00-OCHS

SAFE AT EVERY ALTITUDE: Why Aviation Authorities Need to Codify UAS-

Centric Training, Licenses and Certifications Now

Krista M. Ochs

Applying traditional standards of pilot training,training programs, licenses and certifications toUnmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations isinadequate; such an approach is either too much or toolittle but in either instance, it does not preventsuch technology from being used unsafely. Simplystated, Small UAS (sUAS) requirements will be verydifficult to develop, sustain and regulate,particularly in light of their increasing recreationaland entrepreneurial use and apparent conflict withtraditional, hobbyist Radio-Controlled (RC) aircraftstandards of use. For Medium and High-Altitude LongEndurance (MALE/HALE) UAS, while both the traditional“manned” pilots and “unmanned” operators require adepth of general aviation knowledge, testing andsustained currency requirements, the actual act offlying the two type of aircraft are different enoughto warrant a divergent, compartmentalized trainingpath, certification and licensing for the operators ofunmanned aircraft.

Using open-source information, comparative researchand critical analysis of proven training models,professional assessments and interviews, andassessment of emerging trends, this paper examines the

Senior Program Manager, UAS Training and Support Tasks, Defense SolutionsDivision, General Dynamics Information Technology, 1001 Executive Drive, Ste.D, Sierra vista, AZ 85650

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urgency of codifying UAS training requirements,standards and regulation as quickly as possible and inadvance of the timelines which have been mandated tothe United States (U.S.) Federal AviationAdministration (FAA). Differences and similarities inmanned and unmanned aviation need to be distinguishedat a faster pace and training models already developedby the U.S. Departments of Defense, Transportation andHomeland Security should be applied to unmannedaircraft. It is imperative that aviation authoritiesexpedite codification and regulation of UAS-trainingstandards and certifications; it is critical forpublic safety, good faith and industry liability.

Introduction

As most people are aware, the modern age of flightoriginated in an aircraft built and flown by Orville and WilburWright on December 17th, 1903. Many people, however, are notaware that the efforts to codify training requirements andregulatory oversight of the new aviation industry took almostfive decades. In the early years of civil and military flight,aviation was extremely dangerous; the skies, however, were notnearly so congested. Over the course of the technicalinnovations of World War I and in the years immediatelyfollowing, navigation remained so difficult that: “the onlynavigation devices available to most pilots were magneticcompasses. Pilots flew 200 to 400 feet above ground so thatthey could navigate by roads and railways. Fatal accidents wereroutine.” Safety was considered but not at the forefront ofaviation operations.

The first true efforts at regulating training and standardsoccurred with the Air Mail Act of 1925, which fostered thebeginnings of commercial aviation and passenger service.  Thechanging standards not only affected the aviation industry, butrippled into an evolution in standards of safety, including theintroduction of the first Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) –flagmen.1

The next few decades saw rapid expansion of the industry,not only in terms of operations, but in terms of policy,

http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history. Ibid.1 Ibid.

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regulation and codification of standards beginning with the AirCommerce Act of 1926 – which assigned the Secretary of Commercewith responsibility to grow the commercial aviation industry,to include certification of pilots and aircraft.2 Aviationindustry and regulatory oversight began to expandexponentially. Each decade brought a new flavor of agency,rules and increased emphasis on safety: the Civil AeronauticsAuthority of 1938 with its three-member Air Safety Boardcharged with investigating air accidents and recommendingprevention measures; in 1940, the formation of the CivilAeronautics Board, which assumed responsibility for “safetyrulemakings, accident investigation and economic regulation ofthe airlines”; and in the years immediately following World WarII, ATC became a “permanent federal responsibility” at themajority of airports.3

In 1956, while flying under “visual flight rules inuncongested space”, a Trans World Airlines (TWA) SuperConstellation and a United Airlines DC-7 were involved in amid-air collision over the Grand Canyon, Arizona; all 128people on board were killed. This incident, while seeminglysmall in comparison to later and more modern aviationaccidents, illustrated the requirements for greater emphasis onregulating safety.  While air traffic had doubled in just theten years following World War II, the pace of accidentmitigation was grossly behind the increase in air traffic.

The following decade brought about a high level of change inaviation and transportation authority and regulation, from theinception of the Federal Aviation Agency in 1958, to thecreation of the Department of Transportation in 1967, whichincluded within its subordinate organizations the newly renamed“Federal Aviation Administration” – the FAA.4 Over the rest ofthe 20th century, these entities grappled not only with anexponentially growing aviation environment (in all registers –civil, military and commercial), but also with labor issues,legal issues (such as hijackings and security); thederegulation of the airlines; and significantly, the impact oftechnological innovation and modernization.  2 Also enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots, certifying aircraft,establishing airways, and operating and maintain aids to air navigation.http://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history3 Ibid.4 Ibid.

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The level of modernization challenges faced by the FAA inthe last 25 years is remarkable.  Integration of GlobalPositioning Systems (GPS), new radars, weather forecastingcapabilities, restructuring within the organization, creationof the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in 2000, and the attacksof Islamic extremists on September 11, 2001 – which had immenseimpact on the aviation industry – are only some of the morerecent challenges faced by the preeminent aviation authority ofthe United States.

Enter unmanned aircraft.  Although they, too, have existedfor decades, their integration into the world of militaryaviation operations and their impending migration into civiland commercial roles is not only dramatic, but represents aleap forward in technological innovation that also mirrors thesignificance of the first manned flights. The last threedecades represent an era for humanity that is akin to theIndustrial Revolution of the 19th Century – only this is aTechnology Revolution.  The speed with which information andtechnology becomes available to the masses is unprecedented inhuman history.

Neither the Wright Brothers nor any of the early aviatorscould have imagined what the airspace would look like today, acentury later, nor could they have envisioned a time whenmanned aviation would be compelled to make room for anotherform of aviation – unmanned aircraft. The challenges ofregulating aviation operations have always been present; theintegration of UAS is another evolution- and it is asignificant evolution. Those who perceive themselves asstakeholders in the integration effort are “chomping at thebit” to expedite the integration of UAS, particularly forcommercial purposes. In order for this to occur safely, theFAA needs to codify UAS-centric training, licenses andcertifications now, i.e. as quickly as possible, or they risklosing their ability to control commercial UAS endeavors, whichrisks public safety.

Simply put, the aviation authorities in the U.S. – the FAA –are caught in a safety paradox. They were given a mandate tointegrate UAS in to the National Airspace (NAS) within atimeframe that is actually quite abbreviated in terms ofhistorical norms for transformation. The FAA has been diligentin approaching the associated requirements of this integration- with deep emphasis on and respect for public safety. As a

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result of unprecedented speed in technology access for thegeneral public, however, the pace of the integration is movingso cautiously that citizens and entrepreneurs are nowdisregarding the FAA constraints, thus potentially endangeringthe public and the industry. Therefore, portions of the effortneed to be re-examined and reconsidered as expeditiously aspossible.

