Normativity and Self-Relations [Preprint; final version forthcoming in Philosophical Studies]

Abstract. The paper criticizes two prominent accounts which purport to explain normativity by appealing to

some relation that one bears to oneself. Michael Bratman argues that one has reason to be formally coherent

because otherwise one would fail to govern oneself. And David Velleman argues that one has reason to be

formally coherent because otherwise one would be less intelligible to oneself. Both Bratman and Velleman

argue in quite different ways that rational coherence is normative because it is necessary for the instantiation or

promotion of the independently normative self-relation they invoke. But the paper presents a similar scenario

which arguably exposes a failure of extensional adequacy common to both accounts: one can instantiate the

self-relation in question without being formally coherent. A brief diagnosis is offered for why two such

different accounts turn out to be vulnerable to a similar counterexample, suggesting that other accounts which

appeal to self-relations in a broadly similar way might also suffer from the problem identified here.

Keywords Normativity; Rationality; Instrumental rationality; Self-Governance; Self-intelligibility

1 Introduction

Considerable attention has been drawn recently to accounts that invoke some self-relation to explain

normativity. Two prime examples include understanding oneself, and governing oneself. Thus for example,

David Velleman argues that a practical reason is a consideration that, if one responds to it, would enhance one’s

understanding of oneself. And Michael Bratman argues that one has reason to make one’s mental attitudes

formally coherent because otherwise one would not be self-governing.1

This paper aims to cast doubt on the idea that self-relations can explain normativity in this way, i.e. by

showing that a reason to behave in a certain way derives from a reason to instantiate or promote some such Y. Levy Jesus College, Univeristy of Oxford, Oxford, UK. e-mail: yair.levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk 1 See Bratman (2009a), and Velleman (1993). Other accounts that invoke self-relations in a broadly similar way appear in the work of e.g. Korsgaard (1997 & 2008), who argues that our actions are normative when and because they express our capacity to determine ourselves. See also Street (2008), who argues that one has a reason to F when and because one judges oneself to have such reasons.

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self-relation. It focuses on the two accounts mentioned briefly above, those given by Bratman and Velleman,

which aim to explain the normativity of formal coherence – for example, coherence between means and ends, and

more generally between mental attitudes, by demonstrating how achieving it is necessary for promoting the self-

relation they favour.2 The two accounts are quite different from each other, but in what follows it will be argued

on similar grounds that both accounts fail. It will be claimed, contrary to what Velleman and Bratman argue in

their respective ways, that rational coherence is actually not necessary for the promotion of self-governance or

self-intelligibility. Other, non-rational or irrational forms of coherence can equally promote one’s understanding

of oneself or one’s governance of oneself. While the focus will thus be on two (prominent) specimens, it will be

suggested that their common failure might generalize to target also other accounts which appeal to self-relations

in a similar fashion.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 critically examines Bratman’s argument for the

normativity of instrumental coherence as deriving from the normativity of self-governance. After concluding

that Bratman’s account actually fails, the conclusion is then shown in section 3 to extend beyond Bratman’s

account, to target also David Velleman’s argument for how rational formal coherence is supposedly necessary

for self-intelligibility. Section 4 concludes the discussion with a brief diagnosis of why this common defect

afflicts two such very different accounts, focusing on the structural feature of a relation that one bears to oneself

that is at the heart of both accounts.

2 Self-governance and rational coherence

2.1 Bratman’s argument

Is practical rationality normative? Some philosophers have recently argued for a resounding ‘No’, at least if

practical rationality is understood as requiring coherence. Thus Niko Kolodny and Joesph Raz attack the idea

2 The normativity of rational cohernce has recently been the subject of a lively debate. See, for example, Kolodny (2005), Broome (2005), and Raz (2005a).

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that requirements of rationality which enjoin the achievement of coherence among our practical attitudes are

reason-giving. Take, for example, the requirement of means-ends or instrumental coherence. It seems very

plausible that rationality requires something along the lines of Means-Ends:

[Means-Ends] Rationality requires that if you intend to E, and believe that you will E only if you

intend to M, then you intend to M.

But Raz and Kolodny doubt we have a reason to comply with anything like ME.3 On their view, there

need be nothing distinctively amiss, normatively speaking, with someone just because they are means-ends

incoherent. Any reasons one may have to avoid such incoherence are in fact reasons one has independently of

one’s incoherence: reasons for or against intending to E, or intending to M, or believing that intending to M is

necessary to E-ing. There is no distinctive reason to achieve coherence among these attitudes.

In two recent papers, Michael Bratman responds to the challenge posed by Raz, Kolodny, and others.

