RETHINKING THE INDO PAK TIES IN THE CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIC PEACETHESIS.

Somali Mukherjee.

Scope and theoretical basis

India-Pakistan relations are one of the most widelyresearched areas of International Relations and South Asianstudies. The justification of this proposed paper therefore facesa stiff task. The proposed paper is a theoretical study thatseeks to apply the democratic peace proposition (DPP) or thesisto study the role played by different regime types inconstructing relations with India. As the literature survey wouldreadily establish, while there is an enormous body of literatureon geo-political, historical, and realist readings of India-Pakistan relations, and there exists a considerable body of workon Pakistan’s domestic politics, there is no systematic work yeton the subject that applies the DPP to study the orientations,practices, institutional basis, power struggles, and relatedaspects of Pakistan’s myriad regimes in their relations withIndia. The research gap is therefore self-evident. There is nopublished work in the public domain which has applied DPP toIndia-Pakistan relations and this proposed paper is an attempt tofill in this gap.

There is a growing conviction among the scholars thatwidespread democratization will lead to a more peaceful world.One thought provoking question is whether the democracies are ingeneral peaceful , that is the monadic version holds true or arethe democracies peaceful only towards other democracies and doesbehave aggressively towards other non democracies , that is thedyadic version is more plausible. This paper would like to

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investigate some of the contemporary debates regarding thedemocratic peace thesis and would try to assess whether thedemocratic peace holds in the case of India-Pakistan relationsand if so which version is more plausible. This is because whileIndia has remained a democratic polity since independence,Pakistan has been often ruled by military regimes.

Several criticisms can be labeled against this thesis. One,that the literature has been unconcerned about the possible lageffect between a country’s regime change and its foreign conductand between its regime change and the other’s recognition andconfidence in this changei. Further it has been alleged that DPPfails to distinguish between the initiators and defenders ofinternational hostilities. Also as pointed out by Joanne Gowa itfails to distinguish between the norm based and interest basedattributions of the foreign policy conducts. These issues arevital parameters of this study.

It is well acknowledged that often the Indo Pak foreign policybehavior exhibits strong short term orientations and are helplessprisoners of their past memories which often adversely shapetheir future expectancies. Hence, it can be argued that theseties are not affected by the change in regime type. However, thesecond image matters in foreign policy and domestic variablesneed to be investigated systematically to ascertain what kind ofimpact these generate over time. Even if the finding turns out tobe negative, the exercise would carry significant heuristic valuein itself. The second major problem in applying the democraticpeace thesis in case of Pakistan consists of the popularallegation that the military is the real power centre in

i

? Sebastian Rosato,”Explaining the Democratic Peace’,The American Political Sciense Review,Vol 99,No.3,August 2005,pp 468.

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Pakistan’s political system, no matter what kind of regimeactually rules the state. While this is a powerful argument, yettwo considerations stand paramount. First, it does not necessary follow thatcivilian governments in Pakistan carry no foreign policy autonomy and, secondly, thedegree of autonomy or control cannot be pronounced without empirical investigation. .

The Democratic Peace Proposition is primarily based on twoempirical claims that democracies are unlikely to conflict withone another, secondly democracies are more prone to conflict withnon democracies as non democracies are with one another. TheDemocratic Peace Proposition (DPP) can be subdivided into two parts, a) Source ofpeace and b) Patterns of interactions ii.The sources of peace can be dividedinto Political norms (it includes the socialization of leaderswithin the domestic environment, treated amply in the works ofMaoz , Russet, Raymond . It basically emphasizes on non violentconflict resolution. It further opines that non democraticleaders are socialized in an environment in which coercion andviolence are widely accepted as legitimate means for resolvingpolitical disputes. It further presumes that norms of conflictresolution practices employed by the political leaders wheninvolved in domestic disputes are also used when the leaders seekto resolve international disputes and crises. The second premiseon which the sources of peace build upon is the role ofinstitutional structures. It has four propositions: 1) A centralgoal of state leaders is to retain their positions in thedomestic political arena. 2) In all political systems, thedomestic political opponents of a regime will attempt to mobilizepolitical opposition when the domestic and foreign policiespursued by the regime have failed to achieve the stated policygoals. 3) In domestic political system counter elites are betterable to mobilize opposition in order to challenge the incumbents

ii Steven Chan,”In Search of Democratic Peace : Problems and Promise”, Mershon International Studies Review,Vol 41,No 1,May 1997, pp63.

