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Crisis and Continuity:
A Study of Waste Management Policy Making in20th Century Sydney
Volume 2 APPENDICES
Ian John Reeve
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University.
January 2005
[i]
List of Appendices
Appendix A1 Basic Program for Parsing Infoquick Output..............................................Al.l
Appendix A2 Focus Group Discussion Schedule............................................................. A2.1
Appendix A3 Focus Group Brief.......................................................................................A3.1
Appendix B2 Literature Review........................................................................................ B2.1
Appendix B4 The Waste Disposal Act 1970...................................................................... B4.1
Appendix B5 The Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority.............................................. B5.1
Appendix B6 The Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995................................. B6.1
Appendix B7 Littering, Dumping, Clean-Ups and Waste Places......................................B7.1
Appendix B8 The Agents of Danger................................................................................. B8.1
Appendix B9 Recycling and Packaging............................................................................. B9.1
Note: The B series of appendices are numbered so that the section numbers are in dose correspondence with the section numbers that deal with similar topics in chapters 2 and 4-9 in volume 1.
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Appendix Figures
Figure B2.1 Graphical representation of the waste management hierarchyused by Wilson (1996:2)............................................................................ B2.21
Figure B4.1 Exemptions, directions and prosecutions between 1965-66 and1973-74 under the Clean Air Act.............................................................. B4.16
Figure B4.2 'Co-ordination table' showing role of the State PollutionControl Commission................................................................................. B4.27
Figure B6.1 Comparison of national public opinion polls on various aspectsof environmental concern and the volume of waste-related articlesin the Sydney Morning Herald.................................................................... B6.2
Figure B6.2 Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about dangers from chemicals and waste, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1950 to 1997........................................................................... B6.3
Figure B6.3 Waste hierarchy diagram from the 1995 Labor Governmentwaste policy document, 'Waste Reforms'.................................................B6.94
Figure B7.1 Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about litter and dumping, excluding editorials and letters to theeditor — 1930 to 1997.................................................................................. B7.6
Figure B7.2 Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about industrial disputation involving garbage collectors, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997......................................................B7.7
Figure B7.3 Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about landfill siting, excluding editorials and lettersto the editor — 1930 to 1997..................................................................... B7.30
Figure B8.1 Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about the impacts of tips on surrounding areas, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997............................................................................ B8.5
Figure B8.2 Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about fires in tips,excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997.................... B8.6
Figure B8.3 Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about proposals for, or siting of, incinerators for municipal waste, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997...........................................................B8.14
Figure B8.4 The number of items (e.g. questions on notice, debates on Bills) referenced under the terms 'chemicals' and 'toxic waste' in Hansard indexes for the period August 1972 to May 1995......................B8.56
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Appendix Tables
Table B5.1 Comparison of the MWDA's and WRAPS's stated mission andobjectives in 1977/78 ..................................................................................B5.2
Table B5.2 Quantities of materials recovered from domestic waste for recycling incomparison to the size of the waste stream.............................................B5.47
Table B6.1 Listing of headlines of articles in the Sydney Morning Heraldduring 1987 about dangers from chemicals, burning chemicalsand toxic and hazardous wastes..................................................................B6.5
Table B6.2 National Kerbside Recycling Strategy targets............................................B6.6
Table B6.3 Changes that various groups needed to make, according to the 1994 NSW Government waste policy document'No Time to Waste'................................................................................... B6.79
Table B6.4 The fate of amendments moved in the Legislative Council on theWaste Minimisation and Management Bill.............................................B6.114
Table B8.1 Summary of available information on the dates of construction,location and capacity of incinerators in Sydney...................................... B8.13
APPENDIX A1
Basic Program for Parsing Infoquick Output
10 dim x$ (10)12 input "search keyword(s)?"; key$15 input "name of input file?"; namein$20 input "name of output file?"; nameout$50 lincount=0100 open namein$ for input as #1 200 open nameout$ for output as #2 400 for i=0 to 10 450 input #1, x$(i)460 lincount=lincount+l470 print "parsing line ";lincount500 for j=l to 60550 year=val(mid$(x$(i),j,4))600 if (year>1987 and year<1998) and mid$(x$(i),j+5,1)="p" then 1000650 next j675 if eof(1) then goto 8000680 x$(i)=right$(x$(i),len(x$(i))-6)700 next i750 print "failed to find year about line ";lincount 770 goto 80001000 year$=right$(str$(year),2)1010 page$=mid$(x$(i),j+7,len(x$(i))-j+7)1020 month$=mid$(x$(i),j-4,3)1040 day$=mid$(x$(i),j-7,2)1060 paper$=mid$(x$(i),8,j — 18)1080 if paper$ <>"SMH" then goto 4002000 if month$="Jan" then mon$=l:goto 20502001 if month$="Feb" then mon$=2:goto 20502002 if month$="Mar" then mon$=3:goto 20502003 if month$="Apr" then mon$=4:goto 20502004 if month$="May" then mon$=5:goto 20502005 if month$="Jun" then mon$=6:goto 20502006 if month$="Jul" then mon$=7:goto 2050
[Appendix Al.2]
2007 if month$="Aug" then mon$=8:goto 20502008 if month$="Sep" then mon$=9:goto 20502009 if month$="Oct" then mon$=10:goto 20502010 if month$="Nov" then mon$=ll:goto 20502011 if month$="Dec" then mon$=12:goto 2050 2050 dat$=day$+"/"+mon$+"/"+year$2200 if i>l then goto 2300 2220 head$=x$(0)2240 goto 60002300 if i>2 then goto 24002320 head$=x$(0)+x$(1)2340 goto 60002400 if i>3 then goto 25002420 head$=x$(0)+x$(1)+x$(2)2440 goto 60002500 if x$(i-2)="" then goto 2550 2520 goto 26002550 head$=x$(i-1): goto 60002600 print "encountered enormous headline about line ";lincount 2620 goto 4006000 print #2, key$,dat$,page$,head$7000 goto 400 8000 close #1 8010 close #2 8050 end
APPENDIX A2
Focus Group Discussion Schedule
[Introduction] Research about rubbish — confidentiality — process (short brainstorming sessions followed by discussion) — participants' introductions if they haven't had the opportunity immediately prior the focus group to be introduced to each other.
[Brainstorm] Suppose that a rubbish tip was going to be sited somewhere near where you live and you are a member of a group that is trying to stop the rubbish tip. You want to design a symbol that you will use on placards at demonstrations and as a logo on letters you will write to politicians and councillors. The symbol has to get the message across that you really don't want this rubbish tip. You've decided you'll use the circle and bar like is used on no smoking signs [show example] and you need a picture of something to go behind the circle and bar, so that people who see it know that it's a rubbish tip you are protesting against. And the picture has to make maximum impact — make them feel that yes, there's no way we want that rubbish tip.
You can draw a rough sketch on the paper in front of you, or just write a description in words of the picture you are thinking of, or just envisage the picture in your head. If you've got a couple of ideas, that’s fine, the more the better.
[Allow a minute or so for brainstorming, then go round group, writing up ideas on board. Allow discussion of each idea as it goes up if need be]
[Discussion] We've got lots of ideas up there, does anybody have any preference for one that they think would make maximum impact?[draw out reasons for preference]
[Discussion] Suppose that you were unsuccessful in your efforts to stop the rubbish tip and it was sited somewhere near where you live. What difference do you think it might make to your everyday life? [use following probes as appropriate] Would things feel different having the
[Appendix A2.2]
rubbish tip there? What about in your home — would it make any difference to how your home felt to you, or what you did at home? Would you feel you had to do more cleaning? What about to your health? [draw out, if necessary, perceptions of mechanisms by which the presence of a landfill would affect their health]
5 [Discussion] Would the shape of the rubbish tip make any difference to how you felt? You might have noticed if you've been to lots of tips that sometimes tips fill in a gully or a hole in the ground and other times the rubbish builds up like a hill or mountain. If the rubbish tip near where you lived was like a mountain, would you feel better or worse about it than if it was filling in a gully or a hole? [draw out reasons for preference].
