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S U M M A R Y

I. Project Title

The Development of Human Factors Experimental Evaluation Techniques

II. Objectives

About 30-50 % of the unanticipated trips have been occurred in nuclear

power plants due to human error involvement. Thus a systematic study on

human-machine interaction is necessary for enhancing the safety and

availability of Korean nuclear power plants, through the reduction of

human errors. Recently the human factors' evaluation is strongly required

in aspect of MMIS design and regulation, and the HMI design of control

room in next generation reactors will be mostly designed based on

VDUs(visual display units). New human factors issues, such as evaluation

of information navigation, the consideration of operator characteristics, and

operator performance assessment, related to the HMI design based on

VDUs are being risen. Thus, in order to solve these human factors issues,

this project aims to establish the experimental technologies including the

techniques for experimental design, experimental measurement, data

collection and analysis, and to develop HF (Integrated Test Facility) suitable

for the experiment of HMI design evaluation.

v

III. Scope of Project

To achieve the objectives of this project, which are the development of

ITF and the establishment of experimental evaluation techniques, we

selected the human factors experimental evaluation items and established a

research strategy and direction for the development of human factors

experiment techniques using evaluation items in the 1st year of research

project. In the 2nd year of this project, we selected target systems of

experiments and identified the design variables of target system, the

method of experiment data measurement and data analysis techniques

accordance with the project strategy. And we have also derived the

requirements of measurement equipments and integrated test facility(ITF),

and developed a detailed design specifications according to the

requirements of system. In the this year, we finished the installation of ITF.

Also, we have secured the techniques of experiment execution through the

execution of preliminary experiments from the 3rd year of project. The

research contents of this study are summarized as follows :

o Study on the experimental data analysis and evaluation methodologies

- survey and summary of human factors experimental plans

- development of methods for the assessment of operator's mental

workload

- development of the operator's behavioral analysis techniques

- analysis of experiment evaluation items and survey of the measure of

experiment evaluation

- development of DAEXESS(data analysis and experiment evaluation

vi

supporting system)

o Development of experiment execution techniques

- a preliminary experiment for the suitability evaluation of information

display on a large scale display panel(LSDP)

- evaluation of computerized operation procedure

- an experiment of advanced alarm system(ADIOS)

o Development of integrated test facility(ITF)

- the development of human machine simulator(HMS)

- the installation of telemetry system

- the set-up of an eye tracking system

- the set-up of an audio/video data measurement system

- development of three dimensional micro behaviour analysis system

IV. Results and Proposal for Application

The major results of this project are as follows :

o Study on the experimental data analysis and evaluation methodologies

- a paradigm for human factors experimentation including experimental

designs, procedures, and data analysis

- development of methods for the assessment of operator's mental

workload

- development of DAEXESS(data analysis and experiment evaluation

vii

supporting system)

o Development of experiment execution techniques

- experimental scenario

- prototyping techniques for the preliminary experiments

- techniques for the analysis of experimental data

- interim results from the experiment

o Development of ITF

- human machine simulator(HMS)

- telemetry system for the measurement physiological signal

- eye tracking system for the movement and position of the eye pupil

- audio/video data measurement system for the operator behaviour

analysis

- three dimensional micro behaviour analysis system

The results of this study can be applied to the experimental evaluation

of human system interface designs, experiments for the collection of human

error data and analysis of operators' cognitive mechanism. Especially, the

ITF can be used as the prototyping design tool for the MMIS design of

advanced reactor and KALIMER because the ITF can be also applied to the

test bed for the development of man machine interface system(MMIS).

viii

CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction 1

Section 1. Background and Necessities of Project 3

Section 2. Objectives and Overview of Project 5

1. Objectives of Project 5

2. Summary of Project 5

Chapter 2. Review of the State-of-the-Art 15

Section 1. Overview 17

Section 2. Status of Human Factors Research in USA 20

Section 3. Status of OECD Halden Project 23

Section 4. Status of Research in EdF 25

1. Simulator Test Campaign and Human Factor Data Bank •• 25

2. Evaluation of N4 Control Room 28

Section 5. Evaluation of Advance Control Room Designs and Operator

Support Systems in Japan 31

1. Evaluation of PWR Advanced Control Room 31

2. Improvement of BWR Human Machine Interface 32

3. Development and Evaluation of COSS for PWR 33

4. Development and Evaluation of COSS for BWR 35

5. Development and Evaluation of INS for BWR 36

Chapter 3. Researches and Results of Project 41

Section 1. Development of ITF 43

1. Overview of ITF 43

ix

2. Configuration of ITF 48

3. Development of Plant Simulation Model for HMS 61

4. Development of Human Machine Interface 76

5. Development of Engineering Station Software I l l

6. Development of Instructor Station Software 113

7. Verification of HMS 119

Section 2. Development of DAEXESS 121

1. Overview of DAEXESS 121

2. Experiment Data 122

3. Functional Requirements of DAEXESS 124

4. Data Format of SCADA and DAEXESS 126

5. Implementation of DAEXESS 146

6. Results 152

Section 3. Human Factors Evaluation of ADIOS 153

1. Overview 153

2. ADIOS 153

3. Alarm Systems of ITF 158

4. Objectives of Experiment 159

5 Dependent Variables and Independent Variables 160

6. Experiment Scenarios 162

7. Execution of Experiment 169

8. Analysis of Experimental Data 170

9. Results 174

Section 4. Development and Evaluation of Computerized Operating

Procedures 176

x

1. Methodology 176

2. Description of Research 176

3. Results 191

Section 5. Development of Human Error Prediction Techniques based on

Experiment Scenario 193

1. Overview 193

2. Development of Experiment Scenarios 194

3. Human Error Mode Prediction Method 206

4. Experiments 211

5. Analysis Results of Experimental Data 212

6. Conclusion 212

Section 6. Evaluation of Suitability for Information Presentation with

LSDP 213

1. Overview 213

2. Analysis Method of Experimental Data 213

3. ANOVA and Estimation 215

4. Results 222

Section 7. Review of Evaluation Items and Criteria 224

1. Overview 224

2. Evaluation Items in NUREG-0700 and NUREG-0711 225

3. Evaluation Items in IEC964 230

4. Evaluation Items and Criteria 234

5. Review Results 237

6. Analysis of Relationship between Design variables and

Evaluation Items 240

xi

Section 8. Development of Measurement Equipments 249

1. Telemetry Physiological Signal Measurement System 249

2. Eye Tracking System 277

3. Audio/Video Recording System 289

4. Three Dimensional Motion Analysis System 290

Chapter 4. Accomplishment of Project Objectives and Contribution to

Technology Development 297

Chapter 5. Proposal of Application 303

Section 1. Overview 305

Section 2. Application 307

Chapter 6. References 311

Appendix 1 : Invitation To Bid for HMS 323

Appendix 2 : Experiment Scenarios 395

Appendix 3 : OPAS for Experiment Scenarios 453

Appendix 4 : Time Window for Experiment Scenarios 535

xii

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Human Factors in Software Development

The Personnel Subsystem

Training

Qualification

Staffing

Human Performance

Causal Models of Human Error, Especially for Situations with

Unplanned Elements

Organizational Aspects of the Nuclear Industry

The Impact of Regulations on the Practice of Management

Organizational Design and a Culture of Reliability

Operational Decision Making

Timely Recognition of Emergencies

Characteristics of Managers

The Regulatory Environment

Models of Regulation

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£3(issue)4 31 £ 4 534. 3 4 * 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 * 3 4 4 * 4 £ 4 443134*14 * * 4 3 £ 4

* 4445334 S 3 VDU 4 4 4 HMI* 3 3 3 3 5 . 4 4 4 4 A3.-S: 3 4

- 4 5 -

*34 43* 3£44 43 434 3*4 S4#^4 3^ S 43£3* 44 7}£4 3£#^4 3444 434514-

4 * & 3.l.2£ HMS 3 * * 4 3 4^-44 £*34533 £ £ £ 4 4 % * 4 4 vB 4 4 4 .

a 3.1.2 HMS 7fl*££ £ 4 4%

71 4

'93.8~'94.7

'94.10.5

'94.9-'94.11.30

'94.12.17

'94.12.23

'95.2.7

'95.2.7~'95.2.27

'95.2.28

,95.3.10

'95.3.14

'95.3.15

'95.3.20

'95.3.27

'95.4.7

'95.4.12

'95.4.24

'95.5.6

3 * 4 * 3 4 3 * HMS 3*c>11 314 414 £ ^ 3 ( # 4 4 4 , 43144, POSCON, -§-444, #43144, 4 4 4 4 , EUROSIM, UK-AEA)

£ £ 3 3 4 4 4 ( £ * A 4^) £ 3 £ * * 3 ( 4 £ 4 4 £ £ , 14) £ 4 3 * £ ^ 3 £ 4 4 * 4 £ 4 4 SJ 7fl£

£ # 3 3 4 ^7}

347} *X(*£ : #447} 4 * 3 * 5 . 3 4 **) 3 3 * **44(2 4) 3 * 3 3 4 clarification meeting(#444, S3T, KAERI) 347} *X(clarification meeting3 3 4 4 5:44 £ * 4 £ 3 4 4 ^ 4 £ 34) 4 £ 3 * 4 #4447} 3 4 3 4 * 4 4 3 5 . <a£7} 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 5 . 4 4 ^ 3 4 4 3 4 ^ 4 4 3 4 3 5 . 3 4 3 * £ 4 3 4 3 * *3(3£441 34) * * 4 7 J ( # 4 4 4 4 * 3 * 5 . **) 3 4 3 * * 3 ( 3 £ 4 4 44) * * 4 4 ( # 4 4 4 4 * 3 * 5 . *#) £ 4 3 4

- 4 7 -

3 3.1.2 HMS 3 * $ £ £ 4 4^(741*)

71 4

'95.6-

'95.5~'96.12

'95.5~'95.11

'95.5~'96.2

'96.2

'96.2~'96.5

'95.5~'96.10

'96.5-'96.10

'96.9~'96.11

'97.2~'97.3

'97.3.31

'97.4.25

-3 * £34^-£4 4 3 3 4 £Bfl 3 4 £ 3 ( H u m a n Machine Interface(HMI), Engineering Station, DAEXESS, SCADA)

HMI prototyping

Prototype £ 5 .

HMI stand-alone system(SAS) 4 4

Simulation model 7ll*

4 * 3 4 4 3*3)4 HMI stand-alone 4 ^ 4 4 £ 3

Factory Acceptance testing

Site acceptance testing

Human Machine Simulator 4 *

Open Lab

2. Integrated Test Facility 4 £ 3 :

3 4 * 3 * 3 £ 3 £ 4 3 Integrated Test Facility (ITF) 4 4 3 £ 4 3 £

3 4 3.1.14 4 4 - ITF£ 3 3 * 4 4 i 4 3 * 3 4 7 } 7 } £ 4 3 4 * 3 * 4

* 3 4 4 4i*g(HMS: Human Machine Simulator)4 4 4 * 3 1 4 4 4 3 3

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3 4 3 4 * 3 4 £ 3 * £3<9* £ 51£ 3 4 * 3 £ 3 # 4 ( H u m a n Factors Experiment Systems)*5. £ 4 4 4 514- 3fl 3.1.2£ ITF4 £ * 4 4 * 4 4 313 $14-

7}. HMS

l) 4 3 3 4 £ 4 HMS3 4 3 3 4 £ 4 * 3 3.1.34 44[66]. Main Test Room(MTR)3

£4434*(Operator Station)4 4*444^(Supervisor Station)4 4 4 4 3 Supporting Test Room(STR)3 £ 4 4 4 4 3 4 4(Supporting Test Room Operator Station) 4 4 4 4 3 534-

£ 4 4 3 4 4 * 2034 3 4 4 8 3 4 4 4 ^ 3 £ 4 VDU(Visual Display Unit)* £4414 £ 4 4 4 4 3 * 4 i *4°11 314 4 4 SJ 4 4 * * £ 515.S- 4 4 534 VDU 4 3 3 3 * 4 * * £ 3 * , 4 £ ^ 31* 4 3 3 5 . 4 3 £*<9* £ 534. £ 4 4 3 4 4 4 * # 4 3 £ 2 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 * 4 £(Annuciator Window Panels)* £ 4 3 4 *£4 i £ 3 4 3 * 4 * ^ * £ 3 £ 4 4 4 4 4 * £ 513^- 4 4 514- £ 4 4 3 4 4 £ * # 4 3 * 100 3 4 3 4 4 3343S.43-3(LSDP: Large Scale Display Panel)4 4 4 4 3 514 * 4 £ £ 3 4 £ 3 314 7J-4* S * 4 3 5 . * £ 51^.^- ^ 4 . £4°11 £ 234 4 4 4 4 4 4 £ 5.4#4(FPDU: Flat Panel Display Unit)* £ 4 , * 4 ^ 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 £ * * 4 3 4 4 * £ 5 l3£ 4 4 534.

4 £ 4 3 4 * 4 £ 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 1 3 * 4 4 2 3 4 VDU si 1314 FPDU7} £ 4 4 4 534 4 * 4 -§r^^ S? 31^5. 4 4 * * £ 513-1} $ 4 .

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ZL^ 3.1.1 ITF4 4 3 £ 4 3

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(a) S!£*«**-tt-a«-aul (ITF) *13

(b) HMS<HM £*}««■ a} **! .££

(c) ITFM1 Experiment/Computer Room (d) Host Computer

n 4 3.1.2 ITF4 ^7i ( £ 3 4 £ , £ 3 4 4 * 4 £ Si 3:^5-4*4)

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a 3.1.3 HMS 4 3 3 4 £ 4

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Mam Test Room Operator Station

Mam Test Room Supervisor Station

Supporting Test Room Operator Station

Experiment/Computer Room

HMS Computer Network

Workstation Furniture

- Eight Touch Screen 20" Color CRTs (VDU) - Four 3-button Mouse/Trackball and Keyboards - Two Touch Flat Panel Devices (FPDU) - One Large Scale Display Panel (LSDP)

(BARGRAPHICS 801S Graphics Amplified Projector) - Two Window Annunciator Aiarm Boxes - Two Touch Screen 20" Color CRTs (VDU) - One 3-button Mouse/Trackball and Keyboard - One Touch Flat Panel Device (FPDU)

- Two Touch Screen 20" Color CRTs (VDU) - One 3-button Mouse/Trackball and keyboard - One Touch Flat Panel Device (FPDU)

Instructor Station

Engineer Station

Data Analysis System Station (DAEXESS)

Simulation Computer

- Two Touch Screen 20" Color CRTs - Two Keyboards - Two Mouse Input Devices

- Two Touch Screen 20' Color CRTs - Two Keyboards - Two Mouse Input Devices

- One INDY Workstation - One 20" Color CRT - One Keyboard - One Mouse Input Device - One 486DX PC - Color Inkjet pnnter and LaserJet printer - Challenge Computer (Four CPUs) - Console Terminal - Console Printer

- Three Ethernet Local Area Networks (LANs) - Transfer data between the simulation computer and the INDY

workstation. - Consists of a desk for CRl ana a cabinet for annunciator. - The desk and cabinet are made of wood.

- 5 2 -

Experiment/Computer Room(ECR)3 3 -fe- Host Computer, 4 4 4 ( I S :

Instructor Station)4 4 4 4 4 4 ( E S : Engineer Station), £*g 3 4 4 * 4 4 ^

^ £ DAEXESS(Data Analysis and Experiment Evaluation Support System)

Si 3 1 4 4 * 4 * P C 4 £ 4 4 4 514-

2) i ^ ^ o ] ?<%

HMS i H < | o ] ^LA§°- a 3.1.44 £4[67] . 5L3 * 4 i 4 * 3 1 4 4 *

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4 4 * 4 * DAEXESS sl 4 * 3 1 4 4 4 H M I 4 4 4 £ E ] 3 O I ^ I - 3 ^ - 4 ^

SCADA(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition)^- i i l f l H i 4 * ^ r

514- 4 * 3 4 4 * ^ 5 . ^ 3 4 fe Simulation Model, Executive Software,

Engineer Station Software i ^ - Sl Instructor Station i £ E $ l l o ] 5 . : T L ^ 4 4

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ZL% 3.1.3^- ITF4 4*114°d ±S.3,A°] * A J « . * i * 4 4 3 1 ^ . 9X3. ZL

$ 3.1.4^- Off-line^.3. HMS Runtime Database* ^ 4 4 * « . * ^ 1 - 4 4

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Station £ £ - Functional Simulator4 SCADA system, ZLE]JL HMI 4 ^ i S

J^34*4 ^r*544. DAEXESS 4 ^ * £ ^ 4 WorkstationSLS.4 £ ^ 4 Off-line £ £ 3 4

4 * 4 * ^ r * 5 4 4 . £ 3 ^r*54 4 4 ^ * DAEXESS34 £-8-4 4 * 4

4 # 4 3 4 4 * ^ r £ 4 4 . Eye Tracking System a.5.-fEi 4_SL-fe- £ £ 31 o]

4 * DAEXESS^. 4 * 4 4 - £ ^ ^ 3 1 4 4 4 £ 4 £ * * £ * s . * *

DAEXESS 4 ^ 9 * 4 * 4 4 4 ^ * 4 * 4«fl 4 4 * ^r 515L* 4 4 514-

Instructor Station-^- Executive Software!!- 3 4 4 - 2 - Executive Software-fe-

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file:///fl4

5. 3.1.4 HMS £ S S . 3 4 * ^

Functional Simulator

Simulation Model

Executive Software

Engineer Station Tools

Instructor Station Software

I f SrSrt ?il*o|| c|t*h s.giU Si asj-g-

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Simulation Models) *!*I|S12J Scheduling fllcH (Host ?]>&) 5! A|gej|o|EH Clock ^-x| 7 | ^ Instructor StationcHI s|s|| a ^ s j ^ Snapshot^ Reset i S f - g ^ S

- HMSSI 7H£ 5! ^ I S ^ S $t*h z | # ± ° I *ll CH £ ^ S o | Ml?,^ Station

- Dt§5 tS , Dt£ ? l £ - ^ S! DU^f7|&!S| OSF/Motif User Interface T

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f i S ^ - S -^E-I £J-Ap|- y s ^ Simulation ModelS *)|cH£r *?= 2 i £ * &

Human-Machine Interface (HMI) Software

- HMSollAi VDU4I §•*!£! fi°ll q|*]- s ^ Interface R ^ E 3 asH^I 5! *P I ) * l l g (OSF/Motif User Interface ^ 2 ) - Simulation ModeNI m*h 8**j±; fe^H &* l S-SfJ Action!

Data Analysis and SCADA Software ±J§ DllolE-) a! A | ^ a Logging r--||o|E-|o| off-line £M

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Telemetry System

Eye Tracking System

Experimental Data

Alarm Panels

Operator Action

Log

ZL$ 3.1.3 ITF4 ± = J=34 * ^ £#£■

User Edit l/SConfig

Files ^1 l/S database 1

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LfJ 3.1.4 HMS Run-time Database ^ ± # 5 . (Off-line)

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Simulation Modeler 3 4 t l 4 - S.*i-& Shared Memoryl- f - 3 3 : ^ : S ^ ^ - 4

4 41 olEl f -A]^ 3 ^ s s ] 3 014-.

SCADA 4 i ^ £ - HMI ZL34 4 4 ^ 1 4 ^ 1 - 4*11 ^ ^ 4 ^ £ # ^

1-^r Monitoring^l^. Historical Data Log3 ^ t l 3 ° 1 4 l - ^ 4 - ^ 4 t N | -

t ! 4 . Historical Datafe ^ t l i r HMI Model34 Trend Graph* Display47]

4 3 C a . 4 4 . HMI i ^ M 3 4 4 SCADA 4 ^ 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 ^ ^ ^ 3

4 4 4 * 1 4 ^ . ^ 4 4#5H4<d 5 ^ 4 3 4 1 - ^ ^r 9lsm 4 4 5U4-

Executive Software4 t l 4-S-4 MST(Master Synchronization Task)-fe- S.

i J = ^ ^ - E i 3 3^1- ^ 1 ^ : 4 4 Scheduling Taskl- ^ ^ Simulation Clock^g-

-B-44-fe 4 ^ - i : #3- &4- °1 Clocks <QW 44:4:4(Time-stamped)4 £.

-& 4 # 5 l l 4 ^ 3 4 ^ 3 4 - § - £ 4 . SCADA^ Si7] Frame4 S.-& Tasksl-4

-^^(Synchronizing) 4 3 5 : ^ 4 ^ - Eye Tracking System^ ^ £ - 4 -T- 4"4

4 Synchronization4 ^ -¥ -1 4_l3"t!-4. Instructor Station^- Executive

Software4 4 - ^ 7 l £ 1 4 4 ^r*<944^ Executive Software3 4 3 Simulator

Clock 4 Updating4£^- 4 4 &4".

3) HMS4 3 ^ 4 3 ^ 4 3 ^T§

HMS^J-4 4 *)14 M VDU 3. ^ ^ X-terminall-^: 3 L i J = ^ ^ 4 l " ^

^<L3- S . ^ 3 ^ 4 3 1 - ^7§*}JL &4- zi^ 3.1.5^ HMS4 3 ^ 4 3 S 4 3

^ S * i i o l ^ &4- HMS3 4 Component3 % 3.1^7] 4 3 IEEE 802.3

Standard 3 4 4 37fl4 Ethernet Local Area Networks(LANs)!- 4-8-$ 4 - 3

S^ )H S.3.3.^^ TCP/UDP/IPoli Thin-net Coax Cable(10BASE2)l- 4-§-

4 5 9 4 .

H M S ^ 3 4-8-^1 LAN4 4 ^ £ - 4^ -4 - £ 4 -

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Mam Test Room VDUt l

X-term

VDU«3

X-tam,

VDUiS

X-term

VDU«7

X-tenn

LSDP

X-term Window Alarni Pane!

LaserJet Printei

Ethernet LAN

6 #2

KAER/HMS Computer Complax

IS Imtrvctor Station ES Engineer Station

H ^ 3.1.5 HMS4 3 ^ 4 i-flS.413. ^ H

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- j L i J l . ^ ^ 4 4 - DAEXESS, Data Analysis PC#4 3 4 El MQ ("ftp" ^ ^ 4 5 . 7Hr),

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313 3 T T 4 Complex^ ^ 4 4 ^ - ^ - 4 4 - 4 €■ 3 J = 4 3 5 . 4-8-tl4-.

4 ^ 3 J = 4 3 -^-4 ^ 3 4 3 4 £ 4 « f-tl ^H4# * L ^ 4 4 4 3 3

3 4 3 £ 4 f i ! 4-8-484-. ^ 3 L A N ^ £ # 4 3 4 ^ VDU4- LSDP3,

^-«13 L A N ^ 4 - ^ 4 3 4 Mh £ 4 4 4 * *H<ft ^ ECR3 VDUS, 4 ^ ^ 3

4-£ ^ tj-g. ^ ^ ^ - 4 3 4-8-4 to 3 # 3 LAN^ FPDU3 4-8-4 SS4-.

HMS^-4 X-terminal, 4 ^ ^ 3 4 4 1k-& 4 4 t l 3 ^ 4 3 ^ 4 £ t l

LAN34 4€- LAN^m 4 4 ^ 4 Configuration 4 ^ 4 " ^T4«114 4 ^ 4 ^

^ 915.^ 4 4 544-.

4-. 4^>^4^^-§- # 4

ITF3 44-^4"^^-§- ^ 4 ^ - ^ 4^^4 ;9-4(ETS: Eye Tracking System)

4 Telemetry System4 MTR33 4 4 4 ^ &4- 4 ~ # 4 ^ - 4-R-435.

4 4 * «r# *r & £ 4 Moving RackAS. ^ 4 4 W.

ECR3°fl^ INDY Workstation^ 4 ^ r * J 4 ^ DAEXESS4 Data

Analysis PC7f 91°) ?]*>:?*H!3-8- 3 4 4 1 On-line £ ^ Off-lineAS. §-4

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(a) CCTV 4*114

(b) 4 A^ CCTV s}-^

(c) CCTV Control PC gj S-M i

ZL% 3.1.6 £ * i ^ ^ - 0 ^ 4 - i - 4 t > Audio/Video 4 ^

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th ^ 85L4 4 4 8 4 . MTR33^r 5- r- 4 3 4 3 ^ ^ ^ - TV 4-34(CCTV: Closed Circuit TV)

4 ^ 4 4 4 9X3- ECR3°fl^ CCTV 4 3 4 ^14 PC4- t M Audio/Vedio

Control Systemol 8 4 MTR3°114 ^ 4 4 ^ £ # € # 4 # 4 ^ ^14 *J^

^- 4 4 ^ - S . 4 # ^ £-4^- ^r 8 ^ 4 4 8 4 . ^ 3 3.1.6^ - S - 4 W 4

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84. S l t f ^ ^ - g - 4-43 3*114^ *fl 9 *H4 #41*1 41-4.

3. Human Machine Simulator U^d i JZ'i 7fl -

7f. 41-344 ^ 4

HMS4 ^SLi. S.*i-& CE(Combustion Engineering^ 7f<y-7j .£.(PWR:

Pressurized Water Reactors)^ QQ-g: 3#-°~£. 4 3 * 3 ^ 4 -5-44 7}^

4 4 . 5. 3.l.5fe- HMS 4 1 - 3 4 4 5 . ^ 4 3 4 * ! * * < i 4 4 ^ 8 4 -

4- ^-44i 4 1 - 3 4 4 3 - f t JZ.^

HMS ^-44i 4 1 - 3 4 4 3 * 1 2.?&-& 3 3.1.64- ^ 4 HMS 41-3144

M 3^-8- 5L^1- 4-8-44 3 ^ - 4 8 4 . 444|5L ^ ^ 4 ^ 8 s ^ ^ f

^ -SL^-I: 1 ^ ^ . 4 8 4 .

l) ^ 4 ^ - ±$ ^ 4 s.ci

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a 3.1.5 HMS 41-^144 £ .^4 314 31f-AN SI RH

CH

RD RP

TP

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SW

TU CW CC

MC

AN SI CS SI

CM HG VP VQ RD Bl EA EF GC TB WT EA SA HY IA NT FP VA VC VD VE WH Wl TA CW CC FC SX WO CA CD

Plant Annunciator Systems Safety Injection System Containment Spray Systems Safety Injection System Containment Monitoring System Combustable Gas Control Systems Containment BLDG. HVACS Containment Purge Rod Drive System Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indications Breathing Air Systems Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems Generator Station Cooling H2 & 102 Control Subsystems Turbine BLDG. Closed Cooling Breathing Air Systems Service Air Systems Hydrogens Instrument Air Systems Nitrogen Fire Protection System Aux. BLDG. HVACS Control Room HVACS Diesel Generator Room HVACS ESF SWGR Room HVACS Turbine BLDG. Open Cooling Plant Chilled Water Main Turbine Systems Circulating Water Component Cooling Water Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Systems Essential Service Water Systems Essential Chilled Water Systems Condenser Vacuums Condensates

- 6 2 -

a 3.1.5 HMS 41-3144 2 . ^ 4 3 # 3l-f-(3^r)

MC FW

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EG

WD

RC

RX

CR TH

RM

Nl TC CV

WM AF CD DV FW AS ES HD MS DG DN GC DE GW PS SD RC RG IL PT RS TS

Makeup Demineralizer System Auxiliary Feedwaters Condensates Feedwater Heater Misc. Drain & Vents System Feedwaters Auxiliary Steam Systems Extraction Systems Feedwater Heater Drains Main Steam Systems Emergency Diesel Generator Systems Non-Class IE D/G Systems Generator Station Cooling Radioactive Drain Systems Gaseous Radwaste Systems Process Sampling Systems Steam Generator Blowdown Reactor Coolant Logics Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System Interposing Logic Systems BOP Instrumentation Systems Remote Shutdown Panel Systems Turbine Supervisory System

Control Rod System RC RG SD AR DE PR NR TC CV RC

Reactor Coolant Logics Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System Steam Generator Blowdown System Radiation Monitoring Systems Radioactive Drain Systems Radiation Monitoring Systems In-core & Ex-core Neutron Flux(Radiation) Monitoring Sys. Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control System Chemical & Volume Control System Reactor Coolant Logic

- 6 3 -

a 3.1.6 HMS 4 1 : 3 4 4 a ^ 3^-8- S ^

mmmm

Reactor Core Dynamic Model

NSSS Thermo-hydraulic Model

BOP Model

Single Phase Flow Modeling

Electrical Systems Model

VtA

STK (Space Time Kinetics)

RETACT (Real Time Advanced Core and Thermohydraulics)

TOPMERET (Two Phase Autogenerated Mass, Momentum, and Energy Balances in a Real Time Environment)

FLOWNET (Single Phase Flow Network Automation System)

ED_NET (Electrical Distribution Network System)

: ®M®!&k

- Simulates the true three-dimensional neutronic effects - Simulates various normal operating conditions and

accident transients for the entire range of plant operation at various stages of burnup of a fuel cycle

- Has the capability to simulate the non-homogeneous (different two phase velocities) and non-equilibrium (different two phase temperatures) phenomena essential to the simulation of both the transient response of NSSS for the entire range of operation, and of various accident conditions

- Application domains main steam, feedwater, containment and auxiliary buildings, safety injection system, miscellaneous cooling and gas systems

- Based on three conservation laws for a physical system

- Single-phase and incompressible fluid flow - Quasi-steady fluid flow - One dimensional flow

- An auto code generator that creates the database, segment, and subroutine code

- Provides a solution for electrical distribution networks found in power plants

- 6 4 -

4 4 3 . 2^4 -g-4 S-Ci^r STK(Space Time Kinetics) 5.^-3. 7 f l ^ 4 8 4 -

STKfe #11 3 4 4 ^f", 3 4 4 , Time-dependent Diffusion Equation^- 4-8-

4 3 . ^ 4 4 . 4 S T ^ H 4-8-4 fe- S-fl^r 3.A Shape Function Calculation,

Amplitude Function Calculation, Initialization Q Albedo g-o] 8 4 -

Initialization4 Albedo £.!-£- 4 1 4 4 "MHfe- 4 - 8 - 4 4 &fe4-

STK* 4 - 8 - 4 4 S.^1 7fl^-4 Albedo, Control Rod Worth, Boron Worth,

Neutron Instrumentation ^ 3 ^41 Tuningol oia.o} £ 3 . . ^ 4 ^ > ^ s ^ 4

3 41J 3 4 4 ZL^t Equation, Nodal Method, Adiabatic Approximation,

Point Kinetics Method ^f-4 ;*}.§-5} ftci. STK 3.*&-£S 3 . 3 < I n ^ 3.^ S.?

4 RETACT, 3 3 ^ « H *W# T 1 * » 4 ^ s . n ^ 4 4 4 3 1 4 ^ 1 -44.

2) 3^4 :g-^-3f- < I ^ 1 JZ.'i 3^7l^-^-3-f-(NSSS: Nuclear Steam Supply System)3 3 4 3.^^ S.

n'-fe- RETACT(Real Time Advanced Core and Thermohydraulics)i2.4 Aj-oL

3 . 4 4 NSSS3 4 ^ 4 ( 4 3 . 4-i- 4 4 ^£.(Two-Phase Velocities)!- 7>43) ,

t ^ ^ H s 41- 4 4 ££.# 7>^3) 43)*HH ^ 4 4 ^ 4 ^ 45L431-s.4^ ^ 84.

RETACTfe ^433- f - (RCS: Reactor Coolant System), 44-S- -8-4

(Reactor Vessel), 7r<y-7l(Pressurizer), 4 4 - £ ^4^B^5.(RCPs: Reactor

Coolant Pumps), ^7] ^§7](Steam Generator) ^ 4 ^ ° 1 4 ^ -¥-4°fl 3 4

31- s.^34 4-8-44-RETACTfe- Mass, Energy, Momentum Conservation Equations, Drift

Flux JE.'flo) A>^-s]ji 3.A < I n ^ 3 4 £.-§-(Thermal-Hydraulic Calculation

- 6 5 -

Module), Q ^ 3 4 2f-(Heat Transfer Calculation Module) ^ J t i 3 *

4 4 4 3 2!-(Auxiliary System Interface Module)^. ^ 4 4 8 4 -

RETACT1- 4 - 8 - 4 4 S-iQ ^ 4 -B-S. l f lHf la A^^(F1OW Networking)

£ Nodalization# ^ « ^ - 4 4 ^ 4 4 C e l h f l 3 4 ^ 7 H 4 < ^ # 4 ^ 4 1 4

4 4*11 1 4 4 -frs 5L«(Fiow Model)s 4 £ 4 - 4 8 4 . 2 . ^ 3 4 2-1-4 4 3

4fe- ■¥-£■£ 3 . 3 4 4 / - f r 4 ^3(Pressure/Flow Interface), i i 4 4 3

(Reactor Core Interface) ^ ^ ^ 4 4 3 (Heat Loss Interface)7> 8 4 -

3) 4 4 3 ^ s.'fl 4 4 ^ 1 ^ ( 6 0 ? : Balance of Plant)3 3 ) 4 2 ^ £ - TOPMERET(Two Phase

Autogenerated Mass, Momentum, and Engergy Balances in a Real Time

Environment) 2 ^ S.?* 4 - 8 - 4 4 3 ^ 4 8 4 - # , TOPMERET^ ^ 4

3 ^ ^ 8 0 1 Steam System), ^^- ir3 :f-(Main Feedwater System), 44-8-71

(Containment) ^ *L3LH^(Auxiliary Building), 4 4 ^ 3 ^ ( S a f e t y Injection

System), 714 414 ^ 7fl^ 3*(Cooling and Gas Systems)3 # £ | f

^ 3 4-8-484-

4) 4 4 -8-s. s.1 4 4 -fi-S.(Single Phase Flow)3 3 4 2 ^ ^ ^ FLOWNET(Single Phase

Flow Network Automation System)^ 4 - 8 - 4 4 7f l^ -484 . Mass,

Momentum, Energy Equation^- 4 - 8 - 4 8 ^ . 2 * i ^r*S4 4 ^ 4 # 4 3

Single Phase, Incompressible Fluid Flow, Quasi-steady Fluid Flow,

One-dimensional FlowS. 7 r ^ 4 4 2 ^ ^ ^ 4 8 4 -

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4 4 3 4 4 3 M ^ 4 2 ^ ED_NET(Electrical Distribution

Network System) S . ^ 1 - 4 - 8 - 4 4 7 f l 4 4 8 4 - ED_NETfe 47 l 3 4 3 S-4

3 3 3 4 3 4 4 * 1 1 4 ^ , 3^4S(Segment) , 4 ^ . ^ - 4 3L£.: i^l~a- 4 ^ 4 ^

£ ^ j t ^ X!r s . ^ 4 4 .

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(g) £ 5 . 2 ^

4 ^ -frs, ^ 3 , 4 S 3 ° 1 3 ^ 4 S 2 4 ol34(Stator)3 £ 2 3 3 4

2 t i ^ 4 4-SL44- ^ 4 £2(Ambient Temperature), 4!4jfl4 4 4 4-¥-, 3

4 ^ 4)4-1- ^ 2 4 s^r 4)4^r ^ 4-¥- f-i- 3 . 4 3 4 2 ^ 4 8 4 -

(h) *± ^ £ s . ^

^-4^3(Boric Acid Tank)S.Jf4 ^ ^ 4 - c - ^g-i ^2(Boron

Concentration)! 2 l S ^ 4 4 ^ "S-iH^r 3L44 Jfs), -rV^-3 - £ 4 ^ 4 4

£4(Mixture), Demineralizer Effect, Makeup Line34 4!433-f-(RCS) ]£^

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(k) 3 4 4 s-*i 7]7] 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3471 (Controller)4 Auto, Manual, Reset ^ 4 3

# £ i ^ 434£(PI), 434£(PD) ^ 4344^-(PlD) 3 4 4 t - § - 2. ^ 4 8 4 -

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^ ^ 4 3#7-3 ^ 4 4 4 ^ 34^-3. $4-

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-8- * 4 # 34-^-S. 4 2143. .

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4 ^ 4 4 * 4 £]c^o): *Vr4. rq^ y ^ l S . ^ 44(Excitation) ^ 4 4 ^

4 (Voltage Regulation), Synchronized Reactance Calculation, Infinite/Finite

Bus Analysis 4-c- 47l * 3 4 2 ^ 4 Governor Setting Control, Mechanical

Power Calculation ^ Speed Calculation 4£- 713 ¥ 3 4 2 ^ 3 . 7-^-44-

4- 444^ 2 ^ 3 4 4 4

- 7 1 -

D8M {Data Bass Manage?; FSCAl*(F0RTRAM1^<5eB^^

■ CSCAN (C Pmr&mp$®t m$ Postprocessor (CSGAft

• HO(Urtcer&o&?a$ ■ ISO f^m$^$^&^fMm^$

a 3 3.1.7 US3 & « s * M # 3

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(Editor)

C8CAN Pre-eompiter C Compiler Postprocessor

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FOTRAN77CMIptl«rr Post Proceeeor

UOS (Uneer Oevetopejient System) Level LLD (Linker Loader) IEXEC (mtencthre EXECUTE) ISO (Debugger)

00« (Official Development 8ystem) Level ^LLD * REXEC (Real-Time EXECUTIVE)

MST (Master Syncrontaation Tasks) ISO

.User Database 5 M -Master Data Dictionary

-MSF -Components - Initial ConoTttons

MenjetoOOS

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ZL% 3.1.8 HMS i ^ E ^ o ] 7 ^ * ^ . £

HMS 4 4 i £ > i f US34^ 4xr £ $ 3 * 1 SHI4 71144 8 4 . US3^ *

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^ £ * 4 4 ^ - ^r 8 ^ f - 4 4 i S £ 3 4 4 ^ ) 4 4 .

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Utility ^ Task5. ^ - 4 4 : £ S S 3 4 4 ^ # ^ J L 8 4 - Utility5.^ 3 4 4

3 4 ^ ^44(DBM), FORTRAN ^4^4(FSCAN), C ^4^4(CSCAN),

Linker, 4 4 4 2^(150) -§-0] &cf. Taskfe Master Synchronization

Tasks(MST), Slave Synchronization Tasks(SST), Real-time and Interactive

Executive (RTEXEC/IEXEC) ^ 4 8 4 - 4 1 " 3 4 4 ^3.ZL^^ Subroutine,

Component, Segment, Control, EXEC, MST/SST, UNIX £ 4 Top Down 3

A3. 3 4 4 8 4 -

ZL% 3.1.8£- 4 3 4 4 HMS ifc^m34 3 ^ - * # 2 ! 4 4 ^ 8 4 ^

7d± 4 - 1 3 4 4 SL^-Br ^3. FORTRAN^.5. ^ - # 4 8 ^ - HMI 4i=E.3<Hfe.

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- 7 4 -

12 Hz Control Panel

Instrumentation &

Instructor Station

MST (Master Synchronization

Tasks)

UNIX Operating System

ZL% 3.1.9 HMS ^ 4 4 4 1 - 3 4 4 3:^-2.

- 7 5 -

4. Human Machine Interface JZ.! 7l)4

HMS3, ^ 4 ^ s . 4 4 4 4 £ *H4* 4 4 £ 4 4 4 4 4 4 * 1 4 ^ (Interface)-^ VDU (Visual Display Units), FPDU (Flat Panel Display Units),

LSDP (Large Scale Display Panel) ^ ^§214^(Annunciator Panel) ^ 4 4-H.

3 4 a t - * **H 4 ^ - 4 4 4 - 4 4 4 4 4 4 ? 1 4 3 4 ^ 4 3 i £ ^ | o ] ^

Human-Machine Interface (HMI) i S J g . 3 4 3 4 4 * 4-§-34 3 ^ : 4 8 4 -

7}. HMI 4i=s.4fl4 3 4 4

HMI i=s .* f l4 3 4 4 ^ 4 ^ = S 3 4 4-^1-4 3 ^ 1 4 ^ 4 4 4 « - 4

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4 £ 4 ^ # 3 * 4 4 . ^r, 4 i S K 3 4 f e X-Windows/Motif Graphic

Package, C++/UNIX ^ S. 3.1.734 1 4 4 Third Party Softwarel-4 ^ 3

44 t l - ^r 8 4 Process Diagrams, Alarm Lists ^ Data Trend Graph4 4xr

^ - 4 4 3 4 4 £ 4 3 4 4 4 4 ^ 3 * 4 4 . HMI ± 5 ^ 1 < > l t OSF/Motif^- 4-§"34 Buttons, Toggle Switches, Selection Lists 3? Scroll

Bars4£ WidgeM- ^ 4 ^ 4 4 8 4 -

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3.3, VDU, FPDU SJ LSDP 4 £ £ r HMS3 £ 4 4 4 4 ° H 4 4 Graphic Display* * f - 4 3 4 4 # ^ - S 4 4 ^ " T 8 3 3 ^ 4 -

3 3.1.7 VDU44 Third-Party HMI 7flig- S.^-! Demc^mfe|iit';-Eabrs;,

X-Designer

DataViews

XRT/Graph

XRT/Table

- Graphically define the widget hierarchy for a window structure.

- Can generate the program code needed to implement the window.

- Can create a wide variety of dynamic graphic displays including process diagrams, logic diagrams, annunciator window emulation, etc.

- Can render a variety of trend graphs.

- Can render historical data and display tabular information.

4. VDU Systems

HMI3 £ r VDU 4 4 ^ 20" ^"4 CRTS. ^ 4 4 1280 X 1024 3 4 5 - 4 aL4v X-Terminal44-. CRT4°H4 £44^8: 4 4 ^^(Informat ion Navigation)* 4 4 4 4 , 4 £ ^ , S-31" £ ^ ?lJi = S ^ r « ^r 8 H # 4 4 84 - 4 VDU £4fe 3A £ 4 4 4 44(Monitor) ^ 34(Control)* 4

3 4 ^ 4 4 8 4 . *W £ .=34^- £ 4 4 4 4 1 - ^ 4 4 444rL^(siM Diagram)* M 4 1 - 3 4 4 s.*iA 3 4 4 3 : * -*£*£ ^ 8 5 ^ - 4 4 8 4 -

3-^r VDU3 4S-£ H 4 £ ZL$ 3.1.104 4 4 3 3 Title Area, Navigation Panel, Control Panel ^ Viewing AreaS. ^ £ 4 4 8 4 - VDU3

3 4 4 Navigation 4 H £ ^ 3 3.1.H4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ^ 4 3 ^ 4 4 *

- 7 7 -

Title Area NtvtgaOon Button of Navigation Panel

• a m level/same system using off-page connector

00

same levaVdHTerant system using off-page connector X

Viewing Area

Control Panel

Navigation Panel

Direct navigation using Keyboard(command) Page forwaroVPage

backward button in navigation control ai

ZL$ 3 1 10 V D U 4 ^ . Window Framework

——£» A. Four menu buttons in the Navigation Panel

- > B. Direct navigation using the Graphic Menu

—> C. Direct navigatioin using mouse clicking from a graphic diagram

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> D. Direct navigation using keyboard inputs

E. Go to next/previous page In same level sequentially using the Page Forward, Page Backward buttons in the Navigation Panel

■> F. Last Display/History buttons in the Navigation Panel

n f 3.1.11 VDUf- -1-4 4 4 Navigation ifrifl

- 7 9 -

4 3 4 4 4 Graphic Diagram3°fl4 4 3 4 £ ^ S . Navigation^- *k <$■ 8 H

- ^ - 4 4 8 4 - H, £ 4 4 £ Copy Display 7l^-§- 4-§"44 Viewing Area3

£ 4 4 - 2 8 ^ - 4^1) 4 4 - i - 4 # VDUS.H 4 4 H ^ 4 ^ 4 4 ^r 8 4

V D U 4 3 4 4 4 Navigation^- 4 4 4 1 4 4 ^ 3 T f 4 ^ 8 r 3 3.1.83 4

44 84

1) Main Menu

343-TT-b 3 . ^ 3.1.124 4 4 NSSS Overview, BOP Overview 4 £ r 4

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44-i- 4^484-

2) Graphic Subsystem

ZL% 3.1.134 4 4 Graphic Subsystem^- 4 - § " 4 4 4 # 3 4 4 4 - ^ 4 4

4i 4 3 * 4 4 t r "r X l ^ 4 ^ 4 # 3 4 4 3? 3 ^ Overview Graphic

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3 ^ - 4 ^ ^ 4 4 3 $3.* Animation*}- ^ 9X5-^ 4 4 8 4 - Graphic

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34* 4£44 ^484-

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5. 3.1.8 VDU44 4 4 Navigation 3 4 4 ^

H$m&&m Menu*

Main Menu

Graphic System

Graphic Menu

BOP Overview

NSSS Overview

Reactivity Control Overview

Alarm System Overview

Tabular Alarm

Trend Menu

Trend Viewer

Page Forward

Page Backward

Last Display

History

"Command"

$$mm%& i

display the HMI main menu

display the graphic system overview diagram

displays the graphic menu

displays BOP overview diagram (level 0)

displays NSSS overview diagram (level 0)

displays the Control Rod Drive overview diagram (level 0)

displays the alarm overview diagram (level 0)

displays the tabular alarm display

displays the trend menu

displays the trend viewer (showing last selected trend page)

go to the next diagram within the same level

go to the previous diagram within the same level return to the last display

displays a list of the last 10 displays selected from which the user can select one

A field to enter a graphic page to go to

- 8 1 -

1 ,141 ms-lf^-k^,?*

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REACTIVITY OVERVIEW ALARM OVERVIEW

ir

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3 . TURBINE CONTROL

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GENERATOR CONTROL

BOP OVERVIEW '

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TABULAR ALARM

REACTOR PROTECTION

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ELECTRICAL OVERVIEW

GRAPHIC MENU

REACTOR COOLANT SVS

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MO-I ? i _ - - ■ - «

ZL^ 3.1.12 Main Menu 4 4

- 8 2 -

Note Descr ip t ion SjJefcrfwfPJtgs

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FEEDWATER A CONDENSATE SYSTEM IHTRUNENT ATR SRSTEM MAIMSTEAN SYSTEM SERVICE HATER SYSTEM TURBINE CONTROL * W I N TURBINE SYSTEMS TURBINE PLANT COOLING SYSTEM

NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM OVERVIEW

COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM CONTAINMENT SYSTEM CHEMICAL & VOLUME SYSTEM B A T I N G AND VENTILATION SYSTEM RESTDUAI tfftT REHCV« & 5AF€ TY INJECTION i REACTOR COOLANT 5YSTFH HASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM

• jPFCIAl CONTROL

1 **"-*"" { ■ System [all |

QimphlePagaanmlxtxdtoAlX V Hsm Description *"

JGSOVK PLANT OVERVIEH BOP BALANCE OF PLANT OVERVIEW NS35 NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SV3TEH OVERVIEH

JREACTRL REACTIVITY CONTROL [TURBCTRL TURBINE CONTROL OPERATIONS «RF REACTOR PROTECTION CC GENERATOR CONTROL

JESF ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES l l R I N I T I A T I O N RELAYS INN NEUTRON MONITORING OVERVIEW P0 POWER OPERATIONS

COMPONENT CuOLING TRN A (PART A) OVERVIEW COMPONENT COOLING TRN A (PfJtT B ) OVERVIEH COMPONENT COOLING TRN 8 I.PART A ) OVERVIEH COMPONENT COOLING TRN B (PART B) OVERVIEH CONTAINMENT Si-STEH OVERVIEW CHEMICAL * VOLUME SYSTEH OVERVIEH ELECTRICAL SYSTEM OVERVIEW FEEDWATER & CONDENSATE ■i/STFn <PART ft) Q*TR% FEEDHATER & CONDENSATE SYSTEM <PARi B i OVER* B A T I N G AND VENTILATION SY3TEM OVERVIFH INTRUMENT A I R SYSTEM OVERVIEW HAIN5TEAM SYSTEM <PART A) OVERVIEH MAIN5TEAH SYSTEM (PART B) OVERVIEH RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL 4 SAFrTY IKJETTION bY^ SERVICE HATER SYSTEM OVERVIEH TURBINE CONTROL s f e T E H OVERVIEH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVCKVIEW TURBINE PLANT COOLING iF*7TX OVERVIEH NA5TE DISPOSAL 5TSTEH OVERVIEW

ZL%} 3.1.13 Graphic Menu S ^

- 8 3 -

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' An overview of the whole simulated plant - provides the operator with overall information of plant status.

NSSS Oveview BOP Overview Reactivity Control Overview Alarm System Overview

- System overview diagrams up to 20 diagrams

- Each diagram displays an overview of a particular plant system.

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- provide intermediate diagrams between level 1 and level 3 for future experimental purposes

- Simulation diagrams (SIM diagrams) up to 200 SIM diagrams

- Include control functions

ZL*8 3.1.14 Graphic Subsystem3-M3 3 7} 3 A^^9l ^ ^

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Graphic^- 3 * M " .

3-) Level 0 Diagram

HMI 3 ^ 3 £ - z\-%-3\- £■& A7}*] Diagram-5.5. ^ ^ M & 4 .

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Overview fl-^ 3 * (ZL^ 3.1.17 %2.).

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cf) Level 1 Diagram

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nr) Level 3 Diagram

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Componentl-i- f l - f i S ^ S r ' S ^-^ Sr# Control Panel SJ£.-f3

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CC01: PUMPS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS TRAIN A

ZL% 3.1.21 3<>|7l^ol o } ^ Level 3 SIM Diagram

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3) Alarm Subsystem

Alarm Subsystem* CE <a«V^ 7 1 ^ 3 ^ 3 . ^ ^ ^ ^ f i l ^3«H^(MCR:

Main Control Room)fil ^ ^ 3 f - ^ - 3f-5H°l^*r7l $l*fH #1-<H # 4 -

Annunciator Window^ 3 el 7flfil Alarm BoxS. T ^ J ^ M SU4- A Alarm

Boxl-fil ^ # * t ^ f i l 7l-^-ô] ^ (Func t iona l Zones)* 3£*fl^ cT-

Alarm Subsystem* Alarm Overview Display, Multiple Alarm Detail

Displays, ZL^JL *13-fi] Tabular Alarm Displays. T M J £ M & 4 -

7\) Alarm Overview Display

3 3.1.9^- HMS3î T ^ S Annunciator Alarm ZOftes* ^ S p i 5U3--

Alarm Overview Display J ^ * ZL% 3.1.194 * H HMS 5L^M «H9€ ^

£.7} a t f " € Annunciator Boxl- * # 3 H 1 3 Hî rCr . BlinkingSl^

Annunciator Box Menul- ^ ^ j * ! ^ °^7]A 3T3"£lfe Multiple Alarm Detail

Display S ^ a . 3 . # 3 € 3 " . 4 ^ * # € * A^SLS. * M € %£.* $*}

2 ^ 9X^.

i4) Multiple Alarm Detail Displays

- 9 4 -

ZL% 3.1.22 Multiple Alarm Detail Display $■#

- 9 5 -

Alarm Overview Display i | - ^ 3 4 A Annunciator Box3 3*11 ^-^

3.1.224 3 H ^lM-4 Multiple Alarm Detail Display $*£<>] ^ 3 ^ 4 - °1 *r

M 4 A Alarm Tilefil 3*1 ^ ^ff-^r ^ 3 M ^ ^ 1 ^ 4 Tjji^-4 ^

•a*>3 AQ^o] 9X^. 3. Acknowledge % Reset4 ^7>4 7 ^ 1 7 } 3 ^ 4

^ * 3 « ° 1 a 4 * ^ ^ 5UH - 4<H 5U4-

Alarm Tile* ik#± 4NI£*r* M * r 7 l fl«B Flashingol 4H-^ 4 3

SI3-. A Alarm Tile3 « < ? 1 ^ 3 L ^ A 1 1 - 3 0 1 E H 4*11 * ) H £ 4 . ^

3.1.23* Annunciator Alarm Sequenced ^-El-^JI &£)-. A Display3 cflt!:

Flash A^-Br Fast7> 2 Hz, Slow7> 1 Hzolcf. <$z\ Q#A*\ ^2.7} itA$M

TJ-T- * # € * Page Forward4 Page Backward Navigation Button-i- *}-%■?%

*i A S ^ * S-^SLS. zj3«- ^ 9XA 4<H &4. 3£ 3.1.9 Annunciator Alarm Zones

Zone PM-01J

PM-02J

PM-03J

PM-04J

PM-05J

PM-06J

PM-07J

PM-08J

PM-09J

PM-10J

PM-11J

PM-12J

Description HVAC Alarm

Miscellaneous Instrumentation Alarm

ESF Alarm

CVCS/RCS Alarm

Reactor Control System Alarm

Reactor Control & Protective System Alarm

Aux Feedwater & Main Steam System

Condensate & Feedwater System Alarm

Turbine & Auxiliary Alarm

Site and Aux. Power Alarm

Site and Aux. Power Alarm

Fire Protection Alarm

Annunciator Box Tag's AN-UL-001, 002, 003

AN-UL-004, 005, 006

AN-UL-007, 008, 009, 031, 032

AN-UL-010, 011

AN-UL-012, 013

AN-UL-014, 015, 016

AN-UL-017, 018

AN-UL-019, 020, 021

AN-UL-022, 023, 033

AN-UL-024, 025, 026

AN-UL-027, 028

AN-UL-029, 030, 034, 035, 036

- 9 6 -

Alarm ON

Acknowledge

Acknowledge

WM mF* >Wf md

Reset Alarm OFF

'-¥ 'S*

' Text inside circles indicate annunciator window lamp status. ' Text beside arrows are events.

