NATO - Berkeley Model United Nations

1

NATO ___________ Berkeley model United Nations ___________

berkeley model united nations 2

welcome letter Dear Delegates,

Welcome to BMUN 70’s NATO committee! My name is Sanjay Rangavajjhala, and I am excit-

ed to be your Head Chair for NATO this year. I am a sophomore at UC Berkeley double majoring in

Molecular and Cell Biology and Data Science, with a minor in Computer Science. I have been a part

of the MUN community for 5 years, and have even competed in BMUN’s NATO committee as a dele-

gate, so I can definitely understand what it feels like to be in your shoes!

This year, we will be looking at two topics. Topic A explores the incredibly complex issue of

the Yemeni Civil War, an issue that dates back over 100 years and has resulted in one of the larg-

est humanitarian crises in history. This specialized committee will focus primarily on preserving the

quality of life for the people of the region using the power of NATO. The military and diplomatic

strengths of this Western coalition present a unique perspective to the issue which has not been ex-

plored as of yet. Unlike many of the general assembly committees of the UN, NATO has an authority

to act, which may provide an advantage in instituting peace.

Topic B explores the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2016, NATO deployed Oper-

ation Sea Guardian, which was tasked with surveilling the Mediterranean and disrupting smuggling

networks. However, despite action by NATO and the EU, the illegal flow of drugs, terror, and people

still exists. The scope of the issue is immense, so for the purposes of this committee I want to focus

on the issue of smuggling, both of humans as well as drugs, and terrorism. In this committee, we will

focus on adapting the current NATO infrastructure to more effectively save human lives, both at sea

and on land.

I chose this committee and these topics because I feel that NATO is unique to other com-

mittees in that it has the capacity for action. Instead of suggesting solutions, we have the option to

actually institute real world changes. I hope that this power to enact change empowers you as dele-

gates to think outside of the box. Both these topics have reached a plateau in terms of progress, and

in session I am excited to see how we can jump start the road to recovery in both these issues.

This year, I am joined by my head chairs Isha Shah and Naman Satish.

Isha is a senior studying Bioengineering, with a minor in Public Policy. Isha has been a part of

BMUN since her freshman year at Berkeley and involved in MUN for over 9 years, and is excited to


conclude her Model UN involvement with engaging dialogues and debate in NATO this year!

Naman is currently a freshman and is studying Mechanical Engineering with a very strong

intent to transfer into EECS. He looks forward to the vibrant discussions and unique solutions from

delegates during the committee!

If you have any questions or would like any feedback, please email us at natobmunlxx@bmun.

org. We look forward to seeing you in committee!

4

Topic A: Yemeni Civil War

Topic BackgroundA Brief History of Modern Yemen

To understand the current conflict in Yemen, it may help to study the history of Yemen as

a nation, and the unique interactions between distinct cultural and social groups. Yemen was the

birthplace Zaydi in 901 AD, a traditional sect of Shiite Islam which dominated the Yemeni region until

nearly 1962. A series of expansions by the Ottoman empire in the sixteenth century successfully in-

troduced Sunni Islam to the country’s previously unified religious identity, and incorporated the Zaydi

Shiite community into the Ottoman caliphate. However, the first Western interaction with Yemen only

really occurred in 1839, when Britain led a conquest through the southern Arabian Peninsula and

claimed the port city of Aden for the British protectorate. The British subsequently drew the Violet

Line during the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 to distinguish the land border between British

and Ottoman territory, effectively dividing the Shiite population to the North and the Sunni popula-

tion to the South (Sorenson 2019).

berkeley model united nations


The Violet Line ultimately outlasted Ottoman rule in Yemen, when in 1918 the empire dis-

solved and the Zaydi community of the North gained independence. This new republic was incredi-

bly unstable— due to infighting, the first leader of Zaydis, Imam Yahya, was assassinated in 1948. His

successor, Yahya’s son Ahmad, held power until 1962, though throughout this term he faced growing

tensions with the British protectorate to the South as well as the rise of nationalism in the peninsula.

Upon Ahmad’s death, the military took control of the government, and instituted the Arab Republic

of Yemen (ARY), which was recognized by notable opponents of the Zaydi community (namely Saudi

Arabia and Jordan) in 1968 (Serr 2017).

British rule in the South came to an end in 1963, when the former protectorate became the

Federation of South Arabia. This short-lived federation ultimately capitulated as two rival factions,

the National Liberation Front(NLF), and the Occupied South Yemen Liberation Front, fought for

power. By 1967, the NLF had gained control of most of the territory in Southern Yemen, and in 1969

the new Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen (DPRY) was formed in the former-federation region

(Settembrini 2019).

The DPRY was led by a radical faction of the NLF, and promoted a socialist government, align-

ing itself with the USSR in the rapidly escalating global stage that was the Cold War. Meanwhile, the

military-controlled ARY decided to establish a free-market economy and aligned itself with the West

and Saudi Arabia. The ideological differences between these two states, as well as rising internation-

al tensions, culminated in a series of border wars along the Violet Line between the PRY and the ARY

from 1972 till 1988 (ibidem).

By 1988, a series of losses in border wars and civil unrest with the strict socialist form of gov-

ernance in the PRY ushered into power a new group of moderates, led by Ali Salim al-Bayd, who

began pushing for negotiations and peace talks between the two Yemeni republics (Schmitz and Bur-

rowes 2009). The fall of the USSR cut funding to the PRY, and the discovery of natural gas reserves

along the border area expedited reunification efforts. These took place in 1990 incredibly quickly,

although this did not immediately soothe lingering tensions between the two states. The North took

control of the unified Yemeni government and systematically persecuted the Southern Socialist Party

until it progressively lost all of its official influence and power.

The disenfranchised Southern Socialist Party resolved to take power back militarily, leading to

the 1994 Yemen Civil War. This resistance movement was quickly subdued by Northern forces, who


had the financial and military backing of Western powers and Saudi Arabia. This victory cemented Ali

Abdullah Saleh, a politician from the ARY, as leader of the newly unified Yemen.

During Saleh’s term from 1990 till 2011, he faced many opposition groups, mainly the Houth-

is, a group of traditional Zaydi Shiites who sought to “oppose corruption” in the government and

return Yemeni governance to its Zaydi roots. The Saleh government was wrought with nepotism and

embezzlement of country wealth, which the Houthis took particular offense against. However, the

invasion of Iraq by the United States after 9/11 radicalized the Houthi movement, which they saw as

attacking the fundamental ideals of Islam in the peninsula. The Houthis assumed the motto “Allah is

great, death to the USA, death to Israel, curse for the Jews and victory of Islam”, and modeled their

ideology after Hezbollah. The Houthi group also found itself at odds with the Sunni-dominated Saudi

Arabia and found an ally in Iran from whom they received military and financial support (Ridel 2017).

