Sincerely yours. - United Nations Archives

Mrs. Max Gordon

156 East 79tk Street

New York 21, New York

March 3, 1965

The Secretary GeneralU ThantUnited Nations,New York, N. Y.

Dear Secretary General U Thant,

I want you to know how encouraging it was to hear your

voice speak out for negotiations and peace in Vietnam.

It is shocking to realize the dangers the world is fac-

ing in this cruel, unnecessary war and only more voices

like yours can help pull us back from the abyss.

We need your sane reasoning and I thank you for every

statement you make.

Sincerely yours.

D CROSSF U N D

The Secretary GeneralU; ThantUnited. Nations,New York, N. Y.

"\Mrsr Max Gordon

156 East 79tk Street

New York 21, New York

CRISANTO C. UNDERWOOD, SALES MANAGER GAILEY B. UNDERWOOD, PRESIDENT

RES. TEL. 255-2O6O RESIDENCE TEL. 299-6133

REAL ESTATE-APPRAISALS-INVESTMENTS

REALTY 2SS-7547—255-7548— 25S-7549 2OIS SAN MATEO BLVD., NE

"Consulting Us Doesn't Cost — IT PAYS" ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

28 May 1965

V1

American Association for the ^^^^United Nations, Inc. ^^ ^

345 East 46th StreetNew York, New York

Attention: U. Thant

Dear Sir:

Please furnish the complete quotation preceding the article"The Road to Ruin" from the April issue of the Monthly Review,

Thank you.

Sincerely,

ley B./Underwood

GBU:bw

Encl.

MR 8 , w

ADVANCE GALLEY PROOF—MONTHLY REVIEW

9 MR

April 7965 So iniKh (or the United States claim that it:|rni t .mate" nuverriment in South Vietnam. Theri t w i t h that of the ho\ who• shot his mother..•! i h r ; . .!*kfl thi* mdjjc-Joi mercy on the grounc

A

-&*-KXnibB?S#5M!i 't-.'-i.-i2W -^; V^ («•£ ^"•K*H%'>*-l£fo tT*MrC'; 1 ^J Vi>*' J>v •'' ->f- - *. » ; • *• -

^^plf ^B^^^ l ^^^^ -'-me^0. .'1^*£ aS&H&wa

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/;." ••- ' .^V assumption,•'••,£' ."' ; ••- for grafted..' ' ''legitiTnate/goyeriirneiu^' >$ii..-\>

bouth, Vietnam. '....'- • itself, 'and

assistance.• : -.> • - -hî• though the sc,iji. "•>->. -i--'I.>-^'.--'»'•'-'.

, Paper' itself.'< . legitimate; governnienf in Soinh V.

• ment of the.. .luces âssuming thej'r.dl '.< in- ac ; - . . i u " ,•.!• ' ' i \ i \ ' l > t - !;iu,;j>rr;<:. I .. '••''

' . --.- as evidence oi the. u-ir iaik. i ' . . t .c.i. . .u<.:. a n > l u-^liai . . <A lin - :-l»l combattuig a foirî. . . . c a pier ol .1 ':i!;.c j>a.) t nt V t - ' . i i i i i i i v - "

k .. ' - '• '• icrntory. ••« •VShi, .'. ,f it. [s the .Saigon regime- i "leg^îuate govr.1

ment"r'.Oi is it a (juishng-npe puppet of a loreign unupic.;• ,./ Lviricntiv our whulr . i trn.nle HA\.u(l the ivi»r ui Vietnam Hi is; "*•'

:**•

' ' - : i !0 t' •- tf

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W' ^-••'•^riiton"Rthen'•Jf . incn, .,r- t^^^ri Nooh V

• I . I M . . . JiJlibt tHat ttie^' • K - .1 rJut the e

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Date:31 March 1965

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:DE: George Je Janecek

Director ERD/OPI

1/04/65-14 UNIC, KARACHI (PAKISTAN)2? MARCH, 1965.

Report on Editorial Comments in Pakistan during the Weak Ending 27 March

The Pakistan Press again remained occupied with the National Assemblyelections and their reactions. Some editorials were also devoted to the SecondMinisterial Council Meeting of the R»C«D. (Regional Cooperation for Development)countries at Islamabad, as well as the official visit of the Foreign Ministerof mainland China who caane to Pakistan to sign the border agreement.

There were some more editorial comments on the reported Indian egressionon Dahagram enclave in East Pakistan* Wishing success to the coming Conferenceof the provincial Chief Secretaries of East Pakistan and West Bengal, theMorning News said "that it couldlw possible only if'the Indian attitude would beone of good neighbourllness and respect for international law and the UnitMNations Charter". The paper addedt "But until such an assurance is forthcomingin the tangible form of a fair and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir disputeaccording to the agreed formula of a plebiscite; transfer of Berubari and otherenclaves to Pakistan in keeping with the NoHtti-Nehru Agreement; and stoppageof the eviction of Indian Muslims from Asam etc., it would be futile to expectthat we can have normal relations with her." . ,.

The Pakistan Times• criticising the United States policy for"escalating war in Viet-NamM said that "It is conducting this affair soruthlessly that it has rejected all appeals for restraint — U Thant'smove for a seven-Power Conference on South-East Asia, President de Gaulle'sproposal to hold Geneva-type moot and the sensible suggestion made by theAfro-Asian States to resolve the conflict through pacific negotiations". Itopined that "It may force China to jump into the fray and, as the inexorablelaws of history show, once again a small war may touch off a great war.n ThePakistan Observer also critieieed "the Johnson Administration" for "turning adeaf ear to the general feeling11 of that country.

•£.....

xmxmx SERVICE

NO.5.0/196

March 29, 1965,

To s Overseas Briefing Unit, SlD/OPI, New York

From s J.S. Sauszkiewicz, Director, UNIS, Rangoon

/

Subject t HfflSSSUKVEr

VIETMAMs

In editorials, ranging from sober commentaries to violent attacks 9 thenewspapers in Burma; with one exception, condemn US actions against North Vietnaipas well as the use of gaa and express faar lest the war in Se Vietnam develop intoanother world conflict. Colunnlafc U Yangon in RANGOON DAILY (25.3) urges theUN Hunan Rights Cofnndttee and WHO to inpos« & ban on the use of gas, In aneditorial th*J same day the paper advises that special care should bfl taken byBurma not to get involved in the ideological war between People *e China and theUSSR or in power politics by blocs. Tho paper also urgua countries which expresstheir goodwill towards Burma to show their respect for her policy of strictneutrality.

Long news agency* reports on the ECAFE Annual Session were carried by thepaper* every day. HANTHAtfADDT, in an editorial (21*3) calls for increased "effortsto remove the big inequality of the status existing between menibers o-f the ECAFEwhich are progressing as industrial countries and those which, remain in it asagriculture countries «n The papar also suggests the granting of _i>sui& atgibla interest to all needy members of ECAFE by the Asian Development Bank«

OUTER SPACE:

The latest USSR and USA apace achievements have been applauded andcommented on by all newspapers. While RAH&OOK DAILY warns against the misuseof scientific progress to dominate others , VANGUARD states that the 'J33R spaceflight Is also a victory in peaceful competition and should inspire all bigpowers for honourable competition in space science.

fcTSH DELHI

Name of Paper__

Date

Delki)

_2£^S5

A stronger U.N is in the interest ofall States, including China

JN a world wherebralnwork and money

are invested in propagandadesigned to cover up r,falaims, it Is not easy to estab-lish wh« Is true and tfhat isnot. Theft are several"authentic" versions of overymajor event and the sameword OF notion often hasdifferent , interpretations.Ironically, not infrequently agovernment become.fi a .victimOf ,'ka own propaganda,* The United NatWns 1s net the*nJy place where such deceptionis practised but. unles*. impres-SMBS are misleading, "l« certainly•feaa t|»» tef^'nuflfcer ft Its vie-tun* -Jo. any ,ca«»'.t&0 worldorganization Is mostly used forfio-calle* polemic-passion al-though in the confrontations thattake place there Is often littlegenuine passion or real polemics.As a rule, everything ts plannedin advance, like a campaign tosell a new product.

The reason*, of course, stemfrom historical, sociological andother conditions, but If we thinkof the conseouences. the vifioutcircle into which the UnitedNation* has been dragged poses

ha warning.. It la impossible toI jo on lik«. this, The discrepancy['between the common interests, forthe' promotion of which theworld organization was *£(. up,and the selfish aims that ire gra-idttP'Iy undermining Its very foun-dations, has become *o great thaimany wonder whcthc. the UN

By NenadovicIn this article a Yugoslav commentator discnsne* the

crisis facing the UN and the future of the organizalioa.In'lhe context of the Inability of the UN to play a uiefulrole Jo the Vietnam crisis, Us observations assume «pe-dal importance, si • ' '

can survive If things go on likethit.'

IDEALSAll this, of course, will sound

differently In the official version*put out by political and propa-ganda organs. They will noteven use the. word "propaganda."They talk only of great ideals.About unselfish' ideals like fr«o-dom, justice, revolution, demo-cracy etc. • i,

Thus, it Is in the name of pro*tectlng the threatened nrtnefples<jf the, United Nations that theUSA "!»J<r rtner We»t*rn count-ries demand 'unconditional implc-mentation of the sanctions pres-cribed by the Chitrter againstrhose in arrears of contributions.If this demand were concededthe USSR. (Prance, and other"debtors" witf'lose their right ofvoic, because thcso countries-—.raam on erounds of principle—refuse to hear 9 pon of the ex-penditure incurred on the so-called , UN peacemaking ope-rations.

To evade a voting that mayturn out to 04 its last, the Gene-

ral Assembly has In effect dep-rlven Itself of Its own right tovote. It i« waiting for the BigPowers to find a way out of thecrisis either by fhcmselvei orwith the help of others. At onepoint ihis.long wait nearly be-came" disastrous. Unexpectedly,

rh» A'banian delegate plungeddeep into the troubled Waters of"principled conflicts." He fierce-ly attacked i he domination ofthe ,Big'Powers, aiming espsclftl-ly It the USA and the USSR,and demanded that "the GeneralAssembly begin working "nor-mally."

POSTPONED , •Tfaft Albanian idea' was that

the UN should be cured of itsailment by some «ert of if aurftt*cal operation that weutd Kill tfte

patient. However, tnia',did nethappen. When Albania demand-ed a vote, the Assembly couldnot avoid voting: but It 'votedAgainst Albania's plan—that Is.China's plan.

This meant, in effect, post-ponement of the unwanted con-flict over the problem of debtsuntil better times. But since thecrisis remains—no one has resil-ed from his position—the ques-tion is for whom time works. Inother words what are the pros-pects of the UN being able tostand firmly on Its feet Main?

If the controversy over Article19 Is carried until a "Anal show-down," with everyone stickingto his position, Inevitably all wouldbe losers in the r-nd. includingthe Big Powers. For the worldbains what it Is, no one canpossibly expect the UN to serve

his interests alone. The UN wasset up to be a universal orja-niticlon and it can only existas such.

Tae UN wa» set up to promotethe common interesti of all—ora* Any rate cf most of thena ions. No reasonable man canassert that there are no longerany common interests to promote.On the contrary, It could be said.Jiat it the preient »ige of hu-man development, nations arebecoming inersavngly linked withone another by destiny. If thisriis 'orlcal truth i< respected, therei> prac ically no stile that canwork agaasi the UN withoutfinal analysis, working against itsown natiooaf interests,

It is, of ooiute, another ques-tion whether the UN can ke«pits ZG-yeirttfd structure. Fewbel'ev* it 'cAn. Men demandchange*. And most have cometo the conclusion that accommo-dating she old structure to newrelationship! li the only way forthe organization to avoid crisesl>kc the pr«tea'. one. From thispoint of view, U Thant's recentsuggest on? deserve the greatestattention and the recommenda-tions of the Cairo conference ofnontltgncd countries, which to-day ronititute (he majority in theUN, have opened up the path forb«t iolut'oot.

CHINAAnd nere we can state that,

in spite of all Anomalies, China'sneeds are not m contradictionwith the UN. True the Chinesebehave *s f their foremost aimIs to destroy th< world organi-sation at joon as possible. Thisprecisely was the Impression leftby the AltJanian intervcatioo.Tnl», however, only confirmswhit hat already been said aboutglaring, discrepancies which

; poliiical propaganda contc'ouslyor unconsciously Creates. If,bearing this in mind, Chinssem-moeuicring !t reduced to morerealiitic r^POrtlonj, things wlIJbecome clearer.

China'* position '» by no mean*simple. The Chineit cannat. of.course, be blamed for (he fartthalv iheir ,«t i.i t;.\ is held by

V^ v'

ft

the follower, of Chiang Kai-shek.IJnlll ihu Injustice is repaired.Ihe world organization cannotexpect of Ch'na more \han it i«prepared to give her, The effectof thi* situation cannot be goddfor «»I»r China or the UN.

The Chines* corhpUifl that the£ig Peweis follow a monopoly-tic policy and have monopolistic

'"lhe right :to eipresf thcT suspi-c:on». This-etperiencei --with th« •Big Powers were unpleasant — es- 'oeciaily with th* USA. j

RESISTANCETh«te are itid'tputable (actt.

But "this h not ill t)i»t cm besaid about China and it* rciitiance.

.For China, too. It no longerwhat it uted to be. H doe« notftand isolated in lt» tight forwhat belong! to it, whether in theUN or "in other plate*. The trou-ble it that China's policy doe*no: allow othen whit it demandsfor Itself. And, it it prtdwly onthii— on China'* own »ct»— thitthe rtaliution of China1! legalrights practically Increasingly «-pendi. If, for example, theChinese ginuidely with to fightmonopoly and domination, It Uin thtir highest interest tfi»t theUN should be protected and havethfc powerful tuppert of ill ratherthan of the mett powerful itatel

j only. . r

The true, vital laterettt ofChina, as well at of other «tate«,gr«at and small, cammand, brief-ly, the strengthening of the worldorganization, not its destruction.Thit aim can hardly be achievedwithout China; at th* same timeno si*te. inelud ng China, will doany good either to It self or toolhen by offering useless resist*anoe it the interests of themilority.

NEW DELHI

Name of Paper_

Date

RPiTRIOT (N«V Delhi

28 March 1965

«•••• —••«.—. — .-._.,_,

THANT M1SSIO N TO«o» MART HAGAN

NEW YORK, March 27.fHARGES of piracy and^.aggression in Vietnamwere hurled at US represen-tatives at the UN yesterdayak the peacekeeping com-mittee met to bewail the ab-sence of peace and then ad-journ for a month.-' ttwaharlal Nehru or)cc des-eriMd the UN «s the mirror ofttM -world. • Certainly the •organi-sation reflects th» > present con-fiisloD and paralysis.

The Soviets at UK, however,haro baea diseunlns the possi-

SOVIET PROPOSAL AT tJN MEETINGblllty of U Thant's going to Pe-king and Hanoi to explore thesentiments there on a negotiat-ed settlement of the Vietnamesewar. The Secretary-General iskiKiwit to. b< Interested in theidea*

US .officials have not madetheir reaction, to thc specific plan]cnown. There .is, not, howe\ef.in overwhelming affection for UThant In Washington these days.At s meeting In New York lastweek of UN supporters a 'HighStare Department official ii aidto 'have accused the Secretary-General • of "Inte/fering" • inSouth-east Asian affairs. TheAmericans tend to forget that

U Thant is an Asian and asSecretary-General, hi has someresponsibility for keeping thepeace. Annoyed as they arewjrh U Thant, the Americanamay be les* than enthusiasticabout his coing as emissary toPeking or Hanoi.

If U Thant it unacceptable ;«he.Soviets are prepared to suggestan' Indian or Crylontse. for thejob. Although tie Americans aredown on Thant. Mr Johnsonadopted UN" Under-SeeretaryPaid Hoffman's plan for Mekong,development as the "carrot" .toinduce the Nonh Vietnamese tocome to terms.' Although .the

Mekong Delta to ftlrttt4?>Af& 4fUN protett and tecfaricten*, MrHoffman foresees somctMflg'bll-her than the ,Tenn«saee ValleyAdministration'— a »ittt,r«ifon.a) development basW'';<Mi thepower and Irrigation pdsilWHtys,of the Mekong.' Mr- Hoffmn1

presented the nlan to t hadent a* an ahernatlr* ftpresent "stict."- • • , ,..-.

There is talk trial ''rohitson la now fad up Wtw tiM-*jry achisers and' la t/sttfnafylooking for. a way «tit4f Wittest*.Opposition to the present policyla grotving -r Colombia isdry ev-n -nstt'uMd ,a» >*H al«ht''teaching" where, prouaaora d<«-cussed the VieCnattca* dltuatfoa,

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Date:30 March

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE: George J, JaaeeekMreetor, ERD/OPI

by Br-ieflag Section, EKD/QPI, from UMIC, Accra, 30 March 1965.)

THE U-N- Security Councilmet recently in determine

whether the mandate of the I'.Npeace-keeping force in Cypru>should be extended. 'Ihe IMS'.Secretary-General, t I hant, ha--in a report to (ho Council,recommended a further twomonths' extension, '(bus thepeace-keeping force, which wassent to the island a year aj»<j,is still opera tine on anad-hoc basis.

ft is a fact that tin- force hasin the face or dilliculties, beenable to contain outbreaks olviolence between Greek andTurkish Cypriots, ami ;«lso in-sulated the problem from possi-ble Greek or Turkish niililar)intervention Hut u politicalsettlement is nowhere in sight,and the situation still containsthe seeds of noccrliiintv anddisruption.

Thus tin- uncer ta in ly aboutthe mandate of the I'.N. peace-keeping force underlies the cur-rent U.N. ileinroa. It waspossible to raise this force onthe clear understanding thai thecost of its operations would notbecome a charge on the generalbudget of the world body. Inother words, certain countries,notably the U.S. and Britain,guaranteed to pa; for its cost.

This unsatisfactory compro-mise was meant to aroid arecurrence of the controversyabout payments Tor the U.N.Congo operation, ii controversywhich has seriously weakenedthe United Nations.

The fact is that the U.N. isstill far from hating designed asatisfactory arrangement forcarrying out and paying for its

U ttiam I "•>'

U.N. PEACE-KEEI

FORCE IN

CYPRUSpeace-keeping operations. Amajor criticism of the L.N.Congo operation was that itbecame a cover for the pursuitof the interests not of the L'.N.but of Western powers. In thecase of Cyprus, it is the powersmost directly interested, whichare paying for its maintenance-

This, however, cannot be asatisfactory basis for conducting

f u t u r i t>|u'ruliuiis. MIR'i i n e t i t a -bly lh«- most M-rimis troublespots, be the* in ^uinli-KaslAsia 01 Vfrii-fl art also ureasin which I he interests ol thetwo major him--* c'ash

It is. honcur . in the -upromcinterest of (he majoriu of I ' .Vmembers, at an> rait' of (ht\fro-.\sian countries to cnsiinthai fu tu re I V pi-act-keepingoperation-- do not bt.-crinic apawn in tin. Fa-.t-\Vt-sf conHict.How to devise a madiincn toguarantee this must he theprimary concern of the l:.N.group tvhiclt is cu r r en t tx exami-ning the problem n! fk'-.ico-keeping operations

C O M M R N f A l O

<•X•>

OHAKA luM^IO REVIEW of 26 March 1965(this has also been broadcast texLually)

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Date:

29 March 1965

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:DE: George J» JanacekDirector, EED/OPI

• " " London Information Centre

PRESS OPINION REPORT

No. 12/6517-25 March 24 March 1965

Vietnam

Hopes of possible joint Anglo-Russian moves to ease the Vietnam situation were quicklydashed in the early stages of Mr. Gromyko's visit to London. The Daily Mirror (1? March)headline said "Gromyko's Vietnam Snub". Further comment followed hia press conference onFriday. The Scotsman (20 March) for example said "Mr. Gromyko's visit to London did noharm, but it did no good either" and the Times (20 March) suggested that the "difficulty is,of course, that on neither side is there anyone sufficiently in control of the situation tobargain effectively". The Economist (20 March) suggested that the most likely explanationof "Mr. Gromyko's silence" is "that Moscow is, in fact, impotent, caught in a dilemma in*vented by the ever ingenious and macchiavellian Chinese".

The Observer (21 March) in its clearest statement on Vietnam so far said that it waanot imperative for Britain to "privately interpret ... each side to the other" but more im-portant to attempt to bring pressure on China through the Afro-Asian countries. It con-cluded "so long as the British Government publicly identifies itself with an American policyabout which it is privately sceptical, it can do little to help create this pressure and oustresign itself to have little influence on events".

The news that gas was being used by S. Vietnam attracted a great deal of attention.The Guardian (23 March) said "this new development looks foolish to the point of dementia"and later "the use of gas seems to imply that the political war has now been given up forlost" and that "those for whom military factors alone are relevant ... shamble blindly intodeeper and deeper political difficulties". The Times (23 March) considered that while thegaa in question might be "leas ghastly" than other weapons in the modern chamber of horrors","much of world opinion will not stop and listen to American assurances that the gas beingused in Vietnam is not lethal". The Times, however, saw General Taylor's announcement that"there ia no limit to the potential increase o.f the war in Vietnam" as being a "more disturb-ing announcement". The Times said "It is even possible that it present American policy/will turn out to be correct1 but questioned whether the Americans "ultimate aims" in the con-flict "have been sufficiently clearly defined, and whether the consequences of failure havebeen fully faced".

Earlier in the week (16 March) the Times had stressed that "the origins of the war remainthose of a civil war".

CyprusThere was a reasonably full news coverage of developments concerning Cyprus including the

Security Council Meeting, the increasing tension on the island, the Turkish initiative and thevisit of the Force Commander to Lefka. But there was little comment except that the Express(22 March) suggested that "Britain's had many better uses for her money than protecting Makarioifrom the consequence of his policies".

South West Africa

Similarly the opening of the ICJ public pleadings on the S.V7. African case elicited somenews coverage but no coranent.

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Date:k March 1965

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:DE: George J. Janecek,

Director, ERD/OPI

1/04/65-13 WIG, KARACHI (PAKISTAN)20 MARCH, 1965.

Report on Editorial Comments in Pakistan during the Week Ending 20 March

The Pakistan Press devoted their editorials mainly to the domestic issues,including the Indian "aggression" on Dahagram in East Pakistan and the election toPakistan National Assembly to be held on 21 March.

The Dawn of Karachi, in its leader titled, "Punish; do;n«t Protest11,condemning the Indian "aggression" on Dahagram in East Pakistan, inter alia said:"But the time has come to say that words ... or protests lodged in Delhi or withthe UN, are not going to deter the Indian Chauvinists who have grown too big fortheir sandals because of the aid and support they are receiving from their bigpatrons ...M

The Morning News (Karachi/Dacca), in its editorial, "Act, And Act WithSpeed", condemning the Indian "aggression", said: "This is a direct challenge tou« it has to be followed up with strong retaliatory action .... And this hasto be done without waiting for the effete United Nations to move."

The Dawn, commenting on the "Escalation in Viet-Nam", expressed itsapprehension that "Washington's policy of widening the war in Viet-Nam .... hasgrave implications for the peace and freedom of the Asian mainland." The policywhich has "manifested itself in reckless and provocative deeds", are "easilycapable of precipitating a major war1*, it added. The paper further said: "If oneconsiders all relevant political and military factors .... one comes to theinescapable conclusion that the US is seeking entry into the Asian mainland not toprotect the interests of Asians but to serve the ends of its own geo-politicalstrategy". The Dawn concluded: "Washington's rejection of U Thant's proposal toconvene a conference to end the conflict and of the French appeal to negotiate apolitical settlement shows that the Administration has succumbed to the pressurebeing exerted by the war party in the Pentagon".

•IHHHHHHt


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Beceived from UKIC, Athens,

Date:

March 1965

CR. 13 (11^64)

FROM:DE:

GeorgexJ. JanecekDirector, ERD/OPI

CIPROS MAIL 15 MARCH

Greek

U Thant's report analysed. and criticised-••', fit, M"i'

'THERE WAS onjy-ijjttnrdedcomment yesterday ea»- 'U

Tnanf a report to the Security'but one point on which'k Cypriot Press seems

to ijiree ia; their criticism ofhjs allegedly' potting the Go-vernment and TurMsli Cypriotleadership on an equal footing.

tiQeftneria speaksfailure of

to eland oy the government Jnit* effort to restc^ law , andorder has created a. situationwon* than that.wtricirU tout;

, jpatrls describes U Thant'sviews as 'strange* and con-flicting -with the SecurityCouncil resolutions which re-cognise to the -Cyprus Govern-ment th« responeibUity to takeall measures'arid luldlthmalmeasures for restoration oflaw and Border in tlie country,

atf** expresses thethe Cyprus Foreign

Minister Mr Kyprianou willm i k p clear the Cypriot viewon HIP mn tier when he attendsUi.- Security Council debate,because; it says, if the roU ofL^FICYP '

The attitude' vby behaving asvernment authority,' has em-boldened the rebels. Ffad it notbeen for the presence of UN-FICYP and had the govern-ment been left-free to act aâny sovemlgn governmentwould have acted under such

la such ae V ThantiLi nert in his report, the pit- j C'**' an*! U Thant hadn«-p uj the international fui-cc , invite the attention of

•.Dili .! 'inly be the cau.se offf:-f-iitrr .inomalies and, Uioru-fo:. \\-(iiiid be useless In Cyp-rus.

A {on. dealing with TThant'.s hint thai propolis'w.l i ê mailt' for removal of . i l l

tifications in fact conformswith the President's offer ofOctober last for a general am-nesty and removal of all go-vernment fortifications if theTurkish side was ready to dothe same..

But Haravghl disagrees withU Thant's equating the go-vernment and rebel forces andtakes exception to the com-plaints that the Cypriot Pressengages in unfounded attack onUNFICYP. There are many in-stances of UNFICYP mem-bers behnving in; a manner re-flecting on the name of UNET-

betterUNFI-

ICYP to the need of enforcing I! i\ more effective discipline and' compliance with the terms ofthe Security Council resolu-t:ii!«i. the paper'says.

Voitt than one paper ye.s-terduy published reports of

clrcumstancpp, the position" fortifications wbfcb are not Turkish.I'm-ceased activity inwould b*> normal by now. it essential for the flef<;nce ot Cy-' inn Foniasjusta area. Accord-says. •; , Pto» against, external aftack., irl? to ,h)..e report3 a number

Another point on which U spys that such essential tie- ' of Turks trained in TurkeyThant's report is being criti- ' fences nre not only those which lan-li-d at the coast near thecised is his appeal to »the par. are intended to prevent sea- I Turk.* v<Uage of Galinopornl.- .ties concerned* to agree to flnfl i >ôrnu and r>irt"»rne roiil;a long term .solution. Elefthe- \ also tno;* whJch nrcria says the only party con-cerned must be tht> 'cyprtOtpeople them^selves and the onlyfair and long trrm solution • i"Belf -determination • '

to chrrh iccal «)jmt.-n's-^ftuki 'n;-«fc;e in s(ip.*i ttn|.ti*n -to hrlp the ii-.wad*!*;

HntiVV^)>> W'>'^ ^T Tiui'••r rin ovul of

but ' Agi n publishes reports" thati ••lush Cypriot policemen

hat ve*e engaged in espionage ac-a<jv Xi"ty i.s fnr hack as 1960.

intn; says that Generalot ; O"lvas mny be K°'IK to AlhrnL l

f(T- ftr new .talks next week.

Greek Pre*»

Mediator's report said toadvise independence

report of U.N. Svcrt'UuyGeneral U Thant to the

Security Council proposing ex.tension of the U.N. Force r..rCyprus for another threemonths IM presented In the lo-cal papers tut u late nrws Item.

Meantime all Greek Cyprtotpapers reproduced t'runi theAthens Imtrn' (The Day) aNvw York despatch purport-ing to contain au then t ic in-formation abou1 the contents ofIhe Mediator's nnttt 'lpati I •»•-l>ort (in Cyprus

The recommendation;; ofMr. Galo Plazn, nccordlng tothis report, an- summed up as:

» Cyprus lo form in indepen-dent siatr with majority rule andWlthflUl a TU'^Kl^h \V'O 1 Mr (Mjj( f

iiid <{riii1.trnii-iir ti) r"- 'ni-ulraliii't!ihfti is. r-i »-i i i-^pon^iblu fn irtt '

^overnmi-nt lhro»Kl< an 'tndvjirn- idciii" ,hld and unv dispute 10 be 'rtM< rml tr> an liitcrnutional bndv Isui.h at the United Nations.

» Thi- trraly of establishment '.nbe uhollsried and tht* Greek andTurklih conilniti-nis t:> hi< movedfrom Cyprus.

The Athens paper's cor-respondent .says Mr Galo Plazacould not lecoimnend abolitionof the suite .'ven if he agreedthat the i.nlon of Cyprus withdreec' ot'leivd the bent solu-Uon.

H<- is aaln said to he pro-posing' safeguards of Turkishrights through the Hiipervi-sio i of tT.N observers.

Ag'in yei-U'rdjiy publishedlist ri>pnrtij about re-

.ni[ my uf Trrlti.-ih lord', in

the Karpass area whlcli Isi) now, It Hayw. as alanding place, an al-

ternative U> the Let'ka-Xerosarea in Murphou Bay.

According' to the. paper thebeach fivin Kainagusta toBof^haz is considered a likelypoint ol landing syhlle Turksare engaged in levelling ope-rations near Plutanlsso villageprobably fot the construction

of a liindiui, strip'.The .same paper niiys Turks,

have prepared a tunnel start.Ing from Dr. Kuchuk's officeto the K>reni;x roaJ near theCyprus- Cold Stores, to provl.de an escape if it should benecessttfy. while other tun-nels are vised us arms andsupplv depots or underground

CYPRUS MAIL fi MARCH 1965,

Greek PressA.

Mr. Galo Plaza . under attack-again • • ' • • • • • • " • ,,:::.

TPHE NEW* U.N. MrPlaxa inprua haveprise* toofficialpie,

Thestatemeattributed it

'real aur-i '•government'Qypfriot peo.yesterday.

says that if thevo been corn.-ctlymean* that the

Mediator will "not propose any;solutions butSbnly some sortof <legai stfUuvf in'ttie for»&

'of an independent1' Cypruswith a provisional adrnirn>trn>tlon with ffiy participation of

The Mediator is also underattack for saying that the

• • -if IK-T -•t-i>-iaria.-.aria0^n

British'bases do not form partof the dispute. Both Makhiand Haravghi declare thatsuch statements do not fit inwith his mission suico conti-nued retention of' the basesmeans «continued strife and acontinued threat to'peace*.

Phileluftheros's London cor-,respondent accuses Vthjj,' Ame-ricans of new interventionsfanning •• passions in Ankara.and reactions aiming- at get-ting- the Cyprus problem in-:t lLIJ i Lilt; V- > l*J L10 LflVUI^Il l 111- -M-llTj

volved in new five party talks.' ffi1

- - ™ar

for thi> overthrow of the Ino-nu administration, says thatAnkara can now have firsthand knowledge of the nastyeffects of outsldg interferenceIn Its Internal affairs andshould see that the greatpowers, whether Russia orAmerica, only seek to servetheir own interests.'

Therefore what the Turkshave to do is to revise theirthoughts, promote genuinefriendly relations with theirneighbours and let the Cy-

i.t.t il- rsett'e thefr

»>«lhen.prniH

refen-ing to Tur-conplainttt ;that

arf

Agon yesterday said it re-Ma(Wy lwrna that the ques-tion of alleged American-in-BpirMt espionage Is now inthe hands of the Legal De-partment. The Ministry ofth* Interior have placed at theDepartment's disposal a volu-minous flte 6f documents thestudy of which will take a longtime before it Is decided whe-ther action shall or can be ta-ken,,lt says.

Greek Press

'Government to ask forreduction in U-N. Force

ACCORDING to a report inITiiloleftheros yesterday lhq

Cyprus government will se?ka reduction of the troops ofUNFICYP when renewal ofthe mandate la being discussed.

According to Agon the Fo-reign Minister Mr Kyprianouis leaving- early next week forNew York via Athens, wherehr» will spend a few (lays f<"consultations.

Eleftheria welcomes GeneralGrivaK's Lyssi speech, in whichhe referred to the dim of the.struggle being what PremierIMpahdreou and President. JMa-karlo.s hnd declared it to be —Enosis — and hopes lie will gofurther to disassociate himselffrom the group which claimsto speak for him and gives theimpression of a rift existingbetween him and the Presi-dent.

The espionage- serial ofAgrm yesterday disclosed thatformer Cypriot Intelligence

Chief, Mr Lagoudonti.s, v, tin ifnow in London, has managedto secure employment byGreek security and is shortlymoving to Athens, where hohas already sent his son.

The paper appealed to theGreek authorities not to fallinto the trap of engaging nCypriot snid to he under a

I ch n-ge «>f -spying against hisj own tirtintvv.I Agon says this new mowwas disclosed with a letteronly Fix days old, dated Feb-ruary 2;>, I96.r>, which is signed

T.,inda>< '-.ud to be pseudonymof Lagoudontis. who writes tnhis friend, -thi1 chief Amei'ic.nnspy, in C\pn .v, to iiHsisi himto obtain n dlvorfe.

Accoi'ding to tile [ ;tpc: 1 .goudonti.s has fallen 1:1 lovewith a woman working in es-pionage in Cyprus and in seek-ing a divorce f n > v t his -vifp.

But while A > ; ( . i i muti-, .•yubllcutton of it.- story ol

Amei icun c.-puiuugeagainst the Makarios adminf-.•slration and personally againstMiikarlos and the Minister ofthe Interior Mi- Yorgadjis. the |pro-Gnvas Patris challenged !

the government tn suy why it ihas taken no action if. us it isalleged, It knew of the plotfor the past three years andA-hv it has allowed known

[• ' ,>U"rs» and 'spies tn leave•li t - 1^; nri.

t ' t i tris sayv 'he (iovernmentought to havi- l ; i k e n the mat-ter t<> the c . ' i r i . s 01 fchould doso now m f - i c i c . ] <'f allowing the•alleged evi'ieniv to become a iSMI ialise.1 story to serve paili- j-nn p u l ' r i r . i l interests and f(Jr••.."I - I ' T I R I T V .-iguinst unarmed'

' person iThe p.ipcr M ' i \ e > notice on

the C!uveni:aenl to net within2-t houv-i else it will vtftct tint \v:iy f i t t i n g wi th ciri-um-: t m;-« " ''i put to order .inv one

tin.- publii; peace *

1- ' J


TO*£. * The Secretary-General



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Date:

25 March 1965

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:George J. JanacekDirector, ERD/QPI

xxxxmm SERVICE

fcrch 22, 1965.

To t Oversea* Briefing Unit, EHD/OPI, New Tork

Proa a J.S. Ssusakiewlca, Director, UKIS, Rangoon

Subject : PRESS SURVEY

EC ATE

Prominent space is given in several local papers to the ECAFE Annual SOBSion,

In an editorial, HANTHjWAEDY (16 March) proposes that the SCATS should do everything

possible to increase production in the under-developed countries which are finding

it difficult to keep their production abreast of their increasing population. This

can be achieved by sufficient supply of technical experts, capital investarai and

drawing up right projects, the paper states.

Like the HANTHAWADDT editorial, also an editorial carried by THE rfORKUJB PEOPLE'S

DAILY (20 March) was based on an ECAFE Press Release which was re-issued by this

office. The latter editorial concludes by stating! "The disparity between the

export earnings and the iaport needs is an arbitrary relation which nay be oani-

pulated by the manufacturing countries at will. It is an International obligation

of the manufacturing nations to refrain fron such practices designed to push their

own interests at the expense of sail countries struggling to stand on their own

feet and start sincerely co-operating with theou"

(l similar report plus clippings have been sent to Mr. Tanzer directly).

22 mars 1965

REPORT ON EDITORIAL OQWffiNT IN SWITZERLAND

Au cours do la fin de semaine, nombreuK ont 6td les sujets qui ont

found la mat!fere des prlncipaux titres des journaux : la deterioration de

la situation a Chypre, la deuxieme tour des elections munieipales en France,

les lemons de la re'cente reussite spatiale de 1»URSS, le 13eme raid des avia-

tions sud-vietnamienne et americaine au nord du l?eme paralible et ausai la

marche entreprise par les integrationnistes amdrieains de SeLna 4 tiontgomeiy*

CaTPRE

La question de Chypre revient au premier plan de I1actuality st le Journal

de Gdn&ve (20 mars) consacre son editorial au rapport "guere optimists'1 que

U Thant vient de ramettre au Conseil de se'eurite'. L*auteur ecrit notanment t

•ttalheureusement, malgrfi dee mois de pourparlers entre les trois Etats direc-

temant intdressfis, malgrS I'intervention de deux mfidiateurs SMccessils, auoiui

eomproais n'est apparu. Le second de oes mediateurs, M0 Galo Plaza n»a pas

mfiiae reMigd de rapport a 1'intention du Conseil de s^ourite, se bomant & lalre

part au Secretaire gendral de 1'echeo de ses tentatives.

D'autrs part, le eorrespondant & 1>ONU de la Heuo Zurcher Zeitun,-. (19 mars),

relevant qua le Conseil de seeuritd a recondvit le mandat de l»wrrTCYP pour

trois moi% indique quo la plupart des membres du Conaell de seourita ont fdlicit4

leur collegue sovietique pour le succes des eosnionautelt et recarqug 4 ce propos

que M. Stevenson, ces derniers temps, "emaille de plus en plus 333 talents

oratoires de plaisanteries douteuses".

GATT

La Tribune de Gen&ve (19 mars) revient sur la reunion du GATT qui s'eat

teruin^e jeudi dernier et ecrivait & ce propos t "En resume, la session a Ste"

fructueuse : la niSgociation agricole semble sortie de I'imparse, bieii que le

chemin i parcourir soit encore Vri-is long, les conditions de participation des

pays du tiers monde ont 6t6 definies et les delegues d»Europe orientale oat

trouve le moyen de s'aaseoir a la table de coaTarence.u

UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE, BELGRADE

19 March, 1965

Report on Editorial Comments in Yugoslavia

The direct engagement of American military forces in Viet-Nam, therevival of the Cypriot crisis, the situation in the Congo and the activitiesof the non-aligned countries aimed at finding new possibilities for solvingthe crisis in international relations were topics to which the press devotedmost publicity in the field of international politics in relation to the UnitedNations, during the past week.

The latest success of the Soviet cosmonautics was greeted as the achieve-ment of Soviet and world science alike.

The repeated bombings of the Aaerican air force on the territory of NorthViet-Naa, and, the reinforced engagement of American military forces in Sooth Viet-Naa were generally appraised as dangerous moves which from actions of "retaliation"grow into real war operations.

BOHBA (16 March) wrote that the "current events in Viet-Nam should be ooa-eidered..« in the broader context of the attempt to generalize and legalize methodsof taking the law into one's own hands, the undertaking of violent steps againstothers, which is, as a matter of fact, already the case even outside the Indo-Caiaaparallels - e*g'» in the Congo", and therefore, "the most recent engagements of thenon-aligned countries.•• in Belgrade ..« are indeed an indiapenaible collectiveeffort to spare the world from war devastation and put it back on the track ofactive and peaceful coexistence"*

POLITIKA (15 March) considered that the meetings of the representatives ofnoa-aligned counties in Belgrade were"manifestations of the desire to do aoaotS&agbefore it is too late, that the machine that is floundering into great uaeertaiffityis atopped, and that peace be preserved* It must openly be said that ever siasothe tiae of the Caribbean crisis, there was no greater threat to peace, nor was theworld's concern ever it so enormous"*

OSLOBODJEHJE (15 March) supported the opinion that "the action of the aoa-aligned countries has prospects of bearing fruit, because it is directed at tadwide mobilisation of forces for preventing the outbreak of a broader militaryconflict* for the defense of the legitimate rights of the peoples of Indo-Caiaaand for making impossible any adventurous undertakings which could set fire sotonly to the Indo-China Peninsula but to a broader region"*

The organizing of elections by the Moise Tchombe government has beea inter-preted by the Yugoslav press as a farse and a aeo-eolonial operation which is ia-taaded for the legalization of the Leopoldville regime. According to BOBBA "exceptin the vicinity of Leopoldville and in South Katanga, the elections will actuallybe held only in the larger cities and settlements - there where only Tchombe'3mercenaries are stationed to effectively keep in power"* The results of the roccatmeeting of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity were con-sidered unsatisfactory because, according to BOHBA, "a majority has, unfortunately,act been found even for the formula which could lead to the effective eagageaeatof the Organisation in repelling foreign intervention in the Congo". Accordingto the newspaper, "it is hard to believe that the Organization of African Usity shallunder conditions of even greater disagreement among the African states with regardto the Congolese drama, succeed in doing anything positive before September**

CR.13 (4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P

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DATE:

19 March 1965

FROM:

GeorgeUJ. Janecek,Director, ERD/OPI

mtoB03C0U HO 18 S735

HIISS

$9 etfOTE TO STOP BUST? WAR IH IN00C3INA S8VKT

AfiD? UÛOTE UNDER THIS f HIE

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If ftAftgH STO? f>K£SS iÊPOfin THAT Qt'ESTION SUdTf

ACTICKS AGAINST EEHOCRATJC

MEASURES FOR StdBttlUS ASSISTANCE

T0 VIETN/WE3E PCGHE

«It£ UHCUSÊD AT HEFTIM STOP AS IS

UHAWIHOU^LV A0o?^ri:D ftppEAt TO mm® mviw IN WHICH

OF

m tmwmm UKSUOTE STOPTHAT GUOH Th'E Sfg@Î$ ANtJ

OF PROTEST AÂLffST AGGISESSHE A^ff?l7U^£3 OF

THf SO@N£6 «1U T&iy&Pff JUST CAIfSf

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UN6UOTE

NEW YORK WORLD-TELEGRAM MD SUN, Friday, 19 March 1965

••-•v ,v X.,,'0By Richard Starnes

Pentagonlias Viet Starf—But It's Kept Secret

i &SSpl

SCARCELY A MONTH'' AGO as thetruth-seeking 'hindsight flies, U Thantstirred up-the conditioned reflexes that

lurk in, all-editorial pages when he said theAmerican people, "if they know the truefaets^ will feel that further bloodshed is un-necessary and that negotiation!', alone cancreajp1'conditions which would 'enable theUriited'.St-ates to withdraw gracefully" fromVietnam."

, 4&ftot of Chronically short fuses sputteredangrfly at the suggestion the American peo-

1 ple/iipe.not.,being told .thelscore in Viet Nam,ahiil^por.. Uncle T. wa.s'-cbmpelled to issue astatement, that appeared to. disavow whatiti^gs'aid the day before! Close reading (adying art in,, pur soap-selling culture) dis-closes:: that 'the , United Nations secretary-genetal. didn't really recant at all. -But heseemed-ip, and thus honor was saved.

"Npwywe find: that U Tharit was uttering'..prophetic truth of a high orderi' :The: American people are not being told;theh-truth?;about the clandestine war that-is:biirig •Ragged out against North Viet Nam.American;*| reporters have been arrested(tftoug^vlater released) by United Statestroopsâ' circumstance that would havecaused'an outraged cry. in a more vigorousdayând they have been denied access tonev^s at .its source in Viet Nam.

- . Reporters have been forbidden access toofficers'':., clubs and mess facilities at theDa. Nang air base and in the .city of Da

: Nang. At least one U.S. military spokesmangayie the witless excuse that an installation•;feared to feed and water 8000 troops wouldfije overwhelmed at the additional burden im-

by two score reporters.

" ,. This sort of totalitarian abuse never 90-jgarred in the blackest days of World War II.;?ljj:e.:theory in that war was that the people?$$<>' were paying for it and sending their:s£ns-.tp die in it were entitled to know about

-Old correspondents flew combat mis-:,landed on beaches, shared the dan-

:iger.st;wdf&the!-;.toi.;gh young kids who did the'-•-K'X'u¥l« Jl. . ';î •D«:4TVV*i1'™-JLil'l'JL •*«„ j TT<~—: _ Ti«..1n 4-~

pBM^M^^^Sfe^^.^Vpany. ,-"diled,.;iJp..-'cpmbatâirmea- With; nothing .' 'Hiif- 'tl-icMT1 "•HfffoTiminn+iriTi rsC'ct\ci,'Me?p. -truth ahd-

There is no security consideration in", the;news controversy in Viet Nam. War. | re-porters exercise built-in pre-censorship;;.';nl-.';deed all willingly submit to more format,censorship when circumstaijees''demand 'it.1'But pruning potentially harmful facts/.'fronvcopy and choking news off at the source -âre two vastly different things. In thg'|irstînstance the enemy is properly depriVedôfinformaion that might help him. In the;.;second, it is the American people w&rare'kept in shameful ignorance. _'_

Defense Secretary Robert McNain'ara,',who once shuttled between Saigon' and;Washington like an optimistic yo-yo,- Was'-long been displeased by the nature of the vreporting from Viet Nam. He should have''been, of course, because accounts b'y;'rthepress corps seldom jibed with the Defense-Department's own rosy estimate thati:cthewar was being won.

Some weeks ago, McNamara instituted, adangerous innovation toy offering selectedstateside journalists free 10-day junk'e't's:?tp;Saigon, where they were to be met by^mili-';tary shepherds and shown any aspect of .the-war they wanted to see. I have been unablelto learn if this determination to show every-thing to these U.S>subsidized reporters TIKeluded the air base at Da Nang, or in'.ainy.,event if it still includes it. ;: '-!;'~' "'

The official rationale of this experimentin news management was in exquisitely 'poor taste. It was to the effect that.'thearrival of hand-picked squads of fresh-^-andinexperienced—reporters in Saigon wouldencourage resident correspondents . to --go-more into the field and see what the'- warwas really about. This, to be sure, was a 'thinly veiled libel of a'courageous g'r.olif-ofnewsmen. Some (including Scripps-Howard's,-'Jim Lucas) have spent far more days in"Scombat than many American troops n6%in!lViet Nam. i- ^-:\

These circumstances bring into ShSfp"''question the reliability of the accounts'- of •the war that are being made available t& the'American' people. Many air raids agsfljisfcxNofteVietnamese targets are now recouSited;i

... only, by Radio Hanoi—a bitter commelitarj'tlvfjOJjj'ihe*.present Pentagon view of tHe;3pe't)d

CR.13 (4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P


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l^ t^ itf . ,x

~"7VDA

A87VV £(450) N I G H T LEAD VIET MAM NEWS C O V E R A G EW A S H I N G T O N , MARCH Ig CAP }-A NEW YORK CONGRESSMAN EXPRESSED HIS

CONCERN TO SECRETARY OT DEFENSE ROBERT S. M C N A M A R A TODAY "OVERRECENT REPORTS OF O F F I C I A L RESTRICTIONS ON NEWS C O V E R A G E IN V I E TNAM."

