Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Managing Ethnic Conflict

The State of Afghanistan?

Introduction

The international community promised the Afghan people that

life would be better if the simply allowed us to help them

liberate their government and their soil of religious extremism.

Significant strides are being made at the national level to build

capacity, root out corruption, and expand the positive reach of

the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The

average rural Afghan is poor, illiterate, and without access to

basic infrastructure or newsmedia. To the villager, all the

outside world has brought is all it has ever brought: continued

violence, instability, and death. This paper seeks to better

understand ethnic conflict in Afghanistan, and to propose

research-supported solutions which might positively influence

capacity building and state building activities nationwide.

Conflict Background

Centuries of intertribal and international warfare combined

with unforgiving mountainous desert terrain, extreme poverty, and

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a culture of tribal isolationism have kept Afghanistan from

achieving any meaningful level of development, stability, or

social cohesion. President Karzai’s cabinet and the Afghan

National Assembly have not yet obtained the capacity for outreach

or action beyond Kabul, or the ability to create a unified Afghan

nation. National government remains plagued by corruption,

infighting, and insecurity atop the normal challenges of building

and refining an effective democracy. As the global community

enters its tenth year of intervention on Afghan soil, we seek to

understand if and how the effect of so much labor, capital, loss

of life and good intent is filtering down to the average Afghan.

Consensus seems to be that rampant violence and insecurity

prevent progress and democracy from reaching those most in need

of both.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country in South Asia, lying to

the west of Pakistan and to the east of Iran; to the north it

shares a border with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

China. It is one of the oldest and most continually conflicted

areas of civilization known, as it occupies a strategic territory

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just slightly smaller than the state of Texas at the crossroads

between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The major ethnic

groups and their relative representation nationally are Pashtun

(42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%), Uzbek (9%), Turkmen (3%), Baloch

(2%) and others (8%). Official national languages spoken are

Dari/Afghan Persian (50%) and Pashto (35%) while 30+ other minor

languages are spoken by 15% of the population; bilingualism is

very common across Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s ethnic makeup is a

mosaic of dozens if not hundreds of subdivisions of tribes1, each

fiercely loyal to their clan or village, and each suspicious of

its neighbors. The political sphere of post-2001 Afghanistan is

large and complicated2, with many former warlords starting their

own political parties and attempting something resembling

legitimacy. Ongoing dependency on NATO-ISAF for logistical,

security, training, and technical support simply adds to the

mileu of controversy and confusion.

1 See Appendix I: GIS Tribal Mosaic by Jill Kornetsky with Data from Anonymousat NPS2 See Appendix II: COIN Dynamics slide from Joint Chiefs of Staff powerpoint. To describe the dynamics in this image in prose form would result in a conflict analysis far longer than the scope of this paper…

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Based on minimum standards set forth by the Sphere project3,

Afghanistan has been and remains in a near-perpetual state of

humanitarian crisis. The majority Muslim (99%4) population of

Afghanistan numbers just under 30 million as of July 2011, up

from 18.4 million in 1995. Nearly 43% of the population is under

the age of 14, and life expectancy hovers around 45 years for

both males and females, ranking Afghanistan at a reflection of

just how severely underdeveloped Afghanistan is. Internally

Displaced Persons (IDPs) number over 350,000 and over 3 million

Afghan refugees currently reside in Iran and Pakistan5. An

influx of aid and reconstruction dollars since 2001 has boosted

the economy and provided some work, however unemployment has only

dropped from 40% in 2005 to 35% in 2008, and 36% of Afghans live

below the poverty line today. Much of the rural population

relies on subsistence agriculture for survival, and agriculture

accounts for 80 percent of the workforce in Afghanistan.

Expansion of the economy beyond industries of labor such as

3 Sphere Project. (2011).4 99% Nationally with 90% Sunni, 19% Shia and 1% Other. CIA. (2011)5 These first paragraphs synthesized with material from Blood (1994), the CIA World Factbook (2011), Library of Congress (2005), the National Vulnerability and Risk Assessment or NVRA (2008), the Afghanistan National Development Strategy or ANDS (2010), and UNHCR (2011).

