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TITLE: Perspectives on the success of the NATO mission in Afghanistan

DROP QUOTE: Despite over 20 billion dollars spent on capacity building in Afghan

government institutions over the last decade, efforts by ISAF, UNAMA, and the US remain in the

shadow of the central government’s inability to fully assume governance in the southern and

eastern provinces of Afghanistan.

AUTHOR: Hazim Hodžić

AUTHOR NOTE: Hazim Hodžić (PhD candidate at Faculty of Political Science – FPS,

Sarajevo) is an instructor in the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) in Sarajevo.

He served in the ISAF Mission in southern Afghanistan in 2009. The views expressed in this

article are author's personal views and they do not reflect the official views or positions of the

FPS or of PSOTC.

Abstract

The security and stability of Afghanistan depend on many factors, from which we should

mention: security threat imposed by the insurgence groups, influence of its neighbors (especially

of Pakistan), corrupted and ineffective government and low level of the economical

development. Besides that, the key stability factor of Afghanistan is security perception of the

local population, which could not be secured and guaranteed by current capacities of the elected

government and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In this security context, according to

many analysts, these factors represent preconditions for the success of the insurgent campaign in

Afghanistan. Despite insecurity and instability indicators mentioned above, the USA and NATO

continue withdrawal of combat forces and handover of responsibilities over security to provincial

authorities and ANSF. In this way, it seems that the US and NATO have used apparent tactical

victories achieved during operations in southern Afghanistan conducted in 2010 and 2011, and

the killing Osama bin Laden, to add legitimacy to the perceived partial strategic success of the

mission in Afghanistan, justifying the accelerated ‘achievements’ of Lisbon Declaration

provisions related to the international community’s partnership with Afghanistan. Thus, this

analysis shows that, if the “International community” continues ignoring realty that is taking

place within the space of the “Central – Asian stabilization experiment”, in that way there will be

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preconditions that stable Afghanistan remains high on the list of “geo-politically endangered

species”, in the post-transition period.

Introduction

The mandate and organization of ISAF forces have shifted several times since NATO took over

the mission in October 2003. Initially, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1368, ISAF

was responsible for securing the wider area around Kabul in order to support the establishment

of transitional Afghan authorities and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).1

NATO engaged 5,000 troops for this task at the outset. By the end of 2003, based on UN

Security Council Resolution 1510, NATO initiated expansion of the ISAF area of responsibility

in order to support US efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom – this separate operation in

Afghanistan, active since 2003, has focused on anti-terrorist operations aimed at the destruction

of Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership, and meant to ‘unburden’ US forces in Iraq.2 By October

2006, this expansion of the area of responsibility had been implemented in four stages to

encompass all provinces; those in eastern Afghanistan, at the border with Pakistan, remained

exclusively under US forces. Resolution 1510 also allowed for expansion of the ISAF mission, to

include the establishment of security conditions that would support the creation of central

government institutions and broaden their influence across the whole country. In addition to

ensuring a secure environment, through its 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ISAF is

responsible for reconstruction, development, and providing assistance to central government

institutions in the Afghan provinces.3 These UN resolutions that serve as a basis for ISAF's

mandate are founded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means that ISAF initially

represented a peace enforcement mission. However, weak coordination between ISAF and

Enduring Freedom (for example, ISAF forces did not take over Helmand, Uruzgan, and Nimroz

until 2004 even though US forces left these provinces in 2002),4 insufficient resources –

including ISAF forces – and the weak central government were taken advantage of by the

Taliban, the activities of which between 2005 and 2009 led to a sudden deterioration of the

security situation, especially in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Former UN special envoy to

Afghanistan Lakhadar Brahimi commented at the time that “the [Afghan] government is losing

ground every day to insurgents…who now control at least a third of the country.”5

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Factors of Security and Stability in Afghanistan

At the 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul, Turkey, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had also warned

about deteriorating security in Afghanistan, urging NATO countries to send an additional 3,500

troops.6 However, this did not happen until 2009 under US President Barack Obama, in support

of the proposal of then ISAF commander (and commander of US forces in Afghanistan) General

