Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout ...

Steven D. Capps

~Vice PresidentDUKE McGuire Nuclear StationSENERGY.

Duke EnergyMG01VP I112700 Hagers Ferry Road

Huntersville, NC 28078

o: 980.875.4805f: 980.875.4809

Steven [email protected]

10 CFR 50.54(f)

February 04, 2016MNS-1 6-008

Attention: Document Control DeskU. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D. C. 20555-0001

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Subject: Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRCRequest for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review ofInsights from the Fukushima Dai~ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task ForceReview of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 (ADAMSAccession No. ML12053A340).

2. NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations,dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.

3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, SeismicEvaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic, as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012,Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No.ML13I106A331.

4. Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Final Report 3002000704, dated May 2013,Seismic Evaluation Guidance, Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima NearTerm Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic.

5. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRCRequest for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from theFukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated December 17, 2014, ADAMS Accession No.ML1 5005A085.

frPI

United States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionFebruary 04, 2016

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference i to all powerreactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 1of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States(CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from thedate of Reference 1.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Reference 2 requesting NRC agreement to delaysubmittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening, as well as endorsement ofthe guidance. The delay and industry guidance was endorsed by the NRC in a letterdated May 7, 2013 (Reference 3).

In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance of the final EPRI Seismic Evaluation GuidanceReport 3002000704, dated May 2013, (Reference 4), the ESEP Report for MNS was providedby a letter dated December 17, 2014 (Reference 5). Pursuant to Actions #1 and #2 in Section8.4, Table 8-1 of Reference 5, the modifications, identified in the ESEP Report have beencompleted.

In addition, a revised copy of the MNS ESEP Report is provided in the enclosure. The revisedreport incorporates the walkdown and evaluation information that was not available at the timewhen the original ESEP report was submitted.

There are no regulatory commitments associated with this letter.

•Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact George Murphyat 980-875-5715.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed onFebruary 04, 2016.

Sincerely,

Steven 0. Capps

Enclosure 1: MNS Revised Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

United States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionFebruary 04, 2016

XC:

C. Haney, Region II AdministratorU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionMarquis One Tower245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257

J.P. Boska, Project Manager (NRR/JLD/JOMB)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionOne White Flint North, Mailstop 13 F1511555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852-2738

G.E. Miller, Project Manager (CNS & MNS)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission11555 Rockville PikeMail Stop 8 G9ARockville, MD 20852-2738

J. ZeilerNRC Senior Resident InspectorMcGuire Nuclear Station

Justin FolkweinAmerican Nuclear Insurers95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453

ENCLOSURE IMNS REVISED EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATIONPROCESS (ESEP) REPORT

February 02, 2016

Revision 1

Duke EnergyMcGu ire Nuclear Station

REVISION SUMMARYREVISION# DESCRIPTION

0 INITIAL ISSUE

1 REVISED APPENDICES A AND B TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL FLEX COMPONENTS

AND SEISMIC EVALUATION RESULTS

Page Ilof 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station RvRev. i

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE........................................................................ 4

2.0 BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES ................... 4

3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL................................................... 63.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL .................................................... 6

3.1.1 ESEL Development ....................................................................... 73.1.2 Power-Operated Valves ................................................................. 83.1.3 Pull Boxes ................................................................................. 83.1.4 Termination Cabinets .................................................................... 83.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators..................................................... 83.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections .............................................. 9

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXImplementation .............................................................................. 9

4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS)............................................ 94.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee.................................................. .94.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ........................................ 11

5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM).................................................... 135.1 Description of RLGM Selected ............................................................. 135.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) ............................. 15

6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH ................................................... 156.1 Summary of Methodologies Used......................................................... 166.2 HCLPF Screening Process................................................................... 176.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination ............................................................ 18

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL.................................. 186.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach.............................................................. 19

6.5.1 Walkdown Approach................................................................... 196.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys.................................. ............................ 206.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings........................................................ 21

6.6 H CLPF C alculation Process ................................................................. 21

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays .......................................................... 216.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes) .......................... 24

7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS, ADDITIONAL ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH FLEX STRATEGYCHANGES AND NEW COMPONENT INSTALLATION .......................................... 24

7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns............................... 247.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy

Changes and New FLEX Component Installations ....................................... 247.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out.................................. 24

8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS ............................................................ 25

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station RvRev. 1

8.1 Supporting Information .................................................................... 258.2 Identification of Planned Modifications .................................................. 268.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL

Component Walkdowns/Evaluations ..................................................... 268.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments................................................... 27

9.0 REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 28

APPENDICES

APPENDIX AMNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results

APPENDIX BMNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results

APPENDIX CMNS FLEX Flow Paths

FIGURE'S

Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4] ........................................ 10

Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [4]...................................... 11

Figure 4-3. MNS 5SFE (5% Damping) - Graphical Format.... .......... ............................... 12

Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping)...................................... 12

Figure 5-1. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)................................................................. 15

Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE ................................................ 17

TABLES

Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4]............................................ 11

Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (i to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping) ........................ 13

Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping).................................................................. 14

Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.......................................... 22

Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.......................................... 23

Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions............................................. .. 27

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1.0 Purpose and ObjectiveFollowing the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from theMarch 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct asystematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agencyshould make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed aset of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory frameworkfor protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f)letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that theserecommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letterrequests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements andguidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard andthe current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessmentapproaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment(SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, theNRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken forMcGuire Nuclear Station (MNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim actionin response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through areview of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactorcore following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance inElectric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEPevaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enableNRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions madeas a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies

The MNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor InventoryControl/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.This summary is derived from the MNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to theMarch 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3] (as supplemented by subsequentsix-month updates [20], [21], and [22]), and Duke Energy MNS CalculationM CC- 1612.00-00-0012, Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-TermTask Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List(ESEL) [18].

Simplified flow diagrams which depict the FLEX strategy flow paths are included inAppendix C.

Page 4 of 60


Steam Generator (SG) heat removal is achieved during Phase 1 and 2 via the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (TDAFWP) with suction from buried CondenserCirculating Water (RC) system cross-over header (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-i). Laterstages of Phase 2 and 3 strategy entails SG cooling water make-up via a portable dieselpowered pump with suction from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) and

discharge aligned to new SG FLEX supply connections. Refer to Appendix C, Figures C-2,C-4, C-5, and C-6 for FLEX connection locations. The TDAFWP flow control valves andMain Steam (SM) Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are also required to provide SGheat-removal capability (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-3). The Phase 2 SG heat removalis achieved via the credited B.5.b connection (primary) or via the new FLEX mechanicalconnections located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) doghouses (refer to Appendix C, FigureC-6). The FLEX strategy with steam generators unavailable (i.e., refueling outage) relieson reactor coolant system feed and bleed for Phase land 2. The ESEL was populatedwith the components credited for Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation.

Reactor coolant system borated make-up during normal operation and outage

conditions includes the following primary make-up connections!

* High pressure primary make-up via the Safety Injection System (NI) mechanicalconnection near 2/2NI-152B (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-4).

* Low pressure primary make-up via the Residual Heat Removal (ND) systemmechanical connection upstream of 2/2ND-35 (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-5).

* Borated water suction source FW system mechanical connection (refer to

Appendix C, Figure C-2).

Reactor coolant system inventory control relies upon FLEX pump make-up asaccommodated by reactor coolant system shrink, passive reactor coolant pump sealleakage, and additional letdown capability via reactor vessel head-vents. The reactorcoolant pump seal return outboard containment isolation valve is manually isolated to

conserve inventory and maintain leak-off flow within the Reactor Building. To ensure SGcontinued heat removal capability, the cold-leg accumulator (CLA) block isolation valvesare electrically closed during the cooldown to prevent Nitrogen injection into thereactor coolant system.

There are no required Phase 1 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity. Theprimary Phase 2 FLEX strategy for containment integrity entails repowering one train ofHydrogen igniters. Phase 2 and/or 3 entails repowering of select compartment fansinside of containment.

Later in the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event, the Residual Heat Removal (ND)

system must be aligned to maintain containment temperature. This action isaccomplished by powering a train of ND and Component Cooling (KC) pumps with aportable generator form the Regional Response Center (RRC). For ND and KC systemheat removal, a portable diesel powered FLEX pump is interfaced with the NuclearService Water (RN) system to provide a heat sink from the Standby Nuclear Service

Page 5 of 60


Water Pond (SNSWP). The portable pump is connected via the bonnet of an RN pumpdischarge check valve. Cross-train KC and RN isolation valves are credited with manualclosure, in order to minimize components exposed to the credited FLEX flow pathpressure boundary. Similarly, manual isolation of RN heat-exchangers not required forthe FLEX strategy is credited where possible (e.g., Diesel Generator Engine CoolingWater (KD) heat-exchangers, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting aircompressor, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) motor coolers, etc.).

Necessary attendant electrical components are outlined in the MNS FLEX OIPsubmittal [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [20], [21],and [22], and primarily entail 600 VAC essential motor control centers, vital batteries,equipment installed to support FLEX electrical connections, and monitoringinstrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containmentintegrity. During the latter stages of Phase 3, the 4.16 kV switchgear is powered up tosupport residual heat removal (RHR) operation.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL

The complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B,respectively.

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL

The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installedplant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in theMNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3],as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]. The OIPand subsequent updates provides the MNS FLEX mitigation strategy and servesas the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for theFLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containmentintegrity consistent with the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21],and [22]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope perEPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and thescope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support corecooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrityfunctions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed)are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2

of EPRI 3002000704.

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the corecooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 ofEPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core

Page 6 of 60


cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in theEPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in theMNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEXconnections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequentupdates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connectionmodifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to supporta single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the"Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recoverystrategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) excluded per theEPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:

* Structures (e.g., containment, Rx Building, Control Building, AB, etc.)

* Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

* Manual valves and rupture disks.

* Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX

mitigation strategies.

* Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vesseland internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-upstrategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in

the ESEL.

3.1.1 ESEL Development

The ESEL was developed by reviewing the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates[20], [21], and [22] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEXstrategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and InstrumentationDiagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identifythe boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identifyspecific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of theFLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanicalisolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branchlines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were theprimary reference documents used to identify mechanical components andinstrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected andspecific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrumentdrawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, systemdescriptions, design basis documents, etc.

Page 7 of 60


3.1.2 Power-Operated ValvesPage 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not requiredto change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installedPhase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address thisconcern, the following guidance is applied in the MNS ESEL for functional failuremodes associated with power-operated valves:

* Powered-operated valves that remainl energized during the ELAP events(such as DC-powered valves) were included on the ESEL, with theexception of various air-operated valves which fail to the requiredposition as a result of the ELAP event.

* Power-operated valves not required to change state' as part of the FLEX

mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic eventalso causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable ofspurious operation as they would be de-energized.

* Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEXmitigation strategies during Phase 1, and re-energized and operatedduring subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated forspurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP haspassed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes

Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these componentsprovide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks orconnections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were consideredpart of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance withEPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets

Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiplecables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide acompletely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL toensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities isaddressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators

Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located onpanels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismicevaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinetseismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

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3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping ConnectionsItem 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESELincludes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] andsubsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2." Item 3 inSection 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEXconnection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required tosupport a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."

Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC,and their supports ... " are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance withEPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, anyactive valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in

the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEXImplementation

The ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEX

strategy.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)

4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee

The MNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)was included in the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. DigitizedGMRS frequency and acceleration values from the MNS Seismic Hazard andScreening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. TheMNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.

Page 9 of 60


Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at control poit for McGuire (5% of critical damping

100 1.92E-01 6.48E-O1 -3.05E-01

90 1.95E-01 6.60E-01 3.10E-O1,• 2.01 E-01 6.86E-.01 3.22E-0170 2.16E-01 7.50E-01 3.51E-0160 2,56E-01 9.10E-01 4.24E-0150 3,37E-01 1 .22 E+00 5.65E-0140 4,03E-01 1 .44E+00 6.70E-0135 4,11E-01 1.45E+00 6.76E-01

S 30 4.06E-01 1.41E+C,0 6.60E-0125 3.93E-01 1.34E+00 6.29E-0120 3.84 E-01 I .28E+00 6.03E-0115 3.65E-01 1.18E+00 5.59E-01

12.5 3.49E-01 1.11E+(03 5.28E-0110 3,26E-01 1.02E+00 4.86E-019 3.09E-01 9.50E--01 4.55E-018 2.90E-01 8.75E-01 4.21E-01

7 2.68E-01 7.96E-O1 3.84E-016 2.45E-01 7.I1E-01 3.44E--015 2.17E-01 6.16E-01 3.00E-014 1.80E-O1 4.91E-01 2.41E-01

3.5 1.59E-01 4.24E-0I 2.09E-013 1.37E.-01 3..58E-01 1.77E-01

2.5 1.14E-01 2.88E-01 1.43E-012 1 .05E-.01 2.5-8E.-01 1 29E-01

1.5 8.66E-02 2.06E-01 1 .04E-011 25 7.49E-02 1 .75E-O1 8.86E-02

1 6.47E-02 I .47E-01 7.49E-020.9 6.25E-02 1.42E-Ol 724E-020.8 6.05E-02 1.38E-O1 7.00E-020.7 5.77E-02 1.31E-01 6,69E-020.6 5,35E-02 1,.22E-01 6.20E-020.5 4.70E-02 1 .07E-01 5.4.4E-020.4 3.76E-02 8.55E-02 4.35E-020.35 3.29E-02 7.48E-02 3.81 E-02

0.3 2.82E-02 6.41E-02 3.26E-02025 2.35E-02 5.35E-02 2.72E-020,2 1.88E-02 4.28E-02 2.18E-020.15 1.4LE-02 3.21E-02 1.63E-02

0.125 1.17E-02 2,67E-02 1,.36E-020.1 9.39E-03 2.14E-02 1.09E-02

Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [41.

Page 10 of 60


MNS GMRS0 .8 ........... .. . ... .......- .... ..

0.0.6........

o0 .o .......... ........ . . ... ..

U• i---GM RSU .

0.00.1 1 10 100

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [41.

The MNS Control Point is located at Elevation 716'-6", which is at the base of the

mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings.

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)

A description of the MNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included in

Section 3.1 of the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE is

tabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.

A comparison of the MNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.

Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4].

Frequency (Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g)

0.33 0.06

2 0.36

6 0.36

35/PGA 0.15

Page 11 of 60


MNS SSE5% Damping

0.400.35

~0.0 1/0 0

Figure 4-.MN S (-Dmpn)5SrphclFomt

MNS GMRS vs SSE0.8

rt '7UJ.I

0.6-

0.5

•0.4

U•0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0

./ .......I I-SSE

--GMRS

0.1 1 10Frequency (Hz)

100

Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).

Page 12 of 60


5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)

5.1 Description of RLGM Selected

The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4of EPRI 3002000704 [21. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectralacceleration values for the 5%-damped 'SSE horizontal ground response

spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectralaccelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE groundresponse spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.

