Eldercare Work = Precarious Work?The role of social policies in the emergenceof the professional eldercare sectorSESS Annual Seminar, Tampere - 06 September 2011Jasmin Rocha

Overview

Introduction to the topic Principal research questions Eldercare as an analytically distinct sector Precarious employment Model specification Country case selection Hypotheses Methods and data

Introduction to the topic

Demographic change and increasing female labour market participation increased demand for care

Care deficit shift in care responsibilities

Evolvement of a new care labour market (Bosch/Lehndorff 2001)

Risk of precarization of gendered care labour market

Introduction to the topic

How has the emergence of professional eldercare work been shaped by shifts in responsibilities?

How do these structural changes relate to working conditions in the evolving eldercare labour market?

Eldercare policies

Market actors Working conditions in care

Value of professional eldercare workMacro level

Micro level

Research Questions

I. Which configurations of care policies enhance precarious employment in eldercare?

a) How does the financing of eldercare affect the impact of care policies on levels of precarious employment in eldercare?

b) Do care policies have a different impact on levels of precarious employment depending on the welfare and employment regime?

II. How do social preferences regarding care responsibilities affect the impact of care policies on levels of precarious employment in eldercare?

Research Questions

III. What is the role of informal care in explaining levels of precarious employment? IV. Is precarious employment equally distributed across different professions working in this sector (characteristic of the sector) or can we observe different levels by professional groups (characteristic of specific professions)? V. Does the composition of the care workforce in terms of selection-relevant characteristics differ from those in other care-related sectors?

Eldercare as an analytically distinct sector Distinct both from healthcare as well as market-based

services and production Based on social obligation to provide care, but

linkage with welfare states much more influenced by ideological preferences about defamilialization and state-involvement healthcare (Jensen 2008)

Market logic, i.e. profit per labour unit, does not hold

Healthcare more professionalized, access is universal Employment growth in eldercare more along low-skilled

home-care (Moss/Cameron 2002)

Precarious employment

Definition of precarious employment follows Rodgers (1989):

1) low level of certainty over the continuity of employment;

2) low individual and collective control over work; 3) low level of protection; 4) insufficient income or economic vulnerability. Opposed to quality employment (Moss/Cameron 2007) Up to now no measurement model available (Barbier

2004)

Model specification

Theoretical model attempts to integrate individual-level as well as macro-level approaches to explaining precarious employment

Mechanismic view on causality: X1 X2 Y (Gerring 2007) X1 is the exogenous cause, i.e. social policies concerning

privatization, professionalization and volunteer care ( shifts in responsibilities)

X2 refers to the pathway(s), i.e. predominantly actors involved in the actual provision of care

Y is the outcome of theoretical interest, i.e. the principal dimensions of precarious employment

Privatization

Decrease in firm size

Increase in total number of providers

Increase in inter-firm competition

Increase in flexibility

Decrease in job security

Decrease in income levels

Decrease in returns from professional

training

Decrease in individual job

control

X1: policies X2: market actors Y: eldercare work

Financing and distribution of

financial means

Hypotheses I: financing systems

H1: The outsourcing of the administration of national care budgets to shareholder-based companies (e.g. insurance companies) is likely to increase the mechanisms resulting from privatization of care services.

Privatization

Decrease in firm size

Increase in total number of providers

Increase in inter-firm competition

Increase in flexibility

Decrease in job security

Decrease in income levels

Decrease in returns from professional

training

Decrease in individual job

control

X1: policies X2: market actors Y: eldercare work

Introduction of

eldercare-specific skill

profiles

Promotion of

volunteer-care

Social preferences in

favor of informal care

Stratification of

workforce in firm

Stratification

of tasks

Financing and distribution of

financial means

Increase in informal

care

Increase in competition

formal/informal care

Decrease in competition for workers with other

professional care sectors

Negative selection of workforce into care

Eldercare –specific professionals

receive lower wages than health

professionals

Decrease in task discretion

Increase in low-skilled workers

Privatization Increase in

total number of providers

Increase in inter-firm competition

Decrease in job security

Introduction of eldercare-

specific skill

profiles

Decrease in task discretion

Hypotheses II: social preferences

H2a: Social preferences in favor of informal care increase the competition between eldercare-specific skill profiles and volunteer care.

