign

State would have asked the United Nations to go and would have said; thank you

for the services you have rendered; you may now go. The fact that they have not

found themselves able to tell the United Nations to leave now shows that the Job

has not been done and, therefore, to come and tell us about infringement of

sovereignty does not hold any water at all. It is the Congolese State that asks

that its sovereignty should be limited in order to enable it to maintain law and

order because it has not been in a position to carry out that major function of

any sovereign State.In that respect there is one important thing as far as I am concerned. I can

say here that, owing to the various delays that have taken place, a lot of my own

dutiee by my Government and my delegation have been more or less dislocated, and

Mtf/mh 62(Mr, Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

I have had to make certain commitments which I find difficult to break now without

causing very serious inconvenience to people and institutions. I want to say

here that I shall be quite ready to leave here on Tuesday* I shall try to

disentangle myself from some commitments, but there are some which I cannot

break without causing great hardship; so that any fixture that should be made as

from Tuesday will find me quite ready to leave for the Congo. I think it"is only - -

right and fair that I ebould tell this Committee about that. I do not know what •

arrangements ;other, members of the Commission may have made. That will give 'me'".

ample time to clear the various conanitments which I have made on behalf of my > •

Governmenti I hope this Committee appreciates that I am Minister of Economic-

Development and my-country is only two months old as an independent country.

So, sir, after all the discussion that has taken place, I think that the •...,

position has. become -clearer and we know that if we delay any further, the situation

may get worse. We have to make sure that Lumumba is not destroyed before we get

there; otherwise, we may find that — like the old saying — we go to close .the

stable door and find that the horse is no longer there. Whatever happens, the .

United Nations and the Secretary-General and this Committee must make it clear to

President Kasavubu that we will not exonerate him from responsibility if anything

happens to Mr. Lumumba. Speaking for myself — other representatives are

entitled to their opinions -- I do not consider him now as the Prime Minister of .

the Congolese Republic, but I do consider him as a member of the Legislature and"

entitled to certain privileges. I do consider him as the leader of one of the >

political parties with a role to play in the Congo. I do consider him as a leader *

of considerable opinion in the Congolese State, and I think he could be of some

value to the people of the Congo, whether in Government or in opposition. There

are so many ways in which one can serve in society. It is not everybody who must

lead, and the sad thing about the Congo situation is that its leaders themselves

have not realized that it is their duty, first, to serve their people before they

think in terms of power politics. If they had done so, they would not have called

in the various interventions from different channels. And it is the duty of the

United Nations and our Conciliation Commission to remind them that,it is the

Congolese people and the Congolese State that should come first, before their

individual selves and whatever profits they may gain by a position of power.

MW/mh 63-65(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

I think that is why we are being sent there. Therefore, the question of the person

of Lumumba, or not the person of Lumumba, or of Kasavubu, should be out. Once we

succeed in doing that, I think we shall have done our job and the Congolese people

will thank us for it. If we fail, all the millions of dollars and pounds we are

spending will be wasted.

Therefore, Mr. Secretary-General, I feel that if I have been of any value in

telling you that I am caite prepared to leave here on Tuesday, if that would be of

any help, there remains only the additional point with regard to number. I want to

bring to your notice that when we were preparing to go, the Advisory Committee met

and decided on the quorum that would enable them to work when they got there. If

eight arrive there, they can start to work. That was the number we agreed to.

Therefore, from the suggestions that have been made, I think we shall be able to get

that number, even if some have to stay back. Eight constitutes a quorum or working

majority, according to our decision, as far as that may assist this Committee in

arriving at a number in case it becomes necessary that all will not go.

So, Mr, Secretary-General, I think that we have debated the case of the Congo

long enough. I want to know definitely whether it is the intention of this

Committee that we should go.

T

GSC/rh 66

• • - " • " (Mr* Wachuku, Nigeria)

I do not want to be left in my state of uncertainty any more, and I would have

to say categorically, if the answer is yes this time, in spite of prevarications

and in spite of all sorts of pressures that are being brought behind the scenes

to prevent this Commission from going — I do not want to tell tales, but I can

tell you clearly that certain people are interested in this Commission not going

to the Congo, and pressure is being applied behind the scenes -- we are

determined to go to the Congo to find out the position for ourselves, and I am

ready to take off here on Tuesday. So that if it is decided that we should go,

all we Want is to have a firm decision now. Whether we receive a letter yes or

no, on Tuesday I e»n quite prepared to go, once this Advisory.Committee says we.

should go.

M**» ftlTCKIE (Canada): With regard to the deplorable and shocking

leak of information from this Committee, I noted the suggestion raised by some

of my colleagues here, that a communique might be issued, perhaps prepared by' ' • ' ' . : i ..' : . ;

memberc of the Secretariat, which would, at any rate, partially satisfy the

Press. I must say that I thought myself that the representative of the

Waited Arab Republic, with his usual shrewd wisdom, expressed the realities of

the situation rather well when he said that he doubted that the Press would be

satisfied by an official communique. I must say that I b&ve never known the

Press to be satisfied by that device; but at the same time, if it is felt by

others that it could be, as it were, a sop, then I would be prepared to go.along

with that idea. < •

"I wanted, Mr. Secretary-General, just to ask for one point of clarification

with regard to the proposed departure of the Conciliation Commission* If I

follow the sense of our discussions here today correctly, I would assume that

the consensus was drifting in the direction of an early departure of the

Commission. Now, ourselves, we were rather attracted by the idea of the bureau

going out first, to be followed by the Commission later. We thought that a small

group would have flexibility, the possibility of more informal action,

especially at the very first stages, which might be rather delicate, and that

idea rather appealled to us. However, if others volunteer to go, that would be

equally acceptable.

GSC/rh

(Mr. Ritchie, Canada)

The point that I really wanted to get clarification about, however, was

this: Our tacit assumption, until today anyway, has "been that we were hoping

to get either an invitation from President Kasavubu, or, at any rate, some kind

of grudging admission that the Commission's presence would not be totally

unwelcome. This is the sort of assumption that we were going on, and the sort

of assumption which, of course, it would be much more preferable to go on. But

in view of the lack of reply so far from the President of the Congo, I am

wondering whether we are now going in the direction of taking a decision to

send the Conciliation Commission to the Congo regardless of the attitude of the

President; that i& to say, whether he does not invite the Commission, whether he

refuses to accept it, or whether he partially accepts it. In other words, that

we are going to disregard from now on, although hoping, of course, for some kind

of positive reaction from him — but if no such positive reaction comes, that

the Commission is to go anyway on a given date. Now, I am not at this moment

interested in discussing the merits of this position. I just would like, from

the point of view of my delegation, to know, as it were, where we are going in

the matter, and to clarify in my own mind as to whether that is the position in

which we find ourselves.

I would be grateful for any comment which you, Mr. Secretary-General, or

others might give to enlighten me.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I cannot speak, of course, for the members of

the Committee in general, fcfy understanding is that you are correct in feeling

that we have considered it preferable to have a reaction which would indicate at

least that they would not raise all sorts of obstacles.

To speak quite frankly, I fear that the latest development may mean that

whatever the stand of President Kasavubu is, those going will find quite

considerable obstacles raised by a certain other personality, whose name

is well-known.

For my part, I think the legal question is clear. We have a United Nations

operation there, and I think that it has really been doing what csb be considered

reasonable. For the Government to refuse this addition, this element in the

GSC/rh 68

(The Secretary"General)

United Nations presence in the Congo — they can, of course, refuse

co-operation, but, as I see it, they could not reasonably refuse entry. If

they did, it would be an act of, I would say, some quite serious hostility.

That is to say, I think we are facing a situation where we should count on our

right to come, where we have no certainty at all as regards the welcome of the

President, and where we can, I am afraid, anticipate a negative attitude from

Colonel Mobutu. How that should be reflected in our action is for the Committee

to look into. My own feeling is that there is a point in the relations to

responsible people in the Congo where firmness is the only language which is

understood.

That is my only additional observation. You may recall that this same basic

reaction was reflected strongly in Ambassador DayalTs comments on the matter,

when he deplored that no decision was taken concerning the Bureau. I may come

back later to the question of how our decision today might best be formulated

in view of this element of uncertainty and also in view of some other elements

of which ve are aware.

Mr> AIKEN (iroland): This situation in the Congo has refused to stay

stable for more than a few days over the last several months, and the situation

has altered very drastically since this Committee took the decision to set up

the Conciliation Commission and asked them to go to the Congo. I think that the

most important thing that has turned up in the last ten days is this threat to

Mr. Lumumba. I tMnk we must do everything we can to save him, I appreciate,

like other members of the Committee and every other Member of the United Nations,

what you have done from New York.

I think it is important that someone should go to the Congo from New York

to convey to everybody who is attempting to exercise authority in the Congo what

we here think of the present situation and of the threat to the future of the

Congo involved in any threat to Mr. Lumumbafs life* I agree altogether with

what the representative of Nigeria has said in that regard.

We have, however, no guarantee at this moment that the full Commission willj

be received under conditions which will give it any chance to work successfully*

nor, indeed, have we any guarantee that the smaller group, consisting of the

GSC/rh 69-70

(Mr• Aiken, Ireland)

bureau and perhaps with some additions, will be received likewise. But I think

we have the right to expect, and could anticipate, that a representative of

the Secretary-General would be received and would be treated properly by all

the Congolese authorities. Jto addition to the staff of the Secretary-General in

the Congo would not be anything very extraordinary.

RSH/cw 71

(Mr. Aiken, Ireland)

Mr* Dayal and the other officials, military and civil, who are there must

be very fully occupied in their, day-to-day work of administration and in trying

to keep things moving and to prevent the situation from getting worse, %

conclusion, therefore, is that it is important that somebody from New York

should go there representing the United Nations, representing the Secretary-

General, somebody who would have a chance of starting off the conciliation, work.'

President Kasavubu has promised that he would, at an appropriate occasion and

in the proper circumstances,..receive the full Commission. He promised world

public opinion, before he was admitted here, that he would summon a round-table

conference of all the Congolese leaders of various sorts; he did not exclude .

Mr. Lumumba. • • . ! . .

The only way that I can see-out of the difficulty in the Congo is that

such a round-table conference should meet as quickly as possible and that they

should get broad agreement on certain principles that would enable them to set

up their own governmental institutions, as referred to in the terms of reference

of the Commission, I think the only way.We can start at this moment, the only'

decision we can take tonight, i,n, view of the fact that we have not received .;

a reply from Mr. Kasavubu and.that, the;Security Council is meeting tomorrow, .

the only advice we could give you that could be operated at this moment is that

somebody should be sent by you, representing you, to inform the Congolese >: -• v

authorities how gravely we view the present situation, how appalling it would. .

be if anything happened to Mr. Lumumba and how terrible it would be if,he is

not treated while in prison with reasonably humanity. I cannot think of any

other advice to give you at this moment, pending the development of the situation.

RSH/cw 72

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French); I believe that

this will be our last statement, but I should like to state that the reply

which you, Mr. Secretary-General, vcre good enough to give to our two

questions has not convinced us; on the contrary* In the report "by Mr. Dayal,

which is dated 2 November, and the report which has just been circulated^ we

have noted very flagrant contradictions which to a certain extent may explain

the troubles which have been occurring in the Congo. We still believe that there

is no authority whatsoever with whom the United Nations can deal in the Congo

today, except an authority which is an illegal one. On page 43 of the first

report of Ambassador Dayal, it is stated:

"The College of Commissioners, drawn from inexperienced young students

and whose declared purpose was to keep the elements of the administration

running, created problems of its own in relation to the United Nations

effort." (8/4557, Page 43)

We would stress that part of the report. It went on to say:

"The young raon were invariably accompanied by numerous Belgian

advisers, occasionally drawn from among their own teachers. The inevitable

consequence was that the Commissioners were more inclined to listen to their

own mentors than to act in co-operation with the United Nations consultants,

who in many ministries, found a wall of opposition building up against them.

Indeed, instead of co-operating with the United Nations technical aid

mission, as was their proclaimed purpose, the Commissioners actually set

themselves up in opposition to it. Their inexperience, their lack of

method and order, their susceptibility to outside influences, combined

with a propensity to issue conflicting statements, introduced new elements

of delay, confusion and disorganization. As a result of these combined

factors, the chaotic administrative and economic situation reached the

verge of collapse." (ibid)

These are not the words of the delegation of Guinea. During this crisis,

we have been told, on 3 December the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General addressed an oral protest to Mr. Bomboko, President of the College of

Commissioners* Therefore, the message was not addressed to him as representative\

of the Congo but as the. leader of an organization which the United. Nations itself

condemned on 2 November. This is the first flagrant contradiction.

RSH/cw 73

"' (Mr, Cabs, Guinea)

Secondly, when we look at the document 'dated 2 November, in which it was

stated that UNOC vas faithful to the principle of law, it is stated that:"Equally committed to the principle of legality, it was not unable

to give recognition to a regime founded in fact only on military force."(Ibid, page 11)

In fact, we now have two regimes which we do not recognize* The Assembly

has taken note of this report and, in view of the aggravation of the crisis,

we have expressed, by protests which I call very timid, to the Commissionersour perturbation.

Yesterday, we stated that in order to offer national reconciliation in

the Congo in the presence of divergent opinions — the representative of Nigeriahas Just emphasized this — we must not come to reconcile the dead and the living*

It is a national reconciliation which was the objective envisaged yesterday,

and my delegation regarded with a great deal of surprise, the statement whichwould lead us to believe we were supporting one tendency. If we are stubborn,

it is because we are in favour of the re-establishment of legality*I will go further. When we say that the replies do not convince us, I would

recall that on page 9 of Mr. Dayal's report it is stated:

"On 10 Qptober, representatives of the ANC appeared at UNOC

headquarters,,, they demanded that the UNOC Guard (which had long been

stationed at the residence of Mr, Lumumba, as at those of President Kasavubu,

of the Chief of Staff, Colonel Mobutu and others) be instructed to

facilitate the arrest." (ibid)This was the first arrest, UNOC had taken a position. What position?

I would quote again from the report:

"UNOC took the position that it would not, consistent with its

neutrality, alter the standing orders of any guard in order to facilitatethe execution of a warrant which was not prima facie valid. In this

instance the action was patently wanting in due process, as there had beenno attempt at compliance with the provisions of the fundamental lawrequiring certain . parliamentary procedures to authorize the arrest of a

deputy, provisions designed to protect the State and not individuals*"Although UNOC had not the competence to interpret domestic law, neither could

it withdraw from its functions in order to facilitate, an arbitrary militaryarrest which amounted to an act of political violence," (ibid)

RSH/cv 74-75

(Mr, Caba. Guinea)

It is not the delegation of Guinea which is saying, this; it is the words

of the Special Representative which I have been quoting. Now, the situation

has become really dangerous* We have "before us the recent report and the

messages of the Secretary-General dated 3 December and 5 December,

TL/aJ 76(Mr* Caba, Guinea)

We. are now told that President Kasavubu, in whose wisdom we have confidence.,

must act through due process of law and that the Prime Minister must be dealt

with with justice, dignity and humanity. This is a flagrant contradiction. .

Sincerely, I believe that if we wish to make any progress we must get out

of these contradictions and take a clear-cut position. Which position? I know

that the Committee is of the opinion that the Commission should go to the Congo.

But the Commission is going to find itself confronted with men who have quite

different points of view opposed to theirs. And where are these men today?

Read the last report: it-is clearly stated that practically the majority of

these men are in prison. The President of the Senate is in prison — and .we

emphasized here, three weeks ago, that the Senate is the only body which can

get us out of the constitutional crisis. We must protect these men who have

been elected by the people but who are all now under lock and key. . .

The Prime Minister himself, who represents — let us recognize this -;an

important, fraction of the Congolese people, is no longer free, and still we

want the,Commission to go to the Congo, frhy do this? In order simply to record

a lot of statements one like the other and to try to convince Just one school

of opinion? That is not the Job of a conciliation commission, and a good deal of

doubt arises concerning the future of its work and concerning the actual chances

of success for its mission.

We shall sum up by saying that we still must take note of the contradictions

in which the United Nations Command in the Congo is becoming bogged down, and

we must likewise take urgent steps before the departure of this Commission to see

to it that all persons interested in the Congolese conflict, all persons who can

help us to emerge from this crisis and who enjoy parliamentary immunity — that

all such persons, without distinction, recover their freedom. And let the

Advisory Committee, through its Chairman, take an attitude of stubborn insistence

that the President bring to trial the Prime Minister in accordance with

international law; otherwise we would be contradicting our own first judgement,

which I have Just pointed out, to the effect that this arrest was illegal and

arbitrary.

TL/aJ 77(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

Having thus obtained the liberation of these elected officials of the

Parliament, ve would then be dealing with the only organ which today can act

as the genuine spokesman for the Congo: we would be permitting the two

Chambers to function freely and allowing these men elected by the people to

collaborate with the United Nations.

I am certain that if the United Nations were co-operating with the

democratically elected representatives of the people instead of dealing with

irresponsible commissioners and with the undisciplined troops of Mobutu, the

United Nations would today be the target of fewer accusations.

Thus the Commission will be able to find some area in the Congo in which

to work. So long as this area for its efforts remains unestablished, it is

certain that the Commission will return with a file of records that show but

a failure to effect reconciliation. We were told that Kasavubu was going to

prepare the ground for us and do the spade-work; but the ground will be

prepared for us vhen there remain only -the dead and the living to reconcile,

and the Commission when it arrives will find only the survivors* Then they will

deplore the death of such-and-such a person, telling us that if he were still

alive they would be able to obtain various types of information. It would

no longer be a question of reconciliation, but rather of an action which, I

repeat, would damage the very prestige of our Organization.

Tl /aj 78

The SECREIABY-GENERAL; I do not want to open a debate with the • •

Ambassador* I think it would be sterile. I would, however, ask you, ~

Mr. Ambassador,.in passing judgement on "flagrant contradictions0, to show

some good-will. For example, I will take only two cases. You do -not know the

words used by Ambassador Dayal to Mr. Bomboko, and yet you qualify the

remarks as "timid11.. You do certainly understand that ;Lf Bomboko, for the

information of the Assembly, is qualified with the official title he at present

holds, that does not mean that an oral demarche is addresed to him in'

such terms as to imply any recognition of that position. I could continue in

the same way, but I think it would be sterile.

I would, however, repeat my plea to you, so that in the heat of debate

and in your wish to find arguments you v/ill not be unfair to people'who deserve

much better.

Mr. JHA (India): We have been debating this question of when the

Commission should go to the. Congo for quite a while now at a number of meetings.

We are all aware of the difficult situation in the Congo. I do not;think-

anyone has any illusions as to the extremely difficult task this^Commission would

face in the Congo. At the same time, we are aware that what has jiappened in: •

recent weeks 'is not something which redounds to the credit of the United Nations*

The United Nations has been traduced, its personnel have been assaulted and • . -

beaten up, it has been defied in a way — and by the so-called authorities in •

the Congo — which has caused much pain, much concern, and some thinking in

several quarters as to whether the United Nations operations in the Congo are

worth continuing at all. The present position, as it seems to us, is that there

is a wave of what I might call disrespect for and defiance of the United Nations;

that the forces of order --or disorderj whatever you wish to call them — in the

Congo seem to be riding a high horse; and there is also the feeling — I will be

frank — that the United Nations Command has not been very successful in tackling

these forces and these authorities in recent weeks, and has, perhaps, not been

able to give the amount of protection that it should give to its own personnel

and perhaps to civilians.

TL/aj 79-80(Mr, Jha, India)

So that Is the rather depressing situation. I have mentioned that to

indicate that this is precisely the situation in which the United Nations has

to act -- and when I say "act" I do not mean any military action, or anything of

that sort; what I mean is some positive action, some positive, purposeful

action by the United Nations which will give a new turn to the whole situation.

Now, the idea of sending a Conciliation Commission is not a new one* Its

sanction by the resolution of the United Nations was unanimous. So far as I

know, it appeals to everybody. Nobody has spoken against the idea, nobody

has spoken against the constitution of the Conciliation Commission. I know that

some Powers -- and some of them are big Powers — have not been very enthusiastic

towards it; it may he that some of them may even have had some arriere pensles.

But the position is that this is the one opportunity for positive action that

remains to us. Many of us, most of us here, are not merely indulging, in

parliamentary talk; we have experience of administration, and we know that when

a certain stage is reached in the administration, generally, of any matter,

decisive action has to be taken. To my delegation it seems that the most

decisive action that can be taken to reassert the moral authority of the

United Nations, to show that it is purposeful and that it will not be

deflected from the course it has adopted for itself, is for the Conciliation

Commission to go to the Congo. We have no doubt that that step should be taken.

We have no illusions about the difficulty of the task. It is possible that

we may not have much success. But the effort itself will be worthwhile, and

the mere fact that at this stage the United Nations is taking purposeful, positive

action will have a very good effect all around and will bolster the morale not

only of the United Nations Organization as a whole in the Congo but of many

countries which are interested in the success of the United Nations operation

in the Congo

FGB/pm 81

(Mr. Jha, India)

So our conclusion is that the Commission should go, and it must go as

soon as possible. The representative of Nigeria thought that eight persons

should go in the first batch and the remainder in the second butch. We have no

objection to that, provided that it is definitely fixed that all the twelve of

thirteen who remain how-will go, and that these dates are fixed beforehand.

He has suggested a date for his departure which I suppose will be the departure

of the first batch* In our view that would appear to be a little late, but two

or three days1 delay does not matter. The important thing is that the

Commission should go and that everybody should know that it will be going.

We may not have a- good reception from the present authorities'in the Congo, but

we all hope that at any .rate there will be some kind of acquiescence-- grudging

acquiescence a« the representative of Canada has said -- of this Commission.

However, even if that is not. there we must go by what Mr. Kasavubu has told us

here. When he met the Advisory Committee he was not opposed to the principle

of the Commission. He regarded it as an assistance offered by the United Nations,

as an operation which fitted into the entire complex of the United Nations

operation in the Congo. We must go by'that, and if today he says., "No, they

should not come; they are bad fellows; they would do this or that", we cannot

take notice of that.

We ought to assert ourselves now because if we do not -- we" always wait

for the most1propitious circumstances and we always hesitate -- I am afraid that

we do not think that there is really scope for the continuing success of the

operations in the Congo.

The second point about this Commission would be that it is the right moment

for it to go when there is this extraordinary action being taken against

Mr. Lumumba, who was the Prime Minister: some say he is still the Prime

Minister, while some say that he is the ex-Prime Minister. But even if he is

the ex-Prime Minister, he is a very important leader in the Congo. There is no

doubt that he holds the allegiance of vast numbers of people in the Congo, and

today we have no doubt that if only the threat that is exercised by the

Arme*e Nationale Congolaise were removed or diminished there would \>e many many

people coming forward to support Mr. Lumumba. However, that is an internal matter

and we do not want to go into it, but he is a very important figure. He is not

FGB/pm 82

(Mr, Jha, India)

only a national figure but a world figure, whether one agrees with him or not,

and at this stage many ugly things are being done. We believe that the

Conciliation Commission, with the wisdom of its members, provided that it

proceeds on the right lines in a conciliatory way, can exercise tremendous

influence.

The Foreign Minister of Ireland, whose views we always hear with the

greatest attention and respect, has referred to a representative of the

Secretary-General being sent, if I heard him aright or perhaps a representative

of the Advisory Committee. To us it seems that that may have a good effect in

itself. It may serve some useful purpose, but it is no a substitute for the

positive action I have ventured to mention here. And after all, Mr.

Secretary-General, you have already your representatives there who are carrying

a very heavy burden, I believe that they are in very close touch with

President Kasavubu and others who occupy positions of de facto authority. We are

not very sure whether that, in itself, would be a substitute for the Commission's

going. We feel very strongly that the United Nations either asserts itself and

gives effect to its decisions, or decides not to send the Commission. But the

matter cannot rest there, and in that case the whole affair must be thrown into

the hands of the General Assembly which will then take stock of the entire

situation and decide what, in the circumstances,it will do, or whether it will

even continue the operation in the Congo.

I should like to conclude, therefore, by saying that I would agree with the

suggestion made that the Commission should go quic.kly. We would have no

objection to its going in two batches, but the dates should be fixed and there

should be no vacillation on that account. When we decide that we should send a

polite intimation to the authorities in the Congo about the arrival of this

Conciliation Commission and remind them of their responsibility for assuring the

security and the necessary conditions in which the Commission can work, '

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have made notes myself vhlch I may now bring

out. We have a fev unknowns in the picture* first of all, what decision, if any,

the Security Council may take touching United-Nations action regarding Mr, Lumumba!s

arrest and detention; second, the reply which we have a right to expect to the

demarche a- tto Mr« Kasavubu regarding Mr. Lumumba; and, third, the long-awaited

reaction of his on the preparation of the ground for the Conciliation Commission,

PGB/pm 33-85

(The Secretary-General)

These are all things which have a bearing on what we finally do. However,

on the other hand, I myself stressed my feeling that it is time indeed for a

political presence of another character than we have had so far in the Congo.

I want on that subject to point out that a representative of the Secretary-General

is not a political presence in the sense that he represents any major organ in the

purely political field, the Secretary-General being at most an executive

organ.

Taking all these facts into account, what I would like to do as the result

of this second long debate would be to send to President Kasavubu a message

which would cover the following points.

First of all, with reference obviously to this Advisory Committee, an

expression of disappointment that we had no reaction from him as promised.

Second,' a~n expression of the great concern of the Advisory Committee when it

sees the development of the situation In the Congo. There is no reason to be

specific: imagination can go only in one direction. Or perhaps I should'say

great concern with the situation in the Congo in its bearing oh the possibility

of national unification of the type for which Mr. Kasavubu himself has made

himself a spokesman.

With these two basic observations I should continue by saying that, in the

circumstances, the Advisory Committee confirms its decision that the Conciliation

Commission should go to the Congo, adding that it should go at an early date as

part of the United Nations operation. These words about'the United Nations '..:.:."!

operation would, serve the purpose of, so to say, including it'in the general

framework and avoid any discussion as to whether it is entitled to come or not.

It should further be said that the Advisory Committee then has taken note

of the reaction of the President to the Commission, and that the Advisory •

Committee, not knowing the state of preparation, is willing to take the risk that

such preparation may not have been concluded.

After that I should like to say that, in implementation of this stand, at

least the Chairman and such other members as can leave that day count on leaving

on Tuesday 15 December, and I would modify a little bit the formulation of the

other terms of reference so as to introduce a note of stocktaking of the situation

faclcg the United Nations in the Congo.

HR/bg 86

(The Secretary-General)

That is to say, I would combine a bit of what you, Mr. Foreign Minister (Ireland),

had in nind -oith the regular function of the Conciliation Commission. I would, of

course, odd vhat has been said here about the need to see to the security of these

people and I would try to use such phraseology as to indicate that the question of

security is not just a question of protecting you. It is also a question of

arranging matters in a way which conforms to the dignity of representatives of

the United Nations on this high level.

I would, I believe, in the same message wish to add, finally, a phrase to

the effect that we hope for an early and satisfactory reply to the demarches

regarding Mr. Lumucba.

Of course, this lays down a policy line, which in the first instance should

be brought to the attention of Mr, Kasavubu and not to the attention of anybody

else. We are bound to have a reply to it because he owes us very many replies by

now and some kind of reaction must come. In all events, I think that we would

have to meet on that reply, but for my part, the fact that the Chairman and the

Conciliation Commission and such other members as nay wish to go ahculd' leave on

Tuesday is not something which I would like to see changed by anything short of

force mftjeure, which, of course, is always a reservation we all must make.

Those would be my conclusions.

I could, instead of "Chairman and other members" say "Chairman, Vice-Chairman

and Rapporteur", adding "and other members". That is in accordance with the

Ghana line*I mark, however, that by starting out by confirmation of the decision that

the Conciliation Commission should go at an early date, I have avoided any

impression that this first group means backing down from the previous decision.

That is as good a conclusion as I have been able to draw from this discussion.

It may not satisfy all of you, but we are manoeuvring in a very difficult area

and we can never get, I think, any solution, any formula, which would give full

satisfaction to all the viewpoints expressed.

HR/bg 8?

(The Secretary-General)

I would hope that such a message could- be sent today, and it would be my

belief that it .would have its impact in a favourable direction regarding the fate

of Mr. lAimumba. .But, as always, my word is not the last word. I can draw my

conclusions, but I may stand corrected — even if you may approve of the general

attitude taken — if you feel this or that accent is wrong.

Mr. Mongi SL3M (0?unisia)(interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-

General, I find the suggestion you have Just made both useful and wise. I would

only ask whether it would not-be possible to express,;In this .urgent message, the

hope that no action or measure will be taken which could compromise any

reconciliation or action by the Conciliation Commission: -I refer to any'judgement

or hasty measure which might destroy the usefulness of trie conciliation decjide'd

upon by the General Assembly — and approved in its resolution -The hope 'should

be expressed that nothing should be done to prejudice the success of the

conciliation action. ." • ;

Mr. Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria): I think that is perhaps the'best we can

do today. We know a final date has been fixed. Ther e is a job to be done. It

has got to be:done. I hope that all the members of the Commission' can go on that

day becausie, with the situation as it is, it may be necessary on arriving at '

Leopoldville to break up the body into sub-committees in order to cover the six

provinces.. I am thinking in terms of handling the situation as qiiickly as ' '

possible. It may well be that even that number will be useful, in that there1 are

six provinces, and we can split them up into groups of four, as the case may be,

in order to gather information as quickly as possible and then devise a means of

handling the situation.

I sincerely hope that I did not give.the impression that I was suggesting

only the number eight. I only mentioned the fact that we had decided on a quorum

for the purpose of the work of the Committee. I think I was misunderstood by the

representative of India. I am happy that this body has been able to arrive at a

decision. I think it would have been a terrible loss of face on the part of the

United Nations if, after arranging for the Commission to go to the( Congo, nothing

is done. It would have been disastrous.

HR/bg 88

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

I am also happy that the Secretary-General Included a clause stating that this

is part of the operations of the United Nations. I think that President Kasavubu,

himself, when he spoke to us here, recognized this as one of the modes of assistance

that the United Nations is giving to the Congo, and once these two aspects of the

function of the Commission are understood and recognized, I think -- while not

expecting to achieve a spectacular success — at least we should be in a position

to gather valuable information for future work, if necessary. I think that in

that light we expect to arrive at some valuable conclusions.

Thef SECRETARY-GENERAL; Are there any other observations on these points?

If things work out wrong later on, you are permitted to say that I did notexecutive the decision wisely.

I want to draw your attention to one thing in the records of yesterday's

meeting, in the Engl^h version on page 7 there is a foot-note to a $3 millionassistance to the Central Bank mentioned yesterday by Sir Alexander MacFarquhar.

The foot-note reads "subsequently witheld". In the present circumstances we

did not feel that we could go ahead with this step for the time being, and you may

wish to observe that.

The other point is that if I think back on this meeting and on the question of

information to the Press, I think that anything in writing would be so meager as

to be mildly ridiculous, so if you authorize our Press people to just say simply

that the discussion of the Committee was concerned with the sending of the

Conciliation Commission and the decision will be announced in due time, I think

that is all you can say,and it is better to say it orally than to have it in

writing because those two or three lines will look a little bit amusing.

The meeting rose at 5*50 P*m*

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 18" . 9 December 1960

' * . : ; ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEON THE-CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Friday, 9 December.19^ at 9«30 a.m.

60-32029

The SECMHARY-GENERALi I believe ve should begin, in view of the

proceedings in the General Assembly and the other United Nations organs.

You have before you tvo letters from President Kasavubu, both of which

have been circulated, one of 6 December and one of 7 December, both referring

to the time-table of the Conciliation Commission.

I have no initial comments to make beyond perhaps saying that I do not

believe that they are in the nature of a force majeure in the sense I mentioned

last time, that is to say, that they are not in the nature of something that

necessitates any revision of the previous decision. However, they introduce

some new elements, especially the important one that an arrival of a large

number of members of the Committee after Tuesday would make their visit coincide

with the meeting of Chiefs of State in Brazzaville. Under such circumstances

there may be reasons to consider the modalities of the trip of the Conciliation

Commission.

I am sorry that Mr. Wachuku has not arrived yet. He is, of course, very

much a party to this whole question, but I think that we can at least begin

the discussion before his arrival, after these fev observations of mine.

RSH/rl 3 : -

(The Secretary-General1) »

• ' ' ' • •I should perhaps also tiring to your notice that in the letter of 6 December

President Kasavubu wishes to have clarification of certain points. I have n6t>

of course, taken it upon myself to give any such clarification, the matter being

under consideration by the Advisory Committee' But that is a second question,

the first question is obviously the plans of the Conciliation Commission itself.

Mr. AEEEL (Sudan): To start from the last question, which to me Seems

relatively easy to answer, about the expenses of the travels of the Commission,

is it contemplated that the United Itetions will go into these expenses?"

The SECRETAPY-GENEHALr 1 have never for a moment thought that'weshould charge the Congo Government» ' • • ,

.Mr* ADEEL (Sudan): Questions 1 and 3 are almost the same, in a sense<

. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I'thought that we should talk about th6 time-

table and the modalities of the departure of the Commission, but if the

representative of Sudan wants to have a warm up, so to say, by looking at the

questions, I would make my comments on them. As Ambassador Adeel has already

pointed out, k is no problem. No* 1 is no problem. There is an official list

of members. There are a couple of declarations by members who do not wish to

take part, which does not change the nature of the decision, but is a foot-note

to it. With regard to No* 2, all that can be said is really said in the terms

of reference* I find it very difficult to elaborate on how the Commission

should work in the country. With regard to No. 3> well, I think I will refer

that question back to Ambassador Adeel.

RSH/bg

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): That can be answered Just by looking at the list

In No. 1.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My own feeling was that there should not be

any answer to the question. It should be left unanswered, and that amounts to

the same thing; the rest would have to take care of it. But the real question

before us, I repeat, is how to proceed. If I may go one step further tentatively

in that field, as members seem hesitant, I would say that I do not -- I repeat,

I do not — see that these reactions should change the decisions of the Committee.

However, I would find it natural if we said that obviously the period after the

arrival of people sometime next week — let us say a week or ten days —

will have largely to be of a preparatory nature* It would have to be so, because

if also Mr. Kasavubu is unavailable, indeed, outside the country, I would repeat

the question raised somewhat rhetorically perhaps by a member at the Security

Council yesterday: Who are to be reconciled?

However, I believe that the impact on the situation by representatives of

this Commission may be most valuable, whoever happens to be present, and in that

way could serve as a kind of substantive preparation for the arrival of the

Commission. You can see the conclusions which seem natural to me on a tentative

basis. Of course, this is what we are going to discuss. The conclusion would be

that our previous decision remains valid, but that it is a tacit understanding

that only very few — I would revert to my first stand and say only those who are

members of the Bureau — will in fact leave on the thirteenth; the others will

arrive at an early time and the Commission should get down to formal work in

Leopoldville at the latest at about the time indicated by President Kasavubu.

As you can see, the modification would be a very slight one, and, in fact,

adjusted solely to the fact about which we are informed in his letter concerning

the Brazzaville meeting.

What I have said was said largely by way of provocation, but I do not seem

to be very successful.

RSH/bg

.^ v Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): . I really am at a loss,. Mr. Secretary-General, with

regard to the interpretation to, be. put on the sentence "in President Kasavubu's

letter of 7 December which states, "My resentment was intensified by the fact

that the Conciliation Commission has, on its own initiative, decided to send a

number of its. members to Leopoldville on 13 December".. I am not sure how serious

he was in saying that his resentment was intensified, and whether that would have

anyrconsequences with regard to our decision on the date of departure.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; How can I Judge? .On the. other hand, there is

a distinction which we can make here. The Commission is one thing. It is a

sub-subordinate organ of the United Nations,, On the other hand, resentment or no

resentment, -if somebody.goes from the United .Nations to a place where a major

United Nations operation is under way, is that ;so sensational, is that so

unnatural, Is that something that s.hould give rise, to strong feelings?

Mr. AD5EL (Sufw,n):, To me it should not, .

FGB/mtm 6

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; No, "but I did not ask you, I was trying to

interpret what may be the real value of this phrase that you quoted. I must

leave it at that.

Mr, CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): We have seen two

letters from President Kasavubu which, I believe, deserve a good deal of

attention and consideration from this Advisory Committee, The first impression

which we receive from these documents is that President Kasavubu is not in a

position as yet to meet the Conciliation Commission, despite all the efforts

which have been made with him here, through your representatives, Mr. Secretary-

General, and by some members of the Commission who stressed the importance to him

of sending this body of the United Nations which might contribute greatly to

enabling us to get out of the crisis.

If we look very closely at the letter dated 6 December we shall reach the

conclusion that, so far as President Kasavubu is concerned, he is not ready as

yet to begin talks with the Conciliation Commission, and he reverts to his

argument of three weeks ago, namely, that matters are not ready yet, because he

says that he feels that it would be inadvisable to precipitate the arrival of

the Conciliation Commission. That is the first element which we must stress, and

he strengthens his idea by stating, "... a premature arrival would, I fear,

prevent it from exercising its good offices to the best effect."

The President does intend to do the necessary ground work, but how? He says

that the work is being prepared and the Commission's itinerary being drawn up.

Therefore, in the preparation of the itinerary we must keep his suggestion in

mind. He might say, perhaps, "I am opposed to the Conciliation Commission's

going to X province", let us say, "but I would advise it to get into touch with

such and such a dignitary or such and such an elected person". Therefore, even

in the choice of the persons with whom the Commission would deal, his opinion

would count. Thus we have a new difficulty now.

Later on he points out that he will not be in Leopoldville because he

is going to the Brazzaville meeting. We Africans, who know what is going on in

Brazzaville, would merely say to the Advisory Committee that of course in

Brattavllle preparation* are being made against certain /frican countries. There

FGB/mtin 7

''• • • ' (Mr. Caba, Guinea)

is a vast plot -- with which the United Nations will become familiar -- because

this conference will be aimed against the true interests'of Africa. We have

received rumours already and we know the spirit in which this conference is being

prepared.

Therefore, these are elements of which the Advisory Committee should not take

into account. Today, as far as we are concerned, the Congo crisis is more -

important than any conference, especially an African conference which is being

held in Brazzaville as the result of suggestions made by certain colonial Powers.

But the President does not stop at that. Those were old arguments which he

just padded somewhat. Now he seems to be pretending to learn fbr the first'

time that a Conciliation Commission exists. What does he ask us? He asks us

please to tell him which are the countries participating in the Commission.

But even before President Kasavubu came here to present his representatives to the

General Assembly, the Secretary-General had informed him to the effect that a

Commission had been formed composed of fifteen members. President Kasavubu knew

that even in Leopoldville before coining to New York.

But he wants further clarification on this point.' In other words, when we

send him the list of the twelve remaining countries — because three countries,

Guinea, Mali and the United Arab Republic, have dropped out of the Commission —

the President will reply, "I am opposed to having such and such a country come

because my country has broken off diplomatic relations with that country". If one

looks at item 3 of his prior conditions, one finds that he speaks'of:

"The elimination of risks facing the Congo as a result of the strange

attitude? of representatives from countries with which the Congo has been

obliged to suspend its diplomatic relations;".

He will say, "We have broken off relations with Ghana, therefore Ghana cannot ccme,"

Honestly speaking, can we, representatives of the General Assembly in this Committee,

say, "The representative of Ghana is not going to the Congo because President

Kasavubu objects"? If we were to do that, the Committee would be taking a very

strong, position in favour of one section of the reconciled group as opposed to the

other party, . :

FGB/fitm 8

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

President Kasavubu Is not satisfied. He refers, in his item 2, to "The

nature of the work to be done by the Commission during its stay in the Congo;".

What is the nature of that work? It is to be found in the terms of reference

which we have approved — terms of reference which are known to world opinion

as a whole. It follows from operative paragraph 3 of the General Assembly

resolution which stresses the.need for the creation of this Commission. We worked

out those terms of reference over a period of two weeks. The President is very

familiar with them, and he wants us to modify them once more because their

nature does not reassure him in view of the fact that they speak of the

re-establishment of institutions and, what is more, of the action to be carried

out by the Commission within the framework of the Congolese constitution. The

present regime in the Congo does not want anything that would re-establish

legality within the framework of the constitution.

The President goes even further by pointing out that he wishes to be

reassured concerning the behaviour of the members of the Commission. When he speaks

of the "attitude" of the representatives of certain countries one should read

"behaviour11. In other words, will the representatives who go there be true to

him? Will they not create difficulties for him?

It is clear that we must conclude in analysing this letter that President

Kasavubu does not wish the Conciliation Commission to leave. [There are always

events taking place in Africa, After Brazzaville there will be something else.

The President will tell us, "There is to be such and such an event — do not

come".

President Kasavubu wants to gain more time for himself. He wants to get

spokesmen who, throughout the itinerary of the Commission, will reaffirm their

complete support for the present regime. Those are the conditions which he has not

yet succeeded in obtaining.

At another point in his letter of 6 December President Kaeavubu says himself:MMr, Lumumba1s arrest will now enable the country to concentrate on the task of

reconstruction," He is satisfied by the arrest of Mr. Lumumba, who was the

chief obstacle, but he is not yet completely satisfied. There are in certain

provinces some elected-persons who might say to the Commission, "We do not like

the Mobutu regime or the dictatorship of Kasavubu".

FGB/mtm 9-10

(Mr. Caba. Guinea)

Therefore, as long as there are discordant notes in the Congo the President

will not say that the Commision should leave New York. That is clear. Let us

admit it. And in truth we fail to see how a member of this Committee can conclude

that President Kasavubu's letter does .not constitute a negative reply. It is

negative, and because of that we must decide:

Are wo going to the. Congo to help out Mr. Kasavubu - yes or no?

Are we going to the Congo to re-establish legality - yes or no?

If we reply to tLose very simple questions we can decide that the Commission ehould

leave as a whole. But we cannot send just three merrfoers. As we have already

said, that .would_be a step backwards for the Organization.

That is why we renew our judgement concerning the nature of the work which we

have been;carrying out for the past four weeks. We are unyielding on this point

because we feel that any hesitation on our part will hurt our Organization. It is

because .we have hesitated, end. because we believed that Mr. Kasavubu could

honestly; re-establish lawfulnes.Svin the Congo, that we have lost time. Any

intermediary solution which ;tqok into account these elements of hesitation, these

negative elements contained in the letter of 6 December, would be a serious setback,

harmful to; our Organization,

Those, .are. the. observations which I felt it necessary to make on these documents*

11

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Mr. Secretary-General, you said a while ago

that you were trying to provoke people to talk* Now, whenever you prod something,

it must have eome life about it. It appears to me that with the diecushions that

are going on in the Security Council, it involves the whole future of the United

Nations, especially in view of the communications you have made.

There is here one reality about this whole business. My delegation feels

that we have decided to send the delegation — or party, or whatever it is — and

they should go. But,of course,whoever they are, I hope they will not suffer

the same treatment that some of our people have suffered. But over and above

that, I do not think that the increase of difficulties, of complexities and

conflicts, is a reason for not sending the Conciliation Coiradosion. If anything,

the nsed becomes even greater.

Therefore, since you more or less made a decision, or a suggestion, last

time about sending a small group with the purpose not of liquidation of the

Commission but rather of clearing the way for it, this is your wisdom. After all,

this is an advisory committee; the responsibility is purely yours, and if in your

opinion that will clear the way, then we think it should be done.

That is our position today. Last time when we met we were not sure that

this group of three was a representative group, and to a certain extent it would

commit the Committee to a particular way of thinking through being expressed this

way. But things move on, with the result that anybody can go there. It may well

be that they do not do anything, and that next time we may well say that rather

than have the Commission go, let the Secretary-General himself go. Things move

on that way.

My country regrets that there was delay in sending this Commission. It

requested at that time that it ought to go when it made the proposal, on Monday;

that it should meet at Leopoldville on Wednesday. That is why — it is easy to

be wise after the event — I think that if it had been possible to do this,

some of the developments at a later period could have been avoided.

Therefore, if you can get the Committee's agreement to deal with the item

pretty quickly, instead of going through further discussion such as this — I

think it is quite correct from the procedural point of view, but is it not

TL/bg 12

'••-'•• - .." . . :.. (Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

simply turning our wheels in the air? ,.— that would be possibly the best thing

to do. The Committee in its collective wisdom decided to send tbrsse threes

gentlemen, and they are willing to go, EO that a complete .deadlock should not be

created — and that, I think, is in the spirit of the United Nations as such.

But terms of reference or no terms of reference, I think -.- and I hope everyone

will agree -- that one of the main things we have to find out is what the future

of the United Nations .is 4n this place; what we can do, what ws should not do there,

and so .on... ;Tfce.'fact that we have gone, there is by itself an argument for being

there —.maybe a: condition in its favour. Therefore, if we could dispose of this

matter;.-» I see that the representative of Nigeria has now come — if we could

dispooe-ofthis matter as betwesn,those, three gentlemen and yourself, then we

-.. could proceed to the consideration pf other matters which ars extremely important.

.-•-.- .1 have a succession of telegrams from my Government that ws .shall take care

.of speaking in.the Security Council, not to aggravate the situation. On the other

hand,: einc.e pur people are very much concerned and since our own nationals are

involved in.representation,of the United Nations, in, the Congo, it is difficult to

remain silent-. So my humble suggestion, Mr. Secretary-General, is ths.t you put

it to. the Committee that, since the situation is moving in a dynamic way, one of

the mpst practical ways, of dealing with this, one of the most practical principles

or ideas, is .that some sort of preliminary body should go — you need not call it

the Conciliation Conmicsion if you do not want to — and that the .mcde.litles of it

may be worked out between the Secretary-General and these three gentlemen.

After all, .if this suggestion is accepted it means that we accept the

discretion and leadership of the Chairman of this Committee. £o, if the four of

them could;discuss it and-then, as a result thereof, submit some report to the

, Advisory Committee, that appears to me to be a good idea. Otherwise it appears

to me that we would simply be following an escapist path by reading Mr. Kasavubu's

letters and finding out if his commas and full stops are in the right places, and

discussing what the letters mean.

TL/rl 13(Mr. Krishna Menon, India)

Partly because of the size of the Committee, partly because of the

procedures of the United Nations, we have never been able to deal with these

matters in a workmanlike manner. This is my humble suggestion.

The SECPETApy-GENERAL; I should perhaps bring the representative of

Nigeria, who arrived a few moments ago, up to date.

Before you came, sir, we had a very short discussion. I pointed out these

two letters and what they meant, They were brought in as new material, without

my going into an analysis of the situation or into any analysis of what

Mr. Kasavubufs attitude or reactions might be back of the letters. I said that

I did not feel that they should call for a revision of the previous stand of

this Committee, but that they might influence the modalities, and that tentatively

I would feel that, as it is very doubtful what contacts can be made sometime next

week, after the departure from here, there is reason, perhaps, to consider again

the idea that only the Bureau should go at this stage — and mind you, not with

any change of the decision that the Commission should go, but as a kind of

forerunner and with an open end which I should like to formulate in this way:

We confirm that the Bureau is going — previously I said the Bureau and

cuch other members as can leave. We confirm that the Bureau is leaving on

Tuesday. We say that those who are not going in the Bureau will come at their

early convenience. In other words, we maintain the general stand, but in fact

and in practice we cut it down to you, Mr. Chairman, going with your two

colleagues, those who hold positions or office in the Commission.

I will not try to sum up what our friend from Guinea said about that. If

I understand him correctly, I can sum up what Mr. Krishna Menon said very briefly:

that in the circumstances he would not object to this as a practical solution, but

he might feel that this is a matter that should be discussed with the three of

you.

TL/bg

Mr* ICrlshna MENON (India): This need not be as representative as a

military commission. It would be a preparatory body, so that if in the future

circumstances such a Commission does not go, the United Nations can at least

save its face. After all, they are going to explore the situation; they are

leading gentlemen of the Commission and they are going under your authority, and

whether you call it a bureau or otherwise makes no difference. That way you

could take the attitude that still more people were coming,and that they were

stopped from coming. That you might think over* I do not want to debate it.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think it is"not difficult to find a formula

in that respect, nor is there any need to comment on the decision already

communicated to Mr. Kasavubu. That is to say, we should be able to regard this

as.a purely practical matter, and we could probably break it down to terms even

of names, without revising anything that has been said before.

I have sent for the previous communication — I should have brought it in

earlier — from me to. Mr. Kasavubu, You should have heard it, in order to see

how the line of Mr. Krishna Menon would fit into the previous communication.

I think it does.

But I believe we all would be very much interested in hearing the representativ-

of Nigeria, who is rather close to the firing-line on this story, whatever formula

is used.

Mr. Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria) t Sir, may I have the opportunity to look at

this first? I did not receive notice of this meeting until long after the meeting

started.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Oh, I am sorry. . -.

Mr. Jaja VACHUKU (Nigeria): The notice was sent to the office, I

understand, after midnight, when nobody was there. i

HG/cw 16

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): While our friend

from Nigeria is reading the two letters from President Kasavubu, I should like

to ask a question.

I do not know whether the Press reports and radio reports are correct,

but it would seem that Mobutu's troops have been trying to neutralize some of

the United Nations soldiers in the Congo, Is this true or not?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I have no information at all to that effect.

However, on the other hand, the people, as I mentioned yesterday, in

Stanleyville -- those who act for and even in the name of Mr. Lumumba — have

issued an ultimatum to us -- first, forty-eight hours; perhaps later on, reduced,

according to certain information — according to which they would take all

Europeans as hostages.

This is what I had in mind when I inentioned last night in the Security

Council the need for a report. Such a report will come. If I mention it now

in this way, it is because it is on the tickers, it is in the news. And that

piece of news I can confirm although the report will come somewhat later.

Neither in this context nor in any other context have I heard anything

about the fact that United Nations troops have been neutralized. However,

the people in Stanleyville have warned us not to try to resist their moves.

This matter should come up, in due course, in the Security Council, because

it will be reported there before the debate.

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I am not quite clear as to what you said

with regard to the news involving the taking of hostages* If I understood you

correctly, you suggested that the time has come for United Nations troops to

intervene in order to protect these people. That is what I understood you to

say.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The Provincial Government in Orientale• - • • • - • • • • - " \Province has threatened, on a forty-eight hour basis, to take what may be some

one thousand Europeans as hostages, obviously in order to exert pressure on

the people in Leopoldville•

HG/cw 17

(The Secretary-General)

In that context we have, as a matter of course, had to say that they

will be protected as any resident is protected against arbitrary acts of

violence. There, in that context, the provincial authorities:have said that

they would warn us against any attempt to resist such acts. That is,,in short,

the story. We will have, as a matter of course, to assert pur duties in the

maintenance and the protection of life and property. . . .. . • ..: .-•

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): The point . I was trying to get clear in• . >. *.-. -.- . .•-

my own mind was this: whether disorder prevails in Stanleyville or in any other

part of the Congo, so that it will be the responsibility of the Congo Government -

that is to say, they have a responsibility for maintaining law and order in

the whole area, which certainly has.not been thwarted by a lack of co-operation

on the part of the United Nations -- will we put ourselves ip a worse position

by agreeing to operate in one place and not in another? • . •

Of course, ;your answer would depend on the quantity of.trouble; and that

is a very serious matter. It leads to the whole .question of how to implement

this function of law and order. Otherwise, what would happen is that the United

Nations troops — if this is true and is jiot a .b3.uf f — would- act in. one part

of the country against one political .section which has threatened cruel actions

that cannot be tolerated. At the .same time, ;in other, areas, it will no longer

be a question of threats, Mr. Haromarskjpld,.because these things have been

done. . . . -• ' ' • ' • ; » . ' ' •' ' '

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: They have been done in.Stanleyville, too,

as you know. . .

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Yes, I know. ; I am not one of those

persons who says that cruelty is different ..when .it is perpetrated by-one person

as against another person. I am saying that the w.hole question of intervention

must be taken as a whole. I am not saying this should not be done1. What I am'••"-, : * • ' > . . • . ' • • • ' . • • • •

saying is that, on the other hand, the Congolese army is terrorizing everybody

everywhere, and there we are obliged tp believe w« cannot interfere.. Naturally,

in the other places the quantity is greater, and the,threats are greater• We

must do something. I am not, for a moment, saying that it is an excusable action.

HG/cw 18

(Mr» Krishna Menon. India)

My Government is not concerned with Mr. Lumumba or anybody else. We are

not interested in these personalities. But the time has come probably to get

from the Security Council a definite ruling as to what should be done in this

matter.

Suppose this leads to large-scale hostilities and the engagement of

peoples, whether we are able to meet that position or not. When you come up

against that situation, Mr, Secretary-General, it will not be easy to run an

operation of that character through the methods of committees, the way we are now

operating, I submit that that is the problem,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I do not think,as you certainly agree, that

this is the place or the time to go deeply into the matter. It is a very

difficult matter. But even with the most modest interpretation of law and

order, I think that we have to protect people who have absolutely nothing to do

with the political happenings in Leopoldville against people who have absolutely

no authority whatsoever, under any construction of law or constitution, to take

them as hostages, etc.

I would, without going deeply into the matter now, say that if the

interpretation of the situation should be one where such actions cannot be

resisted, as they have been resisted, for example, in the case of the

charge dTaffaires of Ghana, by the United Nations,then we should leave.

However, to turn to the cable, the communication to Mr* Kasavubu, which

is the one of direct significance for our consideration here, I may read the

text as it was cabled:

"The Advisory Committee on the United Nations operation in the

Congo met today for the second time after the expiration of the time

within which you had promised to give it your opinion on the stage of

preparation reached in the Congo for the work of the Conciliation Commission

It was noted with regret and disappointment that no communication hadj

as yet been received from you. In view of the increasing seriousness of

the situation and the grave concern felt, especially because of the latest

development, the Committee found that it could no longer delay its decision

on the departure of thfi Conciliation Commission.

HG/cw 19-20

(The Secretary-General)

"in the circumstances the Advisory Committee confirmed its decision,

as already communicated to you, that, in implementation of General

Assembly resolution of 20 September I960, operative paragraph 3, the

Conciliation Committee should proceed to the Congo. In confirming its

decision the Committee reiterated that, as noted by yourself, the

Conciliation Commission should be regarded as part of the United Nations

assistance progrtunme in the Congo which was organized at the request of the

Congo Government. The Committee recalled the reactions you expressed to

it regarding the possible usefulness of the Committen and your further,

observation ths* its usefulness would depend on the degree of preparation!

Deciding on the departure of the Commission without having received your

comments on the degree of preparation, the Committee noted that it took the

risk that the Commission might arrive when the preparations were not yet

concluded.

GSC/mh 21

(The Secretary-General)

wlt was decided that at least the Chairman, the two other presiding

officers and such other members of the Commission as could leave that day

should count on departing Tuesday 13 December on the mission assigned to

the Commission and that, pending the arrival of the other members who should

go as early as possible, they should take stock of the situation facing the

United Nations in the Congo in preparation of the work of the Commission.

"The Committee expressed the expectation that all necessary arrangements

regarding security and similar matters would be taken care of in the way

indicated by the position and responsibilities of the members of the

Commission.

"It was the firm hope of the members of the Advisory Committee that no

action would be taken that could reduce the chances of reconciliation and of

creation of such national unity as you yourself have declared to be your aim,

"The Committee had taken note of my two messages to you regarding the

arrest and detention of Mr. Lumumba. They hoped that these messages would

receive an early and satisfactory reply in view of the importance of the

matter in various respects of concern to the United Nations."

That was the message.

If we were to follow up the line of thinking which I understand you,

Mr. Krishna Menon, to express here, it would be that in reply to his later

communication, we would just say that the representatives of Nigeria, Ethiopia

and Malaya count on departing on Tuesday, without any further comment.

Mr* JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I think things have come to such a head now

that something must be done. I think I should leave on Tuesday with the

Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, whatever happens, and President Kasavubu should

be informed that we are coming.

In spite of the report which we received, about preventing the United Nations

from doing its work by this transport monopoly and the rest of it, I sincerely

hope that the President will be made to understand that that type of measure

cannot be conducive to the best interests of the Congo Republic itself•

GSC/mh 22

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

In regard to what is happening in Stanleyville now and the threatened holding

of about 1,000 Europeans as hostages, and the action that is proposed to be taken

by the United Nations, I suppose on humanitarian grounds — because I do not think

that it is based on serious constitutional or legal principles -- while I commend

that, I have my misgivings. We are told that the United Nations cannot interfere

in the internal affairs of the Congo.

Then the question arises: These peoples who are protesting against the

Kasavubu-Mobutu forces, do they represent the provincial Government of

Stanleyville? I think that is one aspect here. We know that the various provincial

Governments are intar.-b; so far, they have not collapsed. Are they spurious forces

or forces of the provincial Governments? The provincial Governments are set up

by the Constitution, and they may have certain powers within their competence.

Will we be accused of interfering in the internal affairs? These questions must

be examined very carefully.

I am raising this point purely for our own interests and discussion, because

I feel that the time has come when the Advisory Committee and the United Nations. • • • • ' • . • • ' . . ' ' < ' ' • : . . ' ' : • - . "will have to decide whether we are going to uphold a constitution that is in being,

or allow Bpacnodie actions this way and that way and leave the substance of the

purpose cf the United Nations in the Congo.

In my own opinion, I think sooner or later it may be necessary.for the

Committee to advise the Secretary-General to have a definite definition on what

we mean by maintenance of law and order in the Congo. I do not see how we can

maintain law and order in the Congo without upholding the Constitution as it exists.

It matters not how defective it may be. That can only be one of the bases on which

we can operate in the Congo.

Otherwise, we start from Leopoldville, somebody sets up his own regime, and

then the United Nations will be fighting against that trying to preserve its own

life and existence; and then the next one is that another one sets up another one

in Kasaij another one in Stanleyville) another one in Katanga, and you have a

multiplicity of forces to face the United Nations. The net result would be that

the United Nations would be ineffective and it would be a failure.'

GSC/mh 23-25

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

I personally feel that, since we are going to the Congo, it is necessary for

a major decision of this nature to be taken, and that the authorities should be made

to understand the basis on which the United Nations will operate in the Congo ..

not in the midst of anarchy. There is a constitution in being, and as long as that

Constitution has not been abrogated and has not been amended -- and it was the

Constitution under which the United Nations was invited into the Congo -- that

Constitution must be maintained. Once it is upheld, then anybody who acts outside

it cannot be said to be either constitutional or legal. I am saying this because

this business of some people taking decisions that sometimes interferes with the

work of the United Nations is not— one does not like to take up newspapers

every morning and read on this type of thing. It shows a certain fundamental

weakness somewhere, and the sooner that is corrected, I think, the better.

I am driven to this trend of thought because of the various withdrawals* We

hear that Ceylon is withdrawing, the United Arab Republic is withdrawing; other

nations are going to withdraw. What will happen if the others decide to withdraw?

That would be very disastrous to the whole thing. All the nations that have

agreed to send troops must be encouraged in their efforts to assist the Congo to

rediscover itself. If the people in the Congo do not like that, then they will

tell the United Nations in no uncertain terms that they do not want it. But we

cannot be wavering here and there, not knowing exactly where we are going.

That is why I feel this morning that I should make this position clear, that

if we do not want to set up a dictatorship — as I said before, do not want to

recognize bodies that can just spring up every morning -- then we must have one

basic principle on which to operate in the Congo, What I suggest is that the

safest point to start is to uphold the Constitution that is in being.

That leads us to a point which we have raised here "before. If we believe

in constitutional government and a democratic institution, then the question of

the re-assembly of the Parliament of the Congolese nation becomes paramount,

whether we like it or not*

HR/cn 26

(Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Nigeria)

President Kasavubu has to decide whether he is a President of an organized

State or President of an anarchy, and the United Nations cannot support a .state

of anarchy because then there is nothing to support at all.

He suspended Parliament, which vas within his rights, but he only has the

right to suspend Parliament for one month* A month has come and gone. If he

is the constitutional Chief of State he must be bound by the.constitution that

put him into power. If he disregards the constitution, then he. disregards .--- -

in fact, automatically nullifies his own existence. He cannot Justify his own

existence,

I think that tho United Nations, sbpuld point this out ~io hici very bluntly,

that he has been recognized here as a Head of, State, he recommended people to

be seated on the basis of the constitution and the Justification of the dismissal

of the Prime Minister is based on the constitution. He cannot in one respect

act in accordance with the constitution and in another respect disregard the same

constitution. That is a contradiction. , .. . . • ,.

I thitk the time has now come when the United Nations has to make up its

mind where it stands in relation to thpse in authority in the Congo, because we\ •• •

are going there; we must have certain guiding principles, , - '

As far as I am concerned, I think it is agreed in this Advisory Committee

that the basis of our action must be within the ambit of the Charter itself.

Then, naturally, we must walk very carefully and. warily, taking into.consideration

that we must not do anything that is likely to be interpreted as interference with

the legitimate actions of the constituted authority in the Congo. 7

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I believe that several of us have to attend

the General Assembly, but we have before us a concrete question which we have

to decide upon. The other problem, raised now by Mr. Jeja Wachuku, is •

most important. I understand that Mr. Krishna Menon also has one, much broader

in nature; but theref of course, the Security Council debate takes precedence.

Also, OB. the issue thect I happened to r^ise, a report will be before the Security. \

Council, so I think that in good conscience we can concentrate on the Immediateissue. .

HR/cn 2?

(The Secretary-General)

I understand that you, Mr. Minister, and the representatives of Malaya and

Ethiopia, will stick to your plan and leave on Tuesday?

Mr. Jaja WACHUKU (Nigeria): Yes,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That would rhyme with the approach of

Jtr% Krishna Menon and it would also rhyme with my thoughts.

Mr. SOPIEE (Federation of Malaya): Mr« Secretary-Goneral, the

representative of Malays has held himself ready to leave as decided, and we are

glad that a decision has now been firmly taken and that- this shall happen. But

I would like to know, would any decision of the Security Council further delay

the departure of this group?

Ofre SECRETARY-GENERAL; In my view, no. It is an independent group

and if we do not formally tie it up with the Commission or with any other

operations, it is perfectly in order that these three gentlemen, under the

United Nations flag, go to Leopoldville, and I do not see anything but useful

results coming out of it, whatever happens in the Security Council.

Mr. ALEKAYEHOU (Ethiopia) : I should say on behalf of my delegation

that the representative of Ethiopia on the Commission, who is the Rapporteur

of that ConsniBsion, is ready to leave, as has been decided here. But, as I

said at one of our earlier meetings here, we would have liked other members of

the Commission to go along with the officers of the Conciliation Commission

because I believe that if the others were to go along with the Chairman,

Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur it would have been possible, perhaps, to start work

immediately, I take it, though, that the departure of the officers alone will

not be limited to a gesture, and that they will start work immediately, as soon

as they have arrived there. In this connexion, I would like to say "that in my

view the President of the Congo, Mr. Kasavubu, should be advised specifically that

nothing should be done there which could perhaps compromise the work of the

HR/cn 28

•,••-• ,..•- .':• (Mr. Alemayehou, Ethiopia)

Conciliation Commission. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that as a

result of the developments in Stanleyville, the Kasavubu Government -- the

Government of the Congo -- would contemplate certain measures against Stanleyville,

That would necessarily hamper the work of the Commission. Therefore, if some

communications were sent to the President in that regard, that 'would probably

facilitate'the work of the Commission, This is the only suggestion that t make.

At the:same time I would also say that there seems to be an argument that

these of ficers should go first on Tuesday. While we would be agreeable, as I

said, it seems to me very important that a message should be sent to him that

noting should be done on his part which would complicate the work of the

Conciliation Commission. By 'that I mean' that he should be prevented from taking

certain action in Stanleyville or elsewhere which would place certain difficulties

in front of the work of the Commission.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; In fact, you may remember that I made exactly

that appeal in my last communication, but there is every reason in the world to

repeat it, and perhaps in sharpened form.

Mr. BENABOUP (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I have two or

three questions to ask. This Advisory Committee is going to send three officers

of the Conciliation Commission. Are the other members of the Conciliation

Commission, who are being sent by their Governments and who are present in

New York, going to wait indefinitely, or should they return home and proceed from

their own capitals, if it is decided that the Conciliation Commission is accepted

by Mr. Kasavubu or by any unilateral decision?

The second question is this: With the departure of the Conciliation

Commission, or with the departure of this reduced group of three, there arises

the problem of the atmosphere in which they will work. The work of this small

group -- this should perhaps be indicated, and it has in fact been indicated

indirectly by the representative of Ethiopia and the representative of Nigeria --

may be assisted by the constitutional authorities there so that they will not

be at the mercy of this or that group or person; or in the absence of such

constitutional authorities, What mandate are we to give to this group of three?

HR/cn 29-30

Morocco)

Or, If the Conciliation Commission itself goes, what mandate is to be given to

the Commission?