As late as March 2014, efforts by the FAA to regulate theuse of sUAS, even at altitudes below 400 feet, appeared to befailing: 

A federal judge slapped down the FAA’s fine for a drone operator,saying there was no law banning the commercial use of smalldrones.  The judge’s decision could open up the skies below 400feet to farmers, photographers and entrepreneurs who have beenbattling the FAA over the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. NTSBAdministrative Law Judge Patrick Geraghty ruled [in late March2014] that the policy notices the FAA issued as a basis for theban weren’t enforceable...5

Issues like the one illustrated above are actually adistraction to the FAA.  Rather than get bogged down into thelegal processes of trying to punish what could ultimately behundreds, if not thousands of people who are actually not thatdifferent from the RC enthusiasts, emphasis should be placed onsafety – and with safety, a sense of urgency related to whatlevel of training, licensing and certification is necessary toallow for such public usage. Training and integration modelsalready exist for this type of evolution within the trainingdoctrine and programs of several national-level entities, suchas the Departments of Defense and Transportation.

Although the Congressional mandate to the FAA stated thatthe administration had to provide a plan for the safeintegration of UAS into the national airspace by 2015, itappears that even that short-term goal is being distracted. Itis not every day a new field is developed that can influence somany other occupations and businesses, from agriculture torocket science to insurance policies.  While opponents of UAS

5 http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/faa-small-drones-ban-104393.ht ml

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integration are vocal, there is also a less vocal,unanticipated public interest in the technology; a generationalshift within the population that has made younger adultsextremely comfortable and conversant with technology; increasedemphasis on finding safer solutions to some aviationrequirements; and lastly, a growing desire to exploreentrepreneurial endeavors by an increasing number of amateurunmanned aircraft operators, business people, artists,scientists, and public service entities.

At risk is the entire future of unmanned aircraft in thenational airspace. Without expeditious codification ofstandards, unregulated operators will continue to violate theguidance the FAA has provided regarding UAS.  In contrast tothe first five decades of aviation history, a single ground orair incident with fatalities or injuries could have adevastating impact on this nascent industry, crippling it orbogging it down in such poor public perception, e.g. “drone”perceptions, that it never reaches its full potential as a toolthat can provide data and save lives.  

There is also the immense challenge of regulatory anarchy.In the absence of training and certifications requirementscodified by the FAA, individuals and low-level entrepreneursare “doing their own thing” with no oversight. This alsojeopardizes the industry. For example, in October 2013, a majordefense contractor discussing sUAS with a law enforcementprofessional at the International Association of Chiefs ofPolice in Philadelphia, PA, was told, “Why should I pay thatmuch for that little airplane when I can go down to myneighborhood hobby store, build my own and slap a camera onit?”6 When the stunned contractor warned the individual aboutthe potential danger to people and property, as well as thepossibility of legal issues relative to current FAA standards,the officer replied, “Who’s going to tell them?”

As Kevin Robillard astutely wrote in Politco in February2014, the FAA is at risk to “lose the drone war”; he adds tothat the FAA is risking “a Wild, Wild West … [and as] operatorsgrow use to flying them without the FAA’s permission, theycould become less inclined to obey any rules the agency puts inplace.”7 Ted Ellett, a former FAA General Counsel who is nowin private practice and specializing in aviation, also added

6 Ochs

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that “most people want to comply with the FAA rules … but themore the FAA acts like a big daddy, behemoth government agencythat is imposing excessive restrictions, the more the feelingof ‘I’m an American – they can’t tell me what to do’ kicks in.And that’s a real danger for the FAA.”8

Without a doubt, aviation authorities and stake-holders havemade enormous strides related to the future employment of UASin the United States.  Unfortunately, they could not anticipatethe rate of interest for integration and failure to addresstraining requirements, licenses, testing and liability – andfailure to dos so without a higher degree of urgency could bedisastrous.  Public safety and confidence is at risk every day;UAS are already highly subjected to negative perceptions.  AsUAS professionals know, the systems are not toys, nor are theymalevolent “drones”, as many in the public have been led tobelieve. They are simply a tool and opening the doors forcommercial employment – particularly for the sUAS in LoSoperations below 400 feet - will increase public confidence andawareness of the their utility.

Aviation authorities should immediately re-assess, address,codify and regulate UAS-centric training standards,specifically in terms of usage and in terms of trainingrequirements, programs and ultimately, licenses andcertifications; this is in the best interest of public safetyand good faith, as well as industry liability. Federalauthorities need to re-assess RC and sUAS rules, either drawingdistinctions based on commercial services or creating a newcategory of pilot certifications. Finally, aviation authoritiesneed to examine their present architecture and assess thealready proven training programs that have been utilized by theDoD for over a decade, as well as the processes for licensesand certification within the Department of Transportation;these models already exist.

 Why Expediency is Second Only to Safety

In 2013, the Association of Unmanned Vehicle SystemsInternational (AUVSI) reported that the integration of UAS into

7Robillard. http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/federal-aviation-administration-faa-drones-103800.html8 Ibid.

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the NAS could create up to 70,000 new jobs and 13.6 billion inbusiness revenue in the first three years of successfulintegration.9 Those numbers have already changed and are nowforecasted to reach $582.2 million by the end of 2019;potential revenue of this level is part of the reason that theindustry is getting more “visibility in the public eye” anddrawing more potential operators.10

Of further concern in the long-term UAS industry, more andmore academic institutions, with and without aviation programs,are beginning to implement degree programs and curricula thatinclude courses related to the design, engineering, operationsand integration of UAS. Many of these courses for operatorsare built along a hybrid training model comprised of DoDtraining practices and architecture combined with traditional,academic methodology and requirements, i.e. labs, researchprojects, etc. Apart from committee approval within arespective college, however, academia is left to divine the FAAintent regarding the future standards and regulations for UASin order to educate their students. Without quick FAA action,these universities and colleges may be turning out college-educated UAS professionals into the aviation community based onan “intuitive” curriculum. These early graduates could play avital role in the early stages of UAS integration, but theycould be a detriment if their coursework was ultimately notcompliant with the ultimate integration goals of the FAA andhow the administration chooses to regulate the industry, aswell as licenses and certificates.

Virtually daily, the media brings a new story of unmannedaircraft being utilized for research purposes, along withstories related to the desire for faster and greaterintegration, i.e. relaxing the rules that have been put inplace by the FAA. Along with the articles that highlight thedesire for faster integration, come the article that illustratethe risk to public safety as people undertake unauthorizedcommercial employment of UAS – the aforementioned Minnesotabeer delivery, the University of Virginia photography andsubsequent NTSB litigation – even famed director Martin

9 http://www.auvsi.org/econreport, p. 2.10 http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/A;;-News/2014/March/04/Small-UAV-market.aspx

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Scorsese reputedly utilized an sUAS during his filming of “TheWolf of Wall Street” in 2013.11

The FAA itself acknowledges that the “approval of UASoperations and pilots will challenge current regulations formanned aircraft”, and have identified procedures for pilotapproval for law enforcement.12 Moreover, they responded toSection 332 of “Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systemsinto National Airspace System” with an expansion plan thatallowed for use of sUAS in the Arctic, to include permanentcorridor routes and operational areas over international waterscontrolled by the FAA on behalf of the International civilAviation Organization (ICAO).13 In this expansion, very littlechanged regarding the current parameters for use within theU.S.: aircraft must be less than 55 pounds in Gross TakeoffWeight; operations are permitted only within Line-of Sight(LOS) (with data ultimately to define safe processes for beyondLOS); operations require both a pilot and an observer; andlastly, the FAA states that it will “review existing airmencertification and medical requirements to determine theappropriate qualifications or rely on sUAS rulemaking to setqualification standards” regarding who has to be “certified”and have the appropriate medical clearance.14

Models for providing training relative to obtaining licensesand higher level certifications and credentials already existnot only within the FAA, but within the department oftransportation, which regulates maritime licenses andcertifications for seaborne activities as well as overseeingstate level licensing requirements for the private andcommercial use of motor vehicles. These already establishedcriteria could assist aviation authorities in definingrequirements for regulating and monitoring the safe private andcommercial employment of unmanned aircraft, specifically smallunmanned aircraft. For medium and high altitude aircraft,aviation authorities should build upon what they have alreadyestablished as the minimum criteria to operate a UAS in the11http://www.suasnews.com/2014/03/27809/faa-says-commercial-drone-operations-are-illegal-public-says-so-what/12 FAA. “Expanding Use of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the ArticImplementation Plan”. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Final.November 2012. 13 Ibid.14 Ibid.