Bratman (2009a & 2009b) offers his own account of the reasons we have to achieve rational coherence, reasons

that he suggests derive from a reason we have for self-governance.4 To be an autonomous, self-governing

agent, according to Bratman, is in large part to form coherent and consistent plans, decisions, and policies,

which the agent is set to adhere to. Such “planning-structures” consist in mental attitudes – intentions,

primarily, but also relevant beliefs, such as beliefs about the means necessary for achieving one’s ends. And if

the attitudes that constitute a plan are incoherent or inconsistent, the plan is incoherent, and the agent cannot

be said to be governing herself with it.

One governs oneself only if one has a coherent “practical standpoint”; only if there is a fact of the matter

as to “where one stands” with respect to a given end. Indeed, according to Bratman, self-governance at least

partly consists in having the attitudes that amount to a (coherent) practical standpoint. And for one to have

3 See Kolodny (2005) and Raz (2005a). Unfortunately there is no space here to discuss their views in any detail. 4 Bratman (2009a, p. 429). In his (2009b), Bratman argues that the reason to be self-governing can similarly explain why there is a reason to avoid having intentions that one believes cannot be jointly realized. To save words, I shall limit myself to discussing Bratman’s argument about insrumental coherence. But I hope it will become clear that a parallel argument to the one presented in the text could be mounted against Bratman’s argument for the normativity of intention consistency.

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such a standpoint requires there to be no conflict between the attitudes that constitute one’s plan for achieving

one’s end.

Suppose one is instrumentally incoherent: one intends to E, believes that one will only E if one intends to

M, but does not intend to M. Then there is no determinate answer as to where one stands with respect to E. In

intending to E one seems to have incorporated it into one’s “practical standpoint”; but in not intending to M,

one seems to have excluded E from one’s practical standpoint. So actually, one does not have a practical

standpoint on E, and is not governing oneself on this occasion. And since one has a reason to govern oneself,

one also has a reason to avoid conflicting attitudes that impede self-governance in this way.

One further assumption is central to this account of the reasons for achieving instrumental coherence.

Bratman endorses a principle according to which if R is a reason to some attainable F, and G-ing is necessary to F-ing,

then R is a reason to G. This assumption about the transmission of reasons is crucial, as it validates the

transmission of the reason for self-governance to a reason for achieving instrumental coherence: since one has

a reason to govern oneself, and instrumental coherence is necessary for self-governance, one also has a reason

to achieve instrumental coherence.

It bears notice that Bratman is only concerned with vindicating the existence of a reason to achieve

coherence. For the suggestion that one’s reason to take the means to one’s end is merely defeasible might raise

a problem. Several philosophers – including Bratman himself in earlier work (1987, pp. 23-27), and also

Broome (1999, pp. 409-410), Setiya (2007), and Way (2010) – point out that a merely defeasible reason in

favour of instrumental rationality is not enough to explain the so-called ‘strictness’ of the instrumental

requirement (cf. for example Setiya [2007, p. 653]: “Appeal to … a defeasible or pro tanto reason is thus too

weak: it fails to capture the requirement expressed by the instrumental principle. It is not just that there is

reason to take the necessary means to one’s ends; one must do so. The principle of instrumental reason makes a

strict or peremptory demand.”) To emphasize, this worry does not arise for Bratman’s position as spelled out

by him, given that he is explicit in not aiming to capture the supposed strictness of instrumental coherence. But

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his position is threatened if the philosophers cited above are correct in suggesting that strictness should be

captured.

However, this complaint will not be pressed further in what follows. The next section argues that, even on

its own terms, Bratman’s explanation of the normativity of instrumental coherence is unsuccessful. This is

because plausible views of self-governance – including Bratman’s own view – suggest that self-governance does

not actually entail instrumental coherence; hence, any reason for self-governance does not transmit to a reason

for achieving coherence, as Bratman claims.

2.2 Self-governance without instrumental coherence

As we have seen, the reason suggested by Bratman for achieving instrumental coherence derives from a reason

for self-governance. One has a reason to achieve self-governance, and one can only do so if one has a practical

standpoint, which entails instrumentally coherent attitudes. It will now be argued, however, that this

explanation fails. As a preliminary point of dissent, note that it is not obvious that a reason for self-governance

can successfully vindicate the normativity of instrumental coherence. To do so, it would have to provide a

reason to achieve instrumental coherence on any given occasion. Now it seems at least arguable that we have a

reason to have the capacity or the disposition to govern ourselves. But why think that this reason goes beyond the

general disposition, and extends to all the particular cases? What counts against a single failure one one’s part to

govern oneself, so long as one is generally (reliably) disposed to do so?5 (In fact, Bratman himself concedes

[2009a] that there are possible scenarios in which there are no reasons for instrumental coherence – namely,

when one’s ends are psychologically unalterable).

Putting this worry to one side, the ensuing discussion will grant for the sake of argument that we do have a

reason to govern ourselves. The focus will instead be on a different objection to Bratman’s account. The

objection targets his idea that self-governance entails instrumental coherence (although, as noted above [fn. 4],

5 The point is made by Raz (2005b), and Kolodny (2008a, p. 383). For extensive discussion, see also Kolodny (2008b).

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a parallel argument could be constructed to target Bratman’s idea that self-governance entails intention

consistency).