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for their policy failures, 4) In all political systems, stateleaders believe that a foreign policy set back for their countrystemming from a diplomatic retreat or military defeat could posea threat to their domestic political position.

Another contested area is whether democracies are morepacific in their actions towards all other states, i.e. theMonadic version or is the Dyadic version which states thatdemocracies are more pacific in their actions only towards otherdemocracies is more valid. We shall come back to this debateshortly. If one has to trace the origin and the trajectory of the development of DPPone has to definitely start with Immanuel Kant and his immortal work “In PerpetualPeace”(1795) , where he states that a republican form of government is exemplified bythe Rule of Law , provides a feasible basis for the states to overcome structural anarchyand to secure peaceful relations among themselves. DPP can be further traced to thework of Dean Babst in the Industrial Research (journal). Here hereported that “ no wars have been fought between independentnation with elective governments between 1789 and 1941”.Melvin ,Small , David Singer (1976) found that democracies participate infewer wars than non democracies from 1815 to 1964.At present thedebate can be summed up as revolving around three competinginterpretations. Democracies are generally more peaceful than nondemocracies. Democracies are more peaceful towards each other.Democracies are no more peaceful than non democracies.

The survey of some of the major texts in the arena of Indo-Pak relations shows thatthere has virtually been no work on the applicability of theoretical models as theDemocratic Peace Thesis in this field. Various aspects of India- Pakistanties like the psychological dimensions of leaders and the masses,the historical legacy, the nuclear question and the role playedby the outside foreign powers have been exhaustively delved into.However there is a dearth of theoretical explanation of therelationship. And the little theoretical work done is essentiallyrealist in inspiration. The proposed paper is therefore expected to provide

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valuable insights into the domestic-external relations and the general dynamics of theIndo-Pak relations.

The presumptions

The first hypothesis is to test whether the “pact of non aggression” among democraciesnecessarily holds or not. Is true as Doyle has posited that the veryconstitutional restraint, shared commercial interests,international respect for individual rights that promote peaceamong the liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts between theliberal and non liberal societies. Some eminent scholars haveargued that what is important is how constrained the leaders are.For e.g. Morgan and Sally Campbell writes …” our hypothesis isthat governments facing the most decisional constraints… shouldbe least war prone “. It implies leaders who are not electedcould be as constrained or even more constrained than theirelected counter parts. John Mearsheimer has alerted us that thepossibility always exists that a democracy can revert back tobeing an authoritarian state. Although a large number ofcountries have recently adopted the democratic structure ofgovernance (i.e. universal suffrage, multiparty competition,contested elections, and legislative oversight), it is still notevident that leaders and people have internalized such democraticnorms. Hence, further research in this arena should seek to find out how farPakistan’s civilian regimes internalized democratic norms and sought peace withsuccessive democratic Indian regimes or not.

Status quo and revisionist states often have divergentforeign policy orientations regardless of their regime types.Thus young and revisionist democracies may not act like matureand status states. Sorensen et al have maintained that thedemocratic progress made in the “Third Wave” (as proposed bySamuel Huntington) has been fragile, tentative and reversible.

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Rousseau and his colleagues have argued that democracies are lesslikely to be involved in crisis initiation because they aresatisfied with status quo. Therefore the second hypothesis which can betested is whether revisionist democracies are more likely to initiate crisis than matureand satiated democratic powers. The tortuous trajectory of India-Pakistan relations affords an excellent case to test thisproposition.

