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Fecha de creación : 12-05-2022

Review of Directive 2002/65/EC on distance marketing of consumer financial servicesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-05-2022Autor WUKOVITS NORA ANDREA

Ámbito político Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Protección de los consumidores | Transposición y aplicación de la legislaciónResumen Adopted in 2002, Directive 2002/65/EC on Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services introduced a legal

framework for governing the distance marketing of financial services, such as banking, loans, insurance andinvestment. Back then, when relevant legislation was limited at Member State level, the directive aimed to improveconsumer protection rules for financial services sold at a distance and to consolidate the internal market by aligningrules in this area. Since its adoption, however, the legal framework and digital landscape for retail financial serviceshas evolved significantly. A 2020 Commission ex-post evaluation of the directive highlighted that it has been effectivein strengthening consumer protection and largely remains relevant through its safety-net function. However, theoverlap of its provisions with product-specific and horizontal EU legislation, as well as changes to the financial servicesmarket have decreased the EU added value and relevance of the directive over time. In addition, digitalisation is foundto have amplified some of its practical weaknesses. Subsequently, a review of the directive was included among theREFIT initiatives of the Commission's 2020 work programme, and an inception impact assessment was published inMay 2021.

Briefing EN

Towards a new regulatory framework for European population statisticsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-05-2022Autor ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Ámbito político Politica social | Transposición y aplicación de la legislaciónResumen Census data and demographic statistics are of great relevance for policy-making at the European, national, regional

and local levels. At a time where the European Union (EU) is undergoing major demographic changes, driven by anageing population, low fertility rates and increased migration flows, demand for accurate and timely populationstatistics rises. In parallel, owing to progress in digitalisation, statistical data collection methods are shifting fromtraditional population censuses and surveys towards the use of administrative data. Such register-based datacollection methods bear great potential in terms of improved data frequency, granularity and burden reduction. Themodernisation of European population statistics is one of the action points included in the European statisticalprogramme 2021-2027, and part of a wider programme to modernise social statistics. Under the current regulatoryframework, Eurostat collects population data under a number of separate legal acts, covering demographic, censusand migration data. One of them, Regulation (EU) No 1260/2013 on European demographic statistics, is set to expirein 2028. According to the 2022 Commission work programme, the Commission will present a legislative proposal onpopulation statistics in the second quarter of 2022. The new proposal should integrate, in a single legal act, annualdemographic and migration statistics and decennial census data, as well as regional and geo-referenced populationdata. It should provide for timelier, more coherent and more specific population statistics that reflect migration moreadequately and facilitate the use of administrative data sources.

Briefing EN

EU response to economic coercion by third countriesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-05-2022Autor GIRARD VERONIQUE

Ámbito político Comercio internacional | Derecho internacional público | Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Seguridad y defensaResumen This initiative focuses specifically on the issue of economic coercion and the EU's possible response, aiming to

preserve the EU's open strategic autonomy and policy-making space. The IA clearly defines the problem, its underlyingcauses, and the objectives to address it. The creation of a new legal instrument to deter and counteract economiccoercion is the only type of option retained for analysis. This presumably follows on from the political commitmentmade in early 2021 (although this is not stated explicitly in the IA). This option was broken down into several policyoptions based on possible parameters used for the design of the instrument. The IA is substantiated by academicwork, stakeholders' contributions and examples. The majority of stakeholders support a new policy instrument and theirinput contributed to the design of the proposed instrument. The IA focuses mostly on economic impacts, while socialand environmental impacts are assessed briefly. Important benefits are expected from the instrument. Costs areexpected only from its use, in particular from the application of countermeasures. The IA focuses on a qualitativeassessment of impacts linked to the instrument's creation and existence, acknowledging that the impacts linked to theinstrument's use are difficult to estimate at the design stage. Adequate monitoring and evaluation of the use of theinstrument and of progress made against the objectives will therefore be important aspects that would have benefitedfrom further detail in terms of indicators and provisions. The proposal generally reflects the preferred option of the IA,although some elements differ from the IA, such as the objectives and definition of economic coercion.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 1

Monetary policy issues in the context of the war in UkrainTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-05-2022Autor RAKIC Drazen

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosResumen On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine. The war itself, as well as related sanctions and

countersanctions are expected to have a significant impact on the euro area economy. This paper summarises therecent monetary policy decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s Governing Council and outlines some policyissues and challenges that might arise in the context of the war, related to price stability, financial stability, climate andenergy policies, ECB/Eurosystem staff projections and public trust in the ECB.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Eurovignette DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-05-2022Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político Fiscalidad | TransportePalabra clave Estado miembro UE | estudio de impacto | impuesto de circulación | infraestructura de transportes | peaje |

procedimiento legislativo ordinario | propuesta (UE) | red transeuropea | tasa por eje | vehículo de motor | vehículoindustrial

Resumen The European Parliament and the Council as co-legislators have adopted changes to Directive 1999/62/EC on thecharging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructure (known as the Eurovignette Directive). Vignettesfor heavy goods vehicles will have to be phased out across the core trans-European transport network from 2030 andreplaced by distance-based charges (tolls). With a number of other changes, this should help make road pricing fairerand more efficient. The European Commission put forward a legislative proposal to amend the directive in May 2017,as part of its first 'mobility package' seeking to modernise mobility and transport. The aim of the proposal was to moveaway from a time-based model of charging (vignettes) to a distance-based one – that better reflects the polluter-paysand user-pays principles – and to include other vehicles. In Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism(TRAN) took the lead. Parliament adopted its first-reading position in October 2018, without agreement with theCouncil. After the 2019 European elections, Giuseppe Ferrandino (S&D, Italy) took over as rapporteur. The Counciladopted its position in December 2020. Interinstitutional negotiations in the first half of 2021 paved the way for anagreement, subsequently approved formally by both the Council and the Parliament. Sixth edition of a briefingoriginally drafted by Ariane Debyser and updated by Damiano Scordamaglia. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Research for CULT Committee: Esports - Policy RecommendationsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 06-05-2022Autor externo Tobias M. SCHOLZ, Nepomuk NOTHELFER (Esports Research Network)

Ámbito político Cultura | EducaciónResumen KEY FINDINGS This Policy Recommendation Briefing is based on the study on “Esports - Background Analysis”. •A

suitable and functioning strategy requires a shared understanding/definition of what esports is. It is important todifferentiate esports from traditional sports. This can have an impact on the system of traditional sports as well. •Esports is constantly and rapidly evolving, making it necessary to address it as soon as possible. Creating a workinggroup regarding a holistic esports strategy is highly recommendable. •The EU needs to foster interdisciplinaryresearch on esports to gain a better understanding of the industry and on how to utilise esports for the Europeancommunity. This knowledge can help to solve digital challenges in general. •The creation of a dedicated researchcentre for esports at the European level is required. •Esports-specific laws are needed just as they are in traditionalsports. •The issue of where the regulatory authority concerning esports lies (or should lie) should be resolved. Intraditional sports, this tends to be local, but esports is much more international and heterogeneous. •Esports standsfor digital communication and innovation. In esports, Europe as a whole is more important than the individual MemberStates. Therefore, esports can be utilised for the creation of a (digital) European identity.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 2

Portugal's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 05-05-2022Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen Portugal is set to receive €16.6 billion in both non-repayable support and loans from the Recovery and Resilience

Facility (RRF), the unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. This amountcorresponds to 2.3 % of the entire RRF, and to 7.8 % of Portugal's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). There is astrong focus on the country's social, economic and environmental resilience, with measures targeting culture, housing,health, broad social responses, and forest and water management. Measures relating to climate transition – includingkey actions on industry decarbonisation and energy efficiency of buildings – reach just over 38 % of the allocation. Thedigital transition focus area of the Portuguese National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) amounts to just over 22% of the allocation, with measures and reforms aimed at public administration and finances, education, andbusinesses. Following the Council's approval of the Commission's positive assessment of the plan, Portugal received€2.2 billion pre-financing in August 2021. Further payments, in 10 instalments for grants and seven for loans, willdepend on progress in implementing the plan. In January 2022, Portugal submitted a first payment request worth €1.16billion in grant and loan instalments (€0.55 billion in grants and €0.61 billion in loans). The Commission made apositive preliminary assessment of Portugal's payment request. The European Parliament is a major supporter of thecreation of a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part in interinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss andscrutinise implementation of the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU MemberStates.

Briefing EN

Luxembourg's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 05-05-2022Autor LILYANOVA Velina

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen Luxembourg's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is set to be financed by the Recovery and Resilience

Facility (RRF) with a total of €93.4 million, consisting of grants alone. While under Article 14 of Regulation (EU)2021/241 (RRF Regulation) Member States can request RRF loans until 31 August 2023, Luxembourg has not yetdone so. The €93.4 million requested is slightly less than the maximum RRF contribution available to the country(around €93.5 million). Luxembourg's RRF allocation is not only the smallest in absolute figures, but also the lowest asa share of grants in relation to both gross domestic product (GDP) (0.15 % of GDP in 2019) and per capita (with €158per citizen). The Luxembourgish NRRP includes measures for a total estimated value of €183.1 million: the RRF's€93.4 million cover 51 % of the costs, while the remainder will benefit from national (around 46 %) and other EU co-financing (the remaining 3 %). The plan aims to address Luxembourg's structural issues, aggravated by the pandemic.The measures included complement and build on priorities laid out in the national economic stimulus package fromMay 2020 (i.e. the Neistart Lëtzebuerg programme). The central objective is to support social cohesion and thepromotion of a modern and attractive economic environment, while responding to climate and environmentalchallenges. With 60.9 % of the funds allocated to climate objectives and 31.6 % to the digital transition – well abovethe RRF Regulation's minimum targets – the NRRP will contribute to common European efforts in these areas. Theclimate and environmental policy guidelines in the NRRP are consistent with Luxembourg's integrated national energyand climate plan (NECP) for 2021-2030. The Luxembourgish NRRP's components relating to skills, health, housingand governance also support cohesion and growth potential significantly in the long term. The European Parliamentparticipates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF, andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) RegulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-05-2022Autor FRIZBERG DIETER

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA provides a comprehensive problem analysis, based on the evaluation of the current TEN-T Regulation, a public

consultation, and targeted consultations with stakeholders and Member States. It is transparent about the methods anduncertainties (e.g. long-term funding) and limitations. The objectives and the policy options have a clear link to theproblem definition. The IA comprehensively analyses the economic, social and environmental impacts of the policyoptions. However, territorial impacts linked to the shift to more sustainable modes of transport could have beenexplained in more depth. Costs and benefits are assessed and quantified. It could have been explained in more detailhow funding will be mobilised. All in all, the IA provides useful information for policy-makers and future policy choices.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 3

EU legislation and policies to address racial and ethnic discriminationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-05-2022Autor DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadPalabra clave Agencia de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea | derecho del individuo | discriminación racial |

discriminación étnica | estadística de la UE | grupo étnico | igualdad de trato | recogida de datos | xenofobiaResumen Racial and ethnic minorities face discrimination and its consequences on a daily basis. The exact scale of the problem

is hard to gauge due to a lack of data and general under-reporting of racist incidents. The coronavirus pandemic hasseen a major increase in reports of racist and xenophobic incidents, and the crisis it triggered has had adisproportionately large negative effect on racial and ethnic minority groups, in the form of higher death and infectionrates. Although since 2000 the European Union (EU) has introduced legislation to combat racial and xenophobicdiscrimination, the problem persists, with the need for new measures recently highlighted by the global Black LivesMatter protests. A number of studies also point to the cost of racial discrimination not only for the individuals concernedbut also for society as a whole. For instance, a 2018 EPRS report argued that the loss in earnings caused by racialand ethnic discrimination for both individuals and societies amounts to billions of euros annually. EU citizens alsoacknowledge this problem: a 2019 survey found that over half of Europeans believe racial or ethnic discrimination to bewidespread in their country. To address racial discrimination and the inequalities it engenders, the EuropeanCommission has put forward a number of equality strategies and actions. One such action, the second Europeansummit against racism, was held on 21 March 2022. The European Parliament, meanwhile, has long been demandingan end to racial discrimination. In recent resolutions, the Parliament has called for putting an end to structural racism,discrimination, racial profiling and police brutality; for asserting the right to protest peacefully; and for boosting the roleof culture, education, media and sport in the fight against racism. This updates a briefing from March 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination

Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system: Fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-05-2022Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen The proposal to revise the market stability reserve (MSR) for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) consists of

prolonging its current parameters. Under the current rules, the intake rate of allowances to the MSR and the minimumallowances placed in the reserve have been doubled until the end of 2023, to allow for a quick removal of surplus EUETS allowances. The proposal is aimed at maintaining the current doubled intake rate (24 %) and minimum number ofallowances placed in the reserve (200 million) until 31 December 2030, the end of Phase IV of the EU ETS. InParliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).The committee adopted its report on 15 March 2022, with 65 votes in favour, 20 against and one abstention. Duringthe plenary sitting of 5 April 2022, the Parliament adopted, with amendments to the recitals, the institution's position fornegotiations, by 490 votes in favour, 127 against and seven abstentions. The Council is currently debating theproposal. Its December 2021 progress report notes delegations' differing views. Third edition. 'EU legislation inprogress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

The EU's zero pollution ambition: Moving towards a non-toxic environmentTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-05-2022Autor HALLEUX Vivienne

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen In the European Union (EU), one in eight deaths is linked to environmental pollution. Pollution is also one of the five

main causes of biodiversity loss, representing a significant cost for society. The EU has set the goal of achieving zeropollution for a non-toxic environment by 2050. This would mean reducing air, water and soil pollution to 'levels nolonger considered harmful to health and natural ecosystems and respecting the boundaries the planet can cope with'.Achieving this long-term ambition will mean updating the comprehensive legal framework currently in place at EU levelto address pollution in order to keep up with the latest scientific evidence. In 2022, the EU is expected to review its airquality standards to align more closely with the recently updated World Health Organization recommendations, and tolook into pollutants affecting surface and groundwater. Additional areas that should be revised in parallel include keylaws designed to tackle pollution at source, setting requirements for pollutant emissions from industry and vehicles, forurban wastewater treatment and sustainable use of pesticides. The key challenges in achieving the zero pollution goalremain to ensure policy coherence, compliance and enforcement. Other issues to monitor include liability for pollutionand related costs, with recent assessments pointing to the need to be consistent and rigorous in implementing the'polluter pays' principle. Parliament has pushed for ambitious action to protect people's health and the environmentfrom pollution. It has argued that air quality legislation should also cover non-regulated pollutants with demonstratedadverse impacts, such as ultrafine particles, black carbon, mercury and ammonia. It has also called for decisive actionon pollutants of emerging concern in water, such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, microplastics, endocrine-disrupting chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Finally, it has urged the Commission to design a dedicated legal frameworkfor soil protection, equivalent to that existing for water and air. Recently, steps have been taken at global level to curbplastic pollution through legally binding means and to form a science-policy interface body on chemicals and waste.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 4

Textiles and the environmentTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-05-2022Autor SAJN Nikolina

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen The amount of clothes bought per person in the European Union (EU) has increased by 40 % in just a few decades,

driven by a fall in prices and the increased speed with which fashion is delivered to consumers. Clothing has the fourthhighest impact on the environment of all categories of EU consumption. This impact is often felt in non-EU countries,where most production takes place. The production of raw materials, spinning them into fibres, weaving fabrics anddyeing require enormous amounts of water and chemicals, including pesticides for growing raw materials such ascotton. Consumer use also has a large environmental footprint, owing to the water, energy and chemicals used inwashing, tumble-drying and ironing, and microplastics shed into the environment. Less than half of used clothes arecollected for reuse or recycling when they are no longer needed, and only 1 % are recycled into new clothes, sincetechnologies that would enable clothes to be recycled into virgin fibres are only now starting to emerge. Various waysto address these issues have been proposed, including developing new business models for clothing rental, designingproducts in a way that would make re-use and recycling easier (circular fashion), convincing consumers to buy fewerclothes of better quality (slow fashion), and generally steering consumer behaviour towards choosing more sustainableoptions. The European Commission laid out its vision for the textiles sector for 2030 in the March 2022 EU strategy forsustainable and circular textiles. The Commission has proposed a regulation on ecodesign requirements forsustainable products and a directive on empowering consumers for the green transition. The package will aim to makeall products on the internal market more sustainable, while providing consumers with information on sustainability. Theapplication of these rules to textiles will be specified in delegated acts, largely planned for 2024. This briefing expandson and updates a 2019 EPRS briefing Environmental impact of the textile and clothing industry: What consumers needto know.

Briefing EN

Roaming Regulation reviewTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-05-2022Autor NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar | Niestadt Maria

Ámbito político IndustriaPalabra clave flujo transfronterizo de datos | itinerancia | propuesta (UE) | protección del consumidor | red de transmisión de datos |

reglamentación de las telecomunicaciones | reglamento (UE) | regulación de precios | tarifa de comunicaciones |teléfono móvil

Resumen The Roaming Regulation established the 'roam like at home' (RLAH) rule that mandated the end of retail mobileroaming charges as of 15 June 2017 in all EU Member States and EEA countries. The regulation is currently in forceuntil 30 June 2022. The application of the RLAH rule has been a success, boosting the use of mobile devices whiletravelling to other EU/EEA countries. For instance, the use of data roaming increased 17 times in the summer of 2019compared with the summer preceding the abolition of roaming surcharges. Nevertheless, five years after itsimplementation, the Commission needed to review the Roaming Regulation, with a view to extending the roamingmarket rules for a further 10 years. The Commission also sought to continue lowering wholesale roaming charges,improve the quality of roaming services, and provide access to all available network generations and technologies,including free access to emergency services, and information on any cost incurred in accessing value added services.Within the European Parliament the file was allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). Thecommittee report was adopted on 14 October 2021, and the mandate for trilogue negotiations approved in plenary thefollowing week. For its part, the Council agreed its position on 16 June 2021. The co-legislators reached a provisionalagreement on the text on 9 December 2021. According to the final text, which was published in the Official Journal ofthe EU on 13 April 2022 and enters into force on 1 July 2022, the RLAH regime will be renewed for a further 10 years.

Briefing EN

Towards new rules for European elections?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-05-2022Autor DIAZ CREGO Maria

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen During the May I plenary session, Parliament is expected to vote on a legislative-initiative report proposing to repeal

the 1976 European Electoral Act and replace it with a new Council Regulation on the election of the Members of theEuropean Parliament (MEPs) by direct universal suffrage. Since the first European elections in 1979, the rulesapplying to the election of MEPs combine the common principles established in the European Electoral Act, asmodified in 2002, and the different national rules implementing them. As a result, important elements of the electoralprocedure remain in the hands of the national legislatures and there is no harmonisation across the Member States.Following the proposals in Parliament's (26 November 2020) resolution on stocktaking of European elections, thereport proposes to further harmonise the rules applicable to European elections in areas such as the age for voting orstanding as a candidate; postal voting; the electoral calendar for European elections; the principles applicable to theselection of candidates, including from a gender perspective; and the electoral threshold. In addition, the reportproposes to establish a common electoral system and procedure for the election of 28 MEPs in a Union-wideconstituency comprising the territory of all the Member States. Once finalised by Parliament, the proposal istransmitted to the Council for its adoption, with the EP required to consent to the final text. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 5

EU gas storage and LNG capacity as responses to the war in UkraineTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-04-2022Autor BOEHM Lasse | WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político EnergíaResumen Russia remains Europe's largest supplier of coal, oil, and gas. This poses a particular difficulty for the EU and its

Member States, which are urgently seeking to reduce their energy dependence. This is not only necessary to pressureRussia economically to end its invasion of Ukraine, but also to prevent Russia from weaponising its energy suppliesand threatening Europe’s energy security in future. Replacing Russian natural gas will be much more difficult thanreplacing oil and coal, due to differences in supply infrastructure, transportation and storage. While part of the long-term solution lies in the promotion of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency savings, the EU willnevertheless require large volumes of natural gas imports in the short and medium term. Since most of Europe’spipeline infrastructure is organised to import Russian gas, alternative supplies will mostly have to come by sea in theform of liquefied natural gas (LNG). To guarantee security of supply, the EU will also need to ensure gas storage levelsremain high so Member States can cope with a sudden interruption of gas supplies. However, both LNG terminals andgas storage capacity are unevenly spread across Europe, with important policy implications. There is a clear need tofrontload investment to diversify supplies and fill storage, but uncertainty as to who can or should finance thesechanges. There is also the question of how to coordinate policy action at EU level, how to buffer against negativesocial and economic consequences, and how to ensure coherence of security of supply with the 'fit for 55' packageand the European Green Deal.

Briefing EN

Important projects of common European interest: State of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-04-2022Autor EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Ámbito político Educación | Energía | Industria | Medio ambiente | Política de investigaciónResumen The concept of important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) is enshrined in Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty

on the Functioning of the European Union. It enables the Commission to allow Member States to design andimplement national investments targeting important market failures or societal challenges that could not otherwise beaddressed. In November 2021, the Commission adopted a communication updating a 2014 communication thatestablished the first set of guidance to be used for the assessment of IPCEIs. The revision is designed to align thecriteria more closely with EU political priorities, in particular the European Green Deal and the digital strategy, whilealso making the setting up of IPCEIs more transparent and open to new participating Member States and economicplayers. In the context of the twin digital and ecological transition, IPCEIs are expected to boost the EU's strategicautonomy by ensuring Member States' capacity to invest together in technological development, and by encouragingthe dissemination of solutions and promoting cooperation across the EU and the economy. As of February 2022, threeIPCEIs have been approved by the Commission: one on microelectronics and two on batteries (with up to 12participating Member States). A further initiative on microelectronics, with 20 participating Member States, was notifiedto the Commission in December 2021 and is awaiting approval. Other initiatives, on clean hydrogen, next generationcloud and health, are being explored.

Briefing EN

Digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-04-2022Autor EISELE Katharina

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen While the Commission makes the case for advancing the digitalisation of judicial cooperation, and while the IA

supporting this initiative received a positive opinion from the RSB, it does nevertheless appear weak on several points.The Commission corroborates its problem definition using several recent sources and data. The Commissionconducted several stakeholder consultation activities, for some of which, more specific information would have beenuseful. Stakeholder views are reflected in the IA report. It appears, however, that the main source, an external study, isavailable only in the interinstitutional database of EU studies and not available to the wider public at the time of writing.Moreover, it appears that the range of options is very limited, with seemingly no real alternative to the preferredlegislative, Option 2 (the voluntary approach under the Option 1 is not considered as effective). It is notable that thedescription of impacts relating to data protection and data security is very limited for all options, despite their likelyrelevance.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 6

Review of rules for alternative investment fundsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-04-2022Autor KRAMER Esther

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA supports the proposal for the review of the AIFMD in an overall effective and transparent manner. It is based on

solid internal and external expertise, including an array of technical recommendations from the relevant EU andinternational bodies in charge of monitoring and supervising investment funds. While the intervention logic of themostly qualitative IA is clear, some aspects could have been substantiated in a more precise way. The highly technicalanalysis would have been more accessible to non-expert readers if interdependencies and links between the problemsand drivers, and between objectives, options and monitoring indicators, had been indicated more clearly. The IAjustifies limited quantification by a lack of data, providing quantified estimates (only) for the expected potential REFITcost savings in the area of depositary services. The IA favours, for the time being, less prescriptive solutions in order torespect proportionality and subsidiarity. It highlights the need of additional targeted expertise for a number ofquestions, including as regards harmonisation of reporting requirements.

Briefing EN

Completing the single market for servicesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-04-2022Autor SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduaneraResumen The pandemic and the negotiations following Brexit have been a serious challenge for the integrity of the single

market. Growing world tensions and the military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation are furtheremphasising the benefits of unity between Member States. Faced with this extremely difficult environment, the EU hasresponded with unprecedented determination, developing a series of new tools and coordination mechanisms, such ascommon procurement and fiscal support, to rapidly address weaknesses. This is, however, not the time forcomplacency, as the international environment continues to be increasingly uncertain, complex and rapidly-changing.Common and long-term strategic ambition at EU level is required more than ever. Previous evaluations by DG EPRSconcluded that completing the single market for services could be instrumental in that respect. In this briefing, ouranalysis confirms that barriers in service sectors and distortions induced by state involvement continue to significantlyhinder free movement of services within the EU. Further ambitious action would be beneficial, with between €279billion and €457 billion of additional GDP per annum in the long term. We thus conclude that completing the singlemarket for services is an integral part of the path towards more strategic autonomy, more resilience, more security, andmore rapid, broad-based and sustainable development.

Briefing EN

Improving working conditions in platform workTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-04-2022Autor TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Ámbito político Empleo | Politica socialResumen The IA presents a qualitative and partially quantitative assessment in support of the proposal on working conditions in

platform work. The problem definition would have benefited from further clarification, in particular of the target group,as it refers to 'some people', whilst the IA describes more widely problems faced by all of the people working throughplatforms. The IA openly explains the difficulties relating to the lack of data on platforms, an issue that the authors ofthe IA tried to address by making great efforts to collect relevant data, for example, through a survey and broadstakeholder consultations. The IA provides a sufficient range of options to address the defined problems and clearlydescribes the stakeholders' views, which appear to diverge, for example regarding the rebuttable presumption withreversed burden of proof of an employment status. In the impacts assessment, the proportionality criterion was notused in the comparison of the options, contrary to the recommendations of the Better Regulation Guidelines.Moreover, the IA openly indicates that it was not possible to quantify some costs (e.g. risk assessment, dataportability). Despite its weaknesses, the IA is able to provide a useful information package for decision-making. As atechnical point, to facilitate reader-friendliness, part of the information included in the extensive annexes could havebeen included in the main analysis.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 7

Completing the single market for goodsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-04-2022Autor SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduaneraResumen The pandemic and the negotiations following Brexit have been a serious challenge for the integrity of the single

market, in particular regarding free movement. Growing world tensions and the military aggression against Ukraine bythe Russian Federation are now further emphasising the benefits of unity between Member States. Faced with thisextremely difficult environment, the EU has responded with unprecedented determination, developing a series of toolsand coordination mechanisms, such as common procurement and fiscal support, to rapidly address weaknesses. Asthe situation remains uncertain and as risks accumulate, continued common action and long-term strategic planning atEU level is required more than ever to significantly reduce harmful dependencies. Previous evaluations by EPRSstressed that the single market for goods could be instrumental in this respect. In this briefing, our updated simulationsconfirm that the untapped potential from the single market for goods is still substantial. In particular, as barriers to tradefacilitation and complexity of regulatory procedures continue to hinder the free movement of goods, further action inthis area could significantly boost intra-EU trade, with potential economic benefits of between €228 billion and €372billion per annum. We therefore conclude that completing the single market for goods is an integral part of the pathtowards more strategic autonomy, more resilience, more security, and more rapid, broad-based and sustainabledevelopment.

Briefing EN

EU economic developments and projectionsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-04-2022Autor GRIGAITE KRISTINA | VEGA BORDELL Javier María

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | CoronavirusPalabra clave crisis monetaria | estadística de la UE | Eurostat | inflación | política fiscal | política monetaria única | previsión

económica | producto interior bruto | recuperación económica | situación económicaResumen This briefing provides a summary of the recent economic developments in the EU Member States and gives an

overview of relevant economic projections forecasted by major international and EU institutionsBriefing EN

Thematic Digest - the EU value added of a set of Recovery and Resilience PlansTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-04-2022Autor DE LEMOS PEIXOTO SAMUEL | GRIGAITE KRISTINA | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen This briefing provides a summarised comparative analysis of three papers prepared by external experts at the request

of the ECON Committee on the value added of a number of national Recovery and Resilience Plans. It further containsa summary of each of the three papers provided. Both the comparative analysis and the summaries are preparedunder EGOV responsibility; assessing and evaluating the integral views of the authors require a read-through of the fullpapers.

Briefing EN

Protecting EU shared values: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-04-2022Autor DIAZ CREGO Maria | MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativosResumen This is the fourth briefing within a series exploring citizens' expectations and recommendations in the context of the

Conference on the Future of Europe, and presenting the European Parliament's response. The briefing focuses oncitizens' proposals relating to EU common values, especially the rule of law. Citizens have placed EU values, includingdemocracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, at the core of a common European identity, anddiscussed ways to enhance and protect these values. They have highlighted the need to deepen people's awarenessand understanding of these values, and encourage dialogue on them. They believe that democratic culture and respectfor fundamental rights and the rule of law should be strengthened, and that Member States' performance should bemonitored closely against the benchmark of EU values. They have called for the procedure under Article 7 of theTreaty on European Union (TEU) to be made more effective, and for the General Conditionality Regulation to beapplied without delay. Parliament's resolutions and input to the legislative process leading to the adoption of theGeneral Conditionality Regulation are largely in tune with citizens' sentiments. Parliament has called repeatedly for theestablishment of a comprehensive EU pact on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. In its feedback to theCommission's annual rule of law reports, Parliament has called for more country-specific recommendations with a clearblueprint for action. Parliament has been very critical of the Commission for unnecessarily delaying the application ofthe General Conditionality Regulation. It has also firmly upheld the primacy of EU law: the cornerstone of the rule oflaw in the EU and the key prerequisite for EU integration.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 8

New EU regulation on gas storageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-04-2022Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político EnergíaResumen The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered serious concerns about EU energy security. The

problem is particularly acute in the gas sector, where Russia is the leading third-country supplier, on which severalMember States are heavily dependent. To ensure the EU is prepared for the risk of an interruption of gas supplies nextwinter, the Commission has proposed an urgent regulation on gas storage, requiring Member States to: fill in at least80 % of their storage capacity by 1 November 2022 (rising to 90 % in subsequent years); carry out the certification ofall gas storage system operators; and provide a 100 % tariff discount on entry and exit points into gas storage. TheCommission has suggested that this regulation be agreed under an expedited procedure by the Parliament and theCouncil, so that it can start taking full effect from summer 2022. The ITRE committee decided to call for use of theurgent procedure (Rule 163) without a committee report, and appointed a negotiating team of MEPs to enterimmediately into interinstitutional negotiations with the Council and the Commission. This decision was endorsedduring the April plenary session of the European Parliament. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

The future of data protection and privacy: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens'expectations

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 27-04-2022Autor MILDEBRATH Hendrik Alexander

Ámbito político DemocraciaResumen This is the fifth briefing within a series benchmarking Parliament's activities against citizens' expectations submitted to

the Conference on the Future of Europe. In a number of different ways, citizens seized the opportunity to call for a highlevel of data protection and privacy, as well as their rigorous implementation. They recommend measures promotingindustry compliance, increasing citizens' control over data, enhancing enforcement and limiting the monitoring, profilingand manipulation of citizens by private and public actors. As this briefing demonstrates, Parliament has largely keptpace with citizens' concerns by taking initiatives in areas where contributing citizens identified a need for action.

Briefing EN

Environmental crime directiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-04-2022Autor HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, which was submitted on 15 December 2021 andreferred to the European Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI). Despite the lack of systematic statisticaldata, environmental, social and economic damage caused by environmental crimes has been widely documented.Directive 2008/99/EC (the Environmental Crime Directive, ECD) was aimed primarily at improving environmentalprotection by means of harmonised criminal legislation. In 2020, the evaluation of the ECD showed that legalshortcomings and enforcement gaps had affected its effectiveness in deterring environmental crime in all its forms. Itsrevision, planned in the 2021 Commission work programme, underpins the Commission's priorities around the GreenDeal and the biodiversity strategy The European Parliament has called on the Commission to tackle environmentalcrime in its 2014 resolution on wildlife crime and its 2013 resolution on organised crime and corruption. The proposal isaccompanied by a communication on stepping up the fight against environmental crime.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 9

Nutrient profiles: A 'farm to fork' strategy initiative takes shapeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-04-2022Autor LAANINEN Tarja

Ámbito político Seguridad alimentariaResumen The European Commission is planning to establish 'nutrient profiles', that is, maximum amounts for nutrients such as

fat, sugar and/or salt in foods, above which the use of nutrition or health claims would be restricted or forbidden. Forexample, breakfast cereals exceeding a sugar limit could no longer advertise their fibre or vitamin content. TheCommission was already tasked with setting nutrient profiles to restrict the promotion of food high in fat, sugar and/orsalt under the Nutrition and Health Claims Regulation ('Claims Regulation') adopted in 2006. Now, in accordance withthe action plan accompanying the EU's 'farm to fork' strategy, the Commission will submit a proposal on nutrientprofiles by the end of 2022. The proposal will form part of a wider package revising EU legislation on food informationsupplied to consumers, together with proposals on front-of-pack nutrition labelling, origin labelling, date marking, andlabelling of alcoholic beverages. In the same package, the Commission also intends to solve a problem that has longbeen puzzling manufacturers and consumers in the herbal and plant products market, namely, that the same productcan be classified both as a herbal medicine and as a food, depending on the Member State in which it is sold. Whilemost consumer organisations and health advocates strongly support the idea of introducing nutrient profiles,opponents caution against overly simplistic labels that punish certain food groups and lead health-consciousindividuals to avoid them. The European Parliament has stressed that food information is a potent tool for empoweringconsumers.

Briefing EN

Asylum, borders and migration: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-04-2022Autor ATANASSOV Nikolai | MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-Margarita | ORAV Anita

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen The Conference on the Future of Europe was designed to give citizens a say about their vision for the EU, by means of

a multilingual digital platform and citizens' panels. The panels are transnational forums, gathering citizens from the EUMember States to discuss their ideas for the future of the Union and make recommendations on how the EU could beimproved. The resulting proposals are diverse and constructive. The suggestions for the future range from adjustmentsof legislation in force to complete overhaul of current systems in an effort to build a more efficient, integrated Union thatis closer to its citizens. This briefing focuses on some of the recommendations made by Panel 4 (EU in theworld/migration), suggestions and comments uploaded onto the multilingual digital platform, and proposals broughtforward by the European Youth Event. The topics cover EU policy on asylum, irregular migration and border protection,and the role of EU agencies in this area. Participants also considered the future of legal migration and integration ofmigrants in the EU. The second part of the briefing gives and overview of the European Parliament's position on thesetopics, and its call for change in the fields where citizens have asked for more EU action. This is the briefing in a serieslooking at citizens' expectations in the context of the Conference on the Future of Europe. The first briefing looked atexpectations having mainly a constitutional and institutional impact, i.e. suggestions to reform the EU institutional set-up, improve the EU decision-making process, achieve closer cooperation among Member States, and strengthenParliament's prerogatives. The second one looked at proposals to enhance citizens' participation to the Europeanproject, through consultations, petitions, European Citizens Initiatives and referendums.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Schengen Borders CodeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-04-2022Autor DUMBRAVA Costica

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativosResumen In December 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal to amend the Schengen Borders Code, which

lays down the rules governing controls at the EU internal and external borders. While debates on the reform ofSchengen have been going on for a while, recent challenges related to the coronavirus pandemic on the one hand,and attempts to instrumentalise migrants as a way to put pressure on the EU's external borders, on the other, havecreated new momentum for reform. The Commission's proposal aims to improve the Schengen system's resilience toserious threats, and to adapt it to new challenges. It introduces a new coordination mechanism to deal with healththreats at the external borders and a new Schengen safeguard mechanism to provide a common response at theinternal borders in situations of threats affecting Member States, including the possibility to directly transfer irregularmigrants apprehended at the internal borders back to the competent authorities in the EU country from which it isassumed they just came, without undergoing an individual assessment. The proposal, which falls under the ordinarylegislative procedure, is at the initial stage of the legislative process. In the European Parliament, the proposal hasbeen assigned to the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). Preliminary discussions have alsotaken place in the Council. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 10

Article 17 TFEU: Dialogue with churches, and religious and philosophical organisationsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-04-2022Autor PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Ámbito político Cultura | EducaciónPalabra clave grupo religioso | iglesia | institución religiosa | pobreza | relación Iglesia-Estado | Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UE

Resumen The EU institutions engage in regular structured dialogue with representatives of churches, and religious, non-confessional and philosophical organisations, on the basis of Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union (TFEU). This dialogue, which takes the form of high-level meetings or working-level discussions, isfocused on policy issues on the European agenda. It traces its origins to earlier initiatives, such as that launched in1994 by Jacques Delors – 'A soul for Europe' – which aimed to find ways to build an ethical, moral and spiritualdimension into European integration and policy-shaping. The draft Constitutional Treaty of 2004 included provisions onregular, open and transparent dialogue between EU institutions, and representatives of churches and religiouscommunities, and of non-confessional or philosophical communities. Although the Constitutional Treaty was rejected inreferendums in France and the Netherlands, its successor, the Lisbon Treaty, adopted in 2007 and in force sinceDecember 2009, preserved the same provisions in its Article 17 TFEU. The European Parliament has stressed theimportance of constant dialogue among, and with, religious and non-confessional and philosophical communities.Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it sought to give substance to the provisions of Article 17 TFEU,primarily through organising dialogue on subjects of interest for the EU and its citizens. The European Commissionand the Council also hold regular Article 17 TFEU dialogue sessions and high-level meetings. This is a further updatedversion of a briefing last issued in November 2020.

Briefing EN, FR

Human development in Putin's Russia: What the data tell usTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-04-2022Autor PICHON Eric | RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen While the UN Human Development Index, which assesses progress in the standard of living, health and education,

ranks Russia among the 'very high human development' countries, other data suggest a more nuanced reality. Russiahas gone from Soviet-era egalitarianism to extremes of wealth and poverty. Economic growth during the first decadeunder Vladimir Putin's leadership slightly reduced the gap between rich and poor, but inequality is still higher than inmost developed countries. Factors such as corruption and low taxes for the rich exacerbate the income gap. Freepublic healthcare and a relatively inclusive education system apparently mitigate inequality. However, many hospitalsare ill-equipped, and universities struggle to compare with foreign counterparts. Since 2014 and the invasion ofCrimea, Russians' living conditions have deteriorated. Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine and the imposition ofWestern sanctions is already placing a burden on the poorest members of Russian society, as prices increase andstaple goods begin to run out. The social contract between Russians and Putin, often considered as one in whichcitizens ceded certain freedoms and civil liberties in exchange for stability and prosperity, is now under strain. Thisbriefing is partly based on and updates previous EPRS publications on socioeconomic inequality and on the educationsystem.

Briefing EN

Multilateral initiatives for upholding human rights in digital technologies: A task for the UN or for liberaldemocracies?

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 21-04-2022Autor ZAMFIR Ionel

Ámbito político Democracia | Derechos humanosResumen With their rapid advancement in recent times, digital technologies have undeniably had major positive and also

negative impacts on human rights. They have offered people better opportunities to communicate and exchangeinformation, thereby empowering them to exercise their right to freedom of expression and association, among others,and to draw public attention to human rights violations. On the other hand, they have enabled disinformation, cyber-surveillance and abusive behaviour, such as hate speech, cyber-crime and misuse of personal data. There is a broadconsensus that the same human rights and human rights obligations that apply offline also apply in the digitalenvironment. However, new technologies are creating a fundamentally different paradigm for human interaction, andthe current international human rights framework has conceptual gaps. The main question for the international debateis how to fill these gaps. Through soft ethical standards or binding rules? What is the best forum for this? While the UNis best placed, given its universal scope, it has been weakened by the actions of authoritarian states. Multilateralcoalitions of democratic states are an alternative avenue, but they bring a risk of fragmentation of the global space fordigital technologies. When looking at how human rights play out in the digital context, it is important to carefullybalance the benefits and risks of new technologies, to apply a multi-stakeholder approach, and to bear in mind thathuman rights obligations, while still incumbent on states as the main duty bearers, also apply to businesses,particularly those behind new technological developments. The EU is involved in the discussions on the above issues,both in the UN and in coalitions of liberal democracies. In parallel, the EU is working on developing guidance andbinding norms on how human rights obligations apply at EU and national level with respect to the digital environment.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 11

Revision of the Ecodesign DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-04-2022Autor BACIAN Izabela Cristina

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Energía | Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la práctica |Medio ambiente | Transposición y aplicación de la legislación

Resumen Ecodesign and energy labelling policies play an important role in the decarbonisation of the energy system. Ecodesignbans the least-efficient products from the market, while energy labelling guides consumers towards the most energyefficient products. While the Ecodesign Directive focused largely on energy aspects, its revision became necessary inlight of the transition to a circular economy where the use of natural resources is reassessed to maximise their valueand minimise their waste. The recently proposed regulation on ecodesign for sustainable products will extend thescope to a wider range of products, strengthen sustainability and circularity criteria, and introduce new informationrequirements for products. Following the adoption of the regulation, the Ecodesign Directive will be repealed. The newlegal framework aims to put in place a harmonised set of rules for sustainable products across all Member States andensure a level-playing field for businesses.

Briefing EN

Situation in Lebanon: Severe and prolonged economic depressionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-04-2022Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix | JONGBERG Kirsten

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen The Lebanese government's decision to impose new taxes in October 2019 sparked nation-wide protests by a

population exhausted by poor public services, worried about increasing national debt and frustrated by widespreadcorruption. Since then, Lebanese politics have been marked by political deadlock that has prevented successivegovernments from implementing urgent reforms. The devastating explosion in the port of Beirut on 4 August 2020 onlyexacerbated the situation. By the time Prime Minister Najib Mikati presented his new government on 10 September2021, the country had sunk deeply into a financial and economic crisis. Lebanon's severe and prolonged economicdepression is, according to the World Bank, 'likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top 3, most severe crisis episodesglobally since the mid-nineteenth century'. Poverty in Lebanon has spread dramatically over the past year and nowaffects about 74 % of the population. Lebanon is host to approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 90 % of whom livein extreme poverty. There are also over 210 000 other refugees. The Lebanese pound has lost 90 % of its value in thepast two years, most people have only two hours of electricity per day, and the healthcare sector is at breaking point.The middle class has been decimated, with many leaving the country or planning to do so. There is concern thatparliamentary elections scheduled for May 2022 may be postponed, further prolonging the political deadlock that ispreventing the implementation of critical reforms. The war in Ukraine is meanwhile expected to have a serious impacton Lebanon, which imports around 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia. The EU has supported Lebanon with€2.77 billion over the past decade, to help the country However, in July 2021, the Council adopted a framework fortargeted restrictive measures, offering the possibility to impose sanctions on persons and entities responsible forundermining democracy or the rule of law in Lebanon. The European Parliament has called Lebanon's presentsituation a 'man-made disaster caused by a handful of men across the political class'.

Briefing EN, FR

Minimising the risk of deforestation and forest degradation associated with products placed on the EUmarket and exported from the EU

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 13-04-2022Autor VIKOLAINEN Vera

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the proposal for an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven globaldeforestation, submitted on 17 November 2021 and referred to the European Parliament's Committee on Environment,Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The proposal was first announced in the 2019 Commission communication onStepping up EU action to protect and restore the world's forests, and then confirmed in the European Green Deal, the2030 EU biodiversity strategy and the 'farm to fork' strategy. On 22 October 2020, on the basis of an own-initiativereport, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, which was accompanied by a European added valueassessment. The resolution calls on the Commission to submit a proposal for an EU legal framework to halt andreverse EU-driven global deforestation. Following up on this request, the Commission included the present proposal inits 2021 work programme and the 2021 joint declaration on legislative priorities.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 12

Nominations for Members of the European Court of Auditors (Cyprus and Malta)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-04-2022Autor FRANKE Michaela

Autor externo Michaela Franke Adam NugentÁmbito político Control presupuestario | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Presupuesto

Resumen As set out in Article 285 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the European Court ofAuditors (ECA) shall consist of one national of each Member State. Article 286 (2) TFEU further specifies that eachMember State has the right to propose its candidate. The Council then adopts the list of Members as proposed by theMember States. Often, this is a partial renewal of the Court - only one or a few Members are appointed, as themandates of the Members may expire at different points in time. The Council can only act after consulting theEuropean Parliament; in practice, the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) is responsible and the Member-designate of the ECA makes a statement before the committee and has to answer its questions. CONT then votes onthe nomination and thus issues a recommendation to plenary, which votes within two months of receipt of thenomination. In case of an unfavourable opinion, the President shall ask the Council to withdraw its nomination and tosubmit a new nomination (Rule 129 of the EP’s Rules of Procedure). However, Parliament’s opinion is not binding forthe Council.

Briefing EN

Solidarity and wealth taxTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-04-2022Autor SCHWARCZ András

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoResumen In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic costs of the lockdown became apparent. Most countries needed

to step up health and social spending, while also introducing stimulus packages as their tax revenues fell. This has ledto increased budget deficits and sovereign debt. Additional revenue streams need to be found in the near future inorder to pay back this debt.

Briefing EN

PETI Fact-finding visit to Baleares, Spain - 11 - 13 April 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-04-2022Autor FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | HEEZEN JOHANNES

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Peticiones al Parlamento Europeo | Politica socialResumen The PETI Committee decided to organise a fact-finding visit to Palma de Mallorca, Baleares (Spain) from 11 to 13 April

2022 concerning several petitions on alleged mistreatment of minors under foster care in Mallorca. This briefingdescribes the legislation in place, the system of guardianship of minors in Spain, the Majorcan Institute of Socialaffairs, the Natzaret Foundation, the timeline of events and the Report of the Commission of Experts on cases ofsexual abuse and exploitation and Sexual Exploitation of Children of minors with a legal measure of protection ofMallorca.

Briefing EN

Sustainable maritime fuels - 'Fit for 55' package: the FuelEU Maritime proposalTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-04-2022Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político Energía | Medio ambiente | TransportePalabra clave combustible fósil | combustible para uso marítimo | contaminación por barcos | estrategia de la UE | navegación

marítima | neutralidad en carbono | propuesta (UE)Resumen In July 2021, the European Commission put forward the 'fit for 55' package of legislative proposals, aimed at ensuring

the success of the European Green Deal. The FuelEU Maritime regulation is one of these proposals and, together withfour other proposals, it seeks to steer the EU maritime sector towards decarbonisation. In the European Parliament,the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) leads the work on this file. On 4 April 2022, the rapporteur JörgenWarborn put forward his draft report which will be considered during the TRAN meeting later in April. To support theuptake of sustainable maritime fuels, the Commission proposes to limit the carbon intensity of the energy used onboard ships. Accordingly, the proposal sets up a fuel standard for ships and introduces a requirement for the mostpolluting ship types to use onshore electricity when at berth. It puts the responsibility for compliance on the shippingcompany. The legislative outcome of this proposal will be closely linked to the simultaneously proposed rules onincluding the maritime sector in the EU emissions trading system, as well as those on alternative fuels infrastructure,energy taxation and renewable energy. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Sustainable maritime fuels - 'Fit for 55' package: the FuelEU Maritime proposal

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 13

Towards deforestation-free commodities and products in the EUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-04-2022Autor HALLEUX Vivienne

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen On 17 November 2021, the European Commission tabled a legislative proposal aimed at curbing deforestation and

forest degradation driven by the expansion of agricultural land used to produce specific commodities, namely cattle,cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soya and wood. Following up on a 2020 European Parliament resolution, which called forregulatory action to tackle EU-driven global deforestation, the proposal would impose due diligence obligations onoperators placing these commodities and some derived products on the EU market, or exporting them from the EU.Member States would be responsible for enforcement, and for setting penalties in case of non-compliance. To facilitatedue diligence and control, a benchmarking system would identify countries as presenting a low, standard or high risk ofproducing non-compliant commodities or products. Obligations for operators and national authorities would varyaccording to the level of risk assigned to the country of production. While generally supporting the proposal,stakeholders have raised some issues, regarding for instance the commodities covered, the protection of humanrights, the impacts of the country benchmarking on trade relationships, and the role of third-party certification. In theParliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, responsible for the file, is expected toconsider its rapporteur's draft report in April 2022. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Review of the Waste Shipment RegulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-04-2022Autor VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen The IA convincingly illustrates the identified problems, although their scale is not always supported by estimates, or the

source of some of the estimates is not provided. When discussing how the situation would evolve without furtheraction, the IA neither discusses the evolution of each problem identified nor any other existing or upcoming EUinitiatives that could lead to improvements. The general objectives appear to be consistent with the problems identified,and the specific objectives comply broadly with the SMART criteria. The retained options tackle the problems' driversidentified progressively, although it is unclear why some of the policy measures identified under Options 2 or 3 werenot taken up under the preferred Option 4. The IA appears to assess the main economic, social, and environmentalimpacts for each policy measure comprehensively, quantifying them whenever possible, and otherwise providing aqualitative assessment. However, the analysis on SMEs is quite limited, and the IA does not provide any explanationas to why competitiveness was not considered. Moreover, despite it likely being relevant, the IA does not appear tohave dealt with the impact on third/developing countries sufficiently and systematically. Overall, the monitoringframework envisaged appears to be adequate, although more clarity as to the choice of identifying indicators for onlytwo specific objectives would have been beneficial. Stakeholders were consulted extensively and their opinionssystematically reported. The efforts undertaken to provide quantitative support for the analysis performed appear to beconvincing, and the IA appears to have addressed the RSB's comments satisfactorily. Finally, the proposal appears tobe consistent with the analysis carried out in the IA.

Briefing EN

Greece's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-04-2022Autor PARI MARIANNA

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen Before the pandemic, the Greek economy was just getting back onto a positive path, following reforms implemented

under the macroeconomic adjustment programmes. Action to address the country's specific characteristics is now allthe more important since the -8.2 % downturn of 2020. Greece was among the first four countries to submit its nationalrecovery and resilience plan (NRRP) in April 2021. The plan envisages investments and reforms totalling €30.5 billion,to be implemented up to 2026, with €17.8 billion to be financed from non-repayable financial support (grants) and€12.7 billion, the maximum possible allocation, from loans. The plan corresponds to 4.2 % of the €723.8 billionRecovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and represents 16.7 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019(the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). The grants alone represent 9.7 % of the country's GDP, and overall thisis the sixth biggest national plan. Greece is the biggest per capita grant beneficiary, receiving €1 666 in grants perperson. The Greek plan was approved by the Council on 13 July 2021, which allowed the disbursement of the pre-financing payment of €4 billion to Greece on 9 August 2021. Further disbursements will be made up until 2026, uponfulfilment of the agreed milestones and targets. Grants are scheduled in nine equal instalments, and loans in six equalinstalments. A first payment request was submitted by Greece on 29 December 2021 for the fulfilment of 15milestones. On 7 January 2022, implementation had begun of 103 measures, corresponding to €6.1 billion. TheEuropean Parliament, which supported an EU recovery instrument from the start of the pandemic, is involved througha regular, structured dialogue with the Commission and the Council, and is competent to scrutinise its implementation.This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updatedat key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 14

Solvency II reviewTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-04-2022Autor GIRARD VERONIQUE

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Mercadointerior y unión aduanera

Resumen The IA covers two Commission proposals representing the biggest amendment to date of the Solvency II framework,which came into force in the EU in 2016. Important parts of the framework laid down in delegated and implementingacts will be updated by the Commission at a later stage. This IA builds on a broad consultation of stakeholders, and onextensive advice from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). In addition to variousreports from EIOPA including a holistic IA, the IA draws on a technical report from the JRC and an external study,which are adequately referenced and publicly accessible. The objectives are directly linked to the problems identified inthe IA and their consequences. The Solvency II review aims to increase policyholders' protection as well as theinsurers' contribution to the long-term green financing of the economy, to contribute to financial stability, and topreserve the international competitiveness of the EU insurance industry. The preferred options are in line with EIOPA'sadvice, except for the policy dimension related to proportionality, where the IA explains why the preferred optiondeviates from EIOPA's recommendation. The IA shows how the combination of preferred options is expected tocontribute to the achievement of the objectives identified. The IA assesses and compares the potential impacts of theoptions presented to achieve these objectives in a systematic way. In addition, the IA describes the potential positiveimpact of the preferred options on SMEs. The IA also explains how the proposed Solvency II review is expected toimprove proportionality and to simplify the regulatory framework. The IA mainly focuses on the economic impacts ofthe initiative. The main social impact assessed by the IA concerns the expected improvement of policyholderprotection. Potential environmental impacts relating to enhanced green financing, could have been more clearlyaddressed in the IA.

Briefing EN

Multilingualism: The language of the European UnionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-04-2022Autor KATSAROVA Ivana

Ámbito político Cultura | EducaciónPalabra clave lengua europea | lengua oficial | plurilingüismo | política lingüística

Resumen Some 7 000 languages are spoken globally today. However, half of the world's population shares just six nativelanguages, and some 90 % of all languages may be replaced by dominant ones by the end of the century. Theharmonious co-existence of 24 official languages is one of the most distinctive features of the European project.Multilingualism is not only an expression of the EU countries' cultural identities, it also helps preserve democracy,transparency and accountability. No legislation can enter into force until it has been translated into all official languagesand published in the Official Journal of the EU. Crucially, the provisions relating to the EU language regime can only bechanged by a unanimous vote in the Council of the EU. The EU is committed to promoting language learning but haslimited influence over educational and language policies, as these are the responsibility of the individual EU countries.In 2016, over one third (35.4 %) of adults in the EU-28 did not know any foreign languages. A similar proportion (35.2%) declared that they knew one foreign language, while just over one fifth (21 %) said they knew two foreignlanguages. The European Parliament is committed to ensuring the highest possible degree of multilingualism in itswork. Based on the 24 official languages that constitute the public face of the EU, the total number of linguisticcombinations rises to 552, since each language can be translated into the 23 others. Currently, over 600 staffemployed in translation and over 270 in interpreting take care of the translation and interpretation needs of the 705Members of the European Parliament. Internally, the EU institutions mostly use just three working languages: English,French and German. The overall cost for delivering translation and interpreting services in the EU institutions is around€1 billion per year, which represents less than 1 % of the EU budget or just over €2 per citizen. Following the successof the European Year of Languages (2001), the Council of Europe designated 26 September as the European Day ofLanguages. This is an update of a briefing published in 2019.

Briefing EN

Strengthening citizens' participation: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-04-2022Autor DEL MONTE Micaela | KOTANIDIS Silvia

Ámbito político DemocraciaResumen Aiming to forge a closer relationship between EU citizens and the EU integration project, the Conference on the Future

of Europe gave 800 citizens gathered in four panels the opportunity to discuss and formulate recommendations for theEU institutions to follow up. Debated in both the conference plenary and the conference working groups, theserecommendations are intended to permeate the whole discussion within the conference. With Panel 2 having issuedthe first set of recommendations in December 2021, the debate has begun, with a focus on how to meet citizens'expectations. It will also discuss how to take the EU project forward in a way that is supported by the variousinstitutions involved in the conference, including representatives of Member States and EU institutions, and membersof national parliaments. A closer look at these recommendations reveals that some of the citizens' panelrecommendations address matters that have already been tackled by European Parliament resolutions. Others arequite close to positions and ideas expressed by Parliament in other ways. This briefing focuses on recommendationswhich propose enhanced public participation in the European project, through consultations, petitions, Europeancitizens' initiatives and referendums. This is the second in a series of briefings looking at citizens' recommendations inthe context of the Conference on the Future of Europe. The first looked at recommendations with an institutionalimpact, i.e. ways to reform the EU's institutional set-up, improve the EU decision-making process, achieve closercooperation among Member States and strengthen Parliament's prerogatives.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 15

Russia’s war on Ukraine in international law and human rights bodies: Bringing institutions back inTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-04-2022Autor LERCH Marika

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Democracia | Derechos humanos | Gobernanza globalResumen In the midst of war, human rights and international law institutions have responded with unprecedented speed to the

unfolding crisis, not least due to the strong engagement of the Ukraine government in multilateral fora. While theseinstitutions can deliver little immediate relief for Ukraine citizens, the initiatives have important political functions: theyshow the political and legal alternatives to the logic of war chosen by the Russian government; they contribute toformalising international consensus and providing independent legal assessments of the attack; and, most importantly,they prepare the ground to ensure accountability for crimes committed in the context of the war. .

Briefing EN

Bosnia and Herzegovina - Electoral and constitutional reforms: Political and legal analysis of the Ljubićcase and related legal decisions

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 07-04-2022Autor STANICEK BRANISLAV

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen Stabilisation of the internal political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that celebrated the 30th anniversary

of its independence on 1 March 2022 but risks internal implosion, remains a priority for the European Union. To thisend, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, called for ‘urgent progress in the electoral andconstitutional reforms’ that are also important ahead of the general elections scheduled for 2 October 2022. This viewechoed the European Parliament’s resolution on the 2019-2020 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina,adopted on 24 June 2021, that called on Bosnia’s authorities ‘to resume inclusive negotiations on electoral reforms’,and regretted the ‘reluctance to implement these rulings by eliminating all forms of inequality and discrimination in theelectoral process’. In the context of the current political crisis that is threatening the constitutional settlement in Bosniaand Herzegovina (BiH), an analysis of the Ljubić case (2016) and associated cases, in particular the Sejdić-Finci case(2009) and the Zornić case (2014), can be of great relevance. Such analysis leads to new ways of understanding thecountry at a time of increased international interest in it, not least in the context of international support for its Europeanperspective and for regional cooperation. The Ljubić case’s relationship to other legal decisions by the ConstitutionalCourt of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CC BiH) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) connects the rights ofconstituent peoples with universal human rights. The analysis of the political and legal context of the CC BiH andECtHR decisions makes it clear that effective implementation of these decisions depends on resolving the internalpolitical stalemate in BiH that currently makes any amendment of the Dayton Constitution an unattainable objective.

Briefing DE, EN, FR, HR

The Ukraine war and energy supply [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 06-04-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | EnergíaResumen Russia’s war on Ukraine has boosted the already high prices of oil and gas in the European Union, posing a question

mark over sustainable deliveries of energy to the bloc. The EU is heavily dependent on Russia for its oil and gas. In2021, two-fifths of the gas Europeans burned came from Russia. More than a quarter of the EU’s imported crude oilcame from the country. The European Commission has announced plans to cut the EU’s dependence on Russian gasby two-thirds this year. Meanwhile, Russia has demanded that it is paid for its gas in roubles, rather than in euros ordollars, as stated in the contracts. The G-7 industrialised countries have dismissed the plan. EU Member States aredivided over including a ban on energy imports from Russia among sanctions imposed on Moscow. Such an embargowould put a squeeze on European households, probably leading to gas rationing. However, it would cut Russia offfrom a major source of the hard currency that it uses in part to finance the war. This note gathers links to the recentpublications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and European energymarkets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanksare Thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 16

EU-Ukraine trade and investment relations and the impact of Russia’s warTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 06-04-2022Autor IGLER WOLFGANG | KRAMER Lorenz

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalResumen The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together: it promotes

deeper political ties, stronger economic links and the respect for common values. The Agreement was negotiatedbetween 2007 and 2011, signed in 2014, and entered into force on 1 September 2017 after unanimous ratification byEU Member States. The Association Agreement includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)between the EU and Ukraine that has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2016. By 2020, the EU had becomeUkraine’s most important export market and principal source of imports, dwarfing Ukraine’s second partner – China –and placing Russia a distant third. Since the Russian Federation launched its military invasion of Ukraine on 24February 2022, EU-Ukraine trade and investment relations have started to experience constraints, with someEuropean (car) manufacturers reporting disturbances and temporarily halting production due to a lack of Ukrainiancomponents. Ukraine’s future trade prospects will depend not only on its trade partners, but also on rebuilding thephysical damage the country has suffered, and on the status of its ports

Briefing EN

Digital services actTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-04-2022Autor MADIEGA Tambiama André

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Protección de los consumidoresPalabra clave comercio electrónico | computación en nube | difusión de la información | directiva (UE) | Internet | mercado único

digital | prestación de servicios | propuesta (UE) | protección del consumidor | tecnología digitalResumen The rules governing the provision of digital services in the EU have remained largely unchanged since the adoption of

the e-Commerce Directive in 2000, while digital technologies and business models continue to evolve rapidly and newsocietal challenges are emerging, such as the spread of counterfeit goods, hate speech and disinformation online.Against this backdrop, the European Commission tabled a new legislative proposal on a digital services act inDecember 2020. The proposal aims at amending the e-Commerce Directive and sets out a horizontal framework forcontent moderation of the EU online space. Interinstitutional negotiations between the Commission, the EuropeanParliament and the Council seeking to reach an agreement on a compromise text started in January 2022.Controversial issues currently being discussed by the co legislators include the scope of the new regulation, theenforcement mechanisms proposed, and to what extent targeted advertising and techniques to influence users'behaviour such as 'dark patterns' should be curbed. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Unaccompanied migrant children in GreeceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-04-2022Autor MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-Margarita

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen Since the beginning of the migratory crisis in 2015, growing numbers of unaccompanied children have been seeking

protection in Europe. With increased migratory pressure in Greece along the EU's external border with Turkey at thebeginning of 2020, and following the Greek government's official request for support, the European Commissionlaunched a relocation scheme to speed up relocation of unaccompanied minors from the Greek islands to other EUMember States. Human rights organisations had denounced the precarious and difficult conditions in whichunaccompanied minors had been living in the Greek hotspots, calling for structural solutions in the form of moresolidarity and responsibility sharing among EU Member States, and a coordinated, child rights-based approach toaddressing the many gaps in the protection afforded to unaccompanied children arriving in Europe. However, recentlegislative changes in Greece, such as the establishment of the Special Secretariat for the Protection ofUnaccompanied Minors (SSPUAM) and a new relocation scheme, have served to improve the situation ofunaccompanied minors in the country drastically. Measures include the creation of an effective and sustainable childprotection system, better reception conditions, and changes to the accommodation system for unaccompanied minors.At the end of 2020, a new law put an end to the practice of detaining unaccompanied children on the sole grounds thatthey were homeless. This was followed in January 2021 by the introduction of an emergency response mechanismthat offers children support and a safety net. This publication is an update of a briefing of May 2020 by Ingeborg Odink.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 17

Goods vehicles hired without driversTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-04-2022Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave alquiler de vehículos | Estado miembro UE | informe | procedimiento legislativo ordinario | propuesta (UE) | transporte

de mercancías | transporte intra-UE | transporte por carreteraResumen The current EU rules provide to haulage companies the possibility to use hired vehicles, but also allow Member States

to restrict this. As part of the 2017 road transport mobility package, the European Commission proposed to soften theexisting restrictions and establish a uniform regulatory framework, which would give transport operators across the EUequal access to the market for hired goods vehicles. As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council haveagreed new rules in October 2021. Member States will not be allowed to restrict, on their territories, the use of avehicle hired by a haulage company established in another Member State. However, they will still be able to restrict, toa certain degree, the use of vehicles that their own companies hire in another Member State. EU Member States willhave 14 months to adapt their legislation before the rules enter into force. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Understanding EU action on Roma inclusionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-04-2022Autor LECERF Marie

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadPalabra clave acción de la UE | discriminación racial | discriminación étnica | exclusión social | informe | integración social | romaní |

sociedad civil (movimientos de opinión)Resumen The Roma are Europe's largest ethnic minority. Out of an estimated total of 10 to12 million Roma in Europe as a

whole, some 6 million live in the European Union (EU), most of whom are citizens of an EU Member State. Asignificant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discriminationand segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education, and difficulties in entering thelabour market, result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people. Since the mid-1990s, theEuropean Union has stressed the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, a key EU initiative emerged with theadoption of an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020, aimed at tackling the socio-economic exclusion of, and discrimination against, Roma by promoting equal access in four key areas: education,employment, health, and housing. As the framework had come to an end, the Commission adopted 'A union ofequality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation' (2021 2030) in early October 2020.Through this new strategy, Member States are invited to tackle the disproportionate impact of the pandemic. In March2021, the Council adopted a recommendation on Roma equality, inclusion and participation, replacing an earlier onefrom 2013. This recommendation encourages Member States to adopt strategic frameworks for the inclusion of Romacommunities. The EU also supports Member States in their duty to improve the lives of all vulnerable people, includingRoma people, through the European structural and investment funds and other funding instruments. Issues relating tothe promotion of democratic values and practices towards Roma, as well as their economic, social and cultural rights,have received particular attention from civil society organisations, while Parliament has been advocating for Romainclusion since the 1990s. This is an update of a Briefing published in May 2021.

Briefing EN

Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience FacilityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-04-2022Autor SAPALA Magdalena

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidad | Asuntos económicos y monetarios | PresupuestoPalabra clave ayuda humanitaria con enfoque de género | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | igualdad de género | instrumento

financiero de la UE | planificación nacional | recuperación económica | reparto de la financiación de la UEResumen The negative impact of the Covid-19 crisis on women's social and economic situation triggered a debate on the urgent

need for a gender-sensitive policy response to the pandemic. In this context, the establishment of the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF) – the EU's biggest financial instrument supporting recovery in the Member States – is anopportunity to channel extraordinary resources toward measures that take into account the principles of genderequality. It is also a chance to put into practice the EU's long-standing commitments to mainstream gender acrossdifferent policies and apply gender budgeting principles to EU spending. Offering an overview of how gender equalityhas been built into the RRF Regulation, this briefing explains what was expected from the Member States when theywere preparing their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) as regards gender equality. It also providespractical examples of reforms and investments where gender equality has been taken into account, from the 22NRRPs approved by the end of 2021 (Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France,Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia andFinland). In keeping with the RRF Regulation, all the NRRPs analysed declare gender equality to be a horizontalobjective, to be given consideration in all measures. However, not all Member States have included dedicated reformsor investments addressing gender-related challenges explicitly or indicating women as the main beneficiaries. Ouranalysis shows that the most numerous and innovative measures are present in the plans of Belgium, Spain, Italy andAustria. This is an update of a Briefing published in October 2021.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 18

Single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the EU - Directive 2011/98/EUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-04-2022Autor AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la práctica | Politica social |Valor añadido europeo

Resumen The Directive 2011/98/EU on a single permit for third-country nationals (non-EU nationals) to reside and work in theEuropean Union (EU) has two main objectives. The first objective is to facilitate the procedure for a third-countrynational to be admitted to work in an EU Member State, by introducing a single application procedure for a combinedwork and residence permit. The second objective is to ensure equal treatment between third-country workers andnationals of the permit issuing Member State, by providing a common set of rights regarding working conditions,education and training, access to goods and services, and social security.

Briefing EN

Inflation explained: What lies behind it and what lies ahead?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-04-2022Autor HOFLMAYR MARTIN

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen Understanding inflation dynamics requires an understanding of the underlying concept and how it is measured.

Inflation is defined as a process of continuously rising prices and falling purchasing power. In other words, a generaland broad-based increase in the price of goods and services over an extended period. The main objective of centralbanks is to keep prices stable, to preserve the integrity and purchasing power of people's money. The most commoninflation indicator measures the average change in the price of a basket of consumer goods and services over time.The closest approximation of what people intuitively understand by the term inflation is the change in their cost ofliving. The Harmonised Indicator for Consumer Prices (HICP), against which the European Central Bank (ECB)assesses the achievement of its price stability objective, is based on this concept. Highlighting the principles ofoptionality, gradualism and flexibility in a recent speech, ECB President Christine Lagarde reflected upon the currentuncertainty. After several years of inflation rates significantly below the inflation target, the ECB is now facingconsumer price increases not seen since the launch of the euro. In February 2022, inflation rates hit an annual rate of5.9 % in the euro area and 6.2 % in the EU. The Russian war on Ukraine is now likely to cause inflation to increasefurther, with underlying price pressure broadening and lingering supply-side bottlenecks. The ECB's monetary policydecision of March 2022 confirmed the previously announced acceleration of monetary tightening, reflecting concernregarding second-round effects and inflation expectations becoming unanchored (when long-run inflation expectationsdiffer significantly from a central bank's inflation target). These concerns outweigh uncertainty over the economic falloutfrom Russia's war and its economic consequences. To react to rising prices, the ECB has therefore prepared theconditions for policy rate increases once asset purchases end.

Briefing EN

Russia's war on Ukraine: Speeches by Ukraine's President to the European Parliament and nationalparliaments

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 01-04-2022Autor DEL MONTE Micaela

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen On 24 February 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine threw the international status quo into disarray by violating the

country's sovereignty and integrity. Since then, over 1 000 civilian casualties have been reported and over 3.8 millionpeople have been forced to flee the country. Many others are displaced within Ukraine's borders, while civilianinfrastructure, including hospitals, schools, roads and buildings, is being targeted by Russian military action. Theshelling of civilians and the alleged use of chemical and/or biological weapons by Russian military forces have spurredthe international community to accuse Russia of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Against thisbackdrop, Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been addressing parliaments around the world to plead thecause of the Ukrainian people and ask for both military and humanitarian help. He began by addressing the EuropeanParliament, before continuing with many others, both in Europe and further afield. The latest in a line of historicalleaders mobilising rhetoric in times of war, Zelenskyy's speeches have each been tailor-made to their specific audienceand have been consistent in reminding policy-makers around the world of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding as aresult of the war and of the Ukrainian people's military needs. Taking a look at speeches given by Zelenskyy to theEuropean Parliament and several national parliaments between 1 and 24 March 2022, in the month after Russiainvaded Ukraine, this briefing summarises the Ukrainian president's main messages and offers some thoughts aboutthe narrative used by Zelenskyy to keep Russia's war on Ukraine at the top of national and international agendas.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 19

EU-China ties and Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 31-03-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen EU officials say that the 23rd summit between the European Union and China on Friday 1 April will focus on Russia’s

war on Ukraine, the engagement of the international community to support Ukraine, the dramatic humanitarian crisiscreated by the conflict, its destabilising nature for the international order and its inherent global impact. The meeting, tobe conducted by video-conference, is also expected to discuss bilateral issues and areas of shared interest, such asclimate change, biodiversity and health, as well as ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship.The EU is also likely to urge China to end its trade ban on imports from Lithuania, which followed the country’sdecision to open a de facto Taiwan embassy in its capital. In recent years, China has become more of a rival for theEU than a declared strategic partner. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from manyinternational think tanks on EU-China relations, the country’s attitude to the war on Ukraine and its policies on otherissues. Analyses on the war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks areThinking’ series.

Briefing EN

China-Russia relations: A quantum leap?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 31-03-2022Autor JOCHHEIM Ulrich

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen Hours before the Beijing Winter Olympics officially opened on 4 February 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping had a

long meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the joint statement issued after the meeting, the Chinese leaderfor the first time voiced his country's outright opposition to NATO enlargement and support for Russia's 'proposals tocreate long-term legally binding security guarantees' in Europe. This stance might be seen as the culmination of arelationship, formed in 1992, between the newly proclaimed Russian Federation and a China that had just startedemerging from the stupor following the Tiananmen Square massacre. This relationship has seen major shifts since1992. At the outset, China's population was greater than Russia's and both countries had a very similar level of GDP.Nowadays, thanks to China's exceptional growth performance, its economy is more than eight times bigger thanRussia's. Similarly, trade with Russia is not of major importance to China in terms of value. However, the high share ofraw materials (including food) in Russian exports and the transfer of Russian military technology are of strategicimportance to China in these relations. Since 2012, the relationship has evolved into an informal alliance in the face ofwhat both countries consider a rising threat from the West to their regimes. At present, China's response to Russia'sfull-scale invasion of Ukraine seems to be more favourable to Russia than it was in 2014 when Russia annexedCrimea. China has been critical of NATO's enlargement to central and eastern Europe, and less insistent about respectfor the territorial integrity of nations – something that it has traditionally upheld in light of the 'open Taiwan question'.On 30 March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in China to discuss thebilateral relationship. Experts posit that China is likely to support the kind of solution to the Ukraine war that would bethe least likely to challenge the power monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party.

Briefing EN

Transparency and targeting of political advertisingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-03-2022Autor ZANDERSONE Laura

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The proposal on political advertising aims to require online platforms to also provide information about the political

affiliation and on the funding of the ads. Binding EU harmonised rules on political advertising will help companies,especially the SMEs, to enter the internal market of cross-border advertising services, as well as promote transparencyof political ads.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive and update of the European Pollutant Release and TransferRegister (E-PRTR)

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 28-03-2022Autor KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen Industrial pollution is regulated by the EU directive on industrial emissions (IED). It lays down rules designed to

prevent, or, if impracticable, to reduce emissions into air, water and land and to prevent the generation of waste, inorder to achieve a high level of protection of the environment taken as a whole. The European Pollutant Release andTransfer Register (E-PRTR) ensures public access to data on emissions from major industrial activities. The ex-postevaluations of the directive and the regulation setting the register show they are generally performing well in practice.However, there are implementation issues, including inconsistences between the directive and the register. Thisbriefing presents findings of publicly available sources on the implementation of both pieces of EU law and thus aimsat informing their upcoming revision in the context of European Green Deal, in which Parliament will be a co-legislators.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 20

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 24-25 March 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-03-2022Autor DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Energía | Salud pública | Seguridad y defensa | Semestre EuropeoResumen Russia's war on Ukraine and the linked issue of energy security constituted the clear focus of the European Council

meeting held on 24 25 March 2022. The meeting included a joint session with the President of the United States ofAmerica, Joe Biden, and it formed part of a trilogy of summit meetings in Brussels (NATO, G7 and EU) demonstratingWestern unity in support of Ukraine and in response to President Vladimir Putin's unacceptable violation ofinternational law. The main outcomes of the meeting were: i) the creation of a new Ukraine Solidarity Trust Fund; ii) avoluntary EU joint purchasing scheme for gas, similar to that put in place for coronavirus vaccines; and iii) theendorsement of the new EU 'Strategic Compass'. However, no further steps were taken with regard to Ukraine's EUmembership application, no common EU approach was found to address increased energy prices and no furthersanctions were imposed on Russia at this stage, despite calls by some EU leaders for energy and/or transport bans. Ingeneral, the conclusions reiterated, or built further upon, the Versailles Declaration of 11 March. Important elementsincluded the need to further reduce the EU's strategic dependence in energy and other sensitive areas, notably criticalraw materials, semi-conductors, health, digital and food security. The meeting also saw Charles Michel re-elected asPresident of the European Council for a second term of 30 months.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with A. Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board - 31 March 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-03-2022Autor GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen This note is prepared in view of a regular public hearing with the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European

Central Bank (ECB), Andrea Enria, which will take place on 31 March 2022. The briefing addresses: 1) the ECB’srecent report on Disclosure of Climate risks, 2) the ECB’s presentation on banks’ exposures to Russia, 3) the waiver ofbank transfer costs to support people in the Ukraine, 4) the ECB’s presentation of Aggregated Results of theSupervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), 5) the situation reflected in the ECB’ Supervisory BankingStatistics for the third quarter 2021, 6) the ECB’s feedback to the EP’s Banking Union INI report, and 7) a summary ofexternal briefing papers on banking supervision in Croatia and Bulgaria.

Briefing EN

Inflation in the wake of coronavirus and war [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-03-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos exteriores | CoronavirusResumen Inflation has reached the highest level in decades in the European Union, United States and many other countries, with

the Ukraine conflict adding upward pressure on prices of energy and food. The Russian invasion has intensified thealready near-record growth of consumer prices resulting from the coronavirus pandemic and broken supply-chains.The war has sharply curbed supply of energy, wheat and other products from Russia and Ukraine, their majorproducers. The countries' exports look set to dwindle further if the war continues and the EU imposes a ban on itsmassive gas and oil imports from Russia, adding to the already strict sanctions on Moscow. Some central banks havesignalled that they will further increase interest rates, and 'stagflation', or high inflation coupled with economicstagnation, could follow. Before the invasion, many experts had expected rapid price growth to be temporary. Now,they believe inflation could become more entrenched, further squeezing households' real income in coming months.This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on resurgentinflation. Analyses on the war and its implications can be found in a previous edition of the 'What Think Tanks areThinking' series.

Briefing EN

Digital Services Act & Digital Markets Act - Collection of studies for the IMCO committeeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-03-2022Autor KAISER KEVIN PAUL | RATCLIFF Christina

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Protección de los consumidoresResumen This collection of studies presents expert studies and workshop proceedings related to relevant topics of the DSA and

the DMA, focusing on opportunities and challenges for the digital single market and consumer protection. The studiesresult from the ongoing interest of the IMCO committee in improving the functioning of the digital single market anddeveloping e-commerce rules based on scientific evidence and expertise.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 21

Strengthening Europol's mandateTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-03-2022Autor VORONOVA Sofija

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave Europol | funcionamiento institucional | informe | innovación | investigación y desarrollo | macrodatos | propuesta (UE) |

protección de datosResumen On 9 December 2020, along with its counter-terrorism agenda, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a

regulation to reinforce the mandate of Europol, the EU law enforcement cooperation agency. The proposed regulationaims principally at rendering Europol's cooperation with private parties more effective; responding to the agency's 'bigdata challenge', by providing a legal basis for processing large and complex datasets, including personal data of datasubjects not related to a crime; and reinforcing Europol's role in relation to research and innovation for lawenforcement. The legislative proposal, which would amend the existing Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794, isaccompanied by another legislative proposal to modify Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the Schengen informationsystem (SIS), to allow Europol to issue alerts in SIS under a new category. On 1 February 2022, the EuropeanParliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement on the proposal for a regulation, which now needs to beformally adopted by the co-legislators. Second edition of a Briefing originally drafted by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Review of the capital requirements frameworkTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-03-2022Autor KRAMER Esther

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA follows a clear intervention logic, with objectives and options deriving from the problems to tackle. It is

transparent about limitations and uses estimates with the appropriate caution. The range of options is predeterminedby the outstanding Basel III standards, which the IA prefers to implement with adjustments reflecting specificities of theEU banking sector and potential consequences of the Covid-19 crisis. The qualitative assessment is complemented byselective pertinent quantification. The IA’s focus is on economic impacts for banks, with limited consideration of socialor environmental effects and little differentiation of effects on banks’ customers. Macroeconomic impacts and effectson SMEs and on the competitiveness of EU banks are assessed only for the preferred options in an annex.