Stanley McChrystal to shift the strategic approach and mission of ISAF to one of

counterinsurgency operations (COIN) meant to “reduce the capability and will of the

insurgency.”7 McChrystal called for increased troop numbers on the order of 40,000; President

Obama approved 30,000 US troops and asked allies to send another 10,000. By mid-2011, ISAF

was comprised of just more than 132,000 soldiers from 48 countries,8 deployed in 6 regional

commands. It should be noted that more than two-thirds of ISAF forces are US soldiers, and they

are deployed in areas where the rebel forces are most active.

The security and stability of Afghanistan depend on many factors. Certainly, the biggest threat is

the insurgency which, in addition to the Taliban, includes the Haqqani network and Hezb-e-

Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), as well as rebel groups from Pakistan such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

(TTP), Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and Al Qaeda.9 In

addition to these groups, there are other important security factors such as: the influence of

neighbors (primarily that of Pakistan, which plays a crucial role in establishing complete control

over federally administered tribal areas in Western Pakistan, where all insurgent groups active in

Afghanistan have operational bases);10

inefficient and corrupt government institutions; and a

vulnerable population, whose security cannot be guaranteed by the elected government and

whose support to rebel forces is significant. According to many analyses of previous

insurgencies,11

all of these factors represent preconditions for the success of the insurgent

campaign in Afghanistan. In this particular case, the Taliban's insurgent activities are especially

widespread in southern Afghan provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan), where attacks have

been undertaken against Afghanistan National Security (military and police) Forces (ANSF),

government institutions and officials, and ISAF, but where they have also won the hearts and

minds of the civilian population (mainly from the Pashtun tribe, whose support is crucial for the

success of the campaign) by establishing a shadow government, supporting opium growers, and

through intimidation.12

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Thus, by the end of 2009, the Afghan government and ISAF found themselves in a ‘to be or not

to be’ scenario in terms of their response to the Taliban-led insurgency campaign – which

strongly reflected then, and still does now, the widely accepted US military definition of

insurgent warfare as a “politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy

of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing

insurgent control.”13

The revised strategy of the NATO/ISAF mission was right to have provided

a response to this situation at the end of 2009. The strategy was based on the theory that ISAF

needed to gain the support of the local population (by winning ‘hearts and minds,’ a strategy first

presented by Sir Gerald Templer during the Malayan counterinsurgency of the mid-20th

century)14

through implementation of a comprehensive approach including the coordinated use

of military and civilian capacities in order to secure a stable peace by the following means: the

creation of a secure environment, reconstruction and development, and the building of credible

local government institutions in the area of intervention.15

Political commitment at the strategic

level shifted in 2010 to a revised mission according to which ISAF, “in partnership with the

Afghan government, conducts population-centric COIN operations, enables expanded and

effective ANSF, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the

Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.”16

This mission

requires implementation of operations in the following stages – preparation, clearing (the

territories of insurgent forces), sustaining (the level of security), and development (of political

and economic potential) – especially in the southern part of Afghanistan, with the goal to

increase security for the population and decrease the influence of insurgents. In this way,

NATO’s strategy to resolve the Afghan insurgency is not the result of judicious predictions and

systematic planning, but is rather a reaction to a four-year failure to achieve progress via the

ISAF mission.

