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Record: 1Projections and relations.Sainsbury, R.M.Monist; Jan98, Vol. 81 Issue 1, p133, 28pArticle*CONDUCT of life*ETHICSHUME, David, 1711-1776Focuses on various subjectivist views about morality, while highlighting DavidHume's views on morals. Hume's view of value and necessity; Projection ofsubjective human feelings; Details on projection; Relational nature of moralproperties.1161400269662822966http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=822966&site=ehost-live<A href="http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=822966&site=ehost-live">Projections and relations.</A>Academic Search Complete

PROJECTIONS AND RELATIONS1. SPREADING VERSUS GILDINGAlthough many different views have been called "projectivist",[ 1] quite a number can be collectedby the thought that some concepts are defective because they are "projections" of subjectivehuman feelings. The act of projection is a transition from a feeling to a concept. Differentdiagnoses are available of why the upshot is defective.

( 1) The act of projection does not issue in the sort of concept that could be intelligibly applied tothings other than feelings. If someone suffering a gloomy feeling calls the sky gloomy, he cannotbe understood as having said anything both literal and intelligible. There is no concept of gloomwhich can be significantly applied to the sky.

( 2) The act of projection does not issue in the sort of concept that could be truly applied to thekinds of things it is supposed to apply to. We can make sense of a sky being gloomy, as we canmake sense of a stone thinking of Vienna; but we know (merely by reflecting on the concepts) thatno such claim could be literally true.

( 3) The act of projection issues in a merely relational concept which, while perhaps attributablewith literal truth, is not the kind of concept the projectors wanted to attain or thought they wereusing. We can say with literal truth that a sky tends to produce gloomy feelings, but (or so theexample needs to continue) in calling the sky gloomy we are unsuccessfully aiming to ascribe to itan intrinsic monadic property. Our use of the concept (whereby we try to ascribe an intrinsicmonadic property) fails to match the only viable account of what it could be referring to (a relation).

The third kind of diagnosis of how projection may lead us astray may be reminiscent of various"subjectivist" views about morality, in particular those of David Hume. However, there is serioussimilarity only upon an interpretation of Hume I would dispute. I think Hume believed that our valueconcepts and discourse are perfectly in order: there are literal truths of the form "this is virtuous","this is beautiful", "this is vicious". As I shall put it, there is no global first-order error in these areas;in particular, no gap between our use of our moral concepts and what they are about. However, forHume there are various errors at the reflective or philosophical level. Some people think of moraldistinctions as made by reason rather than by feeling; and some people think of moral propertiesas monadic rather than relational. These errors do not, however, of themselves lead to error in ourevaluative judgements.

In this, Hume's view of value contrasts with his view of necessity, according to which we areinvolved in global first-order errors. There are no truths of the form "this and that are necessarilyconnected" (for distinct this and that) but we have many false beliefs (or illusions of belief) of thisform. The pattern of diagnosis is close to ( 1) above: the origin of our idea of necessity prevents itbeing the kind of idea that it makes sense to apply to anything. Those who say that Hume'sprojectivism about necessary connection is of a piece with his projectivism about morals are, onthe view I defend, mistaken.[ 2] Projection in the case of necessity is errorinfected; in the case ofmorals, our projections (if they deserve to be so-called) are faultless. We must make room for twokinds of mental operation: when Hume talks, in connection with necessity, of the mind's "greatpropensity to spread itself on external objects" (T 167) he is talking about an operation which leadsto error; but if we allow that his view of morals is adequately expressed in terms of the mind's"productive faculty ... [its] gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed frominternal sentiment" (2E 294), then we must think of gilding and staining as quite different fromspreading, since these processes do not of themselves lead to error.

An account of morality which relates it closely to human sentiments is attractive for a number ofreasons, including the promise of a good account of the nature of moral motivation and aconsistency with naturalism. But if, as in Hume, it takes the form of a relational theory, oneaccording to which a moral property is a disposition to produce a certain kind of sentiment, there isan apparent threat of an unattractive relativism. How is a relational theory to avoid allowing that thesame thing might tend to produce the sentiment of approbation in some and the sentiment ofdisapprobation in others'? If this is a possibility, it would seem that the very same thing must countas both virtuous and not virtuous. Barring expressivist accounts, this apparent inconsistencywould, it seems, have to be dealt with by relativising either the notion of virtue (replacing it by:virtuous from this perspective, or for this group), or else by relativising truth.

The main philosophical aim of this paper is to explore how one can have a relational theory ofvalue ("relationalism") without relativism. The proposal I urge is that although the relational natureof moral properties is a morally neutral fact, the same does not hold for a specification of the kindof human subject standing at the response end of the relation (the "subject term"). As should notreally be surprising, there is no saying what is the best type of moral response without taking updistinctively moral positions. I see no reason to think Hume would disagree.

Some interpretations of Hume's theory of morals, for example that he was an expressivist, or thathe was offering a semantic account of moral terms, would make the problem that I want to addressinvisible to a Humean, so the next three sections of the paper are mostly exegetical.

2. WAS HUME AN EXPRESSIVIST?Hume sums up his relational account of morality as the hypothesis

that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or qualitygives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. (2E 289)

On my reading, he takes moral judgements to be capable of absolute truth, that is, truth notrelativized to a perspective or anything else, so that no relativization is available to save thesupposition that a given quality or action, in a given circumstance, is both virtuous and not virtuousfrom contradiction. To make room for this interpretation, I need first to eliminate the reading of himaccording to which he is an expressivist, one who thinks that moral judgements cannot beevaluated as true or false.

In an explicit discussion of the roles of truth and falsehood in morals, what he fingers as not true orfalse are passions, volitions and actions:

Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement ordisagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever,therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false,and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, arenot susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities,

complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tisimpossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary orconformable to reason. (T 458)

The context is that Hume is trying to refute the view that moral distinctions are discovered byreason. He suggests that since all that reason can discover is truth or falsehood, to suppose thatreason discovers moral distinctions would be to suppose that these are distinctions of truth andfalsehood, that, for example, to be virtuous is to be true and to be vicious false. But moraldistinctions are distinctions among actions, passions and volitions: that is, it is these we say aremorally good or bad. Hence if these distinctions were discovered by reason, they would have toconsist in the discovery that some actions etc. are true and some are false. But since actions etc.cannot be true or false, their moral qualities cannot be discovered by reason.

One may not think that this is a very good argument, since it would as well show that thearithmetical properties of numbers cannot be discovered by reason; but it is an argument whichhas no tendency to support expressivism. It says that the objects of our moral judgements areneither true nor false, but it does not speak to the nature of the judgements.