The Houthis raised arms against Saudi and US-backed Saleh forces 6 times between the years

of 2004 and 2011. These battles trained Houthi forces militarily and taught them to utilize guerrilla

warfare against Saleh’s conventional forces. In their sixth battle in 2010, Houthi forces faced the best

troops in the Republic, special forces trained and equipped by the US, and Saudi air forces. Ultimate-

ly, the Houthi emerged successful, utilizing their familiarity with the region’s terrain to outmaneuver

the opposition (Horton 2016).


The Arab Spring in Yemen

In 2011, the Middle East experienced a series of uprisings against dictatorial regimes which

came to be known as the Arab Spring. The loss by Saleh forces against Houthi insurgents in 2010

only fueled the calls for Saleh’s abdication of power in Yemen. Houthis aligned with Southern loy-

alists and discontented citizens to demand a change in government. In November 2011, President

Saleh resigned and was succeeded by his Vice President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi through a popular

vote in which he won 99.8% of the votes(Colombo 2012). However, institutional weakness and years

of government corruption outlived Saleh’s regime, and soon the Yemeni population was faced with

the same unemployment, poverty, and malnutrition issues that had caused the 2011 uprising to

begin with. Hadi’s lack of action quickly soured his relations with the public. Instead of addressing

these issues, Hadi focused on instituting government and military officials who would be loyal to him

instead of Saleh. However, many of the common, lower-ranked soldiers who were not replaced re-

mained loyal to Saleh. In addition, policy disagreements between the Hadi government and Houthis

over federal and military reform pushed Hadi out of the Houthi’s favor.

Paradoxically, Hadi forces found an ally with Saleh loyalists. Once enemies, these two factions

united in the common goal of opposing the Hadi government. In 2014, the tensions boiled over into

military conflict when Houthis began militarily expanding into the Amran region of Yemen (Brehony

2015). The Houthis gained military success against the pro-Hadi Sunni military in the region and ex-

panded South towards Sana’a, Yemen’s capital where Hadi resided.


The Start of the Civil War

The Houthi-Saleh forces stormed the Presidential Palace in September 2014, placing Pres-

ident Hadi on house arrest and demanding his resignation. However, Hadi succeeded in fleeing

Sana’a, relocating to Aden which he declared the new capital of his still legitimate presidency (Sharp

2018).

By March 2015, Houthi-Saleh forces had rallied to Aden where they continued to challenge

Hadi’s presidency. Under intense pressure, Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia recruited the

Gulf Cooperation Council, a coalition of 7 Arabian countries including the UAE, Egypt, and Qatar,

to launch Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. This operation would consist of airstrikes and naval

blockades on the Houthi-Saleh forces (Broder 2017). Internationally, the US aligned itself with Saudi

Arabia, while the UNSC officially recognized Hadi as the legitimate president of Yemen and called

on Houthi forces to withdraw (Arraf 2017). In response to Saudi Arabia, reports have indicated possi-

ble aid provided to the Houthis by the Iranian military, though the extent to and nature of this aid is

currently unknown.

As countries began choosing sides, terrorist organizations like the AQAP saw the chaos as a

unique opportunity to seize land and resources. In July 2015, the AQAP had full control of the city of

Mukalla, an important port city with the fifth largest population in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition at-

tempted to curtail AQAP’s presence by regaining control of Mukalla in 2016. However, organizations

like the AQAP still have a large foothold in the region, and continue to fight guerrilla warfare to claim

more land and followers(ibidem).

Relations between Houthi and Saleh forces also began deteriorating. These groups had

fought each other from 1990-2011, and despite being united against Hadi their past animosity had

not vanished. In 2017, Houthi forces killed a close aide to Saleh at a checkpoint, who in turn mobi-

lized his troops in Sana’a in response. This culminated in an intense battle between Saleh and Houthi

forces in Sana’a, which ended with Saleh’s assassination in his Sana’a home on December 4, 2017.

This effectively brought an end to the Saleh-led insurgency, simplifying the war to three main internal

actors: the Hadi government, backed by the Sunni Saudi Arabia and the GCC; the Houthis, tradition-

al Shiites allegedly backed by Iran; and the AQAP.

Since 2017, the civil war has reached an effective stalemate. The Saudi-led coalition remains


unable to expand into the Houthi-controlled Northeastern region of Yemen, and AQAP presence has

continued albeit subtly. Attempts at peace talks by the UN have failed on two separate occasions,

and the international scope of this battle has raised tensions across the Arabian Peninsula. However,

this stalemate has hurt Yemeni civilians the most.

The Humanitarian Toll

Even before the war began, Yemen was the poorest country in the Arabian peninsula, thanks

in part to high levels of government corruption and mismanagement. The war only exacerbated

this by crippling infrastructure and services. The violence in Yemen since 2015 has killed more than

10,000 civilians as of 2017 (International Crisis Group 2017), with over 1,400 of those casualties be-

ing children. Most of these civilian deaths can be attributable to airstrikes by the GCC, though clus-

ter munitions and mines employed by ground troops on both sides also present an incredible risk.

Nearly two-thirds of the Yemeni population, which amounts to over 21 million people, are in need of

aid, creating what has been called by the UN secretary-general for humanitarian affairs “the largest

humanitarian crisis in the world” (OCHA 2017).


International embargoes imposed by the UNSC to prevent weapons and munitions from

entering the country have in reality functioned as an embargo for everything from trade to aid as

well. Yemen’s infrastructure and economy pre-civil war was incredibly reliant on imports, with 90% of

the country’s food arriving through port cities. However, once this food actually crosses the embar-

go, it has often gone bad, creating an intense bidding war for already substandard food among the

citizens (Edroos 2017). Indeed, the World Food Program estimates that in 2021 alone, more than

400,000 Yemeni children under the age of 5 are likely to die of starvation (Sheline 2021). The inability

to help an already dire situation prompted the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee to declare a

Level 3 emergency in Yemen in 2015, the most severe classification for humanitarian issues.

The fighting has forced many families to pick a side in the battle in order to survive, with

verified cases of child recruitment to fight in the conflict. In fact, cases of child recruitment increased

by 35 percent in 2017 compared to 2016, resulting in more than one-third of fighters being under

the age of 16 (Rasha 2017). Young girls are also often married incredibly young to provide financial

assistance to ailing families through their dowry. In fact, according to UNICEF, more than two-thirds

of girls in Yemen are married before they turn 18, marking a 20 percent increase from pre-war levels.