Suppose one does not have a coherent practical standpoint: one intends to E, believes that one will not E

unless one intends to M, but does not intend to M. One is instrumentally incoherent. As it happens, one is not

only perfectly aware of this incoherence, but actually endorses it. One has decided in advance not to resolve any

such conflict that may arise between one’s attitudes, but rather wishes to be the sort of whimsical, happy-go-

lucky person who is not troubled by such incoherencies. Indeed, one regards the incoherence as a positively

valuable state.

One has a second-order intention to retain any conflict among one’s first-order attitudes. To be sure, one

lacks a coherent practical standpoint with respect to one’s first-order intentions. But one is no less a self-governor

for that. One is governing oneself by intending to have an incoherent standpoint with respect to the first-order.

Once this higher order intention is formed, one no longer has a reason to achieve lower order coherence. For

doing so will impede rather than facilitate self-governance.6

The foregoing scenario takes its cue from a famous objection raised by Gary Watson to Frankfurt’s

account of personal autonomy. Bratman’s idea that self-governance entails a coherent standpoint is a modified

version of an idea that comes from Frankfurt, who used to think that self-governance consists in having a

second-order desire for one’s first-order desires. But as Watson (1982) and others have pointed out, the

possibility of still higher order desires undermines this idea. For one can govern oneself with e.g. a third-order

desire not to have the second-order desire. So why privilege the second-order desire?

6 It does not seem open to Bratman to dismiss the objection offhand by denying the reality of second order intentions of the sort invoked here. Elsewhere, Bratman himself allows for conflicts between directly contradictory intentions – an intention to E and an intention to not-E (Bratman 2009b). Once such conflicts are allowed onto the scene, there seems to be no reason to deny the possibility of conflicts that arise with higher order intentions. Moreover, given that one can resolve to overcome any incoherencies due to e.g. one’s weak will, it seems equally plausible to maintain that one can do the opposite – intending to tolerate any such violations in the spirit of spontaneity or whatever.

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Partly in response to this point, Frankfurt switches to the view that self-governance is achieved when one

decides or intends to act.7 Bratman develops his own version of this view, and takes it to ground our reasons to

be instrumentally coherent. But as the above scenario shows, the possibility of higher-order intentions

undermines this idea as well. If self-governance is a matter of having a coherent standpoint, then one can

govern oneself by having a coherent standpoint to tolerate incoherent standpoints.

In recent work, Bratman acknowledges the force of Watson’s challenge to Frankfurt’s original appeal to

second order desires.8 He seems to recognize that Watson has successfully undermined the idea that any

particular higher-order desire could ever ensure self-governance. But similarly to Frankfurt, Bratman also seems

to think that the intentions that form part of one’s practical standpoint are better placed than any higher-order

desire when it comes to ensuring self-governance.

It is impossible to do justice within this space to Bratman’s elaborate theory of self-governing agency and

the role of intentions within this theory.9 But a brief sketch should nevertheless be enough to demonstrate why

his view is vulnerable to the possibility, described above, of higher-order intentions to retain first-order

incoherence.

According to Bratman, very briefly, the capacity for self-governance is at least partly a capacity to form

plans and policies that manifest one’s agential nature as a temporally unified creature. Self-governance is

achieved largely through exercising the capacity to organize and coordinate one’s temporally extended existence

by planning one’s projects and activities. Since temporally unified thought and action are essential to agency as

such, one’s capacity to plan and coordinate one’s activities is a capacity to be a truly self-governing agent. And

this planning capacity is one in which intentions play a central role. For as already noted, plans and policies are

partly constituted by intentions. In this way, intentions make a crucial contribution to self-governance, a

contribution which higher-order desires do not make. This is why intentions are better placed than Frankfurtian

higher-order desires to ensure self-governance.

7 Frankfurt (1987). 8 See Bratman (2007). 9 For a statement and discussion of Bratman’s view, see for example his articles “Reflection, planning, and temporally extended agency”, and “Three theories of self-governance”, both in Bratman (2007).

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None of this, however, seems to rule out the possibility of self-governance through higher-order

intentions to retain first order incoherence. On the contrary: such a higher order intention would seem to be an

instance of what Bratman calls a ‘higher order policy’, namely “higher-order pro or con attitudes concerning

our motivation”. And, he adds, “[w]e may call such higher-order policies self-governing policies” (2007, p. 33).