6 [Brainstorm] Suppose that after this rubbish tip had been operating for a few years, we took some drilling equipment onto the tip and drilled a hole down to the bottom of it. And suppose that we brought up a sample of what was at the bottom of the tip. What I want you to do is to think up four or five words that best describe what that stuff might be like. The words could describe the colour or the smell or what it was made of — whatever you think would best describe it.
[Allow a minute or so for brainstorming, then go round group, writing up words on board. Allow discussion of each idea as it goes up if need be. Allow discussion to continue if people want to talk about the words on the board]
7 [Discussion] Well that's a pretty good description of how rubbish might end up after it’s been in the tip for a few years. But what about the rubbish that we send to the tip. Is there anything about the sorts of things you put in the bin, or recycle, or compost, that you really hate? Are there particular sorts of rubbish that you really hate? [draw out reasons for dislikes]
8 [Discussion] We've talked about the things in our rubbish that we don't like. Now what about the litter that we see lying around the place. Is there a particular sort of litter that you really hate to see? Does the place where the litter is make any difference? Are there particular places
[Appendix A2.3]
where you think litter seems particularly horrible? [draw out reasons for dislikes]
[Discussion] We've talked a lot about rubbish and tips — let's finish on a positive note and talk about something positive — Clean Up Australia. Have any of you taken part on Clean Up Australia Day? Do you think there's been any change in the level of community support for Clean Up Australia Day — do you feel there are now more or fewer people taking part than in the first few Clean Up Australia Days? [if some think there has been a decline ask the following] Why do you think so many people wanted to take part on the first few Clean Up Australia Days?
[Close, thank for participation, answer any questions about research]
APPENDIX A3
Focus Group Brief
Two focus groups are required to be conducted in Sydney.
Composition
Group 1 — 7-9 participants, approximately equal numbers of males and females 18-50 years of age. Group 2 — 7-9 participants, approximately equal numbers of males and females aged over 50. Participants should not be all from one suburb or social class but should be from a reasonable spread of locations and socio-economic status.
Length
Group 1 — 1.25-1.5 hours. Group 2 — 1.5-1.75 hours
Focus Group Content
The focus for these two groups is:
• the symbols and meanings that people attach to landfills and the waste within them,
• how they feel a landfill in their vicinity might affect their every day life, and in particular the cleanliness of their home and their health,
• what sorts of waste and litter they feel is especially distasteful, frightening, threatening, including particular combinations of litter and the place where it is dropped, and
• what were the motivations people felt that they or others had for getting involved in the early Clean Up Australia Days (actually Clean Up the Harbour and Clean Up Sydney) in 1989 — 1992.
The focus groups are to include two brief brainstorming activities that will require pens and paper for some participants. A discussion schedule is
[Appendix A3.2]
provided below. This is a slightly modified version of schedule that has been piloted with one focus group in the Armidale district. The groups should be allowed a fair amount of latitude to raise waste issues that are not in the schedule, but that are of concern or interest to them, provided that time permits and the points in the schedule are all visited in the course of the discussion.
Deliverables
• Clear recordings of the discussions on ordinary audio cassettes.
• Telephone briefing by the facilitator about any issues in the group dynamics that should be taken into account in transcribing and interpreting the tapes.
Time Lines
Delivery of cassettes and briefing within four weeks of receipt of order.
Contact Details
Ian ReeveThe Rural Development CentreUniversity of New EnglandArmidale 2351 NSWTel: 02 67735145Fax: 02 67733245Email: ireeve@metz.une.edu.au
[Appendix A3.3]
Focus Group Discussion Schedule
[Introduction] Research about rubbish — confidentiality — process (short brainstorming sessions followed by discussion) — participants' introductions if they haven't had the opportunity immediately prior to the focus group to be introduced to each other.
[Brainstorm] Suppose that a rubbish tip was going to be sited somewhere near where you live and you are a member of a group that is trying to stop the rubbish tip. You want to design a symbol that you will use on placards at demonstrations and as a logo on letters you will write to politicians and councillors. The symbol has to get the message across that you really don't want this rubbish tip. You've decided you'll use the circle and bar like is used on no smoking signs [show example] and you need a picture of something to go behind the circle and bar, so that people who see it know that it's a rubbish tip you are protesting against. And the picture has to make maximum impact — make them feel that yes, there's no way we want that rubbish tip.
You can draw a rough sketch on the paper in front of you, or just write a description in words of the picture you are thinking of, or just envisage the picture in your head. If you've got a couple of ideas, that's fine, the more the better.
[Allow a minute or so for brainstorming, then go round group, writing up ideas on board. Allow discussion of each idea as it goes up if need be]
[Discussion] We've got lots of ideas up there, does anybody have any preference for one that they think would make maximum impact?[draw out reasons for preference]
[50+ group only] If you'd been doing this in the 1950s or 1960s, do you think you would have chosen the same symbol? [if different draw out reasons]
[Discussion] Suppose that you were unsuccessful in your efforts to stop the rubbish tip and it was sited somewhere near where you live. What difference do you think it might make to your everyday life? [use
[Appendix A3.4]
following probes as appropriate] Would things feel different having the rubbish tip there? What about in your home — would it make any difference to how your home felt to you, or what you did at home? Would you feel you had to do more cleaning? What about to your health? [draw out, if necessary, perceptions of mechanisms by which the presence of a landfill would affect their health]
[50+ group only] What about in the 1950s or 1960s, do you think that rubbish tips had more or less effect on the people living near them compared to now? [if different draw out reasons]
5 [Discussion] Would the shape of the rubbish tip make any difference to how you felt? You might have noticed if you've been to lots of tips that sometimes tips fill in a gully or a hole in the ground and other times the rubbish builds up like a hill or mountain. If the rubbish tip near where you lived was like a mountain, would you feel better or worse about it than if it was filling in a gully or a hole? [draw out reasons for preference].
6 [Brainstorm] Suppose that after this rubbish tip had been operating for a few years, we took some drilling equipment onto the tip and drilled a hole down to the bottom of it. And suppose that we brought up a sample of what was at the bottom of the tip. What I want you to do is to think up four or five words that best describe what that stuff might be like. The words could describe the colour or the smell or what it was made of — whatever you think would best describe it.
[Allow a minute or so for brainstorming, then go round group, writing up words on board. Allow discussion of each idea as it goes up if need be. Allow discussion to continue if people want to talk about the words on the board]
[50+ group only] We've been talking about a hypothetical rubbish tip in the present day. What about rubbish tips thirty or forty years ago. Do you think there would have been the same sort of stuff at the bottom if we drilled down into a tip in, say, the 1950s? [if different draw out reasons]
[Appendix A3.5]
[Discussion] Well that's a pretty good description of how rubbish might end up after it's been in the tip for a few years. But what about the rubbish that we send to the tip. Is there anything about the sorts of things you put in the bin, or recycle, or compost, that you really hate? Are there particular sorts of rubbish that you really hate? [draw out reasons for dislikes]
[50+ group only] Have these sorts of things got worse in the last ten or twenty years? Were there things that you really hated in the past that aren't a problem any more?
[Discussion] We've talked about the things in our rubbish that we don't like. Now what about the litter that we see lying around the place. Is there a particular sort of litter that you really hate to see? Does the place where the litter is make any difference? Are there particular places where you think litter seems particularly horrible? [draw out reasons for dislikes]
[50+ group only] What about litter in the 1950s and 1960s? Were the sorts of things we've been talking about a problem then? Were there other things lying around that you really hated that you don't see these days?