The constitutional atmosphere is of great Importance, We have drawn the

attention of the Secretary-General to this point on several occasions. We know,

of course, that his task is rather difficult, but we have clearly said that we

must go back to the Security Council so that the Secretary-General himself can

ask for a mandate giving him rather more extensive powers so that confusion may

be avoided. Th« confusion I speak of would arise if he were accused of

interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo. There are accusations that he

ifi doing nothing and accusations of inertia. There are these two accusations

PJ.I* there are other accusations against the Secretary -General; for instance,

that he is pursuing a policy of inertia.

BC/pm jl

(Mr, Benaboud, Morocco)

All this Is because the Security Conncil has not given him a precise and

clear mandate enabling him to act energetically within a constitutional and

legal framework.

I have put that last question so that the work of the group shall not be

useless. We have other questions to putf but because of the lateness of the hour

I should prefer to limit myself now to requesting an answer to those two questions.

The SECRECY-GENERAL; With regard to the question of'waiting, ' I think

that it would be reasonable to wait at least for the first reactions of those who

will go. For my part, I would not say that we should be tied to the 20th or the

26th, or any other date. But I have in no way given up the idea of the

Conciliation Commission visit as an essential element at the right stage.

In reply to the practical question, I believe that we shou.ld give our

colleagues a chance to see for themselves and to make their own comments on what'

makes sense.

As regards the mandate, I find myself on more difficult ground. I understand

that the representative of Morocco makes a distinction between the mandate for the

group and the mandate for the Commission. With respect to the mandate for the

Commission, I do not see any reason for any change. The mandate is derived from a

decision of the General Assembly; I do not think that it can be changed. It has

been carefully drafted and made known; there is no reason to revise it. As to the

group, I think that we on the inside regard its initiatives and activities as

circumscribed by the mandate of the Commission. On the other hand, we -- and I

take it that this is the view also of Mr. Krishna Menon and some other

representatives who have spoken -- do not regard the group as a forerunner of the

Commission in the sense that it can act instead of or for the Commission. It is

not the Commission.

One may then ask: what is the positive element in it? I said that the group's

initiatives and activities were circumscribed by the mandate of the 'Commission.

Now, the positive element is that, as things are going, the United Nations must

be more heavily felt in Leopoldville. I think that that is obvious. It will be

a very good thing to add the voices of these three gentlemen, speaking the right

kind of language to the right persons. That is certainly not out of order. It

could have been done without any decision by the General Assembly at all.

J

BC/pm 32

(The Secretary-General)

Perhaps I might add a human accent, which I think the Committee will fully

appreciate. I think that it would be only fair to Mr. Dayal, who now carries

the political responsibility very much alone, for him to have people with wide

experience and the right kind of judgement regarding this situation with whom

to consult. That does not unburden him of his responsibilities or me of my

responsibilities. But, just as it is very valuable to have this opportunity in

this Committee of exchanging views, I think that it would be very valuable for him

there to be able to consult the group.

Thus, without formalizing such a mandate, I have with those words tried to

indicate what I regard as the immediate positive value of the group's going. I

should be happy to see them go on trust.

Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French):I shall have a third

question to put on that last point.

We have drawn the Secretary-General's attention to the question of the

deterioration of the situation. Now, I do not think that he can accuse us of

being extreme in our language — the situation is really deteriorating. For our

part, we attach great importance to legality, and we have asked the

Secretary-General to seek powers which will enable him to act firmly. We have

considered the United Nations generally, and this Committee particularly, as a

human being which develops as it grows. Instead we have been faced with the

paradoxical situation that the United Nations is a human being which is

developing as it shrinks, becomes sickly and dies. Why? Because there are political

elements behind the question; there are people who wish to see the Government

eliminated, and, on the other hand, there are people who wish to see the

strengthening and maintenance of what the world recognizes as a side which is more

or less flaccid.

We are afraid that this deterioration and rotting will not be confined to the

Congo, but will spread throughout Africa, thus endangering the whole life of that

continent. If there are foreign Powers who engage in intrigues and mock at

constitutionality to serve their own political purposes, we are in danger because

we are living on the same continent. We see that a screen has been set up for

the satisfaction of these foreign Powers. This screen itself mocks at

EC/pm 33(Mr, Becoboud, Morocco)

constitutionality. Our work here as an international organ consist precisely of

guaranteeing law in order to preserve stability on a continent.

We have been very glad to hear the remarks of quite a number of

representatives here present,and particularly those of the the representative of

Nigeria, who is following the path of morality, law and constitutionality, rjhat

is somewhat reassuring, but if this line is not supported here, in, the United

Nations, we are afraid that even the work of the three representatives who will

go the Leopoldville will be sterile and that in the end the time will have been

ccujvletely lost.

The United Nations cannot avoid contradictions if such contradictions

exist either in the Security Council or in this Committee. We are allowed to use

the troops for one purpose but not for another, particularly when we are concerned

with Katanga or some other places. We must now know whether the

Secretary-General is going to profit from the feat that the Security Council is

meeting to ask for the kind of mandate that will no longer tie his hands with

political intrigues.

In our opinion, legality consists not of defending Kasavubu or Lumumba but,

as we have al'toya maintained, of restoring a normal situation. Now, a normal

situation In the Congo depends upon a nornal situation in the United Nations

itself. We do not want the normalization of the situation that we are seeking in

the Congo itself to be lacking within the United Nations. We may decide to

speak in the Security Council, but for the moment we prefer to limit ourselves

to an intervention in this Committee. We think that our work should be conducted

in a certain direction and that the Secretary-General should assure us that he

would like to follow a much firmer line and that, if there are political currents

outside this Ccnrnittee which are somewhat confused and complicated, that will not

have more influence than the United Nations ec a whole.

That is why we have put our second question. The third question is as follows.

Where do we want to go? For the moment we are feeling our way in the fog. Where

do we want to go? That is my third question.

In other words, Mr. Secretary-General, are you going to ask for a mandate to

act somewhat more firmly so that constitutionality and legality can be restored?

Or are we going to continue feeling our way left and right to suit the wishes of

anyone and everyone in the Congo? -

BC/pm 3 -35

(Mr, Benaboudj Morocco)

If we are going to do the latter, we shall give an excuse to those vho

have withdrawn their troops frcm the Congo, and we shall not be able to guarantee

that the rot will not spread to all the neighbouring territories end, perhaps,

to the entire African continent.

If, however, the Secretary-General replies affirmatively regarding a return

to constitutionality — that is, if he says that he will request somewhat

wider powers — the situation will be more reassuring and even ths little group

which is to leave for the Congo will know that it can begin its work on a firm,

basis.

That, then, is my last question.

AP/rh, 36

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think It is impossible to open a discussion ,

on this very vide and very complicated issue. All I can say is that whatever I

would propose, the Security Council cannot go outside the framework of the Charter,

And if you would give the problem you raised some closer study, in the terms of

the Charter, I think that you will see it is not easy to define the mandate,with

the aim which you'have in mind* But, as I said, this, I do not believe> is. the

right moment to discuss it# There will be occasions also in the Security,Council.

I have given the matter very much thought and I would be quite happy to have some

occasion to debate it with you. There is no difference a~ to what we want to see

happen and want to see accomplished; but there is a question o£ the means and the

legality'of our means. .,. ... , ,, , • ,

There'is one thing we must be wary of, and that is the belief that-the United

Nations can decide everything and arrange everything. We have,, indeed, been . •

given Very limited authority in the Charter itself. .. ... •

Mr. KRISHNA MEUON (India): I do not want to £O into this question,

but I wanted to ask: These three gentlemen will presumably go under the cover

of the United Nations flag?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Yes. ' ' ' . ' . " . • ,

Mr. KRISHNA MENON (India): Because while now Nigeria goes there -* and

his country is accredited to whatever government is there .-• one never knows

what happens when he gets there; and therefore they will be United Nations

personnel.

The SECRETARY GENERAL: They would have all the protection of the top .

United Nations representatives outside the Secretariat — delegates, so to say.

So the status would be quite clear in relation to President Kasavubu.

AP/rh 37

Mr. Krishna MENQH (India): This is a serious matter because things

may change by the time they arrive there.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: No, I will phrase it in such a way that there

can be no hesitation on that score. And I do not think that complicates the

matter, because the very moment they are introduced in this way, with the

background of the previous decisions, of the previous exchanges, there should

not be any ambiguity.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I have two small questions, Mr. Secretary-General.

One is a comment that when our small Commission, comprising the Chairman,

Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur, arrive at Leopoldville, I endorse the view which

has been expressed — I forget by whom — that they should start working as if

they were the whole Commission. I do not think that they should waste time.The Chairman is an eminent Minister; hs has a very great position; he has

our confidence. I think there would be no harm if he and his other colleagues

were to start work as if they were the whole Commission. This is just to save

time, :

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think we are entering into dangerous ground

because then we are in fact changing the Commission from the full number to

three. I think the matter can be left entirely open; as I said, I would leave it

happily on trust. I would insist on the form though that they are not acting

for the Commission, on behalf of the Commission or instead of the Commission.

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): The other question is about this trouble in

Stanleyville. If I recall, there was great insistence in this very Committee at

times when some other people objected, but there was great insistence that the

United Nations intervene to save the lives and liberty of various people. But

today, if I understood correctly, I heard some objection to your intervention in

Stanleyville on behalf of those people whose liberty and freedom was being

threatened. -1

AP/rh 38

(Mr* .Hasan; Pakistan)

I was going to say.that I hope there is no objection, because I remember

on previous ocqasions we, all of us, as a group, as a Commission and as a

Committee, said on humanitarian grounds and on other grounds that the

United Nations should intervene to protect people's lives etc. Therefore, what

was done in Leopoldville, I think, should also be done in Stanleyville: to

protect people. That is very simple. I dp not think it should arouse any

controversy.

The. SECRETARY-GENERAL: I do not think we need to go into the matter

because if protection of life and property does not mean even protecting life

and property, then I dp not know English. So I think my reply is unhesitatingly

"Yes" to your question.

Mrs CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): When Just nov

I analyzed the contents of the letter of President Kasavubu, I was expecting a

formal judgment by the Committee which would take note of the negative reply of

President Kasavubu. But I had the impression that some consider that this

document does not constitute a negative reply.

Faced with the proposal just made to the effect that we should send three

of our number, my delegation makes formal reservations regarding the intention

behind the sending of the officers of the Conciliation Commission and regarding

the nature of the reports — the relation between the Commission and

President Kasavubu who objects to the sending of the Commission—for the reasons

which I have just stated. He tells us that he needs to find persons with whom

the Commission can negotiate. So, we have reservations on this point; those who

go will not have a mandate from the Advisory Committee. I do not know with

what arguments or by what methods they will enter into talks with

President Kasavubu.

Coming now to the proposal just made by the representative of Nigeria that

public order cannot be restored in the Congo without defending the constitution,

my delegation would like once again to call the attention of the Committee to a

few essential points. If we want to get out of the deadlock quickly, we need to

AP/rh 39- 0

(Mr. Caba^ Guinea)

take up a categorical position so that at last the United Nations obtains the

* 'release of the Prime Minister. What measures have been taken to this end? Has

* Hihe International Red Cross been authorized to get in touch with the

Prime Minister? What is the present state of his health? These are points of

information on which we should like to be informed. If the United Nations

Supreme Command in the Congo takes a definite position and is able to tell us

that the Prime Minister has been released and is able to participate in the

restoration of order in the Congo, that will be an achievement.

But we repeat once again that to say that President Kasavubu is proceeding

in a constitutional way, is wrong. The letters are signed by the General

Commissioner for Foreign Affairs; this officer is not recognized by the

United Nations. We are working on a basis of illegality which is reflected

even in the documents which are being distributed. Measures must be taken — and

I share the view of the Ambassador of Morocco — that the Secretary-General in

the course of the prssenb session of the Security Council should insist on

powers being given to him to enable the United Nations to play its role

effectively in the Congo.

(Mr. Caba, Guinea)

We cannot enclose ourselves in the theory that the United Nations is being

neutral when there is no neutrality/when Mobutu is in collusion with Kasavubu

and the Commissioner. The report of Ambassador Dayal emphasized that this

Commissioner and the undisciplined troops1of Mobutu were sowing disorder and

insecurity everywhere. We want order to be restored at Leopoldville rapidly by

means of these measures, and particularly through the disarmament of his troops

who are complicating our tasks* In that'way we could Return-to legality* We

would ensure1 the freedom of all the democratic elements chosen when independence

was proclaimed, so that a strong Government could be set up which would

contribute to the restoration of order and would co-operate with the United

Nations. Until we achieve those solutions we shall get deeper and deeper into

contradictions. We cannot say that we are in the Congo for the purpose of

establishing order when we ourselves are not observing the Constitution.

I think that the Security Council provides the Secretary-General with a

good opportunity,of the kind which he had at the time of the Katanga crisis when

he aske^i lor novers, to ask for the powers which he now needs. He could cjuite

easily tc-V-e energetic steps to ensure. that the United Nations be given competence

and authority to oppose the subversive acts of Mr. Mobutu. We do not recognize

Mobutu or these general Commissioners. These documents that are before us do not

rest on a legal basis. : ,

It is necessary that the United Nations troops take action, and we would

recall that when the seccession of Katanga was imminent we did not want to

intervene, and now when a ico per cent of the population are in ftivour of a

particular solution, we must be able to take action on the basis of a decision

by the Security Council. Otherwise, what has happened in Katanga and what the

United Nations has to accept there will reproduce itself in other parts of the

country.

The 'SECRETARY.-GENERAL; I do not want to interrupt you, Mr, Ambassador,

but I know that the members of the Committee are in a bit of a hurry, and I know

that you have been granted the right to speak in the Security Council, and you

will certainly like to develop those views tliere. We have listened to them with

interest, but I would invite you to think of the clock.

Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I shall sum up then.

We are opposed to the sending of three members, vho would not act vithin the

terms of the mandate that had been drawn up; and we are opposed to taking action

on the basis of this document before us, which is not a legal basis,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There is one small point, Mr. Ambassador,

which you will certainly permit me to clarify. There is a very great difference

between using the force of arms in a military initiative to conquer an airport

and interposing United Nations troops as a screen before innocent civilians,

Africans or Europeans, who are being attacked. The latter point is a police

action without any military initiative; the first is a question of military

initiative. I wanted to make that distinction clear.

Major-General Abdul KADIR (Indonesia): I wish only to say a few words.

I think that my delegation's view on the time of departure of the Conciliation

Commlssjon is well known to this Committee. We have consistently advocated that

the Conciliation Commission has to go to the Congo as soon as possible and that

any further delay would only be harmful to our Organization. The recent

developments in the Congo have only confirmed our belief and, I venture to say,

in the light of President Kasavubufs letter, we see no justified reasons for

any change in our previous decision to send the bureau and such other members

of the Commission who may wish to go on Tuesday. However, if it is the express

belief of the majority of the Committee to send at this stage only the bureau

of the Conciliation Commission, we would go along with that view, provided the

rest will follow as soon as possible. I mean by "as soon as possible" that the

date could be fixed now. If possible, the date of the departure of the second

group — I mean the rest of the members of the Conciliation Commission — could

be fixed between the 17th, which is after the arrival of the members of the

bureau, and 26 December, the date which President Kasavubu has mentioned.

Mr. COOPER (Liberia): I intervene mostly for information. We came

rather late. I know that, at the previous meeting, we decided, or tentatively

agreed, that at least three members would leave on Tuesday — that is, the

Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur of the Commission. " I do not know

what this meeting has decided. Is it still the same decision, that three members

leave on Tuesday?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The decision, as I understand the majority

view — with the formal reservation on record from the representative of Guinea

and a half reservation at least from the representative of Indonesia — or

rather the consensus as I would sum it up with those reservations is that we do

not add anything to the message already sent to President Kasavubu concerning

the decision of Tuesday. We only announce that the representatives of Nigeria,

Ethiopia and Malaya -- that is to say, in fact, the bureau — would stick to the

travel plan and leave on the 13th.

I believe that we should now think of the General Assembly. In this world

of collision and confusion we should at least try to give some time to each

organ of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at .11.13 P^M«

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 1929 December 1960

.: i ..•••• . . ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON,THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Thursday, 29 December I960, at 3 p.m.

60-33989 v,'Lv

BHS/bg 2-5

The SECRETARY-GENERAL! The meeting is called to order. I am very sorry

that we have had to call you at this time when we usually have an opportunity to

sit back a little and take a rest. However, I felt that we should not lose

contact, especially as there are one or two pieces of news which I should like

to bring to your attention and one or two questions on which I am sure you would

like to ponder.

Today's proposed agenda is a very simple one. The first point concerns the

departure of the Conciliation Commission — where we stand and how matters are.

The second point concerns the question raised by Mr. Zorin, namely, the use of

our records. There is a third point which Mr, Bunche would like to raise, that

is the question of the practice we apply with respect to the rotation of units

of the Force.

I shall turn first to the basic question, namely, the departure of the

Conciliation Commission. Mr. Wachuku and his two colleagues have had three

extensive discussions with President Kasavubu, Mr. Bomboko and others, discussions

which I think have proved very useful in clarifying the situation. As a result

of these discussions, I received last night through Mr. Dayal a letter from

Mr. Bomboko transmitting a message from President Kasavubu. There is no reason

for me to go into the full text of the letter. I shall take the key paragraphs

which refer to the background of the conciliation work.

GR/pm ., . , 6

Secretar-General)

I will read the message In French, and you will have the interpretation In .English: . . - . . . ,

"The President of the Republic of the Congo has asked me to • • . -

communicate the following message. Our conference this afternoon allows -me •

to note that you have agreed to the principle of non-interference in the'

internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo* On the other hand, you have

assured me that the members of the Conciliation Commission will conform to

those principles and they will by no means substitute themselves for the

Congolese authorities in seeking a solution to the problems which are of ' -' L

• concern to us."

With this background and interpretation of the principles applying j- which,

as you hear, do not introduce anything new to us, because there has never been

any question of anything of that kind, he says that the Commission is welcome f

The time indicated is 3 January, and there is of course every reason for us to

live up ..to that time-table. We .have of course on the one side made it clear that

the Commission and its terms of reference are as decided by this Committee; .-~

on the other hand we have as a matter of course informed them about the fact that

some members of the Conciliation Commission have put on record here the decision

of their Governments not to take part in this concilietion operation.

I would like, after this meeting and with your Consent, to release to the 'Press

this piece of news. They have somehow got it already; I suppose that is '

unavoidable, but they should at any rate have it in an official release from here.

The text would read ( as follows: ,

"The Secretary-General announced today that following consultations

with President Kasavubu the Conciliation Commission organized by the

, Advisory Committee on the Congo under the General Assembly resolution of

20 September 1960 will arrive in Leopoldville on 3 January 1961. The members '

of the Conciliation Commission who are not already in the Congo and who

have declared themselves willing, to participate will leave 'within the next

few days for a first meeting of the Conciliation Commission on the Congo in

Leopcldville on the aforementioned date."

As you know, without any prior planning it has so developed that I shall go

to Leopoldville the same day and be there for some thirty-six hours* That is to

GR/pm 7

(Hie Secretary General)

say, I shall have the privilege of meeting our friends from the Conciliation

Commission there during their first contact with the situation, I shall not

however, if you will permit me a frivolous expression, in any way get myself

mixed up with it, because their operation is an independent, autonomous one

under the authority of this Committee and my visit is just a visit in passage

down to the Union of South Africa.

Before inviting you to proceed with such observations or questions as you

may wish to present, I would ask Dr. Protitch if he could say something about

the practical arrangements and how things stand.

Dr, PROTITCH; Under your orders,Mr. Secretary-General, I have notified

the delegations last night and this morning. The three members of the Commission,

who are present in New York have been duly notified and we are making arrangements

which I hope will be fully confirmed. We have already a preliminary confirmation

of leaving on Sunday 1 January for Paris and from Paris proceeding to

Brazzaville, where this group with the Secretariat will arrive on 3 January about

noon. Four other members of the Commission who are in their home countries have

been notified both by tfoeir delegations and by us of the date on wfciclx it

is necessary to proceed to Leopoldville. One member, namely the representative

of Liberia, being the Charge* d'Affaires of his country in Leopoldville, is

already there on the spot.

The SECRETARY.»GENERAL; If I may add one final word of comment, it would

be that I think destiny has so arranged it that this is a time when I look with

more hope than ever before towards the possibility of a useful contribution by

the Conciliation Commission. We have reached a kind of stage at which I think

the Commission's influence as a catalyst may be very valuable, especially in the

light of the conclusions that our Congolese colleagues and friends should have

drawn from the debates here, especially in the General Assembly, For that reason

I think we can look forward with satisfaction to this result, which comes late,

but I do not believe too late. That is all I have to say by way of introducing

this development. Are there any questions or observations on it?

GR/pm 8-10

Mr. JHA (India): Referring to the proposed communique which you read

out, I did not quite get the first sentence. ; Would you be kind enouggi to read

i t again? • • - . - • . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Certainly, "The Secretary-General announced . . .

today that following consultations:with President Kasavubu the Conciliation,. .

Commission organized byt: and so on "will arrive in Leopoldville on 3 January 1961."

T^e next sentence reeds "The members of the Conciliation CcnmjLssion who are not

already in the Congo and who have declared themselves w,y.ling to -participate will .

leave within the next few days," . ,

'Mr* JHA (India): Should we not make it clear, that three members of ..

the Commission have already proceeded to the Congo and the rest will be going

there on 3 January, when the first meeting of the.Commission will take placet

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is to say, you suggest we .should, add a ,

sentence before the last one.indicating: that:three members-are already there?

We will do that; it will .clarify the announcement. Some people tend to forget,

but of course it is very.much in our mind, , .,

I should have added to my initial observation that we can congratulate

ourselves on the work of our colleagues and on their .presence there, I have a kind

of hunch that it has already had an impact of the kind for which x;e hoped.

BC/mh 11

Mr. QUAI30N-SACKEY (Ghana): We have read Prese reports concerning

the reservation which has been made about those of us who voted against the

seating of President Kasavubu. Is that reservation contained in the message

which was sent to you, Mr. Secretary-General? In other words, can our

representative on the Conciliation Commission in fact go to the Congo?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The situation is exactly as it has been

described. President Kasavubu is informed about the composition; he is informed

that there will be no change in that composition through a decision of the

Advisory Committee; he is informed that four delegations do not intend to take

part. That is all. That is the background against which President Kasavubu

has invited the Commission to come to the Congo.

From our point of view, the line has been absolutely consistent. Whatever

qualms some people may have had at various stages, the line I have maintained

has not changed.If there are no further observations on this point, we shall change the

communique' to make it more clear by adding the sentence proposed by

Ambassador Jha, Of course, there will be some speculation, but that will just

have to be taken in stride. In this informal meeting I may say that I have

read with a smile the comments being made on my rather modest passage through

Leopoldville. This has been blown up as if it were a major political event,

which it is not. I think that the visit of the Conciliation Commission is such

an event, but my passage through Leopoldville is just an obvious thing to do on

my way to the Union of South Africa.

I turn now to the second point to which the Committee must give some

thought. This arose during the debate in the General Assembly. It will be

recalled that Mr. Zorin voiced some complaint that he had no access to, and did

not know what happened in, the Advisory Committee; he said that he felt that

at least members of the Security Council should have access to information

concerning the Advisory Committee. My reply was the obvious one. I do not

regard the records of the Advisory Committee as belonging in any way to the

BC/mh 12

(The Secretary-General)

Secretariat; they belong to members of the Committee individually and to theCommittee as a whole.

. •'- \I stated that I would draw the Committee's attention to Mr. Zorin's

observation and said that it would naturally be for the Committee to decide.

Since that discussion a related question has arisen. One country — and I think

I can very well mention its name here: Italy — which has made a rather solid

civilian contribution, in the medical field, has said that, while on the one hand j

it feels that there is no reason at all to question the composition of the <

Advisory Committee -- which, as members know, is based on contributions to the \

Force — on. the other hand it feels that those countries which have made a major

civilian contribution are in a position where, from their point of view, it ,

would be .desirable to be kept more in the picture, more au courant with the

situation and whatever happens here. I feel that that is a natural desire.

They do not want to take part in the deliberations,but they would like to be

able to follow what happens.

My own comments on those two proposals would be as follows. I think that

especially at the beginning of this Committee's work we all spoke with the

freedom and in the..way which was natural in the light of the knowledge that

this was a closed club, and that we could therefore express ourselves with all

the desirable.frankness. I think that several things were said that probably

would not have been said in the same way if this had been an open Committee. Of

course, I cannot speak about others, but I am quite sure that that observation

applies to me» For that reason, it is quite obvious that the moment the verbatim

records of pur meetings are made available.to any outsider, even a titre officieux,

informally, a new element is introduced .into the picture. I think that there is

always something to be lost in treating our records in that way. We should all

feel under some kind of restraint — it is not that we distrust others, but

simply that the whole operation would become much more official and much more

public, ... . . . - . .

On the other hand, I feel that we have on the whole perhaps suffered a bit

from the way in which we have so far treated our records. In the first place,

we have had a lot of speculation; we have had leaks, as we know; and we have had

quite a few misunderstandings. All those considerations would speak in favour

BC/mh 13

(The Secretary-General)

of treating our records in the way suggested "by Mr. Zorin or "by the Italian

delegation.

There is another factor. With a group as large as this one, we have

obviously already come to the point where the element of privacy is somewhat

reduced.

Weighing those various considerations, I would say that my own very

tentative conclusion would be that, while as a matter of course a decision of

this nature cannot be retroactive — people have spoken on the assumption that

our records were for the Committee alone --in future it is worth considering

seriously whether we should not agree that the records should be made available,

confidentially of course, to the members of the Security Council and to those .

countries, of which I can give the Committee a list, which have made contractual

civilian contributions; that is to say, contributions organized by the Governments

and not individually, and contributions of such a scope as to make this issue

of direct concern to the Governments in question.

As I have said, however, this is a question to which I think serious

consideration should be given. It is not a question on which I should like to

make a firm recommendation, because there are reasons for and there are definite

reasons against. However, members of the Committee can understand from my use

of the words "serious consideration" that on balance I myself lean towards

caying, "Yes, we shall make the records available in future to the two categories

I have described".

But I really would refer the question to this Committee, because all of its

members are interested parties, both directly and in the collective sense. The

decision will have a certain impact on the character of our work and our

deliberations. I therefore invite members of the Committee to make observations

and suggestions.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I do not think that

it is only delegations representing countries that have made either a military

or a civilian contribution which are concerned in the situation in the Congo.i

There are other delegations which, although they represent countries that have

made no contribution, are Just as concerned. Since the beginning of the last

BC/mh U-15(Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

session of the General Assembly, many new African States have joined the

Organization, and they are very much interested in the situation in the Congo;

this is particularly true of the States which are very close to the Congo. They

are clc-sety concerned in the situation in the Congo even if, for very natural and

understandable' reasons, they have not been able to make any contribution to the

assistance rendered to the Congo, either in the civilian or in the military field,

You, Mr. Secretary-General, in regard to tiia composition of this Ccmmlutee,

chose from the outset a criterion based on the contribution made by Stages to the*

assist-ance rendered to the Congo. At present, as a result of decisions taken by

some of the States members of the Advisory Committee with regard to withdrawing

their troops or ending their assistance to the operations in the Congo, that "

criterion may no longer meet the si tuition. If, for example, Tunisia vere

to decide to with<ir&w its troops fron -aaa Congo — I do not know if it

will do that or'not; the question doeo not arise for the moment --en what

basis couldL'it continue to belong to the Advisory'Committee on the Congo? ' '

DR/rh 16

(Mr. Slim^ Tunisia)

I say this not because I wish in any way to claim that those who have not

made any contributions to the Congo should withdraw from the Advisory Committee*

That is not the case and is far from my idea. My idea is the following: there are

a great number of States who are interested in the Congo, mainly — and I do not

wish to shock any of my colleagues here on this Committee — the African States and

the new States of this contiaent which have not made any contribution. Now,

following on the requests made by Italy or by Mr. Zorin to the effect that they

should be kept informed of the discussions which take place here in this Advisory

Committee, if you open the field to the point where the proceedings of this

Committee are revealed, there is no reason why these proceedings cannot be

communicated to all States and principally, as I said, to the African States who

are not members of this Committee.

I therefore think that we have a situation with two alternatives: either to

communicate the records of the Advisory Committee to all States Members — because

there is no reason to give them to some Members and not to others — or to

communicate them to Security Council members because the action which has been

taken in the Congo is placed under the direct control and direct initiative of the

Security Council.

I do not see any other alternative: either to maintain our previous position

and not to communicate the proceedings of this Committee to anyone or to choose

between the two solutions which I have mentioned. It is obvious that each delegation

can, on its own responsibility, reveal the verbatim record as concerns this or that

delegation; that is a question which concerns them personally and does not concern

either the Secretary-General or the Advisory Committee.

Therefore, summing up, I see no other alternative: if you are going to open

the door and communicate the records of the Advisory Committee to all those who

ask for such information, for instance, to Italy, which has made some contribution

in a civilian way to the Congo, there is no reason not to communicate these records

to other States which are very interested in the development of the situation in

the Congo* Therefore, my suggestion is that we should maintain the status quo

and simply to expand it to the members of the Security Council.

DR/rh 17

-' The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I should perhaps add one thing by way of

clarification. I would regard it as a matter of course that if the records.go

outside of this group, ewen if it is only to Security Council members, we should

follow the usual procedure so that the text would be screened by the members for

such editing as they would wish to make because otherwise ,it would be a bit unfair,

as witja our routine records, and even with the extremely qualified assistance

that we get it is unavoidable that there is this or that error* So I .should.like

to say that I would'regard that as a routine matter of course. :

• -•'•' : Mr»• JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, the present position with

regard'to the UN Congo'. Operations is that both the Security Council and the

General Assembly hace failed to reach-any definitive conclusions and, as far as one

can see, neither body can be called into being at least for some time, with any

possibility of any progress being made or any fruitful discussions taking place.

That being so, it seems to us that the-role of this Advisory Committee, which nas

always' in our view — and I hope in your view —. been important and useful, has

immensely increased. • , .

This is the one tangible body which is more or less continuously in session

and is always available at the call of the Secretary-General, in which, as far as

the discussions in the Committee show, there have been very important statements

and suggestions -and some constructive results have perhaps been achieved.

One!of the great problems today is that the Congo operations should acquire

greater and greater confidence of the vast majority of the Members of the

United Nations, and I would say "that, having regard to the increased importance of

this Committee> which perhaps is the only deliberative body on this subject at

the moment — and it is likely-to remain so for some time --and the need for.

creating greater confidence, especially among the big Powers, we should react

positively and favorably to this idea of a somewhat larger circulation of the

proceedings of this Advisory Committee, It is quite true that, we do not want

these proceedings to be flaunted all over the.p3.ace or,to be quoted or misquoted,

although some misquotations have already been made in the Press, but we do not want

to inhibit ourselves. At the same time, if we take the necessary precautions to

avoid the reproduction of quotations from these proceedings, I would feel that it

DR/rh 18

(Mr. Jha, India)

would "be a good thing if the proceedings of this Committee were made available to

the members of the Security Council. After all, you act under the instructions

of the Security Council, and it is on the basis of the first two or three

resolutions of the Security Council that the whole of the Congo operations have

been undertaken. Therefore, if the proceedings without an official document

number, marked confidential, and also with a request from this Committee which we

can adopt, that we would not like these proceedings to be quoted, that it was only

for the information of the Security Council, it seems to me that it would be

perfectly agreeable to my delegation to have that circulation.

I would prefer not to have it circulated to all Members of the United Nations.

We might wait and see; we might start with the Security Council; I think that that

would probably serve the purpose at the present time.

As regards the others, those who have contributed forces or technical

assistance of a high order such as hospitals, medical relief and all that type of

assistance to the Congo, their interest is quite understandable and legitimate.

However, as Ambassador Slim has said, if they are interested to that extent, they

ought to be in this Committee, and if they were in this Committee they would all

get the record of the proceedings because they participate in this Committee.

I would also agree with him that if we extend it beyond the Security Council

members, who after all have a certain functional and legal responsibility in the

whole of this matter because the whole authority flows from this — and that

includes the Advisory Committee as well — then we should also consider passing it

on to all African States. I personally prefer limiting it to the members of the

Security Council for their information, with the request that the members of the

Committee would appreciate it if no quotations were made from these proceedings,

which are confidential and which are merely sent to members of the Security Council

for their information.

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): Actually I am not going to add to what has

been said by the ambassadors from Tunisia and India on this matter, but I am

wondering whether in fact there should be any circulation of our proceedings as

they have been recorded up to now. I wonder whether it would be necessary to

maintain this verbatim record which has been taken, because, as the- Secretary-General

DR/rh 19-20

. (Mr* Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

has said, the advice or the suggestions which we make here are mostly informal,-

on-the-spot, quick suggestions — naturally and possibly against the backgrounds '

of our own policies at home.

If we are going to have the circulation of the records of this Committee, I '

am afraid that we would then have written speeches. It is likely that, because

the whole proceedings could be made public, we would prepare written speeches here

and it might detract from the informality and ease with which we speak here.

I wonder whether we ohould not consider the necessity of having a summary record

made of what we say here instead of a verbatim record. In that case I would have

no objection if it were to be made public because in any case if you circulate it

to the Security Council it would be publicized one way or the other. Therefore

let us consider the possibility of having a summary record instead of a verbatim-

record. ' . •

FGB/cw 21

Mr. HA5AN (Pakistan): The suggestion that these records should be

circulated to the members of the Security Council would mean that eleven plus

eighteen Members of the United Nations — that is, a total of twenty-nine,

which really means about one-third of the total membership of the Organization --

would have the records, and to deprive the remaining two-thirds of them seems

unreasonable« Either a thing is secret or it is not secret. I do not know

how it can stay where it is, half secret and half not secret.

It has been suggested here that on the pattern of our Governments --

Ambassador Jha's Government, my own Government, and presumably other Governments

also -- we should mark these records "Confidential: not to be quoted". We do

it quite frequently in our Governments. When a thing is marked "Confidential"

it is not to be quoted, and because of the governmental discipline those

instructions are followed. But if we do it in the United Nations it is

extremely doubtful whether the Press, for example, will respect those

instructions* I am extremely doubtful if, merely because we mark the records

"Classified: not to be quoted: not to be reprinted", as suggested, the Press

will observe, those instructions — or any member of the Security Council, or

anybody else* To have thirty persons in possession of these records and

sixty persons not in possession of them does not seem to me to be a very good

suggestion.

I agree with my friend from Tunisia -- and I have stated this consistently

from the very beginning -- that many African countries have a much greater and

much deeper interest in the affairs of the Congo, in these discussions, and in

the records, than have some countries which, fortuitously, are members of the

Advisory Committee, such as my own for example. Therefore, they are piobably

much more interested than certain members of the Security Council in having

these records, but for various reasons we are not going to make the records

available to them. Therefore, there is little reason for making them available

to members of the Security Council.

So my own position, Sir, would be to agree with those of our colleagues

here who have said, "Unless you want to make the records generally available to

all the Members of the United Nations, do not make them available\even to the

Security Council."

FGB/cw 22

(Mr« Hasan, Pakistan)

It has been said by you -• and it is reasonable — that we talk here very .

freely. This is my first experience in the General Assembly, and it is not my

impression that the style was either constrained or inhibited by the fact of

the proceedings being very public. We have the President of the General Assembly

sitting here, arid I do not think that anyone can say. that any Member restrains

himself.pa account of the publicity or anything else. I think that we have

been free,.unconstrained, unrestricted, unrestrained and inhibited in the things

that we have said in tlie General Assembly or elsewhere. Therefore, .that in ...

itself .would not be a reason for restricting the distribution of these recprds^ .,

.Therefore, Sir, to sum up I would say this. Let us stick to what we are . .....

doing at present. That is to say, eighteen Members is enough. Let us have...

these records, but if we are going to issue them to anybody else except the -

Advisory Committee, then let it be to the entire United Nations and not only. - ••

the Security Council. ... . ;

. . .. Mr. ALHAJI-MUHAMMAD NOELERUMA., (Nigeria)i. This question is very

important, particularly in relation to such a very important issue, and I am of •

the opinion that the verbatim record should be confined to this Committee and -...

that,, in order to keep the Security Council informed, perhaps it may be a good

suggestion to give it a summary,. but not the verbatim record, unless the,.

Secretary-General feels that the. whole of the Members of the General Assambly

should .receive copies of the account of the deliberations of; this Committee. ;•-.-;;

But the verbatim record ought to be confined to this Committee. This is my

general feeling, and, as I say, I regard the .matter as ..very important. . f

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): I thought, if I may oay so, that the

representative of Ghana made-a very important point, when he referred to-the

dangerous tendency which might arise,if the verbatim record were widely

circulated, for written.speeches -- speeches for the record and for a wider

audience -- which might detract from the really advisory character of this body

and the informal and, we hope, helpful .kind of interpolations that we have had.

Therefore for my part I feel, like the representative of Ghana and the

representative of Nigeria, that my first preference probably might be for

restricting the record of this group, but if there were to be a wider circulation

FGB/cw 25-25

(Mr • Ritchie t Canada)

I would tend to think that a summary record might be the best compromise

solution,

Mr* SATJj (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I have just a few

comments to make concerning the wish which has been expressed to have access

to the verbatim records of our meetings. I believe, for my part, that it would

be a good idea to maintain the status quo because of the completely informal

nature of our Advisory Committee. And I have another particularly important

reason for believing that we should maintain the status quo. It is that the

use made of these records might go against us and might introduce a new element

into the situation in the Congo, We all know that the constant desire of the

African States is to keep the cold war out of the Congo. We are making every

effort in order that the cold war should not be introduced there in the form

of propaganda, and therefore I think that everything which might feed such

propaganda should be carefully considered before we take any decision. I know

that the Security Council, as a principal organ, has authority over what takes

place in the subsidiary organs of the Organization, and that, without doubt,

certain members of the Council could ask to be given access to our records.

But I believe that, in order to reach a compromise, we might, with a great deal

of caution, undertake to provide some rather succinct summaries of our proceedings^

which would leave us with great freedom of expression here. That is something

which is very important because our statements in this Committee are sometimes

made without our even having instructions from our Governments, That is why I

would support the position taken by certain of my colleagues who are in favour

of simple summaries being furnished to the members of the Security Council.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to

say, first of all, that because of the very nature of the Advisory Committee I

do not see very clearly what decisions can be taken here. We simply express

points of view: the Secretary-General takes them into account and then reaches

whatever decisions he is called upon to reach.

AP/en 26

(Mr« Achkar, Guinea)

Therefore/ by the very nature of our Advisory Committee, ,1 do not

really see why we would not continue the present provisions, namely, that ...

only the members of the Advisory Committee receive records of the points of

view advanced here.

However, I am inclined to support the proposal -- which is a compromise

proposal — advanced by Nigeria, suggesting that the .members of the Advisory

Committee should continue to receive the records and that a succinct

sucsiary be furnished to the Security Council for its 'Information,

It is true that we are here because of the contribution which we make

to the United Nations in the Congo. But we know also that many States

contribute to the United Nations action in the Congo in various ways,

nevertheless, they, do make contributions• ......

Therefore, if we are going to keep informed only those who are participating

in the action of the United Nations in the Congo, I think that would not

lead us very far. I do not know whether I am being very clear, but I believe

that you understand me* Consequently, for the constructive work which we

are attempting to do here, it would be good for: us to maintain the secrecy -

which we have always attempted to observe, I say "attempted to observe11 here,

The secrets are not always complete secrets, and as we know, they do leak out.

The representative of Tunisia made a remark which seemed to be a very

interesting one, when he said that African States were particularly interested,

in the Congo problem. I believe that this is, a very important element, but ;

I do not think that this can give any rights to these States so that they would

have more rights than other States, because, if. anyone else has rights, it

would be the members of the .Security Council -- why not tho General Assembly,

because a resolution was passed by the General Assembly as a whole?

Consequently, I would repeat orice again that I am inclined to support

the proposal put forward by the representative of Nigeria which, I believe,

would allow us to find a compromise solution with regard to the members of the,

Security Council especially*

AP/en 27

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): With respect to the question regarding the

specific requests made, were they made for the full verbatim record or for

simple information of what was happening in this Committee?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My feeling is that as regards Italy the

reason was the simple one that a Government always feels responsible for a

considerable group of its citizens who are placed, on its instructions, so

to say, in the Congo* That is to say, they would be perfectly happy if, in

an appropriate way, the delegation ^»ere kept currair'-ly Infonasd in ratters which

would be of special importance for their work. We are, of course, always

willing to give them such information. But I think they would be perfectly

happy if it were made known that they would be properly informed with respect

to any matters which are of special concern to their work and which are

discussed'here.

Mr, ADEEL (Sudan): I think that is a legitimate request and my

feeling is that if that is agreeable to the Committee, the members of the

Security Council should be kept informed,

Mr, Mongj SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Mr, Secretary-

General, I believe that my present situation will lead to a decisive argument

against the circulation of the records. At the beginning I suggested that

we send the whole record to the Security Council members, but now, after the

statements made by my colleagues, I have changed my mind and I feel that they are

right: there is no reason to send the records in extenso,

I support the proposal made that we communicate to the Security Council

members a summary containing the suggestions which have been definitely made

or decisions which have been taken, because it is not interesting either for

the members of the Security Council or for the Members of the General Assembly

to know that the decision was only for the circulation of all records here

and then a half hour later a decision was taken on another line. All the

Security Council wants to know is that the Advisory Committee has Decided

simply to send a record of its meetings to the Security Council*

AP/en 28

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): We are getting nearer to a solution of thisproblem. It seems that we nave decided to have it in two forms: one is a

verbatim record and the other is a summary record. May J suggest, instead

cf a summary only to the members of the Security Counei. that we circulate•/•' '

a summary to all the Members of the United Nations* "After all, a secret

cannot be kept a secret by thirty persons; and if we are satisfied to send

it to thirty, may I submit, let us send it to all the other people. After

all, they are as much interested as these thirty.

My suggestion would be to restrict the verbatiri record only to the

Advisory Committee but to circulate the summary refcord to all the Members of

the United Nations,

Mr* JHA. (India): So far as my delegation is concerned there is

nothing that we talk about here which we would like to be hidden from anyone

in the United Nations. It is an open point of view which we have given

expression in other places. So far as I am concerned, I am not a bit

constrained because the whole proceedings may go to the members of the Security

Council.

I feel that sometimes a summary may not do justice to what you,

Mr. Secretary-General,have said or to what any of us has said. I often have

had the experience — and I think all of us have had it — that these summaries

are only summaries and they are made by people who are rather under pressure,

and sometimes important points are omitted. It will mean double work for

your staff; it will also mean editing by us.

If it is the view of the majority of the Committee that only summaries

should be sent, I have no objection to that. But speaking for myself, I have

no objection either for the entire proceedings to go to the members of the

Security Council for their information, I would certainly put it to them and

say that it is for their information only and not for quotation. That would be

my condition. If some members of the Security Council on some occasion should

quot? f om itj I would be inclined to move for the stoppage of these proceedings,

Because this is a closed meeting, we speak here in confidence, we enjoy each

other's confidence, we talk very freely with one another and with you,

Mr. Secretary-General, and you do the same with us, if I may say-so. If it is

AP/en 29-30

(Mr. Jhaf India)

* . . - « . , - : . - . . \ ; . . . . . . . . .the idea — ,1 must be sure oh that point -- that these should be quoted, then

• ' • • ' • = • • ' ; ' : . • ' . , V . .

I would have to reserve my opinion. That is the'most important point, that. , •• •

is to say7 let the members of the"Security Council see it for their information;- . . ; • . ' , ! • •

they have a right to know what is happening. I have no- interest in concealing

anything that I say verbatim from any members of the Security Council for.- -

their information. But if they want to quote from that, then, of course, ...

they should have my permission, I do not want to give that'permission; ,... • .

I should like to reserve the consideration of each case on its merits, .;.:

If it is decided to have summary records circulated •—' and as T said, .

I have no objection to that — then the suggestion has been made that it should,

go to all Members of the United Nations. Speaking for my delegation, again,

there is nothing that we would like to conceal from anyone in the United Nations,

but, perhaps, as a beginning it is better to start with the/members of. the

Security Council and'see how this-goes. ' .'..-.- . . . t.

I personally think that since this request has come.from one-of the

big Power members of the Security' Council -•<• and. other powers .have the same .

interest, we must at least assume that; ~- it; might be en,ough, o circulate .

whatever we circulate to the members of the Security Council in the first

instancec ? -' - .-. . ; • . . . . , - . . • • . . .

*

'The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Of course,, there is a reason to .make a

distinction between access to documents and information that is made available.

After all,' it is quite common that seve-ral of you and representatives of

big Powers and others come to me at my office, or coma to lay collaborators and

ask for fairly detailed information on things which we wauld never think.of

circulating in the form of documents.. And, -of course, this is, in that ...

respect, a very open house; and if I am not duty-bound to observe discretion

on behalf of some Government^ if it is a question of .a United Nations operation

as such,I impose on me no inhibitions any more than you; -I mean, everything is

open in that respect, with k single restriction which Is imposed from, outside,

on me, so to say, ."•••' • ' ? . •:,.-, ,- .. .... . ,

HA/ek 31

(The Secretary-Genera].)

The same could apply here, if I may follow the line which has emerged from

the discussion and if I may take into account also the observations just made

"by the representative of India.

I wonder whether one cannot conclude that we should maintain, at all events,

the verbatim records, as it is useful to have them, and that they will be

circulated as before to all the members around the table, and that we will make

a summary record which will go to the Security Council members. I share the

feeling of the Ambassador of India that, at least as a beginning, that is about

enough. There has not been this kind of request from any other quarter. If

there is anything in those summary records, in that summing up, which they would

like to have further clarified or elaborated, in order better to understand what

is in the record, they would have access to the verbatim. But we would not

distribute the verbatim; it would not be in the hands of all these delegations

represented on the Security Council. I imagine that in nine cases out of ten,

or perhaps in ninety-nine out of a hundred, there would not be any questions;

they would be quite satisfied with the summary record. On the other hand, if

there is a point which they do not understand, or which intrigues them in some

way, they would come to my office, as they come for many other things, and ask

questions -- and I would then, with your permission, feel free to say: "Well,

here it is, this is what we summed up in that way."

The gain in such a procedure would be that the question of quotations, or

the question of editing a text so that we can take the risk of quotation, would

disappear — because obviously, as is true with so many other documents that I

show, it is perfectly clear that they cannot be quoted because they have simply

been read as a piece of information.

To sum it up, then, I would say that we would keep our records here; that we

would arrange for summary records on the basis of the verbatim, such sunanary

records to go automatically to all the members of the Security Council; and I

would like to have your permission, if the members of the Security Council, on

the basis of the summary, should say "Well, what does this really meant We do

not understand" -- in that case, I should like to have your permission to give

them the information in the same way in which I inform them of .-so many other

things«

HA/ek 52

(The Secretary-General)

" ' ' . ' • ' • ' • ; ' . . . . » ' •Certainly, Mr. Jha is right in saying that we may express ourselves with

greater freedom here than in other places -- but we do not say anything which '

isvnot, ,so to say ; on our. responsibility and in that sense for the public record;

•"'-••••"• .Mr? QlIMiSON-SACKEY. (Ghana) ; There is one element, I think, whicih:r ':

has been left out -- and that is the Press. Once the Security ; Council has a' '

suncaary , record, . it follows that the Press will get hold of whatever we 'decide ; •

here> In ; that, case, can we not forestall leakages by having communiques issued '-

soon, after , our meejt ings -- , short, crisp summaries of whatever decisions are' taken'

here -. r - tp, the Press, to avoid the kind of leakage about which we Complained "" -

some .time ago? I think that is a very important element' to be considered herd*---

.-.; •; ..The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I agree with you, but that will run into

the very great difficulty that the kind of communique that we agree upon, and

that we think, from our professional angle, is a good communique, is considered ;

incredibly uninterestip£ by. the Press. We will therefore have' the communique-

plus leakages. I think we have to face that hard fact. However, if you will- "

permit me to take .advantage of the special tone of t ese gaukertsgs, j xrauld say

that I do not think the Security Council members are' any worse in 'that rsepeet '

i any of uo around this table. " " ' : ' - -

AClffCAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): There is a- ; • -

simple point of clarification that I would like to 'bring uji, I believe that the

document which will be addressed to the members of the Security Council would be

rather a summary of the suggestions made here 'than an analytical coapte renda,

We would not name the representatives who said this or that; we would simply havea Bunmary o f t h e suggestions, - • . - . » . - .

The SECRETARY -GENERAL (interpretation from French): 'That is a useful

clarification, because the phrase I used was not a good phrase. It would be a .

summary, not a compte rendu ana3.ytiq.ue " ' .

HA/ek 33

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I should like to raise a small point. It

is Important for the Security Council to know the decisions reached by this

Advisory Committee, and I agree with the suggestion by the representative of

Guinea. But, at the same time, this Advisory Committee should have circulated

to it, together with the verbatim record, the summary of the decisions which is

going to be circulated to the Security Council.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes, that will take place as a matter of

course; it will be a part of your documentation. As a matter of fact, you will

see these summaries before they are circulated. Obviously, as is the case with

all resume's, they involve a matter of choice and balance, and I think that the

members of the Committee should have a chance to see them before they go to the

Security Council* That can easily be arranged within 2k hours or 8 hours.

You tflll olvays have them.

Mr. JHA (India); I am not quite clear. Is it the intention that

the summary that will be circulated will not indicate which delegation said what?

In that case, what sort of summary record will that be? My understanding was

that it would be a summary record like the usual summary records in the United

Nations. Those summary records will be without document number, they will be

marked "Confidential", and I think that there should be a note from you,

Mr. Secretary-General, with the first copies that are circulated, saying that

the Advisory Committee has agreed to circulate this but has requested that there

be no quotations from it. What I am anxious about is that no member of the

Security Council, after he has received these summary records, should say that

in the Advisory Committee the representative of such and such a country said

such and such things. That is what I would like to avoid, and that applies as

much to summary records as to verbatim proceedings. I would like that caveat to

be entered. But the summary records must indicate which delegation said what.

We cennot omit the names of delegations. Otherwise, it would not be a summary

record at all, but just a jumble of ideas expressed around the table.

HA/ek 3 -35

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Let me try to clarify my understanding of

it and also my reply to the representative of Guinea. I do not believe that '

we should have verbatim recordsplus summary records df the kind which usually '

are the alternative to verbatim records. I can Use the 'excellent example -£iven

by the representative of Tunisia. Certainly, in an analytical record bf any

oiie of the regular Committees here, the successive stands, whether -of ; ' -'"•••

Ambassador Slim or of others, would be reflected in the text. But that is not

the relevant thing. For example, if wo m&de a summary of this .'debate, we

could certainly do it in much simpler form, but it would not be the cold and

anonymous thing which simply reads that the'Advisory Committee met at suoh and •

such a time and reached sucti and such decisions on such and such points. It is

more than that. But it'is, so to say, a compromise between that and a regular ;

summary record, which gives enough'of tha stands taken to explain the conclusions,

but does not go into what is usually called an analytical summary record -- that

is to say , one giving a full picture, although, contracted, of the whole debate,

I think we have to experiment.' And I think that, as r ealcLbeforeywe should

always circulate them to you in advance. That is especially; importantinthe

first instance, t-ft causa there is a stage when we have tb make up our. minds as to'

what kind of resume* we would wish to have circulated.' But I repeat that I :

believe we should have something between the anonymous points,just giving the >

conclusions^ and a summary record as that is usually understood in this :

Organization. ' • -

BHS/hh 36

Mr. JHA (India): We will receive the first copies*

SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes, you will receive the first copies and

we shall have a discussion of them. I think that may bring us at least to a

tentative conclusion. I hope that our collaborators will be able to do this

in such a way that we shall feel that we have taken a wise decision.

I shall now ask Mr, Bunche to take up the question of rotation.

Mr. BUNCHE; The United Nations Force has already been in the Congo

enough months to require that some practical attention be given to the

subject of rotation. By rotation we mean the replacement of old personnel by

new personnel in the various contingents. It is a word that has come into use

as a result of our experience with the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza

and in other areas using military personnel.

Some of the countries — I think five or six of the total of twenty- seven

countries contributing military personnel to the Congo operation — have

indicated their wish to rotate their contingents at various dates during the

next two months. Now as we have well learned from the four years of experience

with the United Nations Emergency Force, it is desirable, in view of the

complicated organization and the expense involved in the movement of troops,

particularly when they are of substantial numbers, for certain basic principles

to be applied, but for these principles to have enough flexibility in application

to meet the needs of special situations,

The general principles upon which the rotations of contingents are based

may be summed up as follows, and I give this to you for your information.

The first principle is that the rotation of all contingents will be the

responsibility of the United Nations and will be co-ordinated and undertaken

by it, and all such arrangements will be subject to United Nations approval,

This means, of course, that the United Nations will bear the expense of the

transportation. This question has been raised most recently today by one

delegation. Proposals for the relief or rotation of contingents are to be

submitted to the Secretary-General threugh the permanent representatives of the

contributing States in New York, and, to the extent possible, the wishes of

contributing countries as to the specific dates of rotation will be met. It will

BHS/hh 37

••-.-.. (Mr» Bunche)

be understood that this cannot always l?e pin-pointed on the specific date because

ve have to make arrangements fqr transportation, .sometimes through the assistance

of Governments and at afther'times through commercial charter, and it is not always

possible to meet the exact date specified. ,

The second principle is that the length of service of the units in the Congo

is a minimum of six months for countries specifically providing contingents for

such a period. At the outset some of them specified the period of six months

•when they made'the contingents available. For all others the,period is nine

months* We can say, therefore, that the general term of service is from six to

nine months for all personnel provided. Our own headquarters command in the

CongO'has indicated the desirability of having the. six month provision apply-

universally to air peJL'sonnel, that is to pilots and technicians employed in

providing the United Nations aerial transport system in the operation. This is

for reasons of-the particular circumstances involved in this type .of service.

The third principle is "that- rotation will be by the most economical means

of transportation, sea or air. The final decision on the mode of transportation

will rest-with the United Nations> which will, as I:have said, bear all of the

cost of such transportation. .... ... . . . : , . v .

These are the three basic principles .which are now being applied to the

rotations that are being arranged and which will apply to all. others.

• . The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I should perhaps uctl*r scar*.-..the words "basic

principles", because this aspect la a bit complicated and adjustments may have

to be made to special situations. For example, in the beginning we borrowed

one contingent from Gaza and.we could not apply these rules* The same applies

to the future. However, as basic principles, these are what.we want to follow.

If there are no observations on this matter, I should like to inform you

of another matter. As you know, ,1 intend to go to the Union of South Africa

on Monday* On the vuy I shall stop over in Leopoldville. I hope to be able

to stay a couple of days in Cairo, and I have a kind invitation to India. If

circumstances permit, I would very much like to go there and I hope that I shall

be able to do so. This means that I shall be. away approximately three weeks,

BHS/hh 38-UO

(The Secretery-General)

and arrangements have to be made for the period of my absence. The regular

arrangement which is applied when I am away is that, if a question arises of

such a nature that it should be submitted directly to me because it involves my

personal responsibility, then it is submitted to me wherever I am. That

arrangement has worked out quite well. However, in the Congo affair there are

questions from day to day and even from hour to hour, and such an arrangement

would be far too clumsy in this case. In other cases in the past we have

followed the practice that when I have been away the judgement as to whether

matters should or should not be submitted to me has been delegated to three

Under-Secretaries. As a matter of course, they have been chosen so as to

reflect various points of view. In the Congo case, I have felt that a somewhat

different arrangement may be more practical. For that reason, I have asked

Mr, Mekki Abbas to come over from Addis Ababa, where he is Executive Secretary of

the Economic Commission for Africa, and to be with us for the month of January.

He will be responsible for the co-ordination of our operations in the Congo,

but in consultation with those who have traditional personal tasks in relation

to the operation, such as, for example, Mr. Bunche and Sir Alexander Macfarquhar.

The co-ordinating role, which I naturally carry myself under normal circumstances,

will be entrusted to Mr. Mekki Abbas, who, as you can see, is already here inadvance.

Is there any other matter that we need to take up today?

Mr. SUM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to

congratulate the Secretary-General for the arrangements which he has made for

the period of his absence. These arrangements appear quite satisfactory to us

and I hope that there will be no complications during the Secretary-General's

absence.

I have another question, however, which I believe to be rather important and

concerning which I should like to have some clarification before the Secretary-

General1 s departure. I am referring to the question of the financing of the

Congo operations. We learned on the last day of the General Assembly of certain

decisions that were taken regarding the provisional financing of the operations.

We know of the difficulties which face us at the present time. -'However, could

we have some information as to the actual state of the finances, especially as to

the state of the Special Fund which was established by special resolution of the

General Assembly? My Government attaches great importance to this question, and Iam sure that information relating to it would be of interest to all Members.

GR/gp

The SEd ATO-gENEfcAL; I have, of course, no figures available^ 'f '' "

but I can say that the Controller and his Office are reasonably happy after5

the decisions which were taken, anil do not seem to feel any immediate vorry.

However, on this point, since I think it is essential for you t'o have exact'

information, I will ask the Controller to make a short memorandum and have it "

distributed'to you so that you know exactly how we stand and whatL the forecast

is for January and February and the next couple of months. As regards the Fund, '

there is very little new to' be said about it. May I ask Sir Alexander Macfarquhari f h e h a s anything t o say? " " . - - - ' . - . : .

Sir" Alexander' MACFARQ.UHAk; The present state of ttie Fund is that we '

have pledges for just under $lV million, $5 million from the United States,

$3 million from the United Kingdom, a million or more from Canada, the Netherlands

and Sweden, and contributions from Australia, Cambodia, Denmark, Haiti/ Iran,

Liberia, Morocco,'Norway, New Zealand and Tunisia. Of this,'$10 million have

been received. The expenses against the Fund, so far as we have'the accounts l ••••• '

up to date, are at the moment rather led s than the money'in hand. ••••'••••-••

The SEgPETARY-G MRAL! Are there" any commitments? ' •• ••''•' ;; • /;

Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR; Commitments are just ahead of the money

in hand.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It id regrettable that we have not got any ; ! • '

further, and the fact that we have not suffered more from it is explained by •. '

something which we all regret, arid that is that the situation in the Congo- '

is such that we cannot get things under way. There are difficulties in getting

the administrative arrangements into a form which satisfies us and so"on. 'That

is to say, we are still in a state of half stand-still whixjh worries rile quite -

a lot, but we cannot do anything more about it at the moment.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation frorri French): I would-like to '

put one single question: is the State of the Congo actually'receiving ariy

income at the present time? ' - .

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If they are collecting the taxes themselvest

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea): Taxes? Any kind of income.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We are not very much in the know, I must

Mr. JHA (India): With your permission, Mr. Secretary-General, I

wanted to make certain observations, some by way of comment and others by way

of asking questions.As regards the Conciliation Commission we are very glad that the rest of

the Commission is going; we are glad that eventually the opposition and the

reservations of President Kasavubu have been withdrawn. We would like to pay a

tribute to the advance party that went to the Congo, and indeed to yourself,

for pursuing this matter with success.We feel that a great deal depends on this Conciliation Commission. In

the debates in the General Assembly there were differences of opinion on manypoints, but there was unanimity on the importance of the Conciliation Commission

and on the importance of conciliation itself in the Congo, as well as the qiestion

of a broad-based Government as the result of the Round-Table Conference. There

was no difference of opinion on the question of the convening of Parliament.

Both resolutions, neither of which was passed, referred to the importance of the

reconvening of Parliament. We also all observed that although neither resolution

met with the necessary support there was a great deal in common in the statements

that were made, although there were differences of emphasis. I Just wanted to

bring this aspect to your notice and, through you, to the notice of the members

of the Conciliation Commission whom you will be meeting and we would hope that,

during your visit to the Republic of the Congo, you would diplomatically and

unofficially of course try to emphasize the importance of these measures which,

whatever the differences of opinion in the General Assembly, were unanimously

regarded as among the most essential of the things to be done in ,the Congo.

(Mr. Jha, India)

• ; There is also the question of the large numbers of people, members of

Parliament, Cabinet Ministers or former Cabinet Ministers, who are in Jail. It

is the experience of all countries which have passed,through similar crises

that there can be no conciliation, there can be no National Government, without

amnesty. All such measures have to be preceded by political amnesties.' As

you will recall, that was part of one of the resolutions submitted to the General

Assembly. It is obvious that the General Assembly did not like-to pronounce

itself on that, but I think it will be possible for members of the Conciliation

Corjmisslon> and also for you, Mr. Secretary-General, .in:your contacts-with the

3.e>rl.?.rs there, to emphasize the importance of political amnesty. We dp not;wish

tr £o further than that, but it is a general principle and it.is an experience

^brough which my own country has passed. You cannot have political stability

s.:?i* conciliation, or in fact any political advance on a national,.basis, without

political amnesty* .•••.. . -. ;. : ' ••-.• . • -.;.. .-.-•.

Now we hope that, the Conciliation. Commission, whose task we would agree

with you is much more important now than it.ever appeared to.be before,.;wdt34.

persevere and will follow, the right- lines objectively, without.; interfering with

the internal affairs of the country,--and -we hope.that it will; achieve constructive

results-. " ' ' • • • '• : : '. ' . . ' . . . . ' ' :.. •.••- .- ; - • : . . - . ; • • - , . - > , . • . - • • . : .. . .-..-;.

'I wanted to ask you one or two questions regarding the incident. reported

in this morning^ newspapers as having taken place at Luena in Katanga'Province,,

where according to the Press reports large numbers of people were killed ,or

subjected to nimlliation, women were raped and all that kind" of thing by -.-. ....••"

dissident Baluba tribesmen. That is most regrettable, but the newspapers also .

reported that there were contingents of the United Nations Force present at

the railway station where this happened, and we would like to know the fasts .,

about this situations We would like to know how It is that, with the United

Nations Force there, all these atrocities were committed and what the United

Nations Force did in the circumstances. If they did not do anything, why did

they do nothing? What is the use of having a United Nations Force at such

enormous expense, and at such great trouble to yourself, -to Members of the.

General Assembly and to 'everybody,-if it cannot, prevent incidents of thisj

nature, which go against the very fundamentals of civilized behaviour and against

all that the Charter of the United Nations stands for?

GR/gp

(Mr. Jha, India)

If you have not got the facts available at present, I would request you

to circulate the memorandum to all the members of the Advisory Committee for

their information, so that we could perhaps discuss the matter at our next

meeting. It did seem to us rather odd -*• I do not know whether the facts reported

in the newspapers are entirely correct -p that such a situation should have

developed in the presence of the United Nations contingents.

There is another point in regard to which I should be grateful for some

information. Some time ago there were manifestations of marked hostility on

the part of members of the Arme'e nationale congolaise towards United Nations

personnel, and it is a matter of history now that many of them were maltreated,

beaten up, subjected to humiliation and so on. What is the latest situation

in regard to that matter? Is there any improvement in the attitude of the

Armde nationale eongolaise towards the United Nations personnel, have there been

any further incidents, what steps have been taken to prevent the recurrence of

such incidents, and lastly, could you enlighten us as to the situation in

Stanleyville?

BC/pm . . ..,'-. .'-.,:.•;.- 1*6

The SECRETLY-GENERAL; First of all, I would say that, in a rather

strong personal demarche, I have drawn President Kasavubu^ attention to what

was comnon to the tvo draft resolutions, neither of which was passed; and have'

also told him that, if various statements made in the debate are added to the

draft resolutions, it is obvious that the reactions go to some extent beyond

the texts. That is to say, I have drawn from the proceedings in'the general

debate all the advantage that I could draw for the line we are pursuing — I

think unanimously. That refers especially to the convening of Parliament, where

there was a common line and where the philosophy which developed during the

donate, also gave a very clear indication. In that context I have been able,

rvi to speak, to invoke all those various facts as strong support for the line I

.-Aye myself taken, and for many months, in fact.

In the same way the question of the imprisoned Members of Parliament and

ether persons has been brought up in the light of the debate in the General

Assembly and of the draft resolutions; one of those texts, it is true, went a

lot further than the other, but I think that the majority view was quite clear

and could be truly reflected by me even without any written evidence.

In the same approach to President Kasavubu I again brought up the question

of hostility in relation to the United Nations, the armed force or the civilians.

As I recall it at the moment, we have had no recent incidents which indicate a

continuation of the previous difficulties, I think that there is still this or

that kind of distrust lurking somewhere in the background, but we have nothing

specific to complain of. However, I have not been satisfied with that: I have

gone one step further and have asked the President to devote himself to a

personal clarification of the stand which I know he has on the United Nations,

a personal clarification which would make it obvious to the people and to all

those concerned what line should be pursued in relation to the United Nations,

As the Committee will remember, in a couple of interventions in the General

Assembly I myself used fairly harsh — or even very harsh -- language on this

point. In my approach to President Kasavubu I have repeated what I said in the

Assembly — that there are, of course, conditions in which the United Nations

simply cannot and will not operate, and that this has to be taken fully into

account in view of the obvious dependence of the Congo on United Nations

assistance.