Yet, the success of such a strategy is not conditioned only by success in the field - it also depends

both on political will and public support in those countries that have already sent troops to

Afghanistan; troops which, according to the new strategy, should have been strengthened by new

military units. A majority of ISAF member countries have indeed seen a drop in public support

for the ISAF mission (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands),17

and this is

true in the US as well,18

inspiring the need to find a solution that will balance the negative effects

of this new strategy on domestic politics. The solution was found in a transition plan known as

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the Joint Framework for Inteqal (Pashtu for “transition”), adopted at the conference of NATO

foreign ministers and Afghan government representatives in Kabul in July 2010.19

This solution

was later reaffirmed in the declaration on long-term partnership between NATO and

Afghanistan, adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2011. The essence of the

transition plan is that the Afghan government will take over the leading role in all three aspects

of stabilization of the country (security, government, and development) by the end of 2014, as of

the Lisbon summit. It was agreed that a reduction of ISAF combat troops would start by mid-

2011, with a gradual handover of responsibility for security in the provinces to ANSF.20

Through

analysis of the security situation, development of ANSF and the Afghan government, and

economic development, this paper explores the extent to which the ISAF counterinsurgency

strategy has achieved its goals over the last two years and what kind of influence the Joint

Framework for Inteqal can exert as it relates to the overall success of this strategy. The US and

its allies claim that the security situation in Afghanistan is much better now than it was several

years ago. A US Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in

Afghanistan from October 2011, assigned the most credit for the improved security situation at

that time to the success of the offensive operations of particular ISAF members (the US, Great

Britain, and Denmark), conducted along with ANSF in the southern provinces of Helmand and

Kandahar during 2010 and 2011, as well as to the killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in

May 2010. According to the report, the impact of those successful operations was seen in a

decreased number of attacks by insurgents against ISAF and ANSF during 2011, compared to

the previous year.21

The December 2012 Report on Progress noted that the number of attacks

dropped less that year than in 2011; but also that they more frequently occurred outside of

populated areas, so that the “security of many of Afghanistan’s largest cities increased

substantially during the reporting period.” Yet the report also cited a rise in insider attacks and

said that, while “the insurgency’s kinetic capabilities have declined from their peak in 2010, the

insurgents remain resilient and determined.”22

In terms of the protection of civilians, a

quantitative decrease in the number of attacks does not necessarily equate to weakened insurgent

forces nor does it imply that the security situation is improved. Conventional operations by

strengthened ISAF forces in the southern provinces actually compelled the insurgents to adapt

their tactics, primarily reflected in changes to the type of implements used, and to the manners

and locations of attacks. A number of high profile attacks were conducted by insurgents in Kabul

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from June to September 2011, for instance, including the attacks against ISAF headquarters, the

US Embassy, and the British Consul. Additionally, during the same period, insurgents undertook

several attacks against high-ranking political figures, killing 182 political or religious leaders,

including the Chairman of the High Peace Council in Kabul and the Mayor of Kandahar.23

So,

instead of hitherto overt actions against military targets in only the southern and eastern parts of

the country, the insurgents had transferred the focus of their attacks to high-profile military and

political figures outside their previous zone of action. Another indicator that insurgents have

changed their tactics has been the increased intensity of improvised explosive device (IED)

attacks since 2010.

Graph 1: IED attacks – April 2009-September 2012

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The protection of civilians is an important aspect of security, and the graph below indicates that

over 80% of civilian casualties continue to be caused by insurgent actions, with the remainder of

casualties killed or wounded as a result of ISAF actions.

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Graph 2: Civilian casualties caused by ISAF and insurgent actions – April 2009-September 11

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And, in his September 2011 report, the UN Secretary General shared that the number of civilian

casualties of the fighting in Afghanistan had increased by 15% over the previous year.26

In 2012,

civilian deaths did decline, but injuries rose slightly as did the incidence of IED-specific

casualties overall.27

Graph 3: Civilian deaths by year – 2007-2012

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We believe that a discussion about whether these statistics are accurate is less important than

analysis of the data that reflects how Afghans perceive their own security. According to polls

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conducted in Afghanistan over the last several years, the local population has not been made to

feel safer; on the contrary, the data show that 5% more Afghans believed security to be “bad” in

2011,29

though responses in 2012 were more promising.30

Although the total number of insurgent

attacks has decreased yearly since 2010, the adapted tactics of the insurgency have left local

people feeling unsafe, which is key for the insurgents’ successful opposition to a