ZL^ 3.1.23 Annunciator Alarm Sequence

- 9 7 -

4 ) Tabular Alarm Display

ZL$ 3.1.244 Qo] Tabular ALarm Display 4 * 3 * «M8$r ^ J i l - i - £ 4

qSLS. <&7\# Table Alarm Listl- * # € 3 3 3 ^ 3 ^ 4 - S * ^ - t *

OFF Sfe- ACTIVE4 °14&(Binary Value)-!: zjja ojo.^ 7 l * ^ o . S ^JiL Ad37f 4 4 ^ i * 4 4 4 4 °1 &i:0 l ^ll-^Hi^MH Logging44. 41-3 ° 1 4 * Resets 3 * JE.* Alarm List4 °1 3 Logging 3° l^ fe - 4 4 4 4 -

Tabular Alarm Display 4 ^ * Single List Mode4 Two List ModeS] - -

4 4 4 ^ S.S.7} 71^-44 . Single List M o d e 3 4 JE.* ?§£- 3 4 4 (Dynamic

Alarm List)7> 1 4 4 4 1 $JJE-f^4 ^ 3 ^ 4 - 3 3 * ^J5l 3 4 4 t r List

4 £ 3 3 3 - ^ 7 1 4 ^ ^ - 4 4 9X3 §r#Q°] o] Listl- € £ ? - 3 ° f l 4 Scrolls,-

ctj -i- ^ $l5=^- 4 4 S14. Two List Mode34fe- Dynamic Alarm List(3s.

* T j i 3 3 3 3 ^ ) 4 Frozen Alarm List(©l 4 7$s_ 3 3 ^ 3^-) ^ 7 f 4 4

i-T-7> 3 ^ 4 4 - Tabular Alarm Display 4 ^ 3 ^3 3 4 4 ^ * 3 3.1.104

a , £ # 3 1 * All £ Active f-7>4 4 ^ - i : 4 * 3 4 £ ^ 4 J2-* ^ ^ #

1- ^ 5U44 J M * ^ 4 4 3 i i 4 1- ^r SlSL^Alarm Filtering) $ 4 -

a 3.1.10 Tabular Alarm Display 4 ^ 3 3 4 7 1 ^

Name Freeze

Thaw Merge

Description freeze current alarm list and open a dynamic alarm list. (Single-list mode -> two-list mode) return to one dynamic alarm list. move messages from the dynamic alarm list to the bottom of the frozen alarm list.

- 9 8 -

ZL$ 3.1.24 Tabular Alarm Display 4 ^

- 9 9 -

4) Trend Subsystem

Trend Subsystem)* ^ 4 4 : 3 4 * 4 ^ ^ r ^ ^o](Trend)* ^ . 4 ^ 4 4

3 4 * 4 4 . 4 -E-t-i- 4**114 * 4 3 1 * ^-4 Trend Graph Page* ^ § ^ 4

4 4 4 ~& T 1 &H-^ 4 ^ &4- 4 Page-fer Trend Group Point List* 5 ^ 4

3 514. Trend Subsystem3 4 fe- 4 ^ 4 ^ S ^ L £ 4 ^ 1 - 3 3 t r Trend

Graph Page* 52: 4 3 4 Sampling ^£_K 30^-4^1 3 ° 1 4 # Logging §

^ SiH^- 4 4 SHaL 213 2000 Point ID3 3 t > °14 3 °14 (Historical Data)

I 4 ^ T 1 Si4- Trend Subsystem34fe Trend Graph 4-=- * J 4 * 4 t t

Trend Menu Display 4 ^ 4 Trend* 2L7l 4 t t Trend Viewer 4 ^ ^ . ^ . =?■

^ 4 4 5U4-

7p) Trend Menu Display

ZL% 3.1.254 4 * Trend Menu Display 4 ^ 3 4 * 4 ^ 1 * 4 * 4 4 *

*j-*#3 « ^ * «■ sas - 44 ai4. - n]e| 4 2} 4 Trend Graph Page* -f-3 Trend* i i 4 4 3 3 - 4 ^ 1 4

Page-I ^ £ ^ sa*, - 4 ^ 7f-^tr Trend Graph Page3 # 4 * Trend Point List 3 * 4 4 ,

- - id34 Trend Group°..£.Jf4 Trend Graph Configuration* ^ 4 .

3 5 . * Trend Graph Page* 4 ^ ^ 4 ^ 4 Point I D * 4 ^ 1 4 4 Trend

Graph Point List* ^ ^ 4 4 4 Trend Graphs Format Layout, Format

Type ^ Format History* 4 ^ ^ ^r 9X5.^ 4 4 &4-

4 ) Trend Viewer

ZL% 3.1.264 4°1 * 4 3 l * Trend Graph34 4 * 4 4 * 4 4 7>4 7]

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TREND MENU:

Prvt*:t*d fmtd Pager H»s Description

Hasft Dsecrlption rn ~-^~ JTR02 Steady SLat« VatrifM.cat.ioi TR03 Test Page t TR04 Teat Psft« |TROt T«ct pKg* JTK06 Teat page

1TR07 Teat Pag* TR06 CV I5V-IV-5V position Y3N j TRQ3 "ustoaized Trend Pagf TRIO Cualoaizad Trend Pag&

,TRI3 Customized Trend Pag? TRM Customized Trend Pag© JTR15 Cuvtoalzed Trend Pago TR16 Custoalzed Trend Pago

1 FR17 ^imoaized Trend Pago TR1S Custoalzed Trend Pag*-'rRig Custoalzed Trend Pag* ?R?0 fus'oalzed Trend Pag?

5 ws*sao-T. | oiant Overview Poirtti

| ^ S T ^ !

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, yvrtwifrstPobaibk ■?: Poirit;jLU_. Oaatft-iption

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■ ■ * » *

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Ch«nge» Appry I Disi<ir<J

ZZ. 3 1.25 Trend Menu Display 4 ^

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http://VatrifM.cat.ioi

ZL% 3.1.26 Trend Viewer 4 ^ 3

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i r l -* ^m ^ 9Xsm 4 4 5U4. - History t H * * ° 1 * 3 4 Graph Display* 4t!r Time Range* - £ 4 ,

- Up JE-fe- Down Arrow Key* °l-g-34 Page* 4 - ^ S * 4 ^ - ^ . S .

°1*, - Trend Graph4"34 4 * ^ 5 . ^ 4 ^ D r a g 4 3 Graph4"4 ^ - 4

4 4 3 4 4 o > ^ S z i ^ 4 0 ] ,

- *«J 4 4 4 - 4 S * Trend Graph* * ^ & £ * 4*L

- S . * Point ID 3 3 3 Synchronized Time Scales. ^ 4 4 ^ v

- Trend Graph Display Page3 4 4 4 * ^ 4 4 3 0 1 ^ * Freeze.

5. 3.1.11 Single Point ^ Multi Point Trend S . H 3 4 4 3 ^ 1 - 3 0 ] tys.

Single Point Trend

Multi Point Trend

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

displays the point ID.

displays the point description.

displays the point value over a color coded background (which matches the trend line color).

displays time.

displays the point ID.

displays the point description.

displays point status such as Normal or HI Alarm.

displays the point value over a color coded background (which matches the trend line color).

displays time.

Trend Viewer 4 ^ 3 4 ^ - 5 3.1.114 £°] Single Point Trend E ^

Multi Point Trends. ^4*114 # *r 9XZ^ 4 4 5U4- A Trend Graph34

£ 4 4 ^ r Graph 34"£- 4-§"4 £•& Color CodingSLS. 3 ^ # 3 ° 1 4 H ^ - 4

534. - Red: High Alarm and Low Alarm,

- 1 0 3 -

- Yellow: High Alert and Low Alert,

- Green: Normal,

- Cyan: Out of Limits High, Out of Limits Low, Unavailable or Bad.

5) Supplemental Windows

H M I 3 4 3 ^ 4 ^ £.3: 31 J£-f (Supplemental Window)^ Point Search

Dialog4 Point Detail Dialogs. ^ 4 4 ° ! &4-

7\) Point Search Dialog

ZL% 3.1.274 ^ l Point Search Dialog^ £4-? l 0 l ^ - 4 Point4 Point

Group3 4 ^ 3 ° 1 4 3 ° 1 ^ * ^ 3 4 ^ 3 3.-%-^ ^7] 4 t l Database

Browser Window4- °1 ^H-T-CT 4-§"4 A-& 4 ^ * fl-4.

- S € - 3 ^ - 4 Pointl-§- List,

- ^7§ Point S f e Point Group^ 5 < y s 4 ^.fi. ^ 4 0 ] Point ID,

Description, System, Units4 Q-& % 3 4ir-§- 4 - & 3 ^ 3 4 J I ^ 4 *

Matching Point List3 5 . 4 ^ .

4 ) Point Detail Dialog

ZL^ 3.1.284 ^°1 Point Detail Dialog^ ^ - 4 4 4 : ^°dA Point4 4 ^

■£ X M f e ^ - 4 SL°d3-A 331 4 ^ - * 3 ^ * 1 1 ^ 4 . 3 Dialog^ 3 0 1 ^ 3 0 1

i 4 ^ - 4 t H l $13 ^ 4 Point3 431 Trend Graph* J i ^ ^ I Point ID,

Description, Status, Value ^ Time A 331 4 ^ . * 4 ^"3 ^ 4 -

4 . FPDU System

- 1 0 4 -

^ 4 4 ^ S44-4(FPDU: Flat Panel Display Unit)^ £.*§ PC7]& 4 4

4 ^ £ 4 4 - 4 3 . 4 X-tenriinal Emulation £ 5 . ^ . 3 4 4 ^30 4 3 . Ethernet

L A N ^ - f - 3 J i i S . ^ ^ 4 4 3 1 4 4 5U4- FPDU* f - 3 £ 4 € 3 3 -8-4

4 ^"441 ° J 4 £ 3 4 iL 4 ^ - 4 « 41rBH014°ll ^r-g- 44(Manual Trip)

* 7>^ ^ SU r 7l^o] 0*4.

* ! 4 4 FPDU^ Ergo Touch Panel Computer-DSPS. 4 ^ 4 H-& 4<£^§-

A3 5U4-

- DSP/STN Color Display,

- 486SLC/33 Main Board CPU,

- Short Enclosure - Gray Color,

- 8 MB RAM,

- 80 MB Hard Disk,

- MS-DOS 6.XX,

- Ethernet Connection,

- Windows,

- X-terminal Emulation Software.

FPDU4 4*3 £- Title Area, Viewing Area, Control and Navigation

Buttons-9LS. ^ 4 4 4 & 4 - Navigation Button4 ^ 4 ^ £ 3.1.124 ^ 4 - 3.

% 3.1.29^ FPDU ^43113 4 3 ^ 4 4 3 1 * i 4 3 3 1 - 4 4 4 s & 4 -

4 - LSDP System

3 ^ 4 ^ . a 4 4 - 4 ( L S D P : Large Scale Display Panel)^ 100 3 4 3 7 1 4

- 1 0 5 -

3 H ^3&SL3- ^ 4 4 4 Si^-4 X-terminalS. 4 f " 4 4 A&A X-terminalS.

-¥-4 4 - 2 . ^ 4 ^ « 1 4 £ #3-5. 4^1-5fl°l «fl # ^ SU4-. -S .*£ £ 4 ^

4 3 4 3 Overview Diagram^- LSDP3 4 ^ # 4 ° 1 4 £ ^ ^ 4 4 4 & 4 - ^

713 4-§-4 S S - 3 4 - b BARCOGRAPHICS 801S Graphics Amplified

Projector (Auto-lock Scan Range of 15 - 92 kHz, Wide Band 70 MHz RGB

Amplifiers) °14-

S 3.1.12 FPDU Control/Navigation Functions

No. 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9

10

11 12 13

Name SUB CRIT CORE COOL RCS INTG RCS INVT HEAT SINK CTMT INTG

1st Level 2nd Level 3rd Level button 1

3rd Level button 2

Manual Trip Alarm Acknowledge Alarm Reset

Description displays the Subcriticality(2nd level) display displays the Core Cooling(2nd level) display displays the RCS lntegrity(2nd level) display displays the RCS lnventory(2nd level) display displays the Heat Sink(2nd level) display displays the CTMT lntegrity(2nd level) display

displays the 1st level displaydop overview) displays the 2nd level display for the current subsystem displays the 3rd level display for the current subsystem displays the second 3rd level display for the current subsystem

Sends a manual trip signal to the simulation models acknowledge all FPDU alarms reset all FPDU alarms

4 . Annunciator Panels

£43133 444 91 444^-S. £ 4 ^ °1##3* 4#4 £ 3 ^ 4 4 3 £ 4 4 3 4 3 : 4 ^ 4"33 234 Annunciator Panels ^4^14-

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ZL*g 3.1.27 Point Search Dialog 4 3

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Nome- (TRQ1 j

Deiolpttan: f Plant Overview Point*

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Annunciator Panels Alarm Tile-H-jiL : T L 4^1 Annunciator Lamp CabinetiLiiL

T M ^ ^ M &4- A Alarm Tile£- 4"3(Engraving)£ *3^r-§- 7}T]SL 9X°-V] ^

#± 4" 3 1 * 4 4 ^ 4 ^ 3 ^-e)- 3.^0] s\o) ojr4. Annunciator Lamp

Cabinet^- Annunciator Controllers4 3 ^ 5 ) 3 9X3 3 1 3 3 4 < £ 3 4 ° . 5 - 3

^(Daisy-chained) S]<H to RS-232C/RS-422 Serial Cabled f - 3 J L ^ ^ T T

E l 4 ^ S M &4- 5.^3, 4 ^ 1 3 4 ^ - Alarm Sequence, Input/Window

Assignment ^ 4 El- cJ-# 7l-^-§-§- Setup^- ^ & £ - ^ S H &4-

4 Alarm Tile-f-^r 4 i - 3 ° l £ | 3 ^13 - f r£€ Boolean Variable Set3 4

3 ON/OFF S l i ^ - £13 9X4- Acknowledges!- Reset 7 l ^ £ i = E ? l H 5 .

4 - ^ s ! 0 ! Alarm Overview Display5-Jf El tHH-3 ft] 3 .3:4-^- ^r A ! 4 -

«>. Backtrack/Replay 7 l ^

4 f - 3 ° l / £ 4 Backtrack/Replay 2:4"^- 4-Ar3(Instructor Station)34 ^r

TO T5- 514. VDU, FPDU gj Annunciator Panels Backtrack/Replay S3J-3

4 3 ^*fl ^ 3 ^ - SI^- 4 f - 3 c > l ^ SL^A A*} HMI* 4 4 £ 4 3 4 4

4^§ ^r Si4- Replay ^ 3 - 8 : History ^ Logging F i l e t s Updated 4 & ^

4-

Backtrack _S-4°1 SliHIfe Internal Log Data* Scan34 c ^ # 3 ° l ? ! -

4- Trend Graph Datafe 2 ^ 30-g-4:4 3 c>]£i* 4 4 ^ ^ 551°! 3 0 £ 4 4 4

S] Backtrack^! 7 r^4-t}-. 3 0 ^ °14-^-£- Backtrack^ SJig Trend Graph3

3*1 3*13*r # ^ £4-

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5. Engineer Station i S S . 3 3 7fl^-

Engineer Station(ES)£- 3 * ZL^S. HMS 7fl^ ^ # 4 - 3 ° l HMS* -ft-4

4 4 ^«fl ^-S-tl: 4 ^ i S J i . 3 3 ^-4-i- 3 ^ 4 ^ Workstation^ 3-.

Engineer Station £ = S.3<H4 ^^3-Br US3 i ^ S . 3 3 3 4 4 ^ ^ 4 , ES

Instructor Station, Simulation Model Automatic Program Generator,

DataViews 3? DV-DrawSf £-& Graphic Editor, X-Designer4 ;£-£ HMI 7fl

£ £ ^ ^ 4 ^ 1 34°114 3 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ i s s . 3 3 ^ ^ 4 * H 5a4[69}. <y34A^ ES^ 3~§-4 A-Bs 4-^-i: 4 -^3 4~§-£c}-. - Simulation Models] -ft-4 ^ 7fl1h

- Instructor Stations] -ft-3,

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US3 M 4 - 3 4 3 ^ Simulation Model i S ^ o ^ t^3\- £-,£- ^

7>4 %M3. - T ^ S M 5 1 4

- Official Development System (ODS): 7J-4" ^^ Version^.5. 7mQ 4 1 : 3 ° 1 ^ i S l ? | o ] o ] F u l l set

- User Development System (UDS): 4 1 - 3 3 - £ i ^ S - 3 3 s ] c}-f- A3.

s.*\ HA ^ 4 ^ 3 41-^1 ° 1 ^ i £ E ? 1 1 ^ 5 ] < y ^ * q -4 \B4 .

ZL% 3.1.303- A°] On-line Engineer Station Q7§°- 7fl^ 4 1 - 3 ° 1 ^

Load, ES Instructor Station, ZL^JL Interactive Symbolic Debugger (ISD)*

5 .^4-c- Executive Tasks. ^ 4 ^ 4 - °1# A Component-fe- Shared Memory

* f - 3 4-i- Componentt-3- 3 ° ^ H ^ * ^r ^ 9X^^ 3 3 514-

- 1 1 1 -

X-terminal

Host Simulation Computer

ES l/S Runtime Database

ES Shared Memory

ZL$ 3.1.30 Engineer StationSl On-line Operation

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6. Instructor Station ±51H$H 7fll-

Instructor Sta t ionpjAô^)^ X-Window System3 7l3-§- S- SJJE-f

^•4^-5 . ECR3°fl 4 4 4 J 1 S14. Instructor Station &<£■£: 2 3 4 X-terminal

3. ^ 4 4 ° ! Xl-^-4 Dynamic Screen Updates, Input Feedback, Expert Mode

Commands 31 Tableau Request7r 7}^*r4- n H 3.1.31£ Instructor Station

4 ^^^f $ 3 * 44*fl:n. X14-

Instructor Station ^H-fLÎI0^ Pull-down Menu 91 Popup Window*

£11*114 4"47> ^ 3 * 4 4 i ± 7 1 ^ 3 ^ 4 / Malfunction ^<Q ^ 4E> Z } ^

*lHf- ^>fl tt ^r & E ^ 4<H 5U4[68]. Instructor Station^ £ S m 3 ° l 3

4 3 0 ^ 3 3 * *1M4 i f - s . ^ nf} 3.1.324 £ 4 -

7>. Supporting Functions

Instructor Station34^ 4-g-4 ££• 4 € 4 ^ 1 ~ § - #3 £14.

1) a 7 l i ^ i ^ 4

# 1057l|Sl 2:7l3:^l(ICs: Initial Conditions)-§- 4 € * J 4 . IC^ 3A Unprotectedsl- Preassigned ^^-3. 4 ^ 4 -

2) Malfunction Insertion

Instructor Station34^- ^.H. J I4V ^ 4 4 3Â-ir Component

Malfunction-i- £ # S r 3 4 50037>4°fl tf& Malfunction ^ ^ H 7>^-«rJi

$ - 3 3 4 1503 7>4 4 Malfunction^- -§-4 £ ^ 3 ^r 4-2-3. ^"SH 7>^4

- 1 1 3 -

EXIT Dbptey Utility SFC tlscktrsci tteset %assj/xsf Wlixxwz Freest Sssmand:

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Car Print Mew Query

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ZL^ 3.1.31 Instructor Station ^Arr 4 3

- 1 1 4 -

ZL^ 3.1.32 Instructor Station A°]z] * * £ .

- 1 1 5 -

cf. Malfunction ^ ^ 3 $\& 7]^-£- Malfunction Summary Display,

Malfunction System Index, Component Level Malfunctions, Malfunction

Insertion/Modification/Deletion -§-°l 5U4-

3) Reset

°1 4 ¥ * °l-8-*H °13 * 4 2.7l2:4J5-5. Reset £ ^ 513-.

4) Snapshot

Snapshot 71^-fr ^l-g-34 4 - 4 ^ M 4 M ° 1 4 4 - 3 * ^ - 4 ^ 4 a L 4

4 - 3 ^ - 4 4 - * ^r 214- Defaults. Snapshot 4 ^ s . 3:715:4 7l*£-§- IC 03.

Settingtl-4 IC 1 - 3 0 4 4 ^ 3 ^ 4 3 3 3 . °fl 4«H 4 3 * * ^ £ U 31 -

10544 ^ ^ 3 4 3 SnapshotSL3, 4 4 ° 1 € 4 -

5) Backtrack

°1 4 ^ 1 ^ - 6 - ^ - 4 ^ 4-47> « 3 4 # * M 4 ^*S 4 3 4 1 4 4 4 4 - 3 S .

sH-e)7l ^13 ^ A s > 4 - ^7]^ Next, Previous, Jump, Cancel, Reset, Exit,

Set Interval ^ Replay 3 T T 4 ^ 1 - ° 1 &r4.

6) Freeze/Run

°1 4 ^ 7J-A>S. * H ^ ^ 4 3 41-5fl0l^^l 4*3* ^44-2-3. 3 ^ 4 4 4 4 4 4 £ ^r 5U£^ *Kr 4 v * 4 ^ 4 -

7) Time Selection

4 * 4 £°1 Time Mode* 4 4 £ <r 514-

- 1 1 6 -

- Real Tme: ^ 4 4 : 4 M 4 £ -£4,

- Slow Time (1/2 - 1/10): ^ 4 * 4 £ 4 " 4 1 - 41^4 ^ ^ 4 ^ ^ * * ,

- Fast Time: 5L2)S\^ *43^°11 4 4 4 = 4 1*H4 * 4 3 ^ ° f l 4 4

N 3 4 4 ^14 ^5L3. £ 3 * ^ 5U4 4 SLB.^ ^ 4 3 4*34£r ^-4 £ 4

3 ^ Trend* -*14f*l #%*HrHl * * ,

- Step Time: 3 £ = £ ^ ^ 3 4 7)11K43 °fl 4 ^3, 4 * 4 4 °1 4 ^

* ° 1 * 4 4 4 * ^ 1 ° 1 ^ * X Frames 3f" 4*J4?1 4 * Freeze 5LHS. ^ 4

4 ^ .

8) Parameter Monitoring AA^ 3 4 ^ § - o j - g - ^ 3x5.3 .5.0} £ # 1 ^ * 7j-3^- ^ o^Jl oj

& 1 - * 3*m ^ 5U4- A 3^°fl 3 * Update 4 4 " * 4-4°fl 4*fl 2 : 4 3

4 . S- f- 404 7 r 4 3 ^ r * ^ 4 4 1 4-4^- ^ 9X3 Page# 871-4 3 ^ r * £ 4

f!- ^ $14. Trend Graph Display-b 1^ 4 4 7 < 9 ^ 4 4 3 #44fe - 3 ^ 3

3 4 3 H 4 ^ 4 * l i M Ml 3 4 ^ * S € 4

4- Remote Functions

Remote Function^- A*\7\ ^ 3 4 4 1 4vi°fl4 4 ^ 4 4 &TT 4 * 3 1 3 4

4^-§- 3 ^ 1 - 3 °144 4 ^ 4 4 4 £13 11-6-44. Remote Function£-

Discrete4 Analog ^ 7 r 4 4 3 °1 ^ ^ 4 4 514- Discrete Remote Functions

£ On/Off £^r Closed/Auto/Open^ ^ 3 ^ 4 " 4 * 4 4 4 ^ 4 ° 1 ^

Analog Remote Functions^ 0 - 100%, 60 - 96 degrees4 A-& °}^3.ZL &

# * 4 € 4 4

- 1 1 7 -

Remote Functions^- 7]& ^ 4 ^ 3 4 4 ^ l S . 3 : 4 4 ^ 4 4 * 4 4 4 -

3 # 1-3 « « . * 4 ^ 4 103:71- £ 4 3 4*^l°14cfl435- 103: * 3 1 € ^

&£-^ 2 . 4 4 ^ 3144- Instructor Station34^ 4 4 50044 Remote

Functions* 4 ^ 4 3 . 4 ^ 1007 r44 3-g-4 Remote Function* 4 3 ^ - ^

&£-& 4 4 $14- 5. 3.1.13£- Remote Functions] 7 l ^ § * 1 4 4 : 2 . 214-

3 3.1.13 Remote Function 7 l ^

Remote Functions

Menu S t ^ Remote Function Index Display

Remote Function Summary Display

Remote Function Insertion/Modification

Remote Function Deletion

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Field Name

start time

sampling rate (sample/sec )

number of raw data (N)

name of raw data 1

name of raw data N

number of 1st conversed data (M) name of 1st conversed data 1

name of 1st conversed data M

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integer

string

string

integer

string

string

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16

20

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20

20

4

20

20

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1996042910300000

10.0

16

raw_namel

raw_namel6

16

cnv_namel

cnv_namel6

- 1 3 0 -

3 3.2.4 telraw.scd

Field Name

time

raw data 1

raw data N

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMISSFF

float

float

Size

16

20

20

Example

1996042910323550

12.79

5.378

X 3.2.5 telcnv.scd

Field Name

time

1st conversed data 1

1st conversed data M

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMISSFF

float

float

Size

16

20

20

Example

1996042910323550

11.23

13.27

3 3.2.6 telwld.scd

Field Name

time

work load

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMISSFF

character

Size

16

1

Example

1996042910323550

1 (0:load off, l:load on)

- 1 3 1 -

a 3.2.7 telhdr.das

Field Name

start time ( simulation clock )


number of raw data (N)

name of raw data 1

name of raw data N

number of 1st conversed data (M)

name of 1st conversed data 1

name of 1st conversed data M

Format

HHMISSFF

float

integer

string

string

integer

string

string

Size

8

20

4

20

20

4

20

20

Example

00000000

10.0

16

raw_namel

raw_namel6

16

cnv_namel

cnv_namel6

5. 3.2.8 telraw.das

Field Name

simulation clock

raw data 1

raw data N

Format

HHMISSFF

float

float

Size

8

20

20

Example

00023550

12.79

5.378

- 1 3 2 -

fi. 3.2.9 telcnv.das

Field Name

simulation clock

1st conversed data 1

1st conversed data M

Format

HHMISSFF

float

float

Size

8

20

20

Example

00023550

11.23

13.27

3 3.2.10 telwld.das

Field Name

simulation clock

work load

Format

HHMISSFF

character

Size

8

1

Example

00023550

1 (0:load off, Hload on)

* All sizes are in bytes.

2) Eye Tracking System

Host Simulation Computer(SCADA)3 ^ 3 4 Eye Tracking Data^

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5. 3.2.11 Eye Trackinf System Data

SCADA3 334fe 3 4 3

eyehdr.scd eyeraw.scd eyecnv.scd

^

Eye Movement data3 3?} ^ 3 * i # . Eye Movement data 4:o%l Eye Movement data

7 > ^ * DAEXESS 3 333fe 3°kl

eyehdr.das eyeraw.das eyecnv.das

3 3.2.12 eyehdr.scd

Field Name

start time


number of display unit (N)

name of display unit 1

name of display unit N

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMISSFF

float

integer

string

string

Size

16

20

4

20

20

Example

1996042910300000

10.0

8

display _unit_namel

display _unit_name8

5. 3.2.13 eyeraw.scd

Field Name

time

pupil size of left eye

pupil size of right eye

blink rate of left eye

blink rate of right eye

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMISSFF

float

float

float

float

Size

16

20

20

20

20

Example

1996042910323550

10.27

10.24

0.27

0.27

- 1 3 4 -

3 . 3.2.14 eyecnv.scd

Field Name

start time

end time

display unit number

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMISSFF

YYYYMMDDHHMISSFF

integer

Size

16

16

4

Example

1996042910323550

1996042910323800

5

S 3.2.15 eyehdr.das

Field Name

start time (simulation clock )


number of display unit (N)

name of display unit 1

name of display unit N

Format

HHMISSFF

float

integer

string

string

Size

8

20

4

20

20

Example

00000000

10.0

8

display_unit_namel

display _unit_name8

- 1 3 5 -

S. 3.2.16 eyeraw.das

Field Name

simulation clock

pupil size of left eye

pupil size of right eye

blink rate of left eye

blink rate of right eye

Format

HHMISSFF

float

float

float

float

Size

8

20

20

20

20

Example

00023550

10.27

10.24

0.27

0.27

3 3.2.17 eyecnv.das

Field Name


end time ( simulation clock )

display unit number

Format

HHMISSFF

HHMISSFF

integer

Size

8

8

4

Example

00023550

00023800

5


3) 3D Motion System

Host Simulation Computer(SCADA)3 ^ 3 4 3D Motion Data^ £

3 £ 3 3 #-§-43 4 4 4 3 1 4 3 3 ^ 3 * ^ 3 4 ^ Header file4 3D

Motion System34 71^4 3 4 4 7} Raw Data4 4 3 4 * 4 4 4 4 4 - 3

3.2.18£ 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 ^ 3 4 4 * -&44 3 4 4 3 3.2.1934

3.2.22- A 3 4 3 3 Fromat* J^.4^4-

- 1 3 6 -

a 3.2.18 3D Motion System Data

SCADA3 334fe343

3dmothdr.scd 3dmotdat.scd

^

Telemetry data°fl 3*> Telemtry data

* 3 * *«■«- .

71^-^f DAEXESS«H1 *143fe 343

3dmothdr.das 3dmotdat.das

S 3.2.19 3dmothdr.scd

Field Name

start time


number of control machine (N) name of control machine 1

name of control machine N

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMISS FF float

integer

string

string

Size

16

20

4

20

20

Example

1996042910300000

10.0

12

control_mach_name 1

control_mach_namel 2

S 3.2.20 3dmotdat.scd

Field Name

time

distance of momentary movement

distance of accumulated movement

current control machine number

Format

YYYYMMDDHHMI SSFF float

float

integer

Size

16

20

20

4

Example

1996042910323550

12.37

1321.54

5

- 1 3 7 -

a 3.2.21 3dmothdr.das

Field Name



number of control machine (N)

name of control machine 1

name of control machine N

Format

HHMISSFF

float

integer

string

string

Size

8

20

4

20

20

Example

00000000

10.0

12

control_mach_name 1

control_mach_name 12

5. 3.2.22 3dmotdat.das

Field Name

simulation clock

distance of momentary movement

distance of accumulated movement

current control machine number

Format

HHMISSFF

float

float

integer

Size

8

20

20

4

Example

00023550

12.37

1321.54

5


4) System Data ^ 3

System Data 4 Host Simulation Computer 3 4 #^<844 Loggings}

fe- Data* # 4 ^ - TA°-3. HMI System34 # ^ 4 f e Operator Action Log

Data4 Alarm Event Data, ZL?)5L Instructor Station34 # ^ 4 ^ Monitored

-138 -

Parameter Data7> 4 3 4 ^ 4 4 -

4 3 4 System Data^- S.^- £ 3 A ] 3 Host Simulation Computer 3 4

fileS 3 * 4 J L £ 3 4 ^ 4 ^Ml^r SCADA System4 7>^46J-§- 4*1

DAEXESS System34 £ 3 £ 3 * 4*11 4 * 4 4 -

Simulation Model34 # ^ 4 - c - Historical Data^ £ 3 3 4 4 3 HMI

System34 Trend DataS 4 * 4 ^ - 3 1 , HMI System4 shared memory3

logging4 3 J i * , SCADA System^ 3 * 4 3 %3f 3 3 £ 1 4 4 4 -

7}) Operator Action Log Data

Main Test Room4 display terrninal34 # ^ 4 ^ - Operator

Action Data^ HMI System3 4 3 4 ASCII fileS 4 3 4 ^ 3 , A e v e n t 4 4

4 4 4 # ^ 4 3 1 , A filed^- quotes( "" ) S enclose43L comma(,)S £ 3 4

4 - events 4 * 4 ^ 7>4 type4 & 4 .

- opening a pump 3 3 level-3 diagram 3 4 operator 3 4 3 ^r1*^^-

simulation control event

- selecting a new screen 4 4 following a page connector l-£r navigation

event

log format^ 4 * 5. 3.2.234 1 4

- 1 3 9 -

3 3.2.23 Operator Action Log Format

Field Name

simulation clock

Terminal ID

Screen Name

Action Type

Action Description

Format

HHMISSFF

string

string

character

string

Size

8

20

40

1

30

Example

02163406

MTRVDU1

CC01: PUMPS AND HEAT EXCHANGERS TRAIN A 1 (0:navigation, 1 Control)

CLOSE CCV001


4 ^ 3 ^ 3 4 Data^ £ 3 4 if"4 $. DAEXESS System^ 3 3 format

iLS 7 ^ 4 4 . 4 ^ 3 < a * quotes( "" ) 4 commaQ* 3 4 4 ^ 3 * 3 4 4

4-

4 ) Alarm Event Data

VDU alarm system 4 4 annunciator panel system 3 4 # 3 4 ^ -

Alarm event transitions (OFF to ON and vise versa) fe- HMI System 3 3

3 4 ASCII fileS 3 3 3 - b 3 , A e v e n t 4 4 4 4 4 #A<S431, A f i ledt

quotes( "" ) S enclose431 comma(,)S £ 3 4 4 - k g format^ 4 * S.

3.2.244 1 4 -

- 1 4 0 -

3 3.2.24 Alarm Event Log Format

Field Name

simulation clock

Alarm Name

Alarm Description

Format

HHMISSFF

string

string

Size

8

32

40

Example

02163406

an:01a04

ESF SWGR RM TRN A SYSTEM TRBL/DIS


4^711 ^ 3 4 Data^ £ 3 4 # 4 ^ DAEXESS System4 ^ 3 format

J5.S 7k§-44- 7k§- 3 3 * quotes( "" ) 4 comma(,)* 3 3 4 ^ 3 * 4 4 4

4 .

4 ) Monitored Parameter Data

Instructor Station 71^- ^ 3 ^ simulator US3 database 4

simulation variable^- monitoring *J- ^r 8-c- 71-^oj i f J - 4 4 & 4 . £ 4 0}

%A monitoring 4 variable -!-£- time stamped 4 4 binary ^ 3 S log file

3 7 l * 4 J l ol 3 4 scanning ra te^ 4 times/sec 4 4 -

binary ^ 3 S 7 l * 4 log file£- Instructor Station4 3 ^ 4 ^ - tool 3 4

3 £ 3 4 ^"4 ^ ASCII file ^ 3 S 3 3 1 *r 9X3 4 4 4 format - 4 * 4 14.

- 1 4 1 -

Monitored Parameter ASCII File Log Format

Date(Simulation Start Time)

Title

Description line 1

Description line 2

Description line 3

Total number of Points

Pointl_name Pointl_unit Pointl_description

PointN_name PointN_unit PointN_description

Simulation Clockl

Ponitl_value Point2_value... PointN_value

Simulation Clock2

Ponitl_value Point2_value... PointN_value

Example of Monitored Parameter ASCII File Log Format

"Wed May 8 09:47:35 1996"

20

- 1 4 2 -

Pointl_name Pointl_unit Pointl_description

PointN_name PointN_unit PointN_description

0

1.0 2.0 ... 12.1

0.25

1.2 2.1 ... 11.8

o l ^ 3 log 4 data^ SCADA System3 3 4 4 * 4 A-& DAEXESS System

input fo rma tes 7 f : § - 3 4 4 4 -

- 1 4 3 -

Monitored Parameter Data DAEXESS Input Format

a 3.2.25 mphdr.das

Field Name

simulation start time


total number of points (N)

pointl_name

pointl_unit

pointl_description

pointN_name

pointN_unit

pointN_description

Format

YYYYMMDDHH MISSFF float

integer

string

string

string

string

string

string

Size

16

20

4

32

32

40

32

32

40

Example

1996042910300000

4.0

20

a 3.2.26 mpdat.das

Field Name

simulation clock

pointl_value

pointN_value

Format

HHMISSFF

float

float

Size

8

20

20

Example

00023550

1.0

12.1


-144-

5. DAEXESS3 T2-^

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Sys t em*34 ^ r 3 4 Video 3 4 4 * d ig i t a l444 DAEXESS workstation3

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3 * * ^-S-4 £ 3 3 1 4 4 * 3 3 , # 3 , 3 3 32\n DAEXESS ^-S. * 4 3

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4-

System Event Log Window^- £ 3 * # / $ 4 Alarm Event4 Operator

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J.

ZL^ 3.2.3 DAEXESS main 4 4 _ L ^ _

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Alram event data Window IE Alarm event logging data

ZL^ 3.2.5 Alarm Event Data

- 1 4 9 -

\" 11 V r uOggir# "talc* •CEI

T u r n an™ clock 1 I 00090800

»?gga?«K«EW»MWWWgH«gi»'^ WlfgtXWMI tfj

HU 3.2.6 Operator Action Data

f 00 09 07 OP I

Verbal Protocol I/O Window

1 Monitor - > Compare Annunciator - 1 j |

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v4v|iHvjUv^^

v 4 \ ^ w U v ^ ^

OC001600 30503000

ZLrg 3.2.9 "Graph_Zoom"£*,94-4

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Video Play Window^ 3D Motion Analyser4 Eye Tracking System^

°fl3 ^ 3 4 video 3 4 4 * DAEXESSS3443 "MAKE MOVIE FILES"*

f-3 d i g i t a l ^ video £ 4 3 1 4 4 1 3.4 *ra! 4 4 4 7 1 §144 4-§-44.

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forward/backward, stop., mute~r4 4 € f r f-3 video £ 3 4 4 4 * £ S ] t

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4^3^ -S ZL *]$$] v ideo ^^30)47 ! 5 : 4 s ] i * 4 4 -g-^4 421* JE

5L484-

6. 1 ^

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£ 3 4 3 4 * ^ - £ 3 4 4 3 . 2 . i s time window* 3 3 4 : c 4 * 4 4

°-S # 3 4 3 * ^ 3 4 4 - ; t * ^ - # 3 3 1 4 4 ^ ETS(Eye Tracking System),

A/V system, System log * 4 4 - System Log* f - 4 4 # 3 4 3 * 4 4 4 ^ .

ETS4 A/V system3 4 4 4 * 4 4 4 4 * 4 4 * # 3 4 4 .

(2) Error Rate

£ 3 4 3 4 * ^ £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 . 1 t S -SrlAQS] i2.-?r(error)* 3 4 4 s 4 *

ETS, A/V system, System log * 4 3 4 4 1 " % * 4 4 -2-*4 ^"34-¥"* 4

444.

- 1 6 0 -

5. 3.3.1 ADIOS £ 3 ^ 7 f 4 ^ 4 ^

ADIOS * g

3 4 * * ) * , 3 * * , * 3 * # i #

Color coding

Alarm information navigation

3:4 ^.24*171714

3J£°fl A& *3S14

* ? k 5 : * ^ 4 # 3

71 4

m# I J U T 3.S.* 4 3 3 - •fl-'Sja.s. ^-g-

4 4 £4#-° -5 .3 * 3*1.2.3. 4 4 ^ -

j£4 4 = 3 3 4 £ 3 3 1 4 4 * 7>^ 4 3 #

Overview 4 ^ 3 3 3 3 3-S-t- <«d«I 4 4 3 3 3 S . 3 3 3 $ ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ o ] » ^ 3 f -o .^3 3 .Mr 3.S.* 5 4 5 . £ £ 4* 8 *

* £ « 4 ADIOS# ±7l ^J5L43471 2. § * 4 8 ^ 3 , a=«- € * i 7 > 5U^ 3 * 371

^Jl^r ^ a . 4 * # 4 ^ J i s . 4 * 3 * 4 ! * f l 3 r4e} £ 4 * 1 3 3 3 J £ * 3 3 « -

4 £ « - 3 3 * 3 : 3 4 4 4 ^ £ * , ¥ 3 , £ 4 * 4 ^ 4 1 - *!«■ <r 8 *

* 4 £ * 3 " S - * 4 « 3 3 31&€ 3J£ fi] *Jfc 3 4 ( * 4 3 4 «V-§-34)4 *) £ 3 3.S-4 3 4 3 3i 333-2-3. ig 4 t ^ 8 4

ADIOS°fl 3 * * 3 4 4 ^ 4 3 3 i £ ( S 3 th'fl, MMI £ 4 3 *) ADIOS4 Alarm procesing°fl 3 * * # 4 4 ^ 4 3 37l

4r**rfc Measures

4 * 3 4 , Situation Awareness

4 * 3 4 ,

Questionaries

Questionnaries

Mental workload

« * 3 ? r , Error rate, Situation Awareness

Questionaries

- 1 6 1 -

(3) SA(Situation Awareness)

* 4 A V * § 4 4 3 - 2 . 1 i s SA4 # 3 3 3 5? ^-fi- £ 4 ^ 4 7 l l 4 ^ r *

^ 3 4 4 . £ 3 ^ 4 4 3 3 4 4 simulation* freeze33l7r 4 4 - 4 # 3 4 3

41 * 4 4 4 3 ^.fi. 3 7 l ) 4 ^ r ^ 4 ^ 3 4 4 ^ 4 * *£=- £ * * 3 3 4 3 4

4 . 3 3 4 £ * * 3 3 ^ 4 4 ^ 4 ^ 1 - ^ 4 .

(4) Mental workload

KAERI4 3 4 : ¥ - 4 # 3 3 ^ ( t e l eme t ry 7l 4 ) 3 4 4 4 # 3 4 i £ - 3 4 :

4 -

(5) Questionnaire

£ 3 ^ 4 £ 3 4 4 4 4 * S * 44(interview)3 4 4 4 ADIOS/ITF4

MMI A}-g-44Ajr Nuisance Alarm4 ^-fi-3, ADIOS4 3 : 4 4 ^ . 4 4 7 1 ^ 4

^ 4 ^ , ADIOS/ITF4 S 4 3 ^ 4 3 3 3 , ^ 4 3 4 4 i £ , 3 £ J 3 . ^ - A I - 3 - *

4 3 4 - 3 4 * *rai * 4 * ^ 3 4 - 4 -

6. £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 .

£ £ 3 4 ^ 4 * 4 £ * 334 £3443-2.4 4*484-O Feedwater Pump Trip and RCP Sealing Line Leakage

O SGTR

O Loss of Feedwater and Main Steam Isolation Valve Fail

A £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 . 3 3*114-^ * 4 4 4 Error7} time window3 4 4 4 3

4 4 4 8 4 - 3 1 - 3 0 1 4 4 4 3 9 ^ 3 ^ 2 4 4 freeze7> 8 ° - 4 =L 44^3^=-

4 * 4 £ 4 ^ 47l)4^r^ 4 ^ 3 44 - * 4 4 4 ^ 4 4 4 3 £ * ^ 4 ^ - 4

4 4 Situation Awareness#34* 4 £ 3 4 ° 1 1 3 ^ 3 * 4 * 4 ^ 4 - 4 * 3

-162-

4 4 4 ^ S 4 4 S . 4 4 4 Situation Awareness#34 £ 4 4 4 -

7\. £ 3 4 4 3 ^ -

£ 3 4 * * 4 A £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 . 3 4 $ .2.4 (malfunction^ "1134 ^4r £ 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 £ 3 4 8 4 - A 4 4 3 4 - 4 %■ 4 * 4 4 4 4 4 * 20-30S- 3 £ S 3 4 4 8 ^ 3 1 4 ^ A3$- 3%4 431-4 ^-T1-* 44- *4iL 4xr 3 J U 4 i ^ 4 ^ * ^ 3 ^ 4 4 4 3-4 4 3^3- :a4 3-44- 44314 Situation Awareness#334* 3"44 A £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 - 3 4 4 # £ 3 4 4 * 4 4A140] 4 4 Telemetry4 Eye Tracking System4 £ 4 ^ 3 - 3 3 3 4 44* 3-44 444 30 -3 4 £3444 i J ^ s * 3-84-

£ 3 4 4 3 - 2 . 3 4 4 Time Window ^ 1HS4^ T ^ E I ^ S E £ 3 4 4

3^°fl £ # 4 4 8 4 -

1) Feedwater Pump Trip and RCP Sealing Line Leakage

ITF 4 Instructor Station34 Malfunction Setting A] ^ 4^4 ^4.

4

Malfunction ID FW14A CV09A

Delay Time 6:00 7:00

Defunction Time

Final Severity 10

Ramp Time 10

Current Sevirity

- 1 6 3 -

4 4 3 ^ . 5 - FW p/p7r trip44 4*3-^-5- # 4 4 50%44 3^4711 4 4 - 4 3 4 1 4 # 4 4 leakage7r I k ^ o } VCT level4 seal charging flow 7} 3^4711 4 4 ^-^-3-2-S^ PZR4 ^ 4 4 - 3 ^ 4 4 - 4 4 4 4 3 . 3 4 £ 4 4 * FW p/p tripAHl 4J2.44 4 4 4 3 * 4*14:2 1 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 3 3 £ 4 ^ 4 * 3 4 4 4 7 1 Rx triP4^-* £ 3 3 4 4 ^ 4 .

FW p/p trip4 * 4 4 * 4 * * 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 -

(1) SBCS4 3-1-4^- •• HMSSl-4 MS1434 viooi4 7 H 3 * 4 ^ - ^ * 4

4 .

(2) RPCS4 3-1-4 ■¥■ : H M S 4 4 RX0234 turbine runback on ^ - 4

(3) Control Rod 3 ^ 4"4 : HMS^-4 REACTRL3A-1 control rod

insertion44

* 4 4 * ^-^-3-^-5- RCP sealing Line leakage* 4 4 3 4 4 ^ 3

Alarm* * 4 4 CVCS l ine* ^ - 4 4 4 sealing line leakage* 4 4 ^ " *r 8

4 -

4 £ 3 4 4 4 - 2 . 3 3 4 Time Window^ 4 * 4 3:4-

5:00 1st Break

6:00 Malfunction FW14A injection

6:30 TO FW Trip 4 4

7:00 MF CV09A insertion

7:00 TO SBCS, RPCS*3 4 4

7:00 RO Control Rod Insertion 4 4

-164 -

9:00 RO RCP seal leakage point ^ 4

10:00 2nd Break

15:00 Stop simulation

2) SGTR

ITF4 instructor Station34 Malfunction Setting 4 ^ & * 4 ^ 37114

4*4 44-

Malfunction ID TH05B

Delay Time 8:00

Defunction Time

Final Severity 100

Ramp Time 3:00

Current Sevirity

4 4 3 4 SGTR44 severity7> 3 4 4 £ * 34^3 .014 . 2 4 # 4 -2.3 * 4 4 4 4 4 tube ruptured SG* 3 3 4 4 ^ Rx Trip* 4 4 - ^ 3 4 4 3 3 4 * 4 4 4 ^ 4 4 4 . * 4 4 4 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 * 4 4 4 &-$-4 14£ 15 i 3 3 Rx Trip and Turbine Trip4 M 44(PZR level Lo).

4 £ 3 3 4 3 . 2 . 3 3 4 Time Windowfe 4 * 4 4 4 .

-165-

8:00 MF TH05B injection

8:30 TO/RO Radiation High Alarm 4 4

9:00 1st Break

10 :30 TO SG #2 level H i g h * 4 4 ^ tube ruptured S G * ^ - 4 3 " -

12:00 TO MSIV close

??:?? 2nd Break

MSIV closed 30^ 4 4 4 3

( 4 4 1 2 £ 3 3 MSIV* close43fl* 3 * ° l l ^ Turbine Tr ip^ 3 0 4 4 4

3) 22:00 Stop simulation

3) Loss of Feedwater and Main Steam Isolation Valve Fail

ITF4 instructor S t a t i a n 3 4 Malfunction Setting 4 % * 4 ^ 37114

^ 4-§-4 4 4 .

Malfunction ID MS04A WD02A

Delay Time 4:00 6:00

Defunction Time

Final Seventy 30 30

Ramp Tune 1:00

Current Sevinty

- 1 6 6 -

4 £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 . 3 4 ^ MSIV7} 4 4 4 30% 4 3 4 turbine power7> 3 £ 4 ^ S-^3 Containment44 SG blowline3A^ leakage ^ 4 ^ . ^-3-4^ 4 4 . ^ 3 4 1 4 # J ^ - 4 ^ ^ s 2 4 # 4 4 4 4 A3 4 4 ^ ^ 4 4 4 ^ 3 4 # 3 3 ^ 7 > 4 4 ^ ^ ^ s 4 ^ 4 4 4*344-

4 £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 . 3 3 4 Time Window^ 4 * 4 £ 4 -

4:00 MF MS04A injection

5:00 MSIV close ^ 4

5:301st Break

6:00 MSrV open * 4£. (b u t fail)

6:00 MF WD02A injection

8:30 2nd Break

9:50 Moisture Hi Alarm 4 4

11:30 Leakage point(Blowdown Line of SG 1) ^ 4

20.00 Stop simulation

4- Situation Awareness

Situation Awareness#344 4 * 4 4 4 4 ^ 4 ^ Bfl7fl4^rfe- 4 *

4 ^ 4 -

O 4 4 S ^ 4 3 3 * ( R C S ) 4 Tavg

O ^7]*g^7](SG)3 t -47}-^ ^^r *3=(Feedwater Flow)

- 1 6 7 -

O 1 4 # 4 * # ^ r *3=(Letdown Flow)

O 7r47l(Pressurizer)4 4*4 (level)

O 33*fl4fe(VCT)4 ^ 4 (level)

O 3 4 3 3 ^ 3 ^ ^ 1 ) 4 ^ 4 (level)

O ^-^r7l(Condensor)4 ^r4(level)

O ^ - ^ 3 3 ^ 3 ( C S T ) 4 ^ 4 (level)

O ^ 4 l H M ( S G ) 4 ^4(kvel)

O 4 4 S # ^ (Reactor Power)

O 7 > * ^ 4 :§-7l^#7l (condensate ejector) 4 3^r

O 7 r * f l 4 ^-^3^(condensate pumps)4 3 ^

O 71-^-^4 J i ^ - g - ^ ^ ( a u x feedwater pumps)4 ^

O 7 > * ^ 4 7>444<i4(pressurizer heater)4 7X<r

O 7V*^4 4 4 S ^ 4 4 3 S ( R C P ) 4 4=

O 7 > * ^ 4 #43^(ChargingPumps)4 7j1^

O 7 r * ^ 4 ^ ^ 3 ^ ( F e e d w a t e r Pumps)4 7A^r O 1 4 4 4 * 4 ^(Opened Turbine Bypass Valve)4 A.'r O 34-*4(CTMT)4 43(pressure)

O 7r47l(pressurizer)4 43(pressure)

O -4ir7l(Condensor)4 4 3 (pressure)

O ^ ^ 4 i?-^f-4(Steam Common Header)344 ^ 7 1 4 ^ (pressure)

O ^ ^ 7 1 4 3 A ^ 4 ^7l*S.(steam temperature)

O 7V47l(pressurizer)4 *£(temperature)

O 2 4 # 4 44^ ir0fl<i7l(LP pre-heater) ^ 4 4 *£(temperature)

O 4 4 s ^ 4 3 3 : l - ( R C S ) 4 4 * 4 * i ( T c o l d )

O 4 4 S ^ 4 4 3 * ( R C S ) 4 i * 4 * £ ( T h o t )

- 1 6 8 -

Situation Awareness#3 4 fe 2-¥ 3 3 4 3 5 - - ? A J 4 4 4^ .3 ^3c>14 ^ 4 4 4 £44i 37fl4^r7f 444- 4141 8 8 ^ 4 1 - 3 * 4 4 , ^4*11 3 4 4 4 4 ^ 434 £441 37114^4 # 3 * 4 43 3 4 4 ^ 3=^4 3 34^r #41- * ^ 4 A 3 4 4 ^ 44 1 4 4 37114^34 634 £4 ± 3 3 4 ^ 3 3 4 ^ 3 * * ^ ^*3-*-5.s -?344 8^- * 4 * ^7 r, #± , 4*18*4 3 4 4 * J * * 4 4 4 8 4

7. £34 r«J

3 8 * 4 ^ 4 ^-44i3 5 - * 4 ^ 2 * 4 ^ ( 4 ^ t s f e - RO 14, TO 14) 7} £ 3 3 4 4 4 8 ^ - 4 4 * 5. 3.3.24 ^ * £ 3 3 4 4 3 4 £ 3 4 £ 4 4 8 4 .