[Discussion] We've talked a lot about rubbish and tips — let's finish on a positive note and talk about something positive — Clean Up Australia. Have any of you taken part on Clean Up Australia Day? Do you think there's been any change in the level of community support for Clean Up Australia Day — do you feel there are now more or fewer people taking part than in the first few Clean Up Australia Days? [if some think there has been a decline ask the following] Why do you think so many people wanted to take part on the first few Clean Up Australia Days?
[Close, thank for participation, answer any questions about research]
APPENDIX B2
Literature Review
B2.1 Introduction
B2.1.1. Definition of WasteEnglish language dictionaries and lexical databases generally present a number of meanings for the word 'waste' (e.g. Turner, 1987; Fellbaum, 1998). The noun 'waste' refers to areas of land worthless for cultivation, to diminution by wear and tear, to materials regarded as worthless, to useless or profitless activities, and to the act of wasting. The verb 'to waste' refers to squandering something of value, to dissipating materials into the environment, to devastating areas of value and to losing vigor or health. The adjective 'waste' can refer to land or material objects of no value.
Common to these different meanings is the human evaluation of processes and materials. Wastelands are landscapes judged to be of no value. Wasting is a process of diminution that yields little that is judged to be of value, or a process in which what is achieved is judged to be insufficiently more valuable that what was consumed. In societies in which there are concepts of property and ownership, land or materials that pass from having value to not having value are likely also to pass from being owned to not being owned, or at least to a state where the owner is not particularly concerned about retaining ownership (and so becomes a target for the totter or rag-and-bone man). If something comes to have no value for one person, but has value for another then, given the potential buyer and seller are aware of this, it may be traded. If something comes to have no value for anybody, it is likely to be discarded or languish in storage. In many cases, the transition from object of value to object of no value to anyone is also a transition out of ownership. Insofar as ownership may be associated with socially sanctioned rights and duties, discarding material as waste and relinquishing ownership also changes the set of institutions relevant to the material. For example, while a potentially harmful material is in ownership, the owner has a duty to prevent it harming others. When the same material is discarded, there may be no one with this duty, or the duty may fall upon the state. The possible set of transformations across various states of ownership, intended use and value have been well described in Eva Pongracz's epic exploration of the definition of waste and waste management in European industry (Pongräcz, 2002).
[Appendix B2.2]
As the previous example of potentially harmful material implies, we should not expect a discard of no value to anyone to transform itself uncontentiously into the end products of decomposition. If someone sees the possibility of harm to themselves or their interests, then the discarded material becomes an object of political concern. In other words, the human evaluation that is central to the definition of waste goes beyond considerations of the value of uses to which materials might be put. It extends to evaluations of the dangers which materials might represent to the individual (a discarded piece of paper at one's front door might awaken less concern compared to a discarded piece of radioactive paper). It also extends to evaluations of what might follow from the existence of waste materials (a refrigerator dumped on a block of vacant land might be evaluated negatively by the adjacent resident, not so much for any harm the refrigerator itself might do them, but for the car bodies and vagrants which the adjacent resident believes might follow).
Clearly, what counts as waste is critically dependent upon human perceptions. However, this is rarely acknowledged in the definitions of waste provided in professional texts about waste management, or in legislation. These definitions usually depend on some combination of the characteristics of the material in question, including its physical state, its original use, the type of material, its physical properties, its origin and safety issues (White, Franke and Hindle, 1995). In some cases, there is brief acknowledgment of the subjective nature of what counts as waste, either as a prelude to a more detailed definition based on material characteristics, or as a catchall phrase supplementing a definition based on material characteristics.
Waste is something for which we have no further use and which we wish to get rid of It can be solid or liquid...
Barron (1989:1)
...(a) any substance which constitutes a scrap material or other umvanted surplus substance arising from the application of any process; and (b) any substance or article which requires to be disposed of as being broken, worn out, contaminated or otherwise spoiled. Anything which is discarded or otherwise dealt with as if it were waste shall be presumed to be waste unless the contrary is proved.
U.K. Environment Protection Act, 1990, in: Petts and Eduljee (1994:7)
...waste includes:(a) any substance (whether solid, liquid or gaseous) that is discharged, emitted or deposited in the environment in such volume, constituency or manner as to cause an alteration in the environment, or(b) any discarded, rejected, unwanted, surplus or abandoned substance, or(c) any otherwise discarded, rejected, unwanted, surplus or abandoned substance intended for sale or for recycling, reprocessing, recovery or purification by a separate operation from that which produced the substance, or(d) any substance prescribed by the regulations to be waste for the purposes of this Act.
[Appendix B2.3]
A substance is not precluded from being waste for the purposes of this Act merely because it can be reprocessed, re-used or recycled.
New South Wales Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995: S5
Despite such attempts to define waste in detail, the definition has been contested, particularly in Europe. The 1996 EC Draft Resolution on Waste noted that:
The discussion on the distinction between waste and goods has been going on for almost twenty years now. No satisfactory definition has yet been found to determine when a material becomes waste and when waste becomes a good again.
Commission of the European Communities 1996: para. 13
The definition of waste in EC policy directives has been interpreted in various ways by the agencies of member states in an attempt to incorporate EC policy principles in the law of the member states. For example, the United Kingdom Department of Environment Circular 11/94 took the view that it was the environmental or health dangers of materials that followed when they fell 'out of the commercial cycle or out of the chain of utility' that should be considered in determining whether material was waste.
On the other hand, the European Court of Justice has, through a series of cases (e.g the Viscose and Zanetti cases in 1990, the Euro Tombesi cases in 1997, Inter- Environnement Wallonie v Region Wallonne in 1997, the ARCO Chemie Nederland Ltd case in 2000), focused on discarding or intention to discard as the defining characteristic of waste. For example, the judgment in the Palin Granit Oy and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyon kuntayhtymdn hallitus case in April 2002 noted that:
1. The holder of leftover stone resulting from stone quarrying which is stored for an indefinite length of time to await possible use discards or intends to discard that leftover stone, which is accordingly to be classified as waste within the meaning of Council Directive 75/442IEEC of 15 July 1975 on waste.2. The place of storage of leftover stone, its composition and the fact, even if proven, that the stone does not pose any real risk to human health or the environment are not relevant criteria for determining whether the stone is to be regarded as waste.
These definitional difficulties are not unexpected, for several reasons. First, the quantity of materials passing through the economy has increased greatly during the 20th century (e.g. an 18-fold increase for the U.S.A., according to Gardner and Sampat, 1998). Second, the materials flow through the economy is much more diverse. It now includes all 92 elements of the periodic table, compared to some 20 elements at the beginning of the 20th century. Over 100,000 new synthetic compounds have been produced since the 1930s (Gardner and Sampat, 1998). Third, in the last 30-40 years, there has been a
[Appendix B2.4]
increase in the amounts of materials re-used in the economy — materials that would have been discarded in the postwar years. Consequently, there is a greater amount and range of materials that might threaten the health of people or the environment, and some materials, and/or their contaminants, that once would have posed a danger only at their site of disposal, are now returned and circulated within the economy with the opportunity to endanger greater numbers of people. Food contamination by PCBs in the intensive livestock industries is an example of this phenomenon (Bernard, 1999). Lastly, and consistent with the reflexivity of late modernity (Giddens, 1990), there has been growth in the amount and sophistication of scientific and engineering effort applied to the transport, processing and disposal of waste materials, which growth might be expected to lead to greater demands for definitional clarity.
If future societies manage to return most material by-products of the economy back to the economy, the concept of waste materials may be of little utility. In these circumstances, a state seeking to protect the health of its citizens from the hazardous side effects of economic activity will have difficulty using the concept of waste materials to distinguish a class of materials that require particular policy treatment. The above-mentioned legal definitional problems possibly reflect the beginnings of this difficulty.
