BAB I

PENDAHULUAN

Pembangunan di Indonesia terus dilakukan melalui berbagai program,

namun keberhasilannya belum sepadan dengan investasi karena antara lain

kurang memperhatikan partisipasi masyarakat (Colletta dan Kayam, 1987).

Dengan demikian diperlukan pendekatan-pendekatan yang pelaksanaannya

mengikutsertakan masyarakat. Partisipasi masyarakat dalam pembangunan

merupakan kebutuhan dasar seperti halnya kebutuhan sandang, pangan,

papan, pendidikan, kesehatan dan transportasi ( Sumardi dan Evers, 1982).

FAO (1991) menegaskan bahwa partisipasi masyarakat adalah hak azasi,

sehingga masyarakat harus diberi kesempatan untuk berpartisipasi dalam

melaksanakan pembangunan. Kesempatan tersebut perlu diberikan karena

tujuan pembangunan adalah untuk meningkatkan taraf hidup masyarakat

sesuai dengan yang mereka inginkan. Masyarakat sendiri yang akan

merasakan dan menilai apakah pembangunan tersebut berhasil atau tidak.

Maka agar tujuan pembangunan sesuai dengan yang diharapkan oleh

masyarakat dan pemerintah diperlukan persepsi yang sama antar individu

yang terlibat dalam pembangunan.

1. Persamaan persepsi diperlukan mulai dari apa yang harus ditempuh,

bagaimana implementasinya, monitoring dan evaluasi. Akhirnya pendekatan

partisipatif disadari mutlak diperlukan dalam mencapai keberhasilan

pembangunan.

2. Menyadari pentingnya partisipasi masyarakat dalam pembangunan, telah

terbit berbagai buku pedoman untuk melibatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam

pembangunan. Misalnya Direktorat Jenderal Pembangunan Pedesaan (1995)

telah menerbitkan panduan untuk fasilitator tingkat desa tentang

Perencanaan Partisipatif Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa (P3MD) .

Sedangkan untuk Pengembangan Dataran Tinggi Nusa Tenggara diterbitkan

oleh Studio Drya Media (1994). Khusus di bidang pertanian telah terbit buku

panduan umum (FAO,1990) dan buku panduan untuk pertanian di lahan

kering hasil kerja sama dengan International Institute of Rural Reconstruction

((FAO dan IIRI,1995) . Pedoman khusus untuk pengembangan usahatani di

lahan rawa telah disusun oleh Mundy dan Muchtar (1996). Inti dari semua

buku pedoman tersebut adalah bahwa dalam melaksanakan pembangunan

terlebih dahulu perlu diawali dengan penerapan metode Participatory Rural

Appraisal (PRA).

Pembangunan mempunyai arti yang luas, termasuk membuat kebijakan yang

umumnya diperlukan segera untuk menanggapi isu-isu aktual yang sedang

berkembang. Agar kebijakan yang diterapkan dapat diimplementasikan

sesuai dengan isu yang ada, kebijakan tersebut juga harus dibuat melalui

partisipasi masyarakat. Untuk kepentingan tersebut, Bechstedt (1998) telah

menyusun tahapan dan prinsip-prinsip yang harus dilakukan oleh peneliti

dalam menerapkan metode PRA.

Dengan telah diterbitkannya berbagai buku pedoman tentang PRA dimana

satu dengan lainnya saling melengkapi , dirasakan perlu adanya satu metode

PRA yang utuh/lengkap. Tulisan ini mengemukakan metode PRA hasil

ramuan dari metode yang telah dikemukakan dan pengalaman penulis dalam

menerapkan metode PRA. Uraian tulisan meliputi empat hal yaitu: 1)

kegiatan yang perlu dilaksanakan sebelum melakukan PRA ( Pra -

Implementasi PRA). 2) tahapan dan pinsip-prinsip metode PRA.

3) Peningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat melalui pendekatan struktural dan

4) Peningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat melalui pendekatan kultural.

Informasi ini penting untuk menunjang keberhasilan pembangunan sekaligus

sebagai usaha terus mensosialisasikan metode PRA sebagai kebutuhan

dalam mewujudkan keberhasilan pembangunan.

BAB II

DAYA DAN PARTISIPASI

"Masalah petani harus dipecahkan sendiri oleh petani."

(Chamrat Muangyam - Presiden 'Petani

Federasi Thailand, dibunuh di Provinsi Rayong,

21 Juli 1979)

Mengaktifkan Dan Menonaktifkan Kekuasaan

Dalam bab sebelumnya kita berbicara tentang beberapa masalah utama

mata pencaharian para petani miskin, dampak lokal dari struktur nasional dan

supra-nasional serta kebijakan, dan berbagai tanggapan ekonomi kolektif.

Dalam bab ini kita akan mempertimbangkan konteks lokal sosial, budaya,

administratif dan politik di mana tanggapan ini dibuat. Kita akan fokus pada

peluang dan kendala yang dihadapi dalam proses mengatasi masalah

kehidupan. Tentu saja, sebagai salah satu peneliti tingkat desa menyatakan

itu "politik, perdagangan dan budaya diramu bersama-sama". Kita telah

melihat bagaimana beberapa kegiatan ekonomi dapat menyatukan orang

dalam konteks sosial yang lebih luas, dan bagaimana lainnya, eksternal

berasal, strategi ekonomi dapat memiliki efek untuk mencegah, membatasi

atau demobilisasi tindakan kolektif petani miskin.

Untuk batas tertentu petani miskin merasakan fenomena ekonomi (seperti

kebijakan kredit bank, penentuan harga, harga dijamin, beras premi, dll)

sebagai fenomena politik. Selain itu, beberapa factor sosial budaya yang

dirasakan oleh petani dari awal untuk menjadi masalah sosial besar dan

bukan hanya masalah sekunder ditemui di sepanjang jalan. Fokus utama

kami akan keterkaitan antara faktor-faktor ini, dan dinamis terakhir sejarah

mereka. Dikatakan bahwa kelemahan banyak analisis sebelumnya telah

menjadi membaca terlalu statis dan satu-dimensi potensi tertentu, nilai-nilai

lembaga atau bagian dari populasi. Hal ini dapat mengakibatkan salah

tempat optimisme atau pesimisme, dan untuk yang tidak perlu atas penilaian

kekuatan dan kelemahan dari berbagai partisipan.

Memang, ini adalah salah satu pelajaran dari pengalaman. Federasi Tani

Thailand (lihat Bab 3).

Studi kami menunjukkan ketidaktepatan prematur merancang sebuah neraca

"rintangan dan keterbatasan" "untuk partisipasi, di satu sisi, dan" faktor

pendukung dan potensi ", di sisi lain garis-garisnya tidak begitu jelas.

Mengingat ketidakpastian yang melekat dari upaya partisipatif, ada kesulitan

besar dalam generalisasi dan memprediksi baik titik di mana uang muka

dapat dilakukan, resistensi ini dapat ditemui, atau metode metode yang

mereka dapat diatasi.

Lembaga sosial atau unit administratif lokal seperti kelompok tani, lembaga-

lembaga sektor komersial swasta, agama atau keluarga akan diperiksa, tidak

begitu banyak sebagai entitas diskrit, melainkan dalam hal keterkaitan

ekonomi, budaya dan politik. Kita akan membahas hubungan antara resmi

dan sektor non-resmi dan antara lembaga proses informal dan formal (baik

legal dan ilegal). Termasuk menyembunyikan proses, penyembunyian rutin

pengambilan keputusan, sengaja dari pelaksanaan kekuasaan dan pengaruh.

Kita akan melihat kedua material dan fisik, dan juga kendala lebih budaya

dan ideologis: hukum dan peraturan, nilai-nilai tradisional, banding dan

nasihat. Sepanjang kita akan mengacu dan menilai kembali perbedaan yang

sering dibuat antara faktor-faktor yang berasal "eksternal" dari dan yang

berasal "internal" ke lingkungan sosial dan budaya langsung keberadaan

petani miskin '.

Struktur Lokal Kontrol dan Pengambilan Keputusan.

“Bagi orang-orang untuk mencintai bangsa mereka, pemerintah

harus memberikan mereka kesempatan untuk mencintai desa

mereka, Tambon mereka, kabupaten mereka, provinsi mereka,

negara mereka dan bangsa, dalam urutan itu. Ini berarti orang

harus memahami dan dengan jelas melihat bahwa mereka adalah

pemilik, Tambon mereka desa, kabupaten, provinsi dan negara,

bahwa mereka telah memiliki sertifikat dari desa dan Tambon dan

kabupaten, dari jalan dan jembatan, hutan dan waduk; yang

mereka memiliki bagian, suara (juta suan juta gaul) dalam

menjalankan desa mereka, Tambon mereka; kabupaten mereka,

dan sebagainya. Jika hal ini dapat dilakukan, dan dilakukan terus-

menerus dan di setiap langkah, semua orang akan mencintai

negara mereka dengan cinta yang benar-benar dirasakan dan

tidak hanya dibicarakan. "

Kharnman Konkhal.

"'So'n hai rak chaat" ("Pengajaran cinta negara"), Khruuparithat

(Yang telah dipelajari) Vol. 6, 1978.

Pada bagian ini presentasi mengikuti hirarki naik tingkat formal administrasi,

dari desa ke kecamatan, dan kabupaten ke provinsi. Ini akan menjadi jelas,

bagaimanapun, bahwa realitas pelaksanaan kekuasaan di tingkat lokal tidak

berarti hal ini hirarki formal. Laporan ini tidak menangani secara langsung

pertanyaan-pertanyaan dari sifat negara (lihat Bab 2 dan 3), Sebaliknya kita

memeriksa dan gejala manifestasi kekuasaan negara: kadang-kadang dalam

bentuk kekuasaan lokal yang, jika tidak selalu secara formal atau tanpa

kontradiksi, mungkin dianggap sebagai elemen penting yang merupakan

kekuasaan negara di pedesaan.

Tingkat Desa

Ketika sebuah fase 'Bina Lingkungan "berpikir dan kebijakan' dimulai sekitar

25 tahun yang lalu, sering kali ada anggapan bahwa" masyarakat desa "tidak,

memang, ada. Pandangan 'didorong oleh" pendekatan komunitas studi "ilmu

sosial . komunitas monograf ini-vil lages telah "pemimpin" - biasanya trio yang

terdiri dari kepala desa, kepala sekolah dasar, dan biarawan senior, yang,

diperkirakan, bisa didorong untuk bertindak sebagai agen "pembangunan"

dalam kepentingan "masyarakat". Ada harapan dan persatuan

exhortationsthat solidaritas masyarakat dan dapat ditentukan. Namun ini

dimana saat peningkatan populasi dan migrasi ke tanah baru telah

mengakibatkan pembentukan desa baru dan perluasan dari "alam vil-lages"

ke dalam pengelompokan terus menerus rumah tangga dibagi menjadi unit

admin-administratif, sekolah daerah tangkapan, dll ini tidak selalu tumpang

tindih atau sesuai dengan pola komunitas yang lebih tua. Lebih penting lagi,

fenomena ini bertepatan dengan peningkatan percepatan dalam diferensiasi

sosial ekonomi dan birokratisasi di daerah pedesaan. Ini akan menjadi suatu

kesalahan untuk membesar-besarkan tingkat otonomi desa dan homogenitas

pada jaman dulu, tetapi tetap memungkinkan untuk dem-onstrate yang

tingkat tertentu otonomi dalam pengetahuan dan pengambilan keputusan,

kemandirian (istilah sudah usang pada bagian dari perencana pembangunan

tertentu), kerja sama dan egalitarianisme relatif ada yang kontras starkly

dengan realitas saat ini. Ini mungkin lebih nyata di daerah yang berbeda

budaya regional dari Utara dan Timur Laut, karena dalam sikap dan di desa-

desa yang lebih nuklir dan lebih lama didirikan terletak jauh dari pusat politik,

serta di desa-desa dimana aristokrasi penduduk atau pejabat luar yang

kurang . Tanpa berusaha untuk membangun semacam kenangan awal, kita

dapat menyarankan bahwa sebelum penetrasi pertama modal kolonial, dan

berlanjut lama setelah dalam beberapa wilayah ulang, ada asosiasi seluruh

komunitas untuk diri mereka sendiri, untuk mereka,. Vn sosial reproduksi.

Mereka termasuk eksternal, atau "horisontal" hubungan antar-desa, serta

jaringan antar-rumah tangga berdasarkan kekerabatan dan lingkungan.

Mereka terlibat berbagai bentuk pertukaran timbal balik dan redistributif

(misalnya, tenaga kerja untuk pertanian, dan tugas-tugas reproduksi

domestik, penyatuan tenaga kerja untuk komunal agama, finansial sehingga

¬ dan tugas irigasi) dan kolektif pengambilan keputusan dan tindakan. Dalam

kasus terakhir, aparat desa eksternal yang ditunjuk paling dominan adalah

berorientasi desa. n Selain itu, diferensiasi sosial berdasarkan usia, jenis

kelamin, pangkat ritual, dan status nakleng (singkat, "orang kuat") telah! dari

berat yang lebih besar daripada kekayaan dan kontrol atau akses ke alat-alat

produksi. Dalam penelitian kami, kami menemukan bahwa pengalaman dan

bentuk-bentuk kerjasama lokal dari masa lalu, ketika kontras dengan

sekarang, memungkinkan petani miskin untuk menilai sejauh mana dan

kualitas perubahan terkini dan menarik selektif pada nilai-nilai yang lebih tua

dan praktek, mengubah mereka, karena mereka lakukan, dalam rangka

memenuhi tantangan saat ini.

Di banyak desa besar merupakan minoritas kecil rumah tangga, sekitar 5

tetapi tidak lebih dari 10 persen, memiliki tingkat tertentu kekayaan, kontrol

atas sumber daya, dan memiliki prestise yang lebih besar dan kekuatan,

semua yang membedakan mereka dari mayoritas. Rumah tangga ini meliputi

(sering pada orang yang sama) pemilik tanah besar, pedagang komoditi,

penjaga toko, pejabat desa, guru, penggilingan padi dan rentenir yang

berasal dari keunggulan mereka dan koneksi eksternal serta aliansi. Mereka

adalah peran "menghubungkan" massa penduduk desa dengan struktur

negara dan pasar. Dasar untuk ini adalah kemampuan mereka untuk

mengumpulkan desa "surplus" melalui sewa, upah, harga eceran, menangani

komoditas dan bunga. Pada saat yang sama mereka mempertahankan posisi

mengendalikan mereka sebagai anggota komite desa (komite administrasi,

kuil dan komite sekolah, negara baru memulai kelompok tani, dll).

Dari sudut pandang administrasi kabupaten kepala desa dan kecamatan

adalah sangat penting. Mereka busur bertanggung jawab untuk

mengidentifikasi dan memecahkan masalah penduduk desa. Tapi gugatan

umum oleh masyarakat miskin adalah bahwa masalah mereka tidak

diidentifikasi, apalagi disampaikan dan dibahas dalam pertemuan bulanan

antara kepala desa dan pejabat kabupaten. Bahkan pesan resmi dan

instruksi dari pertemuan ini tidak sepenuhnya ditransmisikan ke desa,

sehingga menghambat penilaian dan kontribusi terhadap proyek-proyek

resmi. Para kepala desa sekarang didukung oleh sebuah komite desa yang

kemungkinan akan didominasi oleh lapisan atas desa. Di beberapa desa

adalah wajib untuk hadir di bawah hukuman denda 50 baht. Rapat seni

biasanya dikendalikan oleh komunitas, khususnya kepala desa.

pengumuman resmi dibaca kadang-kadang selama dua jam.

Ada juga kasus-kasus ekstrim di mana perbedaan kepentingan, bersama

dengan sejarah antagonisme, mengakibatkan menyalahgunakan kantor

kepala desa dan hukum, bahkan sampai mengancam desa miskin, atau

pemimpin mereka, dengan kematian. Dalam kasus seperti kemauan dan

kemampuan otoritas hip-nya untuk menegakkan hukum dan hak-hak warga

negara yang paling penting. Semua terlalu sering, bagaimanapun, "adalah

kata kepala itu hukum Tapi ada juga banyak yang warga desa miskin dapat

melakukan., Dan telah dilakukan, dalam hukum untuk menyatakan diri dan

mencari ganti rugi.

Selama periode 1974-76, ada banyak contoh di mana kepala desa

berhadapan, mengkritik dan mencela untuk perilaku mereka, yang

menyebabkan pemecatan mereka dari kantor dan pengusiran dari komunitas

oleh tekanan sosial. Penduduk desa mungkin, tentu saja, mengusulkan

mereka sendiri untuk pemilihan kantor kepala desa dan, dalam waktu yang

berlaku kendala sosial dan tekanan, memilih calon pilihan mereka. Sifat

berpotensi menguntungkan kantor adalah sedemikian rupa sehingga uang

dalam jumlah besar dapat dikeluarkan oleh seorang calon kaya di

kampanyenya. Non-voting dapat menjadi ekspresi penolakan untuk

berpartisipasi pada syarat-menguntungkan. Dalam satu kasus seorang

kepala disebut oleh suara-tidak miskin A! "Kepala 30% 0" karena ia telah

dipilih oleh hanya 30% dari pemilih. Di daerah Chachoengsao, empat

anggota kelompok petani miskin terpilih kepala desa hanya tiga tahun setelah

kelompok ini I. didirikan ini. Hati-hati direncanakan dalam rangka untuk

memajukan bunga: petani miskin dan merupakan akibat langsung dari

pengorganisasian mereka Satu wa:.. sudah terlihat sebagai lawan yang

berpotensi sukses untuk kantor kepala Kecamatan Masyarakat miskin

menyatakan bahwa sebelumnya "kata hukum wa kepala desa, kata-kata kita

tidak berat ". Tapi setelah datang bersama-sama dan mengembangkan rasa

percaya diri mereka mengatakan bahwa. "bahkan orang-orang dengan hanya

empat tahun di sekolah berbicara".

Tingkat kecamatan.

Sebuah kecamatan (Tambon) tingkat administrasi pedesaan telah menjadi

mantan sejak tahun-tahun awal abad ini. Camat (kamnan) dipilih oleh dan

dari antara kepala desa dari 10-20 ¬ administrasi desa administratif terdiri

dari kecamatan. Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir beberapa pejabat

pemerintah non-terpilih (terutama di bidang pertanian dan pembangunan)

telah diposting ke tingkat kecamatan. Lembaga dewan kecamatan atau

perakitan (sapha Tambon) mulai mengambil makna baru dan untuk

menunjukkan janji yang lebih besar pada tahun 1975 saat. untuk pertama

kalinya, dana pusat yang dialokasikan untuk proyek-proyek pembangunan

daerah yang akan memberikan upah tenaga kerja di setiap kecamatan.