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agriculture is further hampered by widespread illiteracy. In

2008, male literacy rates by province ranged from 14-64% and

female from 1-17% and 31% in Kabul6. The staggering lack of

human and physical development creates a situation rife with

conflict as the leaders of each ethnicity, tribe, and clan

scramble to divide limited resources and limited power merely to

survive.

Governance in Afghanistan is a mixture of the post-Bonn

Agreement constitutional democracy, which was modeled on Western

democracies and a revision of the old Afghan constitution from

their quasi-secular era of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and the tribal

systems of governance, with its shuras, jirgas, mullah, maliks,

and other roles and structures both unique to Afghan culture and

present in some form across Islamic states. Based on the text of

Bonn itself, the Afghan people should “freely determine their own

political future in accordance with the principles of Islam,

democracy, pluralism and social justice”7. Ongoing attempts to

6 Afghanistan National Surveillance System and ICON Institute. (2008). See Appendix III7 Government of Afghanistan. (2001)

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reshape the culture of Afghanistan from tribal isolationism to

active and meaningful parliamentary democracy in the style of the

West disregards the highly insular, highly decentralized system

of tribal elders and tribal councils that has been the way of

life for centuries. A modern democracy is suited to a modern or

modernizing country with the physical and communications

infrastructure to support the free exchange of ideas,

information, and people to every corner of a nation. Having

acted as the trans-continental crossroad since the times of

Hannibal and Ghengis Khan, Afghans have historically been caught

in a cycle of invasion and rebellion. In a harsh and isolated

physical environment, tribal people have learned to close ranks

around kin in the interest of self-protection, and to shut out or

fight off invaders and interlopers both foreign and domestic.

Afghanistan’s Potential for “Stateness”

In order for the disparate groups within Afghanistan to

reach a functional democracy, the literature points to the

problem of stateness, or the potential a coalescing society has

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to form the institutions and structures associated with being a

nation-state. In this new millennium where the definition of a

state has been challenged by the dissolution of the USSR, the

former Yugoslavia and even the former state of Czechoslovakia,

“Presumably, a truly sophisticated state theory covering the

state in its totality, at the same time not relying on any

general or essentialist assumption to grasp its uniqueness, its

processional nature and historical contingency may be a

interesting and demanding intellectual challenge. However, such a

theory would most likely also be a highly complex, cumbersome and

elusive construct. The state and its features could become fuzzy

and diffuse.8” In the case of Afghanistan, the issue of

forming a democratic state cannot be resolved without

understanding the potential Afghans have to form a socially

cohesive, functional democracy, that is, we must understand the

unique potential for stateness in this case. “Before you can

have a democracy, you must have a state, but to have a legitimate

and therefore durable state you eventually must have democracy.

The two are intertwined, but the precise sequencing of how and

8 Pfister, T. (2004).

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when to build the distinct but interlocking institutions needs

very careful thought.9”

Zhidas Daskalovski, in studying the democratic consolidation

in ethnically diverse Macedonia, notes the complexities of

building a collaborative democracy in pluralistic settings.

…a country is only democratically consolidated when democracy is the only game in town… [that is] when no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime… The main problems for achieving consolidation in pluralistic societies arise due to a ‘stateness’ problem, namely the disputes over the boundariesof the state, its character… the more the population of the territory of the state is comprised of plurinational, lingual, religious, or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes because an agreement on the fundamentals of[the] democracy will be more difficult… how difficult it is to consolidate a regime if a significant group of its citizens is actively disobedient10.

While this notion is intuitive for anyone with a familiarity with

the scope and complexity of the Afghan situation, Daskalovski has

produced anecdotal evidence from the Macedonian case to warn

practitioners that the process of developing a democracy in

Afghanistan will be highly complicated.

9 Fukuyama, F. (2005). 10 Daskalovski, Z. (2004).

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Fukuyama notes that in cases where capacity for

statebuilding is absent often the international community must

supply some of the basic functions of the state, in order for

progress to begin. However he notes that the scope of assistance

is not a blanket policy and assisting nations must use caution

when supporting the democratic process outside of its borders.