However, most experts agree that the single greatest concern is the lack of accessible and effective


healthcare services, which has turned otherwise controllable diseases into lethal epidemics. Over

15 million people lack access to basic healthcare, and more than 2 million live in acute need of safe

drinking water and sanitation (Save the Children 2016). This has resulted in 2 cholera epidemics since

the beginning of the war, one of which being the largest cholera epidemic ever recorded. Even in

the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Houthi officials have actively downplayed the severity of the

virus, spreading disinformation about the virus and the vaccines as well as refusing to release official

case and death counts (Human Rights Watch 2021).

This humanitarian emergency has created a massive refugee crisis in neighboring states. The

UNHCR has registered more than 200,000 Yemeni refugees since 2015 (Coppi 2018). Most seek

countries in the neighboring countries of Oman, Djibouti, and Saudi Arabia. However, many of these

countries either do not have the infrastructure to support them or have closed their borders to Ye-

meni refugees, creating multiple internally displaced camps throughout Yemen. The Yemeni people

have had their entire lives and futures uprooted by this war, and its effects grow larger each day the

war continues.

Past International Response International involvement in the Yemeni Civil War has existed as long as the war itself. When

Saleh was first overthrown in 2011, the ceasefire was negotiated by the GCC, with support from the

US as well (Arraf 2017). However, as the Hadi regime began capitulating, international actors began

taking sides in the budding war.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has historically had good relations with Yemen, viewing the Saudi influence over

the Yemeni government as prestigious and honorable (Esfandiary 2016). Four main factors have

driven Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the war, according to Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“securing Saudi Arabia’s broader, stemming Iran’s regional expansionist ambitions, combating ter-

rorist threats and safeguarding regional security.” (Orkaby 2017) The Shi’ite Houthis had ties with

the Shi’ite majority Iran and had targeted Saudi territory with missiles in the past. Moreover, a weak

government allowed actors like the AQAP to emerge. Thus, the House of Saud saw it in their best


interest to support President Hadi’s bloc, to both maintain regional security as well as show their

dominance against the Houthi aggressors.

On March 26th, 2015, Saudi Arabia recruited the GCC to launch Operation Decisive Storm.

According to the Human Rights Watch in 2018, “the coalition has conducted scores of indiscriminate

and disproportionate airstrikes hitting civilian objects that have killed thousands of civilians...with mu-

nitions that the US, United Kingdom, and others still supply.” (Human Rights Watch 2018) A Houthi-

led missile strike on Saudi soil in 2018 harshened Saudi actions in the Yemeni Civil War, leading to an

embargo of all Yemeni ports by the coalition. This embargo has stopped food and aid from entering

the country as well, making it the subject of much criticism in the international community. Though

the UNSC has attempted to create a verification and inspection system to hasten humanitarian aid

to Yemen, these efforts have mostly failed largely due to the inefficient port management and lack of

infrastructure at port cities. This results in offloading taking an average of 30 days, by which much of

the food and aid would have become unusable (O’Brien 2016).

As Operation Decisive has continued, it has become increasingly unpopular due to the lack

of progress seen on the battlefield despite the significant difference in resources. This backlash has

caused Saudis to push for a ceasefire, which Houthi rebels refuse to due to the harsh terms Saudis


have demanded. The US and Saudi remain consistent on reinstating Hadi’s government, a condition

Houthis continue to fight against (Sheline 2021). Until this issue in negotiations is resolved, we are

not likely to see an end to the Yemeni Civil War.

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran’s large Shia population, vast resources, and powerful geographic position have made it a

force to be reckoned with in the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, Iran often aligns itself with its religious

identity, offering support to revolutionaries and governments alike in the region so long as they

identify with the Shi’ite sect of Islam. This can be seen in both the case of the Syrian leader Bashar

al-Assad, an Alawite Shi’ite, as well as the Houthi revolutionaries in Yemen, who are a majority Zaydi

Shi’ite.

According to the New York Times in 2012, there is evidence that the Iranian military has been

supplying Houthi rebels with military and financial aid. However, since the coalition embargo was

imposed in 2015, many have argued that Iranian involvement in the region has largely come to a

halt, and Iran continues to deny any involvement with Houthi forces. Despite speculation, no official

evidence has been found that Houthi missiles were supplied by Iran either. Regardless of whether

this is true or not, it is undeniable that the scale of the Iranian presence is nowhere close to that of

the US or Saudi Arabia.

United States

The United States has historically allied with Saudi Arabian forces in conflicts in the Middle

Eastern region. Especially under the Trump administration, Saudi-US relations were strengthened

incredibly, making Saudi Arabia the biggest consumer of US arms in the world. In continuing this pat-

tern, the US has provided logistical and military support to the coalition’s Operation Decisive Storm

through arms deals and tactical advice (Malsin 2017). Faced with increasing public outrage at the

coalition airstrikes and embargo, the US government has officially called for the coalition blockade to

be lifted— this, however, has not been substantiated by any military, economic, or political actions.

The US cites “aggressive diplomacy” as the only way to end this conflict and prevent the AQAP or

Iranian influence from overtaking the region (Al Jazeera 2017).


More than anything, the US’s main goal in the region is to maintain its regional hegemony. It

sees Iran, the AQAP, and other non-Western aligned forces as threats to this. Apart from its involve-

ment in the coalition’s airstrikes, the US has also conducted airstrikes of its own against AQAP bases

in Yemen, with the consent of both the previous Saleh government before 2011 and the Hadi gov-

ernment post-2011 (Rugh 2015). US involvement in the region can continue to be expected so long

as there exists any threat to its regional foothold.

United Nations

In January 2017, Ould Cheikh Ahmed, the second UN mediator for the Yemeni crisis in less

than three years, resigned in frustration. This came after years of no success in negotiating a cease-

fire between the Houthi and Hadi forces, including a conflict-settlement plan presented in 2016 as a

result of the Kuwait Talks (Gladstone 2018). UN-moderated peace talks have largely come to a stale-

mate, as little progress has been made in the last 10 years. As explained by the UN Panel of Experts

on Yemen, “to date, the parties have not demonstrated a sustained interest in or commitment to a

political settlement or peace talks.” (UNSC 2017)

The World Bank also announced in 2017 that it would devote over $500 million to fund emer-

gency health and nutritional aid for Yemeni citizens. These funds will largely be disbursed to the

UNDP, UNICEF, and WHO, to deliver essential services to an estimated 7 million Yemenis. (World

Bank 2017).