Skema seperti terus, dengan variasi, sampai saat ini. The 1982-86 'Nasional

Ekonomi dan Sosial Kembangkan Rencana pemerintah memberi penekanan

dan kekuatan baru (struktur tujuan, baru dan pendanaan) ke Tambon sapha

dalam rangka. "Untuk mendesentralisasikan kekuasaan administratif, untuk

mendorong daerah untuk dapat mengatur dirinya sendiri, pada prinsip

menghormati keinginan orang-orang di setiap kecamatan untuk meletakkan

dasar-dasar sistem demokrasi dari pertolongan iklan bagi mayoritas rakyat

Negara, dengan pengalaman pemerintahan sendiri, orang-orang akan datang

untuk menyadari hak dan kewajiban mereka ... " Secara khusus busur

Tambon sapha sekarang berwenang untuk mengembangkan rencana

ekonomi dan sosial jangka panjang untuk lokalitas mereka sendiri. Pada saat

tahun-tahun sebelumnya, proyek kecamatan diharuskan untuk sesuai dengan

rencana pembangunan tingkat provinsi. Dalam beberapa kasus, Tambon

sapha memiliki sesedikit satu minggu untuk menanggapi arahan resmi.

Namun dewan masih belum memiliki sumber independen pendapatan atau

kemerdekaan sebagai badan hukum yang berbeda.''. Peran direvisi dan

potensi dari Tambon sapha tampaknya menawarkan langkah awal menuju

tingkat yang lebih besar partisipasi rakyat. Bagi pemerintah setidaknya itu

merupakan hal terpenting dalam kebijakan partisipasi mereka.

Banyak sedikit akan tergantung pada komitmen dan kemampuan pemerintah,

kementerian, departemen dan pejabat untuk mengejar tujuan yang

dinyatakan dalam arti penuh. Sebanyak atau lebih akan tergantung pada

realitas lokal kekuasaan dan pengaruh. Proyek ini dianggap potensi dan

keterbatasan Tambon sapha baik dari perspektif umum dan dari pengalaman

di daerah penelitian lapangan. Sebuah dewan kecamatan terdiri dari kamnan,

seorang sekretaris yang adalah seorang guru, kepala setiap desa di

kecamatan, seorang ahli atau orang yang memenuhi syarat

(phusongkhunawut) dari setiap desa, dan sejumlah pejabat tingkat

kabupaten, termasuk Pejabat Distrik, ex officio, dan beberapa Tambon kali

pertanian dan pengembangan petugas. Di sini kita perlu mempertimbangkan

baik proses formal dan informal dan hubungan dalam dan di luar panitia;

hubungan dengan baik tingkat yang lebih tinggi dan konstituensi desa. Kita

dapat mencatat di awal bahwa Tambon sapha adalah yang utama penciptaan

dan tanggung jawab sangat besar dan kuat De Administrasi Daerah

Departemen Dalam Negeri. Di masa lalu, departemen pemerintah lainnya

dan proyek tidak menggunakan komite sebagai lembaga lokal. Misalnya,

Departemen Komunitas Pembangunan telah cenderung mendukung

Pembangunan Desa Com komite, meskipun fakta bahwa, kata-kata m salah

seorang penduduk desa, beberapa dari "ada dalam nama saja". Selain itu,

ada norma dilihat dalam pertolongan iklan yang mengharuskan setiap unit

administrasi harus berusaha untuk mengendalikan dan mengatur unit

bawahan sebanyak mungkin, sehingga dalam praktek dewan menjadi badan

pelaksana dari pemerintah atau administrasi bukan demokratis organ untuk

mengartikulasikan kebutuhan dan keinginan masyarakat ke arah "ke atas".

Kemudian kita akan membahas ketergantungan yang besar pada metode

birokrasi dan mentalitas dan ketergantungan pada struktur resmi, terutama di

tingkat kabupaten. Dalam banyak kasus hal ini diklaim bahwa Pejabat Distrik

atau utusannya "membuat semua keputusan". Anggota dewan hanya

menandatangani nama mereka untuk proyek yang dimulai pada tingkat resmi

yang sesuai dengan, keinginan nilai-nilai dan tujuan lembaga resmi, begitu

banyak sehingga sementara proyek yang melibatkan Relawan Desa De-

pagar mungkin mendapatkan persetujuan seketika, dukungan dari sebuah

pelatihan kejuruan internasional proyek dapat berlangsung dua tahun.

Kantor kamnan, atau kepala kecamatan, adalah sangat penting. Dengan

bantuan kepala desa mereka adalah "mata dan telinga" Kantor trict ¬ Dis.

Kantor kamnan membawa kekuasaan besar dan tanggung-sibility. jumlah

besar uang sekarang ditangani oleh dewan dan keputusan mengenai alokasi

uang ini dapat dibuat tanpa menempatkan tender. Kantor-Pemegang menarik

perhatian semua intercuts luar yang ingin terlibat dalam daerah setempat,

baik untuk perdagangan, com ¬ Merce, ekstraksi sumber daya alam,

pekerjaan konstruksi, proyek-proyek pembangunan, masalah hukum dan

ketertiban atau keamanan, atau kampanye politik Provinsi atau pemilihan

Majelis Nasional.

Untuk tingkat lebih rendah, peringatan yang sama berlaku untuk kecamatan

kepala untuk kepala desa, yaitu, bahwa mereka tidak semua inheren

bertentangan dengan kepentingan masyarakat miskin. Tetapi kamnan ini

mungkin individu yang jauh lebih kaya dan lebih kuat, terkait dengan

kepentingan luar yang mungkin konflik dengan kepentingan warga desa

miskin, ia juga akan dikaitkan dengan baik untuk pejabat dan penduduk desa

kaya atau ke minoritas atas strata desa. Peluang untuk keuntungan

berlimpah dan menguntungkan ilegal, terlepas dari ini, sejauh mana hukum

atau secara resmi ditoleransi sumber pendapatan, yang mengakibatkan

pengaruh dan prestise, cukup besar

Pentingnya contoh terakhir ini, dalam konteks yang diuraikan di atas, tidak

hanya untuk mendokumentasikan contoh lain dari disesalkan "korupsi".

signifikansi terletak dalam mengungkap hubungan struktural, baik formal

maupun informal, di antara mereka dengan keputusan-keputusan kekuasaan,

dan dalam kenyataan bahwa, dalam hal ini, warga desa itu sendiri dirasakan

koneksi ini. Mereka dengan demikian meningkatkan pengetahuan dan

pemahaman tentang struktur politik lokal. Dalam kasus yang sebanding mana

kamnan yang dikenal sangat en ¬ gaged dalam ekstraksi kayu ilegal, sikap

penduduk desa miskin yang digambarkan oleh ungkapan seperti "kamnan

monyet" dan "monyet 'Aku" "mengacu pada tainbon sapha); di sini , "monyet"

adalah julukan derogatoryerring merujuk pada kegiatan hutan ilegal.

Seperti dalam kasus lain begitu banyak pertanyaan tentang informasi dan

komunikasi sangat relevan. Penduduk desa, terutama yang miskin, sering

tidak tahu tujuan dari Tambon sapha, maupun identitas anggotanya. "Aku

bicara, Anda mendengarkan" dianggap modus dewan dari munication com ¬.

Informasi lengkap dan penjelasan dihindari; penduduk desa sehingga

terhambat dari belajar tentang prosedur dewan. Petunjuk Ensu ¬ ing dari

dewan sering mengambil bentuk "ini dan itu proyek akan terjadi, Anda akan

pergi dan sekop bumi pada ini dan itu hari untuk upah begitu banyak per

hari", kadang-kadang tidak ada upah yang diusulkan.

Namun, sejumlah pemimpin petani miskin "merasa bahwa potensi dewan

kecamatan untuk menyelidiki dan membahas kebutuhan lokal dan masalah-

masalah tersebut memang cukup. Pengalaman dari dua orang local di mana

para petani miskin telah menghabiskan beberapa tahun membangun

organisasi mereka sendiri mandiri merupakan indikasi dari upaya untuk

menjamin partisipasi yang lebih besar pada istilah mereka sendiri.

Dalam kasus Yasothorn, kelompok petani, dihadapkan dengan kepentingan

pribadi yang kuat, pada awalnya telah berusaha untuk mendapatkan anggota

perwakilan terpilih menjadi Tambon sapha. Ketika mereka menyadari

kerugian dari representasi nority mereka secara khusus dipilih menurun,

status minoritas dan berhasil dinegosiasikan status pengamat. Dengan cara

ini, mereka memiliki akses ke informasi tertentu dan mendapatkan hak untuk

berbicara tapi tidak untuk memilih. Mereka dihindari berpartisipasi dalam

proses pengambilan keputusan yang seimbang yang mereka rasakan tidak

menguntungkan semua anggotanya dan akan cenderung kurang percaya

padakepemimpinan mereka sendiri di mata anggota. Salah satu anggota

berkomentar bahwa "orang baik tidak dapat bertahan di Tambon sapha".

Dalam kasus Chachoengsao, penduduk menyimpulkan bahwa sapha

Tambon uang tidak digunakan untuk proyek-proyek yang berhubungan

dengan kebutuhan warga desa. Selain itu tidak ada rapat dewan biasa atau

sedang berlangsung kegiatan dewan. Sebagai konsekuensi langsung dari

desa 'pengalaman dalam diri organisasi, dan partisipasi dari beberapa kepala

desa di ganizations atau ¬, ada mayoritas pada komite Tambon sapha yang

lebih responsif terhadap desa miskin kebutuhan. Untuk pertama kalinya,

mereka mampu memastikan pertemuan rutin bulanan yang menganalisa isu-

isu lokal dan masalah secara terus menerus. Selain itu, kemungkinan muncul

dari sukses pencalonan calon baru untuk kantor keamanan.

Tingkat kabupaten dan provinsi

Distrik (amphur), yang kemungkinan akan terdiri dari 10 atau lebih sub

kecamatan, dalam banyak arena yang paling penting bagi pelaksanaan

kewenangan daerah dan pelaksanaan rencana pembangunan daerah. Untuk

petani miskin pengalaman paling langsung dari administrasi negara dan

pendidikan, dari. representasi politik, dan dari pabrik dan komoditas dealer

biasanya terbatas pada tingkat kabupaten. Namun, untuk periode singkat

pada tahun 1974-75 petani miskin memiliki kemungkinan asosiasi regional

dan nasional. Sejak saat itu ada sejumlah onstrations dem provinsi di seluruh

permohonan pemerintah pada harga komoditas. Dalam beberapa kasus ini

adalah pemerintah yang secara langsung dikritik (seperti dalam Mium beras

pra atau kegagalan dijamin skema harga), pada orang lain, pedagang beras

atau pedagang komoditas. Beberapa petani miskin telah di terlibat dalam

demonstrasi dan telah belajar dari kesulitan dan keterbatasan tindakan

tersebut, dan juga kebutuhan, akhirnya, untuk Di tingkat kabupaten

ditemukan perwakilan dari berbagai menteri Departemen Pertanian,

Koperasi, Pengembangan, Tanah, Kehutanan, Bea Cukai, Pendidikan, dan

untuk merekrut perwira militer dan polisi cer ¬ lebih otonom. Lebih penting

adalah kabupaten iklan ministraticn per se, termasuk pejabat Kecamatan dan

berbagai Deputi, dan dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, Deputi Pertahanan dan

Pencegahan Komando Operasi Keamanan Internal (ISOC), yang

bertanggung jawab atas paramiliter, pertahanan diri dan keamanan lainnya

organisasi. pejabat senior sering ditransfer - di satu wilayah proyek ada lima

perwira dalam lima tahun Kabupaten; pejabat senior mungkin tidak permanen

didirikan. Di wilayah Utara dan Timur Laut dipelajari dalam ketidaktahuan

tentang proyek-proyek kami yang berbeda Thailand dialek ditemukan menjadi

hambatan yang signifikan dalam saluran komunikasi, tidak hanya antara

kabupaten dan aparat desa miskin tapi juga kadang-kadang antara panitia

masyarakat dan v '"Pelanggan" (kadang-kadang "godfather") dari agen lokal

yang lebih kecil dan lebih dan klien di tingkat desa dan kabupaten. jaringan

informal mereka persahabatan dan hubungan dengan pejabat kabupaten

sering kali merupakan kelompok yang sangat berpengaruh.

Setiap kabupaten akan memiliki satu atau lebih wakil terpilih (s) di Majelis

Provinsi (sapha cangwat) yang mengontrol anggaran tertentu destined untuk

digunakan dalam lokal. Satu atau lebih anggota terpilih (s) dari Majelis

Nasional dapat berhubungan dengan kabupaten, meskipun tidak selalu

menjadi konstituensi parlemen. Seringkali, perwakilan wakil dipilih dari

kelompok kepentingan komersial yang disebut pada agen komersial dan lokal

sering "bos suara" mereka (hua kaneen) pada saat pemilihan. dana pribadi

lebih dari satu atau dua juta baht mungkin dihabiskan pada kampanye.

Adalah penting untuk menekankan bahwa dalam setiap kasus hampir tidak

ada bentuk tetap dari organisasi partai politik di tingkat kabupaten atau di

bawah.

Hal ini sering mengatakan bahwa penduduk desa "tidak memiliki kepentingan

dalam politik". Sejauh ini benar, maka harus berhubungan dengan

pengalaman mereka sering tidak puas dengan perwakilan politik. Kita harus

menemukan pendapat luas bahwa "politisi hanya tertarik pada petani miskin

kami untuk mendapatkan terpilih", bahwa mereka hanya muncul sebelum

suatu pemilu, pemogokan murah di sekitar, dan telah dijamin sebagai

keuntungan banyak untuk diri mereka jarang dapat dilihat lagi. Pengalaman

ini memberi sumbangan terhadap harapan rendah atau bergantung pada

representasi yang potensial. Ada pengecualian, bagaimana ¬ pernah.

Sebagai contoh, dalam beberapa kasus persaingan faksi di tingkat yang lebih

tinggi untuk mendorong lebih banyak perhatian positif kepada para pemilih

suatu daerah. Sebuah kelompok yang lebih besar dari 'petani, bahkan salah

satu yang eschews klientalis sikap dan perilaku, lebih mungkin untuk

diperhitungkan. Demikian pula, kelompok yang lebih banyak petani au ¬

tonomous 'dapat memilih untuk mencari saluran patronase sadar dan hati-

hati. Ada juga wakil yang, karena alasan integritas pribadi dan kepedulian

masyarakat yang demokratis untuk ongkos wel ¬, menjadikan tugasnya untuk

mengkritik contoh limbah, inefisiensi, kerahasiaan delay, dan korupsi. Ada

orang-orang yang tetap berhubungan dengan pemilihan ¬ tor dan bahkan

mendukung demonstrasi mereka. Dalam dua provinsi dimana studi lapangan,

beberapa anggota dewan provinsi dengan catatan tersebut telah bertemu

dengan kematian mereka hanya beberapa tahun sebelumnya di tangan

orang-orang bersenjata secara anonim. Pihak berwenang menganggap

kematian ¬ fraksi dalam pertempuran antara "kelompok kepentingan",

mereka sering muncul, bagaimanapun, adalah motivasi politik: Dalam dua

kasus dimaksud, petani miskin percaya bahwa mereka dihasilkan dari oposisi

demokratis dengan Aktivitas.

Sebuah aspek dari hubungan sosial di tingkat kabupaten dan propinsi, serta

di tingkat kabupaten, yang kami ingin menekankan adalah tumpang tindih

dan saling merasuknya kepentingan ekonomi, politik dan budaya, serta

kombinasi dari formal dan informal, umum dan " pribadi "kegiatan. Sebuah

contoh yang telah disebutkan adalah bahwa wakil dari DPRD ¬ sentative

untuk Samoeng distrik tersebut, di samping kepentingan pribadi di tingkat

provinsi, telah menjadi tembakau pembelian-monopsoni untuk kabupaten: ia

memiliki tanah kabupaten, bersama-sama dengan primer alat transportasi

masuk dan keluar dari kabupaten, dan menjabat sebagai ketua koperasi

pertanian budaya Dia memiliki hubungan erat dengan administrator lokal di

semua tingkatan. Setelah gerakan serikat kredit yang telah ditetapkan

kabupaten-lebar, ia dikalahkan dalam pemilu-Majelis Provinsi. Kekalahan ini

dapat secara langsung, jika tidak seluruhnya, karena tingkat baru kesadaran

sosial dan kepercayaan dibuat dalam proses pengembangan baru, kelompok

yang lebih otonom. Lawannya adalah seorang muda dengan latar belakang

pendidikan nasional daripada komersial. Dia mendapat dukungan besar dari

para guru lokal dan lebih pejabat kabupaten junior. Dia telah berkampanye

melawan beberapa kepentingan lokal dan tampaknya bersedia untuk

membayar lebih daripada layanan bibir dengan ide representasi

demokratis.Tidak tably, ia menghabiskan 5000 baht hanya dalam kampanye

pemilihan. Pemilu ini mencerminkan perubahan dalam kesadaran penduduk

desa yang ada politik Thailand di Samoeng kabupaten.

Dalam banyak kasus pemerintahan kabupaten dan indikator kemungkinan

tertentu com petugas vidual atau bagian di dalamnya, sebuah serius dan

kuat berkomitmen untuk mengamankan kesejahteraan rakyat kepada siapa

mereka bertanggung jawab secara politik. Kita telah melihat bahwa petani

miskin ingin berpartisipasi dalam skema resmi banyak dan menikmati

manfaat yang timbul dari mereka. Salah satu hasil dari representasi masalah

yang tidak proporsional dari kelompok minoritas di tingkat lokal dan dengan

demikian kebutuhan dan kemampuan bilities masyarakat miskin pedesaan

tidak ditekankan, atau undervalued. Stagnan atau sikap budaya juga

birokrasi signifikan bertanggung jawab atas kondisi ini. Halangan utama

lainnya adalah ketidakpercayaan luas hampir semua inisiatif populer dari

proses demokrasi atau takut mobilisasi populer pada isu-isu sosial dan

ekonomi. petani miskin dan kelompok swadaya harus menghadapi rasa takut

nc bahkan ketika tidak ada niat atau keinginan di pihak mereka untuk

konfrontasi, perselingkuhan menghormati resmi atau pribadi. Samoeng

kasus memberikan contoh tampaknya ¬ unneces tingkat sary perlawanan

resmi untuk sebuah inisiatif populer. Sekelompok guru dan penyelenggara

masyarakat, bersama dengan anggota berbagai kelompok petani,

memutuskan untuk mengadakan adil dalam "markas vil lage " kabupaten

untuk mengumpulkan uang untuk athlctics . Biasanya, Kabupaten _ Petugas

diharapkan untuk menjadi ketua komite untuk memberikan wewenang untuk

peristiwa semacam itu. Dalam kasus ini, bagaimanapun, sebuah provinsi

baru sembly Sebagai wakil diundang. Penduduk desa dari seluruh

kabupaten menyewa truk dan bus, dengan biaya yang cukup besar, untuk

mengambil bagian dalam wajar. Tapi sebelum pameran ini juga dapat

dilakukan seorang perwira distrik, mengacungkan pistol dan dengan

dukungan dari polisi, memerintahkan adil untuk menutup dengan alasan

bahwa itu tidak resmi. Panitia tidak bisa adil dan memiliki tugas yang sulit

untuk menahan penduduk desa marah dan kecewa yang mulai berbicara

tentang "membakar Kantor Distrik." Seorang warga berkomentar bahwa dari

waktu itu dan seterusnya "polisi dapat mengharapkan untuk makan hanya di

kamnan rumah itu" ketika mereka datang untuk mengunjungi desa-desa.