Briefing EN

Amending the rules governing the statute and funding of European political parties (recast)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-03-2022Autor ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen Ahead of the 2024 European elections, the European Commission has presented a proposal to amend Regulation

1141/2014 governing the statute and funding of European political parties (EUPPs) and foundations. The proposedamendments concern, inter alia, the funding provisions, transparency requirements and enforcement of the rules. Thisbriefing examines the quality of the supporting impact assessment (IA), which outlines the problems encountered inapplying the regulation, as identified in recent EU-level reports and through stakeholder input. The range of policyoptions presented in the IA to address the identified shortcomings is rather limited, although under each option, and foreach problem, several alternative measures are considered. Elements of the parallel initiative on political advertising -also part of the European democracy action plan - were integrated into the amending EUPP proposal; however, the IAremains vague on the link between these two initiatives.

Briefing EN

Charles Michel as President of the European CouncilTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-03-2022Autor DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político DemocraciaResumen Charles Michel's (first) term as European Council President comes to an end on 30 May 2022. In advance of his

potential re-election by EU Heads of State or Government to that function, this paper looks at his activities during thecourse of his 30-month mandate to date, with a special focus on the institutional and inter-institutional dimension of hisrole. In practice, the coronavirus pandemic has dictated the agenda of the European Council from almost the beginningof Mr Michel's time in office. The resulting need to concentrate on ‘crisis management’ provided him, as it had hispredecessors, with the opportunity to show leadership, applying a careful balance between the role of facilitator andthat of agenda-setter. Despite the challenging circumstances he has faced, Mr Michel has managed to make his markon the European Council's agenda, notably on external relations, championing the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’. Hedemonstrated strong activism both prior to and after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, playing an important role inEuropean Union mobilisation to support the country. He has also adjusted the European Council's working methods, inparticular with the use of video-conferences of small groups of EU leaders to better prepare full European Councilmeetings. Cooperation between the European Council President and the European Parliament has increased incomparison to previous years, particularly regarding activities not required of the President by the Treaties. Mr Michelhas also innovated in communications, notably through a newsletter aimed at EU citizens.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 22

Construction products Regulation: Revision of Regulation (EU) No 305/2011Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-03-2022Autor TENHUNEN Susanna

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduaneraResumen Designed to improve the free movement of construction products in the EU internal market, the Construction Products

Regulation (CPR) lays down harmonised conditions for the marketing of those products, provides a framework for acommon technical language to assess their performance and sets out provisions on the use of CE marking. TheCommission is planning to issue a proposal for a revision of the CPR by the end of March. The revision is expected toaddress the regulation's suboptimal performance and implementation difficulties revealed in the implementation andevaluation reports. The sustainability goals set in the Green Deal and circular economy action plan give further causeto revise the CPR. The construction sector has high potential for circularity and could therefore play an important rolein the transition towards a resource efficient economy built on a regenerative growth model. In a recent resolution onthe revision of the CPR, the European Parliament welcomed the goals of the circular economy action plan and calledfor an ambitious revision of the CPR. The recommendations made by the European Parliament have some points incommon with those of other EU institutions and stakeholders, such as those underscoring the importance of afunctioning harmonisation system and a comprehensive common technical language, the need for sustainability criteriafor construction products and enhanced clarity of CE marking, and the need for more effective market surveillance.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-03-2022Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Energía | Salud pública | Seguridad y defensa | Semestre EuropeoResumen On 24-25 March 2022, EU Heads of State or Government will meet for the third time in five weeks. In the presence of

the United States President, Joe Biden, they will discuss developments in and support for Ukraine, in the context of theunprovoked Russian invasion of the country. Building on their Versailles Declaration of 10-11 March, EU leaders willtake further steps aimed at strengthening European sovereignty in the field of security, defence and energy security.As regards security and defence, the European Council will endorse the EU Strategic Compass, call for itsimplementation, and give further guidelines for the deepening of European defence cooperation. With respect toenergy, EU leaders will consider means to counter the current spike in energy prices, consider gas storage capacitiesand planning in view of the next winter and resume discussions on phasing out EU dependence on Russian fossilfuels. Furthermore, the European Council will take stock of coordination efforts in response to the Covid-19 pandemic,appraise the European Semester, and review initiatives designed to build a more robust economic base and reducethe EU's strategic dependence in the most sensitive areas. Under external relations, items on the agenda will includethe preparation of the forthcoming EU-China Summit and the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EuropeanCouncil will be followed by a Euro Summit meeting on 25 March.

Briefing EN

Temporary Protection DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-03-2022Autor LUYTEN KATRIEN

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, over 3.4 million people have already been forced to seek

refuge, mostly in neighbouring countries. The European Commission estimates that Russia aggression may havedisplaced up to 6.5 million people. In response, the European Union swiftly decided to grant EU-wide temporaryprotection to people arriving from Ukraine. The EU Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) enables EUMember States to move rapidly to offer protection and rights to people in need of immediate protection and to avoidoverwhelming national asylum systems in cases of mass arrivals of displaced persons. Although invoked several timesin the past, the directive has never been activated before. Russia's military aggression prompted a unanimous decisionin the Council to grant temporary protection (for an initial period of one year) to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. Thistemporary protection may be extended automatically by two six-monthly periods, for a maximum of another year. TheEU's decision to grant temporary protection has been widely welcomed and the directive is considered the mostappropriate instrument under the current exceptional circumstances. There are, however, still many open questions asto its practical implementation in the EU Member States. The scale of the arrivals entails many immediate as well aslonger-term challenges. On the other hand, and in spite of accusations of double standards in favour of 'white' or ethnicEuropean refugees, the demonstrations of EU-wide solidarity with the Ukrainian people raise hopes for concreteprogress on overall reform of the EU's migration and asylum rules. At the time of writing, the conflict has alreadycaused civilian casualties and the destruction of hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, creating ahumanitarian catastrophe both within Ukraine and beyond its borders.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Temporary protection directive

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 23

Access to justice in environmental matters: Amending the Aarhus RegulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-03-2022Autor HALLEUX Vivienne

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave acceso a la información | acceso a la justicia | comunicación de datos | convención internacional | Derecho del medio

ambiente | política de medio ambiente de la UE | propuesta (UE) | reglamento (UE) | transparencia del procesodecisorio | vigilancia del medio ambiente

Resumen The European Union is party to the Aarhus Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. The Aarhus Regulation applies the Convention's provisions toEU institutions and bodies. In 2017, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, reviewing implementation by theparties, found that the EU fails to comply with its obligations under Article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the conventionconcerning access to justice by members of the public. To address this non-compliance issue, on 14 October 2020 theEuropean Commission put forward a legislative proposal to amend the Aarhus Regulation. The Council and Parliamentadopted their positions on 17 December 2020 and 20 May 2021, respectively. Interinstitutional negotiations, launchedon 4 June 2021, concluded on 12 July with a provisional agreement. Parliament approved the agreed text on 5October 2021. The regulation was published in the Official Journal on 8 October 2021, and entered into force on 28October 2021. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

ReFuelEU Aviation initiative: Sustainable aviation fuels and the fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-03-2022Autor SOONE Jaan

Ámbito político TransporteResumen On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of proposals to make the EU's climate, energy, land

use, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, comparedwith 1990 levels – the fit for 55 package. The package includes a proposal to ensure a level playing field forsustainable air transport, also known as the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative. In the draft regulation, the Commissionproposes obligations on fuel suppliers to distribute sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), with an increasing share of SAF(including synthetic aviation fuels, commonly known as e-fuels) over time, in order to increase the uptake of SAF byairlines and thereby reduce emissions from aviation. The proposal also includes obligations on airlines to limit theuptake of jet fuel before departing from EU airports to what is needed for safe operation of flights, with the aim ofensuring a level playing field for airlines and airports, and avoiding additional emissions related to extra weight ofaircraft carrying excessive amounts of fuel. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee onTransport and Tourism as lead committee. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and theCommittee on Industry, Research and Energy are associated under Rule 57. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Latest analyses of Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-03-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen Russia’s armed forces have increased their bombardment and shelling of Ukrainian cities, stepping up the war

launched on 24 February. However, new talks between Moscow and Kiev about a future status for Ukraine outsideNATO have raised hopes about a possible breakthrough in the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has renewed calls on NATO to establish a ‘no-fly zone’ over Ukraine.Instead, the West has imposed tough sanctions against Russia, and many companies are withdrawing from thecountry, pushing it towards a default, emptying its shops and sending the rouble into freefall. Russian PresidentVladimir Putin said on 16 March that Russia was ready to discuss Ukraine's neutrality, but added that Moscow wouldstill achieve the goals of its military operation. Ukraine says it is willing to negotiate to end the war but will not surrenderor accept Russian ultimatums. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from manyinternational think tanks on Russia’s war on Ukraine, its implications for the two countries, for the European Union andfor the whole world. Earlier analyses of the implications of the war can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What ThinkTanks are Thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 24

Revision of the EU's Waste Shipment RegulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-03-2022Autor HALLEUX Vivienne

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen On 17 November 2021, the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise EU rules governing shipments of waste.

The proposed regulation aims at easing shipments of waste for reuse and recycling in the EU, to support the transitionto a circular economy; ensuring that waste exported from the EU is managed in an environmentally sound manner inthe destination countries; and stepping up enforcement to counteract illegal shipments of waste. While supporting theproposed streamlining and digitalisation of procedures, stakeholders have stressed the need for significantimprovements to ensure that the new regulation fulfils its objectives, in particular as regards exports of waste. Theproposal is now in the hands of the co-legislators. In the European Parliament, the Committee on the Environment,Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), responsible for the file, plans to consider its rapporteur's draft report in May2022. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Revision of the EU's Waste Shipment Regulation

EU Taxonomy: Complementary delegated act covering nuclear and gasTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-03-2022Autor CHAILLET GAELLE CHARLOTTE | DIAS FERNANDES LUCIE | HONNEFELDER Stephanie

Ámbito político Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Medio ambienteResumen This briefing has been prepared to support the parliamentary scrutiny of the delegated act (DA) amending Delegated

Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 (‘Climate delegated act’) as regards economic activities in certain energy sectors andDelegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 (‘Disclosure delegated act’) as regards specific public disclosures for thoseeconomic activities. In accordance with the empowerments set out in Articles 10(3) and 11(3) of the TaxonomyRegulation , the Commission shall adopt a DA to establish technical screening criteria (TSC) determining theconditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to climate change adaptation ormitigation. In addition, the Commission is empowered to adopt a DA on disclosure obligations under Article 8(4).

Briefing EN

Deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure: Fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-03-2022Autor SOONE Jaan

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave carburante | combustible | infraestructura de transportes | neutralidad en carbono | propuesta (UE) | recurso energético

| red transeuropea | vehículo eléctricoResumen On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of proposals to equip the EU's climate, energy, land

use, transport and taxation policies to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, compared with1990 levels – the 'fit for 55' package. The package includes a proposal to revise the 2014 directive on alternative fuelsinfrastructure and turn it into a regulation. In the draft regulation, the Commission proposes binding targets for electricvehicle charging points and hydrogen refuelling points, electric charging for stationary aircraft at airports and on-shorepower supply for ships at ports. It also contains provisions for EU Member States to ensure coverage of refuellingpoints for liquefied natural gas (LNG) dedicated to heavy-duty vehicles, and LNG refuelling points in maritime ports. Inthe European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Transport and Tourism. Second edition. The'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 25

EU international procurement instrumentTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-03-2022Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalPalabra clave acuerdo comercial (UE) | Acuerdo sobre Contratación Pública | adjudicación de contrato administrativo | contratación

pública | mercado internacional | OCDE | Organización Mundial del Comercio | país tercero | presentación de ofertas |propuesta (UE)

Resumen Government procurement forms an important part of national economies. The EU has opened up its publicprocurement markets to third countries to a large degree, while many other economies have had limited appetite toliberalise market access. In 2012, the European Commission tabled a proposal for an international procurementinstrument (IPI). The IPI would give the EU leverage in negotiating the reciprocal opening of public procurementmarkets in third countries. The Commission revised the proposal in 2016, taking on board some recommendationsfrom the Council and the European Parliament. However, the revised proposal did not advance owing to differences inMember States' positions. In 2019, discussions in the Council gathered new momentum in the context of a growingrecognition of the need to level the playing field in international trade. In June 2021, the Council adopted a negotiatingmandate that added the threat of market exclusion to the price adjustment mechanism. The Parliament adopted itsposition on the revised IPI proposal in December 2021, modifying its design, scope and application. The triloguesconcluded successfully on 14 March 2022. Third edition of a briefing, the previous editions of which were drafted byJana Titievskaia. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Amending the European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs) RegulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-03-2022Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen European long-term investment funds (ELTIFs) invest on a long-term basis in infrastructure projects, real estate and

SMEs, among others. While the legislative framework – the ELTIF Regulation – for these funds was adopted six yearsago, their market remains small. For this reason, the Commission has proposed amending the ELTIF Regulation tomake it more appealing to investors. The key mulled changes involve differentiating between ELTIFs marketed toprofessional investors and those to which retail investors can have access; removing barriers to retail investor accessto ELTIFs; and establishing an optional liquidity window mechanism for redemptions, for cases where investors needto exit early. The file is currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, it has beenassigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The draft report is expected soon. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Distortive foreign subsidies regulation: A level playing-field for the single marketTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-03-2022Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacionalPalabra clave ayuda a las empresas | capital extranjero | contratación pública | informe | inversión extranjera | mercado único | país

tercero | política de competencia de la UE | propuesta (UE) | restricción de la competencia | vigilancia del mercadoResumen Public financing of enterprises, which has been on the rise globally, can have a distortive effect on competitive

markets. In response to this trend, in May 2021 the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation totackle foreign subsidies with a distortive effect on the EU single market. Under the proposal, the Commission wouldinvestigate subsidies granted by non-EU public authorities to companies operating on the single market and applycountervailing measures, should these subsidies be found to be distortive. It would use three tools: two are notification-based, allowing it to investigate foreign subsidies in companies' mergers and acquisitions, and to investigate the bids inlarge public procurement procedures involving third-country government support. The acquirer or bidder would have togive ex-ante notification of external financial contribution. The third would enable the Commission to investigate othermarket situations. The rapporteur published his draft report in December 2021, and members of the INTA committeetabled amendments to that in February 2022. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated atkey stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 26

Revision of Regulation (EC) 1005/2009 on substances depleting the ozone layerTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-03-2022Autor KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen The depletion of the ozone layer affects negatively both humans and the natural environment. It is provoked by

chemicals known as 'ozone depleting substances' (ODSs), which are also potent greenhouse gases. They have beensubject to legal regulation at international level for several decades (the Vienna Convention and its Montreal Protocol,adopted in the second half of the 1980s under UN auspices). EU has always spearheaded global efforts in the field ofODSs, adopting its first rules in the early 1980s and later addressing them specifically through Regulation (EC)1005/2009. The ex-post evaluation of the implementation of the regulation published at the end of 2019 shows thatoverall performance matches expectations and that the regulation is thus fit for purpose, despite some aspects in needof improvement. A Commission proposal for revision of the regulation is expected in the spring of 2022. Thisimplementation appraisal presents findings on the implementation of the regulation.

Briefing EN

Understanding COVAX: The EU's role in vaccinating the world against Covid-19Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-03-2022Autor PICHON Eric

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitaria | Salud públicaResumen In the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, 'nobody is safe until everybody is safe'. On this basis, the EU, along with the

World Health Organization (WHO) and other public and private partners, set up a global initiative to facilitate thedevelopment, production and global distribution of Covid-19 vaccines. COVAX was initially designed to pool funds andvaccine doses in order to ensure an equitable distribution between all participating economies until all of them –higher- and lower-income alike – reached a threshold of 20 % of their populations vaccinated. The COVAX mechanismdoes not, however, prevent high-income economies from striking bilateral agreements with vaccine manufacturers orselected beneficiary countries. In this context, self-financing economies have secured several times more vaccinedoses than their populations need, widening the vaccine supply gap for poorer economies. The EU and participatingMember States have contributed nearly a third of COVAX funding, however, as is the case for most donors, theirvaccine donations have fallen short of the levels needed. The new rise in cases shows that 'vaccine nationalism' is nota viable policy. The European Parliament has welcomed the EU's participation in COVAX and expects the Commissionto publish an assessment of this participation. To achieve the objective of immunising 70 % of the world population bymid-2022, the WHO has called on the EU, other donors and manufacturers to deliver on their pledges. In parallel, theplan is to develop vaccine manufacturing capacities in lower income economies, and devise a fair solution for sharingCovid-19-related knowledge and patents.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the informal European Council in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-03-2022Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Energía | Seguridad y defensaResumen At the informal European Council of 10-11 March 2022, EU leaders adopted the Versailles declaration condemning the

‘unprovoked and unjustified’ Russian military aggression against Ukraine. They set strategic guidelines for security anddefence, energy and economic and financial affairs.

Briefing EN

Revision of the trans-European transport network guidelinesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-03-2022Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político Desarrollo regional | TransporteResumen To support its economy, provide mobility for people and goods and ensure connectivity of all regions while also limiting

negative impacts on climate and environment, the EU has been building a multimodal transport network across itsterritory: the trans-European transport network (TEN T). The TEN T policy is based on 2013 Union guidelines thatdefined the technical requirements for the planned transport infrastructure and the network layout. Networkconstruction is also supported through EU funding, including the dedicated Connecting Europe Facility programme.Having evaluated the progress in TEN T implementation, the European Commission put forward revised TEN Tguidelines in December 2021, to ensure sustainable connectivity through a reliable and high-quality infrastructurenetwork, aligned with the objectives of the European Green Deal. As co-legislators, the European Parliament and theCouncil will have to agree on the final form of the proposed regulation. In the Parliament, the Committee on Transportand Tourism will lead the file. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 27

Reforming the European Union: How the European Parliament is responding to citizens' expectationsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-03-2022Autor DIAZ CREGO Maria | KOTANIDIS Silvia

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen The Conference on the Future of Europe was designed to give the general public a say about their vision for the EU,

by means of a multilingual digital platform and citizens' panels. The panels are transnational forums, gathering citizensfrom the EU Member States to discuss their vision for the future of the Union and make recommendations on how theEU could be improved. The resulting proposals are diverse but constructive. They include interesting, sometimesambitious, suggestions for the future and in many respects are geared towards building a more efficient, integratedUnion that is closer to its citizens. This briefing focuses on the recommendations made by Panel 2 (Europeandemocracy / values, rights, rule of law and security), and recommendations uploaded onto the multilingual digitalplatform (under European democracy). The latter are predominantly constitutional and institutional in nature andtherefore tackle broader issues, such as reform of the EU institutional set-up, improvements to the EU decision-makingprocess, closer cooperation among Member States and a stronger European Parliament. In many respects, theoverview given in this briefing shows how Parliament has been very active in making proposals and endorsingchanges in almost all the fields where citizens have expressed the need for the EU to take action. While the citizens'panels have been an interesting and innovative exercise in participatory democracy, the outcome of the conferencehas still to take shape, and will be captured in a final report to be issued when its work ends in spring 2022. This is thefirst in a series of briefings that will look at citizens' expectations and recommendations in the context of theConference on the Future of Europe, and the European Parliament's response.

Briefing EN

Denmark's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-03-2022Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen In absolute figures, the Danish National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is the sixth smallest national plan (or

third smallest as a share of gross domestic product, GDP) under the unprecedented EU response to the crisistriggered by the coronavirus pandemic. To date, Denmark has decided not to request any loan, and its Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF) allocation therefore consists solely of a non-repayable grant (see figure below). Denmark isset to receive the maximum allocation of €1 551.4 million from the RRF, which corresponds to 0.2 % of the entire RRFand to 0.5 % of Denmark’s 2019 GDP. The country’s NRRP amounts to €1 615 million, which means that Denmark willadd €63.6 million in national funding towards the total resources of the plan. According to Article 18 of the RRFRegulation, measures under the NRRPs are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council’s approval of the plan,Denmark received €201 million in pre-financing in September 2021. Subsequent payments, to be distributed over sixinstalments, will depend on achieving milestones and targets identified in relation to RRF implementation. The Danishplan is centred around reforms and investments early in the period, and the last instalment is planned for June 2026.The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EU recovery instrument,participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation and scrutinises the work ofthe European Commission.

Briefing DA, EN

Legal issues surrounding compulsory Covid-19 vaccinationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-03-2022Autor DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA | DIAZ CREGO Maria | DUMBRAVA Costica | KOTANIDIS Silvia |

MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-MargaritaÁmbito político Coronavirus | Derechos humanos | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia

Resumen The authorisation of the first Covid-19 vaccines by the European Commission in December 2020 dovetailed with EUMember States' efforts to roll out mass vaccination campaigns to halt the spread of the coronavirus. Amid risingnumbers of Covid-19 cases and fears surrounding what might be the impact of the Omicron variant, those efforts wererenewed at the end of 2021, including the roll-out of booster doses and vaccines for children. However, despiteprogress in some Member States, as of March 2022, only 72 % of the EU population is fully vaccinated (primarycourse). Low vaccination rates have sparked debates around how to increase vaccine uptake. On 1 December 2021,European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said it was time for the EU to 'think about mandatoryvaccination'. Two weeks later, the European Council reiterated the 'vital importance of vaccination in the fight againstthe pandemic', suggesting the need to step up vaccination campaigns and address vaccine hesitancy. Although thereis no common approach to mandatory vaccination against Covid-19 at EU level, some Member States are trying toincrease vaccine uptake among their populations by making vaccination compulsory. For the time being, only threeMember States are imposing a vaccination mandate on all adults (Austria) or on specific age groups (Greece andItaly), although Austria has just decided to postpone the application of the obligation. Other Member States requirecertain categories of workers, e.g. in healthcare or public services, to get vaccinated so as to be able to continueexercising their professional activities (Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia and Hungary), or allow employers toimpose such a mandate on their employees (Estonia and, until 6 March 2022, Hungary). Finally, in some otherMember States, access to certain public spaces is only possible for those fully vaccinated or having recovered fromCovid-19 (Germany, France, Italy and Latvia). This briefing looks at the experiences of selected Member Statesimposing compulsory vaccination for Covid-19 and analyses the EU legal framework applicable to those national rules.It has been written with the contribution of the Directorate for Legislative Acts within the Directorate-General for thePresidency.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 28

Czechia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-03-2022Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen To benefit from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by

the coronavirus pandemic, Czechia has decided to use the grant component of its national allocation, withoutrequesting loans. The targeted resources total €7 036 million and represent 1 % of the entire RRF. They amount to 3.1% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). To receivethis support, Czechia has prepared a National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), a broad programme of reformsand investments that seeks to underpin the recovery of the Czech economy, while advancing the green and digitaltransition and addressing a number of existing structural weaknesses. In addition to the EU support, Czechia hasincluded in its plan a subset of reforms and investments equal to €449 million, which, while integrated into the structureof the plan, are not included in the RRF financing and will be financed from national resources. Measures under theplan are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council’s approval, Czechia has received €915 million in pre-financing, equivalent to 13 % of its total financial allocation. The next payments, divided into nine six-monthlyinstalments, will depend on progress in implementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a strongadvocate for a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on itsimplementation and scrutinises the work of the European Commission.

Briefing CS, EN

Malta's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-03-2022Autor LILYANOVA Velina

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen Malta's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) has a total value of €344.9 million. However, under the EU's

Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which is at the core of the EU's innovative Next Generation EU instrument,Malta is expected to receive around €316.4 million, slightly below the value of the plan, and entirely in grants. Maltahas not requested any loans so far. Under the RRF Regulation, the option to request loan support of up to 6.8 % of2019 gross national income is available until 31 August 2023. Whereas in nominal terms, Malta has the secondsmallest allocation after Luxembourg, in terms of RRF grants per capita, it ranks higher: the value of Malta's grantsunder the RRF equals approximately 2.3 % of its 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), less than the average for theEU overall (in comparison, the RRF equals 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). In December 2021, Malta received €41.1million in pre-financing. The Maltese plan takes into consideration the Council's 2019 and 2020 country-specificrecommendations, and aligns with both national economic and investment plans and funding under EU cohesion policyprogrammes for the 2021-2027 period. The overall objective is to contribute to a sustainable, equitable, green anddigital recovery. In particular, the plan aims to digitalise small and medium-sized enterprises and the publicadministration, promote sustainable public transport and electric vehicles, and step-up the fight against moneylaundering. It embraces the green and digital transitions – major common European challenges – and envisages 53.8% of the total allocation for climate objectives, while 25.5 % will contribute to the digital target. The share of theallocation dedicated to the green transition makes Malta's NRRP one of the greenest. The European Parliamentparticipates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF, andscrutinises the work of the European Commission.

Briefing EN, MT

Fit for 55 package: Reducing methane emissions in the energy sectorTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-03-2022Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Energía | Medio ambienteResumen On 15 December 2021, the Commission presented a proposal to regulate methane emissions reductions in the energy

sector. The proposal is part of the second batch of proposals in the 'fit for 55' package, aiming to align EU climate andenergy laws with the EU Climate Law's 2030 target. The proposal aims to address gaps in current legislation: thoserelating to methane emissions from upstream exploration and the production of oil and fossil gas, but also those fromthe gathering and processing of fossil gas, the transmission, distribution and underground storage of gas, and liquidgas terminals operating with fossil and/or renewable methane. The proposal furthermore introduces provisions onmethane emissions from coal mines and those originating from outside the EU in relation to importer informationrequirements, the methane transparency database and the methane-emitters monitoring tool. Similarly, it sets outrequirements for methane emissions reduction, monitoring and reporting, leak detection and repair, and limits toventing and flaring. In Parliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health andFood Safety (ENVI), with the rapporteur still to be appointed. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 29

Parlamento Europeo: datos y cifrasTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-03-2022Autor SABBATI Giulio

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen Esta nota informativa, publicada por el Servicio de Estudios del Parlamento Europeo, tiene por objeto presentar datos

y cifras clave sobre el Parlamento Europeo, tanto de la legislatura actual (julio de 2019-junio de 2024), como de lasocho anteriores, desde que en junio de 1979 se introdujeran las elecciones directas. En las siguientes páginasencontrará gráficos de varios tipos que: • ilustran la composición del Parlamento Europeo en la actualidad y en elpasado; • plasman el aumento del número de partidos con representación en el PE y la evolución de los grupospolíticos; • reflejan la edad de los diputados y el incremento del número de mujeres que ocupan un escaño en el PE; •explican los sistemas electorales utilizados en las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo en los Estados miembros; •hacen un seguimiento de la evolución de la participación en las elecciones europeas y las diferencias entre Estadosmiembros; • resumen la actividad del PE durante la legislatura actual y las precedentes; • sintetizan la composición delas comisiones, delegaciones y órganos rectores del PE; • explican la función legislativa del PE y su interacción con laComisión Europea. La nota informativa se actualiza periódicamente durante la legislatura 2019-2024 para reflejar losdatos más recientes.

Briefing BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV

Recast EU Regulation on Gas and Hydrogen NetworksTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-03-2022Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político EnergíaResumen On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas

Regulation, as part of the hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU's growing climateambitions, outlined in the European Green Deal and its 'Fit for 55' package. The Commission's legislative proposalaims to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases andhydrogen across the EU, and facilitating their integration in existing or new gas networks. It would create an EUlegislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity. Itwould also oblige existing natural gas infrastructure to integrate a higher share of hydrogen and renewable gases, bymeans of high tariff discounts; provisions to facilitate blending of hydrogen with natural gas and renewable gases; andgreater EU cooperation on gas quality and storage. The Commission's legislative proposal likewise includes a targetedrevision of the 2017 Security of Gas Supply Regulation. This aims to foster greater regional cooperation on gasstorage, facilitate the (voluntary) joint procurement of strategic stocks, and encourages Member States to takemeasures to address the growing risk of cyber-attacks on EU energy networks. First edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

EU directive on gas and hydrogen networksTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-03-2022Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político EnergíaResumen On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to recast the 2009 EU Gas Directive,

as part of the proposed hydrogen and decarbonised gas markets package. This reflects the EU's growing climateambitions, set out in the European Green Deal and its 'Fit for 55' package. The Commission's proposal aims to supportthe decarbonisation of the energy sector by ramping up the production of renewable gases and hydrogen, andfacilitating their integration in EU energy networks. The recast directive would become a core component of a new EUlegislative framework for hydrogen networks, comparable to those that already exist for natural gas and electricity. TheCommission's proposal would refine the principles of the existing Gas Directive and fully extend their scope to coverhydrogen networks. This includes an important set of consumer rights, provisions relating to transmission anddistribution system operators (including their unbundling), third-party access and integrated network planning, andindependent regulatory authorities. In the Parliament, the file was attributed to the Committee on Industry, Researchand Energy (ITRE), which appointed Jens Geier (S&D, Germany) as rapporteur on 7 February 2022. First edition. The'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

EU economic and financial developments: Weekly Picks - 11 March 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-03-2022Autor HAGELSTAM Kajus | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA | TURCU OVIDIU IONUT | ZORPIDIS

ANDREAS | ZSITNAK ALEXANDRAÁmbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios

Resumen This paper provides a summary of recent analyses of the economic, financial and budgetary developments in the EUand the Euro, notably following the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the outbreak of the war. It also highlights relatedpolicy recommendations made in the public domain to mitigate any adverse effects and support sustainable recovery.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 30

Role and election of the President of the European Council: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-03-2022Autor DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Democracia | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen The first term of Charles Michel, the incumbent European Council President comes to an end on 31 May 2022. Based

on previous examples, the (re-)election of the European Council President for the period July 2022 to November 2024is expected to be taken at the last formal European Council meeting before the end of the current mandate. Thisbriefing provides answers to some of the most Frequently Asked Questions regarding the office of European CouncilPresident, notably the role of the position and the election process. It also provides concrete examples from themandates of the three different office holders to date.

Briefing EN

Italy's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-03-2022Autor D'ALFONSO Alessandro

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | PresupuestoResumen In absolute figures, Italy’s Recovery and Resilience Plan is the largest national plan under the unprecedented EU

response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. Italy has decided to use its entire national allocationunder the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), including its loan component. Totalling €191.5 billion, theseresources represent 26.5 % of the entire RRF, equal to 10.7 % of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019(the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). In addition, Italy has earmarked national resources worth €30.6 billion tofurther strengthen a vast programme of reforms and investments that aims to promote the recovery of the Italianeconomy, while addressing a number of structural weaknesses as well as pursuing major objectives such as the greentransition and the digital transformation. Measures under the plan are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council’sapproval of the plan, Italy received €24.9 billion pre-financing in August 2021. Further payments, in 10 instalmentseach for grants and loans, will depend on progress in implementing the plan. In December 2021, Italy submitted a firstpayment request worth €21 billion in grant and loan instalments. On 28 February 2022, the European Commissionendorsed a positive preliminary assessment of this request. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate forthe creation of a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussionon its implementation and scrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series coveringall EU Member States. Third edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycleof the plans.

Briefing EN, IT

France's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-03-2022Autor RAGONNAUD Guillaume

Ámbito político Coronavirus | PresupuestoResumen France's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is a subpart of 'France Relance', a larger recovery strategy

adopted by France at national level, worth €100 billion in total (4.1 % of France's gross domestic product (GDP) in2019). The implementation of France's NRRP will be supported by €39.4 billion in grants under the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF). France has decided to use its entire national allocation for grants and not to request loans.The resources allocated to France represent 5.4 % of the entire RRF resources for the EU, and 1.6 % of the country'sGDP in 2019 (the RRF representing 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). Measures under the plan are to be completed by2026. Following the Council's approval of its RRP in July 2021, France received €5.1 billion in pre-financing in August2021 (13 % of France's financial allocation). The next payments, in five yearly instalments, will depend on progress inimplementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.Second edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN, FR

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 31

Proposed anti-coercion instrumentTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-03-2022Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalResumen It is widely held that geopolitical tensions in the world are on the rise. One of the clear indicators of this phenomenon is

the increasing use of economic tools for the pursuit of strategic and geopolitical aims. This can take the form ofcoercion exerted by one country on another through trade or investment restrictions to interfere with their sovereignchoices. In response to the EU and its Member States becoming the target of deliberate economic coercion in recentyears, on 8 December 2021 the Commission published a proposal for the adoption of an anti-coercion instrument (ACI)that would allow the EU to better respond to such challenges on a global scale. While the new framework is primarilydesigned to deter economic coercive action through dialogue and engagement, it also allows – as a last resort – toretaliate with countermeasures comprising a wide range of trade, investment and funding restrictions. While there isbroad support for creating a legislative tool to address the growing problem of economic coercion, opinions are dividedas regards the severity of countermeasures and the manner of establishing when they should kick in. Within theEuropean Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on International Trade (INTA). A draft report isexpected to be published in April. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

EU strategic autonomy in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-03-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Seguridad y defensaResumen Many politicians and analysts have been arguing in recent years that, being highly vulnerable to external shocks, the

European Union should boost its ‘strategic autonomy’ and/or develop a higher degree of ‘European sovereignty’.These concepts encompass a greater potential for independence, self-reliance and resilience in a wide range of fields– such as defence, security and trade, as well as in industrial, digital, economic, migration and health policies. Russia’smilitary offensive in Ukraine gives this issue great urgency. In energy, the European Commission has now publishedplans to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds this year and end its reliance on Russian supplies of the fuelwell before 2030. And the debate is moving on to ideas and projects involving significantly more integration, solidarityand stronger joint security and defence. The EU’s strategic compass, a medium-term defence and security strategy, isbeing quickly updated to take into account the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II. This note offerslinks to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the European issues related toEuropean strategic autonomy and sovereignty.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board - 14 March 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-03-2022Autor GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA | SLOCOCK OLIVER

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosResumen This note is prepared in view of an ordinary public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Elke

König, which will take place on 14 March 2022. This briefing (1) addresses mainly the situation of Sberbank Europethat has been declared failing-or-likely-to-fail, giving background information (i) on the bank, (ii) the process, (iii) theactions taken, (iv) the public interest assessments made, and (v) the implications for deposit guarantee schemes. Inview of the current situation, this briefing (2) also summarises some information on the European banks’ exposures toRussia and Ukraine, as well as (3) some information on Russian banks operating in Europe.

Briefing EN

'Foreign agents' and 'undesirables': Russian civil society in danger of extinction?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-03-2022Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen After a period of relative freedom in the 1990s allowed the emergence of civic activism in Russia, repression has now

come full circle. Under Vladimir Putin's power vertical, space for independent voices has narrowed. Like the politicalopposition and the media, civil society is now increasingly subordinate to the state. Repressive legislation hasgradually circumscribed the activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As part of a more general drive toexclude external influences after a wave of post-election protests in 2011, in 2012 Russia adopted a Foreign AgentLaw, whose scope since then has been progressively expanded to include media and individual activists as well asNGOs. A second Undesirable Organisations Law from 2015 excludes numerous international NGOs from the country.While the Foreign Agent Law does not actually ban Russian NGOs from receiving foreign support, it makes it muchharder for them to operate and has forced many to close down. The number of organisations concerned is relativelysmall, but it includes many of the country's most prominent activists. Vaguely worded legislation puts large swathes ofcivil society at risk of falling foul of the law, a significant deterrent to activism. Repressive legislation has created adivide between officially tolerated 'social' NGOs, whose activities and values are more closely aligned with theKremlin's agenda, and 'political' NGOs. Conditions for the latter have become increasingly hostile, leaving little roomfor political activism.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 32

Implementation of macro-regional strategiesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-03-2022Autor VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | cooperación regional | Estado miembro UE | financiación de la UE | geografía regional |

Instrumento Europeo de Vecindad y Asociación | Mar Báltico | Mar Jónico | política regional de la UE | TransdanubioCentral

Resumen While each macro-regional strategy is unique in terms of the countries it brings together and the scope of its policies,they all share a common aim: to ensure a coordinated approach to issues that are best tackled together. Building onthe success of the pioneering 2009 European Union strategy for the Baltic Sea region, this form of cooperation hassince become firmly embedded in the EU's institutional framework, with four strategies now in place, covering 19Member States and 10 non-EU countries. Every two years, the European Commission publishes a report to assess theimplementation of the macro-regional strategies, most recently in 2020. With the views of stakeholders and otherplayers helping to complete the picture, it is possible to identify a number of challenges common to all macro-regionalstrategies in areas such as governance, funding, political commitment and the need to be more results oriented. Thishas helped focus discussions on the future role of macro-regional strategies within the post-2020 cohesion policyframework. Introducing a number of measures to strengthen macro-regional cooperation and increase alignmentbetween funding and macro-regional strategy priorities, the post-2020 cohesion policy architecture has the potential toestablish closer links between Interreg programmes and macro-regional strategies and to facilitate the embeddingprocess, whose importance has been brought into even sharper focus in view of the reduction in the Interreg budgetfor 2021 2027. Yet with countries currently focusing much of their attention on their recovery and resilience plans andthe conflict in Ukraine, many Member States have still not presented their cohesion investment plans to the EuropeanCommission, raising fears that valuable cohesion funding could be lost as a result, which could have seriousconsequences for the future implementation of macro-regional cooperation. Organised from 7 to 11 March 2022, andproviding an opportunity for macro-regional strategy stakeholders from across the EU to engage with EU institutionsand raise awareness of macro-regional cooperation, the EU's third macro-regional week could arguably not have comeat a better time. This is a further update to a 2017 briefing, the previous edition of which dates from February 2020.

Briefing EN

Revision of the eIDAS Regulation: Findings on its implementation and applicationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-03-2022Autor TENHUNEN Susanna

Ámbito político Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la prácticaResumen The European Commission’s proposal (June 2021) for a European Digital Identity Framework would provide a trusted

and secure way to authenticate and share qualified data attributes online through a ‘digital wallet’ ensured by MemberStates and allowing transactions across the EU. If put into effect, it would aim to achieve the target set in Europe’s‘Path to the Digital Decade’, which envisages 80 % of EU citizens using digital ID by 2030. It would also execute theEuropean Council’s vision and explicit request for EU-wide secure public electronic identification (eID), which wouldinclude interoperable digital signatures and give EU citizens control over their online identity and related data. TheCommission proposal amends and updates the existing eIDAS Regulation by responding to the challenges raised byits structural shortcomings and limited implementation and to technological developments since its adoption in 2014.The findings of the ex-post evaluation of the eIDAS Regulation shed light on the various limitations preventing thecurrent act from reaching its full potential, while the ex-ante impact assessment of the amending proposal examinesthe different options, their estimated impact, and the reasoning behind the preferred option. Together, they establishthe context for the eIDAS revision, the pitfalls that need to be overcome, and targets. EU institutions have largelywelcomed the Commission proposal in terms of its objectives and concept. However, concerns remain, notably when itcomes to finding the right scope for the act, defining the roles and liabilities of various public and private sector actors,ensuring high data protection, and building an inclusive system that leaves no one behind.

Briefing EN

New EU regulatory framework for batteries: Setting sustainability requirementsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-03-2022Autor HALLEUX Vivienne

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Medio ambiente | Mercado interior y unión aduaneraResumen Given the important role they play in the roll-out of zero-emission mobility and the storage of intermittent renewable

energy, batteries are a crucial element in the EU's transition to a climate neutral economy. The proposal presented bythe European Commission is designed to modernise the EU's regulatory framework for batteries in order to secure thesustainability and competitiveness of battery value chains. It would introduce mandatory requirements on sustainability(such as carbon footprint rules, minimum recycled content, performance and durability criteria), safety and labelling forthe marketing and putting into service of batteries, and requirements for end-of-life management. The proposal alsoincludes due diligence obligations for economic operators as regards the sourcing of raw materials. In the EuropeanParliament, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) adopted its report on 10February 2022. The report is expected to be voted at the March I plenary session, and would constitute Parliament'smandate for interinstitutional negotiations. The French Presidency of the Council aims to reach agreement on ageneral approach at the Environment Council on 17 March 2022. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 33

Fit for 55 package: revising the EU Emissions Trading System as regards aviationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-03-2022Autor VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA identifies three problems that need to be tackled, but the analysis regarding how to promote broad and effective

participation by states in CORSIA would have benefited from further explanation. The section of the report dealing withthe objectives seems less than comprehensive and insufficiently developed. While the options considered appear to besufficiently broad, a clear and transparent ranking based on the various elements considered is missing. The IAappears to reflect a satisfactory analysis of the main impacts of the retained options. The indicators proposed do notappear fully convincing in measuring the success of the initiative. The stakeholders' preferred option for implementingCORSIA is different from the one selected by the IA. Overall, the reasoning of the IA appears to be well grounded, andthe IA appears to have addressed most of the RSB's comments. Finally, the proposal envisages an increase in theshare of auctioned allowances that does not correspond to any of the retained options

Briefing EN

War in Ukraine [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-03-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Seguridad y defensaResumen Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, launching the biggest military offensive in Europe since World War II.

Moscow's incursion into the territory of its south-western neighbour and attempts to capture major cities – notably Kyiv,the capital – have met with firm resistance, thwarting President Vladimir Putin's reported plans for a quick conquestand installation of a subservient government. The United States, the European Union and many other countries haveimposed harsh sanctions on Russia, including attempting to cut some Russian banks off from international paymentssystems and limiting the Russian central bank's access to financial markets, as well as launching trade curbs, assetsfreezes and other restrictions. Many NATO countries have promised to deliver weapons to support Ukrainian fighters.For the first time, the EU has announced plans to send military equipment to a third country. Putin has moved Russia'snuclear force on to 'special alert', sparking fear and renewed condemnation across the world. Hundreds of thousandshave already fled Ukraine to escape the war. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries frommany international think tanks on Russia's attack on Ukraine. Reports from before the invasion can be found in aprevious item of the 'What think tanks are thinking' series.

Briefing EN

Lithuania's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-03-2022Autor SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | PresupuestoResumen Lithuania's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) sets out the package of reforms and investment measures

designed by the country in the context of the EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. Inabsolute figures, Lithuania has decided to use its full grant allocation of €2 224 million under the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF), while declining to avail of the loan component. These resources represent 0.3 % of the entireRRF, equal to 4.6 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in2019). In addition, Lithuania is naturally pursuing national reforms and investments that aim to further promote thedynamism of its economy, while addressing a number of structural weaknesses. It is also pursuing major objectivessuch as convergence towards higher standards of living, the green transition and the digital transformation. Measuresunder the NRRP are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council's approval of the plan, Lithuania received €289million pre-financing in August 2021. The next payments, in nine six-monthly instalments, will depend on progress inimplementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN, LT

Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 24 February 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-02-2022Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen On 24 February 2022, at a special European Council meeting following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders

delivered a message of unity and determination, acknowledging 'the European aspirations and the European choice ofUkraine' and reiterating the EU's support to the territorial integrity of the country. They condemned Russia's continuedviolation of international law, and stressed that Russia 'will be held accountable for its actions'. EU leaders alsoapproved politically a new package of sanctions, which 'bites but does not deter'. Key restrictions linked to gas supplyand to access to the SWIFT payment system, a measure supported by the European Parliament, did not find aconsensus. The EU institutions were also asked to prepare a new set of 'individual and economic sanctions' targetedat Belarus.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 34

EU international investment policy: Looking aheadTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-02-2022Autor HALLAK ISSAM

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacional | Derecho internacional públicoResumen The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, providing the European Union (EU) with exclusive competence in the

area of 'direct investment', as part of the common commercial policy. This covers the conclusion of internationalinvestment agreements (IIAs), which typically aim to protect and/or liberalise foreign direct investment. Since then, theEU has ratified protection IIAs (or provisions in trade agreements) with Canada, Singapore and Vietnam. Early on,concerns were raised as to the specific EU competence. Opinions requested from the Court of Justice of the EU(CJEU) established that the EU had neither exclusive competence in portfolio international investments (which, unlikedirect investments, provide limited control over a firm) nor in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism –two domains covered by EU protection IIAs. EU Member State approval on these provisions was therefore needed.Moreover, to tackle stakeholders' general misgivings about the ISDS system – currently based on arbitral tribunals andperceived by some as insufficiently transparent and predictable – the EU is actively contributing to the multilateral talksto reform the current system, the objective being to establish a fully fledged 'multilateral investment court' with anappeal tribunal and its own judges. Furthermore, EU Member States have protection IIAs with other Member States inplace (intra-EU IIAs), which envisage arbitral ISDS mechanisms. However, the CJEU ruled in 2018 that arbitraldecisions between Member States are incompatible with EU law, and most Member States have agreed to terminatetheir intra-EU IIAs, raising major stakeholder concerns; the European Commission has launched an initiative toaddress these with a proposal for a regulation. Finally, for security reasons, the EU has also implemented EU- anddomestic-level mechanisms to screen, coordinate and exchange information about direct investment entering the EU.The European Parliament is preparing an own-initiative report on EU international investment policy.

Briefing EN

Renewed EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-02-2022Autor D'AMBROGIO Enrico | VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalResumen Spanning a prominent geopolitical area between Germany's Black Forest and the Black Sea, the EU strategy for the

Danube region (EUSDR) is the largest and most diverse among the four EU macro-regional strategies (MRS). Itstarted its existence in 2010, was overhauled in 2020, and covers 14 EU and non-EU countries. It is structured aroundfour pillars: connecting the region; protecting the environment; building prosperity; and strengthening the region.Similar to the other macro-regional strategies, the EUSDR does not have its own budget. Its implementation dependson the mobilisation of funds from other relevant sources (EU, national, regional, private) and on well-coordinated use ofavailable funding instruments at different levels. The principle of embedding the MRS priorities within the 2021-2027national/regional EU funding programmes, in particular the European structural and investment funds (ESI), is gainingprominence. The EUSDR faces a number of issues. Large dissimilarities persist both between and within the EUSDRcountries, further exacerbated by the economic difficulties linked to the coronavirus pandemic. A shortage of funding, agap in the alignment of funds and weak political commitment among the countries involved also pose difficulties for thestrategy's implementation. Furthermore, these countries have to contend with broader global challenges such as thepost-pandemic recovery, climate change and the digital transition, all of which have the potential to divert theirattention away from their efforts to improve EUSDR implementation. With several Ukrainian regions participating in theDanube MRS, the impact of the rapidly unfolding conflict in the country remains unclear. Despite the many positivenew elements introduced by the EUSDR's revised action plan and the post-2020 cohesion policy framework, it remainsto be seen how efficient they will be in addressing the core challenges facing the EUSDR.

Briefing EN

Finland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-02-2022Autor PARRY Matthew | TENHUNEN Susanna

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen Finland's €2 085 million National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) makes use of the grants component of the

country's national allocation under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), with no contribution from the loancomponent. The share of the NRRP equals 0.9 % of Finland's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 and represents atotal of 0.3 % of the entire RRF. In this respect, Finland's plan is relatively big compared to Member States ofcomparable population size and economy, such as Denmark (€1 500 million in grants). Finland has allocated 50.4 % ofits national plan to the green transition, in the service of its ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2035, while digitalexpenditure accounts for 27.1 % of the overall resources in the plan. Thus, Finland exceeds the minimum allocationsrequired by the RRF Regulation, which are 37 % for the green transition and 20 % for digital transformation. TheSustainable Growth Programme for Finland presents the NRRP and is financed by the Next Generation EU (NGEU)recovery instrument. Finland received its first payment of about €271 million in pre-financing, representing 13 % of itsplan, on 21 January 2022; the next payments, in six instalments, will depend on progress in implementing the plan.The total amount of grants under the RRF is subject to revision in June 2022, which might affect the final amountallocated to Finland. In addition to the RRF, Finland's plan draws on other EU funding instruments, such as theConnecting Europe Facility, to finance a cross-border electricity transmission project in partnership with Sweden insupport of the green transition RRF pillar; the Digital Europe and Horizon Europe programmes, to support initiativesunder the digitalisation pillar; and the European Social Fund and European Regional Development Fund for theeconomic cohesion pillar. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN, FI

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Budgetary transfers in the EP in 2021 - still in the wake of the crisisTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-02-2022Autor FRANKE Michaela

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoResumen This briefing analyses transfers in the EP's budget during 2021. It differentiates between transfers that were directly or

indirectly linked to the EP's response to the COVID-19 crisis and those that dealt with other, unrelated, needs,including the EP’s building policy. A comparison between the main tendencies observed in 2020 and 2021 sheds lighton how COVID-19 impacted budget implementation in both years touched by the crisis so far.

Briefing EN

Domestic use of EU Digital Covid CertificatesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-02-2022Autor CLAROS GIMENO Eulalia | Niestadt Maria

Ámbito político Salud pública | TurismoResumen Just before summer 2021, the EU adopted in record time (see timeline below) two regulations on the EU Digital Covid

Certificate (EUDCC). The certificate with a QR code shows if a person has been vaccinated, tested negative orrecovered from Covid-19. It is free of charge, available on paper or on a smartphone, and valid in all EU MemberStates. The two regulations apply from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022. Currently, 35 non-EU countries have signed abilateral agreement with the EU, to accept each other’s Covid-19 certificates. The aim of the EUDCC is to facilitatesafe cross-border movement during the Covid-19 pandemic. Member States remain free to use it for other purposes,according to national law. They can also not require it at all. In February 2022, the Commission presented a proposalto extend its use by one year, while making some amendments (e.g. to accept more types of tests). This overviewshows which Member States are using the EUDCC for purposes other than cross-border travel (data as of 22 February2022). It indicates where and from whom it is required, as well as which proofs are accepted. Some countries use adifferent name for the certificate: e.g. CovidCheck, SafePass, Corona/health pass(port). In all Member States, theEUDCC is accepted, but not all accept the three types of certificates: vaccination, test and recovery.

Briefing EN

HERA, the EU's new Health Emergency Preparedness and Response AuthorityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-02-2022Autor EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Ámbito político Medio ambiente | Política de investigaciónResumen The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic exposed the weaknesses in the EU's preparedness and planning capacities

as well as its lack of funding, with much of the EU's initial response being on an ad-hoc basis. Coordination andcooperation between EU Member States was initially often difficult, and took time to get established and startfunctioning in a structured way. The EU's Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) wasestablished by a Commission decision of 16 September 2021, as part of the European health union initiative that alsoincludes legislative proposals reinforcing the roles and mandates of the European Centre for Disease Prevention andControl and the European Medicines Agency. Set up within the European Commission and endowed with €6 billionfrom the EU's long-term budget, the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, HERA is expected to strengthen EUhealth security coordination during the preparedness phase, shorten crisis response times, and reinforce the EU'soverall health emergency preparedness and response architecture. While the creation of HERA has been welcomedby European stakeholders active in research, innovation and healthcare, they stress their preference for inclusivegovernance, and the need to harness the activities so that they reflect the public good dimension of HERAinvestments. Since HERA is a European Commission entity and not an EU agency, the European Parliament's role,and in particular that of its relevant committees, in assessing and monitoring HERA's effectiveness and efficiency hasyet to be defined.

Briefing EN

Canada's Parliament and other political institutionsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-02-2022Autor PARRY Matthew

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen The contemporary federal state of Canada was formed in 1867, when the Province of Canada merged through

confederation with two other British colonies in North America, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Canada's 1867constitution sets out the rules by which the country is governed and divides government responsibilities into threeseparate branches: parliament, executive and judiciary. In addition to being a federation, Canada is also arepresentative democracy and a constitutional monarchy. Queen Elizabeth, who resides in the United Kingdom (UK),is Canada's head of state. Canada's system of government is modelled on the UK's Westminster system. Canada'sfederal parliament, made up of the Queen and the two houses of Parliament, is both the legislature and the source ofexecutive power: in the tradition of 'responsible government', government ministers are responsible and accountable toparliament, and must answer to it for their actions. There are three levels of government within Canada: federal,provincial and territorial, and the local levels. Under Canada's federal system, the powers of government are dividedbetween the federal level and the 10 provincial governments, with federal responsibility for the three territories de factodevolved to them. The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court in the judicial system. Canada's political systemas a federal constitutional monarchy and its Westminster-style democracy resembles that of Australia. Accordingly, thisbriefing is similar in structure to the February 2020 EPRS briefing 'Australia's Parliament and other political institutions'.

Briefing EN

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An ambitious future for Europe's women after COVID-19: mental load, gender equality in teleworking andunpaid care work after the pandemic

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 24-02-2022Autor FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | SCHONARD Martina

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadResumen The COVID-19 pandemic and its associated economic crisis have impacted women differently than men in the

European Union. Even if gender issues have never been so high-up in the European political agenda, the effects of theCOVID-19 crisis are putting in jeopardy the progress achieved in the past decade in terms on the reduction of genderinequalities in European member states. The effects of the COVID-19 sanitary crisis have also served to highlight theneed for member states to develop proactive – rather than reactive – gender mainstreaming policies. This year’sInternational Women’s Day is a perfect opportunity to look back on the past EU initiatives and reflect how to addressthe future, post-COVID- 19, challenges.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

'Fit for 55' package: Revising the Regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-02-2022Autor VIKOLAINEN Vera

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Medio ambienteResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the proposal to amend the land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF)Regulation (EU) 2018/841. Despite the effort involved, the IA contains a number of shortcoming that significantly limitits potential to usefully inform policy-making. The impacts of the preferred option, its costs and benefits remain unclear,despite the estimates provided in the IA. Moreover, the baseline used in this IA does not appear to be dynamic orharmonised with the 'fit for 55' package, while one of the options does not appear to be a real alternative. Finally, theproposal does not seem to follow the recommendations of the IA, which suggests that relatively less ambitiousLULUCF targets under Option 2 combined with ESR-LULUCF flexibility would be more coherent if the ESR targets aresignificantly raised (which is the preferred option in the ESR IA and the proposal for ESR revision).

Briefing EN

PETI Fact-finding visit to Mar Menor, Spain - 23 - 25 February 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-02-2022Autor FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | HEEZEN JOHANNES

Ámbito político Medio ambiente | Peticiones al Parlamento EuropeoResumen The PETI Committee decided to organise a fact-finding visit to the Mar Menor in the Murcia Region in Spain. Over the

years, the PETI Committee has received a significant number of petitions on the pollution and deterioration of theenvironmental conditions of the Mar Menor. The aim of the mission is to visit the affected areas, hear the petitioners,and investigate and discuss the subject matter of the petitions with the regional and local authorities, as well as withthe Spanish competent authorities, scientists, representatives of social, business and trade union organisations.

Briefing EN

Transport trends in national recovery and resilience plansTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-02-2022Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave ayuda a la modernización | consecuencia económica | economía verde | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia |

inversión de la UE | organización de los transportes | política de transportes | recuperación económica | reparto de lafinanciación de la UE

Resumen To address the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU has put in place an unprecedented temporaryrecovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). Its main spending tool is the Recovery and Resilience Facility,worth €723.8 billion (in current prices). While EU countries differ both in terms of their pre-coronavirus situations and interms of Covid-19-related impacts, they can all seize the opportunity to kick-start their economies with this financialinjection. To access funding under the facility, EU countries have had to preparef their recovery and resilience plans inline with a number of requirements, such as earmarking a certain minimum share for investment in the green anddigital transitions. The plans have to be endorsed by the European Commission and approved by the Council. ByJanuary 2022, 70 % of the plans had been approved. While governments are receiving their first allocations of fundingand a full analysis is still out of reach, it has been possible to get an initial glimpse of the plans' contents. This briefingaims to give a flavour of the elements that EU countries want to take up to revive their transport and mobility systems.As all the projects financed have to be implemented by 2026, careful consideration has been needed to determinewhat is feasible and how it can fit in with long-term national greening efforts. Most governments want to invest inmodern trains, clean vehicles and recharging infrastructure as well as improving public transport. While digitalisation isalready significantly present across all transport modes, strategies for reducing car use and promoting active mobilityare taking hold only gradually. While the planned reforms and investments combine many elements and varyconsiderably, their collective completion could bring a step change towards a clean and modern European transport.This is an update of a Briefing published in October 2021.

Briefing EN

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Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanismsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-02-2022Autor LECERF Marie

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadResumen Equal pay for equal work is one of the European Union's founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on

the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, the implementation and enforcement of this principle remaina challenge. Due to a lack of pay transparency, pay discrimination often goes undetected and victims face difficulties inmaking a claim for redress. On 4 March 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal on bindingpay transparency measures. The proposed directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equalwork or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanismsfocuses on measures to ensure pay transparency, and better access to justice for victims of pay discrimination. TheCouncil agreed its approach on the proposal on 6 December 2021. On 7 September 2021, the co-rapporteurs from theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and Committee on Employmentand Social Affairs (EMPL), jointly responsible for the file, presented their draft report. On 15 November 2021, the jointcommittee took stock of the 1 090 amendments tabled. A negotiating position will be agreed after the joint committeevote on the draft report, expected in March 2022. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated atkey stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Multimedia Equal pay for equal work between men and women: Pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms

EU taxonomy: Delegated acts on climate, and nuclear and gasTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-02-2022Autor SPINACI STEFANO

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Medio ambienteResumen The EU's commitment to the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and the ambitious European Green Deal, require

significant investment. It is estimated that hundreds of billions of euros are needed in the current decade to reach thecarbon reduction targets. The EU taxonomy is a classification system that aims to channel public and privateinvestment into environmentally sustainable economic activities in order to achieve environmental objectives, such asthose in the fight against climate change. It establishes a dynamic list of economic activities considered to beenvironmentally sustainable, provided they contribute substantially to at least one environmental objective and do notsignificantly harm any other. The European Commission claims that such a common understanding of what constitutesenvironmentally sustainable investment can facilitate the funding of the transition to a more sustainable economy bybringing clarity to investors, avoiding market fragmentation and reducing the risk of greenwashing. While the basiclegal act for the taxonomy is already in force, the process of establishing detailed criteria on how to classify activitiesas green is ongoing. A first delegated act on reporting obligations of companies was adopted on 6 July 2021. Thefocus of this briefing is the two delegated acts determining which activities should be considered as sustainable andcontributing to the fight against climate change, and be reported as such. The first climate delegated act came intoforce on 1 January 2022, establishing criteria for activities helping to mitigate or adapt to climate change. Activities inthe nuclear and gas sectors are the subject of a complementary delegated act proposed by the European Commissionon 2 February 2022.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU taxonomy: Delegated acts on climate, and nuclear and gas

European defence and security [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-02-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Seguridad y defensaResumen Russia’s military build-up around Ukraine, as well as fears of an armed conflict between the two countries, have

highlighted the importance of the on-going debate about how to strengthen the European Union’s Common Securityand Defence Policy (CSDP). On 17 February, the European Parliament adopted resolutions calling for a moreambitious CSDP, to counter threats such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, exploitation of migration for political purposes,and foreign interference. The Parliament has also welcomed the work of governments on the Strategic Compass, along-term plan for the EU to become a better provider of security, to act faster and more decisively to protect EUvalues and interests, and to contribute to international peace. The adoption of the Compass would also help the EU toachieve a stronger degree of strategic autonomy. This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentariesfrom many international think tanks on European defence and security. Recent reports on the Ukrainian crisis can befound in a previous item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

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‘Fit for 55’ package: Fuel EU MaritimeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-02-2022Autor TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Ámbito político Energía | Medio ambiente | TransporteResumen The impact assessment (IA) supporting the proposal 'Fuel EU Maritime' provides a qualitative and quantitative

analysis, which is based on sound and recent data. It also explains some uncertainties in the analysis of impacts. TheIA presents a well-evidenced problem definition and a sufficiently broad range of policy options. The quality of the IA isweakened by some inconsistencies in the comparison of options. In addition, the IA does not assess to what extentSMEs are effected of this proposal and the stakeholders' views on the fully fledged options are not indicated. It can benoted also that the open public consultation period does not meet the 12 week-requirement.

Briefing EN

Belgium's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-02-2022Autor HALLAK ISSAM

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) of the European Union (EU) is the core component of Next Generation

EU, a temporary recovery instrument which allows the Commission to raise funds to help the economic and socialrecovery after the coronavirus pandemic. By promoting the sustainable and inclusive recovery that ensures the greenand digital transitions make progress, the RRF is consistent with the Commission's priorities. Belgium has decided touse its entire grant allocation under the RRF and, with a total amount of €5 924 million. Belgium's National Recoveryand Resilience Plan (NRRP) ranks 14th among the NRRPs in absolute budget value. Belgium's NRRP is entirelyfunded through non-repayable grants, which represent 0.8 % of the entire RRF and 1.24 % of Belgium's grossdomestic product (GDP) in 2019. The measures envisaged by the Belgian NRRP should be completed by 2026.Following the Council's approval of the plan, Belgium received €770 million (13 %) of pre-financing in August 2021.The next 10 instalments will depend on 210 intermediate milestones and targets in the implementation of the plan. TheEuropean Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EU recovery instrument, participatesin interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation and scrutinises the work of the EuropeanCommission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EN, FR, NL

Fair and simpler taxation supporting the recovery strategyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-02-2022Autor SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Ámbito político Valor añadido europeoResumen Two European Added Value Assessments (EAVAs) studies on Value Added Tax (VAT) and Corporate Income Tax

(CIT) for the European Parliament's subcommittee on Tax Matters (FISC), identified the gaps in EU legislation in theseareas and evaluated the European added value of various policy options to address these gaps.

Briefing EN

EU space policy: Boosting EU competitiveness and accelerating the twin ecological and digital transitionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-02-2022Autor EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Ámbito político Industria | Medio ambiente | Política de investigaciónResumen Over the past decade, space has gained increasing importance as an economic sector offering opportunities for

established and emerging markets. Space policies and their applications have also gained in political relevance due totheir capacity to tackle global challenges, such as the climate and biodiversity crises, but also due to the growingreliance of the EU economy and society on space infrastructure, services and data. Pursuant to Article 189 of theTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), space is a shared competence of the EU and its MemberStates. EU space policy has two overarching goals: on the one hand, promoting scientific and industrialcompetitiveness with a view to nurturing EU spatial ecosystems and ensuring EU autonomy in space; on the other,increasingly harnessing space investments and services to address key EU political priorities such as the EuropeanGreen Deal and the Digital Decade. This briefing focuses on the state of play in regard to the EU's space economy,while also examining the EU's reliance on space services. Specifically, it highlights the relevance of the EU in theglobal space market and looks at the ways the EU could boost its use of space data and services to deliver on its mainpolitical priorities.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU space policy: Boosting EU competitiveness and accelerating the twin ecological and digital transition

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The Ukrainian crisis: Military threats and diplomacy [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-02-2022Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen Russia continues to strengthen its military presence around the Ukrainian border, despite intensive diplomatic activity

to ward off a feared armed conflict between the countries. Russia has amassed more than 100 000 troops, as well asships, aircraft, rocket launchers and other heavy weaponry near Ukraine, prompting some politicians and analysts tosay that war may be imminent. Others believe Russian President Vladimir Putin is still playing a diplomatic game,aimed, among other goals, at bringing Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of influence. The United States, the EuropeanUnion and other countries have threatened severe sanctions against Russia should it start new hostilities, following itsannexation of Crimea in 2014 and the destabilisation of some eastern Ukrainian provinces. This note gathers links torecent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the crisis and its implications forneighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics. More reports on the issue can be found in aprevious item from the ‘What think tanks are thinking’ series.

Briefing EN

A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-02-2022Autor SAJN Nikolina

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Protección de los consumidoresPalabra clave acumulador eléctrico | armonización de normas | autorización de venta | material de telecomunicaciones | norma de

comercialización | norma europea | norma técnica | propuesta (UE) | teléfono móvilResumen On 23 September 2021, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to amend the 2014 Radio

Equipment Directive, as a first step towards mandating a common charger for mobile phones and other small portabledevices. Under the proposal, these devices would have to be equipped with a USB Type-C receptacle that can becharged with cables compatible with USB Type C, and to incorporate the USB Power Delivery communication protocol.Consumers would have an option to buy devices with or without a charger (unbundling). The proposal would go handin hand with an initiative on the eco-design of external power supplies, so that the receptacle and the communicationprotocol for both ends of charger cables would be harmonised. The Council adopted its negotiating mandate on 26January 2022. Its main request is introducing a pictogram indicating unbundling and a label specifying chargingcapabilities of a device. In the European Parliament, a draft report put forward by the rapporteur on 11 January 2022also proposes improving consumer information through an unbundling graphic and a label on charging characteristicsof a device, as well as extending the scope of the directive to a wider range of devices and requiring the Commissionto harmonise wireless chargers by 2025. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment Directive

Understanding the EU's approach to a new partnership with AfricaTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-02-2022Autor PICHON Eric

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitariaResumen Africa has been put at the core of the Commission's geopolitical work programme and of the French Presidency of the

Council of the EU. In February 2022, a summit between EU and African Heads of State and Government will discussways to build a new and comprehensive partnership, based on five pillars put forward by the EU: green transition andenergy access, digital transformation, sustainable growth and jobs, peace and governance, and migration and mobility.Although the proposal mainly builds on existing frameworks, its high profile and clear commitment to the African Union(AU) make it an important milestone in an effort for a deeper relationship and strengthened partnership in multilateralfora, initiated several years ago. In order to preserve its own economic and security interests in the face of increasedgeopolitical competition, the EU intends to continue to be an important player on the African continent. The EU and theAU have converging interests in a number of areas, such as the fight against climate change and the promotion of asustainable, job-creating African economy. However, they still have to find common ground on migration, securitymanagement, and fundamental values. The comprehensiveness of the proposed strategy is challenged by the gapsand overlaps of the current variable-geometry partnerships. The coronavirus outbreak delayed the adoption of acommon strategy. At the same time, it clearly highlighted the need to strengthen the links between the two continentsin order to tackle the most urgent global issues. Measures to fight the current pandemic and to prevent future oneshave reframed the priorities and will give new impetus to partnerships in areas such as health, the fight against climatechange, and promoting the digital transformation. This briefing updates 'Towards a new EU strategy with Africa',published in June 2020.

Briefing EN

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La société civile et le futur accord entre l'Union européenne et les pays d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et duPacifique

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 11-02-2022Autor PICHON Eric

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitariaResumen Près d'un cinquième de la population mondiale est concerné par le partenariat entre l'Union européenne (UE) et 78

pays d'Afrique subsaharienne, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP). Les organisations de la société civile ont suiviavec intérêt les négociations qui ont abouti en avril 2021 à la proposition d'un nouvel accord entre l'UE etl'Organisation des États ACP. Cet accord négocié couvre des champs de première importance pour la société civile,tels que les droits de l'homme, les enjeux climatiques, le développement durable, la paix et la sécurité. Le textenégocié reconnait l'importance de renforcer les capacités, d'informer et de consulter les organisations de la sociétécivile afin qu'elles participent à la mise en œuvre de la coopération ACP-UE dans leur domaine d'action. Cependant, lenouvel accord laissera aux futures institutions du partenariat le soin de décider des structures et mécanismes quipourraient contribuer à l'expression de la société civile. Le Parlement européen a regretté que les organisations de lasociété civile aient été peu impliquées dans l'élaboration des politiques ou le suivi des activités du partenariat actuel. Ilsoutient leur souhait d'être associées à l'élaboration et à la mise en place des politiques qui découleront du futuraccord.

Briefing FR

Common chargers – Revision of the Radio Equipment DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-02-2022Autor DALLI HUBERT

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The Commission is proposing a new directive on consumer credits to amend the Radio Equipment Directive by

introducing provisions regarding common mobile phone chargers. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impactassessment accompanying the proposal finds that the impact assessment appears to provide a comprehensiveassessment, based on a sound evidence base, of the impacts of the policy options, though the assessment wouldhave benefited from a more thorough discussion of the alignment of the initiative with the proportionality principle andthe impacts accruing to SMEs.

Briefing EN

CO2 emission standards for new cars and vans: 'Fit for 55' packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-02-2022Autor ERBACH Gregor

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen On 14 July 2021, as part of the 'fit for 55' package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal for a revision of

the Regulation setting CO2 emission performance standards for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (vans).To raise the contribution of the road transport sector to the EU's climate targets, the proposal sets more ambitious2030 targets for reducing the CO2 emissions of new cars and vans and allows only zero-emission vehicles from 2035.In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and FoodSafety (ENVI). Jan Huitema (Renew, the Netherlands), who was appointed as rapporteur, presented his draft report on8 December 2021. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Media environment in BelarusTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-02-2022Autor PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Derechos humanosResumen The media situation in Belarus has never been easy. With Aliaksandr Lukashenka being elected president of the

country for the first time in 1994, the necessary reforms to provide media freedom have never materialised. Instead,over the years various laws have lessened the rights of independent journalists and imposed limits on both traditionaland electronic media. Following the August 2020 presidential election, which ignited a brutal crackdown against thedemocratic opposition, the situation has worsened. Harassment, a hijacking, and politically motivated jail terms, bothshort and long, intimidate Belarusians who want to exchange ideas, report wrongdoing or fight for freedom ofexpression and freedom for the country. In January 2022, the Belarusian Association of Journalists confirmed thepresence of at least 32 journalists in Belarusian jails. On the positive side, new electronic media cannot be bannedeffectively and absolutely. While the regime slowly expands its presence on the internet, Belarusians trust independentmedia more and use it more eagerly. However, society’s distancing of itself from traditional state-controlled media isincreasingly met with an angry reaction from the state apparatus, which in turn further tightens related laws. TheEuropean Union, and the European Parliament in particular, actively support independent media and civil society inBelarus, and the Council of the EU and the Parliament both address the challenges to media freedom in the country.Financial help is also provided to Belarus and was even increased at the end of 2021, with priority areas of supportincluding ‘systematically repressed’ independent media.

Briefing EN

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Improving the working conditions of platform workersTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-02-2022Autor KISS Monika

Ámbito político EmpleoResumen Platform work is an umbrella concept covering a heterogeneous group of economic activities completed through a

digital platform. As platform workers' rights are not enshrined in EU labour law, this increasingly leads to problemsrelated to various aspects of their work (working conditions, healthcare, unemployment, pensions) and humandevelopment (education, training, recognition of skills). To remedy this situation, the European Commission hassubmitted a proposal for a directive aimed at improving the working conditions of platform workers, clarifying theiremployment status and supporting the sustainable growth of digital labour platforms in the EU. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Economic Dialogue with the other EU Institutions under the European Semester Cycles during the 9thlegislative term - State of play February 2022

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 10-02-2022Autor HAGELSTAM Kajus

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Coronavirus | Semestre EuropeoPalabra clave Comisión Europea | Comisión PE | Consejo de la Unión Europea | cooperación interinstitucional (UE) | Eurogrupo

(zona euro) | gobernanza económica (UE) | Semestre EuropeoResumen This document provides an overview of Economic Dialogues with the other institutions of the European Union that has

taken place in the competent committee(s) of the European Parliament since September 2019 under the EuropeanSemester for economic policy coordination. It also lists the Recovery and Resilience Dialogues with the EuropeanCommission as undertaken by the competent committee(s) since the entry of force of the Recovery and ResilienceFacility in 2021. It also includes an overview of the respective legal bases for these dialogues.

Briefing EN

Limits on exposure to carcinogens and mutagens at work: Fourth proposalTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-02-2022Autor AMAND-EECKHOUT Laurence

Ámbito político Politica social | Salud públicaPalabra clave enfermedad profesional | sanidad laboral | sustancia cancerígena

Resumen In September 2020, as part of the fight against cancer and to protect the health of workers in a number of industries,the European Commission proposed to amend the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive (Directive 2004/37/EC),expanding its scope and including and/or revising occupational exposure limit values for a number of cancer- ormutation-causing chemical agents. The initiative is proceeding in steps and has now become a continuous process.Following on from three previous legislative amendments, which covered a total of 26 priority chemical agents, thefourth proposal addresses an additional three. On 16 December 2021, after interinstitutional negotiations, the Counciland the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the proposal. The agreed text was endorsed byCoreper, for the Council, on 22 December 2021 and then approved by Parliament's Committee on Employment andSocial Affairs on 25 January 2022. Under the agreement, workers will benefit from greater protection, owing to thesetting of exposure limits for acrylonitrile and nickel compounds and the lowering of the limits for benzene. The scopeof the proposed directive would include reprotoxic substances (which have adverse effects on reproduction and cancause impaired fertility or infertility). Workers who deal with hazardous medicinal products would receive better trainingon how to handle them safely. A vote in plenary is expected in February 2022. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 42

Digital markets actTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-02-2022Autor MADIEGA Tambiama André

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave bienes y servicios | comercio electrónico | datos personales | Derecho de la competencia | economía digital | mercado

único digital | prestación de servicios | propuesta (UE) | protección de datos | protección del consumidorResumen In December 2020, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation on contestable and fair markets in

the digital sector, otherwise referred to as the digital markets act (DMA). The proposed legislation lays downharmonised rules aimed at regulating the behaviour of digital platforms acting as gatekeepers between business usersand their customers in the European Union (EU). This approach entails a shift from ex-post anti-trust intervention to ex-ante regulation, and would enshrine within EU law a set of ex-ante rules that would radically change how large digitalplatforms are allowed to operate in the EU. The Council and the European Parliament agreed their positions on theDMA proposal in November and December 2021, respectively. While endorsing the proposal, both institutions adopteda number of amendments to the Commission's text. Trilogue negotiations aiming to reach a compromise text began inJanuary 2022. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Digital markets act

Child migrants: Irregular entry and asylumTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-02-2022Autor DIAZ CREGO Maria | MACSAI GYORGYI

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen The number of migrant children has been rising globally since the turn of the century. According to estimates by the

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in 2020, 35.5million children were living outside theircountry of birth, 11.5 million more than in 2000. Child migration takes many forms, from regular family reunification toforced and traumatic migration. This infographic focuses exclusively on forced and irregular movements of migrantchildren to the EU.

Briefing EN

Australia's strategic view of the Indo PacificTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-02-2022Autor PARRY Matthew

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen Australia, which is bordered to its west by the Indian Ocean and to the east by the Pacific Ocean, and lies in close

proximity to members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its north, can be described as acentral Indo-Pacific state. Since 2012, the idea of the Indo-Pacific has become a point of reference for Australiangovernments to define the country's foreign and security policy interests. Throughout the post-war period, Australia hassought to meet its conventional security needs primarily by way of its mutual defence pact with the United States (US),the 1951 Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), as well as the 'Five Eyes' signalsintelligence sharing agreement with the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and New Zealand. In turn, the latter isunderpinned by the 1946 United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA). In terms of its tradeinterests, however, Australia has looked increasingly to markets in Asia and proportionally less to traditional Westernallies. As China has risen and grown more assertive, setting up a strategic rivalry with the US and its regional partners,Australia has begun to find it harder to insulate its commercial interests from regional geopolitical tensions. Therecently forged 'AUKUS' security and technology partnership with the US and the UK reflects both the pace ofgeopolitical change in the Indo-Pacific and the enduring centrality of the US to Australia's defence strategy. Havinginitially determined that the lack of a domestic civil nuclear industry precluded the use of superior nuclear propulsiontechnology in Australia's submarine fleet, the current government has re-assessed its security strategy and re-calibrated its defence procurement arrangements, with potentially far-reaching diplomatic implications.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 43

Inland waterway transport in the EUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-02-2022Autor SMIT-JACOBS KARIN

Ámbito político TransporteResumen Inland waterway transport (IWT) is one of the most CO2-efficient transport modes per tonne of goods carried, using

only 17 % of the energy needed by often-congested road transport and 50 % of rail transport. The sector already playsan important economic role in transporting both goods and passengers in Europe. However, it has an untappedpotential for increasing its capacity, which warrants the renewed attention it has recently attracted, in the light ofsustainable development. Despite support from the side of the European Union and at national levels, the modal shareof inland navigation in the overall EU transport sector has long remained more or less stable at 6 %. During the Covid19 crisis, the sector lost a little of its share to the benefit of road transport. To reduce CO2 emissions from EUtransport, the European Commission is seeking to increase the shift of freight transport to rail and inland shipping. Bothrecent Commission strategies – the European Green Deal and the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – reflectthis intention, and outline the steps needed to achieve an increased use of IWT, as well as of short sea shipping. Toplay its role to the full, the sector has to overcome important challenges and become digital, greener and resilient. Nextto new or adapted rules, this will require substantial and additional investment into modern infrastructure, digitaltechnologies and greener vessels, as well as a qualified workforce to ensure the sector's future development. Thisbriefing provides an insight into recent EU policy developments related to inland navigation and includes the views ofthe European Parliament and the main sectoral stakeholders. In addition, it looks at existing financial support from theEU, the new NAIADES III support programme, and offers a short outlook for future reform of and changes to the EU'sIWT network.