Perhaps Hume is interpreted as an expressivist for the following reason: sentiments are passions,and passions are neither true nor false, so sentiments are neither true nor false, but sentimentsare the basis of morality. If we could add that a moral judgement consists in a sentiment we wouldhave a valid basis for attributing expressivism. However, potential evidence is marred by a certainvacillation in Hume. Sometimes he treats a sentiment as like a sensation, sometimes as apropositional attitude, that is, a mental state with a content typically specified by a thatclause. Wehave a tingling feeling, which is a sensation, and we feel that a feather is touching us, which is apropositional attitude, that is, an attitude to a content. Sensations are clearly not, on Hume's view,so much as candidates for truth and falsehood. Given that he can just mean sensation by"sentiment", being told that sentiments are not candidates for truth or falsity does not yieldexpressivism. We would need to find textual support for the view that sentiments in the sense ofpropositional attitudes are attitudes to contents which are not properly evaluable as true or false.However, it is doubtful whether Hume has the resources to make an unequivocal claim to thiseffect.

Given the vacillation, a frequently cited ground for an expressivist interpretation no longer functionsas evidence:

Morality... is more properly felt than judged of .... (T 469)

When, shortly thereafter, he explains what he means by saying that morality is properly felt, hegives feeling the character of a propositional attitude:

We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases; but in feeling that it pleases aftersuch a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. (T 471)

The content, of such attitudes is, on the face of it, truth evaluable; and I am not aware of anypassage which, while holding firm to the attitude interpretation of "sentiment", denies the truth-aptcharacter of the content of the attitude.

A possible interpretation of the Treatise and Second Enquiry sees these works as advancing aview Hume describes, but goes on to repudiate, in "Of the standard of taste":

All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself. (OST 268)

"All sentiment is right" entails that there is no distinction of true and false in a sentiment-basedtheory of morals, which would be enough to make it reasonable to count it as expressivist.However, as I said, he goes on to repudiate this view immediately after stating it, and it remains tofind words which justify ascribing it to a younger Hume.

Early and late, there is plenty of direct evidence against an expressivist interpretation. Forexample, he clearly labels as "true" claims about the value of virtue:

But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society than those here delivered,which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach herwith ease, familiarity, and affection? (2E 279) Further evidence will be adduced in [Section] below,where I justify the claim that Hume believed that there was no global first-order error in morals.This involves attributing to him the view that we are sometimes right and sometimes wrong in ourmoral judgements, a thought which is not available to an expressivist.

A theory according to which sentiment plays a crucial part in the account of moral and naturalbeauty and deformity need not be a theory upon which there is no truth-evaluable judging that anobject is beautiful or deformed. In the Treatise, Hume asks us, in this connection, to recall what hehas said in Book 2 about pride, humility, love and hatred. While pride (for example) is a passion,and so not of itself evaluable as true or false, belief enters the picture: being proud of somethinginvolves believing that it bears some special relationship to oneself.[ 3] Analogously, anexpressivist interpretation must not only show that sentiments are crucially involved and are nottruth-evaluable; it must also show that nothing truthevaluable is involved.

In other cases Hume makes plain that the fact that sentiment is involved in drawing a distinctiondoes not show that truth or falsehood fail to engage with the things distinguished. Consider thisclaim:

There is nothing but the feeling, or sentiment, to distinguish the one from the other (T 624).

Here "the one" is memory and "the other" imagination. No one could seriously suggest that Humemust say that a judgment to the effect that such and such is an idea of memory rather thanimagination is not truthevaluable just because we must, on his view, feel things in order to be in aposition to make such a judgement at first hand. So Hume's insistence that something which is nottruth-evaluable is essentially involved in the formation of moral judgements should not lead us to

suppose that he thought, or should have thought, that the judgements themselves were not truth-evaluable.

3. A SEMANTIC THEORY?The effect of giving sentiment a central role may be not to deprive moral judgements of truthaptness but rather to construe their subject matter as including the sentiments themselves. Thequotation given at the start of [Section]2 might support this interpretation:

[the hypothesis we embrace] defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to aspectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. (2E 289)

One might interpret "defines" in the way it is most likely to be used nowadays, supporting theinterpretation by a supposedly cognate use of "mean":

when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from theconstitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. (T468)

Taking definition and meaning at their twentieth-century face value, Hume would seem to beoffering a subjectivist semantic analysis: an utterance of "This is vicious" means the same as, andcan be defined as, "I have a sentiment of blame from the contemplation of this". However, I do notthink we are compelled to understand Hume in this way.

The second quotation is the only one, so far as I am aware, which uses 'mean' or its cognates in astatement of the connection between virtue and human responses. On several other occasions onwhich Hume uses 'mean', it is best understood in the sense of 'refer to'. The two quotations of theprevious paragraph are inconsistent unless that is the right interpretation of second, for Humeexplicitly contrasts a definition with a synonym (T 77). There is no doubt that Hume thought that insincerely calling something virtuous we would be expressing our sentiment of approbation (thoughalso, on my view, doing something else as well, namely saying, truly or falsely, that the action wasvirtuous). To say that, if sincere, we express this sentiment is consistent with claiming that ourjudgement does not have as its content that this sentiment is present. We could consistently allowthe possibility that someone should insincerely but truly call something virtuous; his insinceritymeans that there is no approbation to be expressed.

Hume's conception of definition makes it quite distinct from semantic analysis. For example, on hisview, to define causation is to say, in some appropriately revealing way, what causation is. For allone can tell in advance, there may be more than one equally good way of saying what somethingis; and this is just what, according to Hume, we find in the case of causation. This would beunintelligible if definition were semantic analysis: there could not be two correct analyses of thesame thing, each drawing on different concepts. In the same vein, we should see the firstquotation (from 2E 289) as saying succinctly what virtue is, rather than as giving a "definition" of aword in the sense of semantic analysis. It resembles, both in its structure and in its status, the

second definition of causation: a cause is the earlier member of a pair of events apt to get aspectator into the grip of a regularity, but this feature of causation is not vouchsafed merely by anunderstanding of the word 'cause'.

Slightly earlier in the same paragraph as the second quotation (from T 468), there is another typeof point which might suggest a subjectivist interpretation:

The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till youturn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises inyou, towards this action. (T 468)

We should not read these words as entailing that in saying that the object is vicious you say thatyou find a sentiment in your breast. The quotation enjoins you to pay attention to your feelingswhen you are trying to determine whether an action is vicious; but this does not entail that theupshot of your determination has a content involving reference to these feelings. Likewise,suppose you wish to know how much fuel you have left. The tank is opaque, and in any case hardto see. It is good advice to turn your gaze away from the fuel tank and towards the fuel gauge. Butthis does not at all suggest that in saying that the tank is three quarters empty you are reallysaying that the gauge registers 1/4.