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national airspace, but expound upon their regulatory authorityand oversight of those training programs and certifications, sothat programs are similar to each other whether they areemployed by industry or academia, and the examination processesare similar to those of manned aviation. For the medium andhigh altitude aircraft, there must be codify trainingorganization for the training of operators which can beassessed by national level authorities to ensure the safety ofthe public. Training for these aircraft would correlate toadvanced ground school and certified flight instruction;prerequisites exams and currency training; medicalrequirements; and lastly, provide the criteria for federallicensing and certification of operators.

Ride Boldly, Ride: Lead the Way with sUAS in Line-of-Sight(LoS) Jobs

Due to increased public interest and access to technology,marketing and media attention, of all of the classes of UASavailable for integration into the NAS, the sUAS appear to bethe “darling”, particularly for small business opportunities.The “smalls” are quite simply the aircraft most likely topermeate all levels of civil usage and possess a high degree ofutility in civil roles. They have the utility to be used by asmall company that provides services, whether takingphotographs or delivering beer.15 They also have the greatestcapability for emergency services, which is why the FAA waswise to provide for the exception of sUAS usage for lawenforcement. These are the aircraft that should be at theforefront of integration efforts. In some ways, they may bethe most simple to integrate. They are also the aircraft thathave the most potential to cause an incident that damagespublic confidence, specifically as entrepreneurs get itchier toconduct commercial operations with no real training or rules inplace.

As late as March 27th, 2014, industry leaders to includesenior leaders of the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)and Consumer Electronics Association urged FAA AdministratorMichael P. Huerta to move faster on “issuing and approving the

15 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/02/05/faa-not-pleased-with-beer-delivery-by-drone-video/

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Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regulating the use of sUAS inU.S. airspace.”16 The rationale for this joint letter was basedon several factors: the FAA small UAS Aviation RulemakingCommittee (ARC) last issued recommendations on these aircraftover four years ago; Public Law 112-95 requires that a finalrule be issued by August 2014; and lastly, “Americanentrepreneurs and businesses cannot realize the tremendousbenefits and efficiencies of UAS systems until this proposedrule moves forward.”17

There are already rules in place for the operations ofsUAS that are being used by hobbyists and technologyenthusiasts, specifically, Section 336 of the FAA AuthorizationBill, the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, which statesessentially that the aircraft must be:

Flown strictly for hobby or recreational use; Operated in accordance with a community-based set of safety

guidelines and within the programming of a nationwide community-based organization; and,

Limited to not more than 55 pounds unless otherwise certified through a design, construction, inspection, flighttest, and operational safety program administered by a community-based organization; and,

Operated in a manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any manned aircraft.18

Further, this portion of the law states that when flownwithin 5 miles of an airport, the operator of the aircraft islegally bound to provide prior notice of the operation to theairport operator and the airport ATC; if flying from apermanent location within five miles, the parties can establisha “mutually agreed upon operating procedure.”19 These rules arevery reasonable for those who desire to operate an RC aircraft,which is in fact an unmanned aircraft, as long as they stay

16Homeland Security Today. http://www.hstoday.us/industry-news/general/single-article/two-association-heads-urge-faa-administrator-to-move-on-drone-regulations/eb60eff04835d9166db6d26c2a48b4d3.html17 Ibid. 18 Public Law 112-95, 112th Congress of the United States. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ95/html/PLAW-112publ95.htm19 Ibid.

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under 400 feet and within the line of sight of the individualoperating the aircraft.

Why then, are these same rules not applied for thoseindividuals or entities who desire to use an aircraft of thisnature for commercial reasons? Is it simply because the rulesstate the “model” aircraft must be “flown for hobby orrecreational reasons”?20 The perception from UAS professionalsnot associated with the FAA is that the commerce-prohibitiverule is in place due to: a lack of codified training andlicensing; the enormously expanding variants of UAS and theCertificate of Authorization (COA) and air-worthiness process;liability and the political fact that the government does notwant to impose training and licensing regulations on thesetypes of sUAS because it would take away from the RC communityshould they be required to meet the same standard and they havelived fairly comfortably under the rules for quite a long time.That being said, there is nothing that prevents a traditional,RC-enthusiast from strapping a “Go-Pro” camera to theiraircraft and hiring that capability out to consumers – justlike a fixed-wing or Vertical Take-Off and Land (VTOL) sUASwith imaging payloads. From a subjective perspective, this portion of the RCRules is self-inflicted pain for the FAA. A minor adjustmentto this part of the rules to eliminate the language related to“hobby” and “recreation” could release an enormous amount ofpressure regarding expediency of integration for sUAS below 400feet and flown LOS. An exclusion of sUAS from the COA processbased on the large variety of aircraft that are and will beincluded in this category would also be required – for sUASrestricted to LOS operations only, i.e. sUAS in BLOS, MALE andHALE aircraft would still require air worthiness certificatesand be included in the COA requirements. Even the FAA itselfhas acknowledged that this may be the end-state. In DocketFAA-2006-25714, regarding UAS Operations in the NAS, the FAAsolicited feedback regarding the creation of another type ofunmanned vehicle, which could then lead to a new flightauthorization instrument “similar to AC 91-57, but focused onoperations which do not qualify as sport and recreation, butalso may not require a certificate of airworthiness.”21

20 Ibid. 21 http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/reg/media/frnotice_uas.pdf

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Further, once the changes to the language occur, regulatorymodels already exist that would allow the FAA to regulate thecommercial use of these sUAS quickly – and yet with emphasis onsafety and compliance. The methodologies employed by the U.S.Department of Transportation (DOT) and its subordinate agenciesand departments to regulate licensing and endorsements forcommercial ground and maritime activities could be applied tocommercial sUAS in LOS operations. The DOT standards couldalso be applied to the more sophisticated aircraft with higherrequirements, albeit with much more training, testing andoversight.

Across the spectrum of UAS, but particularly for sUAS, thecommercial owner of the aircraft agree to FAA-providedoperational guidelines for self-regulation (once these arecodified); provide aviation authorities with a signedDeclaration of Intent, specifically what type of aircraft isgoing to be used and the general location of usage; and lastly,the owner should be required to maintain or submit a list ofserial numbers for critical aircraft components so that theaircraft can be traced to the owner when incidents occur andthe aircraft is lost or the incident is not reported. The firsttwo of these items could be as simple as blocks on aninstitutionalized form when an operator applies for thecommercial license/endorsement.