Non-Governmental Organizations

Though there exist many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attempting to bring hu-

manitarian aid to the people of the region, many of these organizations are not able to help due to

the embargo as well as a significant risk to the aid personnel. The presence of two separate govern-

ments also makes administrative barriers hard to cross for humanitarian workers. However, this does

not imply a lack of effort on the part of the NGOs. UN cluster systems reported 143 different hu-

manitarian organizations working in Yemen as of 2017, an increase of about 90% when compared to

2015 when the conflict first broke out. (OCHA 2017)


Case StudyPre-Civil War Yemen: The Role of Dialogue

Civil wars and national dialogues appear to go hand-in-hand in Yemen; consider, for example,

Yemen’s relationship with the Arab Spring. What kind of productive capacity do dialogues such as

high-level negotiations and community attempts at mediation have, however, to solve war and pre-

vent the outbreak of new hostilities? Elayah and their colleagues suggest that without trust, owner-

ship, and power balance between conflicting factions, dialogues are unpredictable and even useless

(Elayah et al. 2020).

Examining the nature of the dialogues that occurred before and after the civil war in 1994

is helpful for understanding how future dialogues may facilitate the stabilization of the region. To

review, the declaration of the unification of Yemen in May 1990 initiated a transition period of about

two years, concluding in 1992; during this transitional period, Yemen attempted to adopt a wide

national program of political, economic, financial, and administrative reforms (Elayah et al. 2020).

However, both the former North and former South Yemen claimed that they had won the parliamen-

tary election, therefore stalling the implementation of the reforms.

The two ruling elites—the General People’s Congress in the North and the Socialist Party in

the South—held onto suspicion and negative political tensions, even when the General People’s

Congress democratically won the most seats in Yemen’s state parliamentary elections. In an attempt

to contain the crisis before the civil war erupted in 1994, various political forces pursued a dialogue,

forming a committee known as the Committee for the Political Forces’ Dialogue. This committee

attempted to promote national unity, democracy, and stability, eventually producing a document

known as the Document of Pledge and Accord signed by various actors such as the heads of political

parties and NGOs (Elayah et al. 2020). In the Document of Pledge and Accord, actors agreed upon

the importance of evacuating armed forces from the cities, repositioning army units through one

national plan in order to facilitate nationwide military integration, building a local, decentralized gov-

ernment system based on broad popular participation, and including constitutional amendments to

electoral parliamentary and local systems, particularly the public voting system (Elayah et al. 2020).

If all factions signed this document, why did it not solve the crisis and prevent an impending

civil war? The South’s Socialist Party’s leadership could fully and wholeheartedly support the contents


of the document, but they still had no trust in the Northern ruling elite (Elayah et al. 2020). Directly

after the document was signed, “they visited a number of Gulf states and then returned to Aden but

refused to return to Sana’a. This action increased the armed conflicts between the military units, and

after former vice-president Ali Salem called for the South’s separation from the North, civil war broke

out in several locations across the country” in 1994 (Elayah et al. 2020). In addition, tribes (sheikhs)

were not included fully in the process of this dialogue despite having an influential role in the course

of the crisis during both the settlement efforts and the armed conflict stage.

According to Elayah, building an environment of trust between all warring factions before

pursuing any political agenda is crucial for obtaining an outcome that is positive and peaceful. In ad-

dition, Elayah argues, international and but also regional involvement is crucial, especially given that

external bodies are one of the causes of internal conflict in Yemen (Elayah et al. 2020). Finally, local

knowledge and interests from players at intermediate and grassroots levels must accompany any

national dialogue: “Here the prerequisite is, if not balance of power, then readiness to share power”

(Elayah et al. 2020).


Questions to Consider

Question 1: Do you think the current situation in Yemen could have been avoided with more

foreign support? If so, when?

Question 2: How do you think balancing short term humanitarian solutions should be bal-

anced with long term stability solutions?

Question 3: What do you think is the biggest driver in keeping this conflict alive? In other

words, what is the main reason this conflict has not been settled yet?

Question 4: Should foreign nations continue to fight terror in the Arab Peninsula and abroad

even at the risk of radicalizing native factions, like what happened with the Houthis?


Works Cited

Abdullah, Jamal. 30 April 2015, Jamal. “Geopolitical Context of Operation DECISIVE Storm

and GCC STATES’ Attitudes toward It.” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 30 Apr. 2015, studies.alja-

zeera.net/en/reports/2015/04/201543012944560454.html.

Al-Maghafi, Fadhl. “More than Just a Boundary Dispute: The REGIONAL Geopolitics OF SAU-

DI-YEMENI RELATIONS.” University of London, 2012.

Al Jazeera, “US: There Is No Military Solution to End War in Yemen,”. December 22, 2017,

www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/military-solution-war-yemen-171222060356636.html.

Arraf, S. October 2017. The armed conflict in Yemen: A complicated mosaic. The Geneva

Academy. https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/The%20Armed%20Con-

flict%20in%20Yemen.pdf

Bender, Jeremy. “These Maps Show What Could Happen next in Yemen - and How It Could

Impact Global Politics.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 27 Mar. 2015, www.businessinsider.com/

these-maps-show-where-yemens-conflict-could-be-heading-2015-3.

Brehony, N. (2015). Yemen and the Houthis: genesis of the 2015 crisis. Asian Affairs, 46(2),

pp.232-250

Broder, J. Hit and missile. Newsweek. December 2017.

Colombo, S. (2012). The GCC countries and the Arab Spring: Between outreach, patronage,

and repression. Istituto Affari Internazionali.

Coppi, Giulio. “The Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen: Beyond the Man-Made Disaster,” Interna-

tional Peace Institute, January 2018.

Edroos, Faisal. “Saudi Easing of Yemen Siege ‘No Cause for Celebration,’” Al Jazeera,

November 22, 2017, www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/saudi-ease-yemen-siege-millions-suf-

fer-171122173712350.html

Esfandiary, D. and Tabatabai, A. (2016). Yemen: AN opportunity for Iran-Saudi dialogue? The

Washington Quarterly, 39(2), 155-174.


Frantzman, Seth J. “‘Curse the Jews,’ YEMEN’S Houthi Rebel Slogan Handed out at Univer-

sity.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com, 10 Oct. 2018, www.jpost.com/middle-east/curse-the-jews-ye-

mens-houthi-rebel-slogan-handed-out-at-university-569074.

Horton, M. (2016). An Unwinnable War: The Houthis, Saudi Arabia and the Future of Yemen,

An Unwinnable War: The Houthis, Saudi Arabia and the Future of Yemen - Jamestown. [online]

Jamestown. https://jamestown.org/program/unwinnable-war-houthis-saudi-arabia-future-yemen/

Human Rights Watch. (2018). Yemen: Events of 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/

country-chapters/remen, 1-8.