Olahraga, yang biasanya aktivitas politik netral, merupakan kesempatan bagi

konfrontasi di desa Udorn. Bank Rice grup · telah membahas pengaturan

untuk memegang kompetensi distrik-lebar KO tition untuk memilih tim

olahraga untuk mewakili daerah di tingkat provinsi. Hanya satu tim harus

dipilih dari setiap daerah, dan di daerah tertentu, dipilih secara otomatis dari

kamnan desa itu. 12.000 baht anggaran provinsi telah ditentukan. Thrcugh-

pemimpin dan juru bicara utama bagi petani untuk membuat representasi ke

Kantor Distrik. Mereka berpendapat bahwa lebih banyak orang akan

berpartisipasi dan mereka atau tim ganized ¬ (sepakbola, basket dan takraw -

semacam voli Asia Tenggara menggunakan bola rotan) dari dua desa

tambahan. Seperti yang terjadi pened, satu menang dan desa-desa terpilih

untuk mewakili subdis trict. Para petani membayar semua biaya karena

anggaran provinsi tidak akan datang untuk inisiatif ini tidak ortodoks.

Peristiwa ini Pada bagian sebelumnya kita meneliti beberapa struktur penting

dalam pengambilan keputusan dan pengendalian di tingkat lokal, terutama di

tingkat kabupaten dan kabupaten otonom mana bentuk-bentuk lain dari

kegiatan dan organisasi miskin bertemu dengan perlawanan. Di antara

bentuk-bentuk yang kita miliki, agak datar, kontrol sosial yang disebut, kita

lihat di sini khusus untuk satu set kontrol proses yang berhubungan dan

intimidation.18 Mereka harus menekankan azas berukuran karena mereka

yang berulang, lagi dan lagi dalam kelompok kasus studi sejarah kita.

termasuk dalam definisi surveilans (pengacara panjang) dalam bentuk (haa

khao), fitnah (rai sai pai sii), dan tuduhan atau tuduhan (khlao haa). Ini harus

dibuat jelas bahwa tidak peduli seberapa pra valent fenomena ini mungkin,

kita tidak mengacu pada iklan yang "normal" pengawasan administratif dan

peraturan, atau untuk kasus-kasus di mana "menuduh" (orang-orang pada

akhir penerimaan proses ini) adalah melanggar hukum.

Bahasa yang digunakan dalam seperti "tuduhan" memiliki kosakata yang

benar - individual (s) atau kelompok (s) yang "sedang memecah belah",

mereka "menghasut kebencian" (misalnya, terhadap orang kaya) dan

"sengketa menyebabkan", mereka "memobilisasi orang" (dari pemerintah),

atau "mengkritik pemerintah", dan akhirnya, mereka "komunis". Beberapa

tindakan atau pernyataan bahwa bahasa tersebut mengacu pada pir apa

dalam pedoman pelatihan formal seperti yang dituduhkan. "Komunis"

kegiatan. Mereka termasuk: menuntut hak dari pemerintah, mendesak orang

lain untuk menuntut hak mereka dan untuk menolak perilaku menindas atau

rusak pada bagian pejabat atau pemimpin setempat; melakukan survei tidak

resmi; "berbuat baik" untuk kepentingan mereka sendiri; menerima rendah

dibayar atau rendah status pekerjaan saat berhak mendapatkan gaji yang

lebih tinggi, dan tidak menanggapi dengan marah saat diprovokasi.

bentuk khusus dari organisasi dapat menjadi tersangka: negosiasi terdaftar

berhubungan atau kelompok yang berusaha koordinasi supra-lokal;

pertemuan larut malam, dan bentuk non-hirarkis organisasi (misalnya panitia

dengan seorang ketua tidak). Penggunaan beberapa kata modern, banyak

dari uang sewa cur dalam ilmu jurnalisme atau sosial dan bahkan dalam

wacana resmi, adalah ulang garded mencurigakan bila digunakan oleh petani

miskin, misalnya, "Struktur", "mekanisme", "konkret", "abstrak", "analisis",

"kritik", "massal". "Kesadaran", dll secara tidak resmi terorganisir proyek self-

help (seperti koperasi produksi, pemasaran, tabungan kesehatan, kelompok

pendidikan informal, dll) dapat dikenakan biaya. Seperti disebutkan

sebelumnya, pupuk pupuk di skema perbankan desa, di bawah naungan ell

cstablishcd organisasi Kristen, dirujuk. sebagai "komunis pupuk" oleh o senior

(Iicial, sebuah proyek self-help " ac persiapan herbal cused" cuci otak "dari

obat-obatan.

tuduhan ia membuat dalam berbagai konteks. Pertama, ada biaya aktual

yang berkisar dari sindiran relatif lemah, sindiran, rumor, dan mengolesi,

untuk bentuk yang lebih kuat pencemaran nama baik dan fitnah. Anonymous

selebaran mungkin pasokan. peringatan Private dapat diberikan kepada atau

tentang orang tertentu atau kelompok, oleh orang-orang dengan otoritas atau

yang mengklaim hubungan dengan orang itu. Peringatan atau dugaan dapat

dilakukan dalam pertemuan-pertemuan publik. laporan langsung dari

intimidasi oleh pejabat, kata kepala desa, dapat digunakan - secara paralel

dengan tuduhan yang lebih langsung menurut sumber-sumber resmi kurang -

misalnya, "Saya punya nama (nomor yang benar) 'eppositionists', dan

beberapa dari mereka hadir di pertemuan ", atau" Kecamatan pejabat

memiliki nama cn daftar Anda, Anda mungkin juga pergi dan memberikan diri

".

Kedua, ada negara laws.t konteks formal ginning Sejak menjadi monarki

konstitusional. Pada 1932, berbagai bentuk pena legislatif proscribing

kegiatan komunis telah hampir terus-menerus berlaku. Definisi luas dari

ilegalitas berdasarkan hukum memiliki efek membatasi jangkauan kebebasan

politik. Pernah ditemukan selama pra Komunis Aktivitas Act tahun 1979

memungkinkan penahanan tanpa pengadilan untuk 480 hari (maksimum

normal adalah 91 hari). undang-undang terkait lainnya termasuk UU

Hubungan Perburuhan 1975, yang tidak termasuk pekerja pedesaan dari

hukum perburuhan dan hak serikat buruh untuk keempat jenis organisasi.

Ada juga hukum dan keputusan yang memberikan kekuasaan luas dan militer

khusus pada waktu tertentu dan tempat. Selain konteks formal adalah daerah

yang kurang didefinisikan wacana, yang berkontribusi pada iklim gagasan

dan sikap tentang bahaya kepada masyarakat dan dominasi institusi dominan

diringkas dalam slogan "bangsa, religional dan monarki”.

Ada konteks organisasi formal yang / atau kekuatan ideologis dan paramiliter

lebih atau kurang langsung, yang beroperasi di tingkat desa. Pertama, ada

Desa busur Pramuka (selanjutnya VS). The VS didirikan pada 1971 oleh

Police20 Patroli Perbatasan dan telah diberikan oleh mereka dalam

koordinasi dengan Departemen Dalam Negeri dan Departemen tangani

secara lokal Ed. Sejak tahun 1972 mereka telah bertindak di bawah

perlindungan kerajaan. Pada pertengahan 1980-an ada sekitar tiga juta

anggota berusia 14 ke atas, laki-laki dan perempuan, tanpa batas usia atas.

Meskipun bernama Pramuka Desa, banyak unit juga ada di perkotaan. Dalam

lima tahun pertama mereka merekrut 500.000 pramuka, dan pada tahun

1976 lebih dari satu juta dalam satu tahun.

Anggota, direkrut dalam kelompok reguler bernomor. Pejabat lokal

mendorong penduduk desa untuk bergabung dan mungkin menyindir bahwa

penolakan untuk bergabung dapat diartikan sebagai ketidaksetiaan dan

kurangnya patriotisme. Banyak petani miskin dan keluarga mereka adalah

anggota, tetapi mereka tidak diwakili dalam proporsi mereka bersnum,

apalagi di antara para anggota terkemuka yang melakukan sesi pelatihan.

Beberapa keraguan relawan bersedia di tempat pertama. Satu kepala diamati

membuat daftar nama lima puluh dalam menanggapi permintaan resmi untuk

merekrut dari desa. Di sisi lain, patronase kerajaan dan presentasi kepada

anggota kerajaan selendang hitungan ¬ ac untuk orang tnany bergabung

dengan antusiasme beberapa.

Pramuka Desa kerajaan didanai oleh hibah, langganan swasta, dan sering

dari pembangunan dana-.inistrative lokal dan Eden pedesaan. . Dalam

'tingkat ocal mereka disponsori oleh pejabat dari segala jenis (pendidikan,

administrasi, polisi, militer) dan pemilik tanah setempat, pedagang, bankir,

dan politisi - dengan kata lain lingkungan dari "struktur kekuasaan kkal" yang

telah ditentukan. pemuka agama juga ambil bagian, bahkan media roh, tetapi

terutama para biksu, yang berpartisipasi dalam upacara pelatihan. tujuan

yang jelas meliputi: untuk memerangi pemberontakan komunis, menghindari

dan mencegah perselisihan perburuhan, dan mengumpulkan informasi

tentang orang "yang berniat untuk membahayakan Loyalitas negara ke

negara (phakdirar), dan slogan." Bangsa, Agama, Monarki ", sangat

ditekankan. The udomkan kata (ideologi) yang sering digunakan dalam arti

yang positif seperti dalam pernyataan bahwa VS" telah bersatu ideologi

bangsa "atau" Desa Pramuka dapat bersatu pada satu kesempatan ketika

ada potensi yang jelas appropr udomkan, yang 6 Oktober 1976 (Desa Scout

Centre, 1979). Pada kesempatan itu disebut, mereka berparade secara

massal, dengan pedang tradisional Thailand, untuk bergabung dengan Patroli

Perbatasan Polisi, polisi kota dan "Red Gaur" unit (lihat di bawah) untuk

menyerang mahasiswa menduduki Universitas Thammasat di Bangkok.

VS tumpang tindih dalam keanggotaan, dan ideologi, dengan berbagai

kelompok paramiliter. Satu kelompok, Relawan untuk Pembangunan dan

Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan, pertama kali muncul di Chiangmai, modal

utara, pada tahun 1976 dan 1978 kelompok memiliki lebih dari 1.000

anggota, hampir secara eksklusif berpendidikan, VS laki-laki, satu-satunya

kota. Mereka menggambarkan diri mereka sebagai "kelompok senior untuk

Pramuka Desa". Mereka dilatih di sebuah biara kerajaan, diberikan

kekuasaan penangkapan, dan khusus tanggung jawab utama untuk

mengumpulkan intelijen ¬ politik (Muecke, 1980:427).

Beberapa paramiliter Pertahanan Angkatan Sukarelawan (selanjutnya VDF),

dengan berbagai nama, dan terkait dengan kebijakan yang berbeda dan unit

militer atau fraksi, telah ada sejak tahun 1960-an. Pada tahun 1980 mereka

diperkirakan jumlah 52.000 (Bungo, 1980). Sebuah kelompok paramiliter

kemudian, 'mendirikan Thailand Relawan Pertahanan Nasional (yang tannic

pongkan chat), pada tahun 1978, dan saat ini tampaknya yang paling

dinamis. Hal ini disponsori oleh Komando Operasi Keamanan Internal (ISOC)

dan didasarkan pada Divisi Sipil di Departemen Pertahanan kuat dari trasi

sipil ¬ Adrrunis Daerah Negeri. Tentara, polisi dan pejabat sipil berpartisipasi

dalam pelatihan, dan sponsor tambahan (termasuk sumbangan dari senjata

dan uang) berasal dari anggota lokal ¬ struktur kekuasaan legislatif. Mereka

menerima sekitar 10-20 hari pelatihan, pada akhir yang beberapa dapat

menerima senjata. Mereka dibagi ke dalam "perlindungan pembangunan pro

dan kontrol" dan "pembelaan diri" unit, bertanggung jawab untuk bekerja

dengan polisi dan formasi militer. Ruang lingkup kegiatan VDF potensial atau

direkomendasikan adalah sangat luas: dari berbagai bentuk tindakan

ekonomi dan sosial, medis dan bantuan darurat, dengan politik. pendidikan,

pengumpulan intelijen dan peran militer yang lebih.

Di samping, dan tumpang tindih dengan, fungsi pemantauan VS dan VDF

secara khusus dilatih "perang psikologis opera inisiatif ', yang membawa

kartu identitas khusus dan diberi hak istimewa, bukan hadiah uang tunai, dan

informan lainnya, yang dibayar oleh. Hasil Beberapa penduduk dilihat pola

kooptasi di mana pemerintah "pendukung" dikirim untuk pelatihan pertama,

diikuti oleh penduduk dianggap penting, maka setiap kelompok didorong

untuk melaporkan di sisi lain.

Penting tema atau fungsi, yang ditemukan dalam berbagai organisasi lokal

seperti, adalah pengumpulan intelijen, informasi, dan pengawasan, dengan

unsur-unsur pekerja dari pelecehan, provokasi dan intimidasi - sindrom klasik

main hakim sendiri. Hal ini dapat memiliki efek pada kelompok petani miskin

'untuk membatasi kebebasan manuver, menyebabkan penurunan bership

dan pengurangan atau penarikan dukungan resmi atau toleransi. Alasan

umum diberikan untuk tidak mengangkat suara dalam protes terhadap

penyalahgunaan kekuasaan oleh penguasa setempat adalah "kita takut

ditembak di kepala". Efek yang mungkin dialami paling segera dan secara

pribadi oleh anggota terkemuka atau penasehat dari kelompok self-help, tapi

akhirnya oleh kolektif secara keseluruhan. Sejumlah besar kelompok

menganggap ini masalah serius yang dihadapi dalam pengelolaan kegiatan

mereka.

Namun, efek dari "menggunakan orang untuk memerangi orang-orang"

sebagai salah satu penduduk desa berkata, jauh dari benar-benar

melumpuhkan. Untuk satu hal tampak bahwa masyarakat miskin, meskipun

yang terlibat, akan dicegah dari berpartisipasi pada skala sepadan mengingat

biaya waktu dan uang. Kecurigaan bahwa orang yang tidak bersedia untuk

bergabung dengan "komunis" (Muecke, 1980:423) sehingga mungkin

rebound, karena sebagian besar masih anggota non ¬. Ada keterbatasan lain

dan karakteristik dari diri sendiri. Artikel cenderung habis, dan kemudian

beberapa anggota, tidak icast para pelatih, menunjukkan bunga riil, sehingga

skema direncanakan sampai mati; kegiatan mungkin tidak meluas jauh

melewati pelatihan langka dan sesi induksi; relawan ¬ sukarela telah

menyumbangkan waktu, uang dan materi , sering dalam waktu singkat dan

pada pertanian kali merepotkan; keluhan terbuat dari sikap superior dan

perilaku pelatih, akhirnya, "boredorci 'adalah salah satu kritik yang paling

luas.

Karena penolakan untuk bergabung dapat diartikan sebagai tanda

ketidaksetiaan kepada negara, beberapa anggota akan sadar diri

menjauhkan diri dari tujuan resmi kelompok. Misalnya, mereka mungkin

bersikeras pada diskusi serius yang pertanyaan definisi resmi "keamanan

nasional", "id emies ¬ orang", Peserta dll dalam sebuah studi melaporkan

kasus berteriak en thusiastic di klimaks dari upacara VS, abjuring musuh

bangsa, agama, dan monarki, bukan sebagai komunit (seperti dalam penulis

¬ liturgi ized) tetapi sebagai (sajak baik) thutcarit tidak jujur. Informer dapat

diundang untuk berpartisipasi lebih penuh dalam kegiatan kelompok itu

"untuk memastikan mereka mendapatkan cerita yang benar." Ketika diminta

untuk memberikan informasi, orang mungkin mencoba untuk memberitahu

mereka "... tentang kondisi keras orang miskin." Cara lain adalah

humourously "menyerah" untuk tuduhan itu dengan mengatakan "baik, jika

kita menggunakan inisiatif kita sendiri, untuk mendirikan organisasi kita

sendiri ¬ tion dalam mengejar kehidupan kita, diskusi antara 'Komunis' cara

hirarkis, mengkritik pejabat yang korup, dll, baik biarlah. "

Satu pekerja konstruksi berkomentar bahwa "mengetahui bahwa anda

sedang diamati membuat Anda bekerja untuk jujur dan mudah". Tapi yang

paling penting, jika individu dan kelompok dapat mengatur untuk terus

bekerja tidak terpengaruh, maka mereka kekuatan pribadi atau kolektif dan

reputasi untuk memberikan substansi dan legitimasi publik sations accu ¬

bantahan tersebut. Beberapa kelompok menemukan bahwa terdakwa

memiliki penurunan intensitas wacana dari waktu ke waktu dan masalah

kurang. Tapi kendala, sanksi potensial, tetap, bahkan jika diadakan di

penundaan; kebebasan terbatas aksi panggung.

Selain jenis organisasi paramiliter di tingkat desa, ada sejumlah unit lainnya

yang muncul dalam sepuluh tahun terakhir busur lebih langsung dan represif

yang mulai atau ¬ tol dikemas oleh beberapa kalangan resmi. Ini termasuk

"Merah Gaurs" (Daeng krathing - Gaur adalah sejenis kerbau liar),

sekelompok tentara bayaran awalnya disponsori oleh ISOC, dan digunakan

di kota-kota dan desa-desa untuk menjaga tugas (misalnya, pada lokasi

konstruksi jalan) di daerah terpencil daerah. Pada tahun 1980 mereka 25.000

anggota diharapkan (Bungo, 1980). Ada juga "Rangers" (dikenal, setidaknya

lokal, seperti pa-tahan, phran tahan: " hutan diers sol, prajurit pemburu").

Mereka tampaknya sekitar 13 000 digit (Far East Economic Review Ern,

1983). Mereka beroperasi dalam unit relatif otonom, meskipun untuk

beberapa derajat diintegrasikan ke dalam formasi militer reguler. Rangers

telah dilaporkan sebagai bertanggung jawab untuk nomor beries ¬

merampok, penculikan, dan. tindak terorisme dalam beberapa tahun terakhir

(CGRS, 1981: Vo1.8, No.2, 1982: vol.5, No.3). Lebih perkembangan terakhir,

skala tidak jelas, adalah penampilan sejak akhir 1981 dari "regu maut" (juga

dikenal di beberapa daerah sebagai "unit pembunuh pemburu," "unit

pemburu kejam", "kematian skuad unit neraka" ) yang ditetapkan oleh pihak

polisi propinsi untuk mengejar penjahat dan pembangkang tanpa proses

hukum. Ada indikasi bahwa unit ini telah menyebabkan beberapa kematian

dan penghilangan (CGRS, 1982: vol.6,, No.4 1983: Vo1.7, No.1). Walaupun

skala yang lebih kecil ini memiliki kesamaan dengan praktek menyamar dari

"penyelamatan" di Filipina. Syarat Thailand KEB, yang dapat diterjemahkan

sebagai "kehancuran" atau "save".