Might Bratman nevertheless deny that the particular higher-order policy of maintaining first-order incoherence

is in fact self-governing? Given that the policy is conceived and executed by the agent herself, it seems to satisfy

the pre-theoretical, intuitive conception of self-governance as described by Bratman himself, on which “the

agent herself directs and governs her practical thought and action” (2007, p. 4). The policy prescribes a specific

pattern of attitudes, and hence directs and governs one’s practical thought. And it also directs and governs one’s

action: it prescribes E-ing, and it prescribes not M-ing. Of course, given the agent’s belief that she will not E

unless she intends to M, the policy fails to determine that she will actually E. But the same is true of, for

example, plans and policies that one is unsure one will successfully execute – e.g. Anscombe’s example (1957, p.

93) of a man who is determined not to break down under torture, but is not confident he will manage it; or

Bratman’s own example (1987, pp. 38-39) of a person who intends to stop at the bookshop on her way home

but, being prone to forgetfulness, is unsure she will indeed stop. Given these agents’ beliefs, their policies direct

and govern action without implying that the end will in fact be carried out – just like the higher-order policy for

incoherence.

The agent’s higher-order policy thus seems to fit the pre-theoretical conception of self-governance as

given by Bratman. This suggests that Bratman’s substantive account should accommodate the policy, and would

be inadequate if it does not. And in fact, it does seem to accommodate it. To be sure, the agent’s policy violates

Bratman’s criterion of self-governance with respect to E. This might perhaps indicate a sense in which the agent’s

behaviour is not self-governing behaviour, according to Bratman (a possibility considered below); but it does

not constitute grounds for denying that the policy as a whole is self-governing. After all, the agent’s way of

exercising directorship and governance involves a determinate standpoint with respect to the first-order state –

viz., retaining its incoherence – as Bratman’s criterion requires.

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With its indeterminate standpoint on E, the agent’s policy no doubt displays considerable inefficiency, as it

is likely to result in disruption and the waste of resources that go into planning. The policy might, therefore,

seem to undermine the thrust of Bratman’s picture of self-governance as the exercise of coordination over

one’s temporally extended existence, as described above. However, sheer inefficiency cannot in itself render a

policy non-self-governing; for that would impugn too many policies that Bratman’s account does not aim to

address, and which should anyway not be impugned – e.g. a plan to never indulge in the object of one’s desire,

however hard one worked to secure it; or a plan to roll a boulder up the hill, only to let go every time just

before the summit is reached; or a plan to count the grass blades on the lawn, while continuously stopping and

starting over at some random point.10

Other prevalent views of what self-governance consists in – views that differ from both Bratman’s and

Frankfurt’s original desire-based view – would also seem to classify the above scenario as one where self-

governance is achieved. Take, for example, the view on which one is self-governing just when one’s attitudes

are responsive to one’s normative judgments about which ends one has reasons to promote, or which ends are

valuable. In the above scenario, one sees value (oddly as that may seem) in being instrumentally incoherent, as

one takes it to promote the virtue of spontaneity or whatever. So one would indeed be self-governing according

to this view, too.

It might be thought that the problem I have raised for Bratman’s account actually dissolves once we

realize that the scenario described above is one of competing reasons – a reason in favour of achieving

coherence, and a different reason against achieving coherence. This line of response on behalf of Bratman

could be developed on the basis of a distinction between local and global or overall self-governance. Thus

Bratman may wish to concede that the agent described above is self-governing overall, as she is adhering to her

self-governing higher-order policy to maintain the incoherence between her first-order attitudes; but he might

insist that the agent nevertheless has a reason to resolve her first-order incoherence so as to achieve local

coherence, and be self-governing with respect just to E. If this is the correct way to interpret the case, then the

10I thank an anonymous referee for prompting me to elaborate here in reponse to possible objections.

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problem I have been describing may seem merely apparent: a conflict of reasons is a ubiquitous phenomenon

that poses no special difficulties for Bratman. His aim of establishing the reality of a reason to achieve rational

coherence would not be threatened.

Actually, however, that is not plausibly the correct interpretation of the case. For one thing, it is unclear

how a competition of this sort between different reasons, if it existed, could ever be resolved. For it is the same

normative ‘source’ or value – viz., self-governance through adherence to plans – which supposedly

recommends conflicting courses of action, condemning the agent to a very odd kind of normative dilemma:

which trumps which, local or global self-governance? That the dilemma is intractable, if it is, may not be so

strange when viewed through the eyes of the agent, as she is after all placed in a deeply conflicted position; but it

would be unsatisfactory if a theorist or an informed observer were unable to make better sense of the

normative situation for her. And this theoretical task is hard to discharge under the present interpretation due

to the awkward implication whereby the same consideration counts both for and against instrumental

coherence. That not intending to M while intending to E and believing that one will not E unless one intends

to M leaves one without a practical standpoint would be both a reason against having this combination of

attitudes, as it violates local self-governance; and at the same time, it would also be a reason in favour of having

this combination of attitudes, as having it conforms with one’s second-order policy, thereby securing global self-

governance.