H2b: Social preferences in favor of informal care decrease the likelihood of the emergence of eldercare as a “professional project” and thus reinforce the semi-professional character of the sector.

Privatization

Decrease in firm size

Increase in total number of providers

Increase in inter-firm competition

Increase in flexibility

Decrease in job security

Decrease in income levels

Decrease in returns from professional

training

Decrease in individual job

control

X1: policies X2: market actors Y: eldercare work

Introduction of

eldercare-specific skill

profiles

Promotion of

volunteer-care

Social preferences in

favor of informal care

Stratification of

workforce in firm

Stratification

of tasks

Financing and distribution of

financial means

Increase in informal

care

Increase in competition

formal/informal care

Levels of unionization and union bargaining power

Decrease in competition for workers with other

professional care sectors

Negative selection of workforce into care

Labour costs

Eldercare –specific professionals

receive lower wages than health

professionals

Decrease in task discretion

Increase in low-skilled workers

Employment and welfare regime

Hypotheses III: employment & welfare regime

H3a: The more the welfare regime relies on self-help and familial support, the more it will promote volunteer care instead of professional care, leading to increased competition between familial and informal care and professional care.

H3b: The lower the collective bargaining power in the care sector, the stronger is the negative effect of flexibilization at the firm-level on job security.

H3c: The lower the collective bargaining power in the care sector, the stronger is the negative effect of inter-firm competition on income levels.

H3d: If cash benefits are available, high labour costs are likely to increase the informal contracting of care workers instead of formalized work arrangements.

Country case selection

Most-different-systems design, i.e. cases are to differ on specified variables other than X and Y (e.g. Gerring 2008)

Differing variables are contextual, i.e. social preferences, the financing of care and the welfare and employment regime

Nation state as principal unit for case selection Universe of cases includes all European welfare states U K N etherlands D enm ark G erm any Social preferences inform al care

M ixed Low Very low Very high

W elfare and em ploym ent regim e

Liberal Hybrid Social-dem ocratic

Conservative

Financing system

Taxes Social security

Taxes Social security

Methods & Data

Mixed methods approach Principal data sources are national (ISCO88 4-digit coding)

and EU labour force surveys (ISCO88 3-digit coding) First step: quantitative analysis of micro-level outcomes (Y)

in terms of working conditions for each country over time and measurement model for precarious employment (MIMIC model)

Second step: regression analyses with precarious employment index as DV and flexibilization, professional training and negative selection as main IVs (comparison with health care).

Third step: qualitative analysis of policy measures supported by MLM based on EU LFSFlexibilization Professional training Negative selection

Employment in public sector

Self-employed Firm size

Secondary school degree Professional training

degree Additional job-related

training

Tenure Career path

(former job)

LFS variables:

Thank you for your attention!

Literature

Bosch, Gerhard/Lehndorff, Steffen (2001): New Forms of Employment and Working Time in the Service Economy, Final Report, TSER Programme of the European Commission, Directorate General for Science, Research and Development.

Gerring, John (2007): Review Article: The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking Inside the Box, in: British Journal of Political Sciences, 38, pp.: 161–179.

Gerring, John (2008): Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques, in: Box-Steffensmeier, J./Brady, H./Collier, D. [eds.] The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.: 645-684.

Jensen, Carsten (2008): Worlds of welfare services and transfers, in: Journal of European Social Policy, 18(2), pp.: 151–162.

Moss, Peter/Cameron, Claire (2002): Care Work in Europe - Current understandings and future directions, WP6: Care Work and the Care Workforce, Report on Stage One and State of the Art Review, http://144.82.31.4/reports/WP6FinalReportoct.pdf

Rodgers, G. (1989): Precarious work in Western Europe, in: Rodgers, G./Rodgers, J. [eds.]: Precarious jobs in labour market regulation: the growth of atypical employment in western Europe, International Institute for Labour Studies, pp.: 1–16.