For an FAA commercial endorsement for an individual with noaviation credentials or certifications - e.g. an individual whobuilt their own VTOL in the garage and now wants to use it totake wedding pictures, etc. - some level of training programmust be required.22 For commercial use of an sUAS below 400 feetand solely in LoS operations, the FAA could mandate that allpotential commercial operators be at least 18-years old; beable to read, write, speak and understand English; acquire at aminimum a third-class medical certificate (in the interest ofpublic safety); and attend a two-day training program that

22 For an individual who already possesses FAA certifications or licenses, orthose individuals that formerly served within the Department ofDefense/Homeland Security as UAS operators, there should simply be aknowledge-based exam that illustrates their understanding of sUAS LOSoperational principles and FAA guidelines for use of “model” aircraft. Uponcompletion of the “waiver exam”, airmen within these categories would thenreceive the FAA endorsement for the level of aircraft they have applied tofly commercially, in this case sUAS.

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includes the current RC rules and restrictions relative toairspace usage, airport encroachment and coordination, weightrestrictions, etc.

This 16-hour endorsement course would culminate with awritten, sUAS airmen knowledge test, which would beadministered by an FAA-designated examiner; applicants wouldhave to pass to obtain the endorsement.23 The course would alsoinclude instructing sUAS commercial operators on compliancewith federal regulations, as well as the fines and penaltiesfor not following established regulations. It could alsoprovide the commercial user who may not have any aviationexperience with some sUAS-centric operational recommendations,to include:24

Preparing a before, during and after sUAS checklist that includes checks on key aircraft and system components and emergency procedures;

Identifying and respecting the limitations of the aircraft system;

Instruction on developing safe and compliant flight plans for commercial endeavors, i.e. linear flight patterns, racetracks (ovals), etc.;

Instruction on the standing RC rules which provide a foundation for this evolution of commercial endeavor – at least five miles away from airports, avoiding heavily populated areas, etc.;

Weather, noise and privacy considerations (good neighbor philosophies –not only within the aviation community, but with the public); and,

Reviews of various forms take-off and landings and potentialvariables for sUAS variants, in order to emphasis on public safety.

These overarching categories would, of course, requireprofessional curriculum development, instruction andadministration, which could be outsourced to professional23 For all other UAS certification programs for aircraft that are operatingBLOS, some level of aircraft-specific operational proficiency test will haveto be administered, whether via simulator or flight operations with a UAS-specific Certified Flight Instructor (CFI). 24 Further details on training program specifics can be made available viamore formal business arrangements, subject to non-disclosure.

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training service providers or academic institutions -organizations that are or can become trusted agents inproviding UAS training on behalf of the federal government,such as occurred within the Departments of Defense and HomelandSecurity over the last decade. Once validated by the FAA, thetraining program would then be administered by the authorizedtraining organization or center, who assumes authority forproviding those services to members of the public who desire toobtain commercial licenses to operate sUAS within theaforementioned constraints.

When the individual completes the required training program(in this case, a 16-hour course), they would then provide proofof completed training, - their “ticket” - to the FAA, whichwould then provide the license/endorsement to operatecommercially. The commercial operator would then have tosustain currency and recertify in accordance with regulations,likely bi-annually. Over the course of the lifetime of thelicense, the FAA would reserve the right to audit theowner/operator’s commercial operations; flight and maintenancelogbooks; pilot credentials, currency and knowledge, etc.

Thus, the model for training and licensing for an individualor business cadre that desired to use sUAS for commercialpurposes below 400 feet and within LOS would include thismandatory endorsement class that codifies the sUAS operator’stransition from “amateur, hobbyist RC operator” to “novice,commercial sUAS operator.” In short, their path toprofessional certification could follow this process, ifaviation authorities made the minor, necessary changes tocurrent language within the rules:

The individual designs and creates their sUAS or procures a commercially manufactured sUAS;

Under the present RC “hobbyist” rules, the individual trainswith the aircraft, keeping logs;

They meet the requirements of the FAA (medical, etc.) to apply for a commercial license/endorsement to fly sUAS;

Depending on the origin of the aircraft and current FAA requirements, they obtain an airworthiness certificate and register the aircraft with the FAA, providing Declaration ofIntent and Agreement for Self-Regulation;

They locate an authorized, FAA-designated training provider;

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They attend and complete the training, to include the knowledge exam; and,

They submit proof of completion to the FAA, pay their licensing fee, receive the license/endorsement and commence commercial operations.

Applying already established methods of instruction andcertification in order to expedite the integration of sUAS inLOS operations is not only logical, it is compelling. Despitethe negative connotation of the “drone”, the American public isbeginning to see and hear more about the utility of sUAS, evenwith significant systemic constraints applied to their presentemployment (below 400 feet and always LOS). The “smalls”resonate with people who are possessed of an entrepreneurialspirit; it is not every day that a new industry comes intobeing and far-looking business entities that strike quickly andcompetently can be a part of the foundation for all those whofollow.

Also compelling the arguments for the FAA to set let thesUAS “go commercial” with some codified checks and balances isthe political backlash against the aviation administration forsmothering commercial efforts in their infancy. The issue goesbeyond the ruling of the NTSB that the FAA’s policy noticescannot be used as a basis for the ban on commercial use ofsUAS, as stated in the introduction.25 Day after day, more andmore sUAS are making the news as a result of people acquiringthe technology and using it commercially. The WashingtonNationals filmed part of their spring training using a VTOLaircraft and when a spokesperson was asked whether the team hadpermission to us the aircraft to film, he responded ratherflippantly, “No, we didn’t get it cleared, but we don’t get ourpop flies cleared either and those go higher than this thingdid.”26 There is a point to being cautious, but there is alsothe danger of being so risk-averse as to deny the logic ofusage under certain circumstances, i.e. LOS under 400 feet andwithin the standards established for RC aircraft – whether forcommercial purposes or not.

25 Kevin Robillard. 26http://www.sports.yahoo.com/blogs/mlb-big-league-stew/faa-orders-nationals- to-stop-flying-drone-at-spring-training-182122323.html

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The sUAS are ideal for consumer services: surveying land,real estate, construction sites, film-making, event photographyand videography, deliveries, media coverage, etc. Virtuallyall of the aforementioned professional services could besupported by sUAS flying LoS and under 400 feet. The solutionfor these aircraft is simply to alter the RC rules, loosen therequirements for certificates of airworthiness for sUAS thatare going to be flown within LoS, allow a training mechanismusing codified and validated materials via FAA-designatedtraining services provider – and license the commercial sUASoperators. This would increase public confidence that theoperators, even for these most simple sUAS, are being educatedby the FAA and understand the rules by which they are allowedto operate.

The Ravens of Odin: Changing Myth to Reality byIntegrating Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLoS) UAS in Civil Roles

In Norse mythology, the senior god Odin is sometimesreferred to as the “raven-god”. This is because he uses a pairof ravens that fly all over the world and bring informationback to Odin; they are named Hugin (which means “thought” inOld Norse) and Munin (which means memory or mind).27 Accordingto interpretations of this mythology, Hugin and Mugin are“semi-autonomous beings who are simultaneous projections orextensions of Odin’s own being.”28 Like these ravens, theconcept of employing UAS with BLoS – sUAS, MALE and HALE – hasbeen discussed for years and because of the Congressionalmandate to the FAA, the concept is now escaping the realm ofmyth and becoming reality. Like Hugin and Munin, BLoS UAS willbe “semi-autonomous extensions” of humanity – a tool thatsociety can use to bring back information and data, enlightengenerations to come and empower people to seek knowledge withdecreased risk and increased safety. In the future, UAS willprovide services that in today’s mind would seem like sciencefiction, just as the concept of UAS themselves would haveseemed like science fiction to the Wright Brothers a centuryago. The biggest challenge is HOW this will occur.