“counterinsurgency approach that puts Afghan people first.”31

Development of the ANSF and Afghan government institutions is another key element of the

counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. According to the US military’s counterinsurgency

doctrine, a precondition for securing the environment and protecting the population from

insurgents is ensuring that security forces have adequate power and capabilities, with a minimal

ratio of soldiers to local population of 20:1,000.32

In Afghanistan, a country with a population of

around 28.4 million, a counterinsurgency force should therefore consist of some 568,000

soldiers. Accordingly, in 2009, General McChrystal proposed that the US Department of

Defense increase the number of Afghan forces to 400,000 (there were just over 200,000 ANSF

soldiers at the time). Of the total number of soldiers dictated by US counterinsurgency

guidelines, the Afghan Army (AA) would make up 240,000, the Afghan National Police (ANP)

would add 160,000, and ISAF forces would supply the remaining (around 150,000) troops.33

However, at the beginning of 2010, just 170,000 soldiers and 130,000 police officers were

approved. These numbers were achieved by the end of 2012, with a total of 352,000 security

forces (195,000 soldiers and 157,000 police officers).34

As for ISAF, it has never reached its

anticipated full strength either. In fact, the highest number of ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan was

132,000, in June 2011, and the planned drop in combat troop numbers, envisioned in the

transition framework, has already begun, with the withdrawal of 10,000 US troops by the end of

2011, and another 23,000 by the end of 2012. Similar reductions in other national contingents

have already been implemented or announced by: Canada (around 2,000 soldiers were

withdrawn in mid-July of 2011); France (4,000 withdrawn by the end of summer of 2012);

Poland (around 1,500 combat troops to be replaced with non-combat troops); and Denmark (with

500 soldiers mostly engaged in the training of ANSF troops since the start of 2012, replacing a

previous combat contingent of 700 solders).35

To make situation even more complex for ISAF,

both politically and doctrine-wise, nations which deployed troops in northern Afghanistan (for

example, Germany, Spain, and Norway) consider the NATO mission there to be one of peace

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enforcement not counterinsurgency. Consequently, they introduced some limitations on the

(non)deployment of their forces in areas where insurgents are most active.36

And so, by the end

of 2012, the total power of counterinsurgency forces should have been around 450,000, still far

below the dictates of the doctrine and short of empirical norms (from the Iraqi experience).

Beyond the quantity, the quality of counterinsurgency forces should be taken into account.

General McChrystal made this point in his 2009 Assessment, saying that ISAF must improve the

effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations by changing “the operational culture…to focus on

protecting the Afghan people…and building relationships with them.”37

This was reiterated in

the October 2011 Department of Defense report, which noted that “the influence of criminal

patronage networks on the ANSF also continues to pose a threat to stability and the transition

process”38

and again in the December 2012 report, which said that “insurgents have increased

efforts to co-opt…ANSF members,” and “continue to seize on areas where the Afghan

government has failed to provide sufficient governance, rule of law, conflict resolution, and

economic opportunities.”39

Limitations of the Afghan Government

As for development of the capacities of Afghan government institutions, the US Department of

Defense argues that one of four preconditions for the consideration of full handover of a

province to local authorities is the ability of these government institutions to govern and provide

basic public services to the population of the province. Despite over 20 billion dollars spent on

capacity building in Afghan government institutions over the last decade, efforts by ISAF,

UNAMA, and the US remain in the shadow of the central government’s inability to fully assume

governance in the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan. This is the result of insecurity

in these provinces marked by high levels of corruption, internal political tensions, and

insufficiently developed capacities in both the central government and lower level institutions.40

Specifically, the central government still lags behind legislative sector reform, and the

connections between the central and provincial governments are weak. Government institutions

still lack highly qualified staff; by mid-2011, only 60% of civil servant positions at all levels

were filled,41

resulting from a lack of competent work force, and by the end of 2012, the National

Assembly was still considered “extremely understaffed” and “significantly underpaid.”42

The

map below shows the levels of central government control over individual Afghan districts in