REP. BENJAMIN S. ROSEHTHAL, D - N . Y , , M A D E PUBLIC HIS LETTER TOMCNAMARA SHORTLY AFTER A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN D I S A V O W E D AMYPLANS TO IMPOSE CENSORSHIP ON THE HEWS COVERAGE,

PRESS OFFICER ROBERT J, MCCLOSKEY TOLD REPORTERS THEY W I L L BEGIVEN A REPORT ON A CONFERENCE OF W A S H I N G T O N AMD S A I G O N I N F O R M A T I O NOFFICIALS NOW UNDER WAY IN HONOLULU.

"THERE HAS BEEN NO POLICY AIMED AT RESTRICTING THE F L O W OF NEWS,"MCC1..QSKEV S A I D . — \

<Sfi^MTHAL SAID IN HIS LETTER TO THE DEFJENSE CHIEF);"MY 0 WM~CUNC JLKN U V m ' iH1S M A T'i JL K 1S INCRE A5 EITti yTE RSIS TIH G

SPECULATION BY SUCH I N T E R N A T I O N A L LEADERS AS THE SECRETARY G E N E R A L OFTHE UNITED N A T I O N S , SUGGESTING THAT TOE A M E R I C A N PEOPLE ARE MOT'LEARNING ALL THE FACTS ABOUT VIET H A M . ' I AM SURE YOU AGREE THATWE CANNOT AFFORD TO G I V E ANY SUCH SPECULATIONS C R E D I B I L I T Y . "

ROSENTHAL NOTED DISPATCHES REPORTING T H A T F O R E I G N C O R R E S P O N D E N T SIN SOUTH VIET NAM CONTEND THAT THE O F F I C I A L RESTRICTIONS ARE M A K I N GTOE WAR THERE MORE D I F F I C U L T TO COVER THAN AT ANY TIME ST?CE MAJORU.S. INVOLVEMENT BEGAN IN 1961.

"MANY MEMBERS OF THE PRESS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT PRESENT O F F I C I A LPOLICY REPRESENTS A DEPARTURE FROM T R A D I T I O N A L C O f l V E I T I O T I S OF WARC O V E R A G E ^ * SAID ROSENTHAL, AND HE ADDED S

"I AM CERTAIN YOU F E E L ' S T R O N G L Y , AS DO I, THAT A F U N D A M E N T A LD E M O C R A T I C RIGHT, IS THE RIGHT TO K N O W , ON MANY OCCASIONS YOU H A V EEXPRESSED YOUR COMMITMENT TO THIS R I G H T . DF~PITE THE S E C U R I T YREQUIREMENTS I M P L I C I T IN THE C O N D U C T O F ' M O D E R N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y , LET MESAY THAT I APPRECIATE THE CONSTANT D I F F I C U L T Y OF D E T E R M I N I N G E X A C T L YWHERE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS NECESSITATE SOME F O R M A L CENSORSHIP. I AMSURE THIS MATTER IS G I V E N C O N T I N U I N G ATTENTION BY YOU AND OTHERGO VERNMEN T OF F I C I A LS .

AH8WX £"HOWEVER, I DO FEEL THAT THIS COUNTRY CANNOT PROFIT BY A M B I G U I T I E S

IN O F F I C I A L POLICY TOWARD NEWSPAPER COVERAGE IN SOUTHEAST A S I A . IF ,AS THE REPORTS OF PRUDENT AND RESPONSIBLE NEWSPAPERMEN SUGGEST, SUCHAMBIGUITIES DO EXIST, I WOULD WELCOME ANY E X P L A N A T I O N OF T H E I R'CAUSE AND CHARACTER."

MCCLOSKEY M A D E HIS STATEMENTS D U R I N G THE DEPARTMENT'S D A I L YPRESS B R I E F I N G AFTER BEING ASKED ABOUT DISPATCHES FROM U.S.CORRESPONDENTS IN SOUTH VIET MAM TELLING OF I N C R E A S E D R E S T R I C T I O N S INC O V E R I N G THE WAR,

HE SAID THESE MATTERS NOW ARE BEING DISCUSSED AT A H A W A I I M E E T I N GOF U.S. GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICERS AND A B R I E F I N G FOR NEWSME1! W I L L BEHELD HERE *TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON THE DEVELOPMENTS ANDDECISIONS ON HONOLULU.*

HE SET MO DATE FOR THE B R I E F I N G HERE, BUT SAID THE STATEDEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE AT HONOLULU W I L L HOT RETURN BEFORE S A T U R D A Y .

JAMES G, G R E E N F I E L D , ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLICA F F A I R S , REPRESENTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT THE TWO-DAY M E E T I N G IMH A W A I I . OTHER PRESS RELATIONS OFFICERS WERE PRESENT F R O M W A S H I N G T O NAGENCIES AND FROM A M E R I C A N MISSIONS IN S A I G O N .

KB617PES

R O U T I N G S L I P


TO:The Secretary-General

APPROVAL

MAY WE CONFER?

YOUR SIGNATURE

NOTE AND FILE

NOTE AND RETURN

YOUR COMMENTS

X YOUR INFORMATION

AS REQUESTED

FOR ACTION


PREPARE DRAFT


DATE:

18 March 196;FROM:Georfee J. Janecek

Director, ERD/OPI

March 15, 1965»

To i Overseas Briefing Unit, ERD/OPI, Now York

Froas J J.S. Sauszkiewics, Director, UNIS, Rangoon

Subject J

Much space was devoted bj most of the papers to news agsncy reports

on S<scretG,ry-&enGral IT Thant*s proposals with regard to the question of

South-Vietaam. WORKING PQOPLE'S DAILY (feglish Edition }, In an «ditorl«l

on 12 rch, thinks it taost important that win this grave hour a climto

©f ealsa Ernst be created in which & peaceful settlecsent say y©i be aehieTO

Hi® ?istnaiB problem is treated l»y H»st paperes as the EBost burning inter-

national issue,. While alasoet all of them think that a solution should bey^i^:^&foimd at the conference tabl®, the Chinsse language paper FREEDOM |f! * la*--

^4an editorial on 4 March,, writes 8 KIn order to win the anti-CoHssunist

in ¥i0tnfl.JHf the US should us© the South Korean asrsqj and op-sn a aecondA

field on the Coismunist-occupiGd Chines© imirjlandj th© root cause of Coamaajlst

woe in

(5 March) s 9Th© TO desarves uaich gratitude froa ths world for

the majgnar.lESDus way she saatee it possible for the UN to 'forrs the 3>«a.ticm

p«sao« preservation

CR.13 (4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P


TO:the Secretary-General

APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION

MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION

NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT

YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

\DATE:

18 March 1965

FROM: > ^

ILGeorge Jw JanecekDirector, ERD/OPI

UNITED NATIONS Wmi NATIONS UNIESRoontll. Nt. OhtMUchi Bldi.

4. 1-eluaw, Ohumuhi. _..«!»«*£ Tok,o UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE iSiS 2H-102S-9

Ttl. Jll-lOW-9TOKOMMPHESS TOKYO K1BS v »<6 ' l t " f f l -b "J 4f —

linJ'.Ffl? ?S /M f*^ *W *• ^ i'

Report on EkJltjcarial Comment jln Japan

Referring to Int'erhatiohal Cooperation Year, The Nihon Keizai ShLmhun (TheJapan Economic Daily) on 1.1 March deplores the fact that there are too many pessi-mistic elements ahead so far this year in defiance of the original projects ac-cording to which worldwide colorful observances are to take place under UnitedNations sponsorship. .

"As a matter of fact," it says, "we are likely to have one of the most fruitlessyears in the field of international cooperation,," Enumerating such examples asIndonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, the paralyzed nineteenth session ofthe General Assembly, Francei's call for a drastically reorganized United Nationsand the dangerously developing Vietnamese situation, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun says,"Our impression is that the prospect for International Cooperation Year i^ ever sogloomy as far as world politics is concerned, and also the same in the case ofinternational

The_ Nihon^Keizai fonbjun regrets that a widening gap between the North andSouth is partly a result of the insignificantly adjourned nineteenth session ofthe General Assembly, because it had been expected to take a step forward for itssettlement on the basis of the achievements made by the United Nations Conference

^on Trade and Development held in Geneva last year0

Another pessimistic factor, it observes, is the recent French move for creatinga new international currency, entirely independent of the existing internationalfinancial system, which France claims has been dominated only by the Anglo-Saxonpeople.

In these circumstances, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun wonders how the world cancreate a favorable atmosphere to make this year worthwhile to promote internationalcooperation, and calls on all the countries of the world to ponder "this universalpriority."

The Jjipan Times on 11 March observes that a proposal for a fresh conferenceon the Vietnamese problem in which Communist China, as well as Worth Vi^tran,, wouldbe asked to partial pate? has little to commend it0 In view of statements made inPeiping and Hanoi, the paper says, it could hardly be expected to achieve success,,It predicts that, tha divided political sympathies shown in the International ControlCommission's reports would be just as active in any conference of the nature under-stood to have been suggested by Secretary-General If Thant. Thus The^ Tj mes viewsas sound the American requirement that a cessation of hostilities must precede anyfresh conference on Vietnam.

# -a- *

cc: Centre Services, BR, DPI

--£- ?-*> »* r*T,

0 - - - •|TBi SHANAtAN :TtMfeS

TCHING THE WORLD

tha pa.« week, T <• r T• important people rn.ide

•s ery important u p e e r h e ,£.boa( . rcconstrttCtiriK t b cTnlted Nations so that It willbecome an effective tnstra-ment for world -peaof Eventhough the speakers includedsurh notables aj, I Th;mt. theSecretary.General of the I 'N,Senator FnlbriEht. the Chair-man of the I .S. Senate Kor-r'tzn Relations 'Commit teeand Mr. Toynbcf. the emi-nent historian, the ff int-ct ivevalue of their mint rontribi?-tion toward* srl t l ins theproblems of (he ( n:tedNat ions amounted to pr.i" nothing. They u-iufno? tn'o f M n d . i n i t ; n t . i l pre-i i inr i l t ions for tho re''"!"-! t i c -i i ' i n of the Worn V — i i i M rsi : n Affect ive p ( i i i ' i i : i ' . , r^.mi.sat on, and for the

oance of world peace — theelimination of imperialismand the admission of China,

By omirt.lng a'discussion onthe>e pre-conditions, t h e vomitted all realism from theircontributions, and merely in-duifterf Jn wishful, wistful ande n e r v a t i n g day-dreams,which in the long run may doeven mure- harm to the UnitedN'.ulnns Than the misguidedidealism of thp Swedish poefand banker, the late DagHamin iT . s ikn i J . w h o s o w e dnrui-u ,->f thf seeds of the pre •--ei;' cri.M« !n the fer t i le com-

QUOTE:In every oge there is only one important

philosophy to help men arrive at reality. lr>

this age It is dialectical materialism with its

derivatives like Consciencisrn.

t oljii* oiflntaisicaOng con-• ' • ' ! - ' - • • • • - •

If tfcj u-N. u not retardedc&eflr iw= a polltioal body,moving Una being moved bypower iwUttca and economicforces, j then It .1* inerely anfcxtcnslvR tattdne ahop with80in« social welfara agencies

guise or confuse this distinc-tion between the two alterna-tives open .to the UnitedNations, only strengthens thehands of -thpss. who wish tokeep, the,; Wda^Assembly im-potent, or who wish to accen-tuate Ha rote as an Ideologi-cal and practical instrumentfor the capitalist system andthe Western.,powers

C Thant la perfectly correctIn pointing out that the pre-sent U.N Charter was design-ed to meet wmergencies andexigencies wjch »» arose fromthe war'= "'aim's and racialIntolerance of the Axis Pow-ersv and that "rtew allsn-rhents since'the war, with oldcomrades falling out sna oldenemies becoming friends,hava rendered the U.N's basicdocument somewhat out ofdate ".

But that surely must beonly a superficial aspect ofthe anachronisms In the D.N.Charter ? That West Ger-many. Italy and Japan arenow in the Western alliance,snd that Intense racial strifenow seem* confined to SouthAfrica, the U.S.A. and theMiddle-East arc secondaryphenomena which don'tchange the root-causes ofwar-mongerlng and racialIntolerance,

Alliances are temporaryand accidental,, but the waralms of Alexander the Great,Julius Caesar. Napoleon andHitler, were.no different fromthose of General MacArthur,when he involved the UnitedStates and then the UnitedNations, in, the Korean War.Korea is even farther awayfrom Washington, than Indiafrom Mfp»aori»a. Britain fromRome. Moscow ftorri Prance,Prague from Berlin — whatwere, the; Greek, Roman,French. German and Ameri-can troops doing 50 far fromhome ? "'/:'

Pacem In Terris

TN each case there was the1 desire to found, maintainor protect an empire, and

therefore, surely, on the basis. .,...human expeinerice W9 are en-

titled to aay that Imperfallsm,and not personalities oralliances, is the cause of mili-tary aggression ana wars.

But U Thant never men-tioned Imperialism, once,when discussing the crisis anadefective charter of the Unit-ed Nations Is that becausehe identifies imperialism withcolonlaHsni only, and cannotrecognise -Jt In the age ofneo-calonlalism: of to it be-cause he was speaking at thePftcem Jn Terns Convocationto New York, and didn't want

to emoarrass his Catholic andAmerican hosts? In eithercase, as he was making amajor speech on the role ofthe U.N. aa a peace-keepingbody, htg failure to mentionimperialism left his contribu-tion lacking in realism andcreative thought.

The Becratary-Ctenerat orthe U.N. also never mentionedthe need to admit Chinaunder .the revisions of thecharter which he considersimperative. How can youdiscuss nuclear disarmamentwithout Including & greatworld Power which is busyacquiring nuclear arms? Howcan you discuss peace in Asia,without including: the largestPower In Asia? How can yondiscuss world trade, health orcultural development withoutIncttidlne a Governmentwhich represents one-quarterof human!*??

If China acquires nuclearweapon?. V.'w c:i>-, I hi- ITS; ofthe world disarm? If a in-fluenza epidemic hits China,how will the rest of the worldescape? If China does notco - opera I R with UNESCO,what advances can thatspecialised agency of the UN.make which will not widenthe jrulf between Asiannations, ant! between Asiaand the rest of the wnrld?

The Pacem In Terris Con-vocation, called together InNew York, to examine thepolitical and practical impli-cations of the famousEncyclical of Pope JohnXXIII. seemed a mostfavourable occasion to tellthe listening Catholic worldand the American nation thetruths they must face beforehumanity can settle down tothe tasks of peace. TheConvocation discussed worldpeace without mentioningImperialism or the isolationof China from the UnitedNations.

From two other speakers,a historian and an Americansenator. the Convocationheard what, evidently, theWestern world has in mind asan answer to the presentcrisis. For Toynbee, the his-torian, the solutions are assimple as A B C:

"The Soviet Union anaAmerica must co-operate in•preventing other countriesf r o m acquiring nuclearweapons.... The formationof a world government isone condition for the sur-vival Of humanity."For Senator Fulbrtght tfjp

active poitleian. tne solu-tions are more complex fhanfor the academic historianAlthough basically he agreeswith Toynbee, he puts bisIdeas in another way:

•7 can for an end to allthe tyrannies of abstractideas. The United Statesand the S o v i e t Unionshmtlrt adapt their idmloglesto the requirements of achanging world.''in plain language, what

Toynbee and Fulbright toge-the^ are saying IB that if theUnited States and the Soviet

tfhlon will gang up againstChina the? can reduce her toimr'.f'ncc hv r : p - ' rat ing herfrom acquir'- .s o«c|«y .inns,and hey can +K«r> r«ie '•wrldJoU»t |a (with a common '.r'.eo-logy)* by making a wfrldgovernment out of the UnitedNations.

Bonkers And'V -

thinking cango no further. Wistful

Imperialists, who remem-ber when they didn't have tobother about Russia or Chinaif they decide^ to send agunboat to shell Tunis orBandung, would gladly settlefor such a solution, eventhough they would have to"adapt their Ideology *o tharequirements of a changingworld". Wistful cardinalsbattling against the floods ofatheism of a scientific age,and wistful bankers battlingagainst the security risks of a.revolutionary ase. couldthink of no consummationmore devoutly to be wishedfor, than a common ideologywhich would embrace bothmulti-millionaire GovernorRockefeller of New York andComrade Marshal Malinov-sky, head of tb»» Soviet armedforces

It all seems such fantasticnonsense. But It ij dangerousnonsense. The same kind ofnonsense which led Hitleran<i Mussoltni to believe thatmen like Churchill, FranklinRoosevelt and tfe Gaulle fear-ed Communism so much thatthey would 'n a final show-down bring France. Britainand £he United States to theiraids tf they stacked tfteSovtet Union. In this crazydream-world, China Is nowsubstituted (or the SovietUnion, ajid a Westernalliance with a non-Commu-nist Soviet Union emerges Inthe final show-down.

Let us consider a little mor«fully Toynbee'a propositionfirst: How could the SovietUnion and the United Statesco-operaf* In preventingother countries from acqui-ring nuclear weapons? Forthin purpose Britain must beconsidered part of the UnitedStates, as she does not claim,to be an independent nuclearPower. Tt Is hardly likely thatFrance, for all President deGaulle's defiance, could orwould even want to resist thecombined pressure of theSoviet Union and the U.S togive tip her nuclear arms. Inany e.vent. France had al-readv acquired nuclear arms,30 she doesn't full In Toyn-

China Mean?

It Is China\j which Is meant. ChinaIs the onlv country In

Toynbee's mind when hespeaks about preventing the.spread of nuclear weapons.But China, which believes,and has f-he r?Sht to believe,that' she Is a great" worldPower, could only surrenderher right to acquire nuclea?

- TV eHRQns™ if • ws «r~' -E&st...of*-.., ,tw-..<worl.d. (Including the US.AarlH fhe Shvlnt Union) dis-armed as w.ell. Otherwise shewould resist, with arms artattempt t^ prevent her fromachieving nuclear parity witht-.he other nuclear Powers,

What it amounts to. then,Is that Toynbee and Ful-brlght both urffe the. SovietUnion ana America to com-bine to use thfitr. nuclearmight to prevent China fromacquiring nuclear might; and'tte. .American senator goesfurther than the historianin urging that America andthe Soviet 'Union must both

give up their Ideologies toprotect themselves against apossible nuclear China.

Dpe« Senator Fulbrightbelieve that all the Kremlinhas to do la to Bay to thepeople of the Soviet Union—"Let's stop being communists.We've got to have Capltal-C&mmunisni, or the Ameri-cans won't helo n» to disarmChina".

Then he must also believethat all ths White House hasto do Is call together &U thamillionaires, industrialists,Bankers ana trade unionboaaaa In the United States totail''them:'•• "Let's stop beingcapitalists. We've got to haveCornrnunlst-Capltallsin, orthe Soviet Union won't helpus to disarm, China".

Even u crazy nonsense,this is longr-range nonsense.Bven Senator Pulbright mustbelievo that it would take atleast a generation for thaRussian Communists and thaAmerican capitalists to adopta "comsiori ideology". But theUnited .KaUpna ha» onlyadjournert untij next Septem-ber, and China Is preparingfor her a«cpnd nuclear test.

Russian Help

Let tu not over-rate thaIntelligence of men who writehistory boots or who headImportant Congress!onalCommittees. They can copewith some problems bril-liantly, but other problemsreduce them to Imbecility. Ifthere were &n oun.ee of intel-ligence in the whole StateDepartment ana Pentagonabout the immediate needsarid desires, of peoples frefldfrom colonialism, the UnitedStates wouldn't be up to Itsneck In the South-East Asianbog, shoutteft to the Russiansto come and pull It out.

in ever? ago there is onlyone Important philosophy tohelp men arrive at reality. &ithis epoch. It Is dialecticalmaterialism (with tts derivs-

.. ttves Itte GOHSCIENCISM)—commonly Called Marxism.Without the Marxist concep-tions and explanations ofsocial, technological andscientific revolutions, theproblems of this epochremain closed mysteries evento brilliant-men like U Thant.Mr. Toynbee ana SenatorFulbrigtu

They thinfc of time andchange in the same terms astheir pre-EInsteta forefathers.They think of revolutionary

l:,p«5>p!sg,.a.ana. ..continents interms of the bourgeoisFrench ana American Revo-lutions, They think of theUnited Nations as an en-larged veraKiW *r»f 51w parlia-ment at Westminster. Theythink that the Soviet Unionand China have nothing mor«in common than an Ideologi-cal label, and that such labelscan be switched like thealliances which Mettemieh.

.Bismarck and Disraeli usedto make In thetr drawing-rooms,

Such wistful thinking canlead men into great mlscal*e.dlattons and

CR.13 (4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P









For your attention.Copies sent to Mr. Rolz-Bennetb.

DATE:17 March George J. Janecek

UNITED NATIONS . NATIONS UNIES

COPENHAGEN INFORMATION CENTRE

MEMORANDUM No. COP/96TO: Mr. Norman Ho, Chief, Overseas Briefing Unit, United Nations Room No. 2LO, iTJi/CPI

FROM: Kirva Michelsen, Senior Administrative Assistant}UNIC, Copenhagen Da!ft 12 March 1965

SUBJECT: Report on editorial comment in Denmark and Sweden

There was little comment on natters of direct concern to the United Nations.

Cyprus was the subject for a cartoon in Jyllandappsten, Arhua, Demcark, on 6 March

• o«c (attached). Other subjects were a_partheid in South Africa, Mainland China, Yiet-

Nam, the Middle Bast and tine communist conference in Moscow,,

Bsgena Hyheter. Stockholm. 7 March, referring to the Swedisn "ovomsont's

replies to a number of questions from the Expert Committee of the Security Council

and the Committee's conclusion on measurediagainst apartheid , stated that a Swedish

trad© embargo against South Africa would have negligible significance aa a saeana

of pressure. Against the limited damaging effects it would have on Sweden's

economic life should be weighed the extensive public opinion against the enslave-

ment in South Africa. The paper wondered whether this opinion would change if the

indignation at racial oppression would have to be paid for by limited and passing

economic repercussions. It also pointed out that i$ an embargo was to have any

tangible effect the big Anglo-Saxon states, at least, must participate* However,

if a not too small group of states started some kind of sanctions against South

Africa the pressure of world public opinion could be expected to make others follow

suit. The paper felt that a clear Swedish pledge to participate in an embargo

as soon as a sufficient number of states had joined might give a lead to other

stateae If, on the other hand, Sweden who had ao little to lose could not decide

on a clear cosaaitBient in the South Africa question the negative effects could be

considerable. The paper concluded! "The United Nations Committee has given the

Swedish Government an excellent opportunity for an initiative in the South Africa

question. This opportunity ought to be used."

Berllagake Tidende, CoT>enhaeen. 7 March, wrote that so far the Chinese

atomic weapons were a status symbol$ however, they were adequate to demonstrate a

potential power, for any agreement on a ban against the spreading of atomic

weapons would be illusory if China did not ait in at the negotiating table0These weapons equipped the Peking Government with a veto right as long as its

formal veto right was withheld from it in the UN Security Council.

1 enclosure.

K!;: 6 r-virch l.

Comment

NO NEWS FROM CYPRUS

' ' «

. '?*,

J9 I**1 ••„ , W <&•#W.

En hlfe epi?od~ pa Cypern y\] veere nok til etplodigt opQ0r, hvorfor FN regnermed at Fa ;orloenget sit mandat pa 0en.

' A * T ' • ' • . .

U Thanl^r^bJr^.ns/'^robfereD-holder...

A w.iall ijsttidffitt :ln Cyprus will be eiough for a bloody

aud therefora «be 'Jnited Nations coonts oa getting its matdats Jja ilia

inland jfixiantf&d*

U Tlmnts - If only the cork will halt! . . .

TO:

ntoMi

SUBJBCT

U N I T E D N A T I O N S N A T I O N S U N I E S

INFORMATION CENTRE- DAR ES SALAAM

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Mr. Norman HoChief , Over seas Briefing UnitExternal Relations Division *»*Room 260, OPI

,. ,? MHTOtt - ' '*

KUt No.:

A. Faryar, DirectorUNIC, Dar ea Salaam

1.

5.

4.

Conrngnt in E^iet Africa

You might b« interested in the following editorials--

for the 'U.N. ^e^Standard^ ?P February 1965

on the adjournment of the 19 seHsion of the G-an«*n*l

K M T , . -

oti British support for Permanent U e N r Pea ee-K<*>j ping fc - t c t - .

Sanctions against South Africa E « A C Standard 5 Marsh

Sau6tJ.uns The Standard ? Msrch 1965

on report of Security Council's expert Committee onof sanctions against South Afriea.

THE STANDARD, 4 THE STANDARD, Wa THE STANDARD. Tu

THIS STANBARB.MONDAY. FEBRUARY 22. 13S5.

REPRIEVE FORTHE U.N.

TJESPITE the frustrationsand gloomy thoughts

of United Nations' dele-gates dispersing after theadjournment of the 19thGeneral Assembly, thereis one encouragingfeature: the final unityand determination toensure that the UnitedNations be rescued fromits present plight.

When members found them-selves on the brink ofdisaster because of the moveby China's ally, Albania,East and West closed rankswith tiie Afro-Asian countriesto avoid the crisis. Thissurely promises well for afinal solution to the presentproblems from which theUnited Nations could emergestrengthened and moreeffective than it has everbeen before, although itstill remains to be seen whiitthe eventual outcome will be.

In its public sessions sinceDecember, the Assembly hasbeen through a period ofmake-believe by adopting anexternal front which coveredthe deep rifts within onfundamental issues. At thetime this led to muchcriticism but it is nowapparent that to haveoperated in any other waycould have brought about asituation which would havedone lasting damage to theorganisation. The decisionto take the whole question ofpeace-keeping, future andpast, and bring representa-tives of those countriesconcerned together as amatter of urgency to make anew Initiative and a majoreffort to settle the lines offuture peace-keeping policyis the only workable orenow.

In the meantime, thoughtshould be given to the viewsput forward in New York onSaturday by the Secretary-General, U Thant, that theoutmoded Charter was partof the cause of the presentconstitutional and politicalcrisis. Since it was drawnup, loyalties and friendshipsamong the big Powers haveundergone significant changesand a major overhaul isrequired if the United Nationsis to be provided with newmethods and new machineryfor keeping the peace infuture.

THE ST&HBAEBWEDNESDAY. MA&CH3,1965

SANCTIONS"]*HE lack of progress made

by the Security Councilexpert committee on thefeasibility of sanctionsagainst South Africa ref-lects the deep reserva-tions that many of themembers have as to theeffectiveness of economiccoercion.

What is undoubtedlyworrying many of themajor Powers is the costof implementing a deci-sion on sanctions. For theoperation to be effective,it would mean mountinge naval blockade withthe likely addition of aircontrol. For obvious rea-sons, this would have tobe on a massive scale andat a cost no less huge. Ithas been estimated thatthe naval blockade alonewould involve the expenditure of £130,000,000.Where is this money tocome from? Certainlynot from the UnitedNations unless there is amiraculous change in itsfinancial position. Andeven if the money isfound, total quarantinecould not be guaranteedwith the Portuguese inMozambique and Angola.

These are formidable barri-ers but there has neveryet been an obstacle thatcannot be circumvented;Africa's progress over thelast ten years is proof ofthis. No doubt the For-eign Ministers meeting inNairobi are exercisingevery ingenuity in theirstudy of ways and meansto halt South Africa'strade. In the meantime,thought could be given toother lines of action. TheVerwoerd Government isat its most vulnerableover oil which originatesmainly from Afro-Asiancountries. It is surely notdifficult to enlist the aidof those countries in anoil embargo; this at leastwould be an encouragingstart to further measures.

THETUESDAY, MARCH 2, 1365

"BRITAIN has promisedlogistic backing for a

United Nations force withthe intention of strength-ening the world organisa-tion's authority andeffectiveness-

The idea of a small, perma-nent U.N. peace-keepingforce has been under dis-cussion among certainmember countries forsome time past. The Scan-dinavian countries andCanada have shown aparticular interest in it <and a willingness to ear-mark contingents for thepurpose. While still inopposition, the BritishLabour Party was alsovery much in favour ofthe project and at a timewhen Britain was contri-buting the biggest contin-gent to the peace-keepingforce in Cyprus, it seem-ed that this might provea precedent for futureBritish contributions introops.

It has, however, been recog-nised that in most dis-putes which threatenpeace, it is better for theU.N. to avoid direct par-ticipation by troops ofany of the bigger Powersotherwise, some willargue, there is the dan-ger that the operationinstead of preventing theinvolvement of the GreatPowers in a local disputemay have just the oppo-site effect.

The offer now made by Mr.Stewart is therefore awise one. It is not anoffer of troops but oflogistic support for aforce of up to six infantrybattalions and could in-clude short-range andlong-range aircraft, engi-neer and signal troopsand ambulance and trans-port units. This supportcould be of great valueto a U.N- force but whatis perhaps even moreimportant it could not bemisinterpreted as provid-ing Britain with somestrings for the exercise ofpolitical control over

- operations.... . _ ...

ST=» V

East Afnc&n St<nid*Td, , March 3, 1965.

(gastWednesday, March 3, 1965 Nairobi, Telephone 26421-30

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAHpO say the least, the ippoit of the U.N Secmtty Coun--i- ell's evpeit ?ornrmttex on the feasibility of sanctions

against South Africa i£ devious arid equivocal&hotn of all the Verbuuk Ine report rewais a i l ivis ini i . . n e v i t a b l e

in the urturosfancft beUet'n ihos>e concerned with p r a . - ; : c a irealities ^nd those \vhose moti\es are -solely emotional , howe\crrighteous their c.sui»c Thr maiouh of the members have araye.doubts ovin how fcff* tfvo economic* Coercion .-an be in obta in inga t K i j e fj1 ItfA T 'r* feoilh Afn a Ibs opinion « i i ' i . l i < - < 'o bothtricl" embaiô .Jrtd i il b OiiwJf When s i y . U r • • •*« - A .y . -C\pit^t<J Iwie son v nrmfhs Tgo not lor A ; . ' - I • • ' • - n j . . , ! n > .\uth Ihose ieiXiHjf in b i ifc down apartheid. b^t D . I ; .'? iv-. ir- ifor the sheer prjUiirtl J-Sbues jhvo l sed there was m.r-h , • : : ) ! .--not a opposed b piMy-Boer outlook

Yet the London conference which considered in ip ' l cmeni ins m . l i l r u - vsanriiois eouJd <ome to n<j definitive coiu-lusion and now Hieeffectiveness of eqoYjoirtK <sifttftons >s bein^ tfiirssionnJ as amoans bt des(roving djiartheid Comndcnljill.y with ilio I'Nreport, the quesuoji ha^( once again been considered b\ thp O.A UWhile the Ministers meeim? in Nauobi are of om- mind in wish-ing io teforrn the Verwoerd legim? — and in this lon iox t it isof no avail to ajhjue jn deiente 1hat African welfare ;i?id socialconditions are of a high glandard in South A/ru'a. sine.' apartheidasi a t»reed is an affrortt to humsn dignity — maniTes l ly (herare 4t a loss to Cnow ho\vlb&bt to atroinplish tbrir purpose

They have rntiwsecl conhnuea trading wi th South AIn.-a b.- (heWestern Powers renewing appea1s for ro-operatiOn from theUS France and Bi tarn A.t the ?ame time, they branded tlirdeahngs ot Eastern tounines -is Jiifi'it'ndly acts to Afr i rancoun1ri«b" ConlraruMê otijy a month aô, the Western Pre<swas leprinlcmdeS m Nairobi for aOeeedl.y having disto:-tc(i faolspresented to the Economic and Social Commission meeting inCairo b\ iing^ng out China and East Germany as havingmere.ised their tradf v\ th South A f r i f a . No\v. ha\ ' ing heart)reports from Ugaftda Tan/ama ard Kenya, the O.A I" has goneplainly on record atf<un f -<uch unfiiendly acts".

Costs prohibitive of blockade

Countries in both (he East and Ihe Wesl stand rondcuined forcontinued tj-ddiri? agami>t fhe spmt of the ei imumic -an - t i i - ins•wh th othet A,frit-an States regard as essential 10 for e reformon the land of ajJaTthetd Yet not everj A f r i c a n State HII p't-dgeJull support Some r"cad"ers- rounded on this newsiMuer whenit wag pomfed out jetenliv hmv sonw rountr ies . /.:-iiii:;j inparticular had probi^ms. of their o«u whi-h rc.niicre<i t.ill co-operation imoos lole ho\\p\er ardently their leaders m.iy wishto change the Vcnvoerd u«me Having now heard the Zambia!)exojanation^ tho OAU conference expressed s \ n i p a t h y ;,ndunderstanding pf (iw position

Until countries ouKfde A^nca as well as those i:isido. f j ;u cn-operaly- T\itl) thoO A U no amtion1. ean be etTectively jmp'useil.cpononw or miktaiv Thi-, is self evident. Throuah iis L'.N.TfDresenfadon the OAU %v:lt have the opportunity of pi event ingits view-} when the Security Council considers the latest reportat the end of this month The African represenfalivos wil lcertainly piess tdt sariuhons, full and uninhibited. No Prmrciomme'idat.on figuies 'n the report so (he Seruriu- Oiunr i l•will havc,,to a( t o?i its own decisions if agreement ran be foundamong the members

ToensUTOs will ndt hi\e the desired effect on SoulhJrnn\etliately, there would have Io be a long period of

n But a tola.! arms ban would e\crt a serinu-, o/lp.-t onthe eronomy jioi oniy cu t t i ng - uft military supplies but imposinga .strain on the internal, economy because firms would bo t u r n e dover to the production

c'e o . - v - ito or-aa»iso international sanctions asiainst transffi-t-ssors 'h.cnhas Britjin «ho-,€ lead was nat followed against the Fascistfo-ces m Soain in, the da>s ol the League of N.Hjyns Thepratfical difliruities ot command and enforcemont are pmhi'b. 'iveof a comolete ^r apd naval blotkade nowadays: !he ro^t ofna\aJ actiort is estimated at £110,000000 and several hundredni(H)Oils mare for arr Control Who i& f,ojng to pav these ;istro;. '»-mu-al sums when the UN cannot meet the cost* of )„-.!,•?Keeping fortes tilread\ incurred the Soviet Union ;>-ul Fran-ebe'nj* amon^ the chief deiûUers*

The OAcU" remm world wide suooort for the muni ' p;-,ncip'esunder.ymg its delernrtiriation to end apartheid, but how to 'p.itteeth into moral purposed That i:, the perpVxina quest ion.The- immedi-ale anawers aie to persevere w : f h economic hoii i l i lvdespite the samhces involved and to cut oir the South morecompletely b\ \vjthdrawmff landing rights. If Dr Verwoerd andhis men arc too blind to recognise the moun ( in g forces of work!opinion obitmatelr refusing to hbeialise. one dav the coun-rv•despite air internal preventive measuies. vwU meet an up.s.i'r«e2« M' " S" 1? Wl îft* trase4y organised violenceas a solation W th^ last dread,fbl rp«!ort.

5 mara 1965

REPORT OH ISITORIAL CQ&MJ3ST 31 SWITZEHLMD

L©s sujeta l®s pltts diiws fouraissent la saatiere des prlnc LpoAjt ti fares

des journaua: depuis mercredij mads c*®st toujours la crlse viel.u'-dtd&vz:® qul

retient tout par ticuli&r ernes t Inattention d®s comment at ear a pc.1it,iqu«$se

C»est aiasl que iMditorlsdiste d® la !IM£SJiLJÎiaf<> ©xaalnant la situation

asi Vietnam ecastate (3 mars) qw© nombreux sont c®us qui d^sbppri'jvsnt lee

actions d© Wanhington et parai o®ui35»ci U Thant^ qul s'est octaamtint proronc<S

centre la® initiatives affi4rioaijiese II conclut que si Mgar3sr iu Fd-&''"

OB des buta sssestiols d© la prlsenca am^rlcaias au Sud-Vlsîns.®,, i

ee demancter ai la poljtique du Pr^sidant Jfohnaon eonstltue 1© mHilla-ir mcyea

d*y arrivere EQ effets les anciennes eivlli saiioce ds i'Asia n* ao^t pas

le "Wild ¥estfi ©u les ripc-stes imm^disitas aim coups d© fea 3 •-.T t. au.:tdr<^3S

eoisme ane prftuê de viriJIt4» 0®rtass garder la facê s-st iap-rta; t pour cos

populations , raals woe qui concerue eotte wfac®" ®13s ccrraspor.i a

oeptioa touto different® que lôn r.e saarsdt identifier a .1*. for.:.-*

Do son o©l«p le c®rrespondaat & 1'OJTO de la

(3 mar a) qu!«a d^pit d® l*arriv€e du G^n^ral Ehasih a few Y.vrkj I'SOB

penso c«pendasit qu* l'laibassad@ar Bfeffiy^s^FM-Wc soaB©rvar?» I

aarrateur I 1SONH0 Ess dernieras bOffibardOTients aaarical^s du

iaqui&teat las naj.lieos1 des delegations d© I'Asiep et la

indiqu® quf«ll« compte sur d@s operations d© rîorsicr. c

L'edi tori all ate du j^fiJEa&LjIajSsiasSS (5 marsi) ecrlt nctaour.6«r-t. pcur sa

part « "Malgrl 1'^Horme supdriorit^ de leur potential oj l i t i j r f . , "^s Stats™

Ohls n'eirriverorst pas ^ maftrlser uae rebellion quij cartes, art . fi^p^ye® par

1« Vietnam du Ffcrdj, aais qui surtowt est aidl® par la pc-pulatl j'. du sudo U

eat probable que si les habitants pmmilant aasifsstraur l©u.r c -^ l / i I -Ep ils

r^clameraiartt 1'arrftt c!es hoetilit^s0 ®2 souhadt© que las er &. . ' ; sp p

d© a'exposer psur surcroft aux critique© de lours suds les pi-. 3 fidelas

les ladieagp r®cberch®nt 1© plus vita possible una

Le correspondant d@ la

aote la protestation du d^llgue d© la Chin© aatloasdlst© contra 1© fait que

1@ President d© l*Ass®mbl^© g^n^rals a*@st ineliss^ decant la praasl^r, so

en BO falsant pas figurer la Chine psrml les membros du Gondte pour l

&®s probl&aes d@s operations an fa#®ur d« malnti®o de la palx0

Sbcaainant la reeeate ^CSonvocation" qui a eu lieu & Hfew lork pour I?ap-«

plication de le©noycllque "Paoea in T«9rri®% 1© eorrespondant a 1*G?IU da la

ÛilBC r»14T« U mars) qu© ces r0unj.ojas ont ste plus qu'un

d© la malheuireuê session d« 1'Asssrabl^® glndral® si© 1?0!IT.T9 coast!,

tasnt en felt ursa toaitatlê d© rasplaeer la vi.d@ d©s debata ie la pr j

diplomatiqjie par un esprit Ttâo® qui l«w a totaleBenfc fait dlfajt,, L®

correspond ant souligae 1'iiaportanee d® intervention d'f Than*, &t coaolatqa?Il cotsvient dâttesidr© li present pour savoir quallas sont las Lia<*s ncblss

at les mlsea en garde s^ver©ss ®®jitlcsanl©s k iongM«ar d$ jouret'a ou co^rs

d® ceo rlunloasp qui troti'S'aront en septsffibr® un Icho "k 1JON70

eorrespoodant k 1 'Off ice «uropiS®n d© la

aerit (3 BUSTS) & propos da lôtrrsrture da la 22âe. session du GAIT qâ Is

Secr^tsdra executif eataxid fair© das propositions tandant a tr'i.-. if: rai«r la

GATT en organisms perraanent,, Coci permattrait d© ranforser la ->,?sltior. du

GA.TT par rapport I la Conference du ccsamerc© ©t du deT@loppeîiint 'Mont

d©a organes d^jl. cr^4s o« en ôi© d® formation comseac© a sa profiler sur

Genfeveô Et le eorrespondant d!© conolure qwQjafea si 1'on na tl^^t pij cosspto

d®s sasbitlon® d© la 3oaf0rene@9 il eat grand temps quo 1® CAT1! ^.d ®^t devaau

lfSrganisstiou mondial® du ooEjuarc© la plus grand-^ la plis Lap-. rt^r.t^ st la

plus util«w soit enfin.dote dfuna oharte

E© correspondent k 1'OMJ d© la feja.âar^srj^gas ^«~'^-"* " "^tptfi (4de lt^str®iroe Galo FLaaa - UJ Thant^ indlque qu*Qn dlpit de ®*s cla-^t 1 ^ng

optiaistes anterlsureaj Bk Gale Plaza ne YOit pas d© progres daiis laquestion du r&glament du statttt futur da l'flee Bans ces sonditl ^nsp IsSecretaire gâ£ral et le m^diateur estiraent qu'il est nôesaalre i*s pro-logger Is 'm.andat bian qua 108 contributions financlersts pour on cl-:q.jleme

ne sol eat hulleanent «

.COS"!

(4- mara) publie ua second art! rls sjj* "I* Congodans la toTirBQnt«J*o E'autaur Icrit au sujet de eeux qui ont ?«commence "a

et k s*antr©tuer*;,d'uA c6t4 d©s barricades mi QOBJ d© la llbart^ at dela dignit^ humaiaap at de lâutre au son da droit ®t d« la legsJH,eB

s lealignes auivaatas £ "A'ajo&rd'hxd., on salt qua n.l I'un ni l*autre n* ps-aventgagner la partlc par Ids eeulea annaa et qua la vietime csrtalne du oa j®afratricide sera ce pauvre peuple congoleds, aa nous duquol tît le moid©agit et que tout la raonda pretend saiaver a aa jaianieree Dans ces cLrconstaacasj1'tts" ^lebtious nous apparalssemt coiame ua moyea peu approprid pa'ir s<au7«sr 1®Congo quip poaase de tous l«a o8t^sf contlBua sa march© folia et !n^3nsci®nte

la', plongaon final•"

UNITED NATIONS i§81 NATIONS UNIESBOOB «l Km OhUBKU Bldf.,

4. Ldwn, Otewuti.ainAku. Trfro UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE mazn-iKS-

ItfaTrt. 21MOM-9

C*h. TOKOMNIPRESS TOKYO m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ "

Report on Editorial Cpffimant In Japan

Japanese newspapers are increasingly apprehensive of the outcorne of *><•> dan-gerously developing Vietnamese situation resulting from American air ranHs onNorth Vietnam.

Giving full support to Secretary-General U Thant's recent stat^mprt tMt themilitary dispute in Vietnam is meaningless and that the occidental •wnr'M .->n^misunderstands the sentiments of Asians, The Yonduri on "OP ^ebruar^ sa^g thattime has con® for the Western nations to conduct a fundamental reexanin*Hr>n ofthe Vietnamese situation from this point of view. 'Hie yoniuri pons on *o «saythat Western aids even though based on benevolence and justice, is rotunless it is tied in directly with the sentiments and will of th«population. Such aid may even be regarded as unwelcome meddHnF9 it add*.

Sharply charging that the United States air raids run a. dangerous ri sV ofinternationalizing the war, The Asahi Shimbun on 4 Farch calls or both t,hpand the Viet-Cong nationalists to sit at a conference table with calimess apd along-range perspective for the future to put an immediate end to vrarfaro.recalls that the parties concerned, such as Britain, France and theas well as the Secretary-General, are earnestly groping for aof the Vietnamese war, and it eagerly hopes that these trials for neac^ vrP1

a fruitful outcome in the near future,

Elsewhere in editorials on 4 March, The TonAuri Shintbim,and The Tolyo Shimbun take the occasion to express their concern owraction and to hope for peace in that part of the world.

Incidentally, concerning the dispute between Malaysia and ""YidoneShimbun on 2 March notes that the parties concerned are unanimous in ealMnp forJapan's good offices to settle the issue. It will be easerrHalj it, snvq s •forto be a member of the proposed four-nation commit te© to find a spt.t i .pm«>nt tJapan should try to develop it into an organisation designed forany Asian disputes in addition to those concerning Malaysia and

The Japan Times on 4 March editorializes on the unsettled Oynmsagrees with Mr. Galo Plaaa that the continued presence of TMt.ed. TTat1r>ns troops Isessential for maintaining the existing uneasy suspensfon of hostlTlt^R^,considers that the Acheson Plan has been the most relevant to the artn?rl sof all the suggestions made in the past» It does not see why uniw vdfvcould not be effected in such a way as to give thewish for and to satisfy the Government of Turkey, but it Pinphasizes that, ^r^ Bet.tl.i»ment must receive the full consent of both (Treece and Turkny as wel.1 as thement of the two peoples on the island. CVi the other hajid, it corsidpj-.i tvatpartition of such a small island into two parts seems most

* * *

ccs Centre Services, ER, DPI

CR.13 (4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P



APPROVAL

MAY WE CONFER?

YOUR SIGNATURE

NOTE AND FILE

NOTE AND RETURN

YOUR COMMENTS

YOUR INFORMATION

AS REQUESTED

FOR ACTION


PREPARE DRAFT


For your attention.