The awkwardness of this situation is not simply a matter of the same fact counting simultaneously for and

against some action; that much can be a common phenomenon. For example, that today’s special contains nuts

may be a reason to order it, because nuts are delicious; and also a reason against ordering it, because one is

allergic to nuts. However, when such common circumstances arise, each of the conflicting reasons typically

derives from a different normative code (morality, prudence, or whatever) or promotes a different value – e.g.

pleasure (of eating delicious food), in contrast with prudence (avoiding an allergic reaction). There will then be

no special difficulty in resolving the conflict, so long as one has a reasonably clear idea of how the competing

values compare under the circumstances. But the problem with interpreting the present scenario along these

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lines is that each of the conflicting reasons would promote the selfsame value – viz., the exercise of self-

governance. And this is what makes it hard to see how the agent could weigh the reasons against each other and

negotiate the conflict. It is as though, in a parallel kind of case, the fact that to V would be to keep one’s

promise, and hence promote or instantiate the value of promise keeping, could count both in favour and

against V-ing.11

Interpreting the case as one of competing reasons thus seems to incur a commitment to a version of the

highly contentious thesis of “holism” espoused by some moral particualrists,12 on which the same consideration

may in different contexts act as a reason on different sides – and a particularly contentious version of holism at

that, since in the present case it would be the same context in which the pair of conflicting reasons emerge. It is

a commitment that Bratman nowhere explicitly endorses, and one he seems better off avoiding.

A more natural, problem-free interpretation of the above scenario is one on which the reason given by

one’s second-order policy acts as a kind of ‘exclusionary reason’ in the sense of the term famously introduced

by Raz – i.e. “a second order reason to refrain from acting for some reason” (1990, p. 39). The relevant notion

of exclusion is open to different interpretations. On one salient interpretation endorsed here, the second-order

reason is understood as an undercutting, rather than rebutting, defeater (see Horty [2007, p. 15], and Pollock and

Cruz [1999, p. 38], for a similar interpretation; and Schroeder [2005] & [2008] for further discussion). Where a

rebutting defeater works by adding a weightier reason on the contrary side, an undercutting defeater renders

what would otherwise be a reason, no reason at all. (Compare epistemic reasons, where the distinction

originates: one’s visual experience of a red object is ordinarily a reason to believe that there is a red object. This

reason may be rebutted by reliable testimony that the object is not red; and it may be undercut by one’s taking a

drug that makes everything appear red). Now as we have seen, Bratman’s conception of self-governance (as

well as the major alternative conceptions) applies to higher-order self-governing policies such as the one to

retain instrumentally incoherent attitudes. The latter is hence a reason-giving policy according to Bratman’s view,

and the reason it provides works precisely by disabling self-governance from providing reason to secure a local

11I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 12 See e.g. Dancy (2004).

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standpoint – much like an order to disregard one’s previous order, or a plan to disregard a previous plan. After

all, the higher-order policy achieves self-governance precisely by sacrificing the local standpoint. There is thus no

real competition between the reasons on each order; once the higher-order policy is in place, the first-order

reason is completely silenced.13

On the present interpretation of one’s higher-order reason as an undercutting defeater, then, one is self-

governing and yet does not have a reason to be instrumentally coherent. Now Bratman himself concedes that

there are circumstances where the reason for self-governance fails to transmit to a reason for instrumental

coherence – viz. in the specific case, already mentioned, where one’s ends are psychologically unalterable

(Bratman 2009a, pp. 422-430). However, the present case is importantly different. Bratman’s treatment of

scenarios with unalterable ends turns on denying the possibility of self‐governance in those scenarios. For

self‐governance requires, according to Bratman, not only that one have a practical standpoint, but also that

one’s standpoint be open to revision upon reflection; if one cannot modify one’s plan in light of relevant

considerations, e.g. because one’s end is psychologically unalterable, one cannot govern oneself in the first

place. And since one cannot govern oneself, the case is not after all a counterexample to how reasons for self-

governance supposedly transmit to reasons for instrumental coherence: the relevant transmission only occurs if

self-governance is attainable (2009a, p. 429). Whatever the merits of this proposal, however, a similar line will

not be credible in response to the present scenario. For unlike perhaps cases of unalterable ends, this scenario is

one where the agent can and does govern herself – as argued at length above.

To summarize the discussion so far, I have argued that Bratman’s account of the normativity of

instrumental coherence is extensionally inadequate. The reason he suggests one has to achieve instrumental

coherence is said to exist because instrumental coherence is necessary for self-governance. But it is not

necessary: there are cases where one governs oneself while being instrumentally incoherent. The account thus

fails in its attempt to explain the normativity of instrumental coherence as deriving from the normativity of self-

governance. 13The need to expound the nature of one’s second-order reason was driven home to me by an anonymous referee, for which I am grateful.