Konteks akhir pengawasan dan intimidasi "sindrom adalah pola yang lebih

umum dari kekerasan dan pembunuhan di daerah pedesaan Sebagai contoh,

di provinsi kabupaten Uthaithani, di mana studi kasus ini sebagai ¬ sociated

proyek ini dilakukan, tingkat pembunuhan pada tahun 1984.

penurunan tahun 1970 - empat kali av sudah tinggi nasional EraGen ¬ 25 per

100.000 per tahun dan.

Juga perlu diperhatikan adalah distribusi legal dan ilegal luas dan

kepemilikan senjata api di Thailand dan keberadaan sejumlah besar orang

yang bersedia untuk bertindak sebagai "tangan pistol", yaitu untuk melakukan

pembunuhan atas nama orang lain, sering untuk biaya kecil yang akan

bervariasi sesuai dengan pangkat atau kepentingan korban. Sebagian besar

pembunuhan yang disebutkan dalam bab ini adalah penembakan, jarak

pendek oleh pihak ketiga, sering dengan senjata militer, termasuk M 16 'dan

senapan otomatis AK47 ¬ matic. Para korban biasanya dipilih dengan

cermat, tetapi ada fenomena pembunuhan massal kurang diskriminatif.

Sebuah kasus yang sering ditemui peluncuran sebuah granat tangan (juga

banyak tersedia) ke kerumunan di sebuah kuil yang adil, menyebabkan

beberapa kematian dan luka-luka banyak.

Sejumlah besar kasus yang dilaporkan, secara resmi dan dalam pers, yang

akan membalas dendam pembunuhan atau hasil dari sebuah perseteruan

pribadi antara kelompok politik saingan dan kepentingan komersial. Sebagai

contoh, dalam waktu dua bulan sebelum ¬ ing pemilihan Majelis Nasional

pada bulan April 1983, 20 kandidat dan canvassers kampanye telah

terbunuh, hampir semua dengan menembak (Bangkok Post, 17 April 1983).

Sangat sering itu adalah kritik keras dari bunga dan malpraktik dibunuh

(apakah reporter koran provinsi, guru, pekerja konstruksi, anggota terpilih

majelis nasional atau propinsi, dll). Tidak jarang tangan disewa diidentifikasi

sebagai anggota (atau off-tugas) dari salah satu organisasi resmi atau

setengah resmi telah kita bahas. Dalam banyak kasus ada concertn

investigasi pembunuhan-gate sedikit atau ada kegagalan untuk

menghasilkan, biaya jauh lebih sedikit tersangka dan tahanan,. Beberapa

kematian ditempatkan di perawatan berdarah dari "melanggar hukum"

pembunuhan, 21 yaitu, pembunuhan.

Kasus yang paling jelas pembunuhan sistematis pemimpin populer di 1974-5

kampanye kekerasan terhadap para pemimpin Petani 'berat Fed Thailand

(lihat Bab 3). Dalam hal ini, kekerasan yang dilakukan terhadap orang-orang

reformasi organisasi non-kekerasan dan demokratis. Sejak periode itu, pola

pembunuhan selektif sebanding populer di tingkat desa pemimpin, pemimpin

buruh, wartawan, pembangunan. Pekerja, aktivis mahasiswa dapat dilihat.

Dokumentasi ini pembunuhan masih jauh dari selesai. Satu sumber utama,

sebuah kelompok hak asasi manusia yang tidak berhati-hati untuk

melaporkan kasus-kasus yang belum baik dalam ¬ vestigated dan didirikan,

percaya jumlah sebenarnya dari pembunuhan tersebut lebih tinggi daripada

yang laporan (CGRS, 1982: jilid No 6,. 4). Mengacu pada pembunuhan

spesies sebelas dalam periode enam bulan di 1981-2, mengatakan kelompok

yang 'sebagian besar insiden disebabkan oleh pejabat lokal tertentu atau

orang berpengaruh lebih baik berhubungan dengan para pejabat "(CGRS,

1982: vol.6, No.2).

Dapat dikatakan bahwa fenomena kekerasa contrib pedesaan utes apa

pekerja konstruksi telah disebut "iklim ketakutan" di mana serangan

kekerasan atau kematian oleh pembunuhan, bukan pejabat hanya tegura

finansial atau penangkapan, adalah mungkin, akhir sanksi. Ada setan link

strable antara hukuman fisik ekstrem dan budaya, psikologis dan hukum

yang lebih luas. Dengan cara ini, dan peringatan innucndos mungkin.

berpengalaman sebagai intimidasi.

fitur Counter-partisipatif organisasi pembangunan daerah pada bagian sebelumnya kita menganalisis fitur lingkungan sosial dan politik lokal dan konteks kekuasaan mereka. Ini adalah konteks di mana kebutuhan kelompok petani miskin 'untuk mengelola dan mengoperasikan kendala spesifik ex eksternal tentang bagaimana mereka dapat mengelola dan apa yang bisa mereka capai. Pada bagian ini kita akan meninjau karakteristik khusus internal untuk pengembangan organisasi formal dan metode. Pemilihan dan penilaian yang dibuat dari perspektif petani miskin itu sendiri. Pandangan ini

muncul dari pengalaman pekerjaan mereka dan mendiskusikan bersama-sama sebelum dan studi penelitian. Organisasi rating positif disahkan oleh petani miskin yang merupakan anggota dari organisasi berfokus pada apa pun materi dan manfaat ekonomi yang bisa diperoleh, terutama akses terhadap kredit dan pupuk, biaya input yang lebih rendah dibandingkan dengan pasar ritel, dan teknis informasi dan saran. penilaian negatif lebih banyak dan beragam. Beberapa tema penting yang dapat diringkas sebagai berikut:

• sering kurangnya koordinasi dan kerjasama pada dan antara

oiciallevels dan lembaga

• terkonsentrasikannya tujuan birokrasi dan priorities, norma, dan

mentalitas;

• dominasi antara kepemimpinan tingkat desa, anggota strata

minoritas atas dan kelompok kepentingan

• pengecualian dari mayoritas rumah tangga miskin dari

keanggotaan dalam kelompok-kelompok yang dianggap

menguntungkan, seperti Kelompok Petani skema credit union,

dll

• kurangnya keterlibatan berkelanjutan dan substansial anggota

dalam proses pengambilan keputusan, diskusi, monitoring dan

evalu asi kegiatan kelompok

• jangkauan terbatas dan ruang lingkup kegiatan ini, yang tidak

relevan dari beberapa kegiatan, lebih khusus, mereka yang

bersifat non-ekonomi pengumpulan yang korup),(Rural

Employment Generation Program) menjadi baik, pada tiga

tingkatan (desa kepala, keamanan) Sangat luas baru-baru ini

dan sekarang pengembangan dan promosi revivalis moral

(tanah kebajikan Buddhis, tanah emas).

salah satu contoh dari penanaman budaya birokrasi dan praktek. Mereka

adalah gejala drive untuk standardisasi, yang dapat dilihat sebagai lain fonn

kontrol. Thcy juga mencakup bentuk pendaftaran dan peraturan, dan tabung

resmi , serta bentuk imbalan atau kompensasi: tunjangan harian, ditoleransi

penggunaan pribadi dana publik, biaya dan persentase, misalnya "hutan

sukarelawan perlindungan" menerima 50 persen dari ini denda yang

diajukan. Mereka termasuk gaya dan penjadwalan resmi pertemuan bersama

baris reaucratic: biasanya dalam jam resmi dan pada hari-hari kerja resmi;

pejabat berbicara sangat formal melalui mikrofon sebelum penonton dengan

sedikit atau tidak ada komunikasi dua arah. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa

aturan-aturan dan prosedur tersebut tidak disesuaikan agar sesuai dengan

prioritas lokal dengan kebutuhan mereka budaya dan praktis dan bahwa

tujuan resmi dilayani daripada kebutuhan dan kepentingan petani miskin dan

buruh tak bertanah.

Anggota minoritas ini dapat menggunakan posisi mereka untuk memajukan

kepentingan mereka. Mereka sering bisa menggabungkan pendidikan

modem mereka dengan kemampuan untuk memanfaatkan nilai-nilai

tradisional lebih dan hubungan a'uthority, superioritas dan perintah.

Kita sekarang dapat mulai untuk melihat lebih jelas beberapa kendala penting

partisipasi yang melibatkan pengaturan prioritas, mengekspresikan

kebutuhan baru dan isu-isu secara terus menerus, dan monitoring dan

menilai kegiatan kelompok. Dihadapi oleh kendala tersebut, anggota

kelompok ini.

jika mereka tidak puas, akan tetap pasif dan hormat. Mereka skeptis, dan

mungkin diandalkan mereka pribadi tetapi tidak sama meningkat. Pada

gilirannya ini memungkinkan kepemimpinan, dan anggota kuat dan kaya

untuk mengejar tertandingi mereka jika adil, keuntungan. Ini juga

menghilangkan dari pandangan dan pengawasan, dari akuntabilitas kolektif

dan kontrol, kegiatan yang bersifat korup dan ilegal. Oleh karena itu mungkin

tidak akan pernah diketahui mengapa, atau bahkan, sekarung biaya pupuk

lebih dari seharusnya, atau mengapa orang tertentu menerima kontrak

bangunan; atau apa ukuran dari anggaran ini dan apakah itu sah untuk

menggunakannya dalam cara tertentu.

Dalam kasus di mana para petani miskin telah ditarik terjebak Dalam

organisasi resmi menetapkan yang tidak melayani kepentingan mereka atau

kebutuhan paling mendesak, ini "partisipasi" (dalam arti resmi) sering dinilai

sebagai pengalihan, dan bahkan secara sistematis demobiiizing. Singkatnya,

itu sering dianggap buang-buang waktu, uang dan usaha. Beberapa kali

keterlibatan tersebut adalah sukarela, setidaknya pada awalnya, meskipun

konsekuensi sosial tidak bergabung dalam sering merupakan faktor

menghambat. Pemimpin Satu petani miskin 'menjalani pelatihan untuk

sebuah proyek "sukarelawan" yang melibatkan tiga "seminar" - lima hari di

desa, maka sembilan hari di kota provinsi, dan lima lagi hari di desa. Dalam

kasus ini biaya nya tidak dibayar, juga tidak kehilangan nya laba.

Sekali lagi, penting untuk dicatat bahwa banyak contoh dapat ditemukan,

beberapa dari mereka dalam wilayah proyek, dukungan resmi, baik formal

maupun informal, untuk beberapa organisasi lebih otonom dan inisiatif

masyarakat miskin pedesaan. Dukungan ini dapat berasal dari individu

pejabat atau dari lembaga resmi tertentu atau departemen.

proyek ini mengidentifikasi meresap sikap negatif, dan bahkan bermusuhan,

untuk upaya-upaya tersebut pada partisipasi yang lebih besar berasal dari

dalam memimpin organisasi tingkat desa resmi dan tingkat yang lebih tinggi

diasosiasikan. Beberapa cara sikap seperti disajikan, dan dapat menjadi

bentuk-bentuk materi pemaksaan dan kontrol sudah didiskusikan. Mereka

juga dapat ditemukan sampai batas tertentu di non-resmi, organisasi non

pemerintah. Dalam satu kasus sekelompok pekerja pembangunan non-resmi

dan pemimpin petani miskin diundang untuk mengunjungi proyek sebuah

organisasi non-pemerintah lama-didirikan didukung oleh lembaga

internasional. Setelah banyak formalitas, sebuah spontan mulai antara

pengunjung dan petani miskin lokal. Diskusi beralih ke masalah hubungan

penyewa-tuan tanah. Pada titik ini, seorang pejabat senior yang mewakili

LSM, bersikeras membawa diskusi berakhir dan ditujukan para pengunjung

dengan kata-kata: "Anda telah mendorong mereka cukup” Pada satu sisi, dan

lebih jarang, merupakan bentuk ekstrem intimidaticn. Dihitung kurangnya

dukungan kerjasama dan bahan lebih umum. tanpa memaksakan gagasan

federasi. Inisiatif ini bertemu dengan perlawanan besar, kering dituduh

"politik" dan tidak yang telah dipertimbangkan atau diizinkan oleh rencana

resmi dan peraturan.

Pengalihan usaha dan kooptasi juga dapat berasal dari lembaga "sektor

swasta". Dalam Chachoengsaocase, penduduk desa telah tiga kali

ditawarkan tanah lokal untuk pembangunan sekolah menengah, pusat

kesehatan, dan departemen jalan raya. depot, masing-masing. Mereka

kebanyakan anggota salah satu self-help kelompok-kelompok yang

dijelaskan di atas. Dengan berpartisipasi dalam proses perencanaan mereka

berharap untuk diperlukan manfaat ekonomi dan sosial lokal. Dalam hal

mereka adalah pedagang lokal yang berhasil mengalihkan skema ke daerah.

 

model skema pemukiman kembali di daerah yang sama para pendatang baru

yang pada awalnya diperlukan untuk membangun rumah-rumah mereka

dalam gaya yang seragam "modern" tetapi keputusan mereka untuk

menggunakan bahan bangunan lama menang. Ruang rapat besar, terbuat

dari dinding bambu dan beratap dengan rumput, adalah perlu dibangun

dengan kayu keras, dan untuk desain copy-buku. Melakukan ini menghina

dan boros didukung oleh Rotary Club plak provinsi yang akhirnya menghiasi

dinding di atas platform. penyesuaian benar-benar bertentangan dengan

keputusan komite permukiman .

 

trict dengan memusatkan sumber daya pada satu desa yang akan digunakan

sebagai contoh dari "developmenC mengunjungi pejabat senior. Dalam hal ini

pembangunan desa yang melibatkan beberapa tahap. Upaya pertama dan

paling terlihat adalah membangun pagar bambu di sekitar setiap plot rumah.

Tujuan dari ini adalah dua kali lipat dari sudut pandang Kantor Distrik.

Pertama, memberikan penampilan dari "peradaban", bukan dari "berantakan"

desa. Kedua, meningkatkan kontrol atas penduduk desa oleh dinas dan

aparat desa - karena memungkinkan untuk identifikasi mudah rumah petak

dan penduduk. Praktek ini 'lebih ditingkatkan dengan pembangunan dan

tanda-tanda nama di depan rumah masing-masing. Pagar-bangunan

dilakukan dengan desakan konstan kamnan, yang mengancam untuk tidak

memberikan pelayanan hukum, seperti menerbitkan kartu identitas, kepada

siapa pun yang menolak untuk mematuhi. Warga desa sendiri harus

memberikan materiah seperti kayu, bambu dan kuku. Ini biaya yang cukup

terlibat, karena kekurangan bahan-bahan lokal yang tersedia. Meskipun

beberapa menggerutu, sebagian besar bagian depan jalan itu berpagar, tapi

bagian belakang rumah tidak. Di sebuah desa di dekatnya, namun, dengan

tradisi kuat organisasi diri, maka diputuskan untuk mengambil sikap umum

terhadap pagar membangun kecuali kamnan yang disediakan bahan, karena

dirasakan bahwa pagar tidak memberikan manfaat nyata dan bahwa, dalam

hal apapun, mereka akan segera jatuh ke dalam rusak.

Tugas pertama adalah untuk masing-masing kelompok untuk memberikan

"sukarela sukarelawan untuk mengunjungi beberapa desa di provinsi

tetangga yang telah memenangkan kompetisi regional tahun sebelumnya.

Para relawan harus memberikan ongkos 70 baht bus. Hanya setengah

disajikan sendiri. Setelah diskusi beberapa kamnan setuju untuk membayar

sisa biaya menyewa bus. ini terutama terdiri dari cara merawat komite menilai

dan bagaimana menangkap perhatian mereka, misalnya, dengan memilih

seorang gadis cantik untuk menyambut para hakim. Selama kunjungan ke

desa, penduduk desa memberikan sambutan yang ramah dan menunjukkan

kelompok yang

"Internal" masalah organisasi petani miskin sejauh ini dalam bab ini kita telah

meneliti kendala ditempatkan pada ekspresi-diri dan self-organisasi

masyarakat miskin yang berasal lingkup sosial mereka sendiri. Kita sekarang

akan mengalihkan perhatian kami ke beberapa keterbatasan dan kesulitan

yang lebih Hinternal "untuk kegiatan sosial dan budaya sehari-hari

masyarakat miskin pedesaan, terutama karena mereka mempengaruhi

pendidikan dan presesi tenaga kerja. Selanjutnya, kita akan membahas isu-

isu gender, wewenang dan kepemimpinan Tujuannya adalah. untuk

menekankan tema yang dianggap bermasalah dalam proses pencarian ulang

kolaboratif. Kurangnya pendidikan atau keaksaraan sering dibesarkan

sebagai masalah, terutama kurangnya kefasihan dalam bahasa standar dan

pengetahuan" keterampilan akuntansi dasar. Pengetahuan teknis yang tepat

dan socialjpolitical juga dianggap penting dan ini mengangkat masalah

relevansi pendidikan formal.

 

menawarkan empat tahun pertama pendidikan dasar wajib. Hampir semua

anak menyelesaikan tahap ini, meskipun banyak yang harus repear satu

tahun atau lebih dan penyelesaiannya • ada jaminan keaksaraan melanjutkan

atau numerasi. Pada tahun 1978 hanya sedikit lebih dari setengah dari

semua anak menyelesaikan tiga tahun terakhir pendidikan dasar, di bawah

satu sepertiga menyelesaikan tiga tahun pertama, dan setengah angka ini

tiga tahun terakhir kation ¬ edu sekunder, hanya 3,5 per universitas dihadiri

persen.

Meskipun ada kecenderungan terus menuju ketentuan pendidikan yang lebih

besar ada bias terus mendukung kelas-kelas sosial tertentu dan daerah atas

orang lain, kota di negara dan Bangkok selama seluruh negara. Jadi pada

1973-74, 74 persen dari mahasiswa berasal dari keluarga pengusaha atau

pejabat pemerintah; 13 persen dari keluarga pekerjaan lain dan hanya 6

persen dari latar belakang pertanian (dari semua kelas). Dari semua tidak

kurang dari 59 persen berasal dari Bangkok (kurang lebih persen dari

populasi) dan hanya 8 persen dari Kortheast (sekitar 34 persen dari populasi

Banyak ofIicial "pembangunan" berpikir dan pelatihan dimulai dengan

gagasan dasar dari pedesaan. kebodohan. nilai-nilai tersebut dapat

diinternalisasi, sehingga menimbulkan rasa ketidaktahuan yang melekat atau

kurangnya kemampuan. Hal ini diakui menjadi masalah di banyak kelompok

petani miskin '. Untuk beberapa kesulitan yang diatasi sebagai anggota

kelompok yang lebih berpartisipasi dalam diskusi dan tanggung jawab

diasumsikan. Upaya yang dilakukan untuk menekankan sejarah lokal, untuk

menilai, beradaptasi dengan atau mengubah nilai-nilai sebelumnya dan

bentuk hubungan komunitas dan pengalaman.