Kant had proposed three factors that could promotepeace among the democracies; public opinion – it constitutes apowerful force against belligerence .Spirit of commerce thatcontributes to peace and the creation of pacific union amongdemocracies which restrains war among them iii.Russet countersthat public opinion can be quite permissive and often reacts onlyto policies. Walter Lippman has remarked that in their foreignpolicies democracies are likely to be “to be too late with toolittle, or too long with too much, too pacific in peace and toobellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing or too transparent“. This characterization is especially apt in describingdemocracies relations with non democracies. It is pointed outthat established democracies have less confidence in thestability and dependability of their more immature and fragilecounterparts (Russet 1993). Further Maoz and Russet have notedthat when a democratic state confronts a non democratic one itmay be forced to adopt the norms of the international conduct ofthe latter lest it be exploited or eliminated by the nondemocratic state that takes advantage of the inherent moderationof the democraciesiv. All these are open ended research

iii John Macmillan,”Liberalism and Democatic Peace”,Review of International Studies,Vol 33,No 2,April 2004,pp179.iv Barbara Farnham,”the Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception”,International Studies Quaterly,Vol 47,September 2003,pp 180.

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questions, which can be taken up for further investigation.According to Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, minor democracies aremore likely to be challenged by the non democracies. The generaltendency on being attacked is that major democracies seem to bemore restrained while minor democracies seem more war prone,corroborating the claim that “democratic lions squeak anddemocratic mice roar”.

Another point which deserves attention is the fact that thattransparency boosts reciprocal confidence where as its absencecomplicates communication and coordination between democraciesand non democraciesv. The condition of trust does not apply tomixed dyads therefore accounting for their tumultuous relations.Indeed, non democracies lack of trust worthiness and transparencyaccentuates democracies felt need to demonstrate resolve whenfacing them in crisis. Accordingly, further studies may investigate the natureand quality of trust consecrated by the different democratic regimes in their relationswith India. This would necessitate a close study of India’sresponses to peace overtures of such civilian regimes inPakistan, to find what responses were elicited in New Delhi andreasons put forward in support of the same.

The applicability of the proposed model

I propose to apply the DPP in the context of Indo-Pakrelations. Ever since its inception, Pakistan has beenliving under long periods of military dictatorship withshort intervals in the form of civilian rule India cannotremain totally unconcerned because militarism in Pakistanhas been in the past a source of pressure and tension forIndia. The military rulers of Pakistan have invariably

v David L.Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan RTeiter, Paul K.Huth,’Assessing the dyadic nature of the Democratic Peace”,The American Political Science Review,Vol 90,No3,September 1996,pp520.

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always indulged in strengthening their legitimacy bycreating a fear of Indian aggression against Pakistan byjustifying the need to strengthen the military power ofPakistan. I shall explore the rules of Pakistan’s militarydictators, starting from Ayub Khan, whose stated objectivewas the security and preservation of Pakistan and itsideology, as articulated in his autobiography “Friends notMasters”. Apart from the ideology and Kashmir, the mainsource of friction between India and Pakistan at that pointof time was the Indus Water System. After independence Indiahad constructed several multipurpose projects on the easternboundaries of Indus. Pakistan feared that India might repeata 1948 incident that curtailed the water supply .

On the other hand an entente between Pakistan and Chinaevolved in inverse ratio to the Sino Indian hostility, whichultimately climaxed in the border dispute in 1962 .The 1965war began as a series of border flare ups along theundemarcated territory at the Runn of Kutch. The Runn ofkutch conflict was resolved by mutual consent and throughBritish sponsorship and arbitration but the Kashmir conflictproved to be more dangerous. There was a sharp spurt ininfiltrations towards India. Pakistan it seems, hoped tosupport an uprising by the Kashmiris against India. Finallyon September 23, a ceasefire was arranged by the UnitedNations Security Council. In January 1966, Ayub Khan and PMLal Bahadur Shastri signed the Tashkent Agreement. TheTashkent Agreement proved to be the turning point in AyubKhan’s administration.