“Outsiders are driven to supply sovereign-state functions because

of the internal weakness of the countries in question. But

stateness that is provided by outsiders often undermines the

ability of domestic actors to create their own robust

institutions. Too much state-building builds long-term

dependence, and may ultimately come to seem illegitimate to the

locals.” This is exactly the case in Afghanistan, whose people

initially embraced the assistance of a liberating force who

promised a better life under Western-style society than under the

Taliban. Ten years of stalled or insufficient progress has

eroded the confidence Afghans may have had in their international

friends. It is essential that the programs being completed in

Afghanistan today contribute to self-sufficiency alongside

statebuilding; a tangible return of power to Afghan hands is the

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only means of keeping anti-Western sentiment and the blame game

in check.

International “interference” is a source of much regional

discontent and global controversy about the approaches used by

the ISAF in assisting the Afghan people. While an international

military force adds another layer of complexity to the social

mix, Afghanistan’s problems of stateness and social cohesion are

not a construct of the West.

Afghanistan is a fragmented country, with its people dividedalong carious tribal, ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. The diverse and complex ethnic and linguistic structures of Afghan society have created many points of friction and flashpoints for violence… Only in times of crisis or when faced with a threat from the outside has a sense of national unity existed… These attempts [at a central authority] have failed, largely due to the resistance of and loyalty to local tribes and religious structures already in place. The vast diversity found in Afghanistan has produced many obstacles to building a liberal democracy and a strong and integrated nation11.

This is not to say that a state cannot be formed uniting the

people of Central Asia; in the past Afghans have embraced a

monarchy and for a time succeeded in building a communal Afghan

identity. As Young notes, the unity in Afghanistan is dependent 11 Young, D.O. (2007).

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upon collective recognition of an external threat requiring

collaboration to repel. The problem in Afghanistan at the moment

is the lack of a collective opinion about who the “bad guys” are,

and until the ISAF and its civilian counterparts can demonstrate

any kind of progress – towards stability, improved livelihoods,

security from violence, towards Afghan independence – “the West”

will continue to be just another interloping force to contend

with. Progress in good governance and development will allow

recategorization of NATO as friend, and of the Taliban as foe, to

the population.

Since contact with the West, Antonio Giustozzi argues the

tribal way of life has been threatened in Afghanistan, for better

or for worse. Tribalism finds its roots in geographic isolation

and scarcity of resources around which kin can gather to share

and protect. The influx of education, healthcare, new government

institutions, travel, media, and international military action

has exposed Afghans to ideas and opportunities previously unknown

to them. He cites the presence of the Taliban itself as an

arbiter of the end of the tribal way’s steady decline. Giustozzi

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sees statebuilding in Afghanistan as adhering to one of three

interestingly categorized frameworks: Hobbesian or pessimistic-

conservative-fatalistic, Kantian or liberal-progressive-hopeful,

and Machiavellian or practical-self-interested. While most of us

struggle between Hobbes and Kant, short-term versus long-term

goals and outlook; Giustozzi poses that in the case of

Afghanistan, Machiavelli’s The Prince would provide better

insight. “…The only realistic option for the evolution of a

strong Afghan state is the self-interest of Afghan political

elites, either the current or future ones. When they will see

that institution bulding enhances the survivability of the

political regime, they will start investing in it seriously.12”

A rush to presidential rule and unification into a

single nation-state overlooks the notion that while democracy is

the best known way of governing free people in the modern age,

the cooperative and centralized nature of democracy is something

that evolves naturally for each culture. The United States

didn’t start out with the legal and governmental structures of

today’s democracy. Settlements had to coalesce into colonies; 12 Giustozzi, A. (2011)

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colonies had to establish collegial trade and movement between

one another; a common foreign enemy acted as the impetus to unite

forces and start a revolution; a consensus that the people of the

New World would no longer find itself under the thumb of the

crown and instead would form a More Perfect Union finally led to

the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the

United States of America. The freedom embodied within America is

indeed a beautiful labor, but the same as with any birthing

processes it requires work, pain, time and blood.

Rome was not built overnight and over three hundred years

later America is still in the process of building and refining “a

more perfect union.” How then, logically, can the international

community expect the Afghan people to adopt and perfect their own

democracy in a decade or less? Afghanistan can be assisted in

its efforts to democratically consolidate and form a sovereign

state; when doing this however, special attention must be taken

to ensure that the structures and institutions being built are

suited to and owned by the people of Afghanistan.