BC/pm 1*7

(The Secretary-General)

Thus, I think that those three points have already been brought to

President Kasavubu's notice with all possible force* As a matter of course, In

my personal contact with him I shall not go back on what I have said; on the

contrary; I shall add what one can say orolly even if one does not liko to sayit in writing*

As regards the Luena story, all indications are that this is one of those

stories which, through the multiplying effect of rumours, has been built up

into something that has a very meagre basis in hard fact* \\Te have no report

which-would confirm the newspaper version of that incident. If this had been

an incident of the gravity indicated in the Press, our people — even if they

bad preferred to investigate before reporting — would have anticipated the result

of any investigation and briefed us directly. In those circumstances I believe

thr-4t for the moment we can take these very upsetting newspaper stories as Just

o:.ie of those storms which one finds in the Press and which, fortunately, have

nothing in them corresponding to hard facts. However, when we have a definite

report on what may be back of the matter we shall, of course, see to it that the

members of the Advisory Committee are fully informed.

Mr. GIRON (Sweden): I should first like to make one comment on the

statement of Sir Alexander Macfarquhar* Today, in the absence of

Ambassador Rossel, I have sent to you, Mr. Secretary-General, a letter informing

you that we have made good our pledge and have paid our contribution to the

Fund for the Congo.

I would turn now to what the representative of India and the

Secretary-General have aaid about the incident in Katanga. My delegation is of

course very much interested in this matter since — at least according to Press

reports — Swedish United Nations troops were involved. However, for what it is

worth, I may say that I listened this morning to a ccmmuniqu£ read out on one

of the radio stations in New York which was said to originate from the Swedish

Defence Staff and according to which the circumstances of this incident had been

very much exaggerated; I think the communiqu^ mentioned that perhaps one person

had been killed. It appears not to be very certain whether United Nations troops,

or at least Swedish United Nations troops, really were involved in the matter.

However, my delegation has had no official word from Stockholm about the

incident BO far.

BC/pm 48-50

Mr, QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I have asked to speak only to wish you,

Mr, Secretary-General, a very happy New Year and to mention one or two points

for the future.' ' . ; ' . ' . > ' ; ' . . • . . ' ' • • . . . • • .

I am sure that everyone round this table would join me in wishing you well,

Mr. Secretary-General, especially on your visit to Africa.

The past year has been a very difficult one —'at least for me: I had no

summer holidays. I am sure that everyone here is aware of the difficulties which

the United Nations has had to face in connexion with the Congo situation. As my

Government has always said, and as I have repeated here, the Congo crisis can

•"•ery well be the determining factor in the attitude which a number of African

.States, and Africans, will take towards the United Nations. Personally,

I.should like the United Nations to succeed in the Congo. We have definitely

felt that there have been a number of lapses in the country itself. However, the

criticism fcae been levelled at you, Mr, Secretary-General, as the man who wears

the crown, the responsible person involved. I may say that if we have levelled

criticisms against the Command in the Congo we have done so because we have felt

very strongly about a number of things that have happened and not cut of spite.

The year ahead must open a new vista. That is why we place a great deal of

confidence in you, Mr, Secretary-General, during your visit to the Congo. You

have already emphasized some points that I was going to touch upon; namely,

the question of prisoners, especially Mrt Lumumba, who we think should be

released; the return of parliamentary institutions while the United Nations is

still in the Congo, and so forth — in other words, a restoration of stability

. which might help the young country to proceed on its way to the enjoyment of

full independence and sovereignty.

There is a small matter which I should like to raise. It relates to the

difficulty which Ghana aircraft flying material to Kasai has experienced from

the hands of Mr. Pongo, who, I understand, is the Security Officer attached to

Mr, Bomboko. I hope that the difficulty can be straightened out while you are

in the Congo, Mr. Secretary-General.

Again I wish you well, and I look forward to a more prosperous New Year.

DR/mh 51

Mr. ALHA.JI-MUHAMMAD NGILBRUMA. (Nigeria): Mr. Secretary-General, I

•wish you success on your trip to Africa, and I wish to make it quite clear that

it is the intention of our Government to give its full support to what the

Conciliation Commission is going to do in the Congo.

I have a question similar to that posed by the representative of India,

It was reported in a newspaper that the Secretary-General's representative in

the Congo was stopped from making his tour until he agreed to pay a visit to a

political leader. He was not allowed to proceed on the tour until he paid a

courtesy visit to this political leader. Thus in such circumstances, when the

Secretary-General's representative is interrupted or is annoyed in making a tour,

•iihio causes us much anxiety. So, Mr, Secretary-General, I hope your trip to.

/..frica, and particularly to the Congo, will bring a good conclusion and a

colution to this very serious problem.

I have only mentioned this because we have very strong feelings about the

situation in the Congo, because we Africans know the seriousness and the

magnitude of African problems; we know them better than anyone else. Thus, if

your representative can be challenged in making a tour -- I do not say that it

is true, I am just asking a question -- I think that such a matter will cause

some anxiety to the members of the Conciliation Commission who are going to do

their work there. Thus I should like some enlightenment on this matter.

The SECRETARY-GENBPAL; We, Mr. Ambassador, do not know anything about

it, I guess that it is one of those cases where our brilliant and imaginative

friends of the Press if they have no good story, cook up a bad one. That is

a law of nature, it seems. Anyway, we have not heard anything. I am sure that

if anything had taken place which Mr. Dayal felt interfered with the proper

execution of hie duties and his work, he would have reported it. An entirely

different matter is that we, all of us, once in a while run into this or that

kind of snag which we do not take too seriously -- and I do not think anybody

should, A good rule to follow in the Congo, as anywhere else, is to be armed

with a considerable sense of humour because misunderstandings are frequent andi

not very tragic.

DR/mh 52

(Mr. Secretary-General)

May I, for my part', say 'hoV much I-share .-the/feelings/expressed by

Ambassador Quaison-Sackey as regards the hopes for the United Nations in 19&'*

I have always had the feeling that in this or that'way we will succeed and that

nothing would be more unpardonable than to doubt it'incur "current actions. "I

feel that there are very many elements in the picture vblch give promise for the

future, and I am very sorry for any sign of defeatism anywhere in the Secretariat

or outside it. So it is Just not an empty word when 1 say that I, for my part,

look on the Congo operation with quite some hope in 1961;

As regards your kind reference tci me, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, I would reply

vitn what I said to the representative of Nigeria and phrase it so that somebody

u-wist take the blame -- and it seems to be a natural function for the

c-ecretary-General, ' - ' .

I think then we can Just say that we have done our day's1'Job and that we

will meet again in the New Year. All good wishes.

- ' • "•••' ' •' The meeting rose at U.J4-5 p.m.: .-••=...

I

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMJO^EE ONTHE CONGO- - -

Meeting at United Nations Head quarters; New York,on Friday, 20 January 19 1, at 5 p.m.

6l-oi8Uo

The SECRETARY-GENERAL*. The meeting is called to order. I think we are

here in sufficient numbers to "be able to begin. I invited you to this meeting

because I felt that I should inform the members of the Advisory Committee about

what we know about the transfer of Mr. Lumumba to Katanga, what has been or not

been the position and role of the United Nations in the context and what action

I have taken. On the last point, I do it in order to get your advice as to any

further steps that you might find indicated.

You have before you the text of a letter to Mr. Kasavubu and a message to

Mr. Tshcmbe. They are established fact. They were sent last night. They are,

of course, in no sense necessarily the last word or tha complete story from our

side.

If I may then, first tell you what we have by way of information concerning

the transfer of Mr. Lumumba, our story — which is a confirmed one and for that

reason c^n be considered as brushing aside all you may have read in the papers —

runs as follows.

Mr. Lumumba, as you knew, was at Camp Hardy, near Thysville. This is a

military camp of the AJTC where the UN is not, has never been and should not be.

By light aircraft, according to our reconstruction, he was transferred to a

nearby airport at Banana where also the United Nations has not been, to my

knowledge. That is to say, the whole operation regarding his departure was

outside the control of the UN as it has been reconstructed.

I then come to his arrival at Elisabethville and there I would like to read

to you signed testimony of the Swedish officer in charge at the airport, and

five men. There are six signatories in all. The signed testimony runs as follows

"Chief of Guard, Lundgren as well as troops on guard duty at Luano

airport state that the plane, a DC k of Air Congo, taxied directly to the

hangar of the Katangese Military Aviation Company, which is not included in

the area patrolled by the UN company stationed at the airport, and that an

armored vehicle, trucks and jeeps drove up to the plane and surrounded it,

after which gendarmes formed a cordon about 75 metres around the plane.

A nunber of gendarmes, about twenty, formed a gauntlet from the plane to the

jeep that was driven up. The armored vehicle directed its cannon towardsi

the door of the plane. At the plane were, among others, four air hostesses

3-5(The Secretary-General)

who had come from the reception in the air station. First to leave the

.plane was a smartly dressed African. The observations were made through

field glasses from a distance of hundred; metres. Three other Africans

followed the first, .passengers, blindfolded and with their hands tied behind

their backs. One of;them, the first, had a small beard. •

(The Secretary-General)

"As they came down the stairs, the gendarmes ran on to then, kicked

them all, beat them with their rifle butts, and threw them in to Vae jeep.

Four gendarmes then jumped into the jeep and sat down* At that point,

one of the three prisoners yelled loudly. The jeep then took the lead

of the vehicle convoy and drove off along the runway towards the far end

of the airfield, past the landing beacon, where an opening was cut in the

fence to let the convoy out,"

We have also questioned those who were on guard, and the fo3.1owing

additional information can be mentioned here. The total guard force of the

United Nations at the airfield was thirty-seven, but when the incident happened,

only nine were actually on guard duty. They were spread over at leapt a mile,

and only six were direct witnesses of the disembarking,, Further, it is said

that the plane was surrounded, as I said before, by armoured cars, and with the

sum total of 1 0 gendarmes«

The story is thus clear. In some relevant respects, there was serious

manhandling after the disembarking of the passengers on the plane. United

Nations guards were in the neighbourhood, but the plane was surrounded, as I say,

by 1;50 gendarmes who formed a cordon at 75 metres distance. The observations

were made by our people, who were only six, through field glasses,

I do not want to make any comments, but I think that anybody can see that

the possibilities of any kind of intervention by the United Nations guards in

this completely unforeseeable action were very limited, if they existed at all,

I guess that the whole development was a very quick one indeed from the

disembarking to the departure. It is obvious that measures were taken so that

they by-passed the usual control posts as a special opening had been made in

the fence so that they did not take the natural gates from the airport. I

mention this because I feel that you, as well as we in the .Secretariat, feel

concerned about what role, if any, the United Nations may have played in this

matter.

As a matter of course, our representative in Elizabethville at once

approached Mr, Tshombe, pointing out what he could without any additional

instructions, vhicU,so to say, was a matter of course on the basis of general

instructions — a plea for the treatment which we are entitled to expect — but

also for a discussion with Mr. Tshombe about the most serious political aspects of

this development.

7-10(The Secretary General)

As you may gather from the text you have before you, I have reason to believe

that prior* consent had not been given from the Elizabethville side to this

transfer.• This is reflected in my message to Mr, Tshombe.

Regarding our possibilities to act beyond what was done at once, beyond

these letters or messages, it is difficult to see now, at this moment, what kind

of intervention could usefully be added. I should like to draw your attention to

the fact that the Conciliation Cooralssion, which is now at StanXeyville,

will shortly arrive in Elizabethville — I think, in fact they will arrive

tomorrow — and that they have rnade the demand, which l as not been rejected,

that they should be enabled to meet with Mr. Lumumba.

What emerges from my short report shows you, if there is any need to show it,

that newspaper comments to the effect that we hove in this case app3JLed some

kind of non-intervention rule in the extreme sense of staying away are simply

unwarranted and incorrect. We have never considered the rule against interventica

in domestic affairs as barring us from diplomatic action or from the protection

of human rights, or from the protection of law and order in the caee of

individuals, be they individuals with official responsibilities or simple

personalities anonymous in the general picture.

I think this is all I can tell you on this occasion. This is what we know

and this is what we have done, I would say, as I said at the beginning, that

what I have done need in no way be the end of the story and we on the Secretariat

side would appreciate your advice.

11

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I wonder if you are In a position to tell us about

the motives which led President Kasavubu and Colonel Mobutu to order this transfer;

we have read some interpretations of these motives in the newspapers. Perhaps you

have some information on that point.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I cannot do more than guess, and my gueccas run

along the same lines as the newspaper speculations in this respect, that what

activated the plan -- which may have been of long date *•- to transfer him was the

trouble that there had been in Thysville, vhich seemed to indicate that at least

there were very split feelings in the garrison at Thysville regarding the

detention of Mr. Lurnuinba.

Mr» JHA (India): I thank you for the circulation of the letters that

you have sent to Mr. Kasavubu and, through your representatives in Elisabethville,

to Mr. Tschombe. If I may say so, these are on the right lines and they do serve

to emphasize the human rights aspect, the aspect relating to individual liberty

and fair trial and that kind of thing. It is certainly of the first importance

to ensure that elementary human rights are observed in the case of Mr. Lumumba,

that no harm comes to him, that there is no repetition of the incident that took

place at the airport involving very undignified treatment, assault and merciless

beating of Mr. Lumumba and his companions, and that if there is evidence of a

specific charge against him, he should be given a fair trial in a competent court

of justice. It did appear from the newspaper reports that the United Nations

troops were onlookers of a very merciless manhandling of Mr. Lumumba and his

companions, but from what you have said it appears that it was perhaps not possible

for the United Nations personnel to intervene in this matter at all because of the

smallness of their numbers, because of the lack of information, because of the

fact that these incidents took place in an area which was not, if I understood you

aright, the area of the airport which was being patrolled or looked after by the

United Nations forces.

You have been good enough to ask us as to what further action should be taken

and, if I may take the liberty of making some suggestions, the first thing that it

is necessary to emphasize is that, on the part of the United Nations personnel,

12

(Mr. Jha, India)

there should be no repetition of such incidents relating to Mr. Lumumba and his

companions or, as a matter of fact/ in respect of" other people, because if the

United Nations faile in enforcing, or rather, ensuring the observance of elementary

civil rights, then it comes in for a lot of odium; and that should be avoided

because, otherwise, it becomes extremely difficult for all of us -'- and for you, I

imagine — to answer for arid to defend 'the presence of the United Nations in the

Congo with all the difficulties and complications 'that thcvb gives rise to. I believi

that you are already aware of that situation and I would suggest that, if necessary,

this point may be reinforced by further instructions at all le'vels of the

United Nations forces.

Secondly, your communication deals with this question of human rights and

the assurance of a fair trial to Mr. Lumumba in the event of his not being

released* We entirely agree with that, but it seems to UG that this is a matter

which goes beyond these very humane and human rights considerations. As Members

of the United Nations, we have to look at this picture as a whole, and even more

important than the human rights aspect, in our opinion, is the political aspect

of this whole question. ' ' ...

As far as we can see, there is no possibility of any kind of useful continuanc

of United Nations interest in the Congo unless there is accord between the people.

It is obvious that the solution lies in the hands of the people and not of the

United Nations. The United Nations can only assist, can only advice 'perhaps. If

that proposition is correct, then it means that the various parties -- I do not

know whether there are organized parties — or leaders, whether tribal or acting

in an individual capacity, have to get together and find some kind of modus Vivendi

and have the pariiuncnt meet, and perhaps have further elections at a later date

according to what seems to them the best solution of their own problems. For that

reason conciliation, as we have all said in this Committee before and as-has been

accepted by the General Assembly itself — it was evident from the speeches of

everybody -- becomes of paramount importance. Without that there can be no end

to the Congo problem and we shall all be getting deeper and deeper into the mire.

That being so, we have at once to think of the essential elements, the

essential components of any conciliation in the Congo and, without being pro-Lumumlc

or anti-anybody, it is obvious that there can be no political settlement in the

15-15(Mr. Jha, India)

Congo unless one of the principle parties or components to that settlement is

Mr. Lumumba. It has "been said repeatedly that whereas there may be other political

leaders there, perhaps Mr. Lumumba is the only one who cuts across tribal and

other loyalties and is some kind of national figure. The events during the last

two months have clearly indicated that Mr. Lumumba cannot be ignored; and when I

say this it is not to boost Mr. Lumumba but only to state what appears to be an

unbiased inference from the developments in the Congo.

That being so, it seems to us that perhaps we should go a little further and

this will be our advice to you for consideration. We cannot stop at these

communications, good as they are and very appropriate as they are. I think it

has been stressed to Mr. Kasavubu, Mr. Tshcmbe and whoever else is concerned

that if we are to look at the Congo problem in a broad perspective, the sort, of

treatment being given to Mr. Lumumba — his detention without trial, his

incarceration, the most inhuman and undignified treatment given to him, treatment

which is against all codes of civilized behaviour --is not going to help to solve

the political difficulties. I think that if this Advisory Committee — I speak

for my own delegation, of course — is to give you sound and frank advice, our

advice would be, through you, to try to impress on Mr. Kasavubu and whoever else

is concerned, that Mr. Lumumba must be brought out into any kind of conciliation

move, whether it is a round table conference or a meeting of parliament or anything

else. It is, as I said, for them to decide on the best mec-ao of achieving

conciliation. . Therefore, it becomes necessary not only that there should be no

further mistreatment of Mr. Lumumba, that his incarceration should not be

continued without trial, but also that he should be given

the liberty to participate fully in discussions at a round table conference and,

along with others, come to come kind of amicable arrangement. Without that,

frankly, we feel that we are not heading towards anything; we are just aimlessly

drifting in the Congo. And when I say "we" I mean we in the United Nations as well

as the political parties in the Congo,

- ;'.;. ,r••;•."«' .«•••;. =,-•.• '. .«.:••''

. . - . " . . 1 6 .

(Mr, JhaA India)

Would it> then; be possible for you, Mr* Secretary-General,, to say that this

vaa,the .feeling of .the Advisory Committee? Perhaps you would.hesitateto do that,

because, if I may say so, this is rather profound advice and is advice of a

political.nature. Of course, I,am expressing the views of my own delegation,

but, if these are also the views of the other members of the Committee, would it

be poscible, Mr. Secretary-General, to state that,Mr. Lumumba not .only should be

treated humanely, l?ut also should be enabled to participate in a completely

unfettered and independent way in any negotiations at a round-table conference pr

elsewhere?

:, . That leads me to my final point*., Mr. Lumvimba can participate in, negotiations

only if he is not incarcerated by the very people vltii •whom he must _negotiate. If anyone is to advise President Kacavubu or other people in the Congo,

that advice must be that Mr. Lumuuba,1 s incarceration niiould be ended so that he may

participate in negotiations. If it is felt. that..there may be some danger in this

for Mr* Lumumba, he might be put in the.protective, custody of the United Nations;

I did see some suggestion in the newspapers. that the International Red Crocs should

take on.this task, although I do not know how the International Red Cross would be

able-,to secure protective custody. Of course, all this must be done with

rMr. iLumumba's. consent,, but in this way it, might be. possible, without frinally

absolving .Mr., Lumumba, from any legal charges against him thut may be sustainable,•, : • ' ' r • • • • • » . • • • '

, to enable Mr. Lumumba to participate Jn. the work of conciliation* The

Conciliation Conmission, which is in the Congo, could itself help in that process.

I am sorry to have taken so much time. I would sum up as follows, in this

whole picture of the treatment, or the .mistreatment, of Mr. Lumumba which has come

out in the last few days, the most serious politicE.1 considerations are involved,

considerations which go to very root of the maintenance of the integrity of the

Congo. It needs no prophet to say.that, if things continue as they are at present

the Congo itself will not be able to hold together; it will probably be broken up

into various pieces; and that will be one of the tragedies of history.

Therefore, I have merely expressed my views for the consideration of the othe?

members of the Committee. If we are really to give some profound and worthwhile

advice, that is the only line we can take, in our opinion. If that is also thei

view of other members of the Advisory Committee, perhaps you, Mr'. Secretary-General

would 1e good enough to transmit it -- not necessarily as your suggestion, but as

the view put to you for your consideration by the Advisory Committee,

17

Mr. KGILERUMA (Nigeria): Since I was not here, Mr. Secretary-General,

during the firot part of your explanation, I should like to ask two questions.

The first is the following. Is there any truth in the stories we have been

reading in the newspapers that Mr. Lumumba has been beaten and ill treated?

The SECRETARY-gg^gRAL; That has been confirmed by our people. They saw

it through field glasses from a distance of 100 metres. Between them and the

mistreatment there was a cordon of gendarmes. Thus, they were distant witnesses

but nevertheless witnesses to the mistreatment, and wa must trujt their word,

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): My second question is this. Is there any

truth in the reports that the Belgians are casing an attempt to enter Katanga

Province or other places in the Belgian Congo?

The SSCR.ET.ARY'-GKMERAiL; We know nothing to that effect. I think that

that is a newspaper rumour.

Mr* NOILERUMA (Nigeria) : On the question of keeping Mr. Lumumba in

prison and mistreating him, I would say the following. We Africans know our

problems. If Mr. Lumumba is accused of having committed either a political or a

criminal offence, I see no reason why he should be kept in prison for so long,

If he is accused of a political or criminal offence, either serious or not serious,

he must be taken before a court and the case must be decided; it must be proved

whether he is innocent or guilty. That would give the Conciliation Commission an

opportunity to see him either as a freed, innocent person or as a prisoner. To

keep someone in prison for such a long time can create a good deal of resentment

and ill feeling and can break the morale of ths people. I repeat that I see no

reason why Mr. Lumumba should be unnecessarily kept in prison for so long.

As I have said, we Africans know our problems. This is the kind of treatment

which will be given anyone who is left "in tha hands of his political opponents.

Mr. Lumumba's treatment is now entirely within the discretion of his political

opponents. I do not want to comment on whether or not Justice has been done.

The fact is, however, that this poor creature has been left entirely in the hands

of hie political opponents,

18(Mr, Ngileruma, Nigeria)

If the Congolese bed not invited the United Nations to intervene, it would be

a different matter altogether. But they did invite the United Nations to intervene.

And now we see this poor creature being ill treated by his political opponents and

being kept unnecessarily in prison, while his supporters agitate in the country.

I am quite sure that that will lead to very serious consequences. After all, we

Africans are vatching the events in the Congo from many different angles. It is a

Central African country0 There are no guarantees that what happens in the Congo

will not happen in other countries.

I do not Bay that the Conciliation Commission is not doing its work. It has

Just started its work and we must give it a chance to ctudy the whole problem.

Nevertheless, the presence of the United Nations and the Conciliation Ccmiesion is

very important. I see nothing at the present moment in the Congo situation which

would Justify the statement that it was an exclusively internal matter. It would

be entirely different in normal circumstances. But in this case the international,

interest ie involved and the international Organization is present in the country*

In such circumstances, when a poor creature is being ill treated it is very

difficult for me to understand how the United Nations can adhere to the policy of

non-interference in internal affairs. In normal conditions it might be said that

the Congo was a sovereign country and no one should interfere in its own problems.

But in this case the political leaders of the country are agitating and,

furthermore, the country itself invited the United Nations to intervene. I cannot

see how a quarrel which has reached the stage of ill treating a human being can be

considered as an exclusively internal matter. This man's political opponents have

some aim, some interest, in keeping him in prison for such a long time.

I have seen something in the newspapers which I do not like. I refer to the

question of discrimination in the Congo, The newspapers say that the United

Nations will come to the assistance of the white people in the Congo, but when

Africans are killing each other, suffering from hunger, dying of disease, the

United Nations says, "This is an internal affair; we shall not intervene". That is

something which will be of concern to any African State. We have very strong

feelings about this situation in the Congo. We are very anxiously'awaiting a

report from the Conciliation Commission. We fully support the Commission and we

are optimistic that it will not fail to carry out its task. Nevertheless, we ask

the Secretary-General to advise the Conciliation Commission to see that something

19-20

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

is done about Mr* Lumumba. We are not mentioning Mr. Lumumba because we

wish to side with one faction and ignore another. That is not the case at all.

Eut Mr. Lumumba is a human being and a political leader, and without his

participation and that of his supporters the Conciliation Commission cannot do

its work properly.

21

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

If the matter is left to a delay like this, it will be very serious

indeed "because ve do not know when he is going to he tried. He is now

Bte.ying in the prison indefinitely, and that will lead to many had things

ouch as civil war. If it gets out of hand it may extend to other Aftican

countries.

As I said "before, the Congo is in the centre of Africa and all of us are

watching it very, very attentively and very carefully.

The_SECI331!AR7-GEira5AL; I should like to clear up one or two

points, .

First of all, as you know, in the case of the Congo only about half of the

newspaper reports can bo trusted. We should also remember that, quite apart

from the bias which slips into the Press, so to eay naturally, because of

their tendency to dramatize issues and find something which stirs up peoples'

feelings, there is a propaganda element.

The stories about discrimination are completely and utterly unfounded and

are, I believe, explaf.ned by the two factors to which I referred: a certain

tendency to invent stories if there are none, and a certain lack of resistance

against certain propaganda tendencies. As I said, allegations to that effect

are utterly unwarranted.

The major part of the United Nations effort is for the Congolese, the

African Congolese — 4;ha overwhelming part even, I would say. But we

cannot have racialism in reverse -- and that is not your intention —

which gives white peorJa less protection than is given to the

Congolese.

As regards disease and hunger, 100 per cent of the effort is concerned

with Africans, and nothing but that.

As regards resistance to and protection against ill treatment, we give

those protection who ask for our protection, as in Kivu and Orientale. The

actions by the authorities have been, on the whole — I would say, 90 per cent\

directed against the whites, and when the whites have asked for protection

of course we have followed our general rule. But back of that is no picking

and choosing, no classification and no discrimination, and I can assure you

of that in the most strong terms.

22

(The Secretary-General)

Aa regards the position on Mr. Lumumba, you will see from these letters,

vhich in part repeat in a strengthened form what has already been said, that

the point you bring up is very much in our minds and very clearly brought

out. It is said in a letter to President Kasavubu that this is a further

interference with Mr. Lumumba's right to be tried without delay. In the final

paragraph it in said that he should be brought back from Katanga so that,.

unless released, he be given an opportunity to answer the charges against

him. The line you take IE therefore very much th-3 line we have taken

ourselves, and I agree with you that it runs against not only human rights

but also against what is civilized practice in any country to keep a man

detained without bringing him to court, without formulating accusations and

without giving him a fair right to defence. If that right and those

principles are given up, I also agree with you that that is a very simple

way to resolve problems in relation to your political opponents. But I

feel that what was basic to the civilized approach to these problems is

exactly that such abuses are not permitted. For that reacon we will insist

on that line, and we will put all the moral weight we have back of it. I believe

that in this respect as matters have developed, and with the different

functions which the Conciliation Commission has and that we have here, I have

in fact gone considerably further than the Conciliation Commission has found

it possible to do so far. But I am, on the other hand, absolutely certain

that the line taken here, of which the Conciliation Commission is of course

informed, will have the full backing of the Conciliation Commission — that

is to say, whatever moral weight this demarche from my side has in relation

to Kasavubu and Tshombe will be increased by the moral weight carried by the

great number of Afro-Asian States which take part in the work of the

Conciliation Commission. My real worry is whether and, if so, how we can

go beyond that stage, and there I think that our colleague from India made

important and interesting suggestions, especially as regards the need to see

to it that conditions are created under which a free exchange of views can

take place in the action of conciliation. This obviously means tliat we

cannot have any political prisoners among the leaders, and further that we might

consider sonethiog in the direction of some kind of protective custody through

some kind of international agency.

23-25

(The Secretary-General)

Those were, as I understand it, two additional observations which you

wished to make. But this is a thorny problem, and I think we will have to

oig further into it to see where wo are.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French):

I very much regret the treatment inflicted on Mr. Lumumba and his two friends

on the plane who were mernberc of Parliament ana who thus enjoy parliamentary

immunity but who were savagely beaten. I rsgret that for reasons beyond their

control the United Nations forces on the spot could not help them.

Mr. Lumumba and his companions are still in prison -- for more than three

months now — against all rules of law. They have not been tried and no

indictment has been made in their case. This kind of situation can only

deeply shock the conscience of the world,

Mr» Secretary-General, I have read the two letters that you have sent,

one to Mr. Kasavu.bu and the other to Mr« Tshombe'. We hope that at least

these letters will help to guarantee more humane treatment to Mr. Lumumba

and his companions.

We think that the only possible solution of the problem is to free

Mr, Lumumba, We consider that Mra Tshombe' has no Jurisdiction over him

and that he has no right to keep him in prison. On what law does Mr. Tshombe

base himself in doing so? Mr. Tshombe says that hie province is. independent.

In that case, how can he take and keep a man who belongs to another province?

On what basis has Mr. Lumumba been given to him?

Mr. Tehomba has even claimed — I do not know whether or not this is true;

I see it in your letter — that he did not even have knowledge of this situation,

of this fait accompli. If Mr. Tshombe ponders well what he is doing, he should

simply set Mr. Lumumba free.

The result of what I have Just said is that there can be no Congolese

solution without Mr. Lumumba. No negotiations can be successful without

Mr. Lumumba's participation6 Mr, Lumumba is at present a national figure;

he is a figure not only in the Congo but everywhere in Africa. If these

truths are not taken into consideration,we irill never find any solution to the

Congolese problem.

26

Mr.ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to

make a few remarks and perhaps present a few suggestions,

I may begin "by saying that if it were not for our knowledge of the

character of certain politicians such as Mr. Kasavubu we might say that we were

gravely disillusioned and disappointed at his conduct. The Secretary-General

has just had a "brief stay in the Congo and has had. the opportunity of consulting

with Mr, Kasavubu, I suppose that Mr. Kasavubu made certain promises to the

Secretary-General, for example, in relation to facilitating the work of the

Ccnciliation Commission, Two or three days after that Mr, Kasavubu seems to have

changed his mind, unless he received different instructions. First he asked

for the recall of the Secretary-General^ representative in the Congo and then

he transfers from one jail to another the main political figure in the Congo

without whom it is impossible to find any solution of the Congolese problem, the

man with whom the Conciliation Commission was to endeavour to find means of

conciliation among all the Congolese leaders. This maa is sent to the jail of one

of his fiercest opponents, a man who is surrounded by people who would not think

twice before ending'Mr,'Lumumba's life. These are the Belgian advisers who

direct and guide Katanga.

I should like to ask a question of the Secretary-General, It seems that

when Mr, Lumumba and his two colleagues arrived at Elisabethville, there was

only a very small number of'United Nations troops present and no attempt could

be made by them to undertake what the Secretary-General called the protection

of life and property in the Congo. This protection of life and property should

apply to all Congolese, including Prime Minister Lumumba, Thus, if there had

been a sufficient numbor of United Nations troops at the airport, perhaps they

would have tried to stop this barbarous action. If that is the case, I should

be most grateful if the Secretary-General could reply to this question later on.

It seems that as long as Katanga remains a Belgian colony and as long as

every measure taken in Katanga is taken by the Belgians through their so-called

technical advisers, it will be impossible to do anything in Katanga, The

attitude of the Belgians in Katanga with respect to Mr. Lumumba could, of course,

have results among the pro-Lumumba factions, which now occupy a considerable

part of the Congo, that is to say there could be reprisals. For example, they

could begin to mistreat Belgians in that territory. In such an event, it is

27

(Mr* Achkar, Guinea)

clear that the United Nations would attempt to protect these Belgians, although

it was not able to protect Mr. Lumumba*

I am most grateful to Mr, Jha and Mr. Loutfi for their suggestions. It is

very clear to all of us and clear to the whole world that no solution will be

found in the Congo as long as Mr. Lumumba is illegally imprisoned an^ as long

as he does not participate with other Congolese leaders in the political life

of the Congo.

If certain great Powers have made the problems of the Congo into a problem

of personalities and if one thinks that by liquidating Mr. Lumumba one could

solve the Congolese problem, that would be a grave error. We all know that

since Mr. Lumumba has been in jail the situation has not at sll evolved in the

hoped for direction. There will ba thous'inds of Lumumbas in the Congo and in

the whole of Africa* The eventual liquidation of Mr. Lumumba would not solve

the problem. This goes without saying and it should be very clearly understood.

That is why energetic measures must be undertaken to see that at least respect

for one of the most fundamental principles of the United Nations, respect for

human rights, is observed. An illegal Government, such as the Government of

Tshombe, who proclaims self-independence, should not imprison the Prime Minister

of a State of which it no longer claims to be a part.

Therefore, the suggestions of Mr. Jha and Mr. Loutfi should be adopted

by the Committee and also, if possible, by the Secretariat.

We feel that the question raised by the representative of Nigeria is a

very important one. Although we do not always believe the Press and radio reports,

we know through the Press that Belgium has either sent or is about to send two

additional battalions. It is not necassary to recall the recent debates in the

Security Council, However, I think that it would be a most serious ch&llenge

to the United Nations if a few days after the meeting of the Security Council,

which was called to discuss Belgian intervention in Kivu, Belgium were to send

its troops into provinces which they no longer control in order to set up puppet

governments such as the Government of Tshombe. Masaacres would indeed follow

such action. This would certainly daal a very heavy blow to the prestige of the

United Nations. We hope that the United Nations will do everything in its

power to prevent such an occurence.

28

(Mr* Aehbnr, Guinea)

Finally, I should like to insist once again that, if it is impossible at

present, for reasons which are not now apparent, to free Mr, Lumumba at once, the

leaet that should be done is to protect his human rights and preserve the

possibility of solving the Congolese problem in the future. We are convinced

that if Mr. Lumumba were to disappear, United Nations action in the Congo

would be useless. The United Nations will have contributed to creating in the

heart of Africa a most serious situation which could only have grave repercussions

and which would be a threat to the peace of the world.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I should like to point out that in the message

to Mr, Tshombe there is a phrase the significance of which you may not have

seen at once, namely that I say that on the assumption that this was without the.

prior approval of Mr, Tshombe, he undoubtedly would like to see to it that

Mr. Lumumba and his companions are given the benefit of due process of law, and

that I emphasized what follows —"at the place of competent jurisdiction". To

the best of our understanding, Katanga can never be the place of competent

Jurisdiction, We cannot say what court is competent in this case, but quite

apart from the fact that Mr, Tshombe claims to have seceded from the Congo, it

is most certainly not the local judicial authorities in Katanga which are

competent. Negatively, that much is certain.

Mr, ADEEL (Sudan): I am intervening again to join other representatives

in deploring this mode of conduct and the treatment meted out to Mr. Lumumba,

In saying that, I wish also to register my appreciation of the very timely

and proper action taken by the Secretary-General in his communication to

President Kasavubu, I am glad that he reminded Mr, Kasavubu of the concern that

he had expressed previously that the case of Mr, Lumumba should be conducted

in accordance with the rules applied by civilized countries.

In this connexion, my feelings are the same as those of Mr. Jha, namely

that some additional demarche should be made to impress on Mr, Kasavubu and his

lieutenants that this treatment and behaviour do not help the Congolese cause. If

this action is allowed to continue, it will make any prospect of finding a solution

more and more difficult. As we know, and it is becoming more apparent everyday,

Mr. Lumumba cannot be ignored in the political life of the Congo. Any settlement

29-30

(Mr. Adeel» Sudan)

to which either Mr. Lumumba or his proper representatives are not parties will

not be an enduring settlement of the Congolese question*

31

(Mr* Adeelj Sudan)

Saying this, I would add my voice to that of Ambassador Jha and

Ambassador Loutfi that; if in your own way you could convey these feelings

of the Advisory Committee to Mr, Kasavubu, these things cannot be tolerated

any longer because they are not in the interest of the Congo, if he has

the interest of the Congo at heart. I think Kasavubu is really seeing this

himself by now and, I think, by his transferring Lumumba to Katanga, he

has shown some sign of unrest himself. lie is not very happy about the loyalty

cf even the troops in Thysville to himself or to Mobutu.

So all the signs point to the inevitable fact that if a solution is to

be found to the problem of the Congo, Lumumba or his qualified representatives

should be participants in any effort to solve this unfortunate problem. Of

course, it would be ideal if the authorities could be prevailed upon to

liberate Mr. Lumumba; and if that is not possible in the circumstances, I

think it is inevitable that he should be brought to a speedy and very fair

trial, as is suggested in your communication to Kasavubu.

Mr. SALL (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I should like to

make a few remarks concerning the treatment meted out to Mr. Lumumba. I must

say first of all how much we approve the initiative that you, Mr. Secretary-

General, have taken to intervene with President Kasavubu and President Tshombe

so that measures which you deem appropriate be taken as soon as possible.

It seems to us that on the one hand the brutal treatment inflicted upon

Lumumba is profoundly disturbing and shocking. We consider that this brutal

treatment was not in any way Justified, and that on the contrary it would only

tend to worsen the political situation in the Congo and prevent the Conciliation

Commission from reaching the goal that the General Assembly has entrusted to it.We know that political opponents usually mate out very bad treatment to people

who do not think as they do. We think that the detention of Lumumba is in

fact harmful to the cause of peace in the Congo; and on the other hand we

also think that the friends of Lumumba and his adherents will never agree with

the other political leaders of the Congo if Lumumba is still kept in prison

and especially if such brutal acts are inflicted upon him.

32-35

(Mr. Sail, Senegal)

We are also of the opinion that the transfer of Lumumba to what we would

call the Province of Katanga is something extraordinary because Katanga has

seceded; Katanga proclaims itself an independent republic. It is a country

that could be considered as outlawed in the Congo/ and its jurisdiction

certainly could not apply in the case of a trial for Lumumba. This is why

you were very well inspired in stressing that Lumumba should appear before

a competent jurisdiction; and by this we mean a jurisdiction that would not

be located on the territory of Katanga,

My delegation would also like to make a few remarks concerning the very

objectives of the United Nations presence in the Congo. We have always been

of the opinion that the United Nations has in the Congo a mission consisting

mainly of the maintenance of law and order without any distinction. This is

why it would be most appropriate that protection which the Organization could

afford to people in the Congo should be equal to that which it would afford

to the life, freedom, and liberty of all Congolese, especially if these

Congolese happen to be political leaders. This is a very important element and

it deserves to be stressed again because the brutal treatment inflicted upon

Lumumba could lead the people to believe that the protection granted to therights and the freedoms of a Congolese were not as full and unreserved as that

granted to non-Congolese9 to Belgians for example.

We must also underline the fact that according to information whichhas reached us, Lumumba is a political prisoner and not a mere criminal. As apolitical prisoner Lumumba i's entitled to a privileged status, a special

status1. It is only through such status and by ensuring such status that the

Conciliation Commission will best be able to achieve its objective of

conciliation among all political parties in the Congo. It is by guaranteeing

to Lumumba a status which would be consonant to his position as a political

prisoner that it will have the necessary independence to achieve the objectives

which we want to see achieved.

To conclude, I should simply like to say that my delegation would be

strongly in favour of measures that would ensure the transfer of Lumumba from

Katanga to another part of the Republic of the Congo and on the othe'r hand the

granting to him of the status of a political prisoner and not that of an ordinary

criminal.

The SECRETARY-GENERALt I should like to emphasize again that the rules

applied as regards protection are absolutely identical for any individual,

irrespective of position or race. That goes without saying. There are very many

cases of non-Africans. We alvays talk of Belgians, but, for example, in

Stanleyville half of the white population are Greeks or Cypriots, so I think that

the general impression that every non-African in those parts of the Congo is a

Belgian is a little misleading, We have several cases of non-African population

where, in the same way aa here, they have been incarcerated without our being able

to prevent it, where they have bean beaten and maltreated in all sorts of ways

without our being able to prevent it, and where our action, for that reason, has

had to take exactly the same form as in this case, where we also face a fait

accompli outside our control on the preventive side — that is to say, by exerting

whatever pressure we can by political and diplomatic means, and using whatever

moral argunents we can apply in order to protect them while in prison and to get

them released if possible.

An entirely different situation is the one which prevailed while Mr. Lumumba

was in his house in Leopoldville, or, for that matter, when Mr. Gizenga came to

us in Stanleyville. Then we were a protecting power, and we could, as you know,

in Leopoldville, for example, even stop an arrest against him. In the same way,

if, as is now the case outside Bukavu, certain parts of the white population,

after very bad manhandling, have sought refuge in this or that house which we can

protect, and which we do protect, we give them that protection.

These examples should go to show that it is a misunderstanding, and a

dangerous one, if you conclude from the spectacular cases you sea that this or

that kind of discriminatory principle is applied. That is sircply not the case,

and I need not assure you that nothing would be more against the spirit of.the

whole United Nations operation in the Congo than such a procedure. I think that

it would be very good if — on the basis of your conviction, if you agree with me,

on the basis of a study of the factual material if you.want to study it — you

could, so to say/help to kill this suspicion or this fear, because if it is

permitted to grow I think it will haym everybody. It will harm the Organization

as such, very unjustly; it will harm the good co-operation in thejarea; and it

will tend to envenom relations which are good and which should remain good and

trusting.

37(The Secretary-General)

So, speaking here on the basis of what T knoV and with full conviction, I

would ask you to look at this matter and to give consideration to your'

possibility of counteracting this false impression, which may have a reason

because of the fact that in the case of Lumumba —this Very spectacular case —

we have, again and again, once he had escaped from Leopoldville, been faced with

established facts without the possibility of preventive intervention'. -; - • ••-' '

Mrv RITCHIE (Canada): I wihh just to express our feeling of 'shock

and disgust at the brutal treatment Which has' been 'meted out to Mr. Lumumba.

This kind of brutality is equally shocking whether it is applied to Africans or

to non-Africens, to political leaders or to'tn? most obscure individuals. I

should like, at the'same time/ to say that' I have now had the opportunity to

read the two communications which the Secretary-General sent to President Kasavubu

and to Mr. Tshombe, and they seem to us to express in very firm tsrms the

necessity, with which we thoroughly agree, that Mr. Lumumba should be brought 'to

a fair and speedy trial in accordance'with the guarantees which are normally

given to accused persons.

Mr. WAPZAZI (Morocco)(interprete.t5.on from French): At the outset

I should like to express my satisfaction at what has just been said by the

Ambassador of Canada. Press reports this morning stated that a prominent

Canadian personality had replied to a journalist, "We should have our work cut

out if we were to intervene every time someone wras struck".

In the second place, the question which we are studying has two aspects,

a humanitarian aspect and a legal aspect. On the humanitarian plane, we note

with satisfaction the communications which you, Mr. Secretary-General, have sent

to President Kasavubu and to Mr. Tshombe. However, acts of negligence have

been committed at the aerodrome itself. The press has reported that before the

arrival of the aircraft at the airport movements of armoured tanks and Katanga

troops had been observed, which leads one to suppose that something unusual and

abnormal was expected to happen there. Perhaps the United Nations soldiers

could have taken precautions and could have been there in sufficient strength

to prevent what happened. That is an act of technical negligence.

38-lK)(Mr. Warzazi, Morocco)

There is another failure, which is rather more serious. It is of a legal

character, and it concerns, first, the illegal transfer of Mr. Lumumba, and,

second, a certain inertia after that transfer.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have given you all the information we

have which is confirmed and factual information, and I cannot, on

this basis, reply to your question, which is a question which naturally does

arise. However, I should like to point out that in Elisabethville, on the

whole, we have not very many troops because Elisabethville does not represent

one of the points where we have to have concentrations. We have to have them

in north Katanga, in Kasai, in Kivu, in Oriental and in Leopoldville. So I

presume that the company which has been, as a normal thirjg, detached for

protection of the airport, is about what they can, on a normal military basis,

provide. Were developments of this type foreseeable, we, or rather our military

representatives,might wish to make redisposals of their forces. However, as I

have said, I have given you all the information we have and I cannot reply as to

what possibilities there might have existed.

1*1

Mr* Martinue L« JOHNSON (Liberia) t Mr. Secretary-General, I wish to

Join the rest of the distinguished gentlemen around this table in expressing ,our

Governments regret and disgust at the type of treatment that was neted out. to

Mr. Lumumba. We have read about the situation vith interest and followed the

events very closely. We have read stories in certain newspapers about some

nations not wanting to sit by and see the Congo taken over by certain other

political factors in the col.d war conflict* But we noted with interest that

there was no mention of concern for the welfare of the Congolese people.

We have been labouring here for nor.tins exactly to try to prevent bringing

the Congo situation into the cold war. Vie have alcto heard, quite recently,

before the Security Council, the a&nission on the part of the Belgian Government

of the fact that although t-bsre were ciir.umfltc.nce3 beyond tlioir control, they did

permit the Trust Territory to be used, thus contributing towards interference in

the work of the United Nations in the Congo. When any objective attempt was

made on the part of Mr, PayrJl to submit true reports on. the situation in the

Congo, and when those reports were not favourable to certain political factions>there was a great noise in the press that he be recalled, that.he be thrown out.

We have also noted that during the presentation of a statement before the

Security Council by the representative of the Congo Government of Mr* Kasavubu,

he tried to impress that body that all was going well and that certain

interventions were being carried out by the United Nations, He also went to the

extent of criticizing the operation by your representative, .Mr. Secretary-General,

which you replied to very franld.y by explaining to the body that this was not

true and did not express the view of President Kacavubu*

'Therefore, it seems quite obvious that someone is collaborating with

somebody else in such a fashion that there are continuing interventions -vrhich

are going to make it more difficult to carry out our programme in the Congo in

terms of the effectiveness of the operation of ,the Conciliation Commission.

This seems to us to be the crux of the problem; What can we do to prevent

future intervention from either side? We are wondering, Mr. Secretary-General, . .

whether you could give us some indication as to your opinion on the extent of

such interventions in the Congo and what solution you think could ibe set forth,

thus leaving sufficient room, in a quiet atmosphere, for the entire problem to

be speedily brought to a conclusion. . ... . .

The SECI ARY GENgRAL; It Is exceedingly difficult to reply to your

question becaune interventions to the extent that they may exist are not only

anonymoun, but very often seem to be at the invitation of this or that personality

in the Congo. The campaign against the UN, which so far has culminated in the

request for the recall of MrB Dayal, has not stopped in spite of a reaction

which, although polite in fora, could not have been firmer in substance, the one

you SP.W from my side. For example, today there was a statement over the radio

from one of the Commissioners which repeated the accusations against us and

against Special Representative Dayal in nr;ch mo.ve general bu'i at the same time much

more vulgar terms. That is certainly; if not spontaneous; nt least a true

reflection of the views of come of those who at present wield pover in

LeopoldviLLe, and I do not think that there need be any outside inspiration or

any collaboration back of it as an explanation.

However, what is regrettable is that such others who may have an influence

upon the situation in the Congo and on the leading personalities do not exercise

that influence in a direction which would lead to reconciliation and peace and

good co-operation with us. At least there is a sin of omission* As the

matter further is anonymous and as we are in duty bound, as you understand,

to act very much like judges in the sense that we never put on the table anything

which we cannot prove, I would like to stop at this point*

Mr» NGILERllMA. (Nigeria): Mr, Secretary-General, we now rely on

newspaper reports and at times, when we read some bad reports, our temper is

aroused, because the situation in the Congo worries us very much. Therefore, I

would like to make a suggestion that in order for this Advisory Committee to be

in touch with the Secretariat very closely, we could perhaps meet more regularly

in order to get first-hand information, because relying on newspaper reports will

lead to many embarrassments, anxieties and worries.

Secondly, I should like to go back to the question of the Conciliation

Commission a little, I think that in order to facilitate the work of the

Conciliation Commission, we have to stress the point which you yourself,

Mr, Secretary-General, have explained. Mr, Lumumba having more supporters in

the country, I think that without him the Conciliation Commission cannot do its

work properly. This is my very strong conviction, I wish to stress the point

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria) ;

that vigorous action should be taken to facilitate the work of the Conciliation

Commission so that they may see him in a very friendly atmosphere and not under

political pressure or under some bad situation. These are the two points that

I would like to bring to your notice again.

Thq SECTiETARY-GFIEEPL? Ware tha Conciliation Commission to run into

difficulty in seeing Mr, Lumumba, for what it is worth we would of course put

all our pressure back of them and of their right to see him. So far there is no

indication that they will not see him.On the first point, I agree with you entirely. It is our wish to see to it

that you are fully briefed as soon as possible on major developments. There is

one worry on our side which I think you will appreciate, and that is that- italways takes a little bit of time before our people have, jo to sc,y, run down

the various stories and got the facts.For example, the report which I read to you, the signed testimony on what

happened at ElizabethvJJI.le, arrived only this morning; that is to say, we gaveit to you as soon as possible and we will follow the same rule always. That

may however mean that on this and that occasion we will have to wait a few days.As you know, the reporters never wait.

Mr. MA5FAR (Indonesia): Mr. Secretary-General, I would like to join

the other speakers in expressing appreciation for the information which you gaveus so as to bring us up to date on the later developments in the Congo. My

delegation deplores the latest action taken with regard to Mr. Lumumba and inparticular the beatings inflicted upon Mm, and we regret that the UN has been

unable to prevent them.My delegation has already taken note of your explanation of the situation

surroundings these happenings. The Indonesian delegation has repeatedlystressed that no solution of the problem of the Congo could be brought about

without the active participation of Mr. Lumumba, who is one of the nationalistleaders in the Congo. The first step in the solution of the Congo problem is,

therefore, to free Mr. Lumumba. Continued imprisonment of Mr* Lumumba

(Mr. Masfar, Indonesia)

will further hamper efforts for finding a solution to the Congo problem. Westill hope that steps in this direction can be taken. In the meantime, we

would like to express our appreciaton for the steps already taken by you to

prevent further occurrences of this kind.

Mr. ADEEL.(Sudan); I hope I am justified .in surmising that we , are _:;not contesting the competence of jurisdiction on the assumption that Katanga has

declared its independence. We would, not like to speak in any context,. or for

argument1 s sake about t h e independence o f Katanga. , - . . . . .

The SSCRETAKY-GEKERAL; As you may remember, I said, "quite apart from

the. fact of a claim for secession..,/1 we failed to see how the local authorities

in Katar. a could have any jurisdiction under, local .law,, so your point is taken -

care, of . .. _ . .. .. . . - , ,% • ... .....

Mr. I0LITFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): With

regard to the news about Belgian troops in Rua-ida-tJrandi, . I understand,

Mr, Secretary-General, that you have no information on that. Can you clarify

this point?, . . . . . . .

. The g ^ ^ ggggALt .What we know is as follows. First, there was,..

newfi over the ticker yesterday that two .battalions had moved down, to Ruanda-Urundi .

Later, however, there was a cable, also a news agency cable from Brussels,

according to which an official spokesman of the Belgian Government had said

that what. had happened there was that, as part of a rotation, they had withdrawn

one battalion and put in two companies. The third piece of news is -from a

source of our own, and it is unconfirmed. It is from one of our men who has

been on the other side of the border, and he carried back a story which

corresponded to the first newspaper release . However, we cannot say whether that

is original information or just an echo of what was on the ticker. That is to

say, frankly we do not know. We cannot exclude that the story may be true, but

we have no evidence to support it.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Can you

tell us something about the activities in the Congo of the Conciliation Commissiont

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; After the first round of meetings in Leopoldville,

where obviously they had repeated consultations with President Kasavubu, Mr. Ileo,

Mr. Kasenga and with Mr. Kami tatu — these are the names I can mention with.

certainty — they left for Stanleyville, where they arrived yesterday night.

(The Secretary-General)

There have been some difficulties about the arrangements in Stanleyville, but

the latest news received this afternoon is that Gizenga, who at first refused to

see the Commission, now seems to agree to see them, and that should be within the

course of today. In Elisabethville, where the Commission is going next,

Mr. Tshombe has said that they are quite welcome, but that he has no intention to

see them. Of course, we have not accepted that because if they are to go to

Elisabethville, one of those whom they are bound to see is, of course, Mr. Tshombe

himself. We have no report from the Commission which, so to say, speaks with

the voice of the Commission. We just have information concerning the arrangements

they have made and the arrangements which are planned for the near future. I

guess that the Commission would like to wait to make its oT-rn report, or rather

a report on substance, until they have seen a little rtuxre of the scene.

Mr._ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): If the news agency

messages are confirmed, that is to say, if the Belgian Government has concentrated

additional troops in Ruanda-Urundi, is the United Nations planning to do anything

to prevent a tragic collision between the Belgian troops and the troops of the

Congolese Government?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes. The situation is as follows. If we get

any more indication that the stories are true I would in the first instance address

a request to the Belgian Government for full information. I am entitled to do that

already on the basis of the legal status of the Trust Territory. If then it proves

correct, it will require some political action, but I cannot now sit down and

phrase it. It will depend a little on the total situation, but in view of the

Congo situation and our engagement in the Congo, I feel that proper action should

be taken by us in relation to Brussels. So much for the political level. On the

field level, the military level, certain arrangements have already been made,

because in agreement with the Stanleyville and Kivu authorities, the ANC is at

present withdrawn from the border, and the control and the patrolling of the bordei

has been taken over by the United Nations. . That is to say, there is in fact at

present a kind of neutralized zone along the border for which we, the

United Nations, are responsible.

1*8-50

(The Secretary-General)

That means that if the Belgians moved over the border — on land, of course,

if they flew over it would "be another matter — we are at the control posts. The

first encounter they would have would "be with our people, and their instructions,

of course, are clear in this case. In the circumstances, short of a breakthrough

over and against our resistance, there should not be any reason to fear an incident

of the kind you have in mind. I have, however, to repeat my reservation that what

is done by air is something which is much more difficult to control. We have no

military air force patrolling the border and an infantry guard can, of course,

always be jumped. However, I would not believe that for the moment we need to

count with that special risk. All the same, I consider that any build up, if such

a build up has come about in Ruanda-Urundi at present, would be provocative and

render our task much more difficult and dangerous and for that reason would entitle

us to take the kind of action I indicated at the beginning.

Mr. PIHACHA (Pakistan): Following on the information you gave in answer

to Mr. Loutfi's question about the activities of the Conciliation Commission, have

you any indication as to how long they intend to continue their operations?

TheSECRETARY-GE1MSRAL; None whatsoever. However, judging from

conversations, I think that they realistically feel that they must wind up in

such time that the report will be on the table well before the resumed session of

the General Assembly, That would give them another four or five veeks.

Mr. JIIA (India): I also wanted to ask you a question about the report

of the concentration of Belgian troops in Huouda-UruMi. That is something

entirely in the context of recent events and discussions in the Security Council

and is a matter of some concern, I am glad that you have already taken cognizance

of the matter and will take appropriate action in the event of the persistance of

such reports or of any more specific information which may have a bearing on the

Congo situation. Therefore, I will leave the matter at that and we would welcomeifurther information at a later date if you wish to give us that information.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If and when the matter develops further, you will

have that information.

53

Mr, JHA (India): I should like to go back to this question of the

incarceration of Mr. Lumumba. This matter has several aspects. There is the

aspect of human rights, which you have yourself emphasized in your communications.

There is the legal aspect, to vhich you have also referred. These aspects are

important, but I was rather disappointed to see — I do not know whether the Press

report is correct — in The New York Times of today that one of the United Nations

officials, a spokesman, said that the transfer of Mr. Lumumba was an internal

affair of the Congo. It seems to us that that is a very narrow way of looking at

the matter. It is an internal affair in the sense that the physical transfer of

Mr. Lumumba, his custody while he is in detention, and his trial, if one takes

place, are internal matters in which we cannot interfere. But it would be perhaps

not, quite correct to say that it is an internal matter because, in Its . .

consequences, I cannot imagine anything more international or more political than

the continued imprisonment of someone who is a national figure, whom many people

still regard as the .legitimate Prime Minister of the Congo, and without whom even

the most unlettered politician or diplomat can say that there will not be a

solution in the Congo* So, in its consequences, this really goes far beyond.an

internal affair of the Congo — although I will not dispute the proposition that

it is not for the United Nations or for this Advisory Cornnittee to interfere in

the internal affairs of the Congo. But I feel that we would not really be looking

at the thing in the right way if we do not widen our horizons and if we do not see

that this is something which goes far beyond an internal matter of the Congo. It

goes even beyond the human end legal aspects of the question. We do not dispute

the proposition that he should not be kept on indefinitely in jail. If there are

sustainable charges against him, whoever put him in prison should bring these

charges and, like any other person — although I know he has parliamentary

immunities, subject to those immunities he should get a fair trial.

It seems to us that we have to go further and look into the political

repercussions, the political future of the Congo. It is not the intention of

the United Nations -- and I do not think that any of the Members of the United

Nations envisage it — to carry on an endless operation in the Congo* The

happiest thing would be if the United Nations could get out of the Congo after

performing its tnek of ensuring the unity of the country, if the Congolese

themselves forge some kind of solution of their internal difficulties. Therefore,

I would again, in all humility, stress this aspect, namely, that we should not be

52(Mr. Jha, India)

content with merely emphasizing the human rights and the legal aspects. The legal

E~pect, of course, you have quito rightly pointed out in your communicoitions. I

C£ree with Mr, Adeel that we cannot argue with Mr, TuLnaiba — he has seceded

end, therefore, has no jurisdiction -- but that would be a contradiction of the

liLi that all c>f us hav-2 taken in the General Assembly and which has also been

rsnffirmed in the Security Council. But for Tshombe himself, for the whole of the

Congo, and for Kasavubu himrelf — I have no doubt about that if the lessons of the

last few weeks are any guide — it is important th.a'; Mr. Lumumba and those who are

sponsoring him, who are on his side, should be brought within the full range of

amicable discussions, with the asaistance of the Conciliation Commission.

Now, how is that to be done? It is difficult to envisage Lumumba negotiating

while he is kept in close detention by his political opponents. We have had some

experience of such negotiations. When the British were in India, several times

they had negotiations with the Congress Party, and every time during the

negotiations Mahatma Ghandi was freed from prison for the duration of the

negotiations. You cannot negotiate — it is against the laws of natural justice

and carries no conviction to anybody — if you negotiate with any person who is

entirely under control, physically or otherwise. Therefore, it becomes very

necessary, in the context of the conciliation, that the United Nations have at

heart, in the context of the political future of the whole Congo -- and we would be

wrong merely to think of this question as a matter of a legal trial or anything

like that, although that is important — the fact that Mr. Lumumba should be

freed from the custody of his political opponents, though he will not have any-

capacity and can be influenced in a way which is harmful to his own volition and

his own political interests and convictions. That is why I feel that we would be

justified in advising that Mr. Lumumba should be freed from his present custody —

the custody of his mortal enemies. It is extraordinary that he should be pushed

into a province whose chief has been his mortal enemy all these months. He should

be freed from that custody and, with his own consent, of course, should come under

United Nations protective custody because there might be some danger to his

person. Then his consent should be taken to any arrangement, he should be

negotiated with, and the Conciliation Commission should be enabled to perform its

task.

53

• (Mr. Jhft, India)

We are not saying this in any sense of partisanship of Lumumba; we are saying

this in. view of the possible political settlement that might "be reached in the

Congo, in view of the future of the Congo, which can only be ensured by amicable

arrangements between all parties, not the least important of which is Mr. Lumumba

and his followers.

I am sorry to come to this point again, but I would urge my colleagues to

consider this as a reasoneble point of view. It is a point of view which takes

into account the larger political considerations. Even the future of the United

Nations is involved in the whole thing, for if we fail in the Congo we fail in a

big way. We should perhaps advise the Secretory-General, for his consideration,

to put it in the best possible way — and we all know that he does it in a way

which is most appropriate -- that efforts ehouXd be made to get the release of

Mr. Lumumba from his present incarceration and, if necessary, his placement in the

protective custody of the United Nations, the over-all objective being to further

the chances of conciliation in the Congo and the evolutions of a settlement with

the consent of all political parties.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I /think that this intervention has brought us

closer to the stage where we can, so to say, draw conclusions from this discussion,

Permit me first of all to s&y that I do not know whether any spokesman has

said what is reported. If he did, he was, in my view, out of order because I

fully agree thrvt this cannot be regarded as an internal mutter in the sense that

it excludes uo from intervention, if not by force, at least with nil the

authority of the United Nations. That view is, of course, reflected in the very

fact that I have made these two demarches, especially the one to Kasavubu, which,

obviously, would be most inappropriate if I held the view that this is a purely

domestic matter.

Given that background, and given also what I said at the beginning that we .

were, on the Secretariat side, anxious to have your advice as to what further

steps, If,any, could be taken, you see that, from my point of view, there is no

objection at all in principle to an additional demarche to Mr. Kasavubu which, in

that case, would, so to say, take up the line of thinking which has been reflected

here, I think, from all. The starting point might very well be this meeting and,

making such a demarche, of course, the value of it would be that, with the authority

5 -55(The Secretary-General)

of representatives round this table, it could, in all courtesy "but with all

firmness, be pointed out that this runs counter to, and indeed endangers any

effort to normalize political conditions in the country through negotiations,

whatever form Kesavubu or others may wish for such negotiations. It is just as

Much in contradiction to his ideas of a round-table conference as in contradiction

-co any idea basing itself on Parliament as the key institution. That is to say,

we have undoubtedly a very strong argument along the line indicated by Mr. Jh3*.

The point on which I myself still feel uncertainty is the one about

protective custody. I think that to bring it out as a positive propose! would

put us in a rather delicate position in the sense that we suddenly might find

ourselves with some kind of responsibility to be the jailers; and that, of course,

we can never assume- If he were in our hands he should in principle be released

as I see it. However, there is perhaps & way which we could try out, and to which

I would not commit any member of this Committee, and that would be the following.

In discussing the political aspect along the lines indicated by Mr. Jha, in

discussing the need to have the full representation which must include Mr. Lumumba,

in pointing out that in such circumstances his continued incarceration, especially

in such circumstances as prevail at present, is an insurmountable obstacle, we

could tie it in with our general commitment, vliich stands to give proper and

appropriate protection to anybody who takes part in such negotiations, such

talks for reconciliation, within the limits, obviously, of our power.

56(The Secretary-General)

That would mean that ve could indicate the possibility of giving

United Nations protection of this type to anyone who wished to avail himself

of such protection. In this case the protection would necessarily have a

dual aspect. It would, of course, also involve in a certain sense a kind

of guarantee that in these efforts there would be collaboration by Mr. Lumumba,

too. Obviously, if the protection is offered to someone taking part in a

negotiation, it is linked in a sense to the negotiation. This means that it

is not, so to speak, quite unconditional. It means, if I may put it somewhat

frivoloucly, that Mr. Lumumba should not run away from the conference or

from us,

That falls short of what you have said, Ambassador Jha, but you can see

why I think somewhat cautiously in this respect. I do not want us to be

placed in what I would regard as a very false position -- entirely, of course,

against our intentions. Things have a curious way of .slipping in the Congo,

and suddenly a stand which is clean and straight finds interpretations which

make something bad even worse.

To sum up, I feel that this meeting has fully Justified an additional

demarche to Mr. Kasavubu, drawing attention to the political aspects and

linking up this matter of Mr. Lumumba's incarceration with the efforts at

conciliation, whatever form such efforts may take. In that way we would

build up the political argument to its full strength and in a form which I

think is absolutely appropriate. With the Conciliation Commission in the Congo,

and in the light of what has been said in the draft resolution introduced

in the General Assembly last December, we can of course take an active interest

in all measures necessary for conciliation among the parties in the country.

Whether or not that can be rounded off in such a way that the idea of

protection is introduced is a matter to which I should like to give more thought.

From the discussion here, I feel that you yourself, Ambassador Jha, are not

ready to formulate a clear stand on this point. You have thrown out a useful

and valuable suggestion, but I believe that you, too, wish to give more thought

to how it should be presented so as to keep the line straight.

What importance this kind of additional demarche can have nobody can

know, of course. But I feel that if — as I take for granted --it can get

the full support of the Conciliation Commission, as a natural element in the

Commission's thinking and efforts, the weight would fully Justify the move.

57

Mr. JEA. (India): I fully appreciate your hesitation,

Mr, Secretary-General. I think that the suggestion which I ventured to make

doei involve very important considerations. But I feel that we should be

filling in our duty if we did not emphasize that today the only constructive

p.rt of the United Nations activity in the Congo — apart from the technical

r..:> Distance, and so forth — la the effort embodied in the establishment of

the Conciliation Commission and in its work in the Congo. I think that the

time has come when you must emphasize that there cannot be conciliation while

one of the most, if not the most, important political personality in the

Congo, someone with perhaps the largest following there, is kept in prison

arbitrarily and indefinitely, without any trial, and is being subjected to

such inhuman treatment, I do not think that there Is any getting away from

the fact that we must emphasize this point. I do not think that in your

further demarche you will feel any hesitation in conveying to Mr. Kasavubu —

and you are the only channel through which the Advisory Committee can convey

its opinions, which in any case are only advisory opinions -- that this is a

very strong feeling and that this situation must be remedied.