Depending upon which legal doctrine might be adopted, waste may come to be taken to mean most materials circulating in the economy or no materials at all!If the reasoning of the European Court of Justice is taken to its logical conclusion, then all materials circulating in the economy after the phases of natural resource extraction, manufacturing and consumption could be considered as waste, as well as any materials dissipated or sequestered in the environment after any or all of these phases.
Alternatively, this approach could be rejected on the grounds that materials of virgin origin are just as likely to have hazardous side effects in use as do the same materials that have already been used and recycled, so that all materials circulating in the economy are simply materials, regardless of their origins. If, in addition, it was accepted that unwanted material returned to the planet's biogeochemical cycles in such a way as not to cause environmental alteration did not constitute waste (one of the principles in some Australian legislative definitions of waste, such as the Waste Minimisation and Management Act, 1995, quoted above), then there would be no materials that could be called waste.
[Appendix B2.5]
Regardless of the definitional difficulties that emerge from a careful consideration of the meanings of the terms 'w aste', there are a number of terms for particular types of waste which have been in common and generally uncontentious use in professional and policy discourse for many years. These waste categories are based on a number of different criteria which are generally relatively easy to apply.
Firstly, waste can be separated on the basis of physical or chemical characteristics, — for example, into gaseous, liquid and solid categories. The terms liquid and solid waste are widely used as general categories. A related categorisation is whether or not the material is radioactive or not.
Secondly, waste can be characterised by its origins. Categories of this type include bio-medical or clinical waste, construction and demolition waste, household waste, yard waste, commercial waste, industrial waste, agricultural waste, mining waste and so on.
Thirdly, waste can be characterised by its behaviour over time if placed in the environment. Waste with a high proportion of organic materials will decay with the accompanying release of unpleasant odours. Such waste is termed 'putrescible waste'. Waste comprised of materials that do not decay in such a way is often termed 'inert waste'.
Fourthly, waste can be characterised by the magnitude of the danger it is believed to pose. Ffazardous waste, toxic waste and cytotoxic waste are examples of wastes characterised by their dangers to humans.
Fifthly, waste can be characterised by whether or not it is subject to legislative, regulatory or licensing provisions. Control waste (United Kingdom), Subtitle C waste and Subtitle D waste (United States) and prescribed waste (Australia) are examples of this form of characterisation.
The above criteria can apply simultaneously — for example, waste containing asbestos might be solid, industrial, inert, hazardous and a prescribed waste. Lastly, it can be noted that some terms for waste types that are in common use combine several criteria. The term 'municipal solid waste' (often abbreviated to MSW) is an example of this. The waste streams which comprise municipal solid waste depend upon the waste management practices of the municipality,
[Appendix B2.6]
or upon purposeful definition by government agencies. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency of the State of Queensland in Australia, defines municipal solid waste as materials provided by the householder for kerbside collection, excluding the materials placed in containers for recyclable materials such as glass, aluminium and paper (Environment Protection Agency, 2003). The Queensland Environmental Protection Agency defines as domestic waste, the total of municipal solid waste and kerbside-collected recyclates. The United Kingdom Environment Agency, on the other hand, defines municipal solid waste as:
Household waste and other wastes collected by a waste collection authority or its contractors, such as municipal parks and gardens waste, beach cleansing waste and any commercial and industrial waste for which the collection authority takes responsibility
Aylmer, 2004
The United States Environmental Protection Agency definition of municipal solid waste excludes 'municipal sludges, non-hazardous industrial wastes, residue from automobile salvage operations, and construction and demolition debris' (Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 2003).
It can be seen from these examples that, not only can the meaning of 'municipal solid waste' change according to which wastes municipal authorities collect and dispose of, but can also be different by purposeful definition by state agencies. To ensure clarity in the use of waste terminology in this thesis, a glossary of terms is provided.
B2.1.2. Definition of waste management
English language dictionaries and lexical databases generally present two meanings for the word 'management' (e.g. Turner, 1987; Fellbaum, 1998). The first is the act of managing, where the verb 'to manage' means to organise, administer, regulate or take control of the affairs of business concerns or public undertakings. In its second meaning 'management' refers to people who are managing, in the sense described above.
While the concept of a neutral and expert bureaucracy using scientific analysis to determine public policy came into favour in the Progressivist era of the first few decades of the century (Waldo, 1984), the term 'management' was not widely connected with environment or natural resources until the rise of modern environmentalism in the 1960s and the emergence of policy elites with
[Appendix B2.7]
expertise in ecology and natural resources (see, for example, Watt, 1968). I have suggested elsewhere (Reeve, 1993), that the use of the word 'management' in 'natural resource management', 'environmental management' or 'ecosystem management' is a misnomer, at least as far as the sense of the word 'management' described above is concerned. This is because it is implicit in the word 'management' that the manager has the power to manage. However, it has been the case, particularly in the early days of the discipline of natural resource management, that the natural resource manager has very little power over the businesses or private land owners who are causing damage to resources. The term 'management provides the illusion that environmental problems are being attended to by governments.
Leaving aside the question of the actual effectiveness of management, the term 'waste management' can be taken to refer to the organisation, administration, regulation or control of waste. Webster's New Millenium Dictionary of English (Lexico Publishing Group, 2003) defines waste management as: the processes involved in dealing with the waste of humans and organisms, including minimization, handling, processing, storage, recycling, transport, and final disposal
However, if one accepts that the term 'waste' has lost some semantic certainty in the late 20th century, as described in the previous section, then the term 'waste management7 may also be similarly affected. To take one extreme of meaning for 'waste' discussed above, it is possible for waste management to refer to managing of any of the material flows in the modem economy. As discussed at the commencement of section B2.1.1, the concept of waste can apply to things other than physical materials, such as energy or human effort. Accordingly, waste management could be taken to refer to the management of energy efficiency or time and motion studies on the production line.
B2.2 Waste-Related Studies other than Policy Studies
B2.2.1. Disciplinary breadth of the field
Behavioural Psychology
Studies in behavioural psychology have generally focused on the antecedent and consequent conditions that induce individuals to engage in waste minimising or recycling behaviours. Conditions and behaviours that have been studied include:
[Appendix B2.8]
• the effect signs near rubbish and recycling receptacles and the proximity of signs to those receptacles on recycling in offices (Austin, Hatfield, Grindle, and Bailey, 1993),
• the comparison of several methods of collecting office paper for recycling with regard to accuracy of separation (Humphrey, Bord, Hammond, and Mann, 1977),
• the comparison of various methods of recycled material collection including timing, notification and type of container on participation (Jacobs, Bailey, and Crews, 1984),
• the comparison of verbal appeals and contests in promoting paper recycling in schools (Hamad, Cooper, and Semb, 1977),
• the antecedents of recycling and composting intentions (Taylor and Todd, 1995),
• the effect of prompts on waste disposal behaviour in a student cafeteria (Craig and Lei and, 1983),
• the effect of rewards and tokens on food waste in schools (Fisher, 1975), and day care centres (Montesinos, Greene, and Preciado, 1985),
• comparison of lottery ticket rewards and contests in promoting paper recycling in college accommodation (Geller, Chaffee, and Ingram, 1975),
• effect of economic and environmental rationales on source reduction behaviour (de Young, Duncan, Frank, and Gill, 1993),
• assessment of consumer education strategies for reducing contamination in plastics collected for recycling (Cutler and Moore, 1995), and
• evaluation of public education workshops to reduce waste (Springer and Haver, 1994).
Other studies in behavioural psychology have included the satisfactions peopleget from recycling and re-using (de Young, 1986) and campers' understandingof waste disposal and sorting instructions (Ham, 1983).
[Appendix B2.9]
A review of the findings of behavioural psychology studies of waste behaviour was undertaken by (Porter, Leeming, and Dwyer, 1995). It was found that while a number of antecedent and consequent conditions have found to be effective in changing waste behaviour, these changes did not very often persist when the conditions were removed.