27 http://norse-mythology.org/gods-and-creatures/others/hugin-and-munin/28 Ibid.

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As with the LoS sUAS, the FAA needs to focus on expediencyfor integration, but the issue of public safety is of greaterconcern for these aircraft, which are flown out of the sight ofthe operators, using the system itself, essentially ininstrument flight. Currently, the DoD and DHS operate some ofthese aircraft within U.S. airspace, but only in restrictedairspace or with visual observers. Additionally, two UASOriginal Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), have been awarded thefirst commercial COAs as part of the process of exploringintegration while providing, testing and validating data on theintegration process. Both companies have well-establishedhistories with major UAS products for the U.S. Army, Navy andMarine Corps; both provided DoD-contracted systems and serviceswith great success which was the pre-eminent sUAS for U.S. Armyground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The concept of the FAA issuing COAs for these companies issound and credible for data collection relative to integratingUAS into the NAS. It is also sound for demonstratingcapabilities, such as occurred when one of these entitiesworked with the University of North Dakota and the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in 2010; a sUASwas employed to conduct an aerial flood plain surveillanceoperation along the Red River to monitor river levels,supporting the UND and NOAA – the first time a university andfederal agency collaborated on a project, and with industrysupport.29 There could ultimately be conflict-of-interest concerns,however, if OEM companies are afforded the opportunity todefine and manage their own aviation standards and flighttraining programs as the efforts to integrate continue.Without question, the data that industry leaders can provide tothe FAA based on over a decade of large-scale manufacturingefforts and sales to federal agencies is beyond reproach. Thatbeing said, the FAA needs to codify the standards for the BLoSaircraft as quickly as possible, so that they can defineexactly what standards and licenses need to be held by UAS OEMoperators and how they will obtain those endorsements.

Whether an operator has flown UAS for ten minutes or tenyears, the systems will be in their infancy in the NAS for

29 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&tkr=BA:US&sid=a92cltXOZqeU

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quite some time. This means that the FAA standards to beestablished quickly and enforced across the spectrum ofpotential civil UAS operators for the same reason mentioned inthe previous LoS sUAS argument: to ensure public safety andgood faith; to enforce the primacy of the FAA as the authorityfor standards and training; to prevent anarchy within thesystem of standards, i.e. one company’s operators follow oneprocedure and another company’s operators follow another; andlastly, the Roman adage of “quis custodiet ipsos custodet” – who willguard the guards themselves? – may apply. Delegating too muchcertification autonomy and self-regulation of flight standardsand training requirements to UAS manufacturers couldinadvertently allow those standards and requirements to becomedirectly tied to the OEM products, vice reflective of thelarger aviation standards.

Fortunately, the FAA is not under as much public pressureregarding the integration of these aircraft for civil uses,apart from industry proponents. The public outcry for fasterintegration of UAS is greatly focused on sUAS that fly LoS,largely because of the availability of those smaller aircraftand the utility for small businesses, whose requirements can bemet by the smaller aircraft.

There are other reasons that the public is not as aggressivewith the FAA about these aircraft. In Class G, B, C and Dairspace, overcrowding is a potential issue (this is with theassumption that it will be a very long time before UAS arepermitted, if ever, in in Class A airspace). Chris Stephenson,an operations coordinator with the National Air TrafficControllers Association (NATCA) stated: “To most of us airtraffic controllers, it’s unimaginable. But we’re also smartenough to know that it’s coming … I refer to UAS as the tsunamithat’s headed for the front porch.”30

Despite significant constraints, to include the requirementfor Sense and Avoid (SAA) technology, the BLoS UAS are theaircraft systems that may have the greatest appeal for thosewho can afford to procure them or hire them. For some civilroles, particularly research and emergency services, the UASmust be able to operate in conditions that may be more adverse,30 Richard Whittle and Glen Derene. “Drone Skies: The Proliferation ofUnmanned Aircraft is already Outpacing the Regulations that Govern Them. Isthe U.S. Airspace Big Enough for a Deluge of Drones?” Popular Mechanics,Volume 190, No. 8., September 2013.

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require greater levels of dwell time on missions, distances andaltitudes, i.e. require BLoS capabilities on more robustaircraft.

Conventional wisdom dictates that for BLoS UAS operations,the operator or “pilot” needs a much greater level of aviationeducation and experience for certification and licensingpurposes. As stated by Alan Palmer, a retired general officerand currently the Director of the University of North Dakota’sUAS Research, Education and Training: “The FAA is not going toallow someone to fly a UAS in the NAS if that person is not apilot.”31 In Palmer’s experience of almost four decades ofaviation experience with the military and National Guard, toinclude Predator UAS operations, “pilots with prior flightexperience effectively transfer good situational awareness andmulti-tasking skills from the cockpit to the drone operationsenvironment.”32

Although this philosophy is applicable in certain aircraft,it is not applicable to all. According to a Department of theArmy Civilian instructor with over ten years of experience inteaching UAS flight operations, many initial-entry, post-highschool students in the U.S. Army’s Shadow UAS program actuallyfaired far better that those students that were previousmilitary, civil, commercial or private pilots. This instructorattributed this to the fact that the current generation ofyoung adults has been raised with a completely different typeof technology exposure that provides them with an ability tonavigate user interfaces, menu selections, and “knob-ology” tocommand and control this particular UAS, the Shadow RQ-7B.Conversely, the Predator presents a user interface that is moreconsistent with that of a traditional pilot, thus Mr. Palmer’sexperience that “in cock-pit pilots transitioned well toPredators.”33

This illustrates another part of the dilemma for the FAA indesigning and implementing training programs for such a varietyof different aircraft, ground control stations and userinterfaces. The solution for the sUAS in LoS is quite easy whencompared to the challenge of quickly defining trainingstandards and regulatory requirements for the operators of UAS31 http://www.avweb.com/news/avtraining/drone_pilot_training_forecast_uas208586-1.html32 Ibid.33 Ibid.

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in BLoS efforts. In order to institutionalize trainingstandards, requirement and programs for operators of theseaircraft, the FAA needs to implement the previously mentionedchanges for LoS sUAS and then build upon those programs. Asstated above, the methodologies employed by the U.S. DOT andits subordinate agencies and departments to regulate licensingand endorsements for commercial ground and maritime activitiescould be applied to these more sophisticated aircraft toinclude a significant level of training, testing and oversight.The FAA could also apply training models used by the DoD UASprograms (which include training for all levels of UAS) as wellas DHS.

The operator would have to meet the current regulatoryrequirements for a private pilot’s license in terms of agerestrictions and medical certifications, except that for UAS,the recommended flight physical could be a Class III, becausethe pilot is not actually in the aircraft and therefore shoulda medical crisis occur, there is greater likelihood to sustaincontrol of the aircraft.