 

Ada tradisi busur tions dan sumber-sumber pengetahuan yang bisa ditarik

dari sumber seperti filsafat Buddha, atau pengalaman dan pengetahuan yang

berasal dari bepergian dan bekerja jauh dari desa. Sumber-sumber

tradisional, populer dan alternatif pengetahuan memberikan kontribusi sangat

untuk kembali sumber kelompok partisipatif.

Petani miskin sering menemukan bahwa isu-isu tertentu, perbedaan

interpersonal dan dibiarkan terselesaikan karena kurangnya waktu untuk

diskusi bersama, ini telah menyebabkan akumulasi kesalahpahaman (salah

kecurigaan,, esentment, iri hati, kecemburuan, menyalahkan, dll ) yang

mempengaruhi kegiatan kolektif. Seperti yang telah disebutkan sebelumnya,

mengenali masalah dan kenyataan bahwa masalah ini tidak selalu melekat

dengan lokalitas tertentu atau orang yang dianggap langkah positif dalam

proses mengatasi mereka. Sampai sekarang kami telah disebut "baru"

kesulitan keluar dari situasi berubah. Ada satu set lebih lanjut dari

keterbatasan, bagaimanapun, yang secara kultural lebih mengakar, terutama

sikap dan perilaku pelapisan ulang dengan usia, jenis kelamin kekerabatan,

dan otoritas. Tentu saja dapat dikatakan bahwa mereka juga, dominasi

dominan dan ketertiban sosial masa lalu. Mereka adalah apa yang penting

dalam jangka nilai (sakdina). Perbedaan ini terus diperkuat selektif dalam

wacana budaya dominan atau ideologi.

perbedaan luar biasa dalam status sosial (peringkat aristokrat atau birokrasi,

status yg berhubung dgn pendeta, dll). Seringkali ini menyebabkan

keengganan untuk berbicara, atau mengkritik atau bertentangan senior.

Kecenderungan ini dapat mengakibatkan ketergantungan yang ekstrem pada

pemimpin-bahkan dalam beberapa kelompok self-help lebih sukses. Namun,

nilai banyak desa dan hubungan kekerabatan dan bertetangga, terlihat

memiliki aspek positif. Biasanya itu adalah miskin, namun, tanpa memandang

usia atau jenis kelamin. Pengalaman dari beberapa kelompok menunjukkan

bahwa perempuan belum menikah, dan yang menikah mungkin lebih tua

(manfaat dari umur relatif jika tidak pendidikan "modern"), memiliki

kesempatan yang lebih baik memainkan peran sosial yang lebih luas.

Beberapa orang menyatakan bahwa perempuan menunjukkan kekuatan

yang lebih besar dan kemampuan daripada pria, "meninggalkan lebih awal

untuk pergi ke ladang, dan terus bekerja di AFO rumah kembali mereka". Ada

perjanjian, yang bersifat kritik diri, yang dalam prakteknya pria tidak

mengizinkan perempuan untuk mengambil peran yang lebih besar seperti

partisipasi penuh dalam kegiatan kelompok dan tanggung jawab) bisa

membatasi partisipasi perempuan karena takut mereka! dapat berbicara

pembangunan resmi biasanya termasuk kelompok 'ibu rumah tangga dan

kelompok perempuan muda. ini cenderung untuk membatasi topik tertentu

dan perempuan ke daerah-daerah terbatas aktivitas, dan jadi untuk

meminggirkan perempuan dari isu utama produksi dan organisasi

masyarakat.

Sikap hormat dan kepatuhan terhadap pemimpin terkait dengan gagasan

budaya lama mapan hormat untuk pria. Di luar lingkungan desa, atau

lingkungan petani miskin, sikap-sikap ini kadang-kadang busur terikat dengan

perasaan takut. Kosakata Thailand kaya dalam hal dasar yang berarti

menunjukkan rasa takut dan hormat. Dengan demikian menghormati

pemimpin adalah Salah satu tanggapan terhadap perlakuan yang tidak

memadai isu gender dalam proyek penelitian ini adalah komisioning oleh

UNRISD dari studi lanjutan khusus tentang masalah ini. Lihat Gail Om \

"CDT, 0,1986. Lbis berisi referensi bibliografi untuk bekerja terbaru yang

dilakukan oleh perempuan dan isu-isu perempuan. Lihat juga Noeleen

Heyzer, 1986.

• umumnya dianggap menjadi masalah serius dalam kelompok petani miskin.

Hal ini menimbulkan kendala berat dalam kolektif proses pengambilan

keputusan. anggota komite Memimpin mungkin dianggap sebagai "sumeone

mengandalkan pada lebih merupakan perlindungan dari sekedar orang yang

bisa diandalkan, atau sebagai "solusi ajaib" Bahkan salah Keputusan yang

mungkin terpenuhi, mengabaikan atau menekan kembali tanggung-kolektif

untuk memperbaiki atau meninggalkan mereka.

Masalah kepemimpinan menonjol dalam diskusi proyek. Masalah ini dapat

membuat semakin sulit bagi pimpinan kelompok petani miskin untuk bekerja

mendelegasikan atau berbagi dan tanggung jawab dan membangun inti

memperluas anggota berpengalaman. Peran pemimpin dalam banyak kasus

ini adalah satu kompleks diharapkan untuk berpartisipasi tidak hanya dalam

aktivitas petani miskin 'tapi juga dalam kegiatan resmi dan dalam pekerjaan

masyarakat (kesehatan,pelabuhan, kegiatan keagamaan dan pemuda, dll).

Jika mereka tidak berpartisipasi mereka mungkin dianggap sebagai

memecah-belah atau insulliciently publik bersemangat. Dan jika, sebagai

salah satu desa sedih mengemukakan demikian, mereka harus memutuskan

untuk alasan domestik maupun taktis untuk mengadopsi proiile rendah,

sementara melepaskan diri dari semua kegiatan masyarakat, ini juga, akan

menimbulkan kecurigaan resmi. Pada saat yang sama pemimpin petani

miskin 'harus bekerja untuk mengamankan mata pencaharian mereka sendiri.

Semua anggota terkemuka dari kelompok petani miskin 'berbicara masalah

ekonomi yang parah, bahkan krisis, yang disebabkan oleh pengorbanan

waktu dan untuk bekerja bersama. Dalam beberapa kasus hal ini

menyebabkan konflik dalam negeri, strain psikologis, dan dengan demikian

pengunduran diri atau penurunan partisipatif di bagian mereka. Ini juga

afTected efisiensi administrasi dan penurunan waktu yang dihabiskan untuk

menganalisis dan memecahkan masalah. Kadang-kadang, kesalahpahaman

dan ketegangan dalam kelompok, dan kurangnya kerjasama atau

pelanggaran aturan, yang dihasilkan.

masalah-masalah yang dialami rendah dibayar, tetapi penyelenggara

komunitas full-time dan pekerja relawan pembangunan. masalah seperti itu

umumnya tidak cukup dihargai oleh sumber-sumber di luar dukungan, baik

resmi atau tidak resmi. Mandiri, negosiasi otonom diasosiasikan kaum miskin

pedesaan memiliki kebutuhan untuk dukungan luar seperti jaringan informasi,

bantuan hukum dan pertahanan. pemimpin petani miskin yang 'memiliki

pengalaman sosial yang lebih luas dari anggota lainnya dan dengan demikian

berada dalam posisition untuk berkomunikasi dengan dan memobilisasi

potensi "eksternal" sekutu. Ini termasuk pengalaman yang diperoleh sebagai

kepala desa, atau dari bepergian dan kembali berpihak di kuil kota sebagai

anggota ditahbiskan dari Sangha Buddha, atau melalui bekerja di kota dan

pabrik. Beberapa telah diundang untuk mengunjungi negara Asia lainnya

(Bangladesh, Filipina, Sri Lanka) di bawah naungan organisasi agama atau

filantropis yang peduli pembangunan ekonomi dan sosial. Ironis! Y ini juga

dapat memiliki efek negatif menjauhkan pemimpin dari desa, tidak begitu

banyak dalam hal ekonomi, tetapi melalui penggunaan bahasa "baru" dan

akuisisi status baru.

LAMPIRAN ENGLISH

CHAPTER V POWER AND PARTICIPATION

"The farmers' problems must be solved by the farmers themselves."

(Chamrat Muangyam, President of the Farmers' Federation of Thailand, assassinated in Rayong Province, 21 July 1979)

Enabling and disabling powers

In the preceding chapter we spoke of some of the major problems of

livelihood of the poor farmers, of the local effects of national and supra-

national structures and policies, and of various collective economic

responses. In this chapter we shall consider local social, cultural,

administrative and political contexts in which these responses are made. We

shall focus on both opportunities and obstacles encountered in the process of

overcoming problems of livelihood. Of course, as one village level researcher

expressed it "politics, commerce and culture are all mixed up together". We

have seen how some economic activities can unite people in wider social

contexts; and how other, externally derived, economic strategies can have

the effect of preventing, limiting or demobilizing the collective actions of poor

farmers.

To some extent poor farmers perceive economic phenomena (such as bank

loan policies, price determination, guaranteed prices, rice premiums, etc.) as

political phenomena. Moreover, some of the more sociocultural factors are

perceived by farmers from the' outset to be major social problems and not

merely secondary problems encountered along the way. Our primary focus

will be the interrelation between these factors, and their recent historical

dynamic. It is argued that a weakness of many previous analyses has been a

too static and one-dimensional reading of the potential of particular agencies,

values or sections of the population. This can lead to misplaced optimism or

pessimism, and to unnecessary

Over and under valuation of the strengths and weaknesses of various

Parties of Indeed, this is one of lessons learned from the experience the

Peasants' Federation of Thailand (see Chapter 3).

Our study shows the inappropriateness of prematurely drawing up a balance

sheet of "obstacles and limitations"" to participation, on the one side, and

"enabling factors and potential", on the other. The lines of

i lines are not so clearly defined. Given the inherent uncertainties of

participatory efforts, there are immense difficulties in generalizing and

predicting either the points at which advances may be made, resistance may

be encountered, or the methods by which they may be overcome.

Social institutions or local administrative units such as farmers' groups, the

private commercial sector, religious or family institutions will be examined, not

so much as discrete entities, but rather in terms of their economic, cultural

and political interconnectedness. We shall consider links between official and

non-official sectors and between formal institutions and informal processes

(both legal and illegal). Included are hidden processes of routine decision-

making, deliberate concealment of the exercise of power and influence. We

shall look at both material and physical, and also more cultural and

ideological constraints: laws and regulations, traditional values, appeals and

exhortations. Throughout we shall refer to and reassess a commonly made

distinction between factors that originate "externally" from and those which

originate "internally" to the immediate social and cultural sphere of the poor

farmers' existence.

The questions we ask of the recent collective experience of poor farmers are

not what form their organizations take, or whether they are official,

semiofficial, spontaneous, legal or illegal. Nor is it only a question of their

technical aims or the extent to which they achieve them, although this is

obviously important. Rather we question the extent to which they benefit the

poorer rural producers, not only economically but also in social, cultural and

political ways.

While particular forms and problems of production varied between the case

studies, a remarkable degree of similarity was found in the political contexts

of production. This permitted us a greater degree of generalization in the

presentation of the material.

Local structures of control and decision-making

“For people to love their nation, the government must give them the

chance to love their village, their tambon, their district, their province,

their country and nation, in that order. It means the people must

understand and clearly see that they are the owners of their villages,

tambon, districts, provinces and country; that they have bcriefitted from

village and tambon and district, from the roads and bridges, forests and

reservoirs; that they have a part, a voice (mil suan mil slang) in the

running of their village, their tambon; their district, and so on. If this can

be done, and done continuously and at every step, all the people will

love their country with a love that is truly felt and not just spoken of."

Kharnman Konkhal.

"'So'n hai rak chant" ("Teaching love of country"), Khruuparithat

(Teachers' Review) Vol. 6, 1978.

In this section the presentation follows the ascending hierarchy of formal

levels of administration, from village to sub district, and district to province. It

will become apparent, however, that the reality of the exercise of power at the

local level by no means respects this formal hierarchy. This report does not

address directly questions of the nature of the state (see Chapters 2 and 3).

Instead we are examining the manifestations and symptoms of state powers:

sometimes in the form of local powers which, if not always formally or without

contradictions, might be regarded as constituting an important element of

state power in the countryside.

The village level

When a phase of 'Community Development" thinking and policies' was

initiated about 25 years ago, there was often an assumption that "village

communities" did, indeed, exist. This view' was fostered by the "community

study" approach of social science monographs. These villages had

'community leaders" - usually a trio consisting of the village headman, the

head of the primary school, and the senior monk, whom, it was thought, could

be encouraged to act as agents of "development" in the interests of the

"community". There were hopes and exhortations that community unity and

solidarity could be established. Yet this was at a.

time when population increase and migration to new lands had resulted in the

formation of many new villages and the expansion of "natural villages" into

continuous agglomerations of households divided into administrative units,

school catchment areas, etc. These did not necessarily overlap or correspond

to older community patterns. More importantly, this phenomenon coincided

with an accelerating increase in socioeconomic differentiation and

bureaucratization in rural areas.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate the level of village autonomy and

homogeneity in earlier times, but it is nevertheless possible to demonstrate

that a certain degree of autonomy in knowledge and decision-making, of self-

reliance (a well-worn term on the part of certain development planners), of

cooperation and relative egalitarianism existed which contrast starkly with

current realities. This was probably truer in the distinct regional cultural areas

of the North and Northeast, for instance, and in the more nuclear and longer

established villages located further from political centre’s, as well as in

villages where a resident aristocracy or outside officials were lacking. Without

trying to establish some kind of memorial baseline, we can suggest that

before the first penetrations of colonial capital, and continuing long after in

some relgions, there existed associations of entire communities for

themselves, for their own social reproduction. They included external, or

"horizontal" inter-village relations, as well as inter-household networks based

on kinship and neighbor hood. They involved various forms of reciprocal and

redistributive exchanges (for example, labour for agricultural, and domestic

reproduction tasks, pooling labour for communal religious, social and

irrigation tasks) and collective decision-making and action. In the latter case,

externally appointed village officials were predominantly village oriented. !n

addition, social differentiation based on age, gender, ritual rank, and nakleng

(briefly, "strong man") status were of greater weight than wealth and control of

or access to the means of production. In our study we found that the

experiences and forms of local cooperation of the past, when contrasted with

the present, enabled poor farmers to assess the extent and quality of recent

changes and to draw selectively on older values and practices, transforming

them, as they did, in order to meet current challenges.

In a great many villages a small minority of households, about 5 but not more

than 10 per cent, possess a certain degree of wealth, control over resources,

and have greater prestige and power, all of which sets them apart from the

majority. These households include (often in the same person) large

landowners, commodity dealers, shopkeepers, village

officials, teachers, rice millers and moneylenders who derive of their

advantages from their -external- connections and alliances. Theirs is the role

of "linking" the mass of villagers with state and market structures. The basis

for this is their ability to accumulate village "surplus" through rent, wages,

retail prices, commodity dealing and interest. At the same time they maintain

their controlling position as members of village com¬mittees (administrative

committees, temple and school committees, the newer state initiated farmers'

groups, etc.), and through personal patronage (sponsoring religious festivals

and marriages) not to mention economic patronage. Poorer villagers now

often speak of village "society" (sangkhom) from which they are excluded: the

villagers say the rich "don't allow us to participate in 'society' " ("mai hai ruam

sangkhom"). This so¬ciety is often referred to as a "drinking circle"

(sangkhom lao). Further more, I intermarriage may be d at least between

poorer men and the daughters of the well-to-do. Increasingly the "community

leaders" (phunam chumchon) are referred to by the poor as "influence

groups¬(klum ittiphon). Their exclusive social circles reinforce their cohesion

and the -invisibility" or secrecy of their decision- makirl g. Competition

between these groups and individuals may lead to factionalism, which may

place limits on their power. On the other hand this -ncourages selective

cooption of poorer villagers, some of whom.are kinsmen of the rich, as

subordinate clients, which fragments and provides further obstacles to the

poor. The great majority of the poor cannot, in any case, expect to benefit

from the small advantages this type of clientelism provides.

The village temple, with its monks and novices and associated community

rituals, is often the last important "traditional" institution to remain after other

forms of cooperation and collective participation nave been destroyed. But

here, too, new tendencies make themselves felt. Some monks own cars,

have bank accounts and are involved in government schemes. Richer

villagers tend to control the decision-making processes of the temple

congregation, setting compulsory rates of contributions, deciding on and

presiding over expensive festivals or construction projects. Our case studies

revealed instances where resistance to their authority by poorer members of

the congregation, who failed or refused to contribute and attend, was met with

threats of "excommunication" or refusal to arrange proper cremation services.

The position of the poorest, and their ability to organize themselves in more

autonomous ways may depend, in part, on the proportion of such households

in a given village. Thus, in the Samoeng district, where credit dling status

farmers predominated, it was this group that held the overwhelming majority

in the credit union groups, while many of the poor farmers were said to be too

"embarrassed" to join. Where the poor preponderated, everyone would tend

to join, middling farmers as well. At the same time whole villages of mainly

poorer farmers might be "satel¬lites" for richer villages in an economic,

political and social sense. In the Kalasin case a rice bank was organized by

poor farmers in both the karnnan's (subdistrict head) village and the

neighbouring satellite village. Members took a deliberate decision to establish

the rice bank's granary, and to hold their meetings in the poor village. This

had the positive effect of decreasing dependence and increasing freedom

from control and sur¬veillance.

From the point of view of the district administration the village and subdistrict

headmen are of paramount importance. They arc responsible for identifying

and solving the villagers' problems. But a common com¬plaint by the poor is

that their problems are not identified, much less passed on and discussed in

the monthly meetings between headmen and district officials. Even the official

messages and instructions from these meetings are not fully transmitted to

the villagers, thus inhibiting their assessment of and contribution to official

projects. The headmen are now supported by a village committee which is

likely to be dominated by the upper stratum of the village. In some villages

attendance is compulsory under penalty of a 50 baht fine. Meetings art

usually controlled by the conunittee, especially the headmen. Official

announcements are read sometimes for a period of two hours. Proposals are

presented - occasionally by visiting district officials - often without possibilities

for discussion and a simple "yes" or "no" vote is required. Spontaneous

contributions from villagers are limited.

It should be stressed that it is not always the case that the role of the

headman is inherently or universally problematic from the point of view of the

poor farmers. We encountered a wide range of experiences in this respect.

Sometimes poor farmers themselves are elected to the posi¬tion of headman

because of the overwhelming number of poor farmers in a given village, or

because of exceptional personal abilities and qualities. In such cases, the

interest of village officials and the poor are usually not divergent. A significant

number of leaders in the Peasants' Federation were village headmen (see

Chapter 3). Depending on the local situation -that is, type of production,

control ofresources, political and administrative conditions - divergence of

interest and points of tension may be felt to be more internal to the village (for

example, where there are large local landlords and dealers) or more external

(where there are absentee landlords, outside crop purchasers and

moneylenders). In the latter case the interests of the richer, middling and

some poorer farmers may coincide and rich headmen may be capable of

articulating those interests. This is less likely to happen, however, when the

headmen hold a number of other positions such as that of miller, dealer,

shopkeeper, or moneylender. Irrespective of this, poorer farmers may agree

to also join in the headman's rice bank or other such schemes. They may

invite him to be a formal "adviser"" to their own distinct projects; they may

also invite him to their meetings. In the latter case, this may mean holding

additional, more exclusive meetings at which village officials will not be

present. This can result not only from sheer necessity, but also from the

perception of the desirability of participating in various groups at different

levels in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of coalition, and to

avoid unnecessary, misplaced antagonism.