X 3.3.2 ADios 37>£34 £ 3 3 4

£3344^ 1 2 3

3-B-A] ADIOS

I II I

^ ITF II I n

I : * 4 ^ 1 II: * 4 ^ 2

4 £ 3 3 4 * 4 £ 3 4 4 4 447} 8 4 ^ 7>3444 3"34iii(Paired Comparison)3 4 4 *7il£-34 7 f ^ 4 4 A £ 3 4 4 3 - 2 . 3 313: £ 3 ^ 3 -3 i L 4 ^ ] ZL?)JL £ 3 £ 4 ^ 912\2\ £4(random order)S ^ 3 4 4 -

-169-

8. £33444 £-3

7\. Situation Awareness

-f-33-34 ! 4 £ r 4 * 4 £ ^ - 4 , 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 ^ 1 4 ADIOS

4 ITF44-^ Situation Awareness4344 ^ 4 4 7> 8£- 4-2-S £ 3 4 8

4-

4 * 4 4 ^ * t-test44 ADIOS vs. ITF ZL?)JL RO vs. TO 3 3 4 4

^r*5484 (1) ADIOS vs. ITF

tO - 1.8782 < t(0.05;5)=2.571

-f-33 -5. *444 $*. (2) RO vs. TO

tO = 0.5262 < t(0.05;5)=2.571

f-33^5. *444 $*.

4- Mental Workload

£ 3 ^ 3 * 4 4 ( T O ) 4 ^ * 3 3 3 3 8 - ¥ - 4 * Telemetry* * 4 4

#3384- ^-34 ITF444 *334 243 £3443.2.4 34 ^343:* ££$43 f-334 -S-3* *7l484-

4 - Questionnaires

£3^5.^ 4*4- £ * £ * £ £4*44 r*3484.

- 1 7 0 -

Q : ADIOS- r IJ-A^V 3 ^ 3 3 ^ . ^ ^ j i * ^ 4 ^ ^ 4 ^ 7 ^ 4 8 ^ cfl 4 4 ^ * 4^3 #*48£44? A : 32i7> # 4 H ^ 3 4 M 4 4 £ 3 7>3 ^^ .4431 A , S 4 4 ^ ^ ( k e y alarm)4* ^-3-44. 4 3 J i ^ 33°fl 4 4 4 1 3 4 4 £44 i 3 ^ * *(a. 4 4 4 3#*H4 4 3 4 4 3 * 1 * 4 4 4 4 - ADIOS3 ^ ^ 32ifl0fl 4 key alarm3 3 3 4 4 ^ 3 3 4 3 ^ - * 4 ^ 4 - Key alarm* 3 4 4 3JrL£-4 3 2t^ £44 i 3 # * 4 4 3 4 4 4 J I * 4 2 : 4 * 4 4 4 4 4 4 ^ ^ ^ - 4 4 ^ ^ 4 . 4 4 4 ^ 4 ^ 3Efl-& 44-447>44 3 ^ 4 ^ S ( 7 > * 3 ADIOS4-4 ) * 3-2:44. *43:4 ^3 43334 *44 *344 *434 HJ3=-°s £4^7} 4*5 € 3°fl 44 44 4^4 ^4444 # * 444 £4 *444 *4s4 ^3 44*114 «rfe 441 3J 444 43334 33* 3^-44 ^44 *4 43711 S L * 4 € 3 4 4

ZLB14 4 4 3 ° . s * 7l$5i ^11444-44 7 3 1 1 4 ^ * 4314-4. 73114

44 3*°fl^ *4^3 44 #3*3 444 4434 * 4 3 ^ * 443-^ 8fe 334 84-

Q : ADIOS^ 33°fl 4 4 4 3 2 1 * ^ £ - 4 4 S 3 3 ^ 3 0)401 ^-4AJ.

3 5L*4 4 8 ^ 4 4 ? A : 321* 3 3 4 4 4 4 ^-g -XAi^ 4^- t-g-oj ^ 4 J L A^M 4 4

433-3 43 334 4s3 4*28^4^ 443" 884- 33*443 ^ -i-4* ojo.3- 434 3 - 33^-S-4 f-l^ 8 4 4* #4 434 434 ^44 3334 444 -47>JI 844 4^ 3334 4*434 434 3 3 ^ * * 33^s £444 844 4fe *4433 £ 4 * 443-r 8 4

-171-

Q : rrF4 ADIOS4 4 * 3 4 3 3 * 4^434-6-A : 4 4 s st l^- 4 4 * $47>fe3 I T F ^ . 4 ^ ADIOS7> 4 3 4 4 . 3 ^.a. 4 4 ^ 437-*4 8 ^ 4 4 4-^-4 4 3 4 8 4 n r ^ 337-*4 8 ^ 1 4 4 4 4 4 * $ ^ 3 ADIOS^.4^- * 4 4 8 4 -

Q : ADIOS^ 3^-4 ^r* # 4 ^ * 3 * 4 ^ 3 ^-S-4 3 .7> 4 4 4 4 & 4 4 4 * &* 3 -7> s . 4 i ^44£r &8#44? A : A>JL3:713 key alarm4* ^4*kn. 3 ^ 3 ^ £44: parameters* 4 ^ s A^J§-44 ^ * 4 3 4 * 4445.S 4 £ 3 4 4 3 # 4 . ^-34 3^-4 ^ * # 4 4 * 4 ^ 4 3 ^ - * 443- 3 3 £ * 4 € 3 4 4

Q : ADIOS4 ITF4 £ 3 7fl<d>Wg: ?

A : ADIOS* £44: 3 4 £ 3 4 s A > ^ - 7 > ^ 4 4 3 3 * 4 ^ 3 S:43^-S #*3- ^ 8 * 3 4 4 . 3.34 4 4 4 ITF44 4 3 4 * 4 1-444. 4 ^ n r A>^-^^OI ^^7] 3 * 4 A3 A3444. ADIOS34 # 4 ITF^-4*-S 4 ^ - 4 4 4 4 4 ADIOS* rrF3 4 4 4 f-3-434 £ * 3 4 3=3 « 3 4 4 -£ 4 , 4 3 4 ADIOS44* 4 * 4 4 3 ^47} 3 4 ^ ^ 4 4 4 - 4 4 * 4 4 4 4 # * 3 4 4 ADIOS4 1 4, 2 4 3 -§- process mimic overview 4 4 * * 3 3 iL44 A -f-3 3 ^ 4 * 4 4 * 4 ^-34 process 3-f-£°fl 3 ^ 4 4 3 * 4 ^-331 £.44 &*4-ADIOS4 4 4 * 34447} 3 * 4 24#4 3 3 3 ^ - * 4 4 4 4 4 4*4: ^ 3 * 48*31 14^4 $L#<LiL 4*1484.

- 1 7 2 -

Q : £44:4 3Efl# 3-33*31 ADIOS7} -^-§.44^1 Ajjz^Ajq^? A : * * 4 4 ^ ^ 4 4 4 .

4- Error Rate £3443-2 .34 3 3 4 * 4 4 4 3*°H W Time Window* 7)

4 AS £ * * 3 # 4 4 ^-33*LS * 3 4 8 4 - £ 3 1 4 Error Rate#434 *33^-S *44 44* 884-

3 3.3.3 Error Rate

£ 3 3 4 4 5 -1 2 3

ADIOS 0.25 0.67 0.33

ITF 0.25 0.67 0.5

4. 4 4 A/v 4^71*^-4

Video-g-3^ 4 * 4 4 * 43-4 4 # 4 8 4 -

O LSDP4 %*£7 r 3 4 O trend graph4 mimic4 *HKE7} ^ 4 . O ADIOS4 ITF4 Alarm list* 4 ^ 4 4 ^ S %*484-O 4 £ 3 4 * £ 4 4 : * 7>*4 # 3 * 4 3 4 s * 4 4 3 ^ 4 * 3 # 4 8 0.4 3 4 4 ^ MMI* 4 4 4 8 4 . O Touch Screen4 4MM 3 4 8 4 -

- 1 7 3 -

9. 1^-

433 £33144 * 3 * *44 4*4 1* 43-* £444 3= 4 ADIOS3£4SH1 434£* 484-

O * 4 4 * 4^3 4*^4 3 £-44 £3 4 3 £-4 4:^* 4£44. 4* VDTA>*3 34 4*344- *4^3 4£4 4 3 * #3 44 *3£-4 4 H 444*4 4^ 443 34 3£-7> £A,§48*4* ^£ £* 8-5-4 VDT4 3*3* 4* Sl4£-44 4 A S * 4 4 3 3 * *44 44-

O ITF4 3*4 4#3 4 3 £-444 3£-34:S* 3*4*31 * 4 4 * 4 3*3 key alarm* ^ o ^ k l *44 T^s^S* 4X514. 4* ITF7> 3^4* 3£-444 3*3AS *344 844 *444 434* 4* f 3 3#* 4443 3^4* *44^ 4444

O ADIOS4 3*£ 44:*34(14, 24# 44)*3£-7> £^48*44 *4 *444 £-8A4 4^ 3*34 3£-7} £ M ^ 4 * 444 ^3 ADIOS4 3£-34:S* 4444*1 key alarm* 134* 3AS £.44 *443 44 key alarm4 1344 ADIOS4 mimic* 44 4^:44 &* 4. H4 *4^4^4 *4444 *34°fl 314 44£4* 3*444 VDT 44 44444:3 314 *44 s * * 3 * -f-3 **<§£* *7>44^ #4* JL33 £-44 4 4

O 33*4^ AUAgAi %£_& A^^zw 334* 3 * *444 4 * 4x48A4 ITF4 3£-34:S3 3*44* £44 s.3444 44- 3

- 1 7 4 -

4 4 A>3I£A<S^4 3£ - * 4 3 * * 3 - 3 4 * 3 ^ 4 4 ^ 3 4 3£- 4 3 * * 4 4 ^ 4 4 4 &##$ £ 4 * £ 4 £ ^ 8 4

O ADIOS4 4 4 * 3 4 * * * 3 3 * 3 4 4 4 &8A4 X 4 3 3 * 4 4 447> 3 * 4 * 4 4 4 4 - 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 .4* 4 3 4 4 4 --g: ITF4 4 4 3 f-3-44 4 4 3 * 4 # 4 4 ^ * £ 4 * ^ 3 £ * 8 4 . 3 4 ^ 3 4 £ * * ADIOS4 4333°fl 4 4 3 3 £ » A * 4 * 3 4 4 4 , 4 * ADIOS 4 £ 4 4 4 * ITF3S 4 3 4 3 1 * 3 4 4 4 * *5L 8 * * 4 4 4 4 4 * 4 4 * 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4*11 3 S * 4 * 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 -

O ITF4 ADIOS* Error Rate, SA*4 # 4 3 4 * 4 4 4°k> 84^1 4 4 4 4 1-4 4x5L* A^s] ^ * 3 4 447} 884- ITF4 3£-S44 4 3 A } - ^ :n334 44 .

O ITF4 HMI* Touch Screen4 ^*°1 1 4 8 A 4 LSDP4 ^ * * 3 ^ 4 84- 4 * LSDP4 4 4 4 HMI34S ^47} 7}*4:n. 7}4AJOI ^ 4 &7l 3 * 4 4 ^ 4 4 4 8 4 - LSDP34 3£-* 3 * 3 4 * 3 4 3 4 4 4

O ADIOS34 4 S £44 : mimicAS 4 * £ ^ &fe. 71*4 JIB}^ * 8 4- 4 4 £ 3 4 * ADIOS* ITF34 HMI3 £ 4 4 * 3 * 3448*31 4 * «•*£* 3 i £ 3AS 4 4 4 4 .

- 1 7 5 -

n 4 m § s mnM n&m m m7\

1. 3*£^

441 4#* 4*3- £44: 3444:^4 £34 44 *1H£ 44-43 4344:^4 £344£ VDU* 4*4^ 3*4 4#* 4*43* 4*7f **544 &A4, 434 £3 % 3£344 4#4 4 7f *4 £ 44(operating procedure)4 3 £ 3 £ o j ^ ^ £ 4 . £. ^ O | A ^ VDU-4 4 * 4 £ 4 4 4 * 4 3 3 * On-line ^ Off-line4 27r4S * * 4 8 A 4 , 4 4 * *44£°f l44 * 4 * VDU-44, 3*4°fl 4tb * 4 3 4 4 * 4 * 4 4 * £ 3 4 4 , ^ i ^ 4 * £44: 3 4 4 1 - 4 £ s n 3 3 4 * 4 ^ 4 4 4 £ 4 33-4-3 *3"3- * 8 * £ ^ 4 4 - 4 4 4 , On-line * 4 £ 4 4 4 4 4 4 * £ 4 4 3*114 * 3 # 4 4 4 £44: 3 4 , s . 4 4 3 , ^ i £ 4 (protection) 4 ^ 4 4 71*44 442fl44:H *7f3AS n 3 3 4 4 4 , 4 * 3 * 4 4 4 44:^!#4£ * 3 - * Off-line4* £ 3 43714 -S-4:* £ 3 3 43*114 44- 4 4 ^-34 4 4 3 * * * 4 £ s z i # 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4:^! ^ 3 4 £ 4 A S Off-line £ 4 4 4 4 4 4 £ ^ £ 4 4 £ * 8 A I L S

* 4 * 3 4 * 3 ££^-3 33: 4 # 4 4 4*J* 4 3 4 8 4 * 4 * 3 4 * On-line ^ off-line * 4 £ 4 4 4 4 4 4 * 4 4 £3-8-4* 4 4 4 3 £ (Degree of Computerization) 3 4 4 7fl£4JL £4*] 7l*(Generic Functionality)* * 4 4 8 4 - ^ 2 . * 4 * 3 4 7fl£4 APTEA £^^-[7i][721* VDU-44- * 4 £ 4 4 4 £337H1 3 * 4 8 4 -

2. 4 * 3 *

- 1 7 6 -

7\. £3-8-4 3 £

1) 4 4 4 - 3-5- (Degree of Computerization)

On-line * 4 £ 4 4 4 7fl£* VDU-44 ^ 3 4 £ 4 4 4 4 * * 4 3 N4 3 4 £ 4 £ 4 4 4 1-4 4 ^ 3 * 8 4 1:1 m a P P i n g 3 4 * 4 4*7f 44:^13 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 * 3 £ 4 4 3 4 S 4 4 4 4 4 4 ^ 3 4 £ 4 £ 4 4 7 1 4 3 7 1 3 4 £ U * 4 £ ^ * * 3 3 £ 4 ^ 8 4 - 3 5 - Halden HAMMLAB4 COPMA(COmputerized Procedure MAnual system) ^ EdF N4 ^^± £ 4 £ 4 4 4 On-line * 4 £ 4 4 7 1 £ * 4 * 4*11 3 £ 4 i 8 A H S &^2) 3 3 4 4 : 2 8 4 - 4 4 4 4 * 4 £ 4 4 *3°fl 4 4 3 4 4 3 ^.(degree of computerization)* 5. 3.4.14 1 4 * * £ * 8 4 -4

2) £3-8-4 7l) 444 3 i a 3.4.14 **3 44 3. 3.4.24 14 444 3 i * £3384-

£34 444 3£°fl 44 * 4*44 7fl£4 444 3££4* a 3.4.34 1 4

PWR £44:4 *3-*4 £44, 43*4 £44, 3?\JL 43*4 £4 4[75][76]* 33AS 4* 3 444S3* 3 colum format* 3*44 33 *4 £44* 3£48^, 3 544^3* *3- 44*4 4^£44 SAT 14* 4344 VDU-44 *34£ £34 3 3-3- 2-1/2 column 331S4 *3-*4 £44 ^ 43*4 £44* 71)4-484- 44 -efl4 4^3£-* 4* *4 £44°fl *7>44 *4 £44* 444 484-

- 1 7 7 -

3: 3.4.1 *4 £444 *34 4€- 44$ 3£

>v * ! * 4

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3 A**

S3 (Format)

(Process Linking)

(Proess Monitoring)

(Execution)

(Progress Monitoring)

«}ElS|o]£.

(Interaction Devices)

H ^ 3 J E * (Explanations and Helps)

Very Low

Direct Reproduction of Procedure

»

No Manual Read

No

No

No

Plain Text

Keyboard

No

Low

Hierarchical Organization of Procedure

Enhanced Composition of Procedure

Variable Limit Values

(1)

Variables

Limited Automation

-EOP action

Manual Marking of check boxes

Commands

Function key

Passive-Context Independent

Moderate

Indexed Or Encoded Organization of Procedure

Differentiating between operator roles

Process Parameters Values (2)

Equipment Process Status

All Procedure Actions Semi-Automatic Progress Monitoring

Menu-Based

Mouse

Active -Context Dependent

High

Hypertext/ Multimedia-Based Organizatio n of Procedure

N/A

Operator Support System's Information

(3)

Plant Schematics

All Procedure Actions and EOP Automatic Progress Monitoring Iconic-, Window-Based

Touch

Model-Base d Context and User Sensitive

Very High

Intelligent accessct supports to Procedure

N/A

(l)+(2)+(3)

Control Automatics P&ISs/C&IS s

All actions and all procedures

Intelligent Monitoring

Speech

Speech

Predictive -Intelligent

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On-line EOP

Moderate

Low (3 column)

Moderate

Very High

Low

High

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Off-line EOP

Moderate

Low (3 column)

Very Low

Low

Low

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Off-line GOP

Very Low

Low (2-1/2

column)

Very Low

Low

Moderate

Low

Very Low

Moderate

Very Low

Off-line AOP

Very Low

Low (2-1/2

column)

Very Low

Low

Moderate

Low

Very Low

Moderate

Very Low

Ml JL

2-1/2 column:

Intermediate Version

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3 3.4.3 * 3 £4-4 333} ^ 4

*#£*r*h\ On-line EOP

Off-line EOP

Off-line GOP

3#*£

No

No

Yes

4^**1

Yes

Yes

Yes

4^*3

No

No

Yes

H]J7

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Phase

Analysis of Requirements

Prototyping

Training and Preparation

Actual Experiment

Analysis of Results

Contents, Activities - Definition of experiment purpose - Clarification of conceptual contents of

Investigation - Requirements to MMS functionality - Specification of expected results

[general "Ideal Path"] - Definition of independent and

dependent variables - Identification of main constraints

[time, money, people, customer expectations, etc]

- Selection and development of specific experiment design

- MMI design and testing - GUI development and testing - Prepare performance recording

apparatus - Fine tune specific experiment design - Development supplementary facilities,

procedures, etc. - Deviation of training requirements

[needed conceptual and practical training]

- Design of training program and training aids

- Selection of subjects - Implementation of training program - Evaluation of results - Define detailed scenario of actual

experiment - Description of experiment

conditions - Identification of possible sources

of failure and safeguards against them - Execution of experiment - Measurement and data collection - Transformation and merging of raw

data - Analysis of performance registrations - Development of "Ideal Path"

description for actual performance - analysis of Independent and dependant

variables - Evaluation of total system performance - Interpretation of results in terms of

specific purpose

Requirements

- Access to "customer" - Experience from

previous experiments

- Estimates of total available resources

- GUI design tools - PROTOPEX - Measurement devices

- Subjects

- PROTOPEX

- PROTOPEX - Subjects - Instructors

- PROTOPEX - Subjects - instructors - Observers

- PROTOPEX - Experimental Database

- Analysis tools

- Subjects - Customer

- 1 8 9 -

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Time Window

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[77][78].

- Normal operational events : plant startup/shutdown, refueling,

significant changes in operating power

- Instrument failures( safety-related system logic and control unit, fault

tolerance controller, MUX controller, etc.)

- HSI equipment and processing failure(loss of display unit, loss of

data processing)

- Transients(turbine trip, loss of off-site power, station blackout, loss of

all feedwater, safety/relief valve transients, etc.)

- Accidents(main steam line break, positive reactivity addition, control

rod ejection, ATWS, LOCA, etc)

- Reactor shutdown and cooldown using remote shutdown system

- 1 9 5 -

£ 3 : 4 1 4 334<>fl 4 * 4 1 * 4 # * 3 3 4 5 = * ^3 8 4 -- Role and importance of the equipment in plant safety(described in

the SAR), and its connetions

- Type of component or equipment failures which cause the system to

fail

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- Risk significance of components, systems, sequences or scenarios, and

human actions as determined by a risk analysis such as a PRA

- Demands that system operation and failure place on personnel

workload

^ 3 4 4 3 4 3ta°fl 4 4 4 5 i # 4 * 4 1 3 # 3 4 * HSI4 *7> £-

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NUREG-0700 Rev.134* -^*33^(Sampling Strategy)4 4 * * 4 4 4 : 2

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(2) 4 * 4 1 * 3 S 3 3 * 3 3 4 4 * 3 # 3 4 * HSI4 **(samPle)

* i # 4 4 4 3 - 4

- Status monitoring and situation awareness of critical safety

functions

- 1 9 6 -

- Surveillance testing and maintenance

- Alarm monitoring, analysis and response

- Fault detection, analysis, diagnosis, and mitigation

- Monitoring of automated safety functions

- Override of automated system and their direct control

© £ 4 4 ( * 3 ) 7 l # 1 -(Procedure supported(rule-based) tasks) 4- 3

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(sample)* S.3"444 3-4-(MCR personnel, other plant personnel,

TSC, EOF, outside organization)

© PRA3 3 4 4 4 3 3 *333^(risk-significant human interactions)

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® OER34 * 4 4 ^ 3 7 > 84(problematic)JI # 3 4 5L^- HSI4 ^ 4

# 3 4 * 3 3 4 3 * * 5 3 - 4 4 4 3-4-

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* A ^ * 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 - £ 4 4 * « - * 4 5 L * 4 ^ - 84[39].

- 1 9 7 -

- administrative procedure

- general plant operating procedure

- procedures for startup, operation, and shutdown of safety-related

system

- procedures for abnormal, offnormal, and alarm conditions

- procedures for combating emergencies and other significant events

- procedures for control of radioactivity

- procedures for control of measuring and test equipment and for

surveillance tests, procedures, and calibration

- procedures for performing maintenance

- chemistry and radiochemical control procedures

434 3S14* 4*4 14 333: * 84-- £ 3 4 4 3 - ° - * 4 * 4 * 3 3 M 4 4 4 3 £ 4 4 4 3-4. startup, abnormal, transient, accident, shutdown, refueling*4 £ 3 4 : 3 3 3 4 44 £3 4 43 £ * 3 £4 4 4 3:4 - A *33#3 33- £344351* *134 3X33 4%-* 53-4 44 3-4-- A *33#3 33- £344351* *334 3*4 £444 steP3 s *«S444 4 * 3^4 *334 33* 43-°s *«S444 4 * 3^(33 433*)* 53-444 3:4-- A *33#°ti 43- £344351* *1314 4Ari*4-3* S3 444 34-- A * 3 3 M 4 3 £ 3 4 4 3 5 1 * PRA34 3 3 3 4 £ 3 4 3 # 3 4 * ( 3 3 3 * 3*fl£ * 8*) 3 # * 5 3 - 4 4 4 3-4

- 1 9 8 -

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- 1 9 9 -

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3 S 1 4 * * 3 4 4 3 4 .

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- 2 0 0 -

* 1 3 4 -fi-^-1- 3 4 * 4 * 4 * * 3 * ( * * 4 1 ) * * 3 4 4 4 * £3444-fi.°fl 333- * 851* 4 4 4 4 4 YGN3&4JL44 HRA # 3 4 £. * <y*484- 4 4.S.* YGN3&4^44 £47> # s . 4 4 1 ( £ 4 4 3 3 4 # S 4 4 1 ) 3 **33 HRA4 144S.S 4 ^ 3 4 3 4 £434^1 * * 8^-4 £ 3 443-fi. 7fl£3 %*£■ * 8 * 3 ° . s # 3 4 8 4 -

4 4 - S - * * S system 80+ PRA, CE Emergency Procedure Guide,

YGN3&4 PSAR, YGN3&4 design documents, interview with designers/

operators, and visit to YGN3&4 s i t e * * * 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 , 4 * 4 3 3

3 £ 4 * 4 * 4 8 4 . - collect human actions from fault and event tree analysis

- initial quantification using conservative values/judgemental screening

- in-depth analysis of important human errors

5 3 33- f i . * * 4 * 4 1 4 37>4 * 3 ^ s * * 4 s 8 8 4 . O Type 1 : Failure of operator to restore component following

maintenance, test or callibration

O Type 2 : Failure of operator to perform proceduralized actions

during transients

O Type 3 : Failure of operator to perform recovery actions for failed

components or systems

Type 1 Error* HRA Handbook(NUREG/CR-1278)4 THERP* 4 3 - ° - S

3 ^^-(quantifying)^^3, Type 2 Error* ASEP HRA(Accident Sequence

Evaluation Program Human Reliability Analysis)* 4"**r°J 3 3 = 4 4 8 4 .

* 3 * 3 4 * Type 2 Error7r £ 3 4 4 4 - ° - 4 8 3 3 * 3 * 4 ^ - S 4*11 3 3

- 2 0 1 -

* 3 * ^*3484. transients^ 3 * 1 3 4 £ * ^ * ^ PRA/HRA4S* * 4 4 2:4431

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X 3.5.1 Type 2 335l*4*(Human Error Probability^ 2 7 | ^ o | 4=. * 1 3 4 3 * * * # Event Description Mean

1 SDMVHEAR Operator fails to perform feed and bleed operation(early) 2.81x10-1

2 MXXVHCLG Operator fails to perform aggressive cooldown for LSPI injection 2.02x10-1

3 IAFLVAFTFL Operator fails to align the after-filter 04F 1.50x10-1

3 IAFLVPREFL Operator fails to align the pre-filter 02F 1.50x10-1

4 HHABHOPENROOM Operator fails to open ESW pump room door 1.00x10-1

4 NATWV501XN Operator fails to transfer 120V AC source to regulating XFMR 5-01XN

1.00x10-1

4 EKHBV03XN Operator fails to connect 2-01SB bus to ST XFMR 2-03XN 1.00x10-1

4 EKHBV04XN Operator fails to connect 2-01SA bus to ST XFMR 2-04XN 1.00x10-1

4 ELLBV212SB Operator fails to connect LC 2-13SA to LC 2-12SB 1.00x10-1

4 HCVWCHGPC Operator fails to transfer chilled water from train A to B 1.00x10-1

4 MSMPVLHP Operator fails to control switch on in local hand pump 1.00x10-1

5 HSOPHTHROT Operator fails to throttle HPSI flow 5.20x10-2

6 CWMPV002 Operator fails to actuate ECW pump/chiller 02 4.13x10-2

7 HCCQVAFP1A Operator fails to start AFW MDP 01PA room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

7 HCCQVAFPIB Operator fails to start AFW MDP 01PB room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

7 HCCQVCCWPA Operator fails to start CCW pump A standby cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

7 HCCQVCCWPB Operator fails to start CCW pump B standby cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

7 HCCQVCHGPA Operator fails to start charging pump A room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

- 2 0 2 -

7 HCCQVCHGPB

7 HCCQVCHGPC

7 HCCQVCSPA

7 HCCQVCSPB

7 HCCQVHPPA

7 HCCQVHPPB

7 HCCQVLPPA

7 HCCQVLPPB

7 HDABVDG01KA

7 HDABVDGOIKB

7 HDABVDGOIKS

7 HHABVSW02CA

7 HHABVSW02CB

8 CCMPV003P

9 CSOPHCSSO

10 RWT

11 SWMPV02P

12 MXXVHCLGR

13 EGDGH01KS

13 AFTKHRAWS

14 SDMVHLAT

15 MXXVHATWS

16 MXXVHULX

17 MSEVHADVISO

18 CSMNHCSSH

19 AFPPHAFWP

20 FSSKVSIAS

Operator fails to start charging pump B room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start charging pump C room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start CSS pump A room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start CSS pump B room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start HPSI pump A room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start HPSI pump B room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start LPSI pump A room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start LPSI pump B room cubicle cooler 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start fan for DG 01KA room ventilation 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start fan for DG 01KB room ventilation 4.05x10-2

Operator fails to start fan for AAC DG 01KS room ventilation

4.05x10-2

4.05x10-2

4.05x10-2

3.42x10-2

3.07x10-2

3.06x10-2

2.26x10-2

Operator fails to start AHU 02CA in ESW pump room A

Operator fails to start AHU 02CB in ESW pump room A

Operator fails to start the CCW pump 03P

Operator fails to establish the SDC operation using CSSP

Operator fails to refill RWT

Operator fails to start ESW pump 02P

Operator fails toperform aggressive cooldown for LSPI recircularion

2.12x10-2

Operator fails to start and load AAC D/G 01KS 2.04x10-2

Operator fails to arrange alternate water source 2.04x10-2

Operator fails to perform feed and bleed operation(late) 9.83x10-3

Operator fails to ini. emergency boration using CHGP or F&B

7.61x10-3

Operator fails to prevent the overfilling of S/G using SGBD or ADV

4.92x10-3

Operator fails to isolate ADVs on SGI 3.36x10-3

Operator fails to terminate CSS operation 3.20x10-3

Operator fails to restart AFW pump 3.28x10-3

Operator fails to generate S1AS 2.66x10-3

- 2 0 3 -

20 FSSKVRAS Operator fails to generate RAS 2.66x10-3

20 FSSKVCSAS Operator fails to generate CSAS 2.66x10-3

20 FSSKVAFAS Operator fails to generate AFAS 2.66x10-3

20 FSSKVMSIS Operator fails to generate MSIS 2.66x10-3

20 MFMPHSTUP Operator fails to start STUP FWP and feed S/G 2.66x10-3

20 MFMPHSTUPRST Operator fails to restart STUP FWP and feed S/G 2.66x10-3

21 SDMVHBDCLS Operator fails to close bleed valves: switch to SDC 6.55x10-4

22 LSCGHOPERT Operator fails to initiate shutdown cooling 3.28x10-4

22 HSHCHHLCLR Operator fails to initiate hot and cold-leg recirculation 3.28x10-4

23 MXXVHPCON Operator fails to con. RCS pre. using MS, AUX, RCGV, F&B 1.88x10-4

X 3.5.134 £ .* 4 4 1 4 ^ * 3 3 5 i * * ^ 3 £ ( l o s s of feedwater), ^ 4 3 3£(small break loss of coolant), ^7]^^7]A^A^. (steam generator tube rupture), *7l^^3*:2-3(instrurnent air componets failures), i 4 3 3 3 £ ( l o s s of off-site power) * 3 4 £ ^ 3 4 - 4 4 4 £ 3 4 4 3 5 1 4 e l * ^\^\ A r :n4435i* e l -5 .S ^ A J ^ O ) § 30)4..

4- 3 £ 3 £ 3 4 4 4 5 1

HRP4-4 * * 3 * * * 4 4 4 * 4 1 * 1634 £ 3 4 4 4 5 1 * 3 £ 4 8 4 4 4 4 5 i 3 £ * 4 4 4 4 3 4 ^ - 4 £ 3 3 3 4 4 ^ 4 3 ^ 3 : n HRA/PRA4S7V %*48-5-4, 3-4 * 1 3 3 4 7 r 3£°fl 3 4 4 4 3 £ 3 * 3 ^ 4 8 4 - ^ 3 4 1634 4 4 3 5 1 * 4 ^ 4 7y<87i^r3.*§ 3 3 * 4 3 i s 4 3 $3 HRP34 Ji*4-ji 8 * WER*34 NORS34 3 £ 4 ^ - 7\ * 3 4 * * 4 3 4 8 4 .

- 2 0 4 -

® Oil in compressed control air system

® Small LOCA caused by RCP reverse rotation

© Turbine Overspeed

® Secondary leakage to instrument room

© Loss of main transformer

® Steam Generator Tube Rupture

® Reactor coolant pump LOCA(Leakage in sealing line)

® Small feedwater leakage inside containment

© Air leakage in condensor

© Condensate valve coupling failure

® Failure in Primary pressure controller

® Inadvertant emergency boration activation

® Secondary pressure transient/main steam line break

© Turbine trip caused by condensate control valve failure

© Reactor scram caused by faulty controller signal

® Failure of generator to trip

A £ 3 3 4 3 5 1 3 4 3 - 3 7 f l # * £3(parameter setting)4 3 ^ 4 4 4

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3 * * 3 * * 1 € 4 *54* B-A>34 4 4 4 * * 4 * 4 ^ ^ s 43=3-* 3 4 ^ 4 3 4 4 4 8 4 - * <?!*°I14* * 1 £ 4 3 * * * 3 % * # A S X43; * 3 - * # 3**4(Goal-Means Task Analysis)^tl* A-%-*\9XA * 3 - * # 3 * * 4 * 4 * 3 3 * * 3 (Hierarchical task analysis)4-* £ 3 * ! £ *S4* 4 1 3 4 4 *4a}_o_s 4£*r4fe #^4- . ^ 3 ^ 7$%AA * 1 £ 4 £3*1144* ^ 4 * 1 *3(Goal)^.s*4 3 * 3 ° J * 3 * 5L#4 JL 4 3*3?1 *3°fl 43- * 1 ^ 4 3**^(Means)* 333-° -S4 * 3 £ 4 3 £ * fl.Ar*rfc- 3^44[79J. * < S * 3 4 * 4 * 3 - * t f 3 * * 4 * J L * 3 5 I S *8S47l 4 4 4 OPAS(Operator Performance Assessment System)* % * 4 8 4 OPAS* * 3 4 *<24l 4^- 3 * 3 °d * S * * ^ 4 x} # * 3 - 4 * 4 4 - OPAS4 3 3 * * 4 3 * 1 3 $ % 4*391 * 3 3

- 2 0 6 -

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4.. 4^.3 33. <y4^<y £-*}

3 * * 3 * * 4 4 ?4* A * 1 £ 4 3 * 3 33: ?]33?1 * 3 * 3:4484- 4 ^ 4 4 * 3 * ?13-°-** ?]43?1 13°fl4 £ 4 ^ 4 43" 44- #, ?134434 £ 1 4 4 » j * 3 * 4 4 43- 3*33^44 , 4 4 4 * 1 £ 4 ?]3-°-*5iJ=* 3 # 4 * 3 3 4 ^ 4 # * ^ * 443:4- 4 4 ^ * "4. ?133*-8." 3 4 4 * 4 . 433?] * 4 * 4 4 4 A&Q ?133?] % * * * * Rouse(1981)4 1 4 4 * 4 4 4 S 3.5.24 14[80].

- 2 0 7 -

3 3.5.2 1 3 # * * *

Coordinate

Communicate

Bring system states and/or control configuration into specific relation Pass on or receive person-to-person information

Compare Examine the qualities of two or more entities Diagnosis Recognise or determine the nature or cause of a condition by

reasoning Evaluate Apprasal or assessment of a situation Execute Performance of a previously specified action or plan Identify Establish the identity of a plant state Maintain Sustain a specific operational state Monitor Keep track of system states over time Plan Formulate set of actions necessary to achive goal Record Set down or log system event

Alter speed or direction of a control to attain a goal Regulate Quick or speedy review of information sources Scan

Verify Confirm the correctness of a system condition or measurement

4- 133 *-8-

1 3 3 3 % * 4 3 3 3 * - 8 - * 4 * 4 3 3.5.34 1 * 1 3 7 1 8 4 -

A # * * 4 4 4 1 3 3 1 *-S-4 3 * 4 4 - 4 1 3 £ * Hollnagel *(1991,

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1 3 3 1 % * * 4 * 4 SMoC 3 * 4 # 3 4 * * 3 4 84[791[80]. 4 - * 4

1 3 1 1 3 3 * - 8 - * 3 4 £ 4 S 7 r # * £ £ - 1 3 3 *-8-(dominant

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* 4 £ * 3 1 4 -

- 2 0 8 -

a 3.5.3 1 3 € - * 4 * -a . l4 1 1 3 Cognitive Activity

Coordinate Communicate Compare Diagnosis Evaluate Execute Identify Maintain Monitor Plan Record Regulate Scan Verify

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4- CPC(Common Performance Condition)

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44 7f3 £^7f*3oi ££- * l £ 4 5L*5LJ=* 3 ^ 4 8 4 .

3£ 3.5.4 Common Performance Condition

Adequacy of organisation

Working conditions

Adequacy of MMI and operational support

Availability of procedures/plans

Number of simultaneous goals

Available time

Time of day

Adequacy of training and experience

The quality of the support and resources provided by the organization for the tasks or work being performed. This includes communication systems, safety management system, support for external activities, etc Very efficient/Efficient/Inefficient/Deficient The conditions under which the work takes place, such as ambient lighting, glare on screens, noise from alarms, interruptions from the task, etc. Advantageous/Compatible/Incompatible The quality of the MMI and/or specific operational support provided for operators. The MMI includes control panels, workstations, and operational support provided by specially designed decision aids Support ive/Adequate/Tolerabte/lnappropriate The availability of prepared guidance for the work to be carried out, including operating/emergency procedures, routines and familiar responses Appropriate/Acceptable/lnappropriate The number of tasks or goals operators must attend to. Since the number of goals is variable. This CPC applied to what is typical/characteristic for a situation Fewer than capacity/Matching current capacity/More than capacity The time available to complete the work; or the general level of time pressure for the task and the situation type. How well the task id synchronised to the process dynamics Adequate/Temporarily inadequate/Continously inadequate The time of day(or night) when the task is carried out; whether or not the person is adjusted to the current time. Daytime(adiusted)/Night-time(unadjusted) The level of readiness for the work as provided(by the organisation) through training and prior instruction. Includes familiarization to new technology, refreshing old skills, etc. As well as the level of operational experience Adequate.hiah.ly experienced operators/Adequate, but operators not very experienced/Inadequate

- 2 1 0 -

http://Adequate.hiah.ly

S. 3.5.5 1 3 * A £ 4 * 3 " 1 3 A * A H

X$oim$%m~MwB&tm I Observation

Interpretation

Plan

Execution

01 02 03 11 12 13 PI P2 El E2 E3 E4 E5

MimsiM Wmmmo6& i Observation of wrong object Wrong identification made Observation not made (omission) Faulty diagnosis Decision error Delayed interpretation Priority error Inadequate plan formulated Execution of wrong type performed Action performed at wrong time Action on wrong object Action performed out of sequence Action missed(omission)

4. £3

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5. £ 3 4 4 4 4 * 4 £ 4

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3>dA3 3 3 3 ^ 4 ^ 4 3*LS4 3 ^ 3 3 4 1 - 43 : £ 3 4 4 ^ APTEA* 33484[5l] . £ 3 £ 3 * **,944 £ 3 4 4 4 * ^ 3 4 8 4 - 4 # #*4?i3* *33: £3344* *33AS *444 £3371-4 £4 * £84-

2. £34444 *33-^

£ 3 4 4 4 * *3-*3 (analysis of variation: ANOV A)* *S r4 * 3 4 8 4. * <3*34* **U3°J £ 3 3 3 ^ A S ^ - 3 4 4 4 * ^ 3 4 ^ * 4 * 4 8 4 3 * 3 * 3 * 4 * 5 - 3 4 4 4 * 3 3 ^ ^ 3 33- *3*33-^°fl 4 4 4 3-4 5 3 4 4 4 * 3 4 4 M 43- * 3 * 3 * 4 * 4 3 3.6.1* 4*3:4-

3 3.6.1 5 - 3 4 4 - 4 * 3 4 ^ ^ 4 * 3 * 4 S i

Source of Variation

Block (4 t fS* r ) Treatment

( 3 3 ^ * 4 ^ * )

Error

Total

Sunt ot Square

SBLK

STRT

SERR

STOT

Degree of Freedom \

m-1

1-1

N-l-m+1

N-1

Mean Square

VBLK

VTRT

VERR

WAT/VERR

- 2 1 3 -

A *47> #* 4 4 * 4*4 £-4-

Tss£i£\D*' ^ 7 H D'^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * ^ £ ^ 4 4

* 3 4 4 £ 3 4 ^ r * ! 4 8 A ^ M(>=1, oj-qig 0.

STOT= S S l > | - "jy-,

SERJ?=STOT - SBLK - STRT

VBLK=SBLK/(m-l)

VTRT-STRT/(1-1)

VERR=SERx/(N-l-m+l)

44 3A>3 4^3 3j a}o.s F0&4 3^4feC o] F0&4 F(l-l, N-l-m+l;a)4 &SL4 3.^. *4*^a^l4 A ^r^MI* *H4 844-31 433-4- F(l-1, N-l-m+1;a)4 &* *3444 £ 3 3 ^ * 4^-* AA £344 8* F-*ia* 3^4^ ^3 £ * 84- * 3 * 3 * £4 33-3AS 4^3-3 447> 8* 4* £3^34, 4 A *^33 447> 8* 4^ 3443 £3^3 *3-4- 41- A444 444 *3(estimation)33* **I4*C-11, 4 ^ 3 3 3 * A *3^1 43- A 3 5 ( £ 3 ^ 1 4 4 4 33=* * **4 3-&)4 3 4 * 3 * 4*34- 4 ^ 3 3 3 * **J44 444 *3 3 4(contrast)* 3444 4*3, 4 44* £34* 3i* <£3 344* 4

- 2 1 4 -

* ^ 4 AJg5?i4 4 4 * 4 3 A S £ 3 4 4 . 3 4 * 4 * 4 £ 4 . Sc^4,, where 2 c , = 0

3-£ 2«13 ^ r * 4 3«13 * £ 4 ^ 5 4 l^^B ^ * £ 4 4 - 4 4 8 * 4 * £ofiJL^f 3 - 4 ^ 3 4 * A,-0.5(A2 + A3)7\ 4 4 , 4 3 3 c,=l, c2=-0.5, c3=-0.54JL CI + c2 + c3 = 1 -0.5 -0.5 - 0 4 4 -

347f £ 3 4 3 4 3 4^- 3 4 * 3 : * * 4 4 4 3-4. 3 4 * 3 - * 4 * 4 £ 4 .

IlcA^KN-l-m+i-.pp^^

334 A35 A,* 434 * 4 4 A S 4 S 4 3 * 4*44 33£ * 8AS.S A3 54 *34* 4*44 3*1444 3:4- A3 54 *34 * 4 * 4 £ 4 ^ A > 4 3 , ^s] ^A]ofl aj-g-spig 3 4 .

A, = - ^ Q , , where <?,= T,. - - ^ B,

3 4 3 43- 3 4 * 3 * 4 4 £ 4 3A!413 * * s 4 * 4 3 * *3-4 A # 4 * 4 4 *3 :4 0* i 3 - 4 i 8 3 A ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 4 8 3 A ^ 5 3 3 * 4 4 7} 9XA3 #33-4-

* £ 3 4 £344441 4 4 4 4 3 4 * 3 * 4 4 ^ 3 3 < 8 * ^r*348 4- * 3 * 3 4 £ 4 ^ * 3 3 $ 4 £ 4 * A * ^ ^ r £ s 3 3 4 8 4 -

3. S"&£4 ^ * 3 4 £ 4

7\. 3-*Al 3-(response time)

# 333*°fl 43- 3-*43:

- 2 1 5 -

S. 3.6.2 433*41 33: 3:*43:4 £ 3 4 4 4

m^

1

2

3

4

S 3

n | |7 |a^S j 2J4*

20

5151.98

4814.58

7747.56

5904.71

30

4861.65

5130.61

^ ^ ^

6212.77

5401.68

40

5725.68

5245.25

4858.91

5276.61

49

5376.90

5497.91

6686.97

5853.93

S 3

5321.41

5175.95

5057.13

6882.43

S. 3.6.3 433*41 33: 3:*43:4 *3:*4S.

SoUKJ&^Of Vitiation

Block (4 AISxr)

Square of . Mearr

FreMom . Square

6589296.77

F*-vate

Treatment ( 3 3 ^ 4

384*) 714259.2251 238086.4084 0.993207

Error 1198573.895 239714.7791

Total 8502129.89 11

Fo-value7l- F(3,5; 0.05)=5.41S4" 3 A S . S * * 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 : * 4 3 : *

33=* £ 3 &84:n £- * 8 4 . S3- A3 5 4 33£4<?1 A, *4°fl4 4 3 * 4 4 * iL°U 8 * * *

1 4 24 3 4 * 3 * (-268.2372, 1598.2632) A S 0 * £ 3 " 4 n i 8AJE.S J2.*

-216-

343 444 *4tr 44* 3#£ * 84.

m *#3*4| 33: 3-*4?i

£ 3.6.4 *#3*3 43- 4*4?i4 £3444

^

1

2

3

4

S 3

AA&^S\ 3 ^

20

4583.97

5231.61

7150.00

5655.19

30

6682.71

4923.00

^ ^

7037.23

6214.31

40

7581.50

4926.36

5423.55

5977.14

49

7633.68

^ ^

5689.89

7900.06

7074.54

S 2

7299.30

4811.11

5448.35

7362.43

£ 3.6.5 * # 3 * 4 | 33 - 3 - * 4 ? i 4 * 3 * 3 S

Source qfe Variation -

Block ( 4 £ t i 4 ) Treatment

( 3 7 H ^ ^ 4 2!*) Error

Total

; Slimy o* '*- Decree of :.' Square . ' Freedom

15150054.81

936878.5599

258006.4077

16344939.77

3

3

5

11

' kear>; Square

312292.8533

51601.28155

6.052037

Fo-value7l- F(3,5; 0.05)=5.41 J i 4 3E.3. * ^ 3 4 4 * # 4 ^ " * 4 ? i *

- 2 1 7 -

3#* £84:2 £ * 84. A*£54 3 3 £ 4 3 A, * 4 4 4 7>3 * 4 4 * i ° U 8 * * * 4-4

24 3 3 * 3 : * (295.801, 1161.787) SL3. 0* X3"4:n. 8 3 &AJ2.S * * * 3 3 * * 4 3 : 447} ^ 3 3 : 4 - ^ 3 4 * ^ 14 2, ZLZ]3. * * 34 43 3 3 3 3 * 3 * 0* £3-4ai 8 4 4 * 3 3 : 447} &4-. £ 3 : * * 24- 33 4 3 3 * 3 * (17.963, 883.949)AS o* i 3 " 4 2 . 8 4 $ 4 4 * * ^ 3 3 * *43r x}°]7\ *33 :4 - o]3 o.5Ai + 0.5A2 - 0.5A3 - 0.5A4S 3 4 4 * 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 * 3 * * 3 A ^ (251.3542, 863.6988)°.S 0* ^ 3 4 ^ . 8 3 #4-. 4-4-4 <^§ 14. 23 4 4 * ^ 3 : * 4 3 * 33=* £ 3 &A4, A3: * * 34- 4* 4 S 3 A 3 4 * 4 £ * £ - 3 * - 4 3 4 4 4 * 4 4 4 3 & * 4 s £ ^ 9XA. 3 4 * ^ 24- 3 3 : 3 * * 4 3 4 4 * &Q]3 8 4 - £^ -3AS 4 £ 3 4 4 * ^ 3 : * 4 3 * 3 3 3 ^ 4 AA^A 4 4 33=* £ A 4 , 303(** 2 ) 4 4 3 4 4 * ^ 3 - * 4 3 4 403(*^ 3) 4 3 3 4 4 £ * 4 3 : A 4 3 4 ^ £ * 84 -

- 2 1 8 -

4. A**(error rate)

• 333*41 33- A**

3 3.6.6 333*41 33- A**4 £3344

mm

1

2

3 4

ss

° M t 3 ^ 4 384* 20

^ ^ 150 233

150

178

30

100

450

200

250

40

2.17

350 133

^ ^

233

49

267

2.83

1 17

222

S S

195 317

2 16

156

3. 3.6.7 333*3 33 A**4 *3*-3S

Source of Variation'

Block (sltftlXr) Treatment

( 3 7 H £ * 4 2!*)

Error

Total

Sum o| Degree of < Mean Square freedom * Square

4.2407 3

157325 3 05244167

6078617 5 1.2157233

11892567 11

Ffcvalue

0 431362

Fo-value7r F(3,5; 0.05)=5.41 iL4 3 A H S * * 3 4 4 3£"4 3 " * 4 3 *

- 2 1 9 -

3*cr-* £ 3 $84:2 £ ^ 84 .

A3: A J § 5 4 3 3 £ 4 3 A, ^ 4 3 4 7r# & * H * ^o]^ &-. ^ i= . -*• J«.

14- 44 3 4 * 3 * (-0.141687, 3.061687) A S 0 * i 3 4 ^ . 8 A H S S.

343 444 *43- 441- 3#£ ^ 84-

• *<ET3*41 3 3 - A * *

S. 3.6.8 *<ET3*41 33- A * * 4 £33144

S 3

1

2 3

4

ss

o « 7 | a ^ 4 3 8 ^

20

1.00

0.00

0.00

033

30

1.00

4.00

100

3.00

40

5.00 3.00 0.00

^ ^ ^

267

49

3.00 ^ ^ ^

0.00

200

1.67

S S

300 267

0.00

100

3 3.6.9 *#3*41 33: A * * 4 * 3 * 4 X

SQUT$&;0f Varetion

Block (4 t fS* r ) Treatment

( 3 3 g ^ 4 2!*) Error

Sum ot Degree # Square^ , Preedorre Square

1

18

5.25

941667

. ■^ ^ asw tww JI'>:> ■ i 'Jij 'UppMiM

1.75

1.88333

Fofvaiue*

0929204

Total 32 66667 11

- 2 2 0 -

Fo-value7r F(3,5; 0.05)=5.41 JL4 4 i £ l ^ § 3 4 4 - -§-#4 . $ _ * * ,

3 3 = * £ 3 & 8 4 i £ ^ 8 4 .

A3- A 3 5 4 3£-£4<Jl A ^ 4 4 1 4 7>3 * 4 4 * i ^ U 8 * Ari

1 4 34 3 4 * 3 * (-0.740859, 4.490859) A S 0 * £ 3 " 4 ^ 8 A H S S.1

3 4 3 3 4 4 * 4 3 - 4 4 * 3 # £ ^ 84-

4 333?1 33*4-BPM(bit per minuite)

3 3.6.10 333°J 3^*441 33- £ 3 3 4 4

mm

1

2

3

4

ss

"878S4*4 384*

20

^ ^

5.52017

4.39949

5.91346

5.27771

30

4.47587

4.96634

4.24309

4.56177

40

4.60587

5.92658

4.57957

^ ^

5.03734

49

4.86801

5.59796

5.0018

5 1559

S S

4.64992

5.47103

4.85901

5.05278

3 3.6.11 333«y 33*441 33- *3:*4S.

Source of Variation

Sum of Degree of Mean Square , Freedom Square

<■»* -A- ■* ■■■•■*■.*■ V i < i W A W frJMfXv-vfa

F#=?vatu^

Block (4*1 g 4)

110047

Treatment ( 3 3 ^ * 4

^ * ) 1.22121 0.40707 1.306825

Error 1.55748 0.31149

Total 3 87918 11

- 2 2 1 -

Fo-value7> F(3,5; 0.05)=5.41 Ji4 3AJELS * * 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 * 4 3 * 33* #4 #84:2 £ * 84.

A3- A35-4 3 3 £ 4 3 A, *4414 7}% €■ 4-4* A 4 i 8 * * * 23 44 3 4 * ^ * (-0.165910, 1.961780) AS 0* £3-4:2 8A5.S Sl* 343 344 *43- 44* 3#£ * 84

4- £4 *3*3* **J4 £4 *#3*3 33 4£344 3*434 A * *

3 4 4 a=o.05j?_s * 4 3 - 447> 8 * 4 A5itf4- ^ 3 4 4 * * ^ 3 * 3 3*114* * 4 4 447} 3 # 4 3 # 8 4 . * 3 * 3 ^ 4 * 3 3 3 * **33 £ 4 * # 3 * 4 3*33:4 3 3 3 * 4 3*7> 303£34 403£3 * 4 3 4 4 7} 4-4&A4, 2034 303 * * 4034 493* 4 ^ 3 £ 4 * 4 4 4 &84- £ * 3 A S 4 £ 3 4 4 * # 3 : * 4 3 - * 3 3 3 * 4 3*41 4 4 3 3 * «>A4, 303(*^ 2)44344 * # 3 * 3 3 4 403(*^ 3) 434144 3 * 4 3-A4 34^1 £ 41 84-

4. £ g-

* 3^414* 3 3 3 A 4 3 3 JE43- * 8 * 3 3 3 * 4 ? i** O]T_V§-

4 £ 3 * * 4 4 £ 3 4 ^ . 4 4 8 4 - 3 3 3 A 4 3 * 4 3 3 ^ 3 4 £ 4 4 *3°J £ 4 s 4 * 3 € 3 3 ££4i 3 £ 3 A * 3**11 * * 3 3 * 333-

4- 3 3 3 A 4 3 3 4 4 £ * 8 * 3 3 3 * 4 7 i * * * 3 ^ 4 * * 4 4 4 3 4933 3 A S *3483 i , 3 £3-4 37113** A*4^i 8 * * 3 3 £ 3 3 * 4 3 4 ° J # * 4 * 3 * 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 37113*4 ? i** £ 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 * 4 £ 3 * APTEA £ 3 3 3 3 4 4 **S484-

- 2 2 2 -

434 4 £ 3 4 7 r £341 3 4 4 4 3 3 - 3 * 4 * ^ 3 * 1 - 4 1433A **S48A4, 4 3 4 47113* £ 3 4 ^ ° } 3 * 4 3 , A * * , 3?]3. 3 3 3 3 3 3 * 4 *41 33- £ 3 3 1 4 4 * * 3 4 8 4 - * 3 3 - £ 3 3 4 4 * * 3 * 3 4 * 3 3 8 3 Af.g-4^cf.