The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown inTable 5-1. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the i to 10 Hz range is at10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 1.74. The RLGM is determinedby multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.74. Digitized RLGMfrequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-2. The MNS RLGM is

plotted in Figure 5-1.

Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)

Frequency SSE GMRS Ratio(Hz) (g) (g) GMRS/SSE

1 0.180 0.075 0.4162 0.360 0.129 0.3583 0.360 0.177 0.4924 0.360 0.241 0.6695 0.360 0.300 0.8336 0.360 0.344 0.9567 0.333 0.384 1.1518 0.312 0.421 1.3499 0.294 0.455 1.54610 0.279 0.486 1.740

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Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)

Frequency Acceleration(Hz) (g)0.333 0.1040.5 0.1571 0.3132 0.6263 0.6264 0.6265 0.6266 0.6267 0.5808 0.5439 0.51210 0.48611 0.46412 0.44413 0.42714 0.41115 0.397

17.5 0.36820 0.345

22.5 0.32525 0.308

27.5 0.29430 0.28235 0.261

100 0.261

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MNS RLGM

S0.4. ..

* 0.3-R M

0.2

0.1

0.00.1 1 10 100

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 5-1. MNS RLGM (5% Damping).

5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)

ISRS for the ESEP were estimated by scaling the MNS design-basis SSE ISRS by theRLGM scale factor of 1.74.

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach

It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meetor exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterizedas the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a lowprobability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, inthis case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to orgreater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given inSection 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM)methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear PowerPlant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) [7].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959,Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [81.

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6.1 Summary of Methodologies UsedSeismic capacity screening was done using information from the MNS IndividualPlant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9] and supportingdocumentation (M CC 1535.00-00-0004, Seismic PRA/IPEEE BackupCalculations [191).

MNS used a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to address the IPEEE.The SPRA is described in the IPEEE submittal.

Prior to the IPEEE, Duke Energy had performed a SPRA for MNS. The SPRAutilized fragilities calculated in 1981-1983 using the separation of variablesmethodology, which is one of the methods in EPRI TR-103959 [8]. The calculatedfragilities were based on the MNS SSE spectral shape. The IPEEE submittal statesthat these fragilities were updated where needed based on plant walkdowns andused in the IPEEE SPRA. The fragility calculations are documented in Volumes 4and 5 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004. Table 3-1 of the IPEEE submittal gives thefragilities used in the IPEEE SPRA. Equipment items listed in the IPEEEEquipment List, contained in Attachment 24 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004, that werenot included as fragilities in the SPRA had been screened out on the basis of themedian capacity being greater than 2.0g.

The equipment fragilities were based on plant design information, includingequipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes consideredwere functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. Theoriginal anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMAwalkdowns described below. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMAwalkdowns.

Duke Energy also performed a SMA in 1993. The SMA is documented inVolumes 1 and 2 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004 [19]. The SMA consisted of screeningwalkdowns and anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used thescreening tables from Chapter 2 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The walkdowns wereconducted by engineers trained in EPRI NP-6041-SL (the engineers attended theEPRI SMA Add-On course in addition to the Seismic Qualification Users GroupWalkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course), and weredocumented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets from EPRI NP-6041-SL.Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL.Seismic demand was the IPEEE Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for SMA (meanNUREG/CR-0098 [11] ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA). A relayreview, beyond searching for low-ruggedness relays, was not included in theSMA.

Figure 6-1 shows the mean NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum used asthe RLE for the SMA, compared to the RLGM response spectrum. It is seen thatthe RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 2.0 Hz. TheRLE is slightly less than the RLGM at frequencies below about 2.0 Hz. This maybe disregarded as there are no MNS SSCs in this frequency range.

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MNS RLGM vs IPEEE RLE

0.1 . ... .. RLGM,• : - - IPEEE RLE

0.1 1 10 100

Frequency (Hz)

Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.

6.2 HCLPF Screening Process

The SMA was based on the RLE, which was anchored to 0.3g PGA. The RLE isequal to the RLGM at frequencies from about 2.0 Hz to about 6.0 Hz, and greaterthan the RLGM at frequencies above about 6.0 Hz. Therefore, any componentswhose SMA-based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from HCLPFcalculations. The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL are based on ground peakspectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peakspectral acceleration. The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSEfloor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the AB forwhich new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE [111. ThereforeESEL components which were evaluated in the IPEEF SMA, met the screeningcaveats, and had anchorage capacity exceeding the RLE can be screened outfrom ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceedsthe RLGM.

Most of the non-valve components in the ESEL were screened out based on theSMA results. A few components that did not have CDFM anchorage calculationswere screened out on the basis of the HCLPF calculated from the SPRA fragility.In the SMA, valves were documented as a group rather than as individualcomponents with individual documentation. The screening for valves proceededdifferently.

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The Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESEL contain approximately 220 valves in total, bothpower-operated (MOV and AOV) as well as relief valves. Per Table 2-4 of

EPRI NP-6041-SL, active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8gpeak spectral acceleration without any review other~than looking for valves withlarge extended operators on small diameter piping, and anchorage is not afailure mode. Therefore, valves on the ESEL which are listed in the IPEEEMechanical Equipment List may be screened out from ESEP seismic capacitydetermination. Power-operated valves were addressed both in the IPEEEfragility calculations and in the SMA. In the fragility calculations, all of the valveson the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List were screened out on the basis ofmedian capacity exceeding 2.0g. In the SMA, the valves were found to meetEPRI NP-6041-SL, Figures F-25 and F-26 (thus meeting the 1.2g peak spectralacceleration screening criteria) or to exceed the RLE floor response spectra onthe basis of vendor seismic qualification reports. The IPEEE SMA coveredapproximately 360 valves in Unit 1. The walkdowns focused on MOVs on smalldiameter piping and valves at high elevations in the plant. Comparison with Unit2 showed that the conclusions of the Unit 1 review applied to the correspondingUnit 2 valves. Relief valves were not explicitly included in the IPEEE reviewexcept for PORVs, both steam (SV) and reactor coolant (NC), which met thecriteria. Spring-operated relief valves are considered to meet theEPRI NP-6041-SL 0.8g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria withoutexplicit review. On the basis of the above, most of the ESEL valves werescreened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were notscreened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministicEPRI NP-6041-SL CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/oranchorage evaluations.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination

HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, andseismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determinedusing the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF anchorage capacities weredetermined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF seismicinteraction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL

The components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL, Table 2 4. Forcomponents not located on the basemat of the Auxiliary or Reactor Buildings,the ISRS were used for the screening; therefore, the screening levels ofEPRI NP-6041-SL were increased by a factor of 1.5 per EPRI 1019200, SeismicFragility Applications Guide Update [17]. Thus, the accelerations for thescreening levels were 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.

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The SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.74 throughout the frequency rangeand were then clipped (per EPRI 1019200), using the methodology inEPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q, and the North-South and East-West clipped peakswere averaged.

6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach

6.5.1 Walkdown Approach

Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided inSection 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for theSMA process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] describe theseismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all

components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactiveor low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment ofcomponents which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments,or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely moreon alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance onseismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more

hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean completeinspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring anelectrician or other technician to de-energize and open .cabinets orpanels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown isnot intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy ofthe component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group ofcomponents are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is onlynecessary to inspect one component out of this group. The"similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown duringthe seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference todrawings, calculations or specifications. The one component for eachtype which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probablydoes mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this verylimited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can befound so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant isin operation. At least for the one component of each type which isselected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner.For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the firstitems and compare the field configurations with the constructiondrawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence isfound, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as greata detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the

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component class as the SRT becomes confident that the constructionpattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeatedfor each component class; although, during the actual walkdown theSRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. Ifserious exceptions to the drawings or questionable constructionpractices are found then the system or component class must beinspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchoragewhich is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed incriteria for that component, potential SI [Seismic Interaction1]

problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' pastexperience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If anysuch concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one componentof each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased. Theincrease in sample size which should be inspected will depend uponthe number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which areobserved. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size sincethey are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of allelements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix Dgives guidance for sampling selection."

6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys

Many of the components were walked down previously during IPEEE evaluationsand have documented Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) recording theresults. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed byqualified Seismic Review Teams. A walk-by of these components was performedand documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that thecomponent and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown andto verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may havedeveloped since the original walkdown.

Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previouslywalked down during the IPEEE and for some ESEL items which did not have aspecific SEWS in the IPEEE documentation.

Masonry walls in the AB were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet theRLE demand; therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity ofmasonry walls to ESEL components were noted on the SEWS forms. Masonrywalls in proximity to ESEL equipment were verified to have been included in theIPEEE evaluation and determined to not be a credible failure mode for the ESEP.

1 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping

attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed inaccordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]."

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6.5.3 Significant Walkdown FindingsAll of the ESEL components were determined to have an existing capacity greaterthan the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-1and 6-2. These components require modification in order to have a capacitygreater than the RLGM.

6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process

ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluatedusing the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the following

steps:

*Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included inprevious seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment installed plant

conditions;

*Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables inEPRI NP-6041-SL as described in Section 6.2; and

*Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that includeboth structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functionalfailure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and aredocumented in MCM-1612.00-0059.001 [10]. HCLPF results and key failuremodes for ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations areincluded in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays

There are no relays on the ESEL that provide seal-in/lock-out capability forPhase 1 equipment; therefore, no functional evaluation of relays was required.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1

Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.

Problem DescriptionUnit ESEL ID Equipment # Bldg Modification/Recommendation

1 23 EHM-HR-TB27 RB Flex Conduit running between Required Modification: Add metal ties to

EHM-HR-TB29 igniter boxes not supported for band cable to overhead cable tray.

approximately 15 ft.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 23 EHM-HR-TB29 RB Flex conduit from TB29 not tied Required Modification: Add metal ties to

into cable tray. band cable to horizontal and verticalpotions of this wall-mounted tray near 900

bends.


1 24 EHM-TB-0589. AB Secure load path: Required modification:Cabinet mounting tabs do not span Install Unistrut washers under mounting

Unistrut. tabs.


i 48 1SV-VA-00019AB AB Interaction issue: Required modification:A test or vent off port at top of Modify to achieve adequate clearance.

subject valve has been rubbing onside of support structure. Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 AB Secure load path: Pressure Required modification:indicator PI-937 on MC11 is missing Install hold down clip on instrument.

hold down clip.


1 67 EQ.B-PN-DGLSA AB Potential interaction: Required modification:

Unistrut between DGLSA and ATC7 Adjacent cabinets cross-braced together.results in negligible clearance. Modification has been COMPLETED.

AR = Auxiliary Building DH =DogHouse RB = Reactor Building

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Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.

Unit ESEL ID EDB ID Bldg Problem Description Modification/Recommendation

2 18 NI-VA-OO65B RB Potential interaction: Conduit and Required modification:

connecter to motor are in contact with Modify to achieve adequateadjacent structural support, clearance.

Modification has been COMPLETED.2 51 SV-CV-OOO1AB DH Soft target: Required Modification:

Position indicator cable is tight and Trim grating away from cable.

rubbing against floor grating.Modification has been COMPLETED.

2 78 NC-RD-5870 RB Cable support: Required modification:

Loop of signal cable supported by Move coil back and support fromresistance temperature detector (RTD). structural member or cable tray toSubject RTD tubing is bent due to weight remove load on RTD.

____ ____ _______of cable. Modification has been COMPLETED.

AB = Auxiliary Building DH = DogHouse RB =Reactor Building

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6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 andAppendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in thetables:

*For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value isprovided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."

*For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] screening tables, the HCLPFvalue is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened perEPRI N P-6041."

* For items where interaction with masonry walls controls, the HCLPF value isprovided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction - BlockWall s."

* For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPFvalue is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional."

* For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value islisted in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."

.7.0 Inaccessible Items, Additional Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and NewComponent Installation

7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns

All ESEL items were accessible for walkdowns except the Units 1 and 2 dieselgenerator fuel oil storage tanks. These tanks are not accessible for visualinspection since they are buried below grade. Walk-bys of the yard areas abovethe tanks were performed to check for visible outliers or potential seismicinteraction hazards.

7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changesand New FLEX Component Installations

Seismic capability walkdowns and screening evaluations remain outstanding forcomponents which were added to the ESEL as a result of subsequent changes tothe FLEX mitigation strategy, and associated with new FLEX componentinstallations. These outstanding walkdowns and evaluations are denoted as "tobe done" (TBD) in Appendices A and B.

7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out

The remaining ESEL component walkdowns and screening evaluations werecompleted within the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

The outstanding modifications listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 will be completed andclosed-out in accordance with the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

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8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results

8.1 Supporting Information

MNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in theNRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expeditesplant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-termmodifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactorcore following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall MNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. OnMarch 12, 2014, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of astudy [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismichazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central andEastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismichazards show that there [...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk forthe fleet of U.S. plants..." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such,the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safetymargin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with theapproach and results used in the G1-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter alsostated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached inG1-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue tooperate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for MNS was included in the fleetrisk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, theconclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [14] also apply to MNS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached

"Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed anumber of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain marginbeyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databasesof performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and(3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed usingconservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstandlarge ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that haveactually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process hasinherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismicmargins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects ofthe seismic design process, including:

Page 25 of 60


* Safety factors applied in design calculations;• Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs;

• Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations;

• Broadening criteria forlISRS;

* Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis andtesting applications;

* Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit timehistory based time domain analysis;

• Bounding requirements in codes and standards;

* Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concreteand steel);

* Bounding testing requirements; and

* Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additionalcapacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond theessentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs willcontinue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the 5SE.

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications

Tables 6-1 and 6-2 identify the remaining modifications to be made inaccordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2] to enhance the seismic capacity of theplant.

8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL

Component Walkdowns/Evaluations

Plant modifications will be completed in accordance with the schedule identifiedin NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13], which states that plant modifications notrequiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within twoplanned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.

Completion of the remaining ESEL component walkdowns and evaluations willbe completed within the same timeframe outlined for modification completion.

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8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments

The actions Listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.

Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions.

Action # , Action Description Completion Date

1 Complete remaining modifications, Follow-up actions will be completed as

ESEL walkdowns/evaluations for follows:Unit 1 components listed in a December 31, 2016 (if actionTable 6-1. completion does not require a

refueling outage)2 Complete remaining modifications, * The end of the second planned

ESELwaldown/evluatonsforrefueling outage after December 31,Unit2 coponnts iste in2014 (if action completion requires

Table 6-2. outage)

3 Submit a letter to NRC confirming Within 60 days following completion of ESEPimplementation of modifications activities for items 1 and 2.associated with items 1 and 2.

Actions 1 and 2 have been completed.

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9.0 References

1) Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term TaskForce Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.

2) Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic, Electric PowerResearch Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.

3) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With RegardTo Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis ExternalEvents (Order EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy,Huntersville, NC.

4) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"dated March 20, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

5) Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination ofExternal Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991,U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

6) USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination ofExternal Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- 10 CFR 50.54(f),"June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

7) A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1,August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

8) Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, Electric Power ResearchInstitute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

9) Letter from T. C. McMeekin to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "McGuireNuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370; Individual PlantExamination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal," dated June 1, 1994, DukePower, Huntersville, NC.

Page 28 of 60


10) Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Implementation of Seismic RiskEvaluations at McGuire Nuclear Station, Appendix D, "HCLPF Calculations," datedOctober 2014, Rev. 1, ARES Corporation Report No. 030319.13.02.11-001, DukeEnergy Document No. MCM-1612.00-0059.001.

11) Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants,published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-O098.

12) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage RiskEstimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants inthe Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.

13) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward forNTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.

14) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening andPrioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations forRecommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From theFukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.

15) Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and ImplementationDetails (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA,February 2013, EPRI 1025287.

16) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research InstituteFinal Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach forthe Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, InformationRequest for Seismic Reevaluations,"' May 7, 2013.

17) Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric PowerResearch Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.

18) Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List(ESEL), Revision 2, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, Calculation MCC-1612.00-00-0012.

19) Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations, 1994, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC,1994, Calculation No. MCC-1535.00-00-0004.

20) Letter from Steven Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke EnergyCarolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2,Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; FirstSix-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission OrderModifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies forBeyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," datedAugust 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

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21) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 CommissionOrder Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategiesfor Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," datedFebruary 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

22) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "DukeEnergy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and2, Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; ThirdSix-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission OrderModifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies forBeyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," datedAugust 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

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Appendix A

MVNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0

MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPP Results

ESEL ID

1.

2

3

4

5

7

8

10

11

EQUIPMENT

EDB Description

SFW-VA-0532B Refueling Water Rocirn PumpSuction Isolation

SPW-VA-0055A Refueling Water Recirn PumpSuction Isolation

1FW-VA-t051A Refueling Water Recirn PumpSuction Isolation

aND-VA-tO05t ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs

1ND-VA-O06l ND Relief- Hetlegs

1ND-VA-O064 ND Relief - 'B' Coldiegs

SNI-VA-0lSB NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg

SNI-VA-Si51 NI Relief- B' Train Hotleg

SNI-VA-OlBS NI Relief- Coldieg

0RN-VA-5507A SNSWP Supply to Units 1 &, 2

SNV-VA-OS95B NC Pumps SealIWater Return Coot

AUN

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUN

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

750

750

733

733

733

733

750

733

716

733

Rm 611KK/S3

Rm 815

J /Si

Rm 730

GG/52

EE/52

tRa 730

HH/S2

Rm 602

GG1/52

Rmn 617

HH/52

Rm 730

JJl51

tRa 601

AA/63

Rm 602

EE/52

AUX 760 ""'" Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-Byjul5s1

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Closed

Closed

Cloned

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Open

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Open/Closed

Closed

OPERATING STATE Walkdown or

Bldg EL Locution Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS? Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode**

Walk-By

Walk-By

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walk-By

Walk-By

p 7 7 2

Included in ]PE6E, p 772

p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772

p 772 Included in IPEER, p 772

Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

Appendix C Table 2-4

Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL., Rev. 1.,



AppendiuC Table 2-4




AppendiuC Table 2-4



p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 77B

p 7 7

5 Included in IPEEE, p 775

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLG3M

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>R1GM

>RLGM

>RLGM

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per EPRI NP-6541


Screened per EPRI NP-B541




Screened per IPEEE

Screened per IPERE

12 1CV-22CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Ro Cavity' Wisdom Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, Rev. 1, vRM ScendprERN-64

Isolation Valve R 77BCSieCoe OpnadCsd Wlkwn Appendix C Table 2-4275° 176

13 1CV-23CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Ru Cavity' Wisdom Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, vLMSree e PR

Isolation Valve R 77B-SieCoe OpnadCsd Wakwn Appendix C Table 2-4273' 176

14 1NC-A-OO34ANC System Pressurizer PDRV RX 88 Pressurizer Cavity lsd Oe n lsd Wl-y p73 Icue nIEE 7 RG cendprER P64

Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls RN BBy0lsd OpnadClsd WlkB 773nlde5nREEp7

15 1NI-VA-O43SA 1NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply RN 756 SA CLA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPREEE, p 775 >RLI3M Screened per IPEEEfrom SA CLA (MDV) 46° 466

Reference it, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Structural16 1FW-TK-OS01 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461). Meets RLGM Screened per IPEEE

17 1NI-VA-O054A lA CLA Block Valve (MDV) RN 733 Pipe Chase Oe -4 Coe akB 7 nlddi PEp74>LM Sree e PE

421'V-O5B1 L lckVle{O) X 73 Pp 47Rs Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

lB 1NI-VA-OO765 lB CIA Block Valve (MDV) RN 733 PieCae Oe -4 Coe akBy p74 Icue noEE 7 RLGM Screened per [PEEE

224'V-OBB1 L lckVle(O) X 73 Pp 486s Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

21 iEHM-TP-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUN 750 CC/46 Off Functional Walk-By p 74 Neeqien-upadIEESWSvlato. >LMcrneprIPE

22 SEHM-PN-HMPPA H2 Igniter Power Panel AUN 750 CC/46 Standby Punctinnal Walkdown 'eeec R0 ounded by evaluation of 1EHM-TB-SBB. >RL0M Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C

SEHM-HR-TBO3A'TanHgotrReeec10Noinepreedaabs.TsetoSUT25 thru TB71 (Odd A'rio2Intr RLGM Undetermined

Nmesol)(35 Igniters per Train) RN Various Various Do-energized Punctional Walkdown ReeecAppendix 0C TRO.N~ neprec aabs.Tse oSUT

2B 1HMSX-MBA oltgeRe Byas Sitc AX 50 BD Deenegied Funtina WakdwnReference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604123 a1EHMSN-HBPA oltae Re Bypss SitchAUN 30 TD Deenerized PuncionappaednwiAppedix Tabe22-

Page 3,2 of 60


MINS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results

EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or

ESEL ID BOB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes H-CLPF** Key Failure Mode***

Rfrne Screens out based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, ten. 1,23 b 1EIHM-VR-HRMA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 TED Dc-energized Functional Walkdown Apeni Tablevati CLFbsdonUit2vlenn.ve02 untoa


25 Deleted

26 iCA-HX-BOS0 TDCAP tearing Dii Cooler AUX 716 BB/Si Idle Fonctional Walk-By p 542 >RLGM Screened per ]PEEE

27 1A-PU503 TOCAP (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine27 1AP-03 Driven Pump) AUX 716 BB/Si Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >tL.GM Screened per FREEE

27 a iSA-TB-OSS3 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By tale-of-the-boo with 1CA-PU-0OO3, which has an >BLGM Screened per PEEtIPEEE SEWS

27 b 1SA-VA-t554 TDCAP Steam Control Valve AUX 716 BR/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rueo-h-o ib1AP-5S>hc oo RLGM Screened per IPEEEPEEt SEWS

27 c iSA-SGV-lOSS TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-PU-5OO3, which bosoan >RLGM Screened per FREEEIPEtE SEWS

27 d iSA-GS-tOO3 Gear Reducer AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Punctional Walk-By Rueo-h-o>ihiA-USSwihhsa RLGM Screened per IFPEEEIPEER SEWS

28 1CA-PN-AFTP TDCAF Control Panel AUX 716 BB/52 n/a Available Walk-By p 1B7 >ELGM Screened per IPEEB

TOCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 77P/OClndDe WakB p77 IcudinPEp77tLMSrndprIEE29 lSA-VA-SS4BABC (ADV) (DH2) 76FFSClsdOe Waky p77 InlddiIPEp77>LMcrndpr EE

29 a iSA-SV-5480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve InerDoh2us to F5 nrie e-nrie akon Rforence 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

InerDoHous 77P/SEegzd D-nrid Wakon Appendix C Table 2-4

29 b 1SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Inner Dohue 77F/Eegzd D-nrie akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, 9ev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B541

Rm BOG55 iSA-VA-tOSS TDCAP Trip-Throtile Valve AUS 716 Dpen Dpen Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEER, p 771 >RLGM Screened per IPEBE

AA/B2

31 Deleted

32 Deleted

33 Deleted

54 iVl-VA-O032 1AV9setawHrSpl rm G AX 73R 719 ClsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, >R1GM Interaction - Block WallInlet Relief (115 psig) AUFF3p/53 ClsdCoe akon Appendix C Table 2-4

55 iVl-VA-t534 in le Rseltief (115 puigy)roV AUX 733 GG/54 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 1, >LM Itrcin-BokWlInle Relef (15 pig)Appendix C Table 2-4

Re1I-A012 1 le (115 psig)Isr ntArTn AUX 733 Pp/OS1 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 1,>RM SrenderEINP64Relif (15 psg) F/B3AppendixC Table 2-4

37 1 V- 14 A VI Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUrn~i Clse1loe9Wk Reference 13, Screens out based on EPtI NP-6S4i-SL, Rev. 1, >RG ScendprERN-BiRelief (115 psig) FP/S3 AppendixC Table 2-4

31ii-AQiS i VI Auo Bldg Instrument Air Tank Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-BS4i-SL, Rev. 1, >RM ScendprPlN-B4Relief (115 psig) AU 3 GS lndCoe akon AppendiuC Table 2-4

39 llV-0S EBVl Aun Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 GG/S5 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL. Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-tt41

Relief (115 psig) AppendiuC Table 2-4

lSM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Duter Doghouse D/4CoeCd Wkd Reference 13, Screens out based on EPRI NP-604i-SL, Rev. 5, >LG ScendprERN-0440 iiV-59 (120 puig) (DHi) 70Appendix C Table 2-4

Page 33 of 60


MNS Unit 1 ESEL and H-CLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT

ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg

iSM-7AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse41 1iV-55 (120 psig) (DHi)

SSM-3ABC VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse42 11V-05 (120 psig) (DH2)

15W-SAG Vi Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse43 iiV-05 (120 psig) (DH2)

TDCA Flow control to 1A SI and44 1CA-VA-1564AB AUX

Associated Pneumatic Controls

44 a SCA-ML-5540 Manual Loader AUX

44 b iCA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX

44 c 1CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX

44 d iCA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX

44 a 1CA-SV-5540 Solenoid Value AUX

44 f iCA-SV-5641 Solenoid Valve AUX

TDCA Flow Control to lB SG and43 1CA-V-SIS2ARAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU

45 a 1CA-ML-5525 Manual Loader AUX

45k S CA-SS-1521 Selector Switch AUX

450 1CA-MT-5S20 Misc Transmitter AUX

45 d iCA-VP-0520 Valve Fositioner AUX

45 a iCA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUXt

45Sf 1CA-SV-0B21 Solenoid Valve AUX

TDCA Flaw Control to 1C SG and46 iCA-V-OS4BABAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU

460 i CA-ML-5460 Manual Loader AUX

46Gb iCA-SS-5480 Selector Switch AUX

45 c SCA-MT-54R5 Misc Transmitter AUX

46 d 1CA-VP-54B0 Valve Positioner AUX

45 e iCA-SV-t480 Solenoid Value AUX

46Sf 1CA-SV-g4Ri Solenoid Valve AUX

TDCA Flaw Control tol ID S and47 iCA-V-OSOSARAssociated Pneumatic Controls AU

OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or

EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWSa Screening Notes HICLPF** Key Failure Mode*0

*

790 ~~~~~~~~Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI FJF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RM ScendprPRN-64


7O DO/S2 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based an EFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-5541750Appendis C Table 2-4

716 5w60Open OeThotd/ Walk-By p 771 Included in FREtE, p 771 >RLGM Screened per IPEttBR/S0 Closed

767

716

716

716

716

716

716

757

716

716

716

716

716

716

767

716

716

716

Control Rm 623

Rm 600

Rw 600

Rm 600

BR/SI

Sm 600

RB/SI

Rm 600

BR/So

Rm 600

RB/SI

Control Rm 625

Rm BOO

RB/Si

Sm 600

BR/Si

Rm 601

BR/Si

Sm 601

RB/Si

Sm 650

BR/Bi

Rm BOO

BR/Si

Control Sm 626

Rrn 601

RB/Si

Rm 600

RB/Si

Sm 601

BR/Si

Functional Functional Walk-Ry

Functional Functional Walk-By


Functional Functional Walk-B y

Energized REnergizad Walk-By

Energized Energized Walk-By

Opn Open/Throttled/ WakB

Functoa Fuctinloe Walk-By

Functional Functional Walk-Ry



tnergized Energized Walk-By

tnergized Energiced Walk-Ry

Opn Open/Throttled/ WakB

Funtina FuCtional Walk-By




Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O

Rule-of-the-bus with 1CA-64AB

Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-64AR

Bale-of-the-boy with 1CA-64AB

Rule-of-She-boo with 1CA-64AB

Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-64AB

p 7

71 Included in IFEEE, F 771

Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O

Role-of-the-boo with 1CA-S2.AR

Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-S2AB

Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-S2AB

Rule-of-the-boo with iCA-S2AR

Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2AB

p 771 Included in IPEEO, p 7 7 1

Rule-of-the-boo with iMC1O

Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-46AR

Rule-of-the-bus with 2CA-48AB

Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-4RAB

Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-4SAB

Rule-of-She-hon with 2CA-4OAB

p 771 Included in PEtE, p 771

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLIM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

Screened perlPtEt

Screened perlP~EE

Screened perliPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlFEEt

Screened periFREt

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perIPERE

Screened perlPEER

Screened per PEER

Screened perlFEEE

Screened perIPEEE

Screened periPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPFEEE

Screened perlP~EE

Screened perlFEEt

Screened perlFEEt

Screened perIPBEE

Screened per PEER

7156m 0 Energized Energized Walk-ByRB/Si

716 Sm60 Energized Energized Walk-By

716 SmBDOpen pe/hotd/ Walk-By4A/43 Closed

>RLGM

>RLIM

Page 34 of 60


MNS Unit 1 ESEL. and H-CLPF Results

EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdowe or

ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF* Key Failure Modenee

47 a 1CA-ML-0560 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Em 925 Functional Fanctional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1MC1O >RLGSM Screened per IPEER

47 1A-S-36 SeecorwichAU 71 E 60 untinal Fuctonl al-ByRue-f-hebo wih CAOBB RLM Srene pr00RAA/43

Em 60047c 1CA-MT-0965 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 /Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box wish iCA-36AB >ELGM Screened per ]PEEt

Em 60047 d 1CA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 M/3Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with SCA-S6AB >RLGM Screened per PEtEE

47 f OCA-SV-03E1 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Em 600 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGSM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Appendix C

lA SG Main Steaw P0EV and Outer Doghouse Open/Throttled/48 DSV-VA-O019AB Aso5tdPe5tc otos (H) 89 GG0/44 Closed Clsd Walk-By p 294 >RLGSM Screened per IPEER