In February 1966, a national conference was held in Lahore,where most politicians criticized Ayub Khan’s unnecessarycapitulation towards India .In the meanwhile Mujibur Rehmanpresented his 6 point economic and political program for

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East Pakistan’s provincial autonomy. Ayub Khan also lost theservices of his very able foreign minister Bhutto who laterbecame a vocal opposition leader and the founder of thefamous Pakistan’s People Party. In January 1969, severalopposition parties formed the Democratic Action Committeewith the declared the aim of restoring democracy throughmass movement. Ayub Khan reacted by alternating conciliationwith repression Ultimately Ayub Khan invited DemocraticAction Committee to meet him in Rawalpindi , promised a newconstitution and said he would not stand for re election in1970. On March 25 1969 , martial law was proclaimed . AghaMohammad Yahya Khan the army commander in chief wasdesignated the Chief Marshall Administrator. Ultimately AyubKhan announced his resignation and Yahya assumed presidency.

Relations reached a new low when in 1971; India intervenedin support of the secessionist forces in East Pakistan,playing an instrumental role in the creation of Bangladesh.General Yahya launched a new wave of repression in EastPakistan .These events led to the third Indo-Pak war in1971. On 25th March Mujib was arrested and transported towest Pakistan and the west Pakistan forces started executinga planned genocide of the Bengalese. There was an exodus ofabout 100 million Bangladeshis to India. Yahya Khan gave acall to the people of Pakistan to be prepared for a war withHindu India. In October 1971, the uprising in East Bengalgained further strength and momentum due to the organizationof the Bengalese into a guerilla force called the MuktiBahini. Ultimately the Simla Agreement was signed in 1972.Mr.Bhutto declared that his country wanted to make a breakwith the past strife and that he would work for securinggood relations with India.

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The Simla Agreement can legitimately be described as animportant land mark in the bilateral relations of India andPakistan because its provisions successfully provided asound and a practical basis for Indo Pak normalization inthe post 1972 period. It ushered in a new era of good will,cooperation and friendship. It can in fact be described asthe new charter of the Indo Pak détente. Interestingly oneneeds to note the fact that weeks after the Indo-Pak 1971winter war , it was Bhutto who authorized ,orchestrated andadministered scientific research on nuclear weapons and itis he who is known as the father of Pakistan’s nucleardeterrent programme.vi In his book on the PakistanArmy,South Asia expert Stephen Cohen quotes a seniorLieutenant General as warning the late Zulfikar ali Bhuttoagainst using the military to control political oppositiontoo often saying “If you use the stick too often, the stickwill take over”.

Regime of Zia is further regarded as not a healthy factorin the growth of Indo Pak relations. In August 1977, GeneralZia announced the release of nearly 200 prisoners who werelanguishing in the Pakistani jails. India reciprocated thegesture by announcing the release of 200 Pakistani prisonersfrom the Indian jails. In February 1978, Mr. Vajpayee paidan official visit to Pakistan and tried to create a morehelpful and congenial environment. He declared that Indiafully respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity ofPakistan. He emphasized that though India is a big and alarge country it would never play the role of a big brotherin South Asia. Talks in New Delhi produced on 12th April,

vi Shankar Bajpai,”Untangling India and Pakistan”,Foreign Affairs,Vol 82,No.3.May-June 2003,pp125.

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1978, an agreement over the Salal Dam Project . It markedthe ending of a thirty year dispute.