* 3 * 3 £ 4 4£347} **S3: *7 }33 3 * 3 3 - 3 8 * * £343-41 £ 4 4 * £ 3 4 3 3 * 4 8 A 4 , 37113*4 31*4 333*3 3 8 * 4 3 4 * * 4 4 447} si^- 3 AS 44tf :2 23- A**5L * 4 3 - 4 4 * 8 * 3AS #mXA ^ 3 4 4 £ 3 4 4 * # 3 * 4 1 33: 3 * 3 3 - * 3 3 3 * 4 7J1*4 # 3 4 4 * 4 3 - 4 4 * 4 4 3 8 4 - 3 3 3 * 4 31*7} 303 4 4 £ 3 3 * # 3 * 4 3 * 4 3 * 403 434144 * # 3 * 3 * 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 84-

4 4 4 * 3 * * * 4 4 3 3 3 A 4 3 * 303 4 4 4 37113** A 3 4 * 3 4 4 3 3 3 * £ * 884-

3 3 3 A 4 3 * 4 3 3 ^ 3 4 £ 4 3X3*3 HMI44 4 3 3 3 A 4 3 * £ 3 ^ 4 3 # * 7f l43AS S4*}3 - ^ 3 3 * 4 4 , * £ 3 4 £ 4 3 3 3 * 4 711*7} 303 3A £ 3 3 * £ £ 4 3 A * <3* 4 3 4 * 4 3 4 3 * 3AS 4 4 # 4 - 3 * 4 3 : * 3 * * 4 MMI4 3 3 * 4 3 37}4 %*4 * 3713A44 4 4 4 3 * 3 * 4 # * 3 £ 4 * MMI* 3 * * 4 3 * 3 3 3 : * 4 3 A S 4 * 3 7 } * 3 * 4 - * 4 , NUREG-0700 rev.l 3 4 * PWR

3 4 14711*4 £ 3 3 £ ( l o s s of primary pressure)4 ^ 4 * 3 ( t o reestablish

subcooled primary coo l an t )3** * 3 £ 4 3 * A l ? i ^ . S 3 7 } 4 4 o > 3-t}jL

^A*\3 8*31 [78], 4 4 £ * 4 3 4 303 3 A 4 3 3 3 * * £43 : 3 3 3 A 4 3 * A 4 3 * * 3 £ 4 3 * A R > * JS.33 3 A s 3:344.

- 2 2 3 -

1. 3A

* 43414^ 14-3 A3 4 * 4 £ 4 1034 ^7}3-** £3484[14]. (1) operator's acceptance and performance in using advanced MMI

designs

(2) qualification criteria in accordance with the changes in operators' role

(3) effectiveness of alarm systems and suitability of alarm displays

(4) assessment of operator supporting functions

(5) assessment of cognitive workload in tasks using color CRT displays

(6) function allocation between human and machine

(7) assessment of system integrity

(8) assessment of operators' cooperative function

(9) anthropometric convenience and accessibility of information

(10) assessment of operating procedures

4 4 Jg7}3-** A}<34-J3_?]4(EPRI URD), * 3 A 2 , 8 3 * 4 £3431 ^ 3**3= * * 3 S 4 4 A%3: 3 4 4 . ^ 3 4 33*441 33- £-8-3 £ *A3oi ^ 3 3 3 4-e} 4^-4 N R C 3 4 ^ ^3.^ 35*- 3 ^ 3 - * 3 A 3 * A#431 8A4, 3 £4- NUREG-07114- NUREG-0700 rev. 1* £ 3 484[77][78]. 4 3 4 4 * 3 * 3 4 * 4£^ tv 34*er*4 433- Afls* * 3 A 3 4 * 3 - 4 i 8 * 3 ^ 3 A S * * 3*7} 3 s * *341 3 4 £ * 3 4 8 * 3 * 3 £ £ £ A 4 9XA3 3 3 4 8 4 - * 3 NUREG-07114-NUREG-0700 rev. 1344 37}3"** 4 £ ^ 5g7}3*4 4514831 23 : NUREG-07114H # ^ } ; E * 34^- IEC9644H 4 4 3 : 343"*4l 3 3 4

- 2 2 4 -

A 4 £ 3 3 7 } 3 * 4 4 4 3 3 * 4 4 4 8 4 [ 3 i ] . * 3 * 4 1 4 ^ 4 £ 3 3 ^

7 } # * 4 4 S 4 3 4 4 3 1 8 * 3 4 ^ * * * a # 4 3 i 8 * 3 * 3 S 4 4

4 £ 3 3 r ^ 7 K } * 4 ^ 3 4 * 1 - 3 3 4 8 4

2. NUREG-07114- NUREG-0700 rev. 1 3 A ^ 4 ^ 7 1 3 *

NUREG-0711*" 3 3 * 3 A S H ^ £ S i 3 ( H u m a n Factors Engineering

Program Review Model)"4 3 3 * A S 199434 £ 3 4 8 * 4 , £ 4 3 £ 3

± £ 3 4 3 3 * 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 * « ■ * * 1034 Ai(elements)S * *

t\jL 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 , * 3 , 3 # * 4 , £ S 4 ^ * * 3 4 4 3 1 # 4 - 4 *

4 4 ^& 4 * 4 * * 3 4 3 £ 4 3 4 - NUREG-0700 rev. l * " 3 3 4 ^ 3

3 £ 4 %S33(Human-System Interface Design Review Guideline)"43 3

^*}3 ^ 3 4 **( P ar t s ) s * 3 s ^ 51^3 , ^ S 3 ^ ^ £ 4 4 3 3 * 4

£ S 4 3 4 4 [ 7 8 ] . 3 S 3 ^ ^ £ 4 * * 4 l * HSI(Human System Interface)

4 4 3 ^ 3 * 3 3 3 £ s * S.^ASL 8 4 - 4 * NUREG-07114 1 0 3 3

A4i(Element 10.)4 * £ 4 4 , A3: * 3 * 3 4 7}# ^ 4 S 3 4 £ 3 3 3

7}3*3 3 * 4 3 ^ 3 * * 4 4 -

NUREG-07114 103*11 -SL£3 3 3 * 4 3 4 3 ^ 3*(human Factors

Verification and Validation)34* 47fl4 8*(activities)S *AJ^J- ^ 3 ^ 4 .

4 8 / 3 * 37}(design process V&V evaluation)^ 17114 8 * S ^-A3x} £ 3

^■^^■3(design implementation verification's 4 4 8 4 - £ 3 £ 4 4 8 /

3 * 37}(design process V&V evaluation)* HSI 3 * 3 3 4 3 ( T a s k Support

Verification), 8 3 * 3 3 £ 3 4 3 ( H F E Design Verification), * 3 " 3 4 ^ ^

£ ^(Integrated System Validation), * 3 3 3£48( I s sue Resolution

Verification) *j$.S * A ^ < > | O}.OI^ £ 3 7-^^-3(design implementation

- 2 2 5 -

verification)* 4 * £ 3 4 : 8 3 * 4 / H S I 48(Final Plant HFE/HSI

Verification) 4 4-

HSI 3 * 3 3 48(HSI Task Support Verification)* 3 * * 4 , 4 3 * 3

£44(EOP), £**JJ4(critical actions) * 3 4 3 4 4 * * 3 3 4 3 * ^ *<9

4(actions)3 £ A £ HSI7} 3 * 3 * 3 1 " 4 8 4 * 3 A S NUREG-071134

* 441 3 3 3 7 } 3 * * £ A S 3 4 4 3 L 8 3 &4- 3 * ^ * 3 3 £ A 3

HSI4 7}-%-^ 4 8 * * s * 3 £ 4 * 4 * 3 3 * * 3 * **11 * * < 9 4 A S

* £ 3 8 3 * 3 3 £ 3 * A 4 3 & * 4 -

8 3 * 4 3 £ 3 4 8 ( H F E Design Verification)* 8 3 * 4 3 3 , S * , 3

3(HFE guidelines, standards, and principles)3 4 4 4 HSI4 7f l£38 £ 3

A4i7} 3 3 * 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 * 3 * 3 7 } 4 * 3 A S * s HSI £ 3 ^ 4

3 3 4 ^ 3 £ 4 ^ ^ 4 ig7}3 4 * 3 4 - ^-331 * 3 3 3£48( l s sue

Resolution Verification)4- £ 3 4 : 8 3 * 4 / H S I 48(Final Plant HFE/HSI

Verification)41 3*114A * 3 3 A S 3 4 3 3 7 } 3 " * * 8 A 4 A 3 3 3 3 4

4 £ 3 3 7 } 3 * 4 A # * * 7 } * 4 4 . * 3 3 4 ^ £*(Integrated System Validation)* 4^-3O]E](simulator)

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* 3 7 } 4 * £ * 4 4 . 4 * 3 3 * 4 3441 3 4 4 4 3 £ 3 A * 3 £ 3 8

4 ^ 4 f - 3 4 3 * £ 3 4 **<§A * 3 3 4 4 ^ 9 * 3 4 4 * 3 A S 8 3

* 4 £ 3 * £ A S 3 4 - 441 3 4 4 NUREG-071134^ 4-g-4- £ £ $7}

3 * * 3 4 431 9XA.

® adequacy of entire HSI configuration for achievement of HFE

program goals

(2) confirmation of allocation of function and the structure of tasks

assigned personnel

- 2 2 6 -

(3) adequacy of staffing and the HSI to support staff to accomplish

their tasks

© adequacy of procedures

© confirmation of the dynamic aspects of the HSI for task

accomplishment

© evaluation and demonstration of error tolerance to human and

system failures

NUREG-0711344 HFE program goals* 3 3 * 3 4 8 3 * 4 3 £ 3

(human-centered HFE design)4 4 4 * * A 3 3 4 -

® personnel tasks can be accomplished within time and performance

criteria.

<2) The HSI will support a high degree of operating crew "situation

awareness".

® The plant design and allocation of functions will provide acceptable

workload levels to ensure a balance between vigilance and operator

workload.

(3) The operator interfaces will minimize operator error and will

provide for error detection and recovery capability.

2 3 NUREG-071134* * 3 4 ^ 3*(Integrated System Validation)

414 4 * £ * 8 * 37}3A(performance measures)* 4 * 4 £ 4 3 4 4

31 8 4 -

® system performance measures relevant to plant safety(e.g. avoidance

of alarm conditions and technical specification violations)

- 2 2 7 -

® crew primary task performance(e.g. task times, procedure violations)

© crew error(e.g. intention error related to assessment of plant

conditions, execution errors related to use of the HSI)

(3) situation awareness(e.g. proper assessment of implication of alarm

states) :

situation awareness- the relationship between the operators

understanding of the plants condition and its actual condition at any

given time.

(D workload(e.g. cognitive: decision making, physical: motion) :

workload- the physical and cognitive demands placed on plant

personnel

© crew communications and coordination(e.g. information sharing,

coordinated control actions)

(D dynamic anthropometry evaluation(e.g. reach, dexterity)

(fi) physical positioning & interactions with the HSI(e.g. physical

motion between panels and workstations, information display-space

navigation)

f^3- 4i:*!) ^^(Integrated System Validation)34 3 4 4 3 1 8 * 3 7} 3

* * * 8 * 3 4 4 £ 3 3 - 3 7 } 3 * A 4 * 3 3 4 3 & 4 - NUREG-07114

5 § 7 } 3 * 4 4 £ 3 3 3 7 } 3 * * 3 4 3 3 3 * £ 4 S 4 4 3 NUREG-07114

3 4 3 * * * 4 4 8 4 -

* 3 33*11 3 7 } 3 * 4 1 4 ^ 3.^ HSI7} HFE program goals* 3 ^ 4 3

* 3 * 3 7 } 4 A * A * 4 3 i 8 * 3 , 3 * 3 s 4 3 , 3 4 * * 4 3 * 4 4

(high level situation awareness), 38*4(work load) 3341*14 7 l*£ t g-

- 2 2 8 -

(function allocation), * 3 A * 4 3 4 : 4 * * 3A431 8 4 - 4 4 4 4 £ 3 3 W 3 * * 3133 37} 3 * 4 4*433 3 7 } 3 * 4 4 3 3 * 3 * £ * 8 4 - 7 l £ ^ 3 ^ 3 3 3 7 } 3 * 8 operators performance in using advanced MMI designs4 **|A(performance)* AAr 3*44(situation awareness), * 3 3 4 A*(crew error) * A S 3 4 4 3 1 4 ^ 3 3 3 * * 3 8 * 4 * 3l4 4 4 * W 4 3 NUREG-07114 * 3 3 3 * * 4 £ 3 3 3 7 } 3 * A S 3 3 £ * 8 4 -

* 3 3 37}*^** * 3 3 3 3 * 4 3 3 * 4 * 3 4 4 * £ # * 4 8 (confirmation)4* 3 A S 4 £ 3 37}3"*4 8 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 * £ 3 (function allocation between human and machine) 3 ir3:431 3 3 3 4 - 4 4 4 4 £ 3 3 7 } 3 * 4 4 ^ 3 3 3 7 } 3 * A S 3 3 £ * 8 4 -

3 3 3 37}3-** * 3 A 3 4 * 3 ^ 4 * 3 A 3 4 4 * 4 * HSI4 3 3 - 3 * 3 7 } 4 * 3 A S 3 3 4 * £ 3 4 £ 4 4 3 3 4 £ 4 - 4 4 4 4 £ 3 ^7}3-*4 4 ^ 3 3 37}3-*AS 3 3 £ * 8 4 -

3 3 3 3 7 } 3 * * 4 £ 3 37}3*-* £ 3 3 3 7 } 3 * 4 £ 4 3 4 -4 ^ 3 3 3 * * 8***53 3 3 HSI4 * 3 8 # 3 * 48(confirmation)

4 * 3 4 4 - * 3 3 4 ^ ^ 4 1 4 A * 4 * * 3 8 **|A7} £ A ^ ^ 4 * sj-8 4 * 3 A S 433Efl3 *^§ £ 3 4 : 3 3 3 * 4 &* * 3 %3]A3. * 3 4 A * 3 3 3 * * 3 4 4 A * * 3 3 3 3 A*43 i 4 * * 3 8 3 3 - 4 1 * * 3 4 * 4 4 4 - 4 4 1 4 4 8 4 * 3 4 4 4 8 3841 3 3 3 4 4 - 4 37} 3 * * 4 £ 3 « - 3 7 } 3 * * 3333 3 * 3 3 * 3 4 -

4*433 3 " * * * 3 3 4 3 * 4 31341 3 3 3A*(error tolerance)* 3 7 } 4 * 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 8 * 3 4 * HSI7} £ 3 4 * 4 3 1 * 4 3 3 4 * 4 3 i (multiple failures)3 3 4 4 * 3 3 4 3 4 * 3 * 3 7 } 4 * 3 4 4 - 4 3 4 * 4 3 4 * * 3 3 A S 4 4 ^ " A * * ^ 4 A * *S3-*(error-forcing contexts)

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4 4 - 3 A 4 7fl£4 3 * 5 4 4 4 3 4 - 4 3 4 3 * * 4£^g 3 7 } 3 * * 7 3 3

3*41 ^ s 3 * 3 4

£ ^ - 3 A S 4 £ ^ 3 3 7 } 3 - * * A3.A £ 3 3 NUREG-07114

NUREG-0700 rev.l4H 3 4 § } J L oi^. ^7}t^s.^. j£= ^ 3 4 3 1 8 4 3 1 3

3 3 4 - * 4 7 l £ ^ 3 3 4 3 * * 4 1 * 1 operators performance in using

advanced MMI designs, function allocation between human and machine,

assessment of system integrity, assessment of operating procedures * 47fl4

3 7 } 3 * * 4 * 3 7 } 3 * A 4 * A 3 o ] 4^4-jL 3- ^ 9XA. ^ 3 4 NUREG-07114 NUREG-0700 rev.l3A-] 3 4 3 } : E ° ^ jgy^j-s.^. 7 ^ ^ >%

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s * M * * 8 * 314 3 £ 4 4 4 4 4 A 37}3*4 l 3 3 3 7 } * 3 *

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3. IEC9644lA:|4 3 7 } 3 *

NUREG-0711-fer 3S4^(Review Criteria)4lAi &-£ £ - 3 ^ 4^(guidance)

A S % * 4 A * 431 $10.4, 3 * 4 4 4 8 IEC9647} 4 - * 3 s 4 * 3 3 8

3 7 } 3 * * 3 3 4 3 1 8 4 - IEC9644 A.3.3.3 verification and validation of

the integrated control room system 3 4 * Control room and operators,

Control room and operating procedures, and Control room and training

programme4l 3 3 347l*(evaluation criteria)* 3 4 4 3 ! 8 * 4 4 * *

3 3 8 3 7 } 3 * A S 3 * 3 * 8 A 4 , 3 3 * * 4 * 4 £4[3i] .

- 2 3 0 -

Control room and operators(CRO)

© Could specified annunciators, instruments or plant displays be used

as cues, adequated to alert the operator to perform a required action?

© Are controls reachable and displays readable on the reviewed

control room panel?

© Are the identification labels on instrumentation and controls

sufficiently detailed to permit the operator to locate the panel and the

particular control without resorting to other documentation?

© Are indications provided to allow the operator to determine that a

step has been completed or that a condition has cleared? Does this

indication convey the information satisfactorily?

© If the primary cues, controls or indicators are not available, is there

still some way to complete a given step?

© If the operator is expected to take some action when a process

parameter reaches a certain value, is the instrument for that parameter

readable to that value?

© Are all instrument scales and ranges appropriate to the required

reading precision in terms of scale and time resolution?

Control room and operating procedures(CROP)

© Can the actions specified in the procedures be performed in the

designated sequence?

© Are there alternative success paths that are nor included in the

reviewed procedure?

© Can the procedure action be performed in the control room and

- 2 3 1 -

within a specified time?

© Can the operator obtain the necessary information as required in

the procedures from the specified instrumentation in the control

room?

© Will the specified instruments and displays provide adequate

information for the operator to select applicable procedure?

© Is it necessary for the operator to use information or equipment

not specified in the procedures to accomplish his task?

© Is the presentation of plant conditions in the control room

compatible with the description of the same conditions in the

procedures?

® Can the operator find the correct equipment with the labelling,

abbreviations, symbols and location information provided?

® Are instrument ranges consistent with instrument value stated in

the procedures?

© Will the use of the procedures place excessive burdens on the

memory of the operator?

© Are the emergency operating procedures easy to distinguish from

other procedures in the control room(colour, shape, location)?

© Are the procedures and the control room physically compatible?

@ Is there space available in different parts of the control room to lay

the procedures down and will the binding allow them to lay flat on

work space?

© Are the procedures too bulky or too heavy for convenient

handling?

- 2 3 2 -

Control room and training programme(CRTP)

© Can all plant systems and equipment be safely and correctly

operated with the available controls and instrumentation?

(2) Is any plant system or equipment likely be incorrectly operated

due to lack of understanding of those devices?

© Can due action be taken in response to annunciators?

© Can information from controls and instrumentation be

misinterpreted?

© an erroneous conclusions be drawn from controls and

instrumentation?

© Is training used to compensate for deficient design of the control

room or procedures?

iEC9643Ai 3 3 4 3 1 8 * 3 7 } 3 - * * 3 3 3 A S NUREG-07114H 3 4

4 3 i s a * 3 4 # * A 4 * 3 3 8 * £ * 8 4 - 4 3 4 # * * 4 £ ^ § 3 3

7 } 3 * 4 4 3 Z 4 8 4 * 4 3 3.7.14- £4 - .

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a 3.7.1 4 £ 3 3g7}3-* 3 3 4 * IEC9644 3 4 3 *

7liJS g7lH-^ (1) operator's acceptance and performance in using

advanced MMI designs (2) qualification criteria in accordance with the

changes in operators' role (3) effectiveness of alarm systems and suitability of

alarm displays (4) assessment of operator supporting functions (5) assessment of cognitive workload in tasks using

color CRT displays (6) function allocation between human and machine (7) assessment of system integrity (8) assessment of operators' cooperative function (9) anthropometric convenience and accessibility of

information (10) assessment of operating procedures

IEC964 %?\%m

(1) CROP-®,®,© CRTP-®,®,©,®

(2)-

(3) CRO-® CRTP-®

(4) CRTP-®,® (5) CROP-®,®,© CRTP-®,©,®

(6) CRTP-® (7) CRTP-® (8)-(9) CRO-® CROP-®,®,©

CRTP-®,® (10) CROP-®®®©

7 l £ 3 3 4 3 * * (2) qualification criteria in accordance with the

changes in operators' role4 (8) assessment of operators' cooperative

functional IEC96434 4 * 4 3 3 1 8 4 & * * £ * 8 4 - A 3 IEC9644

3 4 3 * * 4 1 4 CRO-®, ©, ®, ®, ®, CROP-®, ©, ©, ©, ®, ®, ®, ©,

®4- CRTP-® * * £341 4 3 3 7 } A 4 * table-top** walk-through* *

44 344* 34 43"3443i 3334

4. 3 7 } 3 * U 3 7 } 3 A

IEC96444 8 3 3 4 NUREG-07114lAi 3 4 3 3 7}*} ^(performance

mesures:PM)* 4 4 A S 4 £ ^ § 3 3 4 3 * * 7-113343 4 * 4 £ 4 -

- 2 3 4 -

(1) operator's acceptance and performance in using advanced MMI designs

- * 3 8 * » ^ 4 3 4 3 341 3 * £ * 8*7}?(PM-i,2) - * 3 3 * 3 * * * 5 3 £ A 3 3 A * MMI s * 4 3 4 4 3 83 i , *

« } S 3 3 3 £ * 8*7}?(PM-3:intention error,4,5:cognitive workload:

decision making)

- computerized procedures* A } - § - £ 3 3 * £ £ 3 3 4 * 3 7 1 4 * ^ *

A * 4 4 4 , £ 4 4 4 4 * 4 * 3 4 3 * &*7}?(PM-l:tech spec

violations, 2:procedure violations, 3:intention error, 4, 5:cognitive

workload, 8:information navigation)

- MMI* A}-g-s}3 £ £ i * 3 3 4 3 1 A * 8 4 * 3 £ * 8 * 4 ?

(PM-l, 2, 3)

(2) qualification criteria in accordance with the changes in operators' role

- £341 43 *334 4£A3* A#43* 8** £4A47} 3* 4-

(3) effectiveness of alarm systems and suitability of alarm displays

- * 3 3 3 T 1 1 * 3 3 3 E 4 * 4 4 A * 3 £ 4 3 3 i £ * 8 *

7}?(PM-2:response time, 3:intention error, 4)

(4) assessment of operator supporting functions

- 3 3 4 3 1 A * 8 * * 3 * 334*7}?(PM-l,2:procedure violations, 3)

- *333 334*44 4^94 ^344 &* 3 4144 £3W 8 * * 4 3 4 * 4 4 3 3 4 ^ 4 A 8 * * A £ * 8 * human factor discrepancies* £ 3 4 * 3 A S 3 4 £ * 8 4 -

- 2 3 5 -

(5) assessment of cognitive workload in tasks using color CRT displays

- computerized procedures* A}-g-«}- 3 3 * £ £ 3 3 4 - * 3 7 1 4 * ^

* A * 4 4 4 , £ 4 4 4 4 * 4 * 3 4 4 * &*7}?(PM-l:tech spec

violations,2:procedure violations, 3:intention error, 4, 5:cognitive


- computerized procedures* A}-§-3- 3 3 EOPS4 3 * 4 * 4 3

7}?(PM-2:response time, 3:execution error, 8:information navigation)

(^) IEC9643A1 3 A ] § } J I 0 1 ^ £ * M * computerized proceduresS 3

* 4 8 * 3 4 4 3*37}*cF*4 4 4 7 } 9XA. ^ 3 4 3 * * 4 color

CRT displays(34*, 3 4 * , 3 4 ^ 3 4 * ) 7 } 7 } 4 4 4 * A 3 3

overload, ease to use, accessibility** 4 4 3 * 3 7 } 3 " * 4 H 3-g-5}

J l 8 A 4 , 3 A 4 computerized procedures 3 ^ " 3 4 4 4 3 * 3 * *

a j * £ £ A * 8 4 - * , 4 4 3 * 3 7 } * ^ * 3 4 computerized

procedures4* £ * 3 4 3 4 « D 3 4 * 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 .

(6) function allocation between human and machine

- 3 3 4 3 1 A * 8 * * 3 * 334*7}?(PM-l,2:procedure violations,

3,5)

- * 8 A 4 A * 3 3 4 workload3 * 3 * * 4 4 3 4 -

(7) assessment of system integrity

- 3 3 4 3 1 A * 8 * * 3 * 334*4?(PM-l,2:procedure violations,

3)

(8) assessment of operators' cooperative function

-236-

- NUREG-07114 3«J3 3 7 } 3 * 4 1 4 4 * 8-3-431 8 A 4 * 3 3 8 3

7 } 3 * * IEC96441* 8 4 -

(9) anthropometric convenience and accessibility of information

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time, 3,5,7,8)

(10) assessment of operating procedures

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- computerized procedures* A}-g-4|- 3 3 * ; * J £ 3 3 4 - ^ 3 - 7 1 4 * ^

* ^ * 4 4 4 , £ 4 4 4 4 * 4 * ^ 4 3 * &*7}?(PM-l:tech spec

violations,2:procedure violations, 3:intention error, 4, 5:cognitive


- computerized procedures* A}-g-3- 3 3 EOP S 4 3 * 4 * 4 3 "

7}?(PM-2:response time, 3:execution error, 8:information navigation)

4 3 A J 4- 3 * 3 7 } 3 * £ S £ 3 3 37}4A(performance measuresPM)

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5. 3 S ^ ^ A } ^ 4 .

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4*3g7}*e}*?i4 £ 3 3 * * 3 4 8 3 i NUREG-07H34 4 4 4 3 1 8 * W 3 A (performance measures)4 8 £ 3 8 4 -

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£ * 8* 3** 4* A#43i 884. 8?!*4 S^44 334 % *AS 441 3*£ * 8* 344.

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4 A 4 4 ° > 3-4- 4 * Halden Reactor Project44 * * 8 * * * 4 4

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84[71]. 1994V14 1995Vd4l £ 3 - £ 4^" NRC4 NUREG-07114-

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4 * £ * 8 * 37}3A(performance measures)SA^ 4 -*4 - £ £ 87fl4 ^ 7 }

4 A * 3 4 4 3 1 & 4 .

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safety)

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3 8 4 * 8 * **3A4 A * * * 4 3 *343(HSI)4 * 3 3 4 3 8 4 4 > ^ 4 3 -* *341 A 4 £ * 3 - 4 * 3 * 8 4 A 4 4 4 4 4 * 4 4 , 3 8 4 3 , £4 A i 4 3 , 4 A A * (intention errors)4- £*SA*(execution error)* 4 441 A3-44-

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343*434^ 433* 444, 43*44 8£3 4^3 3S-3 4 4 437}4 833 * 3 A 3 * £3 3 3 4 A 84- 433 * 3 A 3 * £3 4*4 £ 4 * A 3 4 * ¥338 A*3-£ 4^£-AS4, £34 3"#4 33 4 J L * A ^ , 3 .343- 3} 4 4. £ 4 NUREG-0700(rev.l), NUREG-0711S 3 X 4 * 3 3 HMI £ 3 31 s.^7\o] 4 4 ^ . 3 * 3 4 * | 4 J I oj- ^of l 3 3 4 * 4 3 3 £ A 3 3 4 4 4 * 3 8 8 ¥ £ 4 4 4 - ^ 3 4 , 3 3 * 4 3 3 * 3 A 3 * 4 # * 4 4 * 3 A 3 4 * £ 3 A * 3 83*341 4 ^ * ¥ 4 4 4 * * 4 4 4 , 4 ^ - 4 * £ 3 3 4 3 £ 3 £ 7 } 4 * 3 A S £ 3 4 A 3 £ 4 A 8 * 3 M 4 8 3 * 4 3 31* * 3 A 3 4 £ 3 * 4 ^ 3 * 4 4 4 4 4 A £ * 84- £ 3 3 37}33 31 7l)£3 ITF* a]+\s>] £3*3=41 3 4 31*3 4 ^ 4 A 3 * 3 4 £ ¥ 8 * €■ 4 4 4 , 4 * 4 £ 3 3 3 4 4 31*3 4 ^ 4 A341 # * 3 3 3 3 * 4 3"8€-* 4 3 £ ¥ 8A4, A 3 8 3 * 4 3 £37118 3 * 31 3 3 * 4 3 £ 3 3 * * ¥*344 4 3 Test Bed s %*£ * 8 * 344- * 4 4 3 ^ s 4 4 4 4 3 4 S 4 4 4 4 * £ 4 41 4 4 3 4 # * 3 * 4 4 3 3 3 4 £ (Advanced Control Room)* 7fl££

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- 3 1 0 -

m 6 # s i g a

—311 — NEXT PAQE(S) loft BLANK

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[8] Framatome, N4 the ISOOMWe PWR Nuclear Island, Detailed Technical Description, Vol.2, 1993.

[9] R. A. Olmstead, CANDU Control Centre, Technical Transfer Seminar on KAERI, 1993.

[10] International Symposium on NPP I&C, Developement of control system and control room design of the advanced light water reactors in Japan, Tokyo, May, 1992.

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1990.

[14] 3 ^ - 3 4 3 8 ¥ £ , 8 3 * 4 4 ^ 7 1 1 £ , KAERI/RR-1230/92, 1992.

- 3 1 3 -

[15] 3 ^ - 3 4 ^ 8 * ^ , 3 4 3 £ 3 £ 4 8 3 - 4 3 Interface £ 3 3 3 8 ¥ , KAERI/RR-1060/91, 1991.

[16] £.#, 3 3 * 4 £ 3 , * 3 # 3 4 , 1988. [17] W. W. Wierwille and F. T. Eggemeier, Recommendations for Mental

Workload Measurement in a Test and Evaluation Environment, Human Factors, Vol. 35 no. 2, 263-281, 1993.

[18] T. Kontogiannis, E. Hollnagel, Overview Report : Development of Functional Requirements for an Integrated Test Facility Based on a Generic ACR Concept, Human Reliability Associates Inc., 1993.

[19] EPRI, Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirement Document, Volll, chapter 10, 1992.

[20] IEEE, IEEE Guide to Evaluation of Man-Machine Performance in Nuclear Power Generating Station Control Rooms and Other Peripheries, IEEE Std 1988, pp.845-1988.

[21] IEEE, IEEE Guide for the Application of Huamn Factors Engineering to Systems, Equipment and Facilities of Nuclear Power Generating Stations, IEEE std 1024-1988, 1988.

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[25] T. Kontogiannis, E. Hollnagel, Development of an Integrated Test Facility:Specification of an Experiment Design, Human Reliability Associates Inc.,1994.

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1994.

[27] UFI, Instruction manual: BIOLINK Digital Telementry System, 1994.

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[29] Combustion Engineering, Inc, Human Factors Engineering Standards Guidelines, and Bases for BUPELEX 80+, Report NPX80-IC-DR-791-02, May 1992.

[30] KAERI and Korea Power Engineering Company, Inc, Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant Safety Analysis Report, Vol. 11, Chap. 18, 1991.

[31] CEI/IEC, Design for Control Rooms of NPPs, IEC 964, Bureau Cental de la Commission Electrotechnique Internatioonale, 1989.

[32] USNRC, Standard Review Plan, Rev.l, NUREG-0800, 1984.

[33] AR 602-1: Human Factors Engineering Program, Dept. of Defense, 1983.

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[36] EPRI, Computer-Generated Display System Guidelines, Vol 1 and 2, EPRI-3701, 1984.

[37] Dept. of Defense, Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities, MIL-STD-1472D, 1989.

[38] D. Meister, Human Factors Testing and Evaluaiton, Elsevier, 1986.

[39] USNRC, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, RG-1.33, 1978.

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[41] C. Chavez, et al, A Human Factors Evaluation of a Highly Automated

- 3 1 5 -

Nuclear Power Plant, AI91 : Frontiers in Innovative Computing for the Nuclear Industry, Jackson, Wyoming, Deptember 15-18, 1991.

[42] J. Nielson, Iterative User-Interface Design, IEEE Computer, November 1993, pp.33-41.

[43] J. Nielson, The Usability Engineering Life Cycle, IEEE Computer, March 1992, pp.12-22..

[44] F. Owre, et al, Experiences Gained from Developing and Integrating an Expert System and a Modern Graphi Display System for a Swedish Nuclear Power Plant Control Room, AI91: Frontiers in Innovative Computing for the Nuclear Industry, 1991, pp.393-402.

[45] K. FoUeso and F.S. Volden, Lessons Learned on Test and Evaluation Methods from Test and Evaluatin Activities Performed at the OECD Halden Reactor Project, Halden Reactor Project, September 1993.

[46] M. Takahashi, et al, Development of Realtime Cognitive State Estimator, Seminar Notes for the project of Human Factors Experimental Evaluation Techniques, April 1995.

[47] Gensym Co., G2 Reference Manual (V.3.0), 1994.

[48] Gensym Co., G2 GUIDE/UIL Reference Manual, 1994.

[49] 3 ^ 3 4 3 8 * 4 : £ 4 3 8 ¥ 3 , CNS Tranning Textbook, 1989.

[50] USNRC, Instrumentation for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, RG 1.97, 1980.

[51] 3 ^ - 3 4 3 8 * 4 : , 3 * J 3 A 4 8 4 3 A X 4 3*J-3 37}4 APTEA4 3 * , KAERI/TR-527/95, 1995.

[52] 3^-3438*4:, VDU 43 ¥34£4 83*4£334, 1995. [53] EL-MAR, Inc, EYE Tracking System Installation and Operating Guide

(V.4.0), 1994.

[54JS3T/SEC, HMS 3 £ * 4 3 4 # 3 4 4 , 1995.

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[55] IEEE Fourth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plant, 1988. 7.

[56] Conference Proceedings Man-Machine Interface in the Nuclear Industry,

IAEA, 1988.

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[58] John I. Sackett, Artificial Intelligence and Other Innovative Computer

Applications in the Nuclear Industry, 1987.

[59] Proceedings of the International Topical Meeting on Advanced in

Human Factors in Nuclear Power System, ANS/ ENS, 1986.

[60] Development of Plant Status Display System for on-site Educational

Training, CRIEPI Report ET6009, 1987.

[61] Marks S. Sander, Human Factors in Engineering and Design, 1987.

[62] William B. Rouse, Systems Engineering Models of Human-Machine

Interaction, Vol. 6. 1980.

[63] 3 ^ - 4 1 4 3 8 * 4 1 , 3 4 3 £ 3 A 4 3 3 - 4 3 Interface £ 3 3 " 3 8 ¥ ,

KAERI/RR-817/88

[64] 3 ^ - 3 4 3 8 ¥ 4 i , 3 4 3 £ 3 4 i 4 8 3 - 4 3 Interface £ 3 3 3 8 ¥ ,

KAERI/RR-948/90

[65] 3 ^ X * * 4 4 , 4 3 £ 3 3 ^ ^ , 1985. 3.

[66] Samsung Electronics/ S3 Technologies, Overview Document for the

Human Machine Simulator, prepared for the Korea Atomic Energy

Research Institute(KAERI), Document ID: HMS-S3T-KAERI-TR-DOC-3B,

March 31, 1997.

[67] Samsung Electronics/ S3 Technologies, Human Machine Interface

Software Design Specification for the Human Machine Simulator,

- 3 1 7 -

prepared for KAERI, Document ID: HMS-S3T-KAERI-TR-DOC-4B, April

2, 1997.

[68] Samsung Electronics/ S3 Technologies, Instructor Station Software

Design Specification For the Human Machine Simulator, prepared for

KAERI, Document ID: HMS-S3T-KAERI-TR-DOC-6, March 29, 19%.

[69] Samsung Electronics/ S3 Technologies, Engineer Station Design

Specification for the Human Machine Simulator, prepared for KAERI,

Document ID: HMS-S3T-KAERI-TR-DOC-5A, March 29, 19%.

[70] Samsung Electronics/ S3 Technologies, Facility Requirements Report

For the Human Machine Simulator, prepared for KAERI, Document ID:

HMS-S3T-KAERI-TR-DOC-9, November 12, 1996.

[71] 3^-3438¥4i, 33*4£^37}4^3£ 3 243A 84AJL4,

KAERI/RR-1338/93, 1994.

[72] 3^-3438¥4i, 33*4£3344#3£ 3 343A 84A3L4, KAERI/RR-1489/94, 1995.

[73] H.C. Lee, et al., "Human Factors Experiment Design In Using the

Integrated Test Facility", Proceedings of the Third Pan-Pacific

Conference on Occupational Ergonomics, Seoul, Korea, Nov., 1994.

[74] KAERI, DAEXESS User's Manual for Human Machine Simulator,

HMS-SEC-KAERI-TR-DOC-13, March 31, 1997.

[75] 8 3 4 2 £ 3 4 i 4 £ 3 ^ - 3 ^ . 0 3 ^ 4 2 £ £ 4 i * 3 " * 3 £ 4 4 3 £

Ai. 1994*d 4 £ .

[76] 83 ^ 2 £34i 4£3 ig-3 . 83 4 2 £34i 43*3 £44 3 S> | . 19943 4-£.

[77] USNRC, Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model,

- 3 1 8 -

NUREG-0711, 1994. [78] USNRC, Human-System Interface Design Review Guideline,

NUREG-0700 rev 1., 1995. [79] Hollnagel, E., et al., A cognitive task analysis of the SGTR scenario,

NKS/RAK-1.3, RISO, Denmark, 1996.

[80] Hollnagel, E. and Cacciabue P.C, Cognitive Modelling in System

Simluation, Proceedings of the Third Conference on Cognitive Science

Approaches to Process Control, Cardiff, UK, 1991.

[81] Hollnagel, E. and Marsden, P., Further Development of

Phenotype/Genotype Classification Scheme for the Analysis of Human

Erroneous Actions, HRA Ltd, 19%.

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- 3 2 1 -

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-323- NEXT PAGE(S) left BLANK

21 § 2* MI M (INVITATION TO BID)

1994. 12.

2iiism7\^7}\mnm HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING RESEARCH PROJECT

KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

-325-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. *U$M *M§$HM

INSTRUCTION FOR BID PREPARATION

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION APPENDDC

# <9 l . 71^^1-LH ^-*r ATTACHMENT 1. THE CONTENTS OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

T M 2. JS7V-8- ^ l # ^ s . *r*\ ATTACHMENT 2. THE CONTENTS OF EVALUATION

MATERIALS

ATTACHMENT 3. SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR CONTRACT

- 3 2 6 -

i . *sw sr e»mAi INSTRUCTION FOR BID PREPARATION

INSTRUCTION FOR BID PREPARATION

- 3 2 7 -

l. 3-8-$$) ^ fl^ APPLICATION SCOPE AND PROVISION

l.l * 91% 9±A*\^ t ^ W e j W ^ H ^*m3 9X^ "*!#*** 7l# 7 H f * r *H* W " * ] # * * * ^ ^ 7 r - § - A ^ ^ o l E l 7l)>&"^ °Jt*f l9l

The ITB shall apply to a bid of the development of Human Machine Simulator for human factor experimental evaluation research, which is for the project of KAERI titled "The Development of Human Factor Technologies".

i.2 < y # « £ r 7 i ^ * n < ^ Tt^ £ 7V3<a£* %-AA *IA%A.

KAERI will evaluate the cost and technical specification proposed by the proposers simultaneously.

1.3 £- <$%-& A&A ASr £ * H A A *!*3M. The bidding procedure is as follows ;

(1) °J#^-J1 (A notice of bid)

(2) ^ M ^ ^ K A presentation of bid)

(3) -Of A ?J 7V^<y# (Technical specification and cost bid)

(3-1) 7l#^l°J-A^ ^ ^(Receipt of technical proposals)

(3-2) 7 r ^ ^ " S (Announcement of cost) (3-3) 7l^*fl91A *%7\ 3\ -^(Evaluation of the technical

proposals and selection of technically qualified proposals) (3-4) fJ-^Tf ^"5. (Announcement of qualified proposers)

(4) A A (Contract)

1.3 ol fl-ôll ig5L5L *$7]Z\A &£r # , 711 A^r <$^±$ gîÂ A A °\*mA. Unless otherwise specified in this provisions, KAERI's regulations shall apply to this bid and contract.

- 3 2 8 -

2. ^ ^v f l - 8 -SUPPLIER'S SCOPE OF SUPPLY

- elA^n ^ ^ 5 | 7 ) - § - Simulator 1713 HA, AA, A^ 3l -g*l (£*]#

A set of the Human Machine Simulator, including design, procurement, manufacture, test and installation work, (site location : the designated location within KAERI area)

- ^ i85§7r-§- * 1 ! - 3 M E W T = - Function Simulator, ^ H * L ^ 1 2 : ^ ^ 8 ^ 3l Q'QA ^AA *i7\]5\£: SCADA(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 3 7 1 ^ ^ - * H 9 ^ ^ 9X^ Man-Machine Interface, 7]-g.AA ^ £ - * H > ^ o ] i«"^4.(2. 7]<£^A ^ ZL%\ #2)

The Human machine Simulator shall include Function Simulator, Man-Machine Interface to be able to perform SCADA function and data storage and analysis system of the main test room, supporting test room and experimenter room, (refer to figure 1 in the appendix of "2. Technical Specification".)

- ^ M l # * ^ t f l - 8 - * "2. 7l#if2H»ofl o l - B|4J. £ 4 .

The detailed supplier's scope of supply is described in "2. Technical Specification" of this ITB.

- 3 2 9 -

3. 7l<£;4#Al ^

PREPARATION OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

3.1 7 l ^ ^ J ^ A ) o | ^ CONFIGURATION OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

-;Hm*Kr «aiteHJMS] tfl-g- a, "A91A A^9i^\A", "7]<£^AA", " 1 -<$"%£ ^£-* l °l*flt!- 3 7l^*floM 3? W-g- ^ f l f 4 £ t A*3, *fl#«M

The proposer shall prepare and submit the technical proposal and evaluation materials after fully understanding the contents of the "Invitation To Bid (ITB)", which consist of "1. Instructions for bid preparation", "2. Technical specification"and "ttachments".

- 7l<£2fl?_H^ tr^*I*r«!SH t4i«IM AA^ 1-°J i ^ 7]£A°dAs) ^A A A A AA3*ft°l W -

The technical proposal shall be prepared in accordance with the Attachment 1 : The Contents of Technical Proposal.

- W-g- *fl#*r£.^ t H - W ^ l W ^ M *1H^ 1-°J 2<q ^7>-§- *fl# As. 3 -=-*H A A AA3n°\ x}A-

The evaluation materials shall be prepared in accordance with the Attachment 2: The Contents of Enaluation Materials.

3.2 *<&A AW*& METHOD OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL PREPARATION

- 3 3 0 -

3.2.1 AAA$ oj«.7f 1 *(?H€-g-£ IBM PC jL$7 l f ^ l ^ -A^^7 l (^ -# MS-Word 5.0) A ^ * H 4 ^ * M ° > W -

The original edition of the technical proposal, which shall be a part of contract documents, shall be prepared by using Korean version of MS-Word 5.0 for IBM PC compatible.

3.2.2 all«LH°fl*r S.&, A0*, AA £ ° i 3 H W A~%r £ # * M , *\}9lA7\ *H A% S.& $*LW &%A°\ t_>4. <EL AAA^ £ <$%$ cflôi s]^ AÂQ)^7\ ^#± o . ^ ^ £ 3 3 . <$$. ^^#±3] JiM)#(Replica) Êfl7> °}A3 9lA:§-n -a 3-8- A&noWASr * ^ * A AAAA°\

The proposal shall include all information, including drawings, specifications, materials, and schedules. The proposer shall consider that Human Machine Simulator is not a training simulator, which is a replica type of a specific plant control room, but a human factors experimental simulator

3.2.3 ^ T ^ i ^ s l A l M o l £ *S^ 3\ ;§£, SK^M^r 4 i^^^|<H^ ^ 741 -8-3^ £ «TO^ «i-Ji#£, ^ M < H ^ ^ * M H -8-°}$ A%n°] El 51 7flôfl ^_fi_$ ^ ^ . g . Âfl*l 71 * H 7 l ^ ^ ? I 3 |7H m ft £-S-°l € ^ 9X$m AA3AAQ\ &A. The proposer shall prepare all information in detail to be helpful to

KAERI's technical evaluation, including the scope and depth of system simulation, the methodology for guaranteeing hardware and software design flexibility and expansibility, and the development strategy for the simulator that is suitable for experimental control and practice.

3.2.4 t H - ^ i - e i o j ^ L s l A$ AttAA H£E« a l * * 4\A A&A AA-A9dA^ A9dA A*3*) ^QA^Q^^ A$ Att*\ Hlil"§- A3 a>}A 7m 9^3 3± TlW-i: A*3A^<>} &A-

- 3 3 1 -

KAERI shall be able to pay the contract amount with the following schedule. The proposer shall prepare the development plan and schedule in accordance with this payment plan.

Contract ~ 1995. 7 About 15 % 1995. 8 ~ 1996. 7 About 25 % 1996. 8 ~ 1997. 2 About 60 %

3.2.5 A°dM^ ##•§• *r-§- §r QA°.3. &A. A, A^dA^M * i « - 7]#3 A*}& «3^§- A%AA A*m ^ #4.

In preparing the proposal, it is a preferrable to use Korean Language. The proposer may use English for the preparation of technical contents and items.

3.2.6 A AM AA3A A3)37]^ A^4\ A$\^ 4-&W-

In preparing the proposal, the engineering units shall be MKS

3.2.7 ^ o R i H o i l ^ i g * i *g7l5M SHr^ W ° l ^A&A - f ^ W -

Unless otherwise specified expressly in this ITB, the written in Korean shall have priority to those in English.

3.3 *\<&A4\ « PROPOSITION PROPOSITION OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

3.3.1 AAASr 92%AAA^ AA A*3& *!£- 1-W^3! S#), A£ 5-»M A°d*\M: €4^<3T2-^7f * l « #4^1 *1W AAA*} 4&AA W . The bidder shall submit one original edition(including diskette

containing computer files) and five copies of the technical proposal for KAERI to receive it by the designated date.

3.3.2 AAA 3*r AAA A A A AAA7} 3*r3*l &£ A]AA$= £ °J#^r

- 3 3 2 -

£7l£ $6.3. A^ftA-KAERI shall assume that the proposer abondons the whole of the bid,

in case that the technical proposal of a proposer shall not be received by the designated date.

3.3.3 A AM A}^*, A A A^] 387l-# fl«H Â%A^^7} SL?A^ ^7\, £ TJ, ^ * M ° N ^ ^ H AÂSr A&2-3. AÂ &A-

The proposer shall respond with a written form to the KAERI's request for any modifications and additionals necessary for the evaluation of technical proposal

3.4 *]*£%■ A PRESERVATION OF SECRET

ojôj-Â-KiTBjsl tfl-g-^r A 3AAA ^mA ?^g-* ^ ^ o . ^ ftA. The proposer shall not open the contents of ITB to the third party.

- 3 3 3 -

4. **<&>H 5 g 7 r

EVALUATION OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

4.1 «j«)Â> PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

t H ^ * } ^ ^ - AAAW f>£ ^^(5ôlvfl) oj^-oVvflA^l U ^ * ^ i g %<$.*]$ *]$■% %^jL, Â%& Ti^-A^ 92%^%7\AA A]^ ^ °a^.

KAERI shall review all the technical proposals in five days after receipt of the proposals to check whether the technical proposals are prepared in accordance with ITB. If any one of the proposals is not prepared so, KAERI shall be able to exclude the proposal from the evaluation of bidding.

4.2 7$<&A ^7} EVALUATION OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

4.2.1 A]AA7\ A]^& afl^l-rKr $ H ^ * r 3 £ ^ 7 } nlEl « ^ 7 > 7 l ^ 3\ "3-%A 42f 9j?3 ^7>lVcf.

The technical proposal which the proposer submits shall be evaluated by the KAERI's criteria and methods.

4.2.2 ^ .S . *%7}*^ Major Evaluation Items

t H ^ 4 3 < 3 ^ - £ ^ £ A<$2\ 7l£39J s . 3 ^ - 8 - 0^04 ô>^ ^7}A]

A& * d " ^ ^r-23^3. JH^fk}. A]AA^ ^ -S-W ^ ^ - ^ ^ 4 ^ 3^4:7} Â $7 r«- ^ 5U5.S. AAAi A*3AA W -

For the success of KAERI's project, KAERI shall preferentially consider the following items in the evaluation of the proposal. The proposer shall prepare technical proposal for KAERI to easily evaluate the major

- 3 3 4 -

evaluation items

1) 7 l £ T f 2 M 4 3 <&*\<% The conformance of the proposal with the technical specification of ITB

2) All-eflolBlsi ^ . g . ^ Applicability of the simulator

7 f l ^ € ^ H ^ H ^ r 91A-7}A oJTfl^Tfl* ^t.V S ^ S E f O l ^ ^TflS^F-

The possibility of practical application of Human Machine Simulator as a prototyping design tool for MMI disign.

3) 7}<£%%A 7]AS. The contribution to KAERI's technical establishment

- 7 l < £ ^ 31 * * ^ < «

• 71E}.

- Technology Transfer and Collaboration . Scope of Technology Transfer . Technology Transfer plan and Methods . Collaboration Scope . Collaboration Plan and Methods . Others

4) A r o j ^ * | ^ e f 3] ^ Capability and strategy for the simulator development

o]A t r - g - A } ^ * * 1 ^£t .Vcf . The evaluation items herein include also the followings :

- 3 3 5 -

- 9dAÂ 37-8- All-sHS! 71^^-^si ^ 3 $ O)A^ The degree of proposer's correct understanding of the technical

characteristics of the Human Machine Simulator necessary for KAERI's human factors research

- €-711 Wr*& vfl-8- % %Aê\ ^ ^ AM Evident provision of the project activities and results for every three

months

4.2.3 AAA4\ %7}7]& 31 tf^ I H ^ ^ S T 1 ^ JL-B- T U ^ H Â^, A]AA^= *%7\ ^31-ofl t f l * H f e 0)0)5 ^ 7 ] ^ - ^ o j o , ^ olt t)^. ^ ^

The evaluation criteria and method of proposal belong to KAERI's indigenous rights, and the bidder shall not raise an objection to the result of evaluation and shall not request an any compensation.

4.2.4 " W ^ ^ i ^ r °1«H *flf AAA7\ 3.^ 7]&A v\^.fl^x^jL *§

If all the proposal were evaluated to be inadequate to KAERI's criteria, KAERI shall not be able to select any proposer.

- 336 -

M2i 1.

ATTACHMENT 1.

7mnmM ^n

THE CONTENTS OF TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

- 3 3 7 -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. GENERAL

2. HUMAN-MACHINE SIMULATOR DEVELOPMENT SCOPE

2.1 Engineering and Design Service

2.2 Hardware

2.3 Simulator Software

2.4 Maintenance

2.5 Testing

2.6 Documentations

2.7 Training

2.8 Quality Assurance

2.9 Design Data Collection

2.10 Shipping and Installation

2.11 Warranty

2.12 Others

3. CODES AND STANDARDS

4. HUMAN-MACHINE SIMULATOR HARDWARE REQUIREMENT

4.1 General Requirement

4.2 Man-Machine Interface Requirement

4.3 Simulation Computer Complex

4.4 Instructor Station

4.5 I/O Interface System

- 3 3 8 -

4.6 Equipment Operating Tolerance

MAN-MACHINE SIMULATOR SOFTWARE REQUIREMENT


5.2 Operating System Software Requirement

5.3 Executive System Software Requirement

5.4 Configuration Management System

5.5 Application Software Requirements

5.6 Engineer Station Requirements

INSTRUCTOR STATION

6.1 Simulator Control

6.2 Exercise Control

6.3 Exercise Record

PLANT MODELLING, SCOPE OF SIMULATION

7.1 Process Schematics

7.2 Instrumentation and Control

7.3 Operating Situations

VALIDATION AND TESTING

DOCUMENTATION


9.2 Human Machine Simulator Software Preliminary Design Concept Specification

9.3 Human Machine Simulator Model Preliminary Design Concept Specification

9.4 General Equations and Numerical Schemes

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9.5 Simulation Model Design Report

9.6 Plant Monitoring System(PMS) Software Documentation

9.7 Executive Software Documentation

9.8 Simulator Hardware Documentation

9.9 Instructor Station Preliminary Design Specification

9.10 Final Design Data Base Report

9.11 Othres. (relating with software maintenance, computer software and hardware, I /O hardware, system engineering, annunciator system, malfunction and remote function cross reference and simulation variable global cross reference, etc.)