The training path would become more sophisticated, dependingon the aircraft operator license/endorsement being sought by anindividual or cadre of operators from a business. As alreadyillustrated, the training requirements for the LoS sUAS wouldbe the least sophisticated, requiring as little as a 16-hourcertification course and approved operations only under 400feet. For fixed wing or VTOL sUAS that are to be employed withBLoS usage, the courseware would then expand on that 16-hourcourse, to become at least a 40-hour course. The instructorwould have to meet the medical requirements and have had theircredentials reviewed and approved by the FAA or the FAA’sdesignated authority; they would also have to teach fromlessons that have been validated by the same level of authorityand conduct training in accordance with the changes that theFAA makes to accommodate licensing of sUAS for commercialpurposes below 400 feet, i.e. in a designated area thatcomplies with Advisory Circular 91-57, currently forrecreational or hobbyist use.34 Otherwise, the process remains34 These requirements are for TRAINING only. Once the sUAS operator receivestheir endorsement form the FAA and moves into a civil role that involvesflying a sUAS BLoS, then the current standards of air worthinesscertification for the aircraft and a COA for operations would be required.This is because of the fact that the aircraft will be working out of visual

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tied to the air worthiness requirements and COAs, which are notthe best way to regulate these small UAS.

For a fixed-wing and VTOL sUAS training program with a BLoSendorsement, the first 16 hours of the course would mirror thatof the endorsement for sUAS LoS operations below 400 feet, asdelineated on pp. 8-9, e.g. basic operational familiarity,checklists, inspections, administration (log-keeping), etc.This next level 40-hour course would also culminate with awritten, sUAS airmen knowledge test, administered by an FAA-designated examiner and include testing material to validatethe applicant’s ability to operate a BLoS sUAS; applicantswould have to pass to obtain the endorsement.35 As statedearlier, the course would also include instructing sUAScommercial operators on compliance with federal regulations, aswell as the fines and penalties for not following establishedregulations. This course could also be applied to the noviceoperator, with credit given to those who can prove previousexperience.36 The rest of the training program should include ablend of classroom and practical experience that includescomponents of this nature:37

Familiarization with mission planning software; Instruction on sUAS control software and simulations; Flight operations to include preflight inspections,

system checks, engine runs and take-off (at least twolaunches in daylight and two in darkness);

Flight operations to include automatic and non-GPSdependent flight modes

Performing emergency procedures;range of the operator. 35 For all other UAS certification programs for aircraft that are operatingBLOS, some level of aircraft-specific operational proficiency test will haveto be administered, whether via simulator or flight operations with a UAS-specific Certified Flight Instructor (CFI). 36 For an individual who already possesses FAA certifications or licenses, orthose individuals that formerly served within the Department ofDefense/Homeland Security as UAS operators, there should simply be aknowledge-based exam that illustrates their understanding of sUAS LOSoperational principles and FAA guidelines for use of “model” aircraft. Uponcompletion of the “waiver exam”, airmen within these categories would thenreceive the FAA endorsement for the level of aircraft they have applied tofly commercially, in this case sUAS.37 Further details on training program specifics can be made available viamore formal business arrangements, subject to non-disclosure.

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Performing recovery, auto-recovery and deep-stallrecovery operations (at least two in daylight and twoin darkness);38

Post- flight-operations; and, Basic maintenance for sUAS, such as calibrations, part

replacement, etc.

It is important to note that if possible, the FAA-designatedtraining authority should try to employ the different forms ofsoftware employed by the myriad sUAS aircraft currentlyavailable. Although the variants of aircraft are increasing,the more sophisticated sUAS rely largely upon two basic formsof software control. If the FAA placed emphasis ondecentralizing training authority to trusted agents that canemploy both types of software, they would essentially betraining a sUAS operator with far greater civil utility.

The Greatest and the Latest: Codifying Training Programsfor the MALE and HALE Systems

Integrating the “big boys” is the one task that will notfacilitate easy or expeditious action; these systems will beundoubtedly the most difficult and latest to be authorized tooperate in the NAS. Fortunately, the attitude of the greaterpublic is more likely to be averse than eager to the idea ofthe MALE/HALE aircraft working in the NAS. This has to do withthe “drone” agenda, i.e. the unspoken perception of malevolenceassociated with the employment of that noun and its associationwith what the military euphemistically calls “lethal effects”.In the eyes of the public, the larger UAS and their weaponryconstitutes little more than “remote-control repression: thedirect application of brute force by a state” and theiremployment by the U.S. has actually done more to incite enemiesof the U.S. than diminish their operations and increase U.S.security.39 The fact that they are tools in the hands of peopleand policy-makers is not always addressed.

38 This component would a place of variance between fixed-wing and VTOL,because of the manner in which the respective airframes land and take-off. 39 Audrey Kirk Cronin. “Death from Above: Are Drones worth it”. ForeignAffairs, Volume 92, Number 4, Jul/Aug 2013. Pp. 44-54.

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Even as these systems are maligned, they are also recognizedfor their potential utility. As stated by Mark Bowden:

Drone technology has applications that go way beyondmilitary uses, of course – everything from domestic lawenforcement to archaeological surveys to environmentalstudies … As for Big Brother’s eye on the sky; authoritieshave been monitoring public spaces from overhead cameras,helicopters and planes for decades. Many people think it’s agood idea. The drone is new only in that it combines knowntechnology in an original way – aircraft, globaltelecommunication links, optics, digital sensors,supercomputers, etc. It greatly lowers the cost ofpersistent surveillance …40

As stated in the previous section of this paper, the trainingand integration of these aircraft involves all classes ofairspace and will absolutely require that the aircraft hasSense and Avoid (SAA) technologies. This adds anothercomponent to the FAA effort to regulate training programs. Alltraining for these MALE/HALE systems will have to include atleast some instruction on the most general components of thoseSAA sensors, along with basics of payload sensors, etc. Thechallenge is to create a training program that satisfies theFAA’s requirement to regulate and integrate but to also keep itgeneral enough that once an operator receives an FAA license,certification or endorsement, they can go one to get employmentwith a company that has different products and aircraft fromdifferent OEM and commercial manufacturers. Once theindividual has their “ticket” and begins to work with aspecific system, they will at least then have the basicunderstanding of the technology and the refine that to thespecific system they are flying.

In order for the FAA to codify standards and requirementsfor training for these aircraft, there must be a committedallocation of resources available. These resources must includethe establishment or identification of flight schools that willbe approved by the FAA for this effort. The FAA-appointedadministrator should provide courses and curriculum designed

40 Mark Bowden. “The Killing Machines: How to Think About Drones.” TheAtlantic. September 2013.

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specifically to meet FAA standards for training, testing andcertification. For this to occur, the FAA needs to solicit fororganizations that have the prerequisite skills and experienceto shape a program that is focused and thorough; that embeds ahigh respect for the FAA regulatory standards and creates a newtype of aviation professional; that does not favor one type orcategory of aircraft system over another within its curriculumdesign and operational training; is specific, yet generalenough for licensed operators to obtain employment in anassortment of civil roles – from research to emergency servicesto deliveries; and fairly represents all stakeholders in theemerging UAS community – industry, civil, state and federalemergency services, academia, science, etc.