Understanding words like 'magnetic' or 'memorable' requires appreciating something relational ordispositional. It is not just that something is magnetic only if it has a tendency to affect otherobjects in certain ways, and that something is memorable only if it has a tendency to be relativelyeasily remembered by ordinary humans (as opposed to by electronic circuits or by Memory Man).The further point is that knowledge or approximate knowledge of such facts is involved inunderstanding the words 'magnetic' and 'memorable'. However, although Hume clearly says thatvirtue is, in a somewhat similar way, relational, he does not liken the meaning of 'virtue' and relatedwords to that of words like 'magnetic'. Were he to have done so, he would have made one of hisown theses inexplicable: that at the level of reflection, some people make mistakes about themetaphysical nature of values, thinking, for example, that beauty is "in the objects" rather than "inthe mind". This would be inexplicable if the relational or "in the mind" character of values wassomething which had to be appreciated by anyone who grasped the relevant vocabulary.

We must, on the view I attribute to Hume, think of 'virtue' and virtue as in some respects related as'weight' and weight. Weight is relational: it is a disposition to affect things in a certain way in acertain gravitational field. Knowing this relationality is not, however, a necessary condition forunderstanding the word 'weight'. Likewise, the relational nature of virtue is not somethingvouchsafed by understanding the word 'virtue'.

Understanding the verb 'taste' as it occurs in such a sentence as "This tastes bitter" involvesappreciating a relational matter: a taster, or group of tasters, needs to be contextually suppliedbefore we can assess the statement. The same is not true for the ascription to objects ofadjectives like 'bitter': we can understand a sentence like "This is bitter" without appreciating some

hidden relationality. However, it is quite consistent with these facts that the property of being bitteris relational, to be identified, for example, with the property of tasting bitter to most people. Notevery relationality, not even every philosophically important relationality, enters into semantics.

Hume does advance semantic theses relevant to morals. For example, he says that "Had not mena natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it could never be excited by politicians; nor wouldthe words laudable and praiseworthy, blamable and odious, be any more intelligible than if theywere a language perfectly unknown to us" (T 578). This gives a necessary condition forunderstanding the evaluative words. But not every such necessary condition for understandingmust enter into the content of the words to be understood. Hume would accept that one cannotunderstand colour terms unless one is sighted; but this does not mean that being sighted mustsomehow feature in a specification of the meaning of such terms.

Another semantic thesis is that a word like 'virtue' "implies praise" (OST 267; cf. E 173); but thatdoes not bear on the question whether the relationality of virtue itself enters into the word'smeaning.

4. VARIETIES OF ERROR4.1 There is no global first-order error

A claim concerning some particular action or character that it is virtuous counts as a first-order ornon-reflective one. It simply uses the notion of virtue, and does not engage in any reflection on themetaphysical status of virtue. By contrast, claims that virtue is "in the mind" or "in the objects" arereflective or second-order claims: they attempt to express something about the metaphysicalstatus of virtue, and should emerge from philosophical reflection on its nature.

The most general reason for thinking that it never crosses Hume's mind to suppose that there isglobal first-order error in value judgements is that there is no reason to doubt that his conception ofdiscernment, just as much as our own, is factive. If the problem is to explain the basis of ourdiscemment of moral distinctions, there must be distinctions to be discemed. So the very way inwhich Hume frames the problem presupposes that there is no global first-order error.

More detailed evidence comes from cases in which Hume says that there is error, but it is localizedand explained, and he gives hints about how to avoid it. For example, if you think your enemy isvicious, you need to pause, and consider whether you have not been led astray by partiality:

It is only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, thatit causes such a feeling or sentiment as denominates it morally good or evil. It is true, thosesentiments from interest and morals are apt to be confounded, and naturally run into one another.It seldom happens that we do not think an enemy vicious, and can distinguish betwixt hisopposition to our interest and real villainy or baseness. But this hinders not but that the sentimentsare in themselves distinct; and a man of temper and judgment may preserve himself from theseillusions. (T 472)

One would not talk of occasional illusions unless one thought there was also, on occasion,correctness, that is, truth.

The thought that our sentiments may need correction is not confined to the Treatise. For example,in trying to give an even-handed division of labour between reason and sentiment in the secondEnquiry, Hume writes:

... a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. (2E 173)

We can make sense of correcting a false relish only if we are in an area free of global error.

Hume displays a somewhat varying willingness to explain error as a failure of match betweenfeeling and its object, or as a defect in the sensibility. The willingness is at its height in "Of thestandard of taste", where he uses the tale from Don Quixote to suggest that the tasters would haveshown just as much delicacy of taste, that is, would have been just as right, though not provedright, had the key never been found. This is because taste ought to respond to certain "qualities inobjects":

Though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities inobjects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there arecertain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings. (OST273)

This makes room for the possibility of some "unfitted" quality giving rise to the relevant feeling in acreature whose state is "defective":

Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculatedto please, and others to displease; and if they fail of their effect in any particular instance, it is fromsome apparent defect or imperfection in the organ .... In each creature there is a sound and adefective state; and the former alone can be supposed to afford us a true standard of taste andsentiment. (OST 271)

So local error can be made sense of and explained in terms of the defective state of the judgingsubject ("many and frequent are the defects" OST 273), with the suggestion that the defectivenessconsists in a failure to be fully and properly responsive to the nature of the object in question.

Hume is not consistent through his writings on the question of error. In the Treatise, not long aftermentioning the illusions to which partiality may give rise, he assimilates knowledge of value tointrospection, and taking the latter to be infallible, concludes that the former is likewise:

... the opinions of men, in this case, carry with them a peculiar authority, and are, in a greatmeasure, infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain whichresults from the view of any sentiment or character; and, as that pleasure or pain cannot beunknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any

character as every one places in it, and that it is impossible in this particular we can ever bemistaken. (T 547)

This is not consistent with the "illusions" and "false relish" of the passages cited above. It is alsoinconsistent with the genuineness of moral distinctions. Assuming Hume allows moraldisagreement, the only way to accommodate the infallibility of both parties is to deny that there areabsolute moral distinctions to be discerned: we would be driven either to expressivism (describingthe disagreement in terms other than an inconsistency of content) or to relativism (supplyingdifferent relativizations of the content or of the evaluating concept). On my interpretation, thispassage has to be written off as an aberration.