10. TRAINING PROGRAMS

10.1 General

10.2 Detail training program for CRT(Class Room Training) in Korea

- Instructor Training

- Software Training

- Hardware Training

- Training Materials

10.3 Detail training program for CRT in foreign vendor's country

- Instructor Training

- Software Training

- Hardware Training

- Training Materials

11. QUALITY ASSURANCE

11.1 Hardware Quality Assurance Program

11.2 Software Quality Assurance Program

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12. DESIGN DATA

12.1 Design Data Base

12.2 Responsibility

12.3 Data Availability

12.4 Design Data Freeze

12.5 Data Voids and Conflicts

13. SHIPPING AND INSTALLATION

14. WARRANTY

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M® 2. ATTACHMENT 2.

THE CONTENTS OF EVALUATION MATERIALS

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The proposer shall provide the concerning documents and technical data of following items with his proposal for proposal evaluation

1. Proposer's Capabilitys

- Provide proposer's experience in nuclear power plant simulator or in related areas, including client references for power plant simulators that you have delivered since 1990. Provide name, title, location, fax. number and address.

- Provide man power allocation plan

- Provide estimated number of simulation modelling engineers currently available with your company to provide supporting to the KAERI's project.

- Provide list of simulator contracts performed with same math, models and development tools which proposed to KAERI

- Provide the simulator development project organizational structure and interfaces

Provide a list and resume of key project management and key functional discipline positions (system engineer, NSSS modeler, Instruct Aids, Handler, Hardware, etc.)reporting to the project manager and required to provide project management, design, and development of contract requirements and continuity throughout the life of a simulator software replacement project and meet schedule commitments

- Provide the project list of simulator modification and/or upgrade contracts performed since 1990.

(If the proposer performs the simulator development utilizing subcontractors or jointly with other companies than the proposer itself, the proposer should above describe the above for each company separately.)

2. Technology Transfer

Technology transfer agreement between the proposer and its foreign vendor

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- Transferred mathmatical model list

Transferred simulator development tool list

Transferred reference material list

- OJP(On-the-Job-Participation) list

- Class room training list

3. Others

- Description of technology transfer experienes for the power plant simulators.

List of data requirements for the proposed simulator

- Project milestones

Description of management tools for the simulator development

- Third party proprietary materials

- Others

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M£J 3 ATTACHMENT 3.

71101 -^yj

SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR CONTRACT

- 3 4 5 -

CONTENTS

A l^ W8fl 1 Supply Scope

*11 23: AA^^S &A 2 Contract Documents

*11 3i f- *1 3 Communication

*11 4i &AA]%-4 Documents

*11 5 i ^ l ^ ^ ^ -S l 3 £ 3] ^ o ] 5 Review and Approval of Submitted Documents

*fl 62 al^-ff*] 6 Maintenance of Information Security

A] 72. %-A*%7\ 7 Midterm Progress Meeting and Evaluation

*11 82 741^*1 8 Voluntary Cancellation of Contract

A] 92 4I-H-T5 ° l^ i 9 Transfer of Proprietary Rights

A] 1 0 i tff-^-3 10 Encouragement of Delivery

*11 112: S l E . ^ 11 Delivery Schedule

*11 122 - ^ T ^ U l ^ i H ^ - ^ ^ H l 12 Special Materials Cost and Training

A] 132: * H } ^ 13 Fixed Price

*ll U2 A^z]^2iA

-346 -

14 Payment

A] 152: 4iSS.*fl<H >M--8-€ 15 Software Priviledge

*H 162 741^^-JL 16 Effectuation of Contract

A] 172 J££7fl*! 17 Amendment

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415 ^ $ 3 1 Supply Scope

l . °1 A°1A A^ A°A?AAAA #»d*\ * ^ 8 f l * r A&A £°-A ALA^°d AQ-& AÂAAA 7]£ÂAA AÂ-

The scope of contract is to supply one unit of Human Machine Simulator (hereinafter called HMS) and related services. The functions of HMS must comply this technical specifications, and the overall supply scope of the HMS is described as follows ;

7\. <&AAA% % %A Engineering and Design

- * 1 # 3 M E I * 3.®^ £.-& *}B-AA 3! i = s . * I M o i Â

Design of all hardwares and softwares relating with HMS

A. *r = * H ^ Supply of hardware

- *l-tr3Mt|-g- ^ - i r QA, Engineer Station i ^ ^ o l -g-

Engineering workstation, Computer and peripherals, man-manchine interface, and others.

Supply of software

- Operating System(OS), Executive Software(S/W), Simulation Software, Engineer Station Software, Others.

Integration of hardware and software

A. &&A3.

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Documents

- Design Documents, Design Specifications, Bill of Materials, Users and Maintenance Manual, Others.

A- A% 3\ QA Test and Evaluation

- Test and Evaluation Plan, Test and Evaluation Procedure, Test and Evaluation Reports

Training

A- # ^ J i * Quality Assurance

*>• ÂAS. ^ 3 Collection of design data

A. & * 31 ^ A Transportation and installation

«r. 71 # ^ 1 ^

Technology transfer

2. Â& * ^ 8 f l t e A*$ y^Â .fl.3 5J t s . ÂQ AA A&A. The detail scope of supply shall be in accordance with the technical

specification and other relating documents

^ 2 2 : 7 8 ^ ^ * 1 2. Contract Documents

l. T H ^ H V ^ S ] 7fl°H^-S-^t-*HI A&A &91A a ^ Â$= 3-f A^ 3

If there is a difference or contradiction between the documents of the

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contract, the terms and conditions, which describe in detail or comprehensive, have the highest priority.

2. oi Tfl ° H Aft ^7} SLfe #7$£. 74)^^4431 ^#5afe A A A A A^ afe ^91AA 3 3 Tfls^Hot %-ILAA.

In case of amendment or modification of the contract, the revised contract shall be effective only through the countersign by the responsible persons of both KAERI and the contractor.

3. 7 l # i r 2 H » S-Vft A A^&AÂ ÂA &7-A AAA 7-AAA AA^ AQA A2A <&AAA # £ 3 - f o ^ ÂAA AZ£ AÂ- A°1A AÂ A5. A&Â A^-A^ AAA A^ÂA^ ÂAA ^ A AA AÂ^ ♦ ^ * 1 °1*5*H°1: ftA-

In the event of any disagreement between KAERI and the contractor in the interpretation of the provisions and' contexts of the technical specification, special terms and other conditions of the contract, the interpretation of KAERI shall govern. In case of revision of contract, the contractor shall continue his duty in accordance with KAERI's decision until final decisions are to be made.

^ 3 2: ^ A 3 Communication

1. oi 741 ° M 4 ^ AAAQA 3.^ *A, -&-3I 3\ 7]A AA±.%-%: A^.,^^,AA ^~§- * * M %A 31 ÂftA-

The communication between KAERI and the contractor shall be accomplished by letter, faximile, and meeting

2. ^ l | * K r A°-t ^ f # e l » t H ^ ^ ^ i SH>**t7l #71)>&AA A9JAAA 3°d£ ^ 5114-

KAERI is able to entrust a post-management of contract to human factors engineering project manager of KAERI.

-350 -

^ 4 2: £ " H ^ # 4 Documents

l . A°1AAA7\ A&AAA ¥ €■*!*=■ 7]-£ÂAA A*A A°1AAA^ 7)#fl-AAAA A]<£ ATft Z.A AAA5L °] A^^ÂÂA -£L^*Kr ^ 4°J &A &$As.% ÂA7\ %&A 4 ^ ^M i ^ ^ f e &A 3\ 4 £ t ^ -£L$ ^17H TAA7} i ^ t b fl-3°fl £51^- *)-S *f l#sH°t ftA-

The contracter shall submit all documents for the development of HMS in accordance with technical specification, and any other documents requested by KAERI. The contractor shall sumit the documents necessary for project management besides those specified in technical specification.

^ 5 2: *>#>HfM) 3 £ 31 &<& 5 Review and Approval of Submitted Documents

1. A°1AAA7} aflf^Hr «£°]-8- £.3, itAA, A%A, * 3 a , AÂ 31 &3A %■■& A A°1A ^ s . ^1*1*1 &*r$- A"AA7\ QA^ft ^sL*hA 30«a AAA 3 £ 31 &91AA AA A 7]T}AA t 5 l f-JSL7f 8 ^ $ *P§ô.ii. «£?J3 3 °-3. £-4-

The contractor shall submit all documents (including drawings, specifications, guidelines, schedule, and reports) for KAERI's review and approval. KAERI shall review submitted documents and approve for further processing within 30 days after receipt of the documents. If KAERI does not inform contractor additionals within this period, the submitted documents are considered approval.

2. A°1AAA7\ TAAAA A&AA %£. 3\ &91£ &AAA*r S-Mfe 7]&Â AAA 3 $ A A A^rA-

All documents required for KAERI review and approval shall complay with technical specifications

3. oi 7il$H si74 TAAA «£<?!-§- &A A^® £.3, ÂA 31 7|EH-frBr QA

- 3 5 1 -

4 i ZL A&A AA, A3-, 71^^21 &AA AAA AÂAA AAA S*H A^ %& AAA, AAft A%A AAA AAÂA^ A* °J4$ *A AA$ AAA A-%-±3 ^ A t r * 1 3 i * l * A AAA Sr4-Although all the materials, including documents, drawings, specification

are prepared after KAERI's approval, the contractor shall not be exempted from the responsibility of contractor toward lacks of contents, errors, and technical problems of materials. The contractor shall correct these matters immediately at the expense of the contractort.

6 Maintenance of Information Security

741^tfcfl*Kr ^1144 A&Â SH 7414 44 ^ ^ 5 ^ £ - 7414^*34 # 3 3 714 As.* AAA*$ 3 * » AÂ3 A 3AAA ÂAAAZ: °dÂ-

The contractor should not release any information, including contents of contract, specification, drawings, and other documents related to this project or contract without KAERI's approval.

A] 7 2:^71^71-7 Midterm Progress Meeting and Evaluation

7fl^cf l*Hr 74)^71^-^ 7414°1*S4 ^^y^7}s. j ^ ÂAA 1995\1 7^ 25 «a, 1996\1 7 - i 25°J-|- A^SLS. i 711 -g #A ÂAAA Q&ft S-^&A 3\ =LA AAA £A%(AÂA $ &Z.E.XA £^-)-§- * f l#*H°t ftA- ^^1^7} £AA A 4 ^HI*Rr Q&.A 4 4 T414*H4 a ^ A^ft i * l * 3 * A^ 9XA-

The contractor shall submit the documents, reports, and some outputs(including hardware and software) produced for the midterm evaluation by one month before the midterm evaluation. The dates of midterm evaluation are ;

1995. 7. 25 1st Midterm

1996. 7. 25 2nd Midterm

By the results of midterm evaluation, KAERI can determine the continuity of the contract or can take some proper action.

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*| 8 2: AAÂ 8 Voluntary Cancellation of Contract

1. 4 7414°fl 4 * ^ ^ 4 A*8£r A"-AAA AAA 4 4 9iA^rA AAA *!•¥■ a fe *!•¥■* *H4«- ' r 5U4- 4 4 *l*lfc- a. 1 ) 4 4 4 ^ ^ - AAV «J4*J t -M* 7414 -S-tfl^HXI * ! ^ r A$A i ^ ^ - ^ $ - 4 .

KAERI can cancel some parts or all of the contract at any time during the progress of the contract. The cancellation becomes effective by delivering to contractor cancellation notice identifying the scope and date.

1) 4 *1LAA $ft VAs. A^-A Â tt Stop the work from the notification date.

2) AAA AÂS? 3 ^ 4 4 4 7 - H A& « ^ t f Stop purchasing of equipments of the related cancellation works

3) 7414^^44 * r £ # 4 ° f l Aft ^ € - * ?AA7\ * v « ^r 9X^ 2 3 ° - ^ . A±AAA S ^ * ^€ - f r 7-

DH4°fl7ll 4 ^ 4 4 4 $ 4 l # * r j i E # 4 4

4 2*1 Cancel the order toward the sub-contractor on condition that

KAERI is satisfied, or do a proper action to transfer it to KAERI.

2. ^n||4fe 7414*1143. 4 $ 7414^-cfl^]-^ ^ a - £*j^. SLÂAA 4 4 Jt #A& #3:114 4°fl 3 * 4 . # ^"^74142^ *fl 72 ^*V ^7}»(1995\£ 7^ 20<y, 1996*d 7 * 20<y) * $ • 7414*114^ 7414^-^441 Aît £A s ^ *

KAERI shall compensate losses or damages of contractor by the contract cancellation through the aggrement between KAERI and contractor. But the cancellation of contract as a result of midterm evaluation(article 7) does not apply this term.

*8 9 2 : 4 i - { f ^ o ] ^ 9 Transfer of Proprietary Rights

1. 4 74144 # 3 4 4 AAKAAA ^ I W I T I ] AÂ^ £€■ 7)14^-§-#£- (**fl

- 3 5 3 -

A°.£. ^$$3. Proprietary Informationol 2} 3th)THI44 ^ 4 AttA ^ 4-

All commodities and informations furnished under the contract shall become KAERI's proprietary information.

2. 4 74l4°fl 4 4 * ^ 3 f c 44*114 i * ^ ^"H4°fl741 * ] £ * AAAAs,Â ÂAAA A#€4. The proprietary rights of all commodities and informations under the

contract shall transfer from contractor to KAERI after the receipt

74| 10 2 : tf#^S| 10 Encouragement of Delivery

1. 4 741441 4 4 ÂAS= tf#£ Sr4£ iStM- ^ i } .

KAERI have the rights to urge delivery of goods under the contract.

2. +AA& 4* -¥-#8M tf^sii- AA AAAAAA 45^44 AA AAV #A 31 ?A£ **A *««■ Si4. KAERI personnel shall always be able to visit the field or factory of

contractor and subcontractor for encouragement of delivery without any additional cost.

3. 74l4^tfl4-£r ^-AAS- 4 4 ^ T41«MNI4 3! AS.&A7} AA4: &AÂA 4 4 , %A, A"A, AA, 4 3 , ^ 4 ^ 4 47l ^«8 A** #-tf^ ^ fls* A"AAA A A&azzA* A%AA 4 4 A"-AAA tff-^-4 *&A « £ $ 4£J i3 i4 , * H S , * 5 4 a t 4 5 ^ 4 4 1 cfltv l-f^rS-4-f- ^

Dfl47> | i l £ 4fe S--E-

4 S * *fl^*114$4.

The contractor shall submit the progress report necessary for evaluation of schedules, design, purchasing order, and other KAERI request materials to urge delivery.

A} 11 2: SlHSJ^} 11 Delivery Schedule

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1. 741 W W 257fl-g 4 i f l , S ^ 74l4#3l7l- 1995^ 2-g 31 <g A*3. 4 £ 4&^§- 3 - f 7414= AAASr I997id 2-U 28<y 4*A°fl 74144^4 5L€-^1i# ^ •yso-v^^ ftA. All the commodities shall be delivered within twenty five calander

months after this contract, or in case of delaying of this contract on after January 31, 1995, the contract shall deliver all the commodities by the end of February 1997 at the latest.

A\ 12 2: ^H^r iLH l 4 ^ 3\ 2 3 - £ 3 12 Special Materials Cost and Training

1. 7414^^4^ 3*114 ^3^y]AA A^ 7]<£ÂAA AAA SHr 4 * * M 4 * ÂZL 7l£*H-°fl n}«. ^ J I ? } - ! - ^ # 4 4 4 4 4 4#^l^f 7414 - *11 ! * J 4 ^ *J3 VAA * ^ 4 * 4 * 4 « ^ 5U4-The contractor shall be able to conclude a subcontract with a foreign

company at expense of the contractor in order to meet the supply HMS and technology transfer described in technical specification.

2. 7414^-^4^ S.U-S44 ? 1 T W 3 -fM-S.^* ^ 4 4 AAA°-3, ^*|7> ^ As.* £«3-S-3»4| tfl*i H3-*e-fr ^ 4 4 4 4 *J4. The contractor shall have the responsibility to train KAERI personnel

for the operation and maintenance of the HMS

A] 13 2: 4 H } ? * ! 13 Fixed Price

l. 4 741441 4 4 **«34l 31 7\AA "843 4474144 ^ 4 4 4 f e &Xh°4 A ÂAA $AA°d £ 4 4 ^ * « f l 4 | «JHr SL€- 714*14* **r4-. The fixed price includes the HMS development related hardware and

software cost, and all associated engneering services including design,

- 3 5 5 -

manufacturing, test, installation, documentations, and others necessary for the development of proper and sufficient functioning of HMS specified on the technical specification.

Total cost of this project is won.

A] 14 2 *H^ 4 - ^ 2 : 3 14 Payment

1. 7414^44^ 74l4'ti\M^ 41 _ 4 t 4<a?L£ 31 AA$%A _*1 <tf4|_LJi4-I-

^l#5flo> §1-04, '95H1 7-£ 10<g, '96^ 7^ 10^41^ ZLAAA 7 ^ 4 _____.$H4 1- _ # # 4*11# 3\ &A 24#-_- ^1^*114 *14- 01* ^ 4 1 - ^ * * j * q°d *_ ?AAS= ^-34^41 4 4 7l 2 * 4^-t t 41 &4-

The contractor shall submit the detail reports of project including work progress and work status every four calendar months, and shall furnish midterm products including software, hardware and documents in July 10, 1995 and July 10, 1996. The payment shall be made in every year according to the progress of the project after evaluation of products and quality.

2. ^ 4 1 4 - 74144 4^-4 £ 4 idHHs. 4 4 3 #7^414 ^ 3 4 _ L 4 | 4 4 3 A> 43-44 7414^4 #«(*__-* __4£ 4

1 &4- _, S.& AttA& AAA 4 * &} 3\ 7]§ «*■_. ftA.

KAERI shall be able to pay the cost according to the progress within the identified yearly cost, and shall not excess the total cost of contract. The payment shall follow the unit cost of the commodity and a standard currency justified in the contract

1995. 1 ~ 1995. 7 won

1995. 8 ~ 1996. 7 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ won

19%. 8 ~ 1997. 2 won

KAERI has the right to pay the cost according the progress within the

-356-

limits shown above.

4| 15 5_ ____=$IM > W _ 15 Software Priviledge

1. T i m ^ H r 7-414414 £ 4441 4 4 H_ r__.j_s)144 *i 4-4-8-€51* *11 ^ 4 4 4 £4 - HA 4-8-êlfe 74144 «*Kr ft A^ 4-§-£ A* 5U4-The contractor shall provide the priviledge to use the software without

any limitation and penalty.

2. 4 3.4414 4-8- : 7414^ £- 4441 4 4 * ^ « _-___.^141- AÂAAA *A2-*r, *3ÂV, 47711 _ * 4 ZTASLS, 4 _ 4 ^ s 4 * 4 4 4-§-*J- ^ 5U A. All softwares supplied under this contract shall be able to be used for

the purpose of maintenance of HMS, research and performance improvement in the other field.

*t 16 5_ 7%A ^±$-16 Effectuation of Contract

l . 4 7414£ 4 # 4 4 4 4 ,_ 4 cfl_-47> 7414441 A^ft _s.-¥-4 £3-1- _ ^ 4 4 741°}= ¥AAA 7414^ 4 ^ » 4 4 4 4 *3^ °fl44 -ff-144. The contract shall come into effect form the time of signing of the

contract by duly authorized representatives of KAERI and contractor, and shall remain in effective until the time when all the contractual obligation of contractor and KAERI have been fully carried out.

A] 17 2: _L# 7l|>9 17 Amendment

*_7J1 74144 AA3ft 7l# fl-44fe 4 4 4 4 £ ^ &_._.__, 74144 ¥4 *1 4 4 ^ - 4 ^3^*341 * i _ £ ^__*J 41-511444 4 ^ 4 , 4 j_# 711^444 £ 7 l ^ A AAA A 3 £ 4 4 1 ^ 7414^-44- °1» ^ 4 4 4 4341 ^ £ 4 4<3444 ft

- 3 5 7 -

4. As the technical specification of KAERI is not considered complete, the

contractor shall reflect the KAERI's request to improve and add necessary functions for human factors research activities.

- 3 5 8 -

2. 7 | # ^ 2 W

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

—* I _^*» **■* y ™~W-A\ M S

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN MACHINE

SIMULATOR FOR INTEGRATED TEST FACILITY

- 3 5 9 -

1. General

9 r ^ * r 3 3 ? _ _ 91A:S-A 7]^m 4*11^414^ € 4 3 ^ 4 4 . ^ - 4 * 1 1 ( 4 . 4 : ^ 4 - 4 # 7 i l ^ ) 4 ° _ £ _ ! _ L °dA:§-A £W%7} #7$ ^ 4 - Aft Human Machine 4 1 - ^ 1 1 4 4 ( 4 4 4-_ 314 4 4 ^ 1&)_ 7 f l ^ 4 _ 4 4:4-4 - _ 3 l 4 4 4 SL^ A ^ 7 -^ ^ ^ * r 3 * H ^ - ^ S . _ _ - °§A 3,4Jl7l 1^4. £ 1 - 4 4 ; _ _ , ftA- ^-*1 Human Machine 4 l " 3 H 4 f e - S l ? ! ^ ^ 3^r*J4) 4 ^ - 4 ^ ^ - ^ * H 4 4 £ 4 € ^ H 1 4 4 ^ 3 ^ fc^M -§-01 4_L-^- *! 7414 4 4 A3, ^ft Human Machine Interface4 Â^^°] -g-44:n, £4. 4 3 1 4 ^ ) 4 £ £ Afls.^ 4^1)4 * t f ° l Qs.* 7414

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute(hereinafter called KAERI) is going to develop a Human Machine Simulator(hereinafter called HMS) for the establishment of a human factors experiment environment. The configuration and characteristics of the systems and thermo-hydraulics models shall be based on Younggwang # 3, 4 nuclear power plant. Especially the simulator shall be designed and implemented to be suitable for experiment control, acquisition and analysis of operator performance data, and shall be secured flexibility and expansibility to exchange Human Machine Interface(hereinafter called HMI) design and to incorporate easily new system, such as operator support system.

2) t H - 4.43<3^:_414 7f l^-44^ 4_sH44^r £4.314 £ _ ^ 4 _ °§A 3AS.7] AAÂ Â]%- Êfl(Replica Type)7r 4 4 i , Touch CRT ^\ Flat Panels- 4S>__, 4i_L_L ^H7fl^ i 4/-§-_ AAA A A3, A]A A -R-H4 91A:E-A ^ 4 . - 8 - 4 41-314444. The HMS is not a training simulator of replica type of Younggwang #

3,4 control room but a human factors experimental simulator for the next generation control room type based on soft control using touch CRTs and flat panels

3) IIAÂ ^ £ %ft n K r ^ ^ 3 ^ 1711, _ . 2 ^ ^ ^ 27fl, *)$*H4t-

-360-

MA - _ ^ 4 ^(Experimenter Room) 3l ^ T T - 4 ^ 4 ; _ _ 7 - ^ 3 4 Si 4 ( - ^ 3% 2 4-2:).

The Integrated Test Facility(hereinafter called ITF) is consisted of one main test room, two supporting test rooms, one experiment room for experiments control, and computer room(refer appendix figure 2)

4) ITF 7-^-i- 4*11 A# A9SAA 7 f l ^ 4 4 f e Human Machine Simulator 4 7 - ^ 4 ^ € 4 3 ^#±A A^SL^-i: SLAA^ Function Simulator4 7 ^ , ^ ^ 4 1 - _ 4 € £ 4 . 4 . Station(_Lcfl4-^-4 £ 4 . 4 . Station £ # ) , tfl *§ ^ _ - £ 4 4;, Window Alarm4 _■£ 9lA4A~^, J i i 4 4. ^ * H 1 ^ 4 € Station, ^ ^ 5J _-4.*lHt- 4sfl * ) ^ 4 ^§-4:41 ^ 4 U Engineer Station, Instructor Station 3\ 4_L4^J- ^| -g-^^r 4 ^ : Station 4 4 - (7-^- ^ 3 34-2:).

The development scope of HMS is a function simulator including the modelling of system, operator stations including shift supervisor workstation, large scale display panel, and window alarm in main test room, operator supporting stations in the supporting test rooms, and an engineer station, an instructor station and an analysis station for operator performance analysis works in the experiment room, (refer appendix figure 3.)

5) 4 1 - 3 1 4 4 * MA _■ 4^A>OJ:^ . 71W4J4 -8.4.£ AAftA. A]AA^ A^ft 4 ^ 4 -8.4.41 4TO 4_*4144 4:__$1]4# -_^44 4^__ A~§r A$\ft A^^r ^ 9X^ <?>£ 7414444 ft A-

This technical specification for HMS shows fundamental functional requirements. The proposer shall provide propositions of hardware and software schemes to meet KAERI's requirements

6) 74144^ 41-314 £| 711 -41 ^-2.4; 4-^*414, 4___$I4 ^ A& S.^. 41 An A Aft £ 4 1 - 7413-sflo]: ^cf . A^ft ° . A 4 ^ 4 ^ - 4 . 4 3 3 7-4: 0_4-3-*q-4#7fl^41 AAA %3.%3, ^<_s]'_ 4 1 - 3 M 3 7fliM- 4

4; ^-44°J £ 4 4 €4-

- 3 6 1 -

The contractor shall provide complete documents for HMS development, such as hardwares, softwares and drawings. KAERI will review and approve these documents, and the documents approved by KAERI are to be formal documents.

7) A&n*WA 7mA Aft £.€■ *I0J£ 741447} _4- ^ 4 4 - 74144^

HAAAtt t R - 4 . 4 3 3 ^ 4 ^ £ 4 ^ 4 * H A^ft 41:31444 741 3\ 7mA 4 £ ^ - «H»t ft A-

The contractor shall have all the responsibility of HMS development. However, the contractor shall design and develop HMS satisfactory to KAERI through enough consultation with KAERI under mutual aggreement from the initial stage of HMS design.

8) A]AA^ AAM^ t b ^ - € 4 3 ^ 7 - ^ __■*** ^frfy} M 7-^£ 4 ft 41:31444 Configuration, %^A 3\ M1_L4_4 ?<%, A^AAA A A * * J i 4 # ^ 9Xi? oflwlH^-i- S.VAA *fl**H*r- ftA-

The proposer shall provide in his proposal preliminary drawings, necessary for the establishment of the human factor experiment environment, including HMS configuration, computer networks comfiguration, hardware arrangement, and etc.

-362-

2. Human Machine Simulator Development Scope

1) 41-314 3 ^ °$A 3,43:71 €4311:4. i t - SL^S. 4 4 7414441 An ^ AAA A ft A. The contractor shall be responsible for designing HMS in compliance

with the system model of Younggwang # 3,4 nuclear power plant

2) 91A3-A 41-314E41- 4*11 ^ J L « - 4 1 - 3 1 4 ^ 4 7 4 1 ^ 4 , 4 741f-4 7$Aft 41-314 _ ^ H 31 Malfunction4 ^ 4 f e 4 4 H 4 ^ 4 4 74-41 4 ^ ^ ^ - i ^ - 4 4 7414441 AA A:g-A3, A ^ A3.^ € 4 3 £7-^414 4£t l -4 . 4 £ 4 4.4 SU-t- 4 , 741444 ^ 4 4 4 44.^- ^

The contractor shall provide the system scope and depth of simulation, malfunction coverage including, at least, chapter 7 of this technical specification. The submitted materials shall be reviewed by KAERI. If there is an opinion, the contractor shall reflect the KAERI's opinion by mutual agreement.

3) 74144^ 41 -31444 A^-AA ^ T 4 1 £ 4 7-ufl A A, ^ 4 ^ > 4 4 -£€-^°J£ * !4 . The contractor shall take all the responsibility for design, procurement,

test and installation of hardware of HMS.

4) 41-31 °144 ^7417-4 *H441 _<_4fe £7-, £ 4 3? _ L ^ 4 ^ 4 A£ 741_o]7-4, 4#eH4E4 711 41 _<_4£r 4 _ L * H ^ ± i ^ ° l 5 i 4 $ AA3 ^ 7-D1141 tfft $A^ 4.4. The contractor shall have all the responsibility for engineering and

design of HMS hardware and software including necessary studies and researches, a preparation of reports and drawings, a preparation of specifications, and procurement.

- 3 6 3 -

5) 74144^ 41-314441 „ 3 4 * r s.€- A^A A* "E-^AA ft A.

The contractor shall provide all hardwares for HMS development.

6) 74144^ 41 -31444 £4 . , 4 $ 3\ -fi-4 Ja/r l - 4*11 %&-ft ±*3.A 4 1 - 7-41 H^r ^741444 ftA-

The contractor shall design and supply all the software necessary for simulator operation, test, and maintenance.

3. Code and Standard

1) 41-3144 7111M- A A 3.^ 4<3-£ 7r4- 4541 _?J€ 2_(Codes), 4 £ (Standards) 3\ AAA(Specification)414 *H4*r^ A$ AA-ir A 4 4 ftA-All works shall be in accordance with the applicable portions of the

latest issues of all codes, standards, and specifications.

2) ^9>4-fe- 4 1 - 3 1 4 4 7m^r AAn 4 £ 4 ^ Codes and Standard* A]A A A 7]£AA ftA. The proposer shall describe in detail the applicable codes and

standards for HMS development in his proposal.

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4. Human-Machine Simulator Hardware Requirement

1) °d A'E-A 4 1 - 3 1 4 ^ 1 ^ 4 1 - 3 1 4 ^ %nftfM^, Man Machine Interface 7 - ^ # (Touch Color CRT, Flat Panel, Large Scale Display Panel, Window Alarm, Mouse, Track Ball, Function Keyboard, etc.), Instructor Station, Engineer Station, 3^3 AAA MA ^ £ ^ £ 4 ^ 4 ^ 4 ^ £ 4 - 4 ^ _ . i _ 7 - ^ 4 4 ° > ftA.

The HMS shall consist of the simulation computer system, man machine interface(including touch color CRTs, flat panels, a large scale display panel, window alarms, mouses, trackballs, function keyboards, etc.), instructor station, engineer station, data storage and analysis system, and some peripherals.

2) %%-A 4-^*114^ -9-7-4fe 4 :n .444-£ .» ^ 4 ASLS. S.AV A^ 9X^ ^ £ ^ - -§-4=4- ^ S . * 7V44 ftA- 3^3 f-g-^v 414£^£ A&nA ftA. AH computer hardware shall have enough speed and capacity to

simulate events scenario and to ensure perfect operation and shall have enough spare time and spare .capacity.

3) 74144^ 4 - 3 1 4 ^ * 4 _ S--& £ # 4 ^ ^ 4 - 4 (Laser Printer, Color hard copier ^ ) # 4l^-*fl^> ftA-

The contractor shall provide all components and peripherals(including color hard copier, laser printer, etc.) necessary for HMS.

4) 74144^ 41-31 A*\4 -fr<_^4- AAA34r 4-iL£ ^r 9X^ QA^A^A 7-^ 3? 74141 Aft ^ 4 - i - AA.

The contractor shall have the responsibility for interface design and configuration to assure flexibility and expansibility of HMS

- 3 6 5 -

5) 71 o > 4 ^ *flo>4oii A l l - 3 1 4 3 4 ^ 4 7 - ^ 3\ Man Machine Interface 4 7-^41 cfl^- 414_L4.£ _Ltf-t> AA3°d ^f l££ A]ÂA ftA-

The proposer shall provide comprehensive descriptions for hardware design, including, preliminary drawings of computer configuration, computer networking, and man machine interface configurations.

6) 74144^ M ^ ^ ^ ^ 4 1 wfl4€ Man Machine Interface ^ 4 ^ A AS. 4 £ 4 4 ^ - 4 -S-£^ 4 ^ 4 ^ £ # £ - _ ^ 4 _ L A ^ n A ftA-

The contractor shall select and furnish man machine interface facilities and components of the main test room to satisfy the following functional requirements, but not limited to the followings

7\) Large Scale Display Panel (LSDP)

- LSDPfe 4 * 4 _ £ Process 4__4 %AA aî-i- _ L ^ 4 4 ° > ftA- S ft: 4 4 ^ 4_.Êfll- A1A £ 3 ^ - ^ <&AA ftA-

The LSDP shall be able to present the following types and formats of process information, and all the information type, size, and format shall be able to be changed easily.

. t - ^_ ,o i a l ^ j j L Plant Mimic Diagrams

. Mimic diagram4)44 X 4 4 ^ fl-8-<?>4. *tAÂ LSDP4 ^ & ^ 441 AA7\A M 4 ^44_.__4 3As\S= ^S-AA^

Safety Critical Parameters embeded in plant mimic diagrams or displayed as trends in a separate of the LSDP.

. Process 4__4 4 4 ? f 4 ^ J s - 4 ^ ^ 3 1 Different textual and graphical forms of process information, e.g.

hierarchies or trends of safety and production goals.

- ^ 4 4 ) 47>44 A A AA°-3. 73S.3A7} 7}\?A A ftA-

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The LSDP shall present information in four simultaneous colours. This will be in addition to black and white colours

- LSDP4 37]^ 15mA 4 4 4 1 4 7 r4; 4 £ £ £ 4 £ ^ 3 M - A°d «■ ^ 9X^ ^ £ 4 H 4 7 > 4 4 4 ftA.

The size of LSDP must be so big that, if a typical plant mimic is displayed, the operator shall be able to distinguish or recognize the smallest symbol or value at a distance of 15 meters.

- LSDP41 £ 4 4 ^ 3 i L ^ AASL 300 LuxS} ^^2 :H4414 *8fi.*Ml _. ° ^ 9XAA ftA-

The information of LSDP shall be able to be seen clearly under 300 lux ambient lighting conditions.

- sj- i_*l l#te £ 4 . € 4 I5m5l 44414 7r4- 4 £ 4 £ £ 4 S^St-a- A -_*MI ?!*)«■ *r flH^r ^ £ 4 44SH}.

The LSDP resolution shall be high enough to enable an operator to reliably identify display elements such as symbols, values at a distance 15 meter.

- ^ r £ ^ 4 4 1 4 #4-<y(Flicker) ^ ^ § - ^ _ _ 4 4 &H-^ LSDP4 Scan Rate4 Flash Rate7r ^ £ 4 4°>t!:4-.

The scan rate or refresh rate of the LSDP shall be so high it does not cause flicker under the ambient lighting in the test room.

4 ) Operator Workstation

- ^ ^ - _ 4 l £ r € 4 3 . £ 4 . € 31 5L fl # = - 4 - # Mft Workstationo] *fl^ 4 4 4 A3, 4 € ^ $ * H ^ r AA i L 2 : * ) ^ ^ « ^ 9X^ Workstation

- 3 6 7 -

A A]^-AAA ftA.

The HMS shall include reactor operator workstation, shift supervisor workstation in the main test room and redundant workstations for auxiliary experiment in two supporting test room

4 ) VDU(Visual Display Units)

- 41-31444 4-g-l- 2.ftft € 4 3 £ 4 . _ i 4 SL€r Process 3 Jit- VDU 51441- M A]^&A- S.& ^Jife- A$A T.117- £ ^ 9XAA ftA-

All informations of nuclear power plant shall be presented in VDU monitors and the process information of VDU monitors shall be able to be reconfigured easily in the following types and formats

. #^_L4 4 4 3 - a

Plant Mimic Diagrams

. Mimic diagram4144 S4^lfe- ^-8-4; 4. #ArA A^A^^-3M S.M A^ ^-ft. 9d##A=-

Safety Critical Parameters embeded in plant mimic diagrams or displayed as trends.

. Process 3 j ._4 4 4 7 > 4 ^ s . 4 - ZL%*$A Different textual and graphical forms of process information.

- VDU^T ^ J _ _ a « 4 4 4*114 I67f4 aitf-a- ^441 4 € £ <r 9XAA ftA.

The VDU monitors shall present information in 16 simultaneous colours

- 4-£ AA3.tr lm 444145L 4 € ^ 4 7 r 3 r ^ - _ £ $AA ¥ 4* 9X3. ^ ^ £ 4 44^44, 1280x1024 pixels AA7} s\AM±= AAA-

The VDU resolution shall be not less then 1280x1024 pixels to allow the operator to see clearly display symbols from a distance of 1 meter without forcing them to adopt awkward postures.

- 3 6 8 -

http://AA3.tr

- VDU S L 4 4 4 37]^ 4 ^ ^ 7 r 7 l - $ r ^ _ - _ ; # ?3AAA Tf-^tb ^r 9X3. -s- 404,5. 21" 4 ^ 4 *\AA ftA-

The size of the VDU monitors shall be at least 21 inches to enable operator to identify display elements reliably.

- ^ ^ 2 - ^ 4 4 1 4 # 4 < y (Flicker) f*A-£: ^ - ° - 4 4 $5.^ VDU A Scan Rate4 Flash-Rate7r f ^ £ 4 4 4 _ 4 .

The scan rate or refresh rate of the VDUs shall be so high that it does not cause flicker under the ambient lighting.

4 ) Annunciators

- 41-3143^ 4 £ 4 A-& ^ 4 ^ j i * T^sflo) ^>_L 7fl3M T§3.AA TOLAAMi HA S ^ ^r 9X3-41? £AAAA ftA-

The HMS shall be able to present the following forms of annunciators and be able to easily change the message of conventional window alarm tiles.

. 711314 7$&% Conventional window alarm tiles

. LSDP41 3A*\$= 7§£-Alarms presented in the LSDP

. VDU 2 . 4 4 4 1 £ 4 3 £ TJ^-Alarms presented in the VDU monitors

- 4 j _ i r Mimic diagram^ * V D U # 4 £ 4 3 ^ *§A3, ^ - ^ ^ A A (page)41 A ^ 4 s 9XAA A3, ^7} E^r _7jol -g-4§>^o> ^A-

The HMS shall be able to provide alarms both embeded within plant

- 3 6 9 -

mimic diagrams and dedicated textual alarm pages on VDU monitors.

- 3 i i ^ AA £ 3)44 W 3 - *»*« ^ 9XAA ftA. ^ n 3 ) 4 3 ^ AAft 3^L£44 -MW44 ^ £ 4 _■* SMd -s. * | * « ^ A.AA ftA-

The HMS shall provide alarms in the forms of both visual and audiable warnings. The latter shall include both simple sound warnings and synthesized voice alarms(verbal message about process deviation)

4 ) Others

- £4.€4 2.444- LSDP^-4 ^ J i * * H « ^ ftsm- A2-Z-, 4 £ ^ , E ^ ^ . 9J Touch-sensitive button £ 4 ^ - £ 44=t!: < B ^ ^ l 7 f 41 ^ i M 0 ) ftA-

The HMS shall enable the operator to control the information on the VDU monitors and LSDP through a variety of command devices which include; keyboard, mouse, trackball, and touch sensitive buttons.

- VDU i)-13^-4 $£-£: Function Keyboard 4 Menu-driven dispalyl- f-

AM3, 2 £ AA^ 4r 9XAA ftA. The HMS shall enable the operator to control the information on the

VDU monitors both through specialized functional keyboards(e.g. command functions assigned to keys) and through menu-driven displays(e.g. pointers to select and change process values, and control component such as valves)

- £^°J3 4H-& Aft MÂ A]ÂAA ftA. The HMS shall provide command facilities to voice control inputs

- 27fl4 4 € ^ ^ 4 1 * r £ 7 H £ 7 ^ £ 4*11 41-31444 <£A$. VDU7r A A A]ÂAA ftA.

The HMS shall provide additional VDUs, which is connected to the simulator, for secondary tasks to be performed by the subject in the two

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supporting test room.

7) Instructor Station41-c- 4 l "3 l 0 14- i - 3L-§-4-£~£- aflo^r-c-cfl Q&-ft AM ^ A]A7]±sA *£&-ft M M I 441-01 i^-404,0): ^ A .

The Instructor station shall have all necessary functions and MMI components (including touch screen, mouse, trackball, dedicated function keyboard, etc.) to control and manipulate HMS effectively.

8) i_L_L*M 7m ^ 3 ^ - 741^4-Tr Engineer Station£ 4-§- 314 _ ^ ^ - 4 4 £4.*_^r-I-4 i i s ^.^ i ^ . P & 1 ZAÂ A-& 3AA A A ^ £*fl ^ _ ^ 9XAA ftA- 3?]3. Engineer Station4 7 l ^ * J M l %& tb ^ ^ ^ 4 (digitizing tablet, mouse, track ball, I/O interface, graphic accelerator, etc.)!- S t N 4 ftA-

The engineer station for a software development environment shall be provided the graphical media like soft-panels, P&I diagrams and so on to be monitored the operating variables of the simulation computer and shall contain the peripherals necessary for performing various engineering works.

9) 4 1 : 3 1 4 4 ^ ^ MMI 7l4-&4;4 3^r ^ J L 4 4 £ £ Aft &AA I/O 4 . E i 2 l H i 4 _ ^ o l ^ S H o ) : #ti.

A real time I/O interface system shall be provided for input/output routing, conversion, and processing of signals between simulation computer and MMI equipments.

10) 41-314A 7)1-41 4£4^r 2£ 3 4 4^3 £ £^4 ôô) : *\ 3, ££ £^ 7411- 4£444 ftA.

All computers for using HMS development shall be from the same computer vendor and shall have the same operating system(unix system)

11) A]9iASr HMS 7mA ^£-ft 2 £ 3 ^ 4 4 ^ 4 41444= _• 41<L>441

- 3 7 1 -

^AnA ftA-The proposer shall provide preliminary specifications of all computer

system necessary for HMS development in his proposal.

12) A] _7f^ HMS 7fl 1 H %&ft 2._ 4-^*11441 Aft vfl££ 4 4 £ 4 £ * 3LAAA 414:441 4<£*114 ^-cf. The proposer shall describe all informations of hardware system

necessary for HMS development in his proposal, but not be limited to the following.

- Lists of man-machine interface components which will be used in panel design

- Panel I/O interface system hardware configuration and arrangement

- MTBF(mean time between failures) and MTTR(mean time to repair) of the simulator complex

- Spare capacity of the CPU, main memory, HDD, and communication network

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5. Human-Machine Simulator Software Requirement

1) 41-3143 7fl t £ 4*11 4££ 2.£ 4I_L_L^144 4£i_£ tH3-€43 <37- 7r A^A-The licenses of all software, which are used for HMS development,

shall be provided to KAERI.

2) _:_LH^14^ #3H_Ll- 41444 4*11 4 £ 3 £ _Ji4#£ fl-^44 -_ ^47f 414 _ i 4 # £ 4£(^^47 r 41<H4£ ^r*$)<L3- ^ £ 7-£(*l £^A7} 4H4^ A^m^-3. HA QAA _ 7- 9X3.^ 44 A^ttA 4T41 41 1414; 4 £ ^ 4 £41^£ ^7f^ ^ &£ -_3£ ^ ^ 9X3.^ 44 <4 4:4. A simulation software shall enable the operator to re-allocate control

functions assigned to machine( automatic processing in computer) or human(manual control) by identification of control algorithms used to control plant, and shall be able to test and evaluate problems of function allocation between man and machine in NPP operation.

3) _ I _ L _ L $ ) 1 4 > Ar^ £ 4 4 £ 4 4 2 , ^ - High-level _LSLZL^ ^ 4 ^ _ . _ , 21-^44 _41 £32£4| _4 -_41 #_IL4 _ A> 9X^ _ £4_ An^r AA^ 7- 9Xsm- AAA ftA- 3Z]SL 41-314 # £_L§L314£ »]£ 43iHfl4^414 Af-g-oi 7i--.sH0> QA.

AH software shall use high level language with modular structure and shall present the nearly same status of Younggwang #3,4 nuclear power plant during overall operating condition. The simulation software shall be available in commercial workstation.

3) 41-3144 7fl#£ An mtA 4 ^ 1 4 4 ^SJ=3H 4#£ 4£44 A ftA. The contractor shall use the newest techniques of hardware and

software for HMS development.

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4) M 4 4 . 4<£4.^-l- 4tb "r&ft A ^ 4 AA3.M 41-3144 7fl^_L7--& _LD"tl4-. 4l<?>4;c- Engineer station 4- Instructor Station4 7 l £ £ S^-44 4 £ 4 ASr 41-3143 7m _L7-CTool)4) AA A AAA 4 ^ 4 4 4 ftA-The simulator development tools should be contained as one of the

key factors for effective technology transfer. The proposer shall describe, in detail, the following development tools in his proposal, especially for the engineer station function and instructor station function

. Engineer station software including simulator development tools

. Executive system software

. Configuration management system software

. Instructor station software

5) 74144^ 41-3143 7M41 M&ft 3 £ 3 4 ^ ) 4 1 ^A _ £ 3 £ 7} _ £ _ £ ^ 4 ^ ^ ( U n i x OS)£ 4£*H4 ftA.

The contractor shall use industry standard type operating system(unix OS) with real time capability for the HMS development

6) T4144£ £^41414 #T§ A A ^&ft 5.3ZL$A 7-^4 ^ € 4 3 3 7 - i W ^ <_7-7ll^:44l^4 ^ ? ] £ = - W ^ * H 4 ftA.

The contractor shall perform the works, such as operating system exchange or implementation of important program, after approval of KAERI

7) 74144^ 41-3143 7mA ^&ft 4£41 Aft £¥.3-AA A4A 7-^ £ 4 ^-fi-4-£4 (6 4-SL -) ^ 4 . £ £ 4 4 4*114^ £5 . ^04 , ^ A 4- 741 44=41- 41 #§114 ftA.

The contractor shall submit the simulator software implementation

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preliminary design specification for important function design and implementation (including 6)) to obtain KAERI's approval

8) 74144£ iSJE.314. 711 -41 Aft A^A^rA AAQ^ ±*3,AA 7-^ 4 4 4 . A±ft 60^4.41 f H ? € 4 3 £7-^41 4l#o-r4<4 ftA-

The contractor shall submit the detail items and schedules for software development before 60 days of starting of software implmentation.

9) 414;4^ 4 £ £ 3 £ 3 4 ^ 4 £^41414 ^H) 31 -8-?H An A A A 4 ^ 4 4 4 ftA-

The proposer shall provide detail description of computer operating system characteristics and requirements in his proposal.

10) Executive System£ window-based multitasking menu-driven4 A-& ^ Aft 4 £ 4 ^ 4 ^ £ ^7-^ - 4 .33H^7 r -_7414<>10> A3, -_44: 4 £314^ A7§^r 4l£*H4 ftA-

The executive system shall be able to design a user friendly man machine interface, such as window-based multitasking menu-driven, and shall provide real time simulation environment.

U) 414;4£ 414:441 Executive System41 Aft A A 4 £ 4 £j5-£^-fr A A A A 4^444 ftA. The proposer shall provide detail descriptions of all the detail

functions and important features of executive system in his proposal.

12) 4 1 4 / 4 ^ S ^ - ^ ^ - 4 ^ £ 4 4 . T ^ M 4*11 Configuration Management System41 Aft #<M| ft Ml££ 7]^nA ftA- A Aft M l £ 4 ^ £ Configuration Control, Configuration Management System Database, System Security, System and Database Administration41 Aft v f l £ £ i AAA A ftA.

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The proposer shall provide detail descriptions of configuration management system including coniguration control, configuration management system database, system security and database administration in his proposal.

13) £ £ 4:_L_L*11<H S.3.3^-§r £ ^ £ 4 ^ 4 4 £ £ 2 4 4 4 Aft S_L ZL$ £ f _ f f - ^ W . Atfft ££_iS_L^l<H£ A AS. Modularity, Object Oriented Design, Flexibility, Expandability 4 7 l £ 4 -£-4.£ 4 ^ t f SI°101 ftA- 41<_4£ £ £ 4:_LJi.$H41 An A A 4 £4 M # £ £ 2.® A A A4 A A 4 ^ 4 4 4 ftA. The application programs are identified as those program modules

which are required to simulate the functions of plant systems. These application programs shall be able to satisfy the functional requirements, such as modularity, object oriented design, flexibility, expandability and etc. The proposer shall describe, in detail, the characteristics and requirements of the application programs including functions mentioned above in his proposal.

14) 4:_i_LSll<H 3\ A3,AA £4^-7- ^ ^ 4 1 < H £ £ Aft € 4 4 £ , 2 ^ 4 3£ 4€4£, A^AA 4 ^ 4 £ £ 4 4 4 4 £ £ t l 4£4 -8-34 S M Engineer Station4 41 £ 4 A A ftA- °dA^A^ _74ll- 5L4-4; Engineer Station4 7 l £ 4 £ ^ £ Instructor Station^ £ 4 4 4 4 5-A ^ £ 4 4 4 ftA. The engineer station shall be provided enough functions to support

maintenance of hardware and software, process model development and validation, hardware test, and graphic display editinig for experiment control, etc. The functions and features including user interface design of engineer station shall be same or consistent with instructor station

15) 4 l<_4£ Engineer Station4l 5 E ^ 4 £ 4 3 7 > 4 £ ^ , AcMl_-£ ^ i ^ J=*11<H41 AAA A4AA 4 ^ 4 4 4 ftA-The proposer shall provide the detail description of features, functions,

-376-

characteristics of the software and functions for the engineer station in his proposal.

16) H H 4 - £ ^ £ Aft 4 ^ 3 £ ^3144-41 AA<A 4 £ 4 £ £ 4 £ £ 7-*l§ <r 9XAA ftA- 41 _-7.Hr 4 £ 4 -£.:_£ _ ^ § ^ 5tf£ iJEJL 3144 7fl^-«0

v^:£ 414*fl<4 ftA. The HME shall provide data analysis system to carry out the

following functions on the experiment data and system logging data.

. A AAA AAA Chunking of data

. 4 £4 4 4. 31 oi 4-44 « Insertion of informal data

. 4€- £ 4 s ^ 4 4 « Insertion of codes

. 4€- 314444 3 3 Connecting different data

. «1__ Making comparisons

. c-UolEfSl 4 4 Filtering of data

. AAAA £ £ Data transformations

. 7414; 31 3 4 4 £74144 Computations and statistical processing

• 3 1 4 4 £ ^ 4 ^ 1 £ !41013» HA 7>4 -(visualization)^- 7- 9XAA 4-.(4H-£^ 4 ^ 4 4 44£ycM.<__L 7 -^2 ^ ^ 4 # 4 2^ -£ 3AAA 4 £

- 3 7 7 -

http://_-7.Hr

A). The data analysis system shall be able to carry out data

visualizations, e.g. graphics of combinations of performance measurements in a way that is easy to comprehend.

17) 74144£ 3143 £ ^ £ Aft 4 ^ 9 4 7m % £^41 Aft ^ ° J£ 4.4-The contractor shall have all the responsibility to develop and supply

data analysis system.

18) 4 1 4 ; 4 £ 4 £ 4 ; _ £ Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System(SCADA)4££ -_L - ^ & 4 £ 3l£ AAnA ftA-

The proposer shall present to be able to secure the following SCADA function in engineer station and/or instructor station, and so on.

- SCADA _ 4^3 lo l3 - (P roces s ^ T S £ # € 4 4 ; £ 3 ^ 4_L, Safety Limit 4*1 £ ) _ Data-Base4l #_*!• 7" 9XAA A3 ZL 4 _ L £ _L?J-^- ^ 9XAA ftA-

SCADA shall transfer system data(e.g. process variables, operators interaction, safety limit violations, etc) to the data base of data analysis system and keep a record of them.

- ^ ^ ^ J - f e * )^47f € 4 £ AÂ £4._}i_4l4 z\% i_3 ¥ 7- & 2 £ s p S ^ AÂA £ 3 A ^ £ 7f4°> ftA.

The display graphics shall have design flexibility to edit directly in edit mode of display which the experimenter wants to change graphic size, format, information hierarchy, etc.

- SCADA£ £ A ^ ^ - 4 MAA3L(AASL Â) ^ ^41^ !_ ; _f£ o>u|el. SCADA41 4*11 44-3 M^tfAA* £ 4 ^ ¥ 7- & £ tts.Mr 4 l £ 4 4 4 ftA-

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SCADA shall generate a synchronization signal to be used in order to tag all system data that are logged by SCADA as well as physiological measurements( e.g. heart rate, eye movement, etc.) and audio-visual recording.

- 2 £ ;§.££ ^MA^-3. 44-44°) A3 A AAA A&AA A3. A MA A Function 4 1 : 3 1 4 3 4 £MA £ 4 4 £ 4 1 <8^-§: 4 4 4 £ < _ € 4 .