DATE:

17 March •ge J. Janecek

U N I T E D N A T I O N SINFORMATION CENTRE FOR IRAQ

27J.2I1 Abu NCWHU Strtet

P. O. Box 2048, Almyah

G0K89 • Owfriptwis

: 84171-4

Y - t A .

f. : 106/65

t -Ai »V\

1965

TO s Mr« Honaan Ho, Chief, Overseas Brief lag Unit, Of fie®of Public Infers® tten9 United Nations, New York

FROM s Dik Lehfflk\ahls Director, UNIC, Baghdad

SUBJECTS gysjietlQa te jteor^tMffggensjml'a Press (Tonf erenow*

The Baghdad nawapaper, S lteebU Tbantss efferts fear- peace in Tietaa® and cellefl up«n th»President t® raeet in fftveur of negotiated ssttlssier4ttrf original ia Arabia

ftditorial beadllned "Fir® Undier Ashes inthe 'paper not«d that "US has rejected U Tbant*® suggestion® for aseven-ration conference to settle the problem of Vl@tnamH«

Th& paper said that the situation in Vietn&s i» "ingreat danger despite the ostensibly q«i«t period through vhictt th<problem is now passing, at least at the great power l&v«>l»«o« butth© possibility of detriatation rests on the coînter attacks whicN. Tiatnaia sight launohj and in widoh the Soviet Union ml f?htItself "bound to render help even if it jaaans eonf renting th©face to faoe"e "The flow of American troops could aieer. that Mr- John&on*aadmissiatraticm is day after day slipping; towards a Korea like mr'% thepaper deolared*

"Any effort to end the was" in Viatnas", aaii the paper, "would.be an effort for peao« provided it did not impose & situation which thepeople of îetma did want to recognise or acmeptô °President Johneosis called upon to respostd favoiarably to the calls for peac® widm byU Than*, and to aot on the idea of negotiations to settle theproblem ofVistcas by way ©f e««wetdBg an international conference without ernditionetoeing laid S»WK in advar»e8

p th* paper ae©lare$. It also oalled uponMr* Johnson at© adept a Xiteml foreign poliey9 siiailar to that foty tte late President Kenmdy, in dealiag with the urgent problems

treat«idng the peace of the world*

t£&

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^ Jji-^ftjl

s --.^lEj! Jl

U N I T E D N A T I O N S

INFORMATION CENTRE FOR IRAQ

27 J. 211 Abu NatoKU Street

P. 0. Box 2048,

Telephone : 84171-4

B*f. :

BAGHDAD

March 1965

i .Af 1V1

^

Mro Hcsaraan Hep CMaf, O^srsess Briefing Unit0 Office«f Publio Icfomatlon, United KJationsj New Y«rk

Mk Lebaalrabl, Director,, UHIC,

TO C»iaf«r»no« ©a

that th®for newlj

tloa Btsfeni-tt®<a t©tho estsblistoent ©f ato utuSy araS follow tipon Brada and Development

ereenterpriaoa) Jm^ supported m s^«r©9-

"by ths Missistry ©f Eoo^ssadGa fes»©csamitt®® with its own secretariat

s arafi r®solutions @f ths UH Confersno®

in full thefr®B ths DPIua in Arabic e

tho sasa® s®wgp«psre ©n ®fcb Marshtprinsoiplea reo«ffiaen€i®d "by the Conference,

on ths CoMf®r«nss «Mch ^aa reprofiuced her^ by

i Mr» William C. Paws!!

TO:

THROUGH:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

U N I T E D N A T I O N S N A T I O N S U N I E S


Kr. Korean Eo, Obief, Briefing Section, Date. 1 * Ma rob 1963ERD/OP1, United Nations, l>«* York

18-0-1FILE NO : .

H«Ho Granthas, Director,DJTIC, Katbmandu

on Hitorial Conunftpt la Nepal

Attached pleaea find & report on editorial

I , i

REPORT OH EDITORIAL COMHEOT HI NEPAL

Indonesia* a Withdraw!

Commenting upon the formal withdraw! of Indonesia from thaUnited Hations, weekly PBRSPSCTIV® said, M Indonesia's withd|jawlra«ant an escalation of he? crush Malaysia policies « is for the UI?the Indonesian withdrawal itself was a dismal precedent castingdoubt it on the ability of tha world organisation to evolve into aworld government in due course of

The daily COMMONER has said, * Most of us continue to wonderwhat epeoifio purpose thia step can serve, from tha point of view ofIndonesia. Scalds®, one also has to wonder how at all anyinternational organisation can be envisaged if lik® Indonesia, eves rnation ia to bring in its bilateral quarrels with some other nationsand make it a plea to uit it°n

It has further added, " In the meanwhile, howave?; it will b©a lesson well-Ieamt if froa the exit of Indonesia frosi the Unitedffations, we could understand the urgency of reforming tfa® presentstructure of the world organisation*14

Concerning the change of the structure of the organisation?similar opinions have been expressed by moat of the papers.

The daily NATA SAMAJ pleads for the admission of the PeoplesRepublic of China and eajs that it is a black spot on UU to letfaitf»n.( existed on the Anarioan anas and aid; oooupy the lawful seatof China*

Commenting oi& the same topic it adds? " Aa long as the Westerncountries continue to make the United Nations a platfor&i to fulfiltheir self-intoreot* this sacred organisation will never achieve itsgoals.

Financial Crisis

The FEHSITOPI S! referring to the Committee of Thirty- thr©0nations to find out a solution to the present finanoie.1 oriei@? makesa review of the 19th Seaaion of the General Assembly 0 It says,n The 1?th Session which sat for 80 days could achieve nothingworthwhile to show up» The session was a failure in more than ona

• 2 *•

It further 9»y&j wfh© voting result (on the Al&aaiaato return to nernal proeedu?®) shOOT that over^helmiag majority ofth® oouatria© h&v» re&listed th« importaacs of the 0H and areto ffnd 'out & avsitabl® d«vio® to and its finsnoial and

It ftdd»« "Uo^f tfe* Julian and Africans oovn tries who-frtsa-the aa-^ority ia th« BH Aflaftably eM who sr-s also tfee membersitevl^r appoiated $@ifflitt®e should ®»k© an ftll«out bid to find out ada-idea acceptable to both the

UHIC, KARACHI (PMZSfAN)13

impression® 2*ep&rteS3^ crested togr Rresldeiik Jsrab Khan's recent tow toChina asd particularly fef the Joint ©€miKii<$i@ ispuM '03- his and th® authorities atF^£ing$ were highlighted again'both ia mam asid editorial scassazite0 Th© Ife^SSntinder heading "Pak-»Chtnas© Helations'% deslaywl that HTh© long eossEiajique ahotts t-Matmatt em of effflnsn isfeerssts,, ranging from esojicmd® aid to developing eotmtri©@ tc t'li©ppobiaas of selfnietensi^tioa in Ksgfeatr^ and of passe in th© Indian Ceean arJ, Ssiit --East Asias wera fts!3y dise^ss®d to th® satisfaction of both @M@@R

0 It addetg ?Efhisie a recognition gi en to the p?liseipl« of ©@«<ffiist9e© IB th© field of politics a©trail as ctistcsss ®sd tj»adi-feionsH

e jlssturing that th® stipport for th© right ofdeteratastiea of th© Sashmiri p®opl© his fee@n rising at@Milj in Afrissn aiô©uutri®ap tha |®p0r ofessrîsdis "bnt Chin®1® r®it^fati©a @fe»s how a sttotastisl®f the w&rM ©ptei®is look® ©t th® purolbtai to tli© Sight of justie© as difte©at tessthe managers of tMited latioas whc &r@ guM@d scr@ % @olf»ifitersat than

oa 'th® affairs is Soutlrfa&t A®ias said that ^l&efresh S® air attacks em S&rth ?i^t«»^ffl nitlrot sraj obyisas provocationdangerous ©lemesifc to th© entr®9t eonfliet0, ' Glaimfe^'tliat the real"this d«ag«yen® stratsgj* we^® difficult to ®sjs&3ys©s th© paper saids K

net appeal siras® ©s3y lAat W®Ê fe1* H© ©M HIA'fesI btesslf urg-sd'the'tJH Seeretfisgiîesala. U'Tfeanfe^ .to stsp' ?q> their efforts for a

'of tlie Jtesjst1* wa® peistfd ost ligr the Md^t^gjaegrar as itcalMng for s msmsit TOiafiffSMS® of ®3T"SmtTl«srto**gwi©if the present

It wffiyaetl that "the "sehsu® ©f tefercsdueisg naislear wesposs 1st©Gssan will a»t only aggravate tensioaa in th@ rsgloa btrl; slftina.teljflM«peiHiaaee sad sesâritj of the eomtrtesi conssîed5',? It assessedor^wiaatlon ineltîag th® IMte€ Natioas a@ it i»^ i%

ieeue"* It Kpgiiia:' tlfflt "Qiibs, for- iattmeaîn the W ora thia etjfcjeot althftsgls It@

en total destpMeti«m of iraislew weapons ieditorial the paper 'oddedi *^® fttfeur® ©f the ISsit d feticais ^?hieh is in

of n0R-p@^m92sl. of dues 1^ Eues£a sM Fraa©®of TOO adHi«« pîa®^ M«anfe3^ k^pt out of th® UK, It isit as ft stroag, .'@ff«ettog sud rspresraitativ®

12 mars 19&5

REPORT ON EDITORIAL COMMENTS IN SWITZERLAND

La situation au Vietnam, la position de Bonn vis-a-vis de? Stats

afabes et 'd'lsraSl, la tension raciale aux Etats Unis, les prochaines

elections mardcipal'es en France qui se politlaent ehaque jcur davan-

tage st le de*bat au Bundestag sur la prescription dea crimes nazls ,

tels ont ete depuis raarcredl les sujets les plus largeoent trails

dans la presse.

VIETHAH :.'

Ati sujet de la situation dans le sud-est asiatique, le ^

de Qeafeve (12 mars) publl© tuie depSche de son correspondant a Parie

dans laquelle on peut lire notanoent j non redout®, a Paris, que

certains milieux amerioains trahissent les intentions iritiales et

se laacent dans xme guerre sans issue. S'il en etait ainsij, declare-t-on

de sonirees aiutorisees, 1& France n'intenriendrait pas aux cStes des

Stats Uais, coatrairem«nt i. ce qu'elle aTirait fait dans I3hypothese

d*un conflit a propos de Cuba. La Kaison Blanche a ete raise au courant

de

La Tribune de Seney.e' (11 mars} poursuit la publication de sa

eerie d'articles PUT la question de Chyprs. Ce quatriems article

traite notaBiment de la question des bases ndlitairee dans l*lle ©t

I'envoye special de la Tribune insists sur ^importance que les pays

non engages, et la RAU en pariiculier, attachent a ce problems. Et

I'atiteur ajoute a ce prbpOs t "N^anmoins, maintenant que le debat a

1'ONU est ajourne, Ijopini6n deis neutralistes ne pese pas dans la

balance d'un poids aueai lourd que d'aucnas 1'avaient imagine, Sur-

tout si Americains et Sovi^tiques s'entendent pour preserver la

coexistence pacifique, en effrant par exeinple leur madiat,:r.3:?0 Ni les

une ni les autres n*oat interSt a ce que le foyer d'incendie Cypriote

le re ate dti nwnda.

: ' # • » * •

iSignalons enfin que tous les quotidiens publient ce rnati.'i, ven-

i noBdnatioa par le Secretaire general de M. Henrj Labouisse

comma Directeur ganeral du Fbads des Nations Unies pour 1'eofar.ce.


The Secretary-General



FOR COMMENTS

MAY WE CONFER?

YOUR ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

AS REQUESTED

NOTE AND FILE

NOTE AND RETURN

FOR INFORMATION



POUR OBSERVATIONS


VOTRE ATTENTION

COMME CONVENUSUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE

NOTER ET CLASSER

NOTER ET RETOURNER

POUR INFORMATION

For your attention.

Copy sent to Mr. Rolz-Benn ett.

Date:17 March

CR. 13 (11-64)

DE: \\ George J. Janecek

-'•J

TO:

TKROUOHl

FROM:

U N I T E D NATIONS W NATIONS U N I E SINTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Mr. Korman Ho, Chief, Brisking SeGtiouERD/OPI

Antonio fiamos-Olireira, DirectorUK Information Centre, Belgrade

Date:

NO.:

11 1

BEL,

-lar

'KH.

cr t 19 5.

' 1 r5

- t^— ""

SUBJECT: Reaction to Secretary-General's Press

In connection with George Janseek's circular letter2 March, on the above subject, we ah all keep in mind and send separatereports oa the reaction of the Yugoslav preas whenever the Secretary-General holds a press conference* As you know we have no means of fol-lowing Albanian press comment as

The Yugoslav public was informed about the Sacre tary-i jerer&l8 epreas conference in the reports of 6orrespond®nts of leading Yugos lav papersin New York, and the Tanjug News Agency* However, no special co r tmen twas made on the press conference of 2^ February i tself« On t h e ^ h e rthe recent initiatives of the Seeretary-Geaeral were the s u b j e c tin various leading pap«ra and periodicals, and Eient ioued, in thecommentaries in connection with th« situation in and over Vie> i-'herewith are two write-ups printed in BOEBA, one of the leading Tunewspapers. In general, this time ao well tb@ Sserstary-Ger.eral 'sand initiatives w«?r« very favourably accepted and appraised,

articlesc, iia

Enclosed

Centre Services, EKD/OPI

-36

THK ;:OELD TOILY: P1LAGE

In the lest-few days, in the internationalpolitical life, there ar£ some frequently associated,concerted, or bilateral :arid individual actions of manycountries ,:,nd political leaders to put an end to MO.Cin Vietnam ~.nd start political negotiations. This isunderstandable, becaue naV.r before has the danger ofescalating the conflict io unforeseeable proportionsbeen so near as now after the constantly increasing andincr&asingly fiercer bombing of the territory of North.Vietnam by American planes*

Political rofiexes signalise frora. all ovor thoplace that it is high time .for diplomacy to speak insteadQ-f.gun.Sa. .This, is that eomrion thing which rives colourto all initiatives current in the world today favouringthe diplomatic solution <@f-the drama in Vietnam, stemthey from thtj nonalignedj or from the Palace of Motionson East River, or through considerably complex dialoguebetween tho Soviet Union end Frar.ee, fron British leTt-bonchers or P&pal throne in Rome,,

Tims Yugoslavia, and a number of nonaligned by thoirpeaceful initiative found thwns&lvts working togethervd.th many others in tW world on. constructive effortsto achioYfcj puaca in Vietnam through negotiations, Underv?ay are, as is known, consultations of t-he'nonalirniidand exchange of nossagus b^twc-yn statesmen,. Althoughvjo cannot as yot sp^ak of the ov,.ntual result of thisactivity, of the concrete form and character of thojoint action of th^ nonalign^dy 'thyir attitude is, un-doubtedly, basud on th» platform of an int^trrcl policyof tho nonaligncd and thuir appraisal of Indochinaiaad« last autumn in Cairo wh^n an urgent convention cfa 3aow Gtn*jva conf r^nce, v?£-.s proposed.

Already thu siwssagti b,y President Tito toPresident Johns on, wliich was. widely publiaiic-d in world

and \jidoly acclaimed in. th^ U.K. wc.s appr- ist;dc.s an "iatroduciioii into widur actions of th^ non-d coimtri'ws; v Having ca.llo-d it an initiative of

tho sort thc't is n^cdud in th~ world today ? U Thc.ntctKprxjs'eod hopo that -It "would bo Slv«-ry good if c. numberof oth-r countries iffcri^, to '.join thj Yugoslav Prosidont . if

. .• . • ...- ..;. , . . .. OoEBn«n,ting, -on -JTtta! s message .to Johnson, world

pro SET especially un,vri.:ift d that it contc.ins an appr; is;.-.!of the tru© danger ' >f thw o&oc.-liition of th conflictin. Vlwtfiaiaj that, it di&c'ypns tho possibility r.nd In-•ovltabd itx Q$ |a pcacyftil. oiiftian o.nd thct it pro -OSLCan appro" c eh to '.ncgotir.tio.ni without any pivliininc.ryconditions, - ,.y ,

. 'of • t|iw apprc.ise.1 of thotipa in Vi-tnGBii and --th® .ptacDful solution ar<e present

,-37-

in various variants and other initiatives and proposals,

Also important is. the decision on pooling theefforts of tht; governments of the Soviet Union 'andFrance with the aim of convening a new Geneva conference,

Amongst other initiatives, the activity of theSecretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, whohas undertaken, as he himself says, "private steps"with the American Government for finding a peaceful anddiplomatic way out*

The more the world gladly and with hope greetsthe increasingly ontorprising steps of many governments,politicians and public opinion, the loss that s-rae worldcomprehends and justifies the deaf attitude of U.S.

Government with which all -these appeals and initiativesseem to pass without an echo,...that is, without anofficial commentary.

Remaining unflinchingly on the "position offorce" and continuation of war, the U.S0, judging bymany appraisals of the Western press, is taking adouble riski its respect in tho world ~nd general peace,,

ZR/5/lk B. Docormic

|r* •"

Iv

'IT;- Thairt: 'The position of the USdep&ncls

lew York, March 9, (Tanjtig) r Ul-Secretary General, UThant has no intention of visiting Kosbow, Ashing ton, p-r ia ,or 3kmdon, soon* secretary 0-ener^l U"'$hant has eortjuirined thisto ifcriflag's correspondent ia the United H tiona.

II PI, I I ^ffl I (I «•!*••• • * . „ », I \r f

Thus,the Secretary General has changed-his original|»Ian according to which he w>av to visit the leading pe-so-npj:iiies Q| the jfpûr, great powers aad exchange v-iev;s withthem on tb-e potsio'Dlty to find a way out of the pieeeirccrisis/in vhich the United H«itions l-.nd$d* H?kis plp.n exisstedprior .to the postponement of the ,UM(JA aesaion, whichinterrupted its' work several voeks ago. Tile Vietna£:eso ^riaiswas1'the main reason" that iadwad the Secretary General tochange his plan. U Ihatot feet's that right nov^, in the middleof the crisis- in . 3,etaamj it la not the best time fo_r him tohold tapirs on the" prbbl &m'"of ' e. 0nit,:d Cations. ';/hat isiaore, &^ is. convinced tiir.t .thjfc Situation1 in the United lotionsis' highly":a'fifected b^. the f;iftttsimei0 crisis anf i - tLa t noprogress whatsoever can be ft6*Jiewd until the situation c.-lraadown and suitable possibilities are found for oâon/? iljn;;

of events into aapMei' fiirsctibn,. that ia, in the/\"f* "ôi^rt'f"?o'*i""^rtVtttr jftTBfl:^**-wi w <i 1 T1 TVC1 "f*'T &t£t ? ("'f in /**^T'' lTif^fi» f* 1*1 Vw4> 4it?t^V wj*'KiUJ.W**i!3 UJbMiWAlM^ C* '• «*- ye.-* W**"*!*" vVC**vt3J--Lltr''VJa V . /AA ^

?••• the 'goviet linion, theht© considers- the nnin

oMwhom i e settliiaen-t 6*1 the pfceêat UH crisis doponds ,

thus essassed the situation, the Secretary Gtcxio-is rtow concentrating his" efforts in ths spheie of "quiotom&cyV1 which h:vs "been devologing for sev rel week? now,

HoVevcr, neitite?? of the int^restod parties has thus far madea;** official reply," ei4hfir*dire»stly or indirectly, to his

"<&T±•p'biivtf proposals which ho opnfirmed at a press confoi'cncoHftfiA on February 24> even tnoughy-fpr the matter of thr.t, hodid receive some unofficial indications from several eidco.U Shant has iscsn Eoatly eurpr-Lssd by the attitude of tho U.S . ,boeause of a pessnge from a 'reliable and official place i:iWasiiiiigton, to:"the effect that "thug far no proposal of c.ny

significance haa been

;: : Sssentia1<1y, 1 Thant^'s |>ô|Jbsals are aimed in ths di-raction of pielimiiiar,? negoiiialions among a^l inter^stod _virtiea.

In, his sMsavsra^.tlon with the Sai]ijuÛ fhant lies emphasized that rea>.istic 'poesibilitiu0 forthe XJonstitutioâl-finp.ncial ^crisiai of the Unitod K.itione fortho time boing directiy depend on tho crisis over Vietnam.The deterioration of the feituatioa theê vjill.-minimize theaoprospects,;whilo an improvement in tho situation in Vietnammight create tioiiditiona that wouTd make possible negotiationsalso on the F$ crisis. fh4 probloiB of Vietnam is oodr.y thoIt9|f problem in tho international situation, on "whichthf ontiro iiit or national constQâtio^ depends, *Ja.at i*J; '*r>rlpoatfo nnia international cooêrniion- vConcurrent"' y, tho pool-t.i0n,:'• &t--thi. Unitwd Kr.tions," too, dapo^nds on tho developmenttlib situation in Viotnrja,1? U Shant

IK/8 **'


TO« The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION

FOR APPROVAL

FOR SIGNATURE

PREPARE DRAFT

FOR COMMENTS

MAY WE CONFER?

YOUR ATTENTION

AS DISCUSSED

AS REQUESTED

NOTE AND FILE

NOTE AND RETURN

FOR INFORMATION

POUR SUITE A DONNER

POUR APPROBATION

POUR SIGNATURE

PROJET A REDIGER

POUR OBSERVATIONS


VOTRE ATTENTION

COMME CONVENU


NOTER ET CLASSER

NOTER ET RETOURNER

POUR INFORMATION

For your attention.Copies also sent toMr. Rolz-Bennett and Mr. Urquhart.

Date:

17 Mar.

CR. 13 (1L-64)

UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE, BELGRADE

12 March,, 1965

Report on Editorial Comments in Yugoslaviai ' .

The UN crisis, various initiatives for establishing peace in Viet-• Nam and in Indo-China in general, the Conference of the peoples of Indo-China in Pnom Pen, and the question of the punishment of/§ar criminalswere topics which predominated in the Yugoslav press during the period underreview.

, - . . . . . The forming of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations wasgenerally accepted with satisfaction and favourably commented upon as a newattempt in the direction of solving the UK crisis* but not w i t h optimism asregards being a real settlement of the crisis. OSLOBODJSNJE (Sarajevo, 7 March)wrote that "it is practically unbelievable that within the framework of a hastilyformed committee and under the present conditions of confusion prevailing in theOrganization, a genuine, sound and lasting agreement could be found for such acomplex problem as the problem of world forces "in all of its aspects".,

KOMUNIST (Belgrade, 11 March) concluded ita commentary which was headed^Difficult Condition for Normalization11 with the following words; "The eoapoai-tion of the Special Committee,, •« allows one to expect that it will see its taskin its entirety and eeek for its solution in the right perspectivea Once thiswas: accomplished it would atill be necesaary for the independent countries todevelop timely initiatives to ensure, as soon as possible., the normal work ofthe world Organization? so that it may in future be able to mor<» Eueeaefullyrepulse any temptation that the irresponsible and shortsighted actions of thebig powers expose it tow

0

The press paid a great deal of attention to various initiatives for peac®in the countries of former French Indo-China, among them also the action of th«Secretary-General, U Thant, which was considered most significant* On theother hand, it deemed the stand of the US Government in regard to these ini-tiative a le&g and less understandable and justified.. The consensus of all thecommentaries is that "American military and political activity directed to-wards spreading the war in indo-Chinaf points out once more to the urgencyand resoluteness of counter-action on the part of all peace-leving forces in theworld" and that "such a counter-action may be concentrated on two essentialquestions of the Vietnamese crisis: cease-fire on the part of South Viet~Namin respect to its neighbouring countries, and the seeking of poli t ical solu-tions on the basis of the decisions of the Geneva Conference" (BCRBA, 9 March)«

The meeting of 38 political movements and parties of the countries offormer French Indo-China held in Pnom Fen under the title "Conference of thePeoples of Indo-China" should not be underestimated the newspapers concurred*BORBA wrote that agreement on the part of the Conference participants to esta-blish a permanent Secretariate of the Conference, in Pnom Pen, "is witness initself of the desire to overcome the differences by further action. For aregion such aa Indo-China, every aspiration of this kind, particularly whenit comes from the progressive and liberation movements* that are in actionthere, means eneouragem«nt"0

CR.13 (4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P


TO: The Secretary-General







For your attention.

Copies sent to Mr. Rolz-Bennettand Mr. Urquhart.

DATE:

17 March irge J. Janecek

43 Mart Street, Braddon. A.C.T. Correspondence: Bos 99 55PO ICanberra, A,C.T. Telephone Canberra 44321. Sydney St"£1, Mali"1

67 8944 (Circulation) 34 till, Adelaide SI 0391, Brisbane Sd 131,3S 0141, Hobart £1250.

Friday, March 12, 1683

read WALTER LIPPPVIANN in yesterday'sedition of The Australian was both stimu-

" tiling and depressing.It was consoling to see a commentator of

such authority in America spelling out pre-cisely the case against the warhawks of Wash-ington, and pointing out the ultimate futility of

} the illusion that a jungle war can be won with'aircraft.

It was also good to see a water who has con-sistently supported compromise in South Viet-nam make it clear that he recognised, and say

. America must recognise, a debt of honor to* those Vietnamese who have fought the Viet

Cong. As MR LZPPMANN says, they face beingliquidated, killed or really persecuted in thewake of any settlement which was not a com-promise.

- But while MR LXPPMANN is doing a neces-sary job in forming United States publicopinion, for Australia some of his conclusionsand omissions are depressing.

His reference to South-East Asia as thoughit was a simple entity, instead of Malaysia,Indonesia and Thailand — all very different —was oversimplified.

To find that American South-East Asianpolicy can be discussed without even a refer-ence to Australia is not surprising, toisst itftRf*theless disconcerting.

For Australia, so close to South-East Asia,the total collapse of resistance to Chin® can*not be viewed with the same equanimity asfrom Washington.

Although it is true that communismthe seeds of change, as eastern Europeanperienee has proved, it has not yet been -whether the rigid form of Chinese —******is capable of compromise.

In the long run Chinese communism milprobably change, but that still does aot alterthe fact that for the next generation Australiamay have to face real problems.

If a distinguished American like M® LEPP-MAWKI can carry on his discussion withoutthinking Australia worth a mention, it shouldlead us to think deeply.

There is cause for the fear that the UnitedStates, shaken by a debacle la South Vietnam,may think that a withdrawal to fortressAmerica may be the best policy for the Pacific.

All the more reason for Australia to'lseactive in seeking a solution in Vietnam wftldiwould be a guaranteed eonapromise.The United Nations Secretaw-Gfjeral•• - „. .___ ... .. ... _ „ . . , , - . . - ., ^ttxu^dtt^i,3«W«<iaL^MLL«awtctil

. ! - - .for s@ven-natian talks cm Vietnam. He should|p»-««---»~-—«i»-- ~- ~-—-yy——---«—.•«»••—M-^M^,,,^

beaupjgortedJby^Australia.

4:;THE AUSTRALIAN

Si Mart Street, Breddan, A C.T. Correspondence: Box 99 GPOCanberro^.A.C.T.. Tataphona Canberra 4«23t»_Sygnoy 2OT24. Melbgurna

J3 0141.

uu.v~Jta *,t*iiu*-i* u •sTs*rfe*A w^vtiivj «njii*-i, rfztUAfjuuniQ

Utll. Adelaide 91 Offll, Brisbane 50i31, Perth

't$m. March §, 1$65

- ^4-

.-. ^•^-••vDiOW*.' I^MS, •. s S^Q^y dear that, the

States is resisting initiatives for. .a„,_ ........ ..ia*.' A'week ago,' tfee werew'i$a{ British and Indian moves might

'talks, but the fatest'set these hopes.. .

r* described as •these latest strikes seem to be

i ~ ' _ " % -part m fiite ppm^ne.ot ,W9T,

and diplomatic usefulness :

strikes can be argijedf tet,_,,„ .Ti.^__.-._._jA to tele that the war In Viet-OTL^^Jjewra with'aw superiority is to forget

Those vocal American journalists who, ict asof the Hawks, ^10 Stifike North

aew: mentioa Die»

jS.trat©ii8t, Qmauu,

is^ Now is the time to

^oiaise—not sft-My lead to a

esirclse Inipake it dear that America

in a determined franco^e"any eserdise 'in

Iraught witli "linger. Inlltat the rilils t'lsa only

in« fiwe'lwrlib •'

; rlr

lissia away- Irom

•. ..'l •,. '..-alia

At a conference, it would be Russia the Westwould have to look to on the other side oftable for compromise. What these raidsdoing is to place Russia in the position wher©it has to support China in denouncing the West.' No Sensible person could deny that w_neutralisation would be the best solution.

The ideal would be an Austrian solution, ofthe kind accepted by Russia. But Europe ls"avery different placa from South-East Asia. Bussiahas accepted peaceful co-existence but CMni,as .its polemics against Moscow show, abhors thefiolion of a political vacuum.: A neutralised South Vietnam would !w© to

tie a de-inilitarised, civilian-governed State.' ^swith th© rest of Asia —- even Formosa — th@nWould feaw to be radical land reform. Only aprogressive government—probably left-wing in0ur »!e of ?alues—could achieve this. Th© "Would defeat a Vietnamese military froat.

It is sometimes suggested—usually by thos®romaatlcs who think the Viet Cong really repr^lents South Vietnam—that only a small clique,togeUber with the Americans, is keeping a whdlsliatioa down.

This overlooks the fact that the North Vietnamregime is as represive as NG© DD-IH BZSM everwas. It has had to put down at least one

people in South 'Vietnam resistedi,'then DIEM, and have fought the Viet.For the West to agree to neutralisation'"

safeguards would be to abandon themi vengteanee. , " , J . . ; .Unless America is prepared to plan now Br'a

ds-JUJIitariscd, neutralist buffer State,steeled . by international guarantees, it.

Jro&abty snS 'up by scrambling out afteribgvitable disaster—as the French did.

^ Btif who c0nld guarantee the borders of'si State? Not £fie Afro-Asian bloe or the Westerntowers—only the United Nations. The outlook;is dismal for such a guarantee from a United?''.Nations so. weak, 'ljut it is the only &ottre& f4 :-'.whisk tli^'world-.can turn. . . . . . . . .

MeMBwMle, men and women continue'toThe world, a little blase about it all.Oblivious of the prospect of an accidentalo'f events that might lead to a wkj§r war.

^ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-GeneralA:FOR ACTION

FOR APPROVAL

FOR SIGNATURE

PREPARE DRAFT

FOR COMMENTS

MAY WE CONFER?

YOUR ATTENTION

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AS REQUESTED

NOTE AND FILE

NOTE AND RETURN

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POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLERJ

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NOTER ET RETOURNER

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Date:

17 March 1965

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM: IDE: ^George J. JanecekDirector, ERD/OPI

,Time for changeIT THANT, the U.N.^; Secretary-General,

Has sairt in New Yorkthat the Charter ofthe United Nations is

=' out of date.This is not the first

time that a worlddjgiiitory has indicted

!the charter. In fjct,the organisation hasbee»; criticised moreJhan/three times with-in trie last few weeks.'It has been criticisedby -General de Gaulle,it has been criticised

• by Premier Chpu-EnLai, it has also beencriticised by President

. Sukarno,All this must go to

prove that howeveracceptable the char-ter was when it firstacceptable 1he Char-ily outlived its useful-ness and deserves areview.

We call upon memberstates to take "stepsto effect reforms.

,t:

FMS3 OEPSICM SUMjgftRy

Ho. n

a&Jor foeftts of press attention continued being dsvalogsssjAs ir. Vie

Widest eov®rag« was given to the calling free Canadian Prlussr Minister Lester B.

Bearsm urging tit® "intsnvatioroal eefflasnlty" to sreat© a |»ace-K&3pLag fors® to

the floating thera, as w©li as tfos etotoa&nt, th® follewlng day, fi-om tha UM

that mash jjsroposal i®as "mrth ©^Loiring". A smjor tcâct ims

iflaea infffiraatlon t«as givea absat th® nE»s«ag©s e@nt fcy tlss UN Sec rs tary-

to "fiosnn of a®ln gowaffis" rsaoaiarading a coaforence bstitsan USA, ISSSSi, United

, FK-aftcs©s North said South Viet Naaij and feisjlasid China, "to ead tho wsur o^"

Wide coârag® «as also giv«n H© tSx© eraioumc«Bisat that tfes USA. pledgsd upt to

to tSaa IM facial Posid a»d the J&«ps2id®d Prograaas© of 'I^Q'

A aajoar iteas hflere was tb« ssffltaar on t3as eradte&tlcia ©:f aslaria currsintly undar

®ad spoasoaped by t£M) Pba Anttrioaa Health 0£fiod» Hfc® ©faoing toch plaea In Cueraavaee

(MaxLoo-11 oa £fe©'5tfej> witfe an address ftrom Dec1. Bafaal Msbano Veils., Sec^t-ar^r of Health,

and atteaid®d by'uaor® ttea 10© ea^r&s on tno^lo^l diseases represent lr*g 20 2atlnas»rlcan

nations. J3r. ctor A. Cctt, cfeJtof off tSs® PABO, ala«> spoke at fcb© masting and reswi a

message sent to tt&@ d©l«gat®® by ®p, Atoatos Hor^lfcs, director of tb© PAEO/WEO.

N«3ws about the calling froa Finland China and Pakistan for a raorganisatian of the

U H to allow til® adudssiost of tto first «&s to t&« warld organisation was very coverad

too. In latimassrican. news th® sajor lEâat vis»s prodneed. arînd the congresîmâl

electiono in CM3.e^ e<msidering it fe© a "OoHamatst SUCOSBS" by several editorial cea&aants

Good eovew^® was also otrtainsd by tfe© flamounoflmsnt that th© Mexican Gn.y/ernBssat arid

Nations will oo-spoassor tiut 5th trsintijg e«»s«» in esonomle dsv*9lq|EBBnt arid.

'fco b® Jj®ld at tbs Stolean Hatioiml IM varsity -o»g|-ltoJ^g oa

f. Noriasn Ko

~ 2 -

The six-day meeting of the Organization of African Unity

0.1 fifee Congo, at Nairobi, Kanya, and Its appsal to the Ca%;al9fc<3 Go

and th« otSier govemmunts of asi^hbortrjs states to refrain froc. eng

to aggravate tb® eituatlcaij were among ttos aast co«-®re:i n©vra

Albornoz


INFORMATION CENTRE FOR IRAQ

27J.2/1 Abu Nouivas Street

P. O. Box 2048, Alunyak

Cables : Omniprut

Telephone : 84171-4

ft/. : 95/65

BAGHDAD

10 March 1965

Y • i A .

. A t ) V 1

TO s Mr* Nonaan Ho, Chief, Overseas Briefing Unit, Officeof Public Information, United Nations^ few

FROM S Dik Lslmkuhl, Dirsotar,, UKIC,

SUBJECT?

As r%que»i#r29 we ar® reporting that the Bagh-30 ? wv- 1 •«. ; >*•,s on 7th March quoted ©srtensively frcai the ed i t . i . - r -?«i p r ' i f i

Thant's Foot Slipped" in the New Ye^V Hera7idJ^rj/Kjm of F.^r--=!JJ? and ths fci No0 10 of 5th MarVji 011 ts r««

U Thti n t e& statements to the press on

The Trll'Uiis edltffirl.al was r?»produoec! in fu!3 . and thr : TimsIIULLIIILMO • i^n" H l l l | i i * > ° * tirs*t«cu=oarri

story was siMsn».ri?.*d»

We enclose a phot^oopy ef the original story in Arabic whle!Wars the title "The American Newspaper® Latuwjh ® CaropftSgn A^alruitU Thant Because of his Stand on the War in North, Vietnair, and Sr»--ttkAbout Conditions in hi® Country f

introduced thef ©Hewing I s a s "Ttoa Amerissan

and Tiro 3wa«tionf> w^tharu angrv with Mre 'rh/ui

Ths S9or«tary«<J®neral of the UnAtefl Nations because h« s&i^ tV.ptpsople he® not 'b©«?n irsformed about the fae*e in S

Mr« 'Ehant'a statement has prsdxio©d a political reactionWashington dorrldor®*!o

March 5, 1969 RADIO REVIEW

|"N what uiis I'eerc described as a major policy sfatemeus, ^ Jham, the United•*• Nations Seeretsry-Generaf texs descrillied tfee UaN. Cliarter as "out ef date"asid sairf if was tlip cause of die world body's present constiiuf&fia! aad jcrests- What is reiaarksNe about ffais statement is the faet tbat il coaies fromno less a persoa than the United Natiens Secretary-General buaself,

We must remember that criticisms of (be deficiencies ol" the U.N. bavcbeen mounting m recent times. Osagyefo the President, at East year's con-ference of non-nhgned nations in Cairo, made the same suggestion and calledfor a revision of Che U.N. Chaffer in order to conform to she changed realitiesof our present world condition.

U Tbanl's reference lo the in-adequacies of the U.N, Charter, andthe constitutional and political crisisia which it is currently involvedthus opeas a public debate on asubject that has been of great con-

Broadcast as 'IW©w$ Taifcfrom Sad>o Ghana

cern to ail those genuinely interestedin ensuring tbe confirmed effective-ness of the United Nations.

The baakgrouRil to the currentcrisis is fairly weJMcnown. Osten-sibly it has arisen as a result of thefiaaacial crisis precipitated by theeefusaf of some member-states topay their share of the cost of peace-keeping operations. This, however,is only the outward manifestation ofa conflict,

One fact is, nevertheless, obvious—the composition of the SecurityCouncil has not changed since theinception of the U.N. The fivepermanent members still wield theirveto powers and generally dominatesix non-permanent members.Another reason is that from theoriginal membership of 51 in 1954,the membership of the GeneralAssembly has grown to 116,

We have yet to understand fullythe implications of Uiis development,

On the one haad, Uiis growth inmembership brings the organisationnearer to Us goal of universality—awelcome sign. On the other hand,it has seriously undermined thedisposition o alignments amongthe power blocs. The largest addi-tions to sicw members strtce I960,have besa from the African con-

tinent. When the Gambia, whichbecame independent a fortnight agois admitted to membership, therewill be no less than 36 Africanmember-states iu the U.N. Thus,the Afro-Asian members make upalmost one half of tiie total U.N.membership. As U Thant has said,in a rapidly changing world, thesechanges SB alignments- have inevita-bly made the Charter anachronistic.

Tbe aew eSemerst which this group,with some Latin-Americas! countries,have teSroJuca! Ma Sfee U.R is theirattachment, in varying degrees, S«>the principle of Eoti-aligGEisai ssJieSweeii the etasliiEoaal dlvisieis af theEast and West 5ed fesp®cti?dy fey sheU.S.S.H. said the Halted States of

Tliis is what has tended to pushthe CS«aera> Assembly into greaterprominence, at the expense of theSecurity Council, and thus heightenthe anomalous condition under whichthe Security Council— which is effectmeans the United. States, Russia,Britain, France aad Formosa-can mate decisions, while the Gene-ral Assembly resolutions are onlyrecommendations. This anomaly isat the root of the present financialcrisis of the U.N.

The current session, after futileattempts to carry oa without re-course to "normal voiingprocedutes"has had fo wind up. in the ffiesii-time, efforts are to be made todevise more appropriate means ofauthorising, as weli as paying forthe costs of peace-keepifig opera-tions. Important as this problem is,it must be admitted that it is not theroot of tie U.N.'s dilemma.

If this review of U.N. peace-kejsping operations is undertaken,with the Charter as it now standsas She basis, its recommendations

"will' never be satisfactory. What

ought to Be dctcrmu>ed, as a manof priority, is the role of the GeneiAssemhty and iho Security Coumrespectiveiy m this particular arof peace-keeping operations. Onthis is done, st wi l l be inevitablehave'to take a hard look at the coiposition and powers of the Secur.'Council, and what relevancepresent structure has to world psbleias.

The ridiculoi^ position ot'TaiWcas a permanent iicmiKT vhave to be reviewed ; also iwhole concept of she veto-pott•At the «arse time, ii will lie ueosary to review (it. fiuictioaicgthe General Assembly aad cpasic'whether iis resok'»ions should cctiaue to be merelyor shoiiJd bcrome

In other words, the basic quest:to face now is where muss npower lie \a the U.N.—IB iSecurity Council as guaranteed ,Sh« present Charier, or ia the OSESAssembly. This will amoual tofundamental reappraisal of the TV hiconcept of tlsc U/N. quite at varjoowith the original conception, bat othat cannot be evaded.

U Than! to making his statemc-about the U.N. Charter, said tb"our approach to peace is often ofashioned ao.il aiort aUuiied ,Tenner i\m^ tho.n our present stateIf ihls is a bii of poiitk'kite-flying by the United Watiofoi'«moss scrvsist, ihan the oppttunity mUvSt not he lost. 1965after al! the 2£Hh anniversary of IIU.N., and far from these- twerjcars endowing the Clianer wiinviolability, our expss'ience in theyears must urge us to try and devia worfd-foody mare, attuned to naiour present steeds.



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Date:1? March

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM: C^T"DE: Georgk J. Janecek

UNITED NATIONS INFOKMATION CENTRE, BELGRADE

5 March, 1965

He-port oa Editorial Comments in Yugoslavia

The repeated bombing of th« territory of North Vietnam by UnitedStates planes, events in South Vletaais and icarioua initiatives sad endeavoursfor finding a solution for the crisis in South East Asia were topics whichmostly attracted the attention of the eommentatosra ia Yugoslav leading ness-papers during the period under review*

The repeated bombing of North Vietnam territory, according to generalopinion, carries with it so many dangers that it is practically impossible tobelieve that no serious consequences will result from it« According to BQEB&(4 March) "the greatest danger of this attack is that it introduces lets prac-tice self-willed war operations against all norms of international compatibi-lity and with greatest indifference towards the disposition of world publicopinion which insists on negotiations"* The nssspap^r added that "armedattacks against a sorereign countrys and on the basis of arbitrary construc-tions at that, represents a threat to all sovereign countries and to «orldpeace as a whole"o

POL1TIKA (k March) accused "the extremist conception of the WashingtonAdministration" and referred to it as "founded on erroneous suppositions". Th©paper lent full support to President Tito's stands in his message to PresidentJohneon* The commentary likewioe stressed that "power policy is a system whichbaa, in the main, been abandoned by the greatest number of leading worldpartly also because such a system hampers their interests,, if the course ofworld movements ie considered in an inevitable long term perspective"0

In connection with the Vietnamese crisis aad the situation in SouthEast Asia in general, the Yugoslav pross ia following with sympathies the stepsbeing taken by the Secretary General of the United Nations for finding commonpoints among the interested parties,, efforts of Paris and Moscow to contributejointly to a political solution to the South Vietnam®®® problem®,, endeavours ofthe non-aligned countries to make a joint effort in the diplomatic field, aadthe initiative of Cambodia's Premier Norodom Slhanuk for the convoking of a so~eal3sConference of the Peoples of Indo-CSiina in Pnom Pen«

The newspapers continue to hold the viewpoint that utmost should b©done for the purpose of establishing negotiations ©n the Vietnamese problemand South East Asia in general0

CW/zrf;

17 Ifcawfa

Beer Itet&ese

for s^mr Id.sc! letter of 9 Marete, X sesaiof %" s^pssl <i®teS 12 SSetanaaajy

of '

I agree t?!t& ^tsu that- tfeie Is' a tis» -steea all man ofjaast i^ite tlieir e&fcsetes IB tfes c®ase c^ peace .

am iESst gvaiteftil to ^ou for jom" MaS wowls of

Ycasrs

0 3&aE&

Sue

cc - Mr. LemieuxEeglstry


TO:A:




FOR COMMENTS

MAY WE CONFER?

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AS DISCUSSED

AS REQUESTED

NOTE AND FILE

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For your attention. Copiesforwarded to Mr. Rolz-Bennett andMr. Urqtihart.

Date:16 March

CR. 13 (11-64)

T ^DE: NMorge J. Janeeek

'JTTTTED NATIONS HTPOHMATTON SERVICE.M3w BELKi

JTaaie of Paper_

Date

THE T:MSS OF IKDIA

AGAINST THEGRAIN

There can be no rational ex-planation of the U.S. aerialattacks against North Vietnamother than the possible assump-tion in Washington that thereare—in the Vietnamese situa-tion—certain built-in safe-guards against the danger ofcsealation; Tliis is an assiiunp-tion that«is not entirely unjusti-fied although it is one whichno statesman can or shouldaccept without reservation.None of the parties involved;including North Vietnam, Com-munist China, the Soviet Unionand the United States can haveany reason to expect substan-tial benefits front' a majorconflict and it is this coinci-dence of interests that willundoubtedly help to restrictI he current moves on the Viet-namese chessboard to (he purely•'tactical- level. As things are,nfcithei* Peking nor Hanoi isunder compulsion—either ofevents or logic—to negotiatewith the United States, andespecially so since the VietCong campaign has been suc-cessful ,ajid .the VietnameseGovernment has been reducedto a condition of serious dte-

JJrray. It is clearly this con-sideration—that time is onPeking's side—which has im-pelled Senator Morse categori-cally to reject the policy .otaerial bombings as utterly dis-creditable. It has aTsapersoadedGeneral de Gaulle obliquely todissociate France from , U.S.,policy in Vietnam antjL the U.N.Secretary-General tfe rtfnfbrcifhis appeal for a negotiatedsolution,SJ*fot unrelated to thjscurrent* trend'! in fevour of apolitical solution is the latestrevelation, by no means theonly one. that tliere is a sub-stantial body of opinion inSaigon which believes that asolution can be found only atthe conference table. The,1

powerful Buddhist groups thathave emerged as a meaningfulpolitical force in the south havealso ranged themselves in sup-

port of this view to the point,indeed, where the U.S. policyof aerial warfare is unlikely tobe endorsed even in Saigonitself. Collectively all this addsUD to a factor that cannot bedismissed as pro-communismor appeasement. Senator Morsespeaks for a school of thoughtwhich is as concerned as anyother that communism shouldbe effectively "contained" inSouth-East Asta. It is on thequestion of how this objectivecan be achieved that there isa divergence of opinion whichthe recent U.S. aerial attackshave done nothing to reduce.

There is still a failure inWashington to appreciate thatdespite the Seventh Fleet andits bomber forces the United;States is militarily at a seriousdisadvantage. Handicapped bya corrupt and inefficient regimein Saigon, by a population un-mindful of ideological subtle-ties and by its own reluctance

, H> commit U.S. forces on alarge scale. Washington cannever hope—escalation apart—to bring the military campa'pnto 'm-decisive conclusion. Thissurely means that if commu-nism In South-East Asia fs tobe fought the political arena isthe only field fn which this canbe successfully done. It is be*cause Peking realises this thatthe 'Chinese Government is at-tempting to evade negotiationsby every means. There is con-sequently no reason to be as-tonished1:; by the equanimitywith which Peking has reacted'to the U.S. aerial attacks sinceftiwei'.-Have had the .effect not ff*i>f ol*tr»hanassing the SovietL'nJon but of emphasising

Washington's isolation from anincreasing area of world opinionin which both New Ix-l l i i andSenator Morse anJ innumer-able others are able to speakin one voice. In other wordsonce again the United Suiteshas played into China's handsin the ridiculous belief that afew aerial incursions into NorthVietnam will cause the com-munists to yield or meekly toapproach the negotiating table.The proposal that if the VietCong withdraws from South

jiVietnam U.S. troop-; will alsoJ*e sent home is in this context'thoroughly infantile thoughlentirely consistent with the ini-"rhaturity of the tit-for-lat prin-ciple. The point is not thateither (he Viet Cong or the I'.S.forces should withdraw but thatthe situation must be poliiicallyresolved. If the purpose is—asit presumably is—to bewilder(he Chinese, to expo>e them toihe fest of actual clecJs and tochallenge them w i t h i;utio towhich ihey can h,ue no easyanswer, the United States can-not do belter than to convenean international conferencepossibly under the auspices ofthe U.N. Secretary-General andthereby transfer the entireaffair to a level at which theanti-communist forces can act ;with force and conviction. !Meanwhile the supposition thatcommunism can ba defeatedby dropping bombs deserves

'.the contempt of hdsf, quietlyignored.