Marketing and Communication
A small number of studies have drawn on marketing and communication theories in examining household waste minimisation behaviour. Such studies include the use of means-ends chain theory and laddering methodology to examine consumers' goals in recycling (Bagozzi and Dabholkar, 1994) and a comparison of the effectiveness of different advertising communication strategies in influencing recycling and waste reduction (Obermiller, 1995). A review of the application of marketing approaches to modifying household waste management concluded that there was a need for further studies into the discrepancy between consumers stated preferences for 'green' products and their actual purchasing patterns (Shrum, Lowrey, and McCarty, 1995). Theories of communication have also been used to evaluate risk communication processes about solid waste incineration (Renz, 1992).
Social Psychology
Studies in social psychology have mainly dealt with the relationships between values, attitudes and beliefs and waste minimising and recycling behaviours. A review in 1983 of social psychology's contribution to changing behaviours that lead to environmental problems, concluded that the discipline had much to offer in facilitating the societal transition to more resource-conserving lifestyles (Oskamp, 1983).
Studies of the relationships among values, attitudes, beliefs and waste-related behaviours include:
• attitudes to recycling and correlation with other attitudes and values (McCarty and Shrum, 1994; Larsen, 1995),
factors affecting participation in recycling (Gamba and Oskamp, 1994),
[Appendix B2.10]
• characteristics of recyclers and non-recyclers (Lansana, 1992),
• the relationship between approval of waste charges and feelings of personal efficacy (Abe, Murase, Nakano, and Umino, 1995),
Hornik, Cherian, Madansky, and Narayana (1995), undertook a meta-study of the determinants of recycling behaviour and found that the strongest predictors of recycling were internal facilitators: specifically, consumer knowledge and commitment to recycling best predicted propensity to recycle. External incentives such as monetary rewards and social influence were the next best predictors, along with frequency of collection.
The nature and determinants of environmental concern has been an area to which considerable social psychological attention has been devoted (see, for example (Langeheine and Lehmann, 1986; Stem and Dietz, 1994). Some studies in this area have included attitudes and concern about solid waste (Ladd, 1990; Zimmer, Stafford and Stafford, 1994) and concerns about incineration (Ladd and Laska, 1991). A survey of New Hampshire residents found that NIMBY concerns about waste management facilities were mainly related to children's health (Halstead, Luloff and Myers, 1993). Other studies have examined the relationship between compensation for accepting a waste disposal site in the neighbourhood and concerns about the site (Nieves, Himmelberger, Ratick, and White, 1992); and the psychosocial impacts of exposure to solid waste facilities (Taylor, Elliott, Eyles, and Frank, 1991; Elliott, Taylor, Walter, and Stieb, 1993; Eyles, Taylor, Johnson, and Baxter, 1993).
Education
Studies in education have focused on how children learn about waste, and the evaluation and development of curricula for teaching about waste. Studies have included the knowledge and understanding about waste of pre-school children (Palmer, 1994), school children (Palmer, 1995; Membiela, Nogueiras and Suarez, 1993) and university students (Corral, Obregon, Frias, and Pina, 1994). Other studies have assessed school recycling and solid waste curricula (Boerschig and de Young, 1993, and in some cases (Adler, 1992), have been critical of the way which school curricula seem to be propagating various environmental myths. Analysis of lifestyles has be undertaken to develop consumer education curricula on waste reduction and recycling (Stum, 1992).
[Appendix B2.ll]
Media Studies
Several media studies have examined solid waste issues. A case study by (Bennett and Lawrence, 1995) of the media's portrayal of garbage demonstrated how symbols of social change can be introduced through news icons. A study by (Mazur, 1989) tested the hypothesis that the quantity of media coverage rather than content affects the emergence of resistance to waste disposal sites.
Sociology and Anthropology
Solid waste issues have received some attention in the sociological literature, where they have been analysed as a form of social dilemma (Funabashi, 1995), or in relation to the changing role of women (Schultz and Sievert, 1993; Godbey et al, 1998), to changes in sharing of household maintenance tasks with retirement (Dorfman, 1992), and to the Protestant ethic in North America (Payne, 1971). Other studies have dealt with waste disposal and social stratification (including the relationship between the locations of disposal sites and areas with high proportions of particular ethnic groups) (Bullard, 1983; Bullard, 1984; Collin, 1992), waste and social movements and the impact on policy (Seguin, Maheu, and Vaillancourt, 1995), the historical origins of differing urban and rural attitudes to waste (Mikkelsen, 1992) and comparisons of the views of waste administrators and environmentalists on strategies for waste reduction(West, Lee, and Feiock, 1992). The adoption of innovations framework has also been used in a study of waste management practices by local government (Feller and Menzel, 1978).
Ben Ari (1990) described the influence of cultural assumptions on the arrangements for waste collection in a city in Japan. The requirement that families record their names on their bags of separated waste types was reversed after protest by those involved — this reversal reflecting, in Ben Ari's view, broader cultural changes that were taking place in Japan. The public display of names on recycled materials placed out for collection is a more extreme case of how, as O'Brien (1999:264-265) has pointed out, recycling by kerbside collection in open topped containers or transparent bags results in the making public of that which formerly retained its privacy in opaque sided and lidded garbagecans.
[Appendix B2.12]
Sociological studies at a more macro level of analysis include the comparison of waste production between countries (Poleszynski, 1977), the relationship between waste and broader societal trends such as industrialisation, modernisation, economic growth, and global endangerment (van Dam, 1975; van Dam, 1977; Sisler and Wass, 1988) and prescriptions for reducing the waste intensiveness of USA society (Purcell, 1981).
Garbage analysis is an approach to understanding human behaviour through a particular artefact, viz. garbage, and as such shares the methodological approach of some areas in anthropology and archaeology. Garbage analysis has been used to identify inconsistencies between reported and actual recycling behaviour (McGuire, 1984), as a means of studying household recycling behaviour (Hughes, 1984) and to identify socio-economic target groups for education about battery disposal (Tani and Rathje, 1995). A review of garbage analysis studies was carried out by (Rathje and Ritenbaugh, 1984).
B2.2.2. Constructivist Accounts of Dirt and Danger
A seminal constructivist analysis of concepts of dirt and pollution in traditional societies is Douglas's (1966) work, 'Purity and Danger'. Douglas argued that the notion of matter that is 'dirty' or 'unclean' arises inevitably from the cognitive and physical processes of imposing order on, and creating meaning from, the external world and the body. '... the yearning for rigidity is in us all.It is part of the human condition to long for hard lines and clear concepts.' (p.162). While it might be thought that modem ideas of dirt and waste have their basis solely in the scientific understanding of pathogens and hygiene, Douglas suggested they are nevertheless, as in traditional societies, expressive of symbolic systems. In Douglas's words:
If we can abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left with the old definition of dirt as matter out of place.... It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations, and a contravention ofthat order. Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system.Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements.
(Douglas, 1966:35)
O'Brien (1999:266-267) drew attention to how widespread anomalies and ambiguities can arise in modern societies in the classification of waste materials. He gave the example of toe-nail clippings which, if they are produced in a
[Appendix B2.13]
nursing home, pass into the clinical waste system with its careful attention to the hazards of disease transmission. If they are produced in the home, they pass into the municipal solid waste system where such hazards do not require such careful consideration. Toe-nail clippings are dangerous or not dangerous according to the classification system pertaining at the site of their generation.
According to Lynch (1990:12) and Douglas (1966:4), dichotomies are particularly favoured in the ordering and classification imposed by the human mind. Luhmann (1989) also pointed out that there is a tendency for particular discourses, such as political communications or scientific communications, to be characterised by their own binary codes.