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Two Proposed Approaches to Mediate Ethnic Conflict

Recent surveys show that in this time of mass movements of

IDPs and refugees, radio has become an important source of

information in rural areas; for women who are less likely to

leave the house due to local violence, a radio can be the primary

source of information about the outside world13. In rural areas,

the United Nations is using radio and television to address

illiteracy; in Kandahar14, radio programs are voicing complaints

to government and government is actually responding. Radio and

television have the ability to bridge space, bringing together

countrymen living hundreds of miles apart. Without having to

hold massive town hall meetings, these technologies taken for

granted in most places have the ability to unite a conversation,

inspire debate, and dispel rumors. It will take time for the

products of development – physical infrastructure, higher

education, primary and emergency healthcare, the ability for

13 Kamal, S. (2004). 14 http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=23953 and http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/themes/pcpd/unesco-in-post-crisis-situations/educational-radio-and-television/

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professional self-determination - to reach every Afghan village.

Witnessing the progress that is being made elsewhere, through

documentaries, talk radio, and news programs, would allow those

waiting their turn a bit of faith that help is indeed on the way.

By modeling a new series of channels after America’s C-SPAN

(Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network), this intervention would

address several key issues underlying perpetual ethnic conflict

in Afghanistan.

Firstly, a radio and television network devoted to

transparently and completely recording and transmitting meetings

of the Afghan national government, as well as those of Provincial

and District governments would provide an opportunity for every

Afghan to engage in their civic society. Just being informed of

life outside the village has the potential to increase

understanding between regions and ethnicities; it’s difficult to

argue with most news footage and directly recorded audio quotes.

The ability to watch over their elected officials may empower the

polity to be more critical of leaders whose motivations or

policies are unclear.

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Secondly, a radio and television network devoted entirely to

the minutiae of political meetings may inspire politicians to

more carefully consider and coordinate their standpoints.

Instead of finding the protection of a closed door, negotiations

that have been historically rife with corruption, graft, and

nepotism will be stripped bare for all to judge. As with any

nation’s politicians, there are some who operate in the right

based on principle, and some who are intent on derailing the

process based on distorted principles. The largest group,

though, are those mere mortals like us – those who strive to do

right, but occasionally falter; programming that strives to show

unbiased, unedited coverage of reality can be our big brother.

When people are watching, we tend to be on our best behavior;

when there are only a handful of broadcast channels available,

people will watch whatever is being broadcast.

While radio and television are perhaps more difficult to

distribute than a newspaper or flyer, in a country where some

provinces have an average adult literacy rate of less than 10%,

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information sharing by print means alone inherently favors the

elite and those lucky enough to obtain primary education. In

combination with additional educational networks, a public

affairs news network would provide a tool for villagers to become

verbally literate about issues that concern them. Properly

coordinated with national and local teachers’ curricula, this

network could also be a vehicle for adults and children learning

to read, offering relevant subject matter on tolerance, progress,

and development for motivation. Delivering radio and television

services to 30 million constituents in a mountainous area the

size of Texas will require more than just some cameras and media

training – there is a need for capacity building and creating

social acceptance for media which was banned under Taliban rule.

There is some minimal communications infrastructure available in

Afghanistan – as of 2007 there were about 8 television networks,

50 private radio stations and 30 community based radio stations,

alongside Radio Television Afghanistan’s state-owned channels.

Additional capacity will be needed in order to achieve

nationwide broadcast of at least a few channels, regional

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broadcasting, and local broadcasting. Technical experts will be

required initially in order to select appropriate techniques -

whether radio repeater towers, satellites, or the internet would

be the best medium for in-country distribution. Journalism and

media training programs in each of the 34 provinces which have

shown success in Africa at bridging divides, as well as technical

training for off-camera personnel would accompany distribution of

simple, user-friendly radios and televisions. A simple idea,

yes, but a C-SPAN for Afghanistan (A-SPAN) is the kind of

undertaking that requires partnerships – this isn’t the first

time radio and television have been brought successfully to

conflicted and post-conflict countries, improving the base

situation due to increased communication and transparency, and

there is no need to reinvent the wheel in Afghanistan.