Briefing EN

US-Russia relations: Geopolitical, security, economic and human dimensionsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-02-2022Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen After a period of détente, tensions are rising between the two former Cold War enemies again. Fundamental

differences were already apparent during the Yeltsin years and have increasingly strained relations since 2000, underVladimir Putin. There are few issues that Washington and Moscow agree on, but none is more divisive than Ukraine.Russia is determined to prevent further NATO expansion into post-Soviet eastern Europe, which it still sees as a bufferzone vital to its security and as a sphere of influence. Since late 2021, there are signs that Russia is planning renewedaggression against Kyiv; the US has promised a robust response if that happens. Both sides are likely to avoid directconflict at all costs. Russia is not the military superpower that the Soviet Union was, but it is still a formidableadversary. Most of the bilateral arms control agreements that helped to maintain the fragile military balance have nowgone, but talks launched at the first Biden-Putin summit in June 2021 aim at maintaining strategic stability. Economicsplay a much lesser role in US-Russia relations than geopolitics. Trade and investment between the two countries arelimited, and since 2014, they have been constrained by sanctions. Washington's economic superiority gives it a certainamount of leverage over Moscow; however, the Russian economy has proved more resilient to US restrictions thanmight have been expected. People-to-people contacts could help mitigate geopolitical tensions, but there is littleinteraction. Few Russians travel, study or work in the US, and the same applies vice-versa. Surveys show thatdiplomatic tensions are reflected in the generally negative views that Americans and Russians have of each other'scountries. This is an update of a Briefing published in October 2018.

Briefing EN

Social Economy in SpainTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-02-2022Autor KONLE-SEIDL REGINA ANNA

Ámbito político Empleo | Politica socialResumen The concept of the "social economy" has gained attention and momentum in recent years although the degree of

recognition varies largely from one Member State to another.Spain is an example where the social economy benefitsfrom wide recognition. It is the first European country to enact a law on the social economy concept in 2011. In view ofthe EMPL delegation visit to Madrid, this briefing elaborates first on the concept applied in the SEAP - presented by theCommission on 9 December 2021 - and on the historical development of the social economy concept across Europe.The second part of the briefing focusses on social economy’s historical and legal evolution in Spain. Key aspects ofimplementation of legal provisions in practice are presented and discussed. Inter alia, we look at factors which eitherenable or constrain the proper development of the Spanish social economy sector and draw some conclusions forcreating a European social economy framework.

Briefing EN

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Understanding EU policy on firearms traffickingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-02-2022Autor NEVILLE ANN

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators

point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimatedtotal number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had nocriminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands ofcriminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. Theycan be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in theEU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicitfirearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons alsofrequently appearing. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engagein firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threatprecisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminalconnections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy to convertweapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative andpolicy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking.The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN)in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN’s global firearmsprogramme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governingthe control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed assource or transit countries for illicit firearms.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Understanding EU policy on firearms trafficking

Horizon Europe research and innovation missions: State of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-02-2022Autor EVROUX CLEMENT THIERRY

Ámbito político Energía | Medio ambiente | Política de investigación | Salud pública | Seguridad alimentariaResumen Following the adoption of the United Nations sustainable development goals in 2015, research and innovation

investment strategies worldwide are increasingly geared towards the twin green and digital transitions, in a bid toreinforce the impact of public investments in science and technology by improving their capacity to pool resources andrally various actors, including citizens, behind a specific goal (also known as 'directionality'). Horizon Europe, the 9thEU framework programme for research and innovation (2021-2027), establishes five 'missions' to be achieved by2030. These are the EU's long-term, cross-cutting research priorities, namely: adaptation to climate change; cancer –improving the lives of more than 3 million people; restore our oceans and waters; 100 climate-neutral and smart cities;and a soil deal for Europe. On 29 September 2021, the European Commission presented a communication in which itset out the missions' goals by 2030, and outlines their early implementation phase from 2021 to 2023 throughdedicated calls for funding adopted and published through Horizon Europe. The missions echo calls from theEuropean Parliament to support transnational cooperation in research and innovation through EU investment. The fivemission goals cut across the EU's political priorities, including the Europe's Beating Cancer plan and the EuropeanGreen Deal. The initiative's progress is followed by several of Parliament's committees. Research and innovationactors across Europe have welcomed the missions as important enablers of the twin digital and ecological transitions.

Briefing EN

What is new in the Commission's 2021 Better Regulation Guidelines?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-02-2022Autor ANGLMAYER Irmgard | VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativos | Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Evaluación de la legislación ylas políticas en la práctica

Resumen This briefing examines the revised Better Regulation guidelines and toolbox the European Commission presented inNovember 2021, which translate the Commission’s communication ‘Joining forces to make better laws’ into practice.Compared to the previous edition, many tools and principles are just validated and adjusted, such as the three pillarsof ex-ante impact assessment, ex-post evaluation and stakeholder consultation, or the evaluate-first principle. Twomajor innovations stand out: the introduction of a new 'one in, one out' approach and the mainstreaming of strategicforesight in policy-making. The former aims at offsetting new administrative burdens (i.e. costs resulting fromadministrative requirements contained in legal acts by reducing an equivalent amount of existing burden on businessesand citizens. The latter aims at generating more resilient and future-proof policies by anticipating trends, risks andemerging issues, in particular in areas that are subject to rapid change.

Briefing EN

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EU-Ukraine relations and the security situation in the countryTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-02-2022Autor PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen Since the beginning of 2021, Ukraine has struggled with Russia's attempts to further destabilise the country and

intensify tensions in Europe's east, including through repetitive military build-ups along Ukraine's borders. Russia'smost recent threatening troop manoeuvres, together with its unsupportable security demands, met with a unitedresponse from Western countries, making it clear that a very high price will be paid if Russia attacks Ukraine. The EUand its institutions, including the European Parliament, have been clear in their response to Russia's aggression onUkrainian territory. The EU does not recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and regularly calls on Russia to de-escalate and withdraw its forces, and urges Moscow and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine to adhere tothe ceasefire agreement. Currently the situation remains very volatile. Relations between the European Union andUkraine continue to be shaped by the 2014 Association Agreement, which includes the Deep and Comprehensive FreeTrade Area. The long-term relationship between the EU and Ukraine covers a broad range of areas including trade,providing assistance to the country's health sector, support for the country's reform agenda, and support for the fightagainst hybrid attacks against Ukraine that have been perpetrated by Russia ever since Ukraine made its firm pro-European choice in 2014. Russia decided to respond aggressively to the Revolution of Dignity – a revolution whosemain aim was the signature of the Association Agreement – and immediately after the change of power in Ukraine in2014 it annexed Crimea and moved to actively support Donbas separatists. Intensive fighting in Donbas in 2014 andearly 2015 led to the Minsk agreements, but limited progress in implementing the agreements on the Russian sidehave led to the prolongation of Western sanctions against Russia. Russia continues its bullying policy towards Ukrainewith a wide range of instruments, including disinformation, blackmail and cyber-attacks.

Briefing EN

Rights of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the EU - Directive 2003/109/ECTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-02-2022Autor AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la prácticaResumen Directive 2003/109/EC (the Long-term Residents Directive, or LTRD) sets out the conditions under which a non-EU

citizen ('third-country national') who has legally and continuously resided in a European Union (EU) Member State forat least five years can acquire 'EU long-term resident status'. This residence status is permanent, grants theseindividuals equal treatment rights with EU citizens in several areas, ensures reinforced protection against expulsion,and gives them the (conditional) possibility to move and reside in other Member States. In 2019, the EuropeanCommission published its second implementation report on the directive. It also finalised a fitness check on EU legalmigration legislation evaluating the effectiveness, coherence, and grounds for improvement of the existing EU laws inthe field. These reports found shortcomings both in the EU legal migration framework and in the directive itself. Thelimitations identified mainly concerned the implementation of legislation by EU Member States. The subsequentEuropean Commission proposals under the 2020 new pact on migration and asylum seek to address theseshortcomings by, for instance, revising the LTRD. The LTRD is currently under-used, as most Member States continueto issue almost exclusively national long-term residence permits. Many third-country nationals who could benefit fromthe rights of the EU status do not have access to it. The Commission has received numerous complaints from citizens,and has launched several infringement procedures pursuing legal action against EU Member States. The revision ofthe LTRD aims to improve the directive's implementation and functioning by establishing a 'true EU long-termresidence status' – with a particular focus on strengthening long-term residents' right to move and work in otherMember States (intra-EU mobility).

Briefing EN

Revision of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive: Fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-02-2022Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político EnergíaResumen On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a major revision (recast) of the Energy Performance of

Buildings Directive (EPBD), as part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package. The latter consists of several legislative proposals tomeet the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared to1990. It is a core part of the European Green Deal, which aims to set the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHGemissions (climate neutrality) by 2050. The recast EPBD aims to accelerate building renovation rates, reduce GHGemissions and energy consumption, and promote the uptake of renewable energy in buildings. It would introduce anew EU definition of a ‘zero emissions building’, applicable to all new buildings from 2027 and to all renovatedbuildings from 2030. Zero-emissions buildings would need to factor in their life-cycle global warming potential. Therecast EPBD would accelerate energy-efficient renovations in the worst performing 15 % of EU buildings, and wouldset minimum energy performance standards. In due course, every building would need to achieve at least a Class E ona revised A-G scale of energy performance certificates (EPCs). EPCs would be included in linked national databases.Other provisions introduce building renovation passports and a smart readiness indicator, end subsidies for fossil fuelboilers, and make building automation and control systems more widespread. The file has been referred to theCommittee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which will in due course appoint a rapporteur, who will producea draft report. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

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'Fit for 55' legislative package: Deployment of alternative fuels infrastructureTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-01-2022Autor NAVARRA Cecilia

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The present IA supports the proposal for a Regulation on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure. It seems

quite robust especially in the connection between problem analysis, specific objectives, and measures proposed, andin the quantitative analysis. Still it is complex and not fully accessible to a non-expert reader and it lacks clarity andexhaustive explanations in some points.

Briefing EN

Aviation's contribution to European Union climate action: Revision of EU ETS as regards aviationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-01-2022Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Energía | Medio ambiente | TransporteResumen As part of the 'Fit for 55' package, the Commission is proposing a revision to the EU's emissions trading system (ETS)

as regards carbon dioxide emissions from aviation. The proposal seeks to ensure that the sector contributes to theEU's climate targets through increased auctioning of allowances, with an end to free allowances from 2027, and byapplying the linear reduction of aviation allowances. The proposal will also integrate, into the revised ETS, theInternational Civil Aviation Organization's agreed global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme forInternational Aviation (CORSIA) and apply it to international flights departing from or arriving at an airport inside theEuropean Economic Area (EEA). For domestic flights in the Member States or flights within the EEA, the ETS wouldcontinue to apply. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Environment, PublicHealth and Food Safety (ENVI), where the rapporteur, Sunčana Glavak (EPP, Croatia), has published her draft report.First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Revision of EU ETS as regards aviation: 'Fit for 55' package

Understanding EU data protection policyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-01-2022Autor MILDEBRATH Hendrik Alexander

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen The datafication of everyday life and data scandals have made the protection of personal information an increasingly

important social, legal and political matter for the EU. In recent years, awareness of data rights and expectations forEU action in this area have both grown considerably. The right to privacy and the right to protection of personal dataare both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in the EU Treaties. The entry into force of theLisbon Treaty in 2009 gave the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties and abolished the pillar structure,providing a stronger basis for a more effective and comprehensive EU data protection regime. In 2012, the EuropeanCommission launched an ambitious reform to modernise the EU data protection framework. In 2016, the co-legislatorsadopted the EU's most prominent data protection legislation – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – andthe Law Enforcement Directive. The framework overhaul also included adopting an updated Regulation on DataProtection in the EU institutions and reforming the e-Privacy Directive, which is currently the subject of negotiationbetween the co-legislators. The European Parliament has played a key role in these reforms, both as co-legislator andauthor of own-initiative reports and resolutions seeking to guarantee a high level of data protection for EU citizens. TheEuropean Court of Justice plays a crucial role in developing the EU data protection framework through case law. In thecoming years, challenges in the area of data protection will include balancing compliance and data needs of emergingtechnologies, equipping data protection authorities with sufficient resources to fulfil their tasks, mitigating complianceburdens for small and medium-sized enterprises, taming digital surveillance and further clarifying requirements of validconsent. This is an updated edition of a briefing written by Sofija Voronova in May 2020.

Briefing EN

Review of the EU ETS: 'Fit for 55' packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-01-2022Autor ERBACH Gregor

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen As part of the 'Fit for 55' package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal to review the EU Emissions

Trading System (ETS). The aim of the review is to align the EU ETS Directive with the EU target set out in theEuropean Climate Law to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. Tothis end, the amount of emission allowances would be reduced, fewer allowances would be allocated for free, and theETS would be extended to maritime transport. This would reduce emissions in the ETS sectors by 61 % by 2030,compared to 2005. A separate new emissions trading system would be established for fuel distribution for roadtransport and buildings. The Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund would be enlarged, and Member Stateswould be obliged to spend all of their ETS revenues on climate action. In the European Parliament, the proposal hasbeen referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which has appointed PeterLiese (EPP, Germany) as rapporteur. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Review of the EU ETS: 'Fit for 55' package

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‘Fit for 55’: Revision of the EU Emissions Trading SystemTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-01-2022Autor VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA identifies in a clear manner the problems, which are clearly linked to the objectives of the initiative, as well as

their likely evolution without intervention. The range of options considered seems to reveal an intended path of action,namely the upward revision of the ETS ambition, in line with the political determination already laid out in the 2030CTP. The IA does seem to provide a good account of the key impacts of the retained options, while taking into accountSMEs and suggesting measures to address the social or distributional impacts of carbon pricing. However, not allpolicy options or supporting elements were assessed individually and the IA does not systematically contemplate theimpacts of a scenario more reliant on carbon pricing, nor the interplay between policy areas. The IA’s reasoning issupported by various sources which appear to provide a reliable basis for analysis and which are, overall, dulyreferenced, with the exception of supporting work concerning carbon leakage; however, for most models, theuncertainties and limitations were only vaguely indicated. Overall, the IA does seem to have addressed most of theRSB’s recommendations. The proposal appears to be consistent with the IA’s analysis, although the Commission’sintention to increase the Modernisation Fund share is not assessed under the retained options. Moreover, the choicesregarding the market stability reserve and the Innovation Fund (both left by the IA to be decided politically) do notcorrespond to any of the options assessed in the IA.

Briefing EN

The role (and accountability) of the President of the EurogroupTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-01-2022Autor HAGELSTAM Kajus | LEHOFER WOLFGANG | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosPalabra clave Defensor del Pueblo Europeo | Eurogrupo (zona euro) | gobernanza | Parlamento Europeo | transparencia del proceso

decisorio | Unión Económica y MonetariaResumen This note provides an overview of the role and mandate of the Eurogroup and the role and accountability of its

President, including the procedures for his/her appointment. In addition, this note refers to the debate around thetransparency of Eurogroup proceedings. The paper will be updated in light of relevant developments.

Briefing EN

Holocaust denial in criminal law: Legal frameworks in selected EU Member StatesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-01-2022Autor BAKOWSKI Piotr

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave análisis comparativo | Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos | crimen contra la humanidad | Derecho

comparado | Derecho penal | discriminación étnica | Estado miembro UE | racismo | xenofobiaResumen The Holocaust ('Shoah' in Hebrew) – the state-sponsored, systematic persecution and mass murder of Jews, whom

the Nazi regime and its collaborators sought to annihilate along with other persecuted groups, such as Roma and Sinti– took place in Europe. It is therefore not surprising that a trend to address negationism – i.e. unfounded theoriesquestioning certain historical events – by means of criminal law, originated in Europe. With time, the scope ofcriminalisation has been extended to cover not only the Shoah, but also other internationally recognised crimes. Suchprohibition is, however, not without controversy as it may interfere with fundamental rights, such as freedom ofexpression and academic freedom. The Council of Europe has played a major role in addressing Holocaust denial, inparticular through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights pertaining to the limits of freedom ofexpression. The Court has consistently excluded negationism from the protection of the European Convention onHuman Rights, pointing to the antisemitic nature of the prohibited statements and qualifying them as abuse of rights. Inthe European Union (EU), a 2008 Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia sought to align national legislationon historical denialism. Yet, national laws still differ in many respects, such as the definition of offences and the rangeof historical events, the memory of which they serve to protect. This Briefing looks at criminal provisions in 17 selectedEU Member States: Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary,Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. It attempts to identify the main elements ofthe criminal conduct and of the corresponding punishment. The following EPRS policy analysists have contributed tothe country analyses: Piotr Bąkowski (Poland), Carmen-Cristina Cirlig (Romania), David De Groot (Netherlands),Micaela Del Monte (Luxembourg and Portugal), Angelos Delivorias (Greece), Fabiana Fracanzino (Spain and Italy),Fruzsina Fuzesi (Hungary), Vilma Karvelyte-Shetty (Lithuania), Karoline Kowald (Austria), Katrien Luyten (Belgium),Hendrik Mildebrath (Germany), Marketa Pape (Czechia), Anja Radjenovic (Slovenia), Branislav Stanicek (Slovakia),and Sofija Voronova (France). This is an update of a Briefing published in September 2021.

Briefing EN

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SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutritionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-01-2022Autor CAPRILE ANNA | PICHON Eric

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo rural | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitariaResumen At least one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations (UN) will be missed in 2030 –

SDG 2 – 'zero hunger' – also endangering the accomplishment of the rest of the SDG goals under Agenda 2030.Hunger and malnutrition are rising dramatically across the world, a trend aggravated by the pandemic. In 2020, 811million people in the world were facing hunger, the highest level since 2014, and 3 billion people were without accessto a healthy diet. The fight against hunger and malnutrition has been the focus of two global summits, namely the UNFood Systems Summit (September 2021), which committed to a deep reform of global food systems, and the Nutritionfor Growth Summit (December 2021), which saw the biggest pledge since 2013. In the EU itself, considered one of themost food-secure regions in the world, nearly 7 million people were already experiencing severe food insecurity beforethe pandemic, and malnutrition is on the rise, as demonstrated by obesity and pre-obesity prevalence rates. SDG 2aims not only at achieving food security but also at improving nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture. Theseobjectives have been mainstreamed in the recently reformed common agricultural policy and the 'farm to fork' andbiodiversity strategies. In developing countries, the EU is strongly committed to achieving SDG 2. The EU institutionsand Member States, which collectively provide more than half of official development assistance worldwide, havereaffirmed this commitment in the new European 'consensus on development'. Alongside development aid, the EU hasseveral levers at its disposal to act on food insecurity causes, such as security and defence missions andcomprehensive strategies in conflict areas, as well as substantial research capacities. The fact that its internal policies,in particular agricultural, climate and trade policies, have a spill-over effect on other food systems in the world, inparticular in poorer countries, also make the EU a significant player.

Briefing EN

The European Commission’s annual rule of law reports: A new monitoring toolTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-01-2022Autor MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen The annual rule of law reports, launched by the Commission in September 2020, are a new addition to the European

institutions’ rule of law toolbox. The exercise can be described as a monitoring tool, as it collects data on the state ofthe rule of law in each of the 27 EU Member States but without drawing legal conclusions or giving specificrecommendations. The second rule of law report was published in July 2021 and the third is expected in 2022, with theannual exercise becoming a permanent mechanism. The methodology adopted by the Commission provides forreporting on four subject areas in all 27 Member States: (i) justice systems; (ii) the anti-corruption framework; (iii)media pluralism; and (iv) other institutional issues related to checks and balances. This methodology underlines theclose involvement of Member States in the preparation of the annual reports and their follow-up. The Member Statesare involved throughout the process by way of: (i) a network of contact persons on the rule of law that meets regularlywith the Commission; (ii) contact persons providing written contributions to the report; (iii) dialogue between theCommission and Member States through the network of contact persons, the group of contact persons on nationaljustice systems, the national contact points on corruption, and bilaterally at political and technical level; (iv) countryvisits; and (v) the opportunity for each Member State to comment on the part of the report concerning them. Thereports have met with some criticism from academics, who draw attention to the purely descriptive, rather thanprescriptive nature of the reports and the lack of concrete follow-up.

Briefing EN

EU carbon border adjustment mechanism: Implications for climate and competitivenessTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-01-2022Autor DOBREVA Alina | TITIEVSKAIA Jana

Ámbito político Comercio internacional | Industria | Medio ambienteResumen The EU has implemented the world’s largest carbon-pricing system, the emissions trading system (ETS). While pricing

emissions can encourage industrial decarbonisation, it also risks carbon leakage, whereby EU companies move theirproduction abroad. To date, the EU has mitigated carbon leakage through free allocations to certain industries, but withrising climate ambition and higher carbon prices, the Commission seeks to phase out free allocations. In parallel, anovel carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) would be introduced, requiring EU importers, as of 2026, topurchase certificates equivalent to the weekly EU carbon price. During the transition period, starting in 2023, importerswould be required to report emissions, with a system of monitoring, reporting and verification ensuring accuratereporting of carbon footprints. The CBAM would initially apply to imports in five emissions-intensive sectors deemed atgreater risk of carbon leakage: cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, and electricity. The CBAM charge wouldcover imports of these goods from all third countries, except those participating in the ETS or a linked mechanism. TheCBAM aims to contribute to the EU’s climate neutrality objectives, and encourage partner countries to decarbonisetheir production processes by levelling the playing field in carbon pricing between the EU and third-country producers;less developed countries could be supported in their climate transitions. Following publication of the Commissionproposal on the CBAM in July 2020, Parliament referred the file to the Environment Committee. First edition. The ‘EULegislation in Progress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 49

Cyprus's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-01-2022Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen In absolute figures, Cyprus's National Recovery and Resilience Plan amounts to €1.2 billion. Cyprus decided to use its

allocation under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) predominantly in grants (€1.005 billion), with €200.3million in loans. These resources represent around 0.2 % of the entire RRF, but are equal to 5.2 % of the country'sgross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). They will underpin a vastprogramme of reforms and investments that aims to promote the recovery of the Cypriot economy (Cyprus's GDPdropped by 5.2 % in 2020), while addressing a number of structural weaknesses as well as pursuing major objectivessuch as the green transition and the digital transformation. Measures under Cyprus's plan are to be completed in 2026.Following the Council's approval of the plan, Cyprus received a €157 million pre-financing, disbursed in September2021. The next payments, in ten instalments for grants and four instalments for loans, will depend on progress inimplementing the plan. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on its implementation andscrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Firstedition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing EL, EN

Estonia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-01-2022Autor Niestadt Maria

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen Estonia's Recovery and Resilience Plan – one of the last such plans submitted to the European Commission – sets out

the reforms and public investment projects that Estonia intends to implement with the support of the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF). The RRF is one of the main components of Next Generation EU, an EU instrument tocounter the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Estonia's plan is one of the smallest in the EU in terms of the totalamount allocated. However, when taking into account its number of inhabitants, the country is a medium-sizedbeneficiary. Initially, Estonia requested €982.5 million in grants (so far, it has not requested RRF loans); the Councilagreed to make €969.3 million available to Estonia, of which the allocation for 2021 and 2022 is €759.5 million and isalready final. However, the remaining amount of money that is available might still change until June 2022, dependingon the updated data on Estonia's gross domestic product (GDP) compared to other EU countries. Estonia's planrepresents 0.1 % of the entire RRF, equal to 3.5 % of the country's GDP in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDPin 2019). The reforms and investments included in Estonia's plan should be completed by 2026. Its key focus is on thegreen and digital transitions, the resilience and accessibility of the healthcare system, and social inclusion. The plancould increase Estonia's GDP by between 0.8 % and 1.3 % and help to create up to 4 000 additional jobs by 2026. TheCouncil approved Estonia's plan on 25 October 2021. The European Commission disbursed €126 million in pre-financing on 17 December 2021. The next payments, in seven instalments, will depend on progress in implementingthe investments and reforms. The European Parliament, which was a great supporter of the creation of a common EUrecovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on its implementation, and scrutinisesthe work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. First edition.The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

Briefing ET, EN

Latvia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-01-2022Autor SAULNIER JEROME LEON

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | PresupuestoResumen Latvia's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) sets the package of reforms and investment measures

designed by the country in the context of the European Union (EU) response to the crisis triggered by the coronaviruspandemic. In absolute figures, Latvia has decided to use €1 826 millions of grant allocation under the Recovery andResilience Facility (RRF), while declining to avail of the loan component. These resources represent 0.3 % of the entireRRF, equal to 6 % of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU 27 GDP in2019). Through these resources, Latvia is naturally pursuing national reforms and investments that aim to furtherpromote a dynamic Latvian economy, while addressing a number of structural weaknesses. Latvia is also striving toattain major objectives such as convergence towards higher levels of standard of living, the green transition and digitaltransformation. Measures under the current plan are to be completed by 2026. Following the Council's approval of theplan, Latvia received €237 million in pre-financing in September 2021. The next payments, in a total of six instalments,will depend on progress in implementation. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate for the creation ofa common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation and discussion on itsimplementation and scrutinises the work of the European Commission. This briefing is one in a series covering all EUMember States. First edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of theplans.

Briefing EN, LV

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 50

Research for REGI, CONT and BUDG Committees - Cohesion Policy Calendar (2021-2027 and 2014-2020 Programming Periods)

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 21-01-2022Autor HAASE Diana

Ámbito político Desarrollo regional | Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la prácticaPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | Comisión PE | elaboración del Derecho de la UE | política regional de la UE | relación

interinstitucional (UE)Resumen The implementation timetable for cohesion policy is defined largely by its legislative framework. In order to be able to

plan parliamentary work and exercise systematic scrutiny of policy implementation and of the Commission’s work, it isessential to have an overview of the timing of different steps in policy implementation in the coming years. This type ofbriefing was first published (and subsequently updated) in 2014 covering the 2014-2020 programming period. Thisversion includes the policy actions of the 2021-27 period, while still indicating the last steps of the 2014-20 period. Itincludes a detailed (but non-exhaustive) timetable of policy actions in 2022, together with an overview of major actionsfor the remainder of the programming period, from 2023. Policy actions related to budgetary and budgetary controlaspects are coloured green (for the year 2022).

Briefing EN

Post-Brexit fishing quota changes: 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-01-2022Autor POPESCU Irina | SCHOLAERT FREDERIK

Ámbito político PescaResumen From 2021 to 2025, the EU is gradually transferring part of its fishing quota shares to the UK, in line with the EU-UK

Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). In total, 55 shared stocks are concerned, and 60 % of the overall Brexitquota transfer occurred in 2021. This infographic illustrates the EU quota transfer that year for some of the mostaffected fish stocks. The quota transfer in 2021 for the selected stocks totals 62 211 tonnes, with an estimated overallvalue of €103 million.

Briefing EN

Yiddish language and culture and its post-Holocaust fate in EuropeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-01-2022Autor PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Ámbito político Cultura | EducaciónResumen Yiddish is a language once spoken by Jews in an area spreading from Alsace to the Urals, influenced by and

influencing local languages and cultures. It neared extinction in the 20th century when it lost the majority of itsspeakers, mostly – but not only – through the Holocaust. Yiddish is part of European folk culture, contributing to theworks of great writers and musicians and broadening European culture more generally. Successive waves of Jewishmigration provoked by poverty, persecution, pogroms, Stalinism and Nazism, war and all forms of antisemitism, havedrastically reduced the Jewish population across Europe and, with it, the number of Yiddish speakers. The Holocaust –referred to in Yiddish as Khurbn (destruction) – was an ethnic and cultural cleansing process designed to erase anytrace of Jewish life from European culture, including Yiddish, a language perceived as 'bad German'. Some Holocaustsurvivors tried to recreate their pre-war lives and cultivated their language and culture. Others, however, traumatisedby the war, wanted a new beginning, often far from home and their children wanted to fit in and speak the locallanguage. As the use of Yiddish continues to diminish, its speakers are growing older, and its transmission amonggenerations was interrupted, Unesco has put Yiddish on the definitely endangered languages list. However, the fate ofYiddish as a dead or stifled language is not yet sealed. Traditional religious Jewish communities, mostly in Israel, andNorth and South America, but also in Europe, still use Yiddish and contribute to Yiddish culture. Moreover, Yiddish isenjoying a revival as a language and culture among both young secular Jews and the non-Jewish population, andYiddish language and culture courses, studies, and traditional Jewish Klezmer music festivals abound in Europe andbeyond. Whether this will be enough to keep this European heritage alive and what might be the EU's role in bringingthis once vibrant European culture back to life remains to be seen.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 51

Jewish art collections – Nazi lootingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-01-2022Autor PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Ámbito político CulturaResumen When the Nazis grabbed power in Germany, they had clear ideas about what art is. The persecution of Jews allowed

them to seize Jewish property, forbid Jews from running art galleries, push them out of their countries to exile, andsend them to camps and death. All this enabled some prominent Nazis to start their own art collections. However, mostof the looted valuable classical artworks were destined for existing or planned museums. Nazis and their collaboratorslooted art collections and moved them from annexed or occupied countries most often to Germany and Austria. Thishelped trade in looted art flourish not only in Paris but also in the United States. Due to cataloguing needs, storagerequirements and Allied Forces' bombings, looted cultural property was displaced many times and finally moved tocellars and salt caves in southern Germany and Austria. Similar developments took place at the Eastern Front, leadingto double looting. The Soviet army seized art looted by the Nazis in the territories it conquered and occupied, claimingthem as war trophies, and further displaced artworks across the parts of eastern Europe it held. The division ofGermany among the four occupying forces and the establishment of the Iron Curtain further complicated the task oflocating looted art, as catalogues were scattered across the continent. Due to the huge efforts of the liberating armies,works of art found in Western-occupied zones were returned to the countries from which they had been seized. In theirturn, the governments were expected to hand these items over to their rightful owners. However, this did not alwayshappen; owners and their heirs, or the artworks they were searching for, were not always located. More than 50 yearsafter WWII, to address the fact that the owners of many artworks had still not been identified, the internationalcommunity adopted the Washington Principles, the Vilnius Forum Declaration and the Terezin Declaration, as a signalthat progress towards resolving this difficult task requires museum searches and international cooperation. The aim isto help the few Holocaust survivors still alive, or their heirs, retrieve their artworks. Restitution of cultural propertylooted by Nazis and their collaborators is not only an act of justice. It is also a gesture of recognition of the Jewishcontribution to flourishing cultural and artistic life in Europe.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Ireland and Denmark in the EU: Fiftieth anniversary of accessionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-01-2022Autor NEVILLE ANN | PERCHOC Philippe

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen This year marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the accession treaties to the former European Communities by

Ireland and Denmark. The path to membership was not smooth for either country, with their first two applications madein 1961 and 1967, together with the United Kingdom, effectively blocked by French opposition. With a change ofgovernment in France, the six members of the European Communities reaffirmed their agreement to the enlargementof the Communities, and negotiations on membership began with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom(UK). In Denmark, Ireland and Norway, referendums were held to decide on possible membership. The Danish andIrish people voted 'yes', while citizens in Norway narrowly rejected membership, with 53.5 % voting 'no'. On 1 January1973, Denmark and Ireland (along with the UK) officially became members of the European Communities after morethan a decade of negotiations. Over time, Treaty ratification referendums took place in other countries too, but weremost concentrated in Ireland (7) and Denmark (4). In fact, Ireland remains unique in this sense as the only MemberState that has held a referendum on every major Treaty revision since voting in 1972 to become a member. This wasthe first enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC), bringing membership from the original six to ninemembers. It also meant that the number of Members of the European Parliament rose from 142 to 198, whichrepresented an increase of nearly 40 %. This paper looks at the background to the decision to seek membership of theEuropean Communities, examining the economic and political conditions that caused Ireland and Denmark to seek tobecome Member States. It also discusses key features of EU membership: for Ireland, the decision to join the euro andits relationship with the Schengen Agreement; and for Denmark, the opt-outs introduced with the advent of theMaastricht Treaty.

Briefing DA, EN, GA

Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive: Fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-01-2022Autor KARABOYTCHEVA Miroslava Kostova

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen The revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) is part of the 'fit for 55' package. The current ETD (Directive

2003/96/EC) is outdated and out of sync with the EU's climate and energy objectives. It favours the use of fossil fuelsand no longer contributes to the proper functioning of the internal market. The aspects of energy taxation requiringmost urgent revision are the level and structure of minimum rates, replacement of the volume-based approach toenergy taxation with one based on energy content and environmental performance, and the introduction of anindexation mechanism. The effectiveness of the current directive is further limited by outdated coverage of energyproducts, specifically biofuels, and a series of tax differentiations, reductions and exemptions. In July 2021, theCommission presented a proposal for the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive. Its objective is to align the taxationof energy products with EU energy and climate policies by promoting clean technologies, removing outdatedexemptions and reducing rates that de facto encourage the use of fossil fuels. The ETD revision is a consultationprocedure. It requires unanimity in Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the European Economic andSocial Committee. Parliament has assigned the file to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, whichappointed a rapporteur in September 2021. The ITRE committee is associated with the procedure under Rule 57. Firstedition. 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 52

‘Fit for 55’ package: Carbon border adjustment mechanismTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-01-2022Autor KRAMER Esther

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA is based on extensive internal and external research and modelling and covers a lot of ground relating to a

variety of potential impacts, both in the main text and the annexes. It is also transparent with regard to the limitationsand uncertainties of the analysis. While not all aspects could be assessed in depth, in the interest of proportionality, theIA considers the relevant impacts of the retained options, with a focus on the industrial sectors that were selected forcoverage; it addresses the electricity sector much more briefly in an annex. Although the definition of the objectiveshas some weaknesses, the intervention logic of the IA is clear. The IA could, though, have highlighted more clearly thetrade-offs between the various options in relation to different stakeholders. Furthermore, to reach non-expert policy-makers the complex and technical analysis could have been made more accessible through additional explanationsand precise links to the ETS revision. At the end, the IA highlights the relevance of political decision-making and‘weighting’ of the criteria it has presented, pointing to the need for coherence with the other initiatives in the ‘Fit for 55’legislative package.

Briefing EN

Parliaments in emergency mode: Lessons learnt after two years of pandemicTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-01-2022Autor DIAZ CREGO Maria | MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020 presented parliamentary institutions around the world with a

new and unprecedented scenario. Parliamentary rules of procedure in representative democracies are commonly builtupon the principles of pluralism, deliberation and transparency, aiming to provide an arena in which representatives ofthe people have the opportunity to publicly confront each other's points of view in a free and fair setting. It is, therefore,safe to say that ordinary parliamentary practice and procedures are essentially incompatible with measures seeking tominimise social contacts and discourage − or directly forbid − mass gatherings. As a logical result of the adoption ofthe first restrictive measures aiming to limit the spread of the virus adopted in EU Member States in the first months of2020, parliaments followed suit and implemented specific measures aiming to ensure the continuity of parliamentarybusiness while limiting the spread of the virus and protecting the health of their members and staff. In the early days ofthe pandemic, the European Parliament, together with some other EU national parliaments rushed to digitaliseparliamentary activities in an attempt to ensure that all members could take part in parliamentary proceedings despitethe crisis situation. Some EU national parliaments opted to adopt decisions with a reduced number of members andothers decided to adopt social distancing measures, while at the same time ensuring that all members could continueto take part in parliamentary activities. Nearly two years on from the beginning of the pandemic and with Covid-19infection rates spiking all over Europe due to the Omicron variant, it is time to take stock of the lessons learnt from thishealth crisis from the point of view of parliamentary law. In this vein, this publication updates a previous briefing of April2020 and analyses the modifications in the working methods of the European Parliament and selected EU nationalparliaments throughout the pandemic, aiming to show the advantages, but also the possible drawbacks of the newpractices.

Briefing XL, EN

Artificial intelligence actTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-01-2022Autor MADIEGA Tambiama André

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave gestión de riesgos | innovación | inteligencia artificial | nueva tecnología | propuesta (UE) | robótica | tecnología digital

Resumen The European Commission unveiled a new proposal for an EU regulatory framework on artificial intelligence (AI) inApril 2021. The draft AI act is the first ever attempt to enact a horizontal regulation of AI. The proposed legalframework focuses on the specific utilisation of AI systems and associated risks. The Commission proposes toestablish a technology-neutral definition of AI systems in EU law and to lay down a classification for AI systems withdifferent requirements and obligations tailored on a 'risk-based approach'. Some AI systems presenting 'unacceptable'risks would be prohibited. A wide range of 'high-risk' AI systems would be authorised, but subject to a set ofrequirements and obligations to gain access to the EU market. Those AI systems presenting only 'limited risk' would besubject to very light transparency obligations. While generally supporting the Commission's proposal, stakeholders andexperts call for a number of amendments, including revising the definition of AI systems, broadening the list ofprohibited AI systems, strengthening enforcement and redress mechanisms and ensuring proper democratic oversightof the design and implementation of EU AI regulation. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Artificial intelligence act

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Plan nacional de recuperación y resiliencia de España: Situación actualTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-01-2022Autor KARABOYTCHEVA Miroslava Kostova

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | PresupuestoResumen El plan nacional de recuperación y resiliencia de España (el Plan) es uno de los mayores que financia el instrumento

de recuperación Next Generation EU. Cuenta con la mayor cuantía, en cuanto a subvenciones, en la respuesta sinprecedentes de la UE a la crisis provocada por la pandemia de COVID-19. Por el momento, España ha decididoutilizar su asignación nacional para subvenciones en el marco del Mecanismo de Recuperación y Resiliencia (MRR).El importe propuesto y aprobado (69 500 millones EUR) supone el 9,6 % de todo el MRR, lo que equivale al 5,6 % deproducto interior bruto (PIB) del país en 2019 (siendo el MRR el 5,2 % del PIB de EU-27 en 2019). Además, lospresupuestos generales del Estado prevén una inversión de 27 000 millones de euros, alineados con el Plan. Lafinanciación del MRR se complementará con 12 400 millones EUR de los fondos REACT-UE, principalmente parainversiones en sanidad y educación, y con los fondos estructurales establecidos en el marco financiero plurianual2021-2027. Las medidas del plan deben completarse de aquí a 2026. Tras la aprobación del plan por parte delConsejo el 17 de agosto de 2021, la Comisión Europea desembolsó 9 000 millones EUR de prefinanciación a España,lo que equivale al 13 % de la asignación financiera de ese país con cargo al MRR. Los próximos pagos, en ochotramos, dependerán de los avances en la ejecución del plan. El Parlamento Europeo, que fue uno de los principalesdefensores de la creación de un instrumento común de recuperación de la UE y fue colegislador para la adopción delMRR, participa en los foros interinstitucionales de cooperación y debate sobre su ejecución y en el control del trabajode la Comisión Europea. Este briefing forma parte de una serie que abarca a todos los Estados miembros de la Unión.Primera edición. Los briefings sobre NGEU delivery (Ejecución del Next Generation EU) se actualizan en las etapasclave del ciclo de vida de los planes.

Briefing ES, EN

Labour rights in EU trade agreements: Towards stronger enforcementTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-01-2022Autor ZAMFIR Ionel

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalResumen Since 2008, when the European Union introduced elaborate sustainable development provisions into its agreement

with the Cariforum group of states, provisions on labour rights and the environment have become a central part of mostof the EU's subsequent trade agreements, the one with South Korea (2011) being the first to contain a dedicatedchapter. These provisions continue to evolve: for instance, recent agreements with some of the EU's developedpartners, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, now include additional obligations on safety and health at work.The enforcement of these provisions has, however, numerous weak points, as exposed through the extensiveinvolvement of civil society in the monitoring of trade agreements. There have been isolated cases of weakened socialprotection, despite the provisions on sustainable development that seek to prevent this from happening. A moresystematic and broader problem is that some countries have not ratified the relevant International Labour Organization(ILO) conventions and have failed to apply the ILO fundamental principles in their national legislation and practice.Whether the lack of recourse to withdrawal of trade preferences in cases of breaches contributes to the persistence ofthis problem, remains however disputed. The recently concluded dispute settlement procedure with South Korea helpsclarify the legal implications of the relevant provisions contained in this agreement, and possibly in others. The reportdrawn up by the panel handling the dispute highlights the obligations of the parties to apply the ILO fundamentalprinciples irrespective of their impact on trade, but takes a soft approach towards the obligation to ratify outstandingILO conventions. Proposals by Member States and various stakeholders include more precise and effectivemechanisms such as phased tariff reduction linked to compliance with sustainable development objectives. Thepossibility of trade sanctions has not gained traction, as it does not fit well with the EU's emphasis on consultations anddialogue with its trade partners.

Briefing EN

Right to repairTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-01-2022Autor SAJN Nikolina

Ámbito político Protección de los consumidoresResumen The European Commission has announced the establishment of a 'right to repair', with a view of saving costs for

consumers and facilitating the development of a circular economy. The right to repair may refer to different issues andsituations: repair during the legal guarantee, the right to repair after the legal guarantee has expired, and the right forconsumers to repair products themselves. Rates of repair depend on the type of a product, with the cost of repair beingthe most important reason consumers avoid repair. Research shows that consumers favour products that are easilyrepaired, but their willingness to pay for such products depends on the type of product and the way information on thereparability is presented to them. Currently, EU contract laws give consumers a right to have faulty products repairedduring the legal guarantee, while the new generation of ecodesign rules require the availability of spare parts for acertain time, at least for some products. Repair-related requirements are also present in the rules on the EU Ecolabel.The Commission is now planning a number of initiatives to improve reparability of products, including legislation on theright to repair, on empowering consumers for the green transition, a sustainable products initiative, designrequirements for electronics, and measures making the broader economic context more favourable to repair. TheEuropean Parliament has been in favour of improving consumers' right to repair for over a decade, and has in thisparliamentary term adopted two resolutions that contain a number of concrete proposals to make repairs systematic,cost-efficient and attractive. Consumer organisations and associations advocating for easier repair have called forrules to facilitate repair for non-professionals, and to guarantee consumers access to spare parts and repair manuals.Business organisations favour professional repairs, and have warned that any information requirements should notinfringe on companies' intellectual property.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Right to repair

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European green bonds: A standard for Europe, open to the worldTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-01-2022Autor SPINACI STEFANO

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen Green bonds are committed to financing or re-financing investments, projects, expenditure or assets helping to

address climate and environmental issues. Both governments and companies use them to finance the transition to amore sustainable and low-carbon economy. Since the EIB inaugurated the green bond market in 2007 with its ClimateAwareness Bond, the market has grown very fast, but it still represents only about 3 to 3.5 % of overall bond issuance.The green bond market needs to grow more quickly to achieve the targets in the Paris Agreement. The Commission'sproposal aims to establish an official EU standard for green bonds aligned with the EU taxonomy for sustainableactivities, based on a registration system and supervisory framework for external reviewers of European green bonds.The proposal is currently being examined by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, the file has beenassigned to the ECON committee. In the Council, the working party on financial services is meeting to discuss thedossier. First edition. The ‘EU Legislation in Progress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia European green bonds: A standard for Europe, open to the world

New EU scheme of generalised preferencesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-01-2022Autor ZAMFIR Ionel

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalResumen On 21 September 2021, the Commission published its proposal for a new EU scheme of generalised preferences. Two

of the current scheme’s three components are due to expire at the end of 2023, which would deprive developingcountries of a vital opportunity to trade under preferential terms with the EU. Therefore, renewing the scheme appearsto be both a necessity and an opportunity to strengthen its conditionality in the light of lessons learned and theincreased urgency for dealing with the climate. The Commission considers that the scheme has delivered on itsobjectives, and proposes some ‘fine-tuning’. To ensure that its benefits remain broadly shared, it proposes changes tothe economic vulnerability criteria for GSP+ and to the product graduation threshold for Standard GSP. Taking onboard proposals from civil society, but also from the Parliament, the Commission proposes to extend negativeconditionality to environmental and good governance conventions, and to improve monitoring and stakeholders’involvement overall. Civil society organisations and other stakeholders have put forward some more ambitiousproposals, such as making the monitoring fully transparent and rewarding countries that fulfil jointly agreedbenchmarks related to the conventions under the GSP with additional preferences. First edition. The ‘EU Legislation inProgress’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Democracy and human rights in Latin America: Is democratic erosion gathering pace?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-01-2022Autor GOMEZ RAMIREZ Enrique

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Democracia | Derechos humanosResumen Since the mid-1980s, Latin America has enjoyed long and broad democratic expansion, and has made considerable

progress with regard to free and fair elections and respect for human rights. As the 'most democratic emerging-marketregion in the world', over 80 % of the Latin American population enjoy democracy, a proportion surpassed only inwestern Europe and North America. Standards vary widely however: while Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile stand out inall classifications as the most free and democratic, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba remain at the bottom of the table.However, the tide may be turning for this successful 'third democratic wave' in Latin America, as many countries sufferdemocratic erosion or even backsliding. The progressive decline of democratic indicators in the region has beenexacerbated by factors such as the self-interest of the ruling elites or rampant corruption in some countries, and mayhave been accelerated by the Covid 19 pandemic, which has justified the implementation of freedom-restrictingmeasures and has facilitated human rights abuses. The human rights situation in Latin America and the Caribbean hasindeed deteriorated more generally, with an increase in poverty, inequality, violence, and rising migration from theworst affected countries. The EU has contributed to democracy and human rights in the region by sending electionobservation missions, participating in initiatives such as the Colombia peace process and its implementation or in thecreation of the International Contact Group on Venezuela, and financing projects. The European Parliament hasmeanwhile accompanied democratic developments and crises closely through its resolutions, the Sakharov Prize andother initiatives.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 55

The French Parliament and EU affairsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-01-2022Autor RITTELMEYER Yann-Sven

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen The role of the French Parliament has varied under successive French Republics. The Constitution of the Fifth

Republic, adopted in 1958, was amended by referendum in 1962 to establish the direct election of the President byuniversal suffrage. This created a hybrid political regime with some presidential and some parliamentarycharacteristics, sometimes described as a 'semi-presidential regime' or a 'hyper-presidential' regime. The governmentis responsible to Parliament, but contrary to classical parliamentary regimes, the President plays an important role. ThePresident has the power to dissolve the National Assembly (Assemblée nationale). He or she appoints the PrimeMinister, as well as – on the recommendation of the Prime Minister – the other members of the government.Traditionally, the Prime Minister makes the government's programme or a general policy statement an issue of a voteof confidence before the National Assembly. The latter can overthrow the government, but is largely subordinate to theexecutive – consisting of the President and the government placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. In periodsof 'cohabitation', the National Assembly plays a greater role in supporting the Prime Minister, who in this specificconfiguration acts as leader of the majority. Legislative powers are exercised by the two houses, who vote on laws,monitor government action and assess public policy. The National Assembly (Assemblée nationale) is elected for fiveyears by direct universal suffrage. The indirectly elected Senate (Sénat) represents the 'territorial communities of theRepublic' (Article 24 of the Constitution) and shares legislative power with the National Assembly. It embodiescontinuity, as it cannot be dissolved and half of its Members are renewed every three years. However, in cases ofdisagreement, the National Assembly has the final say. This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments(NPs) and EU affairs. It aims to provide an overview of the way the NPs of EU Member States are structured and howthey process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also provides information on relevant NP publications.

Briefing EN, FR

Priority dossiers under the French EU Council PresidencyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-01-2022Autor ATTARD LUCIENNE

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen France will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2022. It will initiate the work of the Trio

Presidency composed of France, Czechia and Sweden. Executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic,who is elected by direct, popular vote, and the Government. The Prime Minister, appointed by the President, togetherwith the Ministers, is answerable to the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament, and they can be removedby a vote of censure. Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the Senate. The National Assembly is theprincipal parliamentary body, composed of 577 members, who are elected directly for five-year terms. The Presidentialelection will coincide with the French Presidency, in April 2022. France is a founding Member State of the EuropeanUnion, and has already held the rotating Presidency of the Council 13 times. The French President, EmmanuelMacron, will present the political priorities of the Presidency to the European Parliament during the January plenarysession in Strasbourg. While the last French Presidency, in 2008, was characterised by the global financial crisis, theforthcoming one is expected to be dominated by the ongoing Covid pandemic, the cost of energy crisis and theaftermath of Brexit. The French Presidency will very likely give special impetus to the conclusion of the Conference onthe Future of Europe, which should take place in the first half of 2022. The plan is for the Trio Presidency, in its role asmember/observer in the Executive Board of the Conference, to draw on the outcomes of the various activities andcitizens’ recommendations, outline how they define the future of the Union, and start the implementation process.

Briefing EN, FR

CAP horizontal regulation: Financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy for2023-2027

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 21-12-2021Autor ROSSI Rachele

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave ayuda a la agricultura | ayuda financiera | control de gestión | desarrollo rural | FEADER | FEAGA | FEOGA | gasto

agrícola | informe | política agrícola común | producción agrícola | propuesta (UE)Resumen As part of the preparation of the EU budget for 2021-2027, the European Commission put forward a new set of

regulations to shape the future EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on 1 June 2018. The proposal for a regulationon the financing, management and monitoring of the CAP provides the legislative framework for adapting the financing,management and monitoring rules to a new CAP delivery model. This seeks to achieve more subsidiarity andsimplification, with greater responsibility given to Member States, a shift from ensuring single transaction compliance tomonitoring system performance in each Member State, and reduced 'red tape', among other things. Following theiradoption in December 2021, the new CAP regulations will apply from 1 January 2023.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 56

CAP strategic plansTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-12-2021Autor ROSSI Rachele

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave agricultor | agricultura sostenible | ayuda a la agricultura | ayuda financiera | desarrollo rural | intercambio agrícola |

política agrícola común | política en materia de cambio climático | propuesta (UE) | protección del medio ambiente |régimen de pago único | sector agrario | simplificación de las formalidades

Resumen The Commission's legislative proposals on the future of the common agricultural policy (CAP) were published on 1June 2018. They comprise three proposals: a regulation setting out rules on support for CAP strategic plans; aregulation on the single common market organisation (CMO) and a horizontal regulation on financing, managing andmonitoring the CAP. The proposal for a regulation on CAP strategic plans introduces a new delivery model, describedby the Commission as a fundamental shift in the CAP, involving a move from compliance towards results andperformance. It includes a new distribution of responsibilities between the EU and Member States. A new planningprocess is proposed that will cover all the CAP measures, previously covered by different regulations and policydesigns. Following its adoption in December 2021, the CAP strategic plans regulation will apply as of 1 January 2023.Fourth edition of a briefing originally drafted by James McEldowney and Patrick Kelly. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

CAP Amending Regulation (CMO): Amending regulations on the CMO for agricultural products, qualityschemes and measures for remote regions

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 21-12-2021Autor ROJEK Beata

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Agricultura y desarrollo rural | Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave denominación de origen | denominación del producto | etiquetado | organización común de mercado | producto

agrícola | vinoResumen As part of the work on the EU's 2021-2027 budget, the European Commission proposed a set of regulations with the

aim of reshaping and modernising the EU's common agricultural policy (CAP). Put forward on 1 June 2018, the 'CAPreform package' was finally adopted in December 2021. One of these regulations, the Amending Regulation,introduces changes to rules governing the common market organisation (CMO) in agricultural products (including therules on wine), the EU quality schemes (geographical indications) and the support measures for remote regions. Theaim is to equip agricultural markets and support measures to face new challenges, update provisions, simplifyprocedures and ensure consistency with other regulations on the future CAP. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Proposal for a regulation to fight money laundering and counter terrorist financingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-12-2021Autor BAKOWSKI Piotr

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen On 20 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of legislative proposals in the area of anti-money-

laundering efforts and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The package includes a proposal for aregulation on preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing. The proposedregulation would be the central element of what is commonly referred to as an EU 'single rulebook' on AML/CFT. Itsdetailed and directly applicable provisions would replace the minimum rules of the EU AML directives currently in force.The package has been adopted in response to repeated calls by the European Parliament and the Council of theEuropean Union to enhance the EU's regulatory framework on AML/CFT. The aim is for the framework to becomemore coherent, keeping in step with technological innovations and related new forms of crime, as well as remaining inline with international standards in the field. In Parliament, the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and onCivil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs are jointly responsible for the file. First edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Fighting money laundering and counter terrorist financing

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Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders of 16 December 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-12-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político DemocraciaResumen 'The European Council will revert to the issue' or 'reiterates' its view, were probably the most used sentences in the

conclusions issued following the 16 December 2021 meeting of the Heads of State or Government. For many of theissues on the agenda, such as energy, where the geopolitical stakes are high, differences in position remain in theEuropean Council; achieving consensus is therefore part of a longer process. On security and defence, no bigdecisions, but specific guidelines and targeted requests, defined this summit. As regards the discussions on bothCovid-19 and migration, the conclusions mainly include reiterations of previous commitments. Within the broadbouquet of external relations topics, EU leaders warned Russia of 'massive consequences' in case of further militaryescalation in Ukraine. They also denounced the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees by the Belarusian regimefor political purposes, and called for 'the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners'. EU leaders alsoreaffirmed the Union's commitment to cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood, calling to speed up work on thenew Agenda for the Mediterranean, praised the mediation efforts of the African Union (AU) in Ethiopia, calling for 'anunconditional ceasefire' and dialogue, and prepared for the 17-18 February 2022 EU-AU Summit. President CharlesMichel recalled EU Member States' solidarity when mentioning the unacceptable pressure exerted by China onLithuania. As for the Euro Summit, it called again for the completion of Banking Union and the Capital Markets Union.

Briefing EN

Anti-money-laundering packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-12-2021Autor GIRARD VERONIQUE

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia |Evaluación de impacto ex ante

Resumen The IA covers four Commission proposals on anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism. Thislegislative package includes major changes designed to strengthen and tackle shortcomings in the current regulatoryframework, such as the creation of a new AML authority. This briefing analyses the strengths and weaknesses of theimpact assessment accompanying the proposed revisions. The Commission consulted a wide range of stakeholders tosupport the initiative. The IA clearly defines the problem and the objectives that are directly linked to the problemdrivers. However, the IA does not identify any operational objectives that would have facilitated the monitoring of thepreferred options. Moreover, some options could have been refined to be more specific, such as for example on theexact criteria for selecting 'risky entities' subject to direct supervision at EU level. Finally, improvements requested bythe RSB appear to be only partially addressed in the final IA.

Briefing EN

The EU and Russia: A fragile neighbourhood [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-12-2021Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen Russia’s military build-up along its border with Ukraine, and its masterminding – alleged by many politicians and

analysts – of the refugee crisis on the borders of Belarus with Poland and Lithuania, have sparked concerns over theimplications of Moscow’s aggressive foreign policy. Russia has amassed nearly 100 000 troops near the Ukrainianborder, provoking renewed fears that Moscow is about to invade, seven years after it annexed the Crimean peninsulaand destabilised the eastern regions of Ukraine. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko, a close ally of RussianPresident Vladimir Putin, has allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them on toBelarus’s borders with neighbouring EU Member States. This note gathers links to recent publications andcommentaries from many international think tanks on Russia’s foreign and security policy and its implications forneighbouring countries, the European Union and global geopolitics.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 58

The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar: Turning the spotlight on workers’ rightsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-12-2021Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Ámbito político Derechos humanosResumen Enormous natural gas resources have turned Qatar into one of the world's richest countries. The 11 610 km2 nation

currently has the fourth highest GDP per capita in the world. The absolute monarchy's estimated 340 000-350 000citizens benefit from free education, free healthcare, virtually guaranteed – and well paid – employment, and payalmost no taxes. However, the great majority of the emirate’s nearly 3 million inhabitants live in very differentconditions. Qatar has the highest ratio of migrants in the world: 85 % of its population are migrants and 94 % of itsworkforce comes from abroad, mostly from south Asia and Africa. In contrast to the small percentage of expatriatesfrom the West and other Gulf States, Asian and African migrants live and work in harsh conditions. Around 1 millionare employed in construction, and 100 000 are domestic workers. In December 2010, FIFA, world football's governingbody, granted Qatar the right to host the 2022 World Cup, which is scheduled to take place from 21 November to 18December. Expanding on an existing development programme enshrined in the Qatar National Vision 2030, thecountry embarked on an extensive building programme to prepare for the World Cup, involving an estimated 1 millionmigrant workers. However, these preparations placed the spotlight on Qatar’s poor treatment of migrant workers. Inresponse to international pressure, Qatar has introduced important legal changes to improve the situation of theseworkers, which the EU has welcomed. However, according to human rights organisations, the country needs to takefurther steps to stop abuses. Of particular concern is the kafala sponsorship system, which is widely used throughoutthe six Gulf Cooperation Council States and gives disproportionate power to employers, leading to widespread abuseof migrant workers’ rights. Even though Qatar has started to dismantle the kafala system, important elements remain inplace. Moreover, ensuring compliance with more favourable labour laws remains a challenge. Since 2008, theEuropean Parliament has adopted four resolutions addressing the situation of migrant workers in Qatar; it has calledon Qatar to end the 'deplorable situation' of migrant workers and prevent preparations for the 2022 World Cup frombeing 'overshadowed by allegations of forced labour'.

Briefing EN

Towards a new Generalised Scheme of Preferences regulation for developing countriesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-12-2021Autor IOANNIDES Isabelle

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacional | Derechos humanos | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitaria | Evaluación deimpacto ex ante

Resumen The European Commission is proposing a new General Scheme of Preferences regulation to replace the current onethat expires at the end of 2023. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment (IA) on the proposal findsthat the IA logically links the problems, their drivers, the objectives and the policy interventions under consideration.However, the IA remains evasive on the impacts of crucial aims of the regulation -- poverty eradication and advancingsustainable development and good governance. Additionally, when presenting pro and con arguments, it is not alwaysapparent where the IA stands on the issues. Moreover, only some of the operational objectives are specific andmeasurable, raising questions as to the feasibility of those that are not. It is also important to note that on productcoverage, a key issue raised in the EP’s 2019 resolution, there seems to be a discrepancy between therecommendations analysed in the external study and their interpretation in the IA.

Briefing EN

Nominations for Members ofthe European Court of AuditorsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-12-2021Autor FRANKE Michaela

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoResumen The Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs in the European Parliament (EP) is about to draw up an in-house briefing

on national nomination procedures for Members of the European Court of Auditors (ECA). The purpose of the briefingis to provide relevant information to the Members of the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) ahead of hearings ofMembers-designate of the ECA (of which there will be 8 in the course of 2022). In order to develop a betterunderstanding of the national procedures, we are interested to see if and how national chambers are involved in thenomination process.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 59

Participatory foresight: Preventing an impact gap in the EU's approach to sustainability and resilienceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-12-2021Autor KONONENKO Vadim

Ámbito político Planificación prospectiva | Política de investigaciónResumen The concepts of 'sustainability' and 'resilience' have been steadily gaining prominence in the EU's political discourse.

Most recently in 2019, the von der Leyen Commission placed the goal of increased sustainability – environmental,social and economic – at the heart of its European Green Deal set of policy initiatives. As the EU achieves higherlevels of sustainability, it will be more resilient, that is, capable of better withstanding a future crisis or shock, whether inthe form of another pandemic, an economic downturn or a climate emergency. By putting sustainability and resilienceat the centre of its strategic foresight framework, the EU can anchor specific policy objectives in broader narrativesabout its future. However, this may also carry a risk of creating an 'impact gap' – a mismatch between citizens' andstakeholders' expectations, on the one hand, and actual outcomes of policies, on the other. This briefing examines howparticipatory foresight can help to address a potential impact gap in the EU's endeavours related to sustainableresilience and strategic autonomy.

Briefing EN

Désarmement, démobilisation, réintégration : Émergence du concept dans la communauté internationaleTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-12-2021Autor externo Bilquin, Bruno

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Seguridad y defensaResumen La Commission européenne et le Haut représentant de l'Union européenne (UE) devraient adopter le 22 décembre

2021 une communication conjointe sur une approche stratégique de l’UE pour soutenir, dans les pays tiers, ledésarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration (DDR) des ex-combattants issus de groupes armés rebelles. Il s'agitd'aligner le concept et les programmes DDR sur les défis sécuritaires, géopolitiques et de politique de développementdes pays partenaires, en tenant compte des approches évolutives des autres acteurs majeurs du secteur dans lacommunauté internationale. Parmi ces acteurs, l'ONU paraît incontournable, qui a développé depuis longtemps desapproches DDR et soutient ou pourrait soutenir de nombreux programmes DDR dans le monde. Le concept DDRstratégique de l'UE remontant à 2006, son actualisation s'impose. La nouvelle stratégie DDR devrait aussi permettre àl'UE de renforcer sa crédibilité comme pourvoyeuse de sécurité sur le plan mondial. Dans ses relations avec ses payspartenaires les plus fragiles, dans son voisinage comme au-delà, l'UE se mobilise pour une nouvelle stratégie DDRdes groupes armés qui soit à la hauteur du rôle qu'elle entend assurer, aux côtés de la communauté internationale etde ses alliés comme acteur majeur de pacification et de stabilisation au plan mondial. Le Parlement européen soutientles projets DDR de l'Union et demande que la future stratégie DDR soit cohérente avec les instruments de la politiquede sécurité et de défense commune ainsi qu'avec son aide au développement.

Briefing FR

Emergency measures on migration: Article 78(3) TFEUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-12-2021Autor DEL MONTE Micaela | LUYTEN KATRIEN

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen On 1 December 2021, the Commission proposed a Council decision on emergency measures to help Latvia, Lithuania

and Poland face the complex migratory situation at their respective borders with Belarus. The measures provide for anextension of the registration period for asylum applications; the application of the border asylum procedure to processall asylum claims; reception conditions covering only basic needs; and simplified and quicker national returnprocedures for rejected asylum-seekers. The proposal is based on Article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEU (TFEU), which provides for the adoption of provisional measures in the event of a 'sudden increase of arrivals ofthird-country nationals'. Article 78(3) TFEU was first used during the 2015 migration crisis to help Greece and Italy. Onthe basis of this article and in line with Article 80 TFEU, the Council of the EU at the time adopted binding decisionsproviding for the relocation from these two countries of 160 000 people so as to ensure a fair and balanced distributionof, and sharing of responsibility for, asylum-seekers who were already present in the EU. Despite most Member States'willingness to relocate asylum-seekers, some challenged the Council decision before the Court of Justice of the EU(the Court) or refused to implement the decision. As a result, the Court's jurisprudence helped to clarify the conceptand scope of 'provisional measures' within the meaning of Article 78(3) TFEU. Greece was the first EU Member Stateto unilaterally invoke Article 78(3) TFEU, in response to a sudden increase of arrivals of third-country nationals fromTurkey in March 2020. The Greek emergency legislative act was heavily criticised because Article 78(3) TFEU is notintended to enable Member States to take emergency measures unilaterally. It requires the Council to take a decisionon a Commission proposal and after consulting Parliament. This Briefing expands on and updates an 'at a glance' notefrom March 2020, written by Anja Radjenovic.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 60

'Fit for 55' package: Revision of the Effort-Sharing RegulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-12-2021Autor KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA analyses the nature and scale of the problem, which triggers the revision of the Effort Sharing Regulation. While

subsidiarity is suffiicently addressed, the proportionality aspects of the revision are not addressed by the IA. Onegeneral and three specific objectives, clearly deriving from the problem, were set up. Three policy options wereidentified and analysed in detail. The options (and their sub-options) were compared in terms of their potential toachieve the specific objectives, in particular, regarding their scope, environmental integrity, distribution of efforts (interms of fairness and cost-efficiency) and flexibility offered. The options have been analysed mostly for theirenvironmental, economic and administrative impacts. Stakeholder views are abundently used and transparentlyreferenced throughout the analysis of impact. The IA is based on a solid knowledge base combining the use ofqualitative and quantitiave methods.

Briefing EN

The EP’s response to the COVID-19 crisis: budgetary impactTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-12-2021Autor FRANKE Michaela

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoResumen The EP’s budget is drawn up during the year n-1, with the preparations in its Directorates General already starting in

the last quarter of the year n-2. The budgetary procedure - first inside the EP for the institution’s own budget, then forthe budget of the EU as a whole in the interinstitutional part of the procedure - lasts throughout the year n-1, with anagreement usually reached during the last quarter of year n-1. For example, the preparations for the 2020 budget inthe Directorates General started towards the end of 2018, with the main budgetary process taking place in 2019.

Briefing EN

Bronisław Geremek: In search of a united EuropeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-12-2021Autor PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Ámbito político Cultura | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen From his childhood in the Warsaw Ghetto to his tragic death in a road accident while working at the European

Parliament in 2008, Bronisław Geremek faced many personal, professional and political challenges during a period ofconstant turbulence. A world-renowned historian, he was interested in the poor, the excluded and the marginalisedduring the Middle Ages, mainly working as a researcher at the Sorbonne and Warsaw University. The Soviet army’sinvasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 marked the start of his political involvement with those opposing the communistregime. He secretly gave history lectures, spoke in defence of workers persecuted following the cost-of-living riots in1976, and went to Gdańsk in August 1980 to support the strike led by Lech Wałęsa. Geremek subsequently becamean adviser to the founder of the Solidarność trade union. His involvement led to his imprisonment following the militarycoup in December 1981 and the loss of his position as a professor, but guaranteed his place in negotiations betweenthe communist regime and the democratic opposition in 1989. As a member of the first semi-democratic parliament inthe Soviet bloc, he subsequently became Foreign Minister and started the negotiations for Poland’s accession to theEuropean Union. He was elected as a Member of the European Parliament in 2004. His research as a historianfocused on Europe as a civilisation, on questions of European identity and integration, and on civil society. Due to hishistorical research, he had a capacity for in-depth analysis that he used in his European political work and involvement.He concluded that a European public space was essential in order to encourage European civic engagement andawareness.

Briefing DE, EN, FR, PL

Climate action in the European Union: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-12-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen At a time when the European Union (EU) is preparing a major revision of its climate and energy framework in line with

the objectives of the European Green Deal and the targets set in the European Climate Law, this briefing looks atoverall progress on climate action. Although the EU met its 2020 targets for reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) andincreasing renewable energy use and energy efficiency in the extraordinary context of the coronavirus crisis, pandemicrecovery led energy consumption and emissions to rebound in 2021. Member States are required to invest 37 % of EURecovery and Resilience Facility Funds on climate objectives. The European Climate Law sets the targets of reducingnet GHG emissions by 'at least' 55 % by 2030, compared with 1990, and achieving climate neutrality by 2050.However, current climate and energy legislation for the 2021-2030 period is still based on a lower 2030 target of 40 %emission reduction, as are Member States' national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period,required by the Governance Regulation. With the 'fit for 55' package presented in July 2021, the Commission is aimingto bring EU climate and energy legislation in line with the new targets. Member States need to update their NECPs byJune 2024.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 61

Ireland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-12-2021Autor LILYANOVA Velina

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen Ireland's National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) is relatively small compared to the plans of most Member

States. In absolute terms and per capita, Ireland has the second smallest allocation (after Luxembourg) under theRecovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) €989 million entirely in grants. So far, it has not requested any loans (themaximum available loan amount is estimated at €18.7 billion). Most of the funds (€914.4 million) are expected to belegally committed by December 2022. A further set of grants (the remaining amount) will be allocated in 2023,depending on economic developments. Ireland has not requested pre-financing; its grants are planned to be disbursedin five instalments. Relative to the size of the Irish economy, its RRF grants are not large: these are equivalent toaround 0.3 % of the country's 2019 GDP, while the total RRF amounts to 5.2 % of 2019 EU-27 GDP. Given also thatspending will be spread over the years up to 2026, the RRF is not expected to have a significant direct impact onIreland's key macroeconomic indicators. The European Commission estimates that it could increase Ireland's GDP by0.3-0.5 % by 2026. А more significant indirect impact is expected from the overall boost to the EU economy and theassociated cross-border spillover effects. The plan's overall objective is to contribute to a sustainable, equitable, greenand digital recovery. It complements the government's broader domestic recovery efforts under the economic recoveryplan, underpinned by the national development plan (NDP) of €165 billion, for 2021-2030. Although the RRF allocationamounts to less than 1 % of the total NDP investment, it will contribute to key reforms and investments. With 41.9 % offunding allocated for climate and 31.5 % for digital measures, the NRRP's16 investment and 9 reform projects will alsofocus on strategic EU priorities. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional fora for cooperation anddiscussion on the implementation of the RRF, and scrutinises the work of the European Commission.

Briefing EN, GA

Germany's National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-12-2021Autor JOCHHEIM Ulrich | MILDEBRATH Hendrik Alexander

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | PresupuestoResumen Germany is set to receive €25.6 billion in non-repayable support from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the

unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. This amount corresponds to 3.7 % ofthe entire RRF and to 0.7 % of Germany's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). The National Recovery and ResiliencePlan (NRRP) for Germany amounts to €27.9 billion (0.81 % of 2019 GDP) and does not include requests for loans.Excluding value-added tax, this corresponds to a net amount of at least €26.5 billion, slightly above the maximumfinancial contribution of €25.6 billion (0.74 % of 2019 GDP) that Germany can expect. For most of the measures,additional funding will also come from national sources. There is a strong focus on the green transition. Measuresrelating to climate protection –including key actions on mobility and housing – reach at least 42 % of the allocation. TheGerman RRP shows an even stronger digital ambition, reaching at least 52 % of the allocation and ranging fromindustry, to education, social policy and healthcare, to public administration. Following Council approval of the plan, theEuropean Commission, on 26 August 2021, disbursed €2.25 billion to Germany in pre-financing, equivalent to 9 % ofthe country's financial allocation under the RRF. (Germany did not ask for a higher share of pre-financing because the€2.25 billion was already reflected in budgetary acts adopted earlier). The remaining 91 % will be paid in fiveinstalments once Germany has satisfactorily fulfilled the milestones and targets identified in relation to RRFimplementation. An amount of €16.3 billion will be available to be legally committed by 31 December 2022. TheEuropean Parliament strongly advocated the establishment of a common EU recovery instrument. Parliamentparticipates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on its implementation and scrutinises the EuropeanCommission's work.

Briefing DE, EN

Revision of the LULUCF Regulation: Strengthening the role of the land use, land-use change and forestrysector in climate action

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 13-12-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen To align regulations and policies with the legally binding goals – delivering, by 2030, a 55 % net greenhouse gas

emissions reduction compared to 1990, and reaching climate neutrality in Europe by 2050 – on 14 July the EuropeanCommission presented its first proposals under the 'fit for 55' package. One of these proposals involves amendingRegulation (EU) 2018/841 on emissions and removals from land use, land-use change and forestry (the LULUCFRegulation). Among the main changes envisaged are to merge, as of 2030, the LULUCF sector with the non-CO2agricultural sector in a new climate pillar, which would have to achieve climate neutrality by 2035. Moreover, by 2030,LULUCF carbon removals would have to increase to 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e). For the post-2025period, the Commission would set individual targets for each Member State. The proposal has been referred to theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed VilleNiinistö (Greens/EFA, Finland) as rapporteur. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated atkey stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 62

Fit for 55 package: Recasting the Energy Efficiency DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-12-2021Autor EISELE Katharina

Ámbito político Energía | Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Medio ambienteResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Commission’s impact assessment (IA)

accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 14 July 2021 and referred to the European Parliament’sCommittee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The proposal for a recast Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) ispart of the Commission’s ‘Fit for 55’ package that aims to adapt EU law to the new EU objective of a minimum 55 %reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030. This objective was laid down in the new European ClimateLaw, adopted in June 2021, which puts the EU on the path to achieving climate neutrality (net zero GHG emissions) by2050. As originally enacted, the EED (Directive 2012/27/EU) established a common framework for promoting energyefficiency to reach the EU’s 20 % energy efficiency target by 2020 (the target was set in the directive itself). The EEDwas amended by Directive (EU) 2018/2002, which set the more ambitious EU goal of improving energy efficiency by atleast 32.5 % by 2030 and extended its validity beyond 2020 to help achieve the new goal.

Briefing EN

Revision of the third energy package for gas: Decarbonising the gas market. Regulation 715/2009/EU andDirective 2009/73/EU

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 13-12-2021Autor TENHUNEN Susanna

Ámbito político EnergíaResumen Decarbonisation of the internal gas market is necessary for attaining the EU's climate target of reducing greenhouse

gas emission by 55 % by 2030 and reaching net zero emissions by 2050. The revision of the current Gas Regulationand Gas Directive, adopted in 2009 for the natural gas market, is underpinned by the strategies on energy systemintegration and on a hydrogen economy. Introduction of renewable and low-carbon gases to the energy systemrequires a profound transformation of the gas market, as announced in the 2021 Commission work programme and the'fit for 55' package. Different alliances and common projects bringing together regulators, civil society and stakeholdershave quickly emerged to tackle various aspects of this transformation and to open new partnerships. The EuropeanParliament supports the creation of a competitive decarbonised internal energy market. It supports energy efficiencyand encourages decarbonisation primarily through direct electrification using renewable sources. However, it also seesa role for renewable-based fuels for hard-to-abate sectors, such as heavy vehicle transport, aviation, steel and thefertiliser industry. In line with other EU institutions, it considers low-carbon gases as an intermediate solution, andunderlines the importance of taking into account the diversity of national energy systems.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the meeting of EU leaders on 16 December 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-12-2021Autor DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos exteriores | Coronavirus | Democracia | Energía | Espacio de libertad,seguridad y justicia | Seguridad y defensa

Resumen The last regular European Council meeting of 2021, on 16 December, will discuss a broad range of topics, notably thecoronavirus pandemic, crisis management and resilience, energy prices, security and defence, migration, and externalrelations. In the context of the worsening epidemiological situation and the emergence of the Omicron variant, EUleaders will address progress in vaccination across the EU and the impact of new restrictions on the single market.They will also discuss international solidarity and ways of ensuring global vaccine coverage. Their debate on securityand defence will probably focus on two intertwined outstanding issues, the Strategic Compass and the forthcomingcooperation declaration with NATO. On migration, EU leaders are expected to review the follow-up to their previouscommitments and address the migration situation in the English Channel. In the external relations field, they will mostlikely discuss the situation in Ukraine and at the Belarus border, the developments in Ethiopia as well as preparationsfor the EU-African Union summit. As the European Council meeting will take place back to back with the EasternPartnership Summit, EU leaders could take stock of the outcome of the latter. The Euro Summit directly after theEuropean Council meeting will focus on the Covid recovery and review progress on the Banking and Capital MarketsUnions

Briefing EN

'Fit for 55' legislative package: ReFuel EU AviationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-12-2021Autor TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The impact assessment (IA) accompanying Commission's ReFuelEU Aviation proposal provides a qualitative and

quantitative analysis, which is based on sound and recent data. The IA presents clearly described policy options andopenly explains uncertainties in the analysis. However, contrary to the Better Regulation Guidelines, the IA does notassess the impacts on SMEs. In addition, the assessment would have benefited of further clarification in thecomparison of options, the scale of the defined problems, and monitoring and evaluation plans. Moreover, thedescription of stakeholder consultation lacks some transparency.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 63

Boosting cooperation on health technology assessmentTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-12-2021Autor AMAND-EECKHOUT Laurence

Ámbito político Salud públicaPalabra clave ciencias médicas | cooperación científica | cooperación transfronteriza | cuidado de la salud | derechos del enfermo |

evaluación tecnológica | innovación | intercambio de información | material médico-quirúrgico | propuesta (UE) | saludpública

Resumen The European Commission has proposed a regulation on health technology assessment (HTA). HTA is a research-based tool that supports decision-making in healthcare by assessing the added value of a given health technologycompared to others. The proposal would provide the basis for permanent EU-level cooperation in four areas. MemberStates would still be responsible for assessing the non-clinical (economic, ethical, social, etc.) aspects of healthtechnology, and for pricing and reimbursement. While Member States could choose to delay participation in the jointwork until three years after the rules enter into force, it would become mandatory after six years. The EuropeanParliament adopted its final position at first reading on 14 February 2019. In the Council, work was carried out underseven consecutive presidencies. On 22 June 2021, the co-legislators reached a provisional agreement ininterinstitutional trilogue negotiations. The Council's Permanent Representatives Committee endorsed the provisionalagreement on 30 June 2021. Parliament's ENVI committee voted in favour of the text on 13 July 2021. The Councilformally adopted its first-reading position on 9 November 2021. On 30 November 2021, ENVI adopted itsrecommendation for second reading, which is to be debated and voted during the December plenary session. Theregulation, once adopted, will start to apply three years after its entry into force. Fifth edition of a briefing originallydrafted by Nicole Scholz. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout thelegislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Migration: Latest challenges [What Think Tanks are Thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-12-2021Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen The current crisis on the Poland–Belarus border and renewed attempts by migrants to cross the Channel from France

to the United Kingdom have put a new spotlight on the dilemma of how the European Union should deal with refugeesescaping repression and poverty in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, and some parts of Africa. InBelarus, authorities have allowed migrants to take flights into the country to purposely transfer them to their borderswith the neighbouring EU Member States of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Meanwhile, London and Paris arediscussing ways to clamp down on migrants’ attempts to cross the Channel. The Turkish and Mediterranean migrationroutes from Africa to Italy and Spain also remain active. This note gathers links to the recent publications andcommentaries from many international think tanks on migration in Europe and on debates on how to reform its rules.