The act of imposing order, either cognitively or physically, creates that which cannot be accommodated by the order. Initially, this matter, be it remnants of a meal or discarded packaging, is recognisably out of place, and a threat against order. While it still has its identity, the danger remains. Tt is unpleasant to poke about in the refuse to recover anything, for this revives identity. So long as identity is absent, rubbish is not dangerous/ (p.160). As O'Brien (1999:272) noted, modem packaging with its ability to carry appealing and socially meaningful images heightens the contrast between the package as a significant source of meaning and the package as waste.
Once rubbish is anonymous and in its defined place, such as a tip, it is no longer a danger to order. The breakdown of rubbish provides a sense of completion and closure. It returns to the formlessness from whence it sprang when order was imposed. Thus, in the debate between physicians of the miasmatist and contagionist schools in 18th century Philadelphia, Benjamin Rush observed that composting organic wastes and using them on the land removed the danger of miasmas (Raufer, 1998:40). Also municipal solid waste that has been shredded is generally regarded as more aesthetically acceptable than untreated waste (MWDA, 1980-81:35).
Using Sartre's essay on stickiness as an example, Douglas pointed out that things that are a threat to order can be either anomalous (unable to be fitted into existing categories) or ambivalent (blurring the boundaries between categories). Viscous or sticky liquids for which people frequently feel a sense of abhorrence blur the boundaries between liquid and solid and, if touched, blur the boundary between the body and the external world.
[Appendix B2.14]
Lynch (1990:14) introduced the notion of 'intensifies of dirtiness', factors that make dirt seem more dangerous, such as if it is derived from other people or strangers, if we cannot escape it by our own efforts, if it pollutes places that are normally clean or sacred, or if it comes too close or adheres to our body. These aspects of waste discussed by Douglas and Lynch raise the possibility that waste, as an environmental issue, is more 'imaginable' than environmental issues such as climate change. Bell (1994:57), following Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein (1979), drew attention to the imaginability of hazards, and the role of the media in providing richer, more imaginable, accounts of environmental hazards, in the public's overestimation of the risks associated with these hazards.
Lynch also introduced the idea of waste places — 'symbolically debased areas of the city' that signal that social norms and controls are relaxed in their vicinity (p.25-26, 53-54). As might be expected, waste places can attract litter and rubbish precisely because people are aware of this relaxation. Conversely, litter in non-waste places is readily seen as symptomatic of lack of control, or of enforcement of tidiness, a view that has been common in municipal politics as far back as at least the late 19th century (Melosi, 1980:43). Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail below, waste places may be chosen as locations for social interaction among groups of people who seek to escape social norms and controls, such as teenage gangs. For the 21 young middle class adults interviewed by Lynch in 1981, urban waste places symbolised the break down of social order (pp.216-217, 223).
Douglas's and Lynch's views would seem to provide some explanation for the persistence of the miasmic representation of the danger of accumulations of waste that can be inferred from Hoy's (1995) study (section B2.2.4, below). The agents that transport danger from distant accumulations of waste to the vicinity of the individual, be these agents the miasmas of the 19th century, the flies and germs of the 20th century, or the ecosystem processes of the late 20th century, could be seen as being responsible for blurring the boundaries between space that is 'away', i.e. space where wastes can be safely thrown 'away', and spaces where wastes and dirt cannot be allowed to accumulate, i.e. space that is 'not away'. As Hoy's work showed, the areas of personal, domestic and public space that have been 'away' or 'not away' have changed substantially over time, so that materials discarded in certain spaces would draw no attention in some periods of history, but excite intense concern in others.
[Appendix B2.15]
Douglas's study was equally concerned with the relationship in traditional societies between ritual and social structure on the one hand, and notions of dirt on the other. It can be noted in passing that, while Douglas claimed that the genesis of these notions was similar in both traditional and modern societies, she devoted very little, if any, of her study to this relationship in modern societies. However, as discussed in section B2.2.4, below, this shortcoming can be filled by drawing a number of inferences from Hoy's (1995) account of the history of cleanliness in the USA.
The key link between the notion of dirt and individual and collective behaviour is the concept of pollution. The individual becomes polluted or unclean, and therefore a possible danger to himself or herself or others, either through contact with anomalous or ambiguous matter that is understood as dirt, or through behaviour which itself is anomalous or ambiguous. The experience with toxic waste shows that the idea of the polluted individual is not confined to traditional societies. Brown and Mikkelsen (1997:53-54) give a number of examples where people living near, or moving away from, toxic waste sites were stigmatised and avoided by others for fear of risks to their own health.
Douglas suggests that pollution beliefs are used in traditional societies to uphold moral codes, either by suggesting courses of action when moral principles fail to give clear guidance, or by supporting moral codes(p.l33). People who pollute are threatening the moral order (p.66). Pollution beliefs, of necessity, bring beliefs about the external world into the discourse on appropriate behaviour:
. . . the laws of nature are dragged in to sanction the moral code: this kind of disease is caused by adultery, that by incest; this meteorological disaster is the effect of political disloyalty, that the effect of impiety. The whole universe is harnessed to men's attempts to force one another into good citizenship.
(Douglas, 1966:3)
But discourse about norms of civil behaviour is not the only way in which beliefs about waste and pollution enter social life — Douglas pointed out that pollutions can also be cancelled by rituals which do not question the cause of the pollution, and confessional rituals where cause and blame are explicit (p.136).
Lynch (1990:205), found in his in-depth interviews, that concerns expressed about waste were related to perceptions of loss of social control. This was
[Appendix B2.16]
particularly the case for hazardous wastes where there was pessimism about the ability of the individual to avoid some form of contact with these wastes, and of society to control their production and disposal.
B2.2.3. Deviance and Moral Panics
The accounts of Douglas and Lynch alert us to the possibility that lay understandings about waste in modern societies may be linked in various ways to beliefs about morality and governance, and to social rituals of cleansing or other means of expunging perceived ambiguities. The literature on moral panics, while not strictly dealing with waste as does the other work reviewed in this section, nevertheless is concerned with deviant groups in society (rather than deviant matter such as dirt and waste), with appeals to government for action, and with the ambiguities that are held to give rise to moral panics. Thompson (1998:43), for example, suggested that it is the ambiguous status of youth that makes it the focus of more that its fair share of moral panics. However, sex is also a focus of a considerable proportion of moral panics and Thompson (1998:73), following Foucalt (1979) and Weeks (1985), suggested that this is because 'our culture believes that sex speaks the truth about ourselves, that it expresses the essence of our being'. If we accept Douglas's view of the origins of waste in ambiguity, and given the necessity for existence of consuming food and disposing of wastes, it might also be expected that some aspects of waste might be the subject of a form of moral panic.
An early study of the creation of moral panic was Cohen's study of the Mods and Rockers phenomenon in Britain in the early to mid 1960s (Cohen, 1972). This study showed the important role of the media in the early stages in creating an inventory of symbols and meanings that became both a frame for subsequent reporting, and fuel for the ensuing moral panic. This was later termed 'the signification spiral' by Hall and Jefferson (1976). Watney's (1987) study of moral panics about sex and AIDS identified a further characteristic of media framing that contributed to moral panics. Watney found that the press tended to address its audience as families composed of 'normal', 'healthy- minded' and 'right-thinking' people who represented the qualities of an imaginary past populace. On the other hand, in justifying its disapproval of what it represented as deviant behaviour, the press tended to refer to an imaginary future in which this behaviour had led to undesirable consequences (Thompson, 1998:78-80).