SCADA shall transfer data between the above sources and log information in the data base without interfering with or delaying the running of the simulation process.

- SCADA£ ^&73A #7$, £ £ 4 . 4 € 4 £ 4 %7\A Workplace4 A Aft 7 - ^ £ £ 4 4 T 1 1 £ 7- & 2 . £ SH)-7r£sfl<4 ftA-

SCADA shall be an extendible system to allow experimenters to add computerized operator support system and accommodate different configuration of the workplaces.

- 3 1 4 4 1 - 4 4 - 4 £ Data-Base_■ ^ ^ £ 4 : 4 2£7>_L7> MA % A^ 9XS £ ££*i £^°H°> ftA-

The disk storage of the experiment data base shall be large enough to contain the data recorded during experiments, and the disk storage shall be supplied with back-up system for storing data offline.

19) 5ri__L4!- Aft ±5.3.AA*r 4)£41 Aft 4 4 - M . 3 4 , 4 ) £ £ Aft 41 4 4 £ 31 4)£41 31*_ «_7-&£ AUnA € 4 - ^ 3 £ VDU 3 1 4 4 ^ 3 £ £ £ 4 4 navigatingol 7}^ft «j-«j£ 4l£*fl<4 ftA-

The software for the display presentation shall provide a library of symbols, control functions for symbols, and connection links between symbols and parameters. It shall also provide a number of possible ways in navigating through the VDU pages.

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20) 4l<_-4£ HMS 7fl«J-41 ^ [ i ^ a.-. _^_EJL3|441 Aft 31 £ £ 4 4 2 4 £ £ &AAA 414:441 4#sf l4 ftA-The proposer shall describe all informations of software necessary for

HMS development in his proposal, but not be limited to the following.

Detail functional descriptions and user's manuals for the simulator development tools which are to be transferred

Detail descriptions of instructor functions including control tableau, dedicated function keyboard, preassigned IC's(Initial Conditions), lists of malfunctions, lists of scope and depth of system modelling and remote functions, transport method and time for backtrack records, fast-time simulation systems, methods of system stall detection and display, external parameters.

- All lists of softwares to develop simulator development including data analysis, which are to be transferred

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6. Instructor Station

1) 74144£ * i ^ € 4 3 < _ 7 - £ 4 l 4 £ , £ < _ £ 4*11 Instructor Station4 -_ 741, £ £ ^ £4.41 &ft A A ^AAAMM: A&nA ftA- 414 *4AA °<M4l£ A3.M 4 £ 4 A-& 3 1 £ 4 5Lth34. ^ 4 1 4 4 # 3 4 4 *I4-

The contractor shall submit preliminary design specifications of instructor station for review and approval of KAERI before detail design. The preliminary design specification shall contain the following items in detail.

. Instructor Function

. Initial Condition List

. Malfunction List

. Remote Function List

. List of Simulation Models affected by fast-time

2) 4 l « _ 4 £ 4l ( _44l Instructor Station4 4141- 4*11 function keyboard Hflt 4 4 tableau wfl<_£ _ L 4 # 7 9Xxr ^AA 2 * _ £ _ L # 4 4 proposed tableau, function keyboard 41 31*11 ^l^^fl <=>> ftA-

The proposer shall describe in his proposal the proposed tableau and function keyboard. Included in the description shall be sketches showing each tableau arrangement and the function keyboard.

3) - _ $ £ 4 4 1 £ 2 £ £HA A A3 4 4 - 4 2 . 1 - #T$AAA € 4 £ 4 4 41 >4_!t- £ 4 4 1 initiating ^ 7 9Xs^ 4 £ 4 4 4 - ° - 4 £ £ 4 4 -_ $7-*3£ £ 4 4 4 1 4 £ 4 1 : 3 1 4 3 4 £ ^ £ 3 4 1 4 4 4 2 4 £ 4 £ £ Instructor 7l£©l 5 ^ 3 4 4 ftA-

The instructor station shall contain at least the following instructor functions for experiment control, initiation of malfunction at arbitary points, development of initiating events and modification of event scenarios, and shall be able to support prior definitions of testing scenaros in an easy

- 3 8 1 -

way(e.g. user friendly menus)

. Initialization

. Run/Freeze

. Snapshot

. Preassigned Initial Condition : The proposer shall describe in his proposal the details of about 30 preassigned ICs to be supplied.

. Switch Check

. Backtrack

. Replay : This function shall include continuous slow motion replay and stepwise replay

. Restart :

. Direct Change : The simulated variables shall be able to be changed directly

. Malfunction control and Help function

Simulation Speed control(The procee simulation speed shall be controlled by 5 times fast or slow )

4) 4 1 : 3 1 4 3 Process 3 _ L * £ 4 4 £ 4 . € 4 4 ^ O T £ HA %7\Q £ & 2 £ £ 7 H < _ ^ _ L £ 4l£*fl # £ & £ 4 £ 4 - _ 3 4 7 r 4 - _ 3 4 ( £ 4 . € ) 4 ^ 4 £ HA AA^ £ & 2 £ £ 4 4 . £ 4 £ 4 £ 3MQ £ 9X £ 4 £ 31 £ 5 . 4 1 = ^ 4 4 £ _ £ < _ 4 - _ 3 4 4 -S-£4l 4 4 ^-fi.4_L 1- 41£*11 £ £ 5U£ 4 £ £ 4 l £ 4 4 Process ^ _ L £ £ 4 4 £ 4 . 4 3 £ Jg7>4£31 2 £ £ # £ 9XAA ftA-

The instructor station shall provide additional information for evaluation of operator tasks, trends of specific variables for identifying operator actions. Also, the instructor station shall be able to present information of operator request, and shall be helpful to evaluate operator tasks through process information.

- 3 8 2 -

5) 4l<_-4£ Instructor station4l 31*1 £ 3 ?J 4 £ 4 l cflsfl^ a ^ A H ^ 4 7l^sflo> *J4 .

The proposer shall describe in his proposal the features and functions of instructor station in details.

6) 74144£ Instructor station£ 4*114 4 € - ^&ft 4 £ 4 ojo_£ A^n A ftA. The contractor shall provide other necessary functions for

effective HMS control and manipulation.

7) Instructor Station£ multitasking, multiwindow i l 4 . £ A^-3 menu-driven ^4-5-ifL A A ft 4 £ 4 £ 4 ^ 31 £ £ ^ , AA^ ^ Transportability .6-4. £ 4 ;£^ - £ S i 4 4 *M- ^ 3 2 - 4 4 / 4^-41 4 £ 4 £ 4 ^ £ 4*11 7flig-;_ 2 £ 3 3 ^ 1 4 ^ -fi-4.°l i # 4 4 4 ftA-

Instructor station shall secure user-friendliness, flexibility, expandability and transportability requirements with multitasking, mutiwindow and menu driven control and shall reflect the newest and latest man machine interface technology and functions for user friendliness enhancement.

- 3 8 3 -

7. Plant Modelling, Scope of Simulation

1) 4 £ 3 H _ 2 ^ £ <S# 3 , 4 J : 4 £ 4 £ 3.^3. ftA

The simulation model shall be based on Younggwang # 3,4 nuclear power plant.

2) 2 . ^ 4 « J 4 £ ¥ i - _ ^ 4 _ 4 . £ 4 . 31 £ £ 4 * 1 1 ^ £ 4 l £ 4 £ l 4 4 3 £ 4 4 1 £ M £ & £ ¥_^i4i 4 £ 4 H £ E 1 t ^ ^ ^ § 4 # 3 ^ 3 1 4 4 , ^ 4 2 . ^4£^of lA4 °dAft A^MA^s. oliMr ^ £ 4 . 41 __.*! 2 £ £ 4 2 2 . ^ 4 £ £ # 4 4 < 4 ftA- 3^3 £^fl_L ^-311-S*io->£ £ 3 4 _ £ 4 £ Malfunction4 ^ 4 £ 4 1 4 ^ 4 MMI A A ^ 3 £ £ 4*11 IEC-964, NUREG-0700£414 4 1 4 4 ^ 9X^ Initiating Events* _Lth44 %i±ft 4 £ 4 ; _ £ Malfunction4 31^-44°> ftA-The scope of modelling shall cover all operation modes, including

from the startup to 100% level power operation and from 100% level power operation to cold shutdown, necessary for safety operation and effective power production to meet the primary goal of nuclear power plant. The range of malfunctions shall contain, at least, the following event scenenarios including the initiating events necessary for control room MMI verification and validation presented in IEC-964, NUREG-0700.

. (Small) Loss of coolant accidents

. Total loss of electrical supply

. Steam generator tube rupture

. Reactivity accidents

. Loss of natural circulation capability

. Condenser failures

. Problems with the chemical volume control system

. Total loss of heat sink

. Loss of feedwater

- 3 8 4 -

. Steamline rupture

. Failures in rod ejection

. Turbine failures

. Failures of the heat decay system

. Failures of equipment in the containment(e.g. sprays and vents)

. Most of these initiating events mainly combine number of process equipment failures such as pipeline breaks, valve leakage, sensor failure, sticky block valves, etc. For the purpose of the HMS system, a comprehensive classification system of malfunctions that the HMS should handle either on an individual basis or in combination shall be contained.

3) £4 . ^31414 LOCA4 A-& AAft initiating events ^^-f- £ & £ 2 4 4 : 2 . 1 - ^ - 3 - 4 4 4 * H 4 £ 2^ £41££(two-phase flow)!- 3-g-f- £ 9XAA ftA. AAft 4 1 £ ^ 3 1 ! - 2 . ^ ^ 4 £ 3 1 5U<44£ 4<42, 4 £ 4 AS: 4 1 £ 4 s # 3 < 4 4 ftA-

The simulation modelling shall have a capability of two phase modelling for various large scale incidents(i.e. large break LOCA) which are combined with failure of safety system. The following systems shall be, at least, simulated

. Reactor Vessel and Control Rods

. Reactor Coolant System

. Feedwater System

. Main Steam System

. Auxiliary Feedwater System

. Turbine and Condensers

. Heat Decay System

. Instrumentation and Control Power System

. Reactor Regulating System

. Reactivity Control System

- 3 8 5 -

. Emergency Core Cooling System

. Containment System

. Reactor Protection System

. Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System

. Core Protection Calculator

. Plant Monitoring System

. Switchyard System

4) £ £44414 AAA 2 4 ^ 4 £ -414-41 41444 &&4- 41_4£ 2)*d-4 3)*d-£ A^AA 4£3l4-_4 *$A ^2(244 £4, *M1)41 31*11 41<_441 #41441 4^444 ftA- *i^-€43^£4i£ 43*1 4 ^34 4£314^£ A£§ 4.31- 7>4.4. Although KAERI has not presented details of simulation scope and

depth in this technical specification, the proposer shall identify in detail in his proposal all aspects of plant systems which he proposes not to simulate or for which only minimal simulation is proposed. The information shall be accompanied with the justification for each simplication or deletion. KAER reserves the right tp require simulation of these systems .

5) 414;4^ 414:441 4££ £#4£ 4£314^ 2^41 An S.W3 £ 4, £W?1 ^ &A ££ #41441 4#444 ftA. Followings are features that should be incorporated into all applicable

simulation models. The proposer shall describe in his proposal characteristics, modelling approach, and requirements of simulation models including the items listed below.

. Pumps

. Valves

. Flows

. Tanks

-386-

. Heat Exchangers

. Circuit Brackers

. Electrical Systems

. Radiactivity

. Conductivity and Boron Concentration

. Core Neutronics Model

. NSSS Thermohydraulics Model

. Reactor Coolant Pump

. Steam Generator

. Condenser

. Others

- 3 8 7 -

8. Documentation

1) 74144£ 2 £ _IS_L*114 ^ 4-2*114 41 31 ft A A ft £ 4 £ 41£*H4 ftA. The contractor shall supply complete documentation for the HMS for

all software and hardware.

2) 74144£ 414-_7414°<M- SLÂ 2 £ 74141 ^^.ft £ 4 £ 4 4 2 ^ 741 4_L, ^ £<?]£ 4*11 ^_741£441 Aft 4_L3)4 17M4.41 ftÂA 3 <3£^41 41 £ 4 4 4 ftA. The contractor shall submit to KAERI for review and approval design

documents including a preliminary design concept documentation, describing both the HMS software design and implementation and hardware design and implementation in detail by one month before the review meeting

3) 41-3143 Tflg-g- Aft £4£41£ 4 4 2 4 £ 4 A-& £ 4 £ ft£-A SLÂAA ftA-Among the documentations for HMS development, the following

documentations shall be, at least, contained.

- Simulator Software Preliminary Design Concept Specification

- Simulation Model Preliminary Design Concept Specification

- General Equations and Numerical Scheme

- Simulation Model Design Report

(Including Model Identification, System Description and Scope of Simulation,Mathematical Models, Reference Bibliography, Program Symbol List, Subroutine Documentation, Model Interface List, Data Reference List, Malfunction List, Simulated System diagram, Design Data, Software program Listing, etc.)

- Plant Monitoring System(PMS) Software Documentation

-388 -

- Executive Software Documentation

- Instructor Station User's Manual

- Instructor Station Technical Manual

- Engineer Station User's Manual

- Engineer Station Technical Manual

- Simulator Software Maintenance Guide

(Including Startup/Shutdown Procedure, Software Modification Procedure, Maintenance and Development Support Software User's and Technical Manual, Source Code Control System User's and Technical Manual)

- Computer Diagnostic Manuals

- Computer Hardware Documentation

- Simulator Hardware Documentation

- I/O Hardware Manual

- I/O Equipment Maintenance Manual

- System Engineer's Manual

- Other Hardware Documentation

( A complete set of reference and technical manuals, and logic drawings and schematics for all equipment not directly manufactured by the Computer vendor or Contractor )

- Annunciator System Cross Reference

- Malfunction, System and Remote Function Cross Reference

- Simulation Variables Global Cross References

- Performance Test Documentation.

(Including Malfunction Causes and Effects Reports, Acceptance Test Procedure)

- Manufactur's recommended spare parts

-389 -

4) 74144£ 4<a£*S ifl£ £ 1 4 £ £ ^ 4 * i £ 4 ^ *!_L__:a*1# 4l_-4 4 4= ftA. The contractor shall provide every three months the progress report

describing contract activities and results.

-390-

9. Training and KAERI's Participation

1) T41^4£ €43 _££ 4€4 4£31434 £4., £4£1_4H ££# 444- 33£ <9£ £ Xi2£ 4£ £341 31*i ^°J£ 4.4-The contractor shall have all the responsibility for the training of

KAERI personnel to gain sufficient experience in the operation and maintenance of the HMS

2) 41 _ 4 £ 414:441 Instructor Training, Software/Hardware Maintenance Training, £41 A A ^ f l££ # 4 1 4 7]ÂA ftA.

The proposer shall describe in his proposal instructor training, software/hardware maintenance training, and all kinds of trainings of the systems related to HMS

3) T414=4£ *i^-€43 _££4 3€4 £3£ ^£31 €-8-*_ 2£ AAM -_£ 41£*D4: ftA. The contractor shall provide all the facilities including accomodations

necessary for the training activities.

4) £ 3 4 1 &ft 4 £ 4 1 £ 4 _ 4 # £ 7414=44 £ £ # 4 1 4 ÂftA. The details for the training shall be discussed with contractor later.

5) 7414=4£ 41-3143 ?m*\] 31?_ _^€43 _££4 4#43£ 444 4£3M34 7 f l ^ 7412:71 T41£3 3£ M^ÂAA *_^€43<_£ ±A ££4-441 3l*i A A-*; 4.4- 4l_4£ ££4"4 ^ ^341 31 ft tfH ^ 7414 £ 414*114: ftA. The contractor shall have all the responsibility for the KAERI's

participation to establish self-supporting technology from initial design stage to final test stage. The proposer shall describe in his proposal the method, plan and schedule for KAERI's participation and collaboration

- 3 9 1 -

10. Quality Assurance

1) 74144£ £^il£4l Aft ^°J£ 4.4-

The contractor shall have all the responsibility fot the quality assurance of HMS

2) 4l_7f£ 41 _441 £^£L££ Aft _4 ^ #33l££ #414 4#*fl 4 *14-The proposer shall describe in his proposal the procedure and

concerning contents for quality assurance in detail.

- 3 9 2 -

11. Cost

l) 41«_4£ 4 £ 3 1 4 E 4 7fl^£ An €-8-4; z}3,AA ^ £_L_L$1H£ S. ®AA 2.£ 4 4 1 - <QAA #414 AA3,A}^AA ftA-In bid, the proposer shall prepare and submit all the cost in detail for

HMS development including hardware and software cost.

- 3 9 3 -

12. Others

1) A]°dA$= 41-31434 £ £ , -_*1 31 J££(Warranty)4l Aft #4131£ £ 4#*flo> ^ 4 -

The proposer shall describe in his proposal the contents for transportation, installation and warranty in detail.

2) 4 3 414:4 4#4 l %SLft MA-& * i ^ € 4 3 < S £ i ° J _ £ 4 - _ £ ^ 4 AA £ £ Fax.t- M&AA ^AAA.

The prposer be able to discuss the necessary matters for writing proposal with human factors engineering project team by using telephone

and faxcimile.

-394-

¥m B. _!fiA|UrBl_l

- 3 9 5 - NEXT PAGE(S) toft BLANK

Last modlfled:04/09/96 13:49:35

Scenario 1; Oil in compressed air (pneumatic) system

Initial conditions: -Full power. -Tune of day: 11:15 - Operator start to disconnect RL91D001 for repair, workorder 229313A01

Comments: -A piston ring in the compressor has broken which has over a few days lead to oil leaking into various parts of the compressed air system -difficult to diagnose/determine the root cause -Control of the scenario requires field operator to find the root cause -Knowledge based: have to know the malfunction is in compressed air system to identify which procedure to use (?) -Procedures needed by control room to guide field operators search in plant -Can make as safety related as desired (by changing which variables'") -Can involve both units,-common system.

Procedure: -Operating procedure TP 35/M3

Brief scenario description: The compressed air in both units of Loviisa is supplied by two parallel geared compressors. It has been a recurring problem that when the compressor fails, pneumatic valves are disabled all over the plant. In this scenario there is a oil leak in one of the pistons in the compressor that leads to a malfunction of several valves throughout the plant

Before starting Hopes:

Start, Hopes:

To stars sessjonj " , In Hopes main menu select "Sf ssion identification^ "Session run no^ "Initial snapshot" "log set" "Configuration set" "Workstation set" Push the send button. *

1 To start Slaverex: „ Log in on DONALD as RT ENTER: PASSWORD; Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX *

To set the time: In Slaverex: Set

RTHOPESAG RT NETADM

H-START

(1) {e.g. 55) W (8) . ; (12)

SEND_ (U-shaped arrow key)

RT EREFECT

m - " @fcM)SE

The lime must be entered in seconds, one has lo subtract 3600 sec. from the number of seconds Into Ihe

Tiara ICJO/I dcrg where the scetmri»siara,t,.gtno.tifseconds' 1 UWfc « JMHU ^ dfnaurststQO) + (no. ofmtnutes'tO) - 3600

- 3 9 7 -

Before start: Paper work: Deliver workorder 229313A01

Operator should fill out workorder for maintenance of RL91D001.

RN52S001 valve cycling

9 min In Hopes; MF OBJECT: MF: Para:

RN52S001 47 0

10 min Reset malfunction MALF: MF:

RN52S001 47

and MF OBJECT: MF: Para:

RN52S001 47 100

/ / min Reset malfunction MALF: MF:

RN52S001 47

Operators should trip the turbine since first stage superheater is not working.

...and MF OBJECT: MF: Para:

RN52S001 47 0

COND If field operator has been send out by the operators to check on RN52S001, he will call to inform that the valve is completely stuck.

COND When electrician has disconnected electricity of RL91D001. (After call) In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF:

13 min- Stuck open makeup valve RV 10S005 and RVS0S00S: caused by the fault in the pneumatic system:

In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: Para:

...and in Hopes: MF OBJECT:

RL91D001 57

RV50S405 47 89

RV1PS4Q5

""> As the makeup valves RV50S005 and RV10SOOS are stuck open, there will be extra flow to the condensers which will result in a increased flow into the feedwater tanks and this will eventually lead to high levels in these tanks.

- 3 9 8 -

21mm Control valves RN15S005, RN15S003, RN15S009 close

In Hopes MF OBJECT RN15S005 MF 47 PARA 0

and in Hopes MF OBJECT RN15S003 MF 47 PARA 0

and In Hopes MF OBJECT RN15S009 MF 47 PARA 0

25 mm Drain valve RN21S001 from High - -Pressure Preheater RD11 closes

In Hopes MF OBJECT RN21S001 MF 47 PARA 45

Control valve RN13S001 leading from superheater RN 13 opens

and in Hopes MF OBJECT RN13S001 MF 47 PARA 95

Some pneumatic valves leading to and from the low pressure preheater RH15 are also affected

(Nothing-Will happen until the valve RN 15SQQ9_ts_closfid, since it is in series with the two other parallel ones)

High level in RH15 protection signal will bypass preheater

> Level in preheater increases protection bypasses all High Pressure Preheaters

High level in superheater will lower the temperature of the low-pressure steam, and will result in a new and much lower power setpoint for turbine 10

Solutions:

1 TO regulate flow into condensers with shutoff valves RV10S002 and RV50S002 by closing valves until a low level alarm is given etc (Levels will change slowly.-outside the time range of the experiment) Could have the FO hand control some valve e g RN2IS00I and RN13S001, while letting protection system take care of the RN 15 preheater Find a lower stabile power level Have the instrument technicians blow out oil from and fix the pneumatic system

2 Let protection take care of everything,- it will find a lower stabile power level Have the instrument technicians blow out oil from and fix the pneumatic system

3 Trip Turbine, go subcntical, and fix the pneumatic system

- 3 9 9 -

Trends that have to be printed after the simulator has been frozen for the last time (group, page): (20,8) (20,9) (20,10) (10,6) (1,8)

- 4 0 0 -

Last modified: 05.09.9615:38

Scenario 2, Small LOCA Initial conditions: -Full power -Time of day 15 07 -Auxiliary feedwater pump RL91D001 is on overhaul and is not operable

Procedure: •EOP small leakage in primary side nr 538 -operating procedure YD 68/M3,62/M3

Brief scenario description: In this scenario a problem with a RCP relief magnet leads to a pump tnp and a seal leak. The problem is compounded by the primary circuits shut-off valves mability to close properly.

-J fg^

SfartHopesr

Tj&start session: * " "IflljgJQPgs, main menu4ei$et

■jt e iDBK«6nrJJfcat|pn? ^essioArunno* ,

&iskmesendJhuttosu, -

To start Slaverex: lsog*(ftiO|i.DQNALr*asRf

*B$iER?

|fc||!iktxheSJaveREX

^f^ r th&tune :

0} -ft*?** mm .

#>

"x, 'Af?

To start MALF-MEAS: Log m on aOONALD asMALF-ME^Sj:

PAS§1S0RD

- 4 0 1 -

Before start:

Auxiliary feedwater pump RL91 D01 is on overhaul and is not operable:

In HOPES: MF OBJECT: MF:

RL91D001 57

(MF 57 on RL91D001: pump trip,-pump inoperable)

3 min Turn on alarm:'

In Slaverex:

-> "MAGN YD12: SUPPLIED BY BATTERIES":

YD12E924G01-TRUE RCP YD 12DOOl trips

5 min YD12D001 pump trip: In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF:

...and

YD12D001 23

Reset alarm: In Slaverex:

Loss of RCP lifting magnet:

MAGN YD12: SUPPLIED BY BATTERIES";

COND When Putnpspeed YD12Y013 - 0

Reverse rotation device in RCP does not engage:

In MALF-MEAS: In MALF-MEAS main menu "Set RAMP Malfunction" NORS IDENTIFIER: RAMP Gradient: DURATION: Then press the execute button.

F8 YD12Y013 1398 /min 1 min SEND

"*■ Reactor coolant pump YD12D001 reverse rotation

COND • If operator stoppes all the YD pumps manually before the pump Jams after 2 minutes: In MALF-MEAS: In MALF-MEAS main menu F8 "Set RAMP Malfunction" YD12Y013 NORS IDENTIFIER: -699 /min RAMP Gradient: 2 min DURATION: SEND

•> The operator should do this because procedures require all YD pumps to be stopped in the event of any RCP reverse rotation.

- 4 0 2 -

Then press the execute button, COND

...and

..and

..and

2 min. after reverse rotation: Use Slaverex: Type: Type:

InYDQfl: Select Press once

RCP seal leak:

InHQEES: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA:

In MALF-MEAS: select "Set Step Malfunction" NORS IDENTIFIER STEP: LOCKED VALUE: Push execute button:

fx_5(34)=90 fx~5(32)=0.001

YD12S009 'man' then 'close'

YA12S001 148 28

F6 YD12Y013 0 SEND

YD leak

This will not take effect before the network in UNIFLOW is re-calculated

Due to reverse rotation of YD12D001, bearings and seals are destroyed, the result is a YD leakage. (-7-8 kg/s)

The pump has jammed and is leaking through the destroyed seal.

COND After RO tries to isolate YA 12 loop. cold leg gate valve YA12S001 does not close all the way,-sticks open at -10%.

•■■•> Valve takes approx 2 minutes to close, implement MF about 40- 50 sec after RO closes valve.

In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA:

YA12S001 63 10

COND If RO tries to close YA12S002, implement malfunction 63 on this valve as well:

InHQEES MF OBJECT: MF: PARA

YA12S002 63 54

Solution: Some troubleshooting, try fmd/isolate leak. In the event of any LOCA; SCRAM. Start working on GOP and EOP. Cold Shutdown.

- 4 0 3 -

Options: If crew scram reactor and trip all RCPs primary over pressure will result OR Stuck open safety valve YP12S002 and stuck closed PORV YP12S006. Safety valve close when pressure is 50-70 bar (?).

Other options: -Loss of containment isolation (1 or 2 valves) -Possible degradation of safety system (ECCS) -Can not close either gate valve (complicates things: primary loop susceptible to changes).

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time (group, page); (20,8) (20,9) (20,10)

- 4 0 4 -

Last modlfied:05/09/9612:44:01

Scenario 3, Turbine overspeed

Initial conditions -Full power -Time of day 13.13

Comments: -time pressure -masky, but eventual alarm -nsky damage to turbme rotor and generator

explosion/ hydrogen fire common cause PSA (?)

Procedure: -Operating procedure SA-turbines 15/M4A

Brief scenario description: In this scenario....

Start Hopes:

. T<t^tarfeglayerexr'

ENTER.* PASSWORD:

'-St^thtNDTOOiHtar

Tosewbetimei In Slaverex: Set

In this scenario we need MALF-

f p start-MALPTMEA&l-ogjJwm

vtrsmmm mmaam. H-START

€H$

RT PREFECT ND "

' <?#!f>/r^

"?.s, Ki,n,:

-,{//4i'

an))p-act^6Mimf$tmihew»^er^oflseconds into the

- 4 0 5 -

PASSWORD <an4.«tarttb.e program^|5p!fl^ JMAU&MEA&&

In Slaverex type: SlaveREX: MALF-Malfno or object: Malfno or object: Activation logical delay:

SlaveREX: MALF: Malfno or object: Malfno or object. Para: Activation logical delay:

var

var

./time

./time

MALF SET SA50 42 SA00U301U04

MALF SET SA50S001 63 10 SA00U301U04

(MF 42 on SA50: Jamming of turbme control valve.)

(MF 63 on SA50S001: Stuck shut off valve)

Turbine shaft axial bearing damage. High temperature alarm from bearings SB5IT002, SB51T004.High temp, from bearings SB5IT006,SB51T008.

0.5 min In MALF-MEAS main menu "Set RAMP Malf." F8 Set "NORS IDENTIFIER SB51T002 RAMP Gradient 4 /min DURATION: 7 min Standard deviation 0 Then press the execute button. SEND

/ min In MALF-MEAS main menu "Set RAMP Malfunction" F8 Set "NORS IDENTIFIER SB51T004 RAMP Gradient: 3.7 /mm DURATION: 7 min, Standard deviation: 0 Then press the execute button. SEND

1,5 min In MALF-MEAS main menu "Set RAMP Malfunction" F8 Set "NORS IDENTIFIER SB51T006 RAMP Gradient: 3 J /min DURATION: 7 min, Standard deviation: 0 Then press the button: SEND

2 min In MALF-MEAS main menu "Set RAMP Malfunction" F8

- 4 0 6 -

7 min

Set NORS IDENTIFIER: SB51T008 RAMP Gradient: 3 /min DURATION: ?mra Standard deviation; $ Then press the execute button SEND

Control rod bank and a single rod drops inadvertently

In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF:


YZ10U403U01 37

YS00D707 4

Turbines have to be tripped in order to avoid excessive cooling of the coolant and thus a increase in reactivity/ power in the reactor. SS/TO should trip turbines. If they do not decide to trip, the turbines will be protected from a front pressure less than 35 bar by automatics after approximately 1 min 30 sec.

10 mm If the operators has not trippei~ the turbine, do it manually

In UNIMMI TRIP TURBINE

COND Immediately as the turbme trips, type.

Use Slaverex: Type

~~ ~—— > When trip-valve RA50S001 closes a small part of the valve disk is chipped off (about 10% of it's surface area) and is brought down stream until it sticks in the control

SA50S99Z - 10 valve SA50S001 and keeps it stuck open at -10%. (These malfunctions were implemented before start as event based malfunctions)

COND When valve RA54S006 is closing:


RA54S006 63 10%

The pressure difference over the shut-off valve RA54S006 becomes so high that it is not able to close properly:

COND If the breaker AP02Q001 is not opened by the operator within 5 min., open it manually:

On MMI select display AX50 and open the breaker AP02Q001

The TO should not disconnect the turbme off the grid by opening the generator breaker when he notices the leak in the trip valve and control valve because the resistance the grid provides will protect the turbines against excessive over-speed. However, we want the grid to be disconnected, and if the operator does not open the generator breaker, a malfunction will be implemented in order to open the breaker.

-407-

Snip scenario when the turbine 14 speed has reached 3500 rpm. Stop Scenario

At j500 rpm the turbine/generator will be beyond salvaging. Inform SILO to send "sound" into HAMMLAB before scenario is stopped

- 4 0 8 -

Solutions:

In order to avoid undercooling/underpressure two options exist: • Trip reactor, turbines will trip, and pressure will increase. • Trip turbine and the trip reactor,- pressure will increase.

In both cases: hot shutdown.

The only way the turbine/generator can be saved is if the operator reacts very fast after the AQ02 breaker opens and decides to close the/or/ shut off valves RA13/15/54/52S003.

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time (group, page): (20,8) (20,9) (20,10) (17,10) (17,9) (7,9)

- 4 0 9 -

Last modified: 96.8.21 9:23

Scenario 4, Instrumentation line leakage

Initial conditions: -Start at full power. -Easter reduction of power level (reduction in power demand in the spring and increase in hydro-electric production due to snow melting). -Time of day: 20:13 -Work order: Reduce power level by 100 MW with a gradient of 1 MW/min

Procedure: -EOP procedure 538 "small leak on primary side" will be the best one for this purpose.

Brief scenario description: In the event of a instrumentation line leakage in lines involving steam and/or fluids under high pressures, there is a potential for problems propagating to other measuring devices in the vicinity of the faulted one Also, the erroneous measurements can effect the normal operation of the plant by engaging interlocks and automatics in an untimely manner. In this scenario the whole operation of the plant is affected by a problem that starts with instrumentation line break in the steam generator level measurer.


Start Hopes:

To start session: tejfoggsjaattt'mentiselec* "Session. identification "Session nm no" "Initial snapshot" "log set" "€bn%uraiion*eF "Workstation sef Pus&ihe.send buttons

To start Slaverex: Login DttBONALD aSl^Eis: System BfcfiteR; PASSWORD: Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX,

To set the time: In Slaverex; Set

RT HOPESAG RTNETADM

H-START

iP lags 55) (9) (8)

em m ",$ENJ>

RT or System PREFECT ND (N-I-l)SL

TIME? 68880

(U-shaped arrow key)

The time must betntefed in seconds, one has to subtract 360&&O .fr<m the number oj seconds Into the aaywhsretlutsaena'wflarff £%,;ni>. of seconds* (no- ofhours*3600y * (no. qfminutes'60) - 3600

In this scenario we need-MAOS-MBA& . Tostart MALF-MEAS; login on DONALD as MALF-MEASeS; ^SETEKi MALF-MEAS-S

- 4 1 0 -

PASSWORD j and start the program by typing MALF-MEAS-S

19 min Steam generator instrumentation line leakage (YB54L005)

In MAI.F-MF.AS main menu "Set STEP Malfunction" NORS IDENTIFIER: LOCKED VALUE: Then press the button.

F6 YB54L005 4.5 SEND

Level measurement YB54L005 fails and gives its maximum level because of the instrumentation line leakage.

(Room number 1R0522) (IR0522)?? (No alarm will be shown because it is not defined to) (Comment: The signal YB54L005 goes to the automatic on low level only. That gives us no simulation problems. Neither will shared variable in GC give us problems.)

..and Steam leakage in the instrumentation line

..and

Use Slaverex: Type:

in Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA:

vx(58) = 3

RA54 84

J 21 min Measurement error YD 14F001

(This will trip YD14D001):

(-1 kes/min)

Use Slaverex: Type:

InLMlMMI select:

fx_5(46) - 0.01

-YD14S009 (YD00)

-Set YD14S009 into manual mode.

-Click "OPEN" once

26 min Measurement error at the temperature measurement

YP10T001,- causes a bias in the measurement towards an increase in

-411-

In MAI.F-MF.AS main menu "Set RAMP Malfunction" F8 Set "NORS IDENTIFIER" YP10T001 RAMP GRADIENT: -160 /min DURATION: 2 min. Press J on all other values. Then press the execute button. SEND

the pressure level. This results in a erroneous opening of the relief valve YP12S008:

COND When YP1OTOO1 < 240 C:

In Slaverex: Type: YP10T001H02_LV - 400

YP10T001H52 LV-400 COND When YP 1 OTOO 1 < 130 'C:

In Slaverex: Type: YP10T001H54_LV-400

YP10T001H04 LV-400 COND When the relief valve YP12S008 closes, the operator may attempt to set the automatics

YPIOUIOI in manual mode and then close the valve YP12S008 (a good action). If the operator turns the automatics YPIOUIOI back on for some reason, it is important that the valve opens again:

In Slaverex: Type: YP10U101S SET 3

In NORS the valve doesn't open again when the automatics YPIOUIOI is turned back on, but this would happen in Loviisa

27 min Continued steam leakage causes level control YP10L001 to malfunction which will interfere with the makeup pumps.

..and

In Slaverex: Type:

in MAI.F-MF.AS main menu "Set RAMP Malfunction" Set NORS IDENTIFIER: RAMP: DURATION: Standard deviation :

RAMP YP10L001 MALF FROM 0 TO 5 FOR 300

F8 YP10L001 OJ/min 12 min 0 SEND

Then press the execute button.

(We have to use MALF-MEAS because there are 7 variables sharing the same global common address as YP10L001). (Room number 1R0522)(IR0522)??

Makeup pumps (TK51, 52) stop Letdown opens

28 min Humidity alarm in instrument room: Use Slaverex:

- 4 1 2 -

Type: TL40M004H01-TRUE

..and Fire alarm in instrument room: Use Slaverex: Set

Trap alarm in instrument room: ..and Use Slaverex:

Type:

MF00K001G01-TRUE

(-fire alarm on overview comes and stays as it should, fire alarm on alarm list comes but disappears) CHECK THIS!—Seems lo be in order as of 13/6 TZ01K404G01: trap alarm in reactor containment.

TZ01K404G01-TRUE

COND If the operator orders the FO to check location of alarm, after about 3 min.:

Use Slaverex: Type: TL40M004H01=FALSE

The alarm should be turned off when the FO has been in the instrumentation room and acknowledged the alarms:

Use Slaverex: Set MF00K001G01-FALSE

Use Slaverex: Type: TZ01 K404G01=FALSE

Solution: People are sent out to find the leak. RO scrams and stabilises.

Options: -Can find PORV block partially open to continue LOCA -Could add secondary radiation to increase likelihood of SGTR misdiagnosis

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time (group.page); (20,8) (20,9) (20,10) (i,4) (1,7) (7,8) (19,5) Observe the scale on the trends before dumping!! „ _ _ _ _ _ „ _

- 4 1 3 -


Scenario 5, Loss of main transformer-extreme weather-snow

Initial conditions: -Severe winter storm -Limited plant access -TF12 and VF11 are m use on the BD busbar -external faults weather -Time of day 18 26

Procedure: -Disturbance in electrical systems 610 and 664 -Dieselgenerators EY01-04 operation under disturbance in electrical systems 177/M4

Brief scenario description: In this scenano bad weather and a particular wmd direction causes large fluctuations of the level difference over the sea water trash filter A mam transformer trip leads to a RCP trip and reverse rotation When the diesel generator attempts to start, it fails. Plant access is limited because of the weather, and delay eventual repairs

Before starting Hopes

S#?tHopes;

Tostarrsesswn; In^opesmamjnenuseiect ^SessioiMdentMcatiD^ ^SessiandfoftttO'" "ftiiud snapshot "togrseS" *p&x8m®^.®^

^Ws&te&gm^* fttsft&esendttttMrti,

1&^$$*$teveK«' %X% mm B0NAfcEra&B£«r System &{1fcRi PASSWORD: StantheND monitor * and start the SlaveREX

To set The timer

Set

RT/HOPESAG RTPNETA3DM

Br-START

m {&$, m m m m m SENI>

wt PREFECT ND (N-I-1)SL

¥ME*^246ft

^ S h a p e d snow'k&y)

i%V#«f mat >5# zit&nirl m *ecanfft ■xt W$><»s firm

tiis&vsiteiisa&swstatin •££,»#

Before start Changeover to the auxiliary transformer malfunctioning

- 4 1 4 -

In Slaverex: BD06Q001S SET 7 (MF 137: The switch can be manually changed by the operator, something which should not be possible)

1 min

Fluctuations in level difference over seawater trash filter (VAOOLOOl) that can be caused by seaweed or other debris in the water. Fluctuations in a level measurement VAllLOOl in front of the seawater pump VCll also will occur:

Use Slaverex: Type: ' nrc-sc5

nrc-sc5 After 1 min this happens: After 2 mm this happens:

After 2.5 mm this happens: After 3 min this, happens. After 4 mm this happens: After 6 min ■ this happens:

VA01L0Q1 ** ill) VAIIL003 <*-!.? VA11L003=5 VA01LQ01 » 0,4 VA01L00I ■* no VAOILOOI^O.4

6.5 min 7 min

TO send FO to check trash filter Trip of main transformer:


AT02 71

Loss of 6 kV busbar (BD)

RCP trip

Diesel generator starts and fails due to severe weather (hi snow causes ventilation problems in Emergency Diesel Generator corridor - common mode Diesel Generator failure) After the diesel generator starts we will implement MF 130 in order to simulate the diesel generator failure.

15 min in Slaverex ' nrc-sc5-2

nrc-sc5-2 This happens MPO&J&C?

MF: "

and in Slaverex

&W4 m &Y04K001SSET28 &M4K00ISSETJ9 &W4KQQISSET ?

lakes \en> wng for FO to get ta diesel generator room due tn thp wemhzt (takes, about 3-mm jor me generator >o turn completely orTratter some voltage fluctuation, with 0fliy MF 130, »« YFS use Slaverex to tywut tmmQtvpi &>M Wits*flittingaiesei-fiiiiiidiOH, sfreriii

- 4 1 5 -

Solution:...

Trends that have to be printed after the simulator has been frozen for the last time:

-group, page: (20,8) (20,9) (20,10) „ _ _

- 4 1 6 -

Lastmodlfled:96.8.2112:29

Scenario 6, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Initial conditions: - -30 % reactor power -Time of day: 15 05 -Time of year- January -Turbme 50 running idle at 3000 rpm, 0 MW, disconnected from grid -Turbme 10 on grid, synchronised and at 60 MW -Bypass valve RC 11S003 open 20%. -Bypass valve RC51S003 open 20%. -Shift change-over Previous shift has taken turbme 50 up to 3000 rpm,- ready for synchronisation

Procedure: -EOP steam generator tube rupture no. 504 -Operating procedure for RC 1167M5 -Operating procedure for synchronising of generator 161/M5

Brief scenario description: In western PWR reactors one of the most important principles in the safety philosophy is to isolate the primary loop in every conceivable way, such that no radioactive water can escape the containment. There are still ways of which the primary water can escape the primary loop,-and even escape the secondary loop, the result being direct release mto the atmosphere In this scenano several events lead to a steam generator mbe rupture Some smck valves and an increase in pressure result in stuck open PORVs on the secondary side, releasing primary water mto the atmosphere.

H-START

TOyStart session: J^ogefctaain menu; select "Session identification" "Sessipiuunno"

1*€Mfx$uMoAs<£'

C*1

Km m

Toatart Slaverex: Logla oft DONALRas&gta-

'ENTER: PASSWORD: Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX

BSksc&Ysfeift mmmes ND (N44)S^

To set the rime; In Slaverex: Set

TheMxm must bee*ttp?ea)m seconds, one has to

4a? YitimfHzztmatfeztaMS• £.%, mrtfsecondsr*

- 4 1 7 -

Before start:


Turbine bypass valves are open:


Shut off valve RC11S001 open:


stuck

is stuck

YA12S002 62

RC11S003 47 26

RC11S001 63(48) 100

The valve YA12S002 in the loop that the operator will wish to isolate can not be closed:

Under normal conditions, when the turbine/generator is synchronised to the grid the bypass valves should close and the steam that is initially dumped into the condenser will be lead into the turbine

Operator tries to close turbine by-pass valve RC11S0O3.

Valve stuck open in given position.

The TO will instead try to block the steam from dumping into the condenser by closing the shut off valve RC11S001 which is on the same line as the turbine bypass valve.

One steam generator block valve RL72S003 closes because of a electric failure on a limit check card (electric device that controls that a given variable is within certain limits. If it is, it gives a TRUE value out,- of not: FALSE)

Use Slaverex: Loss of main feed water to one steam Type: YB52L961 H01_LV -0 generator

Coincident with increase of reactor

Emergency feed water initiates to affected steam generator on plant protection system (level 180 mm below nominal) Emergency feed water cannot maintain level due to power increase Steam generator Lo level

- 4 1 8 -

power

26 min Steam generator mbe rupture in same steam generator -20-50 kg/s

MF OBJECT: YB52 MF:79 PARA: 140

High pressure safety injection comes on

Immediately the reactor should be scrammed. The operator should try to isolate the steam generator that has been ruptured by stopping the RCP in that loop and closing all valves leading to the steam generator.

The steam generator cannot be properly isolated because the shut valve YA12S002 in the hot leg will not close.

In this case radioactive water will continue to leak into the secondary side. Since the steam valve is shut, the pressure in the steam line will increase to over 56 bar, which is the limit for the secondary circuit PORVs. Soon the pressure will be the same as in the primary circuit (>120 bar). The primary circuit will in effect leak straight into the atmosphere. In order to stop this leak, the primary circuit has to be cooled down to a level that corresponds to a pressure less that 56 bar so

28 min TF trap alarm TZ03U501:

In Slaverex: Type:

TZ03K405GO1: Trap alarm in auxiliary building.

TZ03K405GOl=TRUE

Solution:.

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: (20.8) (20,9) (20,10) (2,1)

- 4 1 9 -

Lastmodlfled:05/09/9611:26:48

Scenarios, YD LOCA Initial Conditions: -Full power -Time of day 05:52 -Task for TO (working order)

-The pump RL21D001 must be isolated for overhaul -The TO has to start the auxiliary pump RL91 DOO 1 -The TO has to stop the pump RL21 DOO 1 and then isolate the pump by shutting all adjacent valves

Brief scenario description: While a RL pump is tested after a overhaul, a unrelated leak in the YD system arises

Before starting Hopes: RTHOPESAG RTNETADM

Start Hopes.

Tostansessjom

'Session identification^ "Session mastf* "MtM snapshot

"(^n^irjjnorfse^

Pflsn the send'bUWoto,

H-START

CO fe.g.§5)

m my TO) SEND {U-shaped; arrow-key,

Tostart&laYerBx: Lojpu on DONAEP sss&T/ &m*:

#•*-*#&

Tctset the time; In Slaverex: Set

In mis'scenario we needMALJa-MEAS.

, To start MALF-MEAS; Log jjn on DONALD as MAJLF-MEAS^s -ENTBRJ PASSWORD and start the program by typing

TIME = 17220

The tune must beenteredjn seconds) one has lo suolracl 3600 see from the manoer qfseconas Into the day where the scenario starts Eg no of seconds m

(no qfhours*3600) + (no ofmmutes'60)-3600

MALF-MEAS-S

MALF-MEAS-S

Before start Enefiagi -Tack for-TQ.(woEkMig.order).. 1-The pump RL21D001 must be isolated for overhaul. 2- TO has to start the auxiliary pump RL91D001, and stop the pump RL21D001 and then

isolate the pump by shutting all adjacent valves.

- 4 2 0 -

Initially: Valves YD32S001 and YD33S001 from emergency sealing water does not open:



YD32S001 61

YD33S001 61

10 MIN. leakage in YD circuit:


YD1050 123 25(~4-5kgs/min)

The location of the leak is after the YD mechanical filters.

The leak reduces the flow to the pump sealing system. When the system notices the low flow of sealing water, the emergency seal injection will tap water straight from the pressure side of the YD10D01 pump and pump it passed the filtration system to the pump sealing system.

13 min Radiation alarm after leak: In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA:

XQ01R055 36 0.1

Emereencv seal water injection initiation. Level in pressurise will decrease because of the leak. Makeup pumps TK52, 53D01 start.

Solution:

- 4 2 1 -

As soon as the operators have established that there is a leak, they are required by procedures to scram the reactor, inform the designated off-site authorities, and isolate the leak (not necessarily in that order, but within minutes of eachother). Chances are that in the simulator the operators will use more time to diagnose than in a real simation, since there are no real consequences in the simulator.

Isolation of the YD pump seal system (close YD10S006 and YD50S006 (or YDlOSOOl and YD50S001), and close YD12S002, YD13S002, YD14S002, YD15S002, YD51S002, YD52S002, YD53S002, and YD12S002).

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: (group, page); (20,8) (20,9) (20,10) (16,4)

Options: Auxiliary FW pump out of service

- 4 2 2 -

Lastmodifled.06/09/96 17:26:06

Scenario 9, Small Feedwater Leakage Inside Containment Initial condition: -Full power -Time of year January -Time of day 23 28 -There has just been a shift-change and the FO is out on a normal checking-round in the plant

Procedure: -EOP feedwater leakage 509/M10

Brief scenario description: A FO discovers a leak m the system that produces the pressure that is needed to control the hydraulic bypass valve RC12S001 Right after this happens, the sea coolmg water pump VCI 1D001 trips The turbine power level will decrease, but one of the bypass valves is unavailable Next a small leakage in the feedwater system mside the containment complicates matters further

Before startmgHopes RTHOPESACt RTNETADM

t o Start Session;

^^toafflMiiio*

w€0to1giiration§efv

^Wprkstatjon^er* Push the send button.

Log m on DONALD as RT"

Msswom Stfflt&eiNDjnonitor Mdsiartthe SlaveREX

TtfcseMhetune;

Set ^TME-80580

$J-$teped aerowAey-)

Tbntfme tmm&4 <smma ».*?&»><& sue has at

(no vfhours*3600) + (no ojmmutes'60) -3600

2 mm FO calls TO and reports a leakage in RC12D001.

-> TOhastostopRC12D001 First the automatics RC12C001S has to be turned off (Format RC90) He will then close RC12S001 since RC12S003 is

- 4 2 3 -

unavailable.

9 min VC11D201 trips inadvertently which -leads to VCI 1 DOOl tripping:

In Hopes: MF OBJECT: VC11D201

57

(Should we do something if the operator desides to call the fire brigade, electricity disconnection'')

Automatic power decrease RCl 1 bypass valve is unavailable,- cannot use all turbine bypasses

14,5 Leakage of feedwater system leading -mm to steamgenerator YB13 WO 1 inside

containment downstream of check valve up to 20 kg/s:

In Hones: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA:

YB13 82 1 (i-i4kg/sX2~2S kg/s) s/G empties

RO should stop YD 13D01 TO should isolate S/G by closing RL33S01, S03, RL43S01, RL83S01

Solution:,

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time(group, page): (20,8) (20,9) (20.10) (1,9) (2,1) (3,7) (7,2) (7,3)

Note: When pump VCI 1 DOOl trips, the screen shows that it has stopped, but not that it has tripped. ->change proposal or error request.

- 4 2 4 -

Last modlfled:06/09/9617:23:13

Scenario 11, Air leakage in valve between condenser and ejector Initial Conditions: -Full power -Time of day: 12:05 -Time of year: January -Taking one generator SP50 into repair,- short down (operation order with instructions about taking down turbine at a gradient of 5 MW/min)

Brief scenario description: While the generator SP50 is taken into repair a small leak in a valve between the condenser SD10 and the SD33 ejector is initiated. The leak results in an increased pressure in the condenser. This increased pressure leads to the ejectors starting. The namre of the leak is such that when the ejector SD33 starts the leak stops, and the pressure in the condenser is rapidly brought down. When the ejector SD33 stops, the leak increases the pressure again, and we get a cycling of pressure. Valves RQ12S001 and RN22S003 should ciose during power reduction, however a torque trip will leave them closed. That results in a HP-heater bypass when approximately 120 MW is reached.

%ejbr(} Marling &ops&>

StartHopes:

To start session: In Hopes raatn menu select "Session, identification" "Session run no" "Initial snapshot" "log set" "Configuration set?' "Workstation s«? Push the send button.

Te start: SiaxerjftK U*gfo oa trONALti as &T at System ENTERi PASSWORD: ytatt^etiD monitor andstartthe SlaveREX

T-sM&e-tune: in Slaverex: Set

m mi ABM

H-START

r?> i&&m r*>!

(8)

on #> SEND

HT orSysteiff PREFECT

m #$443$L

TIME -39600


nihmtti St®/} $x& p&Si •&* tttfrsbs-y ttf&tonds one titt ddyyrhere it&ZGiNorti'Xiiats, f,.%' no. of seconds = (no. ofnours'3600) + (no. of minutes*60) - 3600

Before start:

Briefing: Electrician has discovered an error in the transistor, and the nature of the error is such that the power has to be reduced rather fast Some measurements are to be made while going down in power. Give the operators order to go down to zero power with a gradient of 5 MW/min. then

-425-

disconnect the generator.

Before start:


MF OBJECT: MF:

RQ52S001 61

RN62S003 61

16 mm During power decreases on the SP10 side:

SD33S001 (valve between condenser and ejector) leaks a little (open as much as when three ejectors are working, since then the pressure will stay above alarm limits),- shows closed on displays. This can not be simulated with a malfunction on the valve because backflow of air through these valves and pipes are not simulated in NORS. Instead we will implement an airleakage in the condenser,- this will have the same effect on the condenser (increased pressure).

When the ejector SD33 is s tarted by the automatics, the air leak MF in the condenser has to be reset in order to simulate the behaviour of a ejector valve leak. When the pressure decreases in the condenser and the automatics tu rns the ejector SD33 off,

18 min In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA:

SD10 99 40

Pressure in condenser increases. Additional ejector starts automatically Reactor power increases (could use generation to induce start of additional ejector)

24 min Turbine trip because of high pressure bleed 1:

In Slaverex: Type: SA50P007G01_LV

= 5 COND When ejector SD33 turns ON, reset

MF99onSD10: When SD33S002 opens

Go to Malfunction Handling in the main menu and select RSTMAL: MF OBJECT: SHIFT-F6

- 4 2 6 -

MF: SD10 99

When ejector SD33 turns OFF, When SD33S002 closes Implement MF 99 on SDIO again, as above

Solution:

Operator should/may suspect something is wrong with the ejector when or if he notices that the pressure in the condenser is dependent on whether or not the ejector SD33 is running. The operator should then order the FO to close the valve by hand (and check all other valves, pipes and connections). Without success, the ejector SD33 should be left on and the ejector SD31 should be turned off (one ejector should always be running). Then, at an appropriate time in the future, the valve can be repaired (e.g. under refueling).

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: (20,8) (20,9) (20.10XHrJX9.10)

- 4 2 7 -

http://20.10XHrJX9.10

Last modified: 96.8.29 14:54

Scenario 12, Condensate valve coupling failure

Initial conditions: -Full power -Daytime. 13.25 -Change over of a condensor pump -One condensor pump in repair,- TO has to check if it works property

Brief scenario description: A faulty mechanical coupling results in the opera

Betorestartm&ffopea?