Briefing EN

WTO negotiations on fishery subsidiesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-12-2021Autor SCHOLAERT FREDERIK

Ámbito político PescaResumen Accounting for 17 % of the global average per capita intake of animal protein, fisheries products support many people's

livelihoods and make a significant contribution to food security. However, more than a third of world stocks are fishedat biologically unsustainable levels. Economic losses from the depletion of fish stocks are estimated at US$83 billion. Areduction in fishing capacity and effort would contribute to the recovery of stocks, yet many governments of fishingcountries continue to support the sector with harmful fishery subsidies. Subsidies that directly increase fishing capacityand may lead to overfishing are estimated at about US$22 billion worldwide. Although there are no specific global ruleson fisheries subsidies, they are currently governed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidiesand Countervailing Measures. However, subsidy rules in this agreement are geared towards trade distortion asopposed to the adverse effects on the environment. While new fisheries subsidies disciplines have been part of WTO-level negotiations since 2001, the negotiating mandate was rewritten in 2005 with the aim of eliminating subsidies thatcontribute to overcapacity and overfishing, while also taking into account special and differential treatment fordeveloping countries. Negotiations stalled in 2011, but were revived thanks to the 2015 UN sustainable developmentgoals, whereby government leaders committed to ban harmful fisheries subsidies by 2020, including those thatcontribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The negotiations have been very difficult because they bringtogether two very different worlds, namely fisheries management and the WTO rules system. More specifically, not allmembers consider certain subsidies to be equally harmful, as views and practices in fisheries management varywidely. On 24 November 2021, a draft agreement was submitted to ministers ahead of the upcoming 12th MinisterialConference (MC12). The text includes a ban on subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing, such assupport for the construction of vessels and for operational costs. A number of exemptions would apply, e.g. for certaindeveloping countries and, important for the EU, where fish stocks are exploited at biologically sustainable levels.MC12, which was set to start on 30 November 2021 and had already been postponed from 2020, was put off againbecause of renewed travel restrictions. New dates have yet to be set.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 64

Building up resilience to cross-border health threats: Moving towards a European health unionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-12-2021Autor AMAND-EECKHOUT Laurence

Ámbito político Coronavirus | Salud públicaPalabra clave ayuda de urgencia | cooperación transfronteriza | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | epidemiología | gestión de

crisis | intercambio de información | medicina preventiva | propuesta (UE) | salud públicaResumen On 11 November 2020, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation on serious cross-border

threats to health. In the light of lessons learned from the coronavirus crisis, it aims to strengthen the EU's healthsecurity by revising Decision 1082/2013/EU (the 'Cross-Border Health Threats Decision'). The proposal was presentedin a package that also includes proposals to strengthen the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control(ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), as first steps towards a European health union. Stakeholderswidely welcomed the proposal and the package. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for strongercooperation on health. Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety is responsible forthe file. The Council agreed its position on 23 July 2021. Parliament voted the committee report in plenary on 14September 2021, thereby setting its negotiating mandate and opening the way for interinstitutional negotiations. On 11November 2021, Parliament voted again on the proposal, to update its negotiation mandate to ensure coherencebetween the EU Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and the proposed regulation oncross-border health threats. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by Nicole Scholz. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The future of EU borders in times of pandemic

Japan's global vision: Tokyo's evolving foresight practices, Indo-Pacific strategy and EU-partnershipTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-12-2021Autor NOONAN EAMONN

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Planificación prospectivaResumen Since 1970, Japan has developed a world-leading capacity for foresight. At the outset, the focus was on technology

and socio-economic development. Broader geopolitical and security aspects have become more pronounced in thepast decade. Concerns about global political changes have given rise to an enhanced strategic partnership betweenJapan and the European Union. Common challenges include shifts in global economic power, the emergence ofChina, and uncertainties around the United States' international engagement. While Japan and the European Unionhave differing security policy perspectives and capabilities, joint efforts can have a positive impact in areas such asinfrastructure, digital connectivity, overseas development assistance and energy sustainability. A shared vision oncommon challenges and responses is at the heart of the partnership between the European Union and Japan. Jointstrategic foresight activities, building on existing foresight capabilities on each side, could be considered as a means ofupdating and strengthening this shared vision.

Briefing EN

Improving the working conditions of platform workers: Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional andlocal positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 08-12-2021Autor KISS Monika | RITTELMEYER Yann-Sven

Ámbito político Empleo | Politica social | TransporteResumen This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advance

consultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter’s five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. An EPRS analysis of the positions of partner governmental organisations at EU,national, regional and local levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in thediscussion on the working conditions of platform workers: The employment status of platform workers has to beclarified. The binary system (employed or self-employed) is challenged by the specific characteristics of platform workand bogus self-employment. To give some examples, Ireland classifies workers on the basis of a series of tests, whilePortugal enacts a legal presumption that transport sector platform workers are employees. Platform workers have theright to be correctly informed. This can be facilitated by transparency, designated advisory services, informationcampaigns and communication channels among workers. Platforms must protect privacy, share information and datawith relevant (local) authorities, while artificial intelligence-based algorithms should be controlled by a humanapproach. Local and regional authorities are witnessing the negative social consequences of the limited rights ofplatform workers. Social measures should cover the specific needs of these workers in relation to sickness, accident,unemployment, protection at work and pension benefits. More investment should be made in skills development andrelevant training for platform workers. Transferability and certification of competences would, for example, supportcareer development. The asymmetry between national legislation and issues faced locally and regionally can bemitigated by complementary EU action and strong cooperation between the levels of governance. The role of cities inparticular should be acknowledged. Negotiation frameworks and charters, for example, can help all levels share goodpractices and learn about the impact of the measures taken.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 65

Revision of Annexes IV and V to the EU Regulation on Persistent Organic PollutantsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-12-2021Autor KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen At the end of October 2021, the European Commission submitted a proposal for the revision of Regulation (EU)

2019/1021 on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), and in particular its Annexes IV and V, which determine how wastecontaining POPs must be treated, i.e. whether waste could be recycled or must be destroyed or irreversiblytransformed. The proposal updates the concentration limits of certain (groups of) POP substances already regulated inAnnexes IV and V of the regulation, and also establishes concentration limits for substances that have not yet beenregulated by these annexes. The proposal thus ensures, on the one hand, implementation of the EU's commitments atinternational level (alignment of the EU legislation with developments at international level in the field of POPs, e.g.under the Stockholm Convention on POPs), and, on the other, alignment of the EU legislation with scientific andtechnical progress. It also aims to achieve an optimal balance between the ambitions of the European Green Deal notably, to ensure that human health and the environment are protected from the adverse effects caused by POPs,while also achieving toxic-free material cycles, more recycling and circularity, and reduced greenhouse gas emissions.The recast of the regulation in 2019 envisaged that Annexes IV and V would be revised following the ordinarylegislative procedure. This briefing presents the findings of publicly accessible sources on the implementation of theEU legislation in terms of its scope and subject to revision.

Briefing EN

Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-12-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen Payment systems are of vital importance for today's economies and are the core activity of central banks. To adapt to

recent trends – including the decline in cash usage, the surge in online commerce and contactless forms of payment,and the creation of cryptocurrencies – central banks have, in recent years, explored the possibility of issuing digitalcurrencies themselves. Proponents of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) note that, among other things, they can:alleviate the problem of concentration of the payments infrastructure; facilitate instantaneous and cheaper execution ofpayments; discourage illicit activity and rein in the shadow economy; spur competition in the payment industry; reducethe problem of banks being ‘too big to fail’; promote financial inclusion; contribute to financial stability; preserve theEU’s sovereignty over transactions; help facilitate monetary policy; and support the international role of the euro.Critics of CBDCs range from those who question the need for such currencies altogether, to those who point out therisks, including the possibility that CBDCs could: amplify the international spillover effects of shocks; curtail theautonomy of less powerful economies in their monetary policy, and even substitute their domestic currency; facilitatetax avoidance or a loss of domestic oversight capabilities; put at risk the variety of payment instruments available tohouseholds; create undesired volatility in exchange rates; and put banks’ deposit bases under threat, with negativeimplications for credit provision and output. The European Central Bank (ECB) is involved in the general discussionabout the design and launch of CBDCs. In October 2020, it published a report on a digital euro, identifying anddiscussing features of and options for a euro-area CBDC. In July 2021, the ECB launched an investigation phase,which should last 2 years and aims to address key issues of design and distribution. The European Parliament, as wellas other stakeholders, is expected to participate actively in this phase.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Central bank digital currencies: Evolution or revolution?

Including the costs of owner-occupied housing in inflation measurementTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-12-2021Autor HOFLMAYR MARTIN

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen Housing costs make up a significant part of households' final consumption expenditures. However, these costs are

only partially captured by the inflation indicator on which the European Central Bank (ECB) bases its monetary policydecisions. While the costs of paying rent feed into the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) – the indicatorused to assess the achievement of the ECB's price stability objective – the costs of living in a home owned by theoccupier do not. Instead, only expenditure for maintenance and minor repairs is currently included. More than twothirds of the EU population live in a home owned by their household. At the same time, house prices surged by 19 %between 2010 and 2019, with particularly large increases in the last 4 years. In its monetary policy strategy review, theECB outlined a roadmap to take owner-occupied housing into account in its inflation target. However, severalconceptual and methodological questions need to be answered, from the measuring approach to the collection ofreliable data at an adequate frequency. Academic research suggests that the inclusion of costs of owner-occupiedhousing in the inflation index would only lead to a marginal deviation in the price measure. However, owing to the oftenprocyclical and volatile nature of such costs, their inclusion does not always drive inflation. Moreover, because of theasynchrony of housing-market cycles, inflation levels would likely be more dispersed across EU Member States onceowner-occupied housing costs are included in the HICP. As a first step, the European Parliament stressed in itsresolution on the ECB's 2020 annual report that the HICP is a 'very narrow concept of inflation measurement' thatunderestimates inflation in the euro area. While stronger methodological harmonisation efforts are needed to establishan augmented HICP, the inclusion of owner-occupied housing costs in the inflation measure would better reflect actualand perceived price dynamics, even though the overall effects are likely to be marginal.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 66

Single Resolution Board: Accountability arrangements (9th parliamentary term)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-12-2021Autor MAGNUS Marcel

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave control financiero | cooperación interinstitucional (UE) | empresa en crisis | nombramiento (de miembros) | Parlamento

Europeo | resumen | sesión pública | solvencia | Unión Económica y Monetaria | vida institucionalResumen This document provides an overview of public hearings and exchange of views with the Chair of the Single Resolution

Board (SRB) in the ECON Committee since July 2019. It also provides an overview of all external papers requested bythe ECON Committee by a standing panel of banking experts. Lastly, the annex contains an overview of the respectivelegal bases for these hearings as part of the accountability framework of the SRB. For an overview of public hearingsduring the 8th parliamentary term, please see here.

Briefing EN

Single Supervisory Mechanism: Accountability arrangements (9th parliamentary term)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-12-2021Autor MAGNUS Marcel

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave Banco Central Europeo | competencia institucional (UE) | estabilidad financiera | institución financiera | intervención en

el mercado | intervención financiera | resumen | sesión pública | supervisión financiera | unión bancaria de la UEResumen This document provides an overview of public hearings and exchange of views with the Chair of the European Central

Bank (ECB) Supervisory Board in the ECON Committee since July 2019. It also provides an overview of all externalpapers requested by the ECON Committee by a standing panel of banking experts. Lastly, the annex contains anoverview of the respective legal bases for these hearings as part of the accountability framework of the SingleSupervisory Mechanism (SSM). For an overview of public hearings during the 8th parliamentary term, please see here.

Briefing EN

Public finances in Euro Area Member States: Selected indicators - November 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-12-2021Autor TEIXEIRA DA CUNHA INES | ZOPPÉ Alice

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosResumen This document presents selected indicators on public finance for the Euro Area Member States and the Euro Area as a

whole. For each indicator, it provides a short explanation and the data sources. The final section presents a shortoverview of the main indicators used by the European and other international institutions to assess debt sustainability.

Briefing EN

The NIS2 Directive: A high common level of cybersecurity in the EUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-12-2021Autor NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Ámbito político IndustriaPalabra clave Agencia de la Unión Europea para la Ciberseguridad | consulta pública | criminalidad informática | directiva (UE) |

estudio de impacto | guerra de información | propuesta (UE) | protección de datos | protección de infraestructurascríticas | seguridad europea | seguridad informática

Resumen The Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive is the first piece of EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity, and itsspecific aim was to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Member States. While it increased theMember States' cybersecurity capabilities, its implementation proved difficult, resulting in fragmentation at differentlevels across the internal market. To respond to the growing threats posed with digitalisation and the surge in cyber-attacks, the Commission has submitted a proposal to replace the NIS Directive and thereby strengthen the securityrequirements, address the security of supply chains, streamline reporting obligations, and introduce more stringentsupervisory measures and stricter enforcement requirements, including harmonised sanctions across the EU. Theproposed expansion of the scope covered by the NIS2, by effectively obliging more entities and sectors to takemeasures, would assist in increasing the level of cybersecurity in Europe in the longer term. Within the EuropeanParliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. The committee adoptedits report on 28 October 2021, as well as a mandate to enter into interinstitutional negotiations.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 67

Towards a joint Western alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-12-2021Autor GRIEGER Gisela

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Gobernanza globalResumen Since the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, President Xi Jinping's

signature foreign policy project has drawn widespread criticism, including for challenging the traditional model ofmultilateral infrastructure financing. Western-led bilateral and plurilateral infrastructure and connectivity initiativesdesigned as alternatives have remained fragmented and have been dwarfed in scope and scale by a geographicallyand thematically rapidly expanding BRI, which has thrived on an attractive brand and a streamlined authoritarian one-stop-shop project management system. In contrast to Japan, it has taken the EU and the US years to respond withseparate regional strategies reflecting their distinct geopolitical outlook and economic relations with the PRC. Themanifold implications of the PRC's use of physical and digital infrastructure projects as a foreign policy tool to expandits sphere of influence both across the world and within international organisations have been widely under-estimated.At their 2021 G7 Summit, however, leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US agreedon a global 'values-driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership', known as the 'Build Back BetterWorld' (B3W) initiative, which echoes US President Joe Biden's 2020 'Build Back Better' campaign trail slogan. It is thefirst collective attempt of major democracies to craft a sustainable and targeted alternative to the BRI and to addressthe challenges it poses to the rules-based international order. It seeks to help fill, by 2035, an infrastructure gap in lowand medium-income countries estimated at US$40+ trillion, by leveraging public development finance to mobiliseuntapped private-sector funds. Trends in the flows of global private infrastructure investment suggest that the initiativewill face opportunities and challenges. The European Parliament's 2021 resolution on connectivity and EU-Asiarelations calls for an EU global connectivity strategy as an extension of the 2018 Europe-Asia connectivity strategy, inorder to strengthen the EU's role as a geopolitical and geo-economic actor with a single narrative, and to broadenpartnerships with democracies across the world that share the EU's fundamental values.

Briefing EN

EU action plan for the social economy: Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positionson the European Commission's initiative

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 01-12-2021Autor COLLOVA Claudio | MILOTAY Nora

Ámbito político Politica socialResumen This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advance

consultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter's five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. An EPRS analysis of the positions of partner organisations at European Union (EU),national, regional and local levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in thediscussion on the forthcoming European action plan for the social economy. There is broad consensus that access tofinance requires diversified funding options and that synergies should be established between regional, national andEU funds. Funding under Next Generation EU has the potential to be a positive game-changer for the social economyin Europe. When it comes to framework conditions, the need to increase the visibility of the social economy is widelyrecognised. Public authorities particularly suggest visualising the impact of social economy enterprises and setting upan online platform where social actors can interact. Access to markets could benefit from strengthening the business-to-government channel. Regional governmental organisations advocate stronger inter-regional cooperation within theEU. As an example of good practice, the European Committee of the Regions identifies the social economy thematicplatform under the smart specialisation strategy, which comprises seven regions in six Member States. According topublic authorities, some tools, the European social economy regions (ESER) scheme for example, could be furtherpromoted to strengthen the global dimension of the EU's neighbourhood policy. There is also further potential to link upwith the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN). Somegovernmental organisations signalled their intention to invest in new technologies, such as cloud computing, big data,blockchain and robotisation. Finally, new business models could be created by paying attention to cross-cutting issuessuch as gender equality and the ability of the social economy to find solutions adapted to rural areas. Overall, thesocial economy is seen as a way to solve local problems, including employment, inclusion, care and education, with abottom-up approach.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 68

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: The optimist of the European integration processTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-11-2021Autor PERCHOC Philippe

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave figura política | fomento de la idea de Europa | Francia | historia de Europa | jefe de Estado | movimiento europeo |

personaje histórico | reseña histórica | sistema monetario europeo | unión monetariaResumen Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was one of Europe's leading figures in the generation which came after that of the founding

fathers. He was close to Jean Monnet, but he himself said that his main source of inspiration was Robert Schuman.For both Schuman and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, their relationship with Germany was a thread running through theirlives. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was born in Koblenz, Germany, where his father had been posted in the Frenchadministration after the First World War. Giscard d'Estaing was involved in the liberation of Paris at a very young ageand then in military operations at the end of the Second World War. After studying engineering, he chose a career inpublic administration, going on to be an economic adviser in various post-war French governments. He was laterelected as an MP in Auvergne, where his family had roots, and was then appointed Secretary of State for Finance atthe very young age of 32. He held various ministerial positions in this field, moving in European circles and spendingtime with colleagues from other European Community Member States. Elected French President in 1974, he favoureda policy of economic and social liberalism. His main accomplishments came in the areas of women's, young people'sand disabled persons' rights. At international level, he drew on the support of the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt,to develop political and monetary initiatives. Defeated in the 1981 elections, he continued his political career atregional, national and European level. He carried on working to bring about monetary union and develop the Franco-German partnership, before chairing the Convention on the Future of Europe, which culminated in the drafting of theConstitutional Treaty. Despite his disappointment at the rejection of that treaty, he continued to serve Europe until theend of his life.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Prospects for EU economic recovery [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-11-2021Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Salud públicaPalabra clave enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | grupo de reflexión | previsión económica | publicación | recesión económica |

recuperación económicaResumen Uncertainty is growing over the recovery of the European economy from the recession generated by the Covid-19

pandemic. The European Commission has painted an optimistic growth scenario in its most recent forecast, with theeconomy expected to expand by 5 per cent and 4.3 per cent in 2021 and 2022 respectively. However, an increasingnumber of analysts see the potential for growth dampened by new restrictions in the run-up to Christmas this yeargiven a fourth/fifth wave of the pandemic currently gripping Europe, compounded by the discovery of a new variant ofthe coronavirus. Higher inflation, partly resulting from high energy prices and disrupted supply chains, is also seen as athreat to the economy of the euro area and the wider EU, as are high public debt levels in many countries. This notegathers links to recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on the state of the Europeaneconomy and on debates on how to reform it.

Briefing EN

Rights of women and gender equality with regard to pay, treatment at work, labour market and careeropportunities in Iceland

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 30-11-2021Autor FERNANDEZ LOPEZ LAURA | SCHONARD Martina

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadResumen The Republic of Iceland is one of the smallest European countries, with a population of 370,000 inhabitants in 2021 . It

is an island state and its official language is Icelandic. Historically, geographically and politically, Iceland is connectedto the Scandinavian countries and is part of the Nordic countries, but does not belong to the EU. Iceland is a part of theEEA Agreement, which enables the country to enjoy the benefits of the EU’s single market without the full privilegesand responsibilities of EU membership. The country is also a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 69

'Fit for 55' legislative package: Strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for newpassenger cars and new light commercial vehicles

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 29-11-2021Autor VIKOLAINEN Vera

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave automóvil | contaminación por vehículos automotores | gas con efecto invernadero | lucha contra la contaminación |

neutralidad en carbono | norma medioambiental | propuesta (UE) | vehículo de motor | vehículo industrial ligeroResumen The IA undertakes a quantitative assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts of strengthening the

CO2 targets for cars and vans, using modelling tools with proven track record in supporting EU policy-making. Itidentifies and quantifies the costs and benefits of the combination of preferred options and qualitatively describesindirect costs and benefits. Despite the related considerable effort, the IA seems to define the problem at a ratheraggregated level and does not provide further details as to which consumers, which parts of the value chain in whichMember States are affected and at what scale. Furthermore, the IA does not explain how the CTP scenarios - whichdefine the level of ambition increase for light- and heavy duty vehicles broadly as 'low', 'medium' or 'high' - resulted inthe CO2 emission target levels for 2035 and 2040.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board ECON on 1 December 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-11-2021Autor DIAS BORGES FARRAJOTA CATARINA | GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | SLOCOCK OLIVER | TEIXEIRA

DA CUNHA INESÁmbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosPalabra clave autoridad nacional competente | banco | cooperación institucional | estabilidad financiera | inspección bancaria |

institución comunitaria | país tercero | reservas | sesión pública | solvencia | supervisión financiera | unión bancaria dela UE

Resumen This note is prepared in view of an ordinary public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), ElkeKönig, which will take place on 1 December 2021. This briefing addresses the following topics: (i) cooperation withother authorities, (ii) home/host authorities and the issue of internal MREL, (iii) evolution of MREL stock and shortfalls,(iv) contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, and (v) summaries of external papers on the status quo ofimpediments to resolvability.

Briefing EN

European Commission Work Programme for 2022Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-11-2021Autor HAHNKAMPER-VANDENBULCKE Nora | VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave Comisión Europea | democracia | fomento de la idea de Europa | mercado único digital | neutralidad en carbono |

papel internacional de la UE | programa de actuaciónResumen On 19 October 2021, the European Commission presented its work programme for 2022 (CWP 2022), setting out its

legislative and non-legislative intentions for 2022. The CWP 2022 perpetuates the CWP 2021's twofold ambition (i.e. torecover from the pandemic and to boost the Commission's transformative agenda). A special emphasis is put onhelping the Union emerge stronger and more resilient. This should be achieved by implementing the measures agreedover the last year, and through additional investments and reforms in order to 'accelerate the twin green and digitaltransitions, and build a fairer, more resilient and more cohesive society'. The briefing is intended as a backgroundoverview for parliamentary committees, explaining the CWP 2022’s structure and key aspects, and providinginformation on two types of EPRS publications of interest with a view to the upcoming legislative proposals: initialappraisals of Commission impact assessments and implementation appraisals.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 70

Resilience of global supply chains: Challenges and solutionsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-11-2021Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalPalabra clave acuerdo comercial (UE) | autoabastecimiento | cadena de suministro | comercio internacional | cooperación

internacional | economía en transición | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | globalización | país tercero |seguridad de abastecimiento

Resumen The growing importance of global supply chains has fundamentally changed the way the global economy and goodsmanufacturing are organised. While trade conducted through global supply chains has fallen somewhat as a share oftotal trade since the 2008-2010 global financial and economic crisis, more than two-thirds of international trade stillinvolves transactions made possible by such chains. The EU is profoundly involved in these production chains, moreso than most other countries, and significantly more than both the United States and China. The pandemic disruptedmany supply chains at its outbreak, and the subsequent economic recovery, the strongest on record, led to enormousfurther strain on the global supply system; surging demand, coupled with shortages of workers, ships, containers, aircargo space and clogged ports, created a 'perfect storm'. Supply chain bottlenecks are starting to weigh on theeconomic recovery, slowing growth and leading to delays, holding back the manufacturing sector and fuelling inflation.The EU had recognised its strategic dependence on some foreign inputs even before the pandemic, and had started toseek ways to increase its autonomy – a quest which has been accelerated by the impact of the coronavirus. Toimprove the resilience of supply chains, the EU is applying a policy mix that aims to increase domestic capacity,diversify suppliers and support the multilateral rules-based trade environment; it has also enhanced its cooperationwith the US on supply chains. Other like-minded countries apply a similar policy mix, focusing on supporting reshoringor nearshoring. While this situation is not ideal, global supply chains are hard to reconfigure, and increasing theirresilience is a time-consuming and costly process. Moreover, most experts predict that reshoring or nearshoring will beof limited importance. With time, though, resilience may improve through international cooperation, diversification andthe accelerated uptake of digital technologies.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Resilience of global supply chains: Challenges and solutions

European Parliament scrutiny of FrontexTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-11-2021Autor DEL MONTE Micaela | LUYTEN KATRIEN

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave control fronterizo | derecho del individuo | expulsión | frontera exterior de la UE | Frontex | política migratoria de la UE

Resumen Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 transformed Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and gave theEuropean Parliament a range of tools affording it oversight of the agency's activities. In addition to budgetarydischarge, these include an obligation for the agency to provide information to the Parliament, a key role for theParliament in appointing the agency's executive director, and attendance on invitation by a Parliament expert atFrontex management board meetings. These tools effectively make the Parliament the key player in terms ofdemocratic oversight of the agency. In 2020, amidst allegations of Frontex's possible involvement in pushbacks andviolations of fundamental rights by Member States' authorities at the EU's external borders, the Parliament'sCommittee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) decided to investigate the allegations. The Parliamentused both ex-ante and ex-post accountability instruments, as part of which it asked questions demanding oral andwritten answers, requested the Frontex executive director to appear before the LIBE committee to answer Members'questions, and decided to postpone the discharge of Frontex' accounts in respect of the financial year 2019 (dischargewas subsequently given in October 2021). In January 2021, LIBE decided to step up its action and established theFrontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG) to monitor all aspects of the functioning of the agency, including compliancewith fundamental rights, and transparency and accountability towards Parliament. The FSWG conducted a fact-findinginvestigation, collected evidence and presented its final report in July 2021. While the report 'did not find evidence onthe direct performance of pushbacks and/or collective expulsions by Frontex in the serious incident cases that could beexamined', it found 'serious shortcomings'. This briefing looks at the accountability mechanisms at Parliament'sdisposal and how they have been used to ensure that migrants' fundamental rights are respected and upheld at theEU's external borders.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 71

Violence against women in the EU: State of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-11-2021Autor SHREEVES Rosamund

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadPalabra clave ayuda a las víctimas | convención internacional | derechos de la mujer | derechos humanos | desigualdad social |

discriminación sexual | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | igualdad de género | mujer | violencia doméstica |violencia sexual

Resumen Violence against women is a violation of human rights and a form of gender-based discrimination. Rooted ininequalities between men and women, it takes many forms. Estimates of the scale of the problem are alarming. Suchviolence has a major impact on victims and imposes a significant cost burden on society. The instruments put in placeby the United Nations and Council of Europe, including the latter's 'Istanbul Convention', to which the EU plans toaccede, are benchmarks in efforts to combat violence against women. The EU is tackling the problem in various ways,but has no binding instrument designed specifically to protect women from violence. Although there are similaritiesbetween national policies to combat violence against women, the Member States have adopted different approachesto the problem. Parliament's efforts have focused on strengthening EU policy in the area. Parliament has repeatedlycalled for a European Union strategy to counter violence against women, including a legally binding instrument.Stakeholders have expressed a range of concerns, including regarding the impact of the coronavirus pandemic andthe related need to expand and adapt support for victims, and have highlighted the need for a comprehensive EUpolitical framework on eliminating violence against women. They have also launched new initiatives of their own. Thisis a further update of an earlier briefing by Anna Dimitrova-Stull, of February 2014. The most recent previous editionwas from November 2020.

Briefing EN

Understanding EU policies for persons with disabilitiesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-11-2021Autor LECERF Marie

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadPalabra clave ayuda a los discapacitados | discapacitado | discriminación por motivo de minusvalía | enfermedad por coronavirus |

epidemia | estadística de sanidad | igualdad de trato | recogida de datos | trabajador con discapacidadResumen Both the EU and its Member States have signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and use

its definition of disability as a common reference at EU level. Bearing in mind that there is no other harmoniseddefinition of disability in the EU, and that there is a wide variety of statistical surveys in terms of questions asked andpopulation surveyed, a complete statistical assessment of disability in the EU does not yet exist. However, the annualEurostat statistics on income and living conditions survey reveals that, in Europe, the prevalence of disability is higheramong female, older and less educated respondents. Furthermore, studies show that the coronavirus pandemic hasaffected people with disabilities disproportionately more than others. The EU combats all forms of discriminationalongside and in support of its Member States. To improve the situation of disabled people, it has introduced a seriesof initiatives, programmes and strategies over a number of decades. The European Parliament has been highly activein the bid to end all forms of discrimination against disabled people since the start of the 1980s. In 1997, Article 13 ofthe European Community Treaty, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, (now Article 19 of the Treaty on theFunctioning of the EU) on the human right not to suffer from discrimination on the grounds, in particular, of disability,paved the way for a genuine disability policy. The first step in this regard was the adoption of a 2001-2006 actionprogramme to combat discrimination. Later, the 2010-2020 European disability strategy sought to enable disabledpeople to exercise their rights and participate fully in society and the economy. A new 2021-2030 strategy,incorporating the lessons learned from its predecessor, seeks to ensure that all persons with disabilities in the EU,regardless of their sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation enjoy their human rights; haveequal access to participation in society and the economy; are able to decide where, how and with whom they live;move freely in the EU regardless of their support needs and, no longer experience discrimination.

Briefing EN

Revising the Effort-Sharing Regulation for 2021-2030: 'Fit for 55' packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-11-2021Autor YOUGOVA Dessislava

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | control de la contaminación | derechos de emisión de la UE | estrategia de la UE | gas

con efecto invernadero | neutralidad en carbono | propuesta (UE) | vigilancia del medio ambienteResumen The EU's effort-sharing legislation covers greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in sectors not included in the EU

emissions trading system. A wide range of sources account for these emissions, such as petrol and diesel used forroad transport, energy used for heating and cooling in buildings, animal digestion and fertilisers used in agriculture,waste treatment, and small industries. To cut the emissions in these sectors, the EU effort-sharing legislationestablishes binding targets and sets up annual emissions allocations for each Member State for the 2013-2020 and2021-2030 periods. On 14 July 2021, the European Commission submitted a proposal on a regulation amending thebinding annual emissions reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030. It reviews the collective and nationaltargets set up in the Effort-Sharing Regulation (ESR). The proposal is part of the 'fit for 55' package, which aims toadapt EU climate and energy legislation to the new EU objective of an at least 55 % reduction in net GHG emissionsby 2030 compared to 1990, in accordance with the recent European Climate Law. In order to contribute to the newclimate ambition, sectors covered by the ESR should achieve a collective reduction of 40 % in their emissions by 2030compared to 2005. The file has been referred to the European Parliament's Committee on Environment, Public Healthand Food Safety (ENVI). Initial debates have been held and a draft report is being prepared. First edition. The 'EULegislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 72

EU-Belarus relations: State of play - Human rights situationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-11-2021Autor PRZETACZNIK Jakub | RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Belarús | democratización | elecciones presidenciales | jefe de Estado | medida restrictiva de la UE | migración ilegal |

movimiento pro derechos humanos | represión | Rusia | régimen autoritario | sanción económica | sancióninternacional

Resumen Over the summer and autumn of 2021, in what is increasingly viewed as a hybrid warfare tactic aimed at destabilisingEurope, Aliaksandr Lukashenka's Belarussian regime has instrumentalised migrants, manipulating the organisation offlights from the Middle East to Minsk and deliberately orchestrating migrants' onward travel to the EU-Belarus border.With weather conditions endangering migrants' lives, the situation has also led to serious humanitarian consequences.This activity – which many argue also aims at distracting attention from the worsening situation of freedom in thecountry, with attacks against independent society, journalists and electronic media users – is only the latest in a stringof events underlining deteriorating EU relations with Belarus. The Lukashenka regime has been isolated since thefalsified presidential elections of August 2020, and the brutal crackdown against peacefully protesting Belarusians.Instead of embracing dialogue with the democratic opposition and wider Belarusian society, Lukashenka choseanother path, involving continued brutal repression of the country's citizens. The worsening human rights situation andhijacking of Ryanair flight FR 4978, in June 2021, provoked a response from the EU. This includes a ban on Belarusianair carriers landing in or overflying the EU, a major extension of the list of people and entities already subject tosanctions, and the introduction of sanctions on key sectors of the Belarusian economy. The European Parliament playsan active part in shaping this EU response. Parliament does not recognise Lukashenka's presidency and has spokenout on human rights abuses in Belarus. Awarded Parliament's 2020 Sakharov Prize, the Belarusian democraticopposition is frequently invited to speak for the Belarusian people in the European Parliament. Following the recentdevelopments, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya will make a formal address to the European Parliament in plenary session,on 24 November 2021. This Briefing updates a previous edition, published in July 2021.

Briefing EN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): The EU's strategic partner in AsiaTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-11-2021Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave ASEAN | asociación internacional de la UE | cooperación cultural | cooperación económica | cooperación internacional

| cooperación política | mantenimiento de la paz | países de la ASEAN | relación internacional | seguridad regionalResumen Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is often compared with the EU. Both

organisations brought together former adversaries and successfully resolved tensions through cooperation, helping tobring peace and prosperity to their regions. However, the EU and ASEAN operate in very different ways. ASEAN is astrictly intergovernmental organisation in which decisions are based on consensus. While this approach has made itdifficult for south-east Asian countries to achieve the same level of integration as the EU, it has also enabled ASEAN toaccommodate huge disparities among its 10 member states. In 2003, south-east Asian leaders decided to takecooperation to another level by setting up an ASEAN Community. To this end, they adopted a charter in 2007, thoughwithout fundamentally changing the nature of the organisation's decision-making or giving it stronger institutions. Thecommunity has three pillars: political-security, economic, and socio-cultural. ASEAN's impact has been uneven. Theorganisation is an effective platform for cooperation between its member states and the wider Indo-Pacific region, butits goal of promoting peaceful cooperation is undermined by growing geopolitical tensions, especially in the SouthChina Sea. There has been significant economic integration, even if the goal of an EU-style single market is a longway off. On the other hand, south-east Asians still perceive ASEAN as an elite project with little impact on their dailylives. EU-ASEAN relations span four decades and have steadily deepened, building on common values as well asbooming trade and investment. In 2020, the two sides upgraded to a strategic partnership. This Briefing updates aprevious one, published in November 2020.

Briefing EN

The public sector loan facility under the Just Transition MechanismTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-11-2021Autor MAZUR Sidonia

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | PresupuestoPalabra clave ayuda de la UE | ayuda regional | cambio climático | desarrollo regional | economía circular | economía verde |

empresa pública | política de medio ambiente de la UE | propuesta (UE) | préstamo de la UEResumen The public sector loan facility (PSLF) is the third pillar of the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), along with the Just

Transition Fund and just transition scheme under Invest EU. The facility consists of a grant and a loan component.With the contribution of €1.525 billion for the grant component from the Union budget (including assigned revenues)and EIB lending of €10 billion from its own resources, the aim is for the public sector loan facility to mobilise between€25 and 30 billion in public investment over the 2021-2027 period. Funding will be available to all Member States,while focusing on the regions with the biggest transition challenges. In the European Parliament, the Committee onBudgets (BUDG) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) had joint responsibility for this file.Their report was adopted at a joint sitting of the two committees on 16 October 2020. The provisional agreement onthe proposal reached after trilogue negotiations with the Council was confirmed in plenary session of the Parliament on24 June 2021. The Council adoption followed on 13 July, the Regulation was then signed on 14 July and published inthe Official Journal on 30 July 2021. Second edition of a Briefing originally drafted by Christiaan Van Lierop andSidonia Mazur. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 73

Stablecoins: Private-sector quest for cryptostabilityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-11-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave dinero electrónico | empresa privada | estabilidad financiera | informatización | moneda virtual | riesgo financiero |

sistema de pagoResumen In just over a decade, the payment industry has seen the launch of cryptocurrencies and their explosive growth, driven

by progress in digital technology applications. However, owing to a range of factors, not least their significant volatility,cryptocurrencies have not been adopted on a massive scale, but instead are used largely for speculative purposes.Both national authorities and the private sector have attempted to tackle volatility. The private sector's answer wasstablecoins, that is, cryptocurrencies that aim to keep a stable value relative to a specified asset, or a pool of assets.There are currently three means by which stablecoins achieve this: legal assets, crypto-assets and algorithms. Theuse of stablecoins may enhance financial inclusion, both in developed and developing markets, and might boostoverseas payments in general and remittances in particular. Stablecoins may also have a positive impact oninternational trade, and may contribute to the development of global payment arrangements. There are potentialeconomic risks, however, stemming either from stablecoins' legal characterisation or from governance matters or thecoins' operational resilience. Further concerns are that stablecoins may be used for money laundering or terroristfinancing activities, that consumers may not be adequately protected, and that stablecoins may impede monetarypolicy or propagate financial shocks and generate financial contagion. To tackle these issues, national authorities inmajor economies are taking two complementary approaches: having central banks establish central bank digitalcurrencies ('public stablecoins') and regulating stablecoin use. In the EU, the centrepiece is the European Commissionproposal for a regulation on markets in crypto-assets, adopted in September 2020 and currently under review by theco-legislators – the European Parliament and the Council.

Briefing EN

Femicide, its causes and recent trends: What do we know?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-11-2021Autor externo Consuelo, CORRADI

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidad | Derechos humanosPalabra clave condición de la mujer | derechos cívicos | derechos de la mujer | discriminación sexual | homicidio | mujer | violencia

doméstica | violencia sexualResumen Femicide is a violation of the basic human rights to life, liberty and personal security, as well as an obstacle to social

and economic development. The term indicates the act of intentionally killing a female person, either woman or girl,because of her gender, and it is the end-result of combined risk factors existing at the level of the individual,interpersonal relations, community and society. This crime displays three prominent characteristics: women aredisproportionately killed by men; victims have previously experienced non-lethal violence; the rate at which women arekilled tends to remain steady over time. Estimates indicate that 87 000 women were intentionally killed in 2017, but theexact number is unknown and suspected to be higher. The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the situation andreduced access to services. Femicide’s classification differs according to context, but most significantly includes:killing by an intimate partner or family member; honour, dowry and witch-hunting deaths; femicide-suicide; pre- andpost-natal excess female mortality; infanticide; and deliberate neglect, rooted in a preference for sons over daughters.Collecting accurate data is a strategic goal and necessary to facilitate the design of effective policies.

Briefing EN

Preventing, protecting, providing access to justice: How can states respond to femicide?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-11-2021Autor externo Tamsin BRADLEY

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidad | Derechos humanosPalabra clave acceso a la justicia | condición de la mujer | derechos de la mujer | discriminación sexual | estudio comparativo |

homicidio | igualdad de género | mujer | violencia sexualResumen Growing awareness of femicide has not universally translated into effective policy and programming. Though

legislation relating to gender-based violence and/or femicide exists in many countries, both persist. A combined social,cultural, political and economic approach situates femicide prevention and responses at various levels, includingchanges in individual behaviour. Using the term ‘femicide’ more frequently at international forums is crucial not only tofocus attention on the gendered nature of violence but also to act as a call for action. Situational studies reveal thatpolitical will to end femicide differs from country to country. Femicide together with the patriarchal norms and misogynythat precipitate it are not just extra-EU problems. Rather, they are of global concern, demanding a global response; innon-EU countries this response is often dependent on donor funding. We now know more than ever what works toreverse patterns of violence. These patterns can be broken by developing the capacity of women’s organisations andstrengthening global feminist movements that work with national and local activist networks. Additionally, engagingmen and boys in this process of transformation is vital if we are to address violence against women and girls andultimately end femicide.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 74

Revision of Regulation (EU) 913/2010 concerning a European rail network for competitive freightTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-11-2021Autor BACIAN Izabela Cristina

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | TransportePalabra clave Acuerdo de París sobre el Cambio Climático | gas con efecto invernadero | infraestructura de transportes | método de

evaluación | neutralidad en carbono | política común de transportes | red de transportes | red ferroviaria | reglamento(UE) | transporte de mercancías

Resumen Boosting rail freight transport is an essential pillar of the European Union's long-term policy to make transport moresustainable by cutting greenhouse gas emissions and decarbonising the sector. However, rail freight transport hasfaced numerous barriers in its development, and its growth is held back by its lack of competitiveness with othermodes of transport such as road transport. Regulation (EU) 913/2010 was designed to facilitate rail freight transportacross the EU rail network, through the creation of rail freight corridors, but the potential of those corridors has notbeen fully exploited. While the regulation was conducive to enhanced cooperation across borders, its implementationdid not lead to an increase in rail freight transport along the corridors, with insufficient coordination on trafficmanagement and infrastructure works. Against this backdrop, the Commission has launched a two-step revisionprocess for Regulation (EU) 913/2010. The first step consists of a limited revision, in conjunction with a revision of theTrans-European Transport Network Regulation, focused on aspects of geographical alignment, governance andinvestment planning. The second step will be a wider revision leading to a recast proposal scheduled for the lastquarter of 2022.

Briefing EN

Fit for 55 package: Energy from renewable sourcesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-11-2021Autor DALLI HUBERT

Ámbito político Energía | Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Industria | Medio ambientePalabra clave consumo de energía | energía renovable | estudio de impacto | política energética de la Unión | producción de energía

| propuesta (UE) | recurso renovable | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energéticoResumen The Commission is proposing a new directive to amend the 2018 directive on the promotion of energy from renewable

sources. This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposal finds that the impactassessment draws a clear logic between the problems, their drivers, the objectives and the policy interventions underconsideration. However, the the vast amount of work which must have gone into such an assessment is to someextent impaired by the inconsistent, unclear presentation of options and the equivocal identification of preferredoptions. Also, the IA is not clear as to how it ultimately settles on the specific target of 40%. While the IA was clearly anextremely complex exercise and appears to be based on reliable data, analysis and modelling, different choices as toits organisation and presentation would have likely considerably improved the IA’s clarity and readability and its abilityto support the policy choices made in the proposal.

Briefing EN

Alternative fuel vehicle infrastructure and fleets: State of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-11-2021Autor SOONE Jaan

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave autobús | cambio climático | combustible | contaminación por vehículos automotores | infraestructura de transportes |

recurso energético | reducción de las emisiones de gas | vehículo de motor | vehículo industrial | vehículo nocontaminante

Resumen In December 2019 the European Commission published a communication on the Green Deal, in which it outlined itspriorities to transform the EU into a resource-efficient and competitive economy and to meet the EU's climatecommitments. Subsequently, in line with the Green Deal, the European Climate Law was adopted in July 2021, settingin law the EU target for 2030 of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % compared with 1990 levels. Todeliver the targets agreed in the European Climate Law, the Commission adopted a set of legislative proposals knownas the 'Fit for 55' package on 14 July 2021. To speed up emissions reductions in transport, the package includesproposals to tighten the emissions trading scheme and widen its scope, proposals to increase the use of alternativefuels in aviation and shipping, stricter CO2 emissions standards for road vehicles, and a proposal to amend theAlternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive (AFID) and transform it into a regulation. This briefing provides a snapshot ofthe current state of play in alternative fuels recharging and refuelling points, and in the number of alternative fuelvehicles in circulation in EU countries. Since the adoption of the AFID in 2014, infrastructure deployment for thevarious alternative fuels in road transport has grown, however differences persist between Member States. Similarly,the uptake of alternatively fuelled vehicles differs between Member States, and petrol and diesel engines continue todominate vehicle fleets. Nonetheless, the market for electric vehicles has strongly matured, and the market forhydrogen fuel cell vehicles has also developed. The market for natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) vehiclesis mature and has seen slow growth, but vehicles have remained concentrated in a few Member States. The briefingalso summarises recent projections for future take-up of these vehicles. See also the EPRS 'EU Legislation inprogress' briefing on the revision of the Directive on the Deployment of Alternative Fuels Infrastructure (AFID).

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 75

Sustainability provisions in EU free trade agreements: Review of the European Commission action planTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-11-2021Autor TITIEVSKAIA Jana

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave acuerdo comercial (UE) | acuerdo de libre comercio | Corea del Sur | desarrollo sostenible | interlocutor social |

negociación de acuerdo (UE) | país tercero | política en materia de cambio climático | ratificación de un acuerdo |sociedad civil (movimientos de opinión) | solución de conflictos | transparencia del proceso decisorio

Resumen Sustainability-related provisions are a key part of international trade negotiations. Since the free trade agreement(FTA) signed with South Korea in 2009, EU trade deals each include dedicated trade and sustainable development(TSD) chapters encompassing issues such as environment, labour rights, climate change and responsible businessconduct. In an effort to step up implementation and enforcement of these chapters, in 2018 the Commission publisheda non-paper setting out a 15-point action plan. In the new trade strategy, the 2021 Trade Policy Review, theCommission signalled the early launch of a review of the action plan and held an exchange of views with the EuropeanParliament in July 2021. Parliament has long been an advocate for stronger enforcement and implementation of TSDcommitments. In the three years since the action plan's launch, the Commission – in cooperation with Member States,EU institutions, stakeholders and international organisations – has advanced on many of the proposed actions. Forinstance, EU funding was mobilised to support civil society engagement and responsible business conduct. Assertiveenforcement of TSD commitments materialised in the form of a concluded dispute with South Korea on labour issues.The establishment of the EU chief trade enforcement officer has strengthened the Commission's enforcementcapabilities. Provisions on climate change, including a reference to the Paris Agreement, and widened labourprovisions are all part of recent trade negotiations. However, the action suggesting extending the scope of civil societyinput beyond the TSD chapters to trade agreements as a whole has so far mainly only been reflected in the Trade andCooperation Agreement between the EU und the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the objective of early ratification of thefundamental International Labour Organization conventions continues to be challenging with many partner countries.

Briefing EN

Revision of the TEN-E Regulation: EU guidelines for new energy infrastructureTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-11-2021Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | EnergíaPalabra clave cooperación energética | energía renovable | modificación de la ley | neutralidad en carbono | proyecto de interés

común | red de energía | red transeuropea | reglamento (UE) | suministro de energía eléctrica | suministro de gasResumen On 15 December 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal to revise the 2013 regulation on trans-

European networks in energy (TEN-E). This proposal is currently the subject of interinstitutional 'trilogue' negotiations,which started after both the European Parliament (October 2021) and the Council of the EU (June 2021) had adoptedformal negotiating positions. The 2013 TEN-E Regulation sets out EU guidelines for cross-border energy infrastructure,and outlines the process for selecting projects of common interest (PCI). PCIs are infrastructure projects consideredessential for delivering on EU objectives in the energy field, including improved interconnection between nationalmarkets, greater competitiveness, security of supply, and promotion of renewable energy sources. The list of PCIs isupdated every two years. Certain PCI projects are eligible for EU financing from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).The revised TEN-E Regulation would align closely with the climate neutrality objectives of the European Green Deal:supporting energy infrastructure that consolidates new and existing clean energy technologies, and ending policy andfinancial support for fossil fuel projects. The latter would no longer be included on PCI lists and therefore unable toreceive CEF funding.

Briefing EN

United Nations Food Systems Summit 2021: Process, challenges and the way forwardTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-11-2021Autor CAPRILE ANNA

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo rural | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitaria | Seguridad alimentariaPalabra clave Conferencia ONU | consumo alimentario | hábito alimentario | nutrición | producción alimenticia | reunión en la Cumbre

Resumen The culmination of two years' preparatory work and worldwide mobilisation events, the United Nations Food SystemsSummit took place on 23 September 2021. The idea behind the summit, initiated by United Nations Secretary-GeneralAntónio Guterres, was to start a process of transforming the way the world produces, consumes and thinks about food– as a crucial step in progressing on all 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). The summit was announced inOctober 2019 – before the Covid 19 pandemic became a hunger crisis in many parts of the world – and the stakeshave since risen acutely, bringing a new sense of urgency and creating an opportunity to boost the level of reformambition for global food systems. More than 150 countries took part in the event, which took place entirely on line,wrapping up a process that has generated a remarkable level of mobilisation and public debate through multipleplatforms. Although the summit revealed ample consensus on the need for a radical reform of food systems, it alsoevidenced profound divergences as to how to approach the daunting tasks ahead. A follow-up mechanism has beendesigned to advance the national and global transformative actions announced at the summit, and the United NationsSecretary-General will convene a global stock-taking meeting every two years to measure progress. This briefingupdates an earlier edition, published in September 2021 ahead of the Summit.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 76

The United Kingdom's possible re-joining of the 2007 Lugano ConventionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-11-2021Autor MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativosPalabra clave adhesión a un acuerdo | conflicto jurisdiccional | convención internacional | cooperación judicial civil en la Unión

Europea | Derecho internacional privado | ejecución de sentencia | PTU del Reino Unido | Reino Unido | retirada de laUE

Resumen The 2007 Lugano Convention is an international treaty that regulates the free movement of court judgments in civilcases between the Member States of the EU, on one hand, and the three EFTA states (Switzerland, Norway andIceland), on the other. The convention effectively extends the regime of quasi-automatic recognition and enforcementof judgments that was applicable between EU Member States at the time under the Brussels I Regulation (No44/2001). Whereas the EU rules currently in force regulating the free movement of judgments in civil cases betweenthe EU Member States – the 2012 Brussels I-bis Regulation (1215/2012) – bring about an even higher level ofintegration and presume, therefore, a very high level of mutual trust between the national judiciaries of the MemberStates, relations between the EU and EFTA Member States remain at the level of integration prescribed in 2001 by theBrussels I Regulation. Following the expiry of the transition period provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement betweenthe United Kingdom (UK) and the EU, the UK is no longer bound by either the Brussels I-bis Regulation or the 2007Lugano Convention. Given the fact that the latter is open not only to EU and EFTA Member States, but also explicitlyto third countries, the UK has made a bid to re-join the Lugano Convention. For a third country to become part of thislegal regime, all parties to the convention must give their explicit consent. Whereas this has been the case withSwitzerland, Norway and Iceland, the European Commission, acting on behalf of the EU as a party to the 2007 LuganoConvention, has indicated that it is not prepared to grant such consent, effectively blocking – for the moment – theUK's reintegration within the Lugano regime of mutual recognition of civil judgments. For the Commission, accession tothe Lugano regime is bound up with the notion of close economic integration with the EU, presupposing a high level ofmutual trust. Participation in the Lugano system should not therefore be offered to any third country that is not part ofthe internal market.

Briefing EN

Intelligent transport systems and multimodal ticketing - Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional andlocal positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 16-11-2021Autor PAPE Marketa | RITTELMEYER Yann-Sven

Ámbito político Medio ambiente | TransportePalabra clave datos abiertos | infraestructura de transportes | interconexión de sistemas | protección de datos | recogida de datos |

sistema de pago | sistema de transporte inteligente | tecnología de la información | transporte por carretera | título detransporte

Resumen This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advanceconsultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter's five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. An EPRS analysis of the positions of partner governmental organisations at EU,national, regional and local levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in thediscussion on the revision of the Directive on Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), including a multimodal ticketinginitiative: * The current ITS framework, developed through delegated regulations, has to be evaluated and gapscorrected. The new rules' coherence with existing European Union legislation (e.g. competition law, public serviceobligations, data sharing, passenger rights) should be ensured. Future ITS developments should take better account ofregional and local authorities' experience, as exemplified here. * ITS services' interoperability, based on common EU-wide standards and cooperation, should be ensured, given that current ITS standards differ greatly between and withinEU Member States. Best-practice solutions from the local level should be replicable and systems better shared. Cross-border continuity must be guaranteed. * The role of public authorities in the provision of multimodal transport servicesthrough digital platforms needs to be clarified (legal framework, involvement in privately driven initiatives, etc.). The ITSframework should propose an attractive environment for investment and innovation to all stakeholders, especiallythose operating at local and regional levels. * Governmental organisations favour open data and digitalisation, but warnof related costs. Rules are needed on data management, opening access to data and sharing the costs that arise fromthe production of transport-related public sector data. Security and privacy must be preserved. * Before expanding datacollection obligations, the extent to which the (often locally) collected data is actually reused and how ITS services helpimprove mobility should be evaluated. Any new obligations placed on the local and regional levels should beaccompanied by financial support.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 77

Climate change [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-11-2021Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | Conferencia ONU | documento | política en materia de cambio climático

Resumen The 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties, also known as COP26, held in Glasgow, madelimited progress on measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Leaders and government officials did agreeon plans to limit deforestation and emissions of methane, one of the gases responsible for global warming, but theymade little headway on curbing CO2 discharges. Notably, the leaders of China and Russia did not attend. Before theconference, scientists, analysts and many politicians had urged swift and radical action on climate change, pointing tothis year’s weather anomalies - severe floods in Europe and China, fires in the United States, Australia and many othercountries, and more frequent hurricanes. This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports frominternational think tanks on climate issues, notably the European Green Deal, a set of policy initiatives by the EuropeanCommission with the overarching aim of making Europe climate neutral by mid-century. Links to more studies onCOP26 will be published in a forthcoming item in this series in the next few weeks.

Briefing EN

Global human rights sanctions - Mapping Magnitsky laws: The US, Canadian, UK and EU approachTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-11-2021Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Canadá | Derecho nacional | derechos humanos | Estados Unidos | medida restrictiva de la UE | movimiento pro

derechos humanos | Reino Unido | sanción internacionalResumen Human rights sanctions are nothing new, but the death in 2009 of Russian whistle-blower Sergei Magnitsky in

detention resulted in calls for more vigorous action to counter continuing abuses in many countries. Adopted by the USin 2016, the Global Magnitsky Act was the first of a new generation of human rights sanctions programmes, which, incontrast to traditional sanctions targeted at individual countries, can be flexibly applied to perpetrators from all over theworld, regardless of their geographical location. This briefing compares four such programmes: the US GlobalMagnitsky Act, Canada's Sergei Magnitsky Law, the UK's Global Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Regulations, andthe EU's restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, the most recent of the four to beadopted. All of these are inspired by the ambition to tackle serious human rights crimes from around the world, butthere are also significant differences, for example, in terms of the threshold for human rights offences, the inclusion ornot of corruption-related offences, and the role played by parliaments and civil society. In terms of practical application,Global Magnitsky is by far the most active of the four programmes for the time being, targeting over 300 individualsand entities from 40 countries. Traditional geographical sanctions still predominate in all four jurisdictions;nevertheless, restrictive measures applied under global programmes to Chinese, Russian and Saudi officials highlightthe role that such sanctions can play in furthering Western cooperation on human rights. This briefing has been writtenas part of a collaborative project between the European Parliament's Research Service and Directorate-General forExternal Policies on mapping best practices in global human rights sanctions regimes.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Global human rights sanctions - Mapping Magnitsky laws: The US, Canadian, UK and EU approach

Key figures of 2022 Draft Budgetary PlansTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-11-2021Autor ANGERER Jost | TEIXEIRA DA CUNHA INES

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave deuda pública | déficit presupuestario | Eurogrupo (zona euro) | opción presupuestaria | previsión económica |

producto interior bruto | proyecto de presupuesto (UE)Resumen This document compares key figures included in the 2022 Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs), as submitted to the

European Commission (EC) by the Euro Area Member States by mid of October 2021, with those of the autumn 2021forecasts by the EC and the key figures included in the 2021 Stability Programmes (SPs), as submitted by the EuroArea Member States by end of April 2021, with the those of the 2021 spring forecasts by the EC. The EC is expectedto adopt its opinions on the 2022 DBPs by end of November and the Eurogroup is expected to discuss these opinionson 6 December 2021.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 78

The level playing-field for labour and environment in EU-UK relationsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-11-2021Autor HALLAK ISSAM

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacionalPalabra clave acuerdo comercial (UE) | Acuerdo de Cooperación (UE) | acuerdo de libre comercio | cambio climático | desarrollo

sostenible | norma de trabajo | norma medioambiental | política comercial común | protección del medio ambiente |Reino Unido | retirada de la UE

Resumen The level playing-field (LPF) provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union(EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) constitute a key part of the agreement, and are the product of some of the morechallenging issues in the negotiations. The LPF provisions seek to safeguard fair competition between the parties. Anotable component are the rules on social provisions, labour, environment and climate change, often referred to as the'trade and sustainable development' (TSD) chapters in other free trade agreements. The trading relationship betweenthe EU and the UK is fundamentally different from that between the EU and other countries. Indeed, not only was theUK a Member State of the EU until 31 January 2021 and (almost all) EU laws applied to the UK until the end of thetransition period on 31 December 2020, but the two economies are also close and strongly-interconnected neighbours.The TCA was therefore designed to ensure that a LPF continues post-Brexit. This could be achieved by maintaininglevels of protection at the end of the transition period, as well as by either avoiding significant divergences in the futureor by taking appropriate (rebalancing) measures. To this end, the TCA requires that parties do not weaken or reducetheir levels of social, labour and environmental protection below those in place at the end of 2020 (non-regression).Existing commitments and ambitions on climate change, in particular on climate neutrality by 2050, remain in place forboth parties. In addition, the TCA introduces a mechanism whereby a party can take appropriate rebalancingmeasures to offset any (adverse) 'material impacts on trade or investment' arising from 'significant divergences'between parties. It also allows either party to request a review with a view to amending the agreement, and either partycan opt to terminate the trade chapters if the envisaged amendment is not satisfactory. The TCA LPF provisions onlabour and environment, in view of the LPF focus, strengthen the enforcement of non-regression provisions by allowingfor remedial measures in the event of non-compliance, and also reinforce the precautionary approach. The TCA alsorepresents a notable innovation with its rebalancing and review provisions. This Briefing updates an earlier one,published in April 2021.

Briefing EN

Review of the Intelligent Transport Systems DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-11-2021Autor HAHNKAMPER-VANDENBULCKE Nora

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave directiva (UE) | método de evaluación | política común de transportes | seguridad en carretera | sistema de transporte

inteligente | transporte por carreteraResumen Free movement of people and goods is a fundamental freedom of the EU and its single market. While a well-

functioning EU transport system is critical for the EU economy and growth, the negative externalities associated withtransport in the EU today (emissions, noise, road crashes and congestion) need to be tackled as a matter of urgency.Intelligent transport systems (such as, journey planners, travel information services, intelligent message signs andtraffic lights, safety applications and traffic management) can help to make transport safer, more efficient and moresustainable. A 2019 ex-post evaluation of Directive 2010/40/EU on the framework for the deployment of IntelligentTransport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport (the 'ITS Directive')identified a clear need for further action on interoperability, cooperation mechanisms and data sharing. In view of therevision of the ITS Directive, expected at the end of 2021, the briefing looks at the implementation and functioning ofthis Directive in the past.

Briefing EN

Revision of the Renewable Energy Directive: Fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-11-2021Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político Energía | Medio ambienteResumen On 14 July 2021 the European Commission adopted the 'fit for 55' package, adapting existing climate and energy

legislation to meet the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030.The fit for 55 package is part of the European Green Deal, a flagship of the von der Leyen Commission that aims to putthe EU firmly on the path towards climate neutrality by 2050, as set out in the recently agreed European Climate Law(July 2021). One element in the fit for 55 package is the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED II), to helpthe EU deliver the new 55 % GHG target. Under RED II, the EU is currently obliged to ensure at least 32 % of itsenergy consumption comes from renewable energy sources (RES) by 2030. The revised RED II strengthens theseprovisions and sets a new EU target of a minimum 40 % share of RES in final energy consumption by 2030, togetherwith new sectoral targets. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee for Industry,Research and Energy, with the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety as associatedcommittee under Rule 57. Discussions on the file have also begun in the Council of the EU.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 79

Research for CULT Committee - The role of culture, education, media and sport in the fight againstracism – policy recommendations

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 12-11-2021

Autor externo Bert-Jan Buiskool and Andrea Giannetto (Ockham IPS)Ámbito político Cultura | EducaciónPalabra clave cultura | deporte | educación | medio de comunicación de masas | movimiento contra el racismo | programa de la UE |

racismoResumen This document includes recommendations developed based on a study on ‘The role of culture, education, media and

sport in the fight against racism': to provide the Members of the European Parliament's Committee on Culture andEducation (CULT) with expertise for an own-initiative report (INI) on “The role of culture, education, media and sport inthe fight against racism” (concomitant expertise).

Briefing EN

Revision of Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of environment through criminal lawTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-11-2021Autor HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativos | Medio ambientePalabra clave delito ecológico | Derecho penal | Directiva CE | lucha contra la contaminación | método de evaluación | protección del

medio ambiente | responsabilidad criminal | responsabilidad por daños al medio ambienteResumen Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law – the Environmental Crime Directive

(ECD) – was aimed primarily at improving environmental protection by means of harmonised criminal legislation.Despite noticeable progress on setting up a common legal framework and the undisputed relevance of the directive,there are shortcomings with regard to the uncertain scope of application of the directive, the uneven system forsanctions and the fact that implementation is still lagging behind. In addition, the increasing involvement of organisedcriminal networks calls for a wider recognition of the problem, enhanced tools, specialisation and engagement from allrelevant stakeholders. This implementation appraisal looks at the practical implementation of the ECD in light of theexpected Commission proposal for its revision.

Briefing EN

Rules of origin in EU trade agreementsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-11-2021Autor HALLAK ISSAM

Ámbito político Comercio internacional | Fiscalidad | Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave acuerdo comercial (UE) | acuerdo preferencial | exportación (UE) | importación (UE) | nomenclatura arancelaria |

preferencias generalizadas | producto originarioResumen The European Commission is currently in the process of simplifying and harmonising the rules of origin for EU trade

agreements, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the latter. Indeed, there is a general perception that thecomplexity of the rules and their lack of harmonisation across EU trade agreements, together with burdensomecertification procedures, may be deterring some business managers from making use of the preferential trade tariffsallowed by the agreements. Rules of origin govern the conditions under which an imported good is recognised as'originating' in a preference-given country and eligible for preferential trade tariffs. Provisions on rules of origin covertwo major areas. First, the conditions for conferring origin are designed on a product-by-product basis, followingprinciples typically based on processing operations and/or share of input. An essential part of this process alsoconsists of determining to what extent origin rules may 'cumulate' materials and operations, not only in the parties totrade agreements, but also in third countries (under specific conditions). A second aspect is the certification procedurefor origin, including product consignment conditions. The EU's reform process touches on all of these areas. It startedwith the reform of the generalised scheme of preferences in 2011, a unilateral trade arrangement designed by the EUfor developing countries that inspired the EU's subsequent trade agreement negotiations. In some cases, the EU alsopromotes a more advanced cumulation system, particularly within the pan-Euro-Mediterranean system, to promoteeconomic integration with neighbouring trading partners. Finally, the EU supports the use of flexible consignment rulesthat take into account increasingly globalised inventory management. It also encourages the use of self-certification byexporters as opposed to exporting authorities. Rules of origin are complex and rely on negotiations with partnercountries, and their harmonisation poses a genuine challenge for the EU. In its latest trade policy review published inFebruary 2021, the Commission announced that policy actions on rules of origin are still needed. The modernisation ofthe rules of origin is supported by the European Parliament, which has argued that they determine the 'true extent oftrade liberalisation'.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 80

Mechanism to resolve legal and administrative obstacles in a cross-border contextTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-11-2021Autor VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | Comisión PE | cooperación administrativa | cooperación jurídica | cooperación regional |

cooperación transfronteriza | desarrollo regional | desequilibrio regional | Estado miembro UE | política regional de laUE | propuesta (UE) | región fronteriza

Resumen Often isolated, and with generally poorer access to public services, the EU's border regions face a unique set ofchallenges. This has been recognised under Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, whichprovides that particular attention should be paid to cross-border regions when developing action to strengthen the EU'seconomic, social and territorial cohesion. Yet while the EU has provided significant support over the years, particularlywithin the framework of European territorial cooperation, helping to strengthen connectivity and create new growth andjobs, numerous obstacles continue to hamper cross-border cooperation. The Commission's 2015 cross-border reviewrevealed legal and administrative barriers to be the main obstacle to cross-border cooperation while, in parallel, the2015 Luxembourg Presidency put forward plans for an EU cross-border mechanism, with both processes feeding intodiscussions on a mechanism for cross-border areas, culminating in the present proposal. The EP adopted its first-reading position on the proposal in February 2019, yet progress has been slow, with the Council's Working Party onStructural Measures deciding to cease work on the proposal in May 2021.

Briefing EN

Brexit Adjustment ReserveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-11-2021Autor VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Desarrollo regional | Pesca | PresupuestoPalabra clave asignación de recursos | ayuda financiera | consecuencia económica | ejecución del presupuesto | presupuesto

general (UE) | propuesta (UE) | Reino Unido | reparto de la financiación de la UE | reserva presupuestaria (UE) |retirada de la UE

Resumen As part of the preparations for the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, the European Councilagreed in July 2020 to create a Brexit adjustment reserve within the special instruments outside the budget ceilings ofthe European Union's multiannual financial framework, with a budget of €5 billion to counter unforeseen and adverseconsequences in Member States and sectors that are most affected. The Commission adopted a proposal for aregulation on the Brexit adjustment reserve on 25 December 2020. The reserve will support public expenditureincurred by Member States from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2023 for eligible measures, which include support foraffected sectors, training, and new border facilities. Funding will be available for all Member States, distributed inseveral allocation tranches, with 80 % of the resources due to be allocated to Member States in the form of pre-financing, to be disbursed in 2021, 2022 and 2023, and the remainder to be made available in 2025, where applicable.Each country's allocation is calculated based on the importance of its trade with the UK and, where applicable, itsdependence on fisheries in UK waters and the size of the population of maritime border regions with the UK. Followingthe agreement on the final text between Council and Parliament on 17 June 2021, Parliament adopted its first-readingposition on 15 September 2021, with the act adopted by Council on 28 September. The regulation was published in theOfficial Journal on 8 October 2021. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Social climate fund: Fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-11-2021Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político Energía | Medio ambiente | Politica socialPalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | ayuda financiera | criterio de elegibilidad | fondo (UE) | gas con efecto invernadero |

impacto social | neutralidad en carbono | propuesta (UE) | reparto de la financiación de la UEResumen On 14 July 2021 the European Commission adopted the 'fit for 55' package, a set of legislative proposals to meet the

new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030. The fit for 55 package ispart of the Commission's European Green Deal, which aims to set the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHGemissions (climate neutrality) by 2050. The fit for 55 package includes a regulation establishing a new social climatefund (SCF). The aim of the SCF is to help vulnerable households, micro-businesses and transport users meet thecosts of the green energy transition in the buildings and road transport sector. The SCF is designed to counter theadditional costs that vulnerable consumers may face when the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive isrevised to cover these two sectors, as proposed in the fit for 55 package. The SCF aims to provide over €72 billion inEU funding over the 2025-2032 period, to be paid for mainly by ETS credits in the buildings and road transport sectors.The SCF funds will need to be matched by equivalent social climate funding from Member States, which must preparesocial climate plans. As a new budget line to be financed from EU 'own resources', the SCF will require amendmentsto the Own Resources Decision and the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The file has been referred to theCommittee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and to the Committee for Employment and SocialAffairs, which will be producing a joint report. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated atkey stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Social climate fund: Fit for 55 package

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 81

Evacuation of Afghan nationals to EU Member StatesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-11-2021Autor MENTZELOPOULOU Maria-Margarita

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave Afganistán | ayuda a los refugiados | evacuación de la población | extranjero | reasentamiento de personas | refugiado

| refugiado políticoResumen At the end of August 2021, the United States and coalition forces completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the

Taliban took control of the country after 20 years of conflict. The crisis in Afghanistan has prompted a global responsebased on humanitarian support on the ground, evacuations and resettlement of those in need of internationalprotection, and support for neighbouring countries hosting refugees. Afghanistan has long been a priority for the EU,even before the most recent developments regarding migration and forced displacement. Afghan nationals have beenamong the largest groups of asylum-seekers and refugees hosted on European territory since 2014. Both the EUinstitutions and the EU Member States have been following the recent situation in Afghanistan closely. The EU'sresponse has prioritised completing the evacuation of EU citizens, local staff and Afghan citizens. More specifically, theEU institutions have called for extended cooperation on the evacuations from Afghanistan and the setting up of legalpathways for Afghans at risk, while examining the future engagement with Afghanistan and regional partners. At thesame time, the European Commission has presented a new 'Afghan support package' and held two high-level EUforums focusing on Afghans at risk and stressing the need for increased resettlement pledges from EU MemberStates. In a September 2021 resolution, the European Parliament called for a coordinated response to protect thosemost vulnerable, reiterating its call to the Commission for a legislative proposal on humanitarian visas, and to MemberStates to share responsibility for offering protection.

Briefing EN

Voting and candidacy rights of mobile EU citizens in municipal elections under Directive 94/80/ECTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-10-2021Autor ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Ámbito político Democracia | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Transposición y aplicación de la legislaciónPalabra clave ciudadano de la UE | ciudadanía europea | derecho de voto | Derecho electoral | Directiva CE | domicilio legal |

elecciones locales | elegibilidad | igualdad de trato | inscripción electoralResumen An estimated 13.3 million European Union (EU) citizens live in an EU Member State that is not their country of origin.

Of these, over 11 million are of voting age. Under Council Directives 93/109/EC and 94/80/EC, these 'mobile'Europeans are entitled to participate in European and municipal elections in their country of residence. While MemberStates have successfully transposed both directives, voter turnout among mobile citizens remains low compared tonationals. In its 2020 citizenship report, the European Commission announced a strengthening of electoral rights inEuropean and municipal elections. According to the Commission's 2021 work programme (Annex II), amendingproposals are envisaged for the fourth quarter of 2021, as part of the 'Transparency and democracy package'. Thisbriefing explores the operation of Council Directive 94/80/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate inmunicipal elections and discusses obstacles to citizens' effective exercise of their rights. It also analyses theimplications of Brexit on local election rights for both United Kingdom (UK) citizens residing in the EU 27 and EUcitizens living in the UK. The resulting post-Brexit status quo is a complex patchwork governed by national law andbilateral agreements. A separate briefing examines the implementation of Directive 93/109/EC regarding Europeanelections.

Briefing EN

Voting and candidacy rights of mobile EU citizens in European elections under Council Directive93/109/EC

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 29-10-2021Autor ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Ámbito político Democracia | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Transposición y aplicación de la legislaciónPalabra clave aproximación de legislaciones | Consejo de la Unión Europea | derecho de voto | Derecho electoral | elecciones

europeas | elegibilidad | Iniciativa Ciudadana Europea | Parlamento Europeo | sistema electoral europeo |transposición de la legislación comunitaria

Resumen Under the arrangements set out in Council Directives 93/109/EC and 94/80/EC, EU nationals who live in a MemberState other than their own are entitled to participate in European and municipal elections, respectively, in their countryof residence. This concerns an estimated 11 million EU citizens of voting age (post-Brexit data). Even if MemberStates have successfully transposed both directives, voter turnout among mobile citizens remains low compared tonationals. Similarly, only a fraction of candidates standing for European elections is made up of non-nationals (slightlyover 1 % in the 2019 elections). The European Commission has announced its intention to update both directives;according to its 2021 work programme (Annex II), amending proposals are envisaged for the fourth quarter of 2021,forming part of the 'transparency and democracy package'. This briefing looks into the operation of Council Directive93/109/EC on the right to vote and stand as candidate in European elections. It discusses obstacles that hinder mobileEU citizens from effectively exercising their electoral rights, such as registration and communication issues, and looksinto the problem of double voting. The implementation of Directive 94/80/EC regarding municipal elections is examinedin a separate briefing.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 82

Establishing a framework for a European digital identityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-10-2021Autor TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave administración electrónica | comunicación de datos | datos personales | estudio de impacto | firma electrónica |

formalidad administrativa | mercado único digital | pequeña y mediana empresa | prestación de servicios | protecciónde datos | reglamento (UE) | tecnología digital

Resumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s impactassessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 3 June 2021 and referred to theEuropean Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The proposal seeks to amendRegulation (EU) No 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internalmarket (the eIDAS Regulation) in order to better meet the new market and societal demands for trusted governmenteID linked solutions and for attributes and credentials provided by the public and private sector, which would berecognised across the EU for accessing both public and private services. This proposal would also address users’expectations to have more control over their personal data. This initiative, which European Commission PresidentUrsula von der Leyen announced in her State of the Union speech of 16 September 2020, is included in theCommission’s 2021 work programme and is part of the strategy on shaping Europe’s digital future. In its conclusions of1-2 October 2020, the European Council invited the Commission to come forward with a proposal for a Europeandigital identity framework by mid-2021.

Briefing EN

Security situation in Afghanistan: Implications for EuropeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-10-2021Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix | LATICI Tania

Ámbito político Seguridad y defensaPalabra clave Afganistán | ayuda humanitaria | conflicto religioso | Estado islámico | lucha contra el crimen | política común de

seguridad y defensa | política europea de defensa | seguridad regional | terrorismoResumen Just over two months after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, the movement remains

politically isolated. So far, no country has recognised the caretaker government that the new leaders announced on 7September 2021. The humanitarian situation in a country that largely depended on foreign aid to survive isdeteriorating rapidly, so much so that international aid organisations describe the situation as a 'humanitarianmeltdown'. Aware that the collapse of the economic and financial system in Afghanistan would impact heavily on thestability of the country, the region and beyond, the international community has mobilised large amounts of funds,including €1 billion in humanitarian aid from the EU budget. While no major population movements out of Afghanistanhave been detected so far, the EU is determined to avoid a crisis reminiscent of the 2015 refugee crisis prompted bythe Syrian civil war. EU assistance is partly destined for countries in the region hosting Afghan refugees. In the longerterm, the EU is concerned that Afghanistan could revert to being a safe haven for international terrorists who mighttarget EU countries. The EU's preparedness to deal with the threat from terrorism has evolved significantly over thepast decade. In response to events in Afghanistan, the Council published a counter-terrorism action plan onAfghanistan in September, setting out four clear objectives, and making 22 recommendations for action. The UnitedStates government's determination to leave Afghanistan according to a set timetable, irrespective of allies'reservations, has reignited the debate over the need for greater EU strategic autonomy. The EU's 'strategic compass'process provides a framework for these discussions, including negotiations over a potential future rapid reaction or'initial entry' force, able to provide a European capability to react to events such as those that unfolded in Afghanistan.Members of the European Parliament have called on the EU to reinforce significantly its capacity to act autonomouslyand for the strategic compass to address the terrorist threat from Afghanistan.

Briefing EN

Updating the European digital identity frameworkTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-10-2021Autor NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Ámbito político IndustriaPalabra clave firma electrónica | mercado único digital | prestación de servicios | propuesta (UE) | protección de datos | seguridad

informática | tecnología digital | tratamiento de datosResumen The 2014 Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market

(eIDAS Regulation or eIDAS) was the first digital identity legislation to provide the basis for cross-border electronicidentification, authentication and website certification throughout the EU. Application of eIDAS has been mixed.However, the pandemic increased the need for such solutions to be put in place to access public and private services.On 3 June 2021, the Commission put forward a proposal building on the eIDAS framework, with the aim of giving atleast 80 % of citizens the possibility to use a digital identity to access key public services by 2030 and to do so acrossEU borders. The updated European digital identity framework would also allow citizens to identify and authenticatethemselves online without having to resort to commercial providers, a practice that raises trust, security and privacyconcerns. In parallel, the Commission adopted a recommendation to design a toolbox supporting the framework so asto avoid fragmentation and barriers due to diverging standards. Within the European Parliament, the file has beenassigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE).

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 83

Revision of the EU legislation on geographical indications of agricultural and food productsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-10-2021Autor KARAMFILOVA Ekaterina

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave control de la calidad de los productos agrícolas | denominación de origen | denominación del producto | etiquetado |

producto agrícola | producto alimenticio | valor económicoResumen The EU implements a quality policy (quality schemes) aimed at protecting the names of certain agricultural and food

products. The objective is to promote the unique features of these products linked to their geographical origin(geographical indication) as well as the traditional know-how behind their production (traditional speciality guaranteed).The EU rules on quality schemes have been established by a number of regulations adopted by the EuropeanParliament and the Council of the EU. Recently published studies show that, although the implementation of the EUlegislative framework is assessed positively, certain shortages need to be addressed so that the quality schemes candeliver to their full potential and support the achievement of the objectives of the 'farm to fork' strategy adopted by theEuropean Commission in May 2020 as a cornerstone of the European Green Deal. The Commission work programmefor 2021 therefore envisages the submission of a proposal for a revision of the legislative framework in the fourthquarter of the year. This briefing presents the findings of publicly accessible sources on the implementation of the EUlegislative framework that will be revised.