[Appendix B2.17]
Cohen went on to identify a number of features of the discourse of moral panic that might be expected to apply in situations other than concern about deviant youth groups. Just as the phenomenon was exaggerated as exceptional and a possible harbinger of catastrophe (p.87), the significance of the phenomenon as the tip of an iceberg of social ills, and the degree of moral consensus among the population, was also exaggerated (p.75). In such situations, two types of responses to the problem have appeal. Firstly there is a tendency for local or lower level institutions to be absolved of blame for the problem. Rather, blame is attributed at the higher political level, governments or politicians being blamed for not having given the lower level institutions sufficient powers to deal with the problem. In addition, the shifting of blame up the hierarchy of control is frequently justified by the claim that the particular problem is part of some wider, more fundamental, problem that requires attention at a high level (p.113) — what Cohen termed the 'not only this' argument in the discourse of moral panics. These appeals for government action may come from local parliamentary representatives (p.133), who are not averse to becoming moral entrepreneurs themselves and using the symbolism and clarity of the media's treatment in their own articulation of the issues (p.136). The second type of response follows from the first — if local institutions are seen to have inadequate powers, then the solution must be to introduce wider powers and harsher penalties (p.86-87) — what Cohen called 'escalation'.
Cohen cited a wide range of situations of rule-creation and social problem formulation (such as the abolition of slavery, the prohibition movement, the passing of the Marijuana Tax Act, the sexual psychopath laws, the drug problem, the pornography problem and pollution problems) which he claimed suggest the operation of a fixed sequence of responses:
This starts off with the perception by some people of a condition which is trouble-making, difficult, dangerous or threatening and requiring action:'something should be done about it'. A specific rule is deduced from the general value which is felt should be protected or upheld, and, if appropriate, a method of control is suggested.
(Cohen, 1972:111-112)
While Cohen's work did not examine the role of social groups in moral panics, this aspect was subsequently taken up by sociologists in the USA, such as Good and Ben-Yehuda (1994). Where groups such as social movements, or grassroots groups like NIMBY groups, or professional groups need to attract the
[Appendix B2.18]
interest of the media to further their cause, they may emphasise the moral dimensions of the problem (Thompson, 1998:17-19). This may also involve what Jenkins (1992) termed symbolic politics and the politics of substitution, in which a particular issue is pursued because it is a tractable symbol for another issue which cannot be so readily pursued (Thompson, 1998:21). There is a parallel here with Hajer's observation that:
...the environmental problematique is hardly ever discussed in its full complexity ... Environmental discourse tends to be dominated by specific emblems that dominate the perception of the ecological dilemma in the specific period.
(Hajer, 1995:19-20)
In attempting to explain why moral panics arise at some times and not at others, Cohen followed Erikson (1966), in suggesting that they occur at times when norms and values are under some kind of strain or emerging ambiguity. For the Mods and Rockers phenomenon, there were two sources of ambiguity. One was that it became evident in the 1960s that growing prosperity, which throughout the 1950s had been had seen as unreservedly worthwhile, could have some undesirable consequences, such as more mobile youths with more leisure time. The other was that the neat dress and classlessness of the Mods made them difficult to categorise among known forms of deviant youth behaviour. From a functionalist perspective, moral panics provide a forum in which the ambiguity can be clarified (Cohen, 1972:192-195). Schudson (1989:174) introduced the idea of times when there is a 'demand' for meaning, i.e. times when many of the symbols and meanings within the cultural repertoire fail to resonate with people's experience of reality. At these times, people will be particularly sensitive to culture, presumably in the search for symbolism and meaning in which new experiences can be anchored, o r ' searching the skies for cultural leadership' as Schudson put it.
The prosperity and growing materialism and hedonism of the post-war years was also identified by Hall et al. (1978) as contributing to the social anxiety about the erosion of the traditional Protestant values of frugality and self- discipline (Thompson, 1998:67). It is worth noting at this point that it is this same post-war prosperity that resulted in an increase in the per capitate generation of waste in the industrialised nations. Weeks (1985) suggested that it was the blurring of boundaries between traditional gender roles by feminism in the 1980s that provided a fertile ground for moral panics about sex and AIDS at that time (Thompson, 1998:85). Bennett and Lawrence (1995:25), from the perspective of media studies rather than sociology, draw attention to the
[Appendix B2.19]
importance of news icons during times of official uncertainty and changes in public understandings. News icons, they suggest, 'create junctures for cultural challenge and innovation'. More recently, Thompson (1998:16, 22-24) has argued that the increasing frequency of moral panics in Great Britain is due to increasing social anxiety about the sorts of risks that Beck (1986,1992) draws attention to in his characterisation of the risk society. Although Thompson does not make this point, the sort of social anxiety in Beck's account is directed more to deviant forms of matter rather than deviant groups of people. On these grounds, it might be argued that the greater frequency of moral panics expected by Thompson could well include moral panics over deviant matter. The extent to which moral issues are linked to deviant or ambiguous matter is likely to be variable. For example, genetically modified organisms produced by intervention in the basic building blocks of life affords different, and possibly greater, opportunities for moral outrage than BSE, where health risks had their origins in cattle feeding practices.
B2.2.4. History
Hoy (1995) found, as Douglas pointed out, that popular ideas about filth and cleanliness are by no means a simple extension of the disease theory of the day. But neither are they totally separate from scientific theories of disease. Until the end of the 19th century, the incidence of disease was understood to be due to the miasmas emitted by decaying matter, be it accumulations of household waste or natural vegetation in swamps. The crowding into large cities of immigrants who continued to practice agrarian standards of waste disposal provided the evidence, at least to the middle and upper classes, that disease was associated with dirt, poverty and immorality, these four being the antithesis of conditions in the clean middle-class home, which was seen as a centre of virtue guarded and protected by middle-class womanhood (Hoy, 1995:7).
The idea of waste management as public policy first emerged in the 1850s in the ideas of two sanitary reformists in New York and Boston. However, it was not until the late 19th century, after the popular press had made much of Florence Nightingale and her ideas about sanitation, after a Civil War which re-focused attention on the lessons of the Mexican-American War in which 1 500 American soldiers died in action and 10 000 died of disease, and after a series of cholera, typhoid and yellow fever epidemics, that sanitary arrangements came under
[Appendix B2.20]
some form of organisation and governance. In some cases, as the comments of the National Board of Health about the 1879 Memphis yellow fever epidemic (cited in Peterson, 1970:90) suggest, this organisation had the hallmarks of modern administrative rationalism in waste management: 'Proper sanitation ... can only be accomplished through the means of a thoroughly systematised and comprehensive plan.'
As described in section B2.4.1, below, middle-class women played an important role in the emergence of organised municipal sanitation in the late 19th century. The idea of 'protecting' the home with activities outside the home was consistent with women's experience in the temperance and women's suffrage movements of the late 19th century (Hoy, 1995:73). In particular, it made women's entry into public municipal life in USA possible by deflecting any criticism that by doing so they were neglecting their 'duties' as carers and home makers.
The late 19th and early 20th century was a period, then, when the domain within which dirt was seen as a danger to be cleaned away expanded from the private space of the household to include the public space of the streets.Notably, the issue of cleanliness of that very private space, the body, was largely by-passed in the focus on homes and municipal infrastructure. A number of other aspects of what Hoy terms 'municipal housekeeping' in this period are worth drawing attention to. Firstly, the sanitary reform movement, whether in its earlier radical forms with substantial involvement of women, or its later institutionalised manifestations, was not without moral overtones or extensions. The connection between temperance and sanitation has already been mentioned. According to Hoy (1995:80-81), the Waring era of sanitary reform in New York in the 1890s was followed by the emergence of movements against prostitution, vice and crime on the streets of New York. One of the USA's famous sanitarians of the early 19th century was Caroline Bartlett Crane, who was a minister of the First Unitarian Church and who, after a successful career establishing social and educational programs for the disadvantaged in Kalamazoo, went on to become a respected sanitary consultant, despite the lack of any formal qualifications in the field (Hoy, 1995:81-85).