In 1978, Desai – Zia meet at Nairobi further improved theenvironment of Indo Pak relations. In October 1978 , Indiaand Pakistan agreed to open on reciprocal basis consulatesat Mumbai and Karachi respectively. In November 1978, Indiancricket team visited Pakistan and the cultural and sportsrelation between the two countries started to make a goodhead way. The premature end of the Janata era and in June1980, the development of India Pakistan differences over thecrisis in Afghanistan gave a new twist to the Indo – Pakrelations. In 1982, the Indo Pak Joint Commission wasinstitutionalized, which included the sub commissions fortrade, economy and travel. Indira Gandhi received Zia onNovember 1, 1982 , in New Delhi and during their meetingthey authorized the Foreign ministers and Foreign Secretarylevel talks to proceed with the talks leading ultimately tothe formation of SAARC. In the late 1980s Indo Pak settledrelations settled into a pattern of ups and downs. Despitesignificant economic and trade agreements little progresswas made concluding a comprehensive long term agreement tohave non discriminatory bilateral trade. Siachin conflictoccurred in 1984, New Delhi charged Pakistan for arming andtraining Sikh terrorists in Punjab. In December 1985, thevisit of Zia to India, culminated in both the sides agreeingnot to attack each other’s nuclear facilities, ushered in abrief phase of cordiality.

The cordiality evaporated in early 1986, with India’sunhappiness over Pakistan’s alleged interference in Punjaband the bungled Pakistani handling of pan American airlinerin which many Indians died. For its part Pakistan wasdisturbed by anti- Muslim riots in India and Zia accused

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India of assisting political campaign for Benazir Bhutto.Between November 1986 and February 1987, India and Pakistanconducted provocative missile maneuvers along their borderthat raised tension considerably. India’s Operation BrassTacks took place in Rajasthan across Pakistan’s troubledSindh province and Pakistan’s maneuvers were located closeto India’s state of Punjab. The crisis heightened whenPakistan’s premier nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan revealed thatPakistan had manufactured a nuclear bomb. The tensionscreated were diffused at the foreign secretary level talksin New Delhi (January 31st to February 9) during which thetwo sides agreed to a phased troop withdrawal. Sudden deathof Zia in an air crash in August 1988 the assumption of thePrime Ministership by Mrs. Bhutto after 1988 electionsprovided the two countries with unexpected opportunity toimprove relations.

Rajiv Gandhi’s attendance at the SAARC summit in December1988, permitted the two Prime Ministers to establish apersonal rapport and sign three agreements, including oneproscribing attack on each other’s nuclear facilities.However domestic political pressures in Sindh, Punjab andKashmir destroyed the chances for improved relations in 1989and 1990. For her part, Benazir Bhutto backed away from hercomments on Simla Accords and continued to press the Kashmirissue internationally and public opinion forced Rajiv Gandhiand V.P. Singh to take hard line on events relating toKashmir. In fact during her second tenure, the cordialitywith P.V.Narsimha Rao almost disappeared.

Again in June 1991, Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif proposed talkswith India, Pakistan USA , USSR and China to considermaking South Asia a Nuclear free zone but the minority governmentsof Chhandrashekhar and Narsimha Rao declined to participate.

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Nevertheless, negotiations concerning Siachin Glacierresumed in November1992 after a hiatus of three years. Bythe mid 1990S little occurred to improve the bilateralrelations as unrest in Jammu and Kashmir accentuated and thedomestic politics in both the nations were unsettled. Sharifordered Pakistan’s nuclear tests codenamed Chagai 1 and 2,in response to the Indian nuclear tests. However it alsoneeds to be stressed in 1999,it was under Sharif’sstewardship that the Lahore Declaration was signed withVajpayee. Vajpayee inaugurated a bus service that connectedNew Delhi with Lahore, It dawned on the two powers that thepossession of nuclear weapons brought in addedresponsibility to avoid conflicts and promoted the idea ofCBMs.