1800G Main Steam P0EV and Inner Doghouse FF5Oloe pen/Throttled/ WakB p2949 1SV-VA-0013AB 80oFS lsd akB 9 RLGM Screened per IPEER

Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2) Closed

SC SG Main Steam P0EV and Inner Doghouse Open/Thrcttled/ WakB p29S0 SV-VA-OS7ABC 609 FF/52 Closed WakBoB24>LOM Screened per [PEER

Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2) Closed

1 S-A0 1 0B 1 SC Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse (09 G/44 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 294 >LMSree e PE

Associated Pneumatic Controls (DHi) Closed

52 SBPL-FN-EVDA Vital Battery 120 VDC Distribution OLS cendprFE2 1E-P-DA Panel AUX 703 DD/S4 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212>RGSrendelPE

52 a 1EP-PN-VDD Vital Battery 120 VDC DistributionPanel AUX 733 BB/07 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >LMSree e PE

53Rm 707 Reference 1_0 -LM0 0

Itrcin-BokWl53 B0PL-BA-RVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C54Functional Functional Walkdown Appendixteatin Coc Wl

5 0E-B-VS Vital Battery Charger and Charger Em 73 r 701 Eucinl Fntinl Wldw eference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,0.5Fntoa

Connection Boo ECES B8/04 Appendix C Table 2-4

55 1EPE-MX-RMXA2 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 700 99/46 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLOM Screened per IPEEE

SB SEPE-MX-EMXA4 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/47 Functional Functional Walk-By p 92 >RLGM Screened per FREEE

57 OBPE-MX-EMXH 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 FF/SB Functional functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per FREEE

Em 705SB DBPE-MX-EMXB4 BOO VAC Essential Power AUX 733 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IFEEE

BB/46

1ETp-CA-00O8(S9 CB) Pzr P0EV Relay/Indication AUX 750 CC/SO Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per IPEER

Main Control Board Cabinet for

60 1BOA-PN-MC9 Head-Vent Operation, HotleE AUX 767 Control Em 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 8B >RLGM Screened per IPEREE

Temperature Indication

61. 1EOA-FN-MC7 HS Igniter Control Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 929 Standby Functional Walk-By pB 86E>LGM Screened per FREEE

6 1E -N-C0Main Control Board Cabinet for CA/ AUX 767 Control Em 923 Standby Functixnal Walk-By pB8BRG ceee e PE

NC Systems

Main Control Board Cabinet for NI

63 SEOA-PN-MCSS System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 920 Standby Functional Walk-By FE 86 RLGM Screened per IPEER

Indication

Page 35 of 60


MNS Unit S ESEL and HCLPF Results

EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Waikdown or

ESEL Io teD Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS0

Screening Notes H-CLPF0

* Key Failare Mode0 00

Main Control Board Cabinet for SM

64 StOA-PN-MC2 System (PORy Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Stondby Fanctional Walk-By p 86 .>RLI3M Screened per IPEEL

Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet forICCM a 1EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 7B7 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p SB >RLGM Screened per [PEEL

ICCM Remote Display

ICCM b SEIA-CA-9211 Train A Retonte Display Processor AUX 7B7 Control Sm 925 Standby Punctional Walkdnwn Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6541behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4

ICMc II-A92 ri eoeDslyPoesr AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Waibdawn Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per SPR1 NP-6041behind 2MC2 Appendio C Table 2-4

ICCM d 1EIA-P-9250O Train A Remote Display

ICCM a 1EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display

ICCM f 1LIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-S6 Cabinet

ICCM g 1EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-S6 Cabinet

65 IlE-CA9010 SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Blank Valves65 1 Closure Permissive)

66 SIPE-CA-9025 SSPS Cabinet 'B' (CLA Block Valves

Closure Permissive)

67 1IEIB-PN-DGLSA Various Punctions (iLe. H2 Igniters)

120 VAC Inst and Control65 IEPG-PN-R•KVA Pnior

69 1EPG-BI-EVlA Vital Inserter

70 1F-LT6550 Steam Generator NR LevelIndication Loop 1

Steam Generator NR Level71 1F-LT5540 Indication Loop 2

Steam Generator NR Level72 SP-LT5570 Indication Loop S

Steam Generator Nt Level73 1P-LT6050 Indication Loop 4

74 SSM-PT-50B0 Steam Generator 61 Wide RangePressure Indication Loop

740a 1CA-PN-AFPA SA CA Pump Control Panel

75 1SM-PT-5i10 Steam Generator #2 Wide RangePressore Indication Loop

76 SSM-PT-5140 Steam Generator 63 Wide RangePressure Indication Loop

760a 1CA-PN-AFPB 19 CA Pomp Control Panel

77 1SM-PT-5170 Steam Generator 64 Wide Rangepmessurm Indication Loop

78 1C-RDSSSS Steam Generator 61 NC WR T-HotIndication Loop

79a iC-CASolo Reactor Vessel Level IndicationSystem (RVLIS) Cabinet Train A

79 1C-RD5570 Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-HotIndication Loop

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

RX

RX

RX

SX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

SX

Ann

RX

767

767

750

750

767

767

750

733

733

739

742

741

744

7S0

716

733

735

716

750

740

767

740

Control Sm 925

Control Sm 925

CC/S s

cc/S S

Control Sm 925

cc/54

Control Sm 925

cc/54

Sm 503BB/51

Sm 701

DD/54

Sm 701

CC/SO

Anosm 1A Sm

or° 4SR

Accum SB Rrm

146° 49R

Accum SC Sm

2S4° SSS

Accum iD Sm

32B° SBR

DD/44

Sm 560

BB/51

Rm 702

DD/53

Rm 702

DD/53

Sm 655

CC/Si

Rmn 802

00/45

24° 355

86/49

164° 30R

Standby

Standby

Standby

Standby

Standby

Standby

Standby

Nominal 120 VAC

Output

Nominal 120 VAC

Output

Indication

Indication

Indication

Indication

Indication

Standby

Indication

Indication

Standby

Indication

lndicat ion

Standby

Indication

Functional

Functional

Fu notion a

Functional

Functional

Punctional

Funcoti onal

Potnctis ona

Fsnctional

Indication

Indication

Indication

Indication

Indication

Functional

Indication

Indication

Functional

Indication

Indication

Pan ctin ona

Indication

Walk-By

Walk-By

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walk-B y

Walk-By

Walkdonm

Walk-Sy

Walk-By

Walkdown

Walkdomn

Walkdown

Walkdwnn

Waikdown

Walk-By

Walkdown

Waikdown

Walk-By

Waibdown

Walkdown

Walkdwnn

Walkdown

Role-of-nba-boo with 1MCS, which ban an IPEEESEWS

Sole-of-the-boo with 1MC1, which has an IPEEE

SEWS

Reference SO, Screens oct based on EPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,




p 511

p 11

Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6045-SL, Rev. 1,

Appendis C Table 2-4

p 203

p 65

Reference 10, Screens ant based on EPSI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5,


Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-5541-SL, Rev. 5,


Reference SO, Screens out based on EPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

AppendioC Table 2-4

Reference 10, Screens act based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

Appendin C Table 2-4

Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6045-SL, Sen. 1,

AppendinxC Table 2-4

p 150

Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-B541-SL, Rev. 5,

Appendlo C Table 2-4

Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5,

AppendisxC Table 2-4

p 150

Reference SO, Screens oct based on SPR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,


Reference 10, Screens nout based on EPRI-NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,


Reference 10, Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 5,


Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,


Screened

Screened

0.29

0.29

>RLGM

>RLGM

0.29

vRLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

vRLGM

0.37

>RLGM

Paunction al

Functional

Screened per IPEER

Screened per IPSEEE

Funot innnl

Screened per IPSEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per IPEER

Screened per IPSEEE


Screened per IPEEE



Screened per [PEEE



Functional


Page 36 of 60


MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results

EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Waikdown or

ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL. Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPP** Rep Failere Mode0 0

'

Steam Generatorf#3 NC WR T-HotReeee10Srenou aeonERNP64-LRv.,B0 1NC-RD-9590 RX 740 203° 30R indication Indication Walkdown Reeec>0 cen u ae nER P64-L e.1 RLGM Screened per SFR1 NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4

Steam Generator #4 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,91 1NC-RD-5920 55 740 306° 30R Indication Indication Waibdown '> RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4

#2 OSP-50 Containment NR Pressure AU 5 DS niain Idcto akonReference 10, Screens out based on SFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RG ScendprERN-64Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4

NC3WRNCessT-zer2PrsAure r73302Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1., nRG SceedprPRN-64NC1CPT52 WRPrssrierPesur3 R 72Indication indication Walkdown AppendixeendCpeTable P-204

indication Loop CC/46 Apni al -

Process Control Cabinet 1 Control Rm 925 Iniaon ndctn WlkB pB>RMB4 SEIA-CA-900AX 76Sniaio niaiolakBOp1 RG Screened per ]PEtE(7300 Cabinet) AUA/S45

~~ ~ ~~ S~A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil>RM ScendprPE35 1DT-06Storage Tank yard <760 N/A Intact/Availuble Intact/Available Walk-By pOSE>LM cend e PE

lB Diesel Generator Foel Oii ad <6 / natAalbe itc/vial akB 566 1FD-TK-0057 yr <70NA nttAaiaeInatAaabe Wk-y p56>RLGM Screened per IPEtEStorage Tank

600 VAC Essential for H12 SkimmerSm 803 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1,87 1EPE-MX-EMXA3 Pan lA Soction Isolation Valve AUX 750 Clsd Coe akon>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

1VXOA (04A) BB/43 lsd Cosd Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4

650 VAC Essential for 112 Skimmer86 1EPE-MX-EMXB5 Fan lB Suction Isolation Valve AUX Sm3733Closed Closed WalkdownRfrneiSresotbsdon>ER P64-SRv , uLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6t41

1VX2B (01C) BB/47 Appendix C Table 2-4

89 1EE-MXEMXC600 VAC Essential Vt/VX (04C, 06D&SOSD)

90 1EE-MXEMXD600 VAC Essential for Vt/VS (GEE &90 1B6-MXEMXD SOD)

H2 Skimmer Fan SA Section91 1VX-VA-0001A

Isolation Valve

92 1VX-AH-O003 Hydrogen Skimmer Pan No lA

H2 Skimmer Pan 16 Suction93 SVX-VA-OOO2B

Isolation Valve

64 1VX-AH-5054 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No lB

1VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan SA

95 (1RAF-D-2) Dumper

66 1VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Pan SA

97 1VE-XP-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan lA

66 1VE-XF-tO05 Annulus Ventilation Fan 18

99 1K-PU-003 61 Closed Cooling Water System

Pump

100 1C-PU-O04 82 Closed Cooling Water System

Pomp

101 1KC-TK-0059 Component Cooling Water SystemSurge Tank

102 1KC-VA-0OSOA KCAuoiliary Bldg Suppiy Non-Essential Isolation

103 KC-A-O30A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-103 1C-VA-230A Essential Isolation

104 1KC-VA-OoO1A KCAutiliary Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation

105 1C-VA-OO3A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-

Essential Isolation

AUX

AUX

5X

RX

tX

RX

55

RX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

700

733

831

616

631

610

773

773

767

767

733

733

767

710

750

733

733

Sm 603

Sm 705

66/32

265° 43R

272° 47R

279' 49R

268' 47R

270° 50R

273° 50R

ilJ/Si

NHH/52

HH/57

HH/57

J1J/97

li/S5

li/so

HH/OS

HH/SS

Closed

Closed

Closed

Off

Closed

Off

Closed

Off

Off

Off

On

On

Intact/In-Service

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Closed

Closed

Dpes

On

Open

On

Open

On

On

On

On

On

Iota ct/

In-Service

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Walk-By p 32

Walk-By p 32

Wakon Reference 10,Wakon Appendix C

Wakon Reference 10,Wakon AppendixoC

Wakon Reference 10,Appendix C

Walkdown Reference 10,Appendix C

Rule of tbe boo witb 1VX-AH-O001 which bus IPlWalk-By SEWS

Walk-By p 4 3 4

Reference 10, Screens out based on SPR1 NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1,Wakon Appendix C Table 2-4

Walkdomn Reference 10, Screens out based en EPRI NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1,Appendix C Table 2-4

Walk-By p 255

Walk-By p 255

Walk-By p3526

Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEtE, p 77S

Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773

Walk-By p 7 7

3 Included in ]PEER, p 773

Walk-By p 308

>RLOM

>RLGM

0.60

0.39

0.44

>RLGM

>SLGM

0.33

0.45

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perIPEEE

Functional

Anchorage

P usnctlonai

Ancborage

Screened perIPSEEE

Screened periPEEt

Anchorage

Anehorag#e

Screened perlIPEEE

Screened perlPEtEE

Screened perlPtEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPREEE

Screened periPEEE

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM

Page 37 of 60

Page 37 of 60


MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF ResultsEQUIPMENT

ESEL ID EDB Description

lOB 1KC-HX-O0055 Train A Component Cooling WaterHXt

107 1NC-VA-O052B NC System Pressurizer PORV

l0t 1NC-VA-OOB6B NC System Pressurizer PORV

109 1NC-VA-SSS1 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve

110 iNC-VA-tOSD Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve

111 iNC-VA-tOSS Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve

112 1ND-PU-0551 Train A ND Pump

113 lND-PU-5O02 Train B ND Pump

114 1ND-HX-SOS0 Train A ND HO

115 1ND-HX-OO04 Train B ND HO

118 iNO-HX-SOO5 Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HO

117 1ND-VA-OBOSAC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation

118 iND-VA-OSOiB RHR Pump Hotieg Suction Isolation

119 NI-V17SA Train A RHR Isolation to theCoildegs

Train B RHR Isolation to the120 1NI-VA-Ol7tB

Coldiegs

121 iNI-VA-OliSA Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegn

122 1NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs

123 1NI-VA-Ol5OB Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs

124 1NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hatlegs

125 1NI-VA-O162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs

128 1NI-PU-O059 Train ANI Pump

127 1NI-PU-5S1B Train B NI Pump

128 iNS-PU-BO0l Train A NO Pamp

129 1NS-PU-O002 Train B NO Pump

150 iNS-HX-SOO3 Train A NO Heat Bxchanger

131 1NS-HX-0004 Train B NO Heat Exchanger

132 OSM-VA-007AB Train A MSIV

OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or

Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode0 0 0

AUO 750

BRX

RX

RX

AUO

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUO

tX

tX

AUO

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUO

815

801

BOB

80B

801

B95

695

7500

750

695

745

745

733

733

716

742

716

750

733

716

716

695

690

750

750

792

JiJ/SB

Pressurizer Cavity

110' 329

Pressurizer Cavity

l0t' 329

Pressurizer Cavity

105' 359

Pressurizer Cavity

131' SOB

Pressurizer Cavity

101' SOB

BRa SOS

FF/54

BRa 501

GG/54

BRa 733

LL/S2

Rm 732

LL/B2

Bra 000

FF/S4

182' SOB

180' 229

BRa 602

tS1/52Bra 730

HH/52

BRa 603

JJ/52

FF/02

BRa 603

HH/02

BRa 817

HH/S2

BRa 730

Jl/Si

BRa 628

HH/54

BRa 828

GGt/S3

BRa 502

GG/SO

BRa 553

GG/SO

BRa 733

MM/Si

Bra 732

MM/Si

DD/43

Intact/ Intact/ Walkdow Reference 10, HCLPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >RLGMIn-Serv ice In-Serv ice Appendix C Struutural Mechanics Assuciates