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2010 and 2011; although there was some progress in securing centrally-located districts, the

number of districts in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan where the government operated only

partially or not at all actually increased over the same period. A 2012 UNAMA Mid-Year Report

on Protection of Civilians indicated a continuation of this trend, especially in rural areas, noting

that large portions of several southeast provinces are considered to be “almost completely

controlled by [insurgents], with the exception of the district and provincial capitals.”43

Map 1: Control of Afghan central government institutions at the district level44

According to General McChrystal, among the biggest weaknesses in the system of Afghan

governance is “widespread corruption and abuse of power” that has directly impacted the trust

and support of the people, not only in the Afghan government but also in ISAF, which is

perceived by the public as lacking the “appetite or capacity…to correct the situation.”45

Transparency International reaffirmed this concern in a May 2011 press release titled Corruption

Threatens the Success of the International Mission in Afghanistan, which noted that the threat of

corruption has been seriously underestimated.46

Transparency International also ranked

Afghanistan as the third most corrupt country in the world in their 2012 Corruption Perceptions

Index, indicating the pervasiveness of corruption in the country.47

Despite the efforts of ISAF,

the US, UNAMA, and the Afghan central government to fight corruption – through

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establishment of an ISAF anti-corruption task force known as Shafafiyat (Pashtu for

“transparency”), an anti-corruption unit in the Ministry of Justice, and a high office for

monitoring anti-corruption efforts within the Afghan parliament – the Special Inspector

General’s October 2011 report asserted that “the Afghan government has made little progress in

prosecuting high-level officials because it lacks the political will to do so.”48

Early this year, the

Special Inspector General’s January 2013 report indicated that anti-corruption indictments

remain insignificant and stated that “Afghan prosecutors continued to complain that they lack

supervisors’ support for prosecutions.”49

The Afghan government clearly lacks the capacities and

legitimacy to tackle challenges related to stabilization of the country. This could become an

especially acute problem in the post-transition period, when the international community’s

support will presumably drop from current levels.

Economic development is another precondition for a successful counterinsurgency campaign,

although it is not seen as decisive a factor, because experts feel the transition process in

Afghanistan primarily depends on the security situation in particular provinces.50

The 2011 &

2012 International Monetary Fund reports note that there has been economic growth in

Afghanistan despite the drop of real GDP growth from 21% to less than 6% within two years.

Although the growth of GDP has slowed, current GDP growth – boosted somewhat in 2012 by a

rebound in the agricultural sector51

– is closer to the real average rate of about 9% over the last

decade.52

While particular progress has been made in the transportation, mining, health, and

education sectors,53

current economic growth is mostly the result of spending and donations by

the international community (for example, in 2010, Afghan GDP was somewhat less than US

appropriations for reconstruction, which amounted to just over 16 billion dollars that year).54

Per

capita GDP was just 528 dollars in 2010-2011, which places Afghanistan among the world’s

least developed countries.55

The ISAF contribution to reconstruction and development is mostly

implemented through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (there are 27 PRTs). These teams,

composed of mixed expertise (including experts in economics, construction, diplomacy,

pedagogy, and the military), represent a comprehensive approach to providing the Afghan

government with assistance in order to promote its influence and stabilize Afghan provinces.

Responsibility for funding PRT projects rests with the leading nation in each PRT. However, the

work of PRTs has been marked by a lack of funding, difficulties in sustaining completed

development projects, a lack of competent local staff, and security challenges.56

Given these

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difficulties, and in light of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s decision to dismantle all PRTs

during the transition process, a warning issued by the Office of the Special Inspector General for

Reconstruction of Afghanistan was absolutely on target; it cautioned that a majority of PRTs

could be transformed before the Afghan government is able to govern the provinces by itself.57

The stability and sustainability of development in Afghanistan could be put at additional risk by

a lack of funding in the post-transition period. Specifically, Afghanistan depends heavily on

donor money, which accounts for more than 90% of the total Afghan budget.58

Current and

future decreases of foreign donor reconstruction money (see below) will therefore undoubtedly

affect the ability of the Afghan government to ensure continuous economic and social

development, putting the success of the counterinsurgency campaign in the post-transition period

at risk.