Start Hopes;

TostaiMessiorfc in Horjes mam menu select "Session identification" "Session run no" "InirM snapshot" "fei^-SSif ^onfigumnan, set"

"Workstation set" Push the send button.

To start Slaverex-Log m on DONALD as RT ENTER.-PASSWORD: Start the HD monitor aadisssfttusSiaveRESi

To set the time; kSjaveigc Set

RTHOPESAG &TNETA»M

Bsmm

m (eg. 55) <39>

<m my (0> mm

RT PREFECT

m> #M-9f)SL

TIME = 44400

(U-shaped arrow iey ?

the mm must he,emere» m»Btm& #>& has m sutjtrm 36QU u^^mii»imm«ef^^'(m» into me iSOy where the scenario starts Lg: no. of seconds » (no ofhows*3600) + (no ofmmutes*60) - 3600

Before start Use Slaverex Type VX_2(27)-0

Give operator WORKORDER 229319A12 (blue part)

The mecanical coupling of the valve RM13S003 is broken When operators tries to open RM13S003, it will show open on the displays, but will actually be closed

5 min Maintenance deliver workorder 229310A12 signed (yellow part). At the same time deliver workorder 229311A12 (Revision of RM12D001 and change to reserve motor.) Field operator should open the vaive on the suction side of the RM13D001 pump. TO should start the start-up sequence for the RMl 3 pump. The 3 RM pumps are ninning but as a result of the wrong connection, RM13D001 will not pump anything,- it pumps against a shut Valve. No difference in flow and pressure (EM10FOOI and RMIOPOOl), three way valve RM10S025 stays in same posision. TO should normally stop one of the other pumps since only two pumps should be ninnir.g, but in this case the lack of change in flow and pressure should warn the operator against stopping one of the other pumps.

If the operator stops one of the other pumps:

-Level in condesor will increase, level in feedwater tank will decrease. -Pump trip (low pressure and flow in condensate line)

If operators cannot start pumps again: -Trip of turbine. -Pressure (RM 10PO01) and flow (RM10F001) will decrease. -3 way control valve (RM10S025S) will open more to feedwater tank.

COND IF the operators detect the problem with the valve they will not stop RM12D001. We will in that case implement a malfunction on RM12D001:

Use Slaverex: Type:

IF the operators do not detect the problem with the valve, they will stop RM 12D001. This will result in all the RM-pump on the 10-side tripping because of low pressure. The level in the condenser will increase, indusing the 3-way valve RM 10S025 to increase

RM12P002G52_LV«100 the flow out of the condenser.

COND 2 mm. after the trip ofRM12D001 has been forced, OR Immediately after the pumps trip because of low-pressure:

Use Slaverex: ■ Type: inrc-sc!2

8nrc-icl2 fftis happens;

Sft-ENS343 &

EU21Q001Sset28

? a&t» sa ha&zz £M sm& tUmgfiova FV

;

- 4 2 9 -

jFy21Q001Sset7 }FU21Q00lSsel19 !HJ2JQ0OlSset?

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time (group, page): (20,8) (20,9) (20,10) (10,1) (8,9)

- 4 3 0 -


Scenario 13, Superheater malfunction and TC controller failure

Initial condition: -Full power -Time of day: 20:58 -Workorder: Decrease power on 10 side with 8 MW from max level in order to match RD10 shutdown.

Procedure: -Operating procedure RB330

Brief scenario description: This is a scenano where two controllers fail at approximately the same time, one in the RB system (superheaters) and one m the TC system (deionization) The malfunctions produce a number of alarms, but they are easy to keep apart The controller failure m the RB system leads to a power reduction

Prior to the scenario a small dewatering line leak in the high pressure preheaters was detected and it is necessary to shut down the high pressure system (RDIO) for repair.

^e^stampg Hopes: -~

Start Hopes:

To jrtart session; In. Hopes jnajn menu, select "Sessiottddentificatidn'J "Session run no" "Initial snapshot" "logsej" , ' r0eafigaraoottser

"WMstation set* Push the send button.

Ttegtart. Slaverex: Log in on DONALD as RT ENTER: PASSWORD; Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX*

To set the time: InSJaverexi

-STH.OKESA© mwmmu: •mwa&-

, - -

m , - p,gSS) JP9) m im w>

> ^iSEND

, •

-.RT* BREEEdT m (ff-M)SL

(U-shaped arrow key')

Sej WMvwm

The time must be entered in seconds, one has to mtHmsT$60OsfSi from the imhfriifm«onds Into die

1 mm TO starts decreasmg the turbine 10 output with 8 MW in order to prepare the

-431

...and

shutdown of the RDIO high pressure preheaters. (The decrease of efficency would require an increase of 6 to 8 MW(el) from the reactor,- this would engage the REPQL).

15 min Ctrl, failure in RB52C001/ RA62S009 closing, when closed to 0% the valve is stuck closed.

In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: OPEN/CLOSE:

In Hopes: Valve stuck closed: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA:

RB52C001 44 CLOSE

RA52S009 47 0

When the valve RA52S009 is closed, the superheater stage 2 will not function because no steam leads to it. The low pressure turbines will work less than optimally and a reduced power level will be set for the turbine by the power controller SE10/SK10. -Turbine power will decrease.

17 min The controller TC 10C002 gives a faulty close signal to the valve TF73S003

In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: PARA

TF73S003 47 0

In order to increase activity in the control room and involve the RO's, a controller failure in the TC system is implemented. This malfunction is unrelated to the previous one. (It is also possible to implement a malfunction on directly on the controller (MF 44) However, we do not want the valve to be manually operable, and MF 47 fulfils this requirement better,>

The heatexchanger TC10V002 does not receive any cold water when the valve TF73S003 is closes, and does not cool the letdown water. ->The letdown waters temperature increases.

The filter TC10N001 is bypassed because the letdown waters temperature increases (The filter does only work optimally within a certain temperature range. If the tempera ture exceeds this range, the filter can be harmed. ->Bypass valve TC20S002 opens.

The sealing water is drawn from the TC system. When the temperature in the TC system increases, the sealing water temperature will likewise increase. ->High temperature alarms from the YD system.

COND 3 min after TO calls, MFs on the valve RA52S009 and controller RB52C001 should be inactivated.

TO should send FO to RA52S009, trying to loosen the valve.

In Hopes: Go to Malfunction Handling and select RSTMAL: MF OBJECT:

SHIFT-F6 RA52S009

- 4 3 2 -

MF: 47

..and MF OBJECT: RB52C001 MF: 44

InLWIMMl select: RAS2S009 (SA50)

-Click "OPEN" once.

...and Call TO and inform that valve has been loosened and can be operated manually.

Solution:

There are two separate problems that must be solved individually.

1. The valve RA52S009 interferes with the proper working of the superheater stage 2, and should be opened. First the operator should attempt to open it manually by the TO. When this does not work, the TO should order the FO to open it slowly by hand (There will be a power increase as the superheater starts to function again. It is important to insure a slow power increase). The valve opens, power increases, and the TO can conclude that short term objective of full power production is fulfilled. The controller still has to be checked and repaired. The TO should write a work order to instrument technician to repair problem.

2. The second problem is the increased temperature in the YD system. If the temperature in the YD system increases to much, the proper workings of the sealing water may fail, and in addition, the RCPs may overheat. The increase in the TC system and bypassing of the filters is only a problem in the long run. It is therefore important to insure enough cool water to the YD system while the TC controller is inspected and repaired. The best solution is to direct enough cool water from the 50-side of the TC system to the YD system. -Check that YD50S021 is open. -Check that YD10S023/ YD50S023 are closed. -Close YD 10S021.

>The bypass TC60S002 will now open and enough flow is established to cool the YD system.

- 4 3 3 -

The TC controller can be repaired.

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: Group, Page; (20,8) (20,9) (20,10) (4,8) (4,10) (11,9)

- 4 3 4 -

Last modlfled:06/09/96 17:27:07

Scenario 14, Inadvertent Emergency Boration Activation

Initial conditions: -Full power at start -Time of day 10 32 -Time of year -Boron concentration is high, so the control rods are near their upper position -Workorder for testing generator protections

Procedure: -Synchronising of generator 161/M5

Brief scenario description: In this scenario an inadvertent generator trip and the followmg Xenon poisoning requires the RO to start the dilution program in order to insert enough positive reactivity to reach full power again However, a faulty controller results starts the boron program instead This makes matters worse This scenario presents no safety problems, only economic considerations are at risk

Note: At the inadvertent initiation of boration program, if crew does not start dilution, we still start boration

Before starting Hopes RT HOPESAG RT NETADM

Start Hopes: HrSTART

To start session: In Hopes main menu select "Session identification" "Session run no" "Initial snapshot" „ "log set" "Configuration set" "Workstation set" Push the send button.

To start Slaverex:

(1) (e.g. 55)

m (8) (12) (0) SEND (U-shaped arrow key)

Log in on DONALD as RT ENTER: &T PASSWORD: PREFECT Start the ND monitor ND and start the SlaveREX (N-I-1)SL

To set the time: In Slaverex: Set TJfME~,3402O

The time must be entered m seconds, one has to zybstssS 360>i *>«■ j*om the numtsr of seconds mto the >£ty rti&fi&s ie4frjnr*# ztarz? k% no sfsqconm" %VKJ, ifte»>'tf>$Mt> * {no. ofmmut?s',W-'S<tiW

- 4 3 5 -

5 min Inadvertent generator trip due to SP10K012G03 faulty protection signal

In Hopes: MF OBJECT: MF: T/F:

SP10K008G03 39 T

Control rods will be inserted into reactor due to the generator failure in order to stabilise at a new power level.

..and By phone from electrician: She has made an error, causing the 10-generator to trii

8 min Before the phone call from electrician: Reset the MF in the generator so that it can be taken into use again.

In Hopes: Select "Reset Malfunction": MF OBJECT: MF:

(F6) SP10K008G03 39

9 min By phone from electrician: Electrician made a mistake that initiated the generator t r ip. The mistake is corrected, and the generator can be taken into use again

TO should start turbine-generator synchronisation in order to go back to full power -power increase

Due to the rod insertion there has been Xenon buildup, adding a lot of negative reactivity to the reactor. Since the control rods already were out almost all the way before the poisoning started, it is not enough to pull out the control rods. In order to compensate for the Xenon poisoning and add enough reactivity to the reactor to reach full power, boron dilution has to be initiated.

The RO starts the dilution program

21 min Start boron pump TB22D001:

In TKTB: Start TB22D001 manually

Solution:

- 4 3 6 -

It is important for the operator to anticipate the Xenon poisoning, and to keep a close eye on the reactivity, power level, and boron concentration during this operation. When the faulty boron program is initiated the operator should try to at least stop further boration.

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: (2,1) (20,8) (20,9) (20,10)

- 4 3 7 -

Last modified:06/09/96 13:02.38

Scenario 15, Cycling of MSIV, Secondary pressure transient/main steam line break

Initial conditions: -Full power -Timeofday:22:12 -Time of year:

Procedure: -EOP for Main steam system big leak 506/M3

Brief scenario description: This scenario is among the most serious events that can happen on the conventional (secondary) side of the nuclear plant. Potentially a lot of workers life are at risk, great material damage will occur, and there is a very long recovery time after the event. In this scenario a variety of likely and unlikely events conspire to create a break in one of the major steam lines coming from the steam generators. The force and heat that is spewed out will likely destroy everything in it path, perhaps lead to another steam line break of one of the other lines in the vicinity of it, further compounding the damage. Electrical system will fail and send spurious signals to the control room and other parts of the plant. The hall that the steam is released into will be inaccessible for days, due to the heat that continuously is released. The control room is situated below the feedwater tanks and steam lines. Massive release of humidity will likely penetrate down to the control room, further complicating the control of the simation. However, the control of the nuclear primary side will present few problems and low risk.


Start Hopes:

To start session: In Hopes main menu select "Session identification" "Session run no" "Initial snapshot" "log set" "Configuration set" "Workstation set" Push the send button.

To start Slaverex: Log in on DONALD as RT or System ENTER: PASSWORD: Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX

To set the time: In Slaverex:

RT HOPESAG RTNETADM

H-START

(1) (e.g. 55) (29) (8) (12) (0) SEND

RT PREFECT ND (N-I-DSL


Set TIME-76020

The lime must be entered in seconds, one has to subtract 3600 sec. frjom the number of seconds into the day where Jhe scenario starts. E.g. no. of seconds » (no. ofhours*3600) + (no. ofminutes'60) - 3600

- 4 3 8 -

1 min Leak in TK51 DOOl:

In Slaverex. FCONTRLEAK-=O.65

3 min FO calls operator and informs about a piston ring leak in plunger pump TK51D001. Maintenance has to be informed for repairs.

One of the older more experienced field operators has been on a check round and has noticed that the drainage tank leading from TK51D001 feels a little too hot. He reports this to the control room. The heat indicates that one of the coal piston rings of the plunger pump TK51D001 is leaking. When the piston ring leaks, water passes the pistons and is collected in a drainage tank with a temperature sensor (not simulated in NORS). We will assume that one of the field operators noticed this before the operators. In any case, the operators will change over to the redundant pump TK52D001, and isolate TK51D001. Then the operators have to fill out a work request form to maintenance in order for the proper repairs to be done.

COND When TK51D001is stopped and isolated, reset leak in TK-system

In Slaverex: FCONTRLEAK - o.s

12 min RA 15S003 oscillating open/closed:

In Slaverex: * nrc-scl5 Valve will open and close in cycles

' nrc-scl5 This happens with approx. 2 seconds between each order:

setRA15S003 63 10 0 setRA15S00162 0

reset RA15S003 63*

setRA15SOO3 63 100O

reset RA15S00162 reset RA15S003 63

setRA15S003 63 10 0 setRA15S001620

.reset KA15S003.&S

setRA15 84 100 0

Pressure pulse causes main steam line break next to relief valve:

The oscillating valve causes large pressure impulses to arise with further detrimental effects on other valves along the same steam line and the steam Ime itself. One steam generator in the NORS simulator produces about 174 kg steam pr. second. Note thatthins steam and not liquid, which means that the volumes that have to beremovedevery second are enormous. In order to alleviate the pressure impulses somewhat tie relief vaivesJRA15S00I anci/or'i wuTbe activated: -> The relief valves RA1SS001 and/or 002 opens and ^oses^Oiacoommodate the pressure impulses.

-

- 4 3 9 -

set RA15S003 6340(H) set RA15S00L62 0

The forces are too strong and the pressure impulses cause a steam line break. Normally the pressure difference between the steam generator and the turbine is a few bars, enough to accommodate a sufficient steam removal at 174 kg/s. The steam line break causes an enormous pressure difference between the secondary cycle (~40 bar) and the atmospheric pressure around the steam line. In effect a pressure difference between the steam generator and the outside is created of about 40 bar, leading to much more liquid flashing to steam. Even a relatively modest sized leak will result in large amounts of steam escaping the secondary cycle. This scenario could involve substantial damage to other systems in the plant due to the shear forces involved and to the loss of life to anyone close to the steam line break.

COND Torque trip ofRA 15S004 when operator tries closing this valve.


It is important to keep the pressure in the primary cycle high but the steam line leak causes the pressure to drop rapidly because much more heat is removed in the steam

RA 15S004 generator all of a sudden and the primary 63 water will cool rapidly. This will activate 10 the high pressure SI.

>High pressure SI starts

COND Torque trip ofRA 15S005 when operator tries closing this valve:


RA15S005 63 10

The operator should now try to isolate the leak as quickly as possible. He may try to do this by closing the valve RA15S004 (As the pressure sinks in the steam generator a back flow of steam may occur from the other steam generators). Also the valve RA15S005 has to be closed in order to isolate the other steam generators from this leak. At last he may try to close the feedwater valves in order to relief the back pressure into the steam generator so that no more steam than necessary is dispensed into the feedwater tanks room. A steam line break of this nature will tend to damage many components in the vicinity of the break. We will assume tha t the valve RA15S004 experiences a torque t r ip and stays 16% open.

In a situation as this one, the RO will scram as quickly as possible. Also, it may not be obvious which steam line has broken. It is likely that the TO would close all valves leading to and from all steam generators and by monitoring the levels and pressures in all generators, he will be able to figure out which steam line has broken. Afterwards the TO will re-engage enough steam generators to remove the residual decay heat in the reactor.

- 4 4 0 -

Solution:...

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time(group, page): (20,8) (20,8) (20,9) (20,10X1,3) (7,3) (1,8)

- 4 4 1 -

Last modifled:05/09/9614:24:44

Scenario 16, Turbine trip

Initial condition: -Full power -Time of day. 02:46

Brief scenario description: In this scenario two, possibly three events occur simultaneously Two stuck valves lead to a turbine trip, and a measurement fault gives some confusing alarms to the operator The measurement faults are of no consequence otherwise.

Before starting Hopes.

Start Hopes:

To start session: In Hopes main menu select "Session identification" "Session, run no" "Initial snapshot" "log set" "Configuration set" "Workstation set" Push the send button.

To start Slaverex: Log in on DONALD as RT or System ENTER: PASSWORD: Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX

To^etthe time: In Slaverex:

RT HOPESAG RTNETADM

H-START

(1) (e.g. 55) W (8) (12) (0) SEND

RT PREFECT ND (N-I-l)SL

Set

In this scenario we need MALF-MEAS. To start MALF-MEAS: Log in on

.DONALDasMALF-MEAS-S; " ENTER: PASSWORD and start the program by typing


TIME = 6060

The time must be-mturtdzt Kvonds.one has >o subtract 3608 see, from the number of seconds Into t day where the scenario starts Eg.: no. of seconds m

(no. ofhours*3600)<t- (ho. ofminutes*60) - 3600

MALF-MEAS-S

MALF-MEAS-S

Before start RN17S004 jamming in its "normal" position (seemingly the valve operates as it should under normal operation, but it will

- 4 4 2 -


RN17S004 47 96

fail to close

cu-1! 11 ouvs.£ t iuscs liiuuvcrienuy ^nui necessarily related to the valve jamming above):


RN11S002 47 0

AS me vaive KJ> 11 autw closes, me condensate from the superheater moisture extractor will continue to collect in the tank RN 11 BOO I and the level will increase above the accepted values. This will endanger the turbine and a protection signal from the tank will trip the turbine: -Turbine trip

As the turbine trips the control valve RN17S004 would normally close, however it is stuck. This leads to the low pressure preheater RH17 emptying because there is no flow in from the tripped turbine, but there is flow out because of the open valve. The valve controls the pump: the pump will trip if the valve closes flr it will eventually trip when it gets a low level signal from the preheater RH17. It the latter that happens: -Preheater RH17 empties. -Pump RH17D001 trips.

10 min TF high temperature alarm measurement fault:

In MAI.F-MF.AS main menu select: "Set RAMP Malfunction" (F8) Set "NORS IDENTIFIER TFI1 TOO 1 GRADIENT 20 /min DURATION 3 min Then press the execute button. SEND

13 min High temperature YD injection water alarm measurement fault:

In MALErMEAS main menu select: "Set RAMP Malfunction" (F8) Set "NORS IDENTIFIER YD10T001 GRADIENT 30 /min DURATION 3 min Then press the execute button. SEND

Solution:

- 4 4 3 -

1-TO should order FO to check valves RNI1S002 and RN17S004 and try resurrect the problem with the stuck valves. 2-RO orders instrument technician to check temperature measurement in TF and YD system. >Make a work order for maintenance to repair measurement fault. 3-If problem with valves is solved and measurement faults acknowledged, restart turbine.

(Because of the limited time the operator will at best get through the two first points.)

[Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: (20,8) (20,9) (20,10)

— 444—

Last modified:07/09/96 11:44:24

Scenario 17, Reactor Scram

Initial condition: -Full power -Tune of day 13 II

Procedure: -Normal checks after reactor trip -GOP first part A, then part B

Brief scenario description: A faulty signal causes a reactor trip The resulting transient reveals a stuck feedwater control valve leading to steam generator level cycling between high and low One control rod is will not drop when the reactor scrams A drainage tank pump malfunctions in the unrelated TE system of the plant Later a spurious radiation alarm is generated and the RL92DOOl pump trips Both are unrelated

Before starting Hopes

Start Hopes

To start session In Hopes mam menu select "Session identification" "Session run no" "Initial snapshot" "log set" "Configuration set" "Workstation set" Push the send button.

To start Slaverex. Log in on DONALD as RT ENTER: PASSWORD: Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX

To set the tune. InSlayerex: Set

In this scenario we need MALF--^".AA^V^V.

MEAS.

RT HOPESAG RT NETADM

H-START

" (1) (e.g 55)

m m (12) CO) -SEND '

m P8TOET

m QSUML

TIME =*43560

To Start MALF-MEAS: Logrim oa DONALD as MALF-MEAS-S: ENTER PASSWORD and start the program by typing

(U-shaped arrow key;

The time must be entered in seconds, one has to suhPVct36OQse<s&g01fa mmtbur qfseconds mto the ady-^rvthMscenmttiiBirM&g mp^tfseconds » (no ofhours^SOO) + (no qj mtmttes*60) ■ 3600

MALF-MEAS-S

MALF-MEAS-S

-445-

14 min Smck control rod:

and

.and

In format XSQSk

In Hopes: ML OBJECT: ML: PARA:

Reactor trip caused from controller:

Use Slayerex: Set:

by faulty signal

Before reactor trip, set control rod YS00D101 in manual mode.

RL33S002 47 90 (-63%)

YZ11U401U01-TRUE

Control rod drive voltage < 80%

Feedwater control valve RL33S002 stuck:

All control rods except one drop (The one rod that does not drop is of no consequence, except that we want the RO to make a note of it). ->Turbine trip. the steam generator will give a closing signal to the shut off valve RL33S003. Now the level in the steam generator will run low, giving a new signal to the shut off valve RL33S0O3 to open. Hence, we get cycling of the level in the steam generator. The FO should try to operate the control valve RL33S002 by hand in order to stop cycling.

19 min In MALF-MEAS: In main menu select SET RAMP NORS IDENTIFIER GRADIEN" DURATION Push execute button

The pump TE23D001 empties the drainage (F8) tank TE23B001 for the primary circuit. TE23L001 All the little (normal) leaks are lead to this 0.2 /min tank and when the level is high enough a 3 min signal is given to the pump TE23 DOOl to SEND empty the tank and pump the water back

into the primary circuit again. The symptomes of this will take a little time to come.

-TE23L001 high level 20 min Spurious radiation alarm in one

ejector:

Use MALF-MEAS: Select 'set step' in main menu. F6

When the reactor and turbines are tripped, the volume of feedwater will decrease and eventually the flow is so low that the emergency feedwater pumps RL92D001

- 4 4 6 -

"NORS IDENTIFIER" SD70R001 and RL93D001 take over and the regular "LOCKED VALUE" 0.002 feedwater pumps are stopped (The term

emergency feedwater pumps is somewhat misleading since this is a part of the

COND Right after RL 92D001 starts: Operators should start one of the main feed Trip ofRL92D001 water pumps, preferably RL91 DOO 1, if the

flow into steam generators cannot be In Hopes: maintained. MF OBJECT: RL92D001 MF: 57

Solution:...

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: (20,8) (20,9) (20,10)

Option: FO closes control valve RL33S0O2 by hand: take away MF 47

- 4 4 7 -

Last modl/led:0S/09/96 11:01:12

Scenario 18, Failure of Generator to Trip

Initial conditions: -Full power -Time of day: 23:08 -Shift changeover (from evening to night shift) -High flow in SS30F001 (stator cooling) -10 kg/s

Comment: -A poor handling of this scenario could involve great economic risk due to costly damage of turbine/generator

Brief scenario description: The stator coolant flow increases inadvertently and is noticed by a FO, who is instructed by the RO to reduce the flow by hand (There is no manual control of this from the control room) The FO adjusts it too low and a turbine trip signal is generated. However, the breaker fails to open automatically, and has to be done manually If the operators do not notice this, the generator will work as a motor and the potential for damage is great

Before starting Hopes-

Start Hopes:

To start session: In Hopes main menu select "Session identification" "Session run no" "Initial snapshot" "log set" "Configuration set" "Workstation set" Push the send button.

To start Slaverex-Log in on DONALD as RT ENTER: PASSWORD: Start the ND monitor and start the SlaveREX

To set the time: In Slaverex: Set

In this scenario we need MALE-MEAS. To smtfWALF-MEASi Logan on DONALD as MALF-MEAS^' ENTER: PASSWORD .andstart the program by typing

RT HOPESAG RT NETADM

H-START

(1) (e-g.55) (») (8) (12) (0) SEND

RT PREFECT ND (N-l-l)SL

TIME = 79380

MALF-MEAS-S •> MALF-MEAS-S


The lime must be entered in seconds, one has to subtract 3600 sec from the number of seconds mto the day where the scenario starts Eg no of seconds -(no ofhours'3600) + (no ofminutes'M) - 3600

-448-

Before start.

Generator breaker AP01Q001 fails to open automatically (alternately: missing alarm)

In Slaverex: AF02Q001SSET28 (28: override interlocks)

1 min Trap alarm from reactor building:

In Slaverex: TZ03K405G01-TRU E

This alarm comes only as a diversion from the activity mat later will start on the secondary side, and is of no consequence. However, the RO doesn't know this and should send out FO to check the location of the trap in question.

COND

7 min

3 mm after the call from the FO: Turn alarm off: In Slaverex:

In MALF-MEAS: In main menu select NORS IDENTIFIER GRADIENT DURATION Push execute button.

the RO to

TZ03K405G01-FALS E

F8 SS70F001 2 /min 3 min SEND

FO reports nothing alarm:

unusual- false

ca 8 min Operator may call and ask FO to adjust oil flow, otherwise FO calls. By phone to operator: Field operator reports high flow in stator cooling during routine shift changeover inspection and will adjust (low.

COND

-Flow adjusted by FO: Adjusted too low.

After call from field operator to operator:

In MALF-MEAS: F8 In main menu select SS70F001 "NORS IDENTIFIER" -3 /min "GRADIENT' 3 min

- 4 4 9 -

"DURATION" Push execute button.

COND When flow goes below setpoim of 5 kg/s:

Generator trip signal: In Slaverex:

COND If operator calls FO and orders an increase in flow, the flow will be increased lo just below the trip setpoinf

SS70F0OIH54 LV-12

In MALF-MEAS: In main menu select "NORS IDENTIFIER" "GRADIENTS "DURATION=" Push execute button.

F8. SS70F001 1.5/min 2 min SEND

-Flow below generator trip setpoim (Setpoint ~S).

This signal has a 120 second delay before it is actuated and gives the tripsignal to the turbine (This is how it works in Loviisa too. 120 min. after the low level is reached, the signal is actuated).

>The generator takes two minutes after the trip signal to react. The adjustment came to late, the trip signal went trough.

>Generator trip signal, but breaker fails to open. Turbine trips and reactor goes down to -50% power.

COND

COND

When turbine power starts negative (immediately):

In MALF-MEAS: In main menu select "NORS IDENTIFIER" "GRADIENT' "DURATION" Push execute button.

going

If operator performs manual opening of breaker AP02Q00I,

F8 SP50E002 -6 /min 1 min SEND

Since breaker does not open, generator will act as a motor and drive the turbine by taking current from the grid. The generators/turbines are not designed for this and can suffer great damage after a short while.

-Crew must perform manual opening of breaker.

immediately type

In MALF-MEAS: In main menu select "NORS IDENTIFIER" "LOCKED VALUE" Push execute button.

F6. SP50E002 0 SEND

-Turbine/generator stops after opening of breaker.

- 4 5 0 -

Solution: -The solution is in general given by the scenario description. -If the breaker APOl is not opened within 4 min of the turbine trip signal, the turbine/generator will suffer great damage which of course must be considered a less than optimal solution path.

Trends that have to be dumped after the simulator has been frozen for the last time: (20, 8) (20,9) (20,10) (13, 6)

-451-

^m C. *J®A|L4£|S0|| CHS OPAS

-453- NEXT PAQE(S) left BLANK

Experiment: N*0*1""" Scenario No.: 1 Crew No.: Position: I Administration: Run No.:

OPAS- OPERATOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT SYSTEM

i J 1 Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

I I On-line scoring, data from debriefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

^PadSJilf tBHt. pJI^toecomritt!sseda^(TJP)5ys»m -*>'

v 1) "Cycimg RN52S001 valve will give alarm for closed valve and first stage in superheater will not work

any more. This situation is not allowed so TO has to trip turbinc-2) < Alarnvftem iowptessure, hems grouufeio' -pass^DMenvTO.setid' FO m%iot checkingof

pneumano valves. ' „ „ 3) Send FO to set pneumatic valvesin han# tpmakmHOd^^QM^ F&shouB be iii Contact by

SinWiSKfcma&y'Valves at*affej^TO*&§^^^^^s^poito^.for$tarion-se^urttys tn&operators

25min->

- 4 5 5 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO

rrs'i '■' "■

Check V

Relative importance of detections for Time XX XX

■■j'- 'sswfjKSfy" 4RW Alamifmmeit^y^ytfindramagei | TO

h* •<■****«**< fow-*«fry-

,«ff; ■^Ay^^^^^^^^^^NS-^sswrt'^rtS'rtssssy.

>AD2, Are there nigh level alarm, TO

t 5

I- X 1 J. 1 AD3 LOOK working!.

" ■ A ' T O W w m y t f ^ W * -yoSmportem imports*

TO ' JSSSSSSSSSM

important

AD4 i 2 1 * *

important

AD5

Operations Relative importance of operations for .subgoal. completion

A01 TO

A02 eh«**o»^rm^tJfliTJ!SOJftliejeare , -r<>

i % "y * S

Jmpertant

Sequences Relative importance of sequences for J^o.al.CQmp)e,tign,,

.AS*

A52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ^ y * W ' "

," " " " . -

l'

lH " ^.■■■..^....^.i...^.^M»»»a^.

important

V ' i 2 J 4 5

„. i ;l 1 H Unimportant

important

- 4 5 6 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage B

Unimportant Important

- 4 5 7 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO I Check Relative Importance of detections for I Time 8RteMl.WIIHd»BML ....... , , , , , , , . , !Ljg i»£ |

"Shfr Jcvej $w^Jr^W15W«0t* ?&

i High ieveiaiarni tram High pressure TO |heteehangerf'8!?J0')withby-p3ssing;

t. * ' * *

Operations

« * * j

M s m p n t w important

Relative Importance of operations for 9.«t?gQa!.cp.mpJ,etjpnjjw_

CO? mme&

important C02 Call foefOibt

lchec|tmf':

i i 5 * J

""f

Unimportant Important CQ4 X 4 2 ^ * S

tsaportsm

Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for SH.b8oMc.omfl!elio.n

£9?

, ^ A W ^ m j ^ p ^ A W M W . W ^ J ^ ^ X < ^ ^ -j-W-jfrj-*

--■ist X


- 4 5 8 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

■n^'f * ft fcrf-fcfci** ■■■■■■■!

Unimportant ■ n i.v■■.-.■.v..i m - - v

Important

- 4 5 9 -

Experiment: MRp-aiarm \ Scenario No.: 2

Crew No.: \ Position: \ Administration: I Run No.


L.V.........J Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

On-line sconng, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

.scep,ar|p„name.„ ***V*****q*t}QtV*

$tmM%$&&

■Mato.gogLdvscriPtJoj— tw relets* rotation. 1X0 not* that

the pumjp-begfai&rotatfritt reverse, WVJ/M efose-pressttre-stde va t e YAxxSOi. If there are no success &s wjtf tty to c t e VAstxSfSSs. $B$>&«* k #» &&*& &$h«i» $ * ^»»»tefe^tett^ie primary 4d& py

wmm rotation and the destroy^ *r°*" —-< *- . J^ '* -***^ — *^-«- —*«•»--<i^ •*-- —-.«- <— — •>«-

W*d%* ,Z;Ji£„wt.3, Stage Subgoal description Relative Importance of stage for main

aMgSSBSMSB _

?%pawt(&"!F®mim

c K

i 2 i A 5


* $ ? 3- A j

t P" r * *■ ^ s -ynwpsrtaw ' frroottanj

I Estematedtime: t ^ ? * . * ^ ^ . . D ;

- 4 6 0 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO Check V

Relative Importance of detections for Time ,3"MP.aJ computer), xxxx

AD1 *i«K&:*'4-;s&e?^ ttf»aw$%4 tifting,

> AD2 ; (JDetectpsaari wp iBionnax, &!&*}&&, salanafieid

n> H ^ £**MA&KBSKS

»«

tapBrtari

^ ^ unimporjanf tmporta"!

A03 Detectrevase rotation, tan formal ISM m I'.'.sv.'. j ■;. ■'■'..vjji ■ • vwtX?".v*"

Unimportant important

AD4 " f t H M M M H frtf«JJ>J*J-J*»Jj>J


AD5 X

■■w^y^frw^v.^v- ■- -4 UnimssonsKf Important

Operations

AOl YD12DO01-reverse rotation, begin to close YA12S001.

Relative importance of operations for subqoal completion

RO a ? * J

S ♦ i / K i Unimportant Important

Aar ' „ ,v

YA1SSQBI & teuity, begis to-cto^ IVA1JS002

<#• •■»%

m

ttnofSutssss^ofcrosing.of'miv^tften he^siiouiisrasm reactor arid-stop &&

tlnimportans JpjDortant

, gnimpojjsanj important

AQ4 Sendj?Oan*cioseYA12S001 by band. SO

Ummpoften*

5 4

snpojtaw A05

- Unimportant important Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for

.s.MbgQal.samp.tet)Q.n.,,.....„ AS1 Tripot pump, power reduction, t reversetofttion

RO i 2 i i * I !». „ |. ,^ - |

UhkDpsrt&pt imBortasl AS2

RQ 1 - 1 t ■ 1

Important Unimportant

- 4 6 1 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996


-462-

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative Importance of detections for .9u£.qQa).c.omp.let!on.

Time xx xx

CD1 No chance to isolate leakage in primary j RO/TO ci

hi r i i i - ikiMm^ii Smportaii

CD4 X HH—i—b-H Unimportant Important

QD5 X

Operations Urompwtw Important

Relative Importance of operations for 3ub9P,a},SpmpMP.n

C01 l><Miott»scram.?^actor.ffr?aetBra | 8.0 scrammed then this is the last chance


- 4 6 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detect ions RO/TO Check V

Relative importance of detections for Jui&Q&coxnpletlpn

Time XX XX

\vm y » ^

W* *

," ' " ' | - ■WW'lfc

4 £

-OhJmpotwnf imports^ i

1— <DD2

DD3

Operat ions

X 1

unjmaortartt


Relative Importance of operat ions for .8.M.kg.p.al.cgmB!eMgn , ,

i - $. -<\ i. ?

MmmpprtaoS important

H

X * & * *

4

Unimportanv. important

impeftani

D04 X h

Unimportant Important *t+**t-*fr+f B1WMW.11I I ]

D05 X i * -J * 1 ■ -1 1 1

Unimportant ™"1

Important

Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for ,8ubgpa)„cpirjp|etlpn, v „

DS1

DS2

X unroppitant

W i t m a - W B l i . f n w i i m&rmm-r**

important

X Unimportant Important

-464-

Experiment: N^"18™1 Scenario No. :3 Crew No.: Position: Administration: Run No.:


Scenario analysis and weighting of factors

On-line scoring, data from debriefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

I..Sce,n.a,r)fl.narne„ Turbine over speed

.Maln.gp,ald^s.c.r!pSlon „ iHigh temperanire on bearings SB51TO02,Tf)(M;TO)o and TOOR-T his means mat we tos an bear™? damage or disturbance in bearing coolmg system.Operator has to look at the trends how fast temperature raise is an do an turbine trip.AIways mis decision is little up to different operators .What is tasFT When turbme tnn occur power will decree jjamrrsi tous are JJOIBJS us suni w^ i.ave am $w,ip which will drop to bottom. RA-pressure will orop (&<.M\i Ul&o When a wnoie woup tails operator has to trip reactor. Reactor tnp and also turbines.Turbine SA50 shut or valve RA54SQUb will be damage and also SA50S99 the regulator, valve will not close.&tearo are gams through turbine ana generator breaker will not open. TO should see this and not open breaker before ne tias close other yaivej rswn steamgenerators, If TO will not open breaker then-we will or*n Jt through an default,

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main .flPalcompJetloij , ,

Turbine bearing temperatures are raising. TO tnn turbine upon high temp in bearing.

j estomated time: * "2lnif,, v g { T u r b i n e warrior trip (steam vsT?» «-« rm,

i i ; •* s

h H h~>fcH 'vir.impprta>s tmnonsnr

jetosefog}

j Estomated time:

i i i i i

its-.$aocmt* ' mwrni i

■J-tmin

i Control rod group talis to bottom,

MmMMM§'.2*™.

\ — I — I — I — X Unimportant important

- 4 6 5 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996


-466-

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO I Check Relative importance of detections for I Time )L I j|»b,gpa,|„.c,8rnp.|efl9n I xx xx

BDt TuromeistSB^op iftef&as«j6i»^4<&: power fworjenkg^ ^&«?,

BD2

BDa i % X 4

mtnm«m . i . y . w f r i . i . » > » . y . . ;

Important

BD4 PC l -f—i

Unimportant important BD5 X * * "% * * h—j 1- ""I \

Ummportsssj tmoortant

Operations Relative importance of operations for jjjfegsaLsojiiBMsrj _

B01 Begin to close valves from steam gen./mam folder.

B 0 2 - -Oevide mam JbldertBJWo

TO

,L tmimpertsBS important

Unimportans- important

Boa ~ 1 If hewiil opettt>raJcertteu,ne jausl < | TO-HO scram reactor sciose koiauon valves ]

i •* &****#y**&***+*v*&&>*&*****-^^

Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for ,s»fcflaalsgrop)glip", „

BS1 X ? .anifti>>ortan: Important

BS2 X h-f Unimportant ~

i i i

I i I important

-467-

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections


- 4 6 8 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Unimportant"" Important

- 4 6 9 -

Experiment: NRC-«tonn Scenario No..4 Crew No.: Position: Administration: Run No.


. • Scenano analysis ana weighting of factors

, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

^sejiarJtejjaDJS-

jMskoÔêScr^fflrjL™ Scenano start with power desrpsse,4bw.« gomeBSBw s?«msr$r m«ssK?» Hr «S$BST»> :t'« tmW a work. fofinrtoiitaboutaeifseor fypi- Jxftmvi *aiÂ.v*W»e Mantes KM afcdXOiSSfc&Olto Oi ««thev jompieiet^ dtHfestsfe Had s?ps??^ &im8m<xii Itsat «»«ss^{& &tssB! & A 'ankm^ * <««1 ./a wnicn side [prim/sec). pecide if this is a risk tor tto&ttMlfc Sttatntmd faegsi <»> cmd imwa

Stage Subgoal description

A rjt,e«sS s)Kas»rem««ttaaitV&S4t{t!>S Fault/ measurement Y8S41W

Relative importance of stage for main J9SM.c.eiri|).l(

Important

Emmaied Urn? Temper

19min/21 mm ?empef»mr» measafatneni &utt yPJftTOGji \ "

which cause opening of YF1SS00S

controller < mterlocittBg.f(iult in j(j aa«i pr«Siswfr«oniW)B»

Faulty level controller due to nmsi; [leakage, (normal level controller;-

i i 3 * 5

I—! X ■■■!'■—I important

IMJIL_J252L D iTrapp and fire aiarm-minssiiuuieowoojtt

are mere some connection between leakage j and fire?? Deciae for further operation of scram cit

I-reactor. ,...<—...—,.,-■ -.■,■„,

X

28 min

- 4 7 0 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage A


- 4 7 1 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage B

Detections


- 4 7 2 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage C

Detections RO/TO | Check V

Relative importance of detections for SMtm^simm^P0^ ,.

rem

; Levelfeegra ttJ^rop m, pmtffMm ■i-x-i 1

Ommpon** important

CDS X

-i"—T- I Unimportant Important

CD4 X

I 1 I 1 i Unimportant important

C05 X Uhlmportant important

Operations Relative importance of operations for

VQ<M JNormat^evei controllers} manoauKX j close jet down valve.

f C03 , -j OR-wfll he/see the open jet dpwa valve land close it ?7?W

; C 0 4

COS


Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for .a"bfl03.l.cpmp,le,tjp.n

CS1

CS2

X i

X

; s. 3 4 s



- 4 7 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996


- 4 7 4 -

Experiment: N*0"818™ Scenario No.:5 Crew No.: Position: Administration- Run No.:


I ...... Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

| I On-line scoring, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

■S^Mtejiatng L

Loss of mam transformer

Main goal description Due to alarm jrom sea water filter TO send FO to check if there is a real problem with the sea water filter. While woricmg on it they get a transformer failure .transformer tailer cause turbme trip Change over for dkV bussoars will be aqtuatett but one side fail to changeûiesei generator start butafler-avite there will be a tnp. AH6KV pumps on that Busbar trips and TO/RO supervise power reduction and also lookfor other things,. e«g. plant security. «gd«arms.

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main 4Jo^ l |P j r jpM!on ;

!%Ir0ub.fow sea water niter

l&t^"mted time:1'7**®,, ,„ Alarm from gas relay and transformer tnp wiffi turbine .Undervoltage in 6 fcV Josssfear Dieseigen start and tnp after >>»<u'i

% * 4—:

S^s^npoifeos Smpprtan*

■ ■ &*f*rm- -y •^^*a;*ie^^r^^fê*e^^rr

important

tuiiii

Evaluate plant situation 'êeiitss:,

\ yaiBportaoi ê

Important

Bstemsted time ^ m n t

■>V **Afi***V*n T

- 4 7 5 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

i i J & $


-476-

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage B

B04 Checking of fcjppfcd A W~pom$$> Start ofdieseigenerajw

BOS Checking ot pump stop ott diesel bussbar.Send FO out to re-start diesel.

Sequences

Tramfotifternir*«uderi?OiSta#*iB &W busbars witadieseist&t,4iesel Sipjtt«i iinrtwvnltfloft in hnchar *gwiH FO nnt

unimportant important

- 4 7 7 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage C

Detections

fCDt [Fromoverwieypictore.andAXlOv5d j &OmS i get information at. pisBtsi#?fWfe(^ i.niitnn^flt^.^njnpf^fii^ft*^. ;<CD5:

j weamsr conditioe,

C O g " " '

-478-

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996


- 4 7 9 -

Experiment: NRC-ak™ Scenario No.. 6 Crew No.: Position: Administration: Run No.:


i -■ Scenario analysis and weighting of factors

I I QnJine scQang, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

Steam generator tube repture

JMaljp^P4ld^scjipi)firu Reactor is in neutron flux reg. mode and bypass valves RCl 1 ana 51S02 are open about 20%. TO begin to synchronize generator and take up power on turbine, RC bypass valves should close. It does not close, and the steam pressure begin to (tees-east TO win ctes&RC J1 SO i t buMhts tf stuck opett also. He will send TO to close manua%, RUti&M cirws apas fstfuw, fevei J>egm to cicop two mmutes later we get an Tube-rupture in me same steam gen. and that will will'cpmpensate feedwater feed water loss from the closed valve, but he should se the tuberupture and begin to work op it. Scram reactor and begin to cool down plantto pressure on prtroaiy Msfe of about Sir *sr He; will have help ireomJBOP procedure

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main .sgmpMten. „

I -Synchfotitera^ Ot enerSSSf %fi$ty9m?

| pass valve RCIISOGZ j frmOat in constat* potm ttuwuMu'^ I secondary side power > #BKMKy pow& i

\Failure mblocKviro B j rwlurembifrWvslveJCIPaSQQS jiuNe I »iB close and ieav&$ceattt£M wjthoutieerl

{Estematedtim: Iftfliite

c Tuberepture:fflLS»est]R ■&&¥&$*, ->&rim

2£vua.

- 4 8 0 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996


- 4 8 1 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996

X i 2 3 4 * 1 ' rit..jjjjjjjAjjj..jjjA.l.jjj.j......jl...jjjjjj—V-

Unlmportant Important

- 4 8 2 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative Importance of detections for Time XX XX

CD1 ' <- 1 leveiracaces^»3«itfe*ie8m.fBoeKiKsf | TO WOKS ?m&m%t'4,'&i$$£i.

% s

CDS- t decreasing level in pressunzer, heaters are connected

tCD2 E $ t u £ v e l alarm. ss««am45esk

CD4 All TK50 pumps on

RO i i i » i


RO

CD5

S 3 4 5

,UnimBOBaoi: important

X '' 3 \ * * Unimportant Important

Operations Relative Importance of operations for *Mfr9P.gl .co.rr|pJej;|pn,—,—.„„ „.„...

C01 Stop YD12D001 if notstopped m " B 0 3 "

RO -4—X- I C02 Close YA12S001 ,YA12S002 if jummmg send FO for cioseing by hand

UnimpWftf 4 , „ ™ .

important

RO i i 3 4 3

Unimnoiw^ Important C03 Scram reactor .deciaire emergency sit work on GOP

RO

C04 WorkonEOPtubreptureiJtartboraPou i RO>3>

C05 Begin to cool down to a pressure m primary circ. '< 50 bar

Sequences

TO/RO

■JAmWWWMS^

CS1

CS2J

i 5 i %


Relative Importance of sequences for

5 i i :X *

[X * % l i i

"Unimportant "''Important

- 4 8 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

X ) * % * i UmmHfflWt important

DD5

Operations

IX Unimportant

tf*%pff*f*f*f*st

important

Relative Importance of operations for sM.pgp.3icoir)Pj.e,t,|9n ^ _

D01 X Unimportant important

0O2

Sequences

X ? % '* * * Unimportant important

X i *

J * s

I- i I ' I I uramportapx important

Relative Importance of sequences for .agftgpal completion

DS1 X H—i—-4—"{—1

Unimportant importan*

DS2 X ? 5 s * s I 1 I I ■ ■ I

Unimportant " Important

- 4 8 4 -

r__" [Ore

Experiment: NRC-alarm Scenario No. :8 Crew No.. Position: Administration: Run No..


I—~J Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

L ™ J On-line scoring, data from debriefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

-S^9liarlp,,narn,e,, YD-LOCA

.IWalngpalflescjrtptign,, TO are working o;na,Qrderfb.r overhaul of'RLXIDOOl motor, hwltss startteserv pump KL&tOOttlwill we inmate- leakage mYD50 sealing water Sine (Start of RL91D0OJ ftauttHSung to do wt8tb;iheseaiin.g water leakage).Temperature begm to rise in seating water line after coolers, YD10/50 pumps will changes over and stop. Emergency water pump starts oh tow fww to: Biis icaim^s ot RCP. Level m pressuruer begin to drop .and all TK50 pumps start (TK52,53D0M),Tbere will be am radiation alarm ftom osft side of eontaintnentRO should bestfa tCRisaiaterthe ftonoai ssfcaius r water ati«s; Wh&s j$flatiaius» done, ievei m pressunzer stabilize and begm to mcrease.TRSO pumps stop, there ere only one sealing water pump in the system no and also an leakage in the system so tney should scram reactor, begm to cool down.

- 4 8 5 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

""TJnlmjxirtanP Important

- 4 8 6 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage B Detections

*p RC? and stopijfnmn&mAw& wflt TBimnt start ftfpmpropnt^i iwimrt

RO/TO

BD2 TE50 pump start and indication of leakage in primary cireuite.

Check V

Relative Importance of detections for jw tegM^nwte f lp j j ^

Unimportant important ]


Time XX XX

BD3 Temp, rise ini$ealtog:»*»ter i coolers also pressure <ffif%sScig(. jfiltet


BD4 Sealmg water flowrate to RCP normally | RO after that emergency pump are started, t i i i x i

Unimportant atipsrtan*

B 0 5 level still gomg down m pressunzer and radiation alarm outside containment 1 ^alr ag<» in <i*alino wate r IITW nntgiHf

_ RO

I 2 3 4 5


Operations Relative importance of operations for SMPflpel CQm.Rl.eM9". ™

B01 Check from YDOO sealing water pump situation .flow to sealingsofJtCP

RO 3^,

UmmpQnSM i—"I

important

B02 Check level in pressunzer, RO

1 ? 3 4 S

Unimportant «ipBrta."t

B03 Begm to isolate normal sealing watfr \ «D hives

UnlmposSsssf

B 0 4 Check if there ate sjbil leakage in primary cireuite

K0

B05 Scram reactor and work on EOP.GOP, start boration'.

RO/TO

I T oflinwoiWKf tsn&mmi

t I 3 4 i >.'■ ■ x . a y w w " . ^ ■*. ■■■r..^MKi.i.vw>w^

Unlmportar! important

Sequences Relative importance of sequences for .9.ubgpaJ.c.aroplejjo.rj

BS1

Unimpottasf important

BS2 X ! ~ J * *


- 4 8 7 -

http://CQm.Rl.eM9

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996


- 4 8 8 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

DD5

Operations

ROfTO Check V

Relative importance of detections for miHwlwmMQn..

X * * 3 * *

1-1 i 1 1 Unimportant Important X ' 2 3 4 5

HH-H—hH »niBj»ot »f important Relative importance of operations for

8ttbg.Q.a.i.cp.rripJ.e,tlp_n ____

Time XX XX

D01

D02

X 1 1 3 * 5

! —f .{"—■j—| yniniportant important

X I I I 1 — I


D03

D04

X i 3 4 5 *y- i j>«r t f»T|n|l gKUM'.'ljwiO^HliH^Mt


X * * $ 4 s | . , . n i ^ » | — - , , . . 1 — 1 " - ~ |

iipimportam important D05 i -z

h-4-iJfiimporta.-t important

Sequences Relative importance of sequences for ■S.HlfflPJtomPletlo" -r-

DS1 X i i. * f $

Unirt)DOrta« Important DS2 X

Unimportant +-4—I

Important

- 4 8 9 -

Experiment: NRC-alarm

Crew No.. Position: Scenario No.:9

Administration: Run No.:


..... I Scenario analysis and weighting of factors

L J QaJJne scoring, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

■Sce.nar|Q.narri9...,, Smalt fesra.w^er ieakage inside cpntainra$»

.Maln.8gal.^srip.t(p.n •Afte* $.ss$fts»»;l?&,TO tegans &ii<ms®<6 %£,¥£ &?$%& ssss®, fevsa>ppjuagSCJ2O0J and ciose , (RCAJSSt VCUO201 seawatefpsanjtinja, «M ?«*** i*\taM>.o os wome 1. Tjfhder this fast power reduction, tnet* will be a feedwater iBa&a&e mst<Se BotttattnaeiB..i;o;ntawmetit pressure increase and there will afeo iie-txA imbalance between feed watsr »t&ttnr $3ti0Ma$M)$ stsautt put Now level decreasement in pressunzer with high containment pressure mdicats itikage i» sgconoaiy system.