Closed Closed Walk-By p7 7

3 Included in IPEER, p 773 >RLGM

Closed Cloned Walk-By p 773 Included in IPBEE, pT773 >RLGM

Closed Cloned Walk-By p 773 Included in [P8EE, pT77S >RLGM

Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IP99E, p 773 >RLGM

Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IP900, p 773 >RLGM

intact Pressure WakB p27Off WakB 23>RLGM

Bvundary

intact Pressure WakB p27Off WakB 23>RLGM

Boundary

Intact/ Intact/

In-Service in-Service WakB p45 LO

Intact/ Intact/

In-Service In-Service Wl-y p5 BO

Intact ntact alk-ByRule-of-the-boo with 1ND-PU-B002, wahich has an LOIPEEE SEWS

Closed/Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 775 >RLGM

Cloned/Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEtE, p 773 >RLOM

Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEtE, p 774

>RLGM

Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM

Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 included in IPEEE, pT77

4 >RLGM

Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEt, p 774

vRLGM

Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM

Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM

Open/Cloned Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPtEE, p 774 >BLGM

Intact Pressure WakB p24Off Wl-, p25>BLGM

Boundary

Intact PressureOff Bonay Walk-By p 245 >9LGM

Intact PressureOff Bonay Walk-By p 277 >RLGM

Intact PressureOff Bonay Walk-By p 277 >BLGM

Intact Intact Walk-By p 431 >RLGM

Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM

Open/Cloned Closed Walk-By pS300 >RLGM

Screened perlPEtEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screenud perlPEEE

Screened perPtEEE

Screened perlPtEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened per IPBEEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per PEEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened periPEEE

Screened periPEEE

Screened perIPEEB

Screened perlPEEB

Screened periPtEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened periPtEE

Screened perlPtEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened periPEEE

Screened perIPEEE

Screened periPEEE

Screened per PEtE

Screened perlPEEE

Page 38 of 60

DUO

AUX

AUX

DUO

Outer Doghouse(OH21)


MNJS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results

EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdomn or

Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPFP Key Failare Mode***

DD/S3 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per [PEEE

ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL

133 iSM-VA-OOOSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792(DH2)

134 1SM-VA-OSS3ABC Train C MSIV Inner Doghouse 792(DH2)

135 1SM-VA-OSOSAB Train 0 Mliv Outer Doghouse 792(OHi)

136 1SVVA-320 Train A Main Steum Safety Belief Outer Doghouse 79Valve (DHi)

137 1SV-VA-5021 Train A Main Steam Safety Belief Outer Doghouse 791Valve (DH1)

135 1SV-VA-3O22 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 731Valve (DH1)

139 SSVVA-023 Train A Main Steam Safety B elief Outer Doghouse 79Valve (DHi)

140Train A Main Steam Safetyr Relief Outer Doghouse 794 SRV-VA-t024 Vave911

Valve (DH2(

142 iSVVA-alS Train B Main Steam Safety Relief inner Doghoose 79Valve (DH2}

143Train B Main Steam Safety' Relief inner Doghouse 7914 SSV-VA-t016 Vave(12

1VV-17 Valve (DH2)

149Train B Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 791VA-OB Valve (DH2)

149Trait C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 793.4 15V-VA-OOSB Vave(1i

Valve (DHi)

148 iS-V-OlO Train C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse

149 iSV-VA-SOilTanCManSemSfeyRle8trDgos 791Valve (DH2)

155 1SVVA-512 Train C Main Steam Safety' Relief Outer Doghouse 79

151 1SV-VA-552 Tan0ManSemSfeyRle0nnrDgos 791Valve (DH2)

152 iSVVA-O~lTrain 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79Valve (DH2)

153Train 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 7948 1SV-VA-004O Vave(1i

Valve (0H1)

155 1SVVA-OSB Train 0 Main Steam Safety' Relief Inner Doghouse 79Valve (DH2)

15T-H-O ralB RN Pamp Motorm CootRlier AUXe 71gous

157 1SN-VA-053 N upDicag CosTri2U 716

159 1BN-VA-317O CHXCoigOae2upl U 730

159 iRN-VA-OlOBO3 H oln WtrOte U 733isVationD2

DD/S2

DD/44

00/43

EE/43

EE/43

EE/43

EE/43

0E/53

EE/53

EE/53

0E/52

00/52

E0/52

EE/43

EE/43

EE/43

EE/43

EE/43

00/57

FF/S6

LL/SS

HH/S4

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

In-Service

Normally Open

Throttled

Throttled

Closed Walk-By p 300




Closed Walk-By p 2

97


















in-Service Walk-By p 24 9


Open Walk-By p 77R

Open Walk-By pf776

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLIGM

>RLOM

>RLOM

>RLtGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGSM

>RLGIM

>BLOM

Bule-of-the-box with iRN-PU-0O04, which has an >RLGM

IPEE0 SEWS (p 249)

Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLOM

Included in IP00E, p 776 >RLGM

Included in IPE0E, p 776 >RLGOM

Screened perlIPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened periPEEE

Screened per PEEE

Screened per PEEE

Screened perlPEtE

Screened perlPOOR

Screened per IPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPREE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPERE

Screened periPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened per]PEEE

Screened perIPERE

Screened per POEE

Screened per[PotE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened perlPOEE

Screened perIPEEE

Screened per PEE0

Screened perlIPEEt

Screened perlIPEEt

Page 39 of 60

Page 39 of 60


MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HOLPF Results


ES6L ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS0

Screening Notes H-CLPP00

Key Failare Mode**

160 1EN-VA-0213B BKCPmMooCoerooig AUX 733 NH/SB Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 77B Included in lPttB, p 776 >BLGM Screened per IPEBEWater Outlet Isolation

161 iRN-VA-OBilB 2 CPm oo Coe on AUX 733 GG/57 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 77B Incloded In [PEEt, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEWaterOutlet Isolation

162 1RN-VA-0171B EDO KCD HX Sopply MOV Isolation AUX 73B6m 0 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Incloded in IPEEE, p 776 >RLOM Screened per IPEEBBB/45

163 1RN-VA-5174B EDO KCD HS Outlet MOV Isolation AUX 736 Rm6/45 Open Cloned Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 77B >ELGM Screened per IPEEE

164 1RN-VA-523B6 Train B NS HX Supply Isolation MOV AUX 73 Rm 732 Closed Closed Walk-By p 7 7

B Included in IPEEE, p 776 >ELGM Screened per IPEEEKK/S1

lBS5 1.RN-HX-B01B Train B NV Pomp Mtr Cooler AUX 71.6 Em 630 Standby/ Intact Walk-By p 252 Role-of-the-hon with 1NV-PU-OO1B, which has an >RLGM Screened per IPEEENH/SB In-Sernice IPEEE StWS (p 252)

Em 63 Soanby/ Ble-of-the-boo with 1N V-PU-O0l6, which has an16RSN-X-630ran NSPmtBarngOidooer AU 76Intact Walk-By p

2S

2 >RLGM Screened per IPEBE

16NR-XO2 ri VPmpBaigOlCoe U 1 H/SB In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 232)

167 1RN-HX-5022 Train B NV Pomp Gearbox Oil Cooler AUX 716 EmH635 InStardby/ InacPWl-BEE6 RoE-o-te-o wit 1N-U2152hc)oe >LMSrendprP

166 1VA-AH-5023 Train B NI Pump AHU AUX BBS Em 303 Standby Intact Walkdown Reeec '0 Same make/model as U2 ESEL 160 >ELGM Screened per IPEEtGG/BS Appendix C

163 1VA-AH-OO27 Train B ND Pump AHU AUX BBSEmB5 Standby Intact Walk-By p 4

1.3

>RLOM Screened per IPEEEFF/54

17Rr-n02 ranBN upMr olrAX 70E 626 Sadyrce Wl-y p23 Role-of-the-boo with 1NI-PU-O01O, which has an LMBrendprPE17 R-XO2 ri IPm t olrAX6 GG/S3SadyBnat WlkB 4 IPEEE SEWS (pl245) >LMSree e PE

171 1EN-HX-O026 Train B NI Pump Erg Oil Cooler AUX 716 EmG626 Standby Intact Walk-By p 245 RolE-ftE-booW wit 1N-P-01,whchbso>RLGM Screened per IPEEt

172 1.RN-VA-0297B lB EN Essential Botuom Header to AUX 716 Em 602 Closed Open Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >BLGM Screened per IP6EESNBWP EE/52

173 OEN-VA-5283AC 1B/2B EN Disch To BC X-Over Ieel AUX 716 REE/02 Open Closed Walk-By p77B Included in IPEtE, p 77B >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE

174 SRN-VA-0152B 1B/2B EN Essential Return Header AUX 716 Em 647W Cloned Open Walk-By p776 Incloded in IPEtE, p 77B >BLGM Screened per IPEEEto SNBWP EE/B0

1.73 SRN-VA-Ol5iB Isola Rtio n HedrCosTan AUX 733 EE/54 Closed Closed Walk-By p77B Included is IPEtE, p 776 >ELOM Bcreened per IPEtEE

Emn 647W176 2RN-VA-0297B 2B RN Eon Hdr SNSWP Return Inn AUX 716 E/OOpen Cloned Walk-By p786 Included in IPOEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per fREEE

177 iA-VAi~iB Isolation from circulating water

1770a 1CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Value

177 b 1CA-RV-1622 Relief Value

1770c 1CA-GC-1625 Control Air Gas Cylinder

177 d l.CA-GC-1621. Control Air Gas Cylinder

1770 1 CA-PS-5360 Pressure Switch

Aux

Ace

Aux

Aun

Ace

Ace

Cloned

Energized

Closed

Intact

Iotacot

Functional

Open

Energized

Closed

Intact

Intact

Functional

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Ben. 1.,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on PElR Nf-6041-BL, Ben. 1.,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-BL, Bee. 1,

Table 2-4

Bcreens nut based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1,

Table 2-4

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

Screened per PElR NP-6041

Screened per PElR NP-6041




Screened per EPRI NP-6041.

Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1, >LM ScendprERNP041776f 1CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Ace 716 Functional Punctional Walkdown Tableceeedpr P2-4-64

177 g iCA-T-B-90l Juc'n6o6 oue'ely A n Ace 733 Functional Punctiena[ Walkdown HCLPF for relays, SEWs for remainder of cabinet 0.60 Functional

Letdown Inboard Containment Screens nut based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Ben. 1.,170 1NV-VA-0035A soainRX 752 Open Cloned Walkdown Tbe24>ELGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

17 a 1N-S-0B0 SoenidVaueRE 75 Eerizd e-negied WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Bee. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041178 /N-SV035 Solnoi Vave X 75 Enrgied e-enrgied alkownTable 2-4

Page 40 of 60


MNS Unit 1 ESEL arid HCLPF Results


ESEL. ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS. Screening Notes HCLPFs Key Failure Mode**

Screens out based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RG ScendprER P64178 b 1NV-SV-OSSl Solenoid Valve RX 7 52 Energized De-energized W alkdown Table 2-4>R GSce n dprE R N -04

179 SNV-VA-5121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 tHR HtX Room Cloned Closed Walkdown Screens out bused on EPRI NF-6541-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EFRI NF-6541

Table 2-4

179 a 1NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Waikdown Rule-of-the-bus with SMCSS >RLGM Screened per lFEEE

180 SNV-VA-04S7A etonIbadotin ntRK 752 Closed Closed Waikdown SresotaednEP N-4-LR.1, >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041

Isolation

180 a iN V-S V-4570 Solenoid Valve

lBS b 1NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve

181 1V-VA-458A Letdown Inboard ContainmentIsolation

1810a 1NV-SV-45B0 Solenoid Valve

191 b 1NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve

182 1NV-VA-t025B Excess Letdown Isolation

1820a 1NV-SV-5255 Solenoid Valve

Instrument Air Blackout183 1VI-TK-O0150 cauae

184 1VI-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief

185 iVI-l3S0 Blankout Header Relief

186 iVI-i989 US VI 8/o HDR FLEX AIR SUPPLYCNTRL

187 1ET8 4 KV Essential Swgr

RX

RX

RK

RX

AUX

AUK

AUX

Aux

Aux

752

752

752

752

752

725

725

750

750

750

750

733

De-energized

Dc-energized

Closed

Dc-energized

De-energized

Closed

Do-energized

Iota ct

Closed

Closed

Closed

Energized

De-energized

De-energized

Closed

De-energized

De-energized

Closed

De-energized

Intact

Closed

Closed

Open

Energized

Walkdown

Wulkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Waikdown

Walkdewn

Walk-By

Tacle i-sScreens out based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EFR1 NF-6541-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EFRI NF-5541-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EPRI NF-8041-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on SPRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based en SPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EFRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4, Anchorage qualified for 2oSSE

Screens out based on FF91 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens out based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4

Screens oat based on EFRI NF-E541-SL, Rev. 1,

Table 2-4, Design qualified for 2xSSE

Included in PEEt, p 790

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

vRLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

>RLGSM

Screened per EFRI NP-R541

Screened per EFRI NP-E541

Screened per tPRI NF-6t4l

Screened per EFRI NF-6041


Screened per EPRI NF-E541




Screened per EF91 NP-6t41


Screened per IPEEE

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGSM

* Page number refers no IPEtE scanned document page.*0 HCLPF values of RFLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.2Bg), hut that a sp~ecific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component

was screened out from further evaluation.

0*0* Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened perlIPEEE-lIndicates thatithocomponent was evaluated insthe IPEtEEand therefore weetsnthe RLGM demand.

Screened per EF91 NF-6t41 - Indicates that tbe component meets the screening criteria of SF91 NF-R041, Table 2-4usnd that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor

nor interactions limit the reported HCLFF.

Interaction,- Block Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets

the RLISM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLP~s exceed the reported HCLFF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

*000* Component adjacentto block wall. Aue building block wails were evaluated in the IPEEE as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-1.

However block wall may have lower HCLFF than component, therefore HCLFF reported here as >RLGM.