Human Rights Watch. “Yemen: Houthis RISK Civilians’ Health IN COVID-19.” 1 June 2021,

www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/01/yemen-houthis-risk-civilians-health-covid-19#.

International Crisis Group, “Yemen Country Update,” March 2017, www.crisisgroup.org/

crisiswatch?utm_source=Sign+Up+to+Crisis+Group%27s+Email+Updates&utm_campaign=3b45e-

201faEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_02_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_1dab8c11ea-3b45e-

201fa-359390313#yemen.

Jarhum, Rasha. “Opinion: The Humanitarian Response in Yemen Isn’t Working,” Devex,

January 30, 2017, www.devex.com/news/opinion-the-humanitarian-response-in-yemen-isn-t-work-

ing-89540

Malsin, Jared. “The Big Problem with President Trump’s Record Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia,”

Time, May 22, 2017, http://time.com/4787797/donald-trump-yemen-saudi-arabia-arms-deal/.

OCHA, “Yemen: Humanitarian Bulletin,” November 20, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/relief-

web.int/files/resources/20%20November%202017%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin_FINAL_ENG.pdf.

OCHA, “Yemen: Organizations 3W Operational Presence,” October 2017, available at https://

ochayemen.org/hrp-2017/en/3w; “Yemen: Organizations 3W

Operational Presence,” December 31, 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-organi-

zations-3w-operational-presence-31-december-2016-enar.

Orkaby, A. (November-December 2017). Yemen’s humanitarian nightmare: The real roots of

the conflict. Foreign Affairs, 93-101.

Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Mediator for Yemen Conflict Leaving Post,” New York Times, January


22, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/world/middleeast/yemen-un-envoy.html.

Riedel, B. (2017). Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them? Brookings. https://

www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-

them/

Rugh, W.A. (2015) Problems in Yemen, domestic and foreign. Middle East Policy,22(4), 140-

152.

Save the Children, “Millions of Yemeni Children Facing Triple Threat of Cholera, Measles and

Malnutrition,” October 31, 2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/millions-yemeni-children-fac-

ing-triple-threat-cholera-measles-and-malnutrition.

Schmitz, C. and Burrowes, R. (2009). Historical Dictionary of Yemen. Rowman & Littlefield. p.

94

Serr, M. (2017). Understanding the War in Yemen’, Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs. https://doi.

org/10.1080/23739770.2017.1419405

Settembrini, Maria Maddalena. The proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia: the case of the

Yemeni Civil War. Diss. 2019.

Sharp, J.M. February 2018. Yemen: Civil War and regional intervention. Congressional Re-

search Service Report. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf

Sheline, Annelle. “Washington Has Yemen Policy Backward.” Foreign Policy, 3 June 2021.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/03/houthis-saudi-arabia-biden-yemen-policy-backward/

Stephen O’Brien, “Statement to the Security Council on Yemen,” October 31, 2016, www.

vimye.org/docs ERC_USG_Stephen_OBrien_Security_Council_Statement_on_Yemen_31Oct16.pdf

Sorenson, David S. An Introduction to the Modern Middle East: History, Religion, Political

Economy, Politics. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.

The Irish Times. “At Least 14 Civilians Killed in YEMEN Air Strikes.” 25 Aug. 2017, www.irish-

times.com/news/world/middle-east/at-least-14-civilians-killed-in-yemen-air-strikes-1.3198134.

UN Security Council, Letter Dated 27 January 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Ad-

dressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2017/81, January 31, 2017, www.securi-

tycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2017_81.pdf .


World Bank, “New Yemen Projects to Help 9 Million People with Basic Health and Nutri-

tion Services and Work Opportunities,” January 17, 2017, www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-re-

lease/2017/01/17/new-yemen-projects-to-help-9-million-people-with-basic-health-and-nutrition-ser-

vices-and-workopportunities.


Topic B: Counterterrorism and Capacity Building: Securing the Mediterranean Sea

Topic Background The Mediterranean Sea has become one of the most vital trade regions in the globalized

economy of the modern world. Each year, nearly 65% of the oil and gas consumed by the West

passes through, with the overall value of Mediterranean exports surpassing 1.2 trillion dollars. (NATO

2018) However, the unrest and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and an underde-

veloped framework for deterring and addressing criminal activity threaten the security of this trade

region. Two main issues in particular present unique concerns to the EU: human smuggling and drug

trafficking.

Migrant Crisis in the Mediterranean

In 2016, the International Organization for Migration reported nearly 3,000 known deaths of

migrants at sea, nearly 1% of the 302,000 refugees who attempted to cross the Mediterranean that

same year. (IOM 2016) This was a decrease from 2015, but the issue of migrant deaths at sea is not

new. In 2013, a boat of migrants traveling from Libya to the Italian island of Lampedusa sank, killing

360 people— many of whom were women and children. (Yardley and Povoledo 2013) The event

brought the issue of Mediterranean migrant smuggling to the public eye. It had become a common

phenomenon following the Arab Spring of 2011, which destabilized many countries in the region.

Overall, more than 90% of these illegal migrants can be traced back to 7 main origin points: Syria,

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Turkey, and the countries of Western Africa.

With the most recent pandemic, the crisis has only worsened. Many countries, both in the

EU and abroad, have used COVID-19 as an excuse to turn back refugees, despite it being illegal by

international law. This has resulted in massive delays in rescues to those who need it, as well as the

unlawful expulsion of such migrants back to the same environments they faced danger. (Kakissisand

Bashir 2021) The current civil war raging in Libya makes it an incredibly dangerous transit point,

though it remains the epicenter for Mediterranean smuggling routes due to its proximity to Italy and

lack of regulation. In addition to the buildup of refugees fleeing violence, the economic instability


from the pandemic has created a new surge of economic refugees, hoping to find better economic

opportunities in the EU.

Human Trafficking vs. Human Smuggling

While human trafficking and human smuggling both involve the illegal movement and har-

bouring of individuals, often across borders, for financial gains, there are fundamental differences

that affect individuals being trafficked or smuggled. According to the UNODC, human trafficking

is characterized by an act (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of people),

specific means (threats or use of force, deception, fraud, abuse of power, or abusing someone’s

vulnerable condition) for the purpose of exploitation (for example sexual exploitation, forced labour,

slavery or organ removal). On the other hand, human smuggling is mostly based on the smuggled

individual’s need or desire to enter a country, and the lack of proper documentation to do so. The

two criminal acts often happen in conjunction because smuggled individuals are more vulnerable to

becoming victims of coercion, deception, and abuse. For the purpose of our discussions, we will fo-

cus on human smuggling and consider human trafficking to be a subcategory of human smuggling.