Name of Paper_

.- •'. ; iate:

Viet NamnE divergent views Express-ed by members of the In-

ternational Control Commla- ision qh Viet Nam regarding

•the recent bombing raids bythe U.S.A. point to the ex-treme complexity of the situa-tion. While the representativesof Poland and India have ac-cused the? tJT$:A. of breaking

• the. 1954; agreement on Viet| Nam 'by ;fier bombing attacks,J the Canadian delegate' has de-}feiided the American raids on; the ground that they are the"direct result, of the aggressive' policy of the Coinmunlsts. TheAmerican thesis on the subject

,'ls that the official policy ofthe Hanoi regime is (6 subjUrgate South Viet Nam by force.The wsr in Viet Nam is diirected by the Central Commit-tee of theCommunist

NorthParty.

Viet NamThe Viet

Cong's key leadership has beentrained by. Hanoi and sent Intothe South. The scale of infil-tration from the North has in-creased 'appreciably in recentmonths and the entire patternof activity of Hanoi violatesthe taw of nations, the U.N.

[lowed to suffer In consequenceof the developments in VietNam and that the situation isnot allowed to get out of con-trol. The first problem is toensure the cessation of fight-ing. The International ControlCommission has requested theCo-Chairmen to consider thedesirability of issuing an im-mediate appeal to all concern-ed with a view to reducingtension and preserving peacein Viet Nam and taking what-ever measures are necessary to'stem the deteriorating situa-tion. A military solution of theproblem of Viet Nam is out ofthe question. There can only

j be a political solution which(must be thrashed out at an In-fternational conference. The! people on both sides want apolitical settlement. North VietNani would lose her indepen-dence and become a satellite ofChina if fighting continues.The instability in South VietNam is due partly to the de-sire of large sections of thepeople for a negotiated peace. IThe reunification of both parts'.of Viet Nam and her neutrah- I,Sation -provide an ideal solu-tion, ;but immediately the pro- .blem Is that of persuading all

Charter and the Geneva ac- parties involved' to end" the!

cords. The U.S.A., Mr. Adlal 1'ghting and undertake not toiStevenson told the Security $eek to alter the status quo by I

: Council a few days ago, w&s force or subversion. Iwilling to /withdraw her mlli^ 'tary forces from'..South VietNam if .peace could be restor-ed> thefie by0 ^ptQitipt and asV)Iwrelii cessation .ol agjressi6hby Hanoi against ;ihe' Republic;of Viet Nam'1. According tqKtan,oi, the U.S. decision id:yise'^ier forces rn South Viet

', Niaiitt in a dirtct, operationalj capacity is a new jancroach-^rnent on the sovereignty andindependence of Viet Nam. TheCommunists acc'usei the Ameri-can Administration of pursu-ing imperialistic ~ policies in ••:Viet; Nam and of vilifying the.V"revolutionary Btruggie of the ipeople of South Viet Nam ^aga'nst.the U.S. imperialists-as •aggression from the North.

The U:S.Av and the SovietUnion which have ^been mak- iing; commendable efforts in the :

;

last few years to reduce inter- ;national tension and bring ;about an East-West rappro-,

Jchement should see that .the1

I cause of world peace is not al-

"TITED TTATIOriS THTORKATI'NEW DELHI

Name of Paper

• Date

Plea to make Hindias UN language

ALLAHABAD, March 0 OPTI) —The all-India special Hindi con-vention, organised by ' the HindiSahitya Sammelan, yesterday re-quested the Union Government tomake effort* for making Hindi oneof the official languages of theUnited Nations Organisation.

The convention, which concludedlast night after passing several re-solutions, was of the opinion thaiexisting pattern of education inpublic schools where English wastaught from the very beginningneed a radical change and de-manded that It should be stoppedforthwith.

Presiding over a seminar on na-tunjal language organised by theconvention, Mr N. V. Gsdgil, for-

mer Governor of Punjab, appealedto the protagonists o! Hindi 10keep the doors of Hindi open towords of common use of other re-gional languages.

Mr Gadgi) said that Hindi wasnot confined to a particular pro-vince. It was the language of thewhole country. He would, there-fore, suggest that Hindi shouldcontain words of common use o'fother regional languages to makeit more popular all over the coun-try.

Anti-Hindi agitationHeferring to the recent anti-

Hindi agitation in the South. Heurged the Central Government tobe firm on the Issue of the natio-nal language and not to yield toviolent threats of anti-social ele-ments

Mr Gadgll contradicted thestatements made by Hindi antago-nists that the Constituent Assemblyand the Congress ParliamentaryParty had adopted Hindi as the of-ficial language by only one vote.The Constituent Assembly and theCongress Parliamentary Party hadadopted this provision unanimous-ly. He had himself presided overthe party meeting which hadtaken the decision, he added.

Mr Lafcsrimi Narayan. Speaker ofthe Bihar VUhan Sabha. suggestedthe organisation of "official lan-guage protection committees" inevery district of Hindi speakingStates and raisin? of a. volunteetcorps to propagate Hindi in non-regional languages.

Mr Narayan, opposed the idea ofconducting UF8C examinations inregional langpages.

He said that the Union Govern-ment bad failed to property edu-cate the people of the South re-garding the constitutional and fac-tual position of Hindi. The appro-hension created in the minds of thepeople of the South that Hindi-knowing: people would dominate InGovernment josto WM

'.^TTED ?TA':iOM3 TiTÔHKATTT? r,ii*% 'DELHI

JFanie of Paper

Date

ion

Britain Ims tjiye'nfinancial aid to the territories

'rjnjng Malaysia around £100million since the end;o! the>war This inehides some 820inilAlon towards the plannedexpansion of the Malaysianarmed forces (t&e • question offurther aid for this purposeis currently under review).

i; Brttohr is also -;committed -. toMalayjs&'s 'defence under an.agreetnent concluded, witii the"TPtedertttioh of Malaysia •• in 1957iahd extended in 1963 to applyto- all the territories ,pf Malay-sia. Under this Defence Agree-ment, Britain has undertaken;fed'reh>':~Malaysia, 'at her Gb--vtemment's .request to meetany attack or threat of.'attackon her territory. Britain inreturn is allowed to maintainforces and bases in Malaysiafor this ourpose and to enable

an unsuccessful revolt In Bru-nei (which at thai time wasinterested in joining Malaysiabut eventually chose to re-main outside), evoked sympa-thy and support from,Indone-sia for the rebel leaders in.their aim of setting up a uni-tary state of Brunei. Sarawakand North Borneo (now Sa-bah). unconnected with Malay-sia.

'Confrontation'Thereafter, Indonesian hos-

laysia represented anialisf olat designed totuate Britain's economic andmilitary control, over the area,to -encircle' Indonesia and todestroy the Indonesian revolu-tion. This thesis was supportedby assertions 'that the 'peoniesof northern Kalimantan (Bor-

been denied any op-to express thair

defence and ttieBreservation of peace In SouthEast Asia,

Indonesian hostility towardsMalaysia —first propaganda,then open attacks:, across theborder in Borneo, and .recentlyarmed landing's on the Mala -van peaftnsula— h»ve fai'qeathe Malaysian Government-toInvoke. this\; agr ppjr.cn t s.fidsee'c help from Britain. Aus-tralia and "Mew Zealand, to•^joplement the vety. rcmRide-

TnWe defensive effort-of MalavMi's own armed forces, Bri-tish forces in Malaysia have•bên built up as .'confrorita-tlbn' has deyeloped to keenpace with the growing threat.News of the massive •* increaseof Indonesian forces in Kali-mantan resulted at the «nd of1964 in the dispatch . of yetmore British military, navaland air , reinforcements as a

<precautionary move. Britishforces in the area now numbersome 5p,flOO of whont:' lOiOOOart 1n .Rorrieo. T1^s^ bresentBntlah- Govefnine'tit, ..'.like ;itsprpdpcesdor. IVas made." plftarBrtMin's determination to ho- ,nour it.s obligations to Malay-

(â .[ Malaysia Plan

In li?Sl. when plan* foe aot"Singapore and the

British 'dependencies Ui Bor-neo wtUi the Federation . o(Malaya, to form"an ..enlarged

._ _ . . they did not.Malaysia. .

In fact, a commission of >n-Quiry—-the cobbold Commis-sion—which went to Sarawakand Sabah in 1932, had.eom'lr-med that the majority didwish to join Malaysia, and thisconclusion was later endorsedin elections in both states on

.* basis of•• universal adult suf-frage in which Malaysia was amain issue. - . . .

Active 'confrontation* as.thi-Indonesians call their cainpat-gn to destroy Malaysia b.y th«threat and use of force, beganin April 1963. when groups ofso-called 'volunteers' began t<>infiltrate across the borderfrom Indonesian Borneo Into

Malaysia, • were .first fdnnallyproposed by the Prime Minis-ter ot the Federation. Indone-si'a evinced no hostility to theproposal. On the contrary, !n aspeech before the United Nafions General Assembly inNovember 1961. the Indonesianforeign: Minister said: 'We toVlthem that 'we had.. na oblec-tlnns and that we wi-sfoet) t.hPm.vuctewS'. with this mcraer sothat flveryono may live Inpeace .and .fteedom . ,

The;v|flrSt.'sigr-s of oppositioncame at tlie #nd of 1962, when.

Sarawak and Sabah and to en-gage in raids, sabotage and at-tempted subversion.

InaugurationFollowing a meeting in Tox-

yo in May 1963 between thePrime Minister of Malaya.Tunku Abdul Rahman, andPresident Sukarno nf Indones-ia, there appeared to be somerelaxation of tension. At a fur-ther "s'.unmit" meeting in Ma-nila in August at which Presi-dent Macapagal of- the Philip-pines was also present, Indo-n-esia and the Philippines pro-mised to 'welcome' Malaysiaprovided that the United Na-tions Secretary General ad anindependent and imp;utia) au-thority, r-onfirmed. be lore theestablishment of Malaysia,(scheduled for 3lst August*,that Malaysia had the supportof the peoples of sabah andSarawak. In an effort to ensurethat Malaysia came into beingwith the goodwill of her nei-ghbours, the Tunfcu agreedthat U Thant should be askedt.n send a team to Sarawakand Sabah to check on the wi-shes of the people regardingMalaysia. The British Govern-ment, while indicating its vh-\vthat the Sarawak and Sabahpeoples had already made th^l rwishes abundantly clear, m^tthe Malayan Government's re-quest that facilities should btprovlde-d for ihe UN Investiga-tion and that the date ol Ma-laysia's Inauguration should b*>postponed.

On completion of the .sub*"-quent U N enquiry U Thant re-ported his conclusion vhat theelections tn Sabah and Sara-wak had been free and prooer-ly conducted and that 'there isno doubt about the wishes oJa sizeable majority of the peo-ples of these terri'torips to joinIn the Federation of Malaysia',and on 16th September. 1903Malaysia came into being.

ReactionsIn-stead of welr.oming thr '

?o:matJoi< nf Mfilaysia a.-. .>'.;•*had promised to do. [ndon<--i : l ;denounced the U \ pni.rjir.v. jdespite having earlier appearedto accept at its face va lue ;hrstatement of the leader of theobserver team that he wa.-i 'convihced of the impauti.i'.ity o:the U Nf team's worn.' C ; IM-trontntlon now asûnj-'d j in -:'cvirulent, i-hara-.f.fr D'.alJ-raUcreJationi with Maiavoi.t \vrre

~4JS«USe«i-—A-ii-SCOJIOStiC oS-yCutu ,-of Malaysia wa-s iif tJi.ut.e.1. 'Anti-Malaysia sentiments wereInflamed bv rallies, demonstra-tions, broadcasts and attacksIn the press. The slogan v.-u.;hMalaysia' became a constantlyrepeated battle-cry "VWun-teers' to fight Malaysia werecalled for, and borrtT rrii-iswere intensified. Attacks we:emiidp on British in.vt 'tmiv>n:iand property in Indone-lu ,<nd—at "a lat°r st.ase—Bnt1?li i;o-•mmercidl interests woreover.

.(To Re

\

S TN?ORKiTiCN SERVI^F

Name of Paper_

.Date

Indonesian ConfrontationI

Elections in' Malaya In April.1964, in which ' anti- Malaysianopposition •• groupings suffered& severe defeat, reaffirmed po-pular support lor the conceptof Malaysia .and for the Tun-ku's Government in its resis-tance. to Indonesian aggres-sion. Indonesia's only responsewas renewed threats, partica-larlv President) Sukarno's pro-mis* ttiat -neo-eolontalist Ma-laysia* would be 'crashed* be-fore the sun rose on 1st Janu-ary 1965, and an Intensifiedcampaign of armed Intrusionsand attacks.

Guerrilla raids and enflttra-tlbn across the border in Bor-neo became Increasingly fre-quent. and in Aiisrusl 1964 a•new phase opened with thelaunching: of a series or attem-pted ?ea and air Invasions ofth* Malayan- oenln.'ula. Thenrorwirfclnn of members of thereeular T«done<!i!iTi armed for-

stea-of 75tn -an

pvpv>

In a letter to the TJ. JJ on31st December. 1964. the Ma-laysian ooverivnent drew the'M-«inl<:ation's itfcent'on to theharvest of the previous 12months of 'confrontation':njore than 2t)n Incidents Invol-ving Indonesian aeerression,at a cost of over 100 casualtiesBwonsf the fpRHrl.t-y forces aridmore t*>a« SQfi Hi led nod can-tered InrforiesiaTis. rplnce ac-MVP "confrontation" heffan In»rHl toft'' the T^dorie^*^ hav«Ief n.ea.rlvM nftn ram-altles of

some 3*n hive been kill-ove»- «ifKi VI-IVP siirren-

csntufd as aga-smirltv Forca

Ti1 Indonesia iuscH uht cam-nsl'rn of threats. vUuoemttoiiand denunclatiop of Malavalahas'.eoive on "na-h«ted. -iwifcwta 'backarourirf otf worserslnu

lt coridWo«s. the irrow-

and ?> steadv drif?•»wav from non-sllsmm^nt \nfavour ~f "=n«riarlty' with Cn-aimatilst China.

The most recent develop-ments — Indonesia's decision towithdraw from membership ofthe Tjnlt«d Nations 'the firstcountry ever to dt> so\ annou-nced Iby President Sufearno onSlst Dece«ib6r tn piouc at Ma-lavsla's rtecBoh trt inember-

• *hio -of • the -seonritY" ..... founcii .and' confirmed hy a formalletter of resignation on ?tstJanuarv. and the continuingTndneslan milltarv bulld-un.ttHen with '•eupit.prt f1ccl?»rji-tlons bv PreMdent Sukarno

Tndonestnns

means to .step tip her attackseven further during 1965. Inview or these' developments,Malaysia has felt It necessaryto draw to the Security Coun-cil's attention the mountingthreat to her safety and towarn the TJ N that If thisthreat is realised ahe will naveW> seek U. N. assistance.

Negotiations Foil

Ail attempts -at aegotlaUonand mediation^ between thetwo countries have SQ la,t Tt«»-ken dowa.. 'Th;? obstacle hasbeen Indonesia's refusar to calloft* her armed attacks on Ma-laysia so that menntnarful dis-cussions mar beslri. The Ma-laysian Government has ex-wressed itself ready to nttate at anv time, providsd^oniesla tirist ceases1 .This th<» Indonerfana nrofussto regard tta an unacceptable^recondition contpastinit withtheir own -wHlinftn«ss to neao-tlate *wlthont. conditions', gutwhen thev call on the Tut?kuto neeotlatfl for. to at the TY>-kyft Summit In .Tune ifl6i. ae-re". to the settin«> uo Of anAfro-Asian rondliation com-mlssJpni Vithout precondi-tions' th»v tn fact" T«*»tn snb-<cct to their orwrnnditlon Mia.tMalay^w »us{ rteeotlat* undefti« dure«-«i of cnntlnued Indo-n«sfftn attacks.

• ' . ' • ' -O- i i: .' "":'• ' ' '

Support (For Motaysio

Malaysia has been acceptedas a member of the 0. N., withtoken opposition onlv from In-donesia, backed by Russia 3fceIs now a member of the Secu-rity Council. . Malaysia hask«of the Uidted Nation* fullylQforme<i of Indonesian actsof aggression, and In Septem-ber 1964. followtner ttia para-chute dTOo Sftto Malaya of alarge bodf of \ Indonesiantroops. slh<! complained to 'heSecurity Council. A No^wogi»-iresolution deplortns: th» Indo-nesian landing; v^rt cj>lUn»-respert for tetrltoriaT 'ithough vetoed br the .TTnlon, received favourable vo-tes from S of th« U Councilmembers, inchidine the two

the right to attack a'td intrudeI into'Malaysia, because to In-donesia 'Malaysia does not

' > suggest jfoa&

Th« Prime Ministers of theCommonwealth, at their meet-ing in London in July 1984.assured the Prime Minister ptM»Isy»ia"-fl-r-' •Tn«r"'"»yTni«tmrand support in his efforts to

' preserve t,he sovereign Inde-pendence and integrity of hiscountrv and to promote a,peacpful and honourable set-tlement of current differencesbetween Malaysia and neigh-bourly conhtries." Britain,Australia and New Zealand are.nartlclpattng actively In thedefence of Malaysia, and theyan* Canada «a»'E«?c«7idhus fi-

nancial aid furThe United state.s has a f f i r -

med Its support for Malaysia'sright to maintain her inde-pendence and resist j-ubverslnu.

Onlv the Communist coun-tries. notably China, have beenprepared to back Indonesia'saggressive policies. The Philip-pines, -who have their owa dif-ferences with. Malaysia overtheir claim to Sobah. haveielt unabte to so along with•eonffontattoo'.

Malaysia's Progress

Meanwhile, although Indo-nesian confrontation has pro-duced added problem? for theenlarged federation— for Ins-tance. increased expenditureon defence has become nece-ssary, and the severance oftrade relations between thetwo countries has caused somehardship for Singapore andPenana-— Malaysia has mana-ged not only to rnnintMn. butto strengthen its position.

The economy has continuedto grow: external Investment-has bwn maintained at a highlevel: the prices toe tfce twomain exports of rubber andtin have risen: and tiie loss oftrade with Indonesia has beenoffset bv expansion In otherdirections: notably In inersa- ,sert irtdustrlAlisatdon.

The Government ha? goneshead with plans for Integra-t.'ne the economic systems olthe component Rtafe1?. A five-year development nlan cover-Insr the whoTe of Malaysia 1*being draffd. and the first .stens havi. been takers towards Isetttntr UD a Malaysian com-mon mwrTf^t, so thff 'jlT sr("5n»9v benefH" fn>m ttic "re-aU v>

of a laraer i>*;nrtomic i in l t i•with U<i nif"*e varlert resources |nr>d orodurts. !

Already the country's stan-dard of living, though varyingconslderablv between the com-poir»nt states, <s the highestIn Sout,h-T!ast Asia, the avera-ge level of per caolta Income^pJn" shout doable that ofThailand or the Philippines.Tn il^ external relptinns Ma-tiyp»a has tnken n full .«aT-».re1ft the ronnrfTs o' both the ro-»nTT«riT»trei»ltv' and the unitedNations, and has stated as OP"nf the cardinal w!ncir»]e.= of

culturaleconomicTurfth netTn "n area where Instability-political, economic or both—iscommon 'fro* e^amnip. in ^1**-nam Laos and Indonesia itself"Malaysia ^>a« pr«ented a pic-ture of ord"1lv denriocrstic eo-vernment. financial soundnessf»"d economic 4nd snciai pro-'K1-86SL

UNITED NATIONS IBFOSMATIOT SERVICE

Name of Paper_

Da,te

IKBUSTRMF STJWDAKD (Calcuttc.)

is no secret-' thai th£various measures, imiud-

ing the. econtimic sanctions^that na^^&^takjUt so far by,the U. If.* SgSinst South

bui<retor'a. That itti-

'tude Of the 'African white^..nignjacs^wiM,, nofn be aJtered;By"tht»"i-e|grt of the esjptfti'committee;:stt up by th| U.N.Security Cburtcil last yeipr Idexamine the feasibility ofsanctions against South Africa.'(The'majority, report of the ^committee—its African rhino-;

;fity:has added a note of disfsent—has Jheld that sanctionsare feasible and can be madeeffective but this conclusion iiqualified by so many t'butsând "ifs" that it ha.s bccc>niti|ho maife than a mereVpaperrecommexitiation. ~ltsi impactah the defaulting country islikely to be no more than that

of another moral censure onit, whicli has, as experiencehas shown, left it cold. !

The majority report leads'one to conclude that the bigWestern powers, which havesucceeded <ln dragging somesmftHer'âttons tflth them, do,not Avant sanctions to be ap-plied against South* Africa norperhaps thai, it should aban-don Us -apartheid. This is theplain truth* of the matter. Itis siirel/ not without signifi-cance that . the'draft preparedby Morocco and Ivory Coastproposing, deletion of thequalifying clauses was foundunacceptable to the LatinAmenctth-We«tern ' majority.Iti these eircum'stances accept-ance qf the more stringentdraft put through by the

iSovie,t Union and Czechoslo-vakia was simply.ouV -of lêquestion. ' •' ' ' i

1 fhi*.report, in fact, has ortcemore'brought to a clear fdcus,'possibly'-"more clearly thane,ver before, the polarization offorces in the U.N. over the:issue ôf South. Africa's ghettol«*i;-' -TM newly-liberated,AfWcah haMbns, supported bythe y.S'SJR.. Czechoslovakia'And niost 'of, the Asian coun-tries, .want, that South Africabe1 comptlJed to eat the hum-ble pie and shed its racialpolicies whereas the Western

, jjpwers 8re opposed tp anysuch niove.-". It is unrealisticto expect, in view of this U.N.set-up?: thal4 any re] ief fromracial oppression would cpme

"to th^'coloiifecl' pe'opk of'that1

, country tlirpugh thjs inter-national organisation. Thesepeople will :have to carry ontheir struggle for emancipa-tion: all by 'hemselves unlessin. the jneantimc Ihe cons-ciousnessi ol the stakjis- involv-ed brings about n s.'iange inthe West's attitjdt; Thecoloured people. ' fc^ '"WhiteAfrica will have'-to/j'«x:k(xn

-thU

TTATIONS TJFO'RMATIOir BERVICPI;EW DELHI

Name of .Paper_

Date

733 -nxss OF . Tff V? . >*!.' . ' J

10-3-65

lead oplthe issue of economicSouth Africa.

All'ttie Vfcstern have

« . . . TV * j 11 &y the Smith GovernmentDecision Deferred II is by no means over. Even ifIt is not at all surprising Mr. Smith is deterred by the

that the expert committee set British threat of withdrawing'up by the Security Council last Commonwealth preferences, heJuB&jhas failed to give a firm is not likely to make any con-• '" ; ^' " * -—^-~~ cessioi to African nationalist

opinion;' Soutjiifii: Rhotfesia isalready a pblice Statb'and theWhite:! miijjpirity which is inpower there Intends to keep itso. The UK irttost face up tothe fart that South Africa andRhodes^ along with the Portu-guese in Angola and Mo-zambique now form a for-midabte front which cannot bebreached with innocuous reso-lutions and pious hones.

beenciprjpsedto a trade boycott!as'a means of forcing the Ver-vvToerd Government to give Upits policy of apartheid. Evenlthe Labour Government, which-

[has stopped export of arms toSMth Africa, is not r^epartd

" embargo;it might*

to sanctionbecause of

a tradethe risk

i entail for British investments oftI over £ 900 million. It knowsthat fbther European countries^will jb^i only too willing to re-piace«it as:South Africa's lead-ing trading partner. Fiance hasmade no secret of 'its intentionsand *its representative 'Oflj theLJ;N; -expert committee hasboycotted all its meetings. Ithas already sold Mirage fight-ers^ Alouette helicopters andeven some bombers to SouthAfrica. Even some Communistcountries including China andEast .Germany, which ' nevertire of espousing the cause ofAfrican liberation, liave notl?een; 4ble to resist the tempta-lion of enlarging their tradewith SouUi Africa. Araiiduni submitted by Kenyato the Economic and Social,1Commission of the Organisa-tion for African Unity recentlydisclosed that China's trade withSouth Africa had increasedfrom $ 1.5 million in 1961 to$6 million in 1963. Japan hasnot lagged behind China in in-creasing its trade with the Re-public.

The failure of world pub-lic opinion (o make anyimpression on |f e racist regimein South'?Africa* has in fact en-couraged the if«ctremists inSoutherns Rhojqia. The Bri-tish &<ffietai?iji ^ State forComiqdnweaHB,,,Relations andthe I,br^ ChJiiwllor have re-turnedto L<s Jj>n- after a ten-day visit MI'Salisbury convinced'that th} tireat of a uni-lateral-declarf Jj'(\n of independ-


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Date:

16 March

CR. 13 (11-64)

J. Janecek

U N I T E D N A T I O M S

BUENOS AIRES INFORMATION CENTRE


%enos Aires, 12 Majfch

To:

Subjects

Mr. Norman Bo, Chief NOverseas Briefing Unit

B. Cfaya AguilarInformation Assistant

V'

jfeport on Sdltorial Comrasnta jit Argentina5 to U March 1965

•i, i> ^

• "1A PSSflSA'1 (6/3/65) comments, on "Viedjna Projci-t" ('Special Funl-Argentine I3overnmentj executed by FAG) related*, to the reHaMlU«* : c- of . landand irrigation plans for Rio Negro Province. It .observes M:^- M.- task a-signodto the United Nation* Organs has been achieved, but the provision of fundsgranted by thd Interamsrican Development Bank has been de^ay^d, ae v-?ll as thetasks whose execution is under the responsibility of Argeitina official organism,It insists on the "necessity of ending indecisions or difficulti»3 which delaythe realization cf an ample promotion plan".

"GLAHIN" ( / S S ) coamieats on a WHO experts ndsjiou' .> reportwhich includes figures of childhood rachitism and death ratup LicV: of statisticsand the necessity of a aanitary census wa« pointed out» The newspaper concli^es- after criticising the "practical inefficiency" of the orficiwl healthorganisms - that what those concerned apparently get from the declarations ofUHO's experts is that the starting point for any governmental objective is ahealthy population"*

V 1 * • • ' • : - , ' '- " •&-. '

*BUS8QS AtBSS RERAH)1* published two editorials on the United Nations*Oil 11 Kafch it sajf that the Secretary General of the United Wat; one is goingahaad- with hio attempts at mediation in Viet Nam despite the lack of encouragementfrom the State Departraeht« The United Nations -> the newspaper continues - willprobably be happy to leave it at that so long as U Thant operate 3 quietly andavoids diplomatic complications « The US have to be utilized in negotiations fa?an accoramodation and perhaps to guarantee this if achieved, and it would be amistake to get too involved when Washington, rightly or wrongly., has i^s own pointto establish, which is that foreign-inspired and supported "wars jf nationalliberation" cannot be made .;,• to pay«

In another editorial "BUEJQiS- ALHES HSRAUO" commants en Sir AlecDouglas-Horns' s declarations about the United Nations "which are -with all theirimperfection*- the essential Institution to maintain peace, "The UN machinery hasalso proven its usefulness operations alike. It would be a much nor® uncertain andtherefore hazardous world iiftg" for all of us without this international apparatus,,*It adds that Say be Sir Douglas-Home's declarations havo been n^d* for "electoralnecessities", and it points out the difference betweon Ooverar.er/. al positions andopponents position* It finishes sayiogf'that "the power of the UN can be both under-estimated and overestimated1^

NATIONS IHFOHMA.TIOTT SERVICEKEH DELHI

Bone of Paper. AMMW BAZAB PATttCA (cAicura)Date 11.3.65.

li Thant^ move~D Y : CANCELLING HIS-*-* scheduled visits to world

Vietnam, isals, which '.areGeneral Jseefc to entrust

>»

capitals* a^ti concentrating nisi'various qu.activitiea/on the t$sk of halt-'-dian Primeing th«L£ostilitie$.I -U Thaitf, Secrefcof the:TJ.N. has sh*of prfbfity and urithough; Vietnamsolitary .trouble-:world/ flje incn..Power involvementfraught vWth thetheir inabilitythemselvestion, if^rate further.& catastropheaverted before iff* too late.

The hopeful JfcStpr of tlieVietnamese* """situati^jiX JS">Uiatthe principal parties to th^present conflict'have not re^jected the1"dea of a peacefulnegotiated settlement. Not thatany direct dialogue has -*i-**

by a cease-fire agree-ment. What, precisely, ia theU. ,;-.N*-.ji^ecretarx - Qlpn

sooner gc later. Oi all themating from

latest,

anger ;extricate 'st$j> -is'['4

the situa- -hopti'*""1

to detciio-would be

can be

ed. But,to be found for taDn,

It te ' lUw^;itfaat Comj-

has

„ K, cessation cqfVietflajB. ft can

done by 4Jie preseaueforceof'«, U.

.than by ..the, fct«niational-Control Coranaisalea- -sriuch

- of the Oenevsrteam

but' theiet.Uwone reactions -havfe

tb,:b« faecertalned. For • thatthflSoyfet Unlofi had

';

.=iu.}/ ,t -

~ •»


1°: The Secretary-GeneralA{



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Date:15 March

CR. 13 (11-64)

George J. Janecek

If.

flame of paper

the UN

NATIONS OTOBHATIQWl$ffl DEL3I

3ERVTCT

ter Vll that (ho Soviaf Unionhr;s relief for rejsCt/ng theaulUifity of the Central Ar-sombly to levy ccnivjbutioasfor peace-keeping expanses. Itis because of Chapter V0, Sn asa,nse, that Ihart is a "fipitqfjulcrisis" in the UN. '

A Hltl" wrffertlon willthat the ajjmlnation of Ohaptftr'V]J mifiM nut -

By SHJV SHASffcl

expenses "&s apportioned" bythe General Assembly.

These aspects of Charter re-i'view are highly controversial..;Y«t. irt his address at the

" "ftrtem in Tarrls" Convocation'•

the attention of theAsawnbijn j evet Htnae its tenth

whs n<Hanr general

conwmsuu inivwar el;«ny partiiailai- kind"

*f;*&sn|e but bseaisse Article109 of the Charter «utfiorS'sed-

. ''of'* . ., ,tfta .purpose qf-

,,jte .inu phica to be fixed byftwti-tftfrds' vote of the menlbe*ft'tt..tt»

to?

to bt ail advance. It mayequally veil be regressive. Fofiit is Chapter VII whichthe UK a corporative or•nio chaiactor. Without CL,,,-,,VII ihe UN lapses back to thecooperative piittciple on

' 1he League of Nathnosfounder!. It ^'Jll b« ^-^-y-—.

. ;ha\ tanaar' the CoveaMi oithe•i J • - iiîe of Nations, it was nbt

or•.-:>.• unapiwity prlnaple.

VVliet&aje1 tiie '(UtoihiUOfiChapter Vll can result in afitadvafice or A step backwarddtpends ou what ^ t0 ca^laosit and it is axioraatk that tto

to"«w«BUt th« "«'« b* °* M"ofScal to a. witlsiaa» Of tae CJiJfes/jn thtt Mneftli mw bemi»er Sei«it bat Ji"te n«i«tae- twtstitutional pi'ovlsico can ba

whsthpc *"°''iKifihueK on the JjjtsrnflUdasl:ty by any one group QJ

a1"6 ^rtsUur"" ^lalRfi- Whflt is left, if theW*.ww P^'^s charter is removed, la the gerie-servant under, • orift,.itltfl o{- intematloaal

8«feiri!tary-General of ts«

In vi

wJeTS' :;Pîamentary••piJUeitiop &f CWifteM repsesen- *i^ qha&t6i' tfll, weie ftai(Jtattoi In tUe -UW. As a ttsult, ^fyj in «ye'cui lha poteatifei

*> 4it>«* rianAlia-1 &ubMtn!l!« ntidfU^l .^.,_ .VKM*.^ Ap *U«x Adttcf Pxrn'

was 4a to«« pow«r of tto Gen«al A^

the maVin «tf reand

.Q*a!!l»J Assflmbly anti bj

.* majority w*« novel*to'tttet^ at tha tantb

by voting » to' 'ahittcnHehs tor the

Witi:

_,._ j.- , ---- „-

is this anachronism inChartat^-the kisd; «e>enschrot

' thert % HWf!*»*r, i^w -Mffija w6l^ »ii8asgiftdf td CiilfUSf . rW«W. Uîy^^gft^ »^»,^—--Some nmnJbw-Statea hqW th« partly responsible for the frfe*

that m»ny of its ptovi-! sent oonstttuUoaai and political»rs nd l0Hg»»* In iiecord ^jjgjg to ttift,U3N»''

light <.( the present stateIntea national aflsii-B. it caflhardly be c-swfBttded thittnêrnatbnsl eomniWill

fur a iurlhtr d6se ol tfe«prinolpl*

is fflffltailM flj thetion of tlja unanimity . njlft

. l"> »-J1 i

the vail*

•!ip1hffedli.p j J s r'|4 ..-it; thfe (t6dd to wait until"aa«|>iolaM» iatarflfetiojutL dr*eubiatances"-«r«ated an "ap*

p«a-.e anJ securityftrncttoiu of the UN—the

.trftutlon of puw«rt|je Genera] As.-iembly and th

(3<ninell (ind, *<8it«ifr'-i relationship

'a fljgatteath uesator>t

, to bejar11 " ' i

Chapter V1L For "it ia or.

-

df-""Uve respoa«* t<Jis cither t|]o cojtly one

, ii(d entir dt oqi^ bas&fChapter Vll L-f tMb diaifA oorrect approach to eon-

.lemporso' pcuLiieme w. oft the, one hand, to incorporate in the

"/ Churtef the asKKtiehal of th.-/.'' "tJftJtJng for PM&i* ;, - • • ? ttfen bgaeftrûi it"* ,:? tba pt'jh<;!pl^ of

••/ and, mi the btKet1, to;•<-', anci renew the purposes pf'//•'? Chapter Vii by .reijlailBjiJ

. - . - • * China by some flfftflr, f^Nf*. ';,.f Indeetf. th^ cmjy §ftp?e in which"-':-"/ .the Charter has became '"eat,yx/. ef date" is in the w-p^tftitjonj!

rc^slon tnat t^jalsi Jg, ' ?tJHpermanent member ' of the


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CR. 13 (11-64)

UNITED

NATIONS

NATIONS

UNJES

8528785268

!NFORMATIONSK Button Road — CoSembe-7. United Nations information Service

Cabks: ComnipreitP. O. Bos 1SS5

18 MaroJa 1965

f© t Jfoxman So, Chief* Bjriafli3& SaotionSbcteraal Bolatioas Mvialoa? OFJE

Ffeom t Sar<K> AoGandaseguipHH lufojRaatioa Saivioe, Colombo

.jjo_

is ta soanestioa witfc th© @mo seat to CentraBiraotor» Sateâal EslatioBS Biî.sios dated

Sad o& the

With a g$n»ml eleotica in the offing h®r@? Inlooal political tssafts dcaiaate th« editorial ooluoma of the dailyand weekly press. Hardly aa^ sigsaificaist-esss^sltlis daily press ia regard to intesnatlonal affairsHations«

dOT^t-®d t© nawaq.-aite

A ©onaidsraM.® asmiat of spa@® is©f iatossaatloaal isenaas aad srroalaa in

in th® daily n®ws

Attached hfflr@t« please find a slipping from an article on&£faize fsein the weakly **^ribim®B *8Mob r©f®rs inter-

slia to Ss§or«ta2y-Geaaralffs ?Q@eBt coaffia*st on

irill0f

or official reaction yhlofe aa,r

ca^lfd ©a? poashad dspsssilng ©a the si!|p4£l&sBS®

politic® aad atsossglyI® id©atifiM ©Icaely with toft ofsastpos-ts th© pr^sît

.^^^ •\..--v'xc'" "v1"'V"'U'r"''-ii'/""vl*''^-"'-> ' -

i ,

TRIBUNE, Marsh*, ffl$ FAdE

Has® is aet the slightestsia,

' and

tact decisions are likely to bearrived there,

. oscowlast week-ead, !md warned that

coa-

He statsj^remaiaof,1.

iia could aotto :$se fate

and will. aiy assis-'trace/ HA d*,,0ttl Out JUS- * fion

ew differpnoesexist between Pakui& and M«?s-caw o&< the IdeologSaJ froo^there is not th@ slightest doubtthat continued attacks onNorth VSemaro will bring thewhole conatawnist . camptogether for th® 4cfcnss of a''communist country" «nderatEack. Kosygin's televisionbroadcast fcas {still not closedthe door for negotiations, andthis fact has b^n noted withsatisfaction ; and spproval inPans which has been Uirowiagall its weight for the sum-moning of a {tew Oen«va-4yp8

to ei$ the war m

The basis of his peace withhonour wss that Viet ConggoeriHas shotiM'wttfedraw toNorth Vietnam forgetting that

, tttt Viet Oo»S a«* .esseatisUlySouth Vlctaaraw belonging

'; to tha UNation Front ThisOr, Qutt is no doubt

iic propaganda smoke-screen of Washington bywretea'dtog that it sesks peaceHI Vietnam d e m a n d i n g"all S o u t h ' 'Vietnamese,who do net wast Amcrivan

to |o to North

!,000. Republicans have beeurging President Johnson toadopt a tougher Vtetnames&policy and ex-Vice PresidentKuion te called for aand air blockade. (MeanRussia and the Warsawhave decided to deliver to]Hanoi ground-to-air missilesj,sad aircraft to make retalia-Jtory air raids costly to Aiaer-j;icans). •'[

Kosygia also fainted that• afisi JwsMfscea$.,i5l»paysr visits

more

. .

In the mcaaUme,

„*#''alarge i

i&t parties in Moscow (his week.(starting Match 1). Pekinglhad--tBah0d-«ttt -at -" revisi-

;,4Jsii?Jti"raffld, the Russian CP,|et4e;'$> fa*t'"'*w*k (directly asi ;wdi as ihroygfo Albanian newsr/papers). Chiaa is keeping out

-f of, .the ideological sasjmit

of b l o o d l e s s coups inSaigon which has shocked^ven WasWfigWML- Kfcaah'fessteKn oa^T?4 and sent into esUeas a rpviag sji&bassador, sadlittle Big Minli bas ooce againemerged as the commander inchief. A new Prime Minister,Dr.-Phaa-Huy-Qu&trbaa s&obeen appointed. la a speefcfelast week, 26/2, he bsd statoithat- situation is "not warygood/'aiid had added"Vjctoajnis soiferisg tro nutehr-we •wwtto •eod'tto/witf wiiti

Hie US Js (fesply consciousthat world opinion is strongly

.against W«nfogtois policies in;vwtnsm, The'UN Seerctasy

„ .OftflSrel, U '"thant, tbr thei'tfpcdisrf tiste ia two days src'jtea-"t^lk^ wwk that the militery

;i!e."; Fiancej. Isidia

'other countries haveaitore than on< !, 'ma,S problemsof Sijsfh VietMali could act bs

throygh nyli!ary means.

Dean Rusk, .the UStary of State, said what eur-4rent Premier Qisat had slated?in diffes'em words, that pew^talks were possible only if1

Hasoi kept out of the South. |Apparently realising the USisolation in VietnamtMr, Ruskwas at pains to empjiasiss that |what the US was "fighting for'in South Vietnam was o;n^ iawhich aJi small nations in teaworld had a stake.

/ Washington is not under-1estimating world opinionthis matter and has seat.$SsUnder-Secretary of 'Sfete Av;e- [.Tin Harriman on a round cf .£,visits. Tlsis week he is ito be in New Delhi,

" Bat ths United States isdetermined to step up its mili-tary activities considerably topesolvs the cosflict in Vietnamto. te favow , Jh& US has.decided to increase its amedJoraes, to Sosjfh Vietnam by

'US'

wcrld crisis withfeSitSes o? a dasla feetweds &iSoviet Ualsa and Asageks, !,:•.With Shastri at the hstm it is-1^very unlikely that India will be | |j£;able to do much in spite of l$&the stand taken by to Isdiaof';?;'govemaicat so fer that laefo-!^.China should bs nft«tra!!sed|';'7:;'through a Geneva type Coa»li-'-ferenee. Wasliington, 'kaowifig||-);:"••the v/eakness of tfe fetdjaa^5".'.".""'administration under ShasUij',], .;.>.has not sharply reacted agates!, £ . ' ?(this attitude, slthongh. yl 1been highly critical iQaulte and U Thant forthe very same thing.

Inexorably, the HiStates is escalating th«stage by stage. Each stagethe escalation ooly mms 'step dose to a

UNITED NATION TNFO'fll&TIOH' SERVICEtt$i UELiil

Jtae of Paper. Indian'

Date 38.2.65

' r r1 V ft '-t

">1 $$'l "4*>1 '„' *•< SVnfi TE-W, ' 4 '»J f-43 f ^ t . l

aayi'.-jjftbte^i'kAiii:......*i.a ''fe. _fejf,Ai.l .t.'i i'

j fri|JOtJt?li .fe l «M>. 'MiHn^X rather thaaat the QUO/*\

stage, U • Thant, Secretary- •General of the UN. work* wJta ffieaaes.ol Gwr-'1'world iM-arfetly «mhim.' _i r ;, . J -.. J, |

ma Qetaifta ftew «4im'din. h* e*sftn>«Mliat the

Charts a»,1 vteecl fi?

' AS

.. »'a fornttf .Jabouthe UN's SratiMe incurred ttie *r*th o tlis Bits-

Bnrt:res}paed' la I98i. •• rasfttaqMSeoerai tr TUaat b *srld'e Mo.' 1: psblle «er»antii

an tatenurtWnRtfeivU «r* •»te**f sarnie JS.w^ffismBerajaae't'si55, wltft* blaJie, unmarttt ftw'ftafl-

tn

trnffiy."tri fa« beiievei in "aonly after tatting a cousensua ofooinion. But havsa^" reachfidT & fie-'Cfelon he js, hai'd to bugge.