4.2 There is widespread second-order error

It is hardly surprising that Hume should say that many people make mistakes about themetaphysical nature of values, for if they did not there would be nothing new or striking about hisown view. Putting it roughly, the position is that whereas, according to Hume, values are "in themind", people tend to think they are "in the objects", and this is a mistake:

. . . with regard to beauty, either natural or moral, the case is commonly supposed to be different[from, e.g., vengeance]. The agreeable quality is thought to lie in the object, not in the sentiment.... (TS 218)

We have seen that the "in the mind" nature of values does not entail that we are in first-order errorabout them. But what exactly is this nature?

5. RELATIONALITY AND RELATIVITY5.1 Relationality

We can distinguish two strands in Hume's views about the connection between sentiments andvalues. At the purely metaphysical level, he says that beauty and worth are relative to sentiments.In a more epistemological vein, he says that we can distinguish beauty and deformity, virtue andvice, from one another at first hand only by using feeling or sentiment (though not by using onlythese). This epistemological view seems to me hard to refute; my concern in this paper is themetaphysical one.

Hume is quite clear that moral and natural beauty and deformity are "relative" to sentiments("beauty and worth are merely of a relative nature" [TS 163]), but he represents the doctrine in twoinconsistent ways, on occasion (a) identifying the value with a perception or sentiment, and onoccasion (b) identifying it with the power to produce such a perception or sentiment.

(a) If the beauty or value is itself a perception, then it is quite straightforwardly "in the mind", beinga mental state:

The beauty is not a quality of the circle .... It is only the effect which that figure produces upon the

mind .... (2E 291-2)

(b) He also says that the beauty or value is a power in the object to produce a sentiment in us, forexample:

beauty is nothing but a form, which produces pleasure, as deformity is a structure of parts whichconveys pain; and... the power of producing pain and pleasure make in this manner the essence ofbeauty and deformity .... (T 298)

However, he can easily slide from identifying the value with a relation to identifying it with itsmental term, as in these words which occur a few lines before those just quoted:

... beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as... is fitted to give a pleasure andsatisfaction to the soul .... Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants ofbeauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence. (T 299; cf. OST 229)

If beauty or worth is a power in the object, then it is "in the object", and so, it would seem, not "inthe mind". The inconsistency between the ways (a) and (b) of putting his doctrine can be paperedover by taking powers to be unreal, or not really "in the objects", as when Hume contrasts, asinconsistent, the view that beauty is "something real" with the view that it is "the power ofproducing pleasure" (T 301). He explains the "unreality" of powers, or their failure to be "in theobjects", by the fact that they can be changed without any change in the object:

Now, it is evident, that this sentiment must depend upon the particular fabric or structure of themind, which enables such particular forms to operate in such a particular manner, and produces asympathy or conformity between the mind and its objects. Vary the structure of the mind or inwardorgans, the sentiment no longer follows, though the form remains the same .... (TS 164)

The view I shall discuss conforms to (b), and regards the "unreality" of powers as amounting to nomore than their relationality.

Hume clearly saw a difficulty for the relational view: it seems to entail that the same object can beboth beautiful and deformed, both virtuous and vicious, since the same object may be disposed toproduce both pleasing sentiments of approbation (in some people) and uneasy sentiments ofdisapprobation (in others): relationality of value seems to lead to relativism. In "Of the standard oftaste" he expresses a fully relativistic position:

... each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even perceive deformity, whereanother is sensible of beauty .... To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless anenquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to the disposition of theorgans, the same object may be both sweet and bitter; and the proverb has justly determined it tobe fruitless to dispute concerning tastes. It is very natural, and even quite necessary, to extend thisaxiom to mental, as well as bodily taste. (OST 229)

These sentences are not asserted, but presented for discussion, and Hume registersdisagreement with them. It is much harder to say how he thinks the relativistic conclusion is to beavoided. The problem is not one of how we could know whether something is vicious or virtuous.Rather, the seeming possibility that the same thing should be both virtuous and vicious (relative todifferently structured minds) undermines the way we think about morality, and appearsinconsistent with Hume's own attitude to it, according to which the claim that, for example, it isvirtuous to be just, is patently intended to be inconsistent with the claim that it is not virtuous to bejust.[ 4]

Hume has various lines of response. (i) He stresses the analogy between values and secondaryqualities, reminding us that the relationality in the latter case does not prevent our forming aconception of a "true and real colour" (OST 233). (ii) He considers ways in which a differentresponse to the same object can be blamed on a defect of one of the responders. (iii) He stressesthe fact of human uniformity, and considers two cases of souls structured quite differently from ourown ("superior beings", and a pervert).

5.2 The comparison with secondary qualities

On several occasions, Hume, following Hutcheson, compares values with secondary qualities, forexample:

a late Philosopher has taught us, by the most convincing Arguments, that Morality is nothing in theabstract Nature of Things, but is entirely relative to the Sentiment or mental Taste of eachparticular Being; in the same Manner as the Distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arisefrom the particular feeling of each Sense or Organ. Moral Perceptions therefore, ought not to beclass'd with the Operations of the Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments. (lE, 13,appended as a footnote in later editions; cf. T 469)

Hume claims that according to the "modern philosophy" secondary qualities are perceptions (e.g.,lE 154), but the view required to make the analogy with values, considered in the way I haveelected to discuss them, is that secondary qualities are powers to produce perceptions.[ 5] Thereare several reasons for being suspicious of the analogy. For example, it may be protested that inthe case of the secondary qualities the "perception" is just a sensation, whereas in the case ofvalues, Hume often envisages the response being a propositional attitude: feeling that somethingis virtuous. Again, whereas one might develop the doctrine of the secondary character of somesensible qualities in purely causal terms, it may be that one would prefer to use a normafive notionin connection with values: the mental term of the relation should be not the actual effects of theobject in question, but the effects it should have on a properly structured mind. The feature of theanalogy with which I am concerned is whether it can assure us that there is no inevitable slide fromrelationality to relativism. The second alleged disanalogy is relevant to this and will be discussed in[Section]6.1 below, but the first is not.

In two passages, Hume uses the analogy to reassure us of the reality of moral distinctions even

given the relational system. One is in the Treatise:

Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat, and cold, which, accordingto modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: and this discoveryin morals... has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more,than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, andunfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour. (T469)

The discussion which follows the comparison fudges the issue. We are led to expect that thecomparison will assure us that there is no more lack of reality in moral distinctions than indistinctions of, for example, colours. But the explicit assurance we get is that our sentiments arereal, and lead us in paths of righteousness; a very different matter, and a point which does not initself block relativism.