Briefing EN

Revision of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databasesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-10-2021Autor HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Ámbito político Derecho de la propiedad intelectual | Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave base de datos | Directiva CE | estrategia de la UE | mercado único digital | método de evaluación | propiedad

intelectual | protección de datos | tecnología digitalResumen Following the adoption of the 2015 strategy for a digital single market in Europe and the 2020 communication on a

European strategy for data, both of which sought to establish the right conditions for developing the EU data economy,several additional policy and legislative initiatives were undertaken. Their common goal was to provide the necessarylegal, technological and economic conditions so data access, data-sharing and data re-use could foster innovation,business competitiveness and public interest. One of these initiatives resulted in the adoption of Directive 96/9/EC onthe Legal Protection of Databases (the Database Directive), which is among the legal instruments to be revised as partof the development of an EU data act. As the Database Directive provides rules on intellectual property rights attachedto databases, its revision is also part of the Commission’s intellectual property action plan, adopted in 2020 Thisimplementation appraisal looks at the practical implementation of the directive in light of the expected Commissionproposal for its revision. According to the 2021 Commission work programme, the proposal will be submitted in thethird quarter of 2021, after having initially been part of the 2020 Refit programme.

Briefing EN

The 2021 G20 Summit: Bridging global rifts for a greener and more sustainable futureTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-10-2021Autor ZAMFIR Ionel

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Afganistán | capital (ciudad) | cooperación económica | economía internacional | enfermedad por coronavirus | G20 |

Italia | Lacio | política en materia de cambio climático | política fiscal | recuperación económica | reunión en la CumbreResumen The 2021 G20 Summit, to be held in Rome on 30 and 31 October, was expected to bring together the major

economies' leaders in a physical meeting for the first time since the pandemic began. However, several leaders (ofRussia, Japan, Mexico and China) have announced that they will not attend in person, limiting opportunities to holdinformal bilateral meetings in the margins of the summit. Important decisions designed to put the global economy andsociety on course towards a greener and more sustainable future have already been sketched out at ministerial levelmeetings. These now need to be endorsed by the heads of state or government. With its informal nature, the G20 is avital global platform, bringing together the leaders of all the major developed and emerging economies, regardless oftheir political systems. In a global context characterised by growing rifts between the major geopolitical powers, the USand China in particular, the 2021 summit will be an opportunity to show how committed countries still are to multilateralrules and cooperation, but also how much trust remains to sustain the G20's customary voluntary commitments. Theleaders at the summit are expected to reaffirm their commitments to boosting economic recovery, while mainstreaminggreen and digital objectives. They may also discuss more ambitious climate objectives than their ministers havemanaged to agree. The summit should take the final decision on the historic reform of global taxation, agreeing on aglobal minimum tax rate for firms operating multinationally. Vaccine equity and other health challenges relating to thepandemic will also figure on the agenda. For the EU, the summit is an opportunity to reaffirm its unabatedly strongsupport for multilateralism. The European Parliament has expressed support for the tax reform debated at G20/OECDlevel.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 84

Climate action in Sweden: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-10-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | cambio climático | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | reducción de las

emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | Suecia | transición energéticaResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Sweden submitted its NECP in January 2020. A high proportion of Swedes (76%) expectnational governments to tackle climate change. Sweden accounts for 1.4 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slightly faster pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbonintensity of Sweden's economy is the lowest in the Union and continues to decrease faster than the EU-wide average.Sweden's transport sector has the highest share of total emissions, but reduced its levels by over 23 % from 2005 to2019. The sector with the greatest percentage reduction in emissions between 2005 and 2019 – 56.4 % – was wastemanagement. Under the Effort-sharing Decision (2013 2020) Sweden needs to reduce its emissions in sectors notincluded in the EU emissions trading system by 17 % compared with 2005 levels. The 2030 target under the Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030) is a 40 % reduction. The country is well placed to achieve both the 2020 and 2030targets. The country's share of renewable energy sources was 56.4 % in 2019 and is predicted to reach 65 % by 2030,mainly through wind farms and solar power.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Poland: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-10-2021Autor ERBACH Gregor

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | cambio climático | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | Polonia |

reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | transición energéticaResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment ofeach NECP. Poland's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Poles (62 %) expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. The country generates 10.5 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions. Emissions were stable over the 2005-2019 period, with only small annual variations. The carbon intensity ofthe Polish economy fell by 44 % over the same period, but remains the second highest in the Union. The energyindustries sector, heavily reliant on coal, is the country's largest GHG emitter, with 38 % of total emissions. Whileenergy industry emissions fell by 17 % in the 2005-2019 period, the transport sector emissions increased by 84 %,reaching a 17 % share in 2019. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Poland was permitted to increase its emissions by14 % compared with 2005 levels by 2020 and now needs to achieve a 7 % reduction by 2030. Poland reached a 12.2% share of renewable energy sources in 2019, and aims to reach a renewables share of at least 23 % by 2030, byfocusing on biomass, offshore wind and biofuels. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Slovakia: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-10-2021Autor ERBACH Gregor

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | energía renovable | Eslovaquia | estudio de impacto | gas con efecto invernadero |

reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | transición energéticaResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Slovakia's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Slovaks (63 %)expect national governments to tackle climate change. Slovakia accounts for 1.1 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions and reduced emissions at a similar pace as the EU average between 2005 and 2019. The carbonintensity of Slovakia's economy is significantly above the EU average, but has fallen faster than the EU average.Industry is responsible for the largest part of Slovakia's GHG emissions, with a 37 % share of total emissions. Energyindustry emissions fell by 41 % between 2005 and 2019, and accounted for 16 % of Slovakia's emissions in 2019.Emissions from transport and from waste management increased over the same period while emissions fromagriculture remained stable. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Slovakia was allowed to increase its emissions by 13% by 2020, compared with 2005, and will have to reduce them by 12 % by 2030, but is aiming for 20 %. Slovakiaachieved a 16.9 % share of renewable energy sources (RES) in 2019, exceeding its 14 % target for 2020. The countryaims to reach its 2030 target of a 19.2 % share with onshore wind, photovoltaics and bioenergy. Energy efficiencymeasures focus on buildings, public sector, industry and transport.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 85

Taxing the digital economy: New developments and the way forwardTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-10-2021Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político FiscalidadPalabra clave economía digital | Estado miembro UE | fiscalidad de la economía digital | impuesto nacional | OCDE

Resumen On 8 October 2021, the OECD announced that, following years of intense negotiations, 136 countries had finallyreached an agreement on how to tackle the tax policy challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. Agrowing realisation that these challenges cannot be addressed by the existing tax system – over a century old – helpedachieve the breakthrough. With this, one of the main questions pertinent to the digital economy – how to fairly taxbusinesses that rely on intangible assets and have no or only an insignificant physical presence in the tax jurisdictionswhere they operate – seems to have been answered. The EU and other international bodies have been discussingthese issues for some time. In March 2018, the EU introduced a legislative package on the fair taxation of the digitaleconomy. It contained proposals for an interim and a long-term digital tax. However, there was no immediate politicalagreement in the Council. As finding a global solution at the OECD level or a coordinated EU approach was not yetfeasible at the time, some Member States started designing or implementing their own digital taxes, which gave rise totrade tensions. The two-pillar solution agreed under the auspices of the OECD will put an end to this fragmentation.Pillar One would reallocate taxation rights concerning the largest and most profitable multinationals, and Pillar Twowould introduce a global minimal corporate tax rate. While the consensus has been broadly welcomed, the new ruleshave also sparked controversy, particularly regarding their impact on developing countries, their complexity and theirresilience to possible circumvention. The agreement will be presented for endorsement during the G20 Leaders'Summit scheduled for 30-31 October 2021 in Rome. This Briefing updates a previous one from March 2020.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Taxing the digital economy: New developments and the way forward

Domestic use of EU Digital Covid CertificatesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-10-2021Autor CLAROS GIMENO Eulalia | Niestadt Maria

Ámbito político Salud pública | TurismoPalabra clave análisis comparativo | certificado sanitario | documento electrónico | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | Estado

miembro UE | vacuna | vacunaciónResumen Just before summer 2021, the EU adopted in record time (see timeline below) two regulations on the EU Digital Covid

Certificate. The certificate with a QR code shows if a person has been vaccinated, tested negative or recovered fromCovid-19. It is free of charge, available on paper or on a smartphone, and valid in all EU Member States. In total, 43countries in the world are connected to the EU Digital Covid Certificate system. Its aim is to facilitate safe cross-bordermovement during the Covid-19 pandemic, but Member States are also free to use it for other purposes. This overviewshows which Member States are using Covid-19 certificates for other purposes than cross-border travel (data as of 25October 2021). It indicates where and from whom it is required, as well as which proofs are accepted. Some countriesuse a different name for the certificate: e.g. CovidCheck, SafePass, Corona/health pass(port). In all Member States,the EU Digital Covid Certificate is accepted as proof of vaccination, test or recovery. Some (like Austria) also acceptother proofs, such as proof of neutralising antibodies.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-10-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Coronavirus | Democracia | Energía | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Salud públicaPalabra clave Consejo Europeo | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | Estado de Derecho | mercado único digital | política

comercial común | política migratoria de la UE | precio de la energía | reunión en la CumbreResumen The regular European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021 dedicated significant time to discussing the rule of law

and the rise in energy prices – which have become particularly salient topics at national and European level – as wellas to migration. On the rule of law, EU leaders had a political discussion, underlining the importance of the rule of lawfor the EU, but did not adopt concrete conclusions. Regarding the recent spike in energy prices, they agreed onpursuing short-term, tailored and targeted national measures, and will continue to look for a consensus on long-termmeasures at the next European Council meeting. Leaders also took stock of the coronavirus pandemic, reviewedprogress on the digital agenda and related key legislative files, and held a strategic debate on trade.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 86

United States Congress: Facts and FiguresTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-10-2021Autor BENTZEN Naja | SABBATI Giulio

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave bicameralismo | Estados Unidos | Parlamento nacional | sistema de votación | sistema electoral

Resumen The Congress is the legislative branch of the US system of government. It is divided into two chambers: the House ofRepresentatives (lower chamber) and the Senate (upper chamber). The formal powers of Congress are set out inArticle 1 of the US Constitution, and include making laws, collecting revenue, borrowing and spending money,declaring war, making treaties with foreign nations, and overseeing the executive branch. Elections to the USCongress occur in November every second year, with the Congress convening the following January. The current,117th, Congress was elected in November 2020 and was convened in January 2021. The US has a long-standing two-party system, which means that nearly all members of Congress belong to either the Republican or Democratic parties,while independent members (if any) generally align or sit with one of the two main parties. At the most recent,simultaneous US Presidential and Congressional elections, in November 2020, the Democratic party won the WhiteHouse. The Democrats retained a reduced majority in the House of Representatives, whilst both parties got the samenumber of seats in the Senate (including two Independent Senators who sit with the Democrats), where the Democratsnow enjoy a de facto majority because of the casting vote of the US Vice-President, Kamala Harris. This EPRSBriefing is designed to provide key facts and figures about the US Congress as an institution, including relevantcomparisons with the European Parliament (EP). The back page contains a map showing the location of the variousCongressional buildings on Capitol Hill, home to the Congress in Washington DC. This updates previous EPRSBriefings on the 115th Congress and 116th Congress, which are available online.

Briefing EN

Introducing the European Union agency for asylumTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-10-2021Autor ORAV Anita

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave competencia de la UE | derecho de asilo | frontera exterior de la UE | Oficina Europea de Apoyo al Asilo | política

migratoria de la UE | propuesta (UE)Resumen The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is a European Union agency that provides tools to help the EU Member

States prepare for an influx of asylum applicants and implement EU legislation on the ground. The Malta-based agencywas established in 2010 as an impartial centre of expertise, with the objective of developing practical cooperationbetween the Member States, offering support in the event of particular asylum-related pressures and providingevidence for EU policy-making. In 2016, EASO played a major role in implementing the immediate actions outlined inthe European agenda on migration, which focused on strengthening the EU's emergency response to the migrationcrisis. The European Commission has also called for a strengthened role for EASO in other related areas. To enablethe agency to fulfil its new tasks, build up staff, and deliver operational and technical support to Member States,EASO's budget has seen a nearly tenfold increase over the past seven years, from €14.6 million in 2014 to close to€140 million in 2021. However, concerns have been voiced regarding the way EASO's mandate has expanded inpractice, without the necessary legal basis, and regarding the lack of transparency or appropriate monitoringmechanisms vis à vis its activities. In 2016, as a response to the shortcomings revealed in the EU's migrationmanagement, the Commission presented a proposal to amend and expand EASO's mandate, also changing its nameto the European Union agency for asylum to reflect its stronger powers. As part of the asylum reform package, theproposal was put on hold, but was then relaunched as part of the new pact on asylum and migration in September2020. On 29 June 2021, the European Parliament and the Council reached a political agreement on the agency. Toenter into force, the agreement now needs to be endorsed formally by the co-legislators. The text agreed was debatedin plenary session on 7 October 2021, and the Parliament is expected to vote on it during November 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Introducing the European Union agency for asylum

New genomic techniques: European Commission study and first reactionsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-10-2021Autor LAANINEN Tarja

Ámbito político Seguridad alimentariaPalabra clave genética | informe de estudio de la UE | innovación | nueva tecnología | organismo genéticamente modificado

Resumen On 29 April 2021, the European Commission presented a study on the status of new genomic techniques (NGTs)under EU law. The Council had asked for this study in the context of a 2018 European Court of Justice judgment andthe practical questions raised by it. The Commission study examines the implementation of EU legislation on NGTs,based on consultations with the Member States and stakeholders. It provides information on the status and use ofNGTs in plants, animals and micro-organisms for agri-food and for industrial and pharmaceutical applications. Thestudy defines NGTs as ‘techniques capable of changing the genetic material of an organism and that have emerged orhave been developed since 2001’, that is, after the existing EU legislation on genetically modified organisms wasadopted. The main conclusions of the study point to ‘limitations as to the capacity of the legislation to keep pace withscientific developments’, stating that this causes implementation challenges and legal uncertainties. According to thestudy, there are strong indications that the legislation is not fit for purpose for some NGTs and their products, and thatit needs to be adapted to scientific and technological progress. According to the Commission, the study confirms thatNGT products have the potential to contribute to sustainable agri-food systems in line with the objectives of theEuropean Green Deal and the ‘farm to fork’ strategy. Stakeholders have mixed reactions to the study: while someindustry associations and researchers welcome its content and conclusions, others appear more cautious, and someenvironmental NGOs strongly oppose it. In the European Parliament, the Environment and Agriculture Committees(ENVI/AGRI) have organised public hearings, and the initial views of the Parliament are taking shape in the context ofthe ‘farm to fork’ strategy.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 87

PRIIPs: Revised DA/RTS on improved disclosure rules for retail investment productsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-10-2021Autor CHAILLET GAELLE CHARLOTTE | HONNEFELDER Stephanie | SLOCOCK OLIVER

Ámbito político Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Transposición y aplicación de la legislaciónPalabra clave comunicación de datos | información al consumidor | norma técnica | propuesta (UE) | reglamentación de inversiones |

reglamentación financiera | reglamento (UE) | servicios financieros | sociedad de inversiónResumen This briefing has been prepared to support ECON’s work on scrutiny of the Delegated Regulation amending the RTS

laid down in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 on Key Information Documents (KIDs) as foreseen byRegulation (EU) No 1286/2014 on Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs Regulation) .The Delegated Regulation was adopted by the Commission on 7 September 2021 together with two quick fixamendments of the PRIIPs Regulation and the Directive 2009/65/EC on Undertakings for Collective Investments inTransferable Securities (UCITS Directive).

Briefing EN

Parlamento Europeo: datos y cifrasTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-10-2021Autor SABBATI Giulio

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen Esta nota informativa, publicada por el Servicio de Estudios del Parlamento Europeo, tiene por objeto presentar datos

y cifras clave sobre el Parlamento Europeo, tanto de la legislatura actual (julio de 2019-junio de 2024), como de lasocho anteriores, desde que en junio de 1979 se introdujeran las elecciones directas. En las siguientes páginasencontrará gráficos de varios tipos que: * ilustran la composición del Parlamento Europeo en la actualidad y en elpasado; * plasman el aumento del número de partidos con representación en el PE y la evolución de los grupospolíticos; * reflejan la edad de los diputados y el incremento del número de mujeres que ocupan un escaño en el PE; *explican los sistemas electorales utilizados en las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo en los Estados miembros; *hacen un seguimiento de la evolución de la participación en las elecciones europeas y las diferencias entre Estadosmiembros; * resumen la actividad del PE durante la legislatura actual y las precedentes; * sintetizan la composición delas comisiones, delegaciones y órganos rectores del PE; * explican la función legislativa del PE y su interacción con laComisión Europea. La nota informativa se actualiza periódicamente durante la legislatura 2019-2024 para reflejar losdatos más recientes.

Briefing BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV

Multimedia European Parliament legislative activity, 2004-2020: Co-decision procedure

European green bond standardTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-10-2021Autor KRAMER Esther

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave desarrollo sostenible | economía verde | estrategia de la UE | euroemisión | instrumento económico medioambiental |

método de evaluación | neutralidad en carbono | norma europea | reglamentación financiera | valor de renta fijaResumen The IA assesses elements to be added to the 2019 TEG report on a European Green Bond Standard (EU-GBS). The

range of options is therefore limited to these additional aspects and does not cover the entire set of rules for greenbonds. The IA is based on reliable internal and external research, international data and several stakeholderconsultations. While the definition of the objectives could have been more specific, the problem analysis and theassessment of options are overall logical and thorough, even if their structure could have been more straightforward.Some valuable information - and explanation - featured in the annexes could have made the main text of the IA moreaccessible, especially relating to the technical aspects and current market practices. Despite some weaknesses, the IAmakes a convincing case for a voluntary EU-GBS, with some flexibility for sovereigns, taking into account theirinstitutional specificities, but respecting the screening criteria of the EU-taxonomy.

Briefing EN

The SURE: ImplementationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-10-2021Autor PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA | TEIXEIRA DA CUNHA INES

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave aplicación del Derecho de la UE | ayuda de la UE | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | financiación del

presupuesto | gasto de la UE | instrumento financiero de la UE | lucha contra el paro | paro | reglamento (UE)Resumen Council Regulation 2020/672 established SURE, the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate

unemployment risks in an emergency, which has been in force since 20 May 2020. This note provides an overview intabular format of the SURE implementing decisions as adopted by Council, of Commission issuances under SURE andof disbursements. It will be regularly updated.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 88

Lobbying and foreign influenceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-10-2021Autor BAUER Elisabeth | THIEL Marie

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave desinformación | grupo de interés | injerencia | movimientos de opinión | transparencia administrativa | transparencia

del proceso decisorioResumen Lobbying and foreign influence are normal, integrated activities in modern public policy-making and geopolitics. When

these influencing activities are covert or illicit in nature, however, they can be damaging to public image and levels ofpublic trust in our democratic societies and their institutions, including those of the EU. Although not a modern concept,the frequency and extent of covert influence activities by third countries have been increasing since the mid-2010s. Inthe EU, this has taken the form of disinformation attacks on the EU, hidden agendas pushed by foreign fundedacademic think-tanks and funding of Member State political parties by authoritarian regimes, all with the aim ofundermining the legitimate decision-making processes and political structures in and of the EU. The term foreigninterference is often utilised to differentiate between legitimate influencing activities, such as diplomatic relations, andactivities with the intention to disrupt. As this is not an exact science, however, it is also often difficult to distinguishbetween foreign influence and foreign interference activities. While interference tactics are often coercive, covert,deceptive, and clandestine in nature, influence activities can be made more transparent, thereby making it easier todifferentiate between interference and the more legitimate influence activities. In light of the aforementioned growingforeign interference efforts, the EU considers foreign interference tactics as a serious threat and is taking steps tomonitor and mitigate them, by, for example, setting up specific bodies or committees, especially in the context of EUelections. In parallel, the EU is also trying to improve the transparency of foreign influence activities. One suchmeasure is broadening the scope of the Transparency Register, a public database of the European Parliament, theCouncil of the European Union and the European Commission, for the registration of transparent and ethical interestrepresentation activities. According to the latest OECD report on lobbying, only three OECD nations (the USA,Australia and Canada) have rules in place that cover foreign influence. On the back of a new InterinstitutionalAgreement (IIA) on a mandatory Transparency Register, however, the EU looks set to join those three nations.

Briefing EN

The concept of 'climate refugee': Towards a possible definitionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-10-2021Autor APAP Joanna

Ámbito político Derechos humanos | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Medio ambientePalabra clave ayuda a los siniestrados | cambio climático | desastre natural | desplazado interno | enfermedad por coronavirus |

epidemia | Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático | migración forzosa | política migratoriade la UE | refugiado

Resumen According to statistics published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, since 2008 over 318 million peoplearound the world have been forcibly displaced by floods, windstorms, earthquakes or droughts, 30.7 million in 2020alone. This is equivalent to one person being displaced every second. Depending on the frequency and scale of themajor natural disasters occurring, there are significant fluctuations in the total number of displaced people from oneyear to the next, yet the trend over recent decades has been a growing one. Many find refuge within their own country,but some are forced to go abroad. In the summer of 2021, Europe witnessed heavy and unprecedented flooding,particularly in Belgium and Germany, and heat domes in the Mediterranean region. Scientists relate this directly toclimate change. All things considered, the number of 'climate refugees' looks set to rise. So far, the national andinternational response to this challenge has been limited, and protection for the people affected remains inadequate.What adds further to the gap in protection of such people – who are often described as 'climate refugees' – is thatthere is neither a clear definition of this category of people, nor are they covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Thelatter extends only to people who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their race, religion,nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, and who are unable or unwilling to seekprotection from their home countries. While the EU has not so far recognised climate refugees formally, it hasexpressed growing concern and has taken action to support the countries potentially affected by climate-related stressand help them develop resilience. This briefing is an update of an earlier one from January 2019.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Climate refugees

Rising sea levels

The concept of 'climate refugee': Towards a possible definition

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 89

Updating the framework for the safety of non-food consumer products on the internal marketTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-10-2021Autor VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave armonización de normas | bien de consumo | comercio electrónico | mercado único | norma de comercialización |

norma de seguridad | norma europea | propuesta (UE) | seguridad del producto | vigilancia del mercadoResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the impact assessment (IA) accompanying

the Commission proposal for a regulation on general product safety aimed at ensuring that EU consumers areprotected from dangerous non-food products. The IA defines clearly the problems to be addressed and their analysisappears to be satisfactory but the description of how they would evolve without any EU intervention is limited. The IAdoes not compare the retained options in terms of efficiency, and proportionality. The IA appears to have done aconvincing analysis of the economic and social impacts of the options retained for assessment. The IA includes a verycomprehensive reports of the consultations held, specifically referring to the received feedback in several parts of thereport. Overall, the analysis carried out in the IA appears to be well grounded. The IA appears to have addressed theRSB's comments. The proposal appears to be largely consistent with the analysis provided in the IA.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-10-2021Autor DRACHENBERG Ralf | TORPEY REBECCA MARY

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Energía | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Saludpública

Palabra clave Consejo Europeo | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | política migratoria de la UE | precio de la energía |relaciones de la Unión Europea | reunión en la Cumbre | transformación digital

Resumen The regular European Council meeting of 21-22 October 2021 will discuss the coronavirus pandemic, digital policy,migration, energy prices and external relations. Regarding the coronavirus pandemic, EU Heads of State orGovernment will focus on EU coordination, resilience and readiness in terms of health crises and the EU's futurepreparedness for the short and medium terms. The discussions at the meeting on both digital policy and on migrationare expected to be stock-taking exercises, assessing the implementation of previous European Council decisions andpossibly adding further specifications to them. If the update of the Schengen Borders Code were to be addressed inthe context of migration, this could generate a strong debate, since despite overall support for strong external EUborders, Member States have diverging views on how border protection should be assured. EU leaders could alsodebate energy prices at length, as the issue has become high profile in many Member States. Regarding externalrelations, discussions in the European Council will focus on preparations for forthcoming international events, notablythe ASEM and the Eastern Partnership summits, and the COP26 climate conference. In addition, the Presidents of theEuropean Council, Charles Michel, and the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, may brief EU Heads ofState or Government on the recent EU-Ukraine Summit, held on 12 October 2021.

Briefing EN

European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA): Pre-legislative synthesis ofnational, regional and local positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 15-10-2021Autor COLLOVA Claudio | QUAGLIO Gianluca

Ámbito político Salud públicaPalabra clave autoridad nacional competente | ayuda de urgencia | cooperación transfronteriza | cuidado de la salud | estado de

excepción | gestión de crisis | medicina de urgencia | organismo de la UE | poderes públicos | salud pública | sistemasanitario

Resumen This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series which offers a synthesis of the pre-legislative state-of-play and advanceconsultation on a range of key European Commission priorities during the latter’s five-year term in office. It seeks tosummarise the state of affairs in the relevant policy field, examine how existing policy is working on the ground, andidentify best practice and ideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of Europeansystem of multilevel governance. This analysis of the positions of partner organisations at EU, national, regional andlocal levels suggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in discussion of thelegislative proposal to establish an emergency framework for a European Health Emergency Preparedness andResponse Authority (HERA): * Governmental organisations at all levels advocate a robust operational andinfrastructural framework, with a long-term vision, a coherent legal structure and efficient decision-making procedures.They generally favour a comprehensive impact assessment in advance of the establishment of HERA. * Publicauthorities at national, regional and local levels suggest that the HERA should develop a strong relationship with theWorld Health Organization (WHO). Some governmental organisations especially stress the need for robust links withdeveloping countries. * Public authorities agree on the need for a clear interface between HERA, the European Centrefor Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA). A further issue is therelationship between HERA and existing EU operational crisis management mechanisms, where national authoritiesrecommend avoiding duplication of work. They also suggest taking into account regional and local circumstances in acoordinated crisis response. * Many governmental organisations hold a rather positive view of the interaction betweenthe EU and the national levels, where HERA could have a beneficial coordinating role, although some publicauthorities have expressed concern about possible conflicts of competence between national and EU levels in thehealth sector.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The future of EU borders in times of pandemic

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 90

Looking to Glasgow: A scene-setter ahead of COP26Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-10-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave Acuerdo de París sobre el Cambio Climático | adaptación al cambio climático | calentamiento de la tierra | Conferencia

ONU | convención ONU | Escocia | Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático | Protocolo deKyoto | reducción de las emisiones de gas

Resumen Adopted in 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has gathered the nationsof the world with the common goal to limit dangerous global warming. In December 2021, after having been postponedfor a year due to the coronavirus crisis, world leaders will meet in Glasgow for the 26th Conference of the Parties to theUNFCCC (COP26) to continue negotiations on the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The latest assessmentreport of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underscores the of role human activities in causingglobal warming. The UNFCCC-commissioned IPCC special report on impacts of global warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) alsooutlines the risks of current trajectories. There is therefore strong pressure on world leaders to deliver progress inGlasgow. Parties to the Paris Agreement were required to update their nationally determined contributions to fightclimate change and its impacts before COP26. Some Parties are yet to do so, while analysis of submitted contributionsas of July 2021, shows action to reach the agreed targets remains insufficient. Most key emitting nations continue torate poorly on their climate action performance. While COP24 and COP25 both failed to finalise the Paris Agreementrulebook, and developed nations so far fall short of fulfilling their climate finance promises, expectations are mountingfor Glasgow to finish the job. At the same time, Covid 19 restrictions and impacts continue to create challenges toparticipate in person, especially for developing countries' delegations. Recent Eurobarometer surveys show citizenshave a clear expectation that their governments should handle the climate change challenge, with research alsopointing to a growing acceptance of the need to change personal habits in view of transitioning to more sustainableeconomies. The European Parliament will vote on a motion for a resolution on COP26 at the October II plenarysession in Strasbourg. The draft highlights the urgency of action and calls upon leaders to ensure a just transition andadequate support for areas and states vulnerable to climate change impacts.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU Climate Action: Responding to the global emergency

EU-China relations in challenging timesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-10-2021Autor JOCHHEIM Ulrich

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave China | cooperación comercial | cooperación económica | cooperación medioambiental | desinformación | enfermedad

por coronavirus | estrategia de la UE | inversión de la UE | relaciones de la Unión EuropeaResumen Following the 1975 establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the European Economic Community (EEC)

focused its strategic approach – in line with its competences at the time – on support for China's economic opening,launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping. While this approach resulted in a swiftly expanding trade and investmentrelationship, results in other areas are rather mixed. By most accounts, the strategy also failed to contribute to makingsignificant progress on the rule of law in China and there were no visible results of the EU's human rights engagement.Given that, at the beginning of Deng's reforms, China was very poor, the EEC/European Union (EU) de facto agreed toan arrangement for special and differential treatment, linked to China's status as a developing country. However, withChina having become an upper-middle income country and the bilateral trade relationship still characterised byconsiderable asymmetries, the existing lack of reciprocity in market access and of a level playing field in general haveattracted increasing attention. At the same time, China has been regressing in terms of human rights. Furthermore, thecountry has become much more assertive in the regional context, is fast improving its (offensive) military capabilitiesand has started to engage in global disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks. As a consequence, the EU haschanged its strategic approach considerably, as exemplified by the 2019 Joint Communication, which proposeddifferent legal instruments to ensure a level playing field in trade, and to fend off Chinese attempts to gain access tocritical infrastructures. Relations with the European Parliament have deteriorated, pushing Parliament to put thecomprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) – which had been agreed on 30 December 2020 – on ice.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 91

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders in Brdo pri Kranju on 5-6 October 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-10-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Seguridad y defensaPalabra clave Balcanes Occidentales | Consejo Europeo | Eslovenia | Gorenjska | papel internacional de la UE | política común de

seguridad y defensa | política migratoria de la UE | precio de la energía | reunión en la CumbreResumen The EU leaders met on 5 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, Slovenia, to discuss informally the Union's role in the world

over a working dinner. The meeting was coupled with an EU-Western Balkan Summit the next day. The focus at thedinner was on security and defence in the context of the 'Strategic Compass' process, to be finalised by March 2022,with EU leaders agreeing to continue deepening defence cooperation, not least by strengthening the alliance withNATO. The leaders also confirmed their 2019-2024 strategic agenda commitment to strengthen the EU's capacity to'act autonomously', albeit without agreeing on the modalities. Building unity was central to this preparatory summit.Migration and energy were also raised briefly, but will be addressed in greater detail at future meetings. The EU-Western Balkans Summit on 6 October highlighted the strategic importance of the region for the Union. The focus wason the common commitment to socio-economic recovery and the development of the Western Balkans in the post-pandemic phase, with €30 billion mobilised for investment as part of the economic and investment plan for the WesternBalkans. EU leaders also focused on ways to strengthen political dialogue and security cooperation. The 'BrdoDeclaration' reaffirmed the region's European perspective and the EU's commitment to enlargement, with the caveatsof 'credible reforms', 'rigorous conditionality' and that the assessment of individual countries' progress on the basis ofthe 'principle of own merits'.

Briefing EN

Research for REGI Committee - Cohesion Policy and support to healthTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-10-2021Autor DIETZEN Stephan Klaus

Ámbito político Desarrollo regional | Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la prácticaPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | enfermedad por coronavirus | Estado miembro UE | Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo

Regional | Fondo Social Europeo | inversión de la UE | política sanitaria | reparto de la financiación de la UEResumen As the EU’s main investment policy, Cohesion Policy can play a key role in promoting health and in reducing health

inequalities. This briefing reviews the role of Cohesion Policy with regard to health in the 2014-2020 period andexplores the prospects and challenges that lie ahead. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the COVID-19pandemic.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Hungary: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-10-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | Hungría | reducción de las emisiones de gas |

rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UE | transición energéticaResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Hungary submitted its NECP in December 2019. A high proportion of Hungarians (60 %)expect national governments to tackle climate change. Hungary accounts for 1.7 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbon intensity ofthe Hungarian economy decreased by 35 % between 2005 and 2019, at a faster rate than the EU-27 average.Transport emissions increased by just over 19 % in the 2005-2019 period in Hungary, bringing their share of totalemissions up to over 22 %. Reductions are expected as the country proceeds with its electromobility measures. Thegreatest percentage reduction in emissions between 2005 and 2019 – 37.5 % – was made by the energy industriessector. Under the Effort-sharing Decision for the 2013 2020 period, Hungary was allowed to increase its emissions insectors not included in the EU's emissions trading system by 10 %, compared with 2005 levels, and is on track toachieving that target. Under the Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030) Hungary must reduce its emissions by 7 %compared with 2005. The share of renewable energy sources in Hungary reached 12.6 % in 2019. The country's 2030target of a 21 % share is focused mainly on changes to the transport and heating and cooling sectors, where changesto the existing district heating networks are expected.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 92

Climate action in Slovenia: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-10-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave energía renovable | Eslovenia | gas con efecto invernadero | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento

energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UE | transición energéticaResumen The EU binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Slovenia submitted its NECP in February 2020. More than half (52 %) of Sloveniansexpect national governments to tackle climate change. Slovenia accounts for 0.5 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbon intensity ofthe Slovenian economy decreased by 36 % between 2005 and 2019, a higher rate than the EU average. Energyindustry emissions fell by 29.5 % in the 2005-2019 period in the country. Measures, such as coal phase-out, areexpected to further decrease these emissions. The sector with the greatest percentage reduction in emissions between2005 and 2019 – 45.2 % – was 'other emissions' (buildings and tertiary sector). Under the Effort-sharing Decision(2013 2020), Slovenia was allowed to increase emissions in sectors not included in the EU emissions trading systemby 4 %, compared with 2005 levels, and is on track to achieve this target. The Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030)requires Slovenia to reduce these emissions by 15 %. The share of renewable energy sources in the country reached22 % in 2019. For 2030 the target is 27 %, to be reached mainly through solar and hydro power, and through the useof wood biomass.

Briefing EN

Egypt's foreign policy within a challenging regional contextTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-10-2021Autor STANICEK BRANISLAV

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave cooperación internacional | Egipto | fuerza naval | Mar Mediterráneo | mundo árabe | política exterior | zona económica

exclusivaResumen In the post-Arab Spring period, Egypt's foreign policy has largely been shaped by the state of affairs in the Middle East

and the eastern Mediterranean. Civil wars and unrest have proliferated in the region, creating a knock-on effect felt firstby Iraq and then by Syria, Lebanon and Libya. Conflicts in neighbouring countries, often fought by proxies, haveaffected Cairo's internal political and security interests and influenced Egyptian foreign policy. One such conflict has todo with the persistence of Islamic terrorist networks, such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), in northern Sinai. Another isbetween the Palestinian factions and between Hamas and Israel, in both of which Egypt has been a mediator. Fightingagainst groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-Sinai Provincehas been a key reason for Egypt's interest in reinforcing alliances with Israel, the Arab Gulf countries, the UnitedStates, Russia and the European Union. Following Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's re-election for a secondterm in 2018, competition with regional players, such as Turkey, and the role of political Islam, have become moredominant and intertwined with Egypt's geopolitical and economic interests. In 2020-2021, Egypt successfully mitigatedthe impact of the coronavirus pandemic on its economy and was the only Middle East and North Africa (MENA)country with a positive GDP growth (3.6 %). Despite declining revenues in some sectors, such as tourism, ratingsagencies predict that the country will continue to score the highest levels of GDP growth in the MENA region in 2021-2024. Reinvigorated, Egypt seems to be looking for greater strategic influence and power. The country aims tocontinue partnering with the EU in areas of strategic importance and is likely to play a decisive role in Libya and theeastern Mediterranean. Some initiatives, such as its mediation in the Libyan civil war, participation in the EastMediterranean Gas Forum, and joint military naval exercises with EU Member States, speak of the main prerogativesof Egyptian foreign policy and its incremental alignment with EU interests. The European Parliament supportsenhanced EU-Egypt cooperation but has raised red flags with regard to the situation of human rights in the country.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Malta: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-10-2021Autor ERBACH Gregor

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | cambio climático | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | Malta | neutralidad

en carbono | rendimiento energético | transición energéticaResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Malta's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Maltese people (75 %)expect national governments to tackle climate change. Malta, which generates less than 0.1 % of the EU-27's totalgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, has reduced its emissions at a faster pace than the EU average since 2012.However, according to Malta's NECP, the country's geography and demographics, combined with rising grossdomestic product (GDP), will make it difficult to continue this trend. Energy industries account for 28 % of Malta's totalemissions. While energy industry emissions dropped by 63 % between 2005 and 2019, emissions in the transportsector grew by 22 % over the same period. Malta's NECP outlines policies and measures to increase the share ofrenewable energy and reduce transport emissions. However, Malta does not expect to meet its emissions reductiontargets under the Effort-sharing Regulation domestically, but intends to make use of flexibilities, including the transferof annual emissions allocations from other Member States. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU MemberStates.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 93

Working towards a macro-regional strategy for the MediterraneanTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-10-2021Autor VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave actividad de la UE | cooperación territorial europea | política macrorregional de la UE | región mediterránea (UE)

Resumen A rich tapestry of nations and cultures, the Mediterranean has always been a strategic area for the European Union(EU) and there is much mutual benefit to be garnered from closer cooperation with the countries of the southern andeastern Mediterranean. As a geographical region whose countries face many shared challenges given their jointproximity to a common sea, the idea of establishing a macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean region has beenpresent in EU discourse from the very beginning, drawing support from institutions such as the European Committee ofthe Regions (CoR) and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), with Parliament also contributing.Discussions on the development of a macro-regional strategy in the Mediterranean have explored a variety of differentscenarios, from an overarching strategy encompassing the whole region, to three separate macro-regional strategiesor a combination of both approaches. Progress towards greater macro-regional cooperation in the region has,however, been slow. This situation has arguably been compounded by the challenges facing the region in general,which include issues such as digital transformation, climate change, migration and mobility, and environmentalprotection. Whereas a large number of territorial cooperation initiatives have developed over the years to helpcountries work together to address these issues, the developmental differences between the countries of theMediterranean are such that the priorities of the countries of the southern Mediterranean differ significantly from thoseof their northern neighbours, making it difficult to agree on a set of common priorities for a possible macro-regionalstrategy in the Mediterranean. This lack of consensus could ultimately prove to be the most difficult challenge of all.For while the European Council remains open to new macro-regional strategies, the lack of any agreement among thecountries concerned regarding priorities or indeed geographical scope raises serious questions as to the prospects forthe implementation of a macro-regional strategy for the Mediterranean.

Briefing EN

Review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework -Summary of some related issuesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-10-2021Autor GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosPalabra clave consulta pública | control de liquidez | disponibilidad monetaria | gestión de crisis | resolución bancaria | solvencia |

unión bancaria de la UEResumen In February 2021, the Commission launched a consultation that sought to gather stakeholders’ experience with the

current crisis management and deposit insurance framework as well as their views on the revision of the framework.The results of that consultation were published in a summary report. As the experience with the application of thecurrent framework indicates that some adjustments may be warranted, this briefing summarises some of theunderlying issues.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with A. Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board ECON on 14 October 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-10-2021Autor GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosPalabra clave Autoridad Bancaria Europea | Banco Central Europeo | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | estadística

económica | Eurogrupo (zona euro) | inspección bancaria | instancia de control | necesidad financiera | sesión pública |sistema bancario | supervisión financiera

Resumen This note is prepared in view of a regular public hearing with the Chair of the Supervisory Board of the EuropeanCentral Bank (ECB), Andrea Enria, which will take place on 14 October 2021. The briefing addresses: 1) Emergingrisks in the banking group, as presented to the Eurogroup, 2) results of EBA’s and ECB’s 2021 stress test exercises, 3)the Basel Committee report on early lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic on the Basel reforms, 4) the ECB report onsanctioning activities, 5) the ECB Supervisory Banking Statistics for the first quarter 2021, and 6) summaries ofexternal papers on long-term effects of the pandemic on the banking sector.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 94

The European Green Deal and cohesion policyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-10-2021Autor WIDUTO Agnieszka

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | estrategia de la UE | Fondo de Cohesión | Fondo Estructural | lucha contra la

contaminación | neutralidad en carbono | reparto de la financiación de la UEResumen In line with its commitments under the Paris Agreement on climate change, in 2019 the EU adopted an ambitious

strategy for reaching climate neutrality by 2050: the European Green Deal. The significant reduction of greenhousegas emissions needed to achieve it will require profound social and economic changes, while ensuring a socially fairand just transition. As climate change is linked to the greenhouse effect, the EU's actions for reducing emissionsinvolve greening high-emissions sectors such as fossil fuels-based energy, transport, agriculture, manufacturing andwaste management. Triggered by climate change, heatwaves, water stress, wildfires, coastal flooding and extremeweather events affect EU regions with varying degrees of severity and will require a tailored approach to mitigation.The transition towards climate neutrality cannot be achieved through environmental policies alone. Cohesion policy,which accounts for about one third of the EU budget, supports this process by earmarking funding for climate action,for 'climate proofing' investments and for implementing specific actions in EU regions. In addition to the traditionalcohesion policy funds (European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund and European Social Fund Plus), anew Just Transition Fund will support the transition in regions relying on fossil fuels and high-emissions industries overthe period of 2021-2027. Moreover, one out of the five cohesion policy objectives in the current funding period isentirely dedicated to a greener Europe and fosters investment in clean energy, the circular economy, climate changemitigation and sustainable transport. As the main goal of cohesion policy is to prevent the widening of disparities, it canthus help support those regions that bear the heaviest burden of the transition and make sure that no region is leftbehind. Local and regional authorities across the EU are also working together to tackle climate challenges byparticipating in the European Climate Pact and in initiatives such as the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy,Mayors Alliance for the European Green Deal, and Green Deal Going Local.

Briefing EN

Where will the EU's Strategic Compass point?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-10-2021Autor LATICI Tania | LAZAROU Eleni

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Seguridad y defensaPalabra clave asociación internacional de la UE | defensa estratégica | estrategia de la UE | gestión de crisis | política común de

seguridad y defensa | política europea de defensa | seguridad europeaResumen As Member States encounter increasingly complex security threats, momentum to push for EU initiatives to deliver on

the Union's level of ambition in defence has emerged. A process aimed at bringing clarity, guidance and incentives tocompleting the common security and defence policy, the Strategic Compass is a first for the European Union.Announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2021 State of the European Union speech, aEuropean Defence Summit is expected to take place in February 2022. It is envisaged that, following its much-anticipated presentation, EU leaders will endorse the Compass in March 2022. European Council President CharlesMichel branded 2022 'the year of European defence'. Launched in 2020, developing the Strategic Compass entails acomplex strategic reflection, threat analysis and strategic dialogue among Member States. It is structured around fourinterlinked thematic baskets: crisis management, defence capabilities, resilience, and partnerships. Unlike the 2016 EUGlobal Strategy, which saw the EU institutions take the lead, this process is Member State-led, with the institutionsplaying a supporting and coordinating role. The main challenge of the Strategic Compass appears to be, on the onehand, providing clarity in the EU's objectives (defining the ends, the ways and the means), and on the other, ensuringMember State 'buy-in'. The latter is essential for the follow-up to the process, the findings from which should ideally bereflected in national defence planning processes. The process provides opportunities to improve links between theoperational and capability dimensions of EU defence initiatives and external crisis management, to consolidate existingstrategic partnerships and rethink the configuration of new ones, and to provide a concrete vision for the commitmentsmade since 2016 to boost the EU as a defence actor. However, experts caution that the Compass risks remaining apaper exercise, should the political will to follow up not materialise.

Briefing EN

Consumer Credit DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 05-10-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave contrato | crédito al consumo | mercado único | propuesta (UE) | protección del consumidor

Resumen Consumer credit is a type of loan allowing consumers to purchase consumer goods and services for which they do nothave the funds. It is regulated at national and EU level. The Consumer Credit Directive (CCD), in force since 2008, isthe relevant EU-level legislation. The CCD has undergone several revisions over the past decade, yet growingdigitalisation, insufficient harmonisation and issues affecting consumer protection, among other things, have promptedthe Commission to publish a proposal for a new directive. This proposal brings crowdfunding into the scope of theCCD, expands and clarifies the definitions, and adds new articles relative to, among other things, new obligations forcreditors, tying and bundling practices, ancillary services, advisory services, unsolicited credit sale, conduct ofbusiness obligations for creditors and requirements for their staff. The proposal is part of the Commission's NewConsumer Agenda aimed at updating the overall strategic framework of EU consumer policy. The proposal is currentlyexamined by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the IMCO committee. Atthe moment, no date has been announced for the publication of a draft report. First edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 95

Improving the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanismTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-10-2021Autor VIKOLAINEN Vera

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave Acuerdo de Schengen | asilo político | control de la UE | estudio de impacto | método de evaluación | programa de la

UE | propuesta (UE)Resumen The European Commission proposed to improve the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism established by

Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013. The accompanying impact assessment (IA) provides a well defined problem definition,substantiated with evidence. Furthermore, the stakeholder opinions are reported consistently throughout the IA and areused as input for the combination of measures under the preferred option. Moreover, the data sources underpinningthe IA are recent, reliable, consistently referenced and publicly available at the time of writing. However, the focus ofthe IA analysis is predominantly on the administrative costs and benefits, while the assessment of economic, socialand fundamental rights impacts of the Mechanism’s functioning remains very limited and their quantification was notpossible.

Briefing EN

Consumer CreditTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-10-2021Autor DALLI HUBERT

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave crédito al consumo | estudio de impacto | mercado único | política crediticia | propuesta (UE) | protección del

consumidorResumen The Commission is proposing a new directive on consumer credits to replace the Consumer Credit Directive of 2008.

This initial appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposal finds that the impact assessmentestablishes a logical chain between the problems identified and the policy options considered, which are presented in aclear and balanced way. The options appear to be realistic and feasible, using the existing policy framework as adeparture point and offering a range of interventions with scaling levels of intensity. The impact assessment makes useof a number of visual aids, which are especially valuable in providing the reader with a clear overview of the problemsand their drivers, policy objectives and policy options, and help illustrate the complex links between them.

Briefing EN

Effective remedies for asylum-seekers at EU external borders: A new pact on migration and asylumTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-10-2021Autor RADJENOVIC Anja

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave control fronterizo | Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos | corriente migratoria | Derecho de la UE | expulsión |

frontera exterior de la UE | Frontex | política migratoria de la UE | solicitante de asilo | tratados europeosResumen The European Union's objectives in the field of external border protection are to safeguard freedom of movement

within the Schengen area (an area without internal borders) and to ensure efficient monitoring of people who cross theEU's external borders. To strengthen its external borders and prevent irregular migrants from reaching EU territory, theEU has focused on extending its partnerships with third countries as well as on reinforcing and providing its borderagencies with stronger means and powers. Furthermore, a new pact on migration and asylum, presented in 2020 butstill the subject of negotiations between the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, introduces a new set ofborder procedures as a key 'migration management tool' in the event of the arrival of a large number of asylumapplicants from third countries. When conducting border management and immigration control, states' authorities needto respect international legal requirements that protect the human rights of non-nationals who are subjected to borderchecks, by providing effective remedies for human rights violations at borders, such as a possibility to lodge an appealagainst a decision before a competent, independent and impartial national authority. At the European and EU level, arange of human rights standards have been developed that regulate the powers of individual states when allowing orrefusing entry to irregular immigrants and asylum-seekers and when implementing their expulsion to countries fromwhich they have come or transited on their way.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 96

ECB monetary policy: Strategic reviewTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-10-2021Autor HOFLMAYR MARTIN

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave análisis comparativo | Banco Central Europeo | cambio climático | estabilidad de precios | política monetaria única |

precio al consumidorResumen In July 2021, the European Central Bank (ECB), the central bank of the 19 European Union countries that have

adopted the euro, completed its first monetary policy strategic review for 18 years. The key change, after 18 months ofconsultation, was a new interpretation of price stability (the ECB's primary objective) as a symmetric inflation rate of 2% over the medium term. The aim of this year's review was to adapt monetary policy and central banking to broadermacroeconomic trends, such as digitalisation, globalisation and demographic change, while also giving considerationto the implications of climate change and the carbon transition, in line with the EU's climate goals and objectives. Theresult will have substantial implications for the primary objective (price stability), for the ECB's monetary policyassessment and for its monetary policy operational framework. In short, the revised monetary policy strategy brings theECB's overall strategic orientation closer to its central bank peers, shifting away from curbing high inflation towardsensuring it does not dip too low, while also building climate considerations into the policy framework.

Briefing EN

Alcohol labellingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-09-2021Autor LAANINEN Tarja

Ámbito político Seguridad alimentariaPalabra clave bebida alcohólica | consumo de alcohol | cáncer | denominación del producto | etiquetado | información al consumidor |

marca de calidad | medicina preventiva | nutrición | reglamento (UE) | salud públicaResumen In its Europe's Beating Cancer plan, published in February 2021, the European Commission suggests – among other

initiatives concerning cancer prevention – several actions concerning alcoholic beverages, such as limiting onlineadvertising and promotion, and reviewing European Union (EU) legislation on the taxation of alcohol. Also among theproposals is mandatory labelling of ingredients and nutrient content on alcoholic beverages by the end of 2022. Healthwarnings on labels should follow by the end of 2023. First attempts to label ingredients of alcoholic drinks were alreadymade in the late 1970s, however the Council was not able to agree on any of the proposed models. Furthermore,alcoholic drinks containing more than 1.2 % by volume of alcohol (ABV) are exempted from the obligation, set on otherdrinks and foodstuffs, to list the ingredients and make a nutritional declaration on the label. The European Commissionadopted a report in 2017, concluding that it had 'not found objective grounds that would justify' the absence ofinformation on ingredients and nutritional information on alcoholic beverages. Following on from the Commission'sreport, the European associations representing the alcoholic beverages sectors presented their self-regulationproposal in March 2018, suggesting that some sectors would list all ingredients on labels, while others could use onlinemeans of communication instead. Stakeholders have differing views on the desirability and feasibility of listings on-label; some would prefer this information to be allowed to be given off-label through QR-codes, apps or websites, whileothers absolutely insist that alcoholic drinks should be no different from other sectors of the food and drink industry.The European Parliament has called on the European Commission to consider a health warning and calorie content onalcoholic beverage labels. This is an update of a Briefing published in April 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Alcohol labelling

Jihadist networks in sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, patterns and responsesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-09-2021Autor STANICEK BRANISLAV

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave conflicto religioso | Estado islámico | instrucción militar | misión militar de la Unión Europea | prevención de conflictos |

seguridad regional | terrorismo | África subsaharianaResumen Sub-Saharan Africa has become a new global hotspot for jihadist activity. Armed groups have increasingly developed

strong Salafi jihadist ideologies and forged ties with jihadist movements predominantly active in the Middle East,namely Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known by its Arabic acronym, Da'esh. Therise of jihadist activity in the region of the Sahel, Lake Chad, the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, and more recentlyin northern Mozambique, cannot be attributed solely to the influence of jihadist ideology from the Middle East. Anumber of factors have contributed to the deterioration of security, among them poverty, corruption, various localgrievances, separatist movements, pre-existing intercommunal violence between herders and farmers over land rights(exacerbated by the consequences of climate change), weak state presence, and lack of prospects for young people.In Mali, jihadist groups emerged from the conflict triggered by the separatist Tuareg movement. More recently, inMozambique, grievances and poverty in one of the country's poorest provinces, Cabo Delgado, provided fertile groundfor jihadist ideology, nurtured further by foreign preachers and returning students. The spike in violence attributed tojihadist groups and their ties to foreign movements has prompted international stakeholders, including the EuropeanUnion, to launch counterterrorism operations, also involving local actors. The European Parliament has condemnedthese terrorist groups on several occasions and supported EU military and civilian missions in the region.Nevertheless, the military approach that the international community has preferred up to now has not succeeded inaddressing deeper community grievances and strengthening state presence.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 97

Revising the Energy Efficiency Directive: Fit for 55 packageTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-09-2021Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político EnergíaPalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | ahorro de energía | consumo de energía | cooperación energética | estrategia de la

UE | neutralidad en carbono | política energética de la Unión | propuesta (UE) | rendimiento energético | utilización dela energía

Resumen On 14 July 2021 the European Commission adopted the 'fit for 55' package with a view to adapting existing EU climateand energy legislation to the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by2030, in accordance with the new European Climate Law. The fit for 55 package is part of the European Green Deal, aflagship of the von der Leyen Commission that will involve further climate-related legislation and other new initiatives toset the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHG emissions (climate neutrality) by 2050. The fit for 55 packageincludes a recast of the energy efficiency directive (EED), aligning its provisions to the new -55 % GHG target. TheEED currently sets out the level of energy savings that the EU needs to make to meet the agreed goal of 32.5 %energy efficiency improvements by 2030. The recast EED would require Member States to almost double their annualenergy savings obligations, leading the way by means of action throughout the public sector, action to address energypoverty, and other measures to help to deliver 9 % more energy savings than envisaged by the existing EED and inthe 2021-2030 national energy and climate plans. The file has been referred to the ITRE committee, where therapporteur is still preparing his draft report. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Argentina's Parliament and other political institutionsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-09-2021Autor GOMEZ RAMIREZ Enrique

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Argentina | autoridad nacional competente | Ejecutivo | Grupo parlamentario | Parlamento nacional | poder ejecutivo |

poder judicial | poder legislativo | régimen políticoResumen Argentina is Latin America's second-largest country in terms of size, fourth-largest in terms of population, and third

most important in economic terms. It is a federal republic, composed of 23 autonomous provinces plus theautonomous (capital) City of Buenos Aires. It is an electoral democracy with universal adult suffrage, a presidentialsystem of government and separation of powers. Executive power is vested in the President of the Republic, legislativepower in the bicameral National Congress, and judicial power in the Nation's Judiciary, headed by the Supreme Courtof Justice. Provinces are headed by a governor and have their own legislatures and provincial courts. Argentina hasalways had a multilateral vocation, maintaining a wide presence in global and regional organisations. It has closehistorical and cultural ties with the EU, with which it shares fundamental values. Relations between the EuropeanParliament and the Argentinian National Congress are mainly maintained through the Delegation for Relations withMercosur and the Euro Latin America Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat). In its resolution of 13 September 2017 on EUpolitical relations with Latin America, the Parliament called for 'Argentina to be granted EU strategic partner status asan outstanding player in the (Latin American) region, and a member of Mercosur and the G20'.

Briefing EN

Understanding the EU's response to illicit drugsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-09-2021Autor LUYTEN KATRIEN

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave cooperación internacional | cooperación policial (UE) | estupefaciente | Eurojust | lucha contra el crimen | política de la

UE - política nacional | toxicomanía | tráfico de estupefacientes | tráfico ilícitoResumen The EU is an important market for illicit drugs, both in terms of consumption and production. An estimated 28.9 % of

European adults aged 15-65 have used illicit drugs at least once in their lifetime, a majority of them being men.Cannabis remains by far the most used drug, followed by cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy or molly) and amphetamines. Illicitdrugs have been claiming an increasing number of lives in the EU since 2012, but their impact goes far beyond theharm caused by their use. The illicit drugs market is the largest criminal market in the EU, with an estimated minimumretail value of €30 billion per year in the EU alone. Over a third of the organised crime groups active in the EU areinvolved in the trade in illicit drugs, which, besides generating massive criminal profits and inflicting substantial harm,incites associated violence. Drug markets furthermore have links with wider criminal activity, including terrorism; theyhave a negative impact on the legal economy and communities, cause environmental damage and can fuel corruptionand undermine governance. Illicit drugs have been trafficked into and through the EU for decades, but they are alsoproduced in the EU, for both local and global markets, as is the case of cannabis and synthetic drugs such asamphetamines. In fact, the trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is unique compared to other substances as theproduction of these drugs and new psychoactive substances in most cases takes place in the EU. In 2019, around 1.1million seizures of illicit drugs were reported in the EU-27 plus Norway, Turkey and the UK. The European drug markethas been remarkably resilient to disruption caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Although the EU Member Statescarry the primary responsibility for developing their drug policy and legislation, cross-border cooperation is paramountin the fight against illicit drugs. With the problem constantly expanding in scale and complexity, the EU has beenincreasingly active since the early 1990s, in particular with respect to law enforcement, health-related issues and thedetection and risk assessment of new psychoactive substances.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU action against serious crime

Understanding the EU's response to drugs

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 98

EU-US Trade and Technology Council: New forum for transatlantic cooperationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-09-2021Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalPalabra clave cadena de suministro | cooperación económica | economía digital | Estados Unidos | intercambios extra-UE |

organización internacional | relación comercial | relación transatlántica | tecnologíaResumen In December 2020, the European Commission proposed the creation of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council

(TTC), to facilitate trade, expand investment, develop compatible standards, boost innovation and strengthen thepartners' technological and industrial leadership. The TTC also aims to 'lead values-based digital transformation'.Meanwhile, trade between the EU and US continues and is as important as ever, manifested in the fact that, together,they form the largest bilateral economic relationship in the world, with the largest global data flows across the Atlantic.However, in recent years, transatlantic trade and technology policy relations have been marked by low levels ofcooperation and a number of sources of tension. The 2021 change of administration in Washington neverthelessreinvigorated the relationship between the two. The TTC was formally launched during the EU-US Summit on 15 June2021. High-level politicians will guide the Council, while the groundwork will be carried out in ten working groups,comprised of experts from both partners. They will cover issues such as common standards, resilient supply chains,tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green tech as well as investment screening and export controls.The establishment of the TTC has been widely welcomed by stakeholders and the think-tank community as animportant step towards bridging existing gaps and moving on with a forward-looking agenda, focused on strategicareas and new ways of cooperation. While there is a genuine will to work together on common challenges, somedifficult issues such as unresolved issues from the past and different approaches to regulating digital markets persist,and it remains to be seen whether the TTC will lead to the creation of an ambitious joint policy that influences tradeand technology worldwide. The first meeting is due to take place on 29 September 2021 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The EU-US Trade and Technology Council

European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund 2021-2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-09-2021Autor WIDUTO Agnieszka

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave ayuda al empleo | ayuda regional | crecimiento económico | criterio de elegibilidad | desarrollo regional | desequilibrio

regional | Fondo de Cohesión | Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional | política regional de la UE | propuesta (UE) |región desfavorecida

Resumen In the context of the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, the European Commission published a proposalfor a regulation on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) on 29 May 2018.The new single regulation on the ERDF and CF (previously covered by two separate regulations) identifies the specificobjectives and scope of support for both funds, including non-eligible activities. The majority of ERDF funding will focuson smart growth and the green economy, while the fund will also support other activities such as connectivity, socialissues and local development. The CF will continue to focus predominantly on environmental and transportinfrastructure. Special provisions were proposed for territories such as urban areas and outermost regions. Theindicator framework for monitoring progress will include new common results indicators. On 28 May 2020, theCommission amended the proposal to better support recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. A final political triloguemeeting took place on 9 February 2021, sealing agreement between the Council and the European Parliament. TheParliament voted on the draft regulation at its June II plenary session. The final act was signed 24 June and publishedin the Official Journal on 30 June 2021. Fifth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at keystages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia European Regional Development: Fund and Cohesion Fund 2021-2027

European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture FundTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-09-2021Autor SCHOLAERT FREDERIK

Ámbito político PescaPalabra clave conservación de recursos | desarrollo sostenible | ecosistema marino | estudio de impacto | Fondo Europeo Marítimo y

de Pesca | informe | política marítima | política pesquera | propuesta (UE) | recurso marino | recurso pesquero | regiónperiférica | reparto de la financiación de la UE | seguridad marítima

Resumen As part of the budget framework for the 2021-2027 period, the European Union has adopted new rules on fundingdedicated to the Common Fisheries Policy and the Integrated Maritime Policy. Based on a Commission proposal ofJune 2018, Parliament adopted its first reading position in April 2019. After lengthy interinstitutional negotiations,started after the 2019 elections, political agreement was reached on 4 December 2020. Compared to the previousperiod, the new fund gives Member States more flexibility in defining their own measures, as long as they support thepriorities and are not part of a list of ineligible measures. Departing from the Commission proposal, the co legislatorshave extended support for the small-scale fleet to vessels between 12 and 24 metres in length. The fleet aid provisionsallow support for the first acquisition of a vessel by a young fisherman, for the modernisation of engines, and foroperations that improve safety, working conditions or energy efficiency. A greater focus on aquaculture is reflected inits inclusion in the name of the fund. Preferential aid is provided for outermost regions. At least 15 % of Member States'allocations should be spent on control and data collection. Following its adoption by the Council, Parliament adoptedthe agreed text in plenary on 6 July 2021, closing the procedure at second reading. The new regulation entered intoforce on 14 July and applies retroactively from January 2021. Sixth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 99

Update on recent banking developmentsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-09-2021Autor GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | CoronavirusPalabra clave Autoridad Bancaria Europea | consecuencia económica | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | Estado miembro UE

| estadística económica | inspección bancaria | supervisión financiera | unión bancaria de la UEResumen This briefing summarises recent publications that are particularly relevant in the context of bank supervision, namely:

1) the Basel Committee Interim report on early lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic on the Basel reforms, 2) the EBApeer review report on the prudential assessment of the acquisition of qualifying holdings, 3) the ECB SupervisoryBanking Statistics for the first quarter 2021, and 4) the EBA report on High Earners.

Briefing EN

Participation in early education and careTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-09-2021Autor CHIRCOP Denise | CLAROS GIMENO Eulalia

Ámbito político EducaciónPalabra clave enseñanza obligatoria | enseñanza primaria | escuela infantil | Estado miembro UE | estudio comparativo | guarda de

niños | niño | primera infanciaResumen Following research findings on the positive impact of early childhood education, EU education ministers set a

participation target for 2030 at 96 % of all children three years and over. This will depend on having enough places thatare accessible and affordable. At the same time, the quality of the provision is just as important to reap the potentialbenefits. This infographic looks at the current participation of young children in early childhood education and whatMember States are doing to improve upon it.

Briefing EN

European Parliament involvement in scrutinising the Recovery and Resilience FacilityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-09-2021Autor PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave acuerdo interinstitucional | ayuda de la UE | control presupuestario | cooperación interinstitucional (UE) | intercambio

de información | política presupuestaria | recuperación económica | reglamento (UE) | Semestre Europeo |transparencia financiera

Resumen This note provides a brief overview of Parliament involvement in scrutinising the Recovery and Resilience Facility (andthe European Union Recovery Instrument). It is based on Regulation 2021/241 of 21 February, setting out theRecovery and Resilience Facility, and the relevant parts of the new Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary mattersestablished between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission. It does not cover nor discusses in detail otherinstruments or frameworks for scrutiny, namely those relating to the European Semester, EU budgetary procedures,written or oral questions or any discharge procedures. This paper updates an earlier one initially published on January2021.

Briefing EN

International Agreements in Progress - After Cotonou: Towards a new agreement with the African,Caribbean and Pacific states

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 21-09-2021Autor PICHON Eric

Ámbito político Desarrollo y ayuda humanitariaPalabra clave Acuerdo de Cotonú | negociación de acuerdo (UE) | países ACP | relación ACP-UE | revisión de un acuerdo

Resumen After two years of negotiations, the text of a renewed partnership agreement between the European Union (EU) andthe African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states was initialled in April 2021. The current partnership agreement(‘Cotonou’) was due to expire in February 2020. The then ACP Group of States – which later became the Organisationof the ACP States (OACPS) – and the EU started negotiations on a 'post-Cotonou' agreement in September 2018. TheEU and the OACPS agreed on the principle of a common foundation complemented by three regional protocols. Themulti-level negotiations, the coronavirus crisis and difficulties in reaching agreement on sensitive issues, such asmigration management and sexual and reproductive health and rights, prevented the new agreement from beingfinalised by the initial expiry date set in the Cotonou Agreement. Thus, to avoid a legal vacuum in relations, theprovisions of that agreement were extended until the end of 2021. The European Parliament insisted on maintainingthe ACP-EU joint parliamentary assembly and was successful in this endeavour; in addition, three regionalparliamentary assemblies will be created in the future institutional set-up of the partnership. The new agreement stillneeds to be signed by the parties, and further legal procedures will be required before it can be provisionally applied orenter fully into force. Seventh edition. To view earlier editions of this briefing, please see the EPRS blog.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 100

General product safety regulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-09-2021Autor SAJN Nikolina

Ámbito político Protección de los consumidoresPalabra clave armonización de normas | bien de consumo | norma de seguridad | norma europea | norma técnica | propuesta (UE) |

seguridad del producto | vigilancia del mercadoResumen On 30 June 2021, the Commission adopted a proposal for a general product safety regulation, which would replace the

current General Product Safety Directive, as part of the regulatory fitness-check programme (REFIT). The proposalseeks to address the challenges of product safety of emerging technologies, including use of artificial intelligence (AI)and connected devices, and to establish clear obligations for online marketplaces, which consumers increasingly usefor their online purchases. The proposal would create a single set of market surveillance rules for both harmonised andnon-harmonised products, including by aligning the provisions with the Market Surveillance Regulation, and wouldimprove the effectiveness of product recalls. For non-harmonised products where neither manufacturers nordistributors are established in the European Union, it would introduce a requirement for a person to be responsible forthe product in the Union. The proposal would clarify consumer remedies and harmonise maximum penalties forinfringements. In the European Parliament, the file has been provisionally referred to the Committee on the InternalMarket and Consumer Protection. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stagesthroughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia General product safety regulation

Common Provisions Regulation: New rules for cohesion policy for 2021-2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-09-2021Autor WIDUTO Agnieszka

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave derecho de asilo | Fondo de Cohesión | Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional | Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca

| Fondo Social Europeo | frontera exterior de la UE | gestión financiera | política migratoria de la UE | propuesta (UE) |reparto de la financiación de la UE | seguridad europea

Resumen For the EU budget covering the 2021-2027 period, the European Commission proposed to update EU cohesion policywith a new set of rules. The proposal for a Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) set out common provisions for eightshared management funds: the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Social FundPlus, the Just Transition Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, the Asylum and Migration Fund, theInternal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument. Additional specific regulations add certainprovisions needed to cater for the particularities of individual funds, in order to take into account their differentrationales, target groups and implementation methods. The new CPR is of the utmost importance as it sets the mainrules that govern the above-mentioned funds for the 2021-2027 period. While it builds upon the previous sets of rulescovering the 2014-2020 period, it nevertheless introduces a number of innovations. It aims, amongst other things, tosimplify and improve synergies between the different EU policy tools. On 23 June 2021, the Parliament voted to adoptthe text of the regulation agreed with the Council. The final act was published in the Official Journal on 30 June 2021.Fifth edition of a briefing originally drafted by Vasileios Margaras. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

European territorial cooperation (Interreg) 2021-2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-09-2021Autor VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave Acuerdo de Schengen | cooperación europea | cooperación regional | cooperación territorial europea | cooperación

transfronteriza | desarrollo regional | estadística de la UE | evaluación de conocimientos | Fondo Estructural | FondoEuropeo de Desarrollo Regional | política europea de vecindad | propuesta (UE)

Resumen On 29 May 2018, the European Commission adopted several proposals aimed at defining the EU cohesion policy forthe post-2020 programming period. The package includes a proposal for the new generation of European territorialcooperation (ETC) programmes, commonly referred to as 'Interreg'. The proposed regulation would bring significantchanges to the architecture of ETC, with the reshaping of the three traditional cooperation strands (i.e. cross-border,transnational and interregional cooperation) and the creation of two new components, one dedicated to outermostregions, the other to interregional cooperation on innovation. Another major novelty is the incorporation of cooperationwith countries other than EU Member States. The proposal was examined simultaneously by the Council and theEuropean Parliament. In Parliament, the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) was responsible for the file.Parliament adopted its legislative resolution on the proposal at first reading on 26 March 2019, enabling triloguenegotiations to get under way with the Council. Agreement on the text was reached at the trilogue meeting of 2December 2020, with Parliament adopting the draft regulation on 23 June 2021. Signed on 24 June 2021, the final actwas published in the EU Official Journal on 30 June 2021.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 101

Just Transition FundTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-09-2021Autor JOURDE PERNILLA | WIDUTO Agnieszka

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Coronavirus | Desarrollo regional| Energía

Palabra clave cambio climático | economía verde | fondo (UE) | política de medio ambiente de la UE | propuesta (UE) | reducción delas emisiones de gas | reparto de la financiación de la UE

Resumen The EU aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. Thiswill require a socio-economic transformation in regions relying on fossil fuels and high-emission industries. As part ofthe European Green Deal, on 14 January 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation tocreate the Just Transition Fund, aimed at supporting EU regions most affected by the transition to a low carboneconomy. In the context of recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, an amended proposal on the Just Transition Fund(JTF) was published on 28 May 2020. The JTF is set to have a budget of €17.5 billion (€7.5 billion from the core EUbudget under the Multiannual Financial Framework and €10 billion from the Next Generation EU instrument, in 2018prices). Funding will be available to all Member States, while focusing on regions with the biggest transition challenges.The budget for the Just Transition Fund may be complemented with resources from cohesion policy funds and nationalco financing. The Fund will be part of a Just Transition Mechanism, which also includes resources under InvestEU anda public-sector loan facility. In the European Parliament, the file was entrusted to the Committee on RegionalDevelopment (REGI). A provisional political agreement was reached in trilogue on 9 December 2020, with theParliament adopting the draft regulation on 18 May 2021. The final act was published in the Official Journal on 30 June2021. Fifth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Just Transition fund

Just Transition Fund

Machinery Directive: Revision of Directive 2006/42/ECTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-09-2021Autor ANGLMAYER Irmgard

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Transposición y aplicación de la legislaciónPalabra clave armonización de normas | autorización de venta | Directiva CE | industria mecánica | máquina | norma de

comercialización | norma de seguridad | norma europea | seguridad del productoResumen The Machinery Directive establishes a regulatory framework for mechanical engineering industry products. It regulates

the harmonisation of essential health and safety requirements for machinery in order to ensure the free movement ofmachinery products within the internal market on the one hand, and a high level of protection for machinery users onthe other. The European Commission's Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) evaluation of 2018concluded that the directive has generally remained relevant and effective. However, it pointed at certain shortcomingsin the enforcement of the directive (mainly related to market surveillance, a Member State responsibility), and foundthat despite its technology-neutral design, the directive might not sufficiently cover new risks stemming from emergingtechnologies (in particular robots using artificial intelligence technologies). Furthermore, it identified the potential foradministrative simplification. The Commission issued its new proposal for a regulation on machinery products(COM(2021) 202) on 21 April 2021, as part of the 'artificial intelligence package'. In particular, the change of instrument(regulation instead of a directive) aims at ensuring a uniform implementation in the Member States and avoiding therisk of 'gold plating'.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 102

The situation in Afghanistan: Essential benchmarks for EU engagementTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-09-2021Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Seguridad y defensaPalabra clave Afganistán | ayuda al desarrollo | ayuda humanitaria | Estados Unidos | instauración de la paz | integrismo religioso |

mantenimiento de la paz | migración | OTAN | refugiado | seguridad regionalResumen The departure of United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from Afghanistan marks the

end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban's ability to provide sanctuary forinternational terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically electedgovernment. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military aeroplane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firingrockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fledabroad or were in hiding, and the Taliban had taken back control of most of Afghanistan. On 7 September 2021, theTaliban announced an all-male caretaker government drawn entirely from the Taliban movement, contrary to earlierpromises that the new government would be 'inclusive'. So far, no country has recognised the interim government.There have been reports of reprisals against security personnel, individuals with links to the previous administrationand foreign forces, journalists and minorities, in particular. The rights to education and employment that women haveenjoyed for the past 20 years are meanwhile being curtailed. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the countryis increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, whileforeign assets have been frozen. Many Afghans have fled to neighbouring countries, joining the estimated 3-4 millionAfghan refugees already living there, mainly in Iran and Pakistan. The EU has expressed concerns over thecomposition of the interim government, noting that an inclusive and representative government – which the interimgovernment is not – is an essential benchmark for EU engagement. The EU has made available large amounts ofhumanitarian and development aid and is hoping to establish a diplomatic presence on the ground in Kabul. The EU isalso planning to set up a regional platform for cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbours on issues includingpopulation flows from Afghanistan, terrorism, organised crime and drugs. This Briefing expands and updates an ‘At aglance’ note published on 2 September 2021.

Briefing EN

Citizens' engagement and expectations of the Conference on the Future of EuropeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-09-2021Autor KOTANIDIS Silvia

Ámbito político DemocraciaPalabra clave acta de congreso | democracia participativa | Europa de los ciudadanos | relación administración-administrado

Resumen What sort of European Union do we want to see in the future? What is working well in the EU and what could beimproved? These are just two examples of the kind of questions that the European citizens' panels, part of theConference on the Future of Europe, will have to answer. The Conference on the Future of Europe marks the first timein the history of the EU that citizens have been included in a consultative process in such a structural and innovativemanner. The conference, first announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, is now entering itskey phase, with the first European citizens' panel meeting taking place on 17 September 2021. The widening gapbetween citizens and institutions is a known pattern, not only at EU level but also at national level in many countries.Against this backdrop, some forms of participatory democracy – such as citizens' assemblies – already successful inIreland and elsewhere in recent years, promise to provide a format that allows an open exchange of views in acollaborative environment. The citizens' panels were proposed and designed to give a voice to citizens in the mostinclusive way possible. As such, the panels' key requirement is that they represent the EU population faithfully. Theresult is that 800 EU citizens, equally distributed into four citizens' panels, will be called upon to discuss issues andconcerns that they may themselves identify. The debate is supported by a multilingual digital platform, the main hub ofthe conference. The citizens' panels are not meant to replace representative democracy however, but rather tocomplement it. The Conference on the Future of Europe is a complex democratic exercise in which the multilingualdigital platform gathers ideas from citizens and civil society, citizens' panels give recommendations, and theconference plenary makes proposals on the basis of which the executive board of the Conference will draft the finalreport. The contribution of the citizens' panels will feed into the proposals of the conference plenary and, ultimately,into the final report of the conference that the executive board will present at the end of the conference for theinstitutions to follow up.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 103

Long-term vision for rural areas: European Commission communicationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-09-2021Autor MCELDOWNEY James

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave comunidad rural | desarrollo rural | política regional de la UE | prospectiva | región rural

Resumen In June 2021, the European Commission published a communication setting out a long-term vision for the EU's ruralareas. The range of challenges facing such areas is acknowledged. They include issues relating to demographicchange, such as the loss of population from remote rural areas, lower levels of gross domestic product (GDP) percapita, poor access to services, and issues concerning connectivity. A lower proportion of households in rural regionshave access to next generation broadband compared to the EU average. Tertiary education and basic digital skilllevels are lower in rural areas and a significant gap exists between male and female employment rates. The share ofyoung people aged 15 to 29 years neither in employment nor in education or training is higher in rural areas. Theresponse set out in the Commission's communication includes proposals for a rural pact engaging actors at EU,national, regional and local levels to support the vision and an action plan to support stronger, connected, resilient andprosperous rural areas. A rural observatory will be established to improve data collection and analysis on the situationof rural areas. In support of its proposals, the Commission will put in place a rural proofing mechanism to assess theanticipated impact of major EU legislative initiatives on rural areas. Offering an initial analysis of the communicationand its implications for future policy for rural areas, this briefing examines the challenges and opportunities these areasface. It summarises the views and responses of stakeholders regarding the Commission's long-term vision and thefindings of the public consultation launched by the Commission in September 2020. Evidence is also presented on thelevels of trust rural dwellers have in the different levels of governance. The key drivers that will shape rural areasbetween now and 2040 are identified from the findings of a foresight analysis undertaken by the Joint Research Centre(JRC), which is included in the communication. Lastly, consideration is given to the experience of applying the ruralproofing mechanism, including perspectives on its utility and application in practice.