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main floaLcp^p.lej)o.n..„

A tDisconnectmg faulty fe-iassRCJ^ (leakage m oil system)

ot VCI 1U2U1 and jwwer reaueffQn-

duetotrippedpum.p. - \ i J ? 4 5

1 1 X ■! I I i UiumpOrtat£ Important

'-. 2 3 4 5

X I I I I .Unimportant Important

Esiemated time:' ?mftt

Feed water leakage inside containment i 1 2 3 4 5

- I ! I X I Unimportant Important

- 4 9 0 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage A


- 4 9 1 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage B

BD5

Operations

BOI

-mm B02-checfc&(s»&$mss»$]0S#s*»mthat \ TJJ valve from coftifecsPrKwSjedtws, close f s n m t i n t 5

X '■ * - * * r~—+—"■{—"\ j


X \ '■ww(ifiiyyi

,*<i'- -1- ■a

"jfr"

BCSS

BCW Try to find out about tripped pump

SOS

Sequences

BS1

BS2

important

Relative Importance of operations for JRMbgoaicompietJpjj _ „ „

i ? J -s t

iin»pvs«tat

?

important

tJntoinojjant

Bj tp j j j j j j - j J jAKj Juijjuiu ■.■ in i ■_ jrrrti

Important

% i. i

i Oninpoite^ important

■} ' 4 5

Unift&tfrf&tf Important

X 5 ? "* * 3

I I I- i I UwnwsrtaK* important

u u u i u u i u u f i

Relative importance of sequences for

X UtftOipQrtarjt

i ^ 3 * 3

important

X i i

Unimportant \ \ I

Important

- 4 9 2 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996

4Jnlrnpj>rjag

X i i i '< i ■HfrHUM-y j VIM?'"■*■■ ■"■;.*:}


- 4 9 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

DD4 X s ? i

yAmMJJMJ^yj:

unimportan: .mponant

DD5 X Unimportant Important

Operations

D01

D02

ooa

D04

DOS

Relative Importance of operations for ■&Mb.ao3>l cpjwpjetlpn

X l * ^ * *' Unimportant important

x * * * * *■ i i i i i

Unimportant important X 5 ? * -i *

ijnin^tOrtsni

X * 5 > i >


-

X UtympOfUr* wipiiitam

Relative Importance of sequences for


-494-

Experiment: NRC-Alarm Scenario No.: n

Crew No.: Position: Administration: Run No.:


\ i Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

I I On-line scoring, data from debnefing, audio/Video or eye tracking data

! Scenario name Air leakage in valve between condenser and ejector

l.fflain.qpaJL&escrjptjpn .-.^^.^ —~™™-~~, iWMeifce jRenerater SP50 is *ak&» wt&i-ifyix js-saairtesfe tK-s vifr?%Mzm&^-£$»îi^^WiuuL&e < ISBM ejector isf initiated The leak «su&f in &s ;>?«sa&si gnmisre m. fn* ©ondenvsr Uiis increased 1 Ipressum leads to the ejectors starting, TJie OTIUIK SA fimiisafc 5i ifflco. ttsa when theismetor SD33 starts the '• |leak-stops., and the pressure in the coadensss-fa-^pioiy iu,tm)>to.>fown. Whmvtms ejector $03,i stops, the ' leak increases the pressure again, and-wes gsj a cycling of pressure Yalves RQ52S001 and RN62S0O3 should close during powerreducnon, npwg«e ^ ixnâa yipistii. ieave them closed. That results in a HP-heater bypass when approximately 12QMW $x osacBts^

Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main gp.g!.cp.mple.t|pji ,.,

Beginmg of taking dprngBtsss te^f t for small oweriiauie, i i i -4 i

Disturbance tit cjiange over mUmum

By-passmg oi hign pisssBis }>re».».e8&s 8050, duestucKed.valvft;BN62,«i5^

imporw

....!■■.■>. M " W

| Â^turbmeK^dB»ta j l«gfe^^^-^ | | festeeha®DeT< §

X

- 4 9 5 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage A


- 4 9 6 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage B

Detections

i BD1

RO/TO

|aJarmfro«iaghia«$5uTejnCBndet)SPr i TO

BD2> more ejectors are connected

Check V

Relative importance of detections for SHbgoalcQinpletlon,,,

i

Unlmportar.i; important

BDT When all ejectoras are connected, pressuxebegui to decrease

TO

UnimpBts1* -7& 1 1

(mportan*

BD4 When only one ejector connected begm to increase

TO


rBD5 X Unimportant Important

Operations

B01 Checking from formate SD 10 about starting of ejectors

Relative importance of operations for gMPBPj»l cpmpletipn.. , _

TO ; t s 4 5

\ X i I 1 Unlmpojtsp? important

BOZ Checking other valves about right connections. '

TO

« L-A»> w ' W W M W w y - ^ w ^ - m^-

i 'i i 4 i

' H I X I -i ktoimportajj*

BOS. Change ejectors^ ttatSD33ND0l will Jb^Steworkjfcg ejector, Conthsme w«fc<

V j . . i ^ W . i . . . . j . .

5 * S

unimportant Important

Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for s.MfraQal.sp.mpMip.n.

Uniniportant important

- 4 9 7 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Operations Relative Importance of operations for subooal completion

-CG-1 „ I Take change over aut in manual and | TO try to open ltlf not open send FO out f fiirtwamial nwnin o

1 X I 1 1 Unimportant Important

C02 j Try to open RN62SQQ3 manually by I TO takuigofsubgtQupcontroiier.IFFOout i for-oiwuntt maniiaiiv

1 2 3 4 3

1 \ 1 -X1 UftimpOrt&nt. unponant

C03 Check level alarm and check by -

fpassmg. TO

1 2 3 4 3

I !""~4--j)K—i vomwortarf important

C04 i 0? no by-passing do manually \ TO

ynitnooitanir

i i J i i

i I i I X important

COS x > * * * i J — I — I ™ ! U — I

Unimportant important Sequences

icsi |t>fetOTi lanmmans-fcpfoSsed^&apm $A5»

to

Relative importance of sequences for

i i i i i

yromportar*

JIUIJ' . &iL^***aaarf

important CS2

.... „ilevetinBr>50dueto^tucked s TX> Ictose valveftwasftffl. and bv-nassmg. \


- 4 9 8 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm. 1996

^Unimportant' Important

- 4 9 9 -

Experiment: NRC-Alarms mated Scenario No.: 12 Crew No.: Position: Administration: Run No.:


J Scenario analysis and weighing of factors

Outline.scoring, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

im *L

f CoirSesfesS* vgjv* soupting faunas

LBaalaasaLp^s!6rtetjpr|„ FS&msmasi&gsver workorder 328318&|g£$s»S$g«sUaw psyy M&t) same tone deliver workorder ;■%$& 5AJ2me*iMOJi<JtRMI2D(»<lt «sr4$&«sp $«*w$emttajsst,.* iFjciKS^KSSTissrsiusiiaQJXSPs»^K!v»ontiw«4."><«j4*1->>>' *^lWJ0Of Ma"!? ''rts^wttstanthestanVupseqiKBCsfortne nto/tii$va$ "3>4?îi*;,5"(**<er/nwKW^^^*x5SiisS.s ' *s^».s^htig*^»4Mîw;r^4v^vft&iryi(S(Bits.5tdevalve., iftHiiSMi >y-ii « # srss sagiBiingiv tf ptaxsi in&i&afcs ifcsS ¥*fes &#4tftm8tt&& 8s» sftd {>r«sswsg.(Ki*t(u!(iOi |»>> s^tii^Wifef^^f-îBEMlliSfflJSKwa! inssipnismn i.iii&sxii>i>:sx(ix!%#% »f«*i**i>*5r?«ftS»*i!Siaontytwo npstRss ifcasfci i%pm»g, i>wm,iiiis«s«^: £*#-$fc-:#&^ J* &?* jfri iva&t&sSxite vmm the operator against stopping one of liheoBsS'JHtijS-I After psaon tm&f srsjj ftm -sO) te»t&ste «s KS&SS ¥&. ?¥,• 8&S m ?<#<} s&&£&s,'<js .»<• »BiM>iitYflisip> ss t&ey bave » an

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main -8QJlUS3mP.l.e.tJP" „ . „

Workon taking RM13DQ0J %^%am«i,. anddisconnectmg ofRMJ2£0St

tons

Unimportant

2 3 4 5 .... . ^ ; }

important

iBptofRMU'WDOOf, S J S •* -s

ynimportB^ important

Bstemat6dtlme• ta&

Busbar Mure on FU-fV; ^

Uhirttportanf.

3 ■* S

Important

Estematedtime^ <9_™™Zl^f£L~, T

- 5 0 0 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

..Unimportant important

AD3 X !

Unimportant Important AD4

X 4 J

S I I S 1 ymmportaw

AD5

Operations

X * A'J'J'J'u;j'J'J'J'J'AiuWuiJiJiJiU.i.itip*»-»!lNefiiJf^i'»S

|g»gfBaaiM^

.Unimportant important Relative importance of operations for

..s.HPjpa).g.prr)pMp.n ^ AOi - ' * Qbeck reason: foi;.fto.c/iai»ie in flowrate TO

mm®, A02 FOout for checking of pump, valve connections.

TO i. i

f — 1 ^ " Unlmcortant Important

A03 No stop of RM12D001 TO

* X t 4 J

-1 1 - I I X ■Unimportan?

important

A04

Important

- 5 0 1 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Unimportant important Operations

B01

Relative Importance of operations for jwfea99.l.gp.rp.pieMpn„

Take punjpprograms«of and close tre -way valve RM16S<H&

TO

UnfmpoBS'tf I I X

important

B02 Reset pumps and sort diem again TO

- i -Unimportant Important

Boa i Begmtoopehflawf^ftpfeedwater t TO tank '' \

ynimpoftanr important

; . ™ -

S 3 3 * $

-II ! 1 1 "Unirnporians Important

Sequences Relative importance of sequences for

BS1 X Unimportant' important

- 5 0 2 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage C

Detections RO/TO I Check

CD1 Low voigige-^Sasfem T8. W* %&■ I " O & i H

Relative Importance of detections for MmalJfflraeJstteu___,—

Time xx xx

Uoimpomw*'

CD2 Many i RM10S025sathoin*pJtage

ro

CD3

CD4

CD5

C01 Do turbine nip

Operations

FoUowpowerredaaism and feed w«*w f ROTO inventary

C03 Checking of turbinetnp a-s sh»t ot valves, main faraker open, level ia gteam opn*»ratore

TO

C04 Checking of componenWvsutuos* voltage

RO/TO

■ V ^ W . W t f ^ W .Wi

COS Send electnsian.cheefe flnfltMM*-system.check alarm aboutdejjuiits

TO

Sequences

CS1

Ummportant.

i

H irpportant

X < -* * * ?


X T - I'" J-


X '- 4 *' * 5

I ■ ■ I ""{ ■ T—"I Unimportant important

Relative importance of operations for mtee&sasmMM —,—~~

«H

>. % i i.

XfcwnpSf&rtS

IS * % 4-

Unimppwa important,

t i •( « >

f—H*~—I—7 *-H limrnportam irmportant

Relative importance of sequences for gujjflpjjlcpjripjstjgn

Hh—h importasjfr

- 5 0 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

- 5 0 4 -

Experiment: NRC-Alarms project

Crew No.: Position: \ Scenario No.:13



_w..„.s Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

L _ J OnJiaascoung, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

L8ffiftTOrtP„n,arno„ I Suoerneater malfunction and TO controltettfaiiure

JV1j l.Q .qoalq'sscrjpjjpn,. A.sma1ffee$watertae(eAagB<mhigh-pe#J^ I shutdown pre>heater RDIO for repairs* So-sftsy feave to begmf«adi power aeexease on turbine one with ' about 8 MW.Then there will be an comroftsr feiluns on RB52G001 wit* close valve RAS2SD09, this | agam. will sink temperature oetoprtB^pfissSuKirKurbinje and- 'Vtecpaft. * ifcwage power art turbme ' 2 i a j ^ {&tau). tfters will aiso berim co tu t e^ ^J^#efe TOn^SOOB^mparrofe goes ap and by-pa^^ifrerl^iuittN)*, whep tetapwaftBs testingi^4mi&mlmfrmmm:vzia&m%. watBtsystem^ll'

Subgoal description Relative Importance of stage for main .aoMcffimp.'.ef;iPn—„ —

i a 3

f — ^ — T 4 $

4 i imports?*

- 5 0 5 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

- 5 0 6 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996

- 5 0 7 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996

- 5 0 8 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative Importance of detections for subgp,aj,c.Qmp.i.eSjp.n „

iDD1

DD2

X i i i i i -I; '■'■.. i' t".' ct:&..h-*. ....■'■'■j'. ■ m.^...j

Onimponani important

X 2 3 4 3

4 S I I Unimportant important

DP3,' X h-f- +-H

Unimportant Important [ D D * X *

2 ^ * ?

i J i t i .Unimportant important

DD5 X


Operations Relative Importance of operations for .s.ub.gpa,lcpjTroJetjpri. ,

DOI X

Unimportant (moortant D02 X x i i '■ i

Unimportant (mportant

D03 X 1 i i

Unimportant (mportant

i i i


DQS

Sequences

DSL

X tftiimpnrtant faroortanf

Relative importance of sequences for S,Mbgoa)..cp.mp|ejlPj)L _

X ; * %

Unimportaiii Important

-509-

Experiment: NRC-Alarmsmolect Crew No.. Position:

Scenario No.: 14 Administration: Run No.:


J Scenario analysis and weighting of factors

I I QruLne.scoring, data from debriefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

Scg.rjiarifi.name.. Inadvertent emergency boration activation

Main goal description In this scenario an inadvertent generator tnp and the following Xenon poisoning begin to grow up after power reduction, RO requires to start the dilution program in order to insert enough positive reactivity to reach full power again However, a instrument rattlt for boron pump f"t$22D00I results start of pump. This makes matters worse. This scenano presents no safety problem?, only economic considerations are atrisk

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main •SP^UPJBPjeflPi)

m£g«^sr«ifr4ue to roistatelfom*

5 mm

i&jm&W8t&

g TStjirjrup ot trip.

Smin - 12~min

? 2 i i 5


C , inadv«s&H£ start of boron pump 3 2 i 4 5

|— 1 X-' \- \ Unimportant Important

Estemaiedtime: . . .2 I

„ ^ ■ ^ ■ X " -?-■ ■'■■■■■ ">."W».".V +.■■■.■ ■■■ V > A * A -

- 5 1 0 -

http://Scg.rjiarifi.name

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO Check Relative importance of detections for g.M.bg.p.a!.c9mR!etlpn _—.

Time XX XX

AD1 Alarm ftonvgeheratorprotectionsi anrtt toft'ofgeneratos.

"TO i J i * *

Unimeoitans tawoijarjt : ADZ

Powerreductioo gwamotrssspfcricas Turbiaeiunnii»spMt-i 6«$ 000 rpm

TO i i i.

i—\—r UwmpociBnt AD3

AD4

1 % % 4 i


X 'Unimportant

\ >\ \ • I Important

AD5 X I 2 3 4 3

Operations

^Unimportant important Relative importance of operations for JMPggiLe.grpp'etlpn

A01 checking from alarm, reason to generator trip, feed &acfc from m m n t m p n r * rw»nntp

I TO. r J w f t .Vix f t w *T w / " w T f * w t f t i

Unimportant important A02 ' -- • Checking for power reducnoft,overwiy picture .trend group 1/1 steam nrgrenrtt npiitmn Ally l^wl nwcgunypr

TO/RO r i z *. i -. \ 1 X 1 1 *

Unimportant Important A03 From formate SA10 cnecibngTurbine situation

!..inimpor»«

i i i

*weftaot

A04 X * a ? * s

Ufllmpfiitant important

A05 \ ( i 7 i -i i f I I l lr

Opsmportanf important

Sequences Relative importance o f sequences for ?MpjgaJ completion,—__™™_™

AS1 j . ... . iiiuf " ' f i ' i i11• »' orfiviii'irri'i• ij'

Wiatpmt^i imppitaw-

-511

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO Check Relative importance of detections for .s.Mb^al.eg.mpJet.km, ^ ^

Time xx xx

BD* fronrSAJP and^MO format start t o

■VFT' V4AVMU{MV, 5*A. ■ MOtGayiWlAMMd •

-animportBf^ Jmpertam

BD2 On reactor side Control! rod possesion and power balance

SO i 1 ? 3 4 %

h~t—X—1—I Unimportant lippprtapt

BD3 X J * 3 * * *f *.w. wj....>....w. .&.,..' j . v., . . M . . j



Operations Relative importance of operations for subgpal completion _____

SE,SAJLA>RB,SH progranvtooff and agam on and start command to them

B02 SP10 program on and choice braker tor synchronizing

B03 RO checkingpower resrve on reactor side ,as control rod possision, boron rrm-«ltratu)ft: B04

I X j I I Unimportant important

jftWji^JMJjMltp rw


i i x—i——"i Unimportant Important


B05 X i \ 3 4 5

l~-—-p——I——-{ 1 Unimportant important

Sequences ■i'ljJJJJiBii>M

Relative importance of sequences for >M.bSQ.alc.9.rnpJj?.tlor). ,______„

BSt X r 4™H


- 5 1 2 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative Importance of detections for Time XX XX

CQ1- | Alarm from start of boron pump ; RO f

CD2 Control! rods to nigh aio .power reserve

1—i—-f—X—I Unimportant important

CD3


CD4 X Unimportant Important

CDS X I I 3 4 3

I 1 1 1 1 Unimportant Important

Operations

COI Stop TB22D001 boron pump

Relative Importance of operations for i-lboiaJLcimiPjetioji

RO 1 2 3 4 5 | 1 \-^--~\


C02 Start delution. RO

2 3 4

j X I Unimportant Important

C03 X * * 3 *

s

- . j — I — l _ _ _ _ l — j Unimportant Important

004

COS

X ! 2 3 4 5

1 1 1 I I Unirpportant important

X J—f


Sequences Relative importance of sequences for .s.Mpgp,a)..c.9mple,tlon

CS1 X ' 2 3 4 5

!■ I I I I Unimportant important

■ 5 1 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

- 5 1 4 -

veriment: NRC-Alarms project

Crew No.: Position: Scenario No 15

Administration: Run No


Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

I | Qn-ima scoring, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

.S4_tnMftTnjtms™, Cycling of MSIV, Secondary pressure transient/ mam steam line break

■M«l.qflMl,rte8c.rJPjj0i_. One1 of the elder more expeneneedfieioipp^fittars has ijeen an & -s&s&wmnd andiias noticed that tte« drainage tank leading from TK51D001 feels a little too hot. He reports this to the control room The hea( indicates mat one of the coal piston rings of the plunger pump TKSIDOO) is leaking RA15S003 begin fooscDate ,mewwli be severs^ p$#&xn pike* which: esess safeis jeUefvalve-to open After many cyclings will mere be an bjeak, in afxmfrime

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main .ggaleompletlpj ™__,

Starting ofreserv pump TK52D001, and '. stopping of leakmgTKS ITJ0OI, J

Uotrnportar* +~+

4 J

4—I important

Estimated time ?-§m_t Oscilatingof RA15S003 (fast closing isolation valve.)

Estematedtime:

+ " I—sHc-H

Steam line break 4 2 3 4 5

-I—I X Unimportant important

Estemated time n .^ff*.

te*m+il&**jt^t.

- 5 1 5 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO

A m j FO tve>«_ormsttoit of leaning pump. 80

IAD2 } !SmafldecKa§m£^rtfess_!__srJevel j RO

AD3

Check V

AD4

ADS

Relative importance of detections for


*: i ? i i


j I ■ I I I important

t. i i i i i , h I j 1 - |


Operations Relative importance of operations for .JSMbgpal cojnplMion

A01 Startni&ofereserv pump.and stopping of leaking pump

RO i •? ^ 4 5

unimportant important

A02 Begin ft* prepay leaking pump for repajre, by «~ang *l» off close valves

RO

— ^ . .■■w^W^r tK . , ffifflpoitaat important

A03- X Unimportant important

A04 ?\ T


AQS. X $ % * *

■JiiimEitwant Important

Sequences

AS1

Relative importance of sequences for .gMP.qg,9lc,gffiPjefto.n,.

Unimportant

mj.....^^.t

important

- 5 1 6 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm 1996

Detections RO/TO Check Relative importance of detections for 8,"P9Pa|,co,mp|etlgp _

Time XX XX

f.Bpf / , iAlan^ftp^cj«s^i^Mon,raf^,«nd \ fO itgoestaiwrff

Unimportant Sttipoitafit

TCI smportss

mke$ TO

Urornpotfam SBSonsrS BD4

Alarm from level in steam gen TO ? ? J * i j.........^.... yj _iwi____|

tmiitiponant important BD5*

h ■ 1 - I Unimportant. important

Operations Relative Importance of operations for subgoal cprrjpjetjpn ________

B01 Try to open it and send FO up and look whatssoine on, air leakage ?

TO

v-y^c^rr,*^oVi

,^<in»

l^>ftw»

1-'-

1 =

1 3f 3 4 5

I 1 X 1—I Unimportant jmportam-

B02v Stop l^JJCrMtand check that reactor and„ri)uieriOwejr-aecrea5e

RO/TO; ? « ~ - . | . Uftimppftant "X

important B03 Try getisolaftpn yalvefcom cycling check for eiectncai control failer etc.

TO 1 % 3 4 3

1" -f X ' I — % Cini«tpt)(tah< Important

B04? erose«A15S004 TO 2 i i i

■I I X I ■>-<S.V.-.^'W<it-..W,SS',: .;,,,..■

important BOS Check level regulator

■I X f 4toi«ipwt«n! important

Sequences Relative importance of sequences for g,MP9^1..Q,omp^tig|ri„,„ _ _ _ _ _ _

BS1 i i i

i I I Utiimportant important

- 5 1 7 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage C


Relative importance of detections for | Time XX XX

;C~1 I iPowBr^rjctftssft&ttd tmtmg steam i 7<M%

High steam flow out of steamgen ! TO ¥ 8 1 „v lowenag &>. eajttpressure.

i. % ' i' i. i

4JrHD)9on_Bt ' fcttpertaE*- j

^mttiportas* - * - * -

^moottaw CD3^ Flow d>ff Y M S amdme otnet steam i TO

i


Operations Relative Importance of operations for subqoal completion

C01 Scram reactor,check turbine tnp RO

C02 Close all isolation vatves RAxxS003, close Jeed water»thedef&cs _ftafnowiprftTOr<«aam itnft fY~Rl S\

n^^^^^ f r * * * *^**^ en

s i i 1 5 fcjWJ>J>»jfrjl» M H I I ^ l U H t l IIJjj|lJIJI.-» W IT It F, ^ 6 C


TO i i i

Unimportant 4~*H important 1

CQ3 Devide header in twise, by closing RA50S002

TO i i "■ 4 5

| 1 i__^__j Unimportant

C04 Close YAI5S001 to protect against fast cooling of primary side

important

■i 5 RO 1 1 I X-H


COS I StairboBttm.dsclaire emergency \ RO situation


Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for JEUfeapal.cpmrjJejtlpn.

CS1 X ' * * 4 5


■518-

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative importance of detections for sybgpal completion.. „ ,

DDt X Unimportant

-rrT~ -Important

DD2 X

r—T _4__| Unimportant 'moorta*!

DD3

DD4

DDS

Operations

D01

D02

X Unimportant important

X "< * 5 *

Unimponant important

X 1 2 3 4 5

I I I 1 Unftppoitant important

Relative Importance of operations for sMbgoai completipn


X 1 *

i * 5

- : Unimportant important

D03 X

Unirnportas? important

D04

DOS

S e q u e n c e s

X I -i r ■ t

4 5 4 — |


X i i i * & Ji i in iWiwtiWrt

,wwnATnnfiVM)nnyrt«i

ni,iry»iT

Utiimpoita* Important

Relative importance of sequences for ,s_ba£aJLcoj<Mfilte.n.., „ — _ _

DS1 X Unimportam Important

- 5 1 9 -

Experiment: MRC-Alarms protect

Crew No.. Position: Scenario No.: 16



L___J Scenario analysis and weighting of factors

l„....„J Qn____sc_ong, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

-_an_rJ9._„___ Turbine trip

■■MfiBiAftwyWJJJJJw

In this scenario two, possibly three events occur simultaneously, Stuck valve RN11S002 lead to a turbine trip, and a measurement fault gives some confusing alarms to.the operator. Tie measurement faults are pf no cprtseguence omerw_* RS17 SQ04stuck open m*S'j_-rmal position, and when steam to turbme ends there will be tow level in low pressure pre-heaterand a trip of.condensatepump RNl 7.

Subgoal description Relative Impprtance of stage for main 9Q31 CPrrmietJoq

Ctosingotvaive BNI1S002 .high ievei in j I RjmBOO) with tiwbinetnp. J i i i i i

i i i .. i N ^ i i GrawPOHam wiRSrtant

JEstematednme: 4 m w

|Swc*.cpen valve &tl?$90g „*™Tc-w)mi in pre-heater with condensate pump Rtj" 11 trip.

Estemated timer

i > 3 < 3

X i S \—I Unimportant Important

TPllToOl Measurement fault

'■■

i Estetnat&dtime: ® ntotf tt


- 5 2 0 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections

ADi High level aiantt tp^ondensate tanjfc RNHBGuJ,

RO/TO I Check V

TO

I AD2 ] | Turbme tap TO |

AD3 Power decrease, reactor side

AD4

AD5

Operations

A01 Try to get FO out for hand maneuvering valve, a f ist action

A02 Checking of turbme trip as stop valves,gen breaker,so turbme stop

A03 checking power decrease steam pressure and by pass valves

A04

A05

Sequences

AS1

\ |

RO

TO

TO

RO/TO

i

Relative Importance of detections for subqoal completion

L i i i i i


i i. 5 4 i i M/* * i r ' -{■- /k -\ ■?


1 _ 3 4 5 | ^ | _™_ j j


X ! ; S # 5


X ' * 4 * * 1 ) 1 1 1 1 ( 1 1 1

Unimportant Important Relative importance of operations for SubgpaJ.G.QmflJe.tiou

i r 3 i 5

j A, i X 1 Unimportant important

1 - 9 4 5

i ! A i i Unimportant Important

< i l •* <

UttimPQitant important

X * ? ' * *

j ' - l1 ■" -IA V J J *J ■""■'ft rm>T i rn i i - - - r f


X ' 2 3 *

5

! ! 1 f 1 1 I I 1 1 Unimportant important

Relative Importance of sequences for subgoal comoletlon

X l 2 3 4 5


Time XX XX

r

- 5 2 1 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections RO/TO

fBDI i _atm.itomiowfcvelTO,pw|^s>w«. f T ^ pre- neater f

BD2 Trip of RN17 pump TO

BD3

BD4

BD5

Operations

B01 Checking formate RH10 about level alarm and tripped pump

TO f

B02 J No further operation « TO

B03

B04

B05

Sequences

BS1

Check V

Relative Importance of detections for subqoal completion

i i i i i


i i i i i


X . 2 3 4 3 I * > . ' i


X ' 2 3 4 ' i ! i t !

Unimportant Important X 1 2 3 4 5

I I I ! 1

1 1 1 I i Unimportant Important

Relative importance of operations for 8jibpjaaJ_ojrmJetJpp.

1 2 3 4 5

Unimportant important ! 2 3 4 $

Nk' ! 1 I ! /fS, 1 1 1 - 1

Unimportant Important X 1 2 3 4 5

! 1 ! i Unimportant Important


X j * » ; f Unimportant Important

Relative Importance of sequences for subgpal completion

X * 2 3 * 5 ' i 1 1 1 i 1 i 1 I


Time XX XX

- 5 2 2 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative Importance of detections for s u b g ^ p p j n r j M p j L . ^ , . . . . ,

CD1 Alarm from TF11T001 RO

l J 3 4 5

I X j r-H Unimpotisnt important

CD2 Alarm from'ltDlOTOOl RO

CD3

f—-~!*"—yfv—-j—■—| Unimportant important

X 1 2 3 4 5 | j 1 ^ J


CD4 X 1 I I I I


CD5 X 4™~f~H—I


Operations Relative Impprtance of operations for jMbgja__som___t __

C01 Checking from formates if there could be an measurement fault

RO 1 2 3 4 5

i x i i ; Unimportant Important

C02 Send FO out for checking ofTF measurements in the system and rnmnarp ttipm

RO 1 „ 3. 4 5

I—X—I—HH Unlrnportant Important

C03 From format YDOO check if there are some other temp raising, and compare •hem with VniftTlVll

RO 1 2 3 4 5

1 1 X i s Unimportant Important

C04 X Unimportant

i Important

C05 X I I I

Unimportant; Important

S e q u e n c e s

i_mnmnnnrt—Mg *

Relative importance of sequences for jSjn^palCQmpletJPR . „

CS1 RO X *

2 3 * s


- 5 2 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections

DDl

RO/TO Check V

—

Relative importance of detections for 3u,b^pa|.cpmpjejp,n,

x * i \—!-

UnthTPeitaftS important

DD2 X

Unimportant -4 ___!

Important

DD3

DD4

X } _ »



DDS X I' ' »

H Unimportant Important

Operations Relative importance of operations for subooal completion ,

DOI X Unimportant Important

D02 X \ r—*■


D03 X ! *

J

hH—f Unimportant Important D04

D05

x • » » I I !


X T 2 3

+~ Unimportam Important

Sequences Relative importance of sei g.M.bgpal.cpmpigtiQn

uences for

DS1 X < 2 3

I I I Unimportant Important

-524-

Experiment: NSC-Alarms protect Scenario No. .17 Crew No.: Position: Administration: Run No. ■


Scenano analysis and weighing of factors

On-lma sranng, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

S^gnatto„nam,e.,

Reactor scram

Wain goal o-escriptlpn A faulty signal causes a reactor trip. The resulting transient reveais a stuck feedwater control valve and one control rod is stuced in it's out of core position.Stuck feed water valve are leading to steam generator; level cycling between high and low.Control roAsefc'not .leading; to, nothing special, only operator has to observe it A drainage tank pump malfunctions:)!! die unrelated TE System of the plant. Later.a spurious radiation alarm is generated and the Rt92D0Ol pump trips, Both are unrelated.

Stage Subgoal description Relative importance of stage for main 9 M S P . m P M i g " . ...>,..,,,.


Estemated time: .Main, g I (Jycling of level in steam generator.

Estemalep timq:. IS mm

i i i i i [ t . ' V M " i " " " " M |


ahum. i i i i 5

r~H~~ rf~-f—~\ Ummpottam Important

Esfemat-0-f/ffle?.t9nMn^'mte

^tvtpjrinj. «f=PT .o-mnM

X

25 mm

- 5 2 5 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative importance of detections for .sM.p.flealc.omp,igtjp.o _,

ADl Alarm ji;(jm.iea«o^prvte«ion sy$te«s NRO/M

AD2 Reactor scram and turbines tnp

UntmjKjrtant

RO/TO i i i i

i l l j X Unimportant important

AD3 By-pass valves open and el power decrease.Steam pressure are rising.

TO 1 2 3 4 3

f~—H"">K—'I—"\ Unimportant Important

AD4 All control rod insertect, one controll, rod not inserted

BO Unimportant

AD5 X

Unimportant important Operations Relative importance of operations for

subooal completien A01 Obsemogalarin W

Unimportant Important A02 Check for reactor trip and that turbines will trip

[RO/TO

A03 TO check from trend formate 1 '1 that by-pass valve and-swam pressure heave nnrmnl f**»n hral_»r« *m» nrwm

J W M . B "

i i i *. > »»»_i | | |W. 'A_- . ._CT_J_i_W_l_Ji{^ . ■■■■■■■5


TO

A04 RO checking for under critical condition, ail controll dodsdown, i-twlritip OOP rawttmnn


RO 1 2 1 * 3

I 1 j i X Unimportant important

A05 X t 2 3

_liRSpOS#$:

Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for ?.»,pgpgl, completion

AS1 X

ymmoostant important

- 5 2 6 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996


BD5 X ' f

3 4 * Unimportant Important

Operations Relative Importance of operations for aMfagpalgprnpletlpr). , _.,

B01 dose valve befcre«gul|i^v8r*™&&» group controller R_20UD01 ofanaiett vulw h* rlnwl

TO

Unimportant important B02 send FO. up for hand operate* TO

5 s i A %

^njmpoj-tsnr itn&mrt B03

X i * J ■* J Wt»*w.w i . * i - *T i» i i t;iji;i'i'u'. ■'j ,II, j

iawpenm

i i i i i

Uotmpoaant important

i- _

■/fespoitarit,-

- 5 2 7 -

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Stage C

Detections RO/TO I Check Relative impprtance of detections for _ubflp^|,s.pmpi.eti°n..,.v...,,.,.

Time XX XX

CD1 Measurement TE_ysho«Jr«gb,teyer but pump will tnp from proteaiofi

Unimportam

C D 2 Radiation alarm in oveftvley.picture and in alarm table.

TO

CD3

OD4

I \" I X. "\ UnimpotWBi; aonnrtanjt,


CD5 X

Unimportant

_ i _ _ _ _ ! — ^ Important

Operations Relative impprtance of operations for SHpgpal.cprnRlg.tlO-X.

C01 RO take automatic ofibr TB23 tank; \ -*RO


C 0 2 TO check for troeor<falsesigflai,by checking ,are mere leakage in steam

TO i i i i i


C03 X

H I !'" !—I Unimportant Important

C04 X J S i 4 i

i i i—i—i Unimportant Important

C05 X ! *

j 4 } > X " A A ^ h ^ w £ b (JUJlHimu^utl JT^_4_L«_«^LJLJI—«>■*■«**{


Sequences Relative importance of sequences for -Mh8PJjc_CTPJ_ftton^ „

CS1 RO X ?

Unimportant r-f-

Important

- 5 2 8 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative importance of detections for Time .guj(gp,a.Ucjrfflpt|9ti.pn.. - _ L _ _

AJlan_JuvmtdppedpumpRL9-D001 spTO

DD2

^i ? 3 4 *.

4JnimD0rtftni Important

I

unimportant +-f 4. important

DD3

DD4

| i i i * i


I i, i I i i 4-—-*I^M*■^^^^■wwrfw^y^'^-' ■■■■-■ ■■ ,i. ^--■■■■j

Onlmportant. important W J . v . y w. ' . - . y ,i,i.>y <■

DD5 X 3 4 5

! \ \ Unimportant. important-

Operations Relative importance of operations for 8Mbq,pa).corr)Rl.9t[an _____

D01 Check pump and reset it TO

1 i 3 4 i

i X I—HH Unimportant Important

D02 X 1 4 * 4 5 i*«g««m«JJEW_. U J j l « 11111111| !■■■■■■■■ l l


D03 X J ? 3 * 5


D04 X

tfnimponaM important

D05

Sequences

■l«)t_Coj>*«*Ml__.» l j _-_-JtK——j


Relative importance of sequences for ,su)?gpai.c.9rr)Rleti.pn. _

DS1 XL 5 _ a 4 £

{ ■ w w i w y i M J ) M i i i ' L'f ■ ■ ■ ■ jdii n ■ ■$ ■'' i i ' ( * ' j


-529-

Experiment: NSC-Alarms protect

Crew No.: Position: Scenario No.: 18



I ! Scenano analysis and weighting of factors

On-line sconng, data from debnefing, audio/video or eye tracking data

Scenario name Failure of generator to trip

JMalajLQaLpj?5.C.rJpJJPJL There-will be an faulty trap alarm in the beguuug, Tft« stator cooiant-flo* increases inadvertently and is noticed by ft FO, who is instructed to „e TJt>w.wdaee-d)^flow^j!4ta»<ltIhere is no control of this Uom tbecontm?»o»$: TueFfjr&amswaim_jw-mdiUwfcS»ie4ttPi$ij^&generated. IBowever.(hebreaker fefls _» tipea s3»K!matiC4Jily, and4ta& ta^»_pm.i_mmuy i-Mtsr tipeiwojs 4o not notice this,, the

Stage Subgoal description Relative Importance of stage for main .g.p.aLcpmp|ettpn..

Trap alarm TZQ3K405

Estimated tome: j m a t , . D i s i ^ « e e ~ - " " " * " " " SS70

^ , . 7 8)_fr Estemateti irm&:

i 2 3 4 5 I t-x-\—I—I Unimportant Important

i 4 J

(jdunpoiwdi important

to open. ? 5 ? * J | ^ _ _ j _ _ _ | 1 ^


Estematedtime: 9 - " min

- 5 3 0 -

Stage A

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative importance of detections for ■jwwsffi"ffJu'iVjfttlwiAK^ ■_' ■-'

Time XX XX

|ADi A: r

St f» *&jwrfnrM<&J^

,4toe^f**^^ iW-HMirmannia: K^*?

«rcmr»ftsfrtf

i*D&, '

Unimportant Important AD4 X > 2 } 4 5

I I I I I Unimportant Important AD5 X iJnlrnppitanfe

3 4 5

important Operations Relative importance of operations for

snbgga|..cgmpletlon .,.. A01 Sending FO out for check RO

Unimportant - l - - l I

Important A02 Look for other thing ,as leakage RO

% t 3 4 5

UnJmBotiant important A03 X

-t-Unimportant Important

A04 X S 3 7 4 i

h I I- I I Unimportant * , Important

A05 X _ 4

f~H— Unimportant important

Sequences

A$1

Relative importance of sequences for .gHfegsatoroptetiqn ,.., ... X i i i ** i

8_jnpp__t _ Snpoj!_S

- 5 3 1 -

Stage B

NRC-Alarm, 1996

Detections

BD1 " Alarm from $Qw4i$fa

RO/TO

Ttr

Check _____

Relative importance of detections for W / ; ' " i y r t l > - t H

Time xx xx

i % & i i. ff;j tm- •!& ■ 3 ■ i > y w * » . > , J ^ , > i

msMmtA BD2 .

Atermftomitfew fas? TO > 5 'J

Unlmpoijant BD3

BD4

BD5

Operations

i — 1 1 h dnjipportant important

£ . 5 * 3 * 5 *» fertftV*»y>lj'.

1.lr.l,l I liwju ■!■■■__! | I J HI LUl i

JUnimporant _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ important

X ! 'Unimportant important

BQ1 SendingrJKOsottt for adjusting flow

Relative importance of operations for j-Mbaoal completion

TO' i i } 4 i

j"!i,,

"/K' H f H Unimportant Important

B02. Call FO to take itmunedwtely up, TO i

+--+ 4 5

-H-X Unimportant Important

BO*

BQ4 , « ^ ™ _ ,

J 5 _ i * J rfi ' „ i i i

ynthwwar* important

im4ti$$msr_ Important

B05; i i t

1 ! M I vUniraportaot*- Important

Sequences Relative impprtance of sequences for subooal completion

BS1 - ~-Turbine trip, generator brake? fail to open ,__<igeti.wor3c$?a- motor

TO


- 5 3 2 -

Stage C

NRC-Alarm, 1996


Relative Importance of detections for ___-_,—,—___

exif - '■ <t,< i - -generator, trip signal, and high "backpftwer"

TO <**„ S '

Unimportant * -%H important

CD2 Generator act as motor TO

* >

^nlmbeaant-' .. j...H,.^^.>W^^bf_MWMJ

important 003*

X i i

Unimpprtant5- Important

CD4 * J X

s 3'

1 ! I I ! arSmportan* • itnportant

CDS X - * * * "« i

Unimportant - Important

Operations Relative Importance of operations for .subo^ajc^njpletlpn.

Q01 4. _ x&&M9ret$m0t$to$mzm&i „ turbine is still in 3000 rpm.and high ra harJf nowftn

i $ i i, $

4lntaportan!i important

C02 Open braker and Check that turbme will slow down '

TO 1 1 3 ' * 5

f I I IX Unimportant important

C03 X J *- *- < * I 1 1 1 - 1

Unimportant important C04

X ( M i l

Unimportant important C05

X -j-"—!""■ I i"


Sequences Relative Importance of sequences for SMt?gP_gflmi^_tlgn,,,,,,, ___

CS1 i H a i


- 5 3 3 -

Stage D

NRC-Alarm, 1996


DD4 X 3 " S 3 4 3

I I I I I Unimportant important

DD5 X T


Operations Relative Importance of operations for .s.wfegpal.cpjnplejitea,,,,,^

DOl X " . " J . ' - l i f

- Unimportant -Important


D04 X » * ' * s

I I I I I Unimportant important 005 X * j * * *

Vi. it 1 i 1 ...J..........I Unimportant important

Sequences Relative importance of sequences for .gu.b.gpal.c.grpptetJo.ri

DS1 X Unimpoi

2 3 4 5

i I I I important

- 5 3 4 -

D. MSA|L4&|S0|| iTO Time Window

-535-NEXTPAQE(S)

»•« BLANK

Time Widow of Operator Actions

• Scenario Number: 1 • Stage (A, B.C, Dor A - l , A-2,..): A

Alarm RN52B00I

I I ' I I I ' I J I _____ I I _____ ' I _L_L J I _____ _____ I I Snun

I I

API

AC 2

AC 3

?(Before Second Ala m)

AC1

?(As soon as Send F( I out) AQ2

?(Be ore FO ca I)

?(Befort FOcall)

?(2min after FO} ive inform ition) A 03

?' 3min aftef FO give information,)

?i As soon ai Turbine dip) •4- AQ4

?(1 min ffter turbinje trip)


Scenario Number: I Stage(A, B,C, Dor A-I.A-2,..): B

Smin. after makeup valve stuck open malfunction injection

I I I I I I I I I I I I ■ ■ f J I J I J_J L_L 8nun

I ' I I _____ I I

BD1 ?(C_nnot decided)

BOl

BC2

BO 3

BD2


• Scenario Number: 1 . St_ge(A,B,C, DorA-l,A-2,..): C-1

High level alarm from RHISWOOl it

' » J I J I J I I I I I _____ I ' _____ I ' I I _L_L I I I I 8nun

1 I

CD1

_> CC1


Scenario Number: 1 Stage(A,B,C,DorA-l,A-2,..): C-2

Alarm from RDIO system * 1

I '

CD2

_____

CC2

_____ 8mjn

I I I I I I - l _ _ _ _____ J I _____ ,1 I I I ' I I I


• Scenario Number: I . Stage (A, B, C,D or A-1, A-2,..): D-l

<_n

High level alarm from RHIS " 1

DD1

J I

DC 3

DPI

I I ,2

» ' I ' I I I I I _____ I I J I _____ I I I '

DC3

8nun I I I I


Scenario Number: 1 St_ge(A,B,C,DorA-l,A-2,..): D-2

FO give information for RN system(response for AOl)

4 -

J I .1

' I

DQ2

JL_L J I t-_-

CD2

£ I5

I I I ' ' ' ' I i

' i i i ' 8 nun

I I I I. J I


Scenario Number: 2 Stage(A,B,C,DorA-l,A-2,..): A-1

Alarm from RCP relief magnetic _ _ _ ■ J

i_

ADl

I I _____ J

2

I I * I I

AD2 -- 10 sec after pump trip alarm

_____ a

4 i i I I J I _____

8 min I I I. I _____ I I

Time Widow of Opera to r Actions

Scenario Number: 2 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): A-2

Reverse rotation start

_____ _L_L j2

' ' I ■ I ' I _____ I I I I I I _____ _____ 8 min

' I J 1

AD3

AC1

A02

AQ3

A04

Time Widow of O p e r a t o r Actions

Scenario Number: 2 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): B

Sealing leakage

_____ I I I I ' I I I i l l ' L_L j5

I 1 I I 8 nun

______ _____ _____ _____

BD1

BD2

BOl

B02

BQ3

B04


Scenario Number: 2 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): C

Sealing leakage

I ' _____ I I I I I i I ' I I I I 5

I i I I I I I I 7 8min

COl

C02

C03

CD1

CC4



Alarm from bearing temperature

I I _____ _____ 2

■ ■ ' I ' ' I I I

API

AD2

AOl

AQ2 ?(E earing tem p. > 100)

?(Bearing temp> 10)) A 03

I I

?(Bear ng temp. 110)

8 nun I I I I I ' ' I I _____ _____ ' '



Turbine Trip

_n ■C-

oo

I I .

AD3

AT3A

AOA

2 ' II ' '

3 I t II I

8nun ' ' ' ' ' ' _ _ L I I I 1 ' '


Scenario Number: 3 Stage (A, B, C,D or A-1 , A-2,..): B

Turbine Tt

1 1

BD1

?(On gen.

?(0n gen.

ip

1 1

BC

jreakerop

breakerop

BD2

1

B02

ming) E

_ing) E

1 1

03

04

7(2

7(2

2 1 1

?(E

)sec after

) sec after

1 1

ejfpre valv

Sen. break

Den. break

3 1 1

RAXXSt

eropen)

er open)

1 1

06 close)

.4 1 1 I I _I__L _____ I I - 1 - 1 — .

8nun


• Scenario Number: 3 • Stage (A, B,C, Dor A-1 , A-2,..): C

O

Control rod group fell down to bottom

' ' I ' ' I I I ' ' 1 ' '

CD1

CD2

COl

CC2

CO 3

CO 4

' ' 8 nun

' ' ' ' ______ I I _____ J I 1 I


Scenario Number: 4 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): A

Alarm from sealing water flow low YD14F00I

(_»» (_»»

-L_J l—l

AD1

AD2

AD3

AOl

A02

I I

- _ _ 1

AC 4

_____ I I I I I I I I I I I Ii I I ' ' 1 ' ' 8nun

I I I I I I


Scenario Number: 4 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): B

Faulty measurement and opening of YP12S08 " 1 2

_____

BD1

BD2

J l

BD3

BOl

BQ2

I I. _____ I I I I I I I I j I I ' _____ _____ I I I I

Time Widow of Opera tor Actions

• Scenario Number: 4 . Stage (A, B,C, Dor A-1, A-2,..): C

Let down valve open

CD1

CC1

C03

CD2

CQ2

_____ _____ P -L_l L_J_

_L_J L_L _____ _L_L 8 nun

I I _____ _____


Scenario Number: 4 Stage (A, B,C, Dor A-1, A-2,..): D

Humidity alarm af

_____ ______ I I _____ _____ _____ I I I I _____ -L__ I I I I I I I I, 8nun

I V/i

DPI

DD2

DD3

DPI

DQ2

PQ3

DC4

DOS


Scenario Number: S Stage (A, B, C,D or A - 1 , A-2,,.): A

Alarm from seawater if

_____

I

I

AD1

AQ2

I I

AOl

I I J I I I. I 1 I I I .1. J I 1 8 nun J I _____ I I


Scenario Number: S Stage (A, B, C,D or A-1, A-2,..): B-l

Gas alarm transformer

_____ I I J I _____ I I I I I I I I 8 nun

_____ _l_l L_L I I I I

BD1

BD2 (On transfotiner trip)

BD3

BD4

_BOI

B02

BQ3

B04


• Scenario Number : S . Stage (A, B, C,D or A-1, A-2,..): B-2

Diesel trip «f

.1 I

BDS

- J

B05

_____ _____ 8mjn

I I I I _____ I I _____ _____ _____ I I I I


Scenario Number: S Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): C

Diesel Trip

______ I I. J I I2

I L i I I 8 nun

_____ I I I I L-L _____ _____ _____ I I

CD1

CC1

CC2

CC3


« Scenario Number: 6 • Stage (A, B,C, Dor A-1, A-2,.,): A

From synchronizing of generator

I I I I I I I 8nun

___l_ ______ I I

API

AD2

I I I _____ _____ I I I I ______

AOl

AQ2

AQ3

Time Widow of Ope ra to r Actions

Scenario Number: 6 . Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): B

I

s I

Closed RL72S03

_____

BD1

BO!

I I I I

BQ2

B0|3

I I I I _____ _____ _____ I ' _____ I I 8min

I I _____ ' I


• Scenario Number : 6 • Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): C

_ t

Leak in steam generator initiated

" ' P I I j 1 I 1 I I I I i I I

CD1

CP3

C D 4

8 n u n _____ I I _____ I I _____ ' I 1 I ______ _____

CP2

CO I

C02

C04

COS


Scenario Number: 8 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-l, A-2,.,). A

Start of Scenario

I I I I _____ I I * 1 ■ I I ■ f I I I I _ _ l _ _____ _____ _____ I I _____

AOl

AO


Scenario Number : 8 . Stage (A, B,C, Por A-l, A-2,..): B

Alarm from sealing water flow and stop of normal sealing water pumps

P P I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I J—J l_ l I I 7

I I I I I 8 min

_____]

BPI

BD2

BD3

BD4

BOI

B02

B03

B04

BC5


Scenario Number: 9 Stage (A, B, C,D or A-l, A-2,..): A

Oil leakage call from FO

I ty>

i i

API

AOl

_____ ______ _____ _____ I I ' I I I ' I I I ,J—i 8min

_____ I I I I _____


Scenario Number: 9 Stage (A, B, C, P or A-1, A-2,..): B

Trip of sea water pump

J I

BPI

J I

BOl

I I I I I

B03

BO 4

I I _____

B02

_ _ L J |_ _| 1 I I J I j I I I 8min

I L ______ _____


Scenario Number: 9 Stage (A, B, C, P or A-1, A-2,..): C

Alarm from containment pressure

" 1 ' I J I _L_I l_JL _____ _____ _L_I L-JL 1 I..

J J6 ,7 8mjn I I I I I I I I I I I, I I I I

CP1

CP2

CP3

CD 4

COl

CQ2

CQ3

C04


• Scenario Number : 11 . Stage (A, B, C, P or A-1, A-2,..): A

Beginning of scenario *f

I I _____ I I j__ 8 nun _____ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

API

AOl

<_t ON -~1


Scenario Number: 11 Stage (A, B,C,PorA-l,A-2,..): B

Alarm high pressure in condenser (SPl 1P00I)

B ) l

B ) 2

I I

BOl

B02

______ ______ I I ______ J I _____ I I J I

BP3

J I 8 nun

1 I I I II I I _____

BM

B03


• Scenario Number : 11 • Stage (A, B,C, Dor A - l , A-2,..): C-1

Alarm RP50U101

______

i_n

_■

J I

CPI

COl

I I I I J I _____ 8nun

_I_L J I I I ______ I I I I


Scenario Number : 11 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-l, A-2,..): C2

Alarm SH50U101

-_i o

I I

CD!

,____

I I I I I

CD3

CO::

2

I I I I I

CC"

_____ _| I _____ _____ J l I J _____ I ' 8nun


Scenario Number : 11 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1, A-2,..): D

Alarm from bleed 1 and turbine trip SAS0K301GO1

_____

BDI

BD1

J I

DPI

DQ2

P I I il I I

8 nun ______ J I _____ I I _____ I ' I I I I _____ I ' _____


Scenario Number: 12 Stage (A, B, C, D or A - l , A-2,..): A

Start of RM13D001

f I I I I

API

AOl

AOl

I I I I I I I I I I I I l l f l l | l l f l ' l ' ' f ' ' I I I I I I


Scenario Number: Stage (A, B, C, D or A-l, A-2,..).

Trip ofRM pumps (all) RMl I, 12, 13 DO! * 1 *

<_t --) t*>

J I

BD1

-L.I

BOl

I I

BP2

J I

BD3

BD4

I I I ' 1. I _____ ______ _____ ______ ' I I ' _____ _l__l 8mJn


Scenario Number: 12 Stage(A,B,C,PorA-l,A-2,..): C

Low voltage in busbars FU, FV, EM (alarms EMOOKOOIGOl, ER, FA 7?

______ I

_______ _ _ _ _ _ I I I I I 8 nun

_____ I I I ' J I _L_L I I I I I I _____

CD1

______

COl

CQ2

CQ3

CQ4

COS


t_n

t_n

Scenario Number : 13 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-1 , A-2,..): A

Start of scenario

_I_L i i _____ ______ I i I I . i i 8 nun

_____ I I I I I I I I I I I

AD1

AOl A02


Scenario Number: 13 Stage (A, B, C,D or A-l, A-2,..): B

Gradient alarm from RBI IT807P0I it

_____ I ' I I J I J

3

I I I I I I I I I _____ _____ .6

' I I I I ■ I I I 8 nun

BD1

BD2

BD3

BOl

BQ2

BQ3

BQ4


Scenario Number : 13 Stage (A, B, C, D or A-l, A-2,..): C

- J - J

Alarm from high temperature after cooler TC10W02 (TC10T005H01)

______ I '

CD2

I 1

DI

I ;P4

:D5

co I

l l 1 l l

CQ2

_____

C03

J I 1 1 1 I I 8nun

J I I I _____ I I I I _____


Scenario Number: 14 Stage (A B, C P or A-l, A-2,.,): A

Generator trip (SPI0K003)

00

______

AD

J I

AD

AO

A3

AO

_____ I ' l l ' l l l l l L_J I I I I I I I I I I 4 J . J6 7 8mjn

1


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BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SHEET Performing Org.

Report No. Sponsoring Org.

Report No. Standard

Report No. INIS Subject Code

KAERI/RR-1693/96 Title / Subtitle The Development of Human Factors Experimental Evaluation

Techniques

Project Manager and Department

Bong Stuck Sim MMIS Lab

Researcher and Department

Bong Shick Sim, In Suk Oh, Kyung Ho Cha, Hyun Chul Lee, Geun Ok Park, Se Woo Cheon, Sang Moon Suh, (MMIS Lab)

Publication Place

Taejon Publisher KAERI Publication Date

July, 1997

Page 589 P 111. & Tab. Yes(o), No ( ) Size 19Cm x 25.7Cm Note

Classified Open( o ), Restricted( ), Class Document

Sponsoring Org.

Report Type

Contract No.

Research Report

Abstract (15-20 Lines)

New human factors issues, such as evaluation of information navigation, the consideration of operator characteristics, and operator performance assessment, related to the HMI design based on VDUs are being risen. Thus, in order to solve these human factors issues, this project aims to establish the experimental technologies including the techniques for experimental design, experimental measurement, data collection and analysis, and to develop ITF(Integrated Test Facility) suitable for the experiment of HMI design evaluation. For the establish of the experimental data analysis and evaluation methodologies, we developed as the followings :

- a paradigm for human factors experimentation including experimental designs, procedures, and data analysis

- the methods for the assessment of operator's mental workload - DAEXESS(data analysis and experiment evaluation supporting system)

Also, we have established a experiment execution technologies through the preliminary experiments, such as the suitability evaluation of information display on a LSDP, the evaluation of computerized operation procedure and an experiment of advanced alarm system(ADiOS). Fianally, we developed the ITF including human machine simulator, telemetry system, an eye tracking system, an audio/video data measurement system, and three dimensional micro behaviour analysis system

Subject Keywords (About 10 words)

Experimental Evaluation, Human Factors Integrated test Facility, Human Factors Evaluation, Human Error, Human Factors Experiment, Data Analysis and Experiment Evaluation Supporting System(DAEXESS)

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