My second point is the following* It is true that the United Nations

cannot become a gaoler* But could it not at least be emphasised that during

the period of the negotiations, and without any prejudice to any legal rights

which the Government or Mr. Lumumba may have, Mr. Lumumba should be under the

protective custody of the United Rations with a view to enabling him to

participate fully, effectively and without any pressure or undue influence in

the task of conciliation? I put this idea forward, again, for your consideration,

Mr. Secretary-General. I know that these matters are of some importance,

but this would seem to me to be a line to which no one could really object.

It is not a line which takes away anyone's ultimate rights and responsibilities.

It is a line which is geared solely to the success of the task of conciliation,

which, as I have said, is the only thing that really remains for the United

Nations to sponsor and reinforce in the present circumstances. As we know,\

we cannot get any resolution in the Security Council; we are hardly likely to

get any resolution in the General Assembly; it does not seem possible to extend

the mandate of the Secretary-General. Therefore, the only thing left is

58-60

(Mr, Jhft, India)

conciliation, and the task of conciliation acquires much greater significance

and importance than ever before.

I come now to my third point in this connexion. In its contacts with

President Kasavubu and others, the Conciliation Commission itself might also

emphasize the desirability of having a free Lumumba negotiate, rather than a

Lumumba negotiating under pressure or coercion, a Lumumba negotiating with his

gaolers. The latter in a completely untenable situation. We have no

hesitation in saying that it is a position which we vill not countenance, and,

if necessary, we shall give expression to our views in this respect in other

bodies of the United Nations. Mr. Lumumba has been thrown into the lair of hia

tormentors* °f his mortal enemies — and then it is expected that there can be

conciliation in which he can acquiesce or to which he can agree. That is a

completely impossible situation.

61

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I <fc, not think there is any difference indeed~ ' ibetween your practical suggestions, Mr. Ambassador, and what I tried to outline*

The only nuance perhaps concerns the second point where I, thinking aloud,

indicated that in fact we have promised protection for everybody who wants

protection in taking part in these negotiations. For that reason we could, so

to say, put protection of Mra Lumumba under the general hat. Necessarily it

ft":ways has a dual aspect because it is protection for the purpose of this special

operation; but that is a nuance in presentation, it is not a difference in

substance,

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French):

Mr. Secretary-General, I should like for a moment to speak on the comments of

tha Press, I do not wish to intervene in the internal affairs of the Secretariat

or in the instructions you give to your staff, but I think that there have been Press

comments — and there were a great number of them; at least they were published

in the Press -- originating from United Nations personnel, and I think that this

is a dangerous practice. I am against Press comments, as you know yourself,

and I think it will be more cautious to tell your staff, if you think that my

suggestion is useful, to make as few comments as possible to the Press especially

if they do not have instructions from you because they do put us in a difficult

position. Questions are asked of me which I do not wish to answer, but others

do answer them,

I should like to add a word to what has just been said by my friend, the

Ambassador from India. There is no doubt that Mr. Lumumba must be free; one

cannot conciliate or negotiate with somebody who is in jail. That is quite

obvious, and I am confident that you will do all in your power to bring about

such a result so that Mr. Lumumba will have some freedom to participate in

negotiations on conciliation attempts,which are certainly impossible in the Congo

without his participation.

The question has been raised of Mr. Tshombe's being a secessionist. We do

not recognize that secession, but in any case Mr. Tshombe is the Prime Minister

of a provincial Government. If I remember correctly — I do not have the text

of the Constitution here -- the judicial organs in the Congo, as in many countries

where there is a federal constitution, is on the provincial level and the

62

(Mr* Loutfi, United Arab Republic)

Province is competent; if somebody commits a crime in a province, it is that

province which indicts that person. It is the system in force in the United States,

if I am not mistaken. This could "be explained to Mr. Tshombe: that he is not

competent to judge Mr. Lumumba and that he would do much better if he freed

him.

The SECRETARY-GENEgAL (interpretation from French): As regards the

Press, I am in full agreement with you. I do think that people talk too much,

but the explanation is quite clear. These people are under almost intolerable

pressure, and you know that leading questions are put and that it is sometimes

very difficult to prevent ons?s self from being quoted in a very embarrassing manner.

That happened to me in the Union of Scuth Africa, and everybody knows that I am

rather cautious.

(Continued in English) Regarding the last point, if I avoided spelling

out the competent Jurisdiction it was in order not to run into the question of

secession. As regards the legal theory, I am entirely of your view.

" Mr. ACPKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I am sorry to take

the floor'at this point. We have little to add, but I should like to ask for

a clarification on the situation in the north of Katanga. We know from the Press

that there has b-sen soms trouble between the Balubas and certain units of the

United Nations Force. We also know that Tshorabe, according to the Press, had

pl/maed for the bombardment of the Monumu area with Belgian planes. If you

have any information on the actual situation there, it will help us to

dissipate certain fears that we have on the situation there.

I should simply like to add that we are of course in full agreement with

the Ambassador of Sudan concerning the transfer of Mr. Lumumba to Katanga. There

is no question for us of invoking the fact that Tshombe has proclaimed his

area as independent from the Congo. But there is a legal question here. One

has to respect the Constitution of the Congo, and in no case can a,local

authority like Tshombe indict the Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba. If he were to

be Judged -- and we still do not know for what crime, but of course, that is

something that will be clarified later --he certainly cannot be judged by

Mr• Tshombe.

65-65

The SECRETARY-GENERAL* I should like to call on Dr. Wieschhoff who

may have in his memory more fully the details concerning northern Katanga,

but I can say right away that we have there, as you know, an agreed neutral

cone. The status was changed when 600 men which, so to say, owed allegiance

to the north, Kivu, Stanleyville, arrived in Manono. That led to a rather

troubled situation. However, there have been negotiations between"

General lyaaeou of Ethiopia an1 those authorities vho are responsible, and they

look quite promising as regards the possibility of restoring the neutralized

character of the area. They are not concluded, and for that reason I cannot

say definitely if it will work or not.

Another matter not unrelated but of an entirely different character is the

continued very confused situation on the tribal level with what I believe to

be the spontaneous and not centrally directed attacks of the Balubas against

the UN on various occasions. I think that that should be regarded more as

an expression of confusion in their minds as to what we are and how the situation

is than as anything reflecting a political stand or any kind of warfare either

pro or cbn Mr. Tshombe or Mr. Gizenga. That is the impression I get.

I have some information which I think should be of interest to you. The

day before yesterday General McKeown came to Bukavu and he will go down there

and take a first-hand look at it and he will also, so to say, follow up these

negotiations to which I referred; this should restore order in the area outside

of all political conflicts and if order is restored it is restored on the basis

of an agreement to which both the Tshombe side and the Gizenga side are parties.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): If a certain part

of these troops who are now in the neutralized zone were sent to the south of

Kasai Province, what would be the situation? It is clear that these troops

are fully supported by the people in this area. Thus nothing prevents them,

and it would be in conformity with the unity of the Congo that Katanga should

not be severed from the rest of the Congo. If these troops marched on

Elieabethville the United Nations would still be behind the neutralized area.

But this would be a new situation and I do not know how one would remedy it,

what the United Nations would do. • .

66

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I hope you vill permit me to say that that

is a situation which I should like to face when it arises. In theoretical

terms now and hypothetically with very many elements missing from the picture -

because there are very many elements coming into play, if this were to happen -

I would find it exceedingly difficult to resoVe the problem on the basis of

simple principles. Anyway, our general line would be to balance on this very

thin edge which we have between, on one side, non-interference, and, on the

other hand, the maintenance of law and order. This edge is so thin that

sometimes it is impossible to see it.

I believe that we cannot go much further now, and for that reason I shall

sum up, since I have not heard any objections, the conclusions which I draw

from the debate in the following manner. It is in line with the thinking

of the members of the Committee that, first of all, efforts on behalf of

humanitarian treatment and the observance of generally recognized rules of law

be pursued with all the authority that we can put behind them. Further, that

we approach President Kasavubu in the light of those political arguments which

are proper for us and which refer to conciliation and the efforts to keep the

country together and to guide it towards more normal conditions, and point out

what a vital element in such an effort the treatment of Mr0 Lumumba is and in fact

that it is inconceivable that such negotiations can be conducted with any one

of the political personalities, and first of all Mr. Lumumba, incarcerated.

We should not forget that some other personalities are also incarcerated on

both sides, so that applies all round.

The point I would like to leave open for further consideration and before

we approach Mr. Kasavubu again is the one related to protective custody or

protection, because we shall have to look at it in legal and tactical terms,

I can assure you that we shall go as far as I feel we can go without leaving the

United Nations open to justified criticism or unjustified risks.

I think that in this case there is no reason for me to try to commit

the group or its members to any precise tsact* We shall try and translate the

conclusions of this discussion as faithfully and as wisely as we can. You will

of course be informed about the note to be sent, Just as you have been informed

about these papers.

67

(The Secretary-General)

With regard to these papers, I should like to say that in due time they

will of course be United Nations documents. Th&t is unavoidable. I have no

confirmation that they have been received, and I shall follow the regular rule

not to publish them before they are received and if possible to wait a fully

reasonable time to see whether there is any reaction or any reply so that the

reply can be published at the same time as the letter. I would therefore

appreciate it if you -would regard these papers as confidential documents for,

let us say, another couple of days or so.

That concludes our meeting.

The meeting rose at 3^15 p.m.

UI^JITED .NATIONS. ADVTnnilY COI-WITTEE ON THE

Meeting at United Nationrs IIor.rlq'jn.rtcrr5, Now York,on Thursday, l6 February 'l^ol, u t ' 2 > p .m. .

MW/en

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is regrettable that we are not all here

because I think we all should be, but we may be able to inform the representatives

of Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal when they come and, in that way, catch up

with developments, so as to have a full attendance*

The reason for this hasty meeting is well known to you as we circulated

this morning the message transmitted late last night from the Conciliation

Commission organized under the General Assembly decision by this Committee.

As you see from the text, they have themselves given quite some importance

to this preliminary report. They have pointed out that they have hastened

it and have presented a preliminary report because of those very discussions

which are at present going on in the Security Council. In paragraph 2 of

the message, or the interim report — whatever you may call it -- you find

the following phrase;

/'"' nln view of the significance of the present meetings of the

Security Council and their importance to the solution of the crisis,

the Commission has decided to inform the Advisory Committee immediately

j of certain principal conclusions reached unanimously by all its members

: present in the Congo»"

'*"' Procedurally, of course, it is correct for the Conciliation Commission

to address this Committee which has set it up. The problem which presents

itself to the Committee is, however, how to treat this paper. There is one

question of procedure and another question of substance* I should like to make

a few comments on both of them.

It is obvious from the paper that the members of the Conciliation Commission

intended that their conclusions should be brought to the attention of the

Security Council• I refer to the paragraph which I just quoted. We should

further remember that delegations among those here present — for example,

the delegation of Guinea — and also other delegations, such as the delegation

of the Soviet Union, in the General Assembly have brought up the question of the

character and status of papers presented to this Advisory Committee. When that

happened during the fall on one occasion -- the most important one — I replied

that the paper belonged to the Advisory Committee and, therefore> the question

MW/en

(The Secretary-Oeneral)

of what should be done with the paper must be taken up with the Advisory

Committee and considered by it.

On that occasion the conclusion of the Advisory Committee was that the

Committee could not withhold documents of official character given to the

Committee. If that is added to the obvious indication of the intentions of

the Conciliation Commission, I think that the conclusion is rather obvious.

So much .for the question of procedure, to which I am sure this Committee

wishes to give some attention*

(The Secretary-General)

While the question of procedure requires immediate attention, I think that

the question of substance is in a very different position. The very matters

discussed "by the members of the Conciliation Commission are now being debated by

the Security Council. For us to go into the question of substance would

therefore seem to be premature and even unwise. On the other hand, were the

Security Council to pass a resolution, one of ray first steps -- whatever was

said in the resolution -- would be, as a matter of course, to call this

Committee together in order to consult with it regarding the way in which that

resolution could best be implemented. That is, of course, the major function of

this Committee: to give advice on such issues. I would say that, even if the

Security Council were not to pass a resolution, the situation is obviously one

which does require steps — and steps of urgency -- and again, even without the

basis of such a resolution, I would consider it imperative to bring this Committee

together and have its advice as a background for such instructions as might be

given to the field. That is to say, whatever happens in the Security Council --

but especially if the Council passes a resolution -- this Committee will have an

opportunity to get back to the questions of substance discussed by the Conciliation

Commission in its message.

To sum up, then, my conclusion is that, following precedents and the obvious

indication of the intentions of the members of the Conciliation Commission, from

a procedural point of view this paper should be made a Security Council document.

Regarding the substance, on the other hand, my own reaction would be that this is

not the occasion for a discussion of the substance, but that we should revert to

that definitely after debates in the Security Council -- and that that would be the

case irrespective of whether the Security Council passes a resolution. If it

does pass a resolution, this would be information material subordinated to, and

at the side of, the resolution, which of course would be our main guide.

I think that is enough to explain the situation as I envisage it after

receiving this message.

As usual -- and I need not underscore that for you -- it is my intention that,

Just as in the past we have always had a careful co-ordination between the stands

taken here by me or my collaborators and the stands taken in the Congo by ouri

collaborators there, be they Indians or Moroccans or Ethiopians or" of whatever

HA/mm 7-10

(The Secretary-General)

nationality, so it .remains my. intention, that this Committee;wil haye-,ap opportunity

to pronounce itself on eveiry phase of our work, ; ;,, ,,

With those words, I should like to .invite you'to present;your<observations.

I might remind you of the composition of the Commission. Apart from the . >

Chairman, who is the representative, of Nigeria, we have the.representative of

Ethiopia (who is the Rapporteur), the representatives of. Gfoana, of India, of .• , ••

Liberia, of Malaya i (who is Vice-Chairman), of Morocco, of.Pakistan,;pf Senegal,

of Sudan and of Tunisia, In consequence j those are. the>.on«s who Have unanimously,.

signed this document*

I would suggest' that, in the first instance, we address ourselves to the

question of our own procedure-and, more particularXy> to the question of what-to do

with this paper at the present moment, , - . • • ,,

BC/mrm 11

Mr, SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): On the question of

what should be done with this document, I think that we should bear in mind that

the Security Council is now meeting continuously. This obviously does not even

give us enough time to discuss the substance of the document.

I believe, however, that it would be very useful for the document to be

distributed to members of the Security Council for their information. Mr, Loutfi

has Just suggested that the document should in fact be distributed to all the

Members of the General Assembly, and I agree.

Tha SECRETARY-GENERAL; Actually, I feel that this is rather a

document of the General Assembly, because in this case we are acting pursuant to

General Assembly instructions.

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I agree with what Mr. Slim has just said. We all

know that the United Nations as a whole has been very anxiously awaiting the

reactions of the Conciliation Commission* I think that it would be very opportune

to distribute this document to all the Members, especially since, as I am very

glad to note, the report was adopted unanimously by the Conciliation Commission,

which, if I may say so, represents various shades of opinion in the Assembly,

Mr. DADZIE (Ghana): As the Committee is aware, my Government has

recently taken certain decisions which make it impossible for the delegation of

Ghana and the representative of Ghana on the Conciliation Commission to associate

themselves with the reference in this document to Mr. Ileo as the Prime Minister

of the Provisional Government.

Article 42 of the Loi fondamentale, to which reference is made in paragraph 2 A

of this report as being the fundamental law of the Republic, from which all

authorities within the State derive their power, reads as follows:

"After its constitution, the Government presents itself before each

of the Chambers in order to obtain a vote of confidence,w

This requirement clearly has not been fulfilled.

Furthermore. Article kk of the Loi fondamentale states that until a new' . i _iGovernment is formed current affairs are dealt with by the resigning Government.

BC/mrm 22

(Mr, Dadzle, Ghana)

Before we adopt any suggestions to the effect -.theft thl& .cLppument containing

a reference to Ileofs Government should be presented as a Security Cbuncil

document, I should like to make it cfuite clear that Ghana does not associate' ''•'

itself with the reference, in particular, to Mr, Ileo ad the Prime Minister, -

I should like to make an observation on another paragraph of the report.

We have always stressed the necessity of adhering to legality In regard to the<•'

Congo. We firmly believe that the Parliament is the appropriate-medium through

which the leaders of the country should seek a solution to the present political'

stalemate,, We were informed a few weeks ago that a preliminary session of the

so-called Round-Table Conference had been convened in Leopoldville. This -••• •

conference clearly had no national character; it was completely packed with

supporters of Kalonji, Tshombe, Kasavubu and a sprinkling of national leaders.

We have no confidence in such conferences. Neither have we any confidence in

improvised Constitution-making assemblies such as the one to which I have

referred, particularly if it functions outside of and without any relation to the

parliamentary framework* We believe that all too often such conferences lead

to unstable situations with built-in disruptive elements, elements which often

result in the repudiation of the very agreements reached by even the participants

in the conferences.

It was in order to make those reservations that I asked to speak*

The SECRETARY "GENERAL: Quite obviously, any delegation is free to make

its reservations to this document, but that does not in any way change the fact

that this is the unanimous stand of the Commission,

Mr, ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to

make a few brief comments.

It has Just been suggested that the Advisory Committee should examine only

the procedural aspect of this document —

The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): At this tine, that

IB; Bubeequently, of couxwe, we ehall have to deal vith the substance of the

document.

BC/mrm 13 -15

.Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Yes, of course, at

this time. However, this matter of procedure leads us to the question whether

or not the document should be distributed to members of the Security Council*

In that connexion I should like to voice formal reservations regarding the

concents of the document. My Government cannot in any way subscribe to the

contents of the document.

I should also like to question the purported unanimity with which this

report was adopted. Referring to what the representative of Ghana has Just

stated, I would say that it would seem that there may be some question about that

unanimity.

PGB/ek 16

(Mr. Achkar, Guinea)

I should like to call attention to a few points,, and I must apologize if I

do touch upon the substance of the matter* I have -in mind particularly the

pointe relating to a so-called Congolese Government presided over by a so-called

Minister, Mr. Ileo, and the reference made, also in this document, to the fact

that the United Nations should seek the co-operation of Congolese authorities.

These elements are ill defined, ;

Subsequently we find in this document suggestions emanating from the1

Conciliation Commission, which seems to take over the role which properly belongs

to the Congolese people in suggesting the kind of State which should be

established in the Congo. We are asked to sanction a, very flexible federation

in the Congo. '

We felt that we should voice these reservations and als"6 express our surprise

that this document, which appears to have'been drafted on 1^ February, should

appear like a bolt from the blue 'as if nothing had occurred during the past few

days. We are surprised by this, and we should like to say 'that we attach no

importance whatsoever to conclusions which ••may have been drawn in this way* '

Mr. MAIGA (Mali)(interpretation from French): Mr.-Secretary-General,

I have not very much to add to what has already been said by the representative!

of Ghana and'the representative of Guinea. With regard to this document,: I

would not say that we have any reservations on it: I would say that we are

opposed to each and every paragraph in it. May I make this quite clear? My

Government cannot in any way associate itself with the conclusions drawn in this

document. The document is devoid of any validity. It dates back to a period

when the events which are at present being debated in the Security Council had

not yet occurred.

It seems to me that in this instance what would be well would be, as ...•

suggested by the Secretary-General himself, to convoke the Conciliation Commission,

which obviously cannot conciliate anything in the Congo* The Commission should

at least submit its report directly. That is the best solution. In that way

it woul<i be possible for us to find out whether all members of the Conciliation

Commieeion stand'by the'contents of this document; " . . . . . , , . .

PGB/ek 17

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; . May I draw attention to the fact that the

report IB dated 15 February?

Mr. IXXJTFI (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French): I

certainly have some reservations on this document, but .since today we are not

called upon to discuss its substance I can voice the reservations on behalf of

my Government when we take up the substance. Pending that, I have no further

comment to make.

Mr. BENABOUP (Morocco)(interpretation from French): The impression

which emox"jeo from a cursory reading of this document bears out the hesitation

manifested by the representatives of Ghana, Guinea and the Republic of Mali>

for it seems to be based on the former concept of conciliation, which indeed

gave its name to the United Nations Commies ion. It would seem to be the result

of several conversationo, several steps which may have been taken. It is

extremely concise.. Several meetings must have been necessary before a document

of this type could be drafted, and the general impression which I infer from

all of this is that the document is a little, obsolete. It lags behind the times*

The death of Mr. Lumumba is not even given a mention. There is not even one .)incidental comment on the crisis, not an adjective to depict the existing

situation.

It would seem that this document claims to be timely and topical, and that

assumes that all the protagonists are alive. Of course the reference to the

Loi Fondamentale and to the Government could be interpreted in a given way when

all the protagonists were still alive. If this document constitutes the

unanimous view of the members of the Conciliation Commission it may well be that

all the members held their own views and that this draft represented a

compromise. At the present time, however, the radical change in the situation

does away with any idea of a compromise. To submit this document as a document

which is to be widely disseminated is actually to inject further confusion into

a critical situation — a situation in which there is great emotional ferment

and great impatience, particularly in view of the criminal and murderous acts

which have been recently perpetrated.

FGB/ek 18-20

(Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

I wonder whether it IB wise to distribute a document of this type, which

will serve only to confound the existing confusion. I wonder whether we should

not deal with the situation in the Congo in the light of the recent events, which

have radically changed it, and discuss it in the light of the debates in the

Security Council, which we hope will bear fruit. Then we could go on to forceful

action, rather than running around in circles in this interminable fashion on

this particular issue. If members of the Advisory Committee refuse to accept

this document unanimously it seems to me that that already is an argument .

militating in favour of caution.

I should be grateful if our conversations could proceed somewhat further.

Unfortunately, we do not have much time, but I do wonder whether it is wise and

cautious to adopt a decision on this score. More time, I feel, should be given

to all for study, and we should not act in undue haste.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have already pointed out that the document

is dated the 15th. I can also inform the representative that the question

whether to include a reference to the assassination of Lumumba or not was

discussed and that the Commission intends to send a special message to this

Committee regarding that matter. That is to say, the assassination of Lumumba •

has been taken fully into account in editing this paper. I think that there is

a certain respect due from this Committee, if not to individuals, at least to its

own subordinate organ, and that respect should, of course, take into account the

circumstances under which they worked and the background which they had and which

we do not have.

AW/cn 21

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General we have barely seen this document.

Actually I received it only a few hours ago.

The _SECRETARY-GENERAL: We received it late last nighti '

Mr, JHA (India): We got it as soon as you did. And you havei • * • • ' . ' . . • •certainly done well to bring it t'o the attention of the Advisory Committee

because after all the Conciliation Commission was an organ appointed by this

Committee. Naturally this is an important document, but we liave not had time

to study it and I do not know if I could, in respect of all that is contained

in this report, express our views, because I sit here as the representativei ' " . ' . ' . " : • - - • . . ' : '

of my Government and I cannot give expression to any views on a personal basis.

Therefore, it is very difficult to comment with any great authority. Of -

course, certain parts of it, I think, are in conformity with the instructions ''

that I have already received in connexion with the recent meetings of the

Security Council. Certain other parts are certainly-aot-incdnformityt and for

certain others I do not know'what my Government will think, •

But I would like to make some preliminary observations.- Firstly,- the

status of this Commission is that it is a body of nominees of the eleven • '

Governments of this Advisory Committee — because I believe that the strength -

of the Commission is only eleven now -- and we made it clear right in the •'-'"• ;•• • - • ' , • ' . - • :

beginning that they were to act in their individual capacity* Any decisions -

of the Conciliation Commission are not decisions of Governments who nominated

those members to the Commission. Of course, it has a certain amount of weight :

because they have been working there for six weeks and, as the Secretary-General -

has Just said, it is one of the organs created by us, and we do not deny the

weight or the extent of consideration that the report should receive for this

reason.

But the question arises, what are we to do with this report? We certainly

should refer it to our Governments, and I propose to do that, as indeed all the

members of the Committee will do. We have to wait, for the reasons I

stated at the commencement of my statement, for the considered views of the

Government on certain points.

AW/cn 22(Mr. Jha, India)

The second question raised is should the Secretary-General circulate

it as a document to the Security Council? I do not feel very sure about that.

VThat does it mean? What is the significance of the circulation of this document

to the Security Council? This is a document addressed to the Secretary-General

for "submission" — that is the word used -- to the Advisory Committee for the

Congo. If we decide to have it circulated to the Security Council, do we give

our seal -oo it0 Do we say that these are good suggestions which should be

brought to the members of the Security Council for consideration of the very

difficult problems that they are considering now? If it contains no kind of

endorsement by this Cosziittee, which is a representative committee of

representatives of Governments, then it means just the views of eleven individual

members -- quite experienced people, of course, because we ourselves have

nominated them -- which could be passed on to the members of the Security Council,

In that case there is the likelihood of some confusion, because it may very

well be said that such and such countries, representatives on the Commission,

hold such and such views, and we may be forced to make our position clear with

regard to certain parts of this statement with which I do not think I can agree

because we have a different basis of approach in regard to those matters. So we

may be forced into contradicting openly in the Security Council the report of a

Commission appointed by ourselves, in which the nominees of our Governments sit,

and that may be a very awkward situation.

I should therefore advise a certain amount of further consideration and

caution in that respect.

In coming to the individual parts of the report, again I express these views

very cursorily, and at present I would keep it on a personal basis. Part B says

the following:

"The basis of the newly formed Provisional Government of Prime

Minister Ileo should be broadened so as to make it a Government of national

unity, by including nominees of important political groups which are not

now appropriately represented in the Provisional Government.0

The view of my Government is that we would certainly welcome a truly

national Government in the Congo, a Government based on genuine conciliation. But

we cannot approve of a Government which is formed without this process of

conciliation in which all parties participate. The process in this case is even

AW/cn 23•'.,..'... : ;•-/. (Mr, Jhat India)

more Important than the ultimate result, because if you do not go through the

processes of genuine reconciliation, then the result itself becomes vitiated

and suspect.

In the present case, as far as we know, and as far as one'has seen from

the Press, a Government -- which certainly contains some politicians, some

members of some political parties -- has been formed by President Kasavubu. But

there is no evidence that in forming this Government, or preceding the formation

of that Government, there was any consultation with some very important groups

in the Congo, that is, the group which was led by the late Mr. Lumumba and which

is now led by Mr. Gizenga and which undoubtedly controls a large part of the

Congo. That process was missing. Therefore, the implied approval of the

formation of that Government, as contained in this paragraph, is not acceptable

to us.

.We are not against a completely broad based and genuine government, but

that government must be formed de novo, by de novo processes of conciliation.

It is not enough that the Government has bssn formed and that a few seats have

been kept blank and that now you can invite the other people. That is not the "

sort of, government that is going to solve the problem of the Congo. Therefore,

this paragraph is very difficult to accept from the point'of view that We have

just given expression to. For example, there is paragraph E which reads:

"The Commission considers it desirable to convene a Summit Meeting

of political leaders of the Republic of the Congo at a neutral place,

outside the territory of the Republic if necessary, with a view to

reaching agreement on desired changes in the fundamental law concerning

the structure of tjie Congo..."

In the course of the task of conciliation which we have entrusted to the

Conciliation Commission, it is perfectly in order for them to meet one or

more, or the entire body, of political leaders in the Congo. I do not think

it is their function to convene a body for purposes of making a change in the

fundamental law of the country. That is a function which belongs to the

Parliament of the Congo. That is a function which has been given to them by

the fundamental law. They are the elected representatives of the people and

it is for them ito constitute themselves into a constitutional convention or

a constituent assembly and decide upon what sort of future constitutional law

they will have for the Congo.

AW/cn 2*1-25(Mr. Jhat India)

Therefore, it seems to me that although the Commiesion can certainly meet

anyone, or even the whole body of leaders -- there is no harm in the Commission

asking everybody to meet at the some time -- with a view to discussing the processes

and the methods of conciliation. But I do not know if I can approve of their

idea of convening a conference for changing the fundamental law of the country.

That is not their function and it would not be the right way of changing the

fundamental law of the country. That is a function which must be done through

the Parliament, and it would be derogatory to the respect for the Parliament

which we have always insisted upon if we were to subscribe to this kind of

recommendation.

Paragraph F deals with general amnesty. We are of the view that there

should be a thorough investigation into the circumstances of the death of

Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of the outrage should be

punished. Where do we stand if there is a general amnesty and all of them

get. away scot free? We cannot subscribe to the implications of that paragraph,

although I realize that in the final resort, when everything else is done, it

may be necessary as a measure of final reconciliation to have some sort of

amnesty. But right now when we are faced with the very difficult situation, the

very deep and dangerous emotions caused by the recent killing of Mr, Lumumba

and others, it seems to me that this paragraph is open to grave misunderstanding

and misconstruction,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I am sorry to interrupt, but I am quite sure

that the representative of India shares my concern. We have the Security

Council, all of us, and, before the representative cone in, for that very

i Hison, I tried to make a distinction between the question of procedure —

what to do with the document — and the discussion of substance, which is bound

to come, which we have to have and where I am sure very many views will be

expressed. I think on the whole, on that point, by the way, we will need to hear

the personal opinions also of the members of the Conciliation Commission in order

to fully understand what has come up. Therefore, I do not want to interrupt

the representative. I only feel that we should, in view of the forthcoming

meeting of the Security Council, concentrate our attention on the immediate

problem of how to handle it. I am sorry if I interrupted.

26

Mr* JHA (India): It is all right, I had almost finished. I could

make more remarks on the substantive aspect, but it is not necessary for presentpurposes. -

Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): In connexion with this specific item on our'

agenda, I should like to make three observations. One, the Conciliation

Commission does not by any means formulate the foreign policy of our respective

Governments; two, the Commission's compos it ion were sent to the Congo with the

express idea of being impartial, without inflicting or injecting their national

likes or dislikes, and as such were sent in the spirit that they would be

impartial and a fact-finding commission.

In these circumstances, I see no harm that could be done in making this

document available to the members of the Security Council, since in the final»

analysis it is clear from this report that there is no intention on the part

of the Commission to give any idea that this, is their final word. It is very

specific that they will meet in. Qeneya an<} that their final report will be

made to the Ad visory,. Committee. ; Finally, the Security Council should also be

given access to that document. I believe that this document could only be

helpful in .the present circumstances rather than harmful.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I have one very

slight comment. I simply wanted to call the attention of the members of the

Advisory Committee to the following fact: that at the present time, and this

is a secret to no one, efforts have been under way in certain circles in theUnited Nations, and particularly among the Afro-Asian nations, with a view to

putting before, the Security Council a draft resolution whic'h might command the

support, of the Council,

Many .conversations, much negotiation and great effort were necessary to

succeed in .drafting this text, a text which may not represent all that we desire

but which does represent something constructive, something which may assist the

United Nations Security Council in adopting the measures proposed to it. We

consider. that ;J£ this document were to be circulated to members of the

Security Council at the present time, some might use it to harden their positions

or to buttress the positions they already hold. We feel that the distribution of

DR/aj . . . f . _ : . 27' •- • ; • • •-• : ' (Mr* Achkar, Guinea)

this document would harm the efforts which have been undertaken-and.might,

jeopardize them-' That is why we would suggest that we .retain, this document and,

for a certain number of reasons which were eloquently-mentioned by the _ , , . :.

representative of India,that perhaps some representatives vould like to inform

their" Governments of this document. I suggest that we keep it for the; time . .

being in the Advisory Committee and refrain from distributing it to members..of-

the Security Council. . . :

• ' ••• ' i .' j

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia); As concerns procedure, if the

Advisory Committee were to decide" to send this document to the Security Council,

I would have only one remark to make, and that is that Indonesiadid not participate in the Conciliation Commission. The reason why Indonesia

did not participate in the Conciliation Commission was that we were not-hopeful

and that we had no evidence about the full and wholehearted co-operation of

Mr. Kasavubu himself before our Conciliation Commission went to the Congo.

As to substance, in the beginning our hopes were fading, but after reading

these conclusions of the Conciliation Commission our hopes for conciliation

were finished. I got the impression that the Conciliation Commission, instead

of doing impartial work to make real and true reconciliation, the conclusion

of the Conciliation Commission now sides with the position of Mr. Kasavubu.

That is one of the biggest objections of Indonesia. So for that reason I think

we cannot associate ourselves with the document,

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I wish to support the view expressed by

the representative of India. This is a very important document, and I have to

admit that I have just started to read it here. I do appreciate your aim,

Mi. Secretary-General, in circulating it here. I know that you are thinlcing about

quick action to be taken on the present situation, but we still must find the

time to study it very carefully.

There are many important issues raised by this document to which we must

give careful consideration. It is the work of experienced people. The membersi

of the Conciliation Commission are experienced and were sent to'the Congo to

work impartially to produce something for the advice of this Advisory Committee

DR/aJ 28-30(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

and, also, this Advisory Committee advises the Secretary-General. We mist therefore

give very careful consideration to all points raised by them, one by one.

I again mention what the representative of India has said. Some of the

issues must be referred to Governments although we know that the members of the

Commission are not working for their respective Governments; they are working

on behalf of this Advisory Committee; still the issues are very important* We

represent Governments, and therefore we ought to know the views of our

Governments. Paragraph 2 B is very, very important. To recognize a Government

in the present situation in the Congo is a very difficult matter and we must

give very careful consideration to it*

I do not know whether the Loi fondamentale is a properly worked out

Constitution or not, but the question still remains that both these, 2A

and 2B put together,must get very serious consideration from the members of this

Committee.

MW/mh 31

(Mr, Ngileruma, Nigeria)

I must, make, my statement very brief* I should like to give very careful

consideration,to the matter.and, therefore, I would suggest that the Secretary-

General convene another meeting of this Advisory Committee after giving us a

chance to study .the matter carefully. At the present moment it would be difficul

for us to express an opinion. We can make our personal observations, but

personal observation is one thing and taking the. advice of a government is

another,, and .there are implications which are very serious. Therefore, if it

would be acceptable to the Committee, I would ask the Secretary-General to

convene .another meeting of the Committee after we have studied the document

carefully.

Another issue which was raised was the question of submitting the document

to the members of the Security Council, In my view, it would be premature to

submit this document to the members of the Security Council, We ourselves

must study it*. :We are to give you advice and you should submit a concrete

suggestion to the Security Council after noting the points of view of the

members of this Committee. We ourselves do not know what opinion to express on

this matter. If this document is given to the Security Council — we know the

members of the. Security Council, we have confidence in them and we are not going

to challenge their,integrity or anything like that — but still I must repeat tha; it would be premature to submit the document to them. I should like sufficient

time to-be. given to us and that another meeting of the Committee should be

called/ bearing in mind .the urgency of the matter, because the question of the

Congo' is very urgent in itself. Nevertheless we should like to consider the

document- very carefully and then meet again, because we wish to give you concrete

proposals,; not precarious or careless ones. Therefore, it will be necessary for

us to study it caref.ully and to give you some proposal which you can welcome.• . . • • • ; • . . 4 • • - .

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): It

seems-to me that at present we do not have any time to discuss even the

procedural aspects as it is almost 3 o'clock. I think it will prove necessary

for us to meet again. This will provide us with some time for reflection* Thej '

Council is about to convene. .

MW/mh 32

The SECRETARY"GENERAL; I am very much aware of it. I should like to

say in this context that if this has "been presented to the members of the

Committee, and if I suggested that you devote attention to the question of

procedure — how the document should be treated — it was not out of any sense

of urgency. It was out of a sense of responsibility and impartiality because,

after all, if it is said that this document, which represents the views, the

concerted, unanimous views of eleven distinguished representatives of eleven

members sitting round this table, should not be presented because their unanimous

view may influence the Security Council, then I would say that this is a way of

thinking entirely foreign to me and to the Secretariat. We do not suppress

serious views even if they go against our convictions. That is the issue which

makes it necessary for me to consult you about how such paper should be treated.

If the view of the Committee is that it should not be presented because it is,

as you say, in substance premature, I should just like to point out that in such

circumstances the Committee takes the responsibility for suppression of

information.

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French); First of all, I

should like to stress that the publication of this document, or its distribution

to Members of the General Assembly, or even the discussion of this document in

our Committee, cannot in any way be construed to mean that there is approval of

the conclusions of this report by any member of this Committee. This is a

report which we shall have to discuss and whose conclusions we shall have to

debate, and each of us will draw the proper conclusions on the basis of this

report* I feel, however, that we do not have the right to leave aside any

information having to do with the Congo in these very serious times. We have

just, to our regret, witnessed the murder of one of the outstanding personalities

in the Congo, the late lamented Lumumba. My delegation cannot assume

responsibility for postponing in any way distribution of this document to Members

of the General Assembly or to the Security Council; and here I follow the

suggestion of the representative of the United Arab Republic that this be

circulated to Members of the General Assembly, since, after all, this Commission

was set up pursuant to instructions of the Assembly.

MW/mli 33, ' - ' - (Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

- Of course, we are only an Advisory Committee, Mr,.Secretary-General,.but I

did want to put: forward clearly the views of my delegation. I.cannot assume

responsibility for setting aside information.that may be vital to; the Congo and

to,world.peace. ;

The SECRETARY^GENERAL; Of course, if this paper, in order to avoid

suppression ,o£ the information, is circulated, there should be a covering note

stating who are the members of the Committee and also containing a reminderof what is the mandate of the Commission and, of course, pointing put that they

are .acting in their individual capacities. And, further, that the members of this

Committee have reserved their opinion on all points and that the matter will be

discussed at a later juncture.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): In fact, those are the points which I jotted/

down here. As you recall, we have a standing decision here that records of our

proceedings will be made available to the Security Council. In fact, when we

discussed that, some of us — and myself particularly — urged that the records

be made available to all the Members of the United Nations. However, the

decision was that we should make them available to the members of the Security

Council and it would look odd if we were to present to them our records of today1s

proceedings but withhold a copy of the report of the Conciliation Commission.Now, this report has two aspects. It is written by eleven gentlemen nominated

by eleven governments and, secondly, this Advisory Committee is a channel through

which the report of the Conciliation Commission will be submitted to the

General Assembly or to the Security Council, It has been averred, very rightly,

by the representative of India, the representative of Nigeria and others that

we have not had time to consult our Governments on the various proposals made.

Therefore, what we can do at present is to submit it to the Security Council, but

bring it to the Council's notice that the members of the Advisory Committee have

not had time yet to consult their Governments or to consider the report in detail

The Security Council is at present engaged in an important meeting to discuss

the Congo. This report is written by eleven experts who have spent some time

MW/mh 3 -35(Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

in the Congo, have met various people and have studied the situation, and I do

not think that we have the right to withhold this report from the Security Council

at a stage like this and to deny the Council the "benefit of this experience, of

the skill and wisdom incorporated in the report. Therefore, my suggestion would

be, let us send it to the Security Council, but —

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is a General Assembly document.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan); That was my original comment. I am quite

happy to revert to lb- but, as I eaid, we have not yet considered this in detail*

HA/hm 36

Mr. KGILERUMA (Nigeria): I know, Mr. Secretary-General, that you are not

bound to take the advice of this Committee, although, as you say, we have to give

you the advice. If you feel very strongly that this document should be submitted

to the Security Council under confidential cover, saying, as you have suggested,

that the members of the Advisory Committee have reserved their comments, I see no

objection to that. But it is important that it should be submitted under confidential

cover, because there are so many issues on -which the Security Council members

themselves vould like to get veil thought-out considerations presented to them.

Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco): I should like to support the views expressed by

the representatives of India, Indonesia, Mali, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria, for the

following reasons:

First, we are giving our advice.

Secondly, we give our advice in order not to engage our Governments in the

wrong way.

Thirdly, we have always been under the impression in this Committee that we

worked in an atmosphere that is semi-confidential or, rather, confidential, and

that we have submitted reports only when requested by the members of the Security

Council.

Because of all these reasons and the views expressed by the representatives

\ifaose names I have just mentioned, we should like to see whether it is possible to

accept the suggestion made by the representative of the United Arab Republic: to

give us time to read the nessage again and give you our final views if we are

consulted in order to give our final views* If we are consulted only as a matter

of information — that you are going to do it — it would be quite easy to take the

appropriate action right now. That is all I have to say.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I should like to say one thing. In general terms,

this Committee is an Advisory Committee, In this case, it is this Committee which

has set up the Conciliation Commission, and I have stated to the General Assembly —

and I repeat it here — that I regard documents addressed to this Committee as being

the property of this Committee and not being in the hondo of the Secretary-Qmeral.

That is to say, in this case the usual procedural rules do not apply. I regard

any decision taken as a decision of the Committee, because here we are in an area

HA/hm 37

(The Secretary-General)

vhere the Committee has the status of an organ of the General Assembly, as,I see it.

For that reason, we need not worry about that, and it is not so easy as for me to

say what I intend to do, Just informing ypu about it. What I have said here.-f and

you certainly appreciate it --.is that there is one question of convenience, and

there is another question of,.principle -- what the Committee is entitled to do with

information available to it.

Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland): While Ireland is, of course, a member of the

Advisory Committee, we are not members of the Conciliation Commission, for obvious

geographical reasons. That is why it is my duty to epeak up now and to say what

the Irish delegation feele about what we should do at this important juncture.

The one partaicularly encouraging element in the document which is now before

us is, in our view, its unanimity. We have seen eleven distinguished

representatives of African and Asian countries spending more than six weeks in .the

Congo in their important task of conciliation, and they have finally presented us

with a unanimous report. My delegation was among many which felt that perhaps ;the

size of the .Conciliation Commission was too large to permit of a unanimous report*

But, in fact, we have at last received a unanimous report from the Conciliation

Commission. This is the element .which is most encouraging, in our mind, at ,this

critical juncture. . , - , . -

Mr. Secretary-General, you asked us two questions regarding what we should dp

at this point. First of all, should we or should we not make available to the

Security .Council the important information contained in this report? In our view,

we would be remiss in our duty if we did not. We believe that the Conciliation

Commission itself and its Chairman.have the game view because, in paragraph 2, it.

is stated:

"In view of the significance of the present meetings of the Security

Council and their importance to the solution of the crisis, the Commission

has decided to inform the Advisory Committee immediately."

Therefore, we, believe that we have a duty to convey to the Security Council.

the important..information contained in. this report. : „.....• ,

On the second point, as to whether we her.e should engage now in a discussion

on the substance or whether we should wait until after the Security Council has had

its discussion, we believe that the wise course would be the one that you

suggested, that we would have the discussion on substance, as we must have, at a

later sta e.

HA/bm 38 'f

#•

• • ' • - -'- :-'* -'-•:--'-•' (Mr, Kennedy, Ireland)

May I make one last point:' We "have thie utmost confidence in the Chairnian and

the members of the Conciliation Commission and, when'they present'us' with a

unanimous report, we believe that it is a unanimous report and we"attach great'

importance to what is said in it." Therefore, the 'views of" Ireland, as a member o'f

the Advisory Committee, are clear and, I hope, positive. They are the views of" the

representatives of Tunisia, Sudan, Liberia, Pakistan and, I believe, Nigeria: that,

without entering into the substance of this important report, we could and we should

convey it to the Security Council. ' ••....••,:..

Mr. JHA (India): Like the representative of Ireland, we also have

the fullest confidence in all eleven members of the Commission. But that does not

mean that, as a delegation or as a Government, we abnegate any share of the

responsibility that falls upon us in the United Nations.

The situation seems to be like this: You have received a message from the

Chairman of the United Nations Conciliation Commission. It is addressed to you.

It is entirely up to you, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, to decide

what documents you will circulate or not circulate. If you should wish to do that,

according to your own judgement and your own decision, my delegation will have

nothing to say. We will not challenge your having circulated a document. But I

gather, from your observations, that you would like the Advisory Committee to decide

to circulate it to the Security Council —

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Decide on what line it wants to take. I do not

want to dictate a decision.

Mr. JHA (India): Yes -- and that you yourself do not wish to do it off

your own bet. That is the impression I got.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Yes.

Mr. JHA (.India): Because you feel that this is definitely a document

meant for the Advisory Committee. And I understand your point of view.

HA/hm 39-M>

(Mr. Jha, India)

Now, here we come up against certain difficulties. We have not had a

chance to examine this document. There are very important pronouncements in it,

and certainly the eleven men are wise -- but I believe that we reserve a little

more wisdom for our Governments. If the Advisory Committee circulates the document

to the Security Council, what is the significance of that? What is the Security

Council to infer from that as regards the attitude of the Advisory Committee?

Will it be fair to them to say that really we do not know anything about it, that

we have not consulted our Governments, have not come to a conclusion — but

"You take this into account"? That is where my difficulty arises.

BC/en tkl "1 *• » ''i* • '. -' '>' " (Mr. Jha, India)

•.-"-•• • « ' •••• • ' • • - ' < • • • ; . ' , •.••;.-V <;:-•-<•..:-,•:'; • • . ; • • • • • ,;'. .-... • • . • . . • • ; . • : • • . • : : ; .

My second point is thetfollowing. The Conciliation Commission is.a.

creature of. this Advispry Committee, which,, in turn, oweB:alle^ianoe..to -,. •

the General .Assembly. It_wag the, General.-Assembly wbiph, in paragraph 3

of the resolution of 20 September, decided to establish a conciliation

commission-j, , - . . . . . . . . - . . . . . t . •

A case couldLjbe. made T- if we felt that it was the right thing to do*. '' ' « • . . . • • . ' *-v .. • i .

because of the. importance of the document or anything lik? that -- for ,

circulating the document., to the principal organ , the organ responsible for

the creation of the,. Conciliation Commission) the organ to;which, I would

imagine, the ultimate report of this Advisory Committee will go --.some time (

during the resumed fifteenth session, perhaps* It may be in order to

circulate., this document to all-the Members of the General Assembly, but I do not

see that.a report, which is to be submitted with our:full consideration, and

recommendations to the General Assembly should be circulated to the.Security

Council without our consideration and without .our conclusions* •. .,,.

Therefore, 4-f the document is .to be circulated at al},, it must be circulated

to aj.1 the Members of jbhe General Assembly*. Now, if th,at. is. the case, what•• '' ' * • «• j • • *• •' '.• \ ' .•...'•'••. jis the hurry t We have three or, four weeks .more* Tpere:JLs going to be an ,

interim report and a final report of the Conciliation. Commissipn. There is

going to be> another repprt on the .£eatb of, Mr. Lumumba*, Is it fair to let the

Security Council,;have this document without, the repprt on Mr* Lumumba which is

to come..• and. vbipl^ may throw very great light on the entire situation in the

Congo? ; ... ; . . ,

Those are the difficulties. If it is felt that this document should be.

circulated, there must be a clear indication that it has not yet been considered

by the Advisory Committee and that the Advisory Committee is therefore not in

a position to express any opinion. ...The document will be subjected to further

examination , after .which the) Advisory Committee will.form, its opinion.

Thus, my second point is that the document must be circulated to all the

Members of the General Assembly, and not merely to the members of the Security

Council., •. : ;. : ; , .... ,. _ : ( ...,,. , ... v, , . . . . . , . . .,-...... . •

I come now, to my third point. ;.. The document shpuld not be circulated until

we have before us the report about Mr. Lumumba^ death. The present document

should not be. circulated as .a single document; it should go along with the

BC/en te

(Mr* Jha, India)

other document which, as the Secretary-General mentioned a short while ago,

is to be received. That would be the fair thing to do* »I do not agree with the representative of Ireland that we should be

remiss in our duty if we did not circulate this document. We cannot be forced

into taking steps or decisions; we have certain responsibilities. I would

very much hesitate to endorse certain parts of the report now before us without

having had clear instructions from my Government. If, however, the

Secretary-General thinks that this is a very important document and that it

must be brought to the notice of the Security Council, he can certainly do that

as Secretary-General of the United Nations without any authority from the

Advisory Committee.

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): I was very much interested to hear what

the representative of India Just said about the possibility of circulating

this report to the General Assembly with certain provisos. I am not sure

that Mr. Jhafs third point was particularly relevant; I refer to the

association of this report with the report on the death of Mr. Lumumba,

Like other representatives round this table, we have not had an opportunity

to study this document, and of course we are not in any position to comment

on its substance. But I do think that, whether the document goes to the

Security Council or to the General Assembly, it would be very unfortunate to

give any impression that the document was being suppressed. As the

representative of Pakistan has pointed out, a summary of our discussions here

goes to the Security Council in any event. This document has had a certain -

circulation here, and I think that it would be very optimistic to suppose that

its existence could be hidden. I believe that we should find ourselves in a

very equivocal situation if a document which bore so directly on discussions

now taking place in the Security Council and which was unanimously supported

by the eleven members of the Conciliation Commission appeared in some way to

have been shuffled aside.

That, of course, is subject to the qualification that the contents of the

document have not yet been studied by the members of the Advisory Committee'*

But I do think that if our child, the Conciliation Commission, makes this

report to us, it would leave us in a rather ambiguous position if we did not

make the report available to the Members of the General Assembly -- subject,

of course, to the safeguards which have been mentioned.

BC/en

Mr. 3ALL (Senegal) finterpretation from Frenches ^delegation

would like to make a few cdmments on the distribution of this document to • v.

members of the Security Council-, ' . , .

First, my delegation would like to emphasize -that it. has not had sufficient

time to study the document and that, therefore, it has not been possible for

us to scrutinize in any critical way the various points raised in it. .That is

why we believe that it would be premature to distribute this -document, which

has not been1 carefully studied by the members of the Advisory Committee. .

I* shdul'd irke to make a second observation, which we also .regard .aa very ;importar.t; No reference is made in this document to an event which is not,

only tragic but (fundamental to the Congolese problem and the solution which

may be found to it,' Thus,; we feel that the document contains a serious - . •

gap. '-"Without all the elements of the situation before us, it would ,-

really be difficult to arrive at an .over-all .solution rather than a.partial -...-..

soluticm to this problem, which,is- very important and which 4s now Ipeing

studied by the Security. Co-uncil. . .> ,,: , - . ,-

-•That is1 why my delegation believes that, if this document is to be

distributed, it must .be distributed to. all the Members of the General Assembly;

•our Committee is a creature of the. General^Assembly,, just as the Conciliation :Commission is to. a certain extent an emanation, of this Committee. ,, . .

Hence, even before this document is distributed to,the Security Council, : .

it should, I believe, be distributed to the Members of the General Assembly,

since-ve have .a direct mandate from the Assembly. • , , . . . . . .

My delegation.therefore believes.that all that we can do is to. give advice

and that at this juncture-we cannot give the advice which the Secretary-General

expects''.from us because we consider that the distribution ;of this. Document is.

premature> since we have not,had sufficient.time to:study it, and we cannot Bay

whether we are for or against-any particular point in the document. _

>,-;'•'/'.•...;•;«.?'•.•;*>?. / i-.-i •.:•.i •':'•''.- iv,>. '.I .„•. .;.•..-..;•.'•-

FGB/mm 14-6

(Mr. Sailt Senegal)

Secondly, my delegation wishes to say also that this document is incomplete

because one basic point is omitted — a point which fundamentally alters the

Congolese problem, namely, the recent tragic events which brought about the death

of Mr. Lumumba and his companions,

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to

make one clarification. We never intended to suppress information or to prevent

its free flow. That has never been our intention, neither in Guinea nor, certainly,

in the United Nations. We did, however, say what we felt about this document.

In common with everyone else, we have had an opportunity to go through it only

very cursorily. We find the conclusions embodied in it tendentious, and we

cannot subscribe to them. We felt that the document might have a harmful and .

detrimental effect upon the debates at present taking place. That is the issue,

at stake — not that of suppressing information.

The representative of India has just made a suggestion which seems to me to

be a very interesting one, and it was to some extent supported by the

representative of Canada. If this document were to be distributed to the Members

of the General Assembly it would be, to say the least, appropriate to have it

accompanied by the report on the tragic death of Mr. Lumumba and his two companions.

I think that the Advisory Committee might well dwell upon that proposal. We, for

our part, are quite prepared to give it our support.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The Security Council has, as we know, started,

and I should like to try to have a summing up. This discussion has, I think,

been most illuminating from various viewpoints. I would sura it up in this way.

If I, ae Secretary-General* had received this document I would have considered

myself in duty bound to circulate it, and that, naturally, completely irrespective

of its content. -On the other hand, I have stated to the representative of

Morocco — and on that point I venture to disagree with my friend from India --

that I do not consider this paper as addressed to the Secretary-General but as

addressed to the Advisory Committee. Therefore I could not follow what I would

do myself as Secretary-General if I had been eoj-ely responsible* >

FGB/mm Vf

(The Secretary-General)

I have listened with great care to the observations made here. They indicated,

to say the least, that there is a very great division of opinion.. Two, or perhaps

three, opinions have been heard. I do not consider that under such circumstances

this Committee is ready to give definite advice on this matter. We could proceed

to a vote, but I would consider that against the very spirit of this Advisory

Committee. We have not decided issues by vote before, and I do not think we should

do it now. It is not a useful procedure when matters of this kind are being

discussed. And we have not the time to, so to say, iron out the differences and

find the details of a formula which is satisfactory.

There is the further fact mentioned that this Committee may wish to take into

account the message -- I am not sure it is a report, but the message — which the

Conciliation Commission wants to address to the Advisory Committee regarding the

assassination of Mr. Lumumba.

May I, under such circumstances, conclude that this Committee is for the

present not in a position to give definite advice. I feel myself bound by that

situation, but I reserve my right to call the Committee back into session when

we have received a message regarding Mr, Lumumba, for further consideration of

the matter.

The meeting rose at $«35 P*113*

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting Ito. 2218 February 1961ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ONTHE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Saturday>: 18 February 1961, at 11-a.m.

r ""•'AW/mrm

The SECRETARY GENERAL; I think we might begin, although I hope that

before we come to a more definite stage in our consideration, we will have

full attendance. Naturally, I especially wished to wait so that both the members

of the Security Council who are also members of this Committee had a chance to be

present.

Before turning to the subject which obviously requires our attention in the

first place today, I would like to inform the Committee about two developments.

At their request, we have transferred the widows of the three murdered men to

Stanleyville, There are in all thirty-nine persons in addition. It is an

exception from all rules we have applied so far, but as a humanitarian measure

we consider it to be something we should definitely do. And according to what

we now hear, it has been done.

The other point is the following. The widows had asked us to take all

steps within our power to have the bodies transferred to Stanleyville or to the

place of their choice for burial. A demarche was made through Ambassador Dayal

to Mr, Tshombe in very strong terms The request has for the time being been

rejected.

After that, I think we can turn to the question we have before us, that is

of course, again, how to treat the report: the message we received the other

day and the additional message which we received yesterday regarding the reactions

of the Conciliation group to the death of Mr. Lumumba. After we met the last

time, there were two or three developments of which you are, of course, aware.

As seems to be unavoidable, generally speaking, in this house, there have

been leaks. I have talked about leaks on previous occasions and need not

repeat what I said then and what I feel about it in general terms. Second, as

a result of that we had, as you know, a short exchange regarding the status of

this paper in the Security Council yesterday, in which I referred to my stand

on the status of the paper and the right of this Committee to decide*

DR/ek >

(The Secretary-General)

Third, also as a result of the leak,- there has teen this, an.d Jibat kind

of comment. For example, in one of the morning papers today there was ah

editorial which, in my viev, gave a rather misleading picture of -the character

of the message of the other day and of its 'implications. There is always a

question of judgement, of course, in what you read.inttf a paper* ' Wha* I just'

said stattds for myself, but I must say I read the analysis 'and the evaluation :

with some surprise. " • ' . • > . - • - ,

Thus, those three facts,, plus of course the fact that we nov 'have the

message -regarding Mr. Lumumba's death, seem to me to be the factual background

for this new consideration of the matter we discussed the other day. Recalling

what I said about my own view on the responsibility of the Advisory Committee

in this <iase, I will just invite the members of this Committee to express their

views on the -situation.

: ' Mr. HASAN (Pakistan); Mr. Secretary-General/ before we proceed with

the discussion here of the report or Its- disposal; there' is rbne simple query :'

that, with your permission, I wish to : put. I am simply putting a question and

not implying any comment. I am perfectly conscious 'of *the fact "that you can

refuse to give an answer. '"••" '•••••"• • ' / ' .- • •• : • - • • •-

From' the foot-note of the report of the Conciliation Commission, it

appears that the representatives of Morocco and Senegal were not present when

the report was adopted. 'In fact, the representative wf Morocco made that -quite

clear before the Security Council yesterday. My question, which is a very

simple one, is this : did this absence of the representatives of Morocco and

Senegal imply disapproval of the report cr was it just an absence, implying no

particular attitude toward the report? In fairness to us I think we should

know what is really implied before we proceed further with this report.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I understand that both representatives had

left town. I am informed — this is news to me — that the representative of

Senegal left four weeks ago, and the representative of Morocco left two weeks

ago. I was not aware of this. For that reason the reply to your question

is obvious.

DR/ek

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): Mr. Secretary-General, the other day I

suggested that the report should not be circulated, and at that time I said

this in good faith because we had not had the chance of studying the report.

As you yourself suggested, that the discussions and deliberations of this

Committee are very important and also that secrecy in these deliberations and

discussions is also very important, it is very difficult for one to express a

frank and honest opinion if he is going to be misquoted or if the secret is

going to leak out. Thus when I saw the papers of yesterday and today,

particularly the One yesterday, which says that the text of the report has not

been published but that its contents are known, then what is the use of making

suggestions here if the texts are already known? We make suggestions and we

say that the report should be discussed thoroughly in order to enable us to

give you concrete and proper advice because we wish you to put something concrete

before the Security Council.

We do not think that the members of the Security Council are going to misuse

the papers or make bad use of them. However, as you have taken us into your

confidence and as we are members of this Advisory Committee, we must not give

you any advice which will lead to something bad at the end. Thus, I wish to

stress this point: that secrecy in this Committee must be emphasized; it is

very important. We will go along and give you all our advice frankly and

honestly without any fear of consequences, but we do not want anything to be

revealed outside of this rocra. That is my first point.

MW/mra 6(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

Then, with regard to the report submitted by the Conciliation Commission,

we must congratulate it for producing something which is acceptable unanimously

by-its own members. It is a creditable achievement for them, in about six weeks .

time, in spite of-all the difficulties in the country, to have produced such a

report* But this does not mean that we, members of this Advisory Committee,

are just going to take it. for granted, although I notice that their line of

thinking is identical to the attitude which we here are taking — that is, most "

of them*: •

The draft resolution submitted to the Security Council by the representatives

of Liberia, the United Arab Republic and Ceylon yesterday -- most of us Afro-Asian

members have taken an active part in drafting that resolution •- indicates that

the tone of• that document and the Conciliation Commission's report are identical

on many points. Therefore, we shall reserve our comments on certain points. The

reason why we are going to reserve our comments is that it is very important for

all of us to take the.advice of our respective Governments. On certain points

raised by the Conciliation Commission no member* of this Committee can decide or

can give any advice of his own. We are represent ing-our Governments and it is

essential for .us to know the thinking of our Governments. We do not want to

depart from the policy of those Governments, and if-certain points raised are

considered immediately they may be in conflict with the policies of some

Governments. .. ,

In any case, I must stress my point that we have to congratulate the members

of the. Conciliation Commission Tor having produced such a report within the short

space of six weeks in spite of all the difficulties and troubles in the Congo.

These are the observations which I wished to make now.

.. : . . . ' Mr. JHA (India): On the question that, we discussed at our last meeting,

namely, what to- do with the report., the interim message rather, of the Conciliation

Commission, the situation as it has developed is that the contents of this report

have been fairly accurately reproduced in.some newspapers. That itself, as the

representative of Nigeria has pointed out, places this Committee-and its members

in a sgmewhat:awkward position. Also, guesses have'been made in the Press as

to the opinions of pome individual members of this Committee. ' •'

MW/mm 7

(Mr. Jha, India)

Secondly, this question was raised in the Security Council and, if I may

aay so, quite.legitimately raised because some newspaper reports have come out

and, naturally, have excited the curiosity of the members of the. Security Council.

I should like to remind you, Mr. Secretary-General, and members of the

Committee, that on the last occasion when I intervened I did not say that this

document should not be circulated to the Security Council, If I may, I shall

quote the words which I used:

"The second question raised is, should the Secretary-General circulate

it as a document to the Security Council? I do not feel very sure about

that."

Then I. went on to say:

"I should therefore advise a certain amount of further consideration

and caution in that respect."

I went on later to suggest that if the document was to be circulated it should

be circulated to the Members of the General Assembly — that is to say, to the

Members of the principal organ and to which, really, this Conciliation Commission

owes allegiance in the final result, and which was the principal organ which

commissioned us to appoint the members of the Conciliation Commission.

Having regard to all the facts and circumstances — and we have more facts

now than we had the other day — I think that, in any communication which we make

to the Members of the General Assembly or the Security Council, we should

underscore the additional fact which we now have that two members of the

Commission were not in the Congo at all and, presumably, had no opportunity to

participate in the discussions that led to the formation of the conclusions that

have been sent to the Advisory Committee.

I would suggest for consideration that we circulate the two messages; the

first, concerning their conclusions, with the footnote -- that is very important —

and the second message concerning the death of Mr. Lumumba. I had hoped that

this second message would be somewhat fuller and perhaps one that might throw

sane light on the exact circumstances or the political repercussions of these

incidents. However, it is very brief and it is a formal message. Nevertheless,

we can circulate both these messages, but to all Members of the General Assembly.

In doing so, I would further suggest that there should be a forwarding note

MW/mm 8-10

(Mr. Jha, India)

possibly in the following words which I have Just scribbled down — this is not

meant as a specific proposal:' • • .. . '

"The Advisory Committee decides to circulate the two messages: from •:

the Conciliation Commission to all Members of the General Assembly, In

doing so they wish, however, to bring to their attention: first, that the

Conciliation Commission's conclusions are in the nature of .an interim

report pending a full and final report to the Advisory Committee in discharge

of its mandate, to be submitted later; a copy of the mandate is attached;

secondly, that, pending examination by Governments and endorsement or

otherwise by them, the conclusions of the Conciliation Comnlission can only •'*

represent the individual views of members and should not be taken as the '

views of Governments represented in the Advisory Committee'; thirdly" --''

I do not insist on this because it will be indicated in the footnote — -

"that it is the view of only nine members."

Further, I would suggest for consideration —• the precise wording Is not

important — the point that in circulating the document, the position of all of

us here who represent Governme'nts is protected; that is to s..ay, we are-'not

committed as Governments. But of course ttiey are the views-of the individual

members of the Commission, which may have some weight with the Members of-the

Assembly; and if all the Members of the General Assembly receive the report, '

naturally all'members of the Security Council will receive it.

This is the suggestion which I should like to make for consideration.

HA/en 11

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; May I suggest, Mr* Ambassador, that we

get your scribbled notes and have them typed up. I think that would be

quite useful.

Mr* JHA (India): Nobody will be able to read them -- but I will

ask one of ray colleagues.

The SECRETARY"GENERAL? I might add one thing -- not as a suggestion,

but just fcr your consideration. If we were to proceed along the lines you

indicate, would it not be in order to say that the members of the Advisory

Committee have not so far been in a position to give this report substantive

consideration?

Mr. JEA (India): Yes, that would be very good.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): There is one point that I wish to add

to my previous statement. I am in full agreement at this juncture that the

Conciliation Commission's report should be circulated to the members of the

Security Council and to the Members of the General Assembly, because it is

something which is very delicate and it would be very difficult indeed to

suppress it. For that reason, I am in full agreement that it should be

circulated to the members of the Security Council and to the Members of the

General Assembly. But, at the same time, as I have already pointed out, we are

not going to commit our Governments or ourselves. It is going just in its

present form, and then we have to get the advice of our Governments in the meantime,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that would be covered if

Ambassador Jha added a reference to the absence of any substantive consideration

here. Anyway, we will come back to that; we are at a very early stage of our

consideration.

HA/en 12

'Mr* SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French);-. -As far" as. the

discussion or study of the subject itself and of the substance of the preliminary

report is concerned, I believe that we are not only bound to consult our -

Governments, but I would go further and' say tbist This is,, after all, a

preliminary report, which delineates a set of conclusions-. In order,.to be

properly understood, these conclusions would have to be supported by other •

developments, which surely will figure in the final report. Consequently, . .

a study by this Committee of all the ideas set forth by the Conciliation -..

Commission could serve a useful purpose only after receipt of the general .••'••

report, and also perhaps in the presence of the members of the Conciliation

Commission, some of whom -- if not all -- have been or are members of the , ;

Advisory Committee,

Therefore, as far as the substance is concerned, I think it would be

premature to pronounce ourselves on the :subject pending receipt of the-final,

report, which will shortly be forthcomings .

As far as the circulation of-the report ia concerned, .1 believe it should

be circulated to all the Members of the General Assembly T-, and, of course,

there would be no-reason for not circulating it to members o€ the Security .