A footnote in "The Sceptic", though designed to achieve the same thing, is almost asdisappointing:

Were I not afraid of appearing too philosophical, I should remind my reader of that famousdoctrine, supposed to be fully proved in modern times, "That tastes and colours, and all othersensible qualities, lie not in the bodies, but merely in the senses." The case is the same withbeauty and deformity, virtue and vice. This doctrine, however, takes off no more from the reality ofthe latter qualities, than from that of the former; nor need it give any umbrage either to critics ormoralists. Though colours were allowed to lie only in the eye, would dyers or painters ever be lessregarded or esteemed? There is a sufficient uniformity in the senses and feelings of mankind, tomake all these qualities the objects of art and reasoning, and to have the greatest influence on lifeand manners. And as it is certain, that the discovery above-mentioned in natural philosophy,makes no alteration on action and conduct; why should a like discovery in moral philosophy makeany alteration? (TS 166)

We do not know how much, according to Hume, the relational theory of tastes and colours takesoff from their reality, especially given his willingness elsewhere to contemplate the explicitlyrelativistic conclusion that something may be both sweet and bitter (OST 229). One would hopethat the sentence "Though colours be allowed to lie only in the eye... "would conclude with anaffirmation of the absolute nature of our ascriptions of them, but instead the discussion drifts off inthe direction of the suggestion that painters and dyers are estimable, which they might be even iftheir subject matter were shot through with relativism; and towards an assurance which mayamount to no more than that speculative views have no practical consequences.

Even if we accepted the analogy, and accepted that the relational character of sensible qualitiesdoes not lead to relativism, we would still need to understand how the inference can be avoided.Here and in other passages on the same topic, Hume stresses the uniformity of mankind. In thecontext, this suggests the hypothesis that we prevent relativism by fixing the subject term of the

relation as all mankind (or some suitably selected majority of it). The uniformity among mankindwould then exclude the possibility of a value producing inconsistent responses in the designatedsubject term. I suspect that the early Hume's thinking (especially in the Treatise) scarcely wentbeyond this idea, but that he later refined it quite considerably (especially in "Of the standard oftaste"), in ways I go on to discuss; and when he offers the refinements, he shows that he cannotaccept that the uniformity in mankind is enough to block relativism.

5.3 Defects in responders

Except when carried away by Cartesian excess (see end of [Section]4.1) Hume allows for variouskind of error in moral judgements: (a) we might mistakenly take a pleasure arising fromcontemplating something other than a morally valuable quality for the kind of pleasure distinctive ofmoral approbation (T 472); (b) we might not be sufficiently informed or clear for our response to beappropriate (2E 172); (c) we might not be in the right state: we might be partial, prejudiced, orinexperienced, etc. (T 472; 2E 273; OST 233-4; TS 240). These defects can be specifiedotherwise than as failures to appreciate natural or moral beauty or deformity, so they could featurein a specification of the relevant power without loss of illumination: it's the power to produce therelevant responses in people free from these defects. It is now at least on the cards that the threatof relativism has been met: for it is not obvious that the same thing could produce inconsistentresponses in non-defective subjects.

In his earlier writing, Hume seems to think that the possibility of non-defective but conflictingresponses is not worth taking seriously:

In what sense we can talk either of a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty, shallbe considered afterwards. In the meantime it may be observed, that there is such an uniformity inthe general sentiments of mankind, as to render such questions of but small importance. (T 547)[6]

But in some of his later writings, he does admit the possibility. For example, in "Of the standard oftaste", he stresses that though many divergences can be explained in terms of error, there aredivergences, especially those arising from individual differences of "humour" or cultural andhistorical differences, which cannot:

... where there is such a diversity in the internal frame or external situation as is entirely blamelesson both sides, and leaves no room to give one the preference above the other; in that case acertain degree of diversity in judgment is unavoidable, and we seek in vain for a standard, bywhich we can reconcile the contrary sentiments. (OST 244)

The "blameless" nature of the difference means that neither side is in error in any of theindependently specifiable ways (e.g., is partial, inexperienced, or whatever). In the case of suchdivergences, "there is no standard by which they can be decided" (OST 244). So at least for thesecases the problem of relativism remains. And it spreads out to the other cases as well. For if there

is even a single case in which something can count as virtuous (relative to one non-defectivesubject) and not virtuous (relative to another), the structure of virtue appears to prevent us seeingany cases as genuinely absolute. One would have to admit, it seems, that virtue is fundamentallyrelative, though this might be masked by the cosy conformity of consensus.

5.4 Uniformity and differently structured minds

Hume discusses two cases of beings who are not uniform with the rest of us in their moralresponses: a pervert, and "superior beings". The cases ought to reveal how Hume treats the threatof relativism: if he says the maverick responses or failures to respond show blindness to moraldistinctions, he is clearly resisting relativism and then we need to see if this is based on taking themajority response as the term of the relational moral properties. If he says that these cases showthat the same thing can have apparently inconsistent moral properties, then he must be convictedof caving in to relativism.

In a letter written to Hutcheson before volume three of the Treatise was published, Hume obliquelypoints out that the moral philosophy they share is essentially unchristian. Reading between thelines, the reason is that a Christian God is supposed to be able to engage in moral thought at firsthand, for example, to prefer the virtuous to the vicious, to think justice a virtue and avarice a vice.Yet a Christian God is not supposed to have the ordinary structure of human sentiments. OnHume's and Hutcheson's view of morals these positions are inconsistent.

If Morality were determined by Reason, that is the same to all rational Beings: But nothing butExperience can assure us, that the Sentiments are the same. What Experience have we withregard to superior Beings? how can we ascribe to them any Sentiments at all? They haveimplanted those Sentiments in us for the Conduct of Life like our bodily Sensations, which theypossess not themselves. I expect no Answer to these Difficultys in the Compass of a Letter. (L 39)

Nor, one suspects, did Hume expect an answer in any compass. Hutcheson was a professedChristian (though he had already had trouble from the Church on account of lectures at Glasgow inwhich he proclaimed a sentiment-based moral philosophy), and so open to the difficulty; Humewas not. A Christian cannot say that God cannot make moral distinctions, for what God cannot docannot be done, so one would end in the sceptical position that there are no moral distinctions tobe made. A Christian, therefore, cannot accept a sentiment-based morality. Hume, by contrast,would be happy to say that the so-called superior beings are morally blind; though of course hisprudence would prevent there being any written evidence of such a view. The responsive failuresof superior beings thus do not in Hume's system generate any pressure towards relativism, thoughHume's unwillingness to engage in any open discussion of the issue means that we cannot use itto throw light on the details of his relational theory.