There have also been extreme cases where divergence of interest, together

with a history of antagonisms, resulted in headmen abusing their office and

the law, even to the extent of threatening poor villagers, or their leaders, with

death. In such cases the willingness and ability of hip-her authorities to

uphold the law and the rights of the citizen are absolutely crucial. All too

often, however, "the headman's word is law. But there is also much that

poorer villagers can do, and have done, within the law to assert themselves

and seek redress.

During the 1974-76 period, there were numerous instances where headmen

were confronted, criticized and denounced for their behaviour, which led to

their dismissal from office and expulsion from the commu¬nity by social

pressure. Villagers may, of course, propose their own can¬didate for election

to the office of village headman and, within prevailing social constraints and

pressure, vote for the candidate of their choice. The potentially lucrative

nature of the office is such that large sums of money may be spent by a

wealthy candidate on his campaign. Non-voting can be an expression of

refusal to participate on such -disadvantageous terms. In one case a

headman was referred to by the non-voting poor a! "headman 30%0"

because he had been elected by only 30% of th( electorate. In the

Chachoengsao area, four members of poor farmers groups were elected

headmen just three years after these groups were firs established. This was

carefully planned in order to advance the interest: of the poorer farmers and

was a direct result of their organizing. One wa: already seen as a potentially

successful contender for office of subdistric head. The poor claimed that

previously "the word of the headmen wa law, our words had no weight"". But

after coming together and developing their self-confidence they said that

"even people with only four years of schooling spoke up".

The subdistrict level

A sub district (tambon) level of rural administration has been in existence

since the early years of this century. The sub district head (kamnan) is

elected by and from among the headmen of 10-20 administrative villages

comprising the subdistrict. In recent years some nonelected government

officials (especially in agriculture and development) have been posted to the

subdistrict level. The institution of a sub district council or assembly (sapha

tambon) began to take on new meaning and to show greater promise in 1975

when. for the first time, central funds were allocated for local development

projects that would provide wage labour in each sub district. Such schemes

have continued, with variations, until the present. The 1982-86 'National

Economic and Social Development Plan gave considerable emphasis and

new powers (new structure, purpose and funding) to the sapha tambon in

order

"to decentralize administrative power, to encourage localities to be able to

govern themselves, on the principle of respecting the wishes of the people in

each sub district...laying the foundations of a democratric system of

administration for the majority of the people of the country...with experience of

self-government, the people will come to realize their rights and duties..."

In particular the sapha tambon arc now authorized to develop longer term

economic and social plans for their own locality. At times, in previous years,

sub district projects were required to correspond with province level

development plans. In some cases the sapha tambon had as little as one

week to respond to official directives. Yet the council still has no independent

source of revenue or independence as a distinct legal entity.''

The revised role and potentialities of the sapha tambon seem to offer a

preliminary step towards a greater degree of popular participation. For the

government at least it is the cornerstone of their participation policy.

Much will depend on the commitment and abilities of governments, ministries,

departments and officials to pursue the stated aims in the full¬est sense. As

much or more will depend on local realities of power and influence. The

project considered the potential and limitations of the sapha tambon from

both a general perspective and from the experiences in the field research

areas.

A subdistrict council is composed of the kamnan, a secretary who is a

teacher, the headman of each village in the subdistrict, an expert or qualified

person (phusongkhunawut) from each village, and a number of district level

officials, including the District Officer, ex officio, and some¬times tambon

agricultural and development officers. Here we need to consider both formal

and informal processes and relationships within and beyond the committee;

its relations with both higher levels and the village constituency. We may note

at the outset that the sapha tambon is prima¬rily the creation and

responsibility of the very large and powerful De¬partment of Local

Administration of the Ministry of the Interior. In the past, other government

departments and projects have not used the committee as its local agency.

For example, the Department of Commu¬nity Development has tended to

favour the Village Development Com¬mittees, despite the fact that, m one

villager's words, some of these "exist in name only". Furthermore, there is a

discernible norm within the ad¬ministration which requires that each

administrative unit should try to control and regulate subordinate units as

much as possible, so that in practice the council becomes an implementing

agency of the government or administration rather than a democratic organ

for articulating the people's needs and wishes in an "upward" direction. Later

we shall discuss the considerable reliance on bureaucratic methods and

mentalities and dependence on official structures, especially at the district

level. In many cases it is claimed that the District Officer or his delegate

"makes all the decisions". Council members merely sign their names to

projects initiated at official levels which correspond to the values, wishes and

purposes of official agencies, so much so that while a project involving Village

De-fence Volunteers may get immediate approval, endorsement of a

voca¬tional training project may take two years.

The office of kamnan, or subdistrict head, is of crucial importance. With the

help of village headmen they are the "eyes and ears" of the Dis¬trict Office.

The office of kamnan carries considerable power and respon-sibility. Large

sums of money are now handled by the council and decisions on the

allocation of this money may be made without putting out to tender. The

office-holder attracts the attention of all outside intercuts wishing to become

involved in the locality, whether for trade, commerce, extraction of natural

resources, construction work, development projects, matters of law and order

or security, or political campaigning for the Provincial or National Assembly

elections.

To a lesser extent, the same caveats apply to subdistrict heads as to village

headmen, namely, that they are not all inherently antagonistic to the interests

of the poor. But the kamnan is likely to be a much wealthier and more

powerful individual, linked to outside interests which may con-flict with the

interests of the poorer villagers; he will also be associated with well-to-do

officials and wealthy villagers or to the minority upper stratum of the village.

Opportunities for lucrative illegal gains abound and, quite apart from this, the

extent of legal or officially tolerated sources of income, which lead to

influence and prestige, are considerable. An indication of this arc the large

sums of money which candidates for the office of kamnan are prepared to

dispense on campaigning for office; sums of several 100,000 baht are

frequently spent on such campaigns. Large sums are also spent on

"campaigning" for other local offices, in¬cluding that of subdistrict medica.l.

officer. This parallels the practice in most national Assembly elections of

channeling election funds through the kamnan. Some kamnan, or former

kamnan, go on to seek election to provincial and even national assemblies.

A powerful kamnan may be able to nominate members of the sub district

council without fear of being opposed. lie may also be able to determine the

use of development funds for purposes other than those proposed by

villagers or even decided in council. For example, in one project area money

earmarked for construction of a dam was used to build a temple compound

wall. Another example, also from the project's field studies, illustrates the

possibilities of illegal abuse of funds. The sum of 40,000 baht was budgeted

for the construction of a well. The actual labour cost was 4,000 bah; and the

headman submitted an account for 7,000 baht. Some of the poorer villagers

discovered that the unspent sums had been misappropriated.

The importance of this last example, in the context outlined above, is not just

to document another instance of deplorable "corruption". Its significance lies

in uncovering the structural connections, both formal and informal, among

those with decision- making powers, and in the fact that, in this case, the

villagers themselves perceived these connections. They thereby increased

their knowledge and understanding of local political structures. In a

comparable case where a kamnan was known to be en¬gaged in illegal

timber extraction, the attitudes of the poorer villagers were depicted by such

expressions as "monkey kamnan" and "monkey 'I" "referring to the sapha

tainbon); here, "monkey" is a derogatoryerring epithet referring to illegal forest

activities.

As in so many other instances the question of information and communication

is highly relevant. Villagers, especially the poorer ones, often do not know the

purpose of the sapha tambon, nor the identity of its members. "I talk, you

listen" is considered the council's mode of communication. Detailed

information and explanation is avoided; villagers are thus impeded from

learning about council procedures. Instructions ensuing from the council often

take the form "such and such a project will take place; you will go and shovel

earth on such and such a day for a wage of so much per day"; sometimes no

wages are proposed.

However, a number of poor farmers' leaders felt that the potentialities of the

subdistrict council for investigating and discussing local needs and problems

were considerable. The experience of two localities in which the poorer

farmers had already spent several years developing their own self-reliant

organizations is indicative of efforts to secure greater participation on their

own terms.

In the Yasothorn case, the farmers' group, faced with powerful vested

interests, had sought at first to get representative members elected to the

sapha tambon. When they realized the disadvantages of their minority

representation they specifically declined elected, minority status and

successfully negotiated observer status. In this way, they had access to

certain information and gained the right to speak out but not to vote. They

avoided participating in an imbalanced decision-making process which they

felt did not benefit all its members and would be likely to discredit their own

leadership in the eyes of the members. One member commented that "a

good man could not survive in that sapha tambon". In the Chachoengsao

case, villagers concluded that sapha tambon money was not being used for

projects which corresponded with villagers' needs. Moreover there were no

regular council meetings or on-going council activities. As a direct

consequence of villagers' experience in self- organization, and the

participation of some village headmen in such organizations, there was a

majority on the sapha tambon committee which was more responsive to the

poorer villagers' needs. For the first time, they were able to ensure regular

monthly meetings which analysed local issues and problems on a continual

basis. Furthermore, the possibility arose of successfully nominating a new

candidate for the office of kamnan.

The district and province levels

The district (amphur), which is likely to consist of 10 or more subdistricts,

is in many ways the most important arena for the local exercise of power and

the implementation of local development plans. For most poor farmers direct

experience of state administration and education, of . political

representatives, and of millers and commodity dealers is usually restricted to

the district level. Nonetheless, for a brief period in 1974-75 poor farmers

experienced the possibilities of regional- and national-level association.

Since then there have been a number of province-wide dem-

onstrations to petition the government on commodity prices. In some cases it

is the government which is directly criticized (as on the rice premium or the

failure of guaranteed price schemes); in others, the rice dealers or commodity

merchants. Some poorer farmers have been involved in these

demonstrations and have learned of the difficulties and limitations of such

action, and also of the need, ultimately, for small-scale local organizations,

which represent their interests, to be linked on a larger and wider scale.

At the district level are found the representatives of the various ministerial

Departments for Agriculture, Cooperatives, Development, Land, Forestry,

Excise, Education, as well as the military recruiting officer and the more

autonomous police. More important is the district administraticn per se,

including the District Officer and various Deputies, and in recent years, the

Deputy for Defence and Suppression of the Internal Security Operations

Command (ISOC), in charge of paramilitary, self-defence and other security

organizations. The senior officials are transferred frequently - in one project

area there had been five District Officers in five years; the less senior

officers may be permanently established. In the North and northeastern

regions studied in our project ignorance of different Thai dialects was

found to be a significant obstacle in channels of communication, not only

between district officials andpoorer villagers but also occasionally

between community organizers and villagers. The higher degree of

education among the upper stratum of villagers (that is; knowledge of

Central Thai, and "bureaucratic" language) gives, them a strategic advantage

in this respect.

At the district level we find large scale landowners, merchants, millers,

contractors and owners of transportation who are linked vertically with

provincial- and national-level activities, wholesalers, exporters, and both

national and transnational companies. They are, in many cases, the

'"patrons" (sometimes "godfathers") of smaller and more localised agents and

clients at village and subdistrict levels. Their informal networks of friendship

and association with district officials often constitute strongly influential

groups.

Each district will have one or more elected representative(s) on the

Provincial Assembly (sapha cangwat) which controls certain budgets destined

for use in the locality. One or more elected member(s) of the National

Assembly may be associated with a district even though it may not

necessarily be a parliamentary constituency. Frequently, these represen-

tatives are elected from the commercial interest groups referred to above

and their local commercial agents are often their "vote bosses" (hua

kaneen) at election time. Personal funds of more than one or two million baht

may be spent on campaigning. It is important to stress however that there

are virtually no forms of permanent political party organization at the district

level or below.

It is often said that villagers "have no interest in politics". In so far as

this is true, it must be related to their often unsatisfactory experience with

political representatives. We certainly found widespread opinion that

"politicians are only interested in us poor farmers in order to get elected", that

they only appear before an election, strike bargains all around, and having

secured as much advantage for themselves as possible are seldom

seen again. These experiences contribute to the low degree of hope in or

reliance upon such potential representation. There are exceptions, how-

ever. For example, in some cases factional competition at higher levels

encourages more positive attention on the electors of a locality. A larger

farmers' group, even one which eschews clientelistic attitudes and behaviour,

is more likely to be taken into account. Similarly, a more autonomous

farmers' group may choose to seek out channels of patronage in a

conscious and cautious manner. There are also representatives who, for

reasons of personal integrity and democratic concern for public welfare,

make it their duty to criticize instances of waste, inefficiency, delay,

secrecy and corruption. There are those who stay in touch with the electors

and even support their demonstrations. In two provinces where field studies

were conducted, several provincial assembly members with such records

had met their deaths only a few years previously at the hands of

anonymous gunmen. Authorities ascribe such deaths to factional infighting

between "interest groups"; they often appear, however, to be politically

motivated: In the two cases referred to, poor farmers were convinced that

they resulted from opposition to democratic activities.

An aspect of social relations at the district and provincial levels, as well as at

the subdistrict level, which we wish to stress is the overlapping and

interpenetration of economic, political and cultural interest, and also the

combination of formal and informal, public and "private" activities. An

example already referred to is that of the Provincial Assembly representative

for the Samoeng district who, in addition to private interests at the

provincial level, had been the tobacco-purchasing monopsonist for the

district: he owned district lands, together with the primary means of

transport in and out of the district, and served as chairman of the agri -

cultural cooperative. He had close ties with the local administrators on all

levels. After the district-wide credit union movement was established, he was

defeated in an election to the Provincial-Assembly. This defeat can be

directly, if not totally, attributed to the new degree of social awareness and

self-confidence created in the course of the development of new, more

autonomous groups. His opponent was a younger man with an educa-

tional rather than commercial background. He had great support from the

local teachers and more junior district officials. He had campaigned against

some of the local vested interests and appeared willing to pay more than

just lip service to the idea of democratic representation. Notably, he spent a

mere 5,000 baht on his election campaign. This election reflected a change

in the existing political awareness of Thai villagers in the Samoeng district.

In many cases the district administration and perhaps certain indi -

vidual officers or sections within it, are seriously and energetically com-

mitted to securing the welfare of the people for whom they are politically

responsible. We have seen that the poorer farmers wish to participate in

many official schemes and to enjoy the benefits that result from them.

One problem results from the disproportionate representation of minority

interest groups at the local level and thus the particular needs and capa-

bilities of the rural poor are not emphasized, or are undervalued. Stagnant

cultural or bureaucratic attitudes are also significantly responsible for this

condition. Another major obstacle is the pervasive mistrust of almost all

popular initiatives of the democratic process or the fear of popular

mobilization on social and economic issues. Poor farmers and self-reliant

groups have had to face such fear even when there was nc intention or

desire on their part for confrontation, disloyalty, or personal disrespect to

officials.

The Samoeng case provided an example of an apparently unnecessary

degree of official resistance to a popular initiative. A group of teachers

and community organizers, together with members of various farmers'

groups, decided to hold .a fair in the district "headquarters village" in order to

raise money for ~athlctics. Normally,_ the District Officer is expected to be

chairman of the organizing committee in order to lend authority to such an

event. In this case, however, the new Provincial Assembly representative was

invited. Villagers from all over the district hired trucks and buses, at considerable

expense, to take part in the fair. But before the fair could get underway a district

official, brandishing a handgun and with police support, ordered the fair to close

on the grounds that it was not officially sanctioned. The fair committee could

not prevail and had a difficult task restraining the angry and disappointed

villagers who began talking of "burning down the District Office". One villager

commented that from then onwards "the police can expect to eat only in the

kamnan's house" when they come to visit the villages.

Sport, which is usually a politically neutral activity, was another

occasion for a confrontation in the Udorn village. The rice bank group ° had

discussed arrangements for holding a district-wide knockout competition to

select sporting teams to represent the district at the provincial level. Only

one team was to be selected from each subdistrict, and in this

particular area, was chosen automatically from the kamnan's village. A

provincial budget of 12,000 baht had been earmarked. Thrcugh their main

leader-and spokesman the farmers made representations to the District

Office. They argued that more villagers should participate and they or-

ganized teams (football, basketball and takraw - a kind of southeast Asian

volleyball using a rattan ball) from two additional villages. As it happened, one

of these villages won and was chosen to represent the subdis trict. The

farmers paid all the expenses since the provincial budget was not

forthcoming for this unorthodox initiative. These incidents were social

dramas involving hundreds of people. They illustrate attitudes of mind and

patterns of behaviour and social control which are important precisely

because they are so commonplace and routine. Moreover, in a situation

where there is so little room for popular initiatives, these instances provided

opportunities for self-assertion.

In the preceding section we examined some crucial structures of

decision-making and control at the local level, especially at the subdistrict

and district levels where autonomous forms of activity and organization of

the rural poor are met with resistance. Among the forms we have, rather

blandly, termed social control, we refer here specifically to a related set of

processes of surveillance and intimidation.18 They must be emphasized

because they recurred,-again and again in the histories of our case study

groups. included in the notion of surveillance (peng long) are informing (haa

khao), defamation (sai rai pai sii), and accusation or allegation (khlao haa).

It should be made clear that no matter how prevalent these phenomena

may be, we are not referring to "normal" administrative supervision and

regulation, nor to cases where the "accused" (those at the receiving end of

these processes) are in breach of the law.

The language used in such "accusations" has a precise vocabulary -

individual(s) or group(s) are "being divisive", they are "inciting hatred" (for

example against the rich) and "causing strife"; they are "mobilizing the

people" (against the government), or "criticizing the government"; and

finally, they are "communist".

Some of the actions or statements that such language refers to appear

in official training manuals as alleged. "communist" activities. They

include: demanding rights from the government, urging others to demand

rights and to resist oppressive or corrupt behaviour on the part of officials

or local notables; conducting unofficial surveys; "doing good deeds" for

their own sake; accepting lowly paid or low-status work when qualified to

obtain higher pay; and not responding in anger when provoked. .

Certain forms of organization may be suspect: unregistered associations

or groups which seek supra-local coordination; late night meetings; and

non-hierarchical forms of organization (for example a committee with no

chairperson). The use of some modern words, many of which are cur rent

in journalism or social science and even in official discourse, are regarded

as suspicious when used by poor farmers; for example,"structures",

"mechanisms", "concrete", "abstract", "analysis", "criticism", "mass".

"consciousness", etc. Unofficially organized self-help projects (such as

cooperative production, marketing, medical savings, informal education

groups, etc.) may incur such allegations. As noted earlier, the fertilizer in a

village fertilizer bank scheme, under the auspices of a ~e•ellcstablishcd

Christian organization, was referred . to as "communist fertilizer" by a senior

o(Iicial; a self-help herbal medicine project was accused of preparing "brain-

washing" drugs.

he accusations are made in a variety of contexts. First, there are the

actual accusations which range from relatively weak innuendos, insinuations,

rumours and smearing, to stronger forms of vilification and

defamation. Anonymous leaflets may be circulated. Private warnings may be

given to or about a specific person or group, by people with authority or who

claim connections with such persons. Warnings or accusations may be made

in public meetings. Indirect statements of intimidation by officials, say a

village headman, may be used - in parallel with more direct accusations by less

official sources - for example, "I have the names of (a precise number of)

'eppositionists', and some of them are present at this meeting", or "the

District Officer has your names cn a list, you might as well go and give

yourselves up".