Issue 1: Migrant Smuggling

Migrant smuggling is an extremely lucrative and scalable business benefiting from low costs

of service and sustained high demand. In an infographic published by Europol in 2019, over 90%

of migrations that year were facilitated by smugglers, which generated a total of 190 million euros

along the three main routes of the western, central and eastern mediterranean (Europol). In 2020,

Covid-19 caused many countries to implement stricter border controls, which resulted in changes in

the pattern of smuggling. According to the European Migrant Smuggling Centre’s (EMSC) 4th annual

report, there was increased use of the central mediterranean route, small boats to cross rivers and

canals, and freights to conceal migrants. The last of which is especially dangerous, recalling the case

in Essex when 37 migrant bodies were found in a refrigerated trailer on the 23rd of October, 2019

(BBC).

Issue 2: Drug Trafficking

Migrant smuggling created a series of underground routes by which one can smuggle nearly

anything into the EU. This created a unique opportunity to smuggle drugs like cocaine, cannabis,

and hashish into the EU undetected. Unrest in Syria and Libya have made these regions narco states,

while a lack of regulation in other countries like Morocco allows them to produce huge amounts of

drugs like cannabis which can then be taken across borders. The Centre for Operational Analysis and

Research estimates that the amount of Syrian drugs seized in 2020 alone amounts to over 3.4 billion

dollars, nearly 10% of Syria’s annual GDP. Sales of these drugs have financed these unstable gov-

ernments, as well as terror cells like the AQAP that have sprung among the chaos. (The Economist

2021). Many cartels in South America also utilize this trading route by sending shipments of drugs to

Libya, through which the drugs can enter the EU marketplace. (Paoli 2017)


Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime

The term “crime-terror nexus” has been coined to describe the state of cooperation and

coexistence of terrorism and transnational organized crime (TOC). Terrorist organizations draw from

the profits and expertise of TOC, while TOC groups benefit from from tactics employed by terrorist

grups to maintain territorial control. With state-sponsored terrorism on a decline, the more “privat-

ized” terrorism organizations look towards TOC for logistical support in the form of money, material,

identity, and personnel. The best example is Al-qaeda fundraising by ransoming Western govern-

ments and having a steady hand in the mediterranean drug trade.

Another term “smuggler-terrorist nexus” has been used to explain the rise of terrorism with

the unlawful migration, hypothesizing that terrorist groups can capitalize on existing smuggler chan-

nels to carry out their agendas in the destination country. Like a a terrorist Trojan horse, there are

concerns that terror groups like ISIS could infiltrate the EU under the guise of being a refugee (The

GCTF). These are not just speculation either. The Paris terror attacks in 2015 and the Brussels at-

tacks in 2016 were carried out by terrorists who had posed as Syrian refugees and employed fake

documents. (The Telegraph 2016) However, the topic of terrorism in collusion with illegal migration

is highly contentious because of the various political and refugee rights considerations. Therefore,

further research is required to make sound policy recommendations.


Case StudyOperation Sophia

In response to these growing issues, the EU launched Operation Sophia in 2015, with the

main objective being to prevent further loss of life at sea and disrupt the business model of human

smuggling networks throughout the Mediterranean. ([1] EU External Action 2016) In just a year after

it was launched, Operation Sophia contributed to the prosecution of over 100 smugglers, the dis-

posal of 345 bots, and the rescue of over 29,000 migrants refugees at sea. ([2] EU External Action

2016) Many of the countries in the EU also compose NATO, and so upon the request of the gov-

ernments of Germany, Turkey, and Greece NATO deployed its Standing NATO Maritime Group 2

(SNMG2) to surveil the East Mediterranean for smugglers.

However, this was not NATO’s first operation in the region. After 9/11, the US had invoked

Article 5 of the NATO agreement, which claimed that an act of aggression against one NATO coun-

try would result in offensive measures by all other NATO countries. This culminated in Operation

Active Endeavor, which aimed to patrol the Mediterranean and deter terrorist activity. (NATO 2016)


Deployed in 2001, it had been in operation for over 15 years by the time SNMG2 was first deployed

in the region, albeit for 2 distinct reasons.

Despite the overlap in membership, there was no sharing of resources or information between

NATO’s SNMG2 and Operation Sophia, which created cracks in the security blanket over the Medi-

terranean through which smugglers were able to continue their operations. This prompted NATO to

formally transition Operation Active Endeavor to Operation Sea Guardian. Operation Sea Guardian

was a non-Article 5 mission, with the broader mandate of “working with Mediterranean stakeholders

to deter and counter-terrorism and mitigate the risk od other threats to security.” (Allied Maritime

Command) Italy was a large proponent of this transition, having faced the brunt of illegal migrant

crossings across the Mediterranean to the island of Sicily. The experience of Operation Active En-

deavor in the region lent itself to the efficacy of Operation Sea Guardian in completing its 3 main

tasks: providing maritime situational awareness, countering terrorism, and contributing to regional

capacity building. The removal of the Operation’s Article 5 status meant that any provocation upon

the mission would not incur the full offensive retaliation of NATO, weakening the consequences ag-

gressors face for disobeying the mandate.

There is heavy cooperation between NATO and the EU in the Mediterranean theater: “ a for-

mal information-sharing agreement has been established between NATO and [EU Coastal Guard]”,


and “informal but regular contacts between the two Maritime Operations Centers and respective

Flag Officers had been established.” (House of Lords 2015-2016) Operation Sea Guardian is com-

posed of a fleet of UAVs—based in Sicily— as well as a fleet composed of ships from multiple NATO

countries. This surveillance team conducts 5 focused operations annually, in which they patrol the

East Mediterranean region for any evidence of smuggling.


In 2020, the EU’s Operation Sophia transitioned to Operation Irini, which operated in the

same area of the Mediterranean but with a new mandate to maintain the United Nations arms em-

bargo to Libya due to the Second Libyan Civil War. This left NATO as the main organization operat-

ing in the Mediterranean international waters to prevent the smuggling of humans and drugs from

the MENA region (EU Coast Guard operates in EU waters).