Hume discusses a case of someone whose "perverse" frame of mind prevents the occurrence ofthe sentiments the rest of us feel:

... where one is born of so perverse a frame of mind, of so callous and insensible a disposition, asto have no relish for virtue and humanity, no sympathy with his fellow-creatures, no desire ofesteem and applause; such a one must be allowed entirely incurable, nor is there any remedy inphilosophy. He reaps no satisfaction but from low and sensual objects .... Should I tell him of theinward satisfaction which results from laudable and humane actions .... he might still reply, thatthese were, perhaps, pleasures to such as were susceptible of them; but that, for his part, he findshimself of a quite different turn and disposition. I must repeat it; my philosophy affords no remedyin such a case .... (TS 169)

In this passage, Hume cunningly shifts the reader's attention away from the problem of relativismto a problem about securing conviction. While we might all agree that a moral philosophy cannotbe expected to provide recipes for convening the perverted, it can be expected to give anilluminating description of what the actuality or possibility of perversion shows. Should we say thatthe pervert is blind to features we detect? Or should we say that he exemplifies the relativisticconsequence of a relational philosophy of value, providing an example of a single thing which isboth good and bad (relative to different sensibilities)? Hume seems anxious to avoid the latteroption, but it is not clear how he thinks it can be done.

6. DERELATIVIZINGIf the term of the relational evaluative properties is uniquely fixed, relativism (as I have understoodit) is blocked. We cannot fix the term as everyone, since some people make mistakes; we cannotfix it as all those not suffering from these defects . . . (here follows a list) .... for Hume allows, andwe must agree, that we still may not attain uniqueness: we cannot preclude the possibility that thesame object should give rise to different sentiments in different people even if they are free from alllisted defects. I would urge that we cannot fix the term as the majority, for even the majority mightbe in error.[7] I am not sure whether on this point I am in agreement with Hume. He regardsconsensus as a good sign that one is on the right track (e.g., in "Of the standard of taste"), but thatis not the same as saying that it is constitutive of correctness (cf. Savile 1996). He also thinks thatin morals we must adopt a general viewpoint, and that doing so helps distinguish distinctivelymoral sentiments from private sorrows and joys (2E 273). On the other hand, his historicalperspective, including various discussions of "barbarous ages", makes it likely that he was awarethat majorities could err; and it seems unlikely that he would think that the majority of hiscontemporary Scots, or British, or Europeans, should be fingered as the keystone of his moralphilosophy. In our day, we are vividly aware that a whole culture may be driven mad.

This section explores two alternative approaches to the problem of relativity. The first continues inthe present mode, regarding the relational philosophy as complete, in a way which precludesrelativism, only when a unique term for the relation has been specified. The second approachrejects the presupposition of previous approaches, and claims that although relationalism canproperly insist that there is a unique term, it can relegate to the level of first-order moral judgementclaims concerning what that term is. The existence of a unique term is a meta-ethical thesis; theidentification of it involves judgements of value.

6.1 An ideal observer?

No one could object to the truth of the view that a virtue is something which tends to produce anapprobative response in someone who is a good judge of virtue. Since the notion of a good judgecould build in anti-relativistic features (it could be stipulated that good judges never disagree), wehave found a potential anti-relativistic term for a relational theory. However, to leave things thuswould be unsatisfying. It is not obvious that the dissatisfaction is rightly identified as circularity, forour theorist is not "defining" virtue in a semantic sense. The second definition of causation throwslight on what causation is, even though it makes use of the notion in doing so, in a way that wouldbe unsatisfactorily circular if something semantic were being attempted. However, to use the goodjudge in the simple way envisaged would be to fail to meet Hume's philosophical ambitions, whichare ones we should share. He would want to ask: what is it to be a good judge? What facultiesdoes the judging draw upon? How can we tell a good judge from a bad one? So the originalquestions about goodness in actions or characters would simply re-emerge as questions aboutgoodness in judges of actions or characters.

We might be able to use what is at bottom the idea of a good judge, or ideal observer, in a wayconsistent with Hume's overall aims. The starting point is to allow that a person's sensibility, hiscollection of his dispositions to sentiment-related response or what Hume called his "frame", canitself be an object of moral judgement, and thus something that may give rise to sentiments ofapprobation or disapprobation in that very subject or in others. This means that a subject cancoherently think that his frame is capable of improvement.[8] This could arise on general grounds(for example, extrapolation from past improvements). One could also imagine a subject comparinghis frame with another frame and finding the comparison to be attended with a preferential feelingfor the alternative. This might lead to changing to the alternative frame. On this basis, one mightform some kind of limit notion, for example, defining an ideal observer as one whose frame is notcapable of improvement: that is, a self-satisfied frame, not disposed to respond with greaterapprobation to any distinct frame. Then one could derelativize the relational view by saying that avirtue is something which would give rise to the approbative response in an ideal observer; or thatgives rise to an approbative response which would survive arbitrary improvements in the frame.[9]

The proposal founders on three problems, each enough on its own to cast doubt on the thoughtthat we can in this way construct a unique ideal moral observer. If there are many ideal observers,then the threat of relativism re-emerges.

First, there is no reason to assume that moral judgements are stable under improvement inframes. Consider a judgement which expresses some finely balanced moral preference, say that itis morally better that a supermarket be built on this spot than that the ancient forest be preserved.The general consideration, even though accepted, that one cannot definitely rule out that asuperior frame would have a different response, need not be debilitating. However, if presentedwith a frame one accepted as superior, which responded in favour of the forest, a change of heartwould be required. But this does not preclude a further refinement involving a change back. The

issues are delicately balanced. Improvement might consist, at a first stage, in a greater sensitivityto matters favouring the opposite verdict to one's current one; but subsequent improvements onthat improvement might involve increased sensitivity to matters which would lead one back toone's original verdict. So at the third stage one might return to the original judgement, though nowbasing it in a significantly enhanced appreciation of the factors involved.

Secondly, even starting from the same point, there seems to be no guarantee that there is aunique chain of improvements, or that diverse chains will converge. It cannot be ruled out that Icould coherently regard a frame which delivered the verdict that p as superior to my own and alsoa frame which delivered the verdict that not-p. Both frames might be streaks ahead of mine in theirmoral sensitivity and sophistication, and ranking them other than as equal might be beyond me.Distinct chains with the same starting-point might lead off in different directions and there is noreason to suppose that they ever grow together again.