The second proposed strategy for improved intergroup

relations in Afghanistan is a refocusing on grassroots

development. Rural Afghans have been oppressed and war weary for

decades now. A fiercely self-reliant and independent people have

seen their autonomy eroded by more than two decades of

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fundamentalist, totalitarian Taliban rule. What the outside

world sees as Afghan culture is a mere shadow of the pride of the

Afghan people; true Afghans are a people who repelled and

expelled countless conquering armies, a network of tribal

militias who outlasted the Soviets at the height of communist

power. The fabric of Afghan culture has unraveled to the point

that the youth of today have no memory of Afghanistan’s good

times; individual power must be restored in the community elders

and leaders at the village level, and it must be instilled in the

new generations before another 30 years are lost to misguided

follower fundamentalism.

Before the NATO-ISAF15 era in Afghanistan is over, peace and

development practitioners must take advantage of the wealth of

resources gathered at the Provincial Reconstruction Team secure

bases before international pressure forces military-humanitarian

withdrawal. The allied nations of NATO have brought together

experts from around the world, with experience resolving

conflicts around the world, in the interest of rebuilding the

15 See Appendix with NATO-ISAF PRT Placemat

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country and polity of Afghanistan. Japan16 has contributed

Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration experts who work

with local communities to bring former Talib fighters back into

the fold. Canada and Europe have focused on applying the 3D

Approach17 (Diplomacy, Defense, and Development aka the Whole of

Government Approach) within their respective Regional Commands.

Norway18 operates a Sub National Governance Project to strengthen

the offices of provincial governors and councils as well as

administration of individual municipality. New Zealand19 has a

series of projects in Bamyan province; most involve improving or

repairing schools, orphanages, and local bridges so that life can

resume and progress in rural Afghanistan.

16 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/aid0403-3.html and http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jann/Documents/DDR.pdf 17 http://cicam.ruhosting.nl/teksten/act.07.grotenhuis.owen%20paper.pdf and http://www.3dsecurity.org/ 18 http://www.norway.org.af/News_and_events/prt/faryab1/ 19 http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/projects.htm

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Conclusion

With the ethnic coexistence and co-ethnic development

situation in Afghanistan still very much up in the air after ten

years, the world continues to search for effective interventions

in the unique security and cultural environment it provides. The

history, culture, and geography of Afghanistan predisposes the

nation to strict and even violent divisions between groups. For

Afghanistan to discover its own potential for “stateness,” it

will be essential that everyday Afghan citizens recognize the

benefits of working together and the disadvantage of continued

conflict. We must seek to encourage political consciousness at

all levels of society by offering average citizens a window into

the nebulous world of Afghan national politics; without public

awareness and action, overcoming social divisions would be

impossible.

By opening top-down government processes to the public, we

might encourage greater transparency and fidelity in government

officials. No longer will Afghans be relegated to knowing only

the good and bad results of their tribal infighting; watching the

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process leaves room for input about negotiations and issues, and

informs Afghan citizens of how well their representatives are

serving their purpose. Refocusing international resources and

expertise at bottom-up community building will help to strengthen

capacity and improve standards of living, eliminating much of the

root cause of interethnic conflict in Afghanistan. As more

secure, happier, and healthier communities come together for

national progress, squabbling over prestige and who has it better

or worse can be replaced with genuine efforts at collaboration.

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Giustozzi, A. (2011). Kant, Hobbes or… Machiavelli? Facing the grim choices

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Sphere Project. (2011). The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum

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Appendix I: GIS Map of Tribal Mosaic by Jill Kornetsky

Data from Anonymous at the Naval Postgraduate School: OverlaidTribal Subdivisions

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Appendix II: Afghanistan COIN Dynamics Chart from Joint Chiefs ofStaff PPT20

20

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Appendix III: Human Development Index (HDI) and Components of HDI

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Appendix IV: Literacy Rates (from NVRA 2007/8)

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Appendix V21: ISAF Regional Commands and ProvincialReconstruction Teams

Cooperation and Coordination with the PRTs is a Sine Qua Non May Provide Ideal Sites for Repeating Towers and Other Technology

21 Taken from http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.jpg on 24 March 2011

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