Page 41 of 60


Appendix B


Page 42 of 60


MNS Unit 2 ESEL. and HCLPF Results

EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE

Walkdomn nrESEL. ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Wl-y SEWS

5Screening Notes lHCLPP* Key Failure Mode**

5

1

2

3

4

S

6

7

8

8

10

11

2FW-VA-OSO32

2FW-VA-0O33A

2FW-VA-OOO1A

2ND-VA-0056

2ND-VA-SO06

2ND-VA-O064

2NI-VA-0Ou9

2NI-VA-0151

2N1-VA-0161

ORN-VA-0007A

2NV-VA-O095B

Refueling Water Retire PumpSuction Isolation

Refueling Water Recirc Pump

Suction Isolation

Refueling Water Recirc Pomp

Suction Isolation

ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs

ND Relief - Hotlegs

NO Relief - 'B' Coldlegs

NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg

Ni Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg

Ni Relief- Coidleg

SNSWP Supply to Units l and 2

NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cost

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

750

750

750

733

716

733

716

750

733

716

733

Rm 626J J/6i

Rm 824

Rm 626

J J/Gi

HH/60

FF/60

66/60

Rm 830

66/60

Rm 788

H H/60

Rm 601

AA/63

Rm 802A

EE/G0

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Open

Open/Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Open

Closed

Walk-By

Walk-By

Walk-Gy

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Wulkdown

Walkdown

Walkdown

Walk-By

Walk-By

p 782 Included in ]PEtE, p 782

p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782

p 782 Included in IPEtE, p 782

Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,

Appendio C Table 2-4

Referenun 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,


Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1,







Appoendix C Table 2-4

p 77G Included in IPEER, p 778

p785 included in IPtEEE, p 788

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

Screened perlPEER

Screened perlPEER

Screened perlPEtEE



Screened per EFRI NP-6041




Screened perlIPEGE

Screened per PEtEE

12 2CA22CReactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Caxity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, >RM ScendprPIN-04Isolation-OValAe RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown AppendixeendCpeTable P-204

Isolation Valve ~~117' 2CR Apni al -

Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Caxity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rex. 1, >LM SceedprERN-0413 2NC-VA-0273ACRX72-CSdCosd OeanClsd Wldw>LM SrendprPRN-64

Isolation Value RX 72B° SieCoed Oe0ndCoeRWidw Appendix C Table 2-4

NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cauity Coe pnadCoe akB 8 nlddi PEp73>LMSree e PE4 2N-AO3ASolenoids and Pneumatic Controls RX 806 Clsd pnan5lse°ak-y p 8 ncue5iRERp2

1.5 2N1-VA-0430A 2NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply RX 762 2A CLA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 785 Included in IPEEt, p 785 >RLGM Screexed per PEEtfrom 2A CIA (MOV) 45° SiR

16 2FW-TK-O000a Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Reference 10, Included in IPtEE (p 772). Enaluated by Structural >RLOM Screened per IPEER

Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461).

43 N-AOSA 2ACABokVle MV X 73 Pp 46Rs Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEER, p 784 >RLGM Screened per FREEE

18 2N1-VA-B065B 26 CIA Block Value (MDV) RX 733 Pipe Chase Oe 14 Coe akB 8 nlddi PEp74>LMSree e PE

138e 47Rs Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in FREEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per ]PEER

18 2N1-VA-0076A 2C CIA Block Value (MOV) RX 733 Pipe Chas

20 2NI-VA-0088B 20 CIA Block Value (MOV) RX 73 Pipe Chase317° 49R Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in [PEER, p 784 >RLOM Screened per IPEER

21- 2EHM-TP-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 730 CC/61 off Functional Walk-By p74 New equipment - updated IPEGE SEWS exaluation. >RLOM Screened per IPEEG

22 2EHM-PN-HMPPA HZ2Igniter Power Panel AUX 750 CC/Ga Standby Punctional Walkdown ReeeclBounded by exaluation of 2EHM-TB-a589. >RL0M Screened per tPRI NP-6041-Appendix C

2EHM-HR-TB03 A ri 2giesRfrne1,Nti xeinedtbs.Tse oSUT23 thru TB7a (Odd A'TanH giesRX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown Rfrne.,No nxpinedabs.TstdoSUTS >RLGM Undetermined

numbers only) (35 igoiters per Train) Appendix C TRS.

23 2HM-X-MBP Vltge edBypssSwtchAU 75 C/6 Deenrgied Fuctina WakdwnReference 1.0, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, >81GM Screened per EPRI NP-804123 a 2EHMSX-H8PA oltae Re Bypss witc AUX 750 C/Ga De-eergied Fnctonal Wankown ppenixbCTabl22-

Page 43 of 60


MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPP Results


Walkdown or SWCSreigNtsNLPC- KyPjseMdfESEL ID ED B D escription B ldg EL Loca tion N orm al State D esired State W alk-B ySE SSc e n g N o sH L F * . K e Fal r M d e *

23 b 2EHM-VR-HMRA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 CC/Ri ce-energized Functional Walkdown Rfrne1,SensotbednEPIN-4-Sev1,0.29 FunctionalAppendix C Table 2-4

24 2EHM-TB-1SB9 Local Terminal Boa AUX 750 cc/el n/u Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens oat bused on RPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.60 Functional

Appendio C Table 2-4

25 Deleted

26 2CA-HX-5003 TDCAP Bearing Oil cooler AUX 716 AA/RO Idle Functional Walk-By p 542 >RLGOM Screened per IPEEt

27 2CA-PU-0S03 TurieD rive PAu mp)ryFed e AUX 716 AA/R0 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >RLGM Screened per IPEER

27 a 2SA-TR-O0003 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 Ak/GO Idle Functional Walk-By RulE-ftE-booW wih2>F-03,wihbsa RLGM Screened per PEEt

Rule-of-the-boo wink 2cA-pu-0003, which bus an >LM Sree e PE27 b 25A-VA-0004 TDCAP Steam control Valve AUX 716 AA/60I Idle Functional Walk-By FPEEE SEWS RMScendprFE

Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-PU-0003, which bus an27 c 2SA-GV-0003 TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Wulk-By FPEEE SEWS >RLGM Screened per FREEE

27 d 2Sk-OX-S003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By RIn-ftE-booEW wih2A>-03,wihbsa RLOM Screened per FREEE

28 2cA-PN-AFTp TDCAp control Panel AUX 716 AA/el n/u Available Walk-By p 187 >RLOM Screened per FREEE

29 25A-VA-O048ABC TDCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 Pp/SR Idle Open Walk-By p 796 Included in IPERE, p 7R6 >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE(AOV) (DH3)

lo S-V08 ArSpl oeoi upVle Iner Doghouse PP F/S9 Energized ce-energized Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R0412a 2A-V00 AiSppySlniDupVle (DHS) 77Appendloxc Table 2-4

Reerncn1,Scees uDbsegohERoN-641seev 1 >RLGM Screened per EFR1 NP-604129 b 2SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve InerDoHous 767 FF/S9 Energized De-energized Waikdown Reee~Appendlo10c TableS en2-4°u ae nER P64-L e.1

Rm 601

30 2SA-VA-0003 TDCAF Trip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 PF/eR Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEER, p 786 >RLISM Screened per IPEER

31 Deleted

32 Deleted

33 Deleted

54 2-V-32 2A VI Essential Hdr Supply from VO U 3 Rm 726 closed closed Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLOM Interaction - Block Wall

Inlet Relief (115 psiE) F/9Appendio C Table 2-4

2B Vi Essential Hdr Supply from VG RefeencM10ISceensoutbusdno -F1BNP604-SLWRe.l135 2Vl-VA-0034 AUoRLOM/8 loeInteraction efrece10 -rensou Black PR N-64WallRv.1

Inlet Relief (115 psig()U 3 PS lse lsd Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4

36 2VI-VA-0112 2AV u ~gIsrmn i ak AX 73R 2 lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-BO41-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041

Relief (115 psig) AUF33F/SRApndxCTal -

37 2IV-14 2A VI Auo Bldg Instrument Air Tank AX 73Rm 725 Closed closed Walkdow Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

Relief (115 pslg) F/9Appendio C Table 2-4

38 2VI-A S 28 VI Ase Bldg Instrument Air Tank AU 3 F5 lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R041Relief (115 psig) AU 3 PS lsdcoe abon Appendio c Table 2-4

39 2lV-16 2B VI Ace Bldg Instrument Air Tank AU 3 F5 lsdCoe akon Reference 10, Screens out based on SF91 NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLOM Screened per EPRI NP-R0412-V-16 Relief (115 psUi73P/Sglse loe aidw Appendix C Table 2-4

40 2-V-09 2SM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 790D/67 closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-R041-SL, Rev. 1, oRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-R0412V-A25 120 psig) (DH4() 9 Appendix C Table 2-4

Page 44 of 60


MNS Unit 2 ESEL and H-CLPF Results


Walbdown or

ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State wl-y SEWS* Screening Notes H-CI.PFP Key Failure Mode**

25M-7A8 VI Accumulator Relief Dater Doghouse Referesce 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1,41 2V1-VA-2018 g10pig D4 790 DD/68 Closed Closed Walkdown Apeni C'Tb '24RLGM Screened per EFRI NF-6041

4 2V-A2 2 SM3B8IAcmuao eif Ine ohueReference 10, Screens out bused on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM scendprERN-6442 2lV-09 {25M30 iAcuuao RelifgInerDoHous 790 DD/60 Closed Closed Wolkdows Appendsx C Table 2-4>RM SrendprERN-64

45 ~ 2SM-SAB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 79 05 lsdCoe ld Reference 10, Screens ost based on EFRI NF-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RO cendprER F6443 2lV-09 (120 psig) (DH3} 70D/9 ls)Cosd Wldw Appendin C Table 2-4>RM ScenderERNP64

44 2CA-VA-0084AB OAFo oto o2 1 n AUX 718 Rm80Open peThttd/ Walk-By p 781 Included in PEEE, p781. >RL0M Screened per FREEEAssociated Pneumatic Controls B8/62 Closed

44 a 2CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-bus with 2MC1O >SLGM Screened per PEtEE

44 b 2CA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 718Rm80 Functional Functional Walk-By Role-of-the-boa with 2CA-84AB >RL0M Screened per PEtEE

88/62

Sm 801

44 d 2CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 716 .•,. Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hon with 2CA-64A8 >RLGM Screened per PEtEE

44 e 2CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve

44 f 2CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve

TDCA Flow Control to 28 50 and45 2C-VA-052A8Associated Pneumatic Controls

45 a 2CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader

45 b 2CA-SS-0520 Selector twitch

45 c 2CA-MT-0520 Misc Transmitter

45 d 2CA-VF-0520 Valve Fositioner


4S f 2CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve

TDCA Flow Control to 2C SO and48 2CA-VA-0048AB

Associated Pneumatic Controls

48 a 2CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader

46 b 2CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch

48 c 2CA-MT-0480 Misc Transmitter

48 d 2CA-VP-0480 Valve Fositioner


481f 2CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve

TDCA Flow Control to 2D010 and47 2C-VA-058A8Associated Pneumatic Controls

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

718

716

718

787

718

718

716

716

716

716

787

716

718

716

716

nn/oL

Sm 601

Sm 601

Sm 601

BB/81

Control Sm 825

Sm 601

B8/81

Sm 601

8BB/61

Sm 601

88/61

Sm 801

Sm 801

Sm 601

CC/Bo

Control Sm 925

Sm 801

CC/BO

Sm 801CC/Bo

Sm 601

CC/Ba

Sm 601

Energized

Energized

Open

Functional

Functional

Functional

Functional

Energized

Energized

Open

Functional

Functional

Functional

Functional

Energized

Reference 10,Energized Walkdown Apni

Reference 10,Energized Walkdown Apnl

Open/Throttled/ WakB p78Closed

Functional Walk-By

Functional Walk-By

Functional Walk-By

Functional Walk-By

Reference 10,Energized Walkdown Apni

Energized Walkdown Rernc10Appendix C

Dpen/Throttled/ Walk-By p 781

Closed

Functional Walk-By

Functional Walk-By

Functional Walk-By

Functional Walk-By

Reference 10,Energized Walkdomn Apni

Reference 10,Energized Waikdown Apni

Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 781

Closed

Included in IPEER, p 781

Sale-of-the-hon with 2MC1O

Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-52A8

Rule-of-the-has with 2CA-52A8

Rule-of-the-hon with 2CA-52AB

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM

>RL0M

>RLGM

>RLGM



Screened per IPEtE

Screened per PEtEE

Screened per IPEEE

Screened per PEtE

Screened per FPEEE


AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

Included in PEES, p 781

Rule-of-the-hon with 2MC10

Role-of-the-hon with 2CA-48AB

Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-48AB

Sole-of-the-hon with 2CA-48AB

>RLGM

>RLiM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLOM

>RLOM

Screened per EPRI NF-B041

Screened per FPEES

Screened per FPEES

Screened per FPEES

Screened per FPEES

Screened per PEEt


Screened per EPRI NP-6041AUX 716 Sm 601 Energized

Sm 601AUX 716 88/83 Open

>RLOM

Included in PEES, p 781 >RLOM Screened per FEES

Page 45 of 60




Walkdown or SW cenn oe CP e alr oeESELID EoDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State waSlk-eigyoe HLF* e aiueMoe*

47 a 2CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 625 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hon with 2MCSO >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE

47 b 2CA-SS-5360 Selector Switch AUX 716 6w61Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-hoe with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per [FEtEEBB/63

47 d 2CA-VF-0360 VastTrFnsmitioer AUX 716 RmBaFunctional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-3eAB >RLGM Screened per PEEt66/63

e7 2CA-SVP-0360 SolvenPosidtVaner AUX 71.6 Rm60unergizedl Eunergizedl Walkdown Appendi-n Ct 2A3AB>LG creedpr PE

47 f 2CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reeece1,RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041Appendix C

46 25VCV-OSV-31BA lniB av U 76R 0 nried Eegzd W dw >RLGM Screened per PEPR tE-4

48 2VC-09B26 S0 Main Steam FORV and Outer Doghouse 89FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 264 >LMSree e PE

Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH4) Closed LMScendprPt

50 25V-CV-00S7ABC 2BS6anSemPR ad OtrD os 09 FF/66 Closed OeThotd/ Walk-By p 264 >RLGM Screened per IPEtEAssociated Pneumatic Controls (OH4) Closed

20 53 Main Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse BO PS lsd Open/Throctled/ akB 651 2SV-CV-0501AB60 F5 lse akB 9 >RLGM Screened per PEEt

51Associated Pneumatic Controls (OH3) Closed

52 2EPL-FN-EVOA Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution R MScendprFt5 2ELP-VA Panel AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212>RGSrendplPE

52 a 2EPL-PN-EVDD Vital Battery 126 VDC Distribution>6M ScendprPEPanel AUX 733 CC/57 Functional Punctional Walk-By p 212 >LMSree e PE

63 OEPL-BA-EVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C54Functional Functional Walkdown RefreLeM0,ppInteractionndnt - Blockstng rfertoUWall 5

54 0EPL-BC-EVCS Vt Bteyhagradhrer AX 73RmTO 70upnctional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens oct based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Ren. 1, 0.45 FunctionalConnection Boo ECBS BB/54 Appendix C Table 2-4