Graph 4: Yearly donated budget funding by spending category

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Conclusion

Despite these many indicators of fragile security, insufficiently developed capacities of state

institutions, and a level of economic and social development that does not seem to be self-

sustainable, the first stage of the handover of power to Afghan authorities was completed by the

end of 2011, with the transfer of three provinces and four districts (representing 20% of the

population). The second stage encompassed another eight provinces (to total 50% of the

population), and stage three, which includes the handover of power in all provincial capitals, will

bring the number of entire provinces under local security control to eleven (accounting for 75%

of the population).60

It seems the US and NATO have used apparent tactical victories achieved during operations in

southern Afghanistan and the killing Osama bin Laden to add legitimacy to the perceived partial

strategic success of the mission in Afghanistan, justifying the accelerated ‘achievements’ of

Lisbon Declaration provisions related to the international community’s partnership with

Afghanistan. However, this analysis reveals some of the weaknesses of NATO’s approach to the

Afghan issue. In particular, ISAF member countries are facing decreasing public support at home

for their efforts in Afghanistan; at the same time, they are confronting monumental financial

challenges. These pressures have affected political decision making regarding the (accelerated)

pace of full or partial withdrawal of military forces and have reduced financial assistance to

Afghanistan, directly affecting the capabilities of the ISAF mission. Additionally, reservations in

some NATO countries related to the lack of acceptance of the counterinsurgency campaign as

part of the ISAF mission have resulted in a lack of resources in areas with the most active

insurgent activities, further weakening ISAF operational capabilities. The cumulative effect of

this on the “experiment” that is Afghan intervention – of political disunity, insufficient and

disproportionate contributions, and disharmony within the allied doctrine – is reflected in an

unstable security situation, a weak system of Afghan state administration, and the mere

rudimentary success of economic and social development in the country. As Brzezinski notes, all

of these factors will keep Afghanistan high on the list of “geo-politically endangered species” in

the post-transition period.61

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1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 ( 2001), No. S/RES/1386 (December 20, 2001). Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement 2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 (2003), No. S/RES/1510 (October 13, 2003). Available at: http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf?OpenElement 3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “ NATO and Afghanistan,” www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm (accessed May 26, 2012). 4 Thomas Barfield, “The Roots of Failure in Afghanistan,” Current History 107 (December 2008): 410-417. Available at: http://www.relooney.info/00_New_3092.pdf 5 Lakhdar Brahimi, “A New Path for Afghanistan,” Washington Post, July 12, 2008. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/05/AR2008120503191.html 6 Simon Serfaty, The Vital Partnership: Power and Order, America and Europe Beyond Iraq (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 6. 7 General Stanley McChrystal, Commander’s Initial Assessment, ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan (August 30, 2009), 2-2,

http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140

8 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (October

30, 2011), 33. Available at: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2011-10-30qr.pdf