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The next section argues on similar grounds against Velleman’s account of the normativity of rational

coherence as deriving from self-intelligibility, suggesting that the problem for Bratman generalizes to target at

least one other prominent account.

3 Self-intelligibility and rational coherence

3.1 Velleman’s argument

Much of the work done by David Velleman ties into one overarching project. The project is that of providing a

unified explanation of normativity across its various different domains. One of these domains is rational

coherence. The fundamental notion in Velleman’s explanation of normativity is intelligibility. The normativity of

all normative phenomena is fundamentally a matter of how they contribute to the intelligibility of actions and

mental attitudes. I shall demonstrate how this thought is supposed to explain the normativity of rational coherence.

And I shall provide some reasons for thinking that it cannot succeed. Since Velleman’s explanation is supposed

to work by identifying reasons to achieve rational coherence, we will be naturally led to explore other aspects of

Velleman’s theory of normativity, beyond rational coherence.

Velleman’s understanding of the nature of reasons for action is derived from a thesis about what is

constitutive of action itself. Velleman holds that action is constituted by the “aim” of making sense of oneself

to oneself whenever one acts. The metaphor of action “aiming at” making sense is unpacked in terms of a

tendency in agents to act in ways they can understand, and to be prevented from acting in ways they cannot

understand. Intelligible action enhances self-understanding, which is something agents are constitutively

disposed to achieve.14

Velleman’s thesis about what is constitutively involved in agency will not be assessed here. The focus will

rather be on the way in which this constitutional thesis is deployed to explain normativity. And the crucial step

in deriving normative reasons from the constitutive aim of action is the appeal to the standards of success in 14 See, for example, Velleman (2000, p. 26).

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achieving this aim. Action constitutively aims at self-understanding, and reasons are those considerations that

contribute to achieving this aim by enhancing intelligibility. It is because action aims at self-understanding that a

reason to F is a consideration in light of which F-ing would be intelligible.

Having derived an account of reasons from the constitutive aim of action, Velleman deploys the account

in various places to explain certain other normative phenomena, e.g. rational formal coherence. One such place

is “The story of rational action” (1993), where the focus is the requirement of transitive preferences (although

the argument there will extend to whatever else is required by rational coherence). In that paper, Velleman sets

out to explain why the strategy of regaining transitivity in an intransitive set of preferences by contextualizing

the preferences seems intuitively problematic. Suppose one has a set of preferences that violates transitivity:

one prefers F over G, G over H, and H over F. This set of preferences can be made transitive if each

preference is redescribed relative to the available options. For example, they can be rediscribed as preferences

for F-rather-than-G over G-rather-than-F, G-rather-than-H over H-rather-than-G, and H-rather-than-F over F-

rather-than-H. Contextualized in this way, no two preferences in the set are identical, and there is no violation

of transitivity.

This strategy of regaining transitivity, Velleman plausibly argues, strikes us as cheating (at least in some

cases15). And the reason why it strikes us as cheating is that, while it satisfies the letter of the transitivity

requirement, it nevertheless violates the “spirit” of the requirement; it defeats the purpose of having transitive

preferences, which is to achieve self-intelligibility.16

Intelligibility comes in degrees. The more simple and unified the explanation of one’s behavior, the more

intelligible one is. But if transitivity is regained among intransitive preferences by contextualizing them, then the

spirit of fully achieving this purpose is defeated. Prior to contextualizing, one’s mental economy could be

explained in terms of pair-wise comparisons of the same three values; the new explanation, on the other hand,

would have to cite six different values, each with its own utility assignment. This new explanation is much more

bifurcated and complex, and hence less intelligible. 15 For a discussion of some exceptional cases, where contextualizing may not count as cheating, see Broome (1991, ch. 5). 16 Velleman (1993, p. 239).

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Could intelligibility explain the point or purpose of rational coherence in the way suggested by Velleman?

A case for an answer in the negative will now be provided, based on similar considerations as those raised

against Bratman.

3.2 Self-intelligibility without rational coherence

Recall that on Velleman’s view, as presented in sec. 2.1 above, one has reason to achieve rational coherence

since rational coherence enhances self-intelligibility; the incoherent agent is less intelligible to herself than the

coherent agent. The problem is, however, that this claim works just as well, if it works at all, for non-rational and

irrational forms of coherence as it does for rational forms. It is not implausible that intelligibility is enhanced by

achieving rational coherence, e.g. by having transitive preferences. But there are numerous ways of achieving

coherence in one’s mental economy, and only a very small subset of which are plausibly normative, viz. the

rational ones; all the other ways are non-rational or irrational, and clearly not normative. And if the purpose of

coherence is simply to enhance intelligibility, then nothing could privilege the rational forms of coherence over

the non-rational and irrational forms.