Council.' • " • ' • • ' . ' " • • • ' • • ' . : • • . .•••'.:.-• -.••• : ; . . - . , . . . . . . , - . _

The question still remains whether the circulation of .the report commits. :, ,,

our Governments or not. -I believe it has always been :th« tradition that,.. even

with regard to Committee reports, Governments and delegations, in the course ...

of the debate and in the course of the final vote, can espouse positions . <• -

which differ from the positions in the Committee. This has happened time and

again, when members of Committees have adopted positions which were subsequently

altered. • • ' • ' • . , • . - ; . - . •

Therefore, there is no danger. Our Governments will, have to pronounce

themselves, as well as this Committee, either pro or con or otherwise,

especially since there have been other developments, and still further developments

are perhaps occurring even today. Therefore, we think we cannot pronounce

ourselves on the substance of the report pending receipt of the definitive •

report of the Commission.

HA/en 13

Mr* ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Before making

my observations, I should like to take note of the fact that I was not

altogether wrong at the last meeting when I questioned the unanimity of the

adoption of the paper which had been submitted to us.

The principal issue at that meeting was whether the report should or should

not be circulated. It appears that, even before our last meeting, the report

had in fact been disseminated. It is not so important to learn how this was

done -- but the fact is that the report was already known. The whole press

knew all about it. I think that we wasted a lot of time at our last meeting

on the question of whether we should do something which had in fact already been

done.

I should like to speak briefly of the second message from the Chairman

of the Conciliation Commission to the Secretary-General. In the first place,

I must say that in our opinion there was no need to be in the Congo in order

to draft a message of that type. We had rather hoped that this report, which

had been announced to us and which we were told was in preparation, would be

a proper report. Instead of that, we have received expressions of regret

and condolence which had already been expressed here very aptly. Consequently,

this report which we were awaiting, and which some thought might govern the

question of the distribution of the first report, cannot be regarded by my

delegation as being a serious report. The situation is far too grave for us

to accept the notion that this is sufficient to determine a decis-ion on the

distribution of the first report.

We had hoped that the Conciliation Commission, which went to the Congo to

reconcile the political leaders, including the Congo's outstanding figure,

Patrice Lumumba, would at least -- now that that person is no more, nov that he

has perished in such tragic and appalling circumstances — have provided some

light in regard to the promises offered to the Conciliation Commission about

enabling it to see Mr. Lumumba. In fact, the Conciliation Commission

apparently obtained the views of only one side --it did not attempt to

reconcile -- and that is reflected in the report that has been sent to us.

HA/en

(Mr. Achkar, Guinea)

We had also hoped that, in the report submitted to us, the duplicity..-.

engaged in by some would have been mentioned. The Conciliation Commission had

received a formal promise from President Kasavubu -- the man whom some persist . ..

in calling "President" Kasavubu — that it would be able to see- Mr. Lumumba,-

and this at a time when, as we know from the press and a number of other pieces :

of evidence, Mr* Lumumba'had already been killed. This is the attitude, mind you>

of a man who pretends to be a Chief of State -•* a man who is regarded by some,

elements as being above reproach. This is not a flattering trait. ; If it had

not been for the sadness of the circumstances, this report on the death of

Mr. Lumumba could well have been described as ludicrous* But the goal is

obvious; we have rather a good idea about that. We do not know what impact .

this report will have on the debates in the Security Council -- debates in . :

connexion, with which, for our part, we have co-operated to the best of our

ability within the Afro-Asian group so as to devise proposals which might still

constitute the basis of a decision tb be adopted in the Security Council.

We consider that an attempt -- and a successful attempt,- in fact --to inject

an element of confusion, a tendentious element, into the"debates of the Security.

Council is not something which will fostei* the goodwi'll of all in the United .

Nations. • . •-..

We do not wish to discuss the substance of the first report. We had.

occasion to state at the last meeting that we disagree totally with the majority. . ' • . . ' i . . . •of the points made therein. We cannot be satisfied with conclusions hastily

drawn by some of the members of the Conciliation Commission, hastily drawn

because the goal that was sought had to be achieved immediately.

BHS/cw 16

(Mr. Achkar, Guinea)

We still would like to hope that we shall receive a final report and that

the General Assembly will have time to analyse and evaluate matters in the light

of what is actually happening in the Congo.

There is the impression that measures are being taken one after the other

these days to confront us with accomplished facts. Whenever a tendency appears

in the United Nations to arrive at a constructive solution, other elements are

introduced to upset the arrangements.

I repeat: we do not wish to discuss the substance of this report. We do

not even wish to pronounce ourselves now on the question whether the first

report should be distributed together with the so-called report on the

assassination of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues, since all of us round this

table know that the report is already known to everyone. It has already

influenced the debate in the Security Council, and there is no way of knowing

how far its sinister repercussions will spread.

In conclusion, we must say once again that we are strengthened in our

position that nothing can be reconstructed in the Congo without genuine

conciliation. We consider that the documents submitted to us were not prompted

by eagerness for conciliation. I am obliged to say on behalf of the Government

of the Republic of Guinea that we strongly reject all the conclusions in that

report.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): With regard to the question of circulation,

I would not oppose what is traditionally done in this matter.

I have had no opportunity to obtain the views of my Government on the

substance of the matter, and I shall have to reserve fully the position of my

Government, as many others have done, on the question of substance,

Mr* KAMIL (Federation of Malaya); My delegation will support the

proposal made by Mr. Jha regarding the circulation of the report and the manner

in which it should be circulated so that the position of this Committee and of

our respective Governments will be protected.

In common with many other delegations, my delegation is not yet in a

position to offer any advice on the substance of the report because we are still

awaiting instructions. Furthermore, I should say that perhaps it would be

BHS/cw 17

... .,.. (Mr. Kamil, Federation of Malaya)

premature even to seek definitive instruction1 without knbwing exactljr the1 oasis* '

on which the Conciliation Commission came to its conclusions on'each"of the

paragraphs. The representative of Tunisia has also made this point.

- Mr. SALL (Senegal) (interpretation from French)': ' My 'delegation wishes

to stress first that the-two documents which have been submitted to us were '

adopted without the presence of the representative of Senegal who had been '

appointed as a member of the Conciliation Commission in the Congo. This is a

very important fact to my delegation, because it furnishes p'rbof that thisdocument cpunot commit u s . . . .

My delegation has no objection to the circulation of the'documents to the

Members of the General Assembly and to the members of the Security Council, with

the express reservation that, since we have received no instructions from our

Government,this does not in any way constitute approval on our part of the

matters contained therein. On the other hand, we believe that in order to take

a constructive stand with respect to these two documents we must have the final

report before us.

My delegation wishes to support the proposal presented by the representative

of India, and we are very happy to learn that an introduction has been proposed

for the documents to be transmitted to the tfembers of the General Assembly and

the members of the Security Council.

Mr. SULEIMAN (Sudan): I wish to put a question of clarification with

respect to the relationship of the findings of the Conciliation Commission to

this Committee. Are the reports of the Conciliation Commission to be adopted

first by this Committee or are they just to be sent on to the Members of the

General Assembly?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: This is definitely up to the Committee itself,

but my interpretation of the constitutional position would be as follows. In

the resolution of 20 September, this Committee was requested to make appropriate

arrangements for reconciliation. On that clear mandate, which in fact made this

Committee in this respect an organ of the General Assembly, this Comnittee

appointed a Conciliation Commission. The Conciliation Commission reports to this

BHS/cw 18-20

(The Secretary-General)

Committee. My own feeling is that when the final report is received, the

proper procedure would be for this Committee to report to the General Assembly.

But I believe that in reporting to the General Assembly this Committee may find

it appropriate to annex what it has received from the Conciliation Commission.

I cannot say that we are a letter box for the Conciliation Commission to the

General Assembly. If that were the case the General Assembly would have talked

about the Conciliation Commission, but it did not. The main report must be one

from this organ of the General Assembly to the General Assembly, This Committee

in its turn, of course, will wish to take into account what the Conciliation

Commission has reported to it. I do not believe that in doing so in its own

paper to the General Assembly this Committee can avoid using the papers of the

Conciliation Commission.

RSH/el 21

' (The Secretary-General)

Now, if you look at the present"situation it is therefbre very logical,

as Ambassador Jha has proposed'— I would even consider-it absolutely necessary —

that we say that the Advisory Committee as such is not prepared, on the basis

of this paper, to report to the General Assembly as' it should in due time when

it has definite information. But, on the other hand, we do not feel that we can

keep this paper out of the picture, that is to 'say, this will be a case where

the Advisory Committee reserves its opinion for a later report to the General

Assembly, and when this comeo in it is only as material for the consideration of

the Advisory Committee at a later stage. ..

May I add on this point one thing which I think is a matter of course, that

is, that the reservations made by various representatives and perhaps to be

covered by the kind of note suggested by Ambassador Jha is, of course, a reserve

that covers also the Secretary-General. My participation in this deliberation

and this presentation of the data cannot and should not engage me in substance

as co-signatory of the Conciliation Commission any more than it does other members.

That is a matter of course, but it is just as well to state it here and now so

that there is no ambiguity.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): The

report before us has been called an interim report, and for my'part I must'make •

an observation on this. It is not an interim report; it forms the conclusions

of a report. It has never been the practice in the United Nations to forward the

conclusions of a report without the text of the report. This is ari important

point. I cannot recall having seen in the United Nations an interim report " ; '

containing the conclusions of what would be the general report. That is what we

get out of the reading of the document before us, it is a set of conclusions.

The Conciliation Commission has sent us its conclusions without the text of its

report. These conclusions cannot even be properly understood without the text of

the report. We would have wished to see the members and discuss the matter with

them and ask them for clarifications and explanations. I think that also Is very

important,

I would make a second observation. The second report which we'have before us

is not a report, it is a message to the Advisory Committee, It is not a report

and it does not supplement the report itself; it is an expression of regret at

the death of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues. It is not a report at all.

RSH/el 22

(Mr. Loutfij United Arab Republic)

My delegation also has broad reservations about and disagrees with many of

the conclusions of the Commission, and I reserve my right to express myself more

fully when I receive instructions from my Government,

The question of the circulation of the report is no longer of any great

importance because the report is already in the hands of the Press. Therefore,

I do not see the point of discussing the matter.

In my opinion, the representative of the Sudan raised a very important point,

the question of whether we should simply adopt or approve the report or send it

to the General Assembly without discussing it. I fully agree with the Secretary-

General's interpretation of our constitutional powers, which enable us to discuss

the report and state our views.If this report is to be circulated, I think the appropriate reservations

should be spelt out, making it clear that the members have had no time to discuss

it. I also think it should be a document of the General Assembly, which is

rather an important point. As Ambassador Jha said, I think it should be made

clear that the Committee has had no time to discuss the matter, that the Committee

is awaiting the Conciliation Commission and that there has been no consideration

of the report as to substance, as the Secretary-General has pointed out.

I have one further observation. In view of the grave situation which

prevails, the Conciliation Commission should in fact have come here to draft its

report.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL! On the last point, we are, of course, in a

position to express a wish, if that would be the view of the Committee.

Mr. DAD2IE (Ghana): At our last meeting, I made a number of

preliminary observations, one of which, as reproduced in the record, reads

as follows:"As the Committee is aware, my Government has recently taken certain

decisions which make it impossible for the delegation of Ghana and the

representative of Ghana on the Conciliation Commission to associate

themselves with the reference in this document to Mr, Ileo as the Prime

Minister of the Provisional Government."

BSH/el 23

(Mr. DadziCj Ghana)

I vr-1! 11" :e to nel;e it clear that when I made this observation I had no

intention of casting doubt on the unanimity of the report or, indeed, on the

integrity of the Chairman when he said the report was unanimously adopted by all

those present. It was merely meant to underline the fact that developments have

occurred subsequent to the adoption of the report, developments which will

no doubt be reflected in a slightly modified stand by our representatives when

the final report comes to be written.

In concluaion, I would merely like to say I am in full support with the

suggestion made by the representative of India and with the supplementary

suggestion you yourself made, Mr. Secretary-General.

Mr. BENAEOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I would simply

like to confirm the points I raised at our last meeting and to follow these up

with certain remarks.

First of all I would like to stress the need of attaching to this report,

if it is to be circulated, as has already been stated by the representative of

the United Arab Republic, since it has been circulated outside our Committee and

outside the Secretariat, an additional note. As the representative of India

has stated, when the report is distributed it must contain a note which is

absolutely essential from our point of view. It should contain the points

raised by the representative of India, and the other points as well. We know

that at a certain time the Conciliation Commission was to have left here as soon

as possible but, because of certain irregularities of procedure and other

irregularities of having Mr. Kasavubufs delegation seated at the General Assembly ;there was a certain delay* But once Mr. Kasavubu obtained his seat in the United

Nations, this encouraged him to multiply his acts of terrorism to the extent that

some members of the Conciliation Commission returned to their own countries

without going to Leopoldville, Therefore, there were some absences.

Secondly, there are the absences about which we have heard from the

information which the Secretary-General has given to us. I think this should be

made quite clear in the commentary on the report.

Another point that should be made clear is that this report has three aspects.

First of all, it is a partial report. It does not present a picture of the general

situation, and that is why it has to be followed by a general report which, I

RSH/el 24-25

(Mr* Benaboud, Morocco)

think, will be prepared by the remaining members or by all the members of the

Conciliation Commission who are still there. I have heard news that this general

report will be drafted at Geneva or elsewhere* That is the first aspect.

BC/pm 26

(Mr, Benaboud, Morocco)

The second aspect la that the report was based on certain circumstances.

It was written when a given set of circumstances prevailed, and, according to our

information, it was adopted on the eve of the announcement of Mr. Lumumba's

assassination. Now, Mr. Lumumba's assassination has completely changed the

situation. It has once again demonstrated that the greatest evil of all evils is

foreign intrigue, which encourages the assassins and stains the hands of even

important members of the present Government, -

Hence, it must be taken into consideration that the report was based on

certain circumstances* If we do not take that into consideration we shall be

working, as colonialism generally works, against the aspirations 6f the people

themselves. Our work will be useless and vain and in some cases it will even be

regarded as multiplying the obstacles; instead of seeing the circumstances as they

are, on the basis of present events, we shall be working in the past, in

pre-historic times.

The third aspect of the report is that it is an interim report. All the

points dealt with in it refer to urgent remedies, to ensure that death should not

strike at the heart of the Congo before the real remedies are found. Hence,

this is an essentially provisional and interim report.

That was the first point which I wished to raise and which must be clearly

established if we do not wish to lead ninety-nine delegations into error.

The second point which must be made equally clear relates to the obstacles

which confronted the Conciliation Commission during its negotiations,

particularly the arrogance of the instruments of colonialism, and in the first

place of Tshombe, These obstacles may have misled the Conciliation Commission

itself, which did not know that the three victims had already been assassinated

when it was in the process of carrying out its negotiations. That is why

Mr, Tshombe and his assistants, as we read in the Press, greeted the requests of

the Conciliation Commission with laughter and "tricks".. Thus, these obstacles must

be shown in order to make the situation clear and to indicate that, from the

political point of view as well, there was a certain exchange of views on the basis

of which the report 'was drafted; that could be a constructive and not a negative

point.

BC/pm 2?

(Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

third point relates to the date when the report wad drafted. If, as I

eald a moment ago, we are not going to discuss ideas which were based only on -

certain circumstances, we must give the date when the report was drafted and

make the time element quite clear. Furthermore f the names :of the countries which •

were represented at the time, must be repeated and/ if possible, the reason for-

the absence of the other countries must be given.

My fourth point is the following* . We must give the explanation for. thesedelays , which have made us lose a -great, deal of time and, have helped to ' ,

aggravate the situation still further. We must state why these delays took place.

We must make clear the role of the various factions in, the country and also -of

foreign- intrigue, which influenced the . direction of .events and the circumstances

to the point of giving rise to the situation in which we find ourselves today.

I come now to another point, which, in my opinion, is a vital one. This

point, we believe, will guide the course of all present and future events in the

Congo. > I refer to the aspirations of the Congolese people, as we know them from

the inquiries and testimony, of Mr. Dayal, as Special Representative , of the

Secretary-General and of the Commission* If the Commission has no intention of

dealing with this point, it must be asked to: <*Q so. That is why I say that this

is a vital point. All the countries represented here have passed through this

stage. There was antagonism between -foreign intrigue and pure, frank and-

patriotic nationalism, to the point where the world had an idea of the

situation which. was absolutely false > while :the people concerned had another idea <

of the situation which vas absolutely true. .

I say that, because almost all of us are sure that Mr. Lumumba^ death has

radically changed the situation. If this report was drafted prior to Mr. LumunfcaU

death on the basis of ,a spirit of conciliation on the part of those who follow

Lumumba •-..- and^ we have the impression that they are in the majority, since they .

represent .true patriotism •->- it may be the- case, that since Mr*. Lumumba Ts death

some questions have been raised in their .minds. If, here .In the United Nations,

we are j going to base our work on a situation which has been completely changed

by Mr* I<umumba!s assassination, we shall be confronted by the opposition of the

Congolese people themselves.

Hence, it is always a sound policy to work in full knowledge qf the facts,

nnd it is always dangerous to confuse desires for reality. I think that a reference

to the situation among the Congolese people would be constructive and enormously

helpful.

BC/pm 28-30

(Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

Furthermore, we believe that if there is a crisis it is because, as we have

always said^ there is foreign intrigue. We continue to believe, and we shall

continue to declare openly here and in the General Assembly, that so long as

the Secretariat-General or the United Nations is defied by Belgium, France and

other countries, nothing constructive will be done, because their policy is

aimed at breaking up the Congo, at the independence of Katanga and at the autonomy

or independence of Kasai. Furthermore, there are the intrigues originating in

Brazzaville, We must state definitely and openly that these intrigues exist;

we must state how far they go and what is the extent of Belgium's defiance.

Otherwise, even if the Security Council or the General Assembly adopts the

strongest kind of resolution, we shall be working at a completely theoretical

level, without having any practical means of implementing the resolution because

of foreign intrigue; we shall thus continue to appear to international opinion

like people who do not understand their responsibilities.

This leads me to repeat what we have been saying for the last six months.

If we do not energetically denounce foreign intrigue, if we do not take

energetic positions with respect to such intriguef we shall continue on the path

of the decay not only of the Congo, but of Africa as a whole — and we know that

there are very powerful foreign intrigues in Africa.

I said earlier in this statement that a complete report is to come to us.

That has been announced, and it should be mentioned. Otherwise, every Member

of the General Assembly will believe that these present recommendations are final

ones, that they in fact constitute a report which is neither interim nor partial

nor based only on certain circumstances which prevailed at the time of its

drafting.

In other words, a study of this report will be aided by the knowledge that

it is partial and provisional and based only on certain circumstances; it will

place the accent on the radical change in the situation which has resulted from

Mr, Lumumba's death. All the Members of the United Nations must be warned of

this radical change. This will be useful; it will avoid the adoption of a

resolution or measures by the United Nations which, when presented to the

Congolese people, will meet the opposition of those people.

FGB/mrm Jl

• '••'• -....•:. (Mr, Benaboud, Morocco)

I should like to conclude by stating my agreement with all of those who

have maintained that the report is very important. 'That, is to say, the conduct

which this report would have us adopt is very important, and therefore it cannot

be adopted without our consulting our Governments. Thus all, the ideas which

we are now expressing, and any positions we may take, are conditional upon

confirmation after such consultation with our Governments. ; -..•••• ;

In closing may I say sinfply that I should like to warn you that during the

last seven months we have been revolving around a situation-, and that within the

Congo the situation has gone from bad to worse. My delegation believes .that

this is a very critical time and that we must act with great caution. If we

act lightly, taking as an instrument this report, then perhaps we shall fall

into the same errors that have Aggravated the situation within 'the ,

United Nations at the time <when Kasavubu1 s delegation was imposed* We had then

a miniature picture of what something imposed means, -but in the Congo we are

speaking of a larger picture. Here in the tJaitad Nations we have had a

miniature 'picture of what foreign influence means' and of what -has been imposed

this time not 'on the' Congolese Government but on the Congolese, people and on

the entire world that is represented in the United Nations.

'Thus thia warning, in our view, is extremely Important, and must be put

forth in a spirit of conciliation, of devotion to -the United Nations and of ••.' -.

the success ;of the Congolese patriots. But we must state this warning, and

we hope it Vill be received with as much good faith and goodwill as is .

evinced by my delegation in giving it.

SECRETARY -GENERAL ; One point in what you mention raises some

technical difficulty. You said that this report had been edited " la veille" —

the 'evening before the most recent events, I ;do not know, and we do not know, .

when it was edited or when they formed these opinions; All we know is 'that

it was finally hammered together in a meeting the day it-'was signed and sent.

I leave it to your consideration whether it is likely that the Commission just

stuck to its own guns and, so to say, dated it in a way which from its own

point of view, was misleading. Anyway, for us to say so is something which I do

not think we can do in all fairness and integrity short of having, in that

respect, had word from the members of the Commission.

FGB/mrm f , 32; . . - . . - . , . •

' (The Secretary-General)

I may, perhaps, add one thing. The distinguished representative referred

to foreign intrigue, and I think, in general terms, we have experienced more of that

than any of the others around this table. The Committee will find itself in

the same difficulty in which the Secretariat and I myself have found ourselves

during the past few months, and that is that it is one thing to have certain

views and to have drawn certain conclusions, and it is^ another thing to put

one's signature to an official document stating the same thing, because there

we are in duty bound to be accurate —- accurate and able to pnjve what we say.

That is an editing difficulty, perhaps* It might be overcome, and there are

stray cases of evidence, as we all know, which can be pieced together, but

there is the difficulty that I think the Committee is under the same laws -as the

Secretary-General in that respect.

As I happened to take up this point, I may add one thing* I was

gratified by the implications of what was said because it involved the recognition

that if certain things had not been possible in spite of, to quote your words,

"strong resolutions, strong stands of the United Nations", it has been because of

resistance and obstruction which, in that case, have been, so to say,

resistance and obstruction against the United Nations, It is quite obvious

that the Secretary-General is not stronger than the United Nations, but

listening to some speeches made recently one has the impression that he haa

powers which far exceed those of the Organization itself. It was quite obvious

from what you said that you are very realistic on that point.

Mr. ACHKA.R (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to

revert briefly to the Indian proposal. Ambassador Jha's suggestion, as referred

to also by Mr. Loutfl, is about conclusions of a report which in fact has

not yet been drafted. Let me, therefore, refer to those conclusions and to

the suggestions in that respect of the Ambassador of India.

In the name of my delegation I would express the view in connexion with

the summary record to be made of our debates — because I think it was agreed

some weeks ago that a digest of these debates should be distributed to the

Security Council — that, in view of divers special reasons, it night even be

FGB/mrm 33-35

(Mr« Achtear, Guinea)

well if this time such a summary were distributed to the General Assembly. Ifsuch a summary or digest were compiled, the following point should be made very

clear. It should note that the representative of Guinea expressed his

opposition to any distribution of the document under discussion, a document

which he regards as inadequate and likely to maintain and foster within the

Security Council a conclusion likely or designed to jeopardize an urgent and

peaceful solution of the Congolese crisis.

We are of the opinion that this report can only reconcile Messrs* Kasavubu,

Tshombe, Mobutu and the Belgians and their allies. Such is our position, and

we want it to be made very clear. We know, and we know that the United Nations

knows, that Prime Minister Lumumba was always in favour of conciliation. We

know that at a certain point a document had been signed by Prime Minister Lumumba

and by Mr. Kasavubu, a document which reconciled them. That document has

vanished, and Mr. Kasavubu has gone back on it.

GRR/ek 36

(Mr. Achkar, Guinea)

Consequently, we know that the party of Lumumba and his friends never

opposed reconciliation. We want to put this clearly on record, and in

conclusion we wish to draw attention to two things which are in our opinion of

great interest although unofficial. However, we have become rather accustomed

to that kind of thing in connexion with the Congo; I am referring to the kind

of reports we have heard on the radio since last night, reports of chaos in Kivu

and Oriental Provinces and so on.

We know that these manoeuvres are simply designed to justify a de facto

situation which is being prepared. We are familiar with this sort of thing

and we know that it is necessary for the United Nations to step very delicately,

to be very careful about the situation which is being prepared in those provinces,

We know that so long as there are Congolese nationaliste resolved to defend

their territory, resolved to labour in the interests of their people, foreign

intervention to impose "Uncle Toms" upon the Congolese people will never be

lacking. I chould like to draw the attention of the United Nations to this

danger which is impending and to the dangers in connexion with the latest

accomplished facts within a fully delineated programme parts of which have

already been implemented during the past weeks.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I assume that, from the point of view of

this Committee, there would be no objection if, in a special case, the analytic

summary were given wider circulation. We may, of course, return to that later.

Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): I wish to reaffirm my delegation's firm

Apposition to placing the message received from the Conciliation Commission at

the disposal of the members of the Security Council. My delegation has no

objection to the proposal made by the representative of India that the message

should be circulated to the Members of the General Assembly, with the

clarification that it does not constitute a full report by the Conciliation

Commission and in no way reflects the policy of our respective Governments.

GRR/ek 37

Mr. WIRJOPRAKOTO (Indonesia): First of alk I should like,-to emphasize

again what I stated the day before yesterday, namely, that Indonesia, did not take

part in the work of the Conciliation Commission and is not ;able to associate .

itself with thjLs document containing the message from the Conciliation-Commission.

I would like to be quite olear and to put this on the record. First, I

think all the, documents should be distributed to avoid any misunderstanding. In

the second place, as long as Indonesia is a member of this Advisory Committee,

I believe we have some duties to perform and accordingly I am now. obliged to make

a few remarks. ... .

First of all, we are not opposing any conciliation, but conciliation itself

was difficult one or two months ago and is even more difficult today. I stated

in the Security Council that many kinds.of- conciliation are required, conciliation

among the.Congolese leaders themselves, .conciliation between the United Nations

Command and the Congolese people and leaders, even conciliation in the Security

Council among some of the great Powers, ..For this reason the question now, before

us is really complicated and has been made even,more complicated by the death of,

Mr. Lumumba, as I think the .Conciliation Commission itself: has-mentioned,in the.

message which we received yesterday,, in which it is said that "the unfortunate

event may well compromise the chance of a peaceful solution of the Congolese

crisis." . . - .... .

, • For.all.tUese_reasons I would like to put some questions. Is it not

possible that at this Juncture, we could make a kind of fresh start? Why should

it not be possible for us at present to consider, for instance, some of the ideas

mentioned in the draft resolution proposed in the Security Council yesterday by

Liberia, CeyjLon and the United Arab Republic? Also, in connexion with the

Secretary-General's report of 15 February, the SeeretaryrGeneral referred to a

number, of items and suggested .some concrete measures, which might be discussed

in connexion with the message we now have before us. My question therefore., is,

is it not possible.— we have little further opportunity, time is pressing and

I think, it..is still our duty..to have free discussions between some of the Members

of the United Nations and the Secretary-General — to find some concrete measures

which can be implemented, I think this is essential and urgent. ,

GRR/ek 38-1+0

(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

To come to the point, in your report, Mr. Secretary-General, you mentioned

five points which you have already directed to be implemented. The implementation

is already proceeding. One of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution

eubmitted yesterday by the three Powers in the Security Council mentions, for

instance, the evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military

and para-military personnel not under the Unitad Nations Command, and also

mercenaries. All these matters are inter-related and, if you will permit me to

go further, in addition to the five points I have just mentioned you referred to

three other points which are not yet being implemented, because I understand you

are waiting for some mandate from the Security Council. I refer to the control

over the import of arms into the Congo, the control over the transfer of funds

to the Congo and the enforcement of constitutional measures.

These matters are more or less inter-related and what I have in mind is a

discussion, if that is the right word, of these points. The Secretary-General

was very prudent, referring to the sovereignty of the Congo and asked if the

Security Council would like to take the responsibility for those three measures,

reminding the Council about its duty to respect the sovereignty of a Member

nation. I have been thinking about this matter for a long time, and I think

the best way of respecting the sovereignty of the Congo would be for the

United Nations to defend that sovereignty.

AW/mm

(Mr* Wir jopranoto, Indonesia)

The fact is that in the last months, since September, the sovereignty of

the Congo has been violated -- not only secretly, but openly. The import of

arms, funds and everything else from abroad, particularly from Belgium, was thus

an open .violation of the sovereignty of the Congo. But we have done practically

nothing or little. Therefore, my view is that if the United Nations wishes to

respect the sovereignty of the Congo, we should in the first place defend with

all .measures the sovereignty of the Congo. This is one of the most important

measures, because all the other measures, all the other steps mentioned in the

previous resolution and the one of yesterday, as well as those mentioned in the

message of the Conciliation Commission, are related to the solution of this

problem. It is necessary for us to have the right answer.

I am not going to make statements as to how to defend the sovereignty of

the CongOj but I have just put forward these comments so that perhaps through

discussion, we can find some formula in the sense of making your efforts stronger,

Mr. Secretary-General, to eliminate the legal obstacles of your efforts, and to

pave, the way to the whole success of the United Nations operations*

These, are the remarks that I shpuld like to offer at this stage,

The SECRETARY -GENERAL; First of all, as I said at the last meeting,

it would be my intention, whether the three -Power draft resolution is adopted or

not, to invite you -- I hope you will have time reserved because it will be a time-

consuming operation -- to discussion about how best to implement the resolution

or how best to go ahead even without the resolution. That covers necessarily also

the further development of the five points to which the representative of

Indonesia referred, points which are covered by instructions and by action,

although in a few cases I frankly have had to strain the mandate or Charter rights

of the Secretary-General a little. Anyway, I have done it.

As regards the three points, it is not out of prudence that I have made the

observation to which the representative of Indonesia referred. It is for another

and very simple reason. The right of search regarding arms and seizure, of

course, and the right of control of movements of funds and capital, are rights

within the sovereignty of a nation, rights exercised by the sovereign authorities

of the nation. If we take them over, we have taken over certain sovereign

AW/mm te(The Secretary-General)

functions. The Security Council may find that in the interest of

peace and security, they can take enforcement measures which would

enter such an area, "but most definitely the Secretary-General cannot

on his own do so. That is not straining the mandate; that is setting

a precedent which would show a complete disregard on the side of the Secretary-

General of not only the sovereign rights of nations, but what is from the point

of view of narrow UN operation worse, a complete disregard of the prerogatives of

the Security Council.

That is the reason why I had to put it in that way. But I made it clear

that those were two rights which would be rather useful and which would have been

most useful in the past, although we-have nob had them. But I repeat vhat I said

at the beginning, it is ray firm intention to ask you to devote quite some time

to the working out of an operational programme as soon as we are in a position

to do so without crossing wires with the Security Council.

Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland): Like Indonesia, Ireland is not a member of the

Conciliation Commission, for different reasons, and I feel it, accordingly, my

duty to intervene and to express our delegation's view as to what should be done

with the two messages which we now have before us.

May I say first of all, as I have not had an opportunity of saying this

before, how very much my delegation agrees with the second message which we have

received from the Conciliation Commission regarding the tragic and untimely death

of Patrice Lumumba. Indeed when this tragic news arrived to the Irish Government,

as will be recalled, my Foreign Minister sent the communication to you,

Mr. Secretary-General, expressing the Government's shock and distress at

Mr. Lumumba's death and expressing the sincere hope that in these tragic

circumstances the Security Council would issue a unanimous appeal for restraint

and calm and for the early formation of a government representative of all parties

in the Congo. Accordingly, I do wish to go on record in expressing my delegation's

appreciation of this second message from the Conciliation Commission,

My delegation feels that this message should be conveyed as quickly as

possible to the Security Council and to the Members of the Genera^ Assembly, as

we also said at our meeting on Thursday should be done with the first message

AW/inm *O 4 5 ' '(Mr. Kennedy, Ireland)

from the Conciliation Commission. Since we have received that message two events

have talien place which in our view strengthen the desirability of making the two

reports available without delay. The first , of course, is that''already the

first message has leaked to the Press/ and I join with the representative of

Nigeria in deploring the leakage which has taken place. But I think we would

all agree that the leakage which has taken place does not always accurately

reproduce every element in the first message and therefore, in our view, it is

very desirable to have the entire text presented to the General Assembly, as has

been suggested, without delay.

The second event which has occurred and which strengthens the argument for

immediate publication is the fact that in the Security Council the delegations of

the United Arab Republic, Liberia and Ceylon have introduced a draft resolution

to which the first report of the Conciliation Commission is closely relevant.

We believe that the first report of the Conciliation Commission is an essential

instrument in assessing the problem before the Security Council. We believe that

we would be lacking in our duty if we prevented the information contained therein

from becoming available at once to the Security Council.

Let me stress, in this connexion, the element of urgency which the

Conciliation Commission itself recognized. The Conciliation Commission said the

following in its first message:

"in view of the significance of the present meetings of the Security

Council, and their importance to the solution of the crisis, the Commission

has decided to "inform the Advisory Committee immediately, in advance of its

report, of certain principal conclusions reached unanimously by all its

members present in the Congo."

In our view there never was a moment when the advice of the Conciliation

Commission was more urgently needed, and we were particularly encouraged, as we

said at the last meeting, that these conclusions were reached unanimously by

all the members present in the Congo. I believe that the way to handle 'these two

reports is to convey-them without comment on our part. I would like, if I may,

to address myself very briefly indeed to the suggestions made this morning by

the representative of India. j

DR/rd 1*6

(Mr. Kennedy, Ireland)

There Is one point to which I should like to refer, and it is a point to

which the representative of the United Arab Republic has already made reference.

It is the statement that the Conciliation Commission's conclusions are in the

nature of an interim report pending a full and final report to the Advisory

Committee to be submitted later. In our view, using the actual words used by

the Conciliation Commission, what we have before us in the first message is

rather an advance communication of certain principal conclusions reached

unanimously by all its members present in the Congo. In our view, it is quite

in order for the Conciliation Commission to furnish us with these advance

unanimous conclusions in advance of the preparation of the final report.

May I make one final point, Mr. Secretary-General, in connexion with the

suggestion which has already been made by the representative of the United Arab

Republic. It is that, in our view, the proposal of the Conciliation Commission

to proceed to Geneva in order to prepare the final report is a wise one. In our

view, if the Conciliation Commission were to come here in order to prepare its

final report, knowing as we do the emotional atmosphere which has naturally

enough surrounded the discussions on the Congo, we feel that the Conciliation

Commission might be inhibited from reaching a speedy conclusion to its labours.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, arising from what you

said just now, I am almost tempted to ask the question whether the Security

Council can take over the sovereign rights of a government and a nation, but it

is too near lunch time for me to ask that question. You said that these are

sovereign rights which you could not take over and that that is why it has

been put to the Security Council. However, I am not asking this question.

I am glad that we have all agreed now that the reports of the Conciliation

Commission should be supplied to the members of the General Assembly, I remember

that I also suggested yesterday or the day before yesterday that we should do so

and on circulating it we should make the reservation that the report had not

been considered by the Advisory Committee,

A very good draft has been suggested by the representative of India, and I

would venture to make one or two suggestions for modification for your

consideration and for the consideration of the Committee. ,

DR/rd . 1 ^ 7

(Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

' Out of what the representative of the United Arab'Republic said about-the

Conciliation Commissidn1 s conclusions not being in the nature of an interim •••'

report -- in fact, whatever ve may say about the nature of this report, it is

bound to be misunderstood by some people. From my point of view it is not

necessary to say anything about the nature of the report at all. So my '

suggestion would be to keep the preamble, the first four lines, delete

sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 and go on from the preamble to sub-paragraph 3. It 'would

read as fbllovs: •••••' '

"The Advisory Committee decides to circulate the two messages from

the Conciliation Commission to all members of the (General Assembly. In

doing so they wish, however, to bring to the'attention of all members

of the General Assembly, that: ' •••'•••'..

The Advisory Committee has not considered the substantive aspects of:

the conclusions contained in a message from the Conciliation Commission"; -* i

I would suggest an addition: v . ; . ,

"And these conclusions should not be deemed to represent in any way i;l

the views of the Governments whose representatives comprise the Conciliation"Commission." . . * • . - . • - . - . , • - ,

Just a very simple statement without implying any view about the nature of the

report. It also incorporates the points which'you made yourself, that the

General Assembly would be concerned with the consideration of the report by

the Advisory Committee and not by Governments. :. ,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; May I make a suggestion here. I submit it to you

Mr. Jha because you are, so to say, the draftBman-sponsor* I think that there: ls>

if I may say so to the representative of Pakistan, a need for ah underscoring

of the character'of the paper. So there I find it difficult to follow you. But

I think one could use their own words, which in fact come closer to what -the

representative of the United Arab Republic said,"the Conciliation Commission's '

message contains certain principal conclusions in advance of its rep6rt'V -That

is their own formula and that could not be open to any discussion.

DR/rd W

(The Secretary-General)

I would like to add to that that the final report to the Advisory Committee

will be submitted to the General Asseembly by the Committee with its own

comments. Let us make it clear what the constitutional situation is.

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General,! have no objection to it.

The really important things are paragraphs 2 and 3, and I would certainly insist

on paragraph 2, if that is not regarded as a very violent infringement of any

principles. We must point out, it is our duty to point out to the members of

the General Assembly — because I know there is some misunderstanding about that,

and this WG.S clearly mentioned in one of our proceedings — that they would act

in their individual capacity and not be subject to any directions from

Governments. So we must mo,ke it clear that these represent the individuals. Until

they are examined by Gcverrcects and endorsed otherwise, they cannot be taken

as the views of the Governments represented on the Advisory Committee That

is why I feel that paragraph 2 becomes important.

I am not so keen on paragraph 1; it could even be deleted. But if you

think that the way that you have put it is a more accurate description, I have

no objection at all.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that paragraph 1 is useful and that

it meets the views that liave teen expressed here, if we directly quote the

words of the message there can be no criticism from the members of the

Conciliation Commission, and that is what I would propose. Paragraph 1 would

also give us the advantage of saying hov we are to treat the definite report;

that is to say, the definite report is not, so to say, something which IB signed

by this Committee but something which will be transmitted to the General Assembly

in due time with the comments of this Committee. So we gain two points in

treating it in that way.

I think that we have come to the stage where all of us feel that we should

look at this text and, so to say, try to wind up because it is quite obvious that,

with the exception of the representative of Guinea who is set against it, there

is the feeling that as matters now stand, with a covering note of probably this

type, we would have to circulate it. If that is so, I would, however, make one

immediate suggestion, meeting the point of the representative of Guinea, end that

is that if we have a note of this kind, it should be mentioned that the

DR/rd 1*9-50

(The Secretary-General)

circulation was approved "with the reservation of the representative of Guinea"*

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea): I should lite to ask you one question about the

analysis I was referring to. Is it possible to have it distributed along with

the document? I mean, when we decided to send a kind of analysis of the debate

to the .Security Council, would it be possible to.do the same this time, but, ,.

instead pf sending it only to the Security Council to send it to the .General. .

Assembly? . . . . . ,

: The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We are masters of our own procedure, and for ,

that reason, as .1 said before, it is for the Committee to decide. , There is.no-thing,

to stop the Committee from deciding that way. . , . ,

,. Mr. JHA (India): I would like, if there is, no objection, to have tlje

final text read out after the amendments .that liave been suggested. .That is my ; . .

first point., .. • _ ..... .... ..,_... . . ; § 1 ..,.,. ,, ., ,.. .. .

The second point is that I.would support the suggestion of the. representative ,

of Guinea because we are adopting an exceptional procedure in giving this thing

to all the Members of the Assembly. I think it will be quite right also to let

them have, on the same basis as it is supplied, to members of the Security Council

on this occasion, a summary of the discussions, t ere so that they may .be fully..,.., , ,

informed, . • . . , . . . . . . . .

After we have decided this question of procedure, I should like to bring ; : .

to your attention and to the attention of the Committee one point relating to the ,

situation.in the Congo. However, I do not wish to burden the Committee now, I

hope you,.will, give me .the. opportunity to speak after we have decided on this.

text. , . . . . . . . . . . • . - . . . • . . . . ; - . • . • • • • . •

Mr, RITCHIE (Canada): Mr. Secretary-General^ I have every.sympathy for

the motives of the representative of Guinea in proposing that an analysis pf our,

discussion here, should be appended to this report, £f I understood my colleague

correctly^ ... . , '' ' , . •

The 'SECRETARY-GENERAL: I do not think he meant appended, but circulated.

MW/en 51

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): Circulated simultaneously.

I find myself, I am afraid -- perhaps it is my fault --at some disadvantage

in this respect "because I did not realize that there was going to be a discussion

of substance at this meeting. Views have been expressed on the substance of

various aspects of developments in the Congo. If a summary which purports

to give the view of the Advisory Committee and its members on various aspects

of the substance of the Congo question were to be circulated, I should like to

have had an opportunity to consult my Government, I was under the impression

that this was mainly a meeting concerned with the procedure by which we would

pass this communication on, if we decided to do so, to the Members of the

General Assembly. So, if the representative of Guinea would bear with those

of us who have not been prepared for such an extended discussion, perhaps at

our next meeting in the near future, when substantive matters are raised, we

should all have had an opportunity to make our views felt concerning

the document which had this exceptional circulation. I do not know whether

any of my colleagues are in the same position as myself.

Mr. AGHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I would Isimply

like to point out that, in any event, a decision has already been adopted by

this Committee to the effect that our debate should be summarized in a certain

manner and distributed to the members of the Security Council. This is already

an eatabliBhed procedure. I suppose the same thing will happen this time.

Therefore, I do not really see the difficulty that would arise if, instead of

limiting the document to members of the Security Council only, it were distributed

to all Members of the General Assembly instead. I am not so demanding as I

know that the members of the Security Council will get it anyway. I simply

wish to draw the attention of the representative of Canada to this point. In

the event that the analysis of our debates were distributed, there would

scarcely be any need to state whether or not the representative of Guinea was

opposed because it will figure in the document itself.

MW/en 52

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Analytic summaries are not circulated as

documents; they are circulated for information -- which, I think, helps

the representative of Canada, • '. '.

There is a further point which is that, of course, the reservation made

by the representative of Canada would also figure iti that very paper.

Mr* I/TJJffT (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I should

like to add a word on this point. Todayfs discussion was really a procedural• i . . . • ) . . / ' .

one and I am sure that the analytic summary will emphasize the procedural

aspect, as it properly should. No one entered into the substance of the report.

There are delegations, like my own and that of Guinea, which made it clear

that they have reservations about or disagree with some points of th6

message, but that was said in a general manner. The most Important 'thing • • .

at this stage is the question of procedure.

... The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would venture to propose -*-and I hope

it will meet with the approval of the representative of Canada -- that this

time the wider distribution of this information document te accepted, but

of course there will be a covering note stating that this is because of the

character of the matter, in line with the procedure which we have discussed;

so that we do not establish a precedent because I do not think we should have

that as a rule. '.* ' - - • • ' • • - . ' - . • . . ,

. Mr.. BSNABOtip (Morocco) (interpretation from French)t The only ,.

.point which I believe it is desirable to stress is that of the date. 1 I think

this is essential* It will explain the diversity of points of view-which may

arise in the consideration of this partial report in its discussion in the :

Security Council or elsewhere* I think it is necessary to have this

clarification, which is scientific or historical, so to speak. It is an

accurate fact and I think it is desirable that it should be included.i

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: It is dated the 15th February.

MW/en 53

Mr, BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): No, what I

meant was that this message — which is called a message — addressed to the

Secretary-General "by the Chairman of the Conciliation Commission of the

United Nations in the Congo, has the date of 15 February as the date when it

was posted. But we have to mention the date when it was drafted or agreed

upon. We have "been told that it was adopted possibly three days before it was

posted — at least on the eve of Mr. Lumumba's assassination. That is why

I say that certain members of the Commission left when they realized that

everybody had already agreed on the report and that it simply had to be

reproduced and sent here. That is what I wished to explain, namely, that those

who were present and expressed agreement with the report gave their agreement

to all the paragraphs contained in the report at a given time, and that is the

date which I wish to be mentioned. Perhaps one or two or three days elapsed

before it was finally drafted and all the physical details of its preparation

taken care of. What I wish to be clearly indicated is that the report was

agreed upon by the members of the Conciliation Commission and that there be

an indication of the date when it was agreed upon, which was prior to the date

when it was posted.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The message reads in the first sentence;

"Adopted by Conciliation Commission on 15 February.* If I understand

correctly, the two members who were not present left tvo and four weeks before.

We could perhaps meet your point, Mr* Ambassador, in the light of one cable

here: "As you know Senegal absent" -- I did not remember that — "for four '

weeks.1* That is to say, what you say cannot apply to Senegal. On the other

hand, "Morocco absent since last Sunday 12 February." That is to say, what

you say may apply to the Moroccan representative, that he had given his agreement

to this at an earlier stage and had not had a chance to consider the change in

the situation. But I wonder if that is not most properly met by pointing out

when these members left, because if it were said that the Moroccan representative

left on the 12th, the comments that must follow from it are entirely obvious

and then we are on safe ground because that is, so to say, scientific information.

But may I refer to the question of the text?

MW/en 5^-55

(The Secretary"General)

The representative of India asked how the text should read. I have not

Jotted down any notes, "but I think I shall:just try to repeat it slowly,

We should not change the first line "Decides to* because, as the Guinean

representative said, if the other text is circulated at all, the analytical

summary record, there is no reason to have it mentioned specifically here,^

Then we come to paragraph 1 where I made the following suggestion': "The '

Conciliation Commission's message of the l th" — I think it should be --

contains*" — and I use their own formula — "certain principal conclusions in

advance of its report. The full and final report to the Adviefcry Ccisnittoe to be

submitted later in discharge of the mandate (a copy of the mandate is attached)

will be transmitted by the Committee to the General Assembly with its own

comments."

That would be, I think, the correct way of putting it.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic'):'" I have one 'observation to

make. When we speak of the Committee I think that we ought to put the 'iv''

words "Advisory Committee11, and in the second line we should put nThe Conciliation

Commission" rather than the ^Commission".

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think we should do that all through.

Is that formulation agreeable? I think it is the most exact way that we can

present it.

As to the second paragraph, I do not remember, apart from what

Mr. Loutfi said, that there were any other suggestions. The representative of

Pakistan would have preferred not to have it, but I suppose that, if there :; » . . ' . • . ' • • • .were general feeling that we should have it, he would not insist on deletion.

The. third paragraph, I think, is also something which has never been '"

discussed and which is also accepted,

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I thought the second paragraph should' go into

the third. It is all right with me if you want to keep them separate.

HA/cw 56

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Could we then conclude that an analytical

record, pointing out that it is only for information in exceptional circumstances,

be given to all members, and, further, that the text as revised here will be

the covering note for these two messages?

If that is agreeable, as it seems to be, then I would simply warn you again

that I would like to meet with you very soon and that you should reserve even

more time than is usually the case.

The Ambassador of India had previously said that he wanted to go into

some other matter.

Mr. JHA (India): I will be brief, because the hour is rather late.

We have had rather disturbing information from Leopoldville -- through our own

channels, of course -- of the possibility of some kind of pogrom. Stories

are being circulated about some kind of plot on Kasavubu's life. All of us who

have experience of recent history, particularly the history of the 1930fs, know

that this sort of thing is usually some kind of prelude to a mass massacre, or

mass punishment, or that kind of thing.

I would like to express our great anxiety at this news. Of course,

Mr. Secretary-General, you have your own ways of checking whether it is correct

or not. But I thought it of such gravity that I felt I should place it on

record, and I should like you to consider -- I am sure that your machinery there

is already taking the necessary steps -- the psychological effect of any public

declaration by the United Nations of protection to anyone seeking its protection,

putting them in camps or putting them under guard or giving them protective

custody, or something like that. I simply wanted to bring it to your attention,

because the news that we have received is certainly very alarming and something

that has to be tackled in all possible ways.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I share the feelings and views expressed by

the Ambassador of India, because we have also been informed about rumours which

seem quite threatening. Naturally, we have taken all the steps within our

power. Arrangements have been made for a kind of protected camp, and everybody,

I guess, has by now been informed that he can seek protection in the usual way

and that we will give protection. Militarily, we are reasonably strong in

Leopoldville.

HA/cw 57

(The Secretary-General)

Furthermore', as you have heard, we have brought out from Leopoldville . -

the families and thirty-nine others. • • - •

The third point is that, as regards some people who --according to

rumours, too -- have been sent away from Leopoldville by those who are : > -

in power there, we have done our utmost to track them down and to take all the

protective measures we possibly can. Unfortunately^ you know as well as I do

that that is no more than a relative guarantee. But it is, of course, our duty

to do whatever we can.

As regards further steps, we are very much on the alert -- and alert also

as regards whatever psychological and political pressure we can bring :to bear on

those who would take the responsibility.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

0 LA*vQU\&

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 23•" ' ' ' • ' ' ' • - • • • - - ' ' • ' " ' • ' 21 February 196l

• - . . , , . , , . , - . . ' . 'ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ONTHE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Tuesday, .21 February 1961, at 3 p.m.

61-0502

RSH/mtm 2

The SECRETABY-GENERAL: As indicated at the previous meeting I have,

invited the members of the Advisory Committee for discussion of the situation facing

us after the Security Council decision this morning. I am sure that you all endorse

the invitation I have taken upon myself to issue to the distinguished delegate of

Ceylon as one of the co-sponsors of the resolution passed by the Security Council.

I '.vtend ir.y warmest welcome to the delegate of Ceylon.

It if- my suggestion that we would now urgently embark on what I would regard

as a kind of fi:.-£jt roaling of the resolution in order to see what consequences it

entails within th* f-'cxd prcper to these consultations. This, I believe, would

take several mer.tir.g-j as some of the points likely to arise are complicated and

may well show uv <liii renct:.-. of opinion which we should try to iron out.

In order to keep the discussion on as businesslike a basis as possible and

to arrive at results as quickly as possible, I believe it would be appropriate

if I were now, first of all, to outline a kind of agreed agenda for our

discussions which we could follow so as to cover.the ground systematically and

with the minimum of repetition.

The first question that arises — and one which is crucial -- concerns the

extent to which this Committee, through the Secretary-General or indirectly,

comes into the picture at all in the implementation of the resolution.

The first operative paragraph "urges that the United Nations take, etc."

and the question arises what does the Security Council mean by the "United Nations".

Two diametrically opposed views were expressed at the Council table. On the one

side, the delegate of the Soviet Union stated that "this resolution gives no

mandate to the Secretary-General'1 and further the resolution "gives no specific

instructions to the Secretary-General". On the other side I made the following

statement: "I note the reaffirmation of previous resolutions which entrusted J:h

Secretary-General with execution of the decisions of the Security Council in the

Congo affairs. On that basis I shall urgently avail myself of the valuable

assistance of the Advisory Committee. It is from its members, fifteen of which

are from African and Asian countries, that I will seek guidance in the

implementation," Further, I said, regarding the decision of the Council on an

immediate and impartial investigation of the Lumumba assassination that I would

refer the matter to the Advisory Committee and that I "would abide by its advice"

CORRIGENDUM

United Nations Advisory Committee oh the Congo

Verbatim Record of meeting No. 23, held on Tuesday,21 February 1961, at 3 p»m.

M. MAIGA (Mali)

Page 17. 2nd paragraph, to read:

"There is no doubt that the United Nations Command is under the authority

of the Secretary-General. I am obliged to make a reservation in the none of

my Government on the action of the Secretary-General, because from our point of

view, I would not be able to say that he enjoys our entire confidence.

Everyone has their own position of this problem..."

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia)

Pa e 51. 2nd paragraph. 1st line

for "five" read "eight"

61-05575

RSH/mtm 3(The Secretary-General)

If Mr. Zorin is right, the question arises whether there is any other mechanism

through which the operations envisaged can be set in motion, as on Mr, Zorin's

assumptions the Secretary-General could wash his hands and regard his duties as

limited to the reaffirmed previous resolutions. Under the Soviet assumption

the Secretary-General could to no extent "be held responsible for the implementation

of tir-a new resolution, or for its non-implementation. I am sorry that Mr. Zorin

did not state whether he accepted this consequence of his stand -- that is to say he

did not indicate it, unless euch an acceptance can be read into the statement that

he considered the resolution adopted only as "a first step towards the fulfilment

of those measurer. whiO.: wer« included in the draft resolution of the Soviet Union"

which, as is well known, requested the "immediate dismissal" of the Secretary-

General.

Thus, to repeat it in agenda terms, the first question on our agenda is what

is meant by the "United Nations" in operative paragraph A 1.

The second question, which flows immediately and unavoidably from the first,

is: To what extent does the interpretation of "United Nations" in operative

paragraph A 1 apply to operative paragraphs A 2, A U, B 1 and B 2.

The third question, in its turn, flows from the second one: To the extent

that the operative paragraphs are not addressed to the "United Nations" as

interpreted and are not openly addressed to "all States", to whom are they

addressed? This question is particularly relevant in view of the confused

situation in the Congo and the differences of opinion as regards the status of

various personalities or de facto authorities in the country. The reply is of

particular relevance in operative paragraphs B 1 and 2, but arises also in the

operative paragraphs addressed to the United Nations itself; I have in mind A 1,

A 2 and A ^ which all of them necessitate co-operation between the United Nations

and local authorities.

The questions so far enumerated can be grouped together but I believe all the

same that it is wise to concentrate in the beginning on the first question as it is,

in a sense, the key to the others.

On this first question, I must insist on a clear and definite outcome of

our discussions. I regard it as my duty to report to the Council if, on advice

of the Committee, I were to have to consider myself as not concerned with the

resolution and, likewise, on that same advice, I would have to consider myself

RSH/mtm U(The Secretary-General)

concerned by the resolution (as in fact I stated yesterday in the Council) and,

if so, in what form and to what extent.

Such reports to the Council are necessary as a "background for a judgement

on such further reporting on the implementation of which the Council will "be in

need. If against my expectations this Committee were not to reach a clear and

definite conclusion, I see no way of avoiding a request for an interpretation by the

Security C'vjnci.l itself.

If I uow turn to other questions which in due time we will have to consider,

I can continue my reading of operative paragraph A 1. Measures are required so

as to prevent the c'.c^r°rice of civil war, "including arrangements for cease-fires,

the halting of all iini_-Uiry operations, the prevention of clashes and the use of

force, if necessary, in the last resort".

Two types of questions arise. The first set of questions refers to the

groups and personalities in the Congo with whom the United Nations would have to

deal; the legal basis for the dealings of the Organization with these groups and

personalities; and the aims of such dealings.. This set of questions will require

very serious consideration by the members of this Committee since important political

constitutional and practical problems arise. On what basis do we appraoch a Tshome,

a Kalonji, a Gizenga or a Mobutu? To what extent is it supposed that we must have

their consent? To what extent is it considered that we have a right to force.them

to certain actions? What kind of action should we try to get from them; is it the

same in all cases or are there differences? The situation is highlighted by

another statement of the delegate of the Soviet Union yesterday in which he said

that, if the UN Command were to use operative paragraph A 1 in order to use force

against units of the "legal government" in the Congo, his delegation would think

this to be a violation of the resolution, as the resolution in his view "clearly

indicates against whom these activities should be undertaken"; this quotation

should be seen in conjunction with his other statement to the effect that "The

Gizenga Government which now exists is the legal government of the Congo". It

would follow from his stand, by way of illustration of ray question, that while we

could work only on the basis of consent with Gizenga, we might or perhaps even should

work on the basis of force in relation to others, including Mr. Kasavubu.

RSH/mtm 5

(The Secretary"General)

The other set of questions, which arises in this context, is concerned with

the interpretation of the basis for, the purposes of and the limits to the use of

force. The questions are important both because, again, the Security Council has

not made it clear whether they now work within the framework of Article k2 or still

arc within the framework of Article 40 of the Charter; I stated yesterday in the

Security Council that, to my mind, the latter was the case in view of the

reaffirmation of previous resolutions which clearly do not go beyond Article Uo —

but obviously my interpretation is not authoritative, although it was not

contradicted.

However, tbess •.;;..i2.".tio"A3 are Important also because of the influence of the

stand of the contributing Governments on the size and composition of the Force;

what are they willing to let their troops undertake in the light of the assumption

on which they made -- or make -- their contributions.

For example, both President Bourguiba and Emperor Haile Selassie have made

it clear that the United Nations forces in the Congo may not be a third party to

any conflict and this must mean that they are not supposed to take military

initiative in regard to any army group in conflict with other army groups. When

I myself mentioned the issue in my intervention in the Security Council last

Wednesday, I clearly subordinated the use of force to the establishment of cease-

fires, neutralized zones, etc,, thus indicating that I regarded the use of force

as something which might arise in the protection of agreed peaceful solutions;

that would obviously make the use of force part of the right of self-defence which

the Force has always been recognized as having.

Whatever the interpretation of the clause regarding use of force, it leads

straight to the practical question whether or not efforts should now be me.de for

the strengthening of the Force. The Advisory Committee must express itself on

this point with urgency as if, as I believe, such a reinforcement is most essential,

I should not wait to take action. You will remember that. I stated my own view on

the matter this morning in the Security Council. Both on this and on other points

I would make all essential steps, that I may be entitled or in duty bound to

take in relation to this resolution, the subject of consultation with this Committee

RSH/mtm 6

(The Secretary-General)

In order not to take too much more of your time at this first meeting I will

only, loosely indicate some further questions which will arise under the

resolution*

The most important ones are related to operative paragraph A 2. Replies

have to be found to the questions: t who should be approached, through what means

and with what pressures? Although I regard the question as primarily political

and diplomatic find thus not open to the same technical considerations as the

problems previously mentioned, I consider the stand of the Advisory Committee

essential if the Orga-ilr-P/ticn is to avoid both what the countries most directly

concerned — and r.e rec.ervtevl aro ir,d this table -- would regard as omissions, and

to avoid accusations of sins of commission from those same countries. Although

I myself give the aim of operative paragraph A 2 top priority, I do not think we

are yet ready to discuss it here without first having cleared the ground as regards

the interpretation of operative paragraph A 1 on the point indicated by the words

"United Nations",

The, second specific problem I would also like to mention in this introductory

statement refers to paragraph A *K Were this Committee to find that the initiative

to the investigation, should be taken by the Secretary-General in consultation

with the Committee — as I mentioned yesterday in the Security Council — it must

quickly be decided how such an investigation is to be manned and organized.

I stated in the Council that it should not be an investigation through the

Secretariat because we had neither the resources nor the competence to undertake

such an investigation* Mr. Zorin reached the same conclusion but for the rather

different reason that the investigation should coverthe Secretariat's "own crime",

an expression which highlights the fact that somebody will, somehow, have to

establish terms of reference of the investigation; although I consider Mr. Zorin's

expression somewhat imaginative, I can assure this Committee that the very fact

that it has been used is enough to decide me not to have or not to let anybody in

the Secretariat have anything to do with the drafting of any such terms of

reference.

RSH/mtm 7-9

(The Secretary-General)

I apologize for the length of my introduction but I think that'by making it

I have, in fact, saved time for you. I would hope that we could avoid a general

debate on how to proceed and could devote ourselves at once to the first crucial

question which I raised: what is meant by "United Nations" in operative

paragraph A 1 and to what extent does the interpretation apply to other

operative paragraphs?

In yiew of my position in relation to this whole issue, I would prefer

somebody else to take the chair in the meetings regarding this resolution. On

an introductory, and procedural, level I would, therefore, wish you to take a

decision regarding the organization of our work: would you like to appoint a

special chairman for these meetings or is it your joint wish that we continue as

usual? You need not be diplomatic on this issue as I have already indicated my

preference.

RSH/mtm 10

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, I thank you for having called

this meeting this afternoon. We have certainly not lost any time in getting

together to devise ways and means of giving effect to the resolution,

document S/klkl, that was adopted this morning by the Security Council. You

raised the question as to whether there should be a special chairman for this

series of meetings in which the Advisory Committee might consider the implications

and the manner of the implementation of that resolution and advise you on it.

I have no doubt in my mind that we should continue as we have been doing for

so long. This is an advisory committee on the Congo to the Secretary-General.

You have presided over our meetings, and I am very happy to say that you have

presided with great sagacity and impartiality and you have helped us a great deal

in formulating our own opinions. I think that you should continue to preside.

We are an advisory committee, and the nature of the Committee can never be

changed, although I noted that last night some doubt was cast on even the

raison d'etre of this Committee, but I will come to that point later. That may

have to be clarified at the next resumed session of the General Assembly by

giving some sort of mention or recognition of this Advisory Committee, if that

matter is likely to become an issue. For the present, my view is that you

should continue to preside and we will certainly give you all the advice that

we feel to be necessary and .desirable on the question, of what is meant by the

"United Nations". I might say that this resolution is really an emergency

resolution. What is necesaary is to give effect to it and to implement it.

I would not like us to be involved in any great legal interpretation of the

various phrases used there. These phrases were formulated with great care and in

the face of great difficulty.

BC/dp : 11

(Mr. Jhat India)

«But, without any doubt, our understanding of the expression "the United

Nations",in paragraph 1 of the resolution is the machinery of the United Nations,

And, under the Charter, the machinery of the United Nations is headed by the

Secretary-General as chief administrative officer. Of course, in respect of the

Congo there is a special mission there. The sum total constitutes the expression

"the United Nations" in paragraph 1 of section A of the resolution. We do not

think that any other meaning can be attached to the phrase. We do not think that

any other meaning is practicable.

I should like to make a suggestion. The Secretary-General has raised very

many points in his statement, concerning interpretations, how effect is to be

given to different paragraphs, and so forth. I think that it will facilitate,

our discussions, if we take these points one by one. Otherwise, statements may

become too .long and diffuse. For the time being, therefore, I think that it may

be helpful to hear the views of members of the; Committee on these two points:

who should preside over these meetings, and what ie meant by-the expression

"the United ..Nations" in paragraph 1 of section A of the resolution*

I have ventured to state our understanding of the above-mentioned expression,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You have fully understood my own intention,

I felt that these were, so to speak, preliminary questions, I will give you

notes that I had dictated this morning because I think that it night be

practical for the Committee to have them in advance of the regular .verbatim

record. Without any pretent^ons, they constitute a kind of agenda, yhich might

be helpful.. . • , .. . t . ..

As regards the status of the Advisory Committee, of course there i$. no law,

at all that an advisory committee cannot have its own chairman. The Secretary-

General naturally has to be present because what is involved IB on exchange- i '

between the committee and the Secretary-General, But any special solution of the

question of chairmanship does not follow from the advisory nature of the

committee. In fact, the first advisory committee established was the

Scientific Advisory Committee, which the General Assembly decided should be

composed of seven members. As their first decision, the members' of the Committee

BC/dp 12

(The Secretary-General)

took the line that the Secretary-General should be Invited to attend the meetings

as Chairman, Obviously, the Committee could very well have followed anotherline.

Hence, the matter is not automatically settled. It is not an academic

question: it is a practical one0 The Committee will certainly understand that

this is a situation in which, on this or that point, some people may feel —

I do not feel so myself — that I would, as it were, be split between the role

of Chairman and the role of a kind of party* It is a natural question to put.

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): At the very outset I should like to say that

the Secretary-General should continue to preside over our meetings. I should

like to make the stand of the Nigerian Government very clear as regards the

office of Secretary-General. The United Nations is an organization, an

institution* It has to have an executive officer to carry out the proposals and

resolutions that are adopted. We are quite aware of that fact. It is our

intention that the Secretary-General should carry out the decisions which are

taken. We have not lost our confidence in the Secretary-General, If we were to

do so, we would be courageous enough to make a public statement to that effect.

'For that reason, the Nigerian Government sees no reason why there should be

any suggestion that someone other than the Secretary-General should preside over

these meetings. When the resolution was being drafted, it was clear enough what

the phrase "the United Nations" meant. As I have said, the United Nations is

merely an organization, an institution; it has its own executive officer to carry

out the decisions that are taken. We know that when the resolution is adopted

someone must execute it, We know that that person must be the Secretary-General*

Thus, there is no doubt about what is meant by "the United Nations"; what is

meant is the Secretary-General.

Paragraph 5 of section A of the resolution adopted this morning reaffirms

the other Security Council resolutions on the subject. Hence, we have reaffirmed

resolutions which have already been adopted.

BC/dp 13

(Mr, Ngileruma, Nigeria)

In my view, to attack the Secretary-General at this very crucial time is

not to attack, the person but the Organization, the institution, to try to break

it up and to ensure that proposals and resolutions which are adopted do not lead

to success. That is something which we do not want to see happen.

I would support the suggestion of the representative of India that we should

take up one by one the points that were raised by the Secretary-General, I

would sr.y that I entirely agree Lhat the Secretary-General should continue to

preside over our meetings; he should carry out his duty without any hesitation,

fear or embarrassment. Otherwise, the institution will break down, I know that

the Secretary-General is very courageous, I should like him to continue to hold

the fort. That is the attitude of the Nigerian Government,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I would make only two clarifications.

First, from my point of view, the question of chairmanship here is not at

all a question of confidence: it is a question of good form. It is always

convenient to have a chairman who is, so to speak, outside the debate. That is

the only reason why I have raised the matter.