Eight years of Musharraf era has seen a sea change in theIndo- Pak bilateral relationshionship. General Musharrafwhen he staged his coup against Sharif was the mostunpopular in India than perhaps any Pakistani leader sinceJinnah. He was the architect of the Kargil misadventure.Musharraf started his India file by virtually rejecting theLahore Declaration made by Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif andeven refused to recognize the 1972 Simla Agreement Mrs.Gandhi and Zulfikar ali Bhutto . He maintained this positionduring the Agra summit in July 2001 when he refused toaccept any reference to the cross border terrorism inKashmir. The seminal event that changed the course of theIndia Pakistan relationship was the attack on the IndianParliament in December 2001. The relationship between thetwo countries remained frigid, so much so that the SAARCmeeting was cancelled because of the Indian Leader’s refusalto sit at the same summit table with Musharraf .There afterthe momentum was built slowly resulting in Vajpayee’s visit

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to Islamabad in January 2004, when the Islamabad Agreementbetween the two countries were signed, resuming thebilateral composite dialogues suspended during Musharraf’scoup d ‘ etat. Musharraf ordered all cross border Jihadiactivities to stop. Vajpayee conducted the first freeelections in Indian Kashmir which resulted in the ouster ofthe unpopular government of Mufti Mehmood. The bilateraltalks led to the opening of bus travel between the twoKashmirs for the first time in nearly sixty years. Thereafter one can safely conclude that the Indo – Pak peaceprocess had made some good strides while the General was incommand.

India is convinced that Pakistan was involved in theattacks against the Indian parliament in 2001 and thoseperpetrated in Mumbai in 2008. Pakistan on its part ispersuaded that India is fanning the flames of BalouchSeparatism and manipulating the Afghan government to catchit off guard. At the beginning of 2012, South Asia was stillheld hostage to the India Pakistan confrontation. Indiawanted bilateral negotiations on Kashmir while Pakistanfavored international mediation. During his recent visit tothe US, the Indian PM Manmohan Singh rejected Pakistan’sdemands that Kashmir dispute should be settled in accordancewith the UN resolutions. Manmohan Singh said “I havepublicly stated that there can be no redrawing of borders(in Jammu and Kashmir) …but our two countries can worktogether to ensure, that these are borders of peace…”.

Myra MacDonald, the author of “Heights of Madness” a bookabout the Siachin War between India and Pakistan noted thatfor the first time in the history of Pakistan, a civiliangovernment was pushing a comprehensive constitutional reformpackage through the parliament to curtail the undue

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provisions introduced by the dictators to tighten their gripon power. Zardari had urged the parliament to passamendments that would turn him into a titular head andremove his rights to sack the PMs which has been used byprevious military dictators. General Kayani had repeatedlysaid that he wanted to keep the military out ofpolitics .However the environment at Pakistan wasvolatile,with Zardari imposing Governor’s rule in Punjab toreplace an administration run by the Sharif brothers,TheTaliban insurgency also fast spreading from the tribal areasto The North West Frontier Province. The situation wasalready on the edge with the government agreeing on aceasefire with the Taliban militants in the Swat Valley inexchange for introducing Sharia laws .Further corruptionallegations had tainted the Zardari government, and despitesuccessive orders from the Supreme Court proceedings werenot initiated against Zardari by Geelani,who had throughsuch acts earned Contempt of court proceedings against him.An editorial in the Hindu, offered a very interestinganalysis suggesting that rather than being investigated andbeing branded as a Corruption infested regime, the Zardariled government would prefer a coup by the military so thatthey go down in the annuls of history as a Shaheed.

The beginning of 2013 had been marked by a number ofskirmishes along the Line Of Control. Mid January onwardsthe region had witnessed perhaps the worst bout of fightingin the last ten years. Despite talks between LieutenantVinod Bhatia and Major General Ashfaq Nadeem, where anattempt was made to ease the situation ,the skirmishescontinued unabated resulting in eight Indian casualties andnine Pakistani casualties. The incident incited even theusually calm Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh to say

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that “after this dastardly act, there cannot be business asusual with Pakistan”. As a sign of protest the IndianGovernment decided to send back Pakistani Hockeyplayers ,who were in India to participate in the HockeyIndia League. The death of the Indian soldier SarabjeetSingh in the Pakistani custody further worsened thesituation.