Thirdly, there is no guarantee that chains of improvement with distinct starting points will converge.Perhaps all improvements on a frame which favoured the supermarket would favour thesupermarket, and all improvements on a frame which favoured the forest would favour the forest.[10]

It would be foolish to suppose that we can say what is involved in being a unique ideal observer,thereby specifying a unique term for a relational philosophy of value. However, the notion of anideal can be made use of in a weaker way, presented in the next section.

6.2 A morally substantive but unspecified term

A relational theory is hard put to specify a unique term of the relation, but it cannot allow that thereare distinct terms, on pain of relativism. If this is accepted as the problem, the solution isdetermined: a relational theory must claim that there is a unique term (to address the secondcomponent of the problem), but should not specify it (to address the first). The specification can beleft to first-order moral enquiry. I do not pretend to find this view in Hume; but I do claim that itwould fit his pronouncements well. So the proposal is this:

there is a unique frame such that something is virtuous iff apt to produce approbative sentiments inthat frame, and is vicious iff apt to produce sentiments of disapprobation in that frame.

A satisfier of the unique quantification can be called "the ideal frame". Thus in one respect thepresent proposal resembles that of [Section]6.1. But unlike that proposal, there is no attempt to pindown the details of the ideal frame (though some "formal" constraints can be reasonably imposed).

This theory contrasts with unsatisfactory close alternatives. For example, the proposed theorydoes not say that something is virtuous iff there is a frame in which it is apt to produce approbativesentiments; that would unsatisfactorily resolve any first-order dispute in favour of the disputant whoapproved. The proposed theory does not say that something is virtuous iff it is apt to produceapprobative sentiments in all frames; that would unsatisfactorily resolve any dispute in favour of

the disputant who disapproved. There is no frame concerning which the proposed theory says thatsomething is virtuous iff apt to produce approbative sentiments in that frame; that would mean thatthe meta-ethicist must have already formed a conception of a frame which would resolve everymoral disagreement, a rich enough conception for him to have a de re attitude to it. Finally, theproposed theory does not say that something is virtuous iff there is some frame in which it is apt toproduce approbative sentiments and not virtuous iff there is some frame in which it is not apt toproduce approbative sentiments; that would lead to the conclusion that the action is both virtuousand not virtuous, which would have to be understood relativistically to preserve consistency.

The derelativized or absolutist character of the theory does justice to the felt nature of values. Ifyou and I disagree on some moral issue, I do not have to think you a bad character or onesuffering from some independently identifiable defect or distortion, but I do have to think that youare incorrect; so I could not consistently reject the conclusion that your frame is in the respect atissue less good than mine, for it fails to distribute its approbation and disapprobation correctly. Ican be deferential or timid, but, expressivist views aside, I cannot consistently reject this opinion ofyour frame without going back on my moral opinion.

I think this absolustism extends across worlds: any true moral judgement is necessarily true.(Modal variation must hold constant morally relevant features of the actual object of judgement.)The proposal could accommodate this addition, if desired, by inserting a necessity operator justafter the uniqueness quantifier, taking the rest of the sentence as its scope. One might alsoreasonably think that the proposal is itself necessary (and a priori).

Value contrasts with weight, concerning which we are relativists. The default setting for the term ofthe relation is the earth's gravitational field, but we can easily allow context to fix another setting,even when the default setting is also salient in the context, as can be shown by the natural, andpossibly true, reading of: "Even though now into his third day of weightlessness, the on-boardcatering has been so effective that the astronaut weighs only four ounces less than he did at blast-off." The modal character of our weight relativity is flexible. "You can't make me lighter by takingme to the moon" would reasonably be heard as true as uttered in a weight watcher's club, but asfalse as uttered in connection with a discussion of the appropriate strength of ladder to use for thespeaker to descend from his space ship to the moon's surface.

There is no immediate inference from the relational theory as stated to the Humean conclusionthat whenever moral judgements are made sincerely and at first hand, the subject's sentiments areengaged. This accords with the distinction between the metaphysical and the epistemic theory,made at the start of [Section]5.1 above. The epistemological thesis can, however, be in partexplained by the metaphysical one: if virtue is a tendency to produce a feeling, it's not surprisingthat this is how it generally comes to our notice, and that without the feelings we are handicappedin judgment; indeed, we could not make them "at first hand". However, at least on some views ofhow powers and grounds are related, we cannot rule out that a virtue should also produce effectsother than those which make it a virtue. These effects might make its presence knowable, even if

not knowable as a virtue. There are some similarities and contrasts with causation. The fact that acausal pair tends, by definition, to get us into the grip of a regularity makes it unsurprising that thegrip should be prominent when causes are detected. Indeed, Hume clearly supposes that, just asthe basic case of awareness of virtue involves approbative sentiments, the basic case ofawareness of causation involves experience of grip. However, for causation his theory clearlyallows other routes to causal knowledge (and he occasionally mentions them, e.g., at T 131). Forexample, if we know that every F is followed by a G and that all As are Fs, we can work out fromthis together with the first definition of causation that As cause Gs. Since there is nothing in thecase of virtue corresponding to the first definition of causation, there is no parallel route,independent of the characteristic response, to knowledge of virtue as virtue.

A frame is individuated as a collection of dispositions to respond in certain ways. It can be thoughtof as a function from inputs of actions or characters to moral judgements. The road to thejudgement involves a response of approbation or disapprobation. Some judgements will beabsolute (of the form "This is good"), some comparative ("Both are good, but this is better"). Giventhat good and evil often come inextricably entwined in actions and characters, some judgementswill compare quantities ("There is more evil in it than good"). Though it is not part of the presentproposal to specify the ideal frame in any detail, some common themes in moral philosophytranslate as constraints upon it. For example, most moral philosophies will impose consistencyrequirements, some of which can be roughly summarized by saying that the ideal frame willrespond to the same with the same judgement, to like with like judgements. Transitivity ofcomparative judgements is another likely requirement. One could debate whether the functionshould be partial or total. A form of totality would be this: for every properly presented[11] singletoninput, the ideal frame judges that it is good, or that it is bad, or that it is indifferent, or that it ismixed; for every mixed singleton input the ideal frame judges that its good exceeds its evil, or thatits evil exceeds its good, or that its good equals its evil; for every comparative case, the framejudges that the one is better than the other or that they are morally equal. Partiality would consistin a general or more specific relaxation of these requirements. The notion of an ideal frameconnects with that of moral truth by the equivalence: a moral judgement concerning something istrue iff that thing, properly presented, would produce that judgement in the ideal frame.