NEW DELHI INFORMATION CENTRE

TOMr0

Briefing Unit, ERD/OPI

BatStMniligtmBHflgmMUMMBMIIiail^liJMHa^^

FOR !-

J REPI.7 PLSASE1 SEE MS fI.SASE V

"i_YOt3n aiGHAT'.JRE II KOTg AMD

I 1 MOBS aSTflil.31 1 TOUR

J5OTE1 FOH_.__1 DRAFT

AHD

DATS

& MarchFSOM

Lon BeriNew Delhi

UI-UTED TTATIONS IH7QHMATIOTT SERVICEDELHI

Faate of Paper_

Pate

'Mistaffl of India,

VietnamThe American White Paper

on Vietnam entitled "Aggres-sion from North" is an attemptto justify U.S. policy, in thatpartitioned country at a -tuftei ,i«w_i.:. brAttiina ftriticisna

-

States. Washington is atto convince

iKat tllftiu« * iw

guerillaattempt by

to subjugateby force of

White Papr were1^

»-White Paper *as l*cn

an

In jstation

^iVno're pla^blcjollo^

twomore

JJ&rVB S&ftffh Viet-What is perhaps

Fmore'significant. this is tireU.S. aerial operation after

Prime Minister's pub.

urfacel During theew Delhi has constantly tried

o promote the idea of holdingGeneva-type conference, to

deal with the problem of \»et-nam. As Ojairnaan , of we

, . . .States continues its airnorth of 17th ParriW.Jhew«

India has a.****—v^-r -.-.ibility in Vietnam Per thesame reason it is to be doiitotcdwhether Mr. Shastri and N|r.Swaran Singh would havepcatedly urged the conveningan international conference o

• *T f^f *>**IUt', I«VVietnam unlesssome reasofl to ~ - -Powers directly concerned ainot wholly averse to the id'of seeking a political »tlement It has been safldthat the darkest hour is bef|

*..ltyw\'pr6Vetoj

assured HanoiSoviet tmiefl wflbw

not WHiain tiKJifierent to thetote of North Vietnam and«iould fender it any necessaryassistance. Similar assuranceshave; of course. beetf'fWen byPeking more than once; anc

uM ,it is true that none ofmajor Powers Is particular

aSus to feST "jfeR inaWwf Korea-type w&r.Tues-day's incident has Increased thedanger 6f escalation. Yet, the

1 sftustiod is peflsaps not quite asit might Appear on th

t1TiTTKD NATIONS ItfFCPIvrATIOIJ SEFVTCFNEW DELHI

Name of Paper_

Date

VIETNAMMB OHOU EN-LAI has de-

manded the "Immediateand unconditional" withdrawal1

e-f the United mates l*omSouth Vietnam,. PresidentJohnson has answered- Shat'demand l&3d*aiffi% tbe H*a-vvicst raid sp*Ja^ /ja^l^d, , oat.on NOTth,lfietQsro.\it & a fit-ting answer $) make to an in- ,eolent and unteriabZe demand.Peking "Undws1 irerff *ell what

••> Unitedh vtet-

'ab-

While

will haStates winam wlflsorbed byIs a Chinesethe lenders ' of many AsiancovJntrles content tnetJifielveawith fratbtog,Dtoii» platitudesabout peace and non-Interven-tion^ the United States Inter-poseg its po^t to rsa?$,, theirIndependence Jr(^«»% ,vt|»lated by aggteMvd Cdmmu-nlsnt; The United. States la laSouth Vietnam >t the requestof the South V^xa&a^^^av-:«matent and p^ple, ah$|f wIUhot ^Ithdraw «jjSl peslRS pro-mls^s that tht$& shall, fee, noidolent Interference In tM Jn-tmtil aflalra. wt Sounani- The Uslted,in eiuthgrace1'can pbe no questfe^f1' of an "un-cdndjjtlonar withdrawal atPeking's behest. Those. Includ-ing India, who urge Washing-ton $o seek peace by negotia-tion iHake little account if.South Vietnam's interests <HVfor |hat matter, their owntntepsts, China's policy is tobrtn0 within her sphere all theStoutS-Eaat AMlan coantrlcsone fey one. If South Vietnamfalla6;Jnto Communist handa; asondiabtedly It vylll ^B jSpon astHe United States wltficlraws,ft . «11 be converted Into a"

trained, armed f and

takes3sor3erswm 'rekini-The'"

U5." State Department's reporton "Aggression from theNorth" Is an Impressive docu-ment describing In close detailthe campaign mounted byHanoi Co take over South Viet-nam. If that campaign is to be'resisted successfully, the basefrom which it is directed insistbe destroyed. This is tiie pur-pose of the raids which U.S.and South Vietnamese planeshave been matdnaand It is right,are contlnaed p%f tlgourifntll the aggresslpn againstthe south la halted, "Modera-tion la war Is imbecfllty," andtt la extreme Imbecility in theWnd W gofcrtBa war that theChinese Communists wageeverywhere. The State Depart-ment has said that "until theregime In Hanoi decides tohalt its intervention in tliesooth., or untQ effective stepsare taken to maintain 'peaceand security In the area, theGovernment of South Vietnam'and the United States will'continue necessary measures offdefence against the Commu-nist armed aggression comingfrom-North Vietnam."" Theseraids are an essential,, part ofthe measures of defence. TheTJnlt«d States covets .'nolory cr powe* anywhere.Chose who advise it seek a ne-gotiated settlement should inthe first Instance a&Sresg anappeal to Peking to mafee asettlement possible on tfta vet?reasonable conditions that theU.S. aajt

UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION SERVICE

of Paper_

Bate

• •«•»•«•->r

ma<

aths Of Peace^ last tbs warring pas-are weft set to molvfc

Viet Nam tangle InIn whldi it can

1MB recently, this st-titudfet were hardening, butwith' tbfl compulsion of emtaboth. Washington ana Mam!are £pf»SR®f|? waitag to t&._things wer. iTte g?jm alterna-tive li£'«*ea!stS&i" "of the war.with unpredictable results. TheXJ.S.A. has expressed its readi-ness to puO tifut from SouthViet Nam If &S; Hanoi tegb

sion (tad if peacethere. North

turn insists ontiius eata... Namcomplete- V™- E.—rJeanixeo^.' offitM state-ment from Washington just is-sued marks a new turn in U.S.policy, for the S. Viet Nam Isf-sua is " '

and, |n tfie" pfoosss, sul*mora destruction

thiwgh UJS. air raida whichWere gettiug flarec, or re**13rainlftg' Us hand awhile and

ing, lor complete sufajuga*, in flue course, of its Sou*

sm neisfelbe^e. In opting fti?the {jgaceful method it has fol-lowed the dictates of shrewd

' °.Giant's hand to

ffis p®tle§ tohard realities is•At 'te^ut fSfsshad Called Iw pi-ace. negotia»

,JMr ^»o dlgnifledof Aitieficsin troops

, Suds withdra*of feefc eats

bs IBJicte -txfcslble by Hanoitlirough an undertaking to

psavs ^tfgen alone sea t aeffi^tate the restoration of amity.

cosdition vliowever is noteasy. . £or Hanoi to fulfil.Though belated, the support toIndia's proposal for a 14 -na-ttou Geneva-type conference

'"•""

sauoasi, aas .fto«ef fite Bin Five is willing to

'_

huva MS s bltKfl" taste

have, far from ending

Uiat theregion .ia

'VUS» WMUU » *«*^^»—~

("a coooNkd iavasionVlfl*:<3®k affUvity^')iag large-scale arms

ttoig's catftpaigns ware ccf tort-

tap oonflifit • £T hmcef ortti to-be taeKled wltii the mask off'•»««it»««* „ ««wi$jr»Af *«ji!.

»..« ^-^_ .„._-. to Wv'-<! elded wai ,*foat Fsltivo iv«II wisaild' be!ii th« nation toplay iHi&»& Asia, la'toajn*-tet of mala? -edtojfiitnuaitf inS. Viet Nam which were le^*Ing n6wIi«r&~Fo¥~ Hanoi thfe

, » ,«M. ftt twHiSBl M«lf{mtfH&TCEU *«».«-..—,,,

ng guerilla warfaresucceeded substart^

TO-IT .-••i* 1 « J I

The Indian

Sarae of Paperapct oulsiu; t 10 aii-

M -aS^^ls'iyscfca- r£-'' gions of South-East Asia therehave recently been moves to

" induce las various ceMpiii<tf>to quit the battleneld f<?>_ ^t%'conference table. These .nuv-es have included the contend-

• of tte feeing tfesf- sepomd Q^«•of till &SA sftit withdraw ->?3forces from South Vietnam pro-vided Worth Vietnam ends what

gnus its "aggres-

bour. $he 'ptslinîitsry to nsfjs-tiations ifius^tiSvlOtisIy^be 1 he-restoration of at least a semiil-ence of peace.

no; ue .-^.ttied by torce alone!

lableT ^ ^ ^ "JJS ' V#, .,Ej,en ;i Uie Chineee are•wJliina lo attend a Gem

'•tVpS conference, an encouriing fat'taf is the Russianfor peace in Vietnam which

£re£«sefi|>j:itmake ttt» path «a^{&ilor ne|" 'tiations is to play into the ba*of Peking. The piotrac

3 on!_„.. Siut.y.ijit ,S|e|JdeHt Joisun and his" a^vSer^ arep^rently working on Is tocede a nrove to the

ed largely on Vietnam. c.lsu' sue adsfcbounns e^w

of Cainbodla and Laos and.further away> the £K6EEsfebetween Malaysia and Indo-nesia. Of ths many dangerswhich Ibseateu --and- - .

-

y -American ability to

U» in-

Struggle nowHanoi and Sai3mcause of the Intruding forces onboth sides, could ignite into aworld war. The Ameiicsn offeracknowledges that'tiite-time hascome to call a stop to thesecombustible activities.

and »ca power.

While i his has been dem*trated during the pastweeks, the realisation that

shfii*uie;js!oujBflî8r on thslinent of Aa!a is a conslderaWapflinjjton cannot

.'....J observerswhile the USA has the|

Ifa^ | ieva agpemetUs,. of.

oncl ths 4;liese" a»- force,^ if it vaninto the battle, the Northnamese have still a quart1

a million men under arras

with Vietnam and the laitsr ûuld need .with Laos. obviousJy need to be American army on tlie§Sf^d(W§ $$f&i&sfy 'i|;pi'r ' " r \ f ''-•"" *objectives they"sought are fo be ltl «"5s '-'delre-established. In a shooting countries euch *»**&*•

.' where reprisals and re- fe âlly mterested, _n«tioB»ttaa^3entis-Jhe-«2i- *«^ *&c.,

case tor a show cf utrength. it Sôtol pe«u; wutis difficult to determine who is ^J'-^l^f-J? ™U!S

that tiie Communists have in- OPP3*1 : -. , -^ -

filtrated well below ths sewn- ^s'^'e. V* &ainef bykte^f

teenih parallel, which divides the decision as to who, wgjunder Hsnoj and S-i- ls the aesressor in Sautb Viet-4*,WW"V*" *«ySfl*w*-.-s?'""-H -J^* • "--,..,•-«:,. - jfl%«.T, t>«^*i:' 3iiiri f*fi¥t^^riiffi«^Vfuir'plsirt sreiMsr to fhs Kt:!a: . Ofa tSS.uSgl il S

Violence

rolo than

'JNITED NATIONS TMFOBMATIOH SIERVKT"DELHI

Ham© ofTh® Hinduatasi fissss.

Kate

__ *

On the face is* it. tha "whitepaper" brought outington

Wash-

bsdng lalead to a head-on

claah. The Americans clearlydo not want this to happen but

that

edo! a Qeilya- . .,essferencs to' ersivepeaceful &t£lctn«nt onnam. The documentevideace in eupportGovernment's -stafid that the

onare

whfr Urge that thei* •\#vib'Wfr*Cfi-ww*«<*£pwi»Qn* v""-™wT-.^—-*T, ^nd'..*'-'—• ~" ";•" JintTV*! * w *

and organized by Hanoi and war inj$BSiSh Vietnam cannotthat unless thjs^ enqted-As»c* sbe.jfs&ai fiiet a stand elsewhererican "loops' cannot 'bedrawn idter South ?i tl ., ,Washington clearly is not im- , OTp*^?*,......-.--. . - ,,,,!**. - * . . . . . _ ^-^--^^-^-^tg^i^ ^fouj^f be

toesi.<ia awe circumstances for.America to its;tosee» wifch-t draw feorn the scene and ez-

regloii... ..-— .

escalation; it hasbefore, in Cuba for lea*

cteasetablish p®acg:§jid itlargely because of noa-jj«r*formanoe ol its ewenanted ob*

Vietnam.

PatriotP>ospect with "any

complacency. Neither can we;' afford to be helpless' specta-tors of an intensifying eon*

.baa. to be fefeiacoraing

Vfatnam, with Chinait, also desires peat?

Is ready to provide somettfatttt fbtf.l*ftttty puttinga ston.tp 4U, aggressive acUrl-ties 'inl Sfixsth vletnsai, TSsaAmericana evidently feel t|at'ii they agree tt> & Gsneva-t^ps.<loftfeJ«aee urilihdut receiving

of this kind tUeythe we? in Vtetom

to Qieccnfcretac® taMe;'. ^%«»s& fearsOEunot 4ae—-dfasJlis&ftci oiitt"' ofhand, The Fr^ach disaeter atDiea Blen Phu occurred )tut|betore the 1834 conferencewas held. It is feared that anyoppression of America's wil«tlfagn*iS8s:4p sede a pfeacefol

i» only sesrve asa W«nfii to thT other eit!e to

laveitoinsioos. The

is plan*from tha

carried on jfoyguerillas,

reports, evenvhave come ff^m

»»' Sotilliwho xveat north

n such a situation,taara can claim to

to the terms .oiagreent^nf

Beached at a

«»<;:s

: V!;

^1

I^TP'r^TO:' SERVTCTiiBtf DSL1LL

Nam© of Paper_

<#b«4 •». MWhite Papsrthe North" is'

American" OovernfflTeat" wantsthis docniiBcat.as?a, wara- ^[••thathei.,"guerilla1" action in !

ifcy fectiois and takef olajson, and hfs

is to bring (about a changewill fe© disappointe^ becaussr -•

toe® in South ViefiafelSii&ei iwar agates! olra''

nationalists for months BOW& of Ijorror

is not Hkelyof world p| j||Q!j.. The

'ietriani is cof

SaTgon 15 an American.

however, Jias' not ôw^ ,aj&y ".n /Sffierica's favour so lar;

at iacreasecl use Q|co|>ters îll subdue tfce<

"of trying to com?mc(* otiier Gosv-»-«i*»«*'. âted'stories o* s^-M^'il'-

t Vietnam and

U_Thant fli»f Seet^tadfy-CJgneral of theNr'tias, tndleal^d t3Kat he would lend his

offices to fke end t&at American, forces could-be withifewa la digaffy. Ife

âk-^n6'- -North Vietnact Is fei&t.êrs^ tb .nego-

3Pifrse ^^f elflf mestB could fesWe IJ^ td !save whatever- -face

Mr Ato Stevenson told the SecuritypiJ tl^tf 'A .erl4?i wp,.wtt!ing td with- !

' Its .millta% "I <f|$esS" pr|ti«!sd- Hanoiu r M ' . t t n ' ; ® -sggreiisiOB". 4What'

sB 'shfialtl up* forget Is'

Aerfcaa prop-aâsda at"" ' • • " • • "

whole cs whst used to';;Be'tlisre can |je HO s^tlon toIt has cfcato! foe Itself iJirough

Name of Paper_

Bate

The Hindustan Tims® (He@? Delhi)

2*3.65

... v- r— T. —' ~ ™ Vj" ii? 1

Bridging the GapThe Indonesian offer to

accept ,any recommendation a1 four-nation committee maynwfce-feff the witodrswal ofladoaepfaa gaei-iBss frqmNorth Borneo ee«B» a hear-tening development Allowingthe Japanese move M jacdla-tlon. It was on the Qflc^ion ofwithdrawal that ^M Haplii-liado t^lks in June fettfl brokendown. Malaysia cannot |li «ijidto be churlish in its responseby the yralng of its WhitePaper on an abortive Jndonc-sian plot in January to subvertthe Malayan Govenanmit. TheTutiku, ib^o^cL Is prepoj^d totrust la medSBtion/but be-lieves in keeping his powderdry. He Ms grounds ^r cau-tion. The Ina&nesian eenfroa-tation with Malaysia "peered': to:;-:. os' ' pari|;Chinese thrust Sii So.Aaia. T&a CogtlaanSst swiag

been emphasised feySoekarno'e'

popu-behiad

de-nMinstratioas in Kuala Xurji-piar

! the

i[TOi ,, v.*ifHalf the task e| mediation

might seem to terVesplved bythe JneUmesija- eftEer. But. . . . . . . ..., ....

ima

first test of.awith Kuala

As they have both;indicated that it ia to their!interest to »eek a Malaysiansettlement, there is groundfor hope even, if Ifcere irsomecarry-over of their bitter eoa-ftroversy. 5ffe^lao)d,;lllE8;JBnan,,has offered to mediate bet-iween, fhffl?, wad %pa Abdul

=thc'fitiim

'to sajr wh'ellier thailaad is to,.,,-sw--. ..--rrp ,.,,.« ^

Harae of PaperThe Hindustan Times. (Haw Delhi)

Late

'iif

Cyprus Clouds

I

J K

A Cyprus settlement work-ed out between the Greek andTurkish Cypriots directly

. would be ideal But as politicsis the art of jibe ..possible,

(Archbishop Makarios rejec-. tion of any five-party talks1 with Britain, Greece and T^r-j key does not. appear to befcelpful Eweh the-UN media-tion envisages securing the•agreejjjeat .bjT"'iheseV threePowers to a new settlement. Itis of course true that the rightsof intervention: they have- $e-sema IjUjngfiT' the ZiaSeh andIsmd,«R ajjjresmelnts' aa^guar-antors arg a limitation ontHcj independence of < Cyprus.Arehblahop- Makarios has agood case for ending theserights. So long as the TurkishCypriot minority can count onthe active backing of Turkey,there can be no great induce-ment to them to come to termswith the majority. But Arch-bishop Makartos? statement isnot calculated to reassure theTurkish Cyprfeis- The IJNmediation was unfortunate-ly stalled from the start.Now that the UN >iteelf isparalyzed by the controversyover its peace-keeping opera-tions, there isno knowingwhen the General Assemblycan ever get arouM,to discuss-ing Cyprus aga&fc;1 TBe delaywill not be critical if the lullin Cyprus is maintained. Butwith Archbishop Makarios' re-cent announceadBSSt of holding

I elections ijj»;JwiM8*en a new| unified basis ending the sepe-, rate voting rights of the Tur-kish Cypriots^ a crisis appearsto be in the making.

Archbishop Makarios hassaid that a bipartite confer-ence with the Turkish Cypriotswould have to b® specilicaljylimited to a discussion ofminority rights :«mfl that apolitical solution of the Cyp-rus problem must be left tothe decision of the majority.As he had .wanted the UN toendorse the unfettered right ofCyprus to independence, inclu-ding the right of •^f-Sft&irtd-natwH^the Tjp?*^ _J_.will naturally was&t to knowfao«c selMetmhhsatlon> wfilbe spelt out before the ques-

** •. rc . p-.«- ,*. • *- • •* r t

„,_ :,of ' minority rights istackled. Archbishop Makariobmay not favour Enosis withGreece which would reduce.him to a provincial governor,'faut he Is up-against GeneralGriovas -who—is intent--onswinging the Greek Cypriotsto a union with Greece. Arch-blshop Makarios cannot expsctto win the qonfidenee of tbo

.Turkish Cypriot minority by'ruling o«t }o advancs'a voicefor theta on the isstte of Eno-

» • \

5EF7TCT

Name of Paper_The Hindustan Time a (Jew Delhi)

Date 4.3.65

Two Voices! The Security Council's ex-pert committee finding thateconomic" sanctions againstSouth Africa are .it presentnot feasible^Jbctravg an in-sincerity of approach—<*-rwr--~to We OALPs callfur- mihlfinic and militarysanctions Is rharked by a total«a>nsi> at iim-fifllitv The prosana cons or sanctions havebeen so often discussed thatthere is little point in anotheracademic assessment. The es-'SentM--queatkm*" before theUN committee was whetherthe members were preparedto impose sanctions. SinceSouth African trade is prin-cipally with Britain, theUnited States and France,sanctions to be effective needtheir tripartite agreement.The decision of France not toparticipate at all in the com-mittee's proceedings was aclear veto on sanctions. Bri-tain's attitude was defined bythe Parliamentary Secretaryto the Board of Trade whodeclared three weeks ago:"We are proud to trade withSouth Africa." The decisiveconsideration seems to be thatBritain would stand to lose£210 million in exports ayear from sanctions. Evenraijembargo on oil shipmentscould grind South/ |«$|machinery of gpfernrne^ti;â slow-halt. B^Stlie5 -t|S|if:States, whil| p| {;in5|ii pan arms emliargo, is opposed,to anjj| |»go,.jln: <|^jff|j

^^^^^-:^^^^Spjlfci^(Wnipoe^Siâtipni ...,ffr^,,f..., Pj Al|l& | ; ti!g .|.!:, )fel

i SfenSit ^Sp1sîikîl^^Jf^^^ôf •ttti|iiMi^lJ^yft;*f^;ti&*• it i ^ ipti : .i|6|e. :Sffl^fe|Airic^$n|yenvtyHKivethBflloSi; of4-;$*i*ftrtfiJJntgli^tel^crtnf "" '"'*' *" ''''$jiii!J&m&~'

tptt ha|*|itpl]*:

rJ^^^ff'Sj'"*

ing matertil;tionalist "AJricavthV'liSifisrl

Malawigeneral

Soiith^tb» tat

Beforeextend-

na-South

tates of

bique will have to be free of'their colonial regimes. Untilthen the OAU's cry of mili-tary sanctions is pointless. Itshope of economic sanctions is,nullified by the UN commit- 'tee's stand. But the OAU can-not be so helpless hi its chag-rin at the increasing trade ofseveral Eastern EuropeanStates and China with SouthAfrica.

InJ i they broke do\wi List,.,'C - ' i t i'v - > M i c of ihc vuth-

the Indonesian guo-.l i t ia* In any vu.ie li.'cre li.i> beenlicit- ','ucnJUlhavl'V11} '" ix'bah?

time and'L- number.

tiom arced ilie proposalnation concilia1

sion appears too(T for the limecan be revived' if,.

tatiain run lutu di'that

_.. _t,,T,l. .. iff , lecidcd!to scek'a settteitiej|t|jrah Malay-,sia. he has not «îpjf unhelpful1

since lntlonesia|i^]rlfmalic with-,.dwval from tt&pE*hited Nations;List ,..Decenjbcr His Foreign;\1[»iif*[ier. Mr. Subandrio. has!yisite<i Japan. Pakistan and!Cambfl&ia to assure them that

, Ind'^Sesia does not seek to esca-'[fiit^ the conflict with Malaysia.?^TliiB fjld/gnesian Deputy Foreign;Minister h^jbecn on a similarmission to AfruSftK, countries

iund .President ^Sukarno^hfcs re-'; peatedly said lha.t he|]ispared " "' —*' •""*

j4r|wa| horn jbG,J4j\jted Nationsjill* weA..ItiB/lin.ft4tf Support inAsia and Africa where he;,

Angola, Rhodesia;*™! Mozam-

country s'«frb'rbififreceiveS'lOp, mum;Biit "this ' is* not1'- likely,;tomake much difference to the

onesia has$50 millionexpects ' ta'

,• 19011 .,, offrom'.' tliferc.

euunlrVs" devperal-j economic""situation. Inflali i ' i i lias toucheda new lieight and the value ofIhfc currency hus dropped toS,5CX> rupiahs io (lie dollar as.against "the .official exchangerate of *5 rupiahs to the dollar.Though the reports that theWalaysfan' Government has rc-

Lâlualeers from^ro\S Vsfe>t New

ajfad Sdyfh" Moluccas

President Sukarno cannot alto-y_. .„... .-e the possibility thatsupply of arms and amnuini-

..-,.i*h'y Malaysia can promotedissideiice in the outer islands.

• Irr any cnse the British build-upis so impressive that he cannotpossibly hope to "crush"Malaysia. Bui this does notmean that Malaysia can uin

lihe jungle war, in SabaK pd,fjSarawak where !i6«' tcjîjî' is!>iuch that even a small num-'fter of guerillas can tie do*p"a,(Wge force indefinitely. The con-,flict with ]ntlo£ie,sia H< $i'.

".aggravated racial tcnsioiisffei Singapore. It is. the c-•forc. in- the interest of bothcountries to search for a peace-

,ful solution. Neither can afford|i> stand nn prestige inde-

finitely. *


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London Information Centra

PRESS OPHttOIT REPORT

Ho. 10/65 10 March 1965 )3 March - 9 March |

Vietnam

fha extension of American military involvement in the ?ie-tnas situation was in thenews. file Observer (7 March) commented that "American policy in Vietnam has E.OW entereda aew and more dangerous phase" and suggested that at the 7JEU meeting in Hasse, the Britishshould "try to concert a new European effort in favour of taoderation, realism, and a cease-fire". The Guardian (8 March), in similar vein, headed its leader "Another 5 tap in theQuicksand" and said that the Americana "do not seem to have noticed yet . . «, that every steponwards in th® "measured escalation" of the war - at least from the Tonkin retaliation on-wards - has weakened their own hold and increased that of the Vietcong."

Southern Rhode a ia

Colin Legura, writing in the Observer (7 March), suggested that if the two iiinistarajust returned from Rhodesia were to be "absolutely frank", thay vrould. say that "the moatBritain can hope for is that it might delay the unilateral declaration of independence fora little longer". The Guardian (9 March) thought that the "hope" which Mr. Bottornleyclaimed to aee could only lie in "the release of the detainees and the construction of aparty, preferably with a more thoughtful leadership, srhich can undo some of thr; harm to thenationalist cause which ZAPU and its predecessor have donee" The Times (9 arch) suggest-ed that "the beat that can be peaceably obtained now are guarantees that, if the Africanleaders agreed to work the present constitution, it could not be changed to prevent itsundoubted liberal potential from bringing about aiajorit rule in tiae." The B&ily Tele-graph (4 March) also suggested "the easing of restrictions on African leaders as soon asthe slightest change of heart on their side ia noticeable" and stated tha ; "The rihoUesianGovernment auat also encourage the registration of those Africans with qualifications forthe vote, and must further African education and administrative experience", and alsosuggested that, the hardening of attitudes in Rhodesia was "aggravated by Mr. Wilson8 a de-claratioa of October 1964."

Boonofflio Sanctions against South Africa

Hewe reporting of the Report of th© Security Council Expert Group tended to em-phasize the British dissenting attitude rather than the majority view. Hslla Pick. wrotein the Guardian "A majority of the Committee ... has ... become more confirmed than beforein its views that an economic boycott of South Africa ... could not damage South Africa'seconomy to any appreciable extent." The Times (J March) suggested that the Report in-dicated that "Unless every country in the world were solidly united in a lra.de boycott,evasion would be easy, and South Africa's economy strong enough to survive." The Observer(7 March) in news coverage by Colin Legum, emphasized that the Report foui.a thai "sanctionsare feasible", and in the comment section, the Observer spoke of the need over South Africafor "the kind of courageous statesmanship that was needed to save Europe in the 1930s", aadsaid that "to shrink froa sanctions because of the coat ... is to make a mockery of ourbrave words of building a stable international1 society." The Economist (6 March) said that"sanctions aimed at defeating apartheid would probably not work" but they mi-jht be effectivein achieving a more limited objective, for instance, "to secure co^iliance with a WorldCourt judgement on South 7/est Africa" because "white South Africans would rrc'iably aot beprepared to go hungry to hang on to South West Africa."

Indoaeaia-Eal ay a ia

Times (2 March), the Guardian (4 March), and the Scotsman (4 March) allth®. indication that President Sukarno sight be ending his confrontation with lai^ysia. TheGuardian said "Tuntu Abdul Rahman now seeiss to bsliavp so confidently in the j-uasibility ofpeao© talks with the Indonesian Government that even the killing of ei-r'it soldierj by in-filtrators in Johore on Saturday has not made him change his mind."

ROUT ING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO*A. " The Secretary-GeneralFOR ACTIONFOR APPROVAL


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CR.13(lL-64)

FROM:DE: George J. Janecek

OAT* 12 Kerch ??6

|pt|i|pliSS5 iiWiiai ^ tlwirs s i i

^lllffeilijyfiine Chamber offlM&lt&e

r re'Wal press

$<:M>Nweo$eiXiate".

fo? thethat

States, werereaction toit had beenin pilfering

._T on'ering shovild

1 slate•As in the

•noes which,1 are regarded

oy sending aGeneva to boost the

International Lebour

Published by Herald Publications, Inc.

ANDRES SORIANO JR.President

SEBASTIAN UGARTEExecutive Vice President

GELACIO Y. TECECHIANAssociate Editor •

P. K. MACKERPublisher '

M. N. QUEROL MANUEL ABAD GAERLANManaging 'Editor Associate Editor

Page 8 Friday, March 12, 1965

Thursday, March 11, 1965

NESTOR MATA

Merry-Go-'RoundWith Bung Karno ":

>-pHEEE IS SOMETHING oddly lamiliat about' the new peace feelers emanating . from Ja-;

karta these days. The latest one came Irom In-, donesia's Sukarno, himself. This .

time he says he would want an-other United Nations survey todetermine whether the people olNorth Borneo wished to remainwithin Malaysia and that hewould be willing to attend an-other summit meeting with Ma-laysia and the Philippines, on the

. 1 Malaysian dispute. . He said thisat a Moslem Labor Union Congress in Jakarta.

Before this, as we well know, Sukarno andhis foreign minister, Dr. 'Haden Subandrio,reeled off a flurry of peace feelevs all over theworld, from Asia to Africa and from Europe tothe United States. Nothing, but nothing, cameof .them.

Now we are hearing a new peace overture,•ft Is so familiar a tune that ..many, many ob-• servers can very easily sing the refrain frombeginning to end. Again, Bung Karno is talk-ing peace. Again, he wants to sit down at theconference table. Again, he wants to talk things .over with Malaysia's Tuiiku Abdul Hahman andthe Philippines' President Macapagal.

. In other words, again Bung Karno wantsto take the Tunku' and Macapagal for anotherrnerry-go-'round of fruitless peace talks. Andnobody will gain anything but the big Bungalone I

DUT WHY is Sukarno sounding out a call forpeace again? Is he really interested in peace?

Is he ready to negotiate the peaceful settlementof Indonesia's dispute with neighboring Malay-sia?

Let us examine his latest statement. Hesays that he wants a second U.N. survey in NorthBorneo, obviously in reference to Sarawak andSabah, states incorporated into Malaysia.

Any dispassionate observer will right awaypoint to the basic contradictions of Sukarno.'How, for example, can he so lightly toss oil theidea of a second United Nations survey in Bor-neo when he himself ordered Indonesia's with-drawal from the U.N.?

Assuming that a second one is made, what. guarantee is there that Indonesia, now a non-

member of the U.N., would abide by the find-ings of any U.N. body? What happened duringthe first U.N. survey is known to all. Neither

. .Indonesia nor the Philippines complied withVtheir., solemn,-legal.obligation under the Ma-

• ' :V:.Erom : this 'one .cannot hejp but say that"Sukarno is not "really sincere about all his" showof., peaceful'intentions. • For the^contradiction

•between his avowed plan to crush Malaysia andhis peace overtures, is so obvious that no one, .in his right mind, would ever bother to listen tohim again.

JF, THEN, Sukarno is not really interested In; peace, what is he up to now? Is he merely try-

Ing to create an impression that he is a manof peace?

I think there is good reason to say that his •gambit is designed to remove the stigma of iri-

i: ternational delinquency that he himself inflict- •.•;! ed upon his country when he launched his 5071-;

yang (crush) diplomacy against 'Malaysia and',; ordered Indonesia's withdrawal from the United 'J 'Nations. . .'| Besides, Sukarno is feverishly preparing for ,

. ,t . the celebration of the first Bandung Conference,S whose, principles Indonesia has violated duringf- Its first decade, and the second Bandung Con-f ference "in Algiers. . .[>' ' - ' Now he certainly wants to show to the,"' whole world, especially to all Alro-Asian nations,< that Indonesia is not really aggressive, expan-| slonist arid warlike, but Is kind, peaceful, andi freedom-loving-. • '• '• How well -Sukarno succeeds in' these f ace-';', saving tactics and in deluding others, only time"' will tell. But' if he and other Indonesian leaders•i ~ continue with their irrational policies they willi_ . one day find themselves turned out by an out-'; raged Indonesian people.

' • [ • . Until then, President Macapagal and Ma-| laysia's Tunku Abdul Rahman would do well to

. \ . fee constantly aware of the tricks of Sukarnox who, if given another, chance, will surely take). both of them for a ride — in another game of(merry-go-'roimd! • . • •


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For your attention.

Date:

15 March

CR. 13 {11-64}

FROM:DE:

George J. Janecek

T&

SUWKT,

UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES


Mr. Uorman J. Ho, OPI/External Relations, Room 260a,United'Nationa, Hsw York.

Graham R. Bunting, Information^Assistant, Press.UNIC, London. : ' . l'-f:- " ':'.

Reporting of Secretary-General's Vietnam Suggestions

of these suggestions in the British Press has beer,

minimal. Comment almost non-existent. The Irish Press save a

The attached cuttings on this subject indicate the paucity of

coveragev

Main attention in the British Press in this context hmsbeen on

the Labour Party's "left wing rebellion".

•W.T.-JV.-.f, ...;•_-.'.

H 10 1965

U THANT'S APPEALON VIETNAM .

PLAN FOR SEVEN-POWERCONFERENCE

FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

NEW YORK, March 8.—U Thant, theUnited Nations Secretary-General, hassent messages to some of the principalpowers involved recommending a seven-power conference to halt the Vietnamwar. It is understood that he envisagesit as a preliminary step before a moreformal and enlarged conference takespk'.ce.

Reliable sources said today that U Thanthad proposed That the United States, theSoviet Union, Britain, France, China, NorthVietnam, and South Vietnam take part inthe conference if informal preliminary dis-cussions indicate there is a possibility ofagreement.

These seven powers, plus Laos and Cam-•bodia, attended the 1954 conference atGeneva which produced the armistice agree-ments that ended the Indo-China war withthe division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.

U.S. [RELUCTANCEU Thant, it was learnt, sent his proposal

to six of the suggested participants, omit-ting China. No formal replies have beenreceived, but it is assumed here that theUnited States, which is insisting that it muststrengthen its position before negotiationsbegin, is reluctant to agree at this stage evento talks on the possibility of a conference.

North Vietnam, it was indicated, is show-ing a less " positive " attitude than it didlast autumn to U Thant's attempt to arrangesecret informal discussions between Hanoiand Washington.

However, President de Gaulle hadpreviously advocated reconvening theGeneva conference, and it was believedthat France would favour U Thant'ssuggestion. The Soviet Union and Britainhold key roles because their ForeignMinisters, as co-chairmen of the 1954conference, would have the responsibilityof reconvening it.

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTSAccording to reliable sources, U Thant's

proposal is the latest in a number of•attempts he has made behind the scenesto stop the fighting in South Vietnam. Afterthe fall of the Ngo Dinh Diem Governmentin November, 1963, it was revealed today,he suggested to the United States that itpromote a coalition Government in Saigonthat would include a number of non-communist Vietnamese political exiles. Thissuggestion did not bear fruit.

U Thant, it was learnt, made anothereffort to settle the Vietnam crisis lastSeptember, after United States aircraftbombed installations in North Vietnam. Atthat time U Thant suggested secret talksbetween the United States and North Viet-nam in Rangoon. Hanoi, it was under-stood, accepted, but the United States didnot reply.—New York Times News Service.

c . y?}

move^|db not stir U.S.TH E; U:S.;State2ptpartbiient';said: yesterday it Hid received

:sug|estrons;rroiii; UriThant, the United Nations Secretary--General, regarding a peaceful solution of the Vietnam conflict.

, It said U: Thant; had '.suggested procedures for-.exploringthe possibilities .of a peaceful solution, "but :neither from thissource Jnbr:'from any/:6ther--"do"• we see ariy: indication that,•whatever'•'.the.procedure, the Hanoi:regime is prepared to stoptrying .t& take-over South ; Vietnam by violence."

The State Department 'did not gointo details of -the^. pr<5cediiressuggwted ' by,:;U Thant, although,press reports, from tHe.;..UnitedNations :said he; had?proposed aSeven-Power.!":.. Cbriference»' :which.might tfe.held, sik': a.- step-.towards.ending tbe\ Vietnam1-'*ar.-. •'''• ' . ' ' . ;•. .

In cotnnie.iiting on/'U.''-Thant's,initiative,', tne State1'; Department,stressed 'that:, the. United 'Stktes1 wasstill hopiiig- for -.a peaceful solution,.but was also -still waiting for "some:

indication^ .that i.tê- aggressor's areprepared .to stop 'iHe 'aggression".

'•• France, has wafned 'Washingtonit can expect;no help from'--her ifthe United.,. States gets into a'shooting |, war . with CommunistChina.j..,over,. ^Vietnam, it. .was5earhea«;'in Pfris .."yesterday.1- • In-formed French ~:sources-.sai<i' theyalso havev.-eyery .reason ' tobelieve

. America's^' other-,. NATO- 'allies•would stand: aside • too, ôr-'wouldgive only- 'token i Sid,;, such .-'as'ambularices.;,pr •hospital'..teams.l

'The Prench• .Gcfvefnment,. it" was' learned, has told- Washington . re-

peatedly it is .ôonvinped" the Viet-narn war. cannot 6e won militarily,and that • negotiations, , in which

, Red China would , have • to takepart, are the only hope of endingthe conflict'

v U is known to be deeply pessi-m .stic about the way the .situationis. developing.

General de Gaulle for the past18 months has been urging .a

negotiated settlement of the Viet-nam ',wari. At1 his...last news con-ference-- he .'proposed, reTcon'veningthe 1.4-natioh 1954"• Geneva PeaceConference, "of which 'China was amember..^.France and Russia1 atthe moment ate, discussing, possiblejoint action by -them to get peacetalks started. .,; "\ \. • ' • ' -v .

'• r;'.:' INDIAN PIJEA , • "••;The.1 Indian'jPrime Minister,' Mr.

Shastri,.yesterday:"renewed.bis .pleafor • ending.-hostilities', m Vietnam ,and.' the convening1; Of a Conferenceto find a peaceful solution to-theproblem. Speaking in the\ UpperHouse of Parliament, he. said Indiahad ' been /in ' touch with severalcountries; which , had reactedfavourably'-to the idea..In .London, the Prime Minister

announced • that the Foreign' Secre-tary, Mr. Stewart will get to Wash-ington, . .on • Ma-rch 22nd to discussthe Vietnam crisis with V.S. offi-cials.

Mil Wilson, just back from hisvisit to .West. Germany, also toldthe House1 of .Commons that theBritish. Government hoped the crisiscould be cured by Nks—but -after"and end to aggression by Northagainst. South Vietnam." TheBritish Government, he said, fullysupported the American attitude.

EFFECT ON VIET CONG

A New York Times correspondentin Saigon says-' Vietcong guerillaleaders have begun .recently to

.'counter j.the,;1.-corrosive êffect/ on,., mp'rai<£. of -the' widespread jspecula-;''tion'that "A negotiated ;eritf'to' the'^waf J'"was' : in'-1'sight.. Evidence; ; het says,' .indicates 'thatf both; -Hanoi • 'and'^the,.Rational i'Liberation Front have-become ,,awa.re;j,that.'rumouriS ;'of,peace/^talksll'cpu'ldi'.iind_ermine the.spirit' • of. the-/ Communist? '• guerillas''in'.the south...•:

;IJ.. •;,'-!' Vi ' lA1 ' ' • : ' • ; ; s;;-1

•'; --Am'ericanv-intefpretersj,of<;'ôrtii,'.'yietnamese".;propaganda-::iaccept',::as;.genuine;.-.thetC-Corrtmunists' -;J stated

fe"yjetc6'ng;on(an:' army .camp 'on -Monday was''rerj .piilsed-': with . heayyÛosses"' v Tliei sembr- American 'iadyiser in ' the

5 tfbftps'bad,Jthtownfthanise1yes;'on'.tlhe small.icamp-in'-suicji'd'a) assaults.,:Jri;addi-

'''

,^_-,-c-,.^r.^.~...-^..êrnment estimated^^:tA^|j]^^!'.'2(^^.'yf&tcdbg'';we.re

(

51'

A SEVEN-NATION '"•^ * lariinatY " -,' fioiif et

• 'Wwaf dS.ehdiafe, the Ipftg-id&w'nô'aV1 Vietnam ; war

• fwas- 'proposed1 tonight by"Utiited^ Nations • Secre-jVtarj^.General. U Thaht. .He outlined his plan in, mess-

ages to six of the sevennations, .including Britain,the U.S.; and Russia.

The. seventh- nation — - China —, aid not. get a mesage /because

she Is hot • a niehifier ot the.UN: , :; "••- ; ,, •tr Th'ant is' understand to have'"suggested that the seyifri, -which1 toould'also Include Prance and

South and. North Vietnam,should have a meeting to pre-

.' pare for' -a larger, more formal,conference. •

Today, .however,- after consider-ing "U Thant's proposals, theU.S. '.State Department saidthat- the' Communist North'

:• 'Vietnam has still not indicatedit would, stop Us " aggression "in -South Vietnam;

• ' : • ! > ' ' L E A N I N G • ; • ; 'It was noted that four of the

• seven nations ,. are: on, or lean-,ihg towards1, : 'the' Communistside. These are Red China,

• NprtnV Vietnam, ;;"'. . / .

The Fxeilch favour :;risutrali£ingall .south-East- Asia; butAmerica opposes this as' invit-ing a Communist political take-over. . . . . . ' . . •

The StatejDepartmenty reaction.indicates .that Mr.' , Johnson isnot buying the plan— bne of

. several from the tj N SeS.reta-ry-General-îor the present at

• least. ' . " -While1. : the ; State" Department

were considering U Thant'splan, the build-up of U.S.Marines .taid arrrtour at DaNang- air and missile base 100miles from -the Iforth Vietnambprdei'i continued.

A second Marine helicoptersquadron arrived there; today,and over 4,000 . men will bestationed there when the build-

'NO IIP'PARIS France has warned the

/ US not ta,fejtpgst help if shegets into a shooting match

iwith i China rover VietnamFrench /officials leyealed offt>le Ledord, PXeslde'rit deGaiilte is fconVinced that,onlyv negbtiafaons ^vlll Stop the war,

ROME In the f3"e,-of $uSsiati'p^ftt^ts rtallaji Premier SignorAids Morb *aS ¥eBek.ted his

C SOutfi Vietnam, >( Officials <said; algo fappefiiforai (-peace

^ Britons evacuated^ \^ \ fy*' ** * ^ i^ LftAjJ y a u n g ?f&itish infsaion^'V.^couplB^ Mrvand^Mrs Ed-*'a£fl'^ Oliver"were e 731)3. u"^.t«e-dj by

France warns U;S. 'No help in China war'

+ U Thant seeks Vietnam conference /0 •*

TALKS:Thajit,,put.

' Depart-X aii'/t'rf V-ijJ^r: rfi'V":»'( .ft" .' ? j-?' ;*fc4lfe-^-'*'Y'i V(' * '• '• <iV••'

menT;ye5terday jTorârpeiicef ul soiufion>ilVv.i,-:JS.^K^.^;'i;*?fc5 -teshiSii^SisS?^-'^^ sHsJ '»•„ ,/.Pf: th.eLyietnflm,|conflicT1

i!;rep6i:ts from!A'<l!ij*%j :J>~iii;.i ;;G.vJ,. ....-,.i.•*''..! ' ..-,said i tKaf France•< had^warned

l r : . « > - ^ : / ; « - t ^ ,^"<^7>"'' *< ;the1 ,

i - - ; -help

• -

ifXendihgi-tthfe-conflicfe'^f Wf*«' :

/^^^«.'y;^VTiX'^l|sv,. ^ye*^

__ _ it'Iwai'disclpae^.-yesterday! . :.-\ .^-'iV/'^ •

Cotnmunisitj'i,attack ;.bii" the^ (J..S>camp'-*atr'Kamfack -on :MondajvaiKihe, , bbdies'• 'of ^ raore'j ,,tbap.; JLOO1'yêt.c6hg.trobp5'1iiemajned''pii."[bebattlefield '.yesterday .-as-: evidence

"of'"'tHe CJomraiinist'.; setback." ^ •' v^..Theôy-ie.t.ctiiigi'i'llauiisfi.ed jTtheattack; against^the 'Special•; forcescamp Jcfcrljr on.Monday-'.mohiing'The''firrst^warDlngv6f' the,' attack-was ',3'*: barrage of Gonihiuriijr'recpiless- Qahnonj and .mortar 'fire

;'•' 'Vietnamese "comni'an'ders^,;"saitfrtbab-onJy i33. of thelErtrobpsjwere.kllle'd'and.3.0 wounded; in addition''to ''three''1 Amencan' special,;..fbrces

' "Tbe^,"Government 'also1 sesizecJme^.'of^.the'- . targetVfiaiils;^fweapons".- ever capture^ • from.- £h.e'Bed• guerrillas *in battle/ . , :„ V"^

Ii!!

WAITr . . ,T

CTHOJêace^mpves Sd6 not stir U.h.

- « ^ 1 ( * ^ 'Vv./*',* rr v ', _^»

THEÛ.S.^StatelDepartmentVsaid yesterday it had received^suggestions firom^tr/Thant, ithe(jUnited Nations ^Secretary-

General, regarding a peaceful solution of ^the^Vietnam conflict.'j,It said) LP/Thante had *suggested procedures for1 exploring

i the possibilities o| a-tpga eef ul solution., "but1 neither from thissoiirCe nor* from anjp^pthep, do ,we see an^ indication that,whateverithe procedur.e^thefHanoij're'gime isr prepared tdrsroptrying ttf tafcev°qver"JS<5uth^Vietnam by "f violence "

m . ,„ . . L_ .L".—.^-^^-. illTfae< State-"Department di(f net -goSnto ^ details ^ of the proceduressuggested by^ U Thant, {"althoughpress reports from the UnitedNations, said\he75had (proposed a?Seven-Power Conferencemight be held as^ aWep£towards~ending thevVietnam4 war a 1 ;,

In cOmtne,nting on U Thant'sinitiative, tae State Department^stressed that the United States was

, still hoping for a peaceful solutionbut >was aJso still waiting for "someindication that the aggressors" areprepared to stop the aggression

France, has warned Washingtonit can expect na help fronvher rthe United v States gets /into ashootmgj war with CqpoiumstChins* i over <" Vietnam < it ^ ^wasJearnedvMn Paris yesterday ' Informed French sources said, theyalso have__every reason; toJ believe,Americans" other NATO allies•would stand* aside too, or^woukgive only1" tokenî aid, such -âsam uulanceSi>or hbspital teams *

The French Government it wasI Jearhed, has todd Washington re-

peatedly it is conVincedr the Viet-nam wai; cannot, be won militarily,and that, negotiations,„ in which

, Red China would-, have^ to takepart, are the only hope of endingthe conflict

V ft t» known to be deeplyi pessi-1m stic aboutithe way the situation

. is developingGeneral de Gaulle for the past

18 months^ has been urging ja

propos^d^re conveningthe- 1,4-natioa, 19541 Gene\a PeaceConference/ of which China was ain em her ^ rance and Riissia at

ne°otiated,Jettleinent oL the "".Viet-"'' *•nam At last?newslcorL

V ) INDIAN PLEA,

The rlndian( Prime ^Minister, MrShastn, yesterday renewed" his pleafor ending jhostilmes in Vietnam fv.aud^the convening of a Conference'

1[o'find a peaceful solution to theproblem Speaking in the\ UpperHouse^ of Parliament, he said Indiahad been Anv touch with severalcountries, which had reacted

^favourably to the idea"" In London, tfie Prime Ministerannounced Ihatt the Foreign Scoretary, Mr Stewart will gcJ to Washragton, on March 22nd to discussthe Vietnam crisis with VS offi

, Mr Wilson, just back from hisvisit to W«st Germany, also toldthe House of Commons that theBritish Government hoped the crisiscould be cured by talks—but after" and *nd to aggression bv Northagainst: -South /Vietnam." TheBritish Go.yern'rnent,^ he said, fullysupported the American attitude

EFFECT. ON: VIET ' CONG

A New^York Times correspondentin Saigon says> Vietcong guerillaleaders have begun recently tocounter the corrosive effect t onmorale* of the widespread speculation that a' negotiated end to thewar was in sight Evidence? he

<says indicates thatrbotbt Hanoi andthe National Liberation Front have

f become aware that rumourp ofpeace' talks could undermine thespirit of the Communist guerillasin the south tf ' ;n *•

American interpreters,^ of. i NorthVietnamese propaganda" accept as

, genuine the Communists' ' statedn opposition to a "hegotiatedj settlement They cite adamant^sgtern.—'-

(of the j'pastj.weekj,asr'ftn:tbelrSiRiJ««.tofitbêsivreiiêxpressed-^m Washingran^tfiat^Hanoi doesr-not seek thef.k(nd[)of 'talks advgcated bvj France ..{the Soviet union'1 and others

ArJ assault by^he^Vietcong onan army camp otfj Monday was re-pulsed with ,s heavy losses I The

i senior Amencan ''adv'iser in fileareii[said that the attackihg'troopshad thrown themselves on Ohe smallcamp irTsuioidal assaults, In addition to 100 bodies'"left on„ theground the Government estimatedthat andr)iert 200 Vifetcong* werecarried off or wonndeid — (NewYork^ T-trnej N^ws Service., and

Mr Wilson escapes from VietnamWhether or not the Prime Minister's state-

ments on Vietnam in the Commons yesterday .satisfy his Labour; critics they are probably asgood as. we can expect. Disingenuous, of course—particularly the quick references to the 1954agreements (a very complicated story), and tothe change which he sees in the war in recentmonths. It was not to be supposed that in presentcircumstances he would flatly contradict theAmerican line. Nor would it have done any goodif he had. In fact, his only hars-h words weredirected neither at Mr Rusk nor at the critics ofhis own attitude in the Labour Party, but at Toryattempts to exploit the disagreement betweenthese critics and himself.