Briefing EN

Japan's 2050 goal: A carbon-neutral societyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-09-2021Autor D'AMBROGIO Enrico

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Acuerdo de París sobre el Cambio Climático | cambio climático | consumo de energía | cooperación internacional |

cooperación medioambiental | gas con efecto invernadero | Japón | neutralidad en carbonoResumen In October 2020, Japan's Prime Minister, Suga Yoshihide, declared that by 2050 the country would aim to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions to net zero and to realise a carbon-neutral, decarbonised society. In December, theCabinet adopted the green growth strategy, an industrial policy aimed at generating a virtuous cycle of economicgrowth and environmental protection, together with the business community. A €15.4 billion fund is to be created, topromote ecological businesses and innovation to achieve the goal, offering tax credit of up to 10 %. A carbon tax isbeing considered. The strategy recognises that it would be unrealistic to cover all electricity demand with renewablesonly. So, by 2050 Japan's energy mix will comprise renewable energy (50-60 %), hydrogen and ammonia (10 %), andenergy generated by nuclear and thermal power plants (30-40 %). The strategy acknowledges that promotingelectrification in all sectors will boost electricity demand by 30-50 %. To decarbonise electricity, in addition to usingrenewables and nuclear, Japan wants to further develop its hydrogen technology (in which it is a front-runner) in thedirection of CCUS (carbon capture, utilisation and storage technology). It also wants to focus on tapping into thepotential of ammonia. Meanwhile, prospects for nuclear are unclear, as the sector has been deeply impacted by the2011 Fukushima disaster. Doubts have been raised about the technology necessary for achieving coal substitution andCCUS. Japanese business, while already engaged in innovation projects to achieve net-zero carbon emissions, hasexpressed reservations about some elements of the strategy and the proposed carbon tax. Japan is actively involvedin international cooperation on green technologies and could be an ideal partner to the EU, which, through itsEuropean Green Deal (EGD), also aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. During their May 2021 summit, the EUand Japan adopted the declaration ‘Towards a Green Alliance to protect our environment, stop climate change andachieve green growth’.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 104

Russia's 2021 elections: Another step on the road to authoritarian ruleTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-09-2021Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave elecciones generales | elecciones nacionales | elecciones regionales | jefe de Estado | libertad de prensa | movimiento

pro derechos humanos | oposición política | pluralismo de los medios de comunicación | represión | Rusia | régimenautoritario | sistema electoral

Resumen On 17-19 September, Russia will hold elections at local, regional and national level, most importantly to the StateDuma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly. Four hundred and fifty deputies will be elected for a five-year term.Ever since 2003, the State Duma has been dominated by the pro-Putin United Russia party, which currently holds athree-quarters supermajority. With the ruling party clearly in charge, the parliament serves as little more than a rubberstamp for Kremlin and government initiatives. In Russia's system of managed democracy, the main role of theparliamentary opposition is to preserve an appearance of political pluralism, while carefully excluding most regimecritics. Following the June 2020 constitutional referendum, which opened the door to President Vladimir Putinpotentially staying on until 2036, the authorities moved to eliminate the few remaining pockets of resistance.Opposition activist Alexey Navalny is now in jail, and many other regime opponents are either facing criminal chargesor have left the country. Even though United Russia faces no real electoral competition, it may struggle to repeat its2016 performance. Voters are alienated by the party's reputation for corruption and the generally unpromising contextof political and economic stagnation. Opinion polls suggest that its majority will be reduced, possibly below the two-thirds threshold needed to adopt constitutional changes; nevertheless, the party is virtually guaranteed to win. Manyobservers see the elections, and the wave of repression preceding them, as the latest stage in Russia's transition fromflawed democracy to fully fledged authoritarian state.

Briefing EN

Recovery plan for Europe: State of play, September 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-09-2021Autor SAPALA Magdalena

Ámbito político PresupuestoPalabra clave ayuda financiera | Estado miembro UE | financiación del presupuesto de la UE | instrumento financiero de la UE |

marco financiero plurianual | recuperación económica | reparto de la financiación de la UEResumen Since the beginning of 2021, Member States and EU institutions have been preparing intensively to launch the

recovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). In order to make this unique financial stimulus package fullyoperational, many conditions have needed to be met and preparatory steps completed. First, preparations have beenongoing for the spending of the biggest part of NGEU (90 %) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Thisprocess includes the drawing up of national recovery and resilience plans by the Member States, their evaluation bythe European Commission, and approval by the Council of the EU. Up to 15 September 2021, most of the nationalplans submitted have been positively assessed by the Commission and approved by the Council (18). Based on this,the Commission concluded agreements with those Member States on a legal commitment authorising the financialcontribution to be made, and the first transfers of EU aid (pre-financing) were made on 3 August. In the case of somecountries, however, the assessment procedure has been delayed. In parallel, the system for financing NGEU had to becreated almost from scratch. It is based on borrowing operations carried out by the European Commission on behalf ofthe European Union. These operations could start only once all Member States had ratified the Own ResourcesDecision (ORD), which was done by the end of May 2021. In the meantime, the Commission was preparing for its roleof borrower on an unprecedented scale. At the beginning of the summer, it started implementing its diversified fundingstrategy for the financing of NGEU. In three issuances successfully conducted so far, the Commission has raised €45billion in total out of the €80 billion planned for 2021. This is an update of a Briefing of 7 June 2021.

Briefing EN

Trends in Chinese reporting on the European Union: Xinhua's coverage of EU affairs, 2012-2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-09-2021Autor NOONAN EAMONN

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacional | Derechos humanos | Gobernanzaglobal | Planificación prospectiva | Seguridad y defensa

Palabra clave agencia de prensa | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | política de informaciónResumen The main Chinese news service, Xinhua, has steadily expanded its coverage on the European Union over the past

decade. The main challenges facing the Union have featured strongly, from the refugee crisis to Brexit to the impact ofCovid 19. The tone of the coverage in this period has been neutral, rather than negative, and has not become morecritical during the pandemic. Internal EU policies are often put in a favourable light, although internal divisions alsofeature in Xinhua's reporting. Xinhua tends to emphasise EU cooperation with China and EU divisions with the UnitedStates. It also criticises EU sanctions and human rights complaints, both about China – for example on Xinjiang andHong Kong – and about countries including Russia and Turkey. These trends are in line with China's long-standingstated preference for the EU to become a pole in a multipolar world order that is able to balance US power, despite itsdisapproval of the EU's pursuit of human rights issues. Xinhua's coverage emphasises both the opportunities and thechallenges facing European integration. This dual approach tends to support the view that China is ambiguous aboutthe EU's ability to become a more influential and more useful strategic partner on the world stage. This briefing isbased on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Chinese-language online articles by the state-affiliated Xinhua NewsAgency since 2012, as well as a selection of secondary sources.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 105

China's compliance with selected fields of international lawTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-09-2021Autor PARRY Matthew

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave acuerdo comercial | China | Corea del Norte | cuestión del mar del Sur de China | Derecho internacional | Derecho

internacional de los derechos humanos | desarme | Filipinas | Hong Kong | Organización Mundial del Comercio |política en materia de cambio climático | sanción internacional

Resumen China has ratified numerous legally binding international agreements. Like other countries, it has a strong incentive tocommit itself in this way: international agreements are a means of binding other treaty parties; strengtheninginternational standing; creating a favourable legal framework for trade and investment; and, such as with the 1984Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong, settling territorial questions. At the same time, China has been careful to avoidmaking commitments in two areas in particular: questions of national security and sovereignty, where it recalls ahistory of mistreatment by outside powers; and human rights, where its political and cultural traditions differconsiderably from those of Western democracies. China has often included reservations precluding internationalarbitration in the international agreements that it has ratified. One notable exception to this rule is China's membershipof the WTO and conclusion of trade and investment agreements, where arbitration is such a core part of the system asto be unavoidable. To the extent that China is accused of breaching its international commitments, these tend toconcern its perceived national security interests and territorial sovereignty, as in the case of the governance of HongKong, and maritime and territorial rights in the South China Sea. In other areas, such as human rights and climatechange agreements, China is typically careful to limit its commitments so that it does not formally breach them.

Briefing EN

State of the Union address, European Parliament, 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-09-2021Autor MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave discurso | poder de apreciación | presidente de la Comisión | programa legislativo (UE)

Resumen European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's second State of the Union address, scheduled for 15September 2021, will be delivered at a time when the coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges for theEuropean Union and its Member States. At the same time, thanks to the adoption of the multiannual financialframework for the 2021-2027 period, new opportunities lie ahead – the recovery plan for Europe and Next GenerationEU. Furthermore, the Conference on the Future of Europe was finally launched on 9 May 2021. Nevertheless, anumber of unresolved issues and new challenges remain. These include ensuring that EU values (Article 2 TEU) areupheld in the Member States, including through the application of the recently adopted Conditionality Regulation,addressing the threat of climate change, and equipping Europe for the digital age. The tradition of EU State of theUnion addresses, delivered to the European Parliament by the President of the European Commission, dates back to2010. The address takes stock of the achievements of the past year and presents priorities for the year ahead. Itconstitutes an important instrument for the European Commission's ex-ante accountability vis-à-vis Parliament and isalso aimed at rendering the definition of priorities at EU level more transparent, and at communicating those prioritiesto citizens. The event chimes with a similar tradition in national democracies. The United States, for instance, has along-standing tradition of presidential State of the Union addresses, in which the President speaks in the Capitol to ajoint session of Congress, thus fulfilling a constitutional obligation. In contrast to the US Constitution, the EU Treatiesdo not prescribe a State of the Union address; the EU version was established by the 2010 Framework Agreementbetween Parliament and the Commission. This briefing further updates an earlier one from September 2016, originallywritten by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Briefing EN

Economic Dialogues and Exchanges of Views with the Member States under the European SemesterCycles - State-of-Play

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 08-09-2021Autor HAGELSTAM Kajus

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Semestre EuropeoPalabra clave base jurídica | disparidad económica | Estado miembro UE | macroeconomía | pacto de estabilidad | política

presupuestaria | presupuesto del Estado | reglamento (UE) | vigilancia multilateral | zona euroResumen This table provides a regular update on Member States invited for an Economic Dialogue in the competent Committee

of the European Parliament and an overview of the respective legal base.Briefing EN

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'Global Britain' and 'Europe of Defence': Prospects, challenges and opportunitiesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 06-09-2021Autor LATICI Tania

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Seguridad y defensaPalabra clave política común de seguridad y defensa | política de defensa | política exterior | Reino Unido | relaciones de la Unión

Europea | retirada de la UEResumen Since the referendum to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) has been rethinking its role

in world affairs. Under the 'Global Britain' banner, the UK sees itself as a force for multilateralism, a strong militarypower with global presence and reach, and a strong pillar of the transatlantic alliance. Reflection on the implications of'Global Britain' for the UK's future foreign, security and defence policy has resulted in two strategic documents, theIntegrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, which outline policy priorities and the government's strategicvision. Although the EU as such is to a large extent absent from these strategic documents, there are implications tobe considered, particularly as the EU has taken significant steps towards defence and military integration and as it iscontinuing to deepen its relationship with NATO. Although foreign, security and defence policy were excluded from theformal negotiations on a new EU-UK partnership, at the British government's request, it appears that the EU and UKforeign policy positions, strategic considerations, and security interests remain largely aligned. Various expertstherefore argue that it is worth considering options for flexible engagements and for cultivating a new relationshipthrough other common multilateral, bilateral and international forums.

Briefing EN

European Union Solidarity FundTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-09-2021Autor VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Desarrollo regionalPalabra clave ayuda a los siniestrados | ayuda de urgencia | desastre natural | ejecución del presupuesto | Fondo de Solidaridad de

la Unión Europea | marco financiero plurianual | reparto de la financiación de la UE | zona catastróficaResumen Established in 2002 to support disaster-stricken regions, the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) complements the

efforts of public authorities by helping to fund vital emergency and recovery operations in areas affected bycatastrophes such as flooding, earthquakes and forest fires. EUSF funding is granted following an application from aMember State or candidate country, and may be used to finance measures including restoring infrastructure to workingorder, providing temporary accommodation and cleaning up disaster areas. Although the EUSF Regulation wasrevised in 2014, simplifying rules and clarifying eligibility criteria, several problems still remain. European Commissionreports on the EUSF have drawn attention to the long waiting time countries still face before receiving EUSF funding,while industry experts also point to the risk that the EUSF could run out of funding in the event of several largedisasters taking place within a short space of time. The coronavirus pandemic has placed the EUSF under the spotlightonce again, with the scope of the EUSF Regulation extended in March 2020 to cover support in the event of a majorpublic health emergency, and 17 Member States plus three candidate countries receiving vital assistance. TheEuropean Parliament has been actively involved in recent discussions on the EUSF, adopting a resolution on thereview of the EUSF in May 2021 which included several measures aimed at improving its operations, and preparing areport on the effectiveness of Member States' use of EUSF money in cases of natural disasters. While the 2014revision of the EUSF Regulation and the widening of its scope in 2020 have borne fruit, allowing the EUSF to provideunprecedented levels of support after the 2016/2017 earthquakes in Italy, ensuring much needed assistance inresponse to the coronavirus pandemic, the EUSF will undergo a number of changes during 2021-2027. In particular,the merger of the EUSF with the Emergency Aid Reserve as part of the new Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserveunder the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, with a combined budget of €1.2 billion for both instruments,raises questions as to whether the EUSF will be able to continue to provide such effective levels of disaster recoveryassistance in future. The July 2021 floods in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and therecent forest fires in Cyprus, Greece and Italy are a potent reminder of the EU's vulnerability in the face of theunpredictable forces of nature.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Latvia: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-09-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | cambio climático | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | Letonia |

reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | transición energéticaResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) to cover the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessmentfor each NECP. Latvia submitted its NECP in November 2019. More than half (56 %) of Latvians expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Latvia accounts for 0.3 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and itsemissions increased between 2005 and 2019, in contrast to the average EU trend. The carbon intensity of Latvia'seconomy is higher than the EU average, but has declined since 2005. Emissions from the transport sector increasedby 6.9 % between 2005 and 2019, accounting for 27.8 % of total emissions. The manufacturing industries andconstruction sector showed the biggest percentage reduction (42 %) in emissions over the period. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Latvia was allowed to increase its emissions by 17 % by 2020, compared with 2005, and in 2019was on track to achieving the target. Latvia achieved a 41 % share of renewable energy sources in 2019 and aims toreach 50 % by 2030. The European Commission regards this ambition as adequate, but warns of possible hurdles.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 107

Climate action in Cyprus: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-09-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | cambio climático | Chipre | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero |

neutralidad en carbono | rendimiento energético | transición energéticaResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the 2021 to 2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Cyprus submitted its NECP in January 2020. A high proportion of Cypriots (70 %) expectnational governments to tackle climate. Cyprus accounts for 0.26 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions andhas reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The carbon intensity of the Cyprioteconomy decreased by close to 25 % between 2005 and 2019, at a rate slower than the EU average. Energy industryemissions fell by 3.7 % in the 2005 to 2019 period in Cyprus. Further emissions reductions are expected as the countryshifts its electricity production from heavy fuel oil to natural gas by the end of 2021. Transport and industrial processesand product use were the sectors with the smallest reductions. Under the Effort-sharing Decision for the 2013 2020period, Cyprus needed to reduce its emissions in sectors not included in the EU's emission trading system by 5 %,compared with 2005 levels. For the Effort-sharing Regulation period (2021-2030) the target is set at -21 % comparedwith 2005 levels. The share of renewable energy in Cyprus reached 13.8 % in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a22.9 % share is focused on changes in the heating and cooling, and electricity sectors.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Portugal: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-09-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | contaminación industrial | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | planificación nacional |

Portugal | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisiónde la UE | transición energética

Resumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climateplans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Portugal submitted its NECP in December 2019. More than half (57%) of Portuguesepeople expect national governments to tackle climate change. Portugal generates 1.8 % of the EU's total greenhousegas (GHG) emissions. In 2019, the carbon intensity of Portugal's economy was 22 % above the EU average, and fell ata slightly slower pace than the EU average over the 2005-2019 period. The transport sector reduced its emissions by10.3 % between 2005 and 2019 and is the sector with the highest emissions, accounting for 26 % of Portugueseemissions in 2019. Energy sector emissions, accounting for 19 % of total emissions in 2019, fell by 50 % between2005 and 2019 – the largest reduction in emissions of all sectors. Under EU effort-sharing legislation for the 2013-2020period, Portugal was allowed to increase its non-ETS GHG emissions by 1 %, compared with 2005, and neversurpassed its allocated emissions The share of renewable energy sources in 2019 was 30.6 %. The country's 2030target of a 47 % share is one of the highest in the EU, with a renewable energy in electricity target of 80 % by 2030.

Briefing EN

The Organization for Security and Co operation in Europe (OSCE) : A pillar of the European securityorder

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 02-09-2021Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave cuestión internacional | derechos humanos | OSCE | prevención de conflictos | seguridad europea | verificación del

escrutinioResumen The OSCE's origins go back to 1975, when the countries in the two opposing blocs in the Cold War signed the Helsinki

Final Act, enshrining principles such as territorial integrity and respect for human rights. The act was followed by aseries of follow-up meetings to monitor implementation, in a process known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Following the adoption of the 1990 Paris Charter envisaging a new post-Cold WarEuropean order, in 1995 the CSCE was put on a more permanent, institutional basis and renamed the OSCE. TheOSCE, like the CSCE before it, is based on a vision of 'comprehensive security' that encompasses human rights andeconomic cooperation, as well as traditional 'hard' security. However, hopes that the OSCE could become the centralpillar of a new post-Cold War order faded as divisions re-emerged, between an enlarged EU and NATO on the onehand, and Russia on the other. The OSCE lacks the legal powers and the resources needed to live up to its ambitionof becoming a platform for pan-European/trans-Atlantic cooperation. With decisions taken by consensus,disagreements between participating states hamper decision-making and prevent the organisation from becomingmore effective. The OSCE plays a useful though limited role in several areas. The organisation has been powerless toresolve conflicts in the post-Soviet region, but its observers are the main source of detailed and reliable information onthe situation in eastern Ukraine. OSCE agreements, such as the Vienna Document, help to promote militarytransparency, and election observation missions have advanced democratic reforms in several countries.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): A pillar of the European security order

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 108

Corruption and human rights in third countries: developments in EU external action since 2017Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-09-2021Autor externo Rosana GARCIANDIA

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Democracia | Derechos humanos | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitariaPalabra clave competencia exterior (UE) | comunicación de datos | corrupción | derechos humanos | fraude contra la UE |

movimiento pro derechos humanos | país tercero | Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior | sociedad civil (movimientosde opinión)

Resumen In 2017, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on corruption and human rights in third countries (hereinafter‘EP 2017 Resolution’) which included a set of practical recommendations on corruption and human rights in EUexternal relations. This briefing analyses the progress made by EU actors in implementing those recommendations. Itfocuses on development and human rights tools addressed in the EP 2017 Resolution, including EU funded projectsand programmes, technical cooperation, EU human rights dialogues and public diplomacy, as well as support forwhistle-blowers and civil society organisations exposing corruption. It concludes that, while action has been taken onvarious fronts to support anti-corruption efforts in third countries following the recommendations, a more systematicapproach to corruption and human rights could be taken in some areas. Cooperation between EU actors andenhanced capacity building on corruption and human rights are also key elements for a successful anti-corruptionstrategy in EU external action.

Briefing EN

Biometric Recognition and Behavioural Detection Assessing the ethical aspects of biometric recognitionand behavioural detection techniques with a focus on their current and future use in public spaces

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 02-09-2021

Autor externo Christiane WENDEHORST, Yannic DULLERÁmbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Derecho contractual, Derecho mercantil y Derecho de sociedades |

Derechos humanos | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Gobernanza global | Mercado interior y unión aduanera| Peticiones al Parlamento Europeo | Protección de los consumidores | Salud pública | Seguridad y defensa

Palabra clave biometría | ciencias del comportamiento | datos personales | inteligencia artificial | protección de datos | protección dela vida privada

Resumen This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and ConstitutionalAffairs at the request of the JURI and PETI Committees, analyses the use of biometric techniques from an ethical andlegal perspective. Biometric techniques raise a number of specific ethical issues, as an individual cannot easily changebiometric features, and as these techniques tend to intrude into the human body and ultimately the human self. Furtherissues are more generally associated with large-scale surveillance, algorithmic decision making, or profiling. The studyanalyses different types of biometric techniques and draws conclusions for EU legislation

Briefing EN

European climate lawTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 31-08-2021Autor ERBACH Gregor

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | gas con efecto invernadero | propuesta (UE) | reducción de las emisiones de gas

Resumen On 4 March 2020, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a European climate law, setting theobjective for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050 and establishing a framework for achieving that objective. On17 September 2020, the Commission amended the proposal to introduce the updated 2030 climate target of a netreduction of at least 55 % of the EU's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to 1990 levels. In the EuropeanParliament, the proposal was referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. TheParliament adopted its position on 6 October 2020, calling for a 60 % emissions reduction by 2030 and for anindependent, inter-disciplinary scientific advisory panel. Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement onthe proposal on 21 April 2021. The agreement sets a 55 % net GHG emission target for 2030 (to be complemented byadditional removals from the upcoming review of the LULUCF Regulation), an EU-wide climate neutrality target for2050, and the aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter. It envisages the use of a GHG budget for setting the 2040target and establishes a European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change. Parliament approved the agreed texton 24 June 2021. The regulation was published in the Official Journal on 9 July 2021 and entered into force on 29 July2021. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 109

The EU digital decade: A new set of digital targets for 2030Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 31-08-2021Autor NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Ámbito político IndustriaResumen As part of its digital decade strategy, the European Commission's March 2021 communication puts forward its vision

for new strategic digital objectives for 2030. These should prepare Europe for the roll-out of the next generation ofbroadband infrastructure with gigabit speeds, including 5G, as well as for the digital transformation of public andprivate sectors, to enable an array of new innovative services that should transform the manufacturing, energy, vehiclemanufacturing, digital government services and health sectors. Given its importance for European Union (EU)competitiveness, the European Commission is speeding up the digital transformation by co-financing research,development and deployment of innovative technologies in 2021 2027, under the €7.5 billion digital Europeprogramme, the first EU programme fully dedicated to the EU's digital transformation. Other EU programmes will alsoplay a major role in funding digital infrastructure, including the Connecting Europe Facility and cohesion policy.Furthermore, at least 20 % of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility funds received by each EU country should bededicated to the digital transition. There is some concern that not all consumers and businesses in Europe will benefitfrom the digital transformation, given the current and future digital divide between urban and rural areas and across EUcountries. Given the current climate, the high level of investment needed to achieve the transformation might provedifficult to raise. To measure progress towards the digital decade, the Commission is working on a digital compassmethod with indicators, which should be put forward for this task later in 2021. This would enable measurement of fourdimensions (or 'cardinal points'): improved digital skills, secure and sustainable digital infrastructures, digitaltransformation of businesses and of the public sector.

Briefing EN

Regulating targeted and behavioural advertising in digital services. How to ensure users’ informedconsent

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 31-08-2021

Autor externo Giovanni SARTOR, Francesca LAGIOIA, Federico GALLI,Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios |

Comercio internacional | Democracia | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Derechocontractual, Derecho mercantil y Derecho de sociedades | Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativos |Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Evaluación de la legislación y las políticasen la práctica | Gobernanza global | Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Planificación prospectiva | Protección de losconsumidores

Resumen The study addresses the regulation of targeted and behavioural advertising in the context of digital services. Marketingmethods and technologies deployed in behavioural and target advertising are presented. The EU law on consent to theprocessing of personal data is analysed, in connection with advertising practices. Ways of improving the quality ofconsent are discussed as well as ways of restricting its scope as a legal basis for the processing of personal data.This study is commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and ConstitutionalAffairs at the request of the JURI Committee...

Briefing EN

Climate action in the Netherlands: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-08-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | energía eólica | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | gas natural | gestión de residuos |

informe | Países Bajos | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio dederechos de emisión de la UE

Resumen The EU binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climateplans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. The Netherlands submitted its NECP in November 2019. A high proportion of Dutchpeople (73 %) expect national governments to tackle climate. The Netherlands accounts for 5.2 % of total EUgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and has reduced its emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005.The carbon intensity of the Dutch economy decreased by 29 % between 2005 and 2019, a slower rate than the EU-wide average. Energy industry emissions fell by 15 % in the 2005-2019 period in the country. Measures such as theintroduction of carbon pricing, are expected to further decrease these emissions. The sector with the greatestpercentage reduction in emissions between 2005 and 2019 – 55 % – was waste management. Under the Effort-sharing Decision (2013 2020) and Effort-sharing Regulation (2021-2030), the Netherlands needs to reduce itsemissions in sectors not included in the EU emissions trading system by 16 % and 36 % respectively, compared with2005 levels. The share of renewable energy sources in the country reached 8.8 % in 2019, and for 2030 the target is27 %, to be reached mainly through solar power and offshore and onshore wind farms.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 110

Climate action in Romania: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-08-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Romania's final NECP is from April 2020. More than half (51 %) of Romanians expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Romania generates 3 % of the EU-27's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissionsand reduced emissions faster than the EU average between 2005 and 2019. With several energy-intensive industriespresent in Romania, the country's carbon intensity is much higher than the EU average, but decreasing rapidly. Energyindustry emissions fell by 46 % between 2005 and 2019, reducing the sector's share of total emissions by eightpercentage points. Conversely, emissions from the transport sector increased by 40 % over the same period, doublingthat sector's share of total emissions. Romania relies to a great extent on fossil fuels. Renewables, along with nuclearenergy, but also gas as a primary energy source, are seen as essential to the transition process. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Romania was allowed to increase emissions until 2020 and must reduce these emissions by 2 %relative to 2005 by 2030. Romania achieved a 24.3 % share of renewable energy sources in 2019. The country's 2030target of a 30.7 % share is focused mainly on wind, hydro, solar and fuels from biomass. Energy efficiency measurescentre on heating supply and building envelopes along with industrial modernisation.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Austria: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-08-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Austria's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Austrians (60 %) expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Austria generates 2.2 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissionsand has reduced emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The country's carbon intensity is lowerthan the EU average, following a similar steady downward trend. The transport sector accounted for 30 % of Austria'stotal emissions in 2019 and its share is continuing to rise, whereas in 2019 the energy industries accounted for just 13% of the total emissions share. Austria is aiming to reach carbon neutrality by 2040. Under EU effort-sharinglegislation, Austria was required to reduce non-ETS emissions by 16 % before end 2020, compared with 2005, andmust achieve a 36 % reduction by 2030; this outcome currently seems unlikely. Austria achieved a 33.6 % share ofrenewable energy sources in 2019. The country's 2030 target of 46-50 % renewable energy has a strong focus ondelivering 100 % renewable electricity generation. The bulk of the measures planned to achieve the energy efficiencytargets focus on buildings' heating needs and transport sector transition.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Finland: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-08-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave bioenergía | cambio climático | energía nuclear | energía renovable | Finlandia | gas con efecto invernadero | informe |

reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UEResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Finland's final NECP is from December 2019. A high proportion of Finns (61 %) expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Finland generates 1.5 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissionsand has reduced emissions at a faster pace than the EU average since 2005. The country's emissions intensity islower than the EU average, and following a similar downward trend. The energy industry and transport are the mainemitting sectors in Finland, together accounting for 50 % of total emissions in 2019. With a coal phase-outcommitment, and new nuclear facilities starting operations this decade, energy industry emissions will drop. Finlandhas identified additional measures to reduce transport sector emissions. Biomass will be used for biofuels in transportas well as heat and electricity generation. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Finland was required to reduce non-ETSemissions by 16 % by 2020, compared with 2005, while for the year 2030 the reduction must reach 39 %. Finlandachieved a 43.1 % share of renewable energy sources in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a 51 % share is focusedmainly on wind and biomass. Energy efficiency measures centre on building stock renovation and voluntary energyefficiency agreements across industry and households.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 111

Sino-Japanese controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands: An imminent flashpoint in theIndo-Pacific?

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 30-07-2021Autor GRIEGER Gisela

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen The 50-year-old controversy between Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan over the sovereignty

of a group of tiny, uninhabited islets and rocks in the East China Sea, administered by Japan and referred to as theSenkaku Islands in Japan, as the Diaoyu Islands in the PRC and as the Diaoyutai Islands in Taiwan has become aproxy battlefield in the growing Sino-US great power competition in the Indo-Pacific, against the backdrop of awidening Sino-Japanese power gap. Since 1971, when the PRC and Taiwan laid claim to the contested islets androcks for the first time, challenging Japan's position of having incorporated them into Japanese territory as terra nulliusin 1895, possible avenues for settling the controversy have either been unsuccessful or remained unexplored. ThePRC's meteoric economic rise and rapid military modernisation has gradually shifted the Sino-Japanese powerbalance, nourishing the PRC leadership's more assertive, albeit failed, push for Japan to recognise the existence of adispute. Two incidents in the 2010s, perceived by the PRC as consolidating Japan's administrative control, led to thePRC starting to conduct grey-zone operations in the waters surrounding the islets and rocks with increasing frequencyand duration, to reassert its claims and change the status quo in its favour without prompting a war. The EU has held aposition of principled neutrality as regards the legal title to the disputed islands. However, the risk of unintendedincidents, miscalculation and military conflict arising from the unresolved dispute poses a challenge to regional peaceand stability and to the EU's economic and security interests. The EU's 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy takes a cooperativeand inclusive approach, to promote a rules-based international order and respect for international law. This mayinclude a greater Indo-Pacific naval presence under the strategy's maritime security dimension.

Briefing EN

Peace and security in 2021: The EU's evolving relations with TurkeyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-07-2021Autor AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | DemocraciaPalabra clave Acuerdo europeo de Asociación | ampliación de la UE | ayuda a los refugiados | cooperación comercial |

democratización | Estado de Derecho | reparto de la financiación de la UE | Turquía | unión aduaneraResumen Turkey first sought cooperation with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 (European Union (EU) as of

1992), and has since been key partner of the EU on matters relating to migration, counter-terrorism and trade. The EUand Turkey have been linked by an Association Agreement since 1964, and a Customs Union Agreement since 1995.However, in recent years, EU-Turkey relations have been suffered from Turkey's lukewarm adoption of EU standardsand democratic principles and Ankara's actions in the EU neighbourhood..

Briefing DE, EN, FR

Development of organic production in the EU: 2021-2027 action planTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-07-2021Autor CAPRILE ANNA | MCELDOWNEY James

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralResumen In May 2020, the European Commission published its 'farm to fork' strategy – 'for a fair, healthy and environmentally

friendly food system' – along with the EU biodiversity strategy, as part of the implementation of the European GreenDeal. In those strategies the Commission set a target of 25 % of the EU's agricultural land to be under organic farmingby 2030, as well as a significant increase in organic aquaculture. These targets aim to contribute to improving thesustainability of the food system, to reverse biodiversity loss and to reduce the use of chemical substances in the formof pesticides and fertilisers. The Commission's 2021 work programme set out its intention to prepare an action plan forthe development of organic production for the 2021 to 2027 period, and the action plan was published on 25 March2021. Offering an initial analysis of the action plan, this briefing outlines the measures envisaged and the implicationsfor different stages of the food chain in the EU. It also examines the results of the public consultation launched by theCommission in September 2020 to gather stakeholders' views on the challenges and opportunities for the organicsector. The views of key stakeholders in response to the publication of the action plan are also covered, along with theinitial views expressed by the advisory committees.

Briefing EN

Multimedia 5 facts about organic farming

Development of organic production in the EU: 2021-2027 action plan

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 112

European Union data challengeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-07-2021Autor externo Olga BATURA and Roel PEETERS

Ámbito político Planificación prospectiva | Política de investigaciónResumen The exponential growth and importance of data generated in industrial settings have attracted the attention of

policymakers aiming to create a suitable legal framework for its use. While the term ‘industrial data’ has no cleardefinition, such data possess certain distinctive characteristics: they are a subset of big data collected in a structuredmanner and within industrial settings; they are frequently proprietary and contain various types of sensitive data. TheGDPR rules remain of great relevance for such data, as personal data is difficult to be filtered out from mixed datasetsand anonymisation techniques are not always effective. The current and planned rules relevant for B2B sharing ofindustrial data exhibit many shortcomings. They lack clarity on key issues (e.g. mixed datasets), increase theadministrative burden for companies, yet not always provide the data protection that businesses need. They do notprovide an additional value proposition for B2B data sharing and hinder it in some cases. While this situation warrantspolicy intervention, both the instrument and its content should be carefully considered. Instead of a legal instrument,soft law could clarify the existing rules; model terms and conditions could be developed and promoted and datastandardisation and interoperability efforts supported.

Briefing EN

Improving corporate sustainability reportingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-07-2021Autor VIKOLAINEN Vera

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The European Commission proposed to improve sustainability reporting by revising the non-financial reporting

directive 2014/95/EU. The accompanying impact assessment (IA) provides a well-defined problem that is substantiatedwith evidence, a clear set of objectives that correspond to the problems identified and makes effort to cover SMEs inthe consultation strategy. Overall, the evidence used in the IA seems recent and reliable. However, the IA has not setany concrete targets, indicators or timelines for achieving its objectives. The range of options in the IA appears ratherimbalanced, the analysis has been predominantly economic and has focused on the effectiveness of meeting thespecific objectives and their costs, while the discussion of benefits has remained rather descriptive. Environmentalimpacts seem to have been completely excluded, the costs of indirect effects on SMEs in the supply chains of largecompanies have not been quantified and the benefits for listed SMEs have not been elaborated on.

Briefing EN

Budgetary control of the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU budgetTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-07-2021Autor MONTVAI DAVID

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoResumen As of July 2021, only very limited conclusions can be drawn about the performance of EU policies and programmes

towards the Sustainable Development Goals. With only nine years left until 2030, this raises the question as to whetherthe EU budget is used efficiently via the many spending programmes. This briefing explores what kind of measures arein place to ensure that the implementation of the EU budget contributes effectively to the SDGs at both the EU- andMember States level.

Briefing EN

Artificial intelligence actTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-07-2021Autor DALLI HUBERT

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The Commission is proposing a new Artificial Intelligence Act laying down rules harmonised rules on AI. This initial

appraisal of the Commission’s impact assessment on the proposal notes how the impact assessment the impactassessment banks on a wealth of available research on the topic at hand and uses numerous sources to underpin thediscussion. It observes that the impact assessment offers a diverse and realistic range of options and traces a clearintervention logic connecting the problems and their drivers with the specific objectives and the policy options.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 113

Artificial Intelligence in smart cities and urban mobilityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-07-2021Autor externo Devin DIRAN, Anne Fleur VAN VEENSTRA, Tjerk TIMAN, Paola TESTA and Maria KIROVA

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Energía | Medio ambiente | Planificación prospectiva | Politica social | Política deinvestigación | Salud pública

Resumen Artificial Intelligence (AI) enabling smart urban solutions brings multiple benefits, including more efficient energy, waterand waste management, reduced pollution, noise and traffic congestions. Local authorities face relevant challengesundermining the digital transformation from the technological, social and regulatory standpoint, namely (i) technologyand data availability and reliability, the dependency on third private parties and the lack of skills; (ii) ethical challengesfor the unbiased use of AI; and (iii) the difficulty of regulating interdependent infrastructures and data, respectively. Toovercome the identified challenges, the following actions are recommended: •EU-wide support for infrastructure andgovernance on digitalisation, including high performance computing, integrated circuits, CPUs and GPU’s, 5G, cloudservices, Urban Data Platforms, enhancing efficiency and ensuring at the same time unbiased data collection. •Inclusion of urban AI in EU research programs addressing data exchange, communication networks and policy onmobility and energy, enhancing capacity building initiatives, also through test and experimentation facilities. •Harmonising AI related policies in the EU, taking into account the context specificity: necessary research. •Adoption ofinnovative procurement procedures, entailing requirements for technical and ethically responsible AI.

Briefing EN

Application of the equal pay principle through pay transparency measuresTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-07-2021Autor VETTORAZZI STEFANO | ZANDERSONE Laura

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadPalabra clave condición de trabajo | discriminación económica | discriminación sexual | estudio de impacto | igualdad de género |

igualdad de remuneración | igualdad de trato | propuesta (UE) | remuneración del trabajoResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the impact assessment (IA) accompanying

the Commission proposal for a directive aimed at strengthening the application of the principle of equal pay for equalwork or work of equal value between men and women, enshrined in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome. Following twonegative opinions of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and an exceptional third positive one, the IA provides a goodproblem definition. The IA coherently identifies the problem drivers and makes a compelling case for theconsequences should situation remain unchanged. The options retained for assessment seem built around a pre-selected preferred option package. The analysis regarding the impact on SMEs appears to be insufficiently developedwhile the one on competitiveness is missing. The proposal includes all the measures presented in the IA's preferredpackage as well as two extra measures which were suggested, but not explicitly included in the preferred package.

Briefing EN, IT

EU-Belarus relations: State of play - Human rights situation and Ryanair flight diversionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-07-2021Autor PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresResumen The falsified presidential elections of August 2020, and the brutal crackdown against peacefully protesting Belarusians,

led to the isolation of the Aliaksandr Lukashenka regime. Despite the possibility of starting dialogue with thedemocratic opposition and Belarusian society, Aliaksandr Lukashenka chose another path, involving continued brutalrepression of the country's citizens. The worsening human rights situation and hijacking of Ryanair flight FR 4978provoked a response from the EU, including a ban on Belarusian air carriers landing in or overflying the EU, a majorextension of the list of people and entities already subject to sanctions, and the introduction of sanctions on keysectors of the Belarusian economy. The EU policy also demonstrates a readiness to support a future democraticBelarus. In this respect, the European Commission presented the outline of a comprehensive plan of economic supportfor democratic Belarus, worth up to €3 billion. The European Parliament is playing an active part in shaping the EU'sresponse. Parliament does not recognise Lukashenka's presidency and is speaking out on human rights abuses inBelarus. The Belarusian democratic opposition, which was awarded the 2020 Sakharov Prize, is frequently invited tospeak for the Belarusian people in the European Parliament.

Briefing EN

Artificial Intelligence and public servicesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-07-2021Autor externo Tjerk TIMAN, Anne Fleur VAN VEENSTRA and Gabriela BODEA

Ámbito político Planificación prospectiva | Política de investigaciónResumen AI has become a key enabling technology in public services and its use has increased over the past two

years.Ensuring explainabilty of AI systems in public services is crucial but difficult to achieve in case of black-boxalgorithms. In AI applications in public services, focus is on law enforcement, surveillance and process optimisation. AIfor front-end public services seems less of a priority. There is a growing public concern over the development and useof AI in society. With the increase of its use, the potential for errors and harms also increases.The public sector shouldlead the way in creating trustworthy AI. Regulatory sandboxing and pre-procurement are key for creating trustworthy AIfor public services.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 114

Review of dual-use export controlsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-07-2021Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Comercio internacional | Derechos humanos | Seguridad y defensaPalabra clave arma de destrucción masiva | bien de doble uso | Comisión PE | competitividad | control de las exportaciones |

estadística | exportación (UE) | intercambios intra-UE | licencia de exportación | no proliferación nuclear | ReglamentoCE | restricción de los intercambios | seguridad pública | tráfico ilícito | tránsito

Resumen Certain goods and technologies have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used for military purposes; so-called 'dual-use' goods are subject to the European Union's export control regime. The regime has just been revised,mainly to take account of significant technological developments, increase transparency and create a more levelplaying field among EU Member States. The proposed regulation will recast the regulation in force since 2009. Amongother elements, the proposal explicitly defines cyber-surveillance technology as dual-use technology and introduceshuman rights violations as an explicit justification for export control. It also includes provisions to control emergingtechnologies. The proposed regulation introduces greater transparency into dual-use export control by increasing thelevel of detail Member States will have to provide on exports, licences, licence denials and prohibitions. On 17 January2018, based on the INTA committee's report on the legislative proposal, the European Parliament adopted its positionfor trilogue negotiations. For its part, the Council adopted its negotiating mandate on 5 June 2019, and on the basis ofthis mandate, the Council Presidency began negotiations with the European Parliament's delegation on 21 October2019. Trilogue negotiations ended on 9 November 2020, with agreement on a final compromise text. Endorsed by theINTA committee on 30 November, the Parliament formally voted on the text in plenary on 25 March 2021. TheRegulation was published in the Official Journal on 11 June 2021 and enters into force on 8 September 2021. Seventhedition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

A new neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instrument – Global EuropeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-07-2021Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave ayuda de preadhesión | desarrollo sostenible | estudio de impacto | instrumento financiero de la UE | integración

europea | país tercero | países y territorios de ultramar | política de cooperación | política europea de vecindad |propuesta (UE) | seguridad nuclear

Resumen In the context of the Commission's proposal for a multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period, on14 June 2018 the Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing the Neighbourhood, Developmentand International Cooperation Instrument. Council and Parliament agreed in trilogue negotiations, which ended inMarch 2021, that Parliament would have an enhanced role in defining the main strategic choices of the instrument,through a delegated act and twice-yearly geopolitical dialogue. The Commission also committed to inform Parliamentprior to any use of the 'emerging challenges and priorities cushion', and take its remarks into consideration. Parliamentinsisted that any activities related to migration had to be in line with the objectives of the instrument, and also securedsafeguards on the amounts for capacity-building, election observation missions, local authorities, Erasmus, the Pacificand the Caribbean. Negotiators also agreed to include a reference, in a recital, to existing EU financial rules that allowfor the suspension of assistance if a country fails to observe the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule oflaw. As a final step, negotiators agreed to change the name of the instrument to the Neighbourhood, Development andInternational Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe. After formal adoption by Council and Parliament the regulationwas signed on 9 June 2021, and it entered into force on 14 June 2021. The regulation applies retroactively from 1January 2021. Sixth edition. The 'Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Strengthening Europol’s mandateTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-07-2021Autor EISELE Katharina

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen Europol has been at the forefront of fighting serious and organised crime in the EU. However, with digital

transformations and a global interconnectedness emerging, security threats have become more complex. Against thisbackground, the Commission has published a recast proposal of the Europol Regulation with the objective of, inter alia,(1) enabling Europol to support Member States and their investigations through big data analysis; (2) enabling Europolto directly exchange data with private parties; and (3) strengthening Europol's role on research and innovation. Whilethe Commission made efforts to analyse the problems at hand in the accompanying Impact Assessment, more detailedinformation on the scale and size of the different problems would have been useful. The Commission conductedseveral targeted consultations for this initiative, but did not carry out a mandatory 12-week open public consultation.The IA assesses relevant impacts, including fundamental rights impacts.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 115

'Future proofing' EU policies-The why, what and how of stress testingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-07-2021Autor FERNANDES MEENAKSHI | HEFLICH ALEKSANDRA

Ámbito político Valor añadido europeoResumen Governments and policymakers around the world are increasingly stress testing policies to get ‘ahead of the curve’ and

to be better equipped in response to plausible futures that may include disruptive events. This EAVA in Action providesan introduction to stress testing and how it could support the work of the European Parliament. The use of stresstesting could add value at all stages of the EU legislative cycle and complement existing regulatory policy tools such asex-ante assessment and ex-post evaluation. It could be applied as an anticipatory governance tool across all policyareas to identify weaknesses and opportunities to reinforce the legislative framework.

Briefing EN

Tackling distortions of foreign subsidiesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-07-2021Autor KRAMER Esther

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex anteResumen The IA underpinning the proposal to tackle foreign subsidies is based on solid internal and external research, which

compensates an admitted lack of data. It is transparent about methods, underlying assumptions and certain limitations.The intervention logic of the IA is clear, even if the complex set-up of the policy options and their assessment couldhave been more structured and coherent. The IA does not present operational objectives and few, yet pertinent,monitoring provisions. While the mostly qualitative assessment is thorough and contains selective quantitativeinformation, total cost and benefits could not be estimated. Potential negative effects in case of a significant drop offoreign investments, for instance on employment or prices, could have been addressed in more detail.

Briefing EN

European Court of Justice case law on judicial independenceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-07-2021Autor MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativosResumen Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lists the values upon which the Union is founded. According to this

Article, these values are shared by the Member States and form the axiological backbone of EU law. The rule of law islisted, alongside democracy and fundamental rights, among the crucial values underpinning the Union. However,Article 2 TEU is more than just a mere declaration; it is also a source of binding obligations upon the Member States touphold the Union's values, and therefore also the rule of law. The latter concept, despite broad discussions as to itsexact content, undoubtedly entails such elements as judicial independence, understood in particular as theindependence of the judiciary from other branches of government (legislative, executive). All other elements of the ruleof law, such as the principle of legality, whereby government may act only on the basis of law and within itsboundaries, or the principle of constitutionalism, whereby the parliament's law-making powers must be exercised withinthe limits of the constitution, or the existence of judicial review to enforce those principles – all depend on judicialindependence as their fundamental pre-condition. Recently, however, faced with challenges to judicial independencein certain Member States (as evidenced by on-going Article 7 TEU proceedings), the European Union has starteddeveloping its own standards in this area. Examples include the Commission's rule of law framework (adopted in2014), its two communications on the rule of law, and the annual rule of law report, the first of which was adopted inSeptember 2020. The case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) plays a crucial role in this respect, and scholarspoint out that the Court has been the most effective EU institution with regard to safeguarding judicial independence inthe Member States. The present briefing provides a concise chronological overview of the Court's recent case law onjudicial independence – described by scholars as 'truly revolutionary' – starting from the 2018 Portuguese Judgescase.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 116

EU-Swiss trade relations and the institutional framework agreementTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-07-2021Autor HALLAK ISSAM

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacionalResumen On 26 May 2021, the Federal Council of Switzerland (Swiss executive authority) announced that the country will not

formally sign the institutional framework agreement (IFA) agreed at political level with the European Union (EU) in2018, thereby ending the negotiation process. The objective of the IFA was to create a horizontal governanceframework that would have covered five major EU-Swiss trade-related bilateral agreements signed in 1999, part of the'Bilaterals I' package. It also provided for dynamic alignment of standards in the domains covered by the IFA, a disputesettlement mechanism with jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU on EU law, and State aid rules. The EUconsiders that Switzerland does not respect all of its commitments in the existing agreements, which give the countryaccess to parts of the EU's single market; it perceives the current situation as unbalanced, partly due to the absence ofdispute settlement mechanisms in the existing agreements. In addition, the dynamic alignment and State aid rulesenvisaged in the IFA would have enhanced fair competition between EU and Swiss businesses ('level playing field').Switzerland, although it aims to 'deepen' its relations with the EU by means of new sectoral agreements, is concernedby the potential application of the EU Citizens' Right Directive, as well as the potential future removal of the labourmarket exemptions provided by the IFA protocols. To a lesser extent, it is also concerned with the IFA's State aid rules.Switzerland consequently requested 'explicit clarification' from the EU on these points in 2019, then resumed talks in2021. According to the European Commission and European Parliament, 'the door is always open', but newagreements are unlikely to be signed without a framework agreement. The Commission has also emphasised that theupgrading of existing agreements – necessary whenever new EU standards are adopted to maintain their applicability– will be assessed on a case-by-case basis to prevent unintended effects. Medical device equivalence, previouslycovered by provisions of the EU-Swiss Mutual Recognition Agreement, is the first no longer to be applied as aconsequence of changes in EU standards.

Briefing EN

Protecting pollinators in the EUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-07-2021Autor HALLEUX Vivienne

Ámbito político Medio ambienteResumen Europe hosts a rich diversity of wild pollinators, including over 2 000 species of bees, more than 480 species of

butterflies, almost 1 000 species of hoverflies and thousands of other insect species. In the European Union (EU), 78% of native flora and 84 % of crops are either partially or fully dependent on insects for pollination. Significant pollinatorloss has been documented over time across the EU. According to the European Red List of Bees, around 9 % of allbee species are threatened in the EU. The EU grassland butterfly indicator has recorded a 39 % decline in grasslandbutterfly abundance since 1990. Studies in selected European countries have provided further examples of pollinatordeclines. Such loss entails risks for both societies and ecosystems. EU legislation relevant to pollinator protectionincludes the Habitats Directive; the regulatory framework on pesticides; and the common agricultural policy (CAP). TheEU rules governing the approval of pesticides require consideration of pesticide effects on honeybees. The EuropeanFood Safety Agency (EFSA) is currently reviewing its 2013 guidance on the risk assessment of pesticides on bees,which was never formally adopted due to insufficient support from Member States. One key aspect of the reviewprocess is the setting of specific protection goals, defining the maximum acceptable level of harm to bees, on whichEU ministers have recently agreed. Assessments of action at EU level identified gaps in the key EU policiesaddressing the main threats to wild pollinators. Although progress has been made in the implementation of the EUpollinators initiative (EPI), adopted in 2018 to tackle the decline of wild pollinators, more needs to be done, in particularto address the loss of habitats in farming landscapes and the impacts of pesticides. The EU Biodiversity and the Farmto Fork strategies set out specific targets that can help advance pollinator conservation. Integrating them into the newCAP however remains a major challenge. Pollinator protection is a key issue for the European Parliament, which madeclear that the revision of the EFSA bee guidance document should ensure a level of protection at least equivalent tothat laid down in 2013. Parliament also called for an urgent revision of the EU pollinators initiative, a ban on allneonicotinoid-based pesticides and the inclusion of EU-wide binding pesticide reduction targets in the upcomingrevision of the directive on the sustainable use of pesticides.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Protecting pollinators

National budgets and the European Union budget since 2007Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-07-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos | DOBREVA Alina | KRESNICHKA-NIKOLCHOVA NADEJDA

Ámbito político PresupuestoResumen National budgets are a competence of the national governments of the Member States. However, EU countries

adopting the euro have to meet specific conditions designed to ensure economic convergence, known as theconvergence criteria or Maastricht criteria (agreed by the Member States in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992). Theyinclude conditions on sound and sustainable public finances, along with the macroeconomic indicators - price stability,durability of convergence, and exchange rate stability.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 117

Committee hearings in the European Parliament and US CongressTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 16-07-2021Autor DEL MONTE Micaela | DIAZ CREGO Maria

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioResumen Hearings are used by parliamentary committees as a way to obtain evidence on specific subjects to inform their work

and as public forums to give citizens access to information on policy issues. Committee hearings take different formsdepending on their specific purposes. Oversight and legislative hearings are frequently used to hold the executive toaccount and to inform parliaments' choices as regards proposed or adopted legislation. Investigative hearings, usuallyheld in the context of parliamentary inquiries, often have distinctive features, with some parliaments granted the right tosummon witnesses and take testimony under oath. Finally, some parliaments have relevant appointment powers asregards key positions in the executive or the judiciary and may use pre-appointment hearings to test the suitability ofcandidates or extract commitments from them. The European Parliament's committees frequently organise publichearings with experts for oversight and legislative purposes. They also hold public hearings on European citizens'initiatives, once a given initiative has gathered the necessary public support. Also relevant in the EuropeanParliament's committee work are pre-appointment hearings, in particular those held as part of the procedure forappointing the members of the European Commission. European Parliament committees of inquiry can also invitedifferent categories of witnesses to provide evidence. US Congressional committees, meanwhile, hold oversight,investigative, legislative and confirmation hearings, the latter being peculiar to the Senate, as the President has thepower to nominate people to key positions in the executive and judiciary branch 'with the advice and consent of theSenate'. In the context of the ongoing internal discussion launched by the President of the European Parliament, DavidSassoli, on how to make the Parliament a more resilient and effective institution in the wake of the coronaviruspandemic, this Briefing provides an overview of how committee hearings are organised and conducted in both theEuropean Parliament and the US Congress.

Briefing EN

Revision of the EU Blue Card DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-07-2021Autor LECERF Marie

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave Derecho del trabajo | estudio de impacto | extranjero | frontera interior de la UE | migración profesional | movilidad de

la mano de obra | obrero cualificado | país tercero | permiso de trabajo | política migratoria de la UE | relacióninternacional | trabajador migrante | votación parlamentaria | éxodo intelectual

Resumen Attracting highly qualified immigrants to Europe has been one of the EU's key priorities for several years. However, upuntil now the EU has not been as successful as other OECD countries. This demand for workers is expected toincrease due to the increasing shortage of certain skills and the aging of the EU's population. The proposed directive,which would replace the 2009 Blue Card Directive, increases the attractiveness of the EU highly skilled migrationscheme by expanding its scope, lowering criteria for admission or expanding the rights of beneficiaries. On 15 June2017, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) adopted its report, and voted to openinterinstitutional negotiations. After the Council agreed its mandate, trilogue meetings started in September 2017, butlittle progress was made before the end of the 2014-2019 parliamentary term. In October 2019, Parliament decided toresume work on the file in the context of ‘unfinished business’ to be carried over to the new legislature. The EuropeanCommission’s ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’, presented on 23 September 2020, stressed the need to finalisethe negotiations. On 17 May 2021, the Parliament and the Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council finally reached aninterim agreement on the revision of the directive. On 21 May, Member States’ ambassadors, in the Committee ofPermanent Representatives, endorsed the agreement. And on 3 June, the LIBE committee also endorsed theagreement reached with the Council. Parliament is expected to vote on adopting the agreed text during the September2021 plenary session. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by Martina Prpic. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Addressing the dissemination of terrorist content onlineTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-07-2021Autor LUYTEN KATRIEN

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave acceso a la información | centro distribuidor de bases de datos | difusión de la información | Internet | radicalización |

terrorismoResumen Dissemination of terrorist content is one of the most widespread and most dangerous forms of misuse of online

services in the field of internal security. In line with the 2015 European agenda on security, and taking into account theimpact of this propaganda on the radicalisation, recruitment and training of terrorists, the European Commissionlaunched a voluntary system for tackling terrorism online, based on guidelines and recommendations. However, giventhe limitations of self-regulation, in September 2018 the Commission proposed a regulation on preventing thedissemination of terrorist content online through the removal of such content within one hour of being posted. While theCouncil rapidly reached a position on the proposal, the European Parliament adopted its first-reading position in April2019. Following the European elections, and the appointment of a new rapporteur, interinstitutional triloguenegotiations on the proposal began in autumn 2019. The trilogue meetings were delayed several times, because of thecoronavirus pandemic among other reasons. After a new series of terrorist attacks hit Europe in autumn 2020,Parliament and Council reached political agreement on 10 December 2020. The most contentious issues related to thecross-border effect of withdrawal orders and to the use of automated filters to detect terrorist content online. After theCouncil adopted the text on 16 March 2021, Parliament adopted it in plenary on 28 April. The Regulation entered intoforce on 6 June and will apply as of 7 June 2022. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by François Théron. The'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Tackling online terrorist propaganda

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 118

European Court of Justice and international agreementsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-07-2021Autor CIRLIG Carmen-Cristina | MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativosResumen As a subject of public international law, the European Union (EU) concludes international agreements with other

subjects of international law, i.e. international organisations and states. The EU may enter into such treaties on its own,or jointly with its Member States – depending on the area of competence (exclusive EU competence or sharedcompetences) to which the treaty in question applies. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) enjoys specificcompetences with regard to the conclusion, interpretation and application of international treaties to which the EU is aparty. The ECJ can verify the compatibility of an international agreement with the EU Treaties either ex ante or ex post.Furthermore, international treaties concluded by the EU are considered as acts of the institutions and may be subjectto interpretation by the Court, especially in the preliminary reference procedure. As a rule no ECJ jurisdiction isenvisaged in EU free trade agreements (FTAs), as dispute settlement is carried out through a joint committee, followedby arbitration. In certain specific cases, such as in the European Economic Area and the EU-Turkey Customs Union,the ECJ may have direct involvement in the enforcement of the agreement. The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and theEU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), however, diverge on dispute settlement rules and the role of theECJ. In the former, the ECJ maintained its jurisdiction during, as well as beyond, the transition period with regard tospecific chapters; the ECJ also has the final word on interpreting EU law applied in virtue of the agreement.Conversely, the TCA includes a role for the Court only in regard to the United Kingdom's participation in EUprogrammes, and its dispute settlement rules vary throughout the agreement.

Briefing EN

The Sustainable Development Goals in the EU budgetTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-07-2021Autor KALLQVIST TILDA MARIA ELISABETH

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoResumen This briefing will present an overview of the implementation of the SDGs in the EU long-term budget.

Briefing EN

Re-starting tourism in the EU amid the pandemicTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-07-2021Autor Niestadt Maria

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | TurismoPalabra clave ayuda pública | Banco Europeo de Inversiones | consecuencia económica | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia |

informe | iniciativa de la UE | libre circulación de personas | medicina preventiva | recuperación económica | turismoResumen Tourism plays an enormously important role in the EU economy and society. It generates foreign exchange, supports

jobs and businesses, and drives forward local development and cultural exchanges. It also makes places moreattractive, not only as destinations to visit but also as locations to live, work, invest and study. Furthermore, as tourismis closely linked with many other sectors – particularly transport – it also affects the wider economy. The coronaviruspandemic has hit the tourism sector hard. The impact on various tourist destinations in the EU has been asymmetricaland highly localised, reflecting differences in types of tourism on offer, varying travel restrictions, the size of domestictourism markets, level of exposure to international tourism, and the importance of tourism in the local economy. At thebeginning of summer 2021, several EU Member States started to remove certain travel restrictions (such as therequirements for quarantine or testing for fully vaccinated travellers coming from certain countries). However, allcontinue to apply many sanitary and health measures (such as limits on the number of people in common areas, andcleaning and disinfection of spaces). Such measures and restrictions change in line with the evolving public healthsituation, sometimes at short notice, making recovery difficult for the sector. The EU and its Member States haveprovided the tourism sector with financial and other support. Some measures were already adopted in 2020. Otherswere endorsed only shortly before the beginning of summer 2021. One flagship action has been the speedy adoptionof an EU Digital Covid Certificate. This certificate harmonises, at EU level, proof of vaccination, Covid-19 test resultsand certified recovery from the virus. However, it does not end the patchwork of travel rules. Despite efforts toharmonise travel rules at Council level, Member States still apply different rules to various categories of traveller (suchas children or travellers arriving from third countries).

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 119

Understanding initial coin offerings: A new means of raising funds based on blockchainTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-07-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave Autoridad Europea de Valores y Mercados | blanqueo de dinero | cadena de bloques | capital de riesgo | capital para

la fase inicial | empresa naciente | financiación del terrorismo | moneda virtualResumen Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a relatively new method of raising capital for early-stage ventures. They allow

businesses to raise capital for their projects, by issuing digital tokens in exchange for crypto assets or fiat currencies.They constitute an alternative to more traditional sources of start-up funding such as venture capital (VC) and angelfinance. ICOs can potentially offer advantages in comparison with traditional ways of raising capital. At the same time,their opacity and the general tendency for issuers to exploit regulatory loopholes can carry significant risk for investors,may make ICOs vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing, and could even create financial stabilityconcerns. ICOs have been met with a wide range of initial regulatory responses: from an outright ban in the case ofChina and South Korea, to more supportive approaches in other jurisdictions, with Singapore in Asia and Switzerlandin Europe leading the way. As for the European Union (EU) and the United States, the relevant regulatory agenciesinitially published warning notices, reinforced by statements that securities laws could apply and registration benecessary. The EU went a step further and is currently seeking to partially regulate ICOs, with a proposal for aregulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA regulation). Meanwhile, some Member States are currently implementingregulatory sandboxes, to provide an impetus for innovation without imposing the immediate burden of regulation.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Understanding initial coin offerings: A new means of raising funds based on blockchain

Towards a common EU approach to lifting coronavirus-related restrictions on freedom of movementTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 13-07-2021Autor DUMBRAVA Costica

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaResumen To reduce the spread of the coronavirus, Member States have taken a wide range of measures, which have

significantly affected the free movement of people in the EU. Restrictions on freedom of movement have varied in timeand across countries – following generally but not strictly – successive 'waves' of coronavirus infections. Since thebeginning of the pandemic, the EU and the Member States have been active in developing a coordinated response tothe pandemic, starting from emergency measures to mitigate the effects of the sudden introduction of border controlsin the early days of the pandemic to establishing common approaches on risk indicators, interoperable contact tracingapps, vaccination and digital certification. This briefing provides an overview of the main restrictions on free movementadopted by the EU and Schengen countries focusing on control measures at the internal borders introduced betweenMarch 2020 and July 2021. It then discusses the key steps taken by the EU and the Member States to develop acommon approach to lifting restrictions on freedom of movement. The briefing also places the coronavirus-relatedrestrictions of movement in the context of broader efforts to update and strengthen the Schengen system, which hasbeen under stress for at least a decade. This is an updated edition of an EPRS briefing published in November 2020.

Briefing EN

Rail passengers' rights and obligations in the EUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-07-2021Autor Niestadt Maria | SCORDAMAGLIA Damiano

Ámbito político Protección de los consumidores | TransportePalabra clave Derecho de la UE | discapacitado | empresa de transporte | estudio de impacto | jurisprudencia (UE) | política común

de transportes | propuesta (UE) | protección del consumidor | responsabilidad | tarifa de viajeros | transporte deviajeros | transporte ferroviario | transporte rápido

Resumen In 2007, the EU established a set of basic rights for rail passengers, which became applicable at the end of 2009.These rights provide for all passengers, including those with reduced mobility, a harmonised minimum level ofprotection, information and assistance. Reports have concluded that the implementation of these rights, althoughrelatively smooth, is not done uniformly across the EU. Moreover, other shortcomings have prevented these rights frombeing used to their full potential. In September 2017, the European Commission presented a new proposal to addressthese issues and to strike a new balance between keeping rail operators competitive and providing adequatepassenger protection. The European Parliament adopted its first-reading position on this proposal on 15 November2018. For its part, the Council adopted its general approach on 2 December 2019, under the Finnish Presidency.Interinstitutional negotiations began at the end of January 2020, and on 1 October 2020, under the GermanyPresidency, Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement on the text. On 29 April 2021, the EuropeanParliament voted in favour of the agreed text as adopted by the Council. The new rules were published in the OfficialJournal of the EU on 17 May 2021. They will apply in principle to all international and domestic rail journeys andservices in the EU from 7 June 2023. However, Member States may exempt domestic rail services for a limited time.Seventh edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 120

Single European Sky 2+ package: Amended Commission proposalTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-07-2021Autor Niestadt Maria

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave Agencia Europea de Seguridad Aérea | Cielo Único Europeo | control aéreo | espacio aéreo | Eurocontrol | política

común de transportes | propuesta (UE) | protección del medio ambiente | seguridad operacional de la aviaciónResumen The Single European Sky (SES) initiative aims to make EU airspace less fragmented and to improve air traffic

management in terms of safety, capacity, cost-efficiency and the environment. Its current regulatory framework isbased on two legislative packages: SES I (adopted in 2004), which set the principal legal framework, and SES II(adopted in 2009), which aimed to tackle substantial air traffic growth, increase safety, and reduce costs and delaysand the impact of air traffic on the environment. Nonetheless, European airspace remains fragmented, costly andinefficient. The European Commission presented a revision of the SES in 2013 (the SES 2+ package). While theParliament adopted its first-reading position in March 2014, in December 2014 the Council agreed only a partialgeneral approach, owing to disagreement between the UK and Spain over the application of the text to Gibraltarairport. With Brexit having removed this blockage, the Commission has amended its initial proposal. The Council andthe Parliament have both adopted their positions on the revised proposal, and can thus start trilogue negotiations.Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

EU-UK relations: Difficulties in implementing the Northern Ireland ProtocolTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-07-2021Autor HALLAK ISSAM

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacionalPalabra clave acuerdo (UE) | alimento para el ganado | control fronterizo | informe | Irlanda del Norte | libre circulación de

mercancías | mercado único | producción vegetal | producto alimenticio | producto cárnico | producto de origen animal |retirada de la UE

Resumen On 3 March 2021, the United Kingdom (UK) Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Brandon Lewis, announced in awritten statement to the UK Parliament, and without consulting the European Union (EU) in advance, that the graceperiod on border controls on a series of food and live products shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland would beextended. This meant that products of animal origin, composite products, food and feed of non-animal origin and plantsand plant products could continue being shipped from Great Britain to Northern Ireland without the official certification,such as health and phytosanitary certificates, required by the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland (the Protocol) ofthe Withdrawal Agreement (WA). In response to the UK's decision, the EU launched legal action against the UK forbreaching the provisions of the Protocol, as well as the good faith obligation under the WA. According to the Protocol,the UK must establish border controls on goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland according to EUlaw. The application of EU law to Northern Ireland, together with the conduct of border controls within the UK, wasdesigned to prevent the establishment of physical border controls (a 'hard border') on the island of Ireland, so as tosafeguard the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement which brought peace in Northern Ireland, while preserving the integrityof the EU's single market. The grace period on border controls was agreed by the EU and the UK in December 2020as a temporary solution to problems raised by the UK. The UK government has reiterated that it intends to implementthe Protocol, but that the border controls are causing trade disruption between Great Britain and Northern Ireland andrequire time to be resolved. It has also mentioned other issues involving areas as diverse as medicinal supplies andparcel shipments, as well as the complexity of customs systems and implementation of exchange of informationbetween the EU and the UK. On 30 June 2021, the EU and the UK reached an agreement on some solutions,including the extension of the grace period on meat products, conditional on tight controls.

Briefing EN

New EU strategic priorities for the Sahel: Addressing regional challenges through better governanceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-07-2021Autor PICHON Eric

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Desarrollo y ayuda humanitaria | Seguridad y defensaPalabra clave democracia | derechos humanos | Estado de Derecho | estrategia de la UE | gobernanza | golpe de Estado | informe |

migración forzosa | política exterior y de seguridad común | Sahel | sociedad civil (movimientos de opinión) | terrorismoResumen Recent events have shown that the Sahel region remains highly politically unstable. The military takeover of the

Chadian government following President Idriss Déby's sudden death in April 2021 and the repercussions of the August2020 and May 2021 military coups in Mali are worrying signs of weak democratic governance structures. BurkinaFaso's transitional democracy has also been severely destabilised by the activities of extremist groups and internalconflicts. This political fragility and the lack of government legitimacy have made the responses to the Sahel's securityand humanitarian issues all the more challenging. The continued threat posed by terrorist armed groups and risingintercommunal violence over land and resources have led to both internal and cross-border displacements in Sahelcountries. Meanwhile, the inadequacy of governance mechanisms for managing this displacement, compounded byenvironmental degradation, resource scarcity and population growth, has created a severe humanitarian crisis. Since2011, the European Union (EU) strategy for the Sahel has focused on both security and development to address thesenumerous and interconnected challenges. However, EU efforts have remained dominated by a military approach totackle rising terrorist activity, achieving concrete results but ultimately falling short of long-term regional stability. Thenew EU integrated strategy in the Sahel aims to strengthen action at the political level, focusing on governancemechanisms, human rights, and collaboration with civil society and local authorities, while maintaining securitycooperation with states in the region.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 121

Fighting discrimination in sportTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-07-2021Autor KATSAROVA Ivana

Ámbito político CulturaPalabra clave campaña de sensibilización | Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea | deporte | discriminación

basada en la orientación sexual | discriminación sexual | discriminación étnica | estadística de la UE | Eurostat |programa de la UE | racismo | Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UE | Tratado de la Unión Europea

Resumen Even though the European Union (EU) has built an extensive framework of legislation, instances of racism andhomophobia in sport are still rife. Interestingly, Eurostat surveys reveal that the feeling of discrimination is morewidespread than actual discrimination. Although there are some variations, discrimination in sport very frequentlyinvolves stigmatisation on the basis of external characteristics such as skin colour, body shape and gender. Data from2017 show that some 3 % of respondents claimed to have experienced racist violence in the previous year, withanother 24 % being exposed to racist harassment in that period. Worryingly, the results of a 2018 poll confirm that thevast majority of respondents (90 %) perceive homo/transphobia to be a problem in sport, with gay men feelinghomophobia to be a bigger problem than lesbian/gay women and bisexual people. Action against discrimination at EUlevel is grounded in an established EU legal framework, based on a number of Treaty provisions – in particular Articles2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union, and Articles 10, 19 and 67(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union. The general principles of non-discrimination and equality are also reaffirmed in the Charter ofFundamental Rights of the EU. This legal arsenal is completed by a number of directives and framework decisions –such as the Racial Equality Directive, the Victims' Rights Directive and the Framework Decision on Combating Racismand Xenophobia, to name but a few – aimed at increasing individual protection. The objectives of the sports strand ofthe Erasmus+ programme include combatting violence, discrimination and intolerance in sport and providing fundingfor various projects such as the setting up of LGBTQI+ sports clubs in central and eastern Europe, increasing inclusionin sport, and by bringing together partners who traditionally face barriers to participation, such as women, the LGBTQI+community and people with disabilities. In addition, since 2016, the European Commission has supported the Councilof Europe in promoting safety and security at sports events. In recent years, the Gay Games and the European Gayand Lesbian Multi-Sports Championships have helped raise awareness, build self-esteem and change perceptionsbased on prejudice.

Briefing EN

Mental health and the pandemicTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-07-2021Autor SCHOLZ Nicole

Ámbito político Salud públicaPalabra clave acción de la UE | enfermedad mental | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | informe | joven | OCDE | Organización

Mundial de la Salud | salud mentalResumen While the pandemic is primarily a physical health crisis, it has also had widespread impact on people's mental health,

inducing, among other things, considerable levels of fear, worry, and concern. The growing burden on mental healthhas been referred to by some as the 'second' or 'silent' pandemic. While negative mental health consequences affectall ages, young people, in particular, have been found to be at high risk of developing poor mental health. Specificgroups have been particularly hard hit, including health and care workers, people with pre-existing mental healthproblems, and women. The pandemic has also appeared to increase inequalities in mental health, both within thepopulation and between social groups. To address the population's increased psycho-social needs, the World HealthOrganization Regional Office for Europe established an expert group on the mental health impacts of Covid-19 in theEuropean region. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has issued analyses and guidanceon mental health in general and the pandemic's impact on mental health in particular. At European Union level, aDecember 2020 European Commission communication addressed the pandemic's impact on mental health. In May2021, the Commission organised a major online stakeholder event, and published best practice examples of solutionspresented. A July 2020 European Parliament resolution recognises mental health as a fundamental human right,calling for a 2021-2027 EU action plan on mental health. Members of the European Parliament have also called on theCommission to put mental health at the heart of EU policymaking. Stakeholders broadly rally around calls forprogrammes and funding to improve citizens' mental health, not least to respond to the pandemic's long-termimplications.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Mental health and the pandemic

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 122

EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlookTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-07-2021Autor AUGÈRE-GRANIER Marie-Laure | MCELDOWNEY James

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave aglomeración rural | comunidad rural | desarrollo rural | despoblación | hábitat rural | informe | migración rural |

población rural | región ruralResumen On 30 June 2021, the European Commission adopted a communication on its long-term vision for the EU's rural areas.

The communication identifies areas of action with a view to creating new momentum for the EU's rural areas, whilerecognising their diversity. In recent decades, in many Member States rural areas have experienced depopulation.Such regions face a range of environmental and socio-economic challenges. These include, for example, lower incomeper capita, a higher percentage of the population at risk of poverty and social exclusion, a lack of access to basicinfrastructure and services, and lower levels of access to fast broadband internet. The EU's rural development policyhas sought to help address these challenges. Evaluation evidence is emerging on the impact of the commonagricultural policy (CAP) on the territorial development of the EU's rural areas. Measures relating to village renewal andLEADER (Liaison entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie rurale) measures are considered to be well-targetedand relevant to local needs, although they represent a small proportion of CAP financing. Administrative burdens havebeen raised as an issue that can impact on the developmental process. Recommendations from this evaluationevidence point to the need for better integration of funding streams, the need to maintain a dialogue across theEuropean structural funds, and all the implications this may have for the new CAP strategic plans. The Commission'srecommendations to Member States on their CAP strategic plans highlight a number of recurring themes relating to theemployment, education and training needs of rural areas, including the need to address rural depopulation, promotegenerational renewal, improve connectivity, and address the role played by action taken at local level. TheCommission's communication on a long-term vision for rural areas includes provision for a 'rural pact' to engage actorsat EU, national, rural and local levels and an EU rural action plan, setting out a range of initiatives and actionableprojects. The vision and its supporting analyses will provide a framework for addressing the future of the EU's ruralareas.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook

The financial management of visitor groups to the national parliamentsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 08-07-2021Autor POUWELS Alexandra Cynthia Jana

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | Planificación prospectiva | PresupuestoPalabra clave Alemania | dietas y gastos | gestión financiera | Hungría | informe | Parlamento Europeo | Parlamento nacional | Reino

Unido | viajeResumen In most Member States, visitor’ groups are not sponsored to visit the national parliament. A visit to the national

parliament is free of charge, and all the costs related to the visit, for example travel costs, accommodation and localminor expenses, need to be paid by the visitors themselves. Germany is the only country which has various kinds ofprogrammes where visitors can be reimbursed. Members of Parliament can invite up to 200 people a year of which thetravel costs are partially covered by the German Bundestag. There is also a programme which consists of more daysfor which all the costs related to travel and accommodation are covered by the German government. The GermanBundesrat has a programme in which the 16 federal states can invite people for a visit of multiple days to Berlin. In thiscase the travel costs and accommodation are paid for by the Bundesrat. For all reimbursements, the rules apply thatthe receipts and underlying documents need to be provided to the Bundestag and Bundesrat after the visit. Alldocuments and receipts are checked through an ex-post control. The United Kingdom has a programme in whichcosts are reimbursed, and this programme is funded by the commercial tours of the parliament. In this case, it can beMPs, Peers or the House of Commons or Lords who can invite visitors who are eligible for reimbursement. InHungary, only schools can get reimbursement for their travel costs and the entry fee for the national parliament. All thereceipts need to be provided to the visitor service of the parliament. Some countries do have other schemes in whichthey provide coverage for schools or costs are covered by the MPs’ own funds. The Council of the EU does notsponsor visitor groups. All visits are requested by visitors themselves and they need to cover all the costs related to thevisit themselves. The questions were also sent to the European Commission but no answer was received.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 123

Protection of animals during transport: Data on live animal transportTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-07-2021Autor ROJEK Beata

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralResumen Each year, millions of live animals are transported by road, sea, rail and air within, and to and from, the European

Union, for a number of reasons, such as slaughter, fattening or breeding. To protect their welfare during thosejourneys, the EU adopted Regulation 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport. An evaluation of theregulation showed that, when correctly implemented and enforced, it had a positive impact on animal welfare.However, in some areas weaknesses still persist, largely due to insufficient implementation. In the light of theseconclusions, and bearing in mind its 2012-2015 animal welfare strategy, the European Commission announced itsintention to revise the animal welfare legislation, including legislation on animal transport. Despite the action taken,however, in recent years, repeated breaches of the rules, resulting in accidents and severe animal welfare crises, havebeen highlighted by EU and national control bodies and by animal welfare organisations. On 19 June 2020, theEuropean Parliament set up the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport (ANIT). The workof the committee focused on investigating how EU rules laid down in Regulation 1/2005 are being implemented byMember States and enforced by the European Commission. It held public hearings with the participation ofstakeholders, representatives of national authorities and experts. Insight from these debates fed into the committee'sreport and recommendations to Council and the Commission. This briefing is one of four requested by the ANITcommittee to provide research and analysis following the results of a questionnaire sent out by the committee toMember States. It gives an overview of available data on the transport of live animals.

Briefing EN, FR

Understanding delegated and implementing actsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-07-2021Autor DEL MONTE Micaela | MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativosPalabra clave Derecho de la UE | informe | Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UE | Tratado de Lisboa

Resumen Law-making by the executive is a phenomenon that exists not only in the European Union (EU) but also in its MemberStates, as well as in other Western liberal democracies. Many national legal systems differentiate between delegatedlegislation − adopted by the executive and having the same legal force as parliamentary legislation − and purelyexecutive acts −aimed at implementing parliamentary legislation, but that may neither supplement nor modify it. In theEU, the distinction between delegated acts and implementing acts was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Thedistinction, laid down in Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), seemsclear only at first sight. Delegated acts are defined as non-legislative acts of general application, adopted by theEuropean Commission on the basis of a delegation contained in a legislative act. They may supplement or amend thebasic act, but only as to non-essential aspects of the policy area. In contrast, implementing acts are not defined as totheir legal nature, but to their purpose − where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts areneeded. Under no circumstances may an implementing act modify anything in the basic act. Delegated acts differ fromimplementing acts in particular with regard to the procedural aspects of their adoption − the former after consultingMember States' experts, but their view is not binding; the latter in the comitology procedure, where experts designatedby the Member States, sitting on specialised committees, can object to a draft implementing act. In the case ofdelegated acts, however, the Parliament and Council can introduce, in the delegation itself, a right to object to a draftact or even to revoke the delegation altogether. Both delegated and implementing acts are subject to judicial review bythe Court of Justice of the EU which controls their conformity with the basic act.