Secondly, there is the formal context of state laws.t' Since the beginning

of the constitutional monarchy .in 1.932, various forms of legislation

proscribing communist activities have been almost continuously in force. The

broad definitions of illegality under these laws have had the effect of

restricting a wide range of political liberties. The current Prevention of

Communist Activities Act of 1979 allows for detention without trial for up to

480 days (normal maximum is 91 days). Other relevant legislation

includes the 1975 Labour Relations Act, which excludes rural workers

from the labour laws and the right to forth trade union type of

organizations. There are also laws and decrees which give the military wide

and special powers in certain times and places. In addition to this formal

context there is a less defined area of discourse, which contributes to a

climate of ideas and attitudes about dangers to society and to dominant

institutions summed up in the slogan "nation, religion and monarchy" (chat

satsana phramahakasat).

There is a context of official organizations of a more or less directly

ideological and/or paramilitary nature, which operates at the village level.

First, there arc the Village Scouts (henceforth VS). The VS were founded in

1971 by the Border Patrol Police20 and have been administered by them in

coordination with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education.

Since 1972 they have acted under royal patronage. In the mid-1980s there

were some three million members aged 14 and over, male and female, with no

upper age limit. Although named Village Scouts, many units also exist in

urban areas. In the first five years they recruited 500,000 scouts, and in 1976

over one million in a single year. Members ,are recruited periodically in

numbered cohorts. Local officials encourage villagers to join and may

insinuate that refusal to join can be interpreted as disloyalty and lack of

patriotism. Many poor farmers and their families are members, but they are

not represented proportionally to their numbers,, even less among the leading

members who conduct training sessions. Some are undoubtedly unwilling

volunteers in the first place. One headman was observed making up a list of

fifty names in response to an official request for recruits from his village. On

the other hand, royal patronage and the royal presentation of scarves to

members certainly account for tnany people joining with some enthusiasm.

Village Scouts are funded by a royal grant, private subscriptions, and

frequently from local adn-.inistrative and rural development funds. At the

'.ocal level they are sponsored by officials of all kinds (educational,

administrative, police, military) and local landowners, traders, bankers, and

politicians - in other words the milieu of "kcal power structures" identified

earlier. Religious figures also take part, even spirit mediums, but especially

monks, who participate in the training ceremonies. Explicit purposes include:

fighting communist insurgency, avoiding and preventing labour disputes, and

gathering information about people "who intend harm to the country'.

Loyalty to the state (phakdirar), and the slogan "Nation, Religion,

Monarchy", are stressed. The word udomkan (ideology) is frequently used

in a positive sense as in the statement that VS "have the united ideology of

the nation" or "Village Scouts were able to unite on one occasion when

there was a clear potential appropriate to their udomkan, namely 6

October 1976 (Village Scout Centre, 1979). On the occasion referred to, they

paraded en masse, with traditonal Thai swords, to join Border Patrol Police,

municipal police and "Red Gaur" units (see below) to attack students

occupying Thammasat University in Bangkok.

VS overlap in membership, as well as in ideology, with various

paramilitary groups. One such group, Volunteers for Development and the

Prevention and Suppression of Crime, first appeared in Chiangmai, the

northern capital, in 1976; and by 1978 the group had over 1,000 members,

almost exclusively educated, male VS, in that city alone. They described

themselves as a "group senior to Village Scouts". They trained in a royal

monastery, were given powers of arrest, and specific responsibility for political

intelligence gathering (Muecke, 1980:427).

Several paramilitary Volunteer Defence Forces (henceforth VDF), with

various names, and linked with different policies and military units or

fractions, have been in existence since the 1960s. In 1980 they were estimated

to number 52,000 (Bunge, 1980). A later paramilitary group,'the Thai National

Defence Volunteers (that samak pongkan chat), was set up in 1978, and

currently seems to be the most dynamic. It is sponsored by the Internal

Security Operations Command (ISOC) and is based on a Division of Civil

Defence in the powerful Department of Local Adrrunistration of the Ministry of

the Interior. Army, police, and civil officials participate in training, and

additional sponsorship (including donations of weapons and money) comes

from members of the local power structure. They receive approximately 10-

20 days training, at the end of which some may receive weapons. They are

divided into "development protection and control" and "self-defence" units,

responsible for cooperating with police and military formations. The

potential or recommended scope of VDF activities is very wide: from various

forms of economic and social action, medical and emergency relief, to political.

education, intelligence gathering and more military roles.

In addition to, and overlapping with, the surveillance functions of VS

and VDF there are specially trained "psychological warfare operatives', who

carry special identity cards and are given privileges instead of cash

rewards, and other informers, who are paid according to results. Some

villagers discerned a pattern of co-optation in which government "supporters"

are sent first for training, followed by villagers thought to be critical; then later

each cohort being encouraged to report on the other.

An important theme or function, which is found in a variety of such local

organizations, is intelligence gathering, informing, and surveillance, with the

attendant elements of harassment, provocation, and intimidation - the

classic vigilante syndrome. It can have the effect on poor farmers groups of

restricting freedom of manoeuvre, causing a decline in membership and

a decline or withdrawal of official support or tolerance. A reason commonly

given for not raising voices in protest against abuses of power by local

authorities is "we're afraid of being shot in the head". The effects are likely to

be experienced most immediately and personally by leading members or

advisers of self-help groups, but ultimately by the collective as a whole. A

large number of groups regarded this as a serious problem encountered in

the management of their activities.

However, the effects of "using the people to fight the people" as one

villager put it, are far from totally disabling. For one thing it appears that

the rural poor, though involved, would be prevented from participating on a

commensurate scale given the costs in time and money. Suspicion that

people who do not volunteer to join are "communist" (Muecke,

1980:423) might therefore rebound, since the majority are still non-

members. There are other limitations and self-defeating characteristics.

Budgets tend to run out, and then few members, not icast the trainers,

show any real interest, thus planned schemes die out; activities may not

extend much beyond infrequent training and induction sessions; volunteers

have to contribute time, money and materials, often at short notice and at

agriculturally inconvenient times; complaints are made of the superior

attitudes and behaviour of trainers; finally, "boredorci' is one of the most

widespread criticisms.

Since refusal to join may be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty to the

state, some members will self-consciously distance themselves from the

official purposes of the group. For example, they may insist on serious

discussions which question official definitions of "national security", "en-

emies of the people", etc. Participants in one case study reported the en-

thusiastic shouting at the climax of a VS ceremony, abjuring the enemies

of the nation, religion, and monarchy, not as komunit (as in the author-

ized liturgy) but as the (nicely rhyming) thutcarit dishonest ones. Infor-

mers may be invited to participate more fully in a group's activities "to

make sure they get the story right". When asked to give information, a

villager may attempt to inform them "...about the harsh conditions of the

poor". Another ploy is to humourously "capitulate" to the accusations by

saying "well, if using our own initiative, setting up our own organization in

pursuit of our livelihood, discussing amongst ourselves in a non

hierarchical way, criticizing corrupt officials, etc. is 'communist', well then so be

it".

One development worker commented that "knowing you're being watched

keeps you working honestly and straightforwardly". But most importantly, if

individuals and groups can manage to continue working undeterred, then their

personal or collective strength and reputation can provide a public

refutation of the substance and legitimacy of such accusations. A

number of groups found that the intensity of such accusatory discourse

diminished over time and became less of a problem. But the constraints, the

potential sanctions, remain, even if held in abeyance; freedom of action is stilt

limited.

In addition to the paramilitary type of organization at the village level,

there are a number of other units that have emerged in the past ten years

which arc more directly repressive and which were initiated or tolcrated by

some official circles. These include the "Red Gaurs" (krathing daeng - a gaur

is a kind of wild buffalo), a mercenary group initially sponsored by ISOC, and

which is used in towns and villages for guard duties (for example, on road

construction sites) in remote areas. In 1980 they had an estimated 25,000

members ( Bunge, 1980). There are also the "Rangers" (known, locally at

least, as tahan pa, tahan phran: "forest soldiers, hunter soldiers"). They

apparently number some 13,000 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1983). They

operate in relatively autonomous units, though integrated to some degree

into regular military formations. Rangers are reported as having been

responsible for a number of robberies, kidnappings, and. acts of terrorism in

recent years (CGRS, 1981:Vo1.8,No.2; 1982:Vol.5,No.3). A more recent

development, the scale of which is not yet clear, is the appearance since late

1981 of "death squads" (also known in some localities as "hunter killer

units", "ruthless hunter units", "death squad infernal units") set up by

provincial police authorities to pursue criminals and dissidents without due

process of law. There are indications that these units have been responsible

for a number of deaths and disappearances (CGRS, 1982:Vol.6,No.4;

1983:Vo1.7,No.1). Although on a considerably smaller scale this bears a

resemblance to the undercover practice of "salvaging" in the Philippines. The

Thai term is keb, which can be translated as "culling" or "salvaging".

The final context of the 'surveillance and intimidation" syndrome is a more

general pattern of violence and homicide in rural areas. For example in

the district of Uthaithani province, in which the project's associated case

study was conducted, the homicide rate in 1984 – greatly .decreased from

the 1970s - was four times the already high national average of 25 per

100,000 per anum.

Also noteworthy is the widespread legal and illegal distribution and

possession of firearms in Thailand, and the existence of a large number of

people willing to act as "gun hands"; that is to say, to carry out killings on

behalf of others, often for quite a small fee which will vary according to the

rank or importance of the victim. Most of the killings referred to in this

chapter are shootings, at close range, and by such a third party, and

frequently with military weapons such as the M 16 'and AK47 automatic

rifles. The victims are usually carefully selected, but there is also a

phenomenon of less discriminate mass murders. A typical case would be

the throwing of a hand grenade (also widely available) into a crowd at a

temple fair,: causing several deaths and many injuries. '

A large number of cases are reported, officially and in the press, to be

revenge killings or the result of private feuding between rival political and

commercial interest groups. For example in the two months preceding the

National Assembly elections in April 1983, 20 candidates and campaign

canvassers were killed, nearly all by shooting (Bangkok Post, 17 April

1983). Very often it is the outspoken critic of vested interests and

malpractices who is killed (whether provincial newspaper reporter,

teacher, development worker, elected member of national or provincial

assembly, etc.). Not infrequently the hired hand is identified as a member

(on or off-duty) of one of the official or semi-official organizations we have

discussed. In many of these cases there is little concertn to investigate

the killings or there is a failure to produce, much less charge and

convict, suspects. Some of these deaths are therefore placed in the cate-

gory of "extrajudicial" killings;21 that is, homicides which are initiated,

permitted, or tolerated by organs of the state, other than judicial exe-

cutions or deaths 'caused in the course of military engagements.

The clearest case of systematic assassination of popular leaders is the

campaign of violence in 1974-5 against leaders of the Farmers' Fed-

eration of Thailand (see Chapter 3). In that case, violence was perpetrated

against people who were non-violently and democratically organizing for

reform. Since that period, a comparable pattern of selective

assassinations of village level popular leaders, labour leaders, journalists,

development .workers, student activists can be discerned. The

documentation on these assassinations is far from complete. One major

source, a human rights group which is careful not to report cases which

have not been well investigated and established, believes the real number of

assassinations of this kind to be higher than those it reports (CGRS, 1982:

Vol.6,No.4). Referring to eleven assassinations of this type in a six month

period in 1981-2, the group states that 'most of these incidents were

attributable to certain local officials or influential people well-connected with

these officials" (CGRS, 1982: Vol.6,No.2).

It may be argued that this phenomenon of rural violence contributes to

what some development workers have termed a "climate of fear" in which

violent attacks or death by assassination, rather than mere official rebuke or

arrest, is a possible, ultimate sanction. There is a demonstrable link

therefore between extreme physical sanctions and the more widespread

cultural, psychological and legal ones. In this way innucndos and warning

experienced as intimidation.

Counter-participatory features of local development

organizations

In the preceding sections we analysed features of the local social and

political environment and their contexts of power. These are contexts

in which poor farmers' groups have to operate and which set specific

external constraints on how they can organize and what they can achieve.

In this section we shall review certain characteristics internal to official

development organization and method. The selection and assessment is

made from the viewpoint of poor farmers themselves. These views arise from

their experience of working and discussing together before and dur= ing this

research study. '

Positive assessment of official organizations by poor farmers who were

members of these organizations focused on whatever material and economic

benefits were obtainable, particularly access to credit and fertilizer, lower

cost-of inputs compared with retail markets, and technical information and

advice. Negative assessments were more numerous and varied. Some

important themes may be summarized as follows:

the bewildering array of new projects, with their jargon, acronyms <lnd

roles; the: frequent lack of coordination and cooperation at and

between oOiciallevels and agencies;

the preponderance of bureaucratic purposes and p'riorities, norms

and mentalities; ex officio control of committees;

the predominance, among village-level leadership, of members of

minority upper strata and interest groups;

the exclusion of the majority of poorer households from membership

in groups that are considered beneficial, such as the Farmers'

Groups, credit union schemes, etc,;

the lack of a continuous and substantial involvement of members in

the decision-making processes, discussions, monitoring and evalu-

ation of group activities;

the limited range and scope of these activities; the irrelevance of

some of these activities, more specifically, those of a non-economic

nature; and thl': repeated failure to achieve even limited objc:ctives;

the positive discouragement by officials and l~actership, whether in

principle or in praclice, of the extension of activities (to incl'Jde wider

issues and problems) and of relationship to other groups;

the costs to members, in terms of time, effort and money, of in,

volvement in projects of limited advantage to the1'!1 (especially those

less directly or not at all concerned with agricultural development),

and so the diversionary efTect of such involvemellt; and the often

negative, sometimes hostile, attitudes and actions on the part of of-

ficials and leadership tow<lrds the more actonomous efforts of the

poorer farmers to articulate their ideas and to organize them'selves as

distinct groups or as members of official groups.

There has been a proliferation in recent years of olTicial projects at

the local level and a corresponding plethora of committees and volunteer

office-holders. Villagers often have a sense of being bombarded by a

barrage of new acronyms and roles. In some cases villagers will, however

sceptically, try to make the most of the opportunities presented and to

deri ',Ie what advantage they can. In some instances the new structures

exist only on paper. Specific rural development schemes are scathingly

criticized hy turning their acronyms into sardonic puns, so that ro' po' cha'

(Accelerated Rural Development) becomes ruam phuak khan chug

gathering of the corrupt); or ko'so' cho' (Rural Employment

Generation Programme) becomes either kin saam chon eak, (i.e. be on

the take) at three levels (village head, kamnan, and amphur official), or

Iwong sin chaat (cheat the life out of the nation). The recent and now

very widespread community development and moral revivalist campaign

known as phaen din thamm phaen dinthong (land of Buddhist virtue,

land of gold) becomes phaen din tho' phaen din thae (land of

desperation). A villager's view of land reform (kan phatilup thidin) or

perhaps "reform" in a general sense (kan phatilup) is indicated in the

pun kan phat phat lup [up (patting and stroking, mollifying).

This proliferation of new official "titles" is but one example of the

inculcation of bureaucratic culture and practices. They are symptoms of

a drive for standardization, which can be seen as another fonn of

control. Thcy also include forms of registration and regulations, and

official jargon, as well as forms of remuneration or compensation: daily

allowances, tolerated private use of public funds, fees and percentages;

for example "forest protection volunteers" receive 50 per cent of the

fines that are imposed. They include style and scheduling of meetings

along official bureaucratic lines: usually in official hours and on official

working days; officials speaking very formally through microphones

before an audience with little or no two-way communication. It was

indicated that such rules and procedures were not adjusted to suit local

priorities with their cultural and practical requirements and that official

purposes are served rather than the needs and interests of the poorer

farmers and landless workers.

Members of this minority are able to use their positions to advance

their interests. They are often able to combine their modem education

with an ability to make use of more traditional values and relationships

of a'uthority, superiority and command. Poor fanners are exciuded from

fuller participation by the distinct and often financially demanding social,

practices of this social milieu, for example: exclusive marriage choices,

forms of speech, dress, transport; patterns of display and consumption

(for example, "drinking circles"), travelling to towns, socializing amongst

themselves and with urban, official or com:nercial strata. In the last

analysis, such leadership may resort to more coerciv~ measures. This

may be through the mediation of official laws and law-enforcers or

through less formal and even illegal means.

We can now begin to see more clearly some of the crucial constraints

on participation which involve the setting of priorities, expressing new

needs and issues on a continuing basis, and monitoring and assessing

group activities. Faced by such constraints, members of these groups,

eyen if they are discontented, are likely to remain passive and

deferential. Their scepticism, and perhaps their reli:lnce on personal but

unequal relationships, increases. In turn this permits the leadership, and

stronger and wealthier members to pursue unchallenged their

"legitimate", if unfair, advantages. It also removes from sight and scrutiny,

from collective accountability and control, activities of a corrupt and illegal

nature. Thus it may never be known why, or even that, a sack of fertilizer

costs more than it should; or why a particular person received the

building contract; or what the size of the budget was and whether it was

legitimate to use it in a certain way.

In cases where poorer farmers had been drawn into, or caught up In,

officially instituted organizations which did not serve their interests or

most urgent needs, this "participation" (in the official sense) was often

assessed as diversionary, and even systematically demobiiizing. In short,

it was often considered to be a waste of time, money and effort. Some-

times such involvement was voluntary, at least at first, though apprehen-

sion of the social consequences of not joining in was often a constraining

factor. There are cases too where members and even "leaders" are

simply designated by headmen and others. We also recorded examplc~

of members of poor farmers' groups being quite deliberately coopted by

local powerholders in order to gain" popular" support and information

about the activities of villagers, and to prevent and undermine

autonomous, non-official initiatives. It is true that in the case of many

official groups little time or effort is demanded, or even permitted, and

indeed this can be part of the problem. In many cases, however, time

spent in what are considered to be irrelevant kinds of meetings and

"training" can be demanding. One poor farmers' leader underwent

training for a "volunteer" project which involved three "seminars" - five

days in the village, then nine days in the provincial town, and a further

five days in the village. In this case his expenses were not paid, nor was

his loss of earnings compensated. However, when this same farmer

readily sacrificed his time and energy to poor farmers' projects, he met

with hostility (in the form of the *politicar' insinuati:ms discussed above)

from the officials who had requisitioned his labour for the "volunteer"

scheme. He contrasted these attitudes with some bitterness ..

Once again, it is important to note that numerous examples can be

found, some of them within the project areas, of official support, whether

formal or informal, for some of the more autonomous organizations and

initiatives of the rural poor. This support may come from individual officers

or from certain official institutions or departments which may not.

necessarily be those represented at the district level. Despite such

examples, the project identified a pervasive negative, and even hostile,

attitude to such efforts at greater participation originating from within

the leadership of official village-level organizations and their higher

level associates.