2013 was the year of transformation in Pakistan, manyanalysts hoped that the transfer of power to a new civiliangovernment would perhaps bring a thaw in the tension,however the Pakistani Jihadi forces or Army does not seem tobe in the mood to allow it. It was amply manifested when onthe eve of high profile talks between Sharif and Dr.Singh,militants crossed the Pakistani border and killed eightIndian military personnel.The deliberately timed attackresembles earlier attempts by the terrorists to frustratethe bilateral process.

The New Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif, must indeedovercome the obstacles in his own country before trying tonegotiate peace with India. Both the Jihadi elements and theArmy have vested interest in exacerbating tensions withIndia, lest they face a curtailment in their powers orworse, deep cut in the defense budget. Matters worsened whenthe Mumbai terror mastermind Hafeez Saeed was seen to leadthe Eid prayers before a massive gathering at the GaddafiStadium in Lahore on August 9.He was also seen to lead aparade of several thousands on August 14, to mark thePakistani Independence day. The final nail in the coffin wasthe announcement by the Pakistani Finance Minister , that aplan to grant India Most Favoured Nation , was at presentoff the table.

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Shelling already marked the heaviest exchange since the 2003ceasefire. Indian analysts remain convinced that Pakistanuses shelling as a cover for Jihadi elements crossing theborder to attack the Indian installations. Rough estimatesshow ,there have been 42 ceasefire violations in 2013 ascompared to 17 in 2012.Elections scheduled in India atApril,May 2014,may further compel the present UPA governmentto take a hard line and this fact has been corroborated withthe coming to power of Congress backed Presidentialcandidate, Pranab Mukherjee and his deft handling anddismissing of the pending mercy petitions, which ultimatelyled to the hanging of Kasav, the lone survivor of the Mumbaiattackers. Of late the Indian Army has become a majorirritant in the Indo-Pak relations. Aggressive statementsagainst Pakistan, army’s veto against Siachin reflect theincreasing role of army in political affairs.Atpresent ,settlement regarding Kashmir,Siachin and Sir Creekseem unlikely.The heralding of 2014 ,could witness the‘game’ to grow more perilous.US withdrawal fromAfghanistan,would leave both the countries to jostle forpower in the region.Further it shall again revet theattention of the Pakistani terror groups back on India,asits prime enemy.The internal dynamics of both thecountries,like the secessionist and Jihadi elements alongwith the Pakistani military establishment and the newlyelected Indian government are going to play crucial role inshaping the foreign policy dynamics in the days to come.

The quest for security has been at the heart of Pakistan’sforeign policy since independence, and it is perhaps notunnatural as it was the prodigal child of partition and itsaccompanying bloodshed. The cessation of Bangladeshdelivered a major blow to the ideology which justified its

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existence, therefore the Indo-Pak conflict is bothasymmetric and enduring but the power asymmetry is truncatedand mitigated by many factors in particular the weaker statePakistan has been able to reduce the asymmetry throughstrategy, tactics and alliances with outside powers andacquisition of qualitatively superior weapons.vii The Indo-Pak conflict is simultaneously over territory, nationalidentity and power position in the region. The political

vii Edited by T.V.Paul , The India Pakistan Conflict An Enduring RIVALRY,Cambridge University Press,UK,2005.

Bibliography

1) Dennis Kux , India- Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue? United Institute of Peace, Washington, 2006.

2) William R. Thompson and Richard Tucker, “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.41, No.3, June 1997, pp. 428-454.

3) David L.Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, Paul K.Hath, “Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace”, The AmericanPolitical Science Review,Vol. 90, No.3, September 1996, pp. 512-533.

4) James Mahoney,”Qualitative Methodology and Comparitive Politics”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No.2, February 2007, pp.122-144

5) James Mahoney,Erin Kimball,Kendra L.Koivu,”The Logic of Historical Explanation in Social Sciences”, Comparative PoliticalStudies, Vol. 42, No.1,January 2009, pp. 114-146.

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status of Kashmir from Pakistan’s perspective is unfinishedbusiness of partition along religious lines in 1947.T.V.Paulsays some of India’s domestic constraints arise from thetendency of democratic states not to make territorialconcessions, especially to non democratic states.