Briefing EN

Erasmus 2021-2027: The Union programme for education, training, youth and sportTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 05-07-2021Autor CHIRCOP Denise

Ámbito político EducaciónPalabra clave agencia ejecutiva | cooperación en materia de educación | deporte | educación | estudio de impacto | formación

profesional | informe | política de la juventud | política educativa | programa de la UE | propuesta (UE)Resumen The Erasmus 2021-2027 proposal was published on 30 May 2018. Establishing a new programme ensures the

continuation of the Erasmus+ funding programme for education, training, youth and sport. While Erasmus+ 2014-2020offered mobility opportunities to more than 4 million people, the new programming period aims to reach up to 12 millionparticipants. The new generation programme maintains a lifelong learning approach and works towards the adoption ofa European Education Area by 2025. Flagship initiatives include the European University Networks and the EuropeanStudent Card. The new regulation also focuses on inclusion and aims at greater simplification for end-users. Itincorporates sports in the main structure of the programme, expands the use of digitalisation, supports new areas ofknowledge and introduces DiscoverEU, a new mobility initiative. Stakeholders agree that the previous programme hasbeen highly beneficial but lessons need to be learnt to help the next generation programme run more efficiently andeffectively. The Parliament and Council reached agreement on the proposal following the overall agreement on the2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, and it was adopted in May 2021. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation inProgress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 124

Horizon Europe: Framework programme for research and innovation 2021–2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-07-2021Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político Política de investigaciónPalabra clave CEEA | cooperación científica | difusión de las innovaciones | elaboración del Derecho de la UE | estudio de impacto |

formación profesional | innovación | investigación nuclear | política de investigación de la UE | programa marco de IDT| propuesta (UE) | reparto de la financiación de la UE | seguridad nuclear

Resumen In June 2018, the European Commission proposed a total budget allocation of €100 billion to finance science, researchand innovation projects during the 2021-2027 period, of which the vast majority, €94.1 billion in current prices, wouldbe allocated to the Horizon Europe framework programme. The main aims are to strengthen science and technology,to foster industrial competiveness, and to implement the sustainable development goals in the EU. Horizon Europeintroduces new features such as the European Innovation Council, missions to promote research results, and newforms of partnerships. Horizon Europe also aims at reducing administrative burdens and promoting the concept ofopen science. More operational synergies are expected through better linkage with other EU programmes. In March2019, Parliament and Council reached a partial agreement on most aspects of Horizon Europe. However, the financialaspects were only settled in December 2020 as part of the broader MFF negotiations, together with the sensitive issueof third-country association. The final text was adopted in April 2021 and entered into force retroactively from 1January 2021. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by Cemal Karakas. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Horizon Europe – Specific programme: Implementing the framework programmeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-07-2021Autor SPINACI STEFANO

Ámbito político Política de investigaciónPalabra clave competitividad | cooperación científica | difusión de las innovaciones | estudio de impacto | informe | innovación |

investigación y desarrollo | organismo de la UE | política de investigación de la UE | programa de la UE | programamarco de IDT | propuesta (UE)

Resumen In June 2018, the European Commission proposed a total budget allocation of €100 billion to finance science, researchand innovation projects during the 2021-2027 period, of which the vast majority, €94.1 billion in current prices, wouldbe allocated to the Horizon Europe framework programme. The main aims are to strengthen science and technology,to foster industrial competiveness, and to implement the sustainable development goals in the EU. Horizon Europeintroduces new features such as the European Innovation Council, missions to promote research results, and newforms of partnerships. While the proposal for the framework programme set out the general and specific objective ofHorizon Europe as well as the structure and the broad lines of the activities to be carried out, the specific programmeaims to define the operational objectives and activities, especially for missions, the European Research Council, theEuropean Innovation Council, work programmes, and the committee procedure. In April 2019, Parliament and Councilreached a partial agreement on the specific programme. However, the financial aspects were only settled in December2020 as part of the broader MFF negotiations. The final text was adopted in April 2021 and entered into forceretroactively from 1 January 2021.

Briefing EN

European Defence Fund: Multiannual financial framework 2021-2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-07-2021Autor KARABOYTCHEVA Miroslava Kostova

Ámbito político IndustriaPalabra clave cooperación militar | cooperación UE-OTAN | desarrollo industrial | elaboración del Derecho de la UE | Estado

miembro UE | fondo (UE) | informe | investigación y desarrollo | política común de seguridad y defensa | políticaeuropea de defensa | presupuesto de defensa | programa de actuación | programa de la UE | propuesta (UE) |seguridad europea

Resumen In June 2018, the European Commission presented a legislative proposal on a European Defence Fund, including abudget allocation of €11.5 billion in constant 2018 prices for the 2021-2027 period. The proposal aimed to streamlineand simplify the set-up in place at the time by integrating the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (researchwindow) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (as one part of the capability window) into asingle Fund. The main aims of the Fund would be to foster the competitiveness and innovativeness of Europeandefence and to contribute to the EU's strategic autonomy. In this regard, the Fund would inter alia support collaborativeindustrial projects; co finance the costs of prototype development; encourage the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises; and promote projects in the framework of permanent structured cooperation. Synergies wereexpected with other EU initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, maritime transport, border management, HorizonEurope, the space programme and the European Peace Facility. In April 2019, after several trilogue meetings,Parliament and Council reached a partial agreement on the Fund, covering the content, but not, among other things,budgetary issues. Parliament adopted its position at first reading in April 2019. A provisional political agreement on theoutstanding issues was reached in December 2020. The Council adopted its first-reading position in March 2021 andthe Parliament adopted the text at second reading on 29 April. The final act was published in the Official Journal on 12May.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 125

Measures to advance the realisation of the trans-European transport network: Integrated and fasterproject procedures

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 02-07-2021Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave difusión de la información de la UE | Estado miembro UE | procedimiento administrativo | propuesta (UE) | proyecto de

interés común | red de transportes | red transeuropea | resumenResumen With the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) policy, the European Union seeks to develop a modern, efficient

and climate-friendly network covering all transport modes. Despite the TEN-T's importance for the economy andsociety, and despite the binding timelines and targeted financial support, it risks not being completed as planned. Thisis partly due to complex administrative procedures linked to permit-granting for cross-border projects as well asbroader regulatory uncertainty, often resulting in delays and increased cost. To speed up the network's completion, theCommission has proposed regulatory measures to integrate and shorten permit-granting for projects, and facilitatepublic consultations and the involvement of private investors. On 8 June 2020, the Parliament and the Council agreedon a 'smart TEN-T directive', with this legal form giving Member States more flexibility. The text could not however beadopted before the finalisation of the new Connecting Europe Facility programme, as the annexes of both texts areinterlinked. The Council adopted its first-reading position on the ‘smart TEN-T directive’ on 14 June 2021 and theParliament is due to vote on it during the July plenary session. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefingsare updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Nuclear Safety outside the EU: Proposal for a new Council regulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-07-2021Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave cooperación internacional | difusión de la información de la UE | marco financiero plurianual | país tercero | política de

desarrollo | política europea de vecindad | propuesta (UE) | resumen | seguridad nuclear | Tratado CEEAResumen In the context of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period, the Council has adopted Council

Regulation (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021 establishing a European instrument for international nuclear safetycooperation complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – GlobalEurope on the basis of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Regulation 2021/948complements, but is separate from, the new Global Europe Instrument. Regulation 2021/948 replaces CouncilRegulation (Euratom) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an instrument for nuclear safety cooperation(INSC). It continues to fund the important activities carried out under the previous regulation, namely to support thepromotion of a high level of nuclear safety and radiation protection and the application of effective and efficientsafeguards of nuclear materials in third countries, building on the activities under the Euratom Treaty. Second edition.The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Revising the Machinery DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-07-2021Autor TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave estudio de impacto | informe | inteligencia artificial | Internet de las cosas | intervención normativa | máquina | norma

de seguridad | norma europea | norma técnica | propuesta (UE) | robótica | seguridad del productoResumen This briefing checks the quality of the Commission impact assessment (IA) accompanying the regulation proposal on

machinery products. It finds that the assessment, which is based on various data sources, is mostly qualitative, andexplains openly the analytical methods and data limitations. Furthermore, the scale of all problems and the efficiencyaspect in the comparison of the options could have been further explained. The briefing also stresses that the IA couldhave been more informative in terms of the stakeholder consultations. It also finds it questionable whether the SMETest has been duly conducted.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 126

Disinformation campaigns about LGBTI+ people in the EU and foreign influenceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-07-2021Autor externo Cecilia STRAND, Jakob SVENSSON, Roland BLOMEYER, Margarita SANZ

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidad | Asuntos exteriores | Democracia | Democracia en la UE, Derechoinstitucional y parlamentario | Derechos humanos | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia

Palabra clave desinformación | educación sexual | igualdad de género | impacto de la tecnología de la información | informe deinvestigación | medios sociales | minoría sexual | niño | pedofilia | propaganda política

Resumen The purpose of this briefing is to give a concise overview of disinformation, misinformation and propaganda campaignsabout LGBTI+ persons and rights, originating from or being supported and/or multiplied by actors outside the EU.Based on a review of existing literature, the briefing examines the main narratives used, supported and circulated, aswell as which actors or group of actors are involved. Where available, information on methods, funding and impacts onEuropean values is provided. The main narratives identified include negative othering, opposing a ‘gender ideology’,‘heteroactivism’, restoring a ‘natural’ order, ‘colonialism’ and child safety. The briefing concludes that there is a needfor more research, further harmonisation of legal frameworks, the scrutiny of financial flows and strengthened capacityto detect disinformation, misinformation, propaganda and hate speech.

Briefing EN

Connecting Europe Facility 2021-2027: Financing key EU infrastructure networksTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-07-2021Autor PAPE Marketa

Ámbito político Desarrollo regional | Energía | TransportePalabra clave desarrollo sostenible | estudio de impacto | instrumento financiero de la UE | inversión | política estructural | programa

de la UE | propuesta (UE) | proyecto de interés común | red de energía | red de transmisión de datos | red detransportes | red transeuropea

Resumen The EU supports the development of high-performing, sustainable and interconnected trans-European networks in theareas of transport, energy and digital infrastructure. It set up the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) as a dedicatedfinancing instrument for the 2014-2020 period, to channel EU funding into the development of infrastructure networks,help eliminate market failures and attract further investment from the public and private sectors. Following a mid-termevaluation, the European Commission proposed to renew the programme under the long term EU budget for the 2021-2027 period. In the 2014-2019 term, the Council and the European Parliament provisionally agreed on the content,leaving aside the budget and the questions relating to third countries. Negotiations resumed in the present term,reflecting the Commission’s revised MFF proposal of May 2020 and the European Council conclusions of July 2020.Final details were agreed on 11 March 2021. The agreement has already been confirmed by the responsibleparliamentary committees TRAN and ITRE, and the Council subsequently adopted its first-reading position on 14 June2021. The Parliament is expected to vote at second reading during the July plenary session. Once adopted, the newCEF regulation will apply retroactively from 1 January 2021. Fifth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Prospectuses for investors – Simplifying equity-raising during the pandemicTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-07-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | CoronavirusPalabra clave comunicación de datos | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | información al consumidor | información comercial |

mercado de capitales | participación | profesión financiera | propuesta (UE) | reglamento (UE) | valor mobiliarioResumen A prospectus is a legally required document presenting information about a company and the securities that it offers to

the public or seeks to admit to trading on a regulated market. The relevant EU legislation consists of a directive,adopted in 2003, amended in 2010, and finally replaced by a regulation in 2017. Drawing up a prospectus entails timeand costs, which in the current economic context may deter issuers in distress from seeking to raise new funds, inparticular equity. To remedy this, the Commission proposed to amend Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. Theseamendments aim at creating a temporary (18 month) regime for a short-form prospectus and to simplify the procedurefor issuers (so that they can rapidly raise capital), as well as to release pressure on financial intermediaries. TheCommission proposal was reviewed by the co-legislators who, among other things, increased the range of those whocan benefit from the regime, added elements that must appear in the recovery prospectus and increased the minimuminformation in the prospectus. They further amended Directive 2004/109/EC (the 'Transparency Directive'), thusproviding Member States with the option to postpone, by one year, the requirement for listed companies.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 127

Replacement benchmarks for financial benchmarks in cessationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-07-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave control financiero | Euribor | evaluación comparativa de resultados | mercado de divisas | mercado financiero |

modificación de la ley | propuesta (UE) | reglamentación financiera | reglamento (UE) | índice de preciosResumen The pricing of many financial instruments and contracts depends on the accuracy and integrity of (financial)

benchmarks, i.e. indices, by reference to which the amounts payable under such financial instruments or contracts, orthe value of certain financial instruments, are determined. The anticipated discontinuation of such a benchmark(LIBOR) after the end of 2021 has created fears that it could lead to disruption in the internal market, given that theBenchmarks Regulation ((EU) 2016/1011) does not provide for mechanisms to organise the orderly discontinuation ofsystemically important benchmarks in the EU. That is why the Commission has proposed to amend the said regulation.The co-legislators significantly amended the Commission’s proposal. Their amendments deal, among other things, withthe replacement of a benchmark by EU, or by national law, set additional obligations for supervised entities using abenchmark, regulate the Commission’s powers to adopt delegated acts and establish additional obligations for theCommission with regards to its proposed consultation. The European Parliament adopted the compromise agreementin plenary on 19 January 2021. On 2 February 2021, the Council adopted the act. The final act was published in theOfficial Journal of the EU on 12 February 2021. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updatedat key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Amending securitisation requirements for the impact of coronavirusTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-07-2021Autor DELIVORIAS Angelos

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | CoronavirusPalabra clave actividad bancaria | consecuencia económica | crédito | disponibilidad monetaria | enfermedad por coronavirus |

epidemia | pequeña y mediana empresa | propuesta (UE) | reglamento (UE) | vigilancia del mercadoResumen Preserving the ability of banks to continue lending to companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, is key

when it comes to softening the economic impact of the pandemic and easing recovery. The Commission believes thatsecuritisation can contribute to this. It also considers that in order to increase the potential of securitisation the EUregulatory framework (Regulations (EU) 2017/2402 and (EU) 575/2013) must be updated, to cater for (i) on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and (ii) the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs). The co-legislatorsamended the Commission proposal, with amendments concerning, among other things, the requirements concerningthe credit protection agreement, the third party verification agent and the synthetic excess spread, the macroprudentialoversight of the securitisation market, the obligations of the EBA, the reporting on prudential requirements and financialinformation, grandfathering for securitisation positions and NPE securitisations. The final act was signed on 31 March2021. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

The Slovenian Parliament and EU affairsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-07-2021Autor RITTELMEYER Yann-Sven | ZUMER KLEMEN

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave Comisión parlamentaria | Constitución | Eslovenia | informe | Parlamento nacional | política de la UE - política nacional

| régimen parlamentario | transposición de la legislación comunitariaResumen Since 1991 the Republic of Slovenia has had a parliamentary system composed of the Državni zbor (National

Assembly) and the Državni svet (National Council). The Slovenian Parliament has the features of an 'incompletebicameral system', based on 'asymmetric duality' – the National Council has less authority and fewer competencesthan the National Assembly, in accordance with Chapter IV of the Constitution. The National Assembly is described asthe 'supreme representative and legislative institution, exercising legislative and electoral powers as well as controlover the Executive'. Its members are elected every four years from nine constituencies by a universal, equal, direct,and secret vote. Different, specific, rules apply to the election of one member each of the Italian and Hungariannational communities. The Government of Slovenia is accountable to the National Assembly, and the Prime Minister iselected by the National Assembly by a majority vote of all of its members. This briefing is part of an EPRS series onnational parliaments (NPs) and EU affairs. It aims to provide an overview of the way the NPs of EU Member States arestructured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also provides information on relevantNP publications.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 128

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline: Economic, environmental and geopolitical issuesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 01-07-2021Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | EnergíaResumen The EU's dependence on Russian gas imports shows no signs of lessening. Although the Green Deal envisages a

carbon-neutral Europe by 2050, natural gas remains a key part of the energy mix as coal is phased out and renewableenergy is not yet ready to fully take up the slack. EU domestic gas production is fast declining, and there is not enoughgas at affordable prices from alternative suppliers to replace Russian production. Launched in 2015, the Nord Stream 2pipeline connects Russia and Germany directly via the Baltic Sea, following a similar route to Nord Stream 1completed in 2011. Construction has taken several years, with delays due to protracted legal battles and, since 2019,US sanctions. Nevertheless, pipe-laying continues and is on track for completion in the next few months. Few energyprojects have ever been as hotly debated as Nord Stream 2. Pipeline owner Gazprom, a Russian state-controlledcompany, argues that it is needed to meet the EU's growing demand for gas imports. Germany's energy sector alsosees the pipeline as a viable commercial project. Some opponents point to the environmental impact of the pipeline'sconstruction, as well as the contradiction between the EU's climate goals and long-term investments in fossil fuelimport infrastructure. However, the pipeline's geopolitical implications are its most controversial aspect. Critics,including several EU Member States, describe Nord Stream 2 as a Kremlin project to export malign Russian influenceas well as gas to Europe. They note that, combined with the new TurkStream pipeline delivering Russian gas to south-eastern Europe, it will eventually enable Russia to starve Ukraine's ailing economy of much needed transit feerevenue. The pipeline looks set to perpetuate Russia's stranglehold on EU energy markets and compromise Europeanstrategic autonomy.

Briefing EN

Protection of animals during transport: Sanctions for infringementsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-06-2021Autor ROJEK Beata

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave bienestar de los animales | Estado miembro UE | formación en el puesto de trabajo | incumplimiento del Derecho de la

UE | informe | intercambio de información | legislación veterinaria | Reglamento CE | transporte de animalesResumen Each year, millions of live animals are transported by road, sea, rail and air within, and to or from, the European Union,

for a number of reasons, such as slaughter, fattening or breeding. To protect their welfare during those journeys, theEU adopted Regulation 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport. An evaluation of the regulation showedthat, when correctly implemented and enforced, it had a positive impact on the welfare of animals. However, in someareas weaknesses still persist, largely due to insufficient implementation. In light of these conclusions, and bearing inmind its 2012-2015 animal welfare strategy, the European Commission developed guidelines for handling animalsduring transport, to be disseminated and used for training of transport personnel and enforcement agents. Despitethese measures, however, in recent years, repeated breaches of the rules, resulting in accidents and severe animalwelfare crises, have been highlighted by EU and national control bodies and by animal welfare organisations. On 19June 2020, the European Parliament set up the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport(ANIT). The work of the committee focused on investigating how EU rules are being implemented by Member Statesand enforced by the European Commission. It held public hearings with the participation of stakeholders,representatives of national authorities, and experts. Insight from these debates fed into the committee's report andrecommendations to Council and the Commission. This briefing is one of four requested by the ANIT committee toprovide research and analysis following the results of a questionnaire sent out by the Committee to Member States. Itfocuses on one of the topics investigated by the Committee, namely the systems of sanctions applied by MemberStates for breaches of Regulation 1/2005.

Briefing EN

Protection of animals during transport: Guidelines and researchTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-06-2021Autor ROJEK Beata

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave bienestar de los animales | Estado miembro UE | formación en el puesto de trabajo | informe | intercambio de

información | investigación | legislación veterinaria | Reglamento CE | transporte de animalesResumen Each year, millions of live animals are transported by road, sea, rail and air within, and to or from, the European Union,

for a number of reasons, such as slaughter, fattening or breeding. To protect their welfare during those journeys, theEU adopted Regulation 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport. An evaluation of the regulation showedthat, when correctly implemented and enforced, it had a positive impact on the welfare of animals. However, in someareas weaknesses still persist, largely due to insufficient implementation. In light of these conclusions, and bearing inmind its 2012-2015 animal welfare strategy, the European Commission developed guidelines for handling animalsduring transport, to be disseminated and used for training of transport personnel and enforcement agents. Despitethese measures, however, in recent years, repeated breaches of the rules, resulting in accidents and severe animalwelfare crises, have been highlighted by EU and national control bodies and by animal welfare organisations. On 19June 2020, the European Parliament set up the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection of Animals during Transport(ANIT). The work of the committee focussed on investigating how EU rules are being implemented by Member Statesand enforced by the European Commission. It held public hearings with the participation of stakeholders,representatives of national authorities, and experts. Insight from these debates fed into the committee's report andrecommendations to the Council and the Commission. This briefing is one of four requested by the ANIT Committee toprovide research and analysis following the results of a questionnaire sent out by the Committee to Member States. Itfocuses on one of the topics investigated by the Committee, namely the use and dissemination in Member States ofguidelines on the protection of animals during transport. It also gives an overview of available species-specificresearch on the welfare of animals during transport.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 129

Protection of animals during transport: Training of personnel and enforcement agentsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-06-2021Autor ROJEK Beata

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave animal vivo | aplicación del Derecho de la UE | bienestar de los animales | Estado miembro UE | formación en el

puesto de trabajo | informe | legislación veterinaria | Reglamento CE | transporte de animalesResumen Each year, millions of live animals are transported by road, sea, rail and air within, and to and from, the European

Union, for a number of reasons, such as slaughter, fattening or breeding. To protect their welfare during thosejourneys, the EU adopted Regulation 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport. An evaluation of theregulation showed that, when correctly implemented and enforced, it had a positive impact on the welfare of animals.However, in some areas weaknesses persist, largely owing to insufficient implementation. In light of these conclusions,and bearing in mind its 2012-2015 animal welfare strategy, the European Commission developed guidelines forhandling animals during transport, to be disseminated and used for training of transport personnel and enforcementagents. Despite these measures, however, in recent years, repeated breaches of the rules, resulting in accidents andsevere animal welfare crises, have been highlighted by EU and national control bodies and by animal welfareorganisations. On 19 June 2020, the European Parliament set up the Committee of Inquiry on the Protection ofAnimals during Transport (ANIT). The work of the committee focused on investigating how EU rules are beingimplemented by Member States and enforced by the European Commission. It held public hearings with theparticipation of stakeholders, representatives of national authorities, and experts. Insight from these debates fed intothe committee's report and recommendations to the Council and the Commission. This briefing is one of four requestedby the ANIT committee to provide research and analysis following the results of a questionnaire sent out by thecommittee to Member States. It focuses on one of the topics investigated by the committee, namely how MemberStates organise training for personnel handling animals during transport and for staff tasked with enforcing the rules.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders, 24-25 June 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-06-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos exteriores | Coronavirus | Democracia | Derecho de la UE: sistemajurídico y actos legislativos | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Salud pública

Palabra clave Consejo Europeo | discriminación basada en la orientación sexual | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | Estadode Derecho | Hungría | informe | política exterior y de seguridad común | política migratoria de la UE | recuperacióneconómica | Rusia | zona euro

Resumen The regular European Council meeting of 24-25 June 2021 was noteworthy on several fronts. First, there was anextensive discussion on the rule of law and European values, a topic rarely discussed at the level of EU leaders. It tookplace in the context of a new Hungarian law on child protection, which includes provisions considered by many asdiscriminatory against LGBTQI+ people. Second, following a Franco-German proposal, there was an intense debateabout the EU approach to relations with Russia, with apparent disagreement on whether it is currently worthwhileengaging in high-level dialogue with the country. Among the other topics considered were coordination efforts inresponse to the coronavirus pandemic and economic recovery after the crisis. On migration, EU leaders quicklyreviewed the situation on migration routes, mainly reiterating previous commitments. In the field of external policy,alongside Russia, EU leaders also discussed EU-Turkey relations, the situations in Belarus, Libya, Ethiopia and theSahel, and cybersecurity. EU leaders were also presented with the 2021-22 Leaders' Agenda. In the framework of theEuro Summit, EU leaders addressed the future of the euro area, inviting the Eurogroup to continue its work towardsthe completion of Banking Union and to move quickly to implement the capital markets action plan.

Briefing EN

The European Council and Turkey: Searching for a positive agendaTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-06-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Chipre | Consejo Europeo | control de las migraciones | cuestión chipriota | Grecia | informe | intervención militar |

negociación de adhesión | Siria | Turquía | unión aduanera | zona económica exclusivaResumen Turkey has featured regularly on the agenda of the European Council in recent years, notably in the context of the

migration crisis and military operations in Syria, and as a result of an increasingly tense situation in the easternMediterranean, which led to a significant military build-up at sea during the summer of 2020. In all these cases, theEuropean Council (re)acted swiftly, ensuring that the views of the Member States were taken into consideration. In themigration crisis, it stepped up cooperation with Turkey, reducing the influx of irregular arrivals on EU shores, whileoffering to 're-energise accession negotiations'. This offer has been disregarded, as Turkey has continued to drift awayfrom EU values and principles, multiplying rule of law and human rights violations. In parallel, Turkey has startedpursuing an increasingly assertive regional policy in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and, more recently, inthe south Caucasus. Its assertiveness in the eastern Mediterranean led to the increase in illegal exploratory drillingactivities in the Cypriot and Greek economic exclusive zones (EEZs), which the European Council has condemned onnumerous occasions. In 2020, in an attempt to back de-escalation efforts, the European Council reiterated its offer ofcooperation on a positive political agenda, including modernisation of the EU-Turkey customs union, making thisconditional upon progress on restoring good neighbourly relations.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 130

Revision of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumersTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-06-2021Autor HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Protección de los consumidoresPalabra clave crédito al consumo | Derecho de los consumidores | Directiva CE | Estado miembro UE | información al consumidor |

informe | intervención normativa | recogida de datos | transposición de la legislación comunitariaResumen Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreement for consumers (the CCD) is part of the legal framework tackling consumer

protection and the development of the internal market. Despite improvements in enforcing consumer protection policy,there are shortcomings in particular regarding the scope of application of the directive and the uneven regulatorychoices made in the 27 EU Member States for implementing it. Moreover, there are new challenges – such asdigitalisation and data collection, use and processing – that require immediate attention. This implementation appraisallooks at the practical implementation of the CCD in light of the expected Commission proposal for its revision.According to the Commission work programme 2021, the proposal will be submitted in the second quarter of 2021,after having been initially part of the 2020 refit programme (see Legislative Train Schedule, EPRS).

Briefing EN

Revision of the TEN-T RegulationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-06-2021Autor DINU Alina Ileana

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave cambio climático | economía verde | estudio de impacto | informe | infraestructura de transportes | movilidad sostenible

| política común de transportes | propuesta (UE) | red transeuropea | reducción de las emisiones de gas | reglamento(UE)

Resumen Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 (the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Regulation), has shaped EU transportinfrastructure policy by strengthening the network approach. It has furthermore established guidelines for national andEU investment in transport infrastructure, and introduced targeted funding under the Connecting Europe Facility andother relevant EU schemes. In the context of new technological and social challenges and new policy approaches, theTEN-T Regulation needs to better address present and future needs. To this end, the European Commission hasstarted a revision process that should end with the adoption of a new legislative proposal, planned for the third quarterof 2021.

Briefing EN

EU long-term vision for rural areas: Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positions onthe European Commission's initiative

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 29-06-2021Autor COLLOVA Claudio | MCELDOWNEY James

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave aglomeración rural | comunidad rural | desarrollo rural | despoblación | formalidad administrativa | hábitat rural |

informe | iniciativa de la UE | innovación | migración rural | población rural | región ruralResumen This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series offering syntheses of the pre-legislative state of play and consultation on

key European Commission priorities during the current five-year term. It summarises the state of affairs in the relevantpolicy field, examines how existing policy is working on the ground, and, where possible, identifies best practice andideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of the EU system of multilevel governance.EPRS analysis of the positions of partner governmental organisations at EU, national, regional and local levelssuggests that these public authorities would like the following main considerations to be reflected in discussions on theforthcoming Commission communication on the long-term vision for rural areas: • The EU level recognises that ruralareas represent the fabric of European society. There is a growing concern at the EU level that some citizens living inremote rural areas feel 'left behind'. • Local and regional authorities point out that, if the rural agenda is to besuccessful, it cannot be based on a one-size-fits-all approach, but needs to be tailored to territories' specificities. Thisapplies, for instance, to overcoming demographic challenges. • When it comes to digitalisation and mobility, all levelsof governance see the provision of infrastructure as a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for progress. There is aconsensus on the importance of bottom-up participation of local communities to meet local needs, which is behind the'smart village' concept. • Governmental organisations at all levels of governance see environment protection and actionagainst climate change as a pre-condition for growth. There is a clear call to modernise the farming sector, coupledwith the need to diversify the rural economy as whole. According to public bodies at local, regional and national levels,the experience with the Covid-19 pandemic has proven that there are potential opportunities for future development ofrural areas, starting with jobs that can be carried-out remotely. • Regional and local administrations call for EU andnational administrative procedures to be made less cumbersome and for different types of funds to be streamlined andcombined, applying a 'multi-fund' approach. Finally, the evidence gathered points to additional funding opportunities forrural areas. These include concrete cases of private initiatives, national intervention when the provision of a publicgood is not commercially viable, and State aid and tax credits, when appropriate.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 131

South Korea's pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-06-2021Autor D'AMBROGIO Enrico

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Energía | Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | cooperación internacional | cooperación medioambiental | Corea del Sur | economía verde |

enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | informe | neutralidad en carbono | recuperación económicaResumen As part of its plan for recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, South Korea has launched its own Green New Deal.

Announced in July 2020, this initiative will invest €54.3 billion mostly for enabling a shift to green infrastructure, low-carbon and decentralised energy, for spurring innovation in green industry and for creating 659 000 jobs. The plan willalso support the commercial development of technology for large-scale carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS).In October 2020, South Korea's President, Moon Jae-in, declared that the country would aim to reach carbon neutralityby 2050. He vowed to end dependence on coal and replace it with renewables as part of the Green New Deal. InDecember 2020, the government adopted a carbon-neutral strategy to chart a path towards a sustainable and greensociety. This strategy will support innovative climate technologies that will help South Korea achieve carbon neutralityand set a global example of success in accomplishing this goal. In December 2020, Seoul updated its nationallydetermined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. The target remains unchanged: by 2030, South Korea is toreduce its total greenhouse gas emissions by 24.4 % compared to 2017 levels. Aware of criticism about the country'sweak ambition regarding emissions reduction, in May 2021 Moon Jae-in declared that a more ambitious target wouldbe announced at the COP26 conference on climate change in Glasgow in November. Despite the relatively low levelsof funding that South Korea has allocated to developing countries, it is taking ambitious action to demonstrateinternational leadership on climate change: in May 2021, it hosted the P4G summit focused on public–privatepartnerships, which yielded the Seoul Declaration. Climate change provisions in the EU–South Korea frameworkagreement highlight largely unused potential for cooperation; so far, these provisions have only been used forchannelling EU support to Seoul's emissions trading scheme, for running a three-year EU-Korea climate action projectand for holding the meetings of the joint working group on energy, environment and climate change.

Briefing EN

Revision of the General Product Safety DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-06-2021Autor BINDER ECKHARD

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduanera | Protección de los consumidoresPalabra clave comercio internacional | Directiva CE | importación (UE) | informe | mercado único | norma de seguridad | norma

europea | país tercero | seguridad del productoResumen Two decades after the entry into force of the General Product Safety Directive, the internal market is witnessing an

increasing presence of products made with the use of or involving new technologies, online marketplaces aremushrooming, and a growing amount of products are entering the internal market from outside the European Unionthrough these online marketplaces. Since the General Product Safety Directive does not have any provisions toguarantee that these products are safe for use, there are concerns that consumer protection on the internal marketmight be compromised. In order to keep guaranteeing the safety of all products, the European Commission'sforthcoming proposal will aim to deal with these new challenges for product safety and to find a balance betweenensuring unhindered trade and guaranteeing the safety of all products on the internal market.

Briefing EN

Public hearing with Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board 1 July 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-06-2021Autor GRIGAITE KRISTINA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA | SEGALL REBECCA SARAH FANNY |

SLOCOCK OLIVERÁmbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave actividad bancaria | consulta pública | estadística de la UE | gestión de crisis | informe de actividad | liquidez | Reino

Unido | retirada de la UE | riesgo financiero | sesión pública | unión bancaria de la UEResumen This note is prepared in view of an ordinary public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Elke

König, which will take place on 1 July 2021. The Chair will present the SRB’s annual report for 2020. This briefingaddresses (i) the review of the crisis management framework, and in particular the SRB’s input to the Commission’spublic consultation; (ii) MREL policy and statistics; (iii) liquidity in resolution; (iv) the relationship with the UnitedKingdom: contractual recognition of bailinable liabilities issued under third country laws; (v) developments in respect ofparticular resolution cases; (vi) contributions to the Single Resolution Fund; and (vii) SRB and some other publications.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 132

Public hearing with Christine Lagarde, Chair of the European Systemic Risk BoardTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-06-2021Autor GOTTI GIULIA | GRIGAITE KRISTINA | KOMAZEC KATJA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA |

SEGALL REBECCA SARAH FANNYÁmbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | CoronavirusPalabra clave enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | gestión de riesgos | informe de actividad | interés | Junta Europea de Riesgo

Sistémico | riesgo financiero | sesión pública | solvenciaResumen This note is prepared in view of a regular public hearing with the Chair of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),

Christine Lagarde, which will take place on 1 July 2021. The aim of the meeting is to present the ESRB Annual Reportand to discuss recent developments in macroprudential policy field, potential systemic risks looming ahead, notably theimpact of the pandemic. The briefing takes stock of (i) the ESRB and national macroprudential authorities’ responseto the pandemic outbreak; (ii) summarises recent risk assessments; and takes a closer look at the following topics aspotential sources of increasing systemic risk: (iii) corporate insolvency risks, (iv) macroprudential policy implicationsfrom low interest rates and (v) macroprudential concerns beyond banking.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Lithuania: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-06-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave biocarburante | cambio climático | energía eólica | energía renovable | energía solar | gas con efecto invernadero |

informe | Lituania | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos deemisión de la UE

Resumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climateplans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Lithuania finalised its NECP in December 2019. Lithuania generates 0.55 % of the EU's total greenhousegas (GHG) emissions and has reduced emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. Most economicsectors showed emissions reductions in the 2005-2019 period, with the exception of transport, agriculture and the'other emissions' sectors. The transport and agriculture sectors account for 52 % of Lithuania's total emissions. Energyindustry emissions have fallen by 60 % since 2005, while emissions in the 'other emissions' category, which includesservices and buildings grew by 24 %. EU effort-sharing legislation allowed Lithuania to increase its emissions by 15 %up until 2020. Lithuania stayed well below its 2013-2020 allowances and expects to over-achieve on the 2030 target of9 % reductions relative to 2005, potentially achieving 21 % reductions. Lithuania's renewable energy share was 25.5 %in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a 45 % share focuses mainly on wind, solar and biofuels. Energy efficiencymeasures centre to a large extent on the building stock and transport sector with support schemes for industry andhouseholds.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Estonia: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-06-2021Autor YOUGOVA Dessislava

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | energía renovable | Estonia | gas con efecto invernadero | informe | petróleo | reducción de las

emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UEResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Estonia submitted its NECP in December 2019. Estonia recovered its independence in 1991 and joinedthe European Union in 2004. In the 1990s, the country launched structural reforms related to its transition to a market-based economy. In 2019, its total GHG emissions amounted to 15.2 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent (MtCO2e),excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) and including international aviation, generating 0.4 % ofthe EU-27's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. By 2030, Estonia aims to achieve a GHG emissions reduction of70 % compared with 1990. Its long-term target is a reduction of 80 % by 2050. The new government has set an evenmore ambitious target, aiming for climate neutrality by 2050. It also envisages a motivation package to help localgovernments reach carbon neutrality by 2030. However, Estonia's total emissions per inhabitant remained above theEU average in 2019, and the carbon intensity of its economy was one of the highest in the Union. The country's energyindependence and security of supply still rely on oil shale, although between 2005 and 2019, the share of renewablesin Estonia grew faster than the EU average, over-reaching the 2020 target.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 133

Climate action in Greece: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-06-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | Grecia | informe | lignito | reducción de las

emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UEResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Greece submitted its NECP in December 2019. Greece accounts for 2.4 % of total EUgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and has reduced its emissions at a higher pace than the EU average since 2005.The carbon intensity of the Greek economy decreased by 23 % from 2005 to 2019, at a slower rate than the EU-27average. Energy industry emissions fell by almost 45 % in the 2005-2019 period in Greece, reducing their share oftotal emissions by 14 %. Further reductions are expected as the country proceeds with phasing out lignite-fired powerplants. The sector that showed the greatest percentage reduction in emissions between 2005 and 2019 – 54 % – wasmanufacturing industries and construction. Transport and agriculture were the sectors with the lowest reductions.Under the Effort-sharing Decision for the 2013 2020 period, Greece needs to reduce its emissions in sectors notincluded in the EU's emission trading system by 4 %, compared with 2005 levels, and is on track to achieving it. Theshare of renewable energy sources in Greece reached 19.7 % in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a 35 % share isfocused mainly on changes to the transport and heating and cooling sectors. This briefing is one in a series which willcover all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

Climate action in France: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 24-06-2021Autor YOUGOVA Dessislava

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | energía nuclear | energía renovable | Francia | gas con efecto invernadero | informe | reducción de

las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UEResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. France submitted its final NECP in April 2020. In 2019, France accounted for 459 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent (MtCO2e) in total emissions excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) and includinginternational aviation, generating 12 % of the EU-27 total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Since 2005, the countryhas reduced its emissions at the same pace as the EU average. Over the 2005-2019 period, French emissions perinhabitant decreased faster than the EU average. The carbon intensity of the economy fell by 32 % and remainedamong the lowest in the EU while GDP increased by 17 %. In 2019, the transport, residential, tertiary and agriculturesectors accounted for around 60 % of France's total emissions. In order to reduce its energy dependency, France stillmaintains a high share of nuclear energy in its national energy mix. However, between 2005 and 2019, the share ofenergy from renewable sources rose steadily, reaching 17 % in 2019; this is still 16 percentage points (pp) below the2030 national target of 33 % however. Energy efficiency, along with renewables, is a corner-stone of the Frenchdecarbonisation strategy, targeting in particular the buildings and transport sectors.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 134

Communication on the global approach to research and innovation: Pre-legislative synthesis of national,regional and local positions on the European Commission's initiative

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 23-06-2021Autor COLLOVA Claudio | WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político Política de investigaciónPalabra clave cooperación científica | cooperación en materia de educación | cooperación internacional | innovación | investigación y

desarrollo | libre circulación de trabajadores | pequeña y mediana empresa | personal de investigación | programamarco de IDT | éxodo intelectual

Resumen This Briefing forms part of an EPRS series offering syntheses of the pre-legislative state of play and consultation onkey European Commission priorities during the current five-year term. It summarises the state of affairs in the relevantpolicy field, examines how existing policy is working on the ground, and, where possible, identifies best practice andideas for the future on the part of governmental organisations at all levels of the EU system of multilevel governance.An EPRS analysis of the positions of partner governmental organisations at EU, national, regional and local levelssuggests that they would like the following main considerations to be reflected in the discussion of the communicationon the global approach to research and innovation (R&I): • Governmental organisations stress that research andinnovation (R&I) are essential for the global competitiveness of the EU and greater investment is needed to ensure thatthe EU does not lose its leading position. There is a particular emphasis on the need for SMEs and regional clusters totake part in innovation cooperation, building on existing programmes such as Eurostars. • Public authorities state thatthird-country participation is essential for a successful R&I policy. However, the exact balance between openness and‘strategic autonomy’ is harder to define. Some organisations state that systematic cooperation with third countriesshould be simplified in terms of red tape. Others express concerns about lower international participation in successiveEU R&I programmes. • Various priority regions to be targeted were emphasised, namely, the broader Europeanneighbourhood, the Mediterranean region (PRIMA and BlueMed programmes cited as positive examples) and Africa.Other respondents emphasised the need to deepen ties with strong research capacity countries, such as Australia,Canada, Japan and the UK. • Governmental organisations share the view that mobility of researchers is vital in boththe European and international context. At the same time, EU R&I programmes should seek to prevent a 'brain drain'both away from the EU and within the EU, by promoting and incentivising research careers. • Local and regionalauthorities also call on the Commission to strengthen the links between R&I policies and EU cohesion policies,including regional funds.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders on 24-25 June 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-06-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos exteriores | Coronavirus | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Saludpública

Palabra clave Consejo Europeo | control de las migraciones | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | geopolítica | informe | librecirculación de personas | política exterior y de seguridad común | Rusia | Turquía | vacuna | zona euro

Resumen At its meeting on 24-25 June 2021, the European Council will pursue its coordination efforts in response to thecoronavirus pandemic, discuss the situation on the various migration routes, return to the strategic debate on relationswith Russia, revert to their discussions on Turkey and assess progress in the EU’s economic recovery. In the Eurosummit, EU leaders will discuss the economic challenges for the euro area in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis andreview progress on the banking union and capital markets union.

Briefing EN

Priority dossiers under the Slovenian EU Council PresidencyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-06-2021Autor ATTARD LUCIENNE

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave Eslovenia | Estado de Derecho | política en materia de cambio climático | política europea de vecindad | política

migratoria de la UE | Presidencia del Consejo de la Unión Europea | recuperación económica | salud pública |seguridad informática | tecnología digital

Resumen Slovenia will, in the second half of 2021, hold its second Presidency of the Council of the EU since joining the EU in2004. It will conclude the work of the Trio Presidency composed of Germany, Portugal and Slovenia. Slovenia is ademocratic parliamentary republic with a proportional electoral system. The Slovenian parliament is bicameral, madeup of the National Assembly (composed of 90 members) and the National Council (composed of 40 members). In theNational Assembly, there are 88 representatives of political parties and two representatives of the Italian andHungarian national communities, the latter two elected to represent their interests. The National Assembly elects thePrime Minister and the government. The current government is a four-party coalition, made up of the SlovenianDemocratic Party (SDS); the Modern Centre Party (SMC), the Democratic Party of Slovenian Pensioners (DeSUS) andNew Slovenia—Christian Democrats (NSi). The Prime Minister, Mr Janez Janša from the Slovenian Democratic Party(SDS), was elected to office on 3 March 2020. The next general elections in Slovenia will take place no later than 5June 2022. Other political parties represented in parliament are the List of Marjan Šarec (LMS), Social Democrats(SD), Party of Alenka Bratušek (SAB), The Left, and the Slovenian National Party (SNS).

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 135

Community sponsorship schemes under the new pact on migration and asylum: Take-up by EU regionsand cities

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 18-06-2021Autor RADJENOVIC Anja

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | derecho de asilo | informe | integración de los migrantes | integración social | migración

ilegal | migrante | política migratoria de la UE | refugiado | reparto de la financiación de la UE | solicitante de asiloResumen The number of people in the world that are forcibly displaced inside or outside their home country has risen

significantly in recent years, as also showcased by the unprecedented arrival of refugees and irregular migrants in theEU since 2015. This highlights an urgent need to ensure organised, legal and safe pathways for protecting migrantswho embark on dangerous journeys in an attempt to enter countries of destination irregularly, or find themselves inprotracted refugee situations. A potential solution is the community sponsorship scheme, understood as encompassingseveral different approaches for refugee admission to third countries other than countries of origin or transit. Theconcept includes a shared responsibility between civil society and the state when engaging in refugee admissionefforts, by providing financial, emotional, social and/or settlement support to help newly arrived refugees integrate in athird country. Community sponsorship for integration is particularly important in the EU, where local and nationalgovernments, alongside civil society, have been pondering how best to support newcomers and ease integration andsocial cohesion. Since 2015, the concept has been piloted and launched in several EU countries, including through theactive input of regions and cities. In 2020, the European Commission presented a new pact on migration and asylum,affirming its commitment to supporting national sponsorship schemes through funding, capacity-building andknowledge-sharing.

Briefing EN

The ECB’s Monetary Policy Response to the COVID-19 CrisisTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-06-2021Autor RAKIC Drazen

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | CoronavirusPalabra clave consecuencia económica | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | política monetaria única | recesión económica

Resumen (Updated 18 June 2021) The COVID-19 pandemic was an unprecedented shock to the euro area economy. The ECB'sGoverning Council took a series of measures that collectively provided a substantial monetary policy stimulus aimed atsafeguarding the effective transmission of monetary policy and preventing a serious deterioration of financialconditions. This briefing, which is reguarly updated since March 2020, summarises these monetary policy measures.

Briefing EN

The integration of the European Development Funds into the MFF 2021 - 2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-06-2021Autor POUWELS Alexandra Cynthia Jana

Autor externo Alexandra POUWELSÁmbito político Control presupuestario | Planificación prospectiva | PresupuestoPalabra clave ayuda al desarrollo | control parlamentario | desarrollo sostenible | FED | fondo (UE) | informe | marco financiero

plurianual | papel internacional de la UE | países ACP | países y territorios de ultramar | presupuesto de la UE |sociedad civil (movimientos de opinión)

Resumen This briefing presents detail on the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 that marks a turningpoint, in that it brings together all the EU’s different funds for development cooperation in a single instrument, in orderto ensure consistency between different fields of external action.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 136

Creative Europe programme 2021-2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-06-2021Autor PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Ámbito político CulturaPalabra clave artes | cooperación cultural | creación artística | industria audiovisual | industria cultural | pluralismo cultural | pluralismo

de los medios de comunicación | política lingüística | producción audiovisual | programa de la UE | promoción cultural |propuesta (UE)

Resumen Having considered the possibility of merging the Creative Europe programme with other programmes supportingEuropean values, rights and justice, the European Commission has decided to continue the Creative Europeprogramme as a stand-alone programme, increasing its budget by 17 %. The only programme focusing exclusively oncultural and creative activities and enterprises, it falls under the 'Cohesion and values' heading of the 2021-2027multiannual financial framework. The previous programme focused on the economic dimension of the cultural sectorand its contribution to job creation and economic growth. Some stakeholders had voiced concern at taking such astrongly economic approach to culture. Under the new programme, the economic dimension is one axis alongside thesocial dimension, as well as culture's contribution to international relations. The new framework for cultural policytherefore highlights not only the economic dimension of the cultural and creative sectors, but also the role of culture insocial cohesion and its relation to creative and artistic freedom and diversity, and freedom and plurality of media. TheParliament, Council and Commission started trilogue negotiations in autumn 2019. After an almost year-long break, thenegotiations resumed in the second half of 2020 when the Council, the Commission and the EP reached a commonagreement. The new programme was then finally adopted in May 2021, but applies with retroactive effect from 1January 2021.

Briefing EN

Data Governance ActTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-06-2021Autor MILDEBRATH Hendrik Alexander

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativos | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave datos personales | derecho a reutilizar información | Derecho de la informática | economía digital | informe |

intercambio de información | mercado único digital | propuesta (UE) | protección de datos | protección de la vidaprivada | reglamento (UE)

Resumen Data is a key pillar of the European digital economy. To unlock its potential, the European Commission aims to build amarket for personal and non-personal data that fully respects European rules and values. While the volume of data isexpected to increase dramatically in the coming years, data re-use is hampered by low trust in data-sharing, conflictingeconomic incentives and technological obstacles. As the first of a set of measures announced in the European strategyfor data, the Commission put forward its proposed data governance act on 25 November 2020. It aims at facilitating(largely) voluntary data sharing across the EU and between sectors by strengthening mechanisms that increase dataavailability and foster trust in intermediaries. It establishes three principle re-use mechanisms and a horizontalcoordination and steering board. While there seems to be considerable support for data governance rules, theappropriate approach remains fundamentally disputed. Issues have been raised concerning, for instance, theineffectiveness of labelling and registration regimes to foster trust and data re-use, the uncertain interplay with otherlegislative acts, the onerous rules on international data transfers and the vulnerability of certain mechanisms tocommercial exploitation. The co-legislators, the European Parliament and Council, are in the process of assessingwhether the Commission's proposal presents an adequate response to the challenges identified and are workingtowards defining their respective positions.

Briefing EN

Public finances in Euro Area Member States: Selected indicators - June 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-06-2021Autor GOTTI GIULIA | ZOPPÉ Alice

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Semestre EuropeoPalabra clave amortización de la deuda | Estado miembro UE | estadística de la UE | hacienda pública | indicador económico | Unión

Económica y Monetaria | zona euroResumen This document presents selected indicators on public finance for the Euro Area Member States and the Euro Area as a

whole. For each indicator, it provides a short explanation and the data sources. The final section presents a shortoverview of the main indicators used by the European and other international institutions to assess debt sustainability.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 137

Missing Trader Intra-Community FraudTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 17-06-2021Autor POUWELS Alexandra Cynthia Jana

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoPalabra clave competencias de los Estados miembros | Consejo de la Unión Europea | cooperación fiscal europea | delito fiscal |

exención fiscal | Fiscalía Europea | informe | intercambios intra-UE | IVA | mercado único | Oficina Europea de Luchacontra el Fraude | unanimidad

Resumen Value added tax (VAT) fraud has an extensive impact on the European Union (EU) budget. As missing trader intra-community (MTIC) fraud is the biggest kind of VAT fraud it would be beneficial to fight this kind of fraud to a largerextent.

Briefing EN

Financing for Africa – The EU budget and beyondTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 15-06-2021Autor LILYANOVA Velina

Ámbito político PresupuestoPalabra clave Acuerdo de Cotonú | ayuda al desarrollo | ayuda de la UE | desarrollo sostenible | FED | instrumento financiero de la

UE | marco financiero plurianual | papel internacional de la UE | presupuesto de la UE | reparto de la financiación de laUE | África

Resumen Africa, a continent of strategic importance for the EU, has been in the spotlight of EU attention in recent years for avariety of reasons. In 2020, the Cotonou Agreement, which had governed EU-sub-Saharan Africa relations since 2000,was set to expire. The European Commission and EU High Representative adopted a joint communication in 2020,charting the way towards a new strategy for Africa. However, the sixth EU African Union Summit, planned for the endof 2020, was postponed due to the global pandemic. Thus, 2021 appears to be the next key year for EU-Africarelations, in light of the planned summit and the prospective adoption of both a new EU strategy for Africa and thepost-Cotonou agreement, expected to transform these relations into a 'partnership of equals'. The EU's long-termbudget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF) – has also featured high on the EU's agenda. The expiry of theprevious MFF (2014-2020) in December 2020 and the entry into force of the new, restructured MFF for the 2021-2027period in January 2021 coincided with efforts to reinvigorate and relaunch relations with Africa. Financial support is oneof the key tools in the EU's external action, and, as before, it will also underpin future relations with Africa. This briefingaims to map the main EU financing instruments of relevance to Africa, including the funds that are outside the EUbudget. It also points out the main novelties in the new MFF that have an impact on financing for Africa, such as theinclusion of the European Development Fund in the EU budget and the merging of most previous instruments into asingle one, the NDICI (Global Europe Instrument). In the next seven years, the EU aims to spend its funds in a moreflexible and streamlined way. This would enable it to respond quickly to crises and urgent needs in Africa and the restof the world, to better coordinate its spending with its partners following a 'Team Europe' approach, and to leverageadditional investment, including from the private sector, to boost growth and reduce the gap in official developmentassistance needed to achieve the sustainable development goals by 2030.

Briefing EN

EU cooperation with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO): how to move towards fullmembership

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 15-06-2021Autor MILICEVIC Vera

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoPalabra clave Consejo de Europa | corrupción | democracia | Estado de Derecho | informe | papel internacional de la UE

Resumen The Council of Europe (CoE) has been playing a crucial role in the promotion of human rights, democracy and the ruleof law for more than 70 years. The fight against corruption is essential for maintaining the rule of law. Corruptionundermines the functioning of the state and public authorities at all levels and is a key enabler of organised crime.Effective anti-corruption frameworks, transparency and integrity in the exercise of state power can strengthen legalsystems and trust in public authorities . The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) is the CoE’s anti-corruptionbody. It is currently composed of 50 member states, with others expressing an interest. Apart from all European Union(EU) Member States, its members include countries such as Belarus, Switzerland, the UK, the USA and, mostrecently, Kazakhstan, which joined in 2020. The EU supports the work of the CoE by contributing to its budget to fundjoint programmes and supporting cooperation in the legal field to foster political dialogue. The EU became an observerto GRECO in July 2019. The objective of this workshop is to exchange views on the EU’s potential full membership ofGRECO in the future. In the context of the preparations for the organisation of the workshop, the Chair of theCommittee on Budgetary Control has sought the opinion of Parliament’s Legal Service on the possibility for the EU tobecome a full member of the CoE Agreement establishing GRECO. This paper will present GRECO and its work,GRECO cooperation with the EU and the conclusions of the opinion of Parliament’s Legal Service.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 138

Background note on “Simplification” for the CONT hearing: “Will simplification suggested for the new MFFperiod bring the necessary balance between more efficient, effective and correct spending of EU funds?”

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 15-06-2021Autor CALATOZZOLO Rita

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | PresupuestoPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos | formalidad administrativa | informe |

intervención normativa | marco financiero plurianual | política agrícola común | programa marco de IDT | reglamento(UE) | reparto de la financiación de la UE | simplificación legislativa | Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo

Resumen This note intends to provide general information about simplification as well as to look a bit more in detail on this issuein the framework of Cohesion Policy, Common Agricultural Policy and Research. These three EU policies representsectors that largely benefit from the financing of the EU budget and have experienced simplification due to theresponse of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to the requests of final beneficiaries. At thesame time, there have been repeated calls from the European Court of Auditors regarding these policies to reducetheir complexity and further apply simplification measures, without compromising their functioning and the soundfinancial management of the EU budget.

Briefing EN

Computerised system for communication in cross-border judicial proceedings (e-CODEX)Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 14-06-2021Autor MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave acción civil | acción penal | Agencia Europea para la Gestión Operativa de Sistemas Informáticos de Gran Magnitud en

el Espacio de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia | cooperación judicial civil en la Unión Europea | cooperación judicialpenal (UE) | cooperación transfronteriza | gestión electrónica de documentos | informe | intercambio de información |propuesta (UE) | seguridad informática | sistema de información

Resumen The e-CODEX system is the digital backbone of EU judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. e-CODEXcomprises a package of software products that allow the setting up of a network of access points for secure digitalcommunication between courts and between citizens and the courts, while also enabling the secure exchange ofjudicial documents. The project, which was launched in 2010 with EU grant funding, is managed by a consortium ofMember States and other organisations and is coordinated by the Ministry of Justice of the German Land of NorthRhine-Westphalia. Even though it is currently used by 21 Member States, e-CODEX lacks a clear, uniform and EU-wide legal basis. To remedy this situation, on 2 December 2020 the Commission put forward a proposal for an e-CODEX legal instrument (a regulation) to formally establish the e-CODEX system at EU level. The management of theproject would be entrusted to eu-LISA (the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems inthe Area of Freedom, Security and Justice). Within the European Parliament, the LIBE and JURI committees are jointlyin charge of the file, and the draft report is expected shortly.

Briefing EN

Asylum in the EU: Facts and FiguresTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-06-2021Autor SABBATI Giulio

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave derecho de asilo | Estado miembro UE | estadística de la UE | estadísticas de migración | Eurostat | extranjero |

informe | reasentamiento de personas | solicitante de asiloResumen Asylum is a form of international protection given by a state on its territory to someone who is threatened by

persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion in theircountry of origin or residence. This infographic provides an overview of the number of third-country nationals seekingasylum in EU Member States, their success in asylum procedures, and requests for transfers between Member States,as a consequence of the Dublin Regulation.

Briefing EN

Exchange of views with Commissioner Elisa Ferreira on the implementation of the Technical SupportInstrument

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 11-06-2021Autor ANGERER Jost | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave ajuste estructural | comisario europeo | cooperación técnica | Estado miembro UE | informe | instrumento financiero de

la UE | mercado financiero | recuperación económica | Reino Unido | reparto de la financiación de la UE | retirada de laUE | Semestre Europeo

Resumen Ahead of BUDG-ECON exchange of views with Commissioner Ferreira, on 14 June, this note provides a brief overviewon the 2021 annual workplan, ongoing and finalised projects and some other elements of the Technical SupportInstrument.

Briefing EN

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G7 summit, June 2021: Asserting democratic values in the post-crisis contextTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-06-2021Autor ZAMFIR Ionel

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | CoronavirusPalabra clave Australia | Corea del Sur | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | Grupo de países más industrializados | impuesto

sobre sociedades | India | informe | reunión en la Cumbre | Sudáfrica | Unión Europea | vacunaResumen The 47th G7 summit is scheduled for 11-13 June 2021, and will be chaired and hosted by the United Kingdom. After a

year-long break caused by the pandemic and the former US administration's inability to organise the 2020 summit at alater date than initially scheduled, this year's event is expected to mark a return to strong global cooperation among theworld's major democracies. The leaders of four guest states – Australia, India, South Africa and South Korea – will jointhe leaders of the G7 nations and the European Union, thus reinforcing the group's global democraticrepresentativeness. The G7 has built up a reputation for being an informal framework of cooperation on major globalissues, which is driven by a shared commitment to the fundamental values of liberal democracy. This year's summit isexpected to reaffirm these values in the face of assertive authoritarian tendencies elsewhere in the world. Ahead of thesummit, ministerial meetings in areas selected by the presidency have already taken place, shaping future cooperationamong the G7 nations. 'Beat[ing] Covid-19 and building back better' is an obvious priority this year. Achieving itincludes ensuring more equitable and rapid access to vaccines and other medical supplies for developing countries.While the group has reaffirmed its general commitment to this priority, the US proposal to waive patent rights for theproduction of vaccines still needs to find common ground among the G7 members. Another US initiative – setting aminimum global corporate tax rate – has already been endorsed by G7 finance ministers. It is considered a majorchange in the international taxation system, potentially making history for the G7. Reinforcing cooperation on theregulation of digital developments is another priority, as are ambitions linked to honouring the commitments under theParis Agreement. As every year, the EU, which is a G7 member in its own right, will be represented by the Presidentsof the European Council and of the European Commission. This is an updated version of a Briefing published ahead ofthe Parliament's debate on 9 June 2021.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Germany: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-06-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave Alemania | bioenergía | cambio climático | energía eólica | energía renovable | energía solar | gas con efecto

invernadero | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos deemisión de la UE

Resumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climateplans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. Germany submitted its NECP in June 2020. In October 2020, theEuropean Commission published an assessment for each NECP. A high proportion of Germans (63 %) expect nationalgovernments to tackle climate change. Germany accounts for 24 % of net EU-27 emissions of greenhouse gases(GHG). Since 2005, emissions have steadily decreased, following the average trend in the Union. The carbon intensityof the German economy is falling, also mirroring the EU pattern. Energy industries are the largest source of emissions,responsible for 29 % of total emissions. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, by 2020 Germany was required to reduceits emissions by 14 % compared with 2005. However, the country exceeded its allocated emissions from 2016 to 2019.Germany's current 2030 target under the Effort-sharing Regulation (ESR) is to reduce emissions by 38 % from 2005levels. According to the Commission's assessment of Germany's NECP, with the new proposed measures thereduction will fall short of the target by 3 percentage points. In 2019, renewable energy sources accounted for 17.4 %of gross final consumption, just 0.6 percentage points short of the target set for 2020. Following a court ruling on 24March 2021, which found that the Climate Change Act was not aligned with fundamental rights, the Germangovernment announced its intention to strengthen its commitment, aiming to achieve net-zero emissions by 2045.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Croatia: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-06-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave biocarburante | cambio climático | Croacia | energía eólica | energía renovable | energía solar | gas con efecto

invernadero | informe | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechosde emisión de la UE

Resumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climateplans (NECPs) for the 2021 to 2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Croatia's final NECP is from December 2019. Croatia generates 0.7 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions and has reduced emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. The country'semissions intensity is significantly higher than the EU average, though it is on a steady downward trend. The transportsector accounted for over a quarter of Croatia's total emissions in 2019. The Croatian building stock is also responsiblefor a significant share of total emissions. Energy industry emissions fell by almost 40 % between 2005 and 2019,reducing the sector's share of total emissions by six percentage points. The Croatian economy is heavily reliant onenergy imports. Diversifying supply and reducing demand is seen as key to the transition process. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Croatia was allowed to increase emissions until 2020 but must reduce these emissions by 7 %relative to 2005 by 2030. Croatia achieved a 28.5 % share of renewable energy sources in 2019. The country's 2030target of a 36.4 % share is focused mainly on photovoltaics, wind and biofuels. Measures to boost energy efficiencycentre on building stock renovation and energy efficiency obligation schemes for energy suppliers. This briefing is onein a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 140

Climate action in Italy: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-06-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | energía eólica | energía renovable | energía solar | gas con efecto invernadero | informe | Italia |

reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UEResumen The EU binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Italy's final NECP was sent in December 2019. Italy generates 11.4 % of the EU's totalgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and has reduced emissions at a faster pace than the EU average since 2005.Emissions decreased across all economic sectors in Italy over the 2005-2019 period, with the agricultural sectorshowing the lowest reductions. The transport and 'other emissions' sectors, including buildings, account for almost halfof Italy's total emissions. Energy industry emissions fell by 42 % between 2005 and 2019, leaving the sector in thirdplace in terms of its share of total emissions. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Italy reduced its emissions by 13 %by 2020 relative to 2005, and the country expects to reach the 2030 target of 33 %. Italy achieved an 18 % share ofrenewable energy sources (RES) in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a 30 % share is focused mainly on wind andsolar power. Energy efficiency measures centre to a large extent on the building stock and transport sectors withsupport schemes for industry and households. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Luxembourg: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 10-06-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | energía renovable | gas con efecto invernadero | informe | Luxemburgo | reducción de las emisiones

de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio de derechos de emisión de la UEResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) for the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessment foreach NECP. Luxembourg's final NECP is from May 2020. Luxembourg generates 0.34 % of the EU's total greenhousegas (GHG) emissions and has reduced emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. Most economicsectors showed emissions reductions in the 2005-2019 period, with the exception of agriculture and the 'otheremissions' sectors. The transport sector and the 'other emissions' sector, which includes services and buildings,account for 77 % of Luxembourg's total emissions. Manufacturing and construction is the third largest sector in termsof emissions, accounting for 9 % of total emissions. Under EU effort-sharing legislation Luxembourg was supposed toreduce emissions by 20 % by 2020, and the 2030 obligation is 40 %. Luxembourg however expects to achieve a 55 %emissions reduction by 2030 in sectors outside the emissions trading system. Luxembourg reached a 7 % share ofrenewable energy sources (RES) in 2019 and expects in part to use cooperation mechanisms to reach the 2030 targetof 25 % RES. Energy efficiency measures include both support and obligation schemes for industry, buildingrenovations and transport electrification.

Briefing EN

Own resources of the European Union: Reforming the EU's financing systemTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-06-2021Autor D'ALFONSO Alessandro

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | PresupuestoPalabra clave decisión (UE) | derechos de aduana | elaboración del Derecho de la UE | gestión financiera | IVA | marco financiero

plurianual | política presupuestaria | presupuesto general (UE) | procedimiento presupuestario | recursos propiosResumen On 1 June 2021, the decision that reforms the financing system of the EU budget entered into force, following its

ratification by all Member States. It introduces three significant innovations in the own resources system, applyingretroactively from 1 January 2021. The maximum level of resources that can be called from Member Statespermanently rises from 1.20 % to 1.40 % of EU gross national income (GNI). A temporary increase in the ownresources ceiling, worth a further 0.60 % of EU GNI, is devoted exclusively to the financing of Next Generation(NGEU), enabling the Commission to borrow resources on an unprecedented scale on the capital markets, with a viewto financing the recovery. A national contribution linked to non-recycled plastic packaging waste is introduced, the firstnew EU own resource to be created since 1988. In addition, Parliament pushed for a broader reform of the financingsystem underlining that the introduction of a basket of new own resources should cover at least the repayment costs ofNGEU (for both principal and interest). Parliament managed to include a detailed roadmap for the introduction ofvarious additional new own resources by 2026 in the interinstitutional agreement on budgetary matters with the Counciland the European Commission. Envisaged resources are linked to EU policies on climate and the single market.Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 141

European Solidarity Corps 2021-2027Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-06-2021Autor CHIRCOP Denise

Ámbito político EducaciónPalabra clave ayuda humanitaria | joven | política educativa | programa de la UE | trabajo de jóvenes | voluntariado social

Resumen The financial allocation for the European Solidarity Corps programme is €1 009 million at current prices. Projected tooffer opportunities for 350 000 18 to 30 year olds from 2021 to 2027, the programme is included under Heading 5'Promoting our European way of life' of the Commission priorities. In its initial phases, the European Solidarity Corpssuffered from unsuccessful branding and communication, as it came into direct competition with two similarprogrammes, the European Voluntary Service and the EU Aid Volunteers Initiative. The new instrument merges theseearlier programmes. The distinctive feature of the European Solidarity Corps today is that it brings together solidarityand humanitarian aid volunteering opportunities for young people and uses existing management structures tomaximise focus on delivery and performance. The Parliament and Council reached agreement on the Commission'sproposal following the overall agreement on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, and the legislativeprocedure concluded in May 2021.

Briefing EN

EU partnership on metrologyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 09-06-2021Autor KRAMER Esther

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave estudio de impacto | informe | innovación | metrología | política de investigación de la UE | programa marco de IDT |

propuesta (UE) | Tratado de Funcionamiento de la UEResumen The IA underpinning the proposal on the EU partnership on metrology is based on solid sources. The relatively narrow

range of options is pre-determined by the Horizon Europe provisions, and the mostly qualitative and comparativeassessment gravitates early on towards the preferred option. While subsidiarity, competitiveness and coherence withthe overarching political priorities are consistently addressed, the consideration of benefits and costs of the optionscould have been more complete and precise. The role of the actors in the metrology ‘value chain’ under both thecurrent and the future scheme could have been better explained. The IA does not include budgetary implications noreffects of the Covid-19 pandemic (justified by the ongoing negotiations at the time of drafting the IA), nor does itassess certain novelties of the Horizon Europe partnerships, such as additionally and directionality.

Briefing EN

Recovery plan for Europe: State of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-06-2021Autor SAPALA Magdalena

Ámbito político PresupuestoPalabra clave enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | Estado miembro UE | informe | instrumento financiero de la UE | marco

financiero plurianual | recuperación económica | recursos propios | reparto de la financiación de la UEResumen In December 2020, the adoption of the legislative package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF)

and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument marked the end of an important stage in the process oflaunching a unique financial stimulus package – the recovery plan for Europe. However, in order to make the plan fullyoperational, additional conditions need to be met and preparatory steps completed. First, there is the financing ofNGEU, based on borrowing operations carried out by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union.These operations could start only once the Member States had ratified the Own Resources Decision (ORD). Thisprocedure was completed before the end of May 2021. In the meantime, the Commission started preparing for its roleas a borrower on an unprecedented scale and published its diversified funding strategy for the financing of NGEU. TheCommission has ensured that the preparations are advanced and that it would be ready to begin the borrowingoperations as soon as ratification of the ORD was finalised and the act in force. In parallel, preparations are ongoingfor the spending of the biggest part of NGEU (90 %) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This processincludes the drawing up of national recovery and resilience plans by the Member States, their evaluation by theEuropean Commission, and approval by the Council of the EU. Only then will the Commission conclude an agreementwith each Member State on a legal commitment authorising the financial contribution to be made, and begin pre-financing. An indicative timeline of the whole process shows that the first payments for Member States could be madebetween July and September 2021.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Recovery plan for Europe

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 142

Comparison of key figures in the 2021 Stability Programmes and European Commission Spring 2021forecast

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 07-06-2021Autor ANGERER Jost | KOMAZEC KATJA

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave consecuencia económica | directiva (UE) | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | Estado miembro UE | informe |

opción presupuestaria | previsión económica | programa de estabilidadResumen The purpose of this document is to show the differences between some key indicators of the 2021 Stability and

Convergence Programmes (SCP) of the EU Member States and the Spring 2021 economic forecast of the EuropeanCommission. In accordance with Art. 4 of Council Directive 2011/85/EU, the budgetary planning of the Member States“shall be based on the most likely macrofiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario. (…). Significant dif¬fe¬ren¬cesbetween the chosen macrofiscal scenario and the (most recent) Commission’s forecast shall be described withreasoning (…).”

Briefing EN

Biodiversity protection: Where do we stand?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-06-2021Autor HALLEUX Vivienne

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave Agencia Europea de Medio Ambiente | biodiversidad | convención ONU | degradación del medio ambiente | Directiva

CE | economía verde | estrategia de la UE | informe | política de medio ambiente de la UE | protección de la fauna |protección de la flora | zona protegida

Resumen Based on Member States' reporting under the Birds and Habitats Directives, the backbone of European Union (EU)nature conservation policy, the latest assessment on the state of nature by the European Environment Agency showsthat despite some encouraging developments, the overall picture remains bleak. Only 15 % of habitats and around 27% of species protected under EU legislation have a good conservation status. An EU-wide assessment of terrestrial,freshwater and marine ecosystems found that, overall, the condition of ecosystems in the EU is unfavourable.Worldwide, most indicators of ecosystems and biodiversity show rapid decline. Targets set to tackle biodiversity lossby 2020, at both EU and global levels under the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), have notbeen met. Under the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, part of the European Green Deal, the EU has therefore setitself new targets for the next decade. These include enlarging the current network of legally protected areas to coverat least 30 % of the EU's land area and 30 % of the EU's seas; and setting legally binding EU nature restoration targetsto restore degraded ecosystems. The recent zero-pollution action plan for air, water and soil proposes additionalcommitments relevant to biodiversity protection. Parties to the CBD, including the EU, are due to meet on 11-24October 2021 in China to agree on a post-2020 global biodiversity framework. The EU intends to push for global 2030targets in line with the commitments set out in its biodiversity strategy and for a much stronger implementation,monitoring and review process. The issue of resource mobilisation will be an important one, especially in the context ofthe coronavirus crisis, affecting the funding available for biodiversity. On 28 May 2021, Parliament's Committee on theEnvironment, Public Health and Food Safety adopted an own-initiative report with recommendations to strengthen theEU biodiversity strategy for 2030. The vote in plenary is scheduled for the June I plenary session.

Briefing EN

China: Partner or rival? [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-06-2021Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave China | derechos humanos | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | geopolítica | grupo de reflexión | Hong Kong |

informe | política exterior y de seguridad común | TaiwánResumen Formally, the EU and China have been strategic partners since 2003 – a partnership that was broadened five years

ago by the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. However, more recently, EU officials and politicianshave been expressing increasing concerns over China’s economic expansionism and human rights violations. Thecurrent coronavirus pandemic and developments in Hong Kong have had a marked negative impacted on EU-Chinarelations. This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks onChina, its ties with the EU and related issues. The previous issue on the subject was published in October 2020.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 143

Supporting the single market beyond 2020Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-06-2021Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave competitividad | estadística de la UE | estudio de impacto | financiación de la UE | mercado único | pequeña y mediana

empresa | programa de la UE | propuesta (UE) | recogida de datosResumen The single market programme is a new, dedicated €3.7 billion (in 2018 prices) or €4.2 billion (in current prices)

programme for the 2021-2027 period supporting the single market. It is particularly aimed at empowering andprotecting consumers, and enabling Europe's many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to take betteradvantage of a well-functioning single market. On 3 May 2021, the Regulation establishing the programme entered intoforce, with retroactive application from 1 January 2021. The new programme aims to strengthen and streamline thegovernance of the EU's internal market. It will support the competitiveness of enterprises, and promote human, animaland plant health and a safe food chain, as well as financing European statistics to provide reliable data relevant to thesingle market. The proposal consolidates and streamlines a wide range of activities that were previously financedseparately, and bundles them into one programme. The aim is to create benefits in terms of flexibility, simplificationand synergies, and eliminate overlaps.

Briefing EN

European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT): Regulation and new strategic innovation agendaTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-06-2021Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Política de investigaciónPalabra clave innovación | Instituto Europeo de Innovación y Tecnología | nueva tecnología | propuesta (UE)

Resumen On 11 July 2019, the Commission presented its new legislative package on the European Institute of Innovation andTechnology (EIT). The package consists of a recast of both the previous regulation governing the EIT and a newstrategic innovation agenda. Created in 2008, the EIT is dedicated to increasing competitiveness, sustainableeconomic growth and job creation by promoting ‘knowledge triangle activities’ (higher education, research andinnovation). It operates through 'knowledge and innovation communities' (KICs) that address specific societalchallenges, such as digitalisation, urban mobility, climate and raw materials and was part of Horizon 2020 and willcome uner the new Horizon Europe programme. Interinstitutional negotiations on both files concluded in February2021 and the texts agreed at first reading were formally adopted by Parliament and Council in turn. After being signedon 20 May 2021, both entered into force retroactively from 1 January 2021. Third edition of a briefing originally draftedby Cemal Karakas. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

Multilateral investment court: Framework optionsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-06-2021Autor HALLAK ISSAM

Ámbito político Comercio internacionalPalabra clave arbitraje comercial internacional | Derecho comercial internacional | disputa comercial | ejecución de sentencia |

informe | inversión en el extranjero | inversión internacional | juez | jurisdicción internacional | ONU | vía de recursoResumen The Council of the EU has authorised the European Commission to represent the EU and its Member States in the

intergovernmental talks at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), with a view toreforming the existing investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. The latter provides a procedural framework fordisputes between international investors and host states in relation to international investment agreements, and relieson arbitration procedures. The system has raised serious concerns among stakeholders across the EU, especially inrelation to the transparency and consistency of decisions, the independence of arbitrators, and the cost and duration ofarbitral procedures. The intergovernmental talks at UNCITRAL are aimed at reforming the system in a manner thatwould address these concerns; the overarching goal of the Council mandate is to establish a full-fledged permanentmultilateral investment court with an appellate mechanism and tenured judges. UNICTRAL talks started in 2017; inApril 2019, the working group identified three areas of concerns, namely a) consistency and predictability of arbitraldecisions; b) integrity of arbitrators and decision-makers; and c) cost and duration of ISDS disputes. The states thentabled reform proposals that provided the framework for the discussions launched in October 2019. The UNCITRALSecretariat has circulated two documents summarising the proposals regarding the selection and appointment of ISDSmembers, the establishment and scope of an appellate mechanism, and the enforcement mechanism. The proposalsrange from perfecting the current ISDS to setting up formal investment courts comprised of first-instance and appellatetribunals. The documents include questions to the government delegations. In its reply to the initial draft, the delegationat UNCITRAL for the EU and its Member States supports the establishment of a multilateral investment courtcomposed of a first-instance and an appellate tribunal staffed by full-time adjudicators.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 144

State of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa: Democratic progress at riskTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-06-2021Autor ZAMFIR Ionel

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave democracia | derechos humanos | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | informe | multipartidismo | régimen

autoritario | sociedad civil (movimientos de opinión) | África subsaharianaResumen Although countries in sub-Saharan Africa started opening up to democracy three decades ago, the region is still

characterised by a high heterogeneity of political regimes. Fragile democracies often endure numerous challenges andshortcomings, and share their borders with some of the world's least democratic regimes. Virtually non-existent in1990, multi-party elections are the norm today, yet they still only rarely lead to power changes. The recent trends ofdemocratic recession have not left sub-Saharan Africa untouched, but they have affected individual countriesdifferently. Some unexpected democratic transitions have taken place at the same time as overall democratic declinehas set in. Two sets of reasons account for the fragility of democracies in sub-Saharan Africa – those that are extrinsicand those that are intrinsic to political and institutional settings. The first include low socio-economic development,conflict and insecurity; the second include weak institutions, lack of judicial independence, manipulation of electorallaws and constitutional norms, as well as serious limitations of civil and political rights. In practice, authoritarianregimes have become skilled at using a façade of legality to legitimise their grip on power. The coronavirus pandemichas affected the region less severely than compared to other parts of the world, but its impact on democratic andhuman rights norms has been significant. For the EU – which is an important partner and development aid provider tothe region, while also launching frequent election observation missions there – issues of concern include the shrinkingspace for civil society, the need to broaden political participation for various groups such as women and youth, as wellas the impact of digital developments on democracy and human rights in societies that are still suffering from limitedinternet access and insufficient digital literacy.

Briefing EN

The emerging contours of President Biden's foreign policyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-06-2021Autor PARRY Matthew

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave China | disputa comercial | Estados Unidos | informe | jefe de Estado | política comercial | política exterior | relación

transatlántica | reunión en la Cumbre | RusiaResumen In mid-June 2021, United States (US) President Joe Biden is due to visit Europe for his first overseas trip since taking

office in January. He will attend the Group of Seven (G7) summit from 11 to 13 June in Cornwall (United Kingdom), aNATO leaders' summit in Brussels on 14 June, followed by an EU-US summit on 15 June, and, on 16 June, a summitin Geneva (Switzerland) with Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Biden's arrival in Europe will mark almostfive months in office, providing an opportunity to take stock of his foreign policy record thus far. As the Democraticcandidate in the November 2020 US presidential election, Biden promised that if elected he would pursue a 'foreignpolicy for the middle class'. He argued that strengthening the majority of citizens' financial security, investing in USindustrial capacity, and countering destabilising inequities at home, would allow a more socially and economicallycohesive US to compete with and confront rivals on the world stage. He also argued that his administration's mostpressing domestic challenges – including overcoming the coronavirus pandemic, and adapting to and mitigating theimpact of climate change on the US – would require international cooperation. The Biden Administration's policypapers, positions and statements identify two broad priorities that guide its foreign policy: first, 'building back better' ona global scale, in pursuit of the same imperative at home. Second, working with allies to counter the threats to USinterests posed by authoritarian rivals such as China and Russia, while working tactically with those same rivals wheretheirs and US interests overlap. Biden's early foreign policy moves have fulfilled promises to reverse TrumpAdministration policies in key areas, such as by re-entering the Paris Agreement, re-affirming the importance of thetransatlantic partnership and other traditional alliances, and engaging diplomatically with rivals. However, elements ofthe previous administration's policies remain, in particular some of its trade policy priorities.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 145

Labour market integration of asylum seekers and refugeesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-06-2021Autor ORAV Anita

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave acceso al empleo | automatización | estadística de la UE | estadística del empleo | inserción profesional | integración

de los migrantes | integración social | inteligencia artificial | migrante | refugiado | solicitante de asilo | supresión deempleo

Resumen Migration to the European Union from third countries has been substantial over the past few decades, as Europe hashistorically been considered a continent of relative economic prosperity and political stability. While many foreign-bornindividuals arrive in the European Union (EU) to work, pursue studies or join family members, the EU also experienceda peak of irregular arrivals beginning in 2014 and only starting to subside in 2016. Those large migratory flows includeda substantial number of asylum-seekers and refugees fleeing war and instability in their home countries. As hostsocieties, EU Member States are required to facilitate their integration, i.e. their acceptance in society and ability toaccess different services and the labour market. EU law envisages access to employment for refugees as soon as theyare granted refugee status, or for asylum-seekers at the latest within nine months of lodging an asylum application.However, employment rates for migrants in general, and refugees and asylum-seekers in particular, are persistentlylower than those of native-born populations. Moreover, they are more likely to be employed in low-skilled occupationsthat have high automation potential in the future. If this potential is exploited through the use of artificial intelligenceand digitalisation, the European economy is expected to see a decline in low-skilled employment. To ensure thatmigrants' skills will match the future EU labour market, focus should be turned to facilitating the proper recognition oftheir qualifications, as well as to upgrading their education and skills. The EU supports Member States' integrationefforts through its EU action plan on integration and inclusion.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Empowering migrants into the EU labour market

National ratification of the Own Resources Decision: Procedure completed on 31 May 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-06-2021Autor D'ALFONSO Alessandro

Ámbito político PresupuestoPalabra clave decisión (UE) | Estado miembro UE | marco financiero plurianual | poder de ratificación | política presupuestaria |

presupuesto de la UE | recuperación económica | recursos propiosResumen The Own Resources Decision (ORD) establishes how the EU budget is financed. Its entry into force requires approval

by all EU Member States according to their constitutional requirements. In a majority of Member States, nationalparliaments are responsible for ratifying the decision. In the others, the government alone decides on the approval.Completion of the ratification procedure by all Member States has generally required more than two years. However,there was a greater sense of urgency for the ORD adopted by the Council in December 2020, since its entry into forceis a pre-condition for the launch of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument. The objective was tocomplete the ratification procedure before summer 2021, with a view to ensuring the timely launch of NGEU. AllMember States have now ratified the ORD, and notified the Council accordingly before the end of May. Therefore, on 1June 2021, the new ORD entered into force, enabling the Commission to start borrowing resources for the recoveryinstrument. This is a further update of a Briefing of which the previous edition was published on 20 May 2021.