The recent efforts of the FAA to competitively select aCenter of Excellence for UAS within the next year are certainlya step in the right direction. In this initiative, the FAAenvisions that the COE will be “a consortium of the FAA,university partners and their affiliates selected by the FAAAdministrator to conduct UAS-related research, education andtraining while working jointly on issues of mutual interest andconcern.”41 In this relationship, the FAA also anticipates thatthe COE will be responsible for matching all funds granted, andalso delegates to the as yet to be determined universities theright to contract as appropriate.42

Whether this implies that the FAA would allow universitiesto ultimately become flight schools by region, state, etc. anddesign curriculum that is unique to each partner is unknown.Also unclear is whether this initiative implies that the FAAwill authorize universities to contract flight schools orcommercial/industry curriculum designers and apply coursewareacross the “consortium”, i.e. the same curriculum for all. Thedanger of transferring too much authority to academia issimilar to the previous discussion regarding the ability of OEMto define training requirements and the potential for conflictof interest; this is the rationale for investing in objective,third-party service providers.

Beyond the scope of the COE consortium, the FAA needs toensure standard practices and training programs for operators.

41 http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ang/offices/management/coe/42 Ibid.

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They need to ensure that all potential operators are taking thesame exam to receive licenses or endorsements. Efforts to unifythese initiatives in a common frame are essential to ensuringpublic safety; clear, transparent and published standards forpotential applicants or those who aspire a career withprogression in the field of UAS; and lastly, easeadministration in terms of expectations for the FAA as anorganization – using the same architecture that it uses atpresent, e.g. ground school, flight instruction, instrumentratings, knowledge tests – administered through regional FlightStandard District Offices (FSDO) and FAA-endorsed UASinstructors.

All candidates for flight training with MALE and HALEaircraft should meet the following criteria before acquiringthe license/endorsement:

Be at least 18-years old; Have completed at least FAA Ground School (for both

MALE and HALE); Have a private pilot certificate with Instrument

Rating (IR) (for both MALE and HALE flight); Be able to read, write, speak an understand the

English language; Accumulate and log a specific amount of training and

experience: at least 75 hours in simulation flight (50as aircraft operator and 25 as payload specialist) andat least 40 hours of flight training with a flightinstructor (at least 8 flights);43

Pass a 100-question aeronautical knowledge test; and, Pass an oral flight test administered by an FAA

inspector, FAA-designated examiner, or authorizedcheck instructor.

For the MALE and HALE aircraft, the formal training processwill greatly exceed that of the sUAS. This is an acceptabledifference that has been proven in concept within the

43 For UAS flight training that does not involve maintain visual contact withthe aircraft, there should be no requirement for day or night flights ascurrently exists for manned aviators. This is because the operator is alwaysin on the ground, usually in a shelter, and the aircraft flies usinggenerally using electro-optical or infrared, which can be employed in hoursof darkness.

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Department of the Army, which segregated the Raven sUAStraining program from the larger aircraft by placing it withits users at Fort Benning, Georgia. There must also be anexploration of what other topics may need to be included, i.e.SAA, Instrument Flight Rules, etc.

As stated above, students must start the program havingcompleted Ground School for both MALE and HALE UAS and alsohave a private pilot license with IR to train as a UASoperators, because of the traditional capabilities andemployment of these aircraft and to validate their trainingcommensurate with manned aviators flying on instruments. Asstated by a 10-year UAS professional, “There is no differencein flying a MALE UAS 10 feet off the ground and 10 miles awaythan a HALE UAS flying at 15,000 feet and 1,000 miles away –the operator is equally “blind” in both situations withoutinstruments.”44 The requirement for IR and SAA technology andoperator training should be absolute.

For the operators of sUAS who desire to fly in BLoSsituations and above 400 feet in the NAS, there would likewisebe a requirement for some level of training on instrumentflying, albeit perhaps not as extensive as the current, full-blown IR certification. The FAA-approved Aviation Training Plan(ATP) would be modular in nature and although an actual systemwould have to employed to facilitate training, the coursedesign would also focused on the basics, so that the conceptscan be applied to other aircraft.

The first module would start with keeping accurate logs forflight and maintenance, as well as familiarizing the operatorwith any technical documentation that is provided from themanufacturer for checking equipment, as well as emplacing anddisplacing the system. The instruction would focus onfamiliarizing the student on the components of a MALE or HALEUAS. As most UAS professionals realize, the aircraft itself isonly one part of the Unmanned Aircraft System. This modulewould include instruction and demonstration of the followingcomponents: Ground Control Station, Ground Data Terminal andthe portable variants of these two components; the AutomatedLanding System, if the system has one, or an overview of thearresting methodology. Once the students completed theclassroom and coursework for these lessons, they would move

44 Jeff Cerecke. Personal correspondence, 1 April 2014.

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into actual hands-on or lab training, which would thenfacilitate their learning to emplace and displace thecomponents of the system.

The second module would cover the management of systemicsupport components and include such things as navigating viaoptics and correlating to maps; radio procedures; system logic;emergency procedures; currency requirements; and missionplanning.

Module three would include the systems overview andfamiliarize the student with software panels to include SAAtechnology, as well as payload controls; the bulk of thismodule would be simulator-based. The ideal simulations forFAA-approved use for UAS training certifications would be thosethat have the greatest utility. Simulations software that canbe programmed to mimic different types of UAS flight controlsystems would be ideal, especially if they can be used onlaptops, so that these lessons can be practiced again and againby the student.

After receiving instruction on what is required to presetthe interfaces for flight and preflight inspections, theinstruction would then address launch and recovery processes.Training would then integrate simulation. Ideally, for the MALEand HALE operators, the student would conduct up to 75 hours ofsimulated flight – 50 as the aircraft operator and at least 25hours of that as a payload specialist. Each of these two,distinct simulator training requirements would be concluded bycheck ride exams, to ensure that the student is competentenough to graduate to actual flight operations.

For sUAS that will be flown in BLoS, the FAA will have tomake a decision regarding a simulator requirement. Due to theparameters of the sUAS systems, it is rare to find associatedsimulators for these aircraft, although some do exist and canbe employed via laptop or gaming technology. Should the FAArequire simulation training prior to actual flight training forsUAS operators in the NAS (i.e. over 400 feet in BLoS flight),then the required number of hours should be less than thoserequired for the MALE/HALE UAS operators. This is because thesUAS are simply less sophisticated systems with higherlimitations in terms of endurance, distances and operations.For the sUAS operators, the FAA could consider 10 hours ofsimulator training for these operators, seven in control oflight and three as a payload specialist.