Moreover, he did give ah impression ofactivity—talks with Mr Gromyko next week, theForeign Secretary's journey to Washington theweek after. Probably these efforts will have onlya marginal effect on the course of events ; the endof the war will almost certainly be determinedmore by what happens in South Vietnam thanby what happens in London, or even in Paris,Peking, Moscow, or Washington. So it has beenthroughout; what Mr Wilson thinks matters less(as no doubt he realises) than what a handfulof Saigon generals and monks and a wholecountryful of other Vietnamese think. That isan additional reason for not wanting to offendthe US Government pointlessly. But meanwhilethe British Government's efforts combine with

those of U Thant, Mr Lester Pearson, Presidentde Gaulle, and other statesmen to create anatmosphere in which negotiations come to seemnatural and inevitable. Here again it is impor-tant that some of those adding their mediatorypressure on President Johnson should seemsympathetic to his dilemma.

There are, of course, limits. Washington'sgood opinion is not the sole factor in our foreignpolicy. It is deeply disturbing that a report hasbeen circulated giving the impression that theBritish Government supports the US air strikesagainst North Vietnam. This report has beenprinted in foreign newspapers and broadcast inthe United States. It naturally shocked MrVladimir Dedijer, as he made clear in a letterto the " Times" yesterday, and it must haveshocked many others whom fe like to feel arewell disposed towards us. Apparently it arose froma misunderstanding of something a Governmentspokesman said. It must be untrue ; when MrWilson was asked yesterday by a ConservativeMP for an assurance th,at the Government was" supporting the US Government in the actionswhich they have taken," it was noticeable thathe evaded a direct answer. Instead, he tookrefuge in the truism that " if the 1954 agree-ments were observed, there would be no prob-lem." But a more definite denial of the harmfulreport is needed. The British Government maynot feel able to condemn the raids, but it is notcalled upon to approve them.

Presidentcreate', an

to; seemimpor-

mediatoryseem

::,;9A^rf directed"^ .'TKis, 'report has been,: •'? iiV- '• ^ s^^f ttJ^fe^î^^Pi^j^^^M^yîprintedi';in;;Jpreign, newspapers^^nd,. broadcast in,'

i$£°ê';b^ât;:h?W^ -foj 'an ?assuranc6"vthat;the'"Government wasUk£-'what'Kape^ %|^fts! ^.ir^HPPo^M'^P -US'Government''in .the 'actionsiiPe^ng^MiDscow^prifWashingtph^;, So7it--hjisê6$,,,_^ was': noticeable, that:']rihroughou^ whatiMr;.-Wilso^nithihks^matters, less"" j .he"evadeU".&, direct .answer. ; Instead, he, took';\$. -:'. ^ in,.'the^truism ,,that. " if the 1954 agree-',fbfi?'Saigori'; generals>.and'-, toonks;--;and''1'aV;-'\vhoiî'X-'m'ents'w'ere-.;obsetyedvHnere w.ould. be no prob-' vôuntryûl /of.Bother1 ;Vietni;m:e-se:-ithink^ more': definite •denial off the 'harmful^;an';;additibnai-r,easpnVfof.:-n9t,:)v^ may

., the US Government'pointlessly; !|:-ButVmeaffwh4e^\.^hot(feehabiesUo'-coon'(iemn-'the raids,' but'it is not'•;th^,;B>itiSh-vG^^ > . . - . ' - . - . '. ' - ' . - • • • • • . • . ' • • • ' • • . • • ' < - ' t ' : - - ' ' - ' • • • ' . • : - . - I ' • - . ' ' • • '

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\Date:12 March

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:DE: Geo\ge J. Janecek

3 Karct 1*6$'

HEPOPT OK EDITORIAL COMMENT IN SWITZERLAND

Au cours da la fin de scsnaine^ divers sujets oat parti cull cr

retenu I1 attention dos redactions, notaoaent les eveassnents d-i Victr.aa oi

•viannent d*£tr© dep^ches deux bataillona de marina, la decision la Borua de

aettre £Ln £ son aide 4 la Rspnblique arabe uni©, le voyage de H. Wilson eu

AHesnagno ££d4rale et, aussJ^ la tension croissants en Espa.gne er.tre Iss

milieux estudiantins et le Gouveroement,

le z^daoteur politiqiie de la Hete ZSrcher Zeitung consacre (? mars) un

article en prOTl&re page 4 la situation au 'Vietnam et se douaride si l*on

doit 8*attendre a une extension 6e la guerre. II rel&ve quJS, present les

Etats-Unia interviennent rfieLloment dans la batai3J,e et estime, dsaut?s part

que 1' azmSe eSud-vietnamienn® maint^aaattt qu*alle est vSritablacient souteuuo

par l*Jbu6rique efft pratiquement invincible. S'eLsrt I'auteurj Han©£ psnsera

peut-^re dans cea conditions qpi'll est Impossibl© de conquerir le Susi-

Vietnan sur le plan militaire, ce qui pourrait permettre d'ouvrir la voi©

a des nfigociations BUT I'lndtbdiin®,, n^gocdations d<§sinNs dans bsaueoup de

«t pour la 'preparation dea^aellsa tant d© bonnss r?lon':.4s sont pr^ts

De son c$t£, le correapbadaftt a 1'ONU de la I^gue 2tLrchL§r,_Zejt\ing rand

coiapte (7 mars) de' la" Hisite faite par le SSn^ral KhsrJi aux prssldaits ia

I'ABsaablee at d« Conseil da 8ecurit4 et pms© que^ CCJSBS lo Secretaira

g4n6ralj ses deux interloouteurs ont dfl lui conseillor la rjoderations MSB

que tout le monde ignore a Kew York qgielle est 1'iafluence dont Is Grsn4ral

peut encore disposer & SaCgon.

Le 8 aara, le meme oorrespondant3 rendant cceapbe de l»erlt'*->tisn qus

le Secretaire general a eu avec M. Lester Pearson rapporte quHT Thantj dans

une declaration prudent©, a indiqufi qua pour l>iostant aucune 'nt-sr

du Con0«il de s*ourit6 a*est preVue aur la queslior; vi^-r. ami 2^.5. L©

sdnistrs oanadim a «»pos5 au .Secretaire g&&ral seo promts ^cn^^raact une

- 2 -

force de maintien de la pake, sals il ne s'ensuit pas necessairecient qu'un©

telle force soit constitute par 1»ONU.

COMITE POOR L'ETPDE PBS PHOSIEMES PES OPERATIONS EM FATCUR DU MAIKTIEN DEU PAJX

., ! ';

Le oorrespondant a 1»GKU <3e la Home Zurcher Zeitung Serit (7 mars) que 10

President de l»Asssribl6e general® et le Secretaire general ont precede a des

consultations, notanment av»e les del^gues du Royaum©-Uni3 de lÛRSS et de la

France, tendant a regler das questions de procedure diffidles avar.t de rûnir

le Comitfi pour 1'Atude des probl&aea des operations en faveur du maintien de

la paix. Ces consultations risquent de prendre sneore un certain temps.

CHIPHE

Sous le titre H Feu sous la cendre », la Tribune de Geneve a pubH6 deux

articles (5 et 6 mars) de aon envoy6 special a Ghypre« Parlant de& oasques

bleus dans I'tU, l*auteur fiorit i "La presence de 1'ONU est pe-nnanente, see

patrouilles sillonnent sans cesse lea routes, d&umteleot les positions for-

tififies, supervisent les arrestations, enquStent sur lee disparitions.(««.)

La mer, le soleil, 1'attrait de pays inoonnus, une solde int^ressante5 voila

ce qji'ils viennent chercher ces *soldat8tde la paix* danois, suedois. fin-

. landais, canadiens, australiene, anglaio, irlandais, autrichiens et noe-

z^landAis* Mais ila ne sent guere payfis de retour. Leur r6le d'observateura

neutres les expose aux critiques Sgalement aaereo des deux oaaps.a Et l»ga-

textr, dans la conclusion de son prosier article, ajoute : a 'Chypre ? une

quotation simple que dea interventions dtrangerea ont caapliqc.6 a lolsirs»

Costbiea de fois aiê enteodu cette raaarque« La solutions helas, n*0st pas

pour danain*11 Et9 en temdnant son deuxl&fte article^ !8enToy6 special du

Journal souligne que Kgr Makarios n*accepte lfEnosis quâ la condition qu'ell©

soit n4goci4iej, ear la conmtinaut^ Cypriote grecQjj© ©stime avoir St6 mise flerant

le fait accompli a Zurich at a Londrcw s als crise risque de a^teroissr.

L'Enosia auppos'ait la reconnaissance par 1»ONU du "droit de Chy-pre a 1s auto-

de'tenainatioa*. Or le debat a Manhattan est maintenant rîisj, un d^bat qui

s»annonce d'ailleurs assez mal, en raison du retirement soTi^tique^81

(H.D.R.L, j Liauteur id fait allusion a la reoâte declaration ds» M0

envisafteant une solution fede"rale pour le probl&ie de Chypre quis pour

Greca, compromet le "beau reVe" de

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LABOUR CAtXTO ,

*.'.' '

EMP

i 0pto:'l |ii| |

From Our Political Cpcce*pondea ]

Mr, Shfowell, chairman' ifel H& fart a Imenlary l_abour Patfy, Jed .Jhree omenelder statesmen xdd tWo» .leading Jo 't-wingens last night in tabjirj ij 3 motiorn >n;Vietnam^lhaf has much iWre domes ic.and international sigtuftcj^k« thap -the1

fsujt xrf the Mm Qt^fpsQi Slights,ItrcittH:-- ' 1 If - «t I

That this House, nalwig HHJ eecent declaJj 'turn made by the Score. ija-Ge»«fat*?fthe United Nation';, U Hl&tsb •WbfcS isconsistent with the views'* frtks&ed wtiieiPrime Minister, calls frfr-fljt t«ssaiiort?ifhostilities in Vietnam attdtm refcrenefcîl

, the dispute m Vietnarn td|4x.onfdfcnc«'<itiInterested parties. '' It? ' f

Mr, ShinwcU ts the QJst sigoato^,although apparently the \ jJraftsmaost^ pis . n0t'fels. He i s supplp'tte ' 'ArthitirHcadcrspn. QJC., aj-itortarôf- State for Air and «-i: leaderBjjparlialrtetitary United r^»;iluws ' g fpB;ML-PfeUipi Noel-Daker, tK'.': Nobel jSjiate i.prize^vianer; Mr. Bel'lersger, aSecretary."bf-Stale for \V"ar: Mr.Fc>ol', 8*|clMi.,Sydney (S'ilverman.

..., ,.,-.-jn, it needs (o'be iiBlniijiSt, bp called a CiovewtuneJ~ ihfr'Scnse;;trjaiiit MK i)iMS;GoverrimfjiH's

I 'backiniJ! anil ÎmosiJf rce-rtmaiy' '^hstiated by Mr, "WJU6ri;|iJrnteif. :^v-^

-.", Jt has.l*o main ppppMiS''' Hifst,:apd'rfio'sVinipprtanl. it , « ; - -—-- - • '— --•*-*- •Pr«ji,(Jcflt John.son -tler^mît have give.n.. .. ,.. ..,. , _rp^jif in their Vietnam aif Ji'cnw ,;biit tfipt

iljiertj is. anxiety -in' lôn<"lton" that i'sdffie"attempt shtnild be made^ :pow to ;achjeVea cessation of hostilities/! ' . • ','•'.-•

In this sense, the niotjon is -a her^drunning ahead of Mr. S5tc.wafi,;foreignSeci-etary. who will be jln Waskln;|l(»nfor talks next week, and.^tf Mr. WHftrjn.who will be rheeting Ihtr-'President<inApril 15. , , - ; _ -:,,fi;l

To some extent, too. Idle tone-pfibemotion, with its erriphasfjs'on an inter-national effort to break the.prcseni dead-lock in the Vietnam, situation, is.influenced by the- report Mr. Shinwell-has just brought back .'after contactswith Senators and'..Congj<;essmen at theirjieeiing of Anglo-American parlia-mentarians in, Benftuda. I

Apparently Mr, Shinwell found evi-dence o£ re-Sponsible Arriierican opinion:wanUng,to see:a willtngrx«s in Washing-j

n to îke'riibre than a | military initia-j

. 1. GROMYKO*S VISITNor should it be over?<xiked that Mr.

Gromyko is due in l.onidlon next week.One of the embarrassments for Mr.Wilson in his pieseni.nu'n of hii voik.behind the scenes in his pariy has been 'the insistence of Hit Ruwians th;u ihacshould be oti diidosiire >jf the content

•^r'the aims of the- excrwnpes. Jn part,the motion hint1* -it iho puini Mi WiKon

i h;is bi;i;n diplonruk:!!!^ piessni^ in! Moscow. .

Secondly, thi.- motion is. mtciKk-d lolj'm^rK <i>at ûud't'ii R^'ijcri v i rm. i lU ;il|!^'trietiibei^ \Jt ifu* P.n lMnic.nljr\ I . i lxnir

Par ty can sUmd w i t h ^ t . . Wi lson ai .1time of delicacy .uul d i l V i c u l t > I romriyht to l e f t , pro-Anu'i.ican and a n t i -Arncrican, Labour M,f -, nc 'cvpcctod toagree that U Thnnt's diV:ar.iiion cal l in t ;&>v a cease-tire in Viiiuwrn ;ind a con-ference, is. the r iyht line ;bi the t iovern-

'ment they'arc koopins iri ollice on :i bareoverall miijorils. i .

, The nunws i'f Mi. J not jiul Mr.Silvcrman ainoivj i l ik! M\ princip.dSptin.sor* uuphl to be aft tfiMiraiKt bothfor President JoKnsoii a:pd UK- UruishLabour P a i t \ 'ha t the Goscniii icnt and

kalt ili ûpptirtei's in the Common-, are• •wf ane j i i ind, . , \ •

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Date:10 March

CR. 13{l:U64)

FROM:Ged^-ge J. Janecek

U N I T E D N A T I O N SINFORMATION CENTRE FOR IRAQ

27*2/1 MM Nt

P.O. fita 2M8.

CaMu : OMferar

ftbpfcow : 94J7J.«

Stntt

BAOHOAO

Haroh

TO t Mr* Norman Ho, Chief, Orsrseas Brioflog Unit, Offleeof Publie Informtion, United Nations, New York

FROM t WJc Lehmkuhl, Dlr«otcr, UNIG, Baghdad

SUBJECTS Cartoon oa P*ac»-gaeplmt Fort*

You nay be Interested to know that tbe Iraqi Sorernsientnewspaper, Al- aahooriim. on 6th March 1963 reprinted the enclosedoartoon by Papas froa the uftrdlan on the proposal for British

support on the UK peaoeHeeeping forces.

The oaption translateB aa follow*t

The British proposal aimed to reinforceUN peaoe-keeping forces has impired thinoartoon by Papaa in the &uar4iaa»

Wilson supporting with a gun the UK whichla about to oollapae •••• will the gun beof benefit?

oot Mr. Williaa C. PoweU

IT • A VU

***

UNITED NATIONS . NATIONS UNIES

COPENHAGEN INFORMATION CENTRE

MEMORANDUM No. COP/85

TO: Mr. Norman Ho, Chief, Overseas Briefing Unit, United Nations,Room No. 260, ERD/OPI

FROM: Kirva Michelsen, Senior Administrative Assistant,UNIC, Copenhagen D«to 6 March 1965

SUBJECT: Report on editorial comment in Denmark, Norway and Sweden

The United Hationa, 7iet-Nam, Indonesia* the Near East and the CommunistConference in Hosoow ware subjects for comment.

Berlingake Tidende. Copenhagen, 1 March, wrote that the fact that theSpecial Committee on Peacekeeping Operations for various prestige reasonshad 33 members would scarcely facilitate or speed up the work. If theCommittee really succeeded in finding an arrangement for future operationsit would be a minor thing to get outstanding claims covered. For the con-flict was not over money but over political principles and this fact made itunlikely that the Committee could reach much of a positive result within thetime limit. Expectations for the Committee's achievement were small, since,for many reasons, tiae was not ripe for a revision of the UN Charter. Thefirst prerequisite oust be unanimity on the revision (to give the GeneralAssembly increased power). Other obstacles vere that all the Great Powersmust be able to accept it, and in the paper's opinion the USSfl would not allowa revision until the Peking Government had taken China's seat and the USA wouldnot allow Peking in until this Government softened its aggressive policy. Thusit would take a long time, the paper concluded.

Sydaveneka JJagbladet Sn&llposten* Malmoe, Sweden, 27 February, said thatobviously the UN Secretary-General stepped on a sore toe when he recently spokeabout the Viet-Nam problem. The fuss in the American press showed that theAmerican Government at present opposed all attempts at negotiations.

GOteborgs Handela- ooh S.10fartstidnina« Gothenburg, 3 March, criticizedthe Swedish Finance Minister for seeking an appropriation for donating toIndonesia 2,4 million Sw. kroner's worth of paper, sayingj Does he really con-eider it in order to help President Sukarno with the economy despite the factthat he asks the TO organs to get out? If Sukarno could not stand the TO'aaid to children it could be left to himself to find resources for the productionof school books. The US waa leaving behind in Indonesia equipment worth 35 mil-lion kroner* The paper concluded that there was no end to the dictator'sinsolence and weakness of those who help him. These two phenomena wereintimately connected.

Barsen. Copenhagen, 5 March, Jyllandstiosten. irhus, Denmark, 5 March,and Aftenpoaten. Oslo,27 February, commented on President Nasser's policy andthe supplies of arms to the United Arab Republic and Israel. Jyllandspostensaid that the great powers ought to recognize that peace in the Near Eastwas seriously threatened. In a period "when the United Hations practicallydoes not exist" it would be reasonable if the United States and the SovietUnion, in the first place, agreed to maintain peace, which they, among otherthings, could do, by not pouring any more weapons into the Near East whichalready had too many. In the second place it would be practical if theyguaranteed Israel's frontiers and got the parties to the negotiating table,and finally the development aid from the two powers should concentrate onIsrael*e Eastern neighbours where the Arabs* poverty accounted for muchof the tension. However, such a demonstration of great power responsibilitywas needed urgently.


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Date;

10 March

CR. 13 (11-64)

UNITED NATIONS WKP NATIONS UN IBS

C N I C - R O M E

ADDKEKa: PIAZ/.A 8. MA.KCO. 51 - TEL. 680.007 • CABLES: OMNIPKKSS KOMK

TO: Briefing Section, EBD/OPI, TO HQ, Sew York. D A T E : 5til &;&<&, 1965-9

PILE NO..

FROM: E. Granville Fletcher, Director.

SUBJECT: Italian Proas Opinion on Major US Bventst

The Secretary-General*• Press conference was widely reported with aHew Tork date-line. His proposal to call a conference on Vietnam in Rangoonwas headlined, as was also what L'UHITA described as a "dramatic strugglebetween the White House and TO". There were no editorial comments.

(Jalo Plaza's conclusions on the Cyprus question were also transmittedfrofl London and the picture drawn was one of gloom and despondency. IL TES3POseised the opportunity to publish a long rambling article entitled "BlueHelmet", by Giovanni Artier!, one of its more venerable contributors, whoseverbose and obscure literary style was only matched by the complete irrelevanceand ignorance with which he dealt with the subject.

Only IL POPOLO carried the exchange of letters between U Thant and theIndonesian Government on the occasion of that country's withdrawal from theUK as of 1st March*

The conclusion of the 7th session of the Soonomio Commission for Africain Nairobi was fully reported in L'UHITA. The reporter referred to theinfluence of the Trade and Development Conference together with the recantmeeting in Addis Ababa which discussed measures to provide for the transitionfrom agriculture for sustenance to agriculture for marketing. The writer saidhe got the Impression, after following the work of the Commission, listening tothe debates and speaking to delegates, that th* Conference had allowed itselfto be Manoeuvred into a vicious circle*, and while delegates thought that morecould be done they felt paralised by pressures and influences beyond their control.

The Security Council meeting on South Africa was reported briefly in ILPOPOLO. The same paper today carried a long article in which the Frenchdemographic expert, Jean Bois-Hartin, commented on the recent UN Demographictear Book*

Finally, tfee sane paper last Saturday, carried a Washington story on theInternational Monetary Fund's decision to increase its gold and currency re-serves from 16 to 21 million U.S. dorlftrs.

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Date:9 Mar.

CR. 13 (11-64)


The fallswinp clippings were received today fraa UNICV Lc:r:a:..

v During his press conference at the UnitedNations Headquarters in New York last week,U Thant held up his own country, Burma, as anexample of how a Communist threat could becontained without the loss of 'one preciousAmerican life.' U Thant's praise for Burma waspersonally understandable, but politically dis-ingenuous. It is difficult to find out precisely whatis going on there, but Philip Goodhart hasrecently returned from Burma and given me hisimpressions of a confused scene. Estimates of theamount of territory out of control of the centralgovernment are necessarily sketchy, but about 25per cent of the Burmese budget is devoted to thewar against a variety of insurgents. So far noneof the rebels, including the Communists, seem tohave received any noteworthy assistance fromforeign countries, but the possibility of externalassistance to the rebels is always there. If Chinahelps the Communists, it is doubtful whetherIndia and Thailand can stand aside. The possi-

bility of chaos in Central Burma is one of themajor threats to stability in the Far East.'The first diplomatic gesture of Mr. Wilson's

government was the banding back of theMaodalay regalia. Within weeks of this con-ciliatory move the last important British assetsia the country—a jointly owned Unilever factoryand the silver mines—were nationalised. Even ifthe Burmese government wished to pay adequatecompensation there is no foreign currencyreadily available. Goodhart makes the point thateconomic austerity is matched by politicalrepression. The former Prime Minister, thatgentle Buddhist socialist U Nu. is held in un-comfortable custody with some 2,000 sup-porters whose families have to fend for them-selves. Meanwhile the sizeable Indian communityis being squeezed out of the country at a rate of1,000 a month.

Ironically the present Burmese governmenttried to stop a reception being given for U Thanlby the diplomatic corps when he last visitedRangoon. In the end U Thant was allowed tohave a party: but it seems premature to talkof Burma containing the threat of Communism,or even the danger of total collapse.

35 B«2 g-fis5rBB>S?3_<S IB-. S•f^g.- »3~ '

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TO: The Secretary-GeneralAiFOR ACTION

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Date:8 March

CR, 13 (11-64)

FROM: \VDE: George J. Janecek

London Information Centre

PRESS OPINION REPORT

No. 9/65 3 March 196524 Feb - 2 March

Vietnam

The Statist (26 Feb) in a general article about the UN's "Suicide Session" suggestedthat a debate in the Assembly about Vietnam "might have forced the disputants to enter intonegotiations'* by exposing "the hypocrisies behind the contentions of both sideu". Comraent-ing on the Secretary-General's remarks at his press conference on 24 February the Times(26 Feb) said "U Thant has also entered his plea, less as the spokesman of a temporarilyemasculated United Nations, than as a Burmese with first-hand knowledge of politics andguerrillas in the area". Apart from this reference the Secretary-General's remarks drew littlecomment although they were given good news coverage.

tOT Crisis

An article in the New Statesman (26 Feb) suggested that "there now arises the disturbingsuspicion that in the last resort the super-powers are more in collusion than collision overthe future of the UH. If neither is able to manipulate it satisfactorily, they may bothleave it to fester and wither". The same article dismissed the "comforting ar.rrument thateven if the UN withers politically the specialized agencies which it haa sponsored canperfectly well continue to function" and also suggested as other journals have previously that"the Geneva 75i Joined by Scandinavia and other powers such as Australia, Italy and Canadameet the UN's normal budget needs of $88 million, and even meet thecost of emenjency opera-tions". The Economist (27 Peb) referred to the Secretary-General's remarks at the Pacem inTerris convocation and said, "Mr. Thant - clearly acting to some extent as a spokesman forthe mass of smaller sta.tes - bluntly described as outdated 'the Charter clauses that gave thecouncil primary responsibility for maintaining peace",. The same article sup-heated that apackage deal might be arrived at which would include "abandonment of the attempt to enforcepayments for past operations (though some token payments by the defaulters rai<rht be anecessary face-saver); agreement that future operations will be financed by voluntary con-tributions; and acceptance by the great powers of the assembly's right to a defined butsubstantial authority in regard to peace-keeping, on the lines of last September's Americanformula" and suggested that the technique of "silent consent" whereby powers let operationsfor which they do not have to vote or pay, go forward, could be of great value. John Grigg,writing in the Guardian (1 Feb), favoured a General Assembly role as a "fonrr" and "forcing-house for ... genuine world consciousness", suggested the introduction of weighted voting inthe Assembly and saw the Security Council as "& supplement to, rather than a substitute for,the ordinary diplomatic machinery."

Southern Rhodesia

The visit of the two British Ministers to Southern Rhodesia was in the news. TheGuardian (2 March) suggested that Mr. Bottomley must have "acknowledged two facts; that theaoope for British intervention is narrow and that time is not at present running on theAfricans' side" and suggested that "the disarray of the United Nations, the unpreparednessof some (though not all) of the newly independent countries farther north, and the previousconduct of the Rhodesian nationalists all tell against automatic British support for thefall nationalist demands".

Motes Attention is particularly drawn to the article on British defence policy "Labour'sboab and the White Man's burden" in the Observer (28 Feb). This article at several pointsimpinges on the United Nations.




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Date:4 March

CR. 13 (11-64)


TO:

THROUGH:

U N I T E D NATIONS NATIONS U N I E S>*9-T*r'


Mr. George J. Janecek, Director,External Relations Division, OPI

Date:. March 1965

FILE NO.: .

FROM: Norman Ho, Chief,Briefing Section, ERD/OPIV

SUBJECT: Swiss Comment on the Secretary•General's Press Conference

One of Geneva's regular reports on editorial comment in Switzerland,

dated 1 March 1965, has just arrived. Although any necessary translation of

such reports is normally done on the 38th Floor, and Bardey is tied up today

with the Lettre Hebdomadaire, here is a rough translation of the section of

the report dealing with the Secretary-General's press conference:

"The Secretary-General's declarations in the course of his last

press conference have retained the attention of numerous commentators. In

this respect, the UN correspondent of the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (26 February)

considers that these declarations, if they have gathered the approval of the

delegations to the UN, were nevertheless the object of criticism in certain

American circles. Noting that the Secretary-General had made a later

declaration with a view to clarifying his thinking at the time of his press

conference, the correspondent remarks that U Thant took advantage of this

so-called rectification to repeat forcefully his position^as announced the

day before as well as his doctrine on Vietnam and South-East Asia.

"On 1 March, the same correspondent makes note of the transmittal

by Mr. Stevenson to the Secretary-General of the American "White Book". He

indicates that all the more importance can be attached to the two-hour

conversation of the two men in view of the fact that it took place during a

period of extremely sharp divergences of views between U Thant and Washington."

lor mars 1965

HEPQMTQI EDITORIAL GGflMEMT "SM SMT2EELAKB

declarations du Secretaire general, an cours de SB derniere conferencecl© presssj ont r&tenu I1 attention de nosibreux cojamentateurs* A ce propos, le

correspondant & 1'OKU de la 'geug^-qridigr Jteitung; (26 fevrier) ©stirae que ces

declarations., si elles oht recuoilli I1 approbation des delegations & 1'OHU,

0nt eependa»t fait I'objet de critiques dnns certains milieus americains*

Mot siit que le 'Secretaire general a fait me nouvolle declaration en vue de

pr'4cis.er sa pensse lore de sa conference de press©., le correspondent reaarque

que U Thsnt $ profit^ de ce pretendu rectificatif pour rdpeter avec force sa

position oiMioncee la veille einai quo sa doctrine aur le Vietn^i et lo Sud-Est

Le ler marSj le m&&.& correspondent fait etat de la rsjiiiae par n. Stevenson

au Secretaire general du'livre bleme tffiiericain. II indique quo 1'coi accox-de

line itaporifance d'sutant plus grande & Is confers a'bion de deui: heures dsa devoc

honsaeSj «5tant dam^qu'elle a eu lieu au cours d'une pdriode de divergences de

'vues extrliaattent sigue entre U Tliant et Washing-ton.A propos de la constittttion du Coaite pour 1'dtude des probleraes des ope~

en jfav0ur du maintien de la poi2£j le correspondent a 1'OIJU de la

2eitmig (26 fevrier) indique que les consultations du President de

se heurtSnt S. d'inoosBsntes nouTfellea demandes de participation des

groupes. Les pays occidenteux espSrent fpire ^quilibre a. la. participation

tfe If? To-ugo-dlttvio en foissnt Pdmettre 1'Autriche coaao pays neutre occidental.

Ainsi le Comitd co2iprendr?>it 31 ou 32 meabrGS et I1 on esp&re qu»il pourruitStre cfcfiastitui 1-a sanaine proch;sine pour tenir sa prondere seca.ce dans deu: ou

Le mem© correspondsiit dcrit (ler mars)^ a|)res la constitution duque celle-ol est lrafcoutis£!(3!n«jnt do negoeiations diifieiles. La Chine en a e

' 4cartee oh rsison de 1' opposition sovietique ct, d'rsutro part, la lougoslavie et

Is Hongrie ont et£ adndses d*un cot€, slors que 1'Autriehe et 1'JJepsgne 1'^taient

de 1'TiUtre* Sxiivant le correspondent , les observyteurs ne mettent que peu

- 2. *•

d'espedr flans Is travgdLl collect!£ de &® nomrel orgaaisme trop

oar il cosipbe 33 meinbreSj sut-toat' si I1 on se souvien.!. de 1' chec du ooraiti

ps*4s6d<sst de SI mcasxbrss* Le r51s vdsdtable du Gomite ccaigj.stefait sans

ctoute a faeiliter <&;s contacts directs entê Et'ets-Unis ©t URSS, <§tsnt donne

qae la orlss eat Etee de I1 opposition ds cas dem^ psys et qua seisle

Sous is tttre "ParaS^sie 4e l*OJHJ|4j le sormneatateur de political©la |fetloKei .$ 3$$ 4erit (27 f^vrier) me l»OKU ne peat

Sa mission m paison <3w moncp.© de fonds. II est inswtedssible,,-ilj si l*on y refldchltj de pesiser quo la survie de 1*03SU

d*tas© quesfcicsB. p^cranisis?e« Ea faita il s*sgit d'axitro chose cji'tmHngnoiisre3 mais feflen d'une cris« poHtiqjie due a I'1 antagonism® esntro Sstet Ouagt* Gepesaclaat, il 7 a uri re^ron d'espoir, c'est qu© des deusc eotes

ne SSsi paji qae 1>OIU dispsi*6ls8e, on a reaonel & ixssei" la question$- 1* Article 19*

Signslons safin que tous le© jouBiaîx jaiblieat des

au sujet dte la Hn d^s aeii%-lt<§$ .das Hsfeions Uoies et

le^ alnsi gô 4ea infosaations mlatives I

smuedi dejjniei* a l.tjgaa% du priK international Bag

pas* wa Goaiit^ iat«rnational fi© diploEiates a IB mâolfe ds1»GM.


TCSf" The Secretary-GeneralA;FOR ACTIONFOR APPROVAL


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It should be noted that both thetranslations attached are from reportscarried by Agence France-Presse. Theoriginal copy in French was sent toMr. Dangeard, in the usual way, onthe same day it appeared on the ticker.

Date:

3 March '65

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:DE: Geofige J. Janecek

From L*Orient, dated February 25th, 1965

U THAHT FAVOURS A "GRACEFUL" WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FROM VIETNAM

United Nations, New York, Feb. 24th (AFP) - At the press conference heldtoday, U Thant revealed that for some time, and until now without achievingany substantial results, he had been conducting private discussions on howto bring Viet Nam conflict on the road to a negotiated settlement. U Thantadded that he had had an exchange of views with the "principal parties",including the United States, but he refused to reveal the tenor of theseconversations.

However, Mr, Thant spoke highly of "the wisdom, moderation and sensitivity shownby President lyndon Johnson to public opinion". In addition, stating that"in any war the first casualty is always truth", the Secretary-General drew apicture of the situation in Viet Nam and added that "if the great Americanpeople knew this truth, it would agree that further bloodshed is unnecessaryand that political discussions and negotiations could make it possible forthe United States to withdraw gracefully from that part of the world"»

After recalling that he had always advocated a diplomatic and politicalsolution to the conflict "because it would be impossible to achieve anenduring peace in Viet Nam by military means" U Thant emphasized that timewas of the essence: "in 1963* said he, there was a good prospect for anegotiated settlement but in 1964 the situation worsened considerably andthe possibility of such a solution is now further removed".

takta£«iJEUDI 25 KVRIBR 1965

0 Hart pour mi Tetrait {(Elegant))des U.S.A. au Vietnam

•Ffatlops Unlae. New York 34 Favrier. (AFP) — Au coursd'une CQDttranoe M praise qu'tl a tenue aujourd'hui, U. Thant* reveu qu'll pnxidalt depute quekjue temps — et jusqu'4present sans aboutir & de« resultats ooncluanta — & des ««cU»n-toe* de vues prts*» • «ur lea moyens d'eagag«r le conflit auVlctaam sur l£ M«t« de la solution nAgociee.

Oea echanges de vue« <mt Ifeu avec lea « prtndpaux Jntc-Tt*»(» t, y comprla le» Ktats-Unle, a Jndlqui U Thant qul s'e--itpourtant refuse & reveler la teneur de cea entreticna.

Cependant, M. Tbant ft fait un vif &og« de la « aagesse,de bh wod^ruiloo «t de la. «on»tWU*6 A. ToplnioD puHhjue >du <f>r£sid«&t Lyndon Johnson. Do plus. soullgn<int QU«, « dnaaline guorr*, la pranlire vlcttone est toujouni la v£rlt£, 1« se-cretaire general a fe.lt un espos^ our la situation au Vietnamen declarant que si « le grand peuple am&ricaln oonnalssalt«oU« v4ltt£, U s'accorderalt A oonstatvr QUA de BouvcHes ef^fuslom de wuac wmt tiwtUes «t U convtendralt quo, gr&co &dm dboowtotui et n«£octeU<MM poiitiduw. ln» oondlilona d'un

^Mgai^ 4"* Eteto-Urta de cette partie du ntonde pour-Mre or^es ».

Aprfes avoir rapped qu'll avail toujours pr£cante£ unc so-lution polltlque at diplomatique du oonflit, « car tea moyensinBifaJreii ne sauratent bistaur«r unc .pafx durable au Viet-nam >, U Thant a fait valolr que le temps pressait : « 0 cxts-taU en IKS, a-t*l dit, uue bomw >o»»u>tiV <to «ataUoD nefco-oWc, onto la *Hmfiaa B'est oonatdenlijbM^e^ fucrayfe on1*H et tab PMHifcttfcfe dime tefle Hohrtii w w

'

CR.13 (4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P


TO:







Name of Paper: Al-Jarida —

Date: 26 February 1965

THANT CALLS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION

IN VIETNAM.

followed by the withdrawal of USA while keeping its prestige

United Nations: 25 Reuter - The Secretary-General U-Thant renewd his call

for the necessity of finding an acceptable solution for the Vietnamese

crisis through negotiations so that the USA could -withdraw from the

territory while "keeping its prestige".

U-Thant said in a Press Conference last night, that if the American People

knew the correct facts about the situation, they would have agreed to the

fact that new blood-shed is not needed on that land.

It seems that U-Thant was repeating the words of some American commentators

who previously criticized the American Government for concealing all the

facts leading to the involvment of the American people in the Vienamese problem.

VIETNAM AMD BURMA

U-Thant compared between the situation in Vietnam and the communist revolution

which took place in his country Burma, 17 years ago. He mentioned that, if

South-Vietnam did not ask for the help of USA and had not the USA agreed

to help, then the Vietcong forces would have depended on itself only*

U-Thant mentioned that Burma depended completely on herself to fight the

Communist Revolution which took place after the independence. She never

asked the help of anyone.

He said that he does not call for the "immediate" withdrawal of the American

Forgoes because of the Prestige and the self respect which is involved.

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TO: The Secretary-GeneralA:FOR ACTIONFOR APPROVAL

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In light of your request throughMr. Ramses Nassif, this is the onlyreaction received so far.

I will be sending them direct toyou as soon as they are received.

Centres have been asked to cableany editorial comments.

Date:

2 March 1965

CR. 13 (11-64)

Drge J. JanecekLre ctorvernal Relatirns Div.

•>V 2 March 1965

Press Reaction to the Secretary-General1s Press Conference

The following is an extract from a report, dated 26 February 1965,

received today from the Information Service of the United Nations European

Office in Geneva:

"La situation toujours alarmante dans le Sud-Est asiatique continue a

preoccuper les redactions. C'est ainsi que, rendant compte de la conference

de presse du Secretaire general, le correspondant a 1'OUU de la Meue Zuercher

Zeitung (25 fevrier) indiqua que U Thant a longuement cite 1'exemple de la

Birmanie. Le correspondant rapporte que I1on peut s'imaginer les commentaires

critiques auxquels se sont livres certains des Americains ayant assiste a la

conference de presse, a propos des remarques acerees faites par le Secretaire

general* Le correspondant indique d'autre part qu?on a eu I1 impression que le

Secretaire general n'a pas essuye de refus au cours des contacts qu'il a pu

avoir avec Pekin et Hanoi."

(An unofficial translation follows:)

"The ever-alarming situation in South-East Asia remains a source of preoccupation

to all newspaper editors. Thus, reporting on the Secretary-General's press

conference, the United Nations correspondent for Neue Zuercher Zeitung (25 February)

indicated that U Thant cited at some length the example of Burma. The correspondent

said that one could imagine the criticisms voiced by some of the Americans who

attended the press conference following the sharp comments made by the Secretary-

General, The correspondent also noted that, on the other hand, the general

feeling was that the Secretary-General had not met any refusal in the course of

contacts which he may have had with Peking and Hanoi. "

*25 February 1965TO: SG

Re attached: As discussed with you, I havesaid without attribution to spokesman that youfelt that Americans were not adequately informedabout certain facts you considered important,namely, that military action will not resolve theproblem and that communist China which the UnitedStates refuses to recognize is a. principal factor

Bamses Kassif

THE ASSOCIATED PRESSUNITED NATIONS BUREAU

ROOM 452

UNITED NATIONS. N. Y.

Feb. 25, 1965

Mr. Ramses MassifUnitod Nations

Dear Ramses:

I had a telephone call this morninp from my boss askinp thatwe put in a request for a statement from the Secretary-peneralexplaining what he meant when he said the American people wouldagree with him "if only they know the true facts." Tfcis appear? toimply criticism of the U. S. Government--or the press. There alsowas a statement that in time of war "the first casualty is truth."Tv,is could be construed as meaning that somebody is lying. I pointedout that we had received a partial elaboration from official sources,but he felt that we should at least ask for an expansion by theSecretary-genera1. I don't want to write the Secretary-generaldirectly on this, but I would appreciate it if you would call thisto his attention.

Sincerely,

MAX HARRELSONCHIEF CORRESPONDENT

\

TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Vv

The Secretary-General has had requests from the press for clari-

fication of the statement in his press conference of 2.k February to the

effect that the "American people, if only they know the true facts and

the background to the developments in South Viet-Nam, will agree with

me that further bloodshed is unnecessary" and his further statement that

"As you know, in times of war and of hostilities the first casualty is

truth".

The Secretary-General has emphasized that it was far from his

intention in this statement to suggest that the American people are not

well informed or that the Government of the United States is withholding

information from them about the situation in Viet-Nam. Indeed, he had

expressed the great respect he has for the President of the United States

just prior to making these two observations. Rather, his intent was to

refer to the emphasis and priorities on information that invariably apply

in a war situation. The Secretary-General had in mind that inevitably

the stress in the news is on pursuit of the war, accounts of victories

and set-backs over, for example, such factors as the great suffering of

the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam; the tragic loss of human lives

and property, uprooting of society; the attitudes of Asians which so 'often

are misunderstood in the West; the serious risks and dangers implicit in

pursuing on both sides a war course without political efforts to bring the-

war to an end; the possibility of escalation of the war; and the factor

which the Secretary-General himself has often mentioned, namely the ulti-

mate futility from the point of view of all concerned of seeking a solution

-2-

in the Republic of Viet-Nam by means of war.

The Secretary-General sincerely believes that the American public

is among the best informed in the world, but he doubts that even in the

United States in these times it is possible to receive fully balanced

information on the Republic of Viet-Ham or on the whole broad picture

of South East Asia.

1* SeseHtifcion So* 5&Isbw«mt of Was*

S on 13

first part ©ftte t-em^-ral .

f! SeeaK^€sr» 19 *6 duringpl©aarj me©feiag of theOf th© 1st Session of tfee General

3, IteseltttiGii Bb*96 (2) adopted duringmeetissg of the 0©B©ral

(11.1) adopted9 ltec@mfe®r,t 19^B daring 1?9tt

ateeting of %&e IXXrd Session

CR.13 (4-S9)R O U T I N G S L I P


TO:

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DATE:

23 February 1965

TO: Secretary-General

From: Ramses Nassif

Subj: Questions that may come up at your press conference,tomorrow;

As you are aware, there is a feeling of frustration among corres-

pondents as a result of scrapping the 19th session. A few of them, who

are making a living by working at UN Headquarters, are considering leaving.

The larger bureaus such as AP and the lew York Times are planning to cut

down their staffs. It may be worthwhile to open the press conference with

a short statement giving your own assessment of the past, present and

future of the UN.

1. Tour role in dealing with the financial crisis: Do you expect

to pursue efforts toward a settlement—What chances will the new committee

have—When will it be formed? Do you agree that France, the USSR and the

USA have "conspired" to cripple the General Assembly—Has the UN changed

into a mere debating society—What is the cash position of the Organization—

You have touched on some of these points in your Saturday speech, especially

the powers of the Assembly and those of the Security Council, and you may

be asked to elaborate on them.

2. Viet-nam: Your proposals for the settlement of the problem.

Have you communicated them to all the parties—Any reaction—Do you have

a channel to Peking and Hanoi—Did you discuss this problem with Couve de

Murville—Any conclusions?

3. What other matters did you take up with the French Foreign Minister—

What is his attitude toward the financial crisis—What do you think of

General de Gaulle's proposal to call a conference of the Big Four plus

Peking to discuss the future of the UK?

TO: Secretary-General 2 23 Feb 65

4« Cyprus: Is the Mediator making any progress — When does he intend

to submit his report — How much longer will the force remain in Cyprus?

5. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Spinelli's Report: Do you intend to release it?

b. Do you believe that China is behind Indonesia's withdrawal

from the UN?

c. What changes do you contemplate at the highest level in the

Secretariat? Q»o y&** Jk*4«i~ J ~~W3£&~* d& ,/U i~<.-i-iA &&&£{ "&&£/~&t&3 JllUl4Lt.4.t£.S? < S k/-. " n

d. The 20th anniversary celebrations in San Francisco; Do you

think that the abortive 19th session will dampen the enthusiasm for such

a celebration?

e. Any comment on the assassination of Malcolm JC?

f . Seaction to statement in House of Commons that Britain stands

ready to provide logistic support for a future UN peace force.

g. Your travel plans? The second Asian-African Conference in

Algiers — Africa — Asia — Moscow at the invitation of the new government — Has

the Austrian Government invited you to attend the 10th anniversary of the

State Treaty in May?

"«- .

^


Press ServicesOffice of Public Information

United Nations, N.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION* MEDIA'— NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)

Note No. 299123 October 1964

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS

ON THURSDAY, 22 OCTOBER

- 1 - ' ' ." Hote Ho. 299122 October

The SF TAEt-GEKERAL: I Relieve'that Mr, McVane lias something-to

s a y a t t h e beginning o f thie-.cbnfereJsee. ' . . - • . . .

QUESTION: Mr, Secretary-General, would you explain the purpose .of thepresent move to postpone the opening of'the coding session of the.General Assembly?What are its advantages? . . . " . . ;

The SECKETABY-GBHEiRAti; As you are no doubt aware, I have no strong.,

views on this question.', About two weeks ago I was asked what I considered to •

be necessary or desirable regarding the rumoured moves about the postponement of,

the opening date of the session. I said at that time that if there werei • .

definite prospects' of an agreed;formula in the interregnum, then the postponement

of the session' of the General Assembly might be worthwhile, but not otherwise.

I still hold" this position-. '•'••. ' . ...,".:•But, of course, as you Jtoow, many delegations have been meeting in, the

1 ' r- ' ' ' • ' '

last few days and considering the advisability of postponing the opening date <.

of the session, and there are also rumours that 1 December is a possibility.All I have to say today is that, in-any case, the General Assembly, has to meetin December to dispose of certain important-items, including the adoption of the

budget, and ele^Mons ca the Councils, and I have been, informed that the Second:Committee day wish to iaeet to consider the reccmnendations of the United Nations .

Conference on Trade and Development. • ' .

Of course, it is up to the Member States to decide on any line of action,

and if I receive a request from a majority of the Member States, I shall have to

postpone the openih'g date of the session accordingly. Even if I receive a

proposal from the majority of Member States, I think that, as a matter of form

and out of courtesy, I must poll the remaining Member States to get their•positions on this issue for the record.

(more)

- 2 -

Note No. 299122 October 196it-

W; During private talks recently with President

of the Philippines vas there any discussion on the Malaysian dispute and, if

so; would you mind elaborating on this?

The SB TAHY-GErEBALi 'I:1 took "the opportunity; in my .meeting with

President' Macapagal, of discussing the question of Malaysia since he had played

a very important role in getting -ch'e two parties .together and

iarranging the Manila Summit Conference 'and the : Tokyo

Summit Conference. Wo exchanged views oh certain aspects of the problem, and

I "believe that he will, continue to try his test to bring about the implementation

of the agreement reached at the Tokyo 8una.lt Conference . Of course, as you know,

the principle of another summit conference has been agreed to, but the pre-condi-

tions for the summit dif few.. I th£»&' 'that ;!;.t wtjl be Ms- -endeavour to bring about

a reconciliation of attitudes on these conditions.