Briefing EN

European Peace Facility - Investing in international stability and securityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 02-06-2021Autor IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave ayuda de la UE | comercio de armas | contribución de los Estados miembros | cooperación militar | derechos humanos

| fondo (UE) | informe | misión militar de la Unión Europea | organización no gubernamental | papel internacional de laUE | paz | país tercero

Resumen A key objective of the EU's external action is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security,in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In the context of its common foreign andsecurity policy (CFSP), the Union offers assistance to third states, international organisations and regionalorganisations engaged in peace support operations. Moreover, the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP)– part of the CFSP – provides the Union with its own operational capacity, allowing it to deploy civilian and militaryassets (provided by the EU Member States) in third countries. While many of the operations and missions the EUsupports have military and defence implications, the EU cannot finance activities with military or defence implicationsfrom the EU budget. EU Member States therefore have mechanisms to fund expenditure with military and defenceimplications directly from national budgets. The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a new off-budget fund with afinancial ceiling of €5.692 billion financed by Member State contributions. The EPF, which will be operational by 1 July2021, will make it easier for Member States to share the costs of EU military operations. It will also help the EU tosupport military peace-support operations conducted by third countries and regional organisations, anywhere in theworld. Controversially, for the first time, the EU will be able to provide the armed forces of partner countries withinfrastructure and equipment, including weapons. Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have warned thatthe new facility risks fuelling conflict and human rights abuses around the world. They warn that this could exacerbateviolence and arms proliferation, and fuel the very dynamics the EPF seeks to address. By contrast, practitionersbelieve the facility will ensure that the EU is taken seriously as a security provider and is able to maintain its influencein conflict areas. The Council has called for swift operationalisation of the EPF and has invited Member States and theHigh Representative to present proposals for assistance measures.

Briefing EN

Multimedia European Peace Facility: Investing in international stability and security

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New European Commission communication on Better Regulation: Joining forces to make better lawsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-05-2021Autor ANGLMAYER Irmgard | VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Derecho de la UE: sistema jurídico y actos legislativosPalabra clave Comisión Europea | elaboración del Derecho de la UE | informe | intervención normativa | transparencia del proceso

decisorioResumen Better Regulation ensures that EU policies and laws are prepared in an open, transparent manner, informed by the

best available evidence and backed by comprehensive stakeholder involvement so that they achieve their objectives atminimum cost. It is a dynamic agenda that has gradually evolved in the European Commission since the early 2000s.Today's Better Regulation agenda covers the whole policy cycle. It was shaped under the Juncker Commissionpresidency, which formally declared it a priority, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness, transparency andaccountability of its actions across all policy areas. The comprehensive Better Regulation package of 2015 presented astrategy, guidelines and a toolbox, and established the Regulatory Scrutiny Board as the Commission's regulatoryoversight body. It also paved the way for the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (IIA-BLM) concludedby the Commission, Parliament and Council in April 2016, and which, inter alia, defines their respective roles andresponsibilities in the regulatory process. Following a revision in 2017, the Commission took stock of the BetterRegulation agenda in 2019, concluding that in a post-fact world, evidence-based policy-making remains an imperative.The long-awaited new Commission communication, adopted on 29 April 2021, draws lessons from the BetterRegulation stocktaking review. At the same time, it sets out a policy-making framework that aims at supporting post-crisis recovery and the twin digital and green transformation, in line with the Commission's intention to advance theBetter Regulation agenda further, with 'future-proof legislation that can stand the test of time'.

Briefing EN

Digital markets actTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-05-2021Autor DALLI HUBERT

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave bienes y servicios | comercio electrónico | competencia | economía digital | estudio de impacto | mercado único digital |

pequeña y mediana empresa | prestación de servicios | propuesta (UE) | tecnología digitalResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, submitted on 15 December 2020 and referred to theCommittee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) of the European Parliament. The proposal is part ofthe digital services act package, which includes the digital services act itself. In her political priorities for the EuropeanCommission, President Ursula von der Leyen committed to upgrade the liability and safety rules for digital platforms,services and products, and complete the digital single market. The 2020 Commission work programme also included acommitment to establish an ex-ante competition tool to make Europe fit for the digital age.

Briefing EN

The European Education Area and the 2030 strategic framework for education and trainingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-05-2021Autor CHIRCOP Denise

Ámbito político EducaciónPalabra clave competencias de los Estados miembros | cooperación en materia de educación | cooperación transfronteriza |

educación de adultos | educación preescolar | enseñanza profesional | enseñanza superior | formación profesional |informe | política educativa | primera infancia | programa de la UE

Resumen European Union cooperation in the field of education and training has developed in a number of areas that now havewell-established roots. The best-known example is possibly the Bologna Process that led to the establishment of theEuropean higher education area. The Copenhagen Declaration lent impetus to a process of cooperation in vocationaleducation and training. This was accompanied by two strategic framework agreements for European cooperation ineducation and training (ET2010 and ET2020). The stocktaking on the expiry of the second framework for cooperation –ET 2020 – revealed some positive trends as the numbers of both young children in early childhood education and ofgraduates rose. However, the number of underachieving 15 year-olds remains high and the participation of adults inlearning is low. The European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament seem to concur thatcooperation in education and training needs to be reinforced. The Commission has set out its vision for a Europeaneducation area in three communications, which show that this is still work in progress. The Council, on the other hand,has endorsed another framework for cooperation up to 2030, which is clearly aimed at supporting the implementationof such an area. The May 2021 Education Council conclusions give pointers as to how aspects of this area are to beaddressed. The debate in the European Parliament is in its initial phase with the rapporteur noting that, while there isagreement on the need for a European education area and ongoing cooperation, the European institutions have yet toadopt a single approach.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The European Education Area and the 2030 strategic framework for education and training

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 147

Gender balance on the boards of significant banks in the Banking UnionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 28-05-2021Autor GOTTI GIULIA | GRIGAITE KRISTINA | KOMAZEC KATJA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA |

SEGALL REBECCA SARAH FANNYÁmbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidad | Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosPalabra clave banco | condición de la mujer | consejo de administración | dimensión de la empresa | dirección de la empresa |

gobierno de empresa | igualdad de género | informe | mujer | participación de la mujer | trabajo femenino | uniónbancaria de la UE

Resumen EGOV analysed publicly available information on the corporate governance structures to determine the genderbalance on the boards of the banks in the euro area supervised by the ECB (“significant institutions”), comparing thesituation in 2014 with that in 2020. The general observation is that, overall, the share of female executive directors hasrisen in significant banks from 15.3% to 27.4% (see figure 1) and the share of female supervisory directors hasincreased from 22.3% to 31.7% (see figure 2, further down); these levels are still quite distant from an equal genderdistribution. Moreover, the differences between the nature of board (executive versus supervisory boards) andbetween the type of bank (large versus small) have become smaller. Large banks are, for our purposes, those withassets exceeding EUR 100 bn. Large differences in the share of female directors persist, though, if the data isgrouped at the country level.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-05-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Coronavirus | Democracia | Medio ambiente | Salud públicaPalabra clave Belarús | compañía aérea de bajo coste | Consejo Europeo | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | geopolítica |

informe | política en materia de cambio climático | política exterior y de seguridad común | Rusia | vacunaResumen Following the forced landing of a Ryanair flight by Belarusian authorities on 23 May, Belarus became the central topic

on the first day of the special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021. EU leaders strongly condemned the'unprecedented and unacceptable incident', and were united in imposing further sanctions on Belarus. As regardsRussia, the European Council reconfirmed the five principles guiding the EU's policy since 2016 and asked the HighRepresentative and the European Commission to present a 'report with policy options' by June 2021. On EU-UKrelations, EU leaders called on the European Commission to continue to monitor closely the implementation of the twoagreements concluded with the UK. On foreign affairs, they also discussed the situations in the Middle East and inMali, as well as the forthcoming EU-US summit. The leaders' primary focus on the second day was the fight againstthe coronavirus pandemic, with the European Council calling for rapid implementation of the EU Digital CovidCertificate, the revision of the Council Recommendation on travel within the EU by mid-June 2021 and acceleratedglobal access to coronavirus vaccines. Finally, regarding climate policy, despite renewed support for the 2030 and2050 climate targets, diverging views on national efforts to achieve the objectives set remained apparent.

Briefing EN

Establishing the new EU strategy on adaptation to climate changeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-05-2021Autor VIKOLAINEN Vera

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex ante | Medio ambientePalabra clave adaptación al cambio climático | cambio climático | Derecho del medio ambiente | economía verde | estrategia de la

UE | estudio de impacto | informe | reglamento (UE)Resumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned communication on the new EU strategy on adaptation to climatechange (new adaptation strategy), which aims to realise the 2050 vision of a climate-resilient EU. The IA waspublished on 24 February 2021 and was subsequently referred to the European Parliament's Committee onEnvironment, Pubic Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The Commission's communication builds on Article 4 of theproposal for a European climate law regulation, which requires the Member States and the EU to enhance theiradaptive capacity, strengthen their resilience and reduce their vulnerability to climate change. The new EU adaptationstrategy was first announced in the European Green Deal communication in December 2019. The EuropeanParliament welcomed the new strategy as a key component of the EU's climate policy in its resolution of 17 December2020 and called for a renewed and improved focus on climate adaptation. The Council, meanwhile, repeatedlystressed the need for further action on adaptation, most recently in January 2020. The new strategy on adaptation toclimate change is part of the 2021 Commission work programme.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 148

Georgia's bumpy road to democracy: On track for a European future?Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-05-2021Autor RUSSELL Martin

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Acuerdo de Asociación (UE) | adhesión a la Unión Europea | Asociación Oriental | crisis política | democracia | Estado

de Derecho | geopolítica | Georgia | informe | ocupación militar | OTAN | RusiaResumen Georgia is often considered a frontrunner among Eastern Partnership countries. Despite Russia's continued de facto

occupation of one-fifth of the country's territory, until recently Georgia performed relatively well in terms of politicalstability, pluralism and economic growth. The country is staunchly pro-Western, with aspirations to join both the EUand NATO. Like Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia signed an association agreement with the EU in 2014. The agreementenvisages a free trade area, as well as economic and political reforms that will result in far-reaching integrationbetween Georgia and the EU. Despite this overall positive picture and Georgia's close partnership with the EU, thereare many concerns about the country's progress towards democracy and the rule of law. Problems are highlighted by apolitical crisis, which escalated in November 2020 after opposition politicians claimed that the ruling Georgian Dreamparty had rigged parliamentary elections, and decided to boycott the parliament. The crisis reflects the longer-standingissue of excessive concentration of power, weakening many of the checks and balances that are necessary for ahealthy democracy. Despite reform efforts, institutions that are supposed to be independent of the executive havebecome subservient to the often opaque interests of the ruling party. EU mediation is helping to resolve the stand-offbetween government and opposition, but the political landscape is still highly polarised.

Briefing EN

Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the EU-UK Trade and CooperationAgreement

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 27-05-2021Autor CIRLIG Carmen-Cristina

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave acuerdo (UE) | blanqueo de dinero | confiscación de bienes | cooperación judicial | cooperación policial | Eurojust |

Europol | financiación del terrorismo | informe | intercambio de información | Reino Unido | retirada de la UEResumen On 1 May 2021, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the European Union (EU) and the United

Kingdom (UK) entered into force, having been provisionally applied since 1 January 2021. One of the areas covered bythe TCA, in its Part Three, is security cooperation between EU and UK law enforcement and judicial authorities incriminal matters. The 13 titles under Part Three contain extensive provisions aimed at enabling the continuation ofinformation exchange, including personal data, between competent authorities in the UK and the EU Member States,as well as cooperation related to the surrender of wanted persons. Part Three also provides for close links with Europoland Eurojust, the EU's agencies for, respectively, law enforcement and criminal justice cooperation, although limited bythe UK's third-country status. Rules on exchange of information related to criminal records, on mutual legal assistance,on freezing and confiscation of criminal property, as well as on fighting money laundering and terrorist financing, arealso covered by Part Three of the TCA. A specific political mechanism will be relied on to settle disputes. Whileenabling unprecedented cooperation between the EU and the UK as a third country, the TCA reduces the UK's accessto EU databases and marks a return to divergence, especially as the agreement excludes the jurisdiction of the EUCourt of Justice. In addition, the disapplication of the mutual recognition principle and of the EU Charter ofFundamental Rights in relation to the UK brings the challenge of maintaining mutual trust in security cooperation to thefore. In this context, the conditionality linking suspension or termination of Part Three to UK respect of its commitmentsto fundamental rights, including under the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as in relation to personaldata protection, has been welcomed by many.

Briefing EN

Coronavirus: Latest developments [What Think Tanks are thinking]Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 27-05-2021Autor CESLUK-GRAJEWSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Coronavirus | Salud públicaPalabra clave enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | grupo de reflexión | informe | libre circulación de personas | organización no

gubernamental | vacuna | vacunaciónResumen A year and a quarter after the Covid-19 pandemic first broke out, the disease continues to wreak havoc in many

countries around the world. The process of vaccination continues at varying speeds across the globe, but with a cleardiscrepancy between rich and poor countries. Significant pressure is being applied by NGOs, international institutionsand a number of national governments to help poor countries with vaccinations, notably because of actual or potentialdangerous mutations of the coronavirus. Meanwhile, the EU institutions are close to finalising a 'digital greencertificate' to facilitate safe and free movement between Member States, by providing proof that a person has eitherbeen vaccinated against Covid-19, received a negative test result, or recovered from the disease and carriesantibodies. This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on thecoronavirus and related issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous edition in this series, publishedin February 2021.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 149

Digital Europe programme: Funding digital transformation beyond 2020Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-05-2021Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave alfabetización digital | criminalidad informática | digitalización | estudio de impacto | informatización | innovación |

inteligencia artificial | mercado único digital | programa de la UE | propuesta (UE) | reparto de la financiación de la UE |seguridad informática | tecnología digital | tratamiento de datos

Resumen The Digital Europe Programme is a new financial support tool for the 2021-2027 period, aimed at bolstering the digitaltransformation of society, the economy and public administrations in the EU. With a financial envelope of €7.6 billion(in current prices), a figure 17.5 % lower than the initial Commission proposal, it will build up digital capacity andinfrastructure and support a digital single market. The programme will operate mainly through coordinated andstrategic co-investments with the Member States in the areas of high-performance computing and data processing,artificial intelligence in the public and private sectors, cybersecurity and trust, advanced digital skills and deployment,best use of digital capacities and interoperability. On 11 May 2021, the regulation establishing the programme enteredinto force, with retroactive application from 1 January 2021. The programme, dedicated to supporting the digitalisationof Europe and achieving digital sovereignty, is the first-ever such financial instrument at the EU level. Furthermore, inthe context of recovery from the pandemic, Member States must allocate at least 20 % of the recovery funds toprojects that digitalise their economies and societies. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings areupdated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Digital Europe programme

Understanding EU action against human traffickingTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-05-2021Autor BAKOWSKI Piotr | VORONOVA Sofija

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave ayuda a las víctimas | cooperación policial (UE) | crimen organizado | derechos humanos | directiva (UE) | esclavitud |

estrategia de la UE | lucha contra el crimen | trata de seres humanos | violencia sexualResumen On 14 April 2021, the European Commission presented its new 2021-2025 strategy on combating trafficking in human

beings – 10 years after the adoption of Directive 2011/36/EU, the core EU instrument addressing this phenomenonand protecting its victims. Despite some progress achieved in recent years, a number of challenges still lie ahead.Human trafficking is not only a serious and borderless crime, but also a lucrative business, driven by demand forsexual (and other) services. Criminals exploit vulnerable people (increasingly children), making high profits and takingrelatively low risks. Vulnerability can result from a whole range of factors, including socio-economic ones, and migrantsare a particularly vulnerable group. Gender also plays an important part, as women and men are not trafficked in thesame way or for the same purpose. Women and girls represent a disproportionately high number of victims, bothglobally and at EU level, especially in terms of sexual exploitation. This form of exploitation is still dominant in the EU,even though other forms are on the rise, such as exploitation for forced labour and for criminal activities. The Covid-19pandemic has brought new challenges for victims, as well as amplifying the vulnerabilities of those most at risk.Traffickers – like legal businesses – moved to digital modi operandi, making victims even less visible and less able toask for help and protection. In its efforts to eradicate human trafficking, the EU has not only created a legal framework,comprising an anti-trafficking directive and instruments to protect victims' rights and prevent labour exploitation; it hasalso put in place an operational cooperation network involving EU decentralised agencies, including Europol, Eurojust,CEPOL and Frontex. Moreover, trafficking in human beings is a priority of the EU policy cycle for organised andserious international crime. The European Parliament plays a major role, not only in designing policies but also inevaluating their implementation.

Briefing EN

Multimedia EU action against serious crime

Understanding EU action against human trafficking

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 150

Outermost regions of the EUTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-05-2021Autor VAN LIEROP Christiaan

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo rural | Coronavirus | Desarrollo regional | PescaPalabra clave cohesión económica y social | Colectividad de ultramar francesa | Departamento y región francés de ultramar |

FEADER | Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional | Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca | Fondo Social Europeo |región periférica | reparto de la financiación de la UE

Resumen The European Union's outermost regions qualify for special treatment owing to structural difficulties – such asremoteness, difficult topography and economic dependence on a few products – that can severely hamper theirdevelopment. Specific support mechanisms exist under cohesion, agricultural and fisheries policies, with theCommission outlining measures aimed at assisting outermost regions in communications published in 2004, 2008, and2012. Nevertheless, with the outermost regions continuing to face numerous challenges in areas such as mobility,unemployment and climate change, discussions were launched on the formulation of a new strategy, which waspublished in October 2017. Offering a new approach to supporting the outermost regions' development by optimisingtheir assets, exploiting new opportunities for growth and jobs, and focusing more on their specific circumstances andneeds, the 2017 communication outlines a series of concrete and coordinated actions, calling for stronger partnershipbetween outermost regions, Member States and the EU. In May 2018, the Commission put forward a broad package ofproposals for the 2021-2027 period, providing the legislative framework needed to guide the strategy beyond 2020,taking account of the specific needs of outermost regions in a total of 21 proposals. Following political agreementbetween the European Parliament and Council, this new framework includes a number of new benefits for outermostregions, such as the right to use EU funds for investments in airport infrastructure, and extends many specialmeasures from the 2014-2020 period. Published in March 2020, the European Commission report on implementationof the recommendations of the 2017 communication considers that concrete results have been delivered and that theprocess is going in the right direction. Yet with development continuing to lag behind in the outermost regions, it isclear that challenges persist, a situation that has been compounded by the heavy impact of the coronavirus pandemicin the outermost regions. This has led to calls for a new strategy, with European Commissioner Elisa Ferreira recentlyannouncing plans to present a new communication in 2022. In light of the serious structural challenges facing theseregions, however, it remains to be seen whether a future strategy and the special measures put forward for the post-2020 period will together be sufficient to close the inequalities gap with the rest of the EU. This is a revised andupdated version of a briefing from May 2020.

Briefing EN

Council of Europe standards on judicial independenceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 25-05-2021Autor MAŃKO Rafał

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave deontología profesional | Estado de Derecho | independencia de la justicia | juez | jurisdicción | poder judicial |

procedimiento disciplinario | reforma judicial | Tribunal Europeo de Derechos HumanosResumen Judicial independence is one of the key components of the rule of law (Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union –

TEU), together with the fundamental right to a fair trial (Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of theEuropean Union) and the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU). When it comes to standards forjudicial independence, a special role is played by the Council of Europe and its judicial body, the European Court ofHuman Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. This is especially relevant because, according to Article 6(3)TEU, fundamentalrights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,are in fact general principles of EU law. The importance of the Council of Europe standards and ECtHR case law havebeen highlighted, not least in the Commission's 2020 Rule of Law Report. This briefing discusses a number ofdocuments of the Council of Europe and its bodies, including the Council of Europe's 2010 recommendation on judicialindependence, the Magna Carta of Judges adopted by the Consultative Council of European Judges in 2010, andselected documents of the Venice Commission (the 2007 report on judicial appointments, the 2010 report on judicialindependence, and the 2016 rule of law checklist). Finally, the briefing presents an overview of ECtHR case law onjudicial independence, focusing on issues such as the concept and criteria for assessing it; procedures for appointingjudges and possible irregularities; the question of the term of office, including the vetting of judges and earlytermination of term in office; the problem of external influences on judges (by the executive); possible lack of internalindependence (from other judges); the question of combining judicial office with other work; and, finally, the question ofjudicial immunity.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 151

Updating the EU regulatory framework for batteriesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-05-2021Autor VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave acumulador eléctrico | autorización de venta | desarrollo sostenible | Directiva CE | estudio de impacto | etiquetado |

gestión de residuos | información al consumidor | propuesta (UE) | residuo electrónicoResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, adopted on 10 December 2020 and referred to theEuropean Parliament's Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). The proposal seeks to updatethe EU's legislative framework for batteries as laid out in Directive 2006/66/EC (the Batteries Directive), whoseobjective is 'to minimise the negative impact of batteries and waste batteries on the environment, to help protect,preserve and improve the quality of the environment and to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market' (IA, p.10). With its proposal, the Commission intends to ensure that the existing framework could contribute to the ultimateobjective of achieving an economy with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions (i.e. climate neutrality) by 2050, in line withthe Commission communication on the European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640. In addition, the proposal aims tocontribute to environmental protection, by stimulating investments in the production of batteries with a minimisedenvironmental impact over their life cycle.

Briefing EN

Outlook for the special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-05-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena | DRACHENBERG Ralf

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Coronavirus | Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentario | Industria | Medioambiente | Salud pública

Palabra clave acuerdo comercial (UE) | Consejo Europeo | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | gestión de crisis | política enmateria de cambio climático | Reino Unido | reunión en la Cumbre | Rusia | seguridad europea

Resumen The special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021 will concentrate on climate policy, hold a strategic debateon relations with Russia, continue its coordination efforts in response to the coronavirus pandemic and review theimplementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Regarding climate, EU leaders are expected to takestock of progress made in adopting the EU climate law and give further guidelines on and impetus to EU climate actionand policy. The strategic debate on relations with Russia comes at a moment when bilateral relations have reached anew low, and the EU is reviewing its threat perception as part of the ongoing Strategic Compass exercise. The leaders'discussions on the EU's response to the coronavirus pandemic will include vaccines, international solidarity and the EUDigital Covid Certificate, which has recently been provisionally agreed on by the co-legislators.

Briefing EN

Vulnerable consumersTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-05-2021Autor SAJN Nikolina

Ámbito político Protección de los consumidoresPalabra clave comercio electrónico | Derecho de la energía | información al consumidor | inteligencia artificial | legislación alimentaria

| mercado único | prestación de servicios | publicidad abusiva | servicios financierosResumen Compared to the average consumer, who is considered to be able to make rational choices to find the best deals and

benefit from competitive markets, vulnerable consumers are not considered to be able to do so for a variety of reasons.There are two main approaches to identifying vulnerable consumers. One emphasises those individual characteristicsof the consumer that increase the (theoretical) risk of becoming vulnerable, such as low socio-economic status, loweducation level, not being able to speak a particular language, or a minority status. The other suggests that allconsumers can become vulnerable due to the interplay between their individual characteristics, the circumstances andthe economic market. According to this view, consumers can move in and out of vulnerability, depending on theirindividual state. The European Commission's 2018 consumer survey found that 43 % of EU citizens believedthemselves to be vulnerable as consumers. The image of vulnerable consumers in European Union (EU) law isnarrower than that found in the academic literature. They are defined in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,which requires additional protection for consumers who are 'particularly vulnerable due to their mental or physicalinfirmity, age or credulity'. This definition has been subject to much criticism, as it does not take the different variablesthat can make consumers vulnerable into account. Provisions protecting vulnerable consumers can be found in otherhorizontal consumer legislation, as well as legislation on specific sectors, for instance in the field of energy, financeand food legislation. The development of e commerce and artificial intelligence have also been raising concerns aboutconsumer vulnerability. For instance, the European consumer organisation BEUC is asking for a rethink of theconcepts of 'average' and 'vulnerable' consumers, as some practices online, which combine collection of data withmanipulating consumers, are making all consumers vulnerable and therefore require all consumers to be equallyprotected. The European Parliament has long advocated a wider concept in defining vulnerable consumers, andstronger protection for them, including in the energy, finance and digital sectors.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 152

EU Covid-19 certificate: A tool to help restore the free movement of people across the European UnionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 20-05-2021Autor DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA | DUMBRAVA Costica

Ámbito político Coronavirus | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave certificado sanitario | control fronterizo | control sanitario | diagnóstico médico | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia

| especificación técnica | frontera interior de la UE | igualdad de trato | libre circulación de personas | protección dedatos | vacunación

Resumen The Covid-19 crisis has had a severe impact on free movement in the EU. To address this issue, on 17 March 2021the Commission issued a proposal to establish a 'digital green certificate' – a common framework for issuing, verifyingand accepting interoperable health certificates. The certificate would include proof of vaccination, Covid-19 test results,and/or information that the holder has recovered from being ill with Covid-19. The proposal has been given priority bythe co-legislators with a view to seeking to reach agreement and launch the certificate before summer 2021. Atemporary digital health certificate is seen as a less restrictive measure than others currently in place, such as entrybans, quarantine and business closures, and may allow for a gradual reopening of the economy. Whereas the initiativehas been welcomed by some (such as the tourism and transport sectors), the certificate raises a number of concerns,in relation to its design, fundamental rights implications and overall usefulness. This briefing discusses theCommission's proposals and the initial positions of the EU co-legislators in the broader context. It analyses a numberof key issues raised by the certificate, namely: its legal scope, the different types of certificates included in the overalldigital green certificate, the risk of discrimination, data protection concerns, technical aspects, the timeframe and theoverall added value of the certificates.

Briefing EN

Research for CULT Committee - Media Action Plan: policy recommendations Concomitant expertise forINI report

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 20-05-2021

Autor externo KEA European Affairs; Arthur Le GallÁmbito político Cultura | EducaciónPalabra clave ayuda de la UE | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | inversión de la UE | libertad de prensa | medio de

comunicación de masas | pluralismo de los medios de comunicación | programa de la UE | recuperación económica |tecnología digital

Resumen This Briefing complements the Background Analysis on 'Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: An Action Plan toSupport Recovery and Transformation (news media sector)' and the Briefing on ‘Media Action Plan: Key challengesrelated to media pluralism, media freedom and democracy’. These three research papers were commissioned by thePolicy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies as a part of concomitant expertise aiming to support the workof the CULT Committee on the own initiative report on ‘Europe’s Media in the Digital Decade: An Action Plan toSupport Recovery and Transformation’.

Briefing EN

The new European cybersecurity competence centre and networkTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-05-2021Autor NEGREIRO ACHIAGA Maria Del Mar

Ámbito político Adopción de legislación por el PE y el Consejo | Industria | Mercado interior y unión aduaneraPalabra clave Agencia de la Unión Europea para la Ciberseguridad | difusión de la información de la UE | estrategia de la UE |

investigación y desarrollo | programa de la UE | programa marco de IDT | propuesta (UE) | resumen | seguridadinformática

Resumen On 13 September 2017, the Commission adopted a cybersecurity package with a series of initiatives to further improveEU cyber-resilience, deterrence and defence. A year later, the Commission presented a proposal for the creation of aEuropean cybersecurity competence centre with a related network of national coordination centres. The initiative aimsto improve and strengthen the EU's cybersecurity capacity, by stimulating the European technological and industrialcybersecurity ecosystem as well as coordinating and pooling necessary resources in Europe. The competence centreis supposed to become the main body that would manage EU financial resources dedicated to cybersecurity researchunder the two proposed programmes – Digital Europe and Horizon Europe – within the next multiannual financialframework, for 2021-2027. Within the European Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Industry,Research and Energy (ITRE). The report was adopted on 19 February 2019 in the ITRE committee. On 17 April 2019the Parliament adopted its position at first reading, after two trilogue meetings, before the European elections. A newtrilogue meeting took place more than a year later, on 25 June 2020, and further negotiations followed. During the fifthtrilogue meeting on 11 December 2020, the negotiators of the Council and the European Parliament reached aprovisional agreement. The Council adopted the legislation on 20 April 2021 at first reading. The ITRE committeeadopted the draft recommendation for second reading on 26 April 2021, and it is expected that the EuropeanParliament will adopt the text during the May 2021 plenary session.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 153

The European Parliament's appointing powersTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-05-2021Autor DEL MONTE Micaela

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave competencia institucional (UE) | control parlamentario | nombramiento (de miembros) | organismo de la UE |

Parlamento Europeo | poder de nombramiento | reglamento parlamentarioResumen The role and the prerogatives of the European Parliament have evolved and increased over time, not only as regards

legislative powers and oversight but also in relation to the procedures to nominate, vet and appoint people to othersenior positions in EU institutions, agencies and other bodies. Parliament's role varies from case to case depending onthe legal basis. For instance, Parliament appoints the European Ombudsman, is consulted when appointing themembers of the Court of Auditors and appoints one member to the panel which vets nominees for the European Courtof Justice. Parliament's scrutiny of such candidates, in various different forms, helps in ensuring the credibility,accountability and legitimacy of the process as well as its transparency. What is today codified in the EU Treaties,secondary legislation and Parliament's Rules of Procedure is mostly the result of a set of Parliamentary processes thatbecame established practices over the years. This demonstrates that Parliament has managed to use its politicalleverage to expand and formalise its power to nominate and appoint the holders of senior positions in EU institutions,agencies and other EU bodies. Moreover, through making informed scrutiny of the candidates, Parliament can betterensure that they are qualified for the job. Despite the heterogeneity of procedures, some common patterns may behighlighted, in particular, that candidates and nominees generally appear in front of the relevant committee(s) of theEuropean Parliament, first making a statement and then answering questions from Members. Experience in recentyears shows that Parliament has not been shy in using its powers. Suffice to mention the 2019 hearing process for theappointment of the von der Leyen Commission and the appointment of the first ever European Chief Prosecutor, wherethe Parliament's influence in the final appointments is clear.

Briefing EN

Understanding trilogue: Informal tripartite meetings to reach provisional agreement on legislative filesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-05-2021Autor DEL MONTE Micaela

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave Comisión Europea | competencia institucional (UE) | Consejo de la Unión Europea | cooperación interinstitucional (UE)

| Defensor del Pueblo Europeo | Parlamento Europeo | procedimiento legislativo ordinario | transparencia del procesodecisorio | Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea

Resumen Thanks to successive Treaty revisions, the European Parliament has acquired the status of legislator on an equalfooting with the Council. Today the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 294 Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union − TFEU), previously known as co-decision, covers a vast amount of policy areas. In order to passlegislation, Parliament, representing the EU citizens, and Council, representing the governments of the EU MemberStates, have to agree on an identical text, which requires time and negotiations. The complexity of the EU legislativeprocess has been sometimes criticised for being lengthy and subject to gridlock, thus the risk of not responding tosocietal problems in a timely manner. To overcome this criticism, the legislators have developed informal contacts tospeed up the legislative process while ensuring representativeness and oversight. One of the tools commonly usedtoday to ensure the effectiveness of the legislative process is trilogue, defined as 'informal tripartite meetings onlegislative proposals between representatives of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission'. These tripartitemeetings have been the object of criticism for a number of reasons, including the fact that the number of participants islimited and that they take place beyond close doors. Due to the absence of any explicit reference in the Treaties,trilogues started on a very informal basis in the early 1990s and evolved over time. At the beginning, the institutionsfilled the legal void with informal practice that was subject to an increasing degree of formalisation over time and thenresulted, inter alia, in successive modifications of Parliament Rules of Procedure (RoP). These modifications weredriven by the need to ensure that trilogues efficiently support the legislative process in Parliament while remaining fullytransparent and representative. Today, RoP define the key elements upon which trilogues are built, how to conductnegotiations, and how to ensure that both committees and plenary are fully informed and can exercise their oversightrole. Still, some elements such as the number and frequency of meetings, the practical conduct of negotiations dependvery much on the nature of the legislative file to be negotiated, and thus remain uncodified.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 154

Understanding Eurojust: The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice CooperationTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 19-05-2021Autor DEL MONTE Micaela

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave cooperación transfronteriza | criminalidad | Eurojust | método de evaluación | país tercero

Resumen In December 2019, Eurojust became the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation. The agency aimsat fighting serious cross-border crimes by strengthening coordination and cooperation among the competent judicialauthorities of the Member States. The agency's most recent activity report shows that criminal activities are increasingdespite the restrictions brought about as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. In fact, since the outbreak of thepandemic, the Agency has worked on 3 240 new cases, of which 164 were related to Covid 19. The consistent growthin cases treated by Eurojust in recent years shows the need for cooperation between competent authorities in theMember States and third countries to share information, and receive guidance and support in the fight against seriouscrimes. When Eurojust was set up in 2002, the idea was to create a similar and parallel body to Europol, the EU lawenforcement agency. In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty, and in particular Article 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of theEuropean Union (TFEU), opened up new possibilities to further strengthen Eurojust's cooperation and coordinationroles. Some academics even argue that it paved the way to move from 'coordination' to 'integration' in criminal justicepolicy. According to Article 85 TFEU, Eurojust may initiate criminal investigations and propose the launch of criminalprosecutions; and has an enhanced role in coordinating these activities; as well as facilitating judicial cooperation,including by resolving potential conflicts of jurisdiction. Following the entry into force of the new regulation in 2019, thecompetences of Eurojust are clearly established, and Annex I of the same regulation lists the types of serious crime forwhich Eurojust is competent. Moreover, the democratic oversight of Eurojust is strengthened, due to regular reportingto the European Parliament and national parliaments.

Briefing EN

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders in Porto on 7-8 May 2021Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-05-2021Autor ANGHEL Suzana Elena

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Democracia | Politica social | Salud públicaPalabra clave acuerdo comercial (UE) | Consejo Europeo | diálogo social (UE) | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | India |

política social europea | Portugal | Portugal del Norte | reunión en la CumbreResumen On 8 May 2021, EU Heads of State or Government met in Porto for an informal European Council, preceded on 7 May

by a social summit, organised by the Portuguese Presidency. The informal European Council was followed by anEU–India leaders' meeting, attended remotely by the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. At their informal meeting,EU leaders discussed social policy and, without formally endorsing the Commission action plan, adopted the PortoDeclaration, welcoming 'the new EU headline targets on jobs, skills and poverty reduction' for 2030. They alsoassessed the EU Covid-19 situation, focusing on vaccine production and delivery, the future EU digital greencertificate, and international solidarity in the fight against the pandemic. They also prepared for the EU–India leaders'meeting, agreeing to resume talks on a free trade agreement (FTA) and start negotiations on a stand-alone investmentprotection agreement, and on an agreement on geographical indications that, depending on the pace of negotiations,could either stand alone or be built into the FTA.

Briefing EN

Review of the Energy Taxation DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 18-05-2021Autor HAHNKAMPER-VANDENBULCKE Nora

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Energía | Fiscalidad | Legislación y normativa sobre competencia | Medioambiente | Salud pública | Transposición y aplicación de la legislación

Palabra clave Directiva CE | economía verde | energía eléctrica | fiscalidad | gas con efecto invernadero | política de medio ambientede la UE | política fiscal | producto energético | propuesta (UE) | reducción de las emisiones de gas

Resumen Under the European Green Deal, the EU signed up for the transition to a modern, resource-efficient and competitiveeconomy with no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and economic growth decoupled from resource use. Asa medium target towards the 'net zero' long-term goal, the EU committed to at least 55% GHG emission reductions by2030. Well-designed energy taxation can play a direct role in steering a successful energy transition. However, as thisbriefing shows, Council Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energyproducts and electricity (ETD) and its implementation suffer from significant shortcomings (i.a. highly divergent nationaltax rates across the EU, a wide range of exemptions and reductions applied by the Member States and a lack ofalignment with other EU climate and energy legislation). The Commission therefore plans to review the ETD in thesecond quarter of 2021.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 155

Research for CULT Committee - Media Action Plan: Key challenges related to media pluralism, mediafreedom and democracy - Concomitant expertise for INI report

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 18-05-2021

Autor externo KEA European Affairs; Arthur Le GallÁmbito político Cultura | EducaciónPalabra clave democracia | desinformación | independencia nacional | libertad de expresión | libertad de prensa | medio de

comunicación de masas | pluralismo de los medios de comunicación | profesión de la comunicación | propiedad debienes | restricción de la competencia

Resumen Media pluralism is an essential condition for any democratic society. It constitutes a source of access to a plurality ofeditorial lines and analyses, opinions and issues expressed, as well as a coexistence of public and private servicemedia. Media pluralism is at risk due to several factors. First, the level of basic protection for journalists is threatened,for example in terms of the protection of their personal data online or abusive defamation charges against them.Second, most EU countries are characterised by a high degree of market concentration, with monopoly or oligopolystructures in most news media sectors. These main players co-exist with a myriad of smaller news media operators(e.g. focusing on local news or specialised in particular topics). Third, trust in the media is eroded by fake news anddisinformation, and the perception of an alleged gatekeeping position by larger media groups. Initiatives are howeveremerging to improve transparency in the media, for example by establishing charters for the media to ensure thecredibility and trustworthiness of sources, or by developing algorithms to debunk misinformation.

Briefing EN

EU Space programmeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-05-2021Autor WILSON Alex Benjamin

Ámbito político IndustriaPalabra clave Agencia Espacial Europea | comunicación por satélite | espacio ultraterrestre | estudio de impacto | gobernanza |

informe | navegación por satélite | organismo de la UE | política espacial | programa de la UE | propuesta (UE) |técnica espacial | utilización del espacio

Resumen In June 2018, the European Commission proposed a budget of €16 billion to finance EU space activities during the2021-2027 period. The majority of this would be allocated to Galileo and EGNOS, the EU's global and regional satellitenavigation systems; around a third would be allocated to Copernicus, the EU's Earth Observation programme; and theremainder would be earmarked for security, such as the Space and Situational Awareness (SSA) programme and thenew Governmental Satellite Communication initiative (GOVSATCOM) to support border protection, civil protection andhumanitarian interventions. The main aims of the new space programme are to secure EU leadership in spaceactivities, foster innovative industries, safeguard autonomous access to space and simplify governance. The EuropeanGlobal Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) Agency will be transformed into a new EU Agency for the SpaceProgramme. In April 2019, after trilogue meetings, Parliament and Council reached a partial agreement on theprogramme, which was later incorporated by the Parliament in its first-reading position. The agreement covered mostof the programme content but not the budget, relations with third countries, or operational security. Further triloguenegotiations, alongside the conclusion of MFF negotiations, helped to secure a comprehensive political agreement on16 December 2020. The EU space programme will have a total budget of €14.8 billion. The agreed text was thenadopted by the Council and Parliament in April 2021. Third edition of a briefing originally drafted by Cemal Karakas.The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

Improving roaming on public mobile telecommunications networksTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-05-2021Autor TUOMINEN ULLA-MARI

Ámbito político Evaluación de impacto ex antePalabra clave estudio de impacto | flujo transfronterizo de datos | itinerancia | propuesta (UE) | protección del consumidor | red de

transmisión de datos | reglamentación de las telecomunicaciones | regulación de precios | tarifa de comunicaciones |teléfono móvil

Resumen This briefing finds that the Commission's impact assessment (IA) accompanying the regulation proposal (recast) onroaming is based on sound data and broad stakeholder consultations. Besides qualitative assessment, the IA presentsalso quantified estimates. The REFIT cost savings are only partially quantified. Further explanations would havebenefited the analysis in the comparison of policy options.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 156

Critical raw materials in EU external policies: Improving access and raising global standardsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-05-2021Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | Comercio internacionalPalabra clave acuerdo comercial | importación (UE) | materia prima | país tercero | política de desarrollo | política industrial de la UE |

restricción de las exportaciones | seguridad de abastecimiento | Tierras rarasResumen Lithium and cobalt (used in rechargeable batteries) and rare earth elements (used in wind turbines) are some of the

critical raw materials (CRMs) – raw materials of critical importance – for the EU. Global demand for CRMs is rising, yetthe export restrictions imposed by the resource-rich countries intensify the competition for these materials. To boost itsaccess to CRMs, the EU has a dedicated strategy based on three pillars: two internal ones (increasing domesticsourcing and circularity) and an external one, which is mostly about securing supply from third countries. The externalpillar of the EU CRMs policy is implemented across a number of other policies, mainly that on trade and development.It also involves deploying raw materials diplomacy. Through its trade policy, the EU seeks to implement its priorities byeliminating trade barriers through bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements, and safeguarding its interests throughmore assertive tools such as WTO dispute settlement and trade defence instruments. Through its development policy,the EU seeks to secure and diversify its access to CRMs, while promoting sustainable standards, good governanceand responsible sourcing. It is also advancing its agenda through international fora (e.g. the UN and the OECD) anddialogues with numerous partners. The EU has also passed laws that help to make global supply chains and finance inthe extractive sectors more transparent. In 2020, the European Commission adopted a CRMs action plan mostlybased on existing strands of external action. It introduces several novel ideas, notably launching new strategicpartnerships with both developed and developing nations, which are focused on extraction, processing and refining ofCRMs. In its recent strategies, the EU has also clearly indicated its interest in greening the supply chains andachieving open strategic autonomy as regards CRMs. The success of these will also depend on global cooperation,adequate funding and reconciling differences with resource-rich countries.

Briefing EN

CAP strategic plans: Issues and expectations for EU agricultureTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 12-05-2021Autor MCELDOWNEY James | ROSSI Rachele

Ámbito político Agricultura y desarrollo ruralPalabra clave agricultura sostenible | desarrollo rural | desarrollo sostenible | economía verde | gasto agrícola | política de medio

ambiente de la UE | política en materia de cambio climático | presupuesto de la UE | reforma de la PACResumen The European Commission's legislative proposals for the reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP) were

published in June 2018. Since then a number of significant developments have occurred in this policy area. Theseinclude the adoption of the European Green Deal and its associated initiatives of the 'farm to fork' strategy and thebiodiversity strategy, and also the agreement on the 2021 2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) alongsideadditional support of €7.5 billion for rural development from the Next Generation EU initiative as part of the recoveryand resilience package. The European Parliament adopted its first-reading position on the Commission's proposals on23 October 2020. This position constitutes the basis for negotiations between Council and Parliament, which started on10 November 2020. In December 2020, the Commission adopted its recommendations to each Member State on thepreparation of their CAP national strategic plans. Meanwhile, a number of observations and commentaries have beenpublished on CAP reform. These have highlighted some of the key differences between the proposal adopted by theCommission and the positions adopted by the European Parliament and Council. A range of stakeholders and othershave also expressed their views on the CAP reform. The main challenge for the future EU farm policy will be how toaddress environmental concerns while maintaining farm viability. The nature and scale of the issues facing EUagriculture also represent significant challenges for the strategic planning process along with the content and ambitionof the new CAP strategic plans, including the governance framework for the new policy. The Portuguese Presidency ofthe Council has indicated that reaching an agreement on the CAP reform negotiations in spring 2021 is one of its mainobjectives. The outcome of the trilogue negotiations will determine the future direction of the EU's agricultural policy,including how the CAP will contribute towards the achievement of the targets contained within the European GreenDeal. Much will depend on the design of the new CAP strategic plans, including the effectiveness and efficiency of themeasures chosen and their subsequent implementation.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 157

The rights of LGBTI people in the European UnionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 11-05-2021Autor DE GROOT DAVID ARMAND JACQUES GERA

Ámbito político Asuntos de género, igualdad y diversidadPalabra clave adopción | derechos humanos | discriminación basada en la orientación sexual | estadística de la UE | estrategia de la

UE | identidad de género | igualdad de trato | matrimonio | procreación artificial | violencia sexualResumen The prohibition of discrimination and the protection of human rights are important elements of the EU legal order.

Nevertheless, discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people persiststhroughout the EU and takes various forms, including verbal abuse and physical violence. Sexual orientation is nowrecognised in EU law as grounds of discrimination. However, the scope of the provisions dealing with this issue islimited and does not cover social protection, health care, education or access to goods and services, leaving LGBTIpeople particularly vulnerable in these areas. Moreover, EU competence does not extend to recognition of marital orfamily status. In this area, national regulations vary, with some Member States offering same-sex couples the right tomarry, others allowing alternative forms of registration, and yet others not providing any legal status for same-sexcouples. Same-sex couples may or may not have the right to adopt children and to access assisted reproduction.These divergent legal statuses have implications, for instance, for partners from two Member States with differentstandards who want to formalise/legalise their relationship, or for same-sex couples and their families wishing to moveto another Member State. Combating discrimination has become part of EU internal and external policies, and is thesubject of numerous resolutions of the European Parliament. However, action in this area remains problematic when ittouches on issues pertaining to areas traditionally the preserve of Member States, such as marital status and familylaw. This is a further updated version of a briefing originally drafted by Piotr Bakowski. The previous edition, fromNovember 2020, was by Rosamund Shreeves.

Briefing EN

Multimedia The road to LGBTI equality

Taxonomy Regulation: Approved EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act under Art. 10(3) and 11(3)of theTaxonomy Regulation

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 11-05-2021Autor CHAILLET GAELLE CHARLOTTE | HONNEFELDER Stephanie | VANHOUCKE Sebastien

Ámbito político Asuntos financieros y bancarios | Medio ambiente | Transposición y aplicación de la legislaciónPalabra clave actividad económica | adaptación al cambio climático | desarrollo sostenible | economía verde | instrumento

económico medioambiental | inversión | política de medio ambiente de la UE | propuesta (UE) | protección del medioambiente | reglamento (UE)

Resumen This briefing has been prepared to support the parliamentary scrutiny of the Delegated Act (DA) on climate changemitigation and climate change adaptation as foreseen by Regulation (EU) No 2020/852 on the establishment of aframework to facilitate sustainable investment (Taxonomy Regulation) . In accordance with the empowerments set outin Articles 10 and 11 of the Taxonomy Regulation, the Commission shall adopt a delegated act establishing screeningcriteria to determine the conditions under which an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to climatechange adaptation or mitigation and whether it does not cause significant harm to one or more of the environmentalobjectives listed under Article 9.

Briefing EN

Conference on the Future of EuropeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-05-2021Autor KOTANIDIS Silvia

Ámbito político Democracia en la UE, Derecho institucional y parlamentarioPalabra clave Conferencia europea | cooperación interinstitucional (UE) | democracia | Europa de los ciudadanos | gestión de crisis |

mercado único digital | política de la UE | política en materia de cambio climático | política industrial de la UEResumen After many debates and statements of principle in recent years, the time for a more structured discussion on the future

of Europe's development has arrived. The Conference on the Future of Europe, announced by the Commission'sPresident Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address, is set to start after a long period of standstill owing not onlyto changed priorities brought by the coronavirus pandemic, but also to lengthy negotiations among the institutions. Theaim of the conference is to debate how the EU should develop in the future, identify where it is rising to the challengesof current times, and enhance those areas that need reform or strengthening. A key aspect of this initiative is to bringthe public closer to the EU institutions, listen to people's concerns, involve them directly in the process of theConference and provide an adequate and meaningful response. In this respect, the ambition is to set up pan-Europeanforums for discussion, for the first time ever, where citizens of all Member States can debate the EU's priorities andmake recommendations, to be taken into account by the political-institutional powers that be and, ideally, translatedinto practical measures. The pandemic hit as the preparation of the conference was just beginning and inevitablycaused a delay. In March 2021, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commissionagreed on a joint declaration, laying down the common rules and principles governing the conference. It was agreedthat the leadership of the conference would be shared by the three institutions, with the conference chaired jointly bytheir three presidents. The Conference on the Future of Europe has all the prerequisites to be an excellent opportunityto engage in a more structured debate between institutions and citizens, and arrive at concrete proposals to improvethe way the EU works, in terms not only of institutional dynamics, but also of policies. Some have cautioned howeverthat the initiative must be conducted with the utmost care, in particular as regards the follow-up, so that it remains ameaningful endeavour. This is an updated edition of a Briefing from December 2019.

Briefing EN, FR

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 158

European Pillar of Social Rights: Gothenburg, Porto and beyondTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 07-05-2021Autor MILOTAY Nora

Ámbito político Empleo | Industria | Politica social | Salud públicaPalabra clave acción de la UE | derechos sociales | diálogo social (UE) | integración social | mercado laboral | política de empleo de

la UE | política social europea | seguridad social | zona euroResumen The proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (social pillar) by the European Commission, the European

Parliament and the Council in November 2017 was the fourth major attempt to strengthen the social dimension of theEuropean Union since its inception. The social pillar is to be the fifth pillar of the economic and monetary union. It is toserve as a compass for updating the EU's welfare states and labour markets to the new realities of life and work in the21st century. Its holistic approach puts upward social convergence at its centre and can help to put economic andsocial considerations and rights across EU policies on a more equal footing. Its implementation has mainly been thetask of the Member States in strong collaboration with the social partners and with the support of the European Union.The social pillar's very broad interpretation of the social dimension, pointing beyond social and employment policies,means that it has been regarded by some simply as the starting point for new initiatives in a number of policy fields,and by others as a potential game-changer that can bring about a genuinely new policy dynamic around the EU'ssocial dimension. The new action plan on the further implementation of the social pillar's principles continues along thiscomplex path. It also proposes three new headline targets and the redesign of the social scoreboard to makemonitoring of the implementation process more detailed and accurate. At the Porto Social Summit to be held on 7-8May 2021 the action plan will be one of the major inputs into discussions on the social aspects of medium- to long-termrecovery from the coronavirus crisis, including unemployment, education and training, social protection and poverty.The objectives include clarifying issues around: the enforceability of the social pillar's principles and rights, how toachieve a genuine European social protection floor for all, and governance, monitoring and funding in the context ofthe EU social dimension.

Briefing EN

Multimedia European Pillar of Social Rights: Gothenburg, Porto and beyond

Revision of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring MechanismTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 05-05-2021Autor AHAMAD MADATALI HANNAH NAFIZE

Ámbito político Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la prácticaPalabra clave aplicación del Derecho de la UE | control fronterizo | cooperación policial (UE) | estudio de impacto | frontera interior

de la UE | informe de actividad | método de evaluación | reglamento (UE) | sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (UE) |Sistema de Información Schengen

Resumen As a component of the Schengen Strategy that the European Commission intends to adopt in 2021, the revision ofregulation (EU) No 1053/2013 will aim at making the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism more efficient,by revising current practices - for example, by shortening the adoption processes of the evaluation reports andrecommendations, and ensuring a timely follow-up by Member States.

Briefing EN

Story of the European AnthemTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-05-2021Autor DESCHAMPS ETIENNE

Ámbito político CulturaPalabra clave Consejo de Europa | Europa de los ciudadanos | himno | historia de Europa | movimiento europeo | música | reseña

histórica | símbolo europeoResumen In the inter-war years, advocates of European unity began pondering the choice of an anthem that would convey the

feeling of sharing a common destiny and common values. The creation of the Council of Europe in 1949 spurredfurther calls to this end. Proposals for scores and lyrics for an anthem for Europe began appearing spontaneously. Itwas not until 1972, however, that the Council of Europe formally adopted the prelude of Ode to Joy from Beethoven'sNinth Symphony as the European anthem. For their part, the institutions representing what would become theEuropean Union chose the debates on a citizens' Europe held in the mid-1980s to adopt Ode to Joy as their anthemtoo. On 29 May 1986, the European flag and the European anthem were officially adopted at a ceremony held inBrussels. Although the version of the anthem chosen had no lyrics, it has come to symbolise the European Union. It isplayed at official ceremonies attended by the representatives and/or leaders of the European Union, and moregenerally at many events with a European theme.

Briefing DE, EN, FR

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 159

The informal economy and coronavirus in Latin AmericaTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 04-05-2021Autor GOMEZ RAMIREZ Enrique

Ámbito político Asuntos exteriores | CoronavirusPalabra clave América Latina | ayuda al desarrollo | ayuda de la UE | economía sumergida | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia |

Organización Internacional del Trabajo | pobreza | recuperación económica | salud públicaResumen The coronavirus pandemic has resulted in Latin America's worst economic and social crisis in decades, with a

disproportionate impact on informal workers. The informal economy describes economic activity by workers oreconomic units that is not or only insufficiently covered by formal legal or practical arrangements. Although it is on thedecline in Latin America, the informal economy still accounts for slightly over half of all jobs in the region. To counteractthe spread of Covid-19, various confinement measures were implemented in Latin American countries. Theselockdowns have had a substantial effect on earnings in the informal economy, some estimations show incomecontraction of up to 80 %. By its very nature, the informal economy leaves workers vulnerable to external shocks.Inadequate or non-existent social safety nets mean that income losses can quickly lead to poverty or death. Despiteseveral Latin American countries being classified as high- or upper middle-income countries, large parts of the region'sinhabitants lack access to health care. For those who do have access, out-of-pocket expenses are high. Furthermore,many public hospitals are overstrained and lack the qualified staff to deal with a health crisis. The pre-existing levels ofhigh inequality have been aggravated since the start of the pandemic. Various economic and social policy responseshave been implemented to alleviate the current circumstances. Nevertheless, limited fiscal space and a lack of statecapacity weakens the effectiveness of such policies. The situation is worsened by an expected slow economicrecovery: estimates project a return to pre-pandemic levels of aggregate output only by the end of 2023. The EuropeanUnion has pledged €918 million to support the region under the Team Europe package.

Briefing EN

Research for CULT Committee - The Situation of Artists and Cultural Workers and the post-COVIDCultural Recovery in the European Union : Policy Recommendations Concomitant expertise for INI report

Tipo de publicación BriefingFecha 04-05-2021

Autor externo Mafalda DÂMASO, Culture Action EuropeÁmbito político CulturaPalabra clave condición de trabajo | cooperación cultural | creación artística | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | pluralismo

cultural | prestación social | profesión artística | propiedad intelectual | recuperación económicaResumen The following recommendations present medium- and long-term policy solutions to address the needs identified in the

Background Analysis “The Situation of Artists and Cultural Workers and the post-COVID Cultural Recovery in theEuropean Union”. Its aim is to provide guidelines and principles to structure the contents of the European Framework,and hence improve the situation and working conditions of artists and cultural workers in the EU.

Briefing EN

Matching priorities and resources in the EU budget: Climate action, migration and bordersTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 03-05-2021Autor D'ALFONSO Alessandro

Ámbito político Control presupuestario | Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia | Medio ambiente | PresupuestoResumen Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has been entrusted with a growing number of objectives and

responsibilities. However, ensuring financing of related activities through the EU budget has often proven problematic,as this has long been capped at around 1 % of the Union's gross national income (GNI). During the preparation of thepost-2020 EU multiannual financial framework (MFF), climate action, migration and border management wereidentified among the emerging priorities that required increased joint action and funding. The agreement on EUfinances for 2021 to 2027 provides for a significant relative increase in the financial resources devoted to these policyareas. In absolute figures, the reinforcements are stronger for climate action than for migration and borders.Underpinned by the European Green Deal strategy, climate action will receive the bulk of its resources through theincorporation of climate considerations and objectives across all relevant EU funding instruments (climatemainstreaming). Next Generation EU (NGEU), the temporary instrument to aid recovery from the coronaviruspandemic, will play a major role in the boost to climate-relevant resources. In total, these could amount to some €550billion (in 2018 prices, corresponding to 30 % of total MFF and NGEU resources). For the first time, migration andborder management have a dedicated heading, accounting for 2.1 % of MFF resources. Among other activities,additional allocations will contribute to the agreed reinforcement of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.Opinion surveys show that respondents see climate change and migration among the main global challenges for theEU, but there are gaps between perceptions and expectations of the role of the EU budget in these two domains. TheEuropean Parliament, which is a strong advocate of a robust EU budget commensurate with the Union'sresponsibilities, managed to secure additional resources for instruments relevant to both groups of policies, as well asthe enhancement of the climate mainstreaming methodology. The Parliament plays a key role in shaping andscrutinising how the funding allocated to the policy areas is implemented. Other measures to reinforce the EU budget'scapacity to deliver in the areas of climate action, migration and borders seek to improve synergies between budgetaryinstruments.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Matching priorities and resources in the EU budget: Climate action, migration and borders

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 160

Update on recent banking developments - Calendar week 17Tipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 30-04-2021Autor GOTTI GIULIA | GRIGAITE KRISTINA | KOMAZEC KATJA | MAGNUS Marcel | PACHECO DIAS CRISTINA SOFIA |

SEGALL REBECCA SARAH FANNYÁmbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Coronavirus

Resumen This briefing gives an update on and summarises recent events and developments in the Banking Union, based onpublicly available information.The following topics are specifically addressed: recent ECB banking supervision publications (the Targeted Review ofInternal Models Project Report, the ECB annual report on supervisory activities and the most recent supervisorystatistics); the recent SRB guidance on bail-in for international debt securities; risks and vulnerabilities in the financialsector (ESRB Risk Dashboard; Joint Committee Report on Risks and Vulnerabilities); macroprudential concerns in thenon-banking sector; recent ESMA publications (consultation on money market funds; peer review on CCPssupervision); and two reports on climate related risks published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

Briefing EN

The EU Toy Safety DirectiveTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-04-2021Autor BINDER ECKHARD | HUEMER MARIE-ASTRID

Ámbito político Evaluación de la legislación y las políticas en la práctica | Protección de los consumidoresResumen The Toy Safety Directive (TSD) aims to ensure a high level of health and safety with respect to toys for children under

14 years of age and to guarantee the free movement of toys in the EU by means of provisions for manufacturers,importers, distributors of toys sold in the EU and national market surveillance authorities. More than 10 years after itsadoption in 2009, the European Commission is considering a revision of the directive in the context of the chemicalsstrategy for sustainability. Although the exact scope of this revision has still to be decided, the European Commissionhighlighted areas for further improvement in a recent evaluation of the directive. The Commission's evaluation focusedon: a general lack of monitoring data to assess the TSD's effectiveness; limit values for some chemical substances;and the question of whether limit values should apply not only to toys for children under 36 months, but also to childrenof all ages. In addition, the evaluation looked into the issue of market surveillance and enforcement, where resourcesappear be missing and discussed the difficulties for manufacturers to comply with the 'small parts requirement' for toysintended for children under 36 months. This briefing has been produced by the European Parliamentary ResearchService (EPRS) to assist the European Parliament's Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection in itswork on the implementation report on the Toy Safety Directive. The briefing aims to provide a succinct overview ofpublicly available material on the implementation, application and effectiveness to date of the Toy Safety Directive,drawing on input from EU institutions and bodies and from external organisations.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Belgium: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-04-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave Bélgica | cambio climático | consumo de energía | control de la contaminación | energía eléctrica | energía renovable |

estadística de la UE | gas con efecto invernadero | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energéticoResumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climate

plans (NECPs) to cover the 2021-2030 period. In October 2020, the European Commission published an assessmentfor each NECP. Belgian climate and energy policy is a combined effort of the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Capitalregions. A high proportion of Belgians (60 %) expect national governments to tackle climate change. Belgiumaccounts for 3.3 % of total EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and has reduced emissions at a slower pace than theEU average since 2005. The carbon intensity of Belgium's economy is slightly lower than the EU average and hasmirrored the decreasing EU trend closely since 2005. Emissions from energy industries have fell by almost 30 %between 2005 and 2019, with a 2.9 percentage point reduction for total emissions. Waste management was the sectorwith the biggest percentage reduction (55 % or 1.7 MtCO2e) in emissions since 2005. Transport and agriculture werethe sectors with the lowest reduction. Under EU effort-sharing legislation, Belgium was aiming to reduce its emissionsby 15 % by 2020, compared with 2005, and in 2019 was on track to achieving the target. Belgium reached a 9.9 %share of renewable energy sources in 2019. Its ambition to reach its 2030 target of a 17.5 % share focused mainly onwind and photovoltaic energy, biofuels and the use of waste heat. Measures to achieve the energy efficiency targetsare focused on the building and transport sectors. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 161

Climate action in Spain: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-04-2021Autor MORGADO SIMOES HENRIQUE ANDRE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave cambio climático | control de la contaminación | energía eléctrica | energía renovable | España | estadística de la UE |

gas con efecto invernadero | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimiento energético | régimen de comercio dederechos de emisión de la UE

Resumen The EU's binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climateplans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment of each NECP. A high proportion of Spaniards (67 %) expect national governments to tackle climatechange. Spain accounts for 9 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Between 2005 and 2019, thecountry reduced emissions by 27 %, performing better than the EU average. The carbon intensity of the Spanisheconomy is slightly below the EU average. The transport sector is the largest emitter in the country, generating 27 %of emissions, followed by the energy industry with a share of 16 % of emissions. The energy sector cut emissions by57 % during the 2005-2019 period, strongly contributing to the country's total emission reduction. Under the EU effort-sharing regulation, Spain has committed to reducing non-ETS emissions by 26 % by 2030 (compared with 2005) andplans to surpass this target. Looking forward to 2030, Spain has considerably increased its level of ambition for theenergy transition, moving from a 2020 target of a 20 % share of renewable energy in the energy mix to a 2030 target of42 %. The country plans to focus primarily on the deployment of solar and wind power. The proposed measures areexpected to generate energy efficiency improvements of over 39 %.

Briefing EN

Climate action in Ireland: Latest state of playTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 29-04-2021Autor JENSEN LISELOTTE

Ámbito político Medio ambientePalabra clave agricultura sostenible | cambio climático | control de la contaminación | energía eléctrica | energía renovable |

estadística de la UE | gas con efecto invernadero | Irlanda | reducción de las emisiones de gas | rendimientoenergético

Resumen The EU binding climate and energy legislation for 2030 requires Member States to adopt national energy and climateplans (NECPs) covering the period 2021 to 2030. In October 2020, the European Commission published anassessment for each NECP. Ireland submitted its NECP in mid-2019. A high proportion of Irish people (74%) expectnational governments to tackle climate change. Ireland generates 1.7 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions and has reduced emissions at a slower pace than the EU average since 2005. With a low share of energy-intensive industry, Ireland's carbon intensity, relative to GDP, is among the lowest in the Union, with a higher thanaverage decrease. Currently, the agricultural sector accounts for the majority of Ireland's emissions at 31 %, a 4.3 %increase since 2005. Whereas energy industries, manufacturing and industrial processes traditionally account for themajority of countries' emissions, in Ireland they account for only 28 % combined and have together reduced theiremissions by 33 % since 2005. Ireland exceeded its allocations under EU effort-sharing legislation for 2020 and alsofor 2019 (by 15 %). Ireland intends to use effort sharing flexibilities to reach the 2030 target of a 30 % reduction relativeto 2005. Ireland achieved a 12 % share of renewable energy sources (RES) in 2019. The country's 2030 target of a 34% share is focused mainly on wind, with some solar and biomass, with a renewable energy (RE) in electricity target of70 % by 2030. Energy efficiency measures centre on building stock, smart metering and support measures for lowcarbon heating and energy retrofits for industry and households. This briefing is one in a series covering all EUMember States.

Briefing EN

Trans-European energy infrastructure guidelines: Updating the current frameworkTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-04-2021Autor VETTORAZZI STEFANO

Ámbito político EnergíaPalabra clave competitividad | cooperación energética | estudio de impacto | neutralidad en carbono | pequeña y mediana empresa |

proyecto de interés común | red de energía | red transeuropea | reglamento (UE) | seguridad de abastecimientoResumen This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact

assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned proposal, adopted on 15 December 2020 and referred toParliament's Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The proposal seeks to amend Regulation (EU) No347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (TEN E) with a view to ensure that the existingframework is consistent with, and contributes to, the new 2030 EU climate target, set out in COM(2020) 562,commonly known as the 2030 EU climate target plan, with the ultimate objective of achieving an economy with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions (i.e. climate neutrality) by 2050, and in line with the Commission communication onthe European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 162

Vulnerability of unaccompanied and separated child migrantsTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 26-04-2021Autor RADJENOVIC Anja

Ámbito político Espacio de libertad, seguridad y justiciaPalabra clave derecho de asilo | derechos del niño | derechos humanos | frontera exterior de la UE | menor no acompañado |

migrante | política migratoria de la UE | protección de la infancia | solicitante de asilo | UnicefResumen The United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef) has estimated that the number of migrant children increased from 24

million during the 1990–2000 period to 33 million in 2019. In 2019 alone, some 33 200 children arrived in southernEuropean countries, of which some 9 000 (27 %) were unaccompanied or separated from family member(s) on thejourney. There are various reasons why a child may be unaccompanied or get separated, including persecution of thechild or the parents; international conflict and civil war; human trafficking and smuggling, including sale by parents;accidental separation from the parents over the course of their journey; and searching for better economicopportunities. Despite the existence of a comprehensive international legal framework on children's rights and theirprotection, irregular migrant children, especially those who are unaccompanied or who have been separated from theirparents over their journey, face numerous obstacles and challenges during and after the migration process. Severalinternational and European organisations have identified a number of protection gaps in the treatment of such children,including that they face greater risks of, inter alia, sexual exploitation and abuse, military recruitment, child labour(including for foster families) and detention. In many countries, they are routinely denied entry or detained by border orimmigration officials. In other cases, they are admitted but are denied access to asylum procedures, or their asylumclaims are not handled in an age and gender-sensitive manner. The vulnerable situation of unaccompanied andseparated children worldwide, and the threats they face need to be addressed, particularly in view of the constantincrease in their number. European Union asylum law offers special protection to such children, and the EuropeanUnion has adopted numerous instruments and identified key actions for the protection of all children in migration,including those who are unaccompanied and separated. This briefing is an update of a 2016 briefing by Joanna Apap.

Briefing EN

Revision of Directive 2014/94/EU on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructureTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 23-04-2021Autor DINU Alina Ileana

Ámbito político TransportePalabra clave aplicación del Derecho de la UE | calidad del aire | combustible sustitutivo | directiva (UE) | estudio de impacto |

infraestructura de transportes | movilidad sostenible | producto petrolífero | recurso energético | reducción de lasemisiones de gas

Resumen Alternative fuels can help to diminish the negative effects on the environment and health caused by both passengerand freight transport. Examples of alternative fuels include: electricity, hydrogen, biofuels, synthetic and paraffinicfuels, natural gas, including biomethane, in gaseous form (compressed natural gas, CNG) and liquefied form (liquefiednatural gas, LNG), and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). At European Union (EU) level, a directive on the deployment ofalternative fuels infrastructure was adopted in 2014, with the aim of boosting the development of standard rules andminimum requirements as regards alternative fuels infrastructure (i.e. electric car recharging stations or natural gasrefuelling points) in the EU Member States. However, a revision of the directive is planned for 2021 to take account ofthe latest technological and market developments.

Briefing EN

EU4Health programmeTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-04-2021Autor SCHOLZ Nicole

Ámbito político Coronavirus | Salud públicaPalabra clave cáncer | enfermedad por coronavirus | epidemia | medicina preventiva | programa de la UE | salud pública | sistema

sanitarioResumen On 28 May 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on a new health programme

(EU4Health) for 2021 to 2027. Announced as part of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument, accordingto the Commission, the EU4Health programme is intended to boost the EU's preparedness for major cross-borderhealth threats and improve health systems' resilience. EU4Health would be a stand-alone, dedicated fundingprogramme with an originally proposed budget of €10.4 billion (in current prices). However, during the negotiations onthe 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) and NGEU, the budget for EU4Health was revised downwards,with the July 2020 European Council conclusions allocating the programme €1.7 billion. On 14 December 2020,Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on the programme, including a budget of €5.1 billion.Stakeholders had broadly welcomed the proposal, but generally regretted the European Council's reduction of thefinancial envelope allocated to it. The co-legislators' December agreement on an increased budget was thus positivelyreceived. After adoption by the Parliament and Council in March 2021, based on the text agreed in trilogue, the finalact was signed by the presidents of the co-legislators on 24 March 2021. Regulation (EU) 2021/522 entered into forceon 27 March 2021 and applies retroactively from 1 January 2021. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress'briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 163

Digital cultural diversityTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-04-2021Autor PASIKOWSKA-SCHNASS Magdalena

Ámbito político CulturaPalabra clave contenido digital | convención internacional | digitalización | Internet | mercado único digital | patrimonio cultural |

pluralismo cultural | protección del patrimonio | UnescoResumen Digital technologies have revolutionised every aspect of our lives, and culture is no exception. They have impacted on

the value chains of all the cultural and creative industries not only as regards the creative process and its execution butalso as regards the making of a work or product of art and its promotion, distribution, marketing and sale. Culturalheritage can be digitised and, in the case of analogue film, it needs to be digitised to be made accessible. Someproduction processes are solely digital and are born digital. Technology has a huge potential to make cultureaccessible to all, by democratising both consumption and involvement in cultural creation. However, technologydepends on equipment and infrastructure, which does not necessarily facilitate the diversity of content available anddiscoverable online. Other factors, such as language, skills or geographical location can also make it harder todiscover online cultural content reflecting cultural diversity. Conscious of such barriers, UNESCO has issued guidelineson the implementation of the Convention on Cultural Diversity in Digital Environments. The EU is part of thisconvention and has tools and funds to promote and protect cultural diversity, in line with its obligation stemming fromthe Treaties, not just on its own territory.

Briefing EN

Customs programme: Supporting cooperation to strengthen the customs unionTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-04-2021Autor KARABOYTCHEVA Miroslava Kostova

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetariosPalabra clave aduana | Comité Económico y Social Europeo | cooperación aduanera | estudio de impacto | marco financiero

plurianual | procedimiento legislativo ordinario | programa de la UE | propuesta (UE) | reglamento (UE) | uniónaduanera

Resumen On 18 June 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation establishing a Customs programme forcooperation in the field of customs over the 2021-2027 MFF period, a successor to Customs 2020. The programme'smain objective is to fund actions aimed at strengthening the customs union. On 15 December 2020, the co-legislatorsreached agreement in trilogue. The Council adopted its first-reading position on 1 March 2021. On 8 March 2021,IMCO – the committee responsible for the file in the European Parliament – adopted its recommendation for secondreading of the Customs programme by the Parliament. The Parliament voted to adopt the first-reading position withoutamendments on 10 March 2021, and the final act was signed the following day. The regulation was published in theOfficial Journal on 15 March 2021 and entered into force immediately, and with retroactive application as of 1 January2021. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislativeprocedure.

Briefing EN

EU climate action in ocean governance and fisheries policyTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 22-04-2021Autor SCHOLAERT FREDERIK

Ámbito político Medio ambiente | PescaPalabra clave cambio climático | conservación de recursos | especie marina | gas con efecto invernadero | impacto ambiental | medio

marino | neutralidad en carbono | océano | política pesquera común | protección de las aguasResumen Marine resources are a vital and growing source of food for human consumption, while oceans also play an important

role in climate regulation. Scientific evidence shows that the climate system has changed rapidly in recent decades,with the oceans greatly mitigating the effects of climate change by absorbing excess heat and human-made carbonemissions. The velocity of the effects of climate change leaves little room for adaptation, causing both declines inabundance and geographic shifts in fish populations. As a result, people who rely heavily on seafood and fisheries fortheir livelihoods run the risk of income loss and food insecurity. The European Green Deal places climate action at theheart of a wide range of new legislative and non-legislative initiatives and includes ambitious goals such as achievingclimate-neutrality by 2050 and preserving and protecting biodiversity. The new 'farm to fork' strategy addresses thechallenges of sustainability in the food supply chain and, in the area of seafood, highlights the imminent update of thestrategic guidelines on aquaculture, the goal to support the algae industry and the focus on climate change in the 2022common fisheries policy review. In its biodiversity strategy, the Commission proposes a new binding target of 30 %marine protected areas in EU waters by 2030, a target supported by Parliament. A reduction in fishing pressure couldalso offset the environmental impacts of climate change. The last reform of the common fisheries policy marked animportant milestone by requiring fish stocks to be restored and maintained above levels capable of producing themaximum sustainable yield. An own-initiative report from Parliament's Committee on Fisheries focuses specifically onthe impact of rising seawater temperatures on fish stocks and fisheries. The oceans can be harnessed to help to closethe emissions gap however, by unlocking their renewable offshore energy potential. In its offshore renewable energystrategy, the Commission aims to reach a deployment of 300 GW in offshore wind capacity by 2050, a 20-fold increasecompared to today. Another own-initiative report from Parliament's Committee on Fisheries looks into the impact on thefishing sector of offshore wind and other renewable energy systems.

Briefing EN

Multimedia Offshore windfarms and fisheries: can they co-exist?

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 164

New Ethiopian dam sparks controversy among Nile statesTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-04-2021Autor PICHON Eric

Ámbito político Asuntos exterioresPalabra clave Acuerdo de Cooperación | curso de agua | Egipto | energía hidráulica | Etiopía | gestión del agua | impacto ambiental |

obra de fábrica | planta eléctrica | Sudán | Unión AfricanaResumen Successive negotiation rounds between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt about the filling and operation of the Grand

Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) have ended in stalemate. This new dam, built by Ethiopia on the Blue Nile (theNile's main tributary), will bring into operation Africa's largest hydropower plant. It is expected to secure access toelectricity for the majority of Ethiopians, to foster economic development and to provide revenues from the sale ofsurplus electricity abroad. For its part, Sudan expects the new dam will not only help regulate the flow of the Nile andprevent devastating floods but also provide access to cheap energy; still, it fears the new dam will hinder the yield of itsown dam – Roseires – situated within a short distance downstream. Egypt too is worried about the potential impact ofthe new dam on its own Aswan High Dam, and that it will give Ethiopia control over the flow of the Nile and reduce thefresh water available for Egyptians. Yet again, the GERD has reignited a long rivalry about the sharing of watersamong the Nile basin countries. Most – including Ethiopia – have signed a comprehensive framework agreement onthe water management of the Nile and its tributaries. However, Sudan and Egypt have refused to take part in the Nilebasin comprehensive framework agreement, unless it recognises their right to oversee the use of most of the Nilewaters, which a bilateral treaty of 1959 accorded to them, but which is contested by other basin countries. The EUsupports the African Union in the quest for a negotiated solution on the GERD, which risks further setbacks due to theconflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region. This is an update of a Briefing published in December 2020. The authoracknowledges the assistance of Christian Meseth from the Directorate-General for External Policies (DG EXPO) withthe updating.

Briefing EN

The Euro Area Fiscal StanceTipo de publicación Briefing

Fecha 21-04-2021Autor GOTTI GIULIA | ZOPPÉ Alice

Ámbito político Asuntos económicos y monetarios | Asuntos financieros y bancariosResumen The concept of “Euro area fiscal stance” is used by European and international institutions, as well as academics, to

measure the discretionary fiscal effort at the level of euro area as a whole. From 2012 to 2018, the Commission hasreferred to the euro area fiscal stance in its “Opinions on Draft Budgetary Plans” and has expressed its position on theappropriate fiscal stance in its proposals for the Council recommendation on the economic policies of the euro area.The concept became more prominent with the publication of the Commission Communication on “Towards a PositiveFiscal Stance” of November 2016. Since 2019, however, the Commission has not explicitly proposed an appropriateeuro area fiscal stance for the upcoming year. The euro area fiscal stance is also the subject of a report and of arecommendation by the European Fiscal Board. This note (which is regularly updated) provides an overview of theconcept and of the latest developments.

Briefing EN

12-05-2022 Fuente : © Unión Europea, 2022 - PE 165