Measuring the Success of Operation Sea Guardian

The success of Operation Sea Guardian can be measured based on the number of migrant

smugglers and traffickers identified and disposed of, as this is the mission’s main mandate. Accord-

ing to Frontex (EU Coast Guard) data, between 2014 and 2017 the number of migrants crossing the

Aegean Sea has decreased marginally. One reason for the lack of clear progress may be attributable

to the adaptivity of criminal networks to increased law enforcement. In addition, the presence of law

enforcement at sea just meant that the land routes smugglers employed became of higher demand,

leading to a lack of smugglers in the Mediterranean Sea for these operations to catch. (EC 2017)

Another parameter that can be used to measure the success of Operation Sea Guardian is the

number of migrant arrivals on the shores of Italy and Greece. From 2014 to 2017, there was a net

decrease in migrants arrivals by approximately 30%. It is hard to say whether this decrease is purely

attributable to the efforts of Operation Sea Guardian, although some have claimed that it can be a

negative byproduct of an almost magnet effect these warships may have for migrants. By interna-

tional law, if migrants are apprehended by search and rescue (SAR) teams, they must be brought

back to the European coasts, granting them asylum and rights on EU soil. Thus, migrants abandon

trying to reach the EU shore themselves if they can instead make it to a SAR boat, thereby decreas-

ing the number of migrants apprehended on EU shores without actually solving the problem. (Com-

mittee, E. 2016)


Flaws in Operation Sea Guardian

Despite the push to increase cooperation between the different maritime theaters, there has

been discussion about separating Operation Sea Guardian and SNMG2 in terms of their mandate

and region of surveillance. Doing so would allow more resources to be allocated for both missions,

and could make both missions more efficient. For example, the warships employed by Operation

Sea Guardian to combat migrant routes do not transpose as easily to the large information-gathering

work the SNMG2 is employed for. Instead, these warships are better suited for changing entire flows

of immigration. This waste of resources and efficiency costs lives both at sea and in the EU. This can

also be seen in the area that Operation Sea Guardian operates. Given the lack of resources, NATO

forces mainly operate in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean, neglecting potential modes of entry

through the Western Mediterranean. (Frontex 2016)

In addition, many have criticized Operation Sea Guardian for over-militarizing an already ten-

uous humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean. Others claim that Operation Sea Guardian is instead

being underutilized, in that more resources and manpower should be allocated to the operation in

order for it to have any viable impact. Of course, these are two ends of the spectrum, but they do

indicate legitimate concerns with Operation Sea Guardian’s effectiveness at fulfilling its mandate.

(Singh 2021)

However, the biggest argument against Operation Sea Guardian is it is too removed from

the root of the issue. The flow of Mediterranean migrants can be broken into three main sections:

the origin countries, the transit countries, and the journey at sea. Putting resources towards solving

the instability at the origin countries is one alternative that has been discussed. As Nelson Drake, an

analyst at Beyond the Horizon puts it, “...ending the war and conflicts in countries such as Syria and

Libya, struggling with dictatorship, ending repression and extremism in countries like Eritrea, Soma-

lia, and Nigeria, increasing development in Africa to counter poverty are the cures for a fundamental

solution to the problem.” (Drake 2018) Another alternative that has been referenced as an alterna-

tive to Operation Sea Guardian is cooperating with transit countries— i.e., the countries through

which the migrants travel by land before setting out to sea, namely Libya— to stop the flow of mi-

grants. Currently, neither the EU nor NATO has the authority to surveil Libyan waters. However, given

that Libya is currently in a civil war, this has hampered many efforts to change this. Instituting a func-

tional government in Libya, and providing it resources to stop human traffickers, would be another


solution in terms of mitigating the current migrant crisis. (Benhamou 2018) However, each alternative

comes with its own unique set of challenges, and as of today, no solution has adequately solved the

ongoing crisis in the Mediterranean.

International Action and ResponseSouth and Southeastern Mediterranean Countries

Libya: Under the Gaddafi regime, migrant smuggling through Libya had been kept under

control. However, after the 2011 Arab Spring, which caused Gaddafi to step out of power and initi-

ated the Libyan Civil War, human smuggling and trafficking flows resumed and intensified as more

Libyans joined those seeking refuge in the EU. Currently, Libya is the largest transit country in the

Mediterranean, with individuals from West Africa, the Sahel, and even the Horn of Africa using it as

a means to reach the EU. (Gartenstein-Ross 2015) Libya has actively denied the EU and NATO any

permission to operate in Libyan waters or airspace, as the current military regime does not want any

additional pretense for Western meddling in the country’s civil war. Some in the EU have called for a

3 billion euro package to help fund Libyan border management, but especially with the corruption

that exists in the Libyan government today, drastic changes must be made before the package be-

comes as effective as it could be.

Algeria: While cooperation between South and Southeastern Mediterranean countries are

often thwarted by sectarian or political divides, Algeria and Tunisia proved to be an exception by


successfully aligning their military and intelligence forces to improve border security and counter

terrorism. Wariness towards regional instability has grown since 2011 but reached a boiling point at

the 2013 In Amenas gas plant hostage crisis, when Al-qaeda-linked terrorists entered through the

eastern border Algeria shares with Libya, their most turbulent neighbor. Since then, Algeria’s attitude

and policy shifted towards bilateral military cooperation, border securitization, and efforts to reduce

criminal and illicit trade activities. These changes give hopes for a possible but still fragile source of

regional stability.

Tunisia: Tunisia is located just to the left of Libya, making it an appealing alternative to the

Libyan water crossing. The water distance from Tunisia to Italy is shorter, meaning it is a less risky

journey to take. However, the reason Tunisia represents a lower threat than Libya as a transit coun-

try is because of EU funding. EU support has created a robust border management system, such

that nearly no migrant smugglers now attempt to cross the Central Mediterranean through Tunisian

coastal cities. (Frontex 2015)

Northern Mediterranean Countries

Italy: Italy receives the brunt of migrants and drugs smuggled into the EU through Libya, and

as such has become one of the biggest proponents in both organizations for military surveillance of

the Mediterranean Sea. In 2021 alone, more than 13,000 people have crossed the Mediterranean

into Italy, and many of the current EU nations have refused entry to any of these new migrants. While

there exist migrant camps in island cities like Lampedusa, a growing nationalist movement in Italy is

also threatening the migrants. The League party, a far-right nationalist movement in Italy, has called

for a blockade of Italian ports to prevent any migrants from being let in. Atillio Lucia, a representative

for the League party, has said “They should be helped in their own countries, not come here where

the authorities spend millions on them but let us die.” (Lowen 2021)

Greece: Another proponent of military surveillance in both the EU and NATO is Greece. A

large proportion of migrants using the Eastern migratory routes set foot on the Greek islands of Las-

bos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos, where migrant camps house a total of over 45,000 migrants. The

Greek asylum process is incredibly overrun, with many waiting months or even years to have their

asylum application reviewed and to exit the migrant camps. The coronavirus pandemic has only put


additional strain on the Greek government. Current camps are overcrowded, and many living there

have limited access to clean water, electricity, and sanitation. The Greek government has voiced con-

cerns about a lack of resources to deal with this migrant crisis.