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The training of optical payload operations is an integralpart of UAS training. Some may argue that this requirementshould not fall within the oversight or regulatory control ofthe FAA. It should be included, however, because it iscomprised tasks that the operator or co-operator must undertakesimultaneously with flight control of the aircraft. Studentsmust learn to be able to manage these functions safely while intraining, so as not to be distracted or unable to integrate thefunctions while in operations. 45

The fourth and final module would be flight operations. Overthe course of this module, the MALE/HALE UAS student wouldacquire the prerequisite 50 hours of flight required to be ableto take the aeronautical knowledge test. The recommendednumber of flights is ten; five would be as an aircraft operatorand five would be as the payload specialist, with the fifthflight of each being considered the “check ride”, i.e. a hands-on examination by the flight instructor with a limited, if any,number of errors allowed. This module would also includepreparing all systems components for the flight, each time theflight occurs, as well as launch and recovery.46

For operators destined for sUAS in BLoS over 400 feet in theNAS, the number of hours required for flight training would befar fewer. There are several reasons for this: the generalsystems limitations of sUAS are generally at least 30 to 120minutes of flight endurance with more limited ranges (althoughas technology grows, these parameters are increasing); the sUASsystems are generally easier to master in terms of launching,flying and landing; the potential emergency procedures arefewer; and emplacing and displacing the system generallyrequires less time. For sUAS flight training, the number offlights required would still be five as an operator and five asa payload specialist, but the logged hours of flight time would45 Because not all UAS in the NAS will be carrying optical payloads, the FAAmay want to consider making it a separate endorsement. As stated above, itcritical to operators in terms of managing in-flight control and systemsmanagement and it is also the key component in choosing to use a UAS forcertain functions, i.e. Search and Rescue (SAR), surveys, etc. 46 The FAA may also choose to teach only the components of flight andeliminate the requirement for launch and recovery and system setup, orinclude those in other, separate endorsements. Given the nature of expandingcivil flight operations, however, it is advisable to maintain these taskswith the flight portion of any training, so that operators have the fullsuite of training.

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likely have to be standardized as minimum windows forcertification, due to the systems limitations associated withsUAS. The standard for sUAS in BLoS over 400 feet in the NASshould be a minimum of 5 hours, due to the fact that manytraining centers may employ a sUAS with 30-minute flightendurance due to cost constraints.

Flying a MALE/HALE UAS in BLoS operations demands a higherlevel of knowledge, skills and experience than flying sUAS. Itis also different from flying a manned aircraft and therefore,although portions of the manned ATP do apply, the pilotexperience is so greatly different that it demands theexpansion beyond private pilot – and with training that isvetted outside the scope of stakeholders in the industry. Inorder to obtain a license/endorsement to be able to fly thesesystems, an applicant will have to be able to pass the skillsand knowledge tests for these higher standards, above. Thisportion of the integration, along with follow-on oversight,will be the most challenging portion of the integrationmandate.

Conclusion

The FAA has processes to be able to integrate newtechnologies and adopt new practices. Historically, however,these processes move very slowly and in part, this is due tothe utter emphasis on public safety and regulatory compliance.Unfortunately, that paradigm is no longer acceptable, given theunprecedented speed that technology is currently promulgating.Although there are timelines established that are meant to givebreathing room to the FAA, they are already being circumventedby an impatient public that is increasingly disregarding theauthority of the FAA. The longer this continues, the greaterthe potential for sustained regulatory anarchy and potentialdanger to the public, i.e. it is just a matter of time untilsomeone does something stupid and gets and innocent bystanderkilled. An effort to at least allow commercial operations forLoS sUAS under 400 feet would at least relieve some of thepressure, but in order to do that, minor changes need to bemade to FAA standards and training must be codified – andquickly.

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Delegating the instructional and testing authoritiesto trusted agents who have proven performance within thefederal UAS community has the potential to alleviate a largemeasure of pressure related to the integration of UAS. Itimmediately taps into training research, development, modellingand methodology that has already occurred for over a decade inthe federal UAS world and allows for the integration ofemerging data as trends continue to develop and technologyevolves. It allows the FAA to facilitate its emergingrelationship with universities under the pending COE endeavor,and to fulfill what part of their responsibility should be –developing strategies and harmonizing standards that meet therequirements of all potential participants – academia, industryand civil/commercial endeavors. Recently, the FAA published aseries of myths that it wanted to debunk.47 One of these had todo with UAS operations for commercial violations whichapparently only become known to the FAA via complaints “fromthe public or other businesses.”48 Efforts to police at themicor level are simply a distraction from the larger challengeand the integration effort should start at this area offriction. No one expects a commercial Predator to be flying inthe NAS looking for potato bugs; there is, however, areasonable expectation that a small UAS under 400 feet could beused commercially for just such an endeavor. In short, the models already exist; the efforts towardcodifying training programs, standards andlicenses/certifications could already be occurring and thusallowing the FAA to focus on other challenging portions of theintegration mandate, such as airspace usage and phased in areaswhere UAS training can occur outside areas currently owned bythe federal government. The airspace management and ATCchallenge alone is enormous. The FAA, along with some significantly powerfullobbyist are starting to influence public opinion for thepositive as citizens begin to understand the utility of thetool, to include the most significant utility – the ability toimpact saving lives.

47 http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsid=76381&omniRss=news_updatesAoc&cid=101_N_U48 Ibid.

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When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the National Trafficand Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) on September 9th, 1966,followed immediately by the Highway Safety Act, he undoubtedlywas aware of the daunting challenges that lie ahead.49 He wasaware that he was going to encounter an enormous amount ofresistance from the automobile industry; in this era, Detroitwas still a powerhouse of commercial and political influence.Nevertheless, the President invoked the legislation, statingthat more than 1.5 million Americans had died on the streetsand highways; three times the amount killed in in all Americanwars up to that date.50 Adding further emphasis, he stated:“Safety is no luxury item, no optional extra; it must be anormal cost of doing business.”51

Those involved in UAS operations understand the UAS have thepotential to bring a further component of safety to the publicin those oft-now mentioned “dirty, dull and dangerous” roles.The public is also starting to grasp the positive offerings ofthe technology. The FAA is, in reality, actually moving at afaster pace than its norm, as its history illustrates. To gotoo fast would compromise safety, but to go too slow alsocompromises safety because people who want to obey the law willstart to ignore it because they see a business opportunity. Bysimply expediting the integration of sUAS, the FAA couldmitigate some of the increasing danger to public safety andconfidence. By implementing codified training measures as ameans of integrating sUAS and subsequently regulatinglicenses/endorsements, they mitigate even more hazards to thepublic.

Focusing on integrating the smaller aircraft that is so muchthe focus of the public at present would provide the breathingroom required to explore extensively the training proposalsofferings herein; it would place sUAS in the public eye, whichwould increase public awareness of their utility. As publicawareness of the positive component of UAS increase, the publicattitudes may help facilitate the harder part of theintegration equation – the medium and high-altitude, longendurance aircraft. Ultimately, it will happen, just asPresident Johnson’s legislative effort ultimately altered the49 http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/president-johnson-signs-the-national-traffic-act...50 Ibid.51 Ibid.

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face of automobile usage, right down to the seatbelts allpeople now wear. Ultimately, people will observe UAS in civilroles and wonder how those tasks were completed before therewere UAS.

Ultimately, the ravens Hugin and Munin will fly everymorning over the vast earth, returning in the evening towhisper into the ear of Odin, telling him everything they saw …legally.

References

Audrey Kirk Cronin, “Death from Above: Are Drones worth it”. Foreign Affairs.Vol. 92, No. 4, Jul/Aug 2013, pp. 44-54.

Mark Bowden. “The Killing Machines: How to Think About Drones.” The Atlantic.Sept. 2013, p. 64.

Richard Whittle and Glen Derene. “Drone Skies: The Proliferation of UnmannedAircraft is already outpacing the Regulations that Govern Them. Is the U.S.Airspace Big Enough for a Deluge of Drones?” Popular Mechanics. Vol. 190, No. 8,September 2013, pp. 78-83.

Federal Aviation Administration. “Expanding Use of Small Unmanned AircraftSystems in the Artic Implementation Plan”. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012,Final. November 2012.

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