55 2EPE-MX-EMXA4 650 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE

56 2EPE-MX-EMXA2 650 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPOEE

57 2EPE-MX-EMXB4 650 VAC Essential Power AUX Rm3716Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RL0M Screened per IPEtEE66/63

2ETP-CA-0010SB Pzr FORV Relay/Indication AUX 767 HH/SB Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per FREEE

(2ATC 10)

Main Control Board Cabinet for

56 2EOA-PN-MCS Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rrn 625 Standby Functional Walk-By p686 >RL0M Screened per FPEEE

Temperature Indication

Main Control Board Cabinet with60 2EOA-PN-MC7 AX 77 onrlR92 Stny Futinl W k-y p8>RLGM Screened per PEtE

H2 Igniter Control SwitchAU76 Coto6w65 Sady Fninl WlkB p6

Main Control Board Cabinet for CA61 2EOA-PN-MC10 AUX 767 Control 6m 625 Standby Functional Walk-By p 66 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

/ NC Systems

Main Control Board Cabinet for NI

62 2EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 525 Standby Functional Walk-By p686 >RLGM Screened per FPEEE

Indication

Page 46 of 60


MNS Unit 2 ESEL. and HCLPF Results


ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Wldw T SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPP** Key Failure Mode**Walk-By

Main Control Board Cabinet for SM63 2tOA-PN-MC2 System (PORV Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Sm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p Se >RLGM Screened per IPtEEE

Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet forICCM a 2EOA-FN-MC1 AU 6 oto m95 Sadb ucinl Wl-y p8 RLGM Screened per IPEtEEICCM Remote DisplayAU 76 CotoSm95 Sady Fninl Wlky p6

ICCMb 2EA-CA9211 Train A Remote Display Processorbehind 2MC2

ICCMc 2EA-CA9221 Train S Remote Display ProcessorICCMc 25A-CA5221 behind 2MC2

ICCM d 2tIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display

ICCM e 2EIA-P-9220 Train S Remote Dinsplay

ICCM f 2EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-SS Cabinet

ICCM g 2tIA-CA-922t Train S ICCM-SS Cabinet

SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Block Valves64 21E-CASG1S Closure Permissive)

6B 21E-CA9020 SSPS CabinetS'' (CLA Block Valves

Closure Permissive)

66 2EQB-FN-DGLSA Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters)

120 VAC Inst and Control67 2EPG-PN-EKVA

Panelboard

66 2EPG-Bl-EVIA Vital leverter

Steam Generator NS Level69 2CF-LT-60t nicto Lo

70 2P-LT554t Indication Loop 2

Steam Generator NS Level71 2CP-LT-557t

Indication LoopS2

Steam Generator NR Level72 2P-LTSG~t Indication Loop 4

Steam Generator 61 WievRang

73 2SM-PT-50O Sea50eatr# id agPressure Indication Loop

73 a 2CA-FN-AFFA 2A CA Pump Control Panel

Steam Generator #2 Wide Range74 25M-FT-311G

Pressure Indication Loop

75 2M-PT5140 Steam Generator 63 Wide Range


75 a 2CA-PN-AFPS 26 CA Pump Control Panel

Steam Generator #4 Wide Range76 2SM-PT-5170


Steam Generator #51 NC WS T-Hot77 2C-SDSSS0 Indication Loop

N/A Reactor Vessel Level Indication77 a

(no EDB #) System {RVUS) Cabinet

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

RX

RX

RX

RX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

RX

AUX

767

767

767

767

750

750

767

767

750

733

No

739

742

740

744

750

716

733

733

716

750

740

767

Control Rm 929

Control Sm 925

Control Sm 925

Control Sm 929

cc/ss

cc/S s

Control Sm 929

CC/S SControl Sm 625

CC/SBS

Smn SOS

BB/61

Sm 731

DD/54

Rm 701

cc/ss

Accam 2A Sm

36' 46R

Accum 26 Sm

145° SSR

Accum 2C Sm

219' S6R

Attain 2D Sm

326' S7S

Sm 604

DD/67

Sm 601

BB/61

Sm 713

DO/59

Sm 713

DD/59

Sm 601

cc/62

Sm 6t4

00/67

24' SOR

BS/63

Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference it, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >LMStandy Funtionl Wa~down Appendis C Table 2-4>RG

Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference it, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LMStandy Funtionl Waldown Appendix C Table 2-4>RG

Rule-of-the-box with 2MC1, which has an IPEEtStandby Functional Walk-By utWS >RLGM

Rule-of-the-box with 2MC1, which has an IPEtEEStandby Functional Walk-By SEWS >RLGM

Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference 3D, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6G41-SL, Rev. 1, 02Appendix C Table 2-4

Standy Funtionl Waldown Reference 3D, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 02Appendix C Table 2-4

Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM

Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM

Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6G41-SL, Rev. 1,Standby Functional Waikdown Apeni C'abe - 0.29

Nmnl10VC Functional Walk-By p 209 >SLGMOutput

Nmnl10VC Functional Walk-By p 65 vRLGMOutput

indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >LMAppendix C Table 2-4

indicaion Idicaton Wabdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LM

Indication Indication Walkdown Rfrne1,SresotbsdnSF1P-4-Lev1, >RLGMAppendix C Table 2-4

Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, xLGAppendix C Table 2-4

Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sex. 1, >R M

Indication indication Walkdown Reeec>0 cen u ae nS5 P94-L e.1 RLOMAppendis C Table 2-4

Indicaion Idicaton Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, LMAppendix C Table 2-4

Standy Functional Walk-Sy p 180 >RLGM

Indiction Indiatio Waldown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-5041-SL, Rev. 1, SOAppendix C Table 2-4

Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >LMIndication Indication Walkdown ApenixCLabeM-

Functinal Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 03stadbyAppendix C Table 2-4

Screened per EPSI NP-6041


Screened per IPEE5

Screened per IPEER

Functional

Functional

Screened per FREEE

Screened per IPEtS

Functional

Screened per IPREEE

Screened per FREEE

Screened per EPRI NP-6t41


Screened per EPRI NP-6t41


Screened per SFR1 NP-6041

Screened per PEEt



Screened per IPSEEE

Screened per SFPR1 NP-6041


Functional

Page 47 of 60




Walkdown or SESSreigNtsHLP KeFaleMoe5

ESEL ID EDn Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired StateSESSrennNosHLP* KyFaleMde*Walk-By

Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1,78 2CR-BO Indicatios Loop RX740 164° 3CR Indicatios Indication Walkdown ApedxCTal - RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B041

79 2C080 Steam Generator #3 NC WR T-Hot RefLGM Screenednsoutbapero EEPRNP60NP-854e1 179 2CR-90 Indication Loop RXf 740 203° 3CR Indication Indication Walkdown Refreseni SO Screen out basedMon EPRIeNP-pe41-PRIRev.41

Steam Generator #4 NC WRT-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,80 2NC-RD-920 RX70 3o 0 niaio niain Wldw RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E041

80Indication Loop RN70 38 C niain Idcto akon Appendin C Table 2-4

1 2SP-00 Cndctaiomnt LooPresr AUX 750 00/60 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RG cendprER P64Indcaton oopAppendin C Table 2-4

INdCato LooPrsuie AUXssur/87 Iniaio nicto3Widw Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1,82 2NC-PT-5120 IndCatWR Loprsuie PressureDRm713dcton idcton Wldw Appendix C Table 2-4 >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041

Process Control Cabinet 1 Control Rm 825(32I-A91 7300 cabinet) AUX 767 AA/54 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16 >LMSree e PE

84 2F0-TK-0558 2A Diesel Generator Fuel OilYrd <6NA Inatvilbe nac/albe WlkB p5684 2DT-06 Storage Tank Yr <70NAnttAvial Inatvaabe W k-y p56>RLGM Screened per IPEER

28 Diesel Generator Puel Oil85 2FD-TK-0O57 Strg akYard <780 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By 556 >LMSree e PE

800 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer88 2EPE-MX-EMXA3 Pan 2A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 Rm85Closed Closed Walkdown Reeec'0 cen u ae nER P64-L Re. RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-B041

2VXIA (04A) 88/86 Appendix C Table 2-4

800 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer87 2EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 28 Suction Isolation Valve AUX 733 Rm 718 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041

2VX2B (0iC) 88/65 Appendiu C Table 2-4

800 VAC Essential VE/VX (04C, 080 Rm 80588 2OPE-MX-EMXC &O030) AUX 750 ta/S9 Closed Closed Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

800 VAC Essential for VE/VX (OBE & Rm 71688 2EPE-MX-EMXDO 5D AUX 733 B60Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

H2 Skimmer Fan 2A Suction Reference 10,0.0untoa80 2VX-VA-G001A Isolation Valve RX 828 264' 45R Closed Open Walkdown Appendix C0.0Fntoa

81 2VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen skimmer Fan No 2A RX 818 272° 38R Off On Walkdown Rfrne0,0.38 AnchorageAppendix C

H2 Skimmer Pan 28 Suction Refncencena09 2V--OOB Isolation valve RX 827 283' 489 Closed Open Walkdown Refeencex 10 0.41 Fntoa

83 2VN-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Pan No 28 RX 8186 288' 389 off On Walkdown Rfrne1,0.38 AnchorageAppendix C

2VX-DA-8125 Containment Air Return Fan 2A tale-of-the-bun with 2VX-AH-GOOB, which has an84 RX775 27°5RCoevOe ak RL0M Screened per IPEEE

(2RAF-D-2) Damper RN20 0 lse pn Wl-yPEEE SEWS

90 2VX-AH-0051 Containment Air Return Fan 2A RX 770 270' SOR Off On Walk-By p 4 3 4

>RLGM Screened per PEtEE

RB 2VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 2A AUX 767 u /OS Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-3L, Rev. 1, 0.35 AnchorageAppendis C Table 2-4

87 2VE-XF-O0005 Annulus Ventilation Fan 28 AUX 787 JJ/6S Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-8041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.30 AnchorageAppendix C Table 2-4

A82CP-0 l A Closed Cooling Water System AUX 750 GG/SO On On Walk-By p 255 >LMSree e PE

Pump

99 2CP-02 A2 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 700 PP/SO On On Walk-By p 2550MS0endpe PE

Pump

100 2KC-TK-0009 Component Cooling Water System AUN 787 J /57 Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Walk-By p 528 >LMSree e PESerge Tank>RG ScendprPE

KC Auoiliary Bldg Supply Non-101 2KC-VA-0055A Essential Isolation AUX 750 LI/S9 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEER, p 783 >RLOM Screened per IPEEE

XC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-1_02 2KC-VA-0230A Essential Isolation AUX 730 LLI58 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in {PEEt, p 783 vRLOM Screened per IPEER

Page 48 of 60



EQUIPMENT

ESEL ID EDB Description

103 2KCVA-OO KG KAuxiliary Bldg Return Non-103 2C-VA-001A Essential Isolation

104 2C-VA-OOBA KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-104 2G-VA-OOSA Essential Isolation

Bldg

AUX

AUX

EL

750

750

Location

GG/5e

GG/56

OPERATING STATE

Normal State Desired State WaEWdom*orScreening NotesWalk-By

Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEtE, p 783

Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p SOB

HCLPF**

>RLOM

>RLOM

Key Failure Mode0*

Screened per IPEEE

Screened perlPEEE

15 2 -H-OS Train A Component Cooling Water AX 70JJ7 Inatn-eve ta/n-eie Wadon Reference 10, HICLPF based us IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >LMSree e PE10HXCH-00 AU 5 J5 natI-evc nati-evc aku Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates>RM ScendprPE

106 2NC-VA-5032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 8BOB esrie Cvt Closed Closed Walk-By p 763 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLOM Screenhd per IPEEE110° 32R

107 2NC-VA-OOSBB NC System Pressurizer PORV

103 2NC-VA-SO01i Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve

109 2NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve

110 2NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve

111 2ND-PU-SOO01 Train A ND Pump

112 2ND-PU-5002 Train B ND Pump

113 2ND-HXt-OOS3 Train A ND HiX

114 2ND-HX-O004 Train B ND HX

115 2ND-HX-OO0S Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX

116 2ND-VA-SOO2AC RHR Pomp Hotleg Suction Isolation

117 2ND-VA-O001B RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation

Train A RHR Isolation to the113 2N1-VA-0173A Cilg

Train B RH8 Isolation to theie9 2NI-VA-0178B Cilg

120 2NI-vA-0118A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldiegs

121 2N1-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs

122 2N1-VA-O1SOB Train B NI Isolation to the Coldiegs

123 2NI-VA-01528 Train B NI Isolation to the Hotiegs

124 2N1-VA-0182A NI Isolation to the Codldegs

125 2NI-PU-OOO9 Train A NI Pump

126 2NI-PU-O0lO Train B NI Pump

127 2N5-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump

128 2NS-PU-0002 Train B NO Pump

RX

RX

RXt

RX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

RX

RX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

AUX

Pressurizer Cavity806lOS5°32R

Pressurizer Cavity784

109° 34R

82 Pressurizer Cavity

109° 34R

02 Pressurizer Cavity30 i09= 34R

Sm 506695

Sm 507695 PPS

Sm 785

LL/6O

Sm 786

Sm 508695

746 184'°48R

743 184° 27R

733 00/60

Sm373HH/60

Sm 646716

Sm 646740 0/6

Sm 646716 0/6

Rm 830

70 HH/60

Sm 738

Sm 835716 /5

Sm 633716 0/5

Sm 303

68G0/57

Sm 304695 /7

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Off

Off

Intact

Intact

Intoact

Closed

Closed

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Open/Cloned

Open/Closed

Open/Cloned

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Off

Off

Off

Off

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Intact

Intact

Intact

Intact

Intact

Open

Open

Open

Open

Open

Open/Closed

Open

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Intact

Intact

Intact

Intact

Walk-By p 783 Included in ]PEtE, p 783 >RLOM

Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEBE, p 783 >RLOM

Walk-By p 783 Included in ]PEEE, p 783 >RLOM

Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 7S

3 >RLOM

Walk-By p 273 >RLOM

Walk-By p 273 >RLOM

Walk-By p 458 >RLOM

Walk-By p 458 >RLOM

Rule-of-the-box witE 2ND-PU-tO0l, mhich has anWalk-By IPEtE SEWS >RLOM

Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM

Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLOM

Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784 >RLOM

Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEt, p 7

84

>RLGM

Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784 >RLGM

Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLOM

Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784 >RLGM

Walk-By p 784 Included in ]PEtE, p 7 8 4

>RLOM

Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEtE, p 784 >RLOM

Walk-By p 245 >RLOM

Walk-By p 248 >RLOM

Walk-By p 277 >RLOM

Walk-By p 277 >RLOM

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlPEtEE

Screened per PEtEE

Screened perlPEEt

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlIPEBE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened per PEtE