Some of the ways in which such attitudes are expressed, and may

become material forms of coercion and control have already been dis-

cussed. They may also be found to some extent in non-official, non-

governmental organizations. In one case a group of non-official

development workers and poor farmers' leaders were invited to visit

the project of a long-established non-governmental organization

supported by an international agency. After many formalities, a

spontaneous dialogue began between the visitors and local poor

farmers. Discussion turned to problems of tenant-landlord relations. At

this point, a senior official representing the NGO, insisted on bringing

the discussion to an end and addressed the visitors with these words:

"You have stimulated them quite enough, it's time to go nov/'.

Poor farmers frequemly meet with a range of antagonism. At one

end, and more rarely, are the extreme forms of intimidaticn referred to

earEer. Calculated lack of cooperation and material support are more

common. The head teacher may refuse the use of school buildings for

evening meetings. Access to official channels of information, advice or

material aid may be blocked. Attempts may be made to set up rival or-

ganizations or to incorporate the more autonomous organizations into

more official ones (as in the case of the Credit Union in Samoeng dis-

cussed in Chapter 4). The Yasothorn Farmers' Group's experience of

trying to extend and develop forms of cooperation and coordination be-

tween the district's groups is matched in many other cases. They pre-

sented their initiative within the format of an officially recognized

organization, without any imposing ideas of federation. The initiative

met with substantial resistance, arid was accused of being "political"

and of not having been envisaged or permitted by official plans and

regulations.

Diversion of effort and co-optation may also stem from theactivities of

"private sector" agencies. In the Chachoengsaocase, villagers had

three times offered local land for the construction of a secondary

school, a medical centre, and a highway department. depot,

respectively. They wcre mostly members of one of the self-help groups

described above. By participating in the planning process they hoped

for mu~h needed economic and social benefits for the locality. In eaeh

case they were':outbid~ by a local merchant who managed to divert

the schemes to areas where he would stand to benefit economically and

improve his personal social standing and official connections.

I n the model resettlement scheme in the same area the new settlers

were at first required to build their houses in a uniform "modern" style but

their decision to use old building materials prevailed. The large meeting

hall, made of bamboo walls and roofed with grasses, was required to be

rebuilt with hardwood, and to a copy-book design. This insulting and

wasteful undertaking was supported by the provincial Rotary Club whose

plaque eventually adorned the wall above the platform. This "cosmetic"

adjustment completely contradicted the decision of the settlers'

comm.ittee. It was imposed in order to meet the requirements of the

sponsoring foundation for a proper location for the opening ceremony on

the 200th anniversary of the founding of Bangkok and the reigning

dynasty. For this same purpose the village children were instructed in

polite, upper-register forms of social address, so that they might properly

greet and speak to visiting dignitaries.

I n this case the villagers assert.ed themselves on one small issue,

but. could not. prevail against insistent outside interests which they

perceived to be at best. irrelevant and at worst contrary to their own

material interests and cultural preferences. This may be an example of a

relatively "soft." form of social control, but we have seen how other

groups met with more int.imidating and coercive opposition. Attacks on

the reputation of the leadership of self-help groups, negative insinuations

as to t.heir patriotism, legality and purpose, are frequently made during

official meetings, incIud:ng those of the ideological and/or paramilitary

kind. It is not surprising therefore that some members of self-r..elp groups

see these organizations as ways in which "the people are set against the

people~ and that the issuing of firearms to selected members is seen as

a means of further protecting established interest groups, and not as a

means of "community defence", as is claimed.

The following account of an officially instigated ~project~ is from the

Uthaithani case study. It was launched and encouraged within the official

discourse of "development" and ~participation". It illustrates "a number of

the criticisms raised above: bureau,:ratic" standardization, cooptation of

village leaders, marginal, if any, relevance to local needs. It also

introduces a new theme of increasing importance, namely,

competitiveness.

At the instigation of the District Office, the kamnan entered the village for

a provincial competition. The normal practice is for each dis y the

construction of awnings and name signs at the front of each house.

The fenCe-building was effected by the constant exhortations of the

kamnan, who threatened to withhold statutory services, such as issuing

identity cards, to anyone who refused to comply. Villagers themselves

had to provide materiah such as wood, bamboo and nails. This

involved considerable expense, due to the shortage of locally available

materials. Despite some grumbling, most of the road frontage was

fenced, but the backs of houses were not. In a nearby village, however,

with a stronger tradition of selforganization, it was decided to take a

common stand against fence building unless the kamnan provided the

materials, since it was felt that the fences provided no tangible benefit

and that, in any case, they would soon fall into disrepair. This united

stand taken at the regular meeting of villagers to discuss their rice bank

and ether community matters raised the confid~nce of individuals to

resist the scheme.

The non-material side of the preparations for the competition was

to set up eight development groups (/dum phattalUla). At a village

meeting, the kamnan divided the. village into groups and appointed

group heads to each one. -The kamnan relayed orders via these

leaders, which often placed them in an uncomfortable position since'

they were not naturalleaders and his orders were considered by the

group members to be whimsical. The first duty was for each group to

provide several "volunteers" to visit a village in the neighbouring

province that had won the previous year's regional competition. The

volunteers had to provide the 70 baht bus fare. Only half presented

themselves. After some discussion the kamnan agreed to pay the

remainder of the bus hire fee. In his wel-

. coming . speech, the District Officer offered advice on how to win a

competition - this consisted mainly of how to take good care of the

judging committee and how to catch their attention, for example, by

selecting a pretty girl to welcome the judges. During the visit to the

village, the villagers provided a hospitable welcome and showed the

group the

trict to concentrate its resources on a single village which is to be used

as an example of "developmenC to visiting senior officials. In this

'case, village development involved a number of stages. The first and

most visible effort was to build bamboo fences around each house

plot. The purpose of this is twofold from the point of view of the District

Office. First, it gives the appearance of "civilization" (khwam

rungreuang), not of a "messy" (keeka) village. (Fines were suggested

for leaving cattle dung on main village paths!) Second, it enhances

control over villagers by district and village officials - expressed as

"pokkhro'ng ngait' (literally, "ease of administration"), since it allows for

easy identification of house plots and residents. This 'practice is

further enhanced b exemplary houses that had been selected for their

cleanliness and conformity with official standards.

At the meeting which followed the fence building project, the District

Agricultural Extension Officer spoke of his admiration for the manner in which

the village had "developed" almost overnight. The material effect was less

enthusiastically appreciated by some villagers, who in the past would have

been able to cut across each other's land but now had to walk longer

distances because of the fencing. The principal benefit went to the kamnan,

who came 'second in the annual award ceremony r kh"'aamdii

khwaamcho'b" or "merit points") for which he received an undisclosed sum

of money from the provincial administration. Had he been awarded first

place, he would have received a gold medal and a revolver. Subsequently,

his uncharacteristic burst of enthusiasm for village "development" waned.

Indeed, this burst had surprised many villagers who had grown accustomed

to his concern for his own private business affairs. The following year the

fences fell into disrepair.

"Internal" problems of poor farmers' organizations

So far in this chapter we have examined the constraints placed on the

self-expression and self-organization of the rural poor which originate

HoutsideH their own social sphere. We shall now turn our attention to some

limitations and difficulties which are more Hinternal" to the everyday social

and cultural activities of the rural poor, especially as they affect education

and the labour precess. Next, we shall consider issues of gender, authority

and leadership. The aim is to emphasize themes that were perceived to be

problematic in the course of the collaborative research.

Lack of education or literacy was frequently raised as a problem,

especially a lack of fluency in the standard "Central" Thai language (for

northerners and north easterners)," and knowledge" of basic accounting

skills. Appropriate technical and socialjpolitical knowledge were also

considered important and this raised the problem of the relevance of formal

education.

All villages - with the important exception of many ethnic minority

villages in mountainous and forest areas - have access to schools which

offer the first four years of compulsory primary education. Nearly all

children complete this stage, though many have to repear one or more

years and completion is ·no guarantee of continuing literacy or

numeracy. In 1978 only slightly more than half of all children completed

the last three years of primary education; under one-third completed the

first three years, and half this number the last three years of secondary

education; only 3.5 per cent attended university.

While there is a steady trend towards greater educational provisions

there is a continuing bias favouring certain social classes and regions

over others, towns over the country and Bangkok over the rest of the

country. Thus in 1973-74, 74 per cent of university students came from

families of businessmen or government officials; 13 per cent from

families of other employment and only 6 per cent from agricultural

backgrounds (of all classes). Of all of these not fewer than 59 per cent

came from Bangkok (approximately to per cent of the population) and

only 8 per cent from the Kortheast (approximately 34 per cent of the

population). Even with improved access to education the problem of

content remains; 8. content which, as numerous critical educationalists

attest, reflects an educational culture which encourages a bureaucratic

outlook <md, in the Thai phrase, the desire to be "masters over others"

(pen cao khan nai khan). Comprehensive changes in the content and

purpose of education are unlikely to occur without even greater social

and economic changes preceding and accompanying educational

change in the larger scciety.2Z

One effect, if not purpose, of many dominant. educational systems -

and Thailand is no exception - is to ignore or disr!llsS as irrelevant, at

least to discredit, many pre-eyjsting traditional and popular forms of

knowledge and skills and with them, powers of decision-making and re-

sponsibility. Much ofIicial "development" thinking and training starts with

a baseline notion of rural . ignorance. Such values can be internalized,

thus giving rise to a sense of inherent ignorance or lack of ability. This

was recognized to be a problem in many of the poor farmers' groups. To

some extent the difficulties were overcome as more group members

participated in discussions and assumed responsibilities. Efforts were

made to emphasize local history, to assess, adapt to or transform earlier

values and forms of community relations and experience. Even on this

seemingly innocuous ground, some groups met with resistance. In the

Udorn case an evening self-education class had to be discontinued

22 "Education and Popular Participation" was the topic of one of the

special issue papers produced by the project.

after insinuations were made of subversive activity. (Why should a poor

farmer need a blackboard in his bouse?) There arc of course other traditions

and sources of knowledge to be drawn from, sources such as Buddhist

philosophy, or the experience and knowledge derived from travelling and

working away from the village. These traditional, popular and alternative

sources of knowledge contributed profoundly to the resources of the

participatory group.

Changes in types and relations of production, and diminishing control

over them, have had deep social implications in the labour process. [n

earlier, more subsistence-oriented periods of peasant life there had beeil

greater uniformity of labour processes. greater collective participation in

production, fewer distinctions between" economically" as opposed to socially

and culturally productive tasks, Great value had been attached to visits

between households, talking at length among groups iil working places or

during frequent domestic and temple ceremonies.

T aday there is an intensification of work of purely economic kind, There

is a new division oflabour and there are more varied and numerous

productive activities, labour processes and locations. This has had a socially

fragmenting effect, separating households or neighhours, reducing the time,

eneq~y and willingness of people to meet together regularly, to take on

positions of leadership and t.o engage in unpaid labour. Poor farmers often

find that certain issues, interpersonal differences and CODDicts are left

unresolved due to a lack of time for joint discussion, This has led to an

accumulation of misunderstandings (misplaced suspicions, ,esentment,

envy, jealousy, blame, etc.) which affect collective activity. As was mentioned

earlier, recognizing the problems and the fact that these problems are not

necessarily inherent to particular localities or ciasses of people is held to be

a positive step in the process of overcoming them, .

Until now we have referred to "new" difficulties ansmg out of a changing

situation. There is a further set of limitations, however, which are culturally

more deep-rooted, notably attitudes and behaviour relining to age, gender,

kinship and authority. Of course it may be argued that they, too, have been

"externally" derived - produced'in and by the dominant culture and social

order of earlier times. They are what critical intellectuals term feudal

(sakdina) values. These differences continue to be selectively reinforced in

dominant cultural discourse or ideology. In any case they have been

internalized and practised as part of village-level or peasant culture. For

example, respect for and deference to elders is emphasized at all levels of

Thai society. They are overridden only in cases

after insinuations were made of subversive activity. (Why should a poor

farmer need a blackboard in his bouse?) There arc of course other traditions

and sources of knowledge to be drawn from, sources such as Buddhist

philosophy, or the experience and knowledge derived from travelling and

working away from the village. These traditional, popular and alternative

sources of knowledge contributed profoundly to the resources of the

participatory group.

Changes in types and relations of production, and diminishing control

over them, have had deep social implications in the labour process. [n

earlier, more subsistence-oriented periods of peasant life there had beeil

greater uniformity of labour processes. greater collective participation in

production, fewer distinctions between" economically" as opposed to socially

and culturally productive tasks, Great value had been attached to visits

between households, talking at length among groups iil working places or

during frequent domestic and temple ceremonies.

T aday there is an intensification of work of purely economic kind, There

is a new division oflabour and there are more varied and numerous

productive activities, labour processes and locations. This has had a socially

fragmenting effect, separating households or neighhours, reducing the time,

eneq~y and willingness of people to meet together regularly, to take on

positions of leadership and t.o engage in unpaid labour. Poor farmers often

find that certain issues, interpersonal differences and CODDicts are left

unresolved due to a lack of time for joint discussion, This has led to an

accumulation of misunderstandings (misplaced suspicions, ,esentment,

envy, jealousy, blame, etc.) which affect collective activity. As was mentioned

earlier, recognizing the problems and the fact that these problems are not

necessarily inherent to particular localities or ciasses of people is held to be

a positive step in the process of overcoming

them, .

Until now we have referred to "new" difficulties ansmg out of a changing

situation. There is a further set of limitations, however, which are culturally

more deep-rooted, notably attitudes and behaviour relining to age, gender,

kinship and authority. Of course it may be argued that they, too, have been

"externally" derived - produced'in and by the dominant culture and social

order of earlier times. They are what critical intellectuals term feudal

(sakdina) values. These differences continue to be selectively reinforced in

dominant cultural discourse or ideology. In any case they have been

internalized and practised as part of village-level or peasant culture. For

example, respect for and deference to elders is emphasized at all levels of

Thai society. They are overridden only in cases of exceptional differences

in social status (aristocratic or bureaucratic rank, sacerdotal status, etc).

Often this results in an unwillingness to speak out, or to criticize or

contradict seniors. This tendency can lead to extreme dependence on

leaders-even within some of the more successful self-help groups.

However, many village values and relations of kinship and

neighbourliness, are seen to have positive aspects. Usually it is the

poor, however, regardless of age or gender, who ha ve no voice.

That the issue of gender was only gradually raised and developed in

the course of the project reflects not only the large preponderance of

men engaged in the discussions but also the very ~normality" of the

prevailing cultural definitions of women. By comparison with many other

Asian societies Thai women have a relatively high status and degree of

involvement in production and community life. However, many cultural

definitions of women encourage notions that they are weak, morally in-

ferior, and that they are individually and socially subordinate to men.

The experience of some groups showed that unmarried women, and

perhaps older married ones (benefitting from relative age if not "modern"

education), had a better chance of playing a larger social role. Some

men claimed that women showed greater strength and ability than men,

"leaving earlier to go to the fields, and continuing to work in the home

afo:er their return". There was agreement, of a self-critical nature, that in

practice men did not permit women to take on larger roles such as full

participation in group activities and responsibilities. It ;s a bitter iron)", to

say the least, that in the light of the difIicu!ties poor farmers have in

making themselves heard outside their own sphere, a poor farmers'

committee could restrict the participation of women for fear they may

speak teo much.23 Official development schemes usually include'

housewives' groups and young women's groups. These tend to restrict

the participation of women to limited areas of activity, and so to

marginalize women from major issues of production and community

organization.

Attitudes of deference and compliance towards leaders are linked

with long-established cultural notions of proper respect for men. Outside

the village sphere, or milieu of poor farmers, these attitudes arc

sometimes bound with feelings of fear. The Thai vocabulary is rich in

terms whose basic meaning suggests fear and respect. Thus, deference

to leaders is

23 One response to the inadequate treatment of the issue of gender

in this research project was the commissioning by UNRISD of a

follow-up study specifically on this issue. See Gail Om\"cdt, .1986.

lbis contains bibliographical references to recent work done by

women and on women's issues. See also Noeleen Heyzer, 1986.

commonly perceived to be a serious problem within poor farmers' groups, not

least hy the caders themsc\ves. This raises severe obstacles within collective

decision-making processes. Leading committee members might be regarded

as "sumeone to rely on" (thii phoeng), more a refuge than just a reliable

person, or as a "magical solution" (yaa wiset). Even wrong decisions might

be complied with, ignoring or suppressing collective responsibility for

correcting or abandoning them.

Problems of leadership featured prominently in the discussions of the

project. The energy and quality of work of a small number of poor farmers'

leaders.- in some ca.ses just one or two individuals - and associ-

ated \'olunteers or development workers were judged, in almost all cases, to

be crucial for the successful self-organization of the rural poor.

These problems can make it increasingly difficult for the leadership of

poor farmers' groups to delegate or share work and responsibility and to build

up an expanding core of experienced members. There arc many ways in

which local leadership is exposed, isolated and made vulnerable. They are

the prime targets for all forms of external opposition. At one extreme we have

documented instances of assassinations and of ambushes that led to

serious, sometimes fatal, wounding from guns and grenades. On a more

normal scale there are forms of surveillance, informing, accusation and

intimidation referred to earlier. Mail may be intercept.ed and travel restricted,

for example, by carefully timed official visits and requests.

The role of a leader in many of these cases is a complex one. Leaders

are expected to participate not only in poor farmers' activities but also in

official NvolunteerH activities and in community work (health, ~port, religious

and youth activities, etc.). If they do not participate they may be regarded as

divisive or insulliciently public-spirited. And if, as one villager ruefully put it,

they should decide for domestic or tactical reasons to adopt a low proiile,

<,.nd temporarily disengage from all community activities, this too, would

arouse official suspicion. At the same time poor farmers' leaders have to

work to secure their own livelihood. All leading members of poor farmers'

groups spoke of severe economic problems, even of crises, caused by the

sacrifice of time and efTort to collective work. In some cases this led to

domestic conflicts, psychological strains, and thus to resignation or

decreasing participatory efTorts on their part. This also afTected

administrative efficiency and decreased the time spent on analysing and

solving problems. Occasionally, misunderstandings and tensions within

groups, and a lack of cooperation or infringement of rules, resulted.

any of these problems were ii1so experienced by lowly paid but full-

time community organizers and volunteer development workers. Such

problems were generally inadequately appreciated by outside sources of

support, whether official or unofficial. Self-reliant, autonomous associ-

ations of the rural poor have a need for outside support such as networks

of information, legal aid and defence. Many poor farmers' leaders have

much wider social experience than other members and thus are in a posi-

tion to communicate with and mobilize potential "external" allies. This

includes experience gained as village headmen, or from travelling and re-

siding in city temples as ordained members of the Buddhist sangha, or

through work in cities and factories. A few have been invited to visit other

Asian countries (Bangladesh, Philippines, Sri Lanka) under the auspices

. of religious or philanthropic organizations concerned with economic and

social development. Ironical!y this can also have the negative effect of

distancing leaders from the villagers, not so much in economic terms, but

through the use of a "new" language and the acquisition of a new status.