Secondly, this morning X made clear my own stand on the interpretation of

the phrase "the United Nations", In my final statement to the Security Council

I referred to paragraph 5 of section A of the resolution and pointed out that,

on the basis c:? Its reaffirmation of previous resolutions, I understood that the

machinery set up by those resolutions applied to the entire text. However,

I feel in duty bound to leave that as an open question: first, because I am

not the authority to interpret Security Council resolutions -- I may have my

views on them, but those views may not be accepted by all — and, second,

because this very stand was challenged by one of the permanent members of the

Security Council, in the very clear terms which I have quoted.

But I would thank the representative of Nigrria for his kind words.

BC/dp lit-15

Mr, LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I

endorse what has just been said by the representatives of India and Nigeria,

We see no reason why the Secretary-General should not continue to preside over

our meetings,

So-far as the pbrase "the United Nations" is concerned, it is clear that

that means the Secretary-General and the High Command in the Congo; the

Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer. Hence, this interpretation

should not be open to any doubt.

FOB/cn 16

Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): As regards the question of the interpretation

of the words "United Nations", normally no one would have had, any doubt about

it, and the legislative history behind this resolution at last night's

discussion makes me sure that wthfe United Nations" meant the Secretary-General.

However, if any legalistic support was needed one has only to refer to

Chapter III of the United Nations Charter which states what are the organs

of the United Nations. They are a General Assembly, a Security Council, an

Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court

of Justice and a Secretariat. Just by the process of elimination, since

neither the General Assembly, nor the Security Council, nor the International

Court of Justice, nor the Economic and Social Council, nor the Trusteeship

Council can be entrusted with this function, it follows that "the United

Nations" means the Secretary-General. I feel that that should clinch the

argument as far as that particular point is concerned.

With regard to the chairmanship of this Committee, I do hope that you

are not tired of presiding over us,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; On the contrary, I rather like it.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Then if you wish to continue, please do so.

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I agree, Mr. Secretary-General, with your

observation that we should try as much as possible to avoid statements.

There is a lot of work to be done, and I think that your suggestion that we

should take things one by one and dispose of them is very wise.

As to the particular questions you asked, with regard to the first,

concerning the chairmanship of the Advisory Committee, I must say frankly

that I am not happy that the idea should have occurred to you at all, unless,

as the representative of Pakistan said, you are tired of us or of presiding

over us.

Our interpretation of the words "United Nations" as they occur in

operative paragraph 1 is such that I can only say that I fully endorse.thei

argument of the representative of Pakistan that "United Nations11" in this

case, as we understand it, means the Secretary-General and his collaborators

in the Congo and in the Secretariat.

FGB/cn 17

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; May I point out, before we proceed, that

there is a slight nuance between the Charter position, which you, Mr. Ambassador,

and those who had preceded you have taken, and the stand I took myself

yesterday, because, translated into resolution language, the stand I took

yesterday would have been reflected in the phrase "the Secretary-General of

the United Nations, in consultation with the Advisory Committee". That is

really what I said, o.nd it is, cf course, a qualification of the basic executive

rule in \;he Charter T-iich for example the Security Council or the General Assembly

could introduce. I practise it anyway, but it is a qualification which, I think,

has very great wisdom and merit. I would, for my pert, speaking from my

own personal point of view, hope that you are not tired of me »- that is to say,

that you will permit me to consult you so that we can work together.

Mr. MMGA (Mali) (interpretation from French): The Secretary-General

asks us to sanction in advance the action which he would carry out in the

Congo. I think that it is not up to the Advisory Committee to interpret

decisions of the Security Council. I have already indicated the position of

my Government in the Security Council, and I said there that we could not

sanction the position of the Secretary-General. We participated in the last

debate for the purpose of finding an urgent solution. As far as that urgent

solution is concerned, and in view of the fact that we cannot at present

decide on the i'lte of the Secretary-General, that is, who will be the Secretary-

General of the United Nations, I think that no useful purpose will be served

here by asking us to interpret the decision of the Security Council, because

the Secretary-General himself, being the executive instrument for decisions

of the Security Council, must be able to fulfil that function. And of course,

as far as reg-rds this urgent measure, since we do not want any civil wsr in the

Congo, it is normal Tor the Secretary-General, who has under his orders

the troops and the Command of the United Nations, to take decisions in line with

his present responsibilities.

However, I cannot associate myself with the view that the Advisory

Committee should be asked to sanction his actions in advance. There is no

doubt that the United Nations Command in the Congo is under the authority of

the Secretary-General, and it is on this point that I must enter my Government's

FGB/cn 18(Mr. Malga, Mall)

reservations vith regard to the actions of the Secretary-General because I

cannot say that he enjoys our full confidence. Each of us has his position

on this point, but we are endeavouring to find an urgent solution of the Congo

problem in order to avoid civil war, I have already said this, and, in

consequence/-it is certain thaf no useful purpose would be served by

reinitiating a debate in the Security Council to interpret a text which the

Council itself has formulated,

The- SECRETARY-GENERAL; I note that the representative of Mali

takes on this jpoint a stand different from that taken by one of the permanent

members of the Security Council yesterday who said, as I quoted, explicitly

that the resolution does not give any instructions to the Secretary-General,

and that the resolution does not ask the Secretary-General for any action.

I think that that is enough to indicate that there is a problem of interpretation

involved. .

I further note, and I. note to my regret, that the representative of Mali

feels that it is not fair of me to ask for any advance advice. I am sure .

that that does not exclude the.representative from considering that all

representatives have the full right to say afterwards that my interpretation

was wrong.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like

to state very succinctly that we consider the question being discussed now

to be a spurious problem. We know that the United Nations is what it is. The

various positions expressed in the Security Council have been stated clearly,

but the United Nations being what it is it must be taken as it is, and we

should, rather, agree on the action. What do we expect today's meeting to

achieve? We expected clarifications to be furnished to us on the way in

which the implementation of the provisions of this morning's resolution was

envisaged. If that had been the turn of the debate we expected, once these

intentions had been clearly delineated, that suggestions would be made. That

is when we expected to speak to state our judgement on those intentions as to

implementation. We might then have made our suggestions.

That is my view, and I hope that the debate will not tarry at its present

stage, which I think is not a very important one.

PGB/cn 19-20

Ihe SECRETARY-GENERAL; You expect immediate implementation of the

resolution. Let us take, for example, operative paragraph A k, "Decides that

an immediate and impartial investigation be held...". I read from the

distinguished representative in the Security Council whom I mentioned before.

(I refer to the investigation provided for in the resolution that has been

adopted by the Security Council;)

"I think that it is clear to everyone that there was no proposal that

the Secretariat, should be responsible for this investigation."

Is that not a case in which it is fair for the Secretary-General to ask these

members whether he should consider himself as having responsibility or not?

But I think we can go ahead T. only wanted to point out that the question

is not theoretical tud has not, been raised by me.

Mr. Mor ??: SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like

to address myse3? he two simple points which I think are elementary. First,

as far as the clu"i L-j.tViship is concerned, as Ambassador Jha and the representative

of Nigeria so aptly put it, there is no reason for us to change what we have

become so well accustomed to because you have directed our debates most ably

so far.

MW/pm 21

(Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

As to^paragraph 1 of section A of the resolution adopted by the Security

Council this morning, in so far as implementation of Security Council decisions

is concerned, and having in mind that under the Charter the organ-responsible for.

implementation is the Secretary-General, which is the executive organ, from that

point of view it is normal that the interpretation should relate here-to the .

Secretary-General. . ,.v ,

Now, there are explicit paragraphs in all the decisions.of the Security ;;

Council. In paragraph 1 of the resolution of 1^ July, which authorized the •< .

Secretary-General to take certain action, the Secretary-General is charged;with

certain action. The resolution of 22 July, which was adopted unanimously by the

Council, commended the manner in which the Secretary-General had done his Job and

again charged him to implement the resolution. The resolution of 9 Augiet

confirms the authority given to the Secretary-General and-asks. him. to. continue to

discharge his' responsibility. Then there is the resolution of the ...special-.

emergency session which, in paragraph 2, explicitly asks the Secretary-General, ...

to continue to conduct vigorous action,and so on and so forth. These resolutions

have been specifically reaffirmed by this morning's resolution*r

Therefore, as far as I can see, this resolution, in the words in paragraph vl,

urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures. .This

makes it clear that the Secretary-General has the job to do, together with the.

whole machinery - the United Nations Command, the Special Representative of ..

the Secretary-General in the Congo — which has enabled him to carry out the. ..'

mission entrusted to him. • . .

Moreover^ I am aware that;there have been precedents and traditions as

regards implementation of the decisions of the Security Council and the General.,

Assembly, and the tradition has been that so long as there is no mention in such

resolutions of a task specifically assigned to a special committee or delegation

or persons specifically named or mentioned by country, implementation

automatically is up to the Secretary-General. Therefore, in my opinion, the

words "United Nations" -- as Mr, Jha put it so well — refer to the

Secretary-General and the whole machinery set up for the implementation of the

action decided upon before' the Council. J ... ,

I shall revert to the 'other points when they are raised.

MW/pm 22

Mr« SALL (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I should like to dispel

any ambiguity as regards the interpretation of the words "United Nations11 in the

resolution which we are discussing,

On "behalf of the delegation of Senegal, I wish to declare that for us these

words mean the Secretary -General and the Organization of which he is the

unquestioned head* That is why we consider that you must continue as in the past

to preside over our discussions, in which capacity you have most effectively

contributed to the good conduct of our debates. I believe, moreover, that it is

advisable for us to keep clearly in mind that we are confronting a very grave

crisis in the Congo, that we are facing problems the urgency of which is quite

unchallenged, that the time is not for words but for action, In order to enable

the United Nations to act, it is essential that the one who is regarded as the

Chief Executive of the Organization should be left free to assume his

responsibilities and to implement the resolutions adopted by United Nations

organs.

Mr. SUBASINGHB (Ceylon): First of all, I want to thank you,

Mr. Secretary-General, and the Advisory Committee for the invitation extended to

us to participate in the meeting of this advisory group* I believe — and you

have so stated — that the reason why we have been invited is that we were a

party to the co- sponsorship of the resolution which was adopted this morning by

the Security Council.

As a co -sponsor, I think I should make the position of my delegation quite

clear as to what we mean in this paragraph 1 of section A when we say that

"The United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures, etc," Also, as has

been pointed out earlier with that paragraph is connected paragraph 5> which

reaffirms the Security Council resolutions, etc.

It is true that the role of the Secretary-General has been questioned from

various quarters from time to time, but, so far as I am aware, no decision has

been taken on that. That question has not been decided upon, nor has there been

any desire, or — shall I say? — steps have not been taken .to take any

decision on that question. Therefore, there is no question on whom the

responsibility lies for the interpretation or the execution of this resolution.

There is no alternative, and I quite agree with that, but to follow the old

practice as laid down in the Charter, that decisions of the Assembly or the

Mtf/pm 23-25

(Mr, Subasinghe, Ceylon)

Security Council are, in the first place, carried out by the Secretariat and the

Secretary-General as the Chief Executive*

Therefore, the position of my delegation ia that some delegatione•— or

rather, one delegation in the Security Council has tried to give it a different

interpretation, but in my mind I am quite clear that, in the present

circumstance8, the old practice must continue as regards the Chairmanship* This

is only an advisory body, it is not a statutory body as such. We are here surely

in an advisory capacity, and I do not think that any doubt has arisen

concerning the manner in which you have functioned as Chairman of this body* I

myself nave no doubt whatever about the efficient manner in which you have

conducted yourself as Chairman of this Advisory Committee and, therefore, my

delegation has no objection whatever --in fact we support your continuing as

Chairman of this group.

GRR/aJ 26

Mr* JHa. (India): I should like to say briefly that, speaking

for my delegation, I think the most important thing is that steps should be

considered in relation to which we should be very happy to advise you and give

our advice for what it is worth in regard to the immediate implementation

of tnis resolution. Tne situation in the Congo is very serious, far more serious

than we may realize as we are sitting here, and therefore I do not think we

should waste much time in interpretation or in having a replica of the

debate in the Security Council here. That would be an unprofitable exercise.

There is no doubt in our minds that whether one likes any particular individual

who holds the office of Secretary-General or not, the Charter is definite —

al.ta the executive actions of the United Nations have to be take.i by the

Secretary-General, with his chief administrative officers of the Organization,

and in association with any special machinery which may have been created, as

ibr instance in this case in regard to the Congo. That is not open for discussion

and I think we should start from that primordial position. After that, you

can ask us what measures should be taken under paragraph 1, and how it should

be implemented; paragraph k is also important, and you have also pointed out

what is to be done about paragraphs 2 and J. I suggest that we get along

quickly to these substantive matters. There can be no doubt that while

you are the Secretary-General of the Organization, you are the chief administrative

officer and aj.1 executive action for the implementation of the resolution must

be taken by you, your staff and your organization.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I cannot be more eager than you to go ahead

and I hope that this discussion will take place quickly. On the other hand, I

think you agree with me that it would be rather awkward if steps were taken,

over the signature of the Secretary-General, and afterwards it was said "Oh no,

that was not what we meant at all." That is the reason vhy I had to have

this as a kind of door to the substantive implementation, which requires also

a study of certain elements, because it is a question of the wisdom of certain

moves which we would certainly like to consider together.

GRR/aJ 27

Mr. DADZIE (Ghana): My delegation is in agreement with what the

representative of India has just said. la our view, to the extent that

operative paragraph 1 of part A is in keeping with and follows from previous

resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council in regard -to the

maintenance of law and order, to the extent that the implementation of those

resolutions was entrusted to your responsibility, and having regard to the fact

that those resolutions have been reaffirmed in the present resolution, we feel

that the expression "United Nations" in operative paragraph 1 of part A must

be interpreted as referring to you. When we first emerged as your creation, I

seem to. recall your saying that we were here to tender advice to you and that

although you were not bound to take our advice you would certainly consider it.

I recall also your saying that there was no intention on your part to, I think

the word you used was, unburden yourself of your responsibility. Our understanding

is that that intention stills stands and that our role, although changed in

degree, still in principle remains the same*

On the question of your chairmanship, I am in entire agreement with the

general consensus teat you should continue, particularly on the ground

that any apparent relucviance on' your part might give the impression that perhaps

you were, if I may say so with the greatest respect, seeking to unburden

yourself of the responsibility to which you have referred.

The SECRJ2TARY-GENERAL; That intention certainly stands; I am not

seeking to unburden myself and from that it follows on the other hand that what

is sought here is advice, not decisions. It is also reflected, as you know,

in the very procedure which we have. There is only one point which is quite

clear. It has been said, in what I am afraid is the usual sentimental spirit

of friends in the Press, that the Secretary-General has the most lonely job

in the world. Let us use more professional language, and let us say that he is

very badly off in enlightened advice. So that it is always a question of finding

the best form in which he can get such advice. It is not advice by which he can

be bound under the Charter, because he is not' supposed to take instructions

from anybody, but it is advice the value of which is rated so highly from his

side that he is very likely, as I said this morning, to abide by }.t»

GRR/aJ 28-50

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): your desire to be advised in this manner,

in viev of the debate, is I think proper and I am sure that ve are satisfied

that the authors of the resolution have quite clearly stated what they meant

by the words "United Nations". I am also happy to see that others, who were not

co-sponsors and who did not write the resolution, agree with their interpretation.

That also is our position. We understand fully what they mean.

Regarding the chairmanship, we want to assure you that we are not tired of

you if you are not tired of us.

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): First in regard to the question of

chairmanship. Our delegation does not see any reason to change from the useful

tradition which has been followed during the last five or six months to any

other practice. There is no reason to do so. Even if we have something to

say which perhaps might not be quite agreeable to you, I think it is best to have

you here* That is because we are here to discuss a problem, to express our

opinion, to find tae uest way to help the Congolese people and to help the

United Nations Organization. I therefore repeat that we would like to continue

the practice of having you as Chairman of this body.

In regard to the second point about the interpretation of the words "United

Nations" in the operative paragraph of the resolution, I understand fully the

reason why you put this question to us for consideration. In the light of

recent circumstances this is understandable. We should not forget the fact, I

mean the legal fact, that you are still in office. There is no resolution which

has dimissed you. There may have been a statement, but between a statement and

a resolution there is a difference, and so long as you are in office we have to

deal with you* I understand that there are nuances in the ways of thinking.

For instance, in regard to my own country and my intervention in the Security Council

on behalf of my delegation, our Government has decided to withdraw its troops from

the Congo. The man in the street reaches the conclusion that because of that

Indonesia has withdrawn its confidence in the Secretary-General. But that is only

the man in the street; the official statments and opinions of my Goveniment are

something else. We have stated frankly and cxearly that we have sometimes had

differences of opinion and differences of approach but from the beginning — perhaps

you will remember one of the first meetings of this Advisory Committee — the

objection of my delegation has been that the Secretary-General and the United

Nations Command have had too much trust in the legal approach in seeking for ways

aod means to solve the Congo proolem.

DR/ek 31

(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

We,should like to have more of a political.approach, more of a psychological

approach. This is a difference of opinion, and I think that this difference

still; continues. Perhaps in the near future we will meet each other. However,

to have- a difference of opinion and a difference of approach does not mean that

we have no confidence any more in the Secretary-General. I should like to state

this clearly because perhaps there is some feeling that may give rise to a

misunderstanding. After all, Mr. Secretary-General, in the time that is behind

us we have noticed that there have been some developments, some progress, because

experience is the.best teacher for all of us. In the last four, five or six

months we have had such a bad experience in the Congo and we should have the

courage to say, "Maybe we have made mistakes and because of this experience

some progress has been made". I want to be frank with you. ,„_ -, ,-V

On studying your statement of. 15 February, I note that you mention -five' •-

points, that you only need a legal basis or legal mandate for only three of the

points/ that you are waiting for a new .mandate. In the. view oft our delegation

such a statement reflects progress based on experience... If we are going to go

ahead with this experience and with all these statements-, I think it is .very late

in the. Congo problem, but it. is not too late to solve it in the interests of the

Congolese people and An the interests of the world. So for this reason our

delegation is still a member of the Advisory Committee because we feel that we

have something to contribute as a duty,and I think it is not necessary to make a

point about the position of.the Secretary-General in the Advisory Committee.

Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General, my delegation has

previously expressed its fullest confidence in the person and in the high office

of the Secretary-General, and we wish to reaffirm this firmly. . ,•

The United Nations as referred to in the operative paragraph of the

resolution has but one interpretation for my delegation, which is the good offices

of the Secretary-General. My delegation does not countenance any change in the

chairmanship of this Committee and shares the hope- that you, Mr. Secretary-General,

will continue to guide our deliberations. • •*.

DR/ek 32

Mr. RITCHIE (Canada): Mr. Secretary-General, I should Just like to

echo the consensus of opinion around the table that this resolution should, of

course, in our view, be interpreted as implying that the head of the executive

branch of the United Nations is entrusted vith its execution and by the same

token, I very much hope that you will continue to preside over our deliberations

here. I think that you have said that you would like to proceed in consultation

with this group, and I must say, after your preliminary running over of some of

the problems of implementation which are contained in this resolution, I can

well imagine that any advice and consultation, however unworthy, which might be

available would be welcome. Many here are much more fitted by propinquity to

the Congo or by knowledge of its history and problems than perhaps we are

ourselves to give.that advice. But I can only assure you that for our part we

shall be glad to contribute anything that we can.

I should just like to say too that I think that from our point of view it is

extremely helpful to have this kind of collaboration, to see how your mind and

opinion is moving and how the Secretariat views these problems because of course

we have responsibilities in having troops in the Congo,and there are certainly

very grave decisions arising out of this resolution. So I should like to say

that I hope that this will be a very fruitful work together and to assure you of

such advice as we are able to give you.

Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland): Mr. Secretary-General, I will be extremely

brief because I fully appreciate the point made by the representative of India

that we ought really to get down to the important practical problems that we have

to face. But, nevertheless, I do feel it important to place on record our

position on the two important points which you raised at the outset of our

proceedings this afternoon, particularly because I presume that a summary record

of our positions will be conveyed as usual to the Security Council. For that

reason I should like to place our views on these two matters on record with

brevity, but I hope with clarity.

On the first point, .Mr. Secretary-General, as to whether or not you should

continue to preside over our proceedings, we would very much hope that you would

continue to do so.

DR/ek 33-35

(Mr* Kennedy, Ireland)

~ '• '•'* ••'' • •' -. \,

The outline you have given us this -afternoon of the kind of problems that

ve have to face,flowing from the resolution which was adopted earlier today,

gives us the clear impression that ve have a great deal of practical work to do

in this Advisory Committee. And we in the Irish delegation would be very much

concerned if for any reason you would not wish to preside over our labours,

difficult as they are, but vital EG we also believe them to be.

On the second point, Mr. Secretary-General, as to what is the United Nations,

referred to in part A, paragraph 1, when we urge that the United Nations "take

immediately all appropriate measures", we believe of course that it is the

machinery of this Organization of which you are the executive head. We regard

this resolution as strengthening the role of our Organization in the Congo, and

we would feel in Ireland that strengthening of the role is certainly approved by

the man on the street. Our view, therefore, is the Tiew which has already been

expressed by the representatives of India, Nigeria, Sudan, Ceylon, Tunisia,

Pakistan, Senegal, Liberia, Canada and other representatives. We were

particularly encouraged to hear that the sponsors of the resolution -- the

representatives of Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic— have spoken

up here this afternoon and have given 'an interpretation on the two points you ;

raised, with which we would be wholeheartedly in agreement.

Mr. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): I should just like'to add the

view of my delegation on the two points raised by you earlier, Mr. Secretary-

General.

The first point,'on the question of chairmanship, we of course endorse what

I may call the general views spoken by practically everybody around the table here;

that you should continue to preside over our meetings in this Committee.

On the second question of the interpretation of the intent of the':words

"United Nations" in paragraph 1, part A, of the resolution adopted earlier this

morning, we also support the views, held by many delegations here, that those

words could not in the context of the resolution, especially in relation to the

reaffirmation of the earlier resolutions, but mean to z'efer to the Secretariat as

one of the organs of the United Nations, the Secretariat which is, headed by you,

yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, and the other agencies under your command.

HA/cw 36

The SECRETARY -GENERAL: I was going to say that perhaps we might

follow the wise advice of Ambassador Jha and wind up this introductory part

of the discussion. But I note that the representative of Morocco wishes to

speak, and, of course, I am happy to give him the floor.

Mr. BENABOUP (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I shall be

very brief, since this preliminary discussion should not be prolonged more

than necessary.

It is obvious that, in order to do some constructive and well-organized

work, there should be no thought of changing the status quo in this Committee.

We have always worked under your chairmanship, Mr. Secretary General, end we

hope to do so in the future.

The United Nations was so established that you were entrusted with the

executive tasks of the Organization, and it would be necessary to change the

whole United Nations machinery in order to introduce any change in that respect.

Nevertheless, I think it essential to say that, as from today, what will

be important will be the results we achieve. We have based our interventions

on the experience gained in these past few months. This has been a rather

unhappy experience. The colonial Powers have contributed to the destruction

of United Nations prestige and of the Secretary-General's work, which should

have been easy. To a certain extent, they have also destroyed law and order

in the Congo, and every possible obstacle has been raised in order that these

things should be done and others should bear the blame. It is unfortunate

that it should be so and that the really guilty parties should hide behind

others without "being denounced as they should be. Therefore, today,

Mr. Secretary-General, if there are persons who criticize you or are your enemies,

while you do not denounce the authors of those crimes and those who have

erected those obstacles, obviously you will have to assume the responsibility

for your silence.

However, I should like to reassure you on one point, Mr. Secretary-General:

that practically all Governments represented here have neither strategic nor

any other interests. They do not have economic interests,to obtain the Katanga

uranium; they do not have military interests, to obtain bases; they do not\

have propaganda interests, because this we have done within our own country.

If there are disinterested parties, these are the persons who surround you,and

that is why they speak openly and with courage and frankness.

HA/cw 37

(Mr, Benaboud. Morocco) ••"-'•

We hope that this time the United Nations work will be crowned with the

greatest possible success, because on that success depends the future of the

Congo and of world peace, for which we have assumed such great responsibility •

in the United Nations.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If there is nothing more to add, I think ; "

we might wind up this part of our "discussion. But, before doing so, may I "':

make Just a couple of observations. '•

First of all, let me repeat that 1 have not raised this question either

in order to unburden myself or in order to get some kind of informal vote of :"

confidence* I am not interested in either of those two approaches. :I have -'•

done so simply because, in cold parliamentarian terms, the question did arise/•""-'

and then it was my duty to get the best advice I could on the matter of

interpreting the resolution, for which I shall, of course, finally have to

take the responsibility. •

The second point refer 'to what the representative of Morocco just -said' :

about speaking a coeur ouvert, speaking'bluntly, about inhibitions. In

private life,that is a possibility. In public life, there are certain laws •-••••-•

and restrictions imposed on us. One of those is that anybody in the position

of a standing negotiator'has to see to it that he is in a position to

negotiate with those with whom he has to deal. As you know --to speak bluntly

here -- I have always considered that one of the classic examples of bad •

handling of a matter was the handling by the General Assembly of the China -'"'• : -

prisoner issue in the fall of 195 , when, 'in one and the same re solution; the '••-•

General Assembly condemned Comaunist China and asked for negotiations with

that country. I thirk that illustrates very well what'my 'problem is. I may' :' -

be very tempted, partly in self-defence, to say where I would put the blame.

But it may not be what I should do in my position — and I have not done it.

That is the only reason for a certain reticence. Perhaps I should not say it •

is the only reason. Another reason is that I do not feel entitled to Judge •

anybody in terms of evaluation. That is not my function. Further, I do-not

feel that I am entitled to act as prosecutor unless I can prove my case. ••' That

is the difference between a diplomat; and a politician. ' ' •''• •" " : ' •

HA/cw 38-1*0

(The Secretary-General)

Further, as regards the so-called failure of the United Nations, I would

like to quote an expression that I used the other day, which I think is correct.

If somebody gets the mad idea of climbing Mt. Everest and comes within some

thousands yards of the summit but is cut off from the summit by an avalanche,

nobody calls him a bad climber. And there are avalanches here which should

not be forgotten and which you can talk about & coeur ouvert, while I have

certain inhibitions. I think the United Nations has done a very good climbing

Job indeed, and we should not, so to speak, let ourselves be dejected by the

fact that there are things that nobody can overcome, certainly not in a new

experiment in international diplomacy like the present one. It may be that

later generations, Just as in the case of Mt. Everest, will have oxygen tanks

and what not, and for that reason will also surmount the avalanches. We do

not have them yet.

Finally, there is a piece of indiscretion regarding my own thinking

on the whole Congo operation which I think I can share with you now, because I

think it is of some interest, and also, in a certain sense, it throws a

sidelight on my whole approach to this question of executive functions.

In late July and early August, I had the firm intention of proposing to

the General Assembly, as early as possible, an arrangement for the whole of

the Congo operation on its civilian and military side, patterned on the precedent

which we have in the case of UNRWA, that is to say, the administration of

the Palestinian refugee assistance. That organization has a Director -- or

he should more justly, perhaps, be called Director-General, because it is a

very big administration -- who has at his side a small advisory committee

representing the countries most concerned. That has proved, in another very

delicate field operation, an excellent arrangement. It has the advantage of

current advice by people who live with the problem, with an administrative

responsibility. It has the further advantage of not putting within the

Secretariat tasks which, through their sheer mass, and also due to their

quality, tend to swell like a kind of cancer and eat out all other necessary

functions. The Congo operation has been and remains such a big burden on

the Secretariat, one which encroaches very heavily on other tasks *

RSH/rh 1*1

••••••••• (The Secretary-General)

Another reason for that kind of arrangement is obviously that decisions of

the type which have to be taken should as far as possible be detached from the

specific responsibilities which fall on the'Secretary-General under the Charter •

If, for example, the Secretary-General had been personally responsible for the

Palestine refugees1 assistance, he would have been in all sorts of rather unnecessary

deep waters often, as Mr. Loutfi could certainly tell you. A certain division of

the formal functions in the political field is wise. ;i -

All this was not done for a very obvious reason. When we came close to the

General Assembly the Congo situation was one where we had had one of those• v :

avalanches which made climbing a little difficult, and one thing is certain, one

does not switch responsibility for administration when every minute is needed for

practical work* But the idea has never died in my mind, and I would like to see

it put into effect as soon as we get the situation under control, I think that

one rather triumphant sign of our being finally on the right road'in the Congo

would be when we could, so to say, seriously consider lifting it out into a kind'

of independent administration, naturally owing political responsibility to the

General Assembly but independent in the same sense as that other'administration

to which I have referred. •••• ' . .

Obviously, this has nothing to do with our problem of today, but you can, on

the other hand, see that it has a bearing oh our own constructive thinking ahead.

It is something which also makes these kind of consultation's more natural than

they would have been if this were a normal Charter function for the - *. i

Secretary-General. I excuse myself for these asides, which, however, may be a

little bit of a sidelight to our"aspect of the problem.

If I then come to an attempt to sum up I would put the conclusibns I draw from

this debate in the following terms,'which I think should be put into the analytic

record, probably verbatim, which goes to the Security Council and perhaps la'terv.on,

as they are anyway known to the Security Council, in whatever kind of report I haveto

give of my handling of this resolution. :

Point one: Even if you recognize that reasons may exist which make it

practical to have another procedure in this Committee, reasons which I see veryi ... • i

clearly myself, you do not see any sufficient reason for a change and you wish the

procedure to \5e what it has been so far*

RSH/rh 1*2

(ihe Secretary-General)

Point two: As regards the interpretation of the first operative paragraph

of the resolution, and specifically the words "United Nations" my interpretation,

as I gave it yesterday in the Security Council, to the effect that in the light

of operative paragraph A5 and - I may here in the light of the discussion add - in

the, light of the Charter, the interpretation must "be: the normal machinery of the

United Nations, as- developed in the Congo operation. Even those two members of

the Committee who are reserved as to the role of the Advisory Committee in this

special context obviously shared that view.

Conclusion: If I act on that assumption, that is to say, if I act on the

assumption that this resolution must be considered as putting the responsibility

for implementation on the Secretary-General in forms established for the Congo

operation, I would act in accordance with the principles held by those I have had

the honour and privilege to consult.

That leads us to the next question, which is also rather of a preliminary

nature but which already brings us much closer to the substance. It is the

question of what this interpretation of the "United Nations" means in the other

operative paragraphs. There, I may perhaps give a lead because it may simplify

and shorten the discussion.

Paragraph A2 of the resolution, "Urges that measures be taken for the

immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other

foreign military and para-military personnel" etc. It would seem to follow from

what has been said that it is the view on this point that such measures should be

initiated by the United Nations under the form mentioned, that is to say, with the

final initiative in the hands of the Secretary-General. On the other hand, I am

sure that you fully appreciate that there are other actors in this special drama.

There are Governments around the Congo and there are de jure authorities, at least

de facto authorities, in the Congo, That is to say, the appeal is directed to the

Secretary-General as regards the initiatives and actions by the United Nations.

It is obviously a titre £gal addressed to all Governments and authorities who have

directly or indirectly an interest in such a withdrawal.

Paragraph A3 does not give rise to any question at all.

Paragraph Ak must in the same sense mean that the immediate and impartial

investigation be held on the initiative of the United Nations machinery. In this

case, this applies, especially because, aa what was said by one of the members,

RSH/rh

• ..;, ; ,i (The Secretary-General)

unless the Security Council ha^ set up special machinery.of indicated how the matter

should be done/ it follows from the Charter that - it has.to be done by. the normal

machinery*- • ' • ' • - • • ' - - / . v • - - " - . ' . . . -;:• ' , - • • ' • - • : . . •.';

As to section B,-iwfe of course recognize that the convening of Parliament ie

an-act beyond the competence of. any United Nations organ-* On the other iiand,

the implementation of the resolution In this respect means, of course, to bring:to

those responsible the'appeal or the strong wish and hope of the Security Council

and to bring that to their notice in a form which is as effective as possible in

our effort to reach the result* That is to say, there we have a combination of,

probably/diplomatic, and political actions initiated by.the normal executive organs

of the United Nations-in order to get the necessary action from others, in the

first place, from those who are in a position to convene Parliament, .-.'•.. ;-

As regards the second part of that paragraph, the taking of the necessary

protective measures in that connexion, it is obviously practically a 100 per cent

question 'for the Command.- -I can tell:you.; that it-has for.e long time been a

standing instruction that such'protection should be-g^ven if"and vhen requested.

It has also naturally, in line-with this instruction,, .been offered to those who

were discussing and'studying the possibility of convening- Parliament., ' !-

Paragraph B2 is again a-mixed Operation, because it does require United Nations

initiative> in relation: not;only to.de facto or de jure authorities in control pf

the various armed units, but also to practical action by the United Nations through

its' Command,, especially when one conies-to the sedond part of the paragraph,

"arrangements be made on impartial and, equitable bases to that end". On that:,

pointy obviously, we have a. special-responsibility in the. sense of who is to b6

the umpire if not the representatives of the United Nations* • p .

I think this is what was needed to be added with regard to the consequences of

the interpretation of.the first words-of paragraph Al. ;I present it for,your

comments^ If any. ' It may be that you feel this is all rather obvious") anyway, I

feel that It is something which it IB wise to have said, wise to have looked at,

and that it is wise for me to hear if there are any other, comments. We need not

now go into the subtleties of how the balance is to be established.! between the

various parties who all have to take action. It is Just a question of where,

how and through what agency the United Nations comes into the picture.

BC/dp 1*6

(The Secretary-General)

I believe that these comments, by way of summing up, have been clear enough

for the Committee to address itself to any one of the points on which it might

like to mako observations in principle. We certainly have reason to come back

to the practical issues. That is really the point on which I am badly in need

of advice. Practically all of these things can be done in very different ways,

and we should of course see to it that by combining our wisdom we choose the

way which seems most likely to lead to the desired result in the shortest possible

time.

Mr«, SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to make

some observations and suggestions in connexion with the very clj .r statement

which thi Secretary-General has just made on the implementation of the

resolution.

I should like to try to find ways to implement the resolution in the spirit

of the other draft resolution which was discussed yesterday by the Security

Council and which, in my opinion, was agreed on in principle by the great

majority, if not all, of the members of the Council, although certain drafting

difficulties made it impossible to adopt the text. I refer to the draft

resolution which called for ensuring that all political personalities were

protected against the dangers to which they are now being subjected — that is,

against the dangers of summary execution or assassination.

In the draft resolution which was contained in document S/Vf22, I find a

number of paragraphs which, in my opinion, authorize the Secretary-General or

the United Nations as a whole, as we have defined it, to try to take action now

to avoid the continuation or repetition of crimes such as those which have been

reported upon to the Security Council during the last few days.

The second paragraph of the preamble to section A of the resolution reads:

"Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the killing of

the Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Maurice Mpolo and

Mr, Joseph Okito".

BC/dp 1*7

(Mr. Slim. Tunisia)

That seems to indicate -- and this is indeed the case — that all this

emergency action was taken as a result of the international indignation at these

crimes and, the, ones that followed them. In the preamble to section A of the .

resolution w e read: . . . . - - .

"Deeply concerned at .ijhe grave reprecussions of these crimes and the

.-,-.. danger of wide-spread, civil war and bloodshed,./. , .

Thus;, we are concerned at these crimes and their possible repercussions.

Then, in the third paragraph of the preamble to section B of the resolution

we, read: : .31 Re cognizing the imperative necessity of the restoration of

parliamentary institutions in the Congo in accordance wit! one Fundamental

Lav <o£ the country, so that the will of the people should be reflected

;• through the freely elected Parliament".

Paragraph 1 of the operative .part of section B states:

:'.-"Urges, the convening of the Parliament and the taking of.necessary

protective measures in that.connexipn".

It is obvious that Parliament.could not.meet and act effectively if all its

members, were, not present, including those who are now being held in various

regions, particularly in Katanga.and South Kasai,

Hence, I think that.$he. resolution already authorizes the organ of the.

United Nations.which is.in the Congo to.act in the spirit, if not according

to the letter, of the other draft resolution, which could not be adopted by

the Council but the principles of.which seemed to.be agreed upon by all the

members of the Council, . ., ,- , ,

Consequently, on this ppint I would suggest tl at the Special Representative

of the Secretary-General and the entire machinery of the United Nations.in the

Congo,should take energetic and irarediate action to avoid a repetition of the

crimes that we have been witnessing these last .few days. . . . . . . .

That is what I wished to say on this very urgent aspect of the.question —

.The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation froro,. French): , would apologize

for Interrupting the. representative pf Tunisia, but I should -like.to clarify

this aspect of the matter now.

BC/dp 1£

(The Secretary-general)

(continued in English)

I entirely agree with Mr. Slimfs interpretation of the situation — that is,

that as to the operative paragraphs and the attitude they reflected there was

unanimity regarding the draft resolution in document S/ 733» For that reason,

the relevant paragraphs were cabled to the Special Representative at five o'clock

this morning -- that is, immediately after the Security Council meeting -- with

the further information that he would in the course of today get instructions

for written demarches to all concerned bringing this to their notice as expressing

the unanimous view of the Council, even if, for technical reasons, it had not

found expression in a resolution,

Mr, SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I have certain other

suggestions as regards the Implementation of the resolution in document S/V?lfl«

I would refer first to paragraph A 1, which:

"Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate

measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo *, ,n.

I do not know what plan the Secretary-General has devised to implement this

provision. However, here again, I believe that a number of preventive measures

should be taken before there is resort to force — for example, discussions should

be initiated to see to it that troops are not moved and do not clash; neutral

zones should be established between opposing provinces; the battle that appears

to have started already should be stopped, and so forth. All that requires

negotiations — perhaps preliminary negotiations. If negotiations do not workvf

the resolution authorizes the Secretary-General to rssort to force.

In this connexion it would be desirable attach to each regional command of

the United Nations a superior officer specifically assigned to negotiate and

discuss all these problems, and to assist in negotiations and discussions among

the various parties so as to stop troop movements and obtain a cease fire. While

we have full confidence in the United Nations Command, as my Government has

repeatedly stated, that Command may not at present have all the necessary means.

For the moment it is preoccupied principally with troop movements, with these

operations with which it must deal. The negotiations which must take place have

a military as well as a political character, and it might be useful to ask all the

BC/dp U9-50

(Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

participating Statee if they could furnish officers to work with the Command

staff and to be specially charged with the task of the negotiations for a •

cease fire, the establishment of neutral zones and so forth. These must be

persona who are more particularly, familiar with the vast-areas of bush which..;

exist in these parts of the Congo. That is a suggestion,

I" have' another suggestion with regard to paragraph A k ,pf. the1. di-L.lt -•-.-.

resolution,; In passing, I would note that .at present'the implementation of,,

section A of the resolution seems the most urgent.

Paragraph \ refers to the impartial investigation which must be held in

order t*r ...po.croain --he clreumtances of t!ae dsatii of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues

so that the:perpetrators of .the crimes may be punished. I fully understand that

the United Nations machinery now in the Congo is over burdened with work.

Mr. Dayal'has done everything In hi & 'power, as has General lyasBou.

FOB/cn 51(Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

However that may be, they have other jobs to perform, and I think

that it would have been useful for the Security Council itself to have

appointed an international organ of inquiry consisting of a number of genuine

magistrates or judges — completely non-political, genuine judges. It is

an international operation, of course, and the United Nations carries it out,

but these judges should be drawn partly or especially from among jurists of

Africa and Asia, and should be presided over by, perhaps, an African chairman.

They should be charged with carrying out this impartial inquiry and, if

need be, according to commonly admitted principles and laws acknowledged by

the nations, and especially those acknowledged in the Congo, empowered to

bring to regular judgement the criminals who can properly be charged with•

these crimes. There would have to be a special police team from among the

United Nations forces now in the Congo to assist this body, both as regards

the inquiries to be undertaken and as regards the operations in connexion

with the judgement of the persons concerned.

The Security Council, in its wisdom, did not define what organ should

carry out this impartial inquiry. I would venture to suggest that, if the

Advisory Committee agrees and if this enters within the attributions given

to you by the Security Council in this matter, you might designate — and

this could be the suggestion of the Advisory Committee — such a team of

magistrates to carry out this inquiry, which would relieve the present United

Nations machinery in the Congo. It is obvious that an inquiry conducted by

the present Congolese authorities would lend itself to a good deal of

criticism and suspicion. I therefore suggest this formula. I do not know

whether it is feasible or possible, but I submit it for your deliberation.

For the moment those are the suggestions which I wished to place before you

and my colleagues in this Committee,

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: For the information of the representative

of India it may, perhaps, be practical if I tell the Committee how my own

thinking has been running on the points mentioned by Ambassador Slim. First

of all, as regards the investigation, I share strongly the feeling that it

would have been most desirable for the Security Council itself to have set up

a committee. However, there was very little time for it, and I am certain that

FOB/cn 52

(The Secretary-General)

the Council was anxious, as we all were, not to let that kind of question

delay action on the main issue, especially since as soon as we run into

personality questions it is likely to take some extra time.

The situation being that the Security Council has not said anything, and,

on the other hand, with the interpretation which we have previously discussed

concerning initiatives for implementation of the resolution, I have looked

at two possibilities on the hypothesis that it would be felt that I should,

so to say, press the button. One alternative is the one mentioned by you.

If this Committee, with its knowledge of personalities in Africa and Asia

and perhaps other places -- I do not think we should have some kind of regional

limitation by necessity — could present candidates and agree on a suggestion

as to candidates, that would certainly be a most satisfactory procedure.

However, such a group, if it is to make sense, should be a fairly small one --

I should say something like three -- and picking and choosing may be a bit

difficult, because we are not really in the show and to ask Governments and

to get a long panel, and so on and so forth, is a somewhat cumbersome

procedure.

For that reason I have given thought to a second alternative. I say

only "thought"> because it was a matter I wanted to raise with you in due time.

That would be that I would address a question to the President of the

International Court of Justice in The Hague indicating, first of all, the

aim, second, the desirability of regional emphasis, and asking him to

put up a panel -- not to select the three, because I think that that would

be beyond the reasonable, but to put up a panel; to bring this panel

before this Committee without any delay for your consideration and comments,

this with the hope, obviously, that this Committee might agree on picking

out three frbnf'the "list." That being done we would simply inform the Security

Council about this procedure and this result, with the possibility for the

Council, of course, to take the initiative of action, corrective action,

preventive action, or whatever action it might want to take. That is to say,

not to ask for a decision but to give it the chance to object if ,it so

pleased*

PGB/cn 53-55(The Secretary-General)

I think it Is likely to be the quickest procedure, and as ve are in

a hurry — traces and tracks certainly being muddled and dusted down very

quickly — it is certainly something on which It would be extremely desirable if,

in the course of today even, • we could have a joint view. But, as I said,

in the first place I thought along your line. This other was just a

variation of the same theme which perhaps might simplify our lives, and which

also, of course, has the advantage that we would, without -using the United •

Nations proper, use the juridical organ with the highest prestige within the

United Nations family as a background. As you know, it is not an unusual

procedure at all for Governments to turn to the President of the Court to ask

for arbitrators, and things like that, so that it is perfectly normal.

Regarding the other point, what so far has happened with regard to the

lines of implementation of paragraph A 1 and the personnel problems arising

in that context, I can give you the following somewhat scanty information.

Leaving aside then, for the time being, the questions to which I referred in

my initial statement, and which are very serious questions when it comes to

the implementation in practice -- the questions of to whom one could talk,

on what basis we talk, on what aim we talk, and also what kind of military

measures we have — I will look for the moment at the problems you raised.

We have had for quite a while; as you certainly know, a neutral zone

in northern Katanga and South Kasai, trying in that way to get out of the

interminable and rather tragic mess between the so-called Katanga gendarmerie

and the Balubas. That arrangement was successful for a while. At a certain •

stage it — I would not say broke down, but it got very hollow as the result

of the famous- arrival of some 600 men of the ANC Lumumba legions at Manono.

General Rikhye, who is here, could give you more detailed information on it.

Our line there has, of course, been to try to re-establish what we had,

which is one good way to try to introduce a kind of cordon sanitaire and

perhaps straighten out the problem.

Mtf/pm ( 56

(The Secretary-General)

It is very closely linked up. with the basic question of the.stand, in

theory and in practice, in diplomacy and in politics, which one should take in

the implementation of this resolution to the Katanga gendarmerie which, as you

know, is .probaly the "beet military unit you will find in the Congo. - -j.

The other effort of the same type is still in an early-negotiation stage>

and that is the effort to establish a neutral zone between Orientale and .-

Equator. We have clear indication of an interest in such an arrangement both •

from the Stanleyville side and from the Leopoldville side, and if we could get .

enough of the background, without any formal agreement perhaps, to get de facto

such a neutral zone, I think we could breathe a little more easily because that. •

certainly >rould push further back the risk of an outbreak between military.. units

now following one side or the other. What has happened there is,, as I said,

still in the early negotiation stage. In fact,.these very days . .

General McKeown ie on his way. to Stanleyville where he will meet Lundula and

Gizenga, He has been in Lisala and. Buraba, I believe, too, which covers (the. twp

sides• ., We have played on the.military level partly because I have been .rather

reluctant to letrthese preliminary informal talks take on.a nature which coul,4. • ;

be interpreted as implying any.kind of stand on these various groups or , ;

personalities — which, of course, you nrurt avoid if.it can-be done.... It is very

much like an operation in the,field,where, when,you try,to stop two people from

fighting;you do not first find out what credentials they have.

That leads me to the question of personnel because, as J said, it is in this

case General McKeown who will conduct negotiations. We have had many discussions,

or negotiations, whatever you wish to call thera^ during the whole period in the.

field and they have been conducted by two different types *of persons;, on,.the ' ..

one side, by what we call.political officers r- it is bard to find :a-title. • _•-

They are in fact Just Secretariat members with sufficient .background.to , be able .to^ • , • - • • •

be helpful,so they are not political officers in the sense that they.are some•' ' . ' i " •

kind of o uasi-diplomatic representatives. They are just there to help the

military but, as a sideline,, have been most useful in relation to the personalities

in power. However, that is on a United Nations level and we have not, ;gone .

outside the Secretariat which, if it has been a very, limited thing, avoids any

dangerous political action.

MW/pm 57

(The Secretary-General)

The other category have been various military personalities, senior

military people, who have, I must say, shown a diplomatic ability of which many

a diplomat could be envious. It is vain to enumerate these -- there are many

of them, but you happened to mention General iyKv'sou, and. I would sr.y tiicy;/ not

only is he a good military man, from all I know, but also he is a man with

diplomatic abilities for which I have the highest respect. The same is true of

General Kettani, and I could continue the list. But of course that is something

one can do -when we have no other means and, therefore, your question arises

because it is really not very much sense normally to burden these people, who

have a difficult military operation at all events with these other tasks which

require great coacet.Y:.~-.tlono Therefore, as we progress, if we could get into

the picture people who are qualified as negotiators and have that function for

the very implementation and maintenance of the aims msntioned in paragraph 1,

I think that definitely would strengthen our hand.

We have, frankly, been so overtaken by day to day needs that this kind

of build-up of the administration has had to stand back a little bit in our

activities* ¥e have in fact been very thin -- and rather unhappy about that

thinness --as regards people who could stop the gaps in the negotiation field

in general. The resources of tiie Secretariat in that direction are taxed for

other purposes and are anyway not very big*

This is by way of information on how matters stand.

Mr* JHA (India): I must say that the problems arising from the

implementation of this resolution are enormous. There is no question of that,

and after the fatigue of this morning I muct also confess that it is very

difficult to absorb all these various implications and suggestions if we take

the whole resolution at one time. Therefore, I would suggest again that we

take one aspect, say paragraph k, and finish it and then go on to another.

I think that will be the better procedure, but of course it is entirely for

members to decide. But I do think that if we have long statements -- and these

suggestions are very valuable -- which cover four or five or six different

aspects, it is extremely difficult to absorb and even to remember the suggestions,

I shall confine myself for the time being entirely to part A of the resolution.

If necessary, I shall make some comments and suggestions later about part B.

W/pm 58-60

(Mr. Jha, India)

As regards part A, let us start from the bottom at paragraph If, I heard

with great interest your own ideas about how to give effect to this paragraph.

The paragraph says: "Decides that an immediate and impartial investigation be

held in order to ascertain circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and hiB

colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished". There are

two decisions there: immediate and impartial investigation, and then the

punishment of the perpetrators of the crimes.

It has been suggested, if I understood Mr. Slim correctly, that there should

be one body vhich will carry out the investigation and also take over the

question of punishment. I am not very sure whether I understood him correctly.

We have to have separate bodies for these because, naturally, the investigators

or prosecutors cannot be the judge. The question arises, what should be the

nature of the personnel entrusted with this impartial investigation? I am

inclined to think that it would be a good idea to have this investigation in

the nature of a Judicial inquiry ar.cJ. investigation; that is to say, the

persons in this group should be those whose impartiality, whose Judicial and

legal acumen, whose experience, are beyond doubt. The question arises where to

get these judges from and how to set about recruiting them.

I think you mentioned the figure of three. Personally, I think that is

a good number. It should not be more than three because if you have a larger

number all kinds of complicatioas will appear,

'I'lne next question is, should they be all from Africa, or all from Asia and

Africa., or should they be recruited without any limitation as to the continent

from which they corae? This is a matter on which I myself would like to hear

the views of some of our African colleagues here. Personally, I think that

either you have to have all three Africans, or one African, one Asian and one

Latin American. I mention Latin America because they have, I believe, very

high standards of Jurisprudence there and their legal systems are something of

which they are very proud, I think that it might be possible to get a very

good Judicial officer for this investigation, a man of the status of a judge of

the Supreme Court, for instance. That is something on which I would leave the

composition largely to the views of my African colleagues. But I think we

should have either three Africans,or one African, one Asian and one Latin

American.

GRR/aJ 6l(Mr. Jha, India)

Now, where are we to get these people from? You mentioned the

International Court of Justice, but for myself I am not very sure that the

International, Court of Justice is very veil informed about the judiciary :

of different countries. If they are in a position to do something, I think it

would be a very.good idea to ask the President of the International'Court of

Justice to suggest a panel, but if they are not then perhaps some other means

might have to ue found. I have no particular preference; the important thing

is to get three, good reliable men of very high judicial calibre, : '

If we have -such a panel, the investigation can certainly be undertaken

with everybody1s confidence. .The other point the Secretary-General mentioned •

was to the effect ttyat this would have to be confirmed by somebody. His own

idea of circulating the decision to the members of the Security Council seems

to me a very^good one, it being left to the members of the Security Council

to suggest any .'Changes or anything like that. If, in doing so, the Secretary*-

General were to feel that it mirjht strengthen his hand, he might also tell ;

them that the panel suggestion.had besn placed before the Advisory Committee and.

agreed to lay it. If the Secretely-General viished to do it in tliat r?ay, ;

from the point of view of my delegation we should be' quite willing to have him

say it in this manner and get our consent to it. :.

After the.investigation has been carried out, and on the basis of the ,

results thereof, the question of the punishment of the perpetrators. wilJL. have

to be decided. Perhaps for tnat -we may have-to have an international tribunal

and there may have to be a resolution of the General Assembly or tne Security

Council as the case may be, and or course the terms of reference.for the

international tribunal will have to be very carefully drawn up. Again that is

a matter in regard to which we would leave the Secretary-General .to do the

work in the first instance. If he wanted•our: advice in regard to the terms

of reference, we should be glad to help, but taat is a matter of detail.

Returning now to paragraphs 2 and 3, I will deal first with paragraph 2,

which urges that "measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation

from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military .

personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and

mercenaries." It seems to me that in order to give effect to this paragraph

the first thing to be done is that the Secretary-General should address an immediate

GRR/aj 62

communication to Belgium calling upon it to withdraw all its personnel, military

and para-military, and political advisers who may be in the Congo and drawing

their attention to Article 25 of the Charter which places on all Members of

the United Nations the obligation to carry out the decisions of the Security

Council in accordance with the principles of the Charter , That should be done,

and I would also suggest, in any communication which might be made to Belgium,

that since this is in accordance with a resolution of the Security Council,

and in view of the opinions expressed in the Security Council; the Secretary-

General would be very glad to receive a communication from them stating what

steps have been taken. This communication might be placed by the Secretary-General

before the Security Council for its information. I think such a communication

can be suitably vordcd and will be entirely in conformity with the Charter

and will, further, enable the Security Council at a later date to consider

exactly what measures Belgium has taken.

Mention is also made in the resolution of other foreign military and

para -military personnel. In this respect, the names of several countries have

been mentioned, but one does not know exactly where such personnel comes from.

There is quite a list of countries from which such people might come as

mercenaries, so that for this purpose and also in relation to paragraph 3 there

should be a general cornmunicatiou to all Members of the United Nations drawing

their attention to Article 2^ and to paragraph 3 of the second part of tne

resolution, which calls upou all States "to extend their full co-operation and

assistance and take such measures as may be necessary on their part, for the

implementation of this resolution." This paragraph, actually, should also be

brought to the attention of Belgium. In the general communication that I am

suggesting be made to all Members of the United Nations, which will cover

paragraph 3 a&d part of paragraph 2, the same point may be emphasized, the

same Article 25 may be cited, and they should be asked to report on the measures

they have taken to give effect to the decision of the Security Council contained

in paragraph 3 and paragraph 2 with regard to the general clause regarding all

foreign military and para -military personnel.

GRR/aj . : 63(Mr. Jha, India)

Summing, up, I vould say that the immediate action to be taken under

paragraphs 2 and ) is the despatch of these two communications, one to Belgium

and another to States other than Belgium drawing their attention to the points

I have just mentioned and asking them to inform the Secretary-General of the

measures taken to implement the resolution. After the replies are received

a suitable report could be made to the Security Council or the General Assembly

as may be appropriate. For the time being the implementation of these two

paragraphs can only take the form of these communications, and only thereafter

could other measures be contemplated by the Security Council or the

General Assembly.

Turning now to' paragraph 1, it urges the United Nations to "take immediately

all appropriate measures to prevent occurrence of civil war in the Congo" and

then goes on to spell out what is to be done. The list is not exhaustive, ,it

is only illustrative and includes a reference to arrangements for cease-fires.

The very mention of the very word '"arrr &zients"1 means some kind of negotiation

and agreement, and naturally as has baea pointed out by. Ambassador Slim some

kind of negotiations or contacts will have to be undertaken with those who are

going to be asked to cease fire. . , .

The paragraph goes on to speak of the halting of all .military operations.

The halting of military operations is not a matter for negotiation, it.is a

matter for.action, because although you may halt military operations by

negotiations for a cease fire, our understanding of the way it is put here.is

that this may require, although not necessarily, the taking of action by the

United Nations .

Then the paragraph refers to the prevention of clashes, and this comes into

the same category. There may be an element of negotiation, but the element of

action is much stronger. Now how are these things to be done? This, really, is

again a matter for the Secretary-General's military advisers, who may better be

able to tell him, but speaking offhand our understanding would be that the

United Nations Force should interpose itself between the warring factions and

for that purpose it may be neaecsa.y to have denilitari ed or neutral areas

occupied by the UH Force to isolate the areas where these troubles are going on.

As I said earlier, an element of negotiation is not ruled out, but.1 after all

this has been done if there is any attempt to rush United Nations positions

GRR/aJ 6 -65(Mr. Jha, India)

then we feel that the use of force will be justified in the last resort. There

have been many arguments and quite a number of statements about the use of force,

and apprehension was expressed. Some legal argumentation was put forward in

the Security Council, for instance reference was made to Articles Ul and h2 of

the Charter. In our view, this does not come strictly under Article Ul or U2,

because Article ^1 refers to sanctions, like the stoppage of transit facilities

for aircraft, ships etc. and obviously there will be no question of this; it is

going to be an operation within the Congo in order to prevent a civil war.

DR/cw 66(Mr, Jha, I\:dia)

That does not come into the picture. The breach of diplomatic relations does

not come into the picture at all. Article 42 says that the United Nations

"may take such action "by air, sea or land forces as may "be necessary to

maintain or restore international peace and security". The implication there

is action taken against an aggressor. But that is not the position, that

question does not arise. So far as paragraph 1 is concerned, it is a question

of stopping civil war, and therefore we do not view this provision in the

context of Articles 4l and 42. The use of force mentioned there is purely

for preventive purposes, the gensral framework "being the maintenance of

law and order, which is a task given implicit].:/ in the Security Council

resolutions and in the resolution of the Genoral Assembly of 20 September.

It is not our understanding that force is to be used as an active instrument

for implementing any policy or taking any action; it is preventive force. The

United Nations takes action to irirnrpose "between warring groups, negotiations

are undertaken to have cease-fur.:?, ;-:trategic areas, solely with a viaw to

prevention of clashes, are ruapoeil out aiic! r.oTiiralized or demilitarized. If

there is any attempt by any side to rush these positions, then aud then alone

will use of force be permissible and as a last resort. That is our understanding

of that paragraph.

Of course, I was not o>.<? of the co-sponsors of this resolution, but this

is what we understand, aad we tMnk that if it is construed in that light

there is no conflict with Articles 4l and 42. The whole thing fits neatly

into the framework of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General

Assembly -- the four resolutions, including this one; this is the latest

resolution of the Security Council -- the three previous resolutions of the

Security Council and the General Assembly resolution of 20 September. Tr t is

our interpretation of that Article, that implementation of this Article z»i.e.vixis

that your military advisors get busy; they have information about the latest

positions of the warring troops, etc. Quick action has to be taken for

interposing United Nations forces. Then negotiations will also be undertaken.

If you feel that the present strength of your staff or the deployment

of your staff, whether that pertains to the United Nations Command or the

civilian staff, is not adequate, then naturally it is for you to decide to

augment this staff, to have your representatives wherever you may wish. That is

DR/cv 67

(Mr. Jha, India)

something we cannot say very much about; it is really a matter entirely

dictated by the necessities of the situation.

These are all the remarks that I wish to make at the present stage. As I

said, I have confined myself entirely to part A for the time being. If we

took that part paragraph by paragraph, we could get more specific opinions.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; For the sake of information may I just say

that my own feeling is that the question of punishment can be left aside for

the moment. I believe that decisions there will have to be taken by the

Security Council or the General Assembly, and it will certainly require some

consideration of legal issues which we can leave aside hore because, of

course; the first stage, at all events; is the investigation and there we can

act in the simpler way I have indicated and have, so to say, the hallmark put

on it by the proper organ and not a request for a decision from the side of any

zcajor organ.

As regards the other question which you mentioned le.st, the question

of the use of force, the interpretation you give corresponds entirely to the

thought which was back of what I said in the Security Council last Wednesday,

and also what you find when you go back over the text of my initial statement

today.

I agi"se that in that case the question of Article h2 does not arise

becouse in fact it is an extension of the idea of self-defence, which we

have already used and which has never been put in question, to my knowledge,

in the General Assembly or in any other organ. The reason why Article k2 with

another interpretation arises at all is of course that it is only enforcement

measures in the sense of the Charter which override Article 2(7). If we can

stay away from Article ^2, as we in my view can in this case, following the

kind of view of how the operation should run, as you have expressed it, I think

it is very happy because it will save us a lot of legal trouble and probably

it will at the same time be quite sufficient. However, I should like to point

out that that means that one discards the idea'of, so to say, enforcing the

cease-fire by a staged military attack on some kind of military units. There

may be people who feel that that is what we should do.-- such a staged attack;

then of course another kind of problem arises.

DR/cw 68

(The Secretary-General)

In summing up> I,would Just say that with your interpretation there is no

difference, I think, between your reading of these words and the reading we

hove in the Secretariat.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I sh9uld like

to limit my observations to the first two operative paragraphs of part A of

the resolution which was adopted this morning; these paragraphs, in .our

opinion, are so to spy the prerequisite for any proper arrangement which can

be made in the Congo.

Suggestions hav? been made as to'the interpretation and implementation

of this first part of the operative pc.ragre.phs which are designed to prevent

civil war in the Congo through clashes between the various groups of tfte

ANC. > : ' ' . . .

I believe that the ideas sy.pv--?c;?d by the representative of India are

worthy of careful consideration. Our interpretation regarding the first

paragraph is parallel to what has br;en given,' But the essential element for

an improvement of the situation in the CoTigo is the elimination of standing

foreign intervention in the Congo.

Here again suggestions have bee-,1 voiced which would involve the sending

of comunications to the Belgian'Government and to the Governments of other

Mtrabor States. But one question can then arise: the Belgian Government, as

it has often done, may pretend that is not at all responsible for the presence

of Belgian citizens who happen to be in the Congo. Then the United Nations

would have to deal'with persons in the Congo in a private capacity. Are there

any ways and means to expel these people? Generally, when a person is

undesirable in a country, the authorities of that country have ways and means

to expel them. I am not here suggesting that the United Nations should .

altogether supplant the Congolese authorities, but as soon as the Security

Council deems it necessary that measures should be. taken for elimination of

foreign military and para-military personnel and for eliminating political

advisors, we must visualise the situation of persons who,are there purportedly

in a personal capacity. We must, accordingly, visualize the possibility of

explaining frankly and directly to these persons that .they are .undesirable

in the Congo and that they must leave the country and that if they do not leave

of their own accord the United Nations will expel them from the Cpngo, I think

DR/cw 69-70

(K r,

that sufficiently effective means are available so as not to leave this

matter altogether to the goodwill of the respective Governments concerned

whose nationals may be in the Congo.

I think that this is a suggestion of interest, and we would be very

happy if information could be furnished as to the way in which the United

Nations would deal with these persons for whom no government is responsible

and there may be quite a few of them.

HA/ek . 71

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): It is not really that I am reluctant to sit

here as long as you want to hold this meeting, Mr. Secretary-General — although

it is already 5.30. But, for other reasons alco,we would have preferred

it if the Secretariat had prepared a working paper which the Advisory Committee

coull consider. That would make the deliberations of the Committee more precise

and less rambling, because seme of the problems involved are really very

professional questions, such as those in paragraphs 1 and 2. Paragraph 5 we

may skip for the time being. Paragraph ^ is perhaps the only one on which one

might venture a very quick opinion without very deep consideration. In respect

of that also, my feeling is that we are probably combining the functions of

police with those of a judge.

As regards investigations, I do not know how a judge, however senior and

experienced he may be, can carry on investigations unless there is somebody to

bring evidence before him. Surely, -we do not expect judges recommended by the

International Court to sit in Leopolclville ami collect evidence against villages

or individuals or politicians who are responsible for thiii very tragic aflftftwlnatio

of Mr, Lumumba. The question of trial would come later on, after the

investigations had been completed.

Therefore, my own very unprofessional view would be that at this stage you

require the services of police,rather than of very senior judges, for the

purposes of investigation.

However, I reiterate the view that at this stage perhaps we would be greatly

helped if the Secretariat were to favour us with working papers instead of our

discussing these questions in the manner in which we are discussing them.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Of course, the Judges would have police

assistance. But I think we all have the feeling — it is normal in all

societies — that police are very good for digging things up but not for the

evaluation of facts, and that is exactly where a judge comes in. I was taking

it for granted that we were discussing those who evaluate — and, of course, they

should have all the services we can render them in an appropriate form.

HA/ek 72

(Tb.G Secretary-General)

As regards a working paper, there may be a stage for that, but I think we

need some further guidance before ve can produce a paper which will not give rise

to too much discussion. It should be a crystallization from our side, which may

help to reach further conclusions. But I think -'biiat tlie first round mat be one

of en exchange of views.

Mr, JHA (India): I might contribute something to that discussion,

because I made the suggestion in regard to the judges. The idea is that these

three people will not sit as judges — but you have to have people of high

judicial character in order to inspire confidence, and they must have the

necessary legal training for evaluating evidence. As the Secretary-General has

said, they will have a staff under them — and eome of those may be experienced

police officers. They will, bring evidence before them. It is entirely for them

to work it out. They may also like to hear evidence from any person who comes

before them. They may receive conuaanlcstlcns. They will then be able to

evaluate all that, with their great judicial experience, in an impartial manner.

That is the idea. The idea is not to form a tribunal for investigation. In

that, I entirely agree with the representative of Pakistan.

Mre_HASAN (Pakistan): In my country, ae well as in India, whenever

there ie a riot or a similar occurrence, you have a committee of judges to

investigate and to evaluate evidence, etc., etc. But then those judges have

the legal power, givan to them by national courts, to call for witnesses and call

for evidence, which cannot be denied them. In the case before us, how will

evidence be marc-hailed? Who will collect the evidence? What will be the

authority of these judges to order particular individuals to come before the

committee of investigators and give evidence? I am not a judge — I have never

been a magistrate — but I thought there might be seine difficulty in the whole

operation. That is why I mentioned it.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I am sure it would require co-operation by

local authorities. Otherwise, it just cannot be done. There must be an

acceptance of their being there, first of all. If we get that far, we may get

HA/ck 73

(The Secretary-General)

some co-operation. If we do not get co-operation — as In another famous

case in the United Nations — the vhole investigation is not worth very much.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French): I must

admit that I have not had time to ponder much, Mr. Secretary-General, in order

to give you suggestions on the implementation of this resolution. I must

acknowledge that the implementation of the resolution is not an easy matter.