Hume has a number of substantive things to say about actual human frames. At least at our best,we lack certain specific defects; we seek to "move some universal principle of the human frame"(2E 272); and we are benevolent, sympathetic and humane (2E 231). It would be wrong simply totreat these remarks as if they could translate into partial specifications of the ideal frame, for theyare presented more as observations about how humanity is than as blueprints for how it should be;yet, of course, Hume is well aware that we are not all, or not always, as he describes, for we domake mistakes, and suffer false relishes and improper sentiments. Hume himself tends to stepback: not putting his finger on error, but explaining why something is esteemed erroneous; notidentifying vice, but explaining why something is accounted vicious; describing, rather thanexplicitly endorsing, the opinion of all mankind. The present proposal offers a framework whichaccommodates this. Let Hume insist upon the existence of a unique subject term for values, and

explain its workings in terms of sympathy and humanity; then he can offer further specificationswithout commitment, saying only that these are what are generally esteemed to be components ina properly structured frame. In this way he can combine commitment to the basic nature of valueas relational while avoiding relativism, and without committing himself to endorsing the specificfirst-order moral views he naturalistically reports.[12]

R. M. Sainsbury

King's College, London

NOTES1. Price (1993) distinguishes three different views deserving the name.

2. Contrast Stroud (1992, 623): "The same treatment is clearly to be applied both to the idea ofgoodness or badness and to the idea of necessity, and for the same reason." And Blackburn(1986, 56): "No error occurs in moralizing or modalizing .... "In this essay, Blackburn does notsharply distinguish Hume's view about causation (no error here, I agree) and his view aboutnecessary connection (fife with error, as I interpret Hume). This raises a question about how tointerpret Hume's view that the idea of necessary connection forms part of the idea of causation. Ihave suggested that an idea's part can fix a possession condition for it without constituting anecessary condition for its extension: Sainsbury (forthcoming).

3. Kevin Mulligan reminded me of this point.

4. I assume that apparent relativizations which really amount to a closer specification of the objectunder discussion are set aside. Thus it might be right for Susan to inject the poison into herhusband but not fight for Sally to do "the same" because Susan's husband has asked her to endhis terminal suffering, but Sally's has not (indeed, he is not suffering at all!).

5. I am not aware of any passage in which Hume expresses the view that secondary qualities arepowers. But his vacillation between powers and mental terms in the case of beauty and worthsuggest that this distinction was of little significance to him.

6. I wish I could confidently identify the passage he refers to as "afterwards"! He is not consistentthrough his writings on the question of the degree of uniformity. Contrast, for example:

this uniformity among human kind, hinders not, but that there is a considerable diversity in thesentiments of beauty and worth. (TS 163)

7. This claims the epistemic possibility of actual error, not that in some possible world, the majorityin that world are morally blind. The latter possibility can be catered for by fixing the term of therelation rigidly. A red thing (it might be held) is one disposed to produce certain sensations inpeople as we actually are, which allows for the possibility that red things should fail to produce therelevant sensations. A virtuous deed is one disposed to produce the approbative sentiment in

people as we actually are, which allows for the possibility that virtuous things should fail to producethe approbative response in anyone. This takes a step towards fixing the tenn against modalvariation. But it does not address the point that, for all we know, actual human responses aredefective, and capable of improvement. Arguably, this makes for a theory with a quite differentstructure from, for example, a relational theory of colour.8. In discussing the pervert Hume says "He has not even that sense or taste, which is requisite tomake him desire a better character...." (TS 169). The notion of improvement required here is netrather than on-balance: one frame is better than another only if in no respects worse. To simplifysubsequent discussion, I disallow trading of strengths against weaknesses, and so disallow that aglobally superior frame may be locally inferior.9. The thought is reminiscent of Wright's notion of superassertibility (1992); and of a positiondiscussed by Blackburn (1984,198ff).10. Blackburn (1984,199) summarizes some of these possibilities by saying that a diagram ofpotential improvements might have the pattern of a tree, branching in divergent directions from itsroot. He thinks that he can dispose of this possibility by drawing on material from Hume's "Of thestandard of taste". The upshot is that "an evaluative system should contain the resources totranscend the tree structure" (1984,201). I am not sure that I follow his reasoning, but his emphasisat the crucial point on how someone engaged in judgement must proceed ("as soon as I hold thata case begins to look as though the tree structure applies... I would also judge that one or both ofthe rival sensibilities is capable of improvement", 200, stress in original) suggests that he wouldregard something closer to the position I advocate in [Section]6.2 as properly sustained by hisconsiderations.11. "Proper presentation" covers a number of things; for example, if the cases mentioned in n. 4(above) are presented as the same, they are not properly presented.12. Ancestors of this paper were given at the 1996 Conference of the European Society forAnalytic Philosophy at Leeds, at the Edinburgh New Philosophy Society, and at the PhilosophySociety of the University of Kent. My thanks to participants on those occasions for many helpfulsuggestions.REFERENCESBlackburn, Simon (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Blackburn, Simon (1986). "Morals and Modals." In his Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1993, 52-74. Originally published in Macdonald, Graham and Crispin Wright(eds.) Fact, Science and Morality, 119-141, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

Hume, David: (All page numbers are as given in the Past Masters CD-ROM: The Complete Worksof David Hume, InteLex, 1992. The pagination and textual sources there referred to are specifiedbelow.)

T: (1739-40). A Treatise of Human Nature. Page numbers from the revision by P. Nidditch ofSelby-Bigg's edition, Oxford: Clarendon (second edition), 1978.

E: (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Page numbers from the revision by P.

Nidditch of Selby-Bigg's Enquiries... by David Hume, Oxford: Clarendon (third edition), 1975.E: (1751) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Page numbers from the revision by P.Nidditch of Selby-Bigg's Enquiries... by David Hume, Oxford: Clarendon (third edition), 1975.TS: (1752) "The sceptic." Page numbers from Eugene F. Miller's edition of Hume's Essays: Moral,Political and Literary, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987.

OST: (1757) "Of the standard of taste." Page numbers from Eugene F. Miller's edition of Hume'sEssays: Moral, Political and Literary, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987.

L: J. Y. T. Grieg (ed.) The Letters of David Hume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932. References tothe letter number (not page number).

Price, A. W. (1992). "Three types of projectivism." In Hopkins, James and Anthony Savile (eds.)Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art, 110-128, Oxford: Blackwell.

Sainsbury, R. M. (forthcoming). "Hume and necessary connection". Manuscrito.

Savile, Anthony (1996). "Of the standard of taste." In Lovibond, Sabina and S. G. Williams (eds.)Essays for David Wiggins, 130-146, Oxford; Blackwell Publishers.

Stroud, Barry (1992). "Ayer's Hume." In Hahn, Lewis Edwin (ed.) The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer,609-632, La Salle, IL: Open Court.

Wright, Crispin (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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