To see this in an economical way that retains continuity with the previous section, consider another form

of rational coherence besides transitivity of preferences – viz., instrumental rationality. Being instrumentally

rational might plausibly enhance one’s intelligibility. If one intends to E and recognizes that M is means to E, it

would often be intelligible of one to intend to M. But in some circumstances, it could be equally intelligible not

to intend to M. Consider once again the scenario that was deployed above to argue against Bratman’s account.

In that scenario, one has a second-order policy of not intending the recognized means to one’s first order ends;

one regards such incoherent behaviour as valuable or one there is reason to display. Given this policy, one

would be more intelligible to oneself if one adhered to it and did not intend to M.

It is important that the scenario invokes a general policy of being instrumentally irrational, rather than some

localized failure of rationality due to weakness of will, dithering, and the like. The latter, too, could result in

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behaviour that is irrational yet quite intelligible: we are all disposed to act on our desires, and a strong aversion

to M often explains why one did not intend to M, even though one realized it was necessary for E-ing. Still,

localized incoherencies of this sort are not obviously a problem for Velleman’s account. As his argument

against contextualizing preferences illustrates, and as he points out in various other places, Velleman takes

formal coherence to enhance self-intelligibility by way of “perspicuously summarizing” (1993, p. 242) or unifying

the explananda. And episodes of localized incoherence, e.g. when one’s will yields to one’s desires, could be seen

as more complex, and hence less unified, compared to episodes of coherent behaviour: they involve an extra

attitude (a desire or aversion), which occasionally overrides the execution of recognized means. Such

disunifying behaviour could thus be claimed to impede rather than enhance intelligibility, which would explain

why this behaviour should be avoided, according to Velleman. It is in this respect like contextualizing

preferences for the sake of regaining transitivity: it defeats the purpose of being coherent. Localized instances

of incoherence, however common and intelligible, may therefore not threaten Velleman’s account.

But the scenario invoked here, in contrast with such localized incoherence, does not turn on any extra

psychological mechanism which could be seen as disunifying and hence damaging to intelligibility (except of

course one’s higher-order policy itself; more on this below). One’s policy is not to intend the means when one

intends the end, unless … (e.g. one is strongly averse); rather, the policy is never to take the means. As far as

coherence among one’s attitudes towards M-ing and E-ing goes, then, the instrumentally incoherent policy

involves the same (number of) attitudes that instrumentally coherent behaviour would involve, only arranged

slightly differently – instead of having an intention to M, one lacks that intention. The behaviour of the

instrumentally irrational agent in the scenario therefore achieves unification to the same degree as that of an

instrumentally rational agent, and the former cannot be considered any less intelligible on grounds of

unification. Increased intelligibility through unification provides no reason for the deliberately incoherent agent

to change her ways.

Are there any other grounds, apart from unification, on which the instrumentally irrational agent in the

scenario could be considered less intelligible? The scenario is marked of course by one’s higher-order policy not

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to resolve incoherencies on the first-order. This policy is part of the object to be made intelligible – viz., one’s

mental economy – and should hence be made to fit within the explanation or rationale for one’s behaviour, if

overall self-intelligibility is to be achieved. Velleman acknowledges that overall intelligibility of one’s psychology

is affected also by other considerations, besides unification through formal coherence. One’s behaviour could

be formally coherent, but still square badly with the rest of one’s psychology. If one is a law abiding citizen, for

example, then it may be inscrutable if one were suddenly to plot a bank robbery – however consistent and

coherent one is in pursuing this aim. Since the ultimate object of intelligibility is one’s overall psychology,

“substantive” considerations, such as an improved fit with one’s character as a law-abiding citizen, could defeat

formal considerations such as instrumental coherence (1993, pp. 164-165).

Nothing of this sort can be used to dismiss the force of the present scenario, however. The scenario is not

one in which substantive considerations of overall intelligibility compete with, and possibly trump,

considerations of formal coherence (or vice versa). In fact, neither the formal nor the substantive mode of

intelligibility provides one with reasons in favour of instrumental coherence. From a substantive point of view,

not intending to M while intending to E and believing that one will not E unless one intends to M fits better

with one’s higher-order policy; and from a formal point of view, as we have seen, such instrumentally

incoherent behaviour is no less unified than the coherent alternative.

For this reason, Velleman cannot claim that his account is not vulnerable to the present scenario, as it

leaves in place some reason to achieve coherence. This echoes the point made in sec. 2.2 that a similar response

fails also in Bratman’s case, for he too cannot credibly claim there is some reason in favour of local self-

governance which competes with a different reason in favour of global self-governance. And as we have just

seen, neither can Velleman avail himself of this response; when applied to his account too, the above scenario is

not plausibly understood as one of competing reasons.

A similar line of response, based on competing reasons, is deployed by Velleman to address a related

objection raised against his position, for example by Kieran Setiya in his “Explaining action” (2003). Setiya

complains that Velleman’s view implies that “if one is imprudent or reckless, one has good reason to act in foolish or ill-

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considered ways”.17 If the ultimate point of being prudent is to be intelligible, then it seems that imprudent agents

have at least as much reason to behave imprudently as they do to behave prudently.