Let us take this question of the impartial investigation which will take

place. It;seems to me that we have to set up a commission of inquiry. The

members of it might bo magistrates: that- would be preferable. But this was a

political assassination. Perhaps political men, with a background as magistrates,

would also be desirable. In any event, they should be attended by men

experienced in police and investigatory work.

I should like to ask a qusiitiovi.- Can you think of any precedents in this

matter? I have not had time to excmina this, bub personally I have some doubts

as to, whether there have been precedents.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The General Assembly, of course, took a

decision which gave rise to exactly the same problems in the case of Hungary.

But, since it never functioned as it waa intended to, I do not think there is

any precedent.

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French): First

of all, I must say that these magistrates, if they go to Katanga, for example,

should have the co-operation of the local authorities in one way or another,

because otherwise they would have to be guarded by United Nations forces — and

I would not wish to be a member of such a commission. That is all the more true

since, as I have read in the press, Mr. Tshombe has presented the United Nations

with an ultimatum. The Katanga Government has decreed the mobilization of all

the inhabitants of Katanga, white and black, for the defence of their lives and

their property, which are said to be imperilled by the decisions of the United

Nations. In other words, these persons who would go to Katanga would not, shall

I say, be warmly welcomed.

HA/ek 7 -75

(Mr,United Aj.a'o Republic)

Moreover, the question of hailing persons before a tribunal is premature.

Thi,t is not what we are dealing wrlth. We fir&t have to set up this question

of a commission of investigation. I have to pondsr that and see just who may

be members. The panel asked of the President of the International Court of

Justice is named fo:/ the settlement of international problems rather than

questions of criminal irquiry. But there is no reason not to think of that panel

for this purpose.

Now let me say a few words about the resolutions.

RSH/bg 76

(Mr. Loutfi, United Arab Republic)

Let me begin with paragraph A 2, which urges that "measures be taken for the

immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other

foreign military and para-military personnel" and so on. Surely the first thing

to do is to enter into communication above all with the Belgian Government,

and other Governments, if any, that are involved. But I read today that the

Katanga Government has taken a decision which will render our work more difficult.

The Council of Ministers has decided to grant Katanga nationality tc all those,

white or black, who may wish to have it. That will surely make the situation

far more difficult.

The implementation of this paragraph raises a lot of Juridical problems.

We are a political body in the United Nations. Law cannot help us. Of course,

it is very useful, but we have to exert politics..! pressure on Mr. Tshcmbe.

Political pressure can conceivably ..LQU from Belgium or other States that have

relationships with Mr. Tshombe.

Paragraph A 1 urges "that tba United Natvovxo take immediately all appropriate

measures to prevent tba occurrence cf civil war in the Congo." That,

Mr. Secretary-General, you have already begun to do. That surely is a good

beginning in the right direction, because we have to start negotiating, and I

hope that m:der this paragraph a lot can be clone by means of negotiations between

the authorities. I consider this paragraph to be very important with regard to

the internal situation in the Congo. If we succeed in arresting the civil war

and halting clashes between the various groups, we may even achieve some sort of

reconciliation a little later on, when the minds of the people will be a little

more tranquil. We should, at the beginning, stsrt with these negotiations vhich

you have already initiated. We would like to be informed of the progress of

such negotiations and then we could proffer advice as to what should be done

next.

The SECRETARY-GENERA.L: The approaches mentioned first by

Ambassador Jha and now by you are approaches which will be made as a matter of

course in the course of the day. They are routine, but they are the first and

obvious steps. I need not consult you about them because they are a matter of

course.

RSH/bg 77

(The Secretary-General)

I am glad Ambassador Loutfi mentioned Katanga because Katanga will be the

real headache in paragraphs 1, 2 and k of sections A and agaia very definitely,

in paragraph B 2. It is another variety of the problora which we faced late in

July, and this time I think that, in view of the seriousness of the situation

and, even more, of the experience we now have of the people in power in Katanga,

it has to be most carefully planned as a concerted and effective operation to

which we shall have to devote special attention as an item in its own right within

our sphere of competence and responsibility,, The two pieces of news read out by

Ambassador Loutfi cer vainly indicate what we have to expect.

Mr. BEN&BOITD (Morocco)(interpretation from French): What I wanted to

say has in part been very well said by the representative of the United Arab

Republic. In the cc'irse of this dif-cv.v.sion I have felt rather like a doctor lost

in a room full of lawyers. At SOL'- joints I felt that we were beS.ng given

readings from Sherlock Holmes* I would, have visaed that everyone could be turned

for five minutes into physicians so tbat we could t-hink of the sick tody of

the Congo for a while. A.ll parties have been enunciating important ideas in a

rather disorganized manner. Of course, I have not had time either to ponder

carefully the resolution,- and I would hops thc?/b tomorrow or the next day we might

meet e^gain in order to continuj our deliberations.

I': sesras to me that our first question is tho.t of priorities. In our opinion,

paragraph A 2 should have a priority for consideration, study and action over

all the others. If the people in Katanga, Leopoldville or Kasai are recalcitrant

as regards decisions of the United Nations, and they will be, as Tshombe has made

clear, they will be so because they count on a corps of technical counsellors

and advisers and an inflow of arms and money, especially money. If, on the

other hand, the problem is resolved by reducto ad absurdum, by money being

controlled, arms being controlled and officers being made to leave,

Messrs. Tshombe and Kalonji, and even Kasavubu, will change their attitudes soon

enough. These are men who are being pushed and paid; and the ones primarilyj

responsible are chiefly the Belgians and the others who are working in the

twilight and who send in a flow of mercenaries.

RSH/hg 78-80

(Mr. Benaboud, Morocco)

In this connexion, we might, in parenthesis, answer the representative of

Guinea. In the event that Belgium followed the broken line and was not too

honest or forthright a nation, and if all those officers and technical advisers

became merely individuals, we could assimilate them with all the other mercenaries

and they would then fall under the provision of paragraph A 2 of the resolution.

Belgium certainly cannot squirm out of the obligations set forth here, and if

any priority is to be given, it should be given to that paragraph.

Almost conccmitantly with this is paragraph A 1, but it seems to me that

that paragraph is almost impossible of implementation if those who openly

challenge it, and say so to the Press ana are proud about it, are supported

by an influx of arms and officers. Even though the resolution gives no time-limit

to the Belgians and other mercenaries to leave, the first dercyrcbe by the

Secretary-General might be that announced of gebtlng into contact with Belgium

and giving it a time-limit for the .• •--er to "be v,i~ en .ud a time-limit for

initiating the departure. Th^re ?.rc: t,vo word;.i in p fcg ap1?. A 2, "withdrawal

and evacuation*, and the letter which the Secretary-General might send to the

Belgian Government could show way those words were used. From the drafting

point of view, this might influence the thoughts of those who wish to abide by

the broken line of nineteenth century colonialism.

If we concentrate on paragraph 2, 55 per cent of the problem will be solved,

perhaps even the whole problem, because in that event the United Nations Force

would have two advantages. The first would be that of being alone-and of ensuring

law and order, and the second would be that there would no longer be any

antogonists against whom fire would have to be opened.

The information we have received from the Congo is that this people, even

thought a martryed and unhappy people, is not a bellicose one. The ones who

are bellicose are those who do not understand their own interest, that is, the

Belgians and the mercenaries.

It seems to me that if at this stage of our discussion we attached considerable

importance to the question of priorities, both with regard to our agenda and to

the work subsequently to be done by the Secretary-General and his staff, we would

gain a lot of time and have followed the path of logic by putting first things first.

Contacts with Belgium are the only ones that are of interest and that are practical.

Aside from this, I think that, to begin with, we should completely ignore Tshombe,

because obviously he pays no attention at all to the existence of the United Nations

and he is just a tool.

BC/rh ' 81

Morocco)

If any ccimnunications or contacts are to be made, they must be made with

Kasavubu. Kasavubu is still supposed to be the President of the Congo, and, even

though he is as guilty as the others, from the point of view of the prestige of

the United Nations it would be a grave error to talk to secessionists, thus

enabling them to use these contacts as implicit recognition. In any case, that

would serve no useful purpose from the practical point of view. Kasavubu, although

he is very guilty, is still, as I have said, the head of the Central Government,

and representations to him from the Secretary-General would be quite logical.

That covers the question of the polics and judges. I would leave the matter

there until our next meeting, when we shall have had ample time to reflect on

the question.

Mr *_ADE?!L (Sudan) : If I ~"!o rot maks myself clear I would ask the

Committee to forgive me, because a/tar *he very exhausting day yesterday one cannot

think very straight-

I should like to say just a few words about paragraphs 2 and h of section A

of the resolution.

With regard to paragraph 2. we attach the greatest importance, as I said

before, to the withdrawal of tte Belgians* We have now come to the stage of

deciding how that must be dono. As,I think, the representative of India said,

if Belgium would co-operate more, our task would be made much easier. But there

is one aspect of the question cf withdrawal which we should consider. It may be

necessary to replace these people. There are hundreds of them, we hear, in

Katanga, in the gendarmerie and police and in political positions. It may not be

easy to find Congolese to fill these posts. In that case the question of

replacement will become very important. Some of the Asian and African countries

which are involved may be called upon to fill these gaps. The question of

compensation may arise. Seme of these people may have had long service, and

they are entitled to something. Those were some practical aspects which I wanted

to raise in this connexion.

•mill

BC/rh 82

(Mr* Adeelj Sudan)

As regards paragraph U, we feel that the task provided for there must be taken

in hand immediately. I must say that I am attracted by the proposal made by

Mr, Jha that a magisterial inquiry should be carried out, with a panel to be

composed of three jurists: one from Africa -- who, I think, should be the

chairman -- one from Asia, and one from Latin America, I agree with Mr, Jha that

the trial should be a separate operation from the investigation,

I think that several of these operations can be undertaken simultaneously —

for example, those provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and *4-. These are very big

operations and, before we embark upon them, I think that we have to make sure that

there is at least sufficient military protection. I believe that that is a very

important prerequisite, I do not know what the military position is today and

what are the prospects for the future.

The SECRETARY^GENEPAL: I had intended « but it is too late to do so

today •- to ask General Rikhye to review our present needs in the military field,

Some of the neutralization operations on which we have embarked have been

frustrated by a lack of troops, I also wished to ask him to give an evaluation in

military termsf to the extent that that is possiblef of what this resolution vould

require by way of reinforceEK-i'1^ I think that such information is necessary for the

Committee and that we could make this matter a separate part of our deliberations

tomorrow. As I have said, it had been my intention to ask General Rikhye to give

us this information today, but time is running out.

Mr, SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): In my opinion, the representative of Morocco

hit the nail on the head.

Naturally, the Government of Ceylon has been giving serious thought to this

question, particularly as a member of the Security Council. I should like to

convey to the Committee the thoughts of our Prime Minister, who is also our

Foreign Minister,

BC/rh 85

(Mr. Subasinghe, Ceylon)

We believe that there are certain prerequisites for the establishment of

any peace and security in the Congo. Among these prerequisites, certainly, are

measures to prevent the coming in of military personnel and material. Then there

are such measures as the reconvening of Parliament and the reorganization of the

army. All these measures are included in the resolutions of the Security Council,

But, in our opinion, everything hangs on one cardinal fact: the presence of

foreign elements in the Congo, and particularly the Belgians. If we can remove

that element, I think that it will be much easier to solve the other problems,

such as the reconvening of Parliament.

As we know, we have for a long time been insisting on Kasavubu's reconvening

Parliament, but there has been no response. We believe that if the foreign

support which Kasavubu is receiving were to be withdrawn, the constitutional

question of reconvening F&rlianj.-.i. t vvA.vld become <x:ite simple0 The same is true

of the prevention of the entry of j»:L-.:i/:ary personnel and the reor^snissation of the

army. These are military problems which are c;'.iite capable of being tackled by

able men like General Rikhyea Jn our opinion, they are comparatively simple

technical and military problems. But it is the political problem that is worrying

us very much, and the main political problem, of course, is the presence of the

Belgians 0 Now, how are we to solve teat prc-olem1?

It is true that we have road a frequent appeals to Belgium and to other

countries that are associated with Belgium in various fields; we have asked the

latter countries to exert pressure on Belgium to prevent its giving support to

the Kalonjis, the Tshombes and the Mobutus. However, our appeals have not yet

been answered,, I think that at the moment we should concentrate on the

attainment of that objective. The questions of finding judges, making

investigations and reconvening Parliament are comparatively simple questions if

we can settle the other matter.

Like Mr, Jha, therefore, I am inclined to suggest that the Secretary-General

should take the initiative in making very strong representations to the Belgians

again. I do not know whether he would be right in making similar representations

to other Powers which he thinks have some kind of influence over the Belgians.

Similarly, there are many countries represented here which agree that the presence

of the Belgians is a grave factor in the Congo question. I do not know whether

BC/rh 6V85

(Mr* Subasingbe, Ceylon)

the Advisory Committee would wish to consider the possibility of making

representations through our respective Governments, not only to Belgium, but to

other countries which can exert some influence on the Belgians• I am merely

putting this idea forward for the consideration of the Advisory Committee.

FGB/cn 86

Mr. NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I should like to confine my observations

to operative paragraphs 1 and 2 for the moment. I believe that the

Secretary-General has a military advisory committee in the Congo. If that

is so, I would say that it is the primary duty of that military advisory

coonittee to tackle paragraph 1, vhich concerns the military operation. What

my delegation has in view is this. We wish the Secretary-General's military

advisory committee to negotiate. It is a matter of negotiation and agreement.

Wh-it we should like to see is approaches made very drastically in order to

h&ve the Congolese army lay down its arms end go back to barracks. And when

it goes back to barracks then the Secretary-General's military advisory

committee will be in a position to carry out the other duties concerning the

military operation.

However, most difficult of all is the question of Belgians and Katanga.

Suggestions have been made by the representatives of India and Ceylon and

others, and it is a good suggestion to approach the Belgian Government, to

vrite to them, but in the view of my delegation that is not enough. We wish

to approach the members of NATO -- the big Powers, the United States of

America, the United Kingdom, France -- and to ask them also to co-operate

in order to bring pressure on Belgium. Without their co-operation we may

find ourselves in a very difficult position, and Belgium and Katanga must

respect the views of NATO. I am confident that, with the co-operation of the

United States, the United Kingdom and France, Belgium and Katanga will

co-operate with the Secretary-General. But if Belgium refuses or rejects

the Secretary-General's proposal, then the United Nations will take further

steps to expel undesirable Belgians and other personnel from the Congo.

For this reason, it is very very essential for the Secretary-General to seek

the co-operation of the big Powers, particularly that of members of NATO.

Therefore, as I have said, I wish to confine my observations to those two

> paragraphs in order to have ample time to study the other two paragraphs.

FGB/cn 87

Mr. GEBBE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I hope you understand my hesitation

to speak on all of the problems that have been raised today. Your statement

alone, I think, contains a great many problems which I am sure no one

can deal with and settle right here and nov. Also, the resolution raises

many problems on which I could not possibly give any definite views

whatsoever, but I think:-1 can say quite seriously that we bank a great-deal

on paragraph 2, In other words we share the point of view of those delegations

which, in the debate in the Security Council, made it clear that once

Belgian influence was eliminated many of the problems would either disappear

or become greatly eased, and therefore, solutions could, be found for them.'

Accordingly, I'have intervened only .in order to.stress the fact that if we

could bring about the complete withdrawal,of Belgian influence from the Congo

then I think we would be in a position to.deal with the rest. But with

regard to the problems raised in the paper,., in the resolution and in the various

suggestions, that have: been made, J think, of Bourse, that we need some time

to study them carefully before expressing our views. In connexion with,

paragraph 2 I wonder if it would be possible either for you or for .the authors

of the resolution to let. us know what exactly is meant by "measures".

Mr. JHA (India): I should like to say straight away that we

also regard paragraph 2 as the most important, part of this, resolution, and

there is no question that if Belgian withdrawal and the withdrawal of

other -foreign military and paramilitary personnel can be attained we shall

have gone: half way towards the solution of all our troubles in the Congo and.

of all the troubles of the Congolese in the Congo. Therefore, I would

entirely agree that the greatest effort should be made to bring about

the implementation of paragraph 2 and also of paragraph 3> which is, of

course, auxilary to paragraph 2.

We would agree also that apart from the communication -- which, incidentally,

should probably be sent by telegram because it is a very urgent matter —

that you make to Belgium in connexion with paragraph 2, you may also

consider, as Secretary-General of the Organization or, if you wish to say it,

on the advice of the Advisory Committee, an approach to all the. big Powers

FGB/cn 88-90

(Mr. Jha, India)

and all other Powers which you think might be able to bring Influence to

bear on Belgium and to use their good offices for securing a Belgian

withdrawal, since without that withdrawal nothing can be solved in the Congo,

We would have no objection to that course.

Another thing which I would like to say is that we have discussed

part A of the resolution perhaps a little more thoroughly than part B. I

think all of us have ventured to express our opinions. These are difficult

matters and I think that it might be a good thing perhaps if, after any

other members have spoken, we were to conclude our discussions for today.

Then you might think over all this, and if you want to show us anything or

to ask our further advice perhaps you could call a meeting tomorrow. But I

do think that at this stage it might be the appropriate thing to close our

deliberations because there is much that has been said which will, I am sure,

give you food for thought and for consideration,

Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): May I ask a question?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Certainly.

Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): The Belgian Government takes the position

always that it has nothing to do with the Belgians who are at present in the

Congo -- that they are private citizens who have gone there on their own

responsibility. What is your information?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is correct that that is what the Belgians

say, and I suppose that, as a question of form, the information is correct.

What possibilities we have legally under such circumstances is a question

which, as was pointed out here before by Ambassador Loutfi, certainly has to

be studied. This is, however, a problem which we have run into again and

again. Do not forget that, in forms which cannot be surpassed now as to

firmness, I started the quarrel about this, matter early in October.

MW/pm 91

(The Secretary-General)

The stumbling block is exactly the one you mention: • their status. My

feeling is -- as I have put it te» them and I can put it bluntly,here too — that

even if there are private contracts, I do not know of any Government which does

not find some way in which it can influence the actions of its citizens in

other countries if it wants to, because most people of this Mnd, if they are

not soldiers or adventurers, have an interest in coming back to the country or

an interest in some kind of post there., or what not; and there you have a lever

which may be used. That lever, I do not think, has been used at all so far,

and that is one of the things we can achieve within .the area to which you now

refer. That does not raise any legal question, but only,a political question*

It would be, under the most favourable circumstances, the first result if we

got such action by the Belgian Government in relation to those who have taken

posts in the Congo on private terms.

Mr. ACEKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from. French): I should like to

make some brief observations about the concern and alarm expressed by the

representative of the United Arab Republic .regarding a communiqu^ from Katanga.

It appears that the so-called Council of Ministers have met and decided to grant

TCatangan nationality to all the European mercenaries.there* This is very

dangerous.because, as far as the United Nations is concerned, there can be no

Katangan nationality. It has been reaffirmed time and again here that the

integrity of the Congolese territory and the unity of that territory must be

safeguarded. Therefore, I see no legal difficulty for the United Nations with

regar.d to these people who have assumed Katangan nationality/ a nationality

which cannot exist because there is no Katangan nation and the local

authorities of Katanga surely cannot confer Congolese nationality on foreigners.

This is a clarification which I felt bound to make. Even though I am "not

a lawyer, I only wish to demonstrate that this cannot constitute an additional

difficulty. It is a subterfuge which is valueless because the United Nations

cannot adopt attitudes designed to protect people who have assumed a nationality

which does not exist.

KU/pm 92

Mr» SALL (Senegal) (interpretation from French); The only excise which

I can offer for speaking at such a late hour is. the degree of urgency of the

measures that should be taken with a view to improving the situation in the

Congo, My delegation would like to make some suggestions, particularly in

connexion with paragraphs 1 and 2. of part A of the resolution. .;- •

In our:opinion, the most important thing, at the present time is, in the

first place, to prevent a civil war in the Congo and to take all the necessary

measures for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention

of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. It seems to

us that this is a sine qua non for the implementation' Of paragraph -4, for

example, which deals with the investigation to ascertain the circumstances of the

death of Mr, Lumumha and his colleagues. We believe that so long as there is

insecurity, BO long as there is no peace, it is impossible even to think of an

investigation because a magistrate must be offered every possible guarantee of

security in order that he may work with impartiality and without allowing himself

"oo be influenced by outside pressures or subjected to intolerable pressure.

It is for this reason that my delegation believes that, by the very

nature of the deterioration of the situation, it is necessary for the

organization to show signs of strength and vigour and energy, because we are

at the present time confronted by a psychological shock in the Congo, We know

that the gravest obstacle which we shil meet in the path of United Nations action

in the Congo will be the difficulties created by Katanga, Katanga is well

aware of this, so well aware that it is trying already to create this kind of

psychological shock to show that Katanga is strong and that no one can prevent

it from doing what it wishes to do.

It seems to me that we must always bear in mind the psychological element

which is so important. Moreover, we know that Belgium too might create

difficulties in the way of the implementation of United Nations measures in the

Congo, and that is why my delegation believes that Belgium1s co-operation is

necessary for the application of the concepts and ideals which are expressed in

the resolution of the Security Council,

And here I wish to associate myself with what was said by the representative

of Nigeria to the effect that it would be wise to use imagination and perspicacity

MW/pra 93-95(Mr. Sail, Senegal)

in order to be able to exert a strong influence, either directly or through the

NATO Powers, on Belgium to make Belgium facilitate the task of our Organization in

the Congo. I think that only thus can we create an atmosphere different from the

one that prevails at present, which will enable us to envisage the possibility

of an investigation -- because an investigation into the death of Mr. Lumumba

and his colleagues must be carried out locally. Mr. Lumumba was assassinated

in one of the Katanga villages and an investigation which will require an

autopsy and will also require t>b«v*> wi-t«4»cc»q he b»a-rd must be carried out

locally where the magistrate and the committee will be grau ,. ««-Arv •no*****!*

kind of security.Therefore, my delegation believes that certain measures are urgently needed,

and that the psychological shock which I mentioned is the most important element

to which attention should be drawn.

QR/dp 96

Dato KAKEL (Federation of Malaya): I know it is getting late but I

hope you will not mind my asking to speak if only to make certain observations

on the points raised and discussed this afternoon while things are still fresh

in our minds. First of all, I should like to touch on paragraph k of part A of

t.'.:e resolution referring to the investigation. I think Mr, Jhars proposal or

f.ufr estion was a good one; it commended itself to my mind in the sense that while,

ai' this stage, we are not yet in a position to decide or consider what sort of

tribunal would finally try the perpetrators of the crimes, if ever we catch them,

a parallel can be drawn between this sort of body of imminent jurists and a grand

Jury which would examine evidence produced naturally by experts, police

investigators, witnesses and others and commit the culprits to whatever body

would be competent to try them. So it does seem to me that it is a very good

idea. Secondly, the selection of people mentioned in the field of lav and

politics would probably not only add to -- or rather I should say would be

necessary in order to inject a sense of prestige in this body which will do the

investigation, I do not pretend now to try and suggest the practical ways in

•ft'hich this investigation can be carried out; obviously it depends a lot on the

:vj-operation of the local atthorities. The representative of Senegal has just

stated that this body, if every one is established, must depend on the help and

cc-operation and understanding of the people on the ground. That is my point,

and in short I should like to say that I support Ambassador Jha's proposal.

In regard to the question referred to in paragraph 2 of part A, namely the

immediate withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military forces, I should

like to report that my Government feels very strongly about this. In fact,

on 18 February my Prime Minister made a public statement concerning this very

point; I would not like to weary the meeting by reading all that he said but

this is his statement on the particular point:

"Foreign troops and personnel outside the framework of the United

Nations must be withdrawn at once and the United Nations Force should be

reinforced. Unless reinforcement is sent in the next few days, there is

little purpose in having the United Nations there, since its strength at the

moment is inadequate effectively to carry out the task entrusted to it."

OR/dp 96

(The Secretary "general)

to be most relevant In such approaches, When I put aside what particular

approaches should "be ai&de,it will be because thie choice of countries and so on is

something which, I am afraid, is more easily handled if regarded as a pure

Secretary-General matter rather than dealt with in this kind of debate, which

probably could not contribute ouch to it anyway.

Dato KAMIL (Fedrration of Malaya): There is one last point which was

touched upon by the representative of Ceylon regarding approaches by member

Governments to the Belgian Government. I should like to report to this Committee

that on 16 February my Government sent a note in no uncertain terms to the

Government of Belgium regarding the need to withdraw its troops and other bodies

from the territory of the Congo.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that was a very lucky initiative

which encouraged us greatly, Just as your generous offer of 800 came at the

right moment to help us*

Mr. SUM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): I was going to make

the following suggestion. We have exchanged ideas in a general way with special

reference to the implementation of part A of this resolution. A host of very

interesting suggestions has been forthcoming. A useful purpose would be served,

I submit, if we now interrupted the deliberations of this Committee until

tomorrow. The Secretary-General might then perhaps sum up the essential points

which require more careful discussion and tomorrow we might continue the debate

and supplement it*

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I rather share your view because we have all

been working for three hours after a night we shall all remember for its length,

After we have heard the representative of Morocco I shall try to indicate

what are the immediate practical needs.

GR/dp 99-100

Mr, BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): As a point of

information,for tomorrow perhapsj is it true that there is a Kr-tanga tourist

office in New York which is empowered to grant visas, etc,?

The SECBETARI. -GENERAL; There is apparently an information office

with a very elegant letter-head and at one stage Mr, Tehombe tried to use it

as a channel for sending communications to us, but we refused to accept them

through that channel and we treat such communications as null and void.

DH/mtm 101

(The Secretary-General)

I sia Bumming up in this case only as regards immediate steps: I have already

told you that ve have in the pipeline, communications or demarches in writing to

those concerned for a kind of pressure in the, spirit of resolution SA733, using to

the full the unanimity which existed back of the substance of that resolution.That will be carried out later today.

As regards this resolution, I have treated on the same level the approaches,

first of all, to Belgium but also on a broader basis demarches which have been

mentioned by Ambassador Jha,and which I have regarded as beyond any discussion, that

is the right thing to do at once* However, we know that diplomatic demarches of

that type, although necessary initial steps, are not the things which will yield

the results. They would have to be followed up. Anyway, such communications

will be sent tonight and you will of course be informed about them.

Further, I have for my part in mind, parallel with waiting for a

reply from the Belgians, especially on Part A, paragraph 2, to make an urgent

study here of possible precedents,because there are certainly some precedents

of similar situations in the past - volunteers of this and that kind - and also

a study of the legal implications.

Our friend from Morocco should not be scared of legal implications. It is,

after all, so that we have to look at them 'because they do not only represent

certain Inhibitions on what we can do as decent people, but also very often

provide some forceful arguments. So there is a positive as well as a negative

side to such a so-called legal study.

Those seem to me to be the first and most obvious things to start without

delay. I had had in mind the possibility of some kind of initial approach also

regarding Part A, paragraph k, but it is quite obvious that that requires more

thought as matters now stand. I have also counted on the possibility of some

first initiatives as regards necessary reinforcements, but I think that it is

not a matter of such urgency that it cannot wait for a presentation to you of the

military evaluation. That would in fact mean that all the things that we can do

without further substantive discussion will be done, and done of course

immediately.

F""' '

DR/mtm 102

(The Secretary-General)

If there is anything else which turns up in our further study and which can

be done before we meet again, it will of course be done and you will be informed

about that too because this is a give-and-take, of course. It is not only

that I solicit your advice; it is also so that you will be briefed concurrentlyabout what we c\o.

May I suggest that we meet tomorrow at the same time because all of us have

other things to do and three p.m. is a reasonable time, I guess, for everybody.

Then we will continue the same deliberations. We will certainly wish to think

over what has been said. I would be happy if you would also, for what it is

worth, look at the way in which certain somewhat intricate questions have been

put in my initial statement today.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No, 2U22 February 1961ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ONTHE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Wednesday, 22 February 1961f at 3 P«m.

61.05066

HA/cw 2-3

A The SECRETARY-GENERALi I think it would be wise for us today

to follow the idea expressed yesterday and to concentrate on concrete issues --

without forgetting, of course, the broader framework which we considered

yesterday and regarding which we have had, so to speak, a first reading.

We have two items both of which, I think, require urgent consideration,

and others may be added later on if we feel that our discussion leads in

that direction. The two items are: first, the demarche to Belgium; and,

secondly, the military requirements, as they can be based on analysis of the

military needs, of the military situation deriving from the new rosolution.

The second point, as I said yesterday, can most usefully be introduced by

General Rikhye. I think we should take that at a later stage in our debate

and have a look, first of all, at the demarche to Belgium. A draft text

has been distributed to you. I had originally thought that we would go ahead

with it without any consultation; I had hoped to send it last night. But I

must say that, in working on the text, I came to the conclusion that even

here evaluations come into play,and considerations concerning the best tactics

present themselves in a way which makes it useful to look at the matter

together. A delay of twenty-four hours is a disadvantage which is outweighed

by the advantage of pooling our reactions and our knowledge.

RSH/aJ k(The Secretary-General)

Before inviting you to present your observations on the draft of the

note verbale to the Belgian Government, I should like to mention that the otner

text which has been sent to you is the standard text of the letters already

addressed to Kasavubu, Tshombe, Kalonji and, perhaps, Gisenga. You may be

surprised at my saying, perhaps Gizenga", but I would like to give you the

reason. On Monday we already had information from usually reliable sources that

tne Gizenga group had executed Songolo and other political leaders in Stanleyville.

We had no confirmation, and for that reason it could not be formally reported.

But our later information, although not confirming the first story from Stanleyville

indicates that our people around the place are very much afraid that the

rumour is correct. Were the rumour to be correct, it is a matter of course that

the same communication should be addressed to Mr. Gizenga. That is the reason

for my "perhaps Mr. Gizenga".

However, this text of the letters based on document S/ 733 and addressed

at all events to Kasavubu, Tshombe and Kalonji is submitted to you only for

information. We are all aware that in this case it may be a question of hours

and that the defence of lives is such that no delays are justified.

The other letter, that concerning the withdrawal of Belgian and foreign

personnel, seems to me to give us more leeway, and that is the reason, as I

said before, why I felt we should profit from your advice.

With these explanations, I should like to invite you to present your

observations on the letter. This is not a drafting committee and, as always,

whether I like it or not, I have to take final responsibility for what is sent.

But the questions of substance and the question of balance are relevant, very

relevant indeed, and for that reason I am eager to listen to your views.

Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): Concerning the letter to Katanga,

to Elisabethville and the other places, I nave no observations. However,

concerning the draft of the note verbale to the permanent representative of

Belgium, may I ask you some questions?

It would, according to our delegation, be useful to mention that this

note verbale has the full backing of the Advisory Committee. Perhaps this is

not the usual practice, but the fact is there, and I think that mentioning the

RSH/aj . 5(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

Advisory Committee is not far from the line of the way of thinking, because

you yourself, mentioned in the Security Council that you would avail yourself

of tne valuable assistance of the Advisory Committee and that you -would seek

guidance in the implementation of the resolution. The fact is that we have

discussed the substance of the letter and I think that it would be useful to

mention that this note verbale has the full backing of the Advisory Committee.

That is my first observation.

BC/cn 6(Mr, Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

My second Observation is the following. I do not clearly understand the

sentence at the top of page 2 which reads:

"The actual steps that should be taken are necessarily left to the

Belgian Government".

Would the Secretary-General be kind enough to explain the meaning of that

sentence?

I come to my third observation. It relates to the sentence at the bottom

of page 2 which reads:

"in this regard the Secretary-General is prepared to designate a

senior officer of the Secretariat...".

In my delegation's opinion, if the Belgian Government agrees, in principle or

in substance, to do what we are asking and gives instructions to that effect,

it may be correct to designate a senior officer of the Secretariat to meet with

Belgian representatives. If, however, there is no definite answer or if the

answer is. not satisfactory, it may be advisable at the first stage to

designate some person of high standing to take up the matter.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I should like to give a few explanations

right away.

First, as regards the question of stating that this Note verbale has the

backing of the Advisory Committee, we may perhaps come back to that question

when we have heard what the reactions are and how that can be reflected.

The representative of Indonesia has raised two other points, the first

relating to the phrase "The actual steps that should be taken", and the other

relating to the possibility of designating a senior officer. Of course, both

these points are built on the assumption that the Belgians will react positively*

As a matter of presentation, that could very well be brought in at the end of

the page in connexion with the second sentence to which the representative of

Indonesia referred — we could say "If a positive response is forthcoming from

your Government, we should like to designate...". The sense of this sentence

and the sense of the other sentence mentioned by the representative of Indonesia

BC/cn 7\ . . (The Secretary-General)

v 1 ' • . •

arc part and parcel of the same picture. The sense of "The actual steps

that should be taken are necessarily left to the Belgian Government" is that

the Belgian Government has to act within the limits of its legal authority.

If it is a question of administrative or legal measures in Belgium, obviously

decisions must be taken by the Belgian Government.

On the other hand, there is not very much satisfaction to be drawn from

an open-end solution of that kind* I felt that since we bed to leave the

practical steps to the Belgian Government we should keep in touch with that

Government in a very intimate way, that a person with the proper authority and

background knowledge of law and other matters should be on the Belgians, as

it were, the whole time, saying, "No, but you could do this"; "No, but you

could do that"; "No, but — ".

In that sense, the two phrases are related. We have the open end in the

first sentence; we try to close it in the second sentence* Obviously, when

we talk about a senior officer we mean a representative who really could make

an impact, be constructive in his thinking and exercise the right kind of moral

pressure from the Organization in order, as we say in the Note verbale, "to

further the implementation of the resolution".

There is a further point. It would be much easier if we had someone who

could personally report to me, to this Comnittee and to the Organization on

what was really being done; that would be better than having to rely on

communications, which might or might not come, forcing us to write to the

Belgians and start a correspondence. Having an observer on the spot would,

of course, add to the efficiency.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): In view of the explanation just given

by the Secretary-General, what would be the interpretation of paragraph A 2 of

the resolution? Am I correct in understanding that what this Note verbale

requires of the Belgians is first that they terminate the services of their

citizens in various parts of the Congo and that the actual withdrawal would be

effected by the United Nations? Yesterday I asked what was meant by the word

"measures", and I still think that the interpretation hinges on that word.

BC/cn 8

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My own interpretation is that these arc

measures both from the United Nations and from the Governments concerned. From

our side, "measures" are, so to speak, covered "by the fact that we have

approached the Belgian Government in this way and have a follow-up of the type

indicated. Once we have taken the measures we can take at this first stage —

that is to sey, approached the Belgians as forcefully as possible and arranged

for a follow-up — the question of measures passes over to the Belgians. It

may be that we shall have to come into the picture again, for example to

provide for evaduation or for this or that. But I can clearly foresee two

phases: our first phase, with the follow-up, and the Belgian phase, in which

we should be as much present as possible. From the Belgian side the measures

would be legislative and administrative, and there would perhaps be practical

arrangements, nlso. We would leave open the possibility of a third phn.se of

measures where we might cone into the picture again in this or that way,

perhaps even in the Congo.

Mr. JHA (India): I have only one or two comments to make on the

draft to the permanent representative of Belgium, on which the Secretary-General

is seeking our advice.

The terms of the resolution are very peremptory. It was clear from the

debate in the Security Council that the central thinking of the members was

built around the Belgian withdrawal. I should be very chary of having the

Secretary-General become involved in any legal arguments with the Government

of Belgium* The resolution is quite clear. It is, of course, the Secretary-

General's duty to bring the resolution to the notice of the Belgian Government,

and it is that Government's duty to report compliance.

If my thinking is correct that we should not allow even the slightest

loophole for getting involved in a legal argument with the Belgians, I wonder

whether paragraph 3 of the present draft is really necessary. Perhaps it could

be omitted. Even if it were omitted the draft would read very well, because

there is continuity between paragraphs 2 and k.

BC/cn 9-10(Mr. Jha, India)

I have no objection to the designation of a senior officer. In fact,

that might be a very good thing. -It might help in the achievement of the

purposes of paragraph 2 of the resolution.

In paragraph ** of the note verbale there is a sentence which reads:

"It is also the understanding of the Secretary-General that these

officers and the civilian political advisers serving in the Congo

receive, directly or indirectly, a substantial portion of their

salary and emoluments from the Belgian Government".

I am not very sure that that sentence;need be included. That, again, leaves

a loophole for the Belgians to argue1 that they are not paying these people,

that these people are being paid by the Katanga Government or the Leopo.ldville

Government, as the case may be; they might try to shift the -whole responsibility

on to the shoulders of others. , • .

PGB/ek 11(Mr, Jha, India)

So you might consider whether it is necessary at all to put it. Our point

is that whoever pays the Belgian personnel and Belgian mercenaries, the payment

is there. The source of payment is immaterial. I mean, it is their

nationality, the fact of their being Belgians, which is really the mischief of

the situation. Therefore I would suggest for your consideration the question

whether that sentence could not be omitted*

In the sixth paragraph there is only one small verbal change I would suggest.

That is in the sentence which reads:

"It is essential that the members of the Council be informed within

the next few days of the specific steps that have been ... taken" —

and I would say, "or are proposed to be taken". I would rather not use the

words "which can be taken". Again, this might bring in a whole argument about

the capacity. The capacity is really a matter for them to consider as to

whether they can give effect to a measure, through legislation in Parliament,

through the executive authority, or by threat of withdrawing nationality —

denationalization. That we can leave for them.

Those are the only points that have struck me about this draft.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Without attempting to reply to the argument,

but just by way of explanation so that we can get to the bottom of the matter

in discussion, I would say that "can" of course does not mean here that vo are

starting an argument with them. It is a kind of pressure. But if you say

"have been or will be taken" that is a little bit too limited, because they should

also say what they might do legally — we might qualify "can" in more clear

terms — what they might do, so as to make possible a comparison between what

they might do and what they intend to do. It was intended as a pressure element,

but it may not be happily phrased.

In the preceding paragraph, the sentence expressing the understanding that

these various people receive "a substantial portion of their salary and emoluments

from the Belgian Government", I think that is in itself something which is rather

remarkable. I do not think it hurts to bring it out. It is not the main

argument: it is a subsidiary argument. It is not necessary for the whole

demarche, because the whole demarche can, of course, be built entirely on the

PGB/ek 12

(The Secretary-General)

text, but It tends to narrow down the possible negative replies and reaction.

It tends to narrow down the area inside which they can claim that they cannot do

anything. We, after all, know some things about it.

The paragraph beginning "While th« terms of", which you suggested might even

be deleted, is, of course, not intended to be a paraphrase of what is said in the

resolution itself, but is an attempt to tell them simply, "We do not believe that

you cannot do it". You can observe here, in the phrase that says that "it will

be noted"rtoo, that the underlying assumption of the paragraph is that the Belgian

Government, "like1 other Governments concerned, has legal authority or possibility

of obtaining the authority required to give effect .,..". That is to say, "Don't

come back to us ancl say in your first reply, 'We can't do it1". That is the

reason for it. I do not pretend that it is a deci'.civQ Reason,. br& I

Just wanted-to explain why it had been put in.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, this letter is

necessarily preremptory. It is not the sort of letter which, in normal

conditions, a Government would like to receive from the Secretary-General, but

desperate remedies are being applied. One notices that some of the charges and

insinuations which have been made here are of a nature of what they call ipse dixit.

I suppose you cannot help it. . .

There are one or two questions that Occur to me from a practical point of

view. As regards the Belgian personnel, there are a couple of. remarks on which

I must seek clarification. There is no doubt that the presence of Belgian

military and para-military personnel enables Mr. Tshombe to continue in his

defiance not only of the United Nations but, what must be even more grave from

his own personal point of view, defiance of his own Central Government. And

there are no two opinions that the Belgian personnel employed in the Katanga

forces should go out immediately. But is it not thought that this personnel is

a guarantee that the civil and economic Belgian personnel serving in Katanga

have against massacre? Would you perhaps get us this information? Or probably

you have the information -- the extent to which the civilian and economic Belgian

personnel are sustaining the economic and the industrial production of Katanga.

That is number one. And if they are deprived of this protection which is

PGB/ek 13

(Mr. Hasan, Pakistan)

physically and psychologically provided by the military and para-military Belgian

personnel, what would be their condition? Would they be left in safety and

unmolested, or is it your intention that the economic and industrial personnel

should also leave? This has not been made clear, either in the draft or anywhereelse.

In that case, what about their replacement to continue the economic activity,

on one side, and the liquidation of their own rights as regards compensation for

termination of employment, etc., on the other side? My purpose in raising this

point is to view the whole question realistically. We all want the Belgians to .

get out. Very well. But none of us, I presume, wants the economy of Katanga

and the Congo to collapse iroaodlately, and therefore if, on the one side, you want

to drive out the military personnel — which you muct, according to the Security

Council resolution; there are no two opinions about that -- would you also give

an assurance that the civilian and industrial personnel which would be left in

Katanga would receive United Nations protection, because the only guarantee they

have at present is provided by the military and para-military personnel of their

own country? That personnel must leave. Would you in turn, then, provide an

assurance, and, if so, would you mention it in your letter to the Ambassador of

Belgium, so that they may view the matter practically and realistically again,

and realize that if they withdrew and if they took every conceivable measure to

withdraw their military and para-military personnel, the United Nations would be

stepping into their shoes and would give the necessary protection to that personnel

which it is not the United Nations intention to drive out of Katanga?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I shall try to reply very briefly. I think

we can distinguish between four categories: military personnel, para-military

personnel — to which I would add mercenaries — political advisers,

and the rest of the civilian population. The resolution covers the first three

categories, but not the fourth one. We should also look at the situation in the

different areas. Katanga is a problem of its own kind. The rest of the country

presents other aspects. I would say -- and if General Rikhye, who has first-

hand knowledge of this in recent times, has any other view I hope -'he will take

PGB/ek

• ••'. (The Secretary-General)

the floor and correct me — .that military and para-military personnel in the

rest of the Congo, the five provinces, is of no significance at all for the

protection of law and order or anything of that kind. .They are in the nature

of advisers; they are in the nature of this and.that kind of officer, here and

there, and things do not hang on them. Military and para-military personnel

in Katanga is certainly essential for the value of the gendarmerie. That is

to eay, the question you raise is indeed tha question, "Is the gendarmerie in

its present shape necessary for protection ,of economic lire?" I vould

say that something of a force publique is indeed necessary. There are great

economic values involved. But I do not see any reason why such functions could

not be taken over ty us especially, as you will see from a later presentation,

since "in the situation which is developing here we would need more troops and

would have, of course, to assume wider responsibilities also for law and order.

MW/pm 16

(The Secretary-General)

There remain the political advisers; and I do not believe that political

advisers are of any importance at all in the life of the country in either of the

two parts to which I have referred. That is to say, my reply to your question

would be that in Katanga we would have to assume wider responsibility for law'

and order then before in order to maintain economic production. I think'that isall I '••.an say,

Mrn HASAN (Pakistan): Would you/ in that case, consider this possibility,

namely, that you state that assurance here in this letter?

The S5::RETARY~GE!T5RAL; I would not do it because it would make the letter

too conditional and we have not got the troops now. If they come back and say:

can you_do it?, then I hope we would know a little more where we stand and

would then give a realistic and honest reply. But I would not invite such debate

by pointing it out here.

Mr, ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I did not really wish"

to speak about these two communications but merely to explain my delegation's

position.following the statements by the representatives of Indonesia and - :;

Pakistan. Moreover, with respect to the statement of the representative of

Indonesia, who suggested that we might express the full support, of this Committee

for the letter addressed to Belgium, I believe that this would lead us somewhat

to misrepresent the character of our group. My delegation thinks that this

Advisory Committee has enjoyed and continues to enjoy an advisory' role 'and not an

executive role; and if, in communications to Governments, we begin saying that

this group gives its support in such and such a way to such and such thing, I

think that would change its true nature. When the Security Council adopts a

resolution, that resolution is binding on all States Members. Since there has

been no opposition in the Security Council, therefore the whole Organization is

in favour of the position expressed in that resolution, including the matter of

communications to the Belgian Government] that is to say that, obviously, we,j

an Advisory Committee equally support this communication. But that is not the

issue to be brought out here. I merely wish to make this point.

MW/pm 17

(Mr, Achkar, Guinea)

As regards the misgivings of the representative of Pakistan, I would simply

wish to say that military and paramilitary advisers and mercenaries who are in

Katanga have been there until now not to protect Belgian technicians, "but to

massacre the Balubas. That is the reality, and I find it very difficult to raise

this question as if these people really had protected the Belgian nationals.

Moreover, the United Nations has always declared that it was present in the

Congo for the purpose of protecting human life and well-being, including the life

and well-being of any citizen residing in the Congo legally, those who were working

there, the Congolese population as well as the European. Consequently, there is

no need to reaffirm that in a letter and it would be particularly serious to

consider these mercenaries, these soldiers, this military and paramilitary

personnel, as if they had come to PCatanga for a well defined purpose: that of

consolidating the so-called independence of Katanga and of limiting all opposition

to that movement. Even if the majority of the Katanga population wish to preserve

the unity of the Congo — as has already been shown— these mercenaries are there

to prevent this by masaacring the people and by helping Tshombe in his defiance

of the United Nations.

Therefore, these elements are, in every aspect, negative and very dangerous*

They are dangerous because after the massacres which they cause, they are able to

lead to a state of war, and no one knows at this moment where that would stop.

Accordingly, these people are a hundred per ceut negative as a factor in Katanga and

they must go. As far as the technicians are concerned, who are there in the

interest of the economy of the country, I do not think that this question arises.

The United Nations has already shown that it knows how to protect people when it

wants to. If the difficulty relates to the number of military personnel attached to

the United Nations, I think this difficulty will not emerge until after the

Belgian military personnel have left and Tshombe vill suffer as a result of that —

not the economy of the country.

These are the clarifications which I thought it might be useful to make*

MW/pm 18-20

Mr, NOILSRUMA (Nigeria): I should like to make some very brief

observations on the draft of the letter to the permanent representative of

Belgium*

It is the view of my delegation that the problem of the Congo cannot be

solved with the presence of Belgian military and paramilitary personnel and

political advisers in that country. The aim of the Security Council and of the

Advi&ory Committee is to work very hard with a view to bringing some climate of

tranquillity, peace, law and order to the Congo as quickly as possible. For this

reason, the presence of political advisers is very dangerous. The ultimate aim

of the Security Council, of the General Assembly and of the Advisory Committee is

one and the same -- that is, to make it possible for the Congolese people

ultimately to solve their own problem* For this reason, the presence of these

political advisers will not be in ary way in the best interests of the Congo or

of Africa, or of the United Nations.

I entirely agree with the proposal put forward by the representative of India,

who said that the third paragraph was unnecessary because it speaks of legal

rights and legal authority, and at the end it says; "The actual steps that

should be taken are necessarily left to the Belgian Government." That is quite

true, but the feeling of my delegation is that we are asking the United Nations

to maintain law and order in the Congo in order, as I said, to make it possible

for the Congolese to come together in order to solve their own problems.

DR/dp 21

(Mr. Ngileruma, Nigeria)

In any case, the international law we are asking the Secretary-General to

maintain in the Congo is paramount because this is a special case. As regards

military, para-military personnel and civilians, we anticipate Borne difficulty

from the Belgian Government and we made it quite clear. For that reason we said

that the friends and allies of the Belgians, the big Powers, the United States,

the United Kingdom, France and others might use their good offices to bring

pressure on Belgium to accept the proposals as contained in the Secretary-General's

letter. If the Belgian Government turns around and says, "I am not going to abide

by this proposal", what will happen? Then all our discussions and resolutions

passed are of no use. So we do attach very great importance to paragraph 2 of

the document and at the same time paragraph 5 of part A is also very important

in connexion with the same subject. Even if the Belgian Government accepts the

Secretary-General's proposals and military personnel and para-military personnel

and political advisers leave the country, nothing can stop them from coming back

to the country again; they can come back and cause confusion again.

We are asking the Secretary-General to maintain law and order in the country

for a temporary period. We are not asking the United Nations to be in the Congo

forever. All the suggestions which are contained in the resolution are temporary

measures because as soon as the climate of peace and tranquillity and peace and

order is brought back to the Congo, then it is a sovereign country and up to them

to solve their own problems. It is up to them to maintain their law and order,

but at the present time it is very, very important for us to appeal to the allies

of the Belgians to see that Belgian military personnel, para-military personnel

and political advisers leave because many African countries have been colonies and

have had experience of political advisers from many nations.

For this reason I emphasize the fact that everything possible should be done

for the Belgian Government to accept these pooposals, and it is not at all

necessary to insert this paragraph 2.

I do not want to raise any legal aspects of the matter at such a crucial time.

These are the observations which I wanted to make on these two paragraphs.

DR/dp 22

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): I have just a word of explanation. We all know

that Belgium will have difficulties and also that they will create difficulties

in the way of the implementation of this resolution. I was suggesting a course

of action which would take away the principal reason which Belgium could possibly

have against the implementation of the resolution. Therefore, I was trying to

facilitate the implementation of the resolution; therefore, I was showing greater

solicitude and greater concern for the fulfilment of the wishes of the Security

Council. • , ;

I confess that I am not viewing the matter only politically "but also from an.

administrative point of view. Those of us who have had to struggle with; problems. •

of economic development of their countries, and I have had to do it for ten years,

know how•events in one country have grave reverberations in other countries.

I am anxious that economic and industrial personnel in the Congo should receive

normal treatment so that the long-term interests of the Congo itself and of

other African countries may be safeguarded. There is also a human aspect to-it,

and that is that the economic and industrial personnel are not involved in the

military'operations. : .. <

As-'regards the political and military personnel, I do not have the slightest

hesitation in' saying that they must go as quickly as possible. I was only thinking

of the industrial and economic personnel, and that also for the sake of the Congo's

economy and for the sake of other countries in Africa which have-to develop their

economies, which have to develop their countries and which will-need foreign.

personnel and foreign technical advisers -- not today but in six months or a

year's time or two year's time. Therefore, do nothing which would jeopardize the

long-term interests of the Congo and other African countries. My country's only

interest in the Congo is a normal interest, the interest that it has in Africa

or elsewhere. That is why I made the suggestion. Let us do nothing in anger at

this time which would Jeopardize the interests of the Congo.

DR/dp 25-25

Mr. BRNABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): tfy Government

endorses the suggestion of the representative of India, supported "by the

representative of Nigeria, for the deletion of paragraph 2.

The representative of India also drew our attention to the possibility of

polemics that might arise between the Secretary-General and the Belgian Government

concerning financial support or salaries furnished by the Belgian Government

to its military personnel in Katanga. I think that this is a judicious idea

and paragraph 3j in that event, could begin in the same way as this draft and

could finish at the end of the first sentence. In other words it would begin

as follows: "As regards Belgian military personnel and para-military personnel.••"

and it would could finish on the sixth line as follows: "Without the assent in

one form or another of ths Belgian authorities". The rest of the text could be

kept.

The urgency of the action vis-a-vis the Belgian Government could also be

stressed, that is to say, in the case that the Secretary-General receives a new

refusal, or even a vehement attitude, as has already been done in the past by the

Belgian Government; it might be indicated to the Belgian Government that we are

not prepared to waste any more time in more polemics, which would enable the

Belgian Government to gain more time in order to aggravate the crisis, to continue

the provocations at civil war and to encourage Tshorabe and Kalonji to execute

more people who are, moreover, precious because they constitute the leadership and

the core of the Government.

ORR/rh . 2 6

(Mr. Bonaboudj Morocco)

In the-opinion of ray delegation, it is necessary this, time to make a show

of firmness which, we believe, has been lacking so far in the United Nations as

a whole — and I era speaking about both the Security Council and the: c .

General- Assembly. The Security Council could then have reason to have another -

meeting to -examine the attitude.of the Belgian Government, This idea of firmness

was the reason why my delegation yesterday drew the attention of the

Secretary-General to the purpose for which, this tiire, we included in the - . .

resolution both the words, "withdrawal" and "evacuation". The word "evacuation"

did not figure in previous resolutions, but its inclusion in this resolution ,

was not an accident. Those who wrote the text remembered the past; the Belgian

Government will surely interpose obstacles, and we have no more time for letters

and answers, letters and answers ad nauseam. . There must be a note of urgency

and firmness and it should be made clear that this,is the last time. Belgium

should hot continue to come here plaguing the Congo, vexing the United Nations, •

and making trouble for the whole world. '••.-,..--.. • ,. • •

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I should like to make one or two suggestions,

following upon recent interventions. First of all, if ,we delete what, is now. .„•

called the s'econd paragraph, that is to say the one beginning Awhile the ^erms

of ..* " arid cut down the third paragraph in the way suggested, the first part :

of the third paragraph would in my view stand out as being a.little.weak. The '

two paragraphs obviously are closely linked together. There is also another -

consideration, and that is that according to the news agencies ..--•.and I guess

that they are correct in tnis respect— a so-called spokesman of the Belgian. * ;

Foreign Office has said that Belgium would accept this kind of order, pzcviC.ed it

was not aimed solely at foreigners of Belgian nationality. Of course.it is not,

but I*.think It might be wise to eliminate that possible misinterpretation,, and-

that was one reason for the first sentence in the second paragraph, .It is of

general application, but it is mentioned for the reason that they must take it

especially into account, and we address ourselves to them. .. . ;;

My conclusion is that I feel it might be a good idea to retain the .f lrst .

sentence of the second paragraph and the first sentence of the third paragraph as

suggested most recently by the representative of Morocco. The two sentences will

GRR/rh 27

(The Secretary-General)

stand quite well together and in keeping them we would have countered the

argument of discrimination and at the same time made it quite clear that we do not

want to enter into any argument at all as regards military personnel because in

that case it must be quite clear that they can do it, leaving their objections,

as we can foresee them, to apply to other points which have not yet been raised.

I think theve is a possibility that we could follow the lines suggested by

the r":T;TCfL: ntativ3 of Morocco in another way apart from the one he specially

mentioned, which would allow us, so to say, to stop the door to further debate.

That would be by adding at the end something to the effect that an unfavourable

reaction would have to be brought up by me before the Security Council. That is

a matter of course; I would do it, but it might as well be said.

Mr. JHA (India): There are one or two points which have struck me

in the course of this discussion. The representative of Pakistan brought up the

idea of mentioning that the United Nations should give an assurance of maintaining

technicians and other Belgian personnel who might remain in the Congo. Now, I

may understand why he is suggesting that, but it seems to me thet at this stage we

should not do so, for that was the very plea on which Belgium committed what many

of us think was aggression; it sent in its troops for the purpose of protecting its

nationals* The need for that is long past; the United Nations went in and as far

as I know their latest ground — as far as I have been able to gather privately —

is that after all these people were hired by the Congolese authorities and are

required by them. I do not believe that the argument that the presence of Belgian

military and paramilitary personnel is necessary in the Congo for the protection

of Belgians applies; that is no longer the argument and therefore I do not see

why we should stretch a point in that direction.

Secondly, I would endorse what was said by the representative of Nigeria about

paragraph J)* While we are discussing paragraph 2 we cannot forget paragraph 3j

which is very important and which is connected with paragraph '2. Therefore it might

be considered whether, in this communication, the Belgian Government should not also

hve its attention drawn to paragraph 3 and whether they should not be asked to let

you know what measures they are taking to give effect to the provisions of

paragraph 3.

GRR/rh 28

(Mr. Jha, India)

Thirdly, I would suggest that a mention should be made somewhere in the

communication of Article 25 of the Charter. Here is a resolution of the

Security Council and it is incumbent upon Belgium and everybody else, upon all

Membersf to assist in carrying it out. Article 25 refers to decisions of the

Security Council and states that "the Members of the United Nations agree to accept

and carry out xb. decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present

Charter.1' It might be useful to refer to this somewhere.

I un not quite clear now as to the exact shape of paragraphs 3 and 4 after

the amendment. Would you be good enough to repeat them?

Cpe SECPETA5.Y-GENERAL: What I suggested tentatively, perhaps

with sprno Minor editing changes, r&B that., instead of the paragraph now

beginning "While the t=rms of ... " and the paragraph now beginning "As regards

Belgian military and paramilitary personnel ... ", we should have one shorter

paragraph covering the substance ofthe first sentence in the second paragraph,

"While the terms of ..." up to " ... the Belgian Government,11 and as the second

sentence in the ;=eme paragraph we would have what is now the first sentence of the

third paragraph, "As regards Belgian military personnel ... M up to " ... Belgian

military authorities«" Then we would have the advantage of pointing out that this

is not discriminatory, but is specially addressed to Belgium, which I think is good

psychologically. Further, it would bring out one strong argument which may be

considered as non-controversial, because it has already been used and has never

been countered from the Belgian side and I regard it as so far uncontradicted.

Mr. JHA (India): I think it is also necessary at some time, perhaps

even immediately afterwards, to send a communication to all Members of the

United Nations drawing their attention to their responsibility under paragraph 3

of the resolution, because we use the expression "transit" etc., and that would

mean that all Members of the United Nations would have to co-operate and give

effect to that, and take the measures necessary to prevent the transit of such

personnel. Part of paragraph 2 also has reference to all Members of the

United Nations because there is talk of mercenaries and other foreign military

and paramilitary personnel, and it may be a good thing to state in the communication

.Jin ,„„,

GRR/rh 29-30

(Mr, Jha, India)

to Belgium that a suitable communication, in the light of paragraphs 2 and 3, is

being addressed to all Members of the United Nations. And I would again suggest

for your consideration -- I am not insisting upon it, because it is really for

you to consider, after all it is your communication to the Belgians -- that we

do not go into the question of the salary because they would be able to put up

a very good excuse,

The SECRETARY-GEymAL: We may perhaps leave aside for the moment

the question of the demarches to other Governments which is a somewhat different

question. It gives rise to some difficulty. If we arrive at a positive

conclusion on that point, it is very easy to make adjustments in the text here.

It strengthens my own point that we should avoid the impression of undue

discrimination.

HA/mtm 51

Mr. LOUTFt (United Arab Republic ) ( interpretation from French): On

page 2 of the French text — unfortunately, I do not have the English text —

this statement is made:

"It will be noted, too, that the underlying assumption of the paragraph

is that the Belgian Government, like other Governments concerned, has legal

authority cr possibility of obtaining the authority required . ..".

j". 2iirt eay that I really do not understand what that means.

The SECRETARY- GETCTAL; Well, from the trend of the present discussion,

that will be eliminated, so you nacd not understand it.

MT» LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): All

right, that is very good.

At the end of the same paragraph, it says:

"The actual steps that should be taken are necessarily left to the

Belgian Government."

That is true, but I do not think it serves any very useful purpose to say

so in this context.

I do not understand the next paragraph very well, that is, the fourth

paragraph. I understood that you were going to keep the first sentence, ending

with the words "in one form or another, of the Belgian authorities*1. But the last

sentence is very important, the one which reads:

",.• it is obvious that the Belgian Government is in a position to take

immediate action to bring about the termination of the services, and

consequently the withdrawal, of such military personnel and political

advisers in the Congo".

We could add: "in conformity with the terms of the resolution".

f M":>"

HA/mtm 39

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Would you accept a somewhat different

phraseology to give the substance of this sentence, "because in my opinion this is

self-evident?

Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): My observation is

somewhat parallel to what Mr. Loutfi said. On page 2, the implication is that

the Belgian Government and other Governments concerned have the power and the

possibility of obtaining the necessary authority. This is significant in this

sense: that there are Governments where mercenaries, for example, were recruited.

And their answer is, point-blank, that, according to their constitution, there

is no legislation that would enable them to prevent their nationals from

leaving their territory and enlisting under any banner and serving in any

country. I am thinking, for example, of the Government of the United Kingdom,

which is in that position.

We might mention that this is a decision of the Security Council, an organ

with regard to which all Member States have undertaken to carry out its decisions -•

speaking of the priority of international undertakings as against domestic

legislation. Such a decision of the Security Council, in my opinion, implies

that Governments that may be affected by this decision of the Security Council

are nevertheless under the obligation of finding the necessary legal authority

or, if necessary, submitting to Parliament the necessary bills that would

empower them, even though they are not empowered now, to take action to prevent the

engagement or the departure of their nationals who might be enlisted in any

Congolese army or groups in any capacity whatever — political advisers,

military officers, and so on.

My second observation in fact does touch especially on the Belgian

political advisers. There are political advisers of other nationalities, too.

But the Belgians are the most harmful ones, and I should like to emphasize that

these Belgian political advisers, who have been advising all the Congolese for

the past seven months in the direction of inducing them to follow the wrong road,

the road to dissension, discord, strife, opposition to the United Nations, and so

on and so forth — these advisers belong to opposite political persuasions. They

are to be found in Stanleyville and Elisabethville and Leopoldville; they are

all over the place. And they are the ones who stir up strife and pit Congolese

against one another and against the United Nations.

HA/mtm . 33

(Mr. Slim, Tunisia)

Consequently, -the generalization to be found in the last sentence of the

first paragraph is an important, one: that Belgian personnel are those attached

to Congolese officials in Leopoldville and certain other cities. That is a very

relevant point. If the Belgian Government accepts the idea of the assignment

of a senior officer to further the implementation of the resolution, I wonder

whether Belgian technicians or advisers, who are to be found everywhere, will be

withdrawn from everywhere —.not only from Katanga or Leopoldville or South Kasai,

but from wherever they may be fou d in the Congo.

.- The .SECRETARY-GENERAL; I feel I talk too much but this is, after all,

a kind of cdlt:".:-ig Jco, and the re f civ? perhaps t-..vi one who is to sign the letter has

a natural right to take part in ths debate.

Regarding the first point, I agree with the Ambassador of Tunisia in regard

to the sentence which reads: "It will be noted, too, that the underlying

assumption of the paragraph is that the Belgian Government ...".

I would link your observation, Ambassador Slim, with the observation already

made by Ambassador Jha as regards Article 25, because it is really in the light

of Article 25 that what you said is true. Then I would not like to insert it

just at this place, but at a place where reference to the general legal background

is in order. The text would then run along the lines indicated by Ambassador Jha~-

a reminder of Article 25> the significance of Article 25> and, as a conclusion,

the kind of sentence to which you refer. With your permission, I would ask

Dr, Schachter to tell us where we stand here as far as the Charter is concerned,

because, after all, this is a somewhat novel matter: I do not think we have

invoked Article 25 in that sense before.

Mr. SCHACHTER; I believe that, if Article 25 is considered to be

applicable, there would be no doubt that it would be obligatory upon the Member

States to adopt national legislation or administrative measures to give compliance

to the resolution. The Security Council did not, as you know, expressly refer

to this decision as a binding decision under Article 25. But it would be my own

view that, in the light of the series of actions which had reference to Chapter VII

of the Charter, this could reasonably be considered as a decision to which

Itt'l

HA/mtm 3 -35

(Mr, Schachter)

Article 25 would apply. Obviously, Article 25 does not apply in this sense

to mere recommendations, but I think the history of the dealing with this matter

would give support to the conclusion that Article 25 is applicable.

Th ECI ARY-GENERAL: Would it not be possible to state that this

resolution, which reaffirms earlier resolutions that referred to Article 2p,

obviously is under Article- 25; that this is further confirmed by the fact that certain

of the measures here obviously belong to the category of Chapter VII; and that

therefore the Secretary-General finds it obvious that Article 25 applies, and then

have this matter about national legislation? This idea, introduced in that way,

would certainly ctrengthen the djfcprche quite considerably, and I think we are

on about as safe ground legally ac we usually are in the Congo affair.

RH/cw 36. s

Mr^ JHA (India): Certainly I have no competence to engage in any

argument with your legal adviser, but I do not really fear that Article 25 is'1

not categorical. It is contained in the general provisions in chapter V in

relation to the Security Council, which undoubtedly govern all the decisions

whether taken under chapter VI or chapter VII. What it states is that:

• "The Members of the United Nations agreed to accept and carry out

the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present

Charter."

This applies to all Members, it applies to everyone sitting in this room,

that we should carry out decisions in so far as they are applicable to us, and-

paragraph 5 is also applicable to us. I think that when our Government is

addressed it must take measures, if they are not already on these statute

books, to prevent the transit of this type of person through our territories.

It seems to me that Article 25 is the only article under which you can bring

the decisions of the Security Council, which have a different significance

from the decisions of the General Assembly which, of course, are recommendatory.