6) John Gerring and Rose McDermott, “An Experimental Template forCase Study Research”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.51, No.3, July 2007, pp/ 688-701.

7) John Gerring,” What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?”,The American Political Science Review,Vol.98, No.2, May 2004, pp. 341-354.

8) Shaul R.Shenhav, ”Political Narratives and Political Reality”,International Political Science Review”,Vol.27, No.3, July 2006, pp. 245-262.

9) Sumit Ganguly, The Conflict Unending. India Pakistan Tensions since 1947, Oxford University Press, UK, 2002

10) Kuldip Nayyar, Wall at Wagah India Pakistan Relations, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003.

11) Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict Paths to Peace, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2003.

12) T.V.Paul, ed., The India Pakistan Conflict An Enduring Rivalry, CambridgeUniversity Press , UK 2005.

13) Major General (Retd) Mahmud Ali Durrani, India and Pakistan: The Costs of Conflict and the Benefits of Peace, Oxford University Press, Pakistan, 2001.

14) Major General Ashok Krishna, P.R.Chari, ed., Kargil: The Tables Turned, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 2001.

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CONCLUSION

Since Pakistan has gone through several democratic regimespunctuated by spells of military rule, it is a fit case toinvestigate if the nature of Pakistani foreign policytowards India has varied by the nature of regimes or not.The proposed research questions which can later be delvedinto are the following ones: The chief research question is‘has democratic Pakistan been more peaceful towards Indiacompared to the dictatorial regimes?’Does the Indo Pakistancase corroborate the claim that mixed dyads are more warprone than dyads with similar regime types? What should

15) Rafiq Dossani and Henry S.Rowen, ed., Prospects for Peace in South Asia, Stanford University Press, CA, USA, 2005.

16) Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak, Happymon Jacob, eds., India and Pakistan :Pathways Ahead, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, 2007.

17) J.N.Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, Routledge, London , 2002.

18) Summit Ganguly, ed., India’s Foreign Policy Retrospect and Prospect, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2010.

19) Sebastian Rosato ”Explaining the Democratic Peace”, The American Political Science Review,Vol.99, No.3, August 2005, pp-467-472.

20) Steve Chan,”In Search of Democratic Peace:Problems and Promise”, Mershon International Studies Review,Vol.41,No.1, May 1997, pp 59-91.

21) John Macmillan, “Liberalism and Democratic Peace”, Review of International Studies, Vol.30, No.2, April 2004, pp 179-200.

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count as evidence of peace? Is covert violence and aid toterrorism war like situation? To what extend are democraticfactors responsible for hostile image building? Is there anyevidence that people’s and civil society movements reducethe prospects of war? Does the dyadic democratic theory holdin this critical bilateral tie.

It is perhaps time to take a fresh look at the Indo Paksituation, realism still holds but the answer to bombs bydelivering more bombs shall only wreak in more destructionand havoc and increase human suffering.It is about time thatthe Pakistani military comes out of its insecurity andrealise that though low intensity conflicts may continue amajor war is unlikely due to the presence of nucleardeterrants.More and more CBMs (Confidence Building Measures)should be encouraged between the two countries. Thesuccessive Indian governments too need to abandon hawkishstands and take a more humane approach. We need tocomprehend the internal multiple cancers that are bleedingPakistan, that it is country ravaged by hunger, illiteracy,diseases, with only a small ‘selectorate”, to borrow fromBueno De Mesquita controlling the reins of power. Doescommon man want war? Following Amartya Sen one can say thatpeople”s capabilities need to be improved and only fruitfulengagement can reduce the flame of mutual mistrust burningthe two countries. More people to people contacts, and tracktwo diplomacy needs to be encouraged, forums like SAARCshould be reformed .We need to take advantage of thegerminating seed of democracy in Pakistan, we can perhapsrethink our foreign policy orientation and attain a delicatebalance between realism and constructivism, which with timeand effort might hail in an era of at least “peaceful co-existence”.

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