QUESTION; Since the two major Powers have apparently hardened their

positions with respect to financing, on the eve of the postponement — the very

object of which is to get them together -- would you still be prepared, in a

critical moment, to Intervene, personally, as I believe you indicated some time

ago that you might? •

The SECBETABY-GENBRAL; At some stage I indicated that if the deadlock

still persists by the time the General Assembly meets, I might perhaps come up

with some ideas to break the deadlock. But the 'positions of the parties primarily

concerned remain very rigid and I do not see- any prospect of a conciliatory

formula or an agreed formula to break the deadlock.- In the circumstances, I do

not intend to come' up with any personal proposals.

QUESTION; Do you have any comment on Mr. Khrushchev's displacement

and the method used? Would you, in the same way that President EisenhowerV

indicated, like to hear from him directly?

(more)

- 5 -

te' No/ £991'22

The SgCEETARY-gBpIRAj.; Ml> it id fldt ffcci^ Of course, inmy position to 'make an assessment of slMto^tir6ji& life the one which we witnessedin the Soviet Union last week- since tfilf M% $%$M£il& domestic matters. But if' I

. ,'. v .. "; £ t- . ; .^

nay venture an bpinion, afte'r the da^rp? OT iMol&#afij($ la the Soviet Union,I do not think that the Soviet <3bve'2?n^M ^l^.,J^'iltMi- a fbireign .policy differentfrom the. one adopted "by Mri tCbii'tishdhev'V " . " .Afiiiiikily^ last FridayAtribassadotf Fedorferikb saw me and informed- ^ df the chahgfe in the Soviet leadershipand transmit-ted to iue the line of the- a^W' '©oTtefiaBisat in the Soviet Union, thatit Wbitld continue to pursue the policies of peaceful coexistence) disarmamentahd the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the strengthening ofthe United Nations. So I do not think that there will be any material changein the Soviet policy regarding foreign affairs* &ut perhaps there is apossibility of a change in emphasis,

(more)

Hote Ho. 29922 October

Incidentally, I happen to have known Mr. Brezhnev since 19;>5. I met him

in Alma Ata at that time, when lie was the heacL of. the Commupist P&rt" of. . . , ' > ••• .•.; 4 ; '• •' , ••• ' '••••• • : . . . - . • • . • . . : • • . ' ••- •; f . . • --;?• ,'•-•• * »• • . ; - • . . - . - . •> - ' • ••• •

Kazakhstan. When I met him1 again':" in ; 1962 'in. Moscow, and again last year .an the' , '•• .,.. . ';•')•.jVl'T IT S ' ':'. . ' ' ' •-"-••.•' '"• •".•• ••''' .-•' ' • •

occasion of--the signing in Mosccw-bf the_partial. nuc4«a^Jiest ban treaty, I found

him the same' friendly,- warm and unaffected gentleman;' with' a deep knowledge of world, i -. • ' .-.'• ';V,:•'.•: 'to &r,.as:i'> "' . . • "••- . '

affairs. • • ' ' :, '"' •':••'•'*•>: . . . . • • • ••• . , . ...: • , ; • •' •• ''".••.•..-.- ^'Jr-^iiSKn:^?-^--, '• ••' '•'' ;•

I also know-Mr. Kosygin; . 1'have'''met-'him-"1 Several times. In my .opinion, he is

one of the most unostentatious men-'I ha e .eirei' met;. From, all accounts he is one

of'the most respected .le£dei>s of tfce' ..Soylet .Union.1' , . • . . • \ _. •

Of covtrse, "both Mr.'3reahne--r ar\d.Mr. Kosygln have1 a,realistic .appraisal of

the world situation, and it is unlikely that,they will'..reverse ,the course of

history "by taking the Soviet Union back tp.,the..pre-1953 era-

As regards Mr, Khrushchev, I have^ as,you know, made my personal assessment.

on more than one occasion. I still believe that he will be long remembered as a

man who tried his best to implement 'the principle of peaceful coexistence — and,

if I may say so, he did so with some degree of success in that he had been able

to convince a considerable segment of public opinion in the West of his sincerity.

I think that it would be helpful and even desirable, if Mr. Khrushchev were able

or inclined to make a public statement on the circumstances leading to his exit.

QUE IQH: Reverting to the matter of Article 19, have you considered

or discussed with the principal parties the possibility of again referring the

issue to the International Court of Justice for clarification of the question

whether the Assembly could make any mandatory recommendations under Chapter VI?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have not discussed that aspect of the problem

with any Member State, although I understand that some Member States are interested

in taking it up when the General Assembly meets.

QUESTION: Have you any comments to make on the Chinese explosion of a

nuclear bomb and on how that might affect China's membership of the United Nations?

(more)

Note No. 299122 October

The SECRETAHY-GEHSRALi As regards the Chinese nuclear test last week,

I must -say that from the pcint of 'view of the United Nations, and particularly

in the context of the General Assembly resolutions — specifically the

resolution atVj ed in 1962 'condemning all tests — the Chinese nuclear test is

deplorable. In my view it is particularly regrettable in the wake of the

signing last year in Koscow of the partial nuclear test "b u treaty, vhich

was endorsed by the General Assembly by an overwhe.ijaing majority.

You will remember that I predicted last year that there was a probability

of & Chinese nuclear test some time in I$6k. I based that prediction on the

available information that a nuclear reactor had been established in China as

early as 1958. Although the Soviet Union had withdrawn its technical assistance

from China in I960, the Chinese vsre reported to'have at that time at least" ten"

nuclear scientists -who had been trained, abroad.

Iir that connexion^ there was an interesting news dispatch yesterday about .

a speech in Colurobus, Ohio, day before yesterday by an eminent American,

Governor 'Landon1, "who was the" Republican candidate 'for President in 1936. Of

course, I do riot agree with all that he said, but one aspect of his proposal,

regarding the need for a dialogue between the present nuclear Powers, has some

merit. 1 feel that it could be very worth while if attempts were made to have

a dialogue between -the United States, the Soviet Union» the United Kingdom,

France and the People's Republic • of China, perhaps sometime in 1965. In my

view, 1965 will be A more congenial year than previous years for the conduct of

such a dialogue. Of course, there are protocol and diplomatic considerations,

but I feel very strongly that they should be secondary. The primary consideration

should be that of nuclear destructibility and radio-activity.1 As you know,•there .are two duly constituted forums for the discussion of

disarmament and a nuclear test ban: the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation

Committee on Disarmament. Legitimately, all questions regarding disarmament,

the banning of nuclear tests, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and

nuclear weapon capabilities should be thrashed out either in the General Assembly

or in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. However, the kind of •

dialogue proposed by Governor Landon can certainly supplement the work of the

General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(more)

_ 6 - Note No, 259122. October

Regarding the second part of Miss Pick's question on the prospects of the

admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, I have this to

say. It ehould be remembered that the problem has two aspects* I h&ve made this

observation on a previous occasion also* Some Member States maintain that the

question is one of representation, not admission. Their argument is based on the

premise that China is already a Me&ber of the United Nations — one r>f the founding

Members, one of the five permanent m.eiabers of $he Security Council. Therefore,

China is already a Member of this Organization* The question, according to them,

is one of representation s »Jho should represent China? This is the attitude held

"by some of the Member Statesu

Another -view-point is held by the vast majority of the Member States, who

maintain that the question is one ©? adms.sion, Of course, the General Assembly

has taken up this question from. year to year. The General Assembly decided by impli-

cation that it was a queetfion; of admission '6f a new Member, act representation. And this

majority opinion prevailed. Of course, I have no means of knowing what will

happen in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly regarding this question*

QUESTION? Today, Red China turned down President Johnson rs request to

sign the test b.an treaty. Is there anything that your Office would do or might

do to change the mind of the Red Chinese in this regard?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As I have just said, one of the best means of

bringing about a favourable atmosphere for fruitful negotiations is to start

thinking of a dialogue. . .

Would your Office initiate that?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL.; Wo. I am. not authorized by any of the organs of

the United Nations to initiate such a step,

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- 7 - Note No. 299122 October 196k

' ; QUESTION: I should like to turn to another topic, Mr, Secretary- ,

General;, Thirteen Member States of the United Nations, all of them members .of the

Arab League, have confirmed in writing to the United Nations that their

Governments at a meeting in Alexandria openly 'declared that, they would attempt

to. liquidate another Member of the United Nations ~ Israel, Do you think,

Mr. Secretary-General, that there is anything the United Nations might do to

obviate or perhaps reverse such a step, or should the United Nations' Just sit

still .and wait until an explosion occurs? ':

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As in the case of all similar situations, when

any development arises which is likely to disturb international peace and

security, it is for the Security Council to meet and deal ,with such a situation.

And for such a consideration, of course, it is for the Member States to take the

initiative* If I feel that the situation is such as to make necessary the con-

vening of the Security Council, of course, I can take the initiative. But I

do not see any need for the moment of a Security Council consideration of this

matter. ,. =' .

. QUESTION r If I might' follow Miss Fields question, in your opinion is .

the likelihood of the seating of the delegates from Peking in the United Nations,

within the next six months, say, increased today over what it was, say, a month

or two ago? "What are the prospects, in other woi-ds, and what is the desirability

of that also, in your estimation? '

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As I have said, Mr, Grant, I have no real basis

on which to make an assessment of the opinions of the Member States, because to my

knowledge some of the Member States have not decided one way or the other regarding

this question. I am in the same position as you in that I do not know what the

prospect in the next session of the General ABSP-mbly will be.

)

' "v, 8 -. Note No-. 299122 October 1964

QUSSTIOM.; Mr, Secretary-General;, In the light of what you have just

stated — and I beiiove in past years you and your predecessor have also indicated

the n^ed of universality as far as this world Organization is concerned — usw

hold the viev that no matter what, policy a Government has, we should try to get

as many into the club as possible^ I was ,}ust thinking vhether you still maintain

that view of universality as far as conoerns. the nation of China which has just

exploded the bomb? /

The SEC TARY-GE'g.R')!; Yes, I still maintain my position in favour of

universality, As you knoT^the p:?ir,oiple of universality is implicit in the Charter

itself, so I am always in favour of universality* As regards the question of the

People's Republic of China,? 1 "tehinls: on a previous occasion I made a distinction

"between two U Thantns tf Sbant as the Representative of Burma and U Thant as the

Secretary-General of this Organization* As the Secretary-General of the United

Nations., I have to act and speak only :in the context of the resolutions of the

appropriate organs of this Organization, and not otherwise.

QUESTIOiff ' You mentioned a moment ago that you would find it desirable

for Mr» Khrushchev to make a public statement on the circumstances of the events

last week. Did you coKi inicate this opinion of yours to Ambassador Fedorenko when-

you saw him, or have you made any approach to the Soviet Government since then in

this regard?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; No, I 'did not.

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- 9 - Note No. 299122 October 1964

QUESTION; In an earlier question on the Arab League's position, the

questioner put his own interpretation on this and said that it meant the

liquidation of a Member State. I'am sure that you have read the reply of the

thirteen Arab States to the Security Council, and Israel has once again put in a

letter to the Security Council misquoting the Conference. To I understand

from your reply, Mr. Secretary-General, that you do not share the interpretation

of the gentlemen who put the question earlier, that the meetiag meant to destroyIsrael?

• " The SECKETARY-GiilERAL: ' As I have said, in all similar situations, if

any Member State or States feel that develdpiaeafcs are likely to

disturb international peace and security, that State or those States can bring

this to the attention of tae Security Council for consideration, and, of course,

the Security Council Is the competent orgsn to deal with such a threat. That is

what I said, • 1 clo not necessarily identify myself, of course, with tile sentiments

expressed in the questions posed in the course of these press conferences.'

QUESTION; in view of what you call the rigid position of the major

Powers on Article 19,:do you 'think that, as the Chief Executive Officer of this

Organization1who tears the responsibility for the survival of this Organization, you ca

let the1confrontation occur, if it has to occur, at the beginning of the General

Assembly' :or do you not -'think it is incumbent on the Secretary-General to

maintain the viability of the Organization? .

; "• -The SECRgiARY-GJilERAL; I "have tried ay best privately • •

in my meetings''with many representatives, here and elsewhere, to take the

necessary steps to avoid a direct confrontation on Article 19, so .far without

success-t Of course, I will continue with my efforts in aa unofficial and discreet

manner to the beet of my ability, but for the moment there appear to be no

prospects of an "avoidance of a direct"confrontation. I understand many

(more).'

- 10 - ( Mote Ho. 299122 October 1964

delegations are also thinking of certain, measures on their own initiative

to avoid cueh a coufroritatioE. But, as I have said, in the face of "one

rigid pos:! ti^M taV-en by the parties primarily concerned, I do not propose

to coma up with say formal proposals to treat the deadlock.

QUEST ION; it was earner expected tliat, MJV -Ktirushchev^inight come to

this i session of tbe General As«Hssih2y. Ifew yo'(,u&t*i£>- *mUc-ation that Mr* Kosygin

and Mr* Brezhnev might cone?*

The SECRETARY-G-E.WLALr ? .» I do not have any information on their

attitudes regarding their attendanc*i at th& OvXri; session of the C-erjieral Assembly^

but personally I do not think they plan to come.

QUESTION; Did you happen to hear frosi S£p» fedorenko- or from anyone

else that Mr. Gromylso might come?

The JSlOREgABY GMEBPX; ' Yes, I understand that Mr. Gromyto is coming.

.tfQUESTION; % question is about the economic and social functions <6f the

United Nations, especially with regard to the millions of dollars that have

been spent and will be spent. The question concerns the efficiency of the

United Nations Secretariat sad- agencies, which you touched on in your Staff Day

speech. Could you please elaborate about what you think of this efficiency and

how it can be improved so that the United Nations economic and social functions

can grow?v

The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The United Nations economic and social functions

comprise a large area of activity. Of course, we have the Economic and Social

Department here, and we are going to set up another- unit, as I indicated a moment

ago, in connexion with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Of

course, there is an Industrial Development Centre, and. there are various facets

of this big and tremendous operation of economic and social functions.

(more)

- 11 :- Note No, 2991' 22 October

QUESTION; I was thinking of the efficiency of the operation and what you

^ .think ofit. . ,;. .. ... •.'•.• - - •• ' . •

The t .SECKETARY.-GENBEA ; That is a very contentious .question. Of course, .. •

many people are inclined to. think that there is something wanting in the performance

of the economic and social"functions.of the United Nations, and some Member States areeven inclined to believe -that more and tiore speicalized. agei ies, are, necessary for

the efficient operation of the economic and social functions. This is still

contentious. Of course, I have to be guided by the decision..of the -General. Assembly

and Economic and Social Council on this question. . • •

QUESTION: Mr. Secretai-y-GeHQral, 4o you feel that'meetings such as has4' " t

been called by the. Canadian Government on the technical aspe'cts of peace-keeping,

a meeting outside the United Nations, are useful? Do-you think it should be •

enlarged to include political discussions and do you plan to send observers?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; When I was in Canada earlier this

year, Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Foreign Minister Paul Martin discussed with

me, among other things, this projected meeting which they had in mind. I think

it is a very desirable trend among Member States to take an increasing interest

in taking the necessary measures to strengthen the United Nations as an effective

instrument for the maintenance of peace. But I cannot make any assessment of this

projected meeting in view of the fact that I am not familiar with the

agenda tp be discussed and the composition of the group which is going to meet

in Canada.

Of course, as regards my sending an observer, I will be guided primarily

by the terms of reference and the composition of the group.

QUESTION; Mr. Secretary-General, would you be kind enough to tell us

what is at present the financial situation for the third action period of the

United Nations in Cyprus?

(more)

- 12 • Note No. 299122 October 196*1-

The SECBEZARY-GjapmAI.; The financial situation regarding the third

three-month period of IMFICYP operations is far from satisfactory. As you know,

I appealed to all Member States for -voluntary contribatdoos and the '

response has r.ot been satisfactory. I have been Informed that so far we havereeeived pledges to the amount of $4,070,000 for the tfcird three-month period, as

against the expected expenditure of $7,050,000, So in order to effect certaineconomies and expenditures, I held discussions with some of the countries

providing contingents to IMFICYP, with a view to exchanging views on certain items

of expenditure which could be economized. I have sent my Military Adviser,

General Bikhye, to the three capitals, ;Helsinkis 'Stockholm and Copenhagen; he is

currently meeting the appropriate authorities of these three Governments with a

view to effecting certain economies in regard to. the expenses arising out of

their contingents in Cyprus. Of course, General Bikkye ia being assisted by

representatives of the. Controller's

(more)

13 - Note No, 299122 October

QUESTION; Mr. Secretary-General, while deploring the Chinese nuclear

test, you referred to a General Assembly resolution which condemned all

| tests. We know that some of the nuclear Povers have been conducting underground

nuclear tests and also that France is due to explode a thermo-nuclear device

in the Pacific. How would you describe these tests and the projected French

test? . - • • .

The SECBETAR -GEEBIvAL: As I have said, the General Assembly resolution

of 1962 condemned all tests ; including underground tests, and this resolution

still stands. Of course, the partial nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow of last

year was related only to three categories 'of tests, without the underground

tests. But in the context of the General Assembly resolutions all tests

must be condemned.

QUESTION : Mr. Secretary-General, do you think that if the Assembly

is postponed until December 1 Or thereabouts it will be possible, or will it

likely be possible, in the meantime, for some solution of the question of

Article 19 to be achieved? And if no solution is achieved and there is a

confrontation, what do you think the result will be and what will be the

reaction of the parties involved?

The SECRETARY- GENERAL; Well, Mr. Oatis, I have no means of knowing

what the prospects will be when the General Assembly meets and I have no means

of knowing whether satisfactory results will be achieved in the interregnum

between now and 1 December, if the General Assembly is postponed to 1 December.

QUESTION ; What will happen on the opening day?

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think it is up to the Member States to

decide on a certain line of action.

(more)

Note No. 299122 October

•QUESTION: How late cduld the Assembly start this year and still do

all the work that it has to do before 1

'! As regards the organizational aspects of the

General Assembly, I think they 'can be taken care of by the Secretariat.

QUESTION; What is the latest date -•- December 21, December 28?

The SECRETARY"GENERAL; I do not think it is advisable to postpone

the General Assembly that late.

• QUESTION-; What is the latent -you think It is advisable -to 'postponethe General Assembly? • • -' '•• '• •-•'•• •••'••' • '••'•• •. • ' • • '

The: SECRETARY- GENERAL;1 I-1 hatfe-no;- personal vlevrs. ' I have said- that1"-

there are rumours afloat that marry Member States are thinking in terms of

1 December.

. . • The' Press "Conference ended at llf' 0 a.m.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCESERVICE DE PRESSE ET INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

SPEECHES & PRESS CONFERENCES February 21, 1965No. 217

TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW OF M. MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE

FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ON THE CBS TV NETWORK PROGRAM FACE THE NATION

ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 21, FROM 12:30 TO 1:00 PM

During the Face the Nation interview, the French Foreign Minister wasquestioned by CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb; Max Frankel, Dip-lomatic Correspondent of the Washington Bureau of the New York Times;, and CBSNews Correspondent George Herman,

George Herman; "Mr,, Couve de Murville, when the average Americanlooks at France he's puzzled, he thinks to himself, 'What has ourcountry done wrong? Why don't the French like us anymore? Whyare they trying to get our gold? Why are they blocking us in theUnited Nations? Why is President de Gaulle trying to kick us outof Europe? Why are they coming up with unorthodox solutions forVietnam? What have we done wrong?'"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, I would say that this is hardly an un-expected question' and maybe I'm here precisely to explain why I believe,personally, that this is a hasty generalization and probably not a very fairjudgment."

Herman; "Mr. Couve de Murville, France and America: are very im-portant allies in the free world as we face the troubles thatbeset the free world now. How is the state of our alliance?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, I don't think the state of our alliance,between France and the United States, causes any real motive for alarm. Weare, as you said, old friends and allies. We have in common a great number ofinterests and a great number of questionso

-2-

rf Sometimes, the interests are not exactly the same, of course,, Oftenthe judgments on the questions are different, asd the fact is that when thathappens we don't hesitate on the French side to say it and to try and explainwhy our positions are different, the reasons for which our judgments are not theJudgments that you have,,"

Frankgl; "Mr<> Minister j,one of the differences of judgments that tendsto look like actual friction in the headlines relates to Vietnam,

"May I ask you — I gather that the French believe that we cannot winmilitarily-the kind---of' warTtliiat 'the-TJnited States''is now • involved inin South Vietnam,, Your country has long experience out there,, Is itthat you are convinced we must lose? If so, why?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, as you say, we — it's true that we havehad a long and painful experience in Vietnam a number of years ago= Now we areout, and now the responsibilities are no longer ours,, To a large extent, theyare American responsibilities.

"So, I think it's good and fair on our side, when we discuss with you,to try to explain what is our judgment on this situation — on the situation -~and the reasons why we think that one course of action would be better thananother oneb

"I don't -=- I wouldn't say at all that you are bound to failo That'snot the question,, What happens in Vietnam — in. South Vietnam — is somethingvery special which is called the guerrilla war.

"Our experience is that this is a war that is very difficult to winby military means, and we think that the origin of a guerrilla war being politicalproblems inside the country, mainly, it is normal that we should try and find asolution by political means rather than by military meanso

"That's what we think, generally speaking,,"

Kalbi Mr0 Minister, there appears to be still another coup going on inS&igon at this very moment. Do you feel, sir, that the kind of politicalinstability that we find in South Vietnam at the moment makes it at allfeasible OT even possible for the United States to engage in any kind ofnegotiations at this time?"

Couve de Murville;"Well, you see, the political instability that yousee developing in Vietnam — the coup of today is not especially important; it isjust the prolongation of a situation that you 'and we know very well about sincesome time now0

"This political instability is just a manifestation of the fact thatwhat is happening in Vietnam is not just a war in the classical sense of the word,but a guerrilla war, which is something quite different, as I said,,

"And political instability is connected, is linked to the continuationof this guerrilla war to which you must find a political solution, which meansyou must find a way to bring about all the Vietnamese, because after all it isthe Vietnamese people that are in South Vietnam, essentially„

"You must bring them together and try and put them in a positionfreely to decide what they want their future to be and what they want theirfuture government to be.,1*

Kalb; "At the same time, sir, I'm kind of curious about how you wouldsuggest this happen, in view of the fact that the instability is so great.How do you reconcile the American position vis-a-vis that instabilityand at the same time your own government's position that we woyld haveto engage in negotiations and, I assume, as quickly as possible, inyour view?"

Couve de Murville; "Well, we thinfc that the negotiations =sbpuld beengaged as soon as possible,, A long time, in our opinion, has already been lost,and the more we wait the more, of course, the situation deteriorates'and the moreit is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement,,"

Frankel; "As a nation — I'm sorry. Did you finish?"

Couve de Murvillet "Yes, I wanted to add this, that what we believe,also, is thfct if a negotiation is engaged — which means a conference of one kindor another -- it will create a new element in the situation, we hope, giving thepossibility for a cease-fire and then for political development tending to a normal-ization in South Vietnamo"

Frankel; "As a nation which has, certainly, as great a stake as theUnited States in the total outcome of the Agian confrontation, if notthe direct responsibility in Vietnam, does France believe that Westerninterests would be seriously damaged if a Communist or pro-Communistregime came to power in South Vietnam?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, that is, of course, one of the problems thatarise. And, as far as I understand it, one of the main problems — this possibilityis one of the main reasons why, on the American side, one is reluctant about theidea of a negotiation or a conference., It is, of course, something to be. envisaged.

"I don't know what's going to be — nobody can say what's going to be' thefuture, the political future, in South Vietnanu What seems to me essential is thatSouth Vietnam is given independence, freedom, and is in a situation to decide it-self its own futureo"

Herman; "Dividing the question for a moment, leaving aside our part ofit, do you think there is any reason why the North Vietnamese,' at thisseason, would want to negotiate, instead of continuing to make the pro-gress they have been making?"

-4-

Gouve de Murville: "Well, that's another question, to which I,personally, have no answer. You should ask the North Vietnamese, of course, ifyou want to negotiate with theiru"

Herman; "You,»."

Couve de Murville; "It seems to me that their interest is to arriveat a peaceful solution, because, in any case, peace will have to come one day,and the sooner, the better."

Herman; "How broad do you envision these negotiations? Who would bethe parties on each side?"

Couve de Murville; "Oh, well, we've always believed that there shouldbe a sort of conference of the type we had previously in Geneva in '61-'62 — in' 54> before, with all the interested countries participating, which., of course,means on the Communist side both the Soviet Union, China — Peking, China —and North Vietnam."

Kalb: "Mr. Minister, in your view, should there be any preconditionsset in advance: of the convening of such a conference?"

Couve de Murville; "No, I think we should begin discussing and tryingin good faith to find a solution."

Kalb; "And the other part of that question, sir, do you feel — haveyou any indication, on the basis of French experience in Hanoi andPeking, that the other side — it takes two to negotiate — is preparedto negotiate?"

Couve de Murville: "Well, I can't answer that question What I can sayis that it seems to me to be in their interest, and I don't see why anybody wouldrefuse to negotiate with the view of coming back to what was the situation createdby the 1954 Geneva agreement. That seems to me the basis of the negotiation."

Herman; "Mr. Minister, it not only takes two to negotiate; it takes twoto have diplomatic relations. You've made reference to Peking, as wellas to the Soviet Union.

"The United States has frequently watched our brethren in the free worlddevelop relations with Peking and then, sometimes, have very disappointingrelations. I was in Hong Kong when the British first developed theirrelations with Peking and watched their disappointment grow very strong.

"How are France's relations with Peking? Are they fruitful? Are yougetting information? Do you have a feeling of the Red Chinese government?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, I would say that our relations with Pekingdevelop in a normal way. We have, as you say, diplomatic relations. We have anembassy there. They have an embassy with us. And we have contacts with them ina quite normal way, discussing questions of common interest, as is always the case

when you have diplomatic relations,"

Herman: "Is there a real dialogue?"

Gouve de Murville: "Yes, of course,"

Frankel: "Mr, Minister, let me ask you, in terms of American-Frenchrelations, why is it that France in this case — that is, China,Vietnam, several European questions — has been almost dramatic indemonstrating its differences of opinion with Washington,, What isyour purpose in this?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, I don't think that is a very fair judgment.As I said right at the beginning, answering your question, we are saying andwe are saying openly, publicly —• what we think the course of action should beas regards the South Vietnamese problem,,

"That has nothing to do with the idea of being unpleasant or disagree-able to the United States or of trying to make things more difficult. On thecontrary, we believe that by taking publicly that position on the Western side, ithelps further developments in this situation.

"And we think that we are usefully using our relations with you when wetell you quite frankly, quite openly, and even publicly, what we believe. I thinkit's not what friends should do between themselves to hesitate to say the truth..."

Kalb; "Mr. Minister, in terms of..."

Couve de Murville: ".ooor what they believe to be the truth."

Kalb; "In terms of a broader Western interest, do you feel, sir, thatit could serve that interest for France, at this time, in some capacity,to serve as a go-between between Washington and Peking?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, that's another question which I think I wouldnot be., in a position to answer. What I can say, I think, is that we have no director special interest now in Vietnam since 1954. Our interest is of a more generalkind, and that is called the peace of the world."

Herman; "Mr. Minister, to go back to what you were saying about makingyour suggestions openly, freely, and frankly, it's hard to disagree withthat and yet is it not frequently the courtesy among nations to let theother country know quietly, through diplomatic channels, before what Wash-ington now considers the semi-annual bombshell from Paris explodes here?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, on this Southeast Asian question, it's a veryvery long time — it's many years — that your government has been fully informedof what our position is. And if I may remind you what happened some years ago —that was in 1961 — we had a discussion of that kind, and it was a public discussion.It was a propos Laos at that time, and then we discussed — we discussed with our

-6-

other friends, also — and finally- we came to a kind of agreement which permittedus to convene the Geneva conference,"

Frankel; "Would you tell us sir, from the other side of the Atlantic,what is the feeling in France and in Europe, as you gather it? Isthere counterpart feeling that the United States itself has not alwaysbeen as free with its consultations of its allies, that it has too oftenundercut them, that its interests are getting obviously different in theworld from those of Europe?"

Couve de Murville: "I wouldn't say that. What I would say would ratherbe this: That you are a very big and powerful country, and the countries in Europeare not so big and not so powerful.

"Therefore, it's easier for you to tell us what you think than for usto tell you what we think, and maybe that's partly an answer to the questionthat was put previously."

Kalb; "Mr. Minister, one of the problems concerning this Vietnamdilemma at the. moment is just what the Communist response might be.There is, at the moment, a new leadership — relatively new leadershipin the Kremlin.

•"I wonder, sir, if you could give us what your assessment is of thisleadership's intentions-— one, in Southeast Asia, and, secondly, to-wards the broader sense of Bast-West negotiations."

Gouve de Murville; "Well, there is a new leadership in the Kremlin»That's true. I don't believe that that new leadership has a very different policyfrom the previous one, which means from the one of Mr. Khrushohev, even if some-times the methods are not quite the same or not quite so spectacular.

"As regards Southeast Asia, the Russian position has been known sincea very long time, and, if I may say, it's not teery different from our own position,that is, that the idea of a political settlement is the right one and that itshould be brought about by negotiation.

"Now, on the other side, you were speaking of East-West relations.As I said before, I don't think that the new Soviet government is in a differentposition from the other — the previous one. I think they still continue to be-lieve in what they call peaceful co-existence, which means the progressivenormalization of the relations between them and us."

Herman; "Does that normalization mean less pressure on Berlin and onWest Germany?"

Couve de Murvillet "Well, it seems to me that there should be a strongcontradiction between peaceful co-existence and a new Berlin crisis, as the onewe have had from 1958 and which led to the building of the wall across Beailin,"

-7-

Herman; "I recall that you said in 1963, I think it was, thatyou needed — we needed — an end to threats on West Berlinand an end to pressure on the highway for a reasonable periodin order to achieve some kind of a detente over Berlin.

"Do you think we're approaching that reasonable period?"

Couve de Murville: "Yes» You see, we thought that, at thattime, as pressure was put on us and as even threats were expressed, thetime had not come to negotiate."

Frankel; "Do you think,„„"

Couve de Murville; "...that we should negotiate only when thereis no pressure or no threat."

Frankel; "YeSo"

Gouve de Murville; "So, if there is no pressure or no threat,we're always ready to speak."

Frankel; "Bo you think that time is now approaching?"

Couve de Murville; "Well, it seems to me that the situation issuch now, and, as a matter of fact, for two years now — really, since theend of the Cuban crisis — the relations between the United States and theSoviet Union have developed enormously and you now have frequent contactswith Soviet leaders."

Frankel; "But, do you think it is time to really open up seriousnegotiations on such subjects as the division of Germany? Arethe Soviets ready?"

Couve de Murville: "Yes, that' s another question. You see, Ithink you must make a distinction which is only realistic between improvingrelations — I said, 'normalizing' relations — on one side, and settlingproblems on the other side,

"And, as a matter of fact, the only great problem between us andthe Soviets is the German problem, which is the essence of the Europeanproblem, the question of what's going to be the future reunified Germany.

"That, of course, is a matter for a long process and long dis-

-8-

Herman: "Mr. Foreign Minister, in the light of your remarksabout the lessening tension, the lessening frictions, betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union, between the Easternworld, do you think there is still a need for a large Americanmilitary presence on the continent?"

Couve de Murville: "That, of course, is a very importantquestion.

"Let me say, first of all, that I think, generally speaking,for the peace of the world — Which means, really, for maintaining thebalance of power in the world — the alliance between Western Europe andNorth America — which is really what the Atlantic Alliance is — continuesto be necessary, and probably will be necessary for a very long time to come.

"Now, there is that consequence of the Alliance which is thepresence of American troops — Important contingents of American troops —in Western Europe. I think that for the time being it is still very im-portant to maintain this American military presence in our region ofEurope."

Herman; "Do you think it should be retained as an independentAmerican force, or should it be unified with the European forcesaround it into a NATO force that is well-homogenized?"

Couve de Murville; "Ah, that's the old question of so-calledintegration. I think that in any case, you know, the American troops willbe always American troops."

Frankelt Under what circumstances can you imagine the Americansbeginning, at least, to withdraw some of those troops?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, that1s a question to which, for thetime being, I think I couldn't give an answer."

Frankel; "Would the development of France's nuclear power ora European nuclear power be relevant to that?"

Gouve de Murville; "No, I don't think so, because whatevernuclear force there is in France, it's for the future. At present, itdoesn't change anything in the balance of power in Europe."

Kalb: "Mr. Minister, do you feel that some of the problems thatFrance has with the United States could profitably be taken careof at a meeting between President de Gaulle and President Johnson?"

Couve de Murville; "Oh, yes. Of course, I think such a meetingwould be very useful."

-9-

Kalb; "And, in the course of your conversations this pastweek with President Johnson, could you tell us whether sucha meeting was arranged for this summer?"

Gouve de Murville: "Well, I already had the opportunity of sayingthat this question was not 'really discussed' between President Johnsonand myself, and it seems to me now, speaking on my own behalf, that forthe time being it probably will be very difficult for President Johnsonto have a fixed schedule for the months to come."

Herman; "Mr. Foreign Minister, the problems of France are notjust the United States,, You also have neighbors closer at home,,President Kennedy is quoted as having said that part of the needsof your policy is tension with America for your other doings,, Isthat true?"

Couve de Murville (laughing): "No, I think it's a little bit ofa caricature of what our policy is. Our policy is certainly to act as afree and independent state. That has nothing to do with the fact of havingor not having good relations or difficulties with the United States as longas, I believe, the United States consider us also as a free and independentcountry."

Herman; "Is it necessary or is it an easy way to prove freedomand independence to make explosive statements, or is this purelyan internal matter?"

Gouve de Murville; "Well, I would say it is neither internal norexplosive. Why should it be explosive to say what one thinks?"

Herman; "The only thing I can say is that it sometimes astoundsthe hearers, and I'm terribly sorry to say that our time is up,and I want to thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister, for being here toanswer our questions, being here to Face the Nation."

UN Resolutions dealing with

Nazi war crimes :

1. Resolution Ho.3"Extradiction and Punishment of War"Criminals" adopted on 13 February194-6 during 32nd plenary meetingof the first part of the 1st Sessionof the General .Assembly;

2. Resolution No.95 (I) adopted on11 December, 194-6 during 55thplenary meeting of the second partof the 1st Session of the GeneralAssembly and

3. Resolution No.96 (I) adopted duringthe same meeting of the General Assemb.

4. Resolution No.260 (III) adopted on9 December, 1948 during 179thplenary meeting of the Illrd Sessionof the General Assembly.

3. EXTRADITION AND PUNISHMENT OF 'WAR CRIMINALS I

The General Assembly: 'taking note of the Moscow Declaration of

1 November 1943 by President Roosevelt, MarshalStalin and Prime Minister Churchill concerningenemy atrocities in the course of the war, and ofthe declaration by certain allied governments of13 January and 18 December 1942 concerning thesame matter;

taking note of the laws and usages of warfareestablished by the fourth Hague Convention of1907;

taking note of the definition of war crimes and .crimes against peace and against humanity con-tained in the Charter of the International Mili-tary Tribunal dated 8 August 1945;

believing that certain war criminals continueto evade justice in the territories of certain States;

recommends

that Members of the United Nations forthwith •take all the necessary measures to cause the arrestof those war criminals who have been responsiblefor or have taken a consenting part in the abovecrimes, and to cause them to be sent back to thecountries in which their abominable deeds weredone, in order that they may be judged and pun-ished according to the laws of those countries;

and calls upon

the governments of States which are notMembers' of the United Nations also to take allnecessary measures for the apprehension of suchcriminals in their respective territories with a viewto their immediate removal to the countries inwhich the crimes were committed for the purposeof trial and punishment according to the laws ofthose countries.

Thirty-second plenary meeting, 13 February 1946.

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95 CD. Affirmation of fhe Principlesof International Low recog-nized by fhe Charter of theNurnberg, Tribunal

The General Assembly,Recognizes the obligation laid, upon it by Ar-

ticle 13, paragraph i, sub-paragraph a, of theCharter, to initiate studies and make recommen-dations for the purpose of encouraging the pro-gressive development of international law andits codification;

Takes nate of the Agreement for the establish-ment of an International Military Tribunal forthe prosecution and punishment of the major warcriminals of the European Axis signed in Londonon 8 August 1945, and of the Charter annexedthereto, and of the fact that similar principleshave been adopted in the Charter of the Interna-tional Military Tribunal for the trial of the majorwar criminals in the Far East, proclaimed atTokyo on 19 January 1946;

Therefore,Affirms the principles of international law

recognized by the Charter of the Niirnberg Tri-bunal and the judgment of the Tribunal;

Directs the Committee on the codification ofinternational law established by the resolutionof the General Assembly of 11 December 1946,'to treat as a matter of primary importance plansfor the formulation, in the context of a generalcodification of offences against the peace and secu-rity of mankind, or of an International CriminalCode, of the principles recognized in the Charterof the Niirnberg Tribunal and in the judgmentof the Tribunal.

Fifty-fifth plenary meeting,ii December 1946.

96 (I). The Crime of Genocide• Genocide is a denial of the right of existence

of entire human groups, as homicide is the denialof the right to live of individual human beings;such denial of the right of existence shocks the

j conscience of mankind, results in great losses toI humanity in the form of cultural arid other con-i tributiohs represented by these human groups,: and is contrary to moral law and to the spiriti and aims of the United Nations.| Many instances of such crimes of genocide havej occurred when racial, i eligious, political and otherI groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.

The punishment of the crime of genocide is a. matter of international concern.

The General Assembly, therefore,Affirms that genocide is a crime under interna-

: tional law which the civilized world condemns,1 and for the commission of which principals and

accomplices — whether private individuals, publici officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is

committed on religious, racial, political or anyother grounds — are punishable;

Invites the Member States to enact the necessarylegislation for the prevention and punishment ofthis crime;

Recommends that international co-operation beorganized between States with a view to facilitat-ing the speedy prevention and punishment of thecrime of genocide, and, to this end,

Requests the Economic and Social Council toundertake the necessary studies, with a view todrawing up a draft convention on the crime ofgenocide to be submitted to the next regular ses-sion of the General Assembly.

rifty-fifth plenary meeting,ii December 1946.

sk v£- §J -^[od3X *

260 (III). Prevention and punishmentof the crime of genocide

ADOPTION OP THE CONVENTION 0\ THE. PIIE\ ENT ION AND PUNISHMENT OK THE

CRIME OF GENOCIDE, AND TEXT OFTHE CONVENTION

The General Assembly

Approves the annexed Convention, on thePrevention" and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide and proposes il for signature and rati-fication or accession in accordance with itsarticle XI.

Hundred and seventy-ninth plenary meeting,9 December 191(8.

(c) Direct and public incitement to commit geno-cide;

(rf) Attempt to commit genocide;(c) Complicity in genocide.

ARTICLE IV

Persons committing genocide or any of the otheracts enumerated in article III shall be punished,whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,public officials or private individuals.

ARTICLE V

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, inaccordance with their respective Constitutions, thenecessary legislation to give effect to the provisionsof the present Convention and, in particular, toprovide effective penalties for persons guilly of geno-cide or any of the other acts enumerated in arti-cle III.

ANNEX

. TEXT OF THE CONVENTION

The Contracting Parlies,

Having considered the declaration made by theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations in its reso-lution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that geno-cide is a crime under international law, contrary tothe spirit and aims of the United Nations and con-demned by the civilized world;

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocidahas milicted great losses on humanity, and

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankindfrom such an odious scourge, international co-oper-ation is required ;

Hereby agree <u hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE I '

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide,whether committed in time of peace or in (,imc ofwar, is a crime under international law which theyundertake to prevent and to punish.

ARTICLE II

In the present Convention, genocide means anyof the following acts committed with intent to des-troy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial •or religious group, as such :

(fl) Killing members of the group ;(6) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-

bers of the group ;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions

of life calculated to faring about its physical destruc-tion in Nvhole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent birthswithin the group ;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group toanother group.

ARTICLE III

The following acts shall be punishable :

(a) Genocide;(6) Conspiracy to commit genocide;

ARTICLE VI

Persons charged with genocide or any of the otheracts enumerated in article III shall be tried by acompetent tribunal of the State in the territory ofwhich the act was committed, or by such interna-tional penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction withrespect to those Contracting Parties which shall haveaccepted its jurisdiction.

ARTICLE VII

Genocide and the other acts enumerated in arti-cle III shall not be considered as political crimes forthe purpose of extradition.

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in suchcases to grant extradition in accordance with theirlaws and treaties in force.

ARTICLE VIII

Any Contracting Party may call upon the compe-tent organs of the United Nations to take such actionunder the Charter of the United Nations as theyconsider appropriate for the prevention and suppres-sion of acts of genocide or any of the other acts euu-

• merated in article HI.

ARTICLE IX

Disputes between the Contracting Parties relatingto the interpretation, application or fulfilment of thepresent Convention, including those relating to (heresponsibility of a State for genocide or any of theother acts enumerated in article III, shall be submit-ted to the International Court of Justice at the requestof any of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE X '

The present Convention, of which the Chinese,English, French, Russian and Spanish texts areequally authentic, shall bear the dale of 9 December1948.

AUTICLE XI

The present Convention shall be open until31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of anyMember of the United Nations and of any non-mem-

• X E R O J2 COPY f

ber State to which an invitation to sign has beeniiddrcssed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and theinstruments of ratification shall be deposited withthe Secretary-General of the United Nations.

After 1 January 1950, the present Conventionmay be acceded to on behalf of any Member of theUnited Nations and of any non-member State whichlias received an invitation as aforesaid.

Instruments of accession shall be deposited withthe Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XII

Any Contracting Party may at any time, bycation addressed to the Secretary-General of the"United Nations, extend the application of the presentConvention to all or any of the territories for theconduct of whose foreign relations that ContractingParty is :esporisible.

ARTICLE XIII

On the day when the first twenty instruments ofratification or accession have been deposited,, theSecretary-General shall draw up a proces^verbal andtransmit a copy of it to each Member of the UnitedNations ard to each of the non-member States con-templated in article XL

The present Convention shall come into force onthe ninetieth day following the date of deposit of thetwentieth instrument of ratification or accession.

Any ratification or accession effected subsequentto the latter date shall become effective on the nine-tieth day fallowing the deposit of the instrument ofratification or accession.

. ARTICLE XIV

The present Convention shall remain in effect fora period o! ten years as from the date of its cominginto force.

It shall thereafter remain in force for successiveoeriods of five years for such Contracting Parties ashave not denounced it at least six months before theexpiration of the current period.

Denunciation shall be effected by a written notifi-catioQ addressed tt the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations.

• AmcLE XV

If, as a result of denunciations, the number ofParties to the present Convention should heroineless than skteen, the Contention shall cease to i;r inforce as from the date on which the last of these de-nunciations shall become efbctive.

ARTICLE X\I

A request for the revision of the present Conven-tion may be made at any time Ly any ContractingParty by means of a notification in Yriling addressedto the Secretary-General.

The General Assembly shall decide ipon the steps,if any, to be taken in respect of such nquest.

ARTICLE XVII

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shallnol ify all Members of the United Nations and thenon-member States contemplated in article XI of thefollowing :

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions re-ceived in accordance with article XI;

(6) Notifications received in accordance with arti-cie Xll;

(c) The date upon which the present Conventioncomes into force in accordance with article XIII;

(;/) Denunciations received in accordance with ar-tide XIV;

(?) The abrogation of the Convention in accor-dance with article XV;

(fl Notifications received in accordance with arti-cle XVI.

ARTICLE XVIII

The original of the present Convention shall hedeposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention shall be trans-mitted to all Members of the United Nations and tothe non-member States contemplated in article XL

ARTICLE XIX

The present Convention shall be registered by theSecretary-General of the United Nations on the'dateof its coming into force.

B S. V. 43- t>- 3STUDY BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COM-

MISSION OF THE QUESTION OF AN INTER-NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

The General Assembly,

Considering that the discussion of the Conven-tion on the Prevention and Punishment of theCrime of Genocide has raised the question of thedesirability and possibility of having personscharged with genocide tried by a competentinternational tribunal,

Considering that, in the course of developmentof the international community, there will be anincreasing need of an international judicialorgan for the trial of certain crimes under inter-national law,

Invites the International Law Commission tostudy the desirability and possibility of establish-ing an international judicial organ for the trialof persons charged with genocide or othercrimes over which jurisdiction will be conferredupon that organ by international conventions;

Requests the International Law Commission,in carrying out this task, to pay attention to thepossibility of establishing a Criminal Chamber ofthe International Court of Justice.

Hundred and seventy-ninth plenary m^t'iiff.9 Dc;'c»tbi: i!)'fli.

iXEROfj f copvfXEROI—'COPYj

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• c SO - o - /

APPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO DEPEN-' DENT TERRITORIES, OF THE CONVENTION

ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENTOF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE77(e General Assembly recommends (hat Parties

to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-ment of the Crime of Genocide which adminis-ter dependent territories should take suchmeasures'as are necessary and feasible to enablethe provisions of the Convention to be extendedto those territories as soon as possible.

Hundred mid seventy-ninth plenary meeting,- 9 December 1948.

CR.13<4-59)R O U T I N G S L I P

Comments for th& record should not be written on thisSlip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead.

TO:Mr. C.V. Marasimhan

APPROVAL

MAY WE CONFER?

YOUR SIGNATURE

NOTE AND FILE

NOTE AND RETURN

YOUR COMMENTS

YOUR INFORMATION

AS REQUESTED

FOR ACTION


PREPARE DRAFT


You asked me to let you have somesuggested remarks on the Institute forthe Secretary-General's Press ConferendThe attached remarks, which couldfollow an inspired ouesticn, have ^Isobeen copied to Mr. rlassif.

DATE:

16.2.65

FROMI^^^M___^^^^^^^^^_^^^^^^_^^^^_^_

H€JG£ Qf^Ue-^x.

Confidential

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PRESS CONFERENCE

PROPOSED REMARKS ON THE UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FCR

TRAINING AMD RESEARCH (UNITAR)

As you know, I was authorized by the General Assembly at its eighteenth

session, to take the necessary steps to establish the United Nations Institute

for Training and Research (UNITAR) and to explore governmental and non-

governmental sources of financial assistance for it.

Although no further action is reo^uired of the Assembly, Member States

would, I think, like to know that the response to my appeal of December

1963 for financial contributions to the Institute, has so far been very

encouraging.