My own objection complements the one raised by Setiya and others, though it is distinct from it. It targets

formal rather than substantive considerations such as prudence, where each kind of consideration – the

substantive and the formal – plays a different role in Velleman’s account of normativity. The former

contributes to self-intelligibility by perspicuously summarizing disparate elements of one’s psychology; the latter

supplies the content of one’s mental attitudes, character traits and so on which are apt for being explained and

made intelligible. The different (formal) target of my objection implies that the response Velleman deploys to

address Setiya’s objection is unavailable here. In response to Setiya’s objection, Velleman points out18 that there

are things any agent is naturally inclined to desire; one such thing is the agent’s own survival and well-being.

The prudent agent can therefore make better sense of herself than the imprudent agent; she could explain her

actions in terms of desires that everyone naturally shares.19

But however adequate this is as a response to Setiya, it does not seem to help with mine. For it would be

much less plausible to contend (and Velleman does not do so) that everyone naturally shares a desire to be

instrumentally coherent. One who does not desire to take the means to one’s end is not in a perverse

pathological state on a par with the severely depressed or the suicidal who have lost all desire to survive; failure

to take the means to one’s end could be the result of perfectly common episodes of forgetfulness, dithering,

laziness, and so on. At most it is perhaps arguable that agents naturally share a desire that means be taken to

their end, so that their desired end be realized; but that is not always the same as desiring to take the means

oneself. Thus suppose one intends to go to Chicago but does not intend to call the travel agent, while realizing

that one will not get to Chicago unless one calls to give him the details of one’s itinerary, since no one else will

17 Setiya (2003, p. 376). 18 See Velleman (1989, ch. 10 & 11). See also Velleman (2009, p. 44). 19 Velleman’s response here shows that he takes self-intelligibility to be achieved partly by comparing one’s own behavior with that of others.

19

do it. One may naturally desire that the details be received by the travel agent, while not desiring to call him oneself

(perhaps because the agent is rude and obnoxious).20

There is therefore no room for interpreting the scenario offered here as one of substantive intelligibility

competing with formal intelligibility; neither mode of intelligibility provides reasons in favour of instrumental

coherence. The unavailability of this response is an important difference from Setiya’s argument – besides the

former’s more general nature, manifested in how it also targets the very different account given by Bratman.

4 Conclusion

Each of the two accounts examined above is quite different from the other. But they share a common basic

feature. The explanation they propose for the normativity of rational coherence invokes some kind of relation

that one bears to oneself. For Velleman, the relation is that of making sense of oneself (to oneself); for Bratman,

it is self-governance. Both understand the ultimate purpose of rational coherence in terms of engagement in

some such relation with oneself. Successful engagement in the relation is taken to be something one

independently has reason to achieve, and rational coherence is claimed to be necessary for instantiating or

promoting the relation. In this way, the normativity of rational coherence is supposed to have been

demonstrated.

Actually, however, this line of thought suffers from a fundamental failure common to both accounts. The

failure is one of extensional adequacy. Contrary to what Velleman and Bratman suggest, rational coherence is

not necessary for the instantiation or promotion of the self-relation they invoke: one can understand oneself and

govern oneself even while being rationally incoherent. Hence, these accounts fail to explain the normativity of

rational coherence.

This failure of extensional adequacy seems to arise from the nature of the self-relations invoked. There are

so many different ways of achieving coherence among one’s attitudes; only very few of these ways are plausibly

20 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.

20

rational. But if the reason to achieve coherence is that it instantiates or facilitates successful engagement in

these self-relations, then it is hard to see why one should stick to the rational, rather than some irrational or

non-rational, ways of achieving coherence. For there is nothing in the rational forms of coherence and

consistency that makes them better suited to the task of self-governance or self-intelligibility. Many other forms

of coherence may fit the bill.

It may seem tempting to try to understand the normativity of coherence in terms of some self-relation. If

rational coherence is a matter of internal relations among mental attitudes within the mind, then perhaps some

relation that obtains between the mind and itself offers the key to understanding the very point or purpose of

coherence. As the arguments above show, however, at least two prominent blueprints for developing this

thought are unsuccessful. The self-relations they invoke cannot adequately account for the reasons to achieve

coherence as they propose to do. This failure casts doubt on the thought that normativity can be explained by

how it facilitates self-relations.

Acknowledgements I am grateful first and foremost to John Broome and Ralph Wedgwood, for many invaluable suggestions and disucssions. For their very helpful comments on earlier drafts, I’d like to thank also John Brunero, David Enoch, Nadeem Hussain, Noa Leibowitz, Nic Southwood, Jonathan Way, an annoymous referee, and audiences at LSE, and the University of York.

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