9 For more about foreign terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan, see: Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation, United States Institute for Peace (September 2008). Available at: http://www.usip.org/publications/thwarting-afghanistan-s-insurgency-pragmatic-approach-toward-peace-and-reconciliation 10 Daniel Markey Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt, Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 36 (July/August 2008). 11 See: David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1964); or David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” Survival 48, No. 4 (December 2006): 111-130. 12 For more about the Taliban insurgency campaign in central Helmand, where the author spent five months in 2009, see: Hazim Hodžić, “Afghanistan: The War for Perceptions?” in Katastrofy Naturalne i Cywilizacyjne (Wroclaw: Polish Military Academy, 2011), 361- 376. 13 US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24 (December 2006), 1–1.Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf 14 For more about Sir Gerald Templer, who commanded British forces during the Malayan counterinsurgency campaign, see: Noor Ampssler, “Hearts and Minds: Malayan campaign re-evaluated,” August 27, 2010, Defence Viewpoints, http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/hearts-and-minds-malayan-campaign-re-evaluated 15 Peter Jakobsen, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress, Danish Institute for International Studies, No. 2008:15 (October 8, 2008), 9. Available at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/ Reports%202008/Report_2008-15_NATO_Comprehensive_Approach_Crisis_Response_Operations.pdf 16 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining Afghanistan National Security Forces (April 2010), 12. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf 17 Gilles Dorronsoro, “Talking to the Taliban: Quick-fix or Political Solution?,” April 14, 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=2848 18 Amanda Terkel, “Lugar on Afghan War: Americans are Wondering “Where Does This Stop?,” January 8, 2011, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/18/richard-lugar-afghanistan-stop_n_810360.html 19 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, No. E-0B2276C (October 2011), 55. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/October_2011_Section_1230_Report.pdf 20 Louisa Brooke-Holland and Claire Taylor, Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition, House of Commons, No. SN/IA5851 (July 9, 2012), www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05851.pdf (accessed September 1, 2012). 21 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress (October 2011), 2. 22 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, No. 1-86DE5F2 (December

2012), 1-2. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_Report_final.pdf

15

23 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (October 30, 2011), 85.

24 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress (December 2012), 160. 25 Ibid., 33. 26 UN General Assembly Security Council, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, No. A/66/369-S/2011/590 (September 21, 2011). Available at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/SG%20Reports/110921%20SG%20Report%20on%20Afghanistan%20FINAL.pdf 27 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (February

2013), 1-2. Available at: http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zYmVmJCwBe4%3d&tabid=12254&

language=en-US

28 Ibid., 2. 29 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress (October 2011), 72. 30 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (April 2012), 67. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_27_12.pdf 31 General McChrystal, Commander's Initial Assessment, 2–11. 32 US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 1–13. 33 General McChrystal, Commander's Initial Assessment. 34 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress (October 2011), 13. 35 Brooke-Holland and Taylor, Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition, 22-24. 36 Astri Suhrke, “A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 15, No. 2 (April 2008): 229. Available at: http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3038-a-contradictory-mission.pdf 37 General McChrystal, Commander's Initial Assessment, 2–1. 38 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress (October 2011), 14. 39 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress (December 2012), 21.

40 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (October 2011), 81. 41 Ibid., 89. 42 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (January

30, 2013), 103. Available at: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-01-30qr.pdf

43UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan: Mid-Year Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (July

2012), 19 (see footnote). Available at: http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=-_vDVBQY1OA%

3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US

44 Anthony H. Cordesman, Afghanistan at the End of 2011: Part One – Trends in the War, Center for Strategic and International Studies (January 3, 2012), 39. Available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120103_Afghan_War_at_End.pdf 45 General McChrystal, Commander's Initial Assessment, 2–9. 46 Transparency International, Corruption Threatens the Success of the International Mission in Afghanistan, press release, May 13, 2011, http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20110513_corruption_afghanistan (accessed May 26, 2012) 47 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (accessed May 26, 2012). 48 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (October 2011), 95. 49 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (January 2013), 117.

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50 Alessandro Marrone, Afghanistan in Transition: The Security Context Post-Bin Laden, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rim, working paper, No. 11|13 (June 2011), 9. Available at: http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1113.pdf 51 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Islamic Republic of Afghanistan..., country report, No. 11/330 (November 2011), 6.

Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12245.pdf

52 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (January 30, 2012), 127. Available at: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-01-30qr.pdf 53 Ibid., 135. 54 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (October 2011), 102. 55 The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 (May 2012), 1. Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Vol1Overview8Maypm.pdf 56 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress (October 2011), 94. 57 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (October 2011). 58 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (January 2012), 21.

59 SIGAR, Quarterly Report (January 2013), 57. 60 Brooke-Holland and Taylor, 9-10. 61 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Eight Geopolitically Endangered Species,” Foreign Policy (Jan/Feb 2012).