Screened per PEEE

Screened per PEES

Screened per IPEEE

Screened perlPEES

Screened perlPEtE

Screened perlIPEEE

Screened per PEEE

Screened perlPEtS

Screened per PEtEE

Screened perlPEES

Screened per PEtEE

Screened perlP6EE

Screened perlPEEt

Screened perlPEEE

Page 49 of 60


MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HICLPF Results

EQUIPMENT

ESEL ID BOB Description Bldg EL

129 2NS-HX-1003 Train A NI Heat Exchanger AUX 750

130 2N5-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750

131 25M-VA-ISS7AB Train A MliV Outer Doghouse 792(DM4)

132 2SM-VA-S0OSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792(DM3)

1.33 2SM-VA-S003ABC Train C MIV Inter Doghouse 792(DM3)

134 25M-VA-OOOIAB Train D Mliv Dater Doghouse 792)DH4)

135 2VV-20 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 7832VV-35 Valve (DH4)

136 2V-VAO021 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 7813 2VV-01 Valve (DH4)

137 2V-VAO022 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78

Valve (DM4) 73

:138 2V-AO03 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 73313 2VV-23 Valve (DM4)

139 2SV-VA-OO24 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 733Valve (DM4)

140 2SVVA-~l4 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78

Valve (DM3)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse11 2VV-13 Valve (DH3)

142 25V-VA-OO1B Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78Valve (DM3)

143 25V-VA-5017 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 7388Valve (DH3)

144 2VV-lg Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 782VV-03 Valve (DM3)

Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse145 25V-VA-SSS8 Vave(D3

Train C Melt Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 7816 2VV-53 Valve (DM3)

OPERATING STATE

Location Normal State Desired State Walkd-Byo SEWSr Screening Notes HCLPFP* Key Failure Mode***

Em 738>LM srendprF6L/OIntact intact Walk-By p

4 5 1>LM Sree e PE

Rm 736

DD/69

DO/I9

DD/B7

EE/68

EB/EB

EE/SB

EE/SR

EE/SB

E/ES5

EE/60

Intact

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Open/Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Closed

Intact Walk-By p 4511





Closed Walk-By p 2 9

7












>RLOM

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>R133M

>RLGMW

>RLGSM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGM

>RLGIM

>RLGM

>RLOM

Screened perlFEtEE

Screened per FEES

Screened per PEEE

Screened perlPFEBE

Screened perlFEEt

Screened per IPEEE

Screened perlFEEE

Screened per IFEEE

Screened perlPEEE

Screened perlFEtEE

Screened perlFEtEE

Screened perFEtEE

Screened perlFEEE

Screened per FEEE

Screened perFEtEE

Screened perlPSEEE

Screened per IPEEE

147 2VV-lO Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78 E/6O Closed Closed Walk-By p 237 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE2VV-SS Valve (DM3) 7B

Page 50 of 60


MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HICLPF Results


ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBy SEWS* Screening Notes NCLPF** Key Failure Mode**

148 2SV-VA-O11l Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 78E/OCoeClsd Wk-y p27>RLGM Screened per IPEtEEValve (DH31) 78E/SClsd Coe WakB p29

Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghoase 78S/SCoe lsd Wl-y p9149 2SV-VA-0012 79E6OCoeCosd Wk-y p27>RLGM Screened per ]PEtE

Valve (DH3I)

10 2VV-02Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 78E/ES6 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >LMSree e PE

10 2VV-52 Valve (DH4) RMScendprPE

151 2V-VAOB03Train DMain Steam SafewyRelief Outer Doghouse 78E/8Coe lsd Wl-y p27>LM Sree e PE

151 2SV-VA-O045 ri08 anSemSft ele ue ohue 78E/8 lsdCoe akB 9 >RL0M Screened per IPtEEValve (DH4) 78E/nClsd Coe Waky p29

1532 S-AO5 Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788E/ES Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >LMSree e PE

Valve (DH4)

54 2VV-06Train 0 Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >LMSree e PE

14 2VV-05 Valve (DH4) 78S/BClsdloe Waky p29

Rule-of-the-hon with 2RN-PU-0053, which has an >LM Sree e PB155 2RN-HX-OOO5 2A RN Pump Motor Coaler AUX 716 PP/S6 In-Service In-Service Walk-By p 249 IRLGMEScreeed(per2PE)

RN Pump Discharge Cross Train156 2RN-VA-5540A AUX 716 00/59 Normally Open Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtS, p 786 >RLOM Screened per IPESS

Supply Isolation MDV

157 2RN-VA-OOS6A KC HIX Cooling Water Supply AUX 760 NH/S6 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPtEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEtEIsolation

25S 2RN-VA-SS89A KC HX Cooling Water Outlet AUX 750 HH/B8 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included In IPSEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEIsolation

15 R-AO1Al A1C Pomp Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 00/SS Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included In IPSEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE

Water Outlet Isolation

16 R-AB2AA2 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 00/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEtE

Water Outlet Isolation

Sm 714 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 799 >RLOM Screened per IPSEEE161 2RN-VA-O070A EDO 1(D HX Supply MDV Isolation AUX 736 DO/En

162 2RN-VA-0073A EDG KD0 HX Outlet MDV Isolation AUX 736 Rm0764 Open Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEt, p786 >RLOM Screened per IPSEEE

163 2RN-VA-0134A Tri SH upl'slto AUX 750 RMM/Si Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEtE, p 798 RL0M Screened per IPEtE

Sm 634 Standby/ Itc WakB p22 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NV-PU-O515, which has an >RLOM Screened per IPEtEE164 2RN-HX-0017 Train A NV Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/57 In-Service Itt WakB p25 IPEtE SEWS (p 252)

Sm 694 Standby/ Intact Walk-By p 252 Rueo-h-o ih2VP-OS hc a n >RIGM Screened per ]PEtEE165 2RN-HX-0019 Train A NV Pump Bearing oil Cooler AUX 716 HH/B7 In-Service IPEEt SEWS (p 252)

16 2-H-2 Train A NV Pump Gearbos Dii AUX 716 Sm 634 Standby/ Intact Walk-By p 252 Role-of-the-boo with 2NV-PU-0S15, which has an >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE16 2NH-21 Coaler HH/57 In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 252)

Sm SO5efrnc50167 2VA-AH-0024 Train A NS Pump AHU AUX 695 G57Standby Intact Walkdown Rfrnepndx0CSame make/model as ESEL 168 >RLOM Screened per IPEEE

Sm 506 Stnb Inat Wl-y 41

169 2VA-AH-0025 Train A ND Pump AHU AUX 695 GG/59 tnb nat akB 1 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

Sm 635 Sady Itc WakB p25 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NI-PU-0009, which has an >LM Sree e PE169 2RN-HX-0023 Train A NI Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/58Sady ItcSak9 p25 IEESW p25 >LMSree e PE

Rrn 635 Rule-of-the-boo with 2NI-PU-0009, which has an >LM Sree e PE170 2RN-HX-0025 Train A NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler AUX 716 HS9Standby Intact Walk-By p

2 45 >RPEMEScreeed(per2P5t

Page 51 of 60




ESEL ID EDE Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBo SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode**

171 2RN-VA-O279B Unit 2 Aus Bldg Ventilation Return AUX 750 Rm 830 Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEER, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEtIsolation KM/es

172 ORN-VA-0147AC 1A/2A RN Disch to RC S-Over Isol AUX 716 Rmp60n Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included ie IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per FREEE

173 5RN-VA-0148A SA/2A RN Essential Return Header AUX 716 FF/39 Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEtEE, p776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEEto SNSWP

2A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Rm 647174 2RN-VA-5286A Isolation AUX 733 FP/es Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLOM Screened per IPEtE

lA RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return175 1RN-VA-0286A IoainAUX 733 EE/5n Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEER

Unit 1 Non-ESS Return Isolation to Rm 6026ERO cendprPt176 1RN-VA-5564A AUX 733F/S Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in FREEE, p 776 >LMSree e PE

SNSWPFF5

177 2EPE-MX-EMXB 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 73Rmn 724 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEtGG/B6

178 2CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Aus 716 Closed Open Walkdown Screens out based on EPRI NP-6O41-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6E41Isolation from circulating water Table 2-4

Screens out based on EF61 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RM ScendprERNP64178 a 2CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Value Ass 716 Energized On-energized Wulkdown Table 2-4>RM ScenderERNP64

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RG ScendprERN-64178 b 2CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve Aus 716 Closed Closed Walkdown Tableceeedpr 2-4-64

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1,178 c 2CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 716 Intact Intact Walkdown Table 2-4 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604Z

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041178 d 2CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 716 .Intact Intact Walkdown Table 2-4

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RG ScendprERNP64178 e 2CA-PS-5385 Pressure Switch Ass 716 Functional Functional Walkdown Tableceeedpr P2-4-64

178f CAPS-39 PessreSwtchAu 76 Fncioal untinal WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041178 CA-S-581 resure with An 76 Fnctonal Funtioal alkownTable 2-4

178 g 2CA-TB-1901 aundto BR' huesRlysA Ass 716 Functional Functional Walkdown HCLPF for relays, SEWs for remainder of cabinet 0.68 Functional

Letdown Inboard Containment Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 5, >RG SrenderPIN-6417 N-AO3A Isolation ER 732 Open Closed Walkdown Table 2-4

Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, LM Sree prER P64178 a 2NV-SV-535E Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScendprEINP04

Page 52 of 60




ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State WalkdowBo SEWS. Screening Notes H-CLPF** Key Failure Modet*

Screens out based or tPRI NP-E045-SL, Rev. 1, >RM ScendprPRN-E4179 b 2NV-SV-5351 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RM ScendprPIN-64

Screens out based on EPRI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 1, >LM ScendprtlNFE4180 2NV-VA-t121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 RHE HtX Room Closed Closed Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScendprPRN-64

180 a 2NV-ML-1250 Mancal Loader AUX 767 control Rm 923 Functional Functional Walkdown Rule-of-the-boy with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE

18 N-AO5A Letdown Inboard Containment X72Clsd Coe WadwnScreens out bused on EPRI NP-E041-SL, Rev. 5, >RG ScenderEINP64

isolation E75clsd Coe WakwnTable 2-4

Screens out based on EPRI NF-E041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened p)er EPRI NF-E541191 a 2NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve EX 752 De-energized De-energized Walkdown Table 2-4

2NVSV451 olnod alv E 72 c-negied c-negied WakdwsScreens out based on EPRI NF-E541-SL, Rev. 5, SRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E041581 b N-V47 oeodVleR 5 eeegzd D-nrie akonTable 2-4

18 N-AOBA Letdown Inboard containment R75Cosd Cse WadwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, >RM ScenderPRN-64

Isolation E75clsd coe WakwnTable 2-4

Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, EO ceee e PR PE4182 a 2NV-SV-4585 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG SrenderEINP64

Screens oat based on EFEI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, RO ceee e FR PE4182 b 2NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Dc-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG ScenderERNP64

183 2N-V-OOSB Exes Ledon soatin X 25 loedClsed WakdwnScreens out based on EFEI NP-6541-SL, Rev. 5, >tLGM Screened per EPRI NP-E541183 NV-A-025E toces Ltdon iolaton S 78 cosedCloed albownTable 2-4

Screens oat based on EFRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, RO ceee e FR PE4183 a 2NV-SV-5250 Solenoid Valve EX 725 Dc-energized Dc-energized Walkdown Table 2-4>RG SrenderERNP64

Instrument Air Blackout Screens oct based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 5,184 2V1-TK-O0SSUX70 vnatInat Wlkon>LGM Screened per EPEI NP-E545

Accumulator AU 5 natItc akonTable 2-4, Anchorage qualified for 2xSSE

185 2V-12g lakot ccuulto Rlie AX 50 loedClsed WakdwnScreens out based on EPRI NP-E541-SL, Rev. 1, vRLGM Screened per EPRI NF-E541185 V1-328 ElakoctAccmultorRelif AS 70 cosedCloed alkownTable 2-4

Screens oct based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 5G ceee e PR PE4186 2VI-1335 Elackoct Header Relief AUS 730 closed closed Walkdown Table 2-4d)r PR N-64

18 V-t8 Ul Vi B/D HDE FLEX AIR SUPPLY Au 5 lsdOe akonScreens out based on FFR1 NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6045

18 V-99 CNTRL Table 2-4, Design qualified for 2xS5E

188 2ETA 4 KV Essential Swgr Aax 750 Energized Energized Walkby Included in PEEt, p 795 >RLGM Screened per PEEt

* Page number refers to IPEtE scanned document page.

""HCLFPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLFF esceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (S.26g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component

was screened oat from further evaluation.

**Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per PEEt - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per FFR1 NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6045, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor

nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

interaction - Elock Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evalcuated in the IPEtE and therefore the block wall meets

the ELOM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage -Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - indicates that functional failure is the gocerning failure mode for the component.

***Component adjacent to block wall. Aax building block walls were evaluated in the PEEt as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-2.

However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.

Page 53 of 60


Appendix C

MNS FLEX Flow Paths

List of Figures

Figure C-i. Auxiliary Feedwater System .............................................................. 55

Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System ........................................ 56

Figure C-3. Main Steam Header........................................................................ 57

Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System..................................... 58

Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System.......... 59

Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater SystemTempering Header .............................................................................. 60

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Expdied eimicEvlutio PocesepoMcUXIrNuLeARY StEDATion YTE Rev. 1

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

N•N-S•FETY AUXILIARY ~EE{]WATER

8URIEQ 'CDESE•CI~Cd.LATI•O

TUR~BINE DRIVEN

STE•.', OENER•ATO•

CTEA', CENERATD'•

5TEA¢-l OE,•EfbTC•

Figure C-i. Auxiliary Feedwater System

Page 55 of 60

ExpeitedSeimic valatio PrcessReprt, c 6uReularE Statio RevPL1Rev. 1

BORATE~ WATER SUPPLYREFUELING WA I ER S'~$IEW

~~%Lfl~ IfR,~c:ut ~.M.

Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System

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MATN STEAM

HEAOER Rev. 1Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 1

MAIN STEAM HEALER

CS AE S

STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER (9:

RE-HEATERS(2ND STAGE;

FDWPT

Figure C-3. Main Steam Header

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ExpdiedSeimi Ealutin rocssReort M~uREANCleaR StatioNT AE Rev. 1

REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-JPSAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM

~SC KOl LE~

C~L~ LL~S

M~ 1421 L~

Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System

Page 58 of 60

Expditd Sismc Ealutin Poces Rpor, M~uREAC NCOLeArT StatioERe.Rev. i

REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP(LOW PRESSURE~

RESIOJAL HEAT ~E~~vAL SY~TEM

HOT LEGCL,,, 3)

(cONY.

Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System

Page 59 of 60

S/G SECONDARY FLEX MAKE-UP

PUMP CONNECTIONS

FEEDWATER SYSTEM

TEMPERINO HEADER Rev. I


S/C SECOND ARY FLEX MAKE -UP PUMP C~NNE CTIUNSFEEDWATER SYSTEM TEMPER INC H AD H

I L JTI

Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header.

Page 60 of 60

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