I am sure that you know from the press releases that forty-five Govern-

ments have now either paid or pledged contributions to the Institute and a

large number of Governments have indicated their intention to contribute.

My Personal Representative visited some fifty countries last year in

order to follow up on my appeal for contributions to the Institute. He

hopes to visit a number of Latin American countries this Spring and will

probably also visit other countries which have not yet contributed later in

the year.

In the very near future I intend to address a special appeal to a number

of private foundations who have already indicated their interest in contributing

and, thanks to the generosity of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Institute

now has a home of its own immediately opposite the United Nations at 805 First

Avenue.

I am currently proceeding with the nomination of the Institute's Board

of Trustees, after consulting with the Presidents of the General Assembly

and the Economic and Social Council. It is my hope that the Board can hold

- 2 -

its first meeting before the end of March and that the appointment of an

Executive Director will be made shortly thereafter.

Being convinced of the constructive part which the new Institute can

play in strengthening the United Mations itself, I consider thisnnost

encouragingYresponse by Member Governments to my appealVlDOth timely andT- ' ^practical

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COL 10 44*

CYPRUS

1. Galo Plaza's itinerary is as follows:

visited Ankara 23 and 24 February;returns to Nicosia on 25 February;leaves Nicosia for Athens on 27 February;proceeds to London on 28 February;leaves London for New York on 2 March.

2. After his present round of consulta-tions, the Mediator will decide whether tosubmit a report to me» There is nothing morethat can be said until I have had the oppor-tunity of discussing with him upon his returnto New York. vv > ' "

3.If asked about your recent statement onCyprus, background is as follows:

press campaign in Cyprus was being conductedagainst UNFICYP, alleging that the Force wasnot carrying out faithfully the instructionsof the Secretary-General. I wished, therefore,to make it absolutely clear that my SpecialRepresentative and the Commander of the Forcewere meticulously carrying out the mandateof the Security Council and my instructions.

4. For some time now, there has been anincrease in tension in Famagusta. My SpecialRepresentative and the Commander of the Forceare presently engaged in discussions with theGovernment and the Turkish Cypriot leadershipin order to solve the srr-fcmrfcTigg difficultiesin this area.

5. Rotation: I have appealed twice to theGovernment of Turkey requesting it to defer therotation of part of its contingent in Cyprusuntil after the Security Council meeting onCyprus which is tentatively scheduled to takeplace around the 15th of March. I ha«e indica-tions that the Govt. of Turkey may respondpositively to my appeals.

INDONESIA

1. UNTAB Office in Djakarta will closeon 28 February.

2. Government of Indonesia has requestedthat all projects under Expanded Programme ofTechnical Assistance should "be terminated.Phasing-out may take a few months after1st of March, for some projects.

3. The Government has also requested termin-ation of all Special Fund projects with theexception of the Institute for Geology andMining, whose future is still under consider-ation.

4. In accordance with the terms of the letterfrom the Government of Indonesia dated 20January 19 5> the Indonesian flag will not beflown after 1st March.

5. Concerning the Fund for the Developmentof West Irian, the UN Resident Representativein Djakarta has requested clarification fromthe Government regarding its intentions,by letter of 16 February. A reply isbeing awaited.

6. In due time it is my intention to takeup with the Indonesian Government the impli-mentation of the remaining responsibilitiesentrusted to me by the Agreement of 15August 1962 between Indonesia and theNetherlands concerning West Irian.

U N I T E D H A T I 0 K S

Press ServicesOffice of Public Irtfc-rmtion

United .wations, N.lr.(FOR USE OF OTFCBMATION MEDIA — NOT M OFFICIAL RECORD)

Press Release SG/SM/25112 February 1965

STATEMENT BY THE 5ECEgTARY-GE3MlAL CW TEE

SITUATION IN VIST-NAM

"I am greatly disturbed by recent events in South-East Asia, and particularly

by the seriously deteriorating situation in Viet-JSam. My fear, frankly, is in

regard to the dangerous possibilities of escalation, because such a situation,

if it should once get out of control, would obviously pose the gravest threat

to the peace of the world,

"I have stated my views on this problem many tines before. Only last year,

when I was interviewed in Paris in July, I said that'military methods have failed

to find a solution of the South-East Asian problem for the last 10 years and I

do not believe the same methods will bring about a peaceful settlement of the

problem. I have always maintained that only political and diplomatic methods of

negotiation and discussion may find a peaceful solution. I have suggested some

time ago, that a return to the conference table might produce some results. That

means, in effect, that a revival of the Geneva Conference may perhaps achieve some

results, I am convinced of this because of the very critical situation in that area,'

"I am conscious of course of my responsibilities under Article 99 of the

Charter. I am also aware that there are many difficulties in the way of attempt-

ing a United Nations solution to the problem, in view of its past history and the

fact that some of the principal parties are not represented in the United Nations.

Many world leaders who, I know, share this concern and anxiety have made other

suggestions. At the present time it is not possible for me to say what would be

the best means of discussing this serious situation in an atmosphere conducive

to a positive solution; but I do feel very strongly that means must be found,

and found urgently, within or outside the United Nations, of shifting the quest

(more)

- 2 - Press Release SG/SM/25112 February 1965

for a solution away from the field of battle to the conference table. In

this connexion I believe that arrangements could be devised under which a

dialogue could take place between the principal parties with a view, among

others, to preparing the ground for wider and more formal discussions.

"Meanwhile I would like to appeal most earnestly to all the parties

concerned for the utmost restraint in both deeds and words, and I would urge

them to refrain frora any new acts which ma,y lead to an escalation of the

present conflict and to the aggravation of a situation which is already very

serious.

"I make this appeal -most earnestly in the interest of the peace and

well-being of the people of Viet-Warn and of the world at large."

* ### # : .


Press ServicesOffice of Public Information

United nations, H.Y.

(FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AW OFFICIAL RECORD)

Uote No. 3072£0 February 1965

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

A United Nations spokesman today made the following statement:

"The question of the extension of the United Nations Peace-Keeping

Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond March 26 is under consideration by the

Secretary-General but he has reached no conclusion about it and is taking no

position on it at this stage. He is seeking from the Government of Cyprus

and the other Governments directly concerned their views on the question

of extension, and his ultimate recommendation to the Security Council on

this matter will be made in the light of the responses received from the

Governments coneernei.

"Pending Security Council action on the future of the Force in Cyprus,

the Secretary-General is confident that the Fores will continue to function

with the remarkable dedication and success that have attended its efforts

thus far, despite some recent indications that it may'meet increasing

difficulties. The Secretary-General has expressed his appreciation tc his

Special Representative ,Carlos Bernard©s, and to the Commander of the

Force, General K.S. Thimayya, for the meticulous way in which they

have sought to carry out the mandate of the Security Council and the instructions

of the Secretary-General regarding the Cyprus operation. As a matter of

routine in a peace-keeping operation, the Secretary-General is in daily contact

with Mr. Bernardes and General Thinsayya,"

* **«• *

. VU N I T E D N A T I O N S

Press ServicesOffice of Publie'information "

. . . United Nations, N.Y.

(FOB USE. OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- -NOT AN OFFICIAL EECOSD)

CAUTION; ' ADVANCE. TBXIC . .• .. • - .-..'' • --.: Press Release SG/SM/251*Not. for use before 1:50 p.m. E8T 19 February.. 1965(l85p J3MT) Saturday, 20 February

'•*•"'-"". •'• ' TEXT OF SEGEETAEY-GECTEEAL'S ADDRESS

• ' - ' • • ' ' TO 'PACEM IN TEREIS* CONVOCATION

"There are times, and this is one of them, when the world, in the absence

of some'' tremendous and immediate threat, seems to wallow helplessly in a

aibra'ES of' dispute and discord. In such times it is easy to lose our sense of

the urgent'necessity of strengthening and developing further an international

order capable of withstanding and containing the crises and conflicts of the

'future. And it is in times like these that spiritual leadership and inspira-

tion' are more necessary than ever.

"In the great encyclical letter Pacj5m_in Terris, Pope John XXIII appealed

to'men to 'spare no labour in order to ensure that world events follow a

reasonable and'human course*.. The encyclical, as I pointed out when it was

first published in 1963? is very much in harmony with the spirit and objectives

of the United Nations Charter. It emphasizes the dignity and worth of the

human person, the rights of man and his corresponding duties, 'the principle

that'all States by nature are equal in dignity', the imperative need for

disarmament, the importance of economic development of the under-developed

countries; these are only illustrative of many principles which are to be

.found also in the Charter and to which the encyclical gives such eloquent

expression. In its specific reference to the United Nations it appeals to all

peoples to interest themselves in the development of the Organization, to make

it 'ever more equal to the magnitude and nobility of its task*..

. ''"This recognition by His Holiness Pope John XXIII of the importance of the

role of'the United Nations in the modern world was reiterated by His Holiness

Pope Paul VI when I had'the honour of being received in audience by him on

11 July 1963. His Holiness then observed that the Holy See considers the

United Nations to be }an instrument of brotherhood between nations, which the

(more)

- 2 - Press Release SG/SM/25U19 February 1965

Holy See has always desired and promoted, and her.ce a "brotherhood intended

to favour progress and peace among men'. His Holiness went on to say: r¥e

therefore derive consolation from your visit, and we avail ourselves of the

occasion to renew the expression of our esteem and of our hopes for the

fundamental programme of t&e TJnited Hatlons, especially in regard to the

elimination of war, 'the assistance of developing peoples, and of those in

need of defence and promotion, the lawful liberties of individuals and social

groups, and the safeguarding of the rights and dignity of the human person.

To these sentiments, then, we add our good wishes for the true prosperity of

the great Organization of the United Nations, and for the happy success of

its activities.'

"In the two years which have elapsed since the publication of the

encyclical Paceg i Terris the need for human solidarity and understanding

has, if anything, increased. Our situation is a paradoxical one. We have,

at last, both the means and the general desire to secure peace and justice

for all. We know all too well the price we shall surely pay for failing to

secure that peace and justice, We are not basically disagreed, whatever

our ideological differences, about the kind of world wa wish to have.

The United Nations Charter, already accepted by 115 nations, describes it;

the encyclical describes itj and it is also described in ms.ny great works

of literature, scholarship and prophecy which are the common heritage of

all mankind.

"What element, then, is lacking, so that, with all our skill and all

our knowledge, we still find ourselves in the dark valley of discord and enmity?

What is it that inhibits us fron going forward together to enjoy the fruits

of human endeavour and to reap the harvest of human experience? Why is it that,,

for all our professed ideals, our hoges and our skill, peace on earth is still

a distant objective, seen only dimly through the storms and turmoils of our

present difficulties?

"All great moves forward in the history of mankind have required changes

of existing attitudes and states of mind, so that real life can catch up

with the creative ideas that underlie our evolution. We are now trying to

ma,ke the step forward from a world of antagonism^ domination and discord

to a world of co-operation, equity and harmony. This is a large step and

an important break with the past. It is not to be expected, therefore, that

men will easiljr and immediately accept it -- and adapt themselves to it.

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f - 3 - Press Release SG/SM/25U19 February 1965

In the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution it is said that; 'Sinca wars begin

in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must

be constructed.1 This sentence may well provide one key to our present

difficulties. It is an aspect of our problems to which the encyclical

Pacem in Terris is especially relevant.

"Thus, although we have abjured war as an instrument of policy, all

nations have not yet abjured the state of mind that has so often led to war --•

the nationalistic urge to dominate and extend, by various.means, their spheres

of influence, and the conviction of the unquestionable superiority of thair

own particular traditions, forms and ways of life. Nor has it been possible

effectively to eliminate the use of force, whether openly or covertly, as a

means of furthering political or other ends. Such attitudes inevitably breed

in other nations the fears, resentments and suspicions which historically have

also created the atmosphere of tension in which wars break out. Again, although

we speak loudly for equal rights and against discrimination, there are still

many nations and groups throughout the world who are not prepared to accept the

practical consequences of these ideals, while an even greater number still

suffer from discrimination or lack of equal opportunity. It is this failure

of everyday, practical behaviour to keep pace with professed ideals and aims

which makes the promise' of our infinitely promising world a mockery for so

many of its inhabitants.

"We have accepted the idaa of the United Nations as a representative

instrument for promoting and maintaining international order. This is an

important step away from'the old and narrowly nationalistic attitudes. We

are, however, still a long way from showing that confidence in each other and

in the great instrument itself, which alone can make it work for us and give

practical reality to the ideals to which all nations have subscribed in the

Charter. The fact is that, though our desire for peace is'undeniable, our

approach to peace is often old-fashioned and more attuned to former times than

to our present state. Even the UnitedNations Charter itself provides a good

example of this. Chapter VII, for instance, on action with respect to threats

to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, plainly stems from

the experience of the aggressions of the Axis Powers in the thirties, a kind of

situation which is unlikely to recur in cur world of super-Powers armed with

hydrogen bombs amid a vastly increased number of smaller independent States.

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- 4 - Press Release19 February 1965

f

To be candid, some provisions of the Charter, like Chapter VII, were framed

with an eye en the potential re-emergence of the Axis 'Powers as a threat to

international peace and security. Memories of the war and the ruthlessness of

its perpetrators were still very fresh in the minds of the founding fathers of

•the United Nations when they met in San Francisco. This state of mind explains

the concept behind big Power unanimity in tailing preventive or enforcement

measures against aggression, potential and real. This mood was responsible for

the formation of the Military Staff Committee and for the ideas behind its

composition and functions.

• "However, the course of history took a new turn. Alignments changed; old

enemies became new friends; old comrades-in-arms found themselves in opposite

camps,, and the United Nations could not function in the way it was intended to

function. The provisions of the Charter relating to action with respect to

•threats to peace and acts of aggression were subjected to various interpretations.

I must 'say in all frankness that in these circumstances the Charter provisions

•are somewhat out of date. It is this anachronism in the Charter -- the kind of

anachronism which is inevitable in our rapidly changing world -- that is partly

responsible for the present constitutional and political crisis in the United

Nations.

•"We have to work towards a world order in which aggressive nationalism or

expansionism are banished as a means of promoting or protecting national

interests, where fanaticism is no longer necessary to support a different point

of view and where diversity can be preserved without resort to prejudice and

hatred, ' We have seen how the great religions of the world, after lamentable

periods of bigotry and violence, have become accommodated to each other, without

losing their influence or spiritual independence, by a mutual respect for, and

understanding of, the spiritual and moral aims which are common to them all.

.We must try, both earnestly and urgently, to extend that process of accommocla-

tion to the political, ideological, economic and racial alignments of the

world. All of our high aims, our vaunted technology, our skill and our real

desire to co-operate and to help one another will be of ho avail if this

adaptation to new circumstances, this general accommodation, this real change

of heart, does not come about.

(more)

1

Press Release SG/SM/25419 February 1965

"The realignment of political power in the world is a process whose

changing outlines frame the political enigma of our times. The forces likely

to "be released "by this process, "b.enign and. othervri.se, can however, be foreseen

and cannot be ignored,, They can, and must, be channelled and directed by a

positive effort of all nations working together in the United Nations, if we

are to grasp our destiny and mould our future rather than be swept away into

a new and appalling age of strife and hatred. It is not enough to be active

only when a dire international emergency breaks about our heads. We need

to make a constant effort, year in and year out, to strengthen by practice

the theory of a peaceful and co-operative world.

"Beneath the present political realignments, the world is in fact divided

in a numbe'r of ways. It is divided, economically; it is divided racially;

and it is divided ideologisally} although this latter division may prove

to be less basic than the first two. These divisions must be faced and

discussed with reason and determinations We ignore them at our peril, for

if they are allowed to persist and grow larger they will unleash, as they

already show signs of-doing, darker forces of bigotry, fear, resentment and

racial hatred than the world has ever seen* We cannot agree to live in such

a nightmare, still less to bequeath it to.our children,

"Though its current problems are great and its present authority uncertain,

the United Nations does provide a forum in which these divisions can be

discussed and gradually reduced within the framework of the common interest

in peace and justice, and. with the safeguards that only an organization

representative of all peoples, all interests and all motivations can provide.

The United Rations has also, on numerous occasions, furnished a machinery

through which countries can co-operate to deal with threatening situations

and to keep the peace.

As the respect for it grows, the Organisation should also serve as a

centre for the harmonizing of national policies vithin the wider interest«

We must eventually arrive, in the"affairs of the world, at a state of political

maturity in which it will be considered statesmanlike, rather than weak, for

even a great country to alter its course of action or to change its national

policy in the common interest or in deference to'the will of the majority.

I hasten to add that we are certainly nowhere near to such an idyl "lie

situation today.

(more)

- 6 - Press Release SG/SM/251*19 February 1965

"These, to ny mind., are the compelling reasons why the United Nations

must be preserved and strengthened and why the disagreements of the greatest

. Powers, however justified they may "be,, must not he allowed to disrupt and

stultify the Organization, We haveseen, in the crisis over arrears in

payments to the United Hations budget, an episode that is both depressing and

heartening -- depressing for the damage done to the effectiveness and dignity

of the United Nations — heartening for the loyal and unceasing-efforts of the

Member nations to preserve their Organisation by finding a Solution. There

is no doubt that the relationship between, and the role of, the Security Council

and. the General Assembly are issues of great importance. These issues will

surely continue to occupy the minds of most of us, since they are. basic

to the great debate now going on. As I have said earlier., the writers of the

Charter envisioned complete agreement among the five permanent members of

the Security Council, who would be collectively responsible for keeping.the

peace by supplying arms and men, in certain contemplated situations. These

situations, however, did not come about. History took a new turn; the

Security Council could not act in the manner it was intended to act, and the

General Assembly assumed, or had to assums, certain functions not originally

contemplated in the Charter,

"We are now witnessing the beginning of ths great debate — whether the

big Powers in unison, through the agency of the Security Council, should

take exclusive responsibility for maintaining international peace, and

security while 'tlie General Assembly functions as a glorified debating society

in political matters, or whether an attempt should be made to secure a fair,

equitable, and clearly defined distribution of functions of the two principal

organs, in the light of the changing circumstances, and, particularly, bearing

in mind the increase in the membership of the Organization., from J?0 ia 19 5

to llU in 1965- Account will have to be taken of the fact that in the General

Assembly are represented., in addition to the bag Powers, all the other States,

the smaller Powers, whose understanding, assistance and co-operation are

nevertheless essential in regard to decisions involving issues of international

peace and security. JThese issues are serious, and.the manner in which they

are resolved will affect profoundly the organic growth of the Organization

in the years to come. They can only be resolved by a will to compromise and

(more)

\ - 7 - Press Release SG/SM/25419 February 1965

accommodate, In the overriding interest of maintaining peace.-, Che smaller

Powers are playing, and must play, an essential role as the spokesmen of

moderation and. common Interest in this process and, if a solution is found, much

credit -will be due to their steadfastness and determination.

"Governments, however well and sincerely they may co-operate in the

United Nations, cannot "by themselves face the great and shifting problems of

our age in isolation. The peoples they represent must also give life and

reality to the aims and Ideals of the Charter, towards which we strive,, Here

again, we now have the means to achieve a great objective, an enlightened world

public opinion. One of the revolutions of our age, the revolution in

communications of all kinds, has made a well-Informed world, public opinion

technically possible for the first time in history. Our problem is to ensure

a beneficial use of t&e&e J308&S of communication* This is a challenge to

leaders both temporal and spiritual, to intelligent and creative men and women

everywhere. Without real knowledge and. understanding and without a determination

to learn from the past, to rid ourselves of outmoded prejudices and attitudes,

and to face the future together with both hope and. wisdom, we shall not

succeed in making our aims and ideals a working reality. The encyclical

Pacem in Terris gives us an inspiring lead towards that change of heart which

our great aims so urgently require."

• » • +

UNITED NATIONS yjjgj NATIONS UNIES

N E W Y O R K

CABLE ADDRESS • UNATIDNS NEWYDRK • ADREHBE TELEGRAPH I Q U E

FILE NO.:

<^sr-SECRETARY-GENERAL: ' '

to "be added:

1. Reaction to Russian support of de Gaulle's appeal forVietnam taUcs^

2. Do you have any information on General Khan's mission here?

3» Do you favour the Security Council taking up Vietnam "beforeconvening the Conference in Geneva?

4« Referring to your Addressto Pacem in Terris convocation inwhich you said that thettnTgharter was an anachronism^^?'

• can you clarify this statement?"i

f ••*-* a -T.Mn a

tor- CA^C^ Uk<^ f

VWieslaw Gornicki

Polish Press Agency

QUESTION

Mr. Secretary General:

would you care to comment upon the termination of persecution of Nazi

crimes "by the West German governement, particularly in the light of relevant

resolutions, adopted by the General Assembly?

£7

2k February 1965

I should like to emphasize that while confronted with difficult

political problems, the General Assembly did reach a: unanimous decision

•whereby new institutional machinery on trade and development officially

came into being within the United Nations. This is indeed a very

significant achievement which shows that positive international

co-operation does exist in the economic field. May I point out

in this connexion that the resolution establishing the UN Conference

on Trade and Development institutes a system of conciliation procedures

which is a new development in the United Nations. These procedures

were worked out by a special committee appointed by me and whose

membership comprised representatives of all the groups of countries

participating in the Geneva Conference. The special committee

submitted a unanimous report last September.

Further to the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade

and Development, various steps have been taken to implement its

provisions as quickly as possible. The Assembly confirmed the

appointment of Dr. RaiSl Prebisch as Secretary-General of UNCTAD

aid work is proceeding in the organisation of the new secretariat that

he heads and that will be responsible for servicing the Conference,

the Trade and Development Board and its subsidiary organs. As

you know, I submitted a report on the administrative and financial

implications relating .to the new institutional machinery which was

considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary

Questions. Further to the report of the Committee, I have decided to

abolish the posts of Deputy Secretary-General and Director for Co-

ordination and have also decided to separate one of the Divisions

• t j • «

- 2 -

envisaged in the organizational chart ,of my report by creating two

Divisions dealing respectively with Invisibles and Financing Related-

to Trade. The question of the location of the UNCTAD secretariat was

left in abeyance but I trust that the Member Governments of the Conference

will, in due course, take a decision on the matter. While the present

situation involves certain administrative difficulties, I believe that

the location of the UNCTAD secretariat has to be decided upon by

governments. May I add that under the terms of the resolution

adopted by the General Assembly on the interim financial arrangements

and authorizations for 19&5) e Secretary-General is specifically

authorized to take appropriate measures in order to finance certain

new priority proiJanmes such as those relating to UNCTAD.

Thus the new responsibilities tha't the United Nations has

assumed in the field of trade and development are being fully

implemented. The Trade and Development Board will hold its first

session at United Nations Headquarters on the fifth of April. In

addition to settling all procedural questions such as the adoption

of its rules of procedure, the Boarg will also determine the terms

of reference and composition of its subsidiary organs and will

consider the manner in which the recommendations adopted at Geneva

are to be put into effect. In this connexion the Board is expected

to approve its programme of work and the calendar of meetings for 1965.

It is also expected to discuss the preliminary arrangements for the

second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development which the

first Conference recommended should take place in 1966.

- 3 -

In closing my remarks on this subject, I should like to stress

that we in the Secretariat fully share the views repeatedly emphasized

during the general debate of the Assembly, that the creation of the

new institutional machinery on Trade and Development may well prove

to be a turning point in the history of United Nations activities in

the economic field.

CONFIDENTIAL

Notes in connexion with Press Conference scheduled for 24 February 1965

It may be anticipated that besides questions of a general

character concerning the nineteenth session of the General Assembly,

there will be specific questions, some of which will seek elaboration

of the points in the Secretary-General's address of 20 February 1965

and others specifically on the questions of peace-keeping operations,

Indonesia's withdrawal, representation of China, South Viet Ham

and the Congo.

Address of 20 February 1965

In order to avoid a misunderstanding, it may perhaps be

indicated that the General Assembly has not functioned as "a

glorified debating society" and that the Members, including the

Great Powers, do not seek to assign such a role to the organ. It

is also the hope shared by many that the implementation of the

Charter amendments recommended by the General Assembly would

substantially increase the role of the smaller Powers in the Security

Council. There is also a general consensus that many adjustments can

be brought about within the existing framework of the Charter to

make the Organization more effective in the maintenance of inter-

national peace and security.

Peace-keeping Operations

It is now clear that the question of peace-keeping operations,

which affects the very existence and effectiveness of the United

Nations, is a political problem and a solution can be expected only

if persistent efforts are made in that context. The decision of

the General Assembly for a comprehensive review is an important oneSpecial

and the w*b»-Committee to be established will have a very vital role

to play. The Secretary-General might wish to make an appeal to all

Members and particularly to the Great Powers to lend their fullest

co-operation in finding satisfactory solutions to the problems that

face the Organization.

Indonesia's Withdrawal

There are bound to be several questions on this subject. TheSecretary-General may not wish to comment on this matter in any

- 2 -

detail except to say that Indonesia *s withdrawal is a regrettable

event, and he; might also express the hope, which is undoubtedly shared

by the Membership at large, that Indonesia's withdrawal is only temporary

and that she will be back in the UN before long.

The Secretary-General may welcome the widespread urge in the

United Nations for all concerned to take a good look at the Organization

in order to keep pace with world developments. He may indicate that

this is particularly timely in the "International Co-operation Year".

Solution of two of the most pressing and controversial issues, namely,

the problem of peace-keeping operations and the question of the

universality of Membership, should help strengthen the UN greatly.

On the question of universality of Membership, the Secretary-Generalmay like to state that in the interests of the Organization it is

vital that those States that are outside the Organization should be

brought in, which alone will help in strengthening the Organization.

Biere is considerable support in the world for the United Nations

as an important instrument for peace, disarmament, economic development,

etc. Such support should not degenerate into a static "cult', but must

be reflected in constant and creative efforts to improve the effectiveness

of the Organization and achieve the purposes as envisaged by its

founding fathers.

South Viet Nam

Tbe Secretary-General will no doubt wish to emphasize once againthe need for bringing about a peaceful settlement of the problem. Hiemay like to repeat some of the observations made in his statement of12 February 1965 and especially the need for "shifting the quest fora solution away from the field of battle to the conference table."The Secretary-General may also like to renew his appeal to all theparties concerned and perhaps even add a special appeal to the GreatPowers to refrain from any acts which might lead to the aggravationof the situation and to co-operate in seeking a peaceful solution "in

the interests of the peace and well-being of the people of Viet Nam

and of the world at large."

4 «

Congo

The Security Council decided to leave the matter at this stage

for a political solution by the Organization of African Unity. The

Ad Hoc Committee of the O.A.U. is currently meeting in Nairobi. A

meeting of the O.A.U. Ministerial Council will take place in Nairobi

at the end of this week. The continuation of the disturbing situation

in the Congo is a source of concern and the Se cretary-General may

wish to express the hope that the O.A.U. will find suitable approaches

for a peaceful solution.

JACSC MILLER _

,„„=»,„ ---NEWS RELEASEU.S. SENATE H^

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 1, 1965

WASHINGTON, D. C.--World peace would be better served if U Thant resigned

his post as Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senator Jack Miller {R-Iowa)

asserted today.

In a Senate speech, Senator Miller declared that U Thant, in view of his

recent statements on Vietnam., can no longer "command the trust and respect so

necessary for the performance of his duties. Tl

"I find Mr. U Thant's behavior one-sided, prejudiced, ungrateful, super-

ficial, and unrealistic, " the Senator said.

He singled out for criticism U Thant's suggestion, as reported in news media

of last week, that there would have been no Communist intervention had the United

States stayed out of South Vietnam.

Senator Miller then remarked:

''Isn't it strange that Mr. U Thant had no words of condemnation against

North Vietnam for its acts of aggression? vVhy didn't he condemn the violation by

North Vietnam of the Geneva pacts of 1954 and 1962?"

A member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Iowa Republican

declared that President Johnson "will continue to have my full support" as long as

the President adheres to his current policy of firmness in dealing with the North

Vietnamese.

". . . It is important that not one sign of a return to the unfortunate'accommodation' policy be shown, " he said. He suggested that thepossibility of Red China sending troops to North Vietnam and Laos"will be in direct proportion to our failure to continue a policy offirmness, as distinguished from a policy of 'accommodation. ' "

But he expressed concern that "Hanoi may interpret this new policy of f irm-ness as merely an 'interlude' in what has been a policy of "accommodation1 ratherthan a change in the policy of 'accommodation. ' If Hanoi misreads the policyintentions of our President and the Secretary of State, things will get worsebefore they get better. "

"In the final analysis, " Senator Miller emphasized, "the war in Vietnam is atest of the wills of the people of the United States and those of the CommunistWorld, particularly in Hanoi and Feiping, as of the moment.

The moral fibre, the character, the patience of our people to break the Com-munist will to win in this area are involved. Ours is a truly moral cause--com-pletely in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principleswhich have caused millions of freedom-loving people to turn to the United Statesfor leadership in the cause of peace with justice and respect for the dignity of man,

"We must not fail in providing this leadership. And may I say, in behalf ofour President, that great leadership does not always mean the most popular leader-ship. What is important is the righteousness of the cause and the perseverance ofa leader to see it through. "

State-menf'by SENATOR JACK MILLER (R-Iowa) on Senate Floor

SUBJECT: SOUTH VIETNAM, U THANT

DATE: MARCH 1, 1965

Mr. President: Oh February 17, President Jbhnson stated very clearly andsuccinctly our purpose and objective in South Vietnam. He said:

''That purpose and that objective is to join the defense and protection of thefreedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that isdirected from outside their country.

"We have no ambition there for ourselves. We seek no wider war. But wemust all understand that we will persist in the defense of freedom and our contin-uing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessaryby the continuing aggression of others.

"These actions will be measured, and fitting, and adequate. Out stamina,and the stamina of the American people, is equal to the task. "

On February 25, Secretary of State Dean Rusk issued a prepared statementamplifying the policy statement of the £ resident. The key points of this statementare as follows:

1. The nations of Southeast Asia have a right to live in peace, freefrom aggression directed against them from outside their borders.This is a point of vital importance to the safety and the very existenceof a hundred smaller nations all over the world.

2. North Vietnam, in callous disregard of the Geneva agreements of1954 and 1962, has directed and supplied the essential military per-sonnel and arms for this aggression, aimed at the imposition of aCommunist regime by force.

3. The position of the United States toward threats to the peace inSoutheast Asia has been made clear many times, going back to 1954,when President Eisenhower wrote to the President of South Vietnam thatour offer of assistance was to enable South Vietnam to maintain ''astrong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion ofaggression through military means7'.

4. The key to peace in Southeast Asia has been repeated over and overagain. It is the readiness of all in that area to live at peace and toleave their neighbors alone. Those who are not leaving their neighborsalone know exactly what it means--the illegal infiltration of militarypersonnel and arms cannot be described as "leaving your neighbor alone".

5. Compliance with the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 canestablish peace.

6. What is still missing is any indication that Hanoi is prepared tostop doing what it is doing against its neighbors. The absence of thiscrucial element affects the current discussion of "negotiation". Anegotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmation of aggressionis not possible.

I wish to repeat here today what I have said ever since our retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. I fully support President Johnson in his actionsof firmness, and I fully support his policy statement of February 17 and the policystatement of Secretary Rusk to which I have just referred.

Indeed, I would go a step farther than the Secretary and say that not onlymust Hanoi indicate that it is prepared to stop what it is doing to its neighbors inSouth Vietnam, but it must bring back the many thousands of guerrillas and in-filtrators to North Vietnam, where they belong, before negotiations begin. Thiswould not preclude a period of a truce during which these people, along with their

(more)

- ' '* , 2-

war materiel, are pulled back to North Vietnam. Perhaps this is implied whenthe Secretary says that ''negotiation aimed at the acceptance or the confirmationof aggression is not possible," but I think it Should be clearly stated. Also itshould be made clear that any period of a truce or "cease fire'1 cannot be used asa ruse for the North Vietnamese to consolidate their positions in South Vietnam--let alone improve them.

On February 27, the State Department issued a "white paper'1 on Vietnamsetting forth a full and up-to-date summary of the "massive" evidence establishingNorth Vietnam's responsibility for the aggression against South Vietnam--evidencewhich has been presented to the International Control Commission.

The "white paper" points out that the war in Vietnam (and note that it usesthe word "war") is a new kind of war--a totally new brand of aggression againstan independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom; thata Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign peoplein a neighboring state; that South Vietnam is fighting for its life against a brutalcampaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlledby the Communist regime in Hanoi—an aggression which has been going on foryears.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attackingSouth Vietnam were trained in North Vietnam and ordered into South Vietnam byHanoi; that the key leadership of the Viet Cong, the officers and much of the cadre,many of the technicians, political organizers and propagandists have corne fromNorth Vietnam and operate under Hanoi's direction; that the training of essentialmilitary personnel and their infiltration into South Vietnam is directed by themilitary high command in Hanoi; that many of the weapons and much of the ammu-nition and other supplies used by the Viet Cong have been sent into South Vietnamfrom Hanoi; and that war materiel from Communist China and other Communiststates has been channeled through North Vietnam for the Viet Cong army.

The evidence shows that these attacking forces remain under the militarydiscipline of Hanoi after they enter South Vietnam, and that increasingly theforces sent into South Vietnam are native North Vietnamese.

The infiltration rate has been as follows:

Year Minimum

1,8003,7005,4004, 2004,400

Thus since 1959, nearly 20,000 Viet Cong officers, soldiers and technicians areknown to have entered South Vietnam under orders from Hanoi and that probably17,000 more infiltrators were sent in. It is now estimated that the Viet Congnumber 35, OOOj-comprising the "hard core" of all Communist forces.

Of particular interest is the statement in the "white paper" that "Clearly therestraint of the past was not providing adequately for the defense of South Vietnamagainst Hanoi's open aggression, " that further means for defense were agreedupon between the United States and South Vietnam, and that the air strikes againstNorth Vietnam were made as a "limited response fitted to the aggression thatproduced them".

I have been saying ever since our government permitted PremierKhrushchev to renege on his agreement for on-site inspection in Cuba that apolicy of "restraint" might sound good, but if it really is not reasonably firm, itwould be misinterpreted by the Communists as a sign of weakness. This is whathas happened in Vietnam, and I am encouraged that the State Department hasfaced up to this fact. Whether or not the air strikes on North Vietnam areindeed "fitted" to the aggression by the Viet Cong only time will tell. I hope thatthey are. I am concerned that Hanoi may interpret this new policy of firmnessas merely an "interlude" in what has been a policy of "accommodation" rather

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than a change in the policy of "accommodation". If Hanoi misreads the policyintentions of our President and the Secretary of State, things will get worse beforethey get better. More lives will be lost—American as well as Vietnamese. Moredevastation will come to North Vietnam and probably to Hanoi itself. Concern isbeing expressed over the possibility that Red China will send troops to NorthVietnam and Laos for eventual use against South Vietnam. I suggest that thispossibility will be in direct proportion to bur failure to continue a policy of firm-ness, as distinguished from a policy of "accommodation". That is why it is soimportant that not one sign of a return to the unfortunate "accommodation" policybe shown; and it will not be shown as bong as the present policy of the Presidentand the State Department are steadfastly adhered to. They will continue to havemy full support as long as they follow this policy.

And while I am on this point, we may trust that Peiping will understand thatthe "privileged sanctuary" policy which prevailed during the Korean War wentdown with the bombs on North Vietnam.

I have not been particularly concerned over the reaction in some capitals toour change from a policy of "accommodation" to one of firmness. After all,there has been general satisfaction to let the United States and South Vietnambear almost all of the cost of repelling the aggression by North Vietnam. Toomany of these capitals have long been following a policy of "accommodation",exchanging ambassadors with Red China, failing to pay their obligations to theUnited Nations, accepting our foreign aid, and influencing our foreign policy.Words like "paace", "negotiation", "settlement" and "restraint" are expedientswhich seem to blind them to the evidence of aggression and to their moral re-sponsibility in the family of nations to help put a stop to it. We may hope that ourclear and steadfast adherence to a policy of firmness will persuade them to ourcause.

What does concern me, however, is the attitude and statements of Mr. UThant, Secretary General of the United Nations.

On February 24, the day before Secretary Rusk's policy statement, Mr. UThant told a news conference that he bad proposed a secret peace plan to end thewar in South Vietnam. It was reported that he was unusually critical of Americanpolicy in Southeast Asia and suggested that there would have been no Communistintervention had the United States stayed out of South Vietnam, supporting hiscontention by using his own country, Burma, as an example. He said that theBurmese Communist underground had never received any outside help becausethe Burmese government had not itself asked for any outside help in fighting theCommunists. "Not one precious American life has been lost in Burma, " he wasquoted as saying. "Not one precious American dollar has been spent in Burma inthe form of military assistance in the last 17 years. "

Isn't it strange that Mr. U Thant had no words of condemnation against NorthVietnam for its acts of aggression? Why didn't he condemn the violations byNorth Vietnam of the Geneva pacts of 1954 and 1962? Just because his owngovernment in Burma did not seek military assistance from the United States,does he deny the right under the SEA TO treaty of South Vietnam to ask the UnitedStates for help against Communist subversion? Does he deny that the Commu-nists in Burma, in South Vietnam, in Cuba--are controlled by Peiping or theKremlin? Do his statements sound like those of a representative of the UnitedNations, whose Charter says:

" Ne the Peoples of the United Nations /are_/ determined to establish con-ditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treatiesand other sources of international law can be maintained. "

"And for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with oneanother as good neighbors. "

Does Mr. U Thant believe that North Vietnam has been acting like a "goodneighbor"?

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I invite attention that the Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided among otherthings as follows:

"Article 5. To avoid any incidents which might result in the resump-tion of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall bewithdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five days of thepresent Agreement's entry into force/

"Article 6. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted tocross the provisional military demarcation line unless specificallyauthorized to do so by the Joint Commission.

"Article 17. (a) With effect from the date of entry into force of thepresent Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any re-enforcementsin the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war materiel,such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet enginesand jet weapons and armoured vehicles, is prohibited. "

I invite attention that the Geneva Agreement of 1962 provided among otherthings as follows:

The parties undertake that (a) they will not commit or participate in anyway in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty,independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom ofLaos; (b) they will not resort to the use or threat of force or any othermeasure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos; (c) theywill refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internalaffairs of the Kingdom of Laos; . . . (i) they will not use the territoryof the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of othercountries. "

I note from the World News Digest that on last July 8 Mr. U Thant proposedreconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference to negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam.A^hat good does he think this would do when North Vietnam has violated the 1954Geneva accord?

On last August 6, following a conference with President Johnson, Mr. UThant told reporters that he believed the UN Security Council was currently in noposition to be "usefully employed in a settlement" of the problem, being hamperedby the nature of the dispute and by the fact that Hanoi is not a member of the UN.

With respect to Mr. U Thant1 s statement: "Not one precious American dollarhas been spent in Burma in the form of military assistance in the last 17 years",I note from the February 24 issue of the Davenport Times-Democrat that theAllen and Scott report refers to a secret $9 million arms program furnished bythe United States to Burma; and I might add that for fiscal year 1964 we furnished$1. 5 million in foreign aid of a non-military nature.

I find Mr. U Thant's behavior one-sided, prejudiced, ungrateful, superficial,and unrealistic. How can he command the trust and respect so necessary for theperformance of his duties? He ought to resign.

May I remind my colleagues in the Senate that last August 7, by a vote of 88to 2, we passed the Southeast Asia Resolution, following the retaliatory raids onNorth Vietnamese F-T boat bases ordered by President Johnson as a result ofattacks on our destroyers in the Bay of Tonkin. This resolution was approvedwithout a single negative vote in the House of Representatives. It says:

''That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President,as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attackagainst the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. "

"The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peacethe maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonantwith the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nationsand in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective DefenseTreaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines,

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to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any mem-ber or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requestingassistance in defense of its freedom;"

I do not criticise the sincerity of my two colleagues who voted against thisresolution; and their continued criticism is completely consistent with their voteat that time. But what I am wondering about are the statements of some of thoseSenators who voted for this resolution which, in light of the evidence, hardlyrepresent support for the President in his action to put a stop to Communistaggression in South Vietnam. It is these statements which might collectively beinterpreted by Hanoi as a "sign" that the United States is not going to be as stead-fast in pursuing the President's policy as we must be. We simply cannot be in-consistent about this matter.

It will not do to contend that we are following the wrong course of action justbecause there are frequent changes in the government of South Vietnam. Ourprevious policy of accommodation has contributed to this. When we were askedfor help to stop Communist aggression, it would beronly natural that the SouthVietnamese expected that help to be effective. It wasn't, and one cannot blamethe people for becoming disillusioned. Ambassador Taylor's indication that themorale of the people improved following our attacks on North Vietnam bears outthis point. These people want to be left alone, but if they aren't left alone byNorth Vietnam and if it appears that the United States is not going to take suffi-cient action to put a stop to it--that the Viet Cong will win, it is understandablewhy a good many of these troubled people would want to be on the side of thewinner. Costly air strikes against the privileged sanctuary of North Vietnam havebeen designed to persuade Hanoi that we mean business, and if aggression contin-ues, more of the same can be expected. Hanoi must be persuaded that any gainfrom continued aggression will be more than offset by its losses. No one in thePentagon whom I know is saying that air strikes against guerillas will stop them.But there are other targets besides guerrillas. They may have to be destroyedbefore the cost of continued aggression is brought home to the Communist regimein Hanoi.

In the final analysis, the war in Vietnam is a test of the wills of the people ofthe United States and those of the Communist World, particularly in Hanoi andPeiping, as of the moment. The moral fibre, the character, the patience of ourpeople to break the Communist will to win in this area are involved. Ours is atruly moral cause--completely in consonance with the Charter of the UnitedNations and the principles which have caused millions of freedom loving peopleto turn to the United States for leadership in the cause of peace with justice andrespect for the dignity of man. We must not fail in providing this leadership.And may I say, in behalf of our President, that great leadership does not alwaysmean the most popular leadership. What is important is the righteousness of thecause and the perseverence of a leader to see it through. Neville Chamberlainwas, undoubtedly, popular for the moment following the Munich agreement.Winston Churchill was not always popular, but he will go down in history as thefinest leader the World has known in our time.

16 September 1966

TO: Secretary-General

FROM! Bamses ITassif

SUBJECT: Questions which, may come up at your press conference Monday,19 September 1966

1. As you know, your last meeting with the press at Headquarters wasat the DMCA annual luncheon on 17 June. Since then you have given 3 pressconferences: Geneva, 6 July; Mexico, 26 August; Santiago, 30 August.

2. Two issues are bound to dominate your press conference on Monday:

a. Your statements on 1 and 15 September on your decision notto be available for a second term: There will be many questions on thereasons that led you to that decision—The appeals from several quarters toreconsider—The basic issues and how they could be changed to induce you tochange your mind. Are you determined, come what may, to leave on 3 November?Will you be willing to stay until the end of the Assembly? Do you have anythoughts on how you could help in finding an able and acceptable successor?

b. Viet-Eams You said in Santiago that you would continue yourefforts for a peaceful settlement and reiterated your 3 points as the onlyway to provide a congenial atmosphere for discussions and negotiations.Where do we stand now? How do you feel about the US disregarding the 3 pointsand escalating the bombing of the Forth? Is it true that Peking has rejectedthe 3 points out of hand (Mr. Goldberg's interview with the Christian ScienceMonitor on 15 September)? Have you received any indication, official orunofficial, from Hanoi regarding their reaction to the 3 points? ¥hat doyou think of the "elections" in South Viet-Nam—Did they really change thesituation there?

3. Miscellaneous:

a. Your views expressed in the Introduction to the Annual Report:Several of your friends, among the correspondents, have concluded that thisIntroduction is by far the strongest and most outspoken you have ever writtenon the state of affairs of the UKT and the world. They maintain you havepainted a very gloomy picture. Do you have anything to elaborate on:Observers from all countries—China's representation—UI\F finances anddisarmament.

b. Outer space: The proposed treaty seems to have collapsed—Any comment?

c. Have you received any word from Paris or Moscow re voluntarycontributions?

d. Any comment on Rhodesia in the context of the recent CommonwealthConference in London?

e. Any word from Jakarta about their intention to rejoin the UN?

f. Are you encouraged "by the report of Mr. de Rib"bing on hisrecent round of talks in Thailand and Cambodia?

g. South West Africa,

h. Aden

i. Cyprus

j. Apartheid and new South African Government

DISTHBUTJON1 SG v/1 Mr. Uarasimhan1 Mr. Rolz-Bennett1 Mr. Powell1 File

U N I T E D N A T I O N S m m ® N A T I O N S U N I E S

19 September 1966

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am happy to have this opportunity to meet with you on

the eve of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

The Assembly will have an important agenda to discuss and I

amsure that your coverage of the different points of this

agenda will add greatly to public understanding of their

significance.

You will recall that in my statement of 1 September as

well as in the Introduction to my Annual Report, I had also

drawn attention to certain issues, some of which are of primary

importance to the continued effectiveness of the Organization in

various fields and some of global significance in relation to

world peace. In regard to these issues, although I quite realize

that overnight solutions are not feasible, it is my sincere hope

that the public debate and the many consultations which take

place during the General Assembly will bring a new awareness

of the gravity of the problems involved and generate renewed

efforts at trying to solve them.

I wish again to express my strong feeling that what is most

important at the present stage is that attention be directed

to these issues.

U Thant

If September 1966

Gentlemen.,

I am happy to have this opportunity to meet •with you on

the eve of the twenty*£lrgt session of the general Assesfcly.

The Aeeenibly will have an important agenda to diseuss and I

sffl£sure that your eov<srsge of the different points of this

agenda will add. greatly to public understanding of their

significance.

You will ree&ll that in vy statement of 1 Septeinber as

well as in the Introduction to $$? Annual Beport, I had also

dram atteati0E to ess-tain issues, some of -which are of primry

importance to the ooatlnuea effeetiveaess of the Organization in

fields and sextos of global significance in relation to

peace, la regard to these issues> although I quite realise

that overai it solutions are not feasible, it is my sincere hope

that the pis&lie $eb&te ana the many consultations t>rhica ta3i©

place Staring the General Asseiably will bring a new awareness

of the gravity &f the prflttoleos involves and generate renewed

efforts at trying to solve them.

I -wish again to express say strong feeling that -what is most

ijaportant at the present stage is that attention be direetefi

to these issues.

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Sincerely yours. - United Nations Archives

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