Non-Governmental Organizations

There are many NGOs currently working in the Mediterranean area with SAR missions. In fact,

over 40% of SAR missions in 2017 were executed by NGOs, and in 2016 NGOs supported the ar-

rest of over 930 facilitators of human trafficking. There is a fear that NGOs exacerbate the “migrant

magnet” issue NATO and EU missions faced, although many counter by explaining that NGOs tend

to be much more cost-efficient than missions like Operation Sea Guardian due to their smaller boats

and larger search radius. (FRA 2021)


Questions to Consider

Question 1: Do you think Operation Active Endeavor should have had its mandate broadened

to become Operation Sophia?

Question 2: How has the coronavirus pandemic changed the situation in the Middle East,

Northern Africa, and the Mediterranean? Are there any particular opportunities and/or hindrances

these unique times create in terms of solutions to the smuggling issue?

Question 3: Do you think that additional intervention on the behalf of Western powers in this

issue is helping, or is it exacerbating an already escalated situation?

Question 4: Considering the timeframe and resources involved in preventing each, which step

of the smuggling chain should be prioritized: the origin countries, transit countries, or at sea?


Works Cited

Allied Maritime Command, “Operation Sea Guardian,” factsheet, http://www.mc.nato.int/

ops/Documents/OSG%20FactsheetV1.pdf

BBC. “Hundreds of Migrants Still Dying in Med Five Years since 2015.” BBC News, 31 Aug.

2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53764449.

Benhamou, M. (2018, January 9). EU External action in the Mediterranean. Retrieved from

Seminar: Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies Martens Centre

Committee, E. (2016, May 13). Operation Sophia, the EU’s naval mission in the Mediterranean:

an impossible challenge 14th Report of Session 2015-16. Retrieved from UK parliament: https://pub-

lications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/144/14407.htm

Drake, Nelson R. “Efficiency and Relevance of EU-NATO Operations in the Mediterranean as

a Cure for Irregular Immigration.” Beyond the Horizon, 8 Feb. 2018, behorizon.org/wp-content/up-

loads/2018/02/Efficiency-and-Relevance-of-EU-NATO-Operations-in-the-Mediterranean.pdf.

Dibenedetto, Alessandra Giada. Implementing the Alliance Maritime Strategy in the Mediter-

ranean:: NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian. NATO Defense College, Dec. 2016, www.jstor.org/stable/

pdf/resrep10237.pdf.

EC. (2017, March 22). COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT REFIT EVALUATION of

EU legal framework against facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. Retrieved from

European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2017/EN/SWD-2017-

117-F1-ENMAIN-PART-1.PDF

European Union External Action, “European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean: Operation

Sophia,” Factsheet, updated 15 September 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-opera-

tions/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf [1]

European Union External Action, “Busy days for operation SOPHIA force Command-

er,” 16 November 2016: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/

news/20161116_en.htm

FRA. “June 2020 Update - NGO Ships Involved in Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean


and Legal Proceedings against Them.” European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 18 June

2021, fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2020/2020-update-ngos-sar-activities.

Frontex. 2015a. Annual Risk Analysis 2015. Warsaw: Frontex.

Frontex, “Migratory Routes Map,” updated August 2016: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-

and-routes/migratory-routes-map/

Gartenstein-Ross, D., N. Barr, G. Willcoxon & N. Basuni. 2015. The Crisis in North Africa: Im-

plications for Europe and Options for EU Policymakers. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of Interna-

tional Relations Cligendael

House of Lords, European Union Committee, “Operation Sophia, the EU’s naval mission in the

Mediterranean: an impossible challenge,” p.23, 14th Report of Session 2015–16, http://www.publi-

cations.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/144/144.pdf

IOM, “Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 298,474; Deaths at Sea: 3,213,” Press Release,

20 September 2016. https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-298474-deaths-

sea-3213

IOM. (2018, January 25). Mediterranean Update. Retrieved from IOM: https://missingmi-

grants.iom.int/pdf?url=https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean/pdf

Kakissis, Joanna, and Abu Bakr Bashir. “Asylum-Seekers Make Harrowing Journeys in Pan-

demic, Only to Be Turned Back.” NPR, NPR, 13 Feb. 2021, www.npr.org/2021/02/13/949182773/

the-harrowing-journeys-to-safety-of-asylum-seekers-during-a-pandemic.

Lowen, Mark. “Lampedusa: Italy’s Gateway to Europe Struggles with Migrant Influx.” BBC

News, BBC, 12 May 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57087818.

NATO, “Operation Active Endeavour,” updated 12 July 2016: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/na-

tohq/topics_7932.htm

NATO. “Operation Sea Guardian Patrols the Eastern Mediterranean.” Mc.nato.int, mc.nato.

int/media-centre/news/2017/operation-sea-guardian-patrols-the-eastern-mediterranean.

Paoli, Giacomo and Jacopo Bellasio, Against the rising tide: an overview of the growing crim-

inalization of the Mediterranean basin. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.

rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE220.html.


Singh, Arjun. “A Terrorist’s Tempest: The Challenge of Operation Sea Guardian.” NAOC, 28

Apr. 2021, natoassociation.ca/a-terrorists-tempest-the-challenge-of-operation-sea-guardian/.

Spaic, Igor. “Migrant Smugglers to Eu Made between $5 and $6 Billion Dollars in 2015, States

New Report.” OCCRP, 19 May 2016, occrp.org/en/daily/5248-migrant-smugglers-made-between-5-

and-6-billion-dollars-in-2015-states-new-report.

The Economist, “Syria Has Become A Narco-State.” 24 July 2021, www.economist.com/mid-

dle-east-and-africa/2021/07/19/syria-has-become-a-narco-state.

The Telegraph, “Majority of Paris attackers used migration routes to enter Europe, reveals

Hungarian counter-terror chief,” 2 October 2016: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/02/ma-

jority-of-paris-attackers-used-migration-routes-to-enter-europ/

Yardley, Jim, and Elisabetta Povoledo. “Migrants Die as Burning Boat Capsizes off Italy.” The

New York Times, The New York Times, 3 Oct. 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/europe/

scores-die-in-shipwreck-off-sicily.html.

NATO - Berkeley Model United Nations

Documents

Transcript of NATO - Berkeley Model United Nations