I would have no hesitation in mentioning Article 25. ' :

Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I have

some doubts on this point raised by the representative of India whether this

is a theoretical discussion* I believe Article 25 does not apply to

recommendations. The word "decisions" is applied to decisions of the Security "

Council; it is not related to decisions under chapter VI, which are recommendations.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think we can easily sidetrack this

question of the extent of the mandatory character by simply, with a good

conscience, saying that this is the interpretation of the Secretary-General, in

the light both of the content and the general character, as it is under

Article 25 with all the consequences, and natural consequences, in relation to

all countries, I do not think that would be challenged, and it does strengthen

our hand.

If you have no further observations, I have to thank you for good advice

and I think it has taken us quite a distance. In the light of these

observations, we will tidy up the text. I think that you know, without any

repetition from our side, roughly how it will look. If you would .like to have

RH/cw 37

(The Secretary-General)

a clear idea, I can, however, repeat it. I think that in a proper place we

could add a paragraph covering the ground Just mentioned, the applicability

of Article 25 and the consequence of that for national legislation. 'We should

cut down the two paragraphs we have been talking about, but I would, in the

light of the observations made here, somehow find a way to save the final

sentence of th3 paragraph beginning "As regards Belgian military assistance".

That sentence has a value and can easily find its way in the presentation.

I would finally add a reference to the necessity for me to bring this

matter before the Security Council unless a co-operative, helpful reply is

forthcoming.

Mr. BETOOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): With

respect to what you have just said that you will bring this before the

Security Council if there is any delay, vill this be left to the

Belgian Government that they can answer within two, three or five months, or

are you going to say that you are bound by the pressure of circumstances to

request a reply within such and such a time, within a week?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL*. In the text you have before you there is

already a sentence to the effect that it is essential for the members of the

Council to be informed within the next few days of the steps that have been

or will be taken. 'The "next few days" is, after all, a strong expression so I

think that this is covered.

We have the other question connected with the letter to which Ambassador Jha

especially referred, the question of the demarches to all Governments. It is

a little difficult to say exactly what should be or should not be in such a

general communication. I think that Ambassador Jha, and the representative

of Nigeria, were quite right in pointing out that, as in the case of Belgium,

it is not only paragraphs 2 and 3 but perhaps other paragraphs that should be

brought to their attention. In order to see to it that nothing is omitted and

that we are on common ground, I would have euch a text edited and sent to you

so that we can have a look at it.

rt" • I,-. -V:

RH/cw 38

(The Secretary-General)

The other question, apart from substance,-is the one of whether it should

be addressed to all Member Governments or only to some of them. There are

arguments against both solutions. If we address it to some, it would be a

question of picking and choosing, and that would be extremely delicate and

unpleasant. However, in all frankness, I guess that some Governments receiving

this cor.iriunicaTiion vould be surprised to the extent of even being shocked at

receiving it. We have to keep that in mind, and I think that we would not

particularly like to get a letter back. Anyway, we can leave that aside for

the moment because we can decide on distribution when we have the text. Of

course, reference to this likely solution need not be brought into the text

proper because when the note verb«u.e is handed over to the Belgian

representative it can be said th:?.t it is under consideration and naturally

we will address everybody concerned. That will take care of that side.

Then we have the military problem, and I would like General Rikhye to

give you his picture of the situation.

General RIKHYE; The resolution adopted by the Security Council on

the morning of 21 February 1961 allots the following tasks to the United Nations

Conmand in the Congo:

Firstly, take immediate and all appropriate measures to prevent the

occurrence of civil war. These arrangements will require halting of all

military operations, prevention of clashes, arrangements for cease-fires

and establishment of neutral zones. It is now presumably common ground

that force may be resorted to only in self-defence and in protection of

agreed peaceful solutions.

Secondly, arrange the withdrawal and evacuation of all Belgian and

other foreign military, para-military, and mercenary personnel in the Congo.

Thirdly, block all ingress from outside into the Congo of military

personnel and material that is not channelled through the United Nations.

From the very start of the United Nations operations in the Congo, the

United Nations Command has been mainly concerned with making such arrangements

which would prevent civil war and clashes, so the new resolution only reiterates

a directive to the United Nations Command which is already in existence. The

RH/cw 39-UO

(General Rikhye)

United Nations Command, however, had insufficient troops to cope with the

major civil war threat which has developed lately. Furthermore, the withdrawals

of certain contingents from the Force have seriously prejudiced its

capabilities even to carry out tasks which existed before the recent serious

threat of civil war.

BC/aj(General Rikhye)

I therefore feel that it is essential that at this very early stage of my

presentation I discuss the number of troops required for the tasks nov allotted"

to the United Nations,Force in the Congo.

We have already circulated two documents shoving the previous military strength

and the allotment» In another document ve have stated the deployment of our

latest force, which la in progress now. The present deployment was seriously

hampered by a shortage in air.transport and therefore, according to the information

available, up .to: today, has been only partly carried out.

In his.intervention early on the morning of 21 February, during the last

meeting of the Security Council, and, later, during yesterday's Advisory Committee

meeting, the Secretary-General has stated his own views in regard to the use

of .,force in the implementation of paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution.

In order to give the Committee some idea of the enormity of the task if the

United Nations Command were required to resort to military initiative in line

with the alternative mentioned here by the Secretary-General yesterday as'another

possible stand, a minimum of Uo,000 troops would be required. In military

parlance it would mean an army corps consisting of two infantry divisions with

supporting arms,, including tanks and artillery. A strong air component would

be necessary for this force, including an enormous air transport unit and' \..'•'?.-••

aircraft, for air reconnaissance, and possibly fighter bombers. • " .

However,.as the above method to achieve our tasks is not now under '•'••'•

consideration-— I may refer here to yesterday's statements by'the delegations'

of India-and Guinea — I shall address myself to the assessment of our tasks in

light of the Secretary-Generalfs statement in regard to the use of force in

the operations in the. Congo, I must also presume here that all further military

action will follow political negotiation and mediation, as envisaged by many

of the representatives in their statements at yesterday's Advisory Committee

meeting. Therefore, military action will be a continuation of political action.I shall first of all deal with the requirement of troops in Leopoldvilie.

The Committee is already aware pf the present situation in the city, where a

number of arbitrary arrests.are being carried out, thereby seriously affecting

the law and order situation and, creating tension. Adjacent to the city is the

largest airport in the country, Ndjli. This also is the main airbase for the

BC/aJ 1*2(General Rikhye)

United Nations air operations and therefore has to be suitably guarded. A

mininun of three battalions is required for the security of Leopoldville. Afourth battalion is necessary as a reserve, which will also be a Force reserve.

In the remainder of the Province of Leopoldville there are five other

important or vulnerable areas: Matadi, which is the main port for ocean-going

liners in the Congo; Thysville, where there is a very large ANC garrison,

which is veil known for the effect it has on the general law and order situation;

the ex-Belgian base of Kitona, which, besides a large number of buildings and

equipment, has enough arms and ammunition so that, if taken over by the ANC,

the latter!s position would be largely strengthened; and, lastly, Banningville

in the north and Kikwit in the south — Banningville is near the lakes. A

minimum of two battalions is required for the security of these areas.

In Equateur Province the presence of an infantry battalion in Coquilhatville,

the capital, is essential. This city has a large ANC garrison. Some troops are

also required in the northern part of this Province, to take care of Gewena

and other towns and villages.

In the Oriental Province, at least two battalions are required in Stanleyville,

and another battalion to be deployed in the rest of the Province. Since

Stanleyville is the centre of pro-Lumumbists and elements of the ANC which are

loyal to them, it has become an important military objective. The Committee is

already aware of rumours of an alleged offensive by General Mobutu with his

Leopoldville ANC against the Stanleyville ANC. General Mobutu has carried out

his military concentrations in the area of Lisala Bumba, both along the Congo

River. The main means of moving troops in this area remains the River — the

river approach also being the shortest to Stanleyville. At the same time,

from Bumba two main road approaches are available. There is yet a third approach

in South Equateur at Djolu, and a fourth one at Ikela. In order, therefore, to

prevent an armed conflict between Mobutu and Lundula, it would be necessary to

place United Nations troops along the approaches mentioned by me. This will

require one or two infantry battalions.

In the Province of Kivu, Bukavu, Goma and Kindu are three vulnerable areas,

which require about two infantry battalions. The Commitee is aware of the

lawlessness of the ANC in this area and the continued necessity to prevent

atrocities against Congolese and non-Congolese. ,

BC/aj U5(General Rikhye)

Katanga, presents our greatest difficulties. Its gendarmerie, led by

foreigners; is a most effective force in the Congo. The armed conflict between

Tshombe's troops and Balubakats, temporarily halted vith the establishment of

United Nations neutral zones, has recommenced with all intensity. Withdrawal

of contingents from the United Nations Force seriously hampered our ability to

keep the neutral zones neutral. The ex-Belgian base of Kamina is another

heavy commitment, A minimum of two infantry brigades, each of three battalions,

is required for Katanga.

In the Province of Kasai, tribal war halted through United Nations efforts

has again broken out, following the recent political murders. Kalonji's private

army in South Kasai continues to pose a large threat to the law and order situation.

The presence of pro-Lundula ANC a* Kindu — that is in the Province of Kivu —

and the reported advance by some of its elements to Lodja, which is about

300 miles north of Luluabourg is another important factor. A minimum of four

battalions is required for this Province.

Therefore, a total of twenty-three battalions is required to carry out

the first task by the United Nations Command, as required by the recent

Security Council resolution.

Yesterday afternoon a number of representatives expressed their views on

arrangements for cease fires, the establishment of neutral zones, and so on.

I am very glad to inform the members of the Committee that these are the exact

lines on which the United Nations Command has been functioning throughout.

There is no lack of experience in these aspects of our tasks, and b^ now we have

considerable experience in making these arrangements in the Congo* However, we

lack staff for various duties connected with this. There are no set methods for

it; the means have to be adopted according to the situations as they present

themselves. For instance, when in August of last year we arranged the withdrawal

of Lumumba's ANC from Bakwanga in South Kasai, in order to prevent Kalonji's

Balubas from going into South Kasai., a neutral zone was established between

Katanga and Kasai. When this was abrogated by Kalonji, as we found that we

should not prevent a return of Balubas to their homes in South Kasai, a cease-

fire zone was established from Bakwanga to Mwene Ditu on the Elisabethville-

Luluabourg railway line to prevent fighting between Kalonji's private army and

Lulua tribes.

BC/aJ(General Rikhye)

Again, in October when fighting broke out in this area, new cease-fire

lines viere arranged and a neutral zone was established in the Mwene Ditu area

on the railway line* In Katanga, neutral zones were established covering very

nearly one third of the Katanga Province, where all rival forces and armed

bands were neutralized. The United Nations Command has now under consideration

and negotiation a neutral zone between Ruanda-Urundi and Kivu, another

one between Kivu and Katanga, and yet another between Kivu and Kasai. We were

unable to implement these neutral zones owing to lack of troops.

For the last few days General McKeown, the Commander, has been actively

engaged in arranging a cease fire and establishing a neutral zone between

the Mobutu ANC and the Lundula ANC.

As I have said, there is no set pattern for arriving at these arrangements.

VJe start negotiations at any level where contact can be established between the

lowest and the hignest. ONUC civilian representatives or political officers

assist the military command right from the inception of these arrangements.

This brings in the most essential political and legal advice. When a reasonable

stage in negotiations is reached, the negotiations are taken over by the

United Nations Command, which usually despatches high-ranking military officers,

accompanied by a United Nations legal adviser and any other expert who may be

required to assist.

FOB/pin 46

(General Rikhye)

The United Nations military staff includes a liason section..which at present .

is headed by Brigadier Otu of Ghana, who has a number of bilingual officers available

to him. We have for several months been attempting to increase this establishment

to provide bilingual military observers for various tasks, including the

observing 'required in connexion with the establishment of neutral zones and

cease fires» About forty more officers are required for our fresh commitments,

and the United Nations must appeal for contributions which will assist us in this

respect.

The second task allotted to the United Nations Command by the new Security

Council resolution is to arrange the withdrawal and evacuation, of all Belgian

and all other foreign military, paramilitary and mercenary personnel from the Congo*

Thiswill necessitate an accurate assessment of the numbers present and

supervision of their evacuation. And, furthermore, there will be a need to .;

replace military advisers an military technicians. For these additional ..;• :

personnel will again be required, and we sincerely hope we shall continue to ..-.-.

receive your generous assistance. . ... .• .i . . •The third and last task given to the United Nations Command is to prevent , •.

entry of military personnel and material in the Congo that has not been channeled •

through the United Nations. This would require control of all major airports :

the seaport of Matadi and important river ports, the railway lines and the roads*

I have already mentioned the number of troops required for Matadi. The .•

security of airfields has already been considered in my previous assessment,

However, approaches from neighbouring territories into the Congo have not be

catered for, and for this additional troops would be required. From all the above

requirements a total of twenty-five battalions is needed. Since we shall be

left with sixteen battalions after the planned withdrawals, about nine additional

battalions are required to enable the United Nations Command to carry out

satisfactorily the new tasks alloted to it, , .

I should like to say a few words about the United Nations air transport in

the Congo, It has met with many difficulties from the beginning, and every effort

continues to be made to improve the situation. We have even gone to the extent

of a large civilian charter to provide the required number of aircraft. Details

of the Air Transport Unit are given in a separate document alreadyj circulated.

FGB/pm 1*7

(General Rikhye)

A civilian charter has many drawbacks, and it is therefore necessary to

reorganize our Air Transport Unit to make it larger and to place it on a more

practical ethnic group basis. The United Nations hopes that generous contribution!

vill continue to be made in personnel to achieve the desired efficiency so

necessary for the efficient functioning of the United Nations Command in the

Congo,

The gSCKBTABY-GENERAL; Thank you. Are there any questions?

Mr, Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like

to. thank General Rikhye for the clear statement he has made to us on the situation,

and I wish to put a question to him with regard to control of the air space over

the Congo. I had occasion two or three months ago to put a similar question, and

I decided then that control of the whole of the air space was impossible at that

juncture owing to the deficiencies of radar which make it impossible to control

large areas. That is to say, the installations in the airports did not permit of

that. Is the situation somewhat better now? In other words, at the present time,

with the aid from ICAO, are we in a position to supervise all aircraft passing

through the air space of the Congo or all aircraft that may land at small

aerodromes vhich are not completely in the hands of the United Nations Command

itself at the present time?

General RIKHYE; When the question was put the term "air space" was

used* I expect what was really meant was all air movement in the Congo, and

particularly landings of aircraft. If so, I can say that the situation is quite

satisfactory. Generally speaking, practically every airport in the country has

United Nations troops stationed on it. Equally, ICAO has its personnel posted

everywhere* However, in the Congo there are a very large number of small

airports which are really owned by private companies, plantations or factories,

and they are so numerous that it really is impossible to establish any control over

them. In any event they do not have any radio or radar facilities available as

they are meant primarily for private use. Over those little control is possible.

We do send military patrols in those areas specifically to examine airports andi

generally to control them if any movement is suspected. Otherwise, it is not

poscible to control them.

FGB/pra 1*6-50

Mr, Mcngi SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): May I ask GUI

for one snail clarification? Pees this mean that, under the system now being

rum by ICAO, if aircraft come from abroad without identifying themselves and

land at one of those small airfields lost in the bush, it is possible for the

United Nations to detect their arrival? Does it know that an aircraft is there,

that it has landed, or where it is? I am thinking, of course, of radar and

related'Installations for ascertaining those facts,

.- General RIKHYE; No, I am afraid that we do not have the means to

detect such aircraft, but generally when any aircraft which come to the Congo

from neighbouring countries, or indeed from anywhere, we are informed through

J.CAO of their departure, because on their take-off airfields they have to give

all the relevant information. They have to state their destination, and they

have also to file a route. Thus we do know that aircraft have taken off for the

Congo and what time they took off, and if they do not land --if there is some

suspicion^ -- it is possible to check what happened* I think I can safely say that

generally thp United Nations Command is fully in the picture with regard to all

flights in the Congo, their purpose and their destination.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): There was one point

in General Rikhye1a statement which I did not quite grasp, namely, the situation

in North Katanga, I understood that that was the area inhabited by the Balubas,

and that operations were frequently undertaken against those tribes. We were

told, even, that they are armed with very outmoded muskets. Anyway, they are

trying to defend themselves. From the statement made a moment ago I understood

that a suggestion had been made to neutralize a zone between Kivu and Katanga,

in which case the Baluba tribes would be inside that neutral zone, inside Katanga,

in which case how would they be protected against the operations mounted against

them from the south? If I misunderstood I should be very grateful for

clarification on this subject.

i* iinmniii||iiMiipiL " ~* ""

MW/ek 51

(Mr. Achkar, Guinea)

There is another point. We have strong reasons to believe that there has

been, and continues to be, a good deal of traffic between Brazzaville and

Lecpoldville. These cities are quite similar. There are boats , ferries, etc.,

which go back and forth all day. How much control, if any, does the United

Nations Force exercise over the possible content and freight-loading of these

boats, barges, etc., as they ply tlieir trade between Leopoldville and Brazzaville?

General RIKHYE; I shall take the first point. Perhaps there is

some misunderstanding about Balubcs. The Balubas generally inhabit the area of

North Katanga, West Katanga and South Kasai. The operations that I referred to

against the Balubas were against t,:-ic» Kalonji Balubas, who had first been driven

out from tusir normal homes in August and then returned to their homes as a result

of cease-fires arranged by the United Nations Command. This was all part of the

tribal war also going on in the area of South Kasai. Then they attempted — that

is, the £alubas of Kalonji -- to advance towards Luluabourg and also towards the

Southwest. Aa thio wao making an armed entry into the homes of the Luluas,

the United Nations Command prevented this movement and established a neutralized

zone and a cease-fire line so that they could not go beyond areas which were

Baluba homes and could not enter the areas which belong to Luluac.

The other Balubas live in North Katanga and are generally called Balubakats,

in view of their political leanings — the name which they have given themselves.

It was the armed conflict which started between Katanga authorities and the

Balubakats of North Katanga which led the United Nations Command to intervene and

establish neutral zones.

Neutral Zone A was established starting from the area Monono, then going

north, excluding Albertville, and then running along the railway line, including

the railway line west towards Kabalo. This was a very large area which we

included in Neutral Zone A.

Neutral Zone B was south of the Lakes, astride the railway line

Elisabethville-Kamina, in the area of Luena, where there are the coal mines, the

cobalt mines and certain other mines. This is a small neutral zone mostly

confined to this area as there vas a concentration of Balubakats in that region.

MW/ek 52(General Rj.Vbye)

In tijeso two zones the agreement was that all armed bodies -- that is, the

Katanga gendarmerie, Katanga police, any Balubakats personnel organized into

armed bands, and any other armed bands — would be. neutralized and remain in situ

and not carry out any aggressive acts of any kind, and responsibility for law

and order was completely-taken over by the United Nations troops. So it was

not an operation against. Baluba^ in this particular instance. It was a cessation

of hostilities between Katanga authorities and the Balubakats.

Your other point was:, why are arrangements being made to establish neutrality

between Kivu and Katanga? This naturally followed from the situation as it

developed. Kindu is a large ANC garrison town and this ANC is loyal to

Stanleyville. From this garrison, plus possibly some additional troops from

other garrisons loyal to Stanleyville, a small battalion managed to find its way

to Monono, which was. one of the. main causes of the increased trouble we have had

in the northern area of our neutral zone. Therefore, it was essential to prevent

any further movement- of the ANC from Kivu into Katanga; .or, vice versa, it was

our responsibility to prevent any counter action being taken by the Katanga

gendarmerie against the ANC in Kivu. That was the idea behind striving to

establish a neutral zone there. There have been a number of clashes between these

two rival groups along the border.

Your last question was about Brazzaville. The new Security Council

resolution now places responsibility on the United Nations Command to establish

checks, and these checks will be established, of course, as soon as we have enough

troops.

Mr. JHA (India): With regard to the statement just made by

General Rikhye, I have two points to make. First, I should like to ask him, in

the light of the latest situation which we have heard about — namely, the advance

of pretty formidable forces from the Katanga side northwards, the advance of

Mobutu forces, said to number about 2,000 and practically on the point of launching

an attack, if it has not already started — what is the likelihood of being able

to prevent a civil war, as contemplated in paragraph 1 of part A of the

resolution? If there is, what is the time given? Our general repression is

53-55

(Mr. Jha, India)

that this is a very serious situation and even before anything can be done

perhaps a fait accompli may be presented to us. I should like to know whether

the situation can be saved in terms of paragraph 1 of part A of the resolution.

If so, what is the time that is given to the United Nations? Of course, I do

not want to ask military secrete, but what are the precise sort of measures that

can be tsken now for this situation to be disengaged — that is to say, for the

imminent clash to be averted? I should like some information because, with

your permission, I wish to make some general observations.

General RTKIIY.S : Firstly, even before this resolution came up for

discussion before tiie Security Council, the United Nations Command in the Congo

was greatly concerned about the build-up of tha rival ANC groups astride the

Oriental-Equator border. We put our hand back into the empty barrel to try to

find some troops we could station along that frontier, and ve were only able to

place up to about a platoon — about thirty men with an officer — along the

important approaches mentioned in my military appreciation. At the same time,

every possible effort was made to get in touch with the two rival groups and

find some opening where we could start negotiations for neutralizing that area*

DR/cn 56(General Rikhye)

As you know, General McKeovn personally has seen Mobutu and is going

to get in touch with the other side in Stanleyville in order to arrive at

seme arrangements. So as far this 'kind of action is .concerned, there is no

lack of effort on the part of the Command in the Congo.

But the very serious drawback is inadequacy of troops. It is absolutely'

essential, in order to m«ke our voice heard by the two rival groups, that we

have an adequate number of troops available to interpose between the two. The

first task would be to prevent clashes*

There have been clashes in the past which we were unable to prevent due

to lack of troops. Furthermore, there has been a military build-up on both •

sides which ag-.v!n cin be prevented if it is possible for us to etstion adequate

numbers of troops wl jre the rival camps have concentrated their own armies,

in order to build eouie confidence in either side in our ability to prevent

an armed conflict. It is therefore very essential that the United Nations

Command in the Congo is reinforced as speedily as possible. The effectiveness

of the efforts of the Commander of the Force entirely depends on the military,

strength which is available to him.

Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, I quite understand that

if negotiations can be successfully concluded with regard to cease-fires, to

neutralization, that of course is a way of saving the situation. , But assuming

that that fails, is it militarily possible for the United Nations -- at present

I understand that there may be difficulties because there are not adequate

troops— but how soon could they do it if troops were available? To put it

another way, how soon are the extra troops needed and all that? Therefore,

it seems to us that if the present situation is not avoided then perhaps it

may be very difficult to stop a civil war at all, with all the various

consequences and complications arising therefrom. I want to be clear about

that militarily, I understand that from the point of view of the negotiations,

it is yes; we hope that the negotiations will succeed. However, if they do

not succeed, is it possible to 'interpose or intervene or, as General Rikhye

has said, to create confidence that really ve have the capacity to stop such

a thing. . i

DR/cn 57

General RIKHYE: Firet of all, as you quite rightly said yourself*

Mr. Jha, negotiations have to be carried out which are both political and

military in their nature. However, as I said earlier, the presence of

adequate numbers of troops is an important factor and it helps both negotiations

military and political.

These troops are required iirjnediately because we are very badly off for

troops and the recent withdrawals have really prejudiced our capabilities almost

where we are reaching the cint that the Force may well be ineffective in its

ability to carry out the previous tasks. The fresh tasks require even

additional troops, c/od if those troops are not made available to the Command

iT^rediately, it vill not be possiLI.e for them to carry out their new directives

to your rabisf rjctiorit

The fjECRETARY-G^NERAL; May I add here, General, as I understand

the situation, you say that negotiations will be both military and political

but that basically they ar^ military?

Oeneral RIKHYE: Yes.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The other point is of course rather obvious:

the sooner we get those troops the better it is. We pass now through a phase of

the utmost difficulty because of the uncertainties surrounding certain groups

in the Force, and that is carefully observed by certain gentlemen who know that

and for that reason we have not, so to say, full battle strength at the table.

I may in this gloomy picture inject something which has a bearing on

what you say. The news agencies carried this afternoon a story from

Katanga, which has not yet been confirmed, but which, if it is confirmed, is

a kind of ray of hope. It is a communique' from Mr. Tshombe who says that:

"At a meeting this morning between the representatives of the

United Nations, Mr. Berendsen and Colonel KJellgran and a Cabinet Minister

of Katanga, an agreement was reached whereby all movements of troops

likely to lead to friction will be stopped."

DR/cn 58(The Secretary-General)

It is a kind of half cease-fire agreement on his side and a full stopping

cf troop movements. If that is significant for the psychological reaction —

not the first- day — the first day, as you know, it was very angry — but the

second day -- it is positive action in the evaluation of your problem,

Mr* JHA (India): I would only hope that it might be possible to

get as many troops as possible to interpose. Thirty is naturally a very

disappointing number. If it is possible to interpose more, I am sure that the

United Nations Command will look into that.

The other point I want to mention is this. I should like to go on record,

so that there may be no misunderstanding of what I said yesterday, that our

interpretation and understanding of paragraph 1 of Part A of the resolution

adopted by the Security Council is that the central object of this paragraph

is the prevention of civil war. For that purpose certain details are s^ lied

out in the resolution, such as cease-fires, halting of all military operations

and use of force in the last resort. In our opinion, these are illustrative —

I should not be understood as having meant that this is all the United Nations

can do — the element of negotiation is certainly there; agreements can be

reached* It would certainly save a lot of trouble and bloodshed perhaps.

I also pointed out that we are thinking in terms of preventive force,

not the use of force to attain any active or positive results or policy in

the United Nations. This force is to be used for preventing a civil war. At

the same time I think it is our understanding that the prevention of civil war

may lead to the undertaking of measures which we cannot contemplate here and

which must in the last resort be left to the Command that is there. For

example, if it is known or if it is feared that a certain railway junction is

being used or will be used for the deployment of large numbers of persons, of

forces, for indulging a civil war or a contemplated attack -- I am just giving

a hypothetical case — the United Nations Command may feel that the

neutralization of that area, the isolation of that particular strategic area,

be it a railway station or even an airport, or in an emergency an air strip

or lines of communication, then according to our understanding the obligations

under paragraph 1 will extend to that kind of action. What I meant to impress

was that we have to take an extensive interpretation of paragraph 1, not a very

IB/en 59-60(Mr. Jha,. India)

Intensive one. According to the extensive interpretation, the objective is

the prevention of civil war. While it is not the intention to go. about using

force and displaying United Nations force everywhere or taking forceful .

measures of various kinds, it is the intention that this force, if necescary,

has to be used in the event of its becoming indispensable for the prevention

of a civil war.

GR/dp 61

(Mr. Jha, India)

It is not merely a question of war which is actually taking place, "but of the

measures necessary for a prevention of thet condition or even prevention of

preparations for a civil war. As regards the control, the check posts mentioned

by General Rikhye at various places, if they are considered necessary they would

again be related to the prevention of a civil war, to prevent, for example, .

an extensive military build up. In our view, that would be quite legitimate,

but again it is a matter which depends on the local situation and must be left

a gr?at deal to the decision of the United Nations Command* We certainly hope

that this provision will be used properly and effectively.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I do not want to engage the discussion in this

particular direction now, but I would like to put a question to Ambassador Jha

because I think the point he raises is a very, very important one. It is bound

to arise when we ask for troops, because the Governments are bound to as., what

they are supposed to do.

Ainabassador Jha talks about an extensive interpretation of the duty to take

necessary action for the prevention of civil war and refers to the specific

example of an important railway Junction which is, so to say, being built up

into a kind of staging area for a contemplated attack. I think it is a very

striking example. If we can foresee the risk of such a development, there is the

possibility -- I would say the obligation -- to occupy that railway junction,

and with sufficient force available I think that might be done without any

c&sualties because people ususally retreat in the face of effective power without

fighting it out. But suppose, on the other hand, that we are overtaken by events --

troop movements by air can be very fast — and what the Command is facing is a

situation where troops are on the spot — Congolese troops — at a railway function

and that in support of it are sufficient to engage in serious battle with United

Nations troops. Are the United Nations troops theu supposed to attack the railway

junction and, so to say, occupy it in such a way?

Ambassador Jha says that the decision would have to rest with the Command,

but I do not think that is quite fair because the Command must know how far it is

permitted to go. That is to say, in the first example I would think that the

Command would probably act automatically, without any reference back; in the second

• P • !:>,>-;

GR/dp 62

(The Secretary-General)

case, they would have either to fall back on a general instruction or ask for «

specific instruction. This difference between the two cases, I think, brings out

in a very clear way the problem involved in the phrase used in paragraph 1 of

part A of the resolution to which you referred, and I believe it is a point on

which questions are bound to be raised at a very early stage when we ask for more

troops, because obviously if you g<2t engaged in an armed conflict or clash of SOCK

seriousness, as would be the case in the second alternative, it makes you at once

a party militarily in opposition to those already holding the railway Junction an<

you may become the "enemy", since probably those holding or taking the railway

Junction have other enemies which they have in mind when they make their first

military moves. It means that the United Nations troops are not, so to say,

interposed, but in fact a party to the fight between two units. As I said., I do

not want to engage the discussion in this way now, but I felt that it was fair

to pursue your line of thinking one step further as food for our joint thought

and for consideration perhaps at a somewhat later moment.

My question to Ambassador Jha is, has he in mind a clear view as to this

distinction, does his "extensive interpretation" carry also the second alternative

or has he covered definitely the first alternative while wanting to leave the sec*

question entirely open?

Mr. JTIA (India): I am not competent to go into these discussions

connected with military strategy; I only ventured to make these observations

because I gathered from General Rikhye's statement that there was an sssumption

that the United Nations Force continued on the same basis, that is to say, did

not fire except in self-defence. That is a very good rule and we do not want it

to be broken, and the impression I get was that according to his assessment all

that was necessary was that you should get more troops and then go along in

exactly the same way as before. It is the point of viev of my Government that

actually we have so far not gone far enough, and that was the whole point of havii

paragraph 1 of the resolution adopted by the Security Council. Exactly how far,

or how much farther, one should go -- that is something which we really cannot

spell out here, but I did wish to point out that the central objecij;' of this

paragraph was the prevention of civil war in the Congo.

GR/dp 65

(Mr. Jhat India)

Negotiations, we are all agreed, must be undertaken, and from what you have

just read out -- and I hope the news is true,-- a very good beginning has been

made and the weight of the Security Council is being felt. Another thing is the

interposition of troops. That is perfectly all right; I also agree that the

Force should not be used except for preventive purposes; it is a preventive force

really, except in the last resort.

In tbe particular example of a railway junction which I just mentioned offhand,

I should say that if the junction is already strongly fortified &nd the United

Nations cannot neutralize it except by entering upon full-scale war, I do not

wish to put that responsibility on the Command;reference must be made to you

and through you to the Security Council if necessary. But there may be ot.hsr

ways; after all there is always a point at which you can take such preventive

action; if a particular railway junction is fortified, maybe the next one is not

and is itself an area where preventive action can be taken. This is a matter

of detail but I thought it would be fair to ourselves, and would also inform our

colleagues, to say that it has been our view that something more forceful,

naturally within the ambit of paragraph 1, has to be done, because this is very

far-reaching, it speaks of all appropriate measures, and the propriety of the

measures must be determined in the light of the particular and various

circumstances. Naturally it is not possible for me to give a very precise answer

to the military problem that would arise here*

The. SECRETARY -GENERAL: I would like to make one observation here.

I think the new resolution widens the field definitely in one respect. It means

that, as the representative of India pointed out, we are certainly entitled to

occupy posts, and that is a use of force which we so far have hesitated to engage

in because you always come into the sensitive area of how far our rights go In

a foreign country. We have in fact occupied in only two cases, Kamina and Kitona,

which may be said to be in our hands militarily, and they are bases, as you know,

in a very special position. So, short of fighting, I would say that this has

already introduced a considerable widening which is very helpful. The Force has

already instructions which give to the notion of self-defence an interpretation

• (The Secretary-General)

which makes it possible to take defensive action for all positions held. - In

the right of self-defence according to the instructions is regarded as also

covering the case when they resist a military effort to push them out .from a

position which1 they hold under orders. In these circumstances, the widening of

our rights undar this resolution gives entirely new weight to this

right of self-defence, because it ncans key points and areas, and if

ve combine this fact with the right of self-defence as already interpreted,

we are in fact entirely effective in a way which we have not been and could not

be so far, not because of the weakness inherent in the notion of self-defence,

but because of the weakness which follows from the fact that we could not order

people to hold any kind"of place just because it suited certain military

considerations on our side.

This means that even without reading into the resolution the right to stage

a full-scale military attack on such and such a position, we- have considerably

strengthened the military weight of our Force provided, of course, that our

resources^ are sufficient to occupy, and that is really where you come to the

third and indeed decisive point, the scope, the size of the United Nations Force.

There we have had other weaknesses in the past..

So I would put it in this way. The self-defence rule as such has not been

the basic weakness, but that rule, combined with the lack of troops and

considerable otibiguity as to our right to occupy territory, has led to a

situation of military weakness when we have had to face the kind of problem which

you have mentioned.

HA/mtm 66

Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco): I would like to ask General Rikhye a question

for information. How is the Mobutu army financed, equipped and trained today?

GENERAL RIKHYE; The first part of your question referred to financing.

The troops have received irregular payments, which have "been mostly in the nature

of advances by the Congolese military command from time to time. Their rate

of pay has also been increased considerably and certainly is a very heavy burden

on the present Congolese budget.

Your second question was about training?

Mr. BENABQUD (Morocco): Equipment.

GENERAL RIKHYE: The ANC, which was previously known as the Force

Publique, was a very well equipped armed force in the Congo. Part of it was

meant as an expeditionary force, and, during World War II, the Belgian Congo

did take part in support of the Allied effort in different parts of Africa. And

so the Force Publique, which is now called the ANC, is extremely well equipped.

It has modern weapons, which it continued to receive right up to the time of

the independence Of the Congo.

Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco): My question, I believe, was answered pe*rtialiy«

But I am aiming at the source of money and the source of weapons. We have been

told that, when the Belgians left the Congo, they drained the treasury of the

Congo to the last penny, and that the United Nations was alarmed "by this financial

situation, and later the Congolese army had to receive financial assistance

in order to prevent real disorder because of famine and need. So who gives that

money? You have referred to this financial burden as a burden on the Congolese

budget. But is there any source known of money given to Mobutu and Kasavubu,

and who also gives the equipment?

GENERAL RIKHYE; As regards the money, the only source that I am aware

of is the Congo Bank or Banque du Cong<3, the treasury of the Congo. If there

is any other source, I am not aware of it. -'

HA/mtm 67

(General Rikhye)

As regards the equipment, as I have explained, it was already there. As a

matter of fact, as I said in my military appreciation, the former Belgian "base

of Kitona still has large quantities of arms and ammunition, which are now under

the safe custody of United Nations troops. So any arras and equipment which the

Congolese army possesses -- all the different'factions of this army — all came

during the period of the Belgian Congo.

Mr, BENAEOUD (Morocco): Who trains the soldierc?

GENERAL RIKHYE; Who trains them now? They do not get any training.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; One detail, on the financial Bide: I think

that the budget is largely a deficit budget, and in a rather erratic way the

treasury has been trying from time to time to draw, or has drawn, advances from

the Central Bank. That has happened in Leopoldville, it has happened in

Stanleyville, and I think it has happened in other places too -- that is to say,

what is known as solid deficit budgeting.

Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco): Is the Central Bank a state-owned bank or

a private Belgian company?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is formally independent of the Government -

and I do not think it is a Belgian one • There is a kind of cpneell mon^taiye

that sits on it, on which we have an expert — a Swiss expert -«• but there is

the usual constitutional rule: that it has its own responsibilities, autonomous

responsibilities.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I must compliment General Rikhye on a most

interesting and lucid appreciation of the military situation and military

requirements in the Congo. It was so interesting that even a very unmilitary

person like myself became interested. .

I have only one question. General Rikhye, you said that, as far as thei

major airports are concerned, the United Nations has fairly good information

about all the traffic, and that the traffic could not elude you. Your control -

HA/mtm 68-70

Hasan, Pakistan )

at least your information was adequate, you said. But you made an exception

of the private air strips. May I ask: In total, how important would these

private air strips be?. How important would all the traffic which can "be unloaded

at these private air strips be from your military point of view? And are there

land connexions .between these private air strips and military centres of either

faction? That AS, if military supplies are unloaded at these private air strips,

how can they be carried to military centres or military points where they are

needed? . ( '

• • GE IRAL RIKHYE: In regard to the second part of your question, if

I tray asnwer that first, all these ancillary air strips or airports are

connected by. good roads to the various road systems which exist in the Congo.

Therefore/ once anything has been able to get to these airfields, it is possible,

for it to be given further distribution to the different divided parts of the

country. •

: As- to the first part of your question, it is a normal rule in international

aviation that, as soon as an aircraft has filed its flight plan and as soon. as

it has given its route and its destination, the airfield automatically informs

the route, to the people who are affected along the route,, as veil as the

destination. Also, the estimated time of its arrival is given. So, when -the. -

aircraft does not turn up, there is a certain emergency procedure which the ICAO

goes into, as if the aircraft were lost, and so there is very little chance for

any aircraft to come through unless it is undeclared all along.

RSH/rh 71

Mr., NGILERUMA (Nigeria): I should like to thank General Rikhye for

hia very important report, I should like to say that what is important is an

increase in the United Nations Force. That is the main basis of our discussion,

and for this reason, in order to save our time, it is something which should be

referred to our respective Governments.

If I understood General Rikhye correctly, he said that the negotiations in

the Congo called for military negotiations, and not political ones. I have been

thinking all along that the problems in the Congo called for political negotiations,

and in connexion with this I should like to ask one or two questions.

Firstly, we always hear of the names of politicians like Tshcmbe, Ileo and

Gizenga and so forth. Would the General say that the Congolese military forces

are loyal to these political leaders? Would there be any use in negotiating with

these political leaders? Could any benefit be derived from negotiating with them,

or would it be of no use because the forces are not loyal to them but are

independent and under the control of no one?

I would like to ask a second question similar to that asked by the

representative of Morocco. I would like to ask about Tshombe's forces. How are

they trained? How are they financed? Are they loyal to Tshombe?

General RIKHYE; When I referred to military negotiations with regard

to arrangements in connexion with a cease fire and so on, it was in the context

of such arrangements being made between Mobutu Ts ANC and Lundula's ANC, They are

the two effective commanders, or the most effective commanders of their own

respective groups and have generally greater control over the ABC which allegedly

is more loyal to them than anybody else. At the same time, they are the people

who would be involved in a likely armed conflict across the Ecuator and Oriental

border. Therefore, in this particular instance it was found more practical to

make contacts at the military level and then develop them, if there was any

usefulness, towards the political end, whereas in Katanga the arrangements for

a cease fire and the neutralization of any area always have to start with Tshombe,

because he is in complete control of his gendarmerie. The Commander of the

Katanga gendarmerie is a Belgian colonel, Colonel Cre"vecoeur, and he also acts

as military advisor to Tshombe. When we made the arrangements to establish thesei

two neutral zones we dealt with Tshombe.

RSH/rh - 72- .

(General Rikhye)

I will now take up the second part of the question* I have already stated

that the Katanga gendarmerie is loyal to Tshombe because it is his own creation..

The background of this gendarmerie is that it was one of the groups of the

former Force Publique, now called the.Annexe Nationals Congolaise,witfr headquarters

at Elisabtf-thville.* its strength .at that time was about 3,000, and after Tshombe's

secessionist ;effort he removed all the personnel who were not loyal to him.. That

reduced it to about 1,500. Then Tshombe started recruiting, and he increased what

is now called his' Katanga gendarmerie to about 3>000. Simultaneouslyj.he brought.

in the iformer officers'of the Force Publlque to officer it. He then increased

it to 5/000, which is the present strength of the gjK lxffi** ?-. . It has also had

a proportionate increase in its foreign officers and personnel. V/e also believe

that a'recruiting campaign, has been carried on for some period now under, which

he is attempting to recruit another 2rOOO, so that it would then have a total

strength of 7,000.

As I have said earlier, their training is carried out by former

Force Publique officers or certain new foreign officers. They are trained

extremely well, but the Katanga gendarmerie is in two parts. One part, consisting

of mobile columns, is very effective and is as well trained as any regular army

unit. It consists of four columns with a very high proportion of foreign officers

and NCOfs. The columns have about the strength of a weak battalion, as we know

it. The remainder of the Katanga gendarmerie is primarily carrying out static

duties. It is not very highly trained and could not really be used in any military

action as such%

The Katanga authorities pay them.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I have a question which really arises from your

own statement, Mr. Secretary-General. I do hope I misunderstood you because the

impression I got was that the United Nations troops will take action when they are

strong enough to beat the other side, but when they are not strong enough to beat

the other side they will retire, I do hope I misunderstood you, but I was reminded

of the nursery rhyme, "Those who fight and run away can come and fight another day",

I hope that is not the intention, •'

RSH/rh 73-75

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I discussed an alternative. There were

different possibilities arising from the example given by Ambassador Jha. The

second alternative to which I wanted to draw attention in order to clarify the

ground in our discussion was one in which a post of the kind which is important

was held by military strength. In that case, obviously it could be done without

shedding blood only if we were very strong, but, of course, whether such action

is or is not acceptable, under the resolution, is independent of whether we

can do it with or without bloodshed. Therefore, the point to which you referred

is concerned with a situation which was discussed hypothetically, and for that

reason I do not think you need to have any worry. We will first of all have to

arrive at a ploa of vhat to do in relation to a post vhich is militarily

important and which is occupied by those whom we would not like to have at that

place*

M¥» LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): I should like to ask one question

about the strength of the forces of Mobutu, about how they are trained and their

number.

BC/cw 76

General RIKHYS! The exact figures of the strength of the ANC which

owes its loyalty to Mobutu and the ANC which owes its loyalty to Lundula are

not known; I do not .think that they know this themselves. The best figure

that we have been able to arrive at is about 7,000-plus for Mobutu and about

7,000-minus for Lundula. . .

There has -been very little training of the ANC since the United Nations ,

hal to discontinue its training programme, which happened in about . .........

October. Up to that time we had found that the ANC was an extremely well-trained

formation. However, they hn.d stopped any training since independence. The. ..

men did hot wish to go on parade. They did not, wish to do physical training

in the morning. They .considered that not doing this was part of independence..

But, slowly, - we. ve re p.ble to persuade them to return to the drill grounds, and

we started -drilling-them and, persuaded them to do some physical training and .

some weapon training. - •• . •',..-.

•As I have already said, these personnel are extremely well trained^ except,

that there has been very little refresher training. All that we were able..to

achieve during our- period with them was to give them refresher training for

about eight-weeks inrall --that is, from about August to about October,,

Where they are very-badly off now is in the fact that there is no... ,_.. ; 1 £ .

officer corps as such — or, at least, there was no officer corps as suo . .

A number of non-commissioned officers and even privates became officers overnight.

As the Committee knows, in about October a number of Mobutufs men were.sent for

training abroad. There were 207 officers sent for such training abroad. . .-,

Mr. SUBA3INGHE (Ceylon)i Where? , , , •

: General RBCHYBi In Belgium. In addition to that, Mobutu- was able

to send a number of missions to several countries, and these personnel have .,. :

returried. I do not know what kind of training one can receive on a mission,but,

certainly they have returned with broader ideas. This group of officers which

went on mission are now foreign-travelled and have formed Mobutu's General Staff.

This General Staff now consists of about eight Congolese officers.

BC/cw 77

(General Rikhye)

Also, after October Mobutu called back some of the former Force publique

officers to act as advisers. The exact figure is unknown since these

personnel are in civilian clothes and it is very difficult to distinguish

between them and the normal foreign civilians in the Congo. They have

introduced a certain training programme, and one of the units which they

improved was the armoured car unit in Thysville which, as the Committee knows,

vas fairly active in November in Leopoldville. I do not think that

they have been £.ble to achieve very much other than to provide the necessary

General Staff support and military advice for command and administration.

Our United Nations instructors were able to impart, in addition to the

training I have already mentionedv training in adjutant and quartermaster duties

at the unit level, in order to keep the units going, because the Congolese

were totally unaware of these things. If, now, one finds that.these units are

able to feed themselves, that there is some system of unit accounting, that

there is some semblance of control in the unit, it is because of the training

which was given to them by United Nations instructors for a period of about

eight weeks.

The Lundula ANC has come into being only during the last few weeks.

Before, it was part of the overall ANC. Lundula was dismissed. He was inactive

for a very long period, and the ANC in Stanleyville was owing its loyalty to

Mobutu. It therefore has received about the same amount of training.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Since there was a question about where the

207 officers were trained, I might say that we have twice made very pointed

protests to Belgium regarding this training and, like in very many cases, have

not to my knowledge received any reply. A similar question arose in the case

of one or two other countries. We intervened orally when we heard rumours about

the matter, and the countries involved abstained.

I think that we should add one thing to what General Rikhye has said.

In this case training does not mean moral training. The discipline is about

as weak as it can be. I should also perhaps point out that as regards matters

related to military training, financing, and so forth, we arc, as I have

already pointed out to this Committee, at a very considerable disadvantage.

BC/cw 78-80

(The Secretary-General)

because /we have no intelligence service — and, in my view, we should not have

one since that would introduce a rather dangerous element for an international

organization .J But that explains why we are in a state of ignorance and

innocence about very many points on which others have, or believe that they

have, information.

Mr, ACI-KAR (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like

to revert to a question which was put by the representative of Morocco and to

which General Rikhye replied,but on which I still have some doubts. I am

referring to the question of who is arming Mobutu and his soldiers. General

Rikhye said that the ANC had been very well equipped before independence and

that, consequently, Mobutu still had the arms which had been available then.

But we understand that at a certain time the ANC, at least in Leopoldville,

had freely laid down its arms. This was confirmed during the discussions in

the Security Council by Mr. Bomboko, who was then a Minister of the Central

Government.

Now, if the arms were surrendered to the United Nations at Leopoldville,

how does it happen that Mobutu's soldiers are as well equipped as they were

before independence? I should like to have seme clarification on this point,

which I find somewhat obscure.

I should like to ask a second question, which has already been asked in

another form. What is the staffing of the Mobutu troops which are about to

mount an offensive? General Rikhye has spoken of the loyalty of the gendarmerie

to Mr. Tshombe. This is obviously due to the foreign elements, who are

undoubtedly very well paid, and so forth. General Rikhye himself has said that

the gendarmerie is the creation of Mr. Tshombe, Has Mr. Mobutu any similar

personnel or staff at his command?

FGB/aJ 81

General RIKHYEt Your first question was how did the ANC in

Leopoldville get back their arms which Mr. Bomboko had stated had been voluntarily

laid down by the ANC there. This statement by Mr. Bomboko to which you have

referred was made during the very early stages — in July, as a matter of fact,

soon after the arrival of the United Nations troops — and while the United Nations

troops were arranging the withdrawal of the Belgians some ANC voluntarily handed

their weapons in for safe custody. Soon after the arrival of the United Nations

troops we encouraged the ANC to have their weapons kept in safe custody. Once

the United Nations began to organize and train the ANC, and to introduce some

discipline, these weapons were available to them for purposes of training. There ..

was no question, as such, of throwing away arms at any time. It was a question

of handing the arms in because at that particular time any ANC found armed by.

Belgian military personnel was liable to be shot at. Of course, once the

Belgian personnel left that part of the United Nations Force fs task was completed,

and we started the next task which was part of our technical assistance to

the ANC. The arms were kept in the armories of the ANC camps in Leopoldville,

' ' The SECRETARY -GENERAL; Under the key of the ANC.

General RIKHYE: Under the key of the ANC. I would really say that

it was part of our training programme, because before that we used to find

that some of the weapons were kept during the night in their married quarters,

and quite often early in the morning either a wife or a child would be sent by

the soldier to collect his rifle or machine gun for him before he went on parade.

We thought that that was a very highly dangerous practice, and we encouraged

them to bring their weapons into the armories, and the key was kept by the ANC.

Thus there is no question of rearmament.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There are two points there which I might make.

One is that in the technical sense no ANC troops were ever disarmed, and the

other is that they handed in their arms, yes, but not to the United Nations. That

was part of the whole pattern on our side. Of course, we could not disarm

at that stage. That would have been highly objectionable. Nor could we be,i

so to say, their masters in the sense that we had the key to the armories.

Both things at that period — it was July-August in fact — would have been

considered very much against the rights of the Central Government,

FGB/aJ 82

General RIKHYE: The second part of the question was about staffing,

and to what extent Mobutu has the loyalty of his troops.

Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea): Encadrement,

General RIKHYE; Well, as I have already explained, the officers

available to Mobutu at present are untrained. The officers who are receiving

training abroad have not yet returned. He has a very small group of these

officers who have been on missions abroad, and he is using them as general staff.

As I stated earlier, I am afraid they know very little about military planning

or the conduct of military operations. However, as personalities, a number

of officers have come forward. They have developped with experience and have

a reasonable control over elements of the ANC. The ANC of Mobutu or Luuclula

should not be compared with that of Tshombe, as I have stated earlier, as there

are important factions within those two groups — both in Lundula's group and

in Mobutu's group.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We could make a comparison — I think that

is what the distinguished representative had in mind — with the gendarmerie

in Katanga where the encadrement, the officer cadre is to a very large

extent non-Congolese. What is the situation there? To what extent would you say

that the present officer cadre of Mobutu's force is non-Congolese?

General RIKHYE: It is entirely Congolese. The cadre of officers

and NCO's, with very few exceptions is all Congolese.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The military advisers are not Congolese.

General RIKHYE; Military advisers are not Congolese, whereas in the

Katanga gendarmerie foreigners are integrated into their unit establishments.

Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland); I also should like to express on behalf of

my delegation our thanks and appreciation to General Rikhye for the precision

with which he has given us some very important and, I think, very interesting

information this afternoon. The purpose of my question is merely to round out

FGB/aJ 83(Mr. Kennedy, Ireland)

the information which we have already received, and in particular to complement

the questions which have already been raised by the representatives of Nigeria

and Morocco.

I was wondering whether General Ri'khye could give us any indication at all,

in order to complete the picture, as to the sources from which the Gizenga farces

in Oriental Province — the forces which are loyal to him '-- have derived their

money and weapons, both at present and in the past. What I am particularly

interested in, in view of the terms of the draft resolution adopted by the "

Security Council, Mr. Secretary-General, is whether there is any evidence that

money or weapons have come in from outside, or whether in fact equipment has been

transferred to these ANC forces within the Congo. Any information on this subject

would, I think, be very interesting in view of the terms of the Security Council

resolution.

General RIKHYE; As the Secretary-General stated earlier, the

United Nations Command in the Congo does not have any intelligence facilities.

Therefore the information which is available to us cannot be absolutely accurate.

However, our contacts are very good with the various authorities ..concerned,

as well as with the ANC in the OrientaleProvince. As a matter of fact the

relations have always been very satisfactory between our military forces and

the Congolese troops stationed throughout the Congo. So I would say, generally,

that the assessment of the United Nations Command would be fairly accurate.

In brief, very little has come in, if at all, to the Oriental Province.

If anything has come in it could only be a trickle, and there are so many

possibilities where stuff could have reached the Oriental Province. After all,

to give a comparative example, my own country, India, has very large borders

and it is quite a problem for the police to prevent gun running, which is a very

paying profession in most countries. So I think that that is all I can say in

that respect.

As regards finance, generally they are very badly off in Orientale, and it is

the story of the whole Province. It is not only the ANC in that Province. The

authorities there also are very badly off. It is really outside my field but,

from the little I know about it, the United Nations financial adviser is tackling

this as part of the over-all banking and financial problem of the Congo.

FGB/aJ 84-85

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; A. I mentioned before, there have been

instances of Central Bank advances also to the authorities in Stanleyville.

How they have come about is a somewhat difficult and confused story* I cannot

give the details, but anyway there have been such advances.

Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): A while ago we heard that the authorities in

Elisabethville and in Leopoldville were advancing claims to the equipment left

at the bases in Kamina and Kitona. I wonder how serious they are in that claim

and if they persist in it what would be the United Nations attitude, sir.ce

General Rikhye has told us that those bases contain very large amounts of

equipment and ammunition.

My second question relates to the equipment side. We have been told that

the Force publique was left with very good modern equipment, but one q«.v-r;uion

which I think is important is the source of ammunitiono They muat have

exhausted a lot of what was left for the Force publique by now shooting at snake

or game. They must have a source of supply of ammunition. To my knowledge

they have no ammunition factories in the Congo. I wonder if you could enlighte

us on those two aspects.

Mtf/pm86

The. SECRETARY-GENERAL; Perhaps I should reply to the first question

because it is mainly political.

You have seen our demarches once or twice regarding the bases, including t

arms kept at the bases. We have not received any reply to those demarches, Tl

is to say, the matter has arrived at a deadlock where we, so far, have the laei

word. It is our underatanding that we are there as custodians and cannot hand

the arms over to anybody.

General RIKEYEt The second part was about ammunition. The United Ni

Command in the Congo had always made arrangements for observation at all entrit

into the Congo, particularly for war material,and I would say that what lias con

is not very much and it is very difficult to establish the source of c '-

ammunition, as the boxes carrying labels could well originate from one country

pass through several others, or be sold to somebody else and resold or re-issu

It is very difficult to apportion names regarding the sender of such ammunitio

However, the new resolution gives us the necessary authority to take more

effective action and I have no doubt that we shall be able to do so, provided

have extra troops.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I should perhaps mention one thing. We have

under very serious consideration, with a lot of worry, the railway line in fr

Angola* That is the main point on which the question of search and seizure ha

arisen — the question which I placed before the Security Council. It is the

question of the legal rights, on the one side and, on the other hand, exactly

as the General now mentioned, a question of our military resources because, il

you have really to check a railway line>it is an operation of some scope. Alt

in this case, therefore, we are led back to the question of increase of militg

potential* It is already 6 o'clock and I do not want to lengthen the

discussion, but I would like to point out that the point on which I would hope

could arrive at a kind of consensus as to the advice is the one concerning

requests for further troops. I shall have a suggestion to make later when we

back to it, but I Just warn you that I should like to raise that ,as a concret<

question so that we can go ahead with it.

MW/pm 87

Mr* Mongi SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I think you have

Just touched on the heart of the problem now, and I must renew my thanks to

General Rikhye for the clarification which he has given us, which shows that the

United Nations Command in the Congo is in the course of doing a good job to ensure

the greatest measure of stability and peace possible to that country. But the

essence at the present time, particularly in view of the new task given to the

Command by the Security Council, is to have the largest possible number of troops,

I was about to put to you, Sir, the question whether there are any prospects,

in the light of your contacts, of troop reinforcements. If not, I think it

might be useful to ask the Security Council directly for such aid. I hope that

you will receive satisfactory replies, or will have some reply to the requests

which you have made.

On my own behalf and that of my country, I regret that, in view of Jo;:e

very delicate position in which we find ourselves, close as we are to the war in

Algeria, we are not in a position now to provide you with a larger number of our

troops. If our position were different, we would have been happy to provide the

United Nations with more troops than we have done heretofore.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I can tell you what the present situation is.

We made some time ago -- a month ago or so -- renewed requests for troops«

They did not lead to positive results so far in more than one single case — the

Federation of Malaya from which we got a contingent of 800 men*- In other cases

we had some Noes which, I think, mainly were because of technical considerations

such as the one you refer to in the case of Tunisia. We have had several replies

which left the question pending or left a question mark after them, I believe

that those question marks referred to the political situation and the tark of the

Force, For that reason I do not see in previous refusals any reason not to try

again on the basis of the new resolution.

My own intention, therefore, will be — and that is what I wanted to discuss

with you -- to go a new round, basing it on the resolution and pointing out the

new tasks which the resolution assigns to the Force, and also giving in broad

outline the evaluation of what these tasks require to which we have listened today.

MW/pm 08- 0

(The Secretary-General)

My own feeling Is, as a matter'of course, that Just as in the b-ginning,

without for that reason engaging in-some ,kind of regionalism or racism, obviously,

reinforcements should be sought in the first place .from African countries,

and to all possible extent from African countries* We fcave been most grateful for

the assistance received from outside Africa; it,has been very valuable and it is

a very natural part in any United Nations operation, in order to avoid a

one-sidedness which is not desirable. But such assistance has always been an

addition and not part of the hard core. Now, however, you know better than I do

that the resources of Africa in this- case are limited. . I know that many of the

countties which contributed troops really went very far in sacrifices, and for

that reason it is asking quite a lot when you request them, if possible, to put

up further new contingents. However, it if fcr them to judge and not for us»

Thus, in the first instance, the request should be directed to African

countries which have aken a stand which, so to speak, leaves a -leeway, perhaps

leaving out those who have taken a stand which clearly indicated that they are

st the end of the read, either politically or militarily. I do not know

whether it in much Use to put them into the picture at once - we may hnve to come

to It, but it is perhaps less rewarding.

Secondly, it seems to me that, as before, it is natural to turn to our Asian

friends. I would myself, as matters stand, not feel that it would be in keeping

with the policies applied to the Force, nor very reasonable for other reasons

in relation to the- countries concerned, to try to press either Ireland cr Sweden

for more troops;' and that cuts out the rest of Europe too.

A question which has been raised by some people, and one on which I look with

great hesitation, is the possibility of including this or that Latin American

country. I can tell you here that I have sounded out Mexico, which seemed

indicated if one were to try any Latin American country, but with a negative

result.

DR/cn -.;.... • . ' • . . . 9 1(The Secretary-General)

That is to say, I think that the reply to your'.question will depend mainly on

the attitude and the possibilities of African States and the attitudes and r

willingness of^Some Asian States. I feel that the Security Council approach, ...-.•

an appeal through the Security Council, is a valuable suggestion, but I feel- ;.. •/:;

on the other hand that if such an appeal can be avoided it should be avoided.- , '

I think that the Security Council has had quite a lot of discussions about ...

this matter, and even a practical demand of this type is very likely to give

rise to a/:new- dr-bate.'• , ••

At all events,- I feel that it is reasonable to interpret the resolution :..>•. .

and the consequence of-the resolution as a kind of authorization to make; ..this . ••, -

effort spontaneously, and make it obviously in the form I have indicated and • -

wi.tV the type of argument I have also indicated. Were that effort to fail,

were we to^remain on, so to say, a fifteen battalion basis instead of ... .

twenty-five, then'I feel that this is something which, together with the j.,.

military evaluation, should be reported to the Security Council. It would., , •...-..

be for the-members of the Security Council themselves to see whether they ,.,-.., -. •

wanted) to*take up the situation in this or that direction or not. : .- , •.'•/•. •

•?i-.'Mrv.;JOHNSON (Liberia); My delegatipn wishes to think General Rifchye..;.;., /_•.-..,

for-his excellent Delineation of the military necessities in the Congo. : We. . ;•; ;

wish to .share the opinion of the representative, of Nigeria that we should -:,:i: -; .v-

immediately invite our respective Governments' attention to the situation./.. .- ,-r . .-

However, I should like to be permitted to make this observation. The

circumstances that led to the present Security Council resolution are not, in

our opinion, military although this aspect is implied. To our thinking.it

is purely pplitical considerations that led to the events of.the.last.few days.

Do you not think that- some attention should be directed to the political

aspects of the Congo with a yiew to evolving guidelines towards a speedy

solution o f t h e problem a s a whole? . - , . . - ,

The real question for us after months of charges and.countercharges is,

to my mind, as follows: what shall the United Nations do to bring the

Congolese leaders to work together as a unit? As we have heard from General

Rikhye, it will take some time to achieve, but it will not be necessary to

patrol the whole of the Congo,

DR/cn 92

(Mr* Johnson, Liberia)

In the circumstances, a somewhat serious treatment of both the military

and political situation ehould be undertaken by this group. If the message

from the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo dated

22 February 1961, which has Just been circulated, is authentic, I think it

is all ths more reason vhy the political aspect should be seriously considered

•vicl resolved.

S5CPRPARY-GMg3AL! I should like to add one observation which

certainly should be brought out in the letters to Governments in regard to

troop movement o-> Were we to get re-conciliation, bringing together at least

StprJ.eyvillo and Leopoldville in a form which represented national unity over

that line,, and I would hope also Katanga — but that may come at the second stage,

and I do not think we necessarily should wait for it — I say were we to get

reconciliation on that line, it would at once facilitate the military problem

enormously. It would reduce the need for the considerable troop concentrations,

as we would not have to separate ths two forces, and it would also open the road

to use of ANC for law and order purposes, as it should be used, under a unified

political leadership. That is to Gay, if the political effort is pursued

simultaneously with the military effort, it will increase the chances that the

military strengthening will be of 'abort duration. That would facilitate for Member

States the making of a contribution. That indicates on the other hand how right

you are that it is necessary to pursue the political efforts with all possible

energy, if for no other reason in order to be able to justify the demand for troope.

In the next few days the Conciliation Commission will meet in Geneva^ They

are bound to present their report in good time before the General Assembly

reconvenes; that is to say, it should not be more than another week or BO, I

guess, before we should be able to expect at least a report which does not

contain only conclusions but also arguments and findings. That seems to me

to be the moment when this Committee really must go head first into the very

cold water of a political settlement. To discuss it here and now in a

ER/en

(The Secretary-General)

way vhich might, so to say, delay actions on those points where we see a need

for action is certainly not your intention.

I think it is very good to bring it to your attention as a problem

because the two things, as I said, are seriously interlocked.

May I go back for a iroment to this communication to Governments and

refer to a matter which arose earlier during the debate. In such communications,

of course, attention must be drawn especially to operative paragraph 1, part A.

As I said, I foresee that Governments will ask questions about the tasks, how

far they extend and how far the troops nc.y come to be used. That is to say,

they w?mt to have a clarification of the instructions which are likely to be

given. That is an extremely difficult question, as we know, to define in

hypothetical terms. It is not easy when you face a situation but it is worse

to do it in hypothetical and general terms. But I am afraid that we will

have to try to do it.

I think that in the first communication it may be enough to refer to

the paragraph itself and to the debate in the Security Council which is the

only document of interpretation that we have. There is no authoritative

interpretation given by anybody, and for that reason in such a communication I do

not now find it possible to go further. On the other hand, I do not believe

that it is the. end of the discussion. I do believe that we will get

questions back. We have already had them from a couple of prominent

contributing African countries. I referred yesterday to Emperor Haile Selassie

and to President Bourguiba, If that is symptomatic, I think we will be put

against the wall in order to clarify our thoughts, I would not exclude at- all

that if and when provided with such a background and, helped with the

type of question put to us, we devote attention to the problem again, we might

be able even to phrase that part of an instruction or discuss at least the

phrasing and reach unanimity. Nothing would be more helpful. It would

still not be an authoritative interpretation. It would still be a decision

taken on the responsibility of the Secretary-General, but we are well-

aware of the fact that the strength of such a decision is increased by the

thoroughness and care given to the background thinking and the background

DR/1

en 9 -95(The Secretary-General)

arguments and background considerations. So while pointing out that I think

there must be for the moment a reference just to the resolution and the

relevant parts of it and the debate, I think we should prepare ourselves for

an attempt, at least, to be more precise so as to be able to reply to the

questions which I foresee.

GRR/ek 96

Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): 1 was happy to notice that a good while ago

you observed that it was past six o'clock, and X have only one question to put.

It is an economic question: judging by what you said, almost all the Provincial

Governments in the Congo seem to be subsisting on overdrafts from the Central

Dank, and as you know overdrafts mean deficit financing, they really mean the

printing of note<3 and issuing them to the Government. How does this come about?

I presume there is only one Central Bank in the Congo — normally there is only

one in any country?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; They have established a separate one in Katanga,

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): What about Oriental Province? Have they one,

and has Leopoldville one?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There is one in Leopoldville and one in

Ellsabethville, the second one established quite recently.

Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): If they all have Central Banks, my question is

unnecessary.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The Bank in Stanleyville is a branch office

of the one in Leopoldville.

I think the reminder of the time was opportune, but may I sum up this

discussion in the following way: I would act in accordance with your own

conclusions from the facts we have listened to today if I make this appeal

in an effort to find out what possibilities we have quickly to add to the United

Nations Force. The letter will be of the type I have indicated and it may be that

we shall have an opportunity to have a look at it — I do not know. I would,

however, at the same time remind you of what I Just recently said, namely, that

the letter will necessarily be what Member Governments are likely to consider aa

incomplete, and we should brace ourselves for the difficulties ahead when they

start asking Questions.

GRR/ek 97(The Secretary-General)

I believe that if it is not too inconvenient to you we should have a

similar meeting tomorrow, because we have to look at the investigation question,

and there are other questions which require quick action. If that is agreeable

to you, I would therefore suggest that we meet again at three o'clock and in

that ccse we may be abla to present to you further texts and suggestions for

yJUT consideration.

The meeting rose at 6.23 p.m.