A second aspect of the municipal housekeeping period was to demonstrate how a public and private preoccupation with cleansing could assist in the reaffirmation of local or national identity or sense of purpose in times of difficulty or ambiguity. For example, Hoy (1995:77-78) records that the Chicago
[Appendix B2.21]
sanitary reformist, Ada Celeste Sweet, and the Municipal Order League was able to capitalise on the growing concerns in 1892 that the 1893 World Fair would reflect poorly on Chicago and its citizens if one of the periodic typhoid or cholera outbreaks occurred when the city was host to millions of visitors. Similarly, in New York, Hoy suggests that the 1893 depression coupled with the social tensions of rapid population growth had led to a lack of confidence in the ability of institutional structures to deal with the problems of dense urbanisation that were emerging. However, Waring's militarily organised street cleaning, his formation of juvenile street cleaning leagues, and his ability to assemble powerful symbolic imagery in the street parades of white clad sanitary workers, did much to restore public confidence in the possibility of a:
...final solution of all [their] other problems of government [that would enable them to] accomplish other cleanings that have in the past seemed hopeless of accomplishment'
(New York Times, July 7,1896, cited by Hoy, 1995:80)
The growing acceptance of the germ theory of disease towards the end of the 19th century provided a rationale for the extension of the ideas of domestic and municipal cleansing to the cleansing of the body. Some public health professionals attempted to draw a distinction between 'filth that is dangerous and that which is nof (Chapin, 1902 cited by Hoy, 1995:107), arguing that it was far cheaper if people kept themselves clean than to clean streets of rubbish and remove garbage, the accumulation of which made 'no demonstrable difference in a city's mortality'. However, rather than the 'new public health' based on the germ theory replacing the ideas of the sanitation reformists, the body was simply added as one more domain in which they believed cleanliness should be pursued.
The moral connotations of domestic and municipal cleanliness were extended to include bodily cleanliness. For example, the editor of the Lady's Home Journal wrote in 1896:
The man who makes a point of keeping himself clean, and whose clothes look neat, no matter how moderate of cost they may be, works better, feels better, and is in every sense a better business man than his fellow worker who is disregardful of both his body and his dress, or either. He works at a distinct advantage. The external man unquestionably influences the internal man.
(cited in Hoy, 1995:92)
[Appendix B2.22]
To some extent, the germ theory, which in popular understanding gave the dangers of dirt a greater geographical reach even if the mode of transmission of germs was still somewhat miasmic, provided justification for public policy directed to cleansing the bodies of the poor, the disadvantaged and the immoral. In an article to the North American Review of 1895 titled The Microbe as a Social Leveller', Cyrus Edson wrote:
A man may live on the splendid 'avenue', in a mansion plumbed in the latest and costliest style, but if, half a mile away, in range with his open window, there is a 'slum', or even a neglected tenement-house, the zephyr will come along and pick up the disease-germs and bear them onward, distributing them to whomsoever it meets, whether he be a millionaire of a shillingaire, with a perfectly levelling and democratic impartiality.
(cited in Hoy, 1995:99)
It is worth noting that Edson had anticipated by almost 100 years Beck's (1986, 1992) observation about the particular nature of the risks of modernity:
In some of their dimension these [patterns of risk across society] follow the inequalities of class and strata positions, but they bring a fundamentally different distributional logic into play. Risks of modernisation sooner or later also strike those who produce or profit from them. They contain a boomerang effect, which breaks up the pattern of class and national society. ... Reduced to a formula: poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic.
(Beck, 1986,1992:23, 36; emphasis in original)
Insects, with their small size and ability to transport germs over distances, provided public education and, later, private sector advertising an easy means to carry the miasmic concepts of insidious health dangers transported from distant filth through much of the 20th century. In 1903, the discovery of typhoid bacillus on the feet of flies, and the inference, subsequently proved incorrect, that flies were responsible for the typhoid epidemics in the slum areas of Chicago lead to political upheaval in local public health provision (Hoy, 1995:105-106). Despite the erroneous association of flies with typhoid, public sanitation programs in New York in 1907 were warning of the dangers of the 'typhoid fly' (Hoy, 1995:110). In the 1916 polio epidemic, flies were used in public health campaigns for greater cleanliness, despite the fact they had no role in the spread of polio (Hoy, 1995:133). In the southern States in the 1920s, health and school reformers 'became a part of the chorus of voices that transformed annoying, pesky houseflies into dangerous "dealers in deaths" or "germs on legs".' (Hoy, 1995:132).
[Appendix B2.23]
In the early 20th century, schools became the focus of public programs aimed at teaching children the importance of personal cleanliness. In secular and church schools alike, cleanliness was seen as the prerequisite for, or at least concomitant with, values such as decency, self-respect, obedience, diligence, thrift, patriotism, piety and honesty (Hoy, 1995:126-127). By the 1930s, however, the private sector had taken over from governments the task of conveying messages about the importance of personal cleanliness. As technological developments in the early 20th century, such as closed vehicles, motorised street cleaning and the automation of dirty physical tasks, resulted in people accumulating less dirt on their persons in their daily life, the soap and glycerine manufacturers of the USA became concerned at the effect this would have on their sales. In 1927, a group of manufacturers formed the Cleanliness Institute, the function of which was to foster cooperation between government and industry in ensuring the personal cleanliness message reached every American (Hoy, 1995:142). The Institute undertook surveys of personal hygiene in schools and embarked upon a major publicity campaigns that flooded schools with pamphlets, posters, flyers and textbooks.The association between cleanliness and morality was reinforced in the materials produced by the Institute:
Those with 'clean collars', according to the Cleanliness Institute, not only got the best jobs but were more successful in them. Why? Because clean people had more self respect and were also more confident, efficient, and affable.
(Hoy, 1995:143)
Although Hoy does not draw out this point, it was the soap and cosmetics industry, together with the emerging 'science' of advertising, that was largely responsible for the invention of another domain in which the promotion of cleanliness was immensely profitable for industry. While personal cleanliness in the first quarter of the 20th century had focused on the cleanliness of the skin, particularly the hands, and to a lesser extent the face, in the second quarter of the 20th century, the volume of air surrounding the body became the focus of attention. The primary justification for personal cleanliness in the first quarter was health through reducing the transmission of disease-carrying germs. However, in the second quarter, the primary justification for cleanliness in the new domain was maintenance of social approval, an approach that has remained one of the mainstays of advertising and consumerism to this day. For example, in 1902, Lifebuoy soap was 'the Friend of Health', in 1926 it was 'health soap', but by the early 1930s it was the defender against the personal social disaster of 'undie odor' — 'She never omits her Daily Bath, yet she wears underthings a SECOND DAY' ( cited by Hoy, 1995:147). While the
[Appendix B2.24]
maintenance of social approval was the main rationale, the ideas of germs and disease were nevertheless still present as a kind of subtext in the advertising message, carried by the advertising industry's invention of pseudoscientific conditions such as 'halitosis' and 'b.o/.
While the expansion of the personal odour control industry was built largely on people's fear of unpopularity or unspoken moral censure, the success of the household cleanliness products that proliferated in the first half of the 20th century came from the combination of three factors. Firstly, the germ theory of disease provided a source of gripping and horrifying images that began to supplement or replace text as advances in photographic and printing technology reduced the cost of pictorial advertisements. The invisibility of germs, and their ability to multiply rapidly and be spread by flies, rats and other 'vermin' provided the advertising industry with the opportunity to invent a large number of additional household cleaning tasks for the diligent housewife — tasks that were far more difficult and complex than those the housewife of the 19th century carried out in protecting her household from the effects of miasmas.
Secondly, the rise of Fordism and Taylorism, together with the Taylorising of domestic toil as home economics, provided a putative solution the increasing extent and complexity of household cleaning, as well as providing the advertising industry with a further source of potential social opprobrium. The housewife who failed to avail herself of the cleaning products and associated electrical cleaning appliances could now be subject to implicit censure in advertising for being a poor manager and inefficient.
Thirdly, the advertising industry was not slow to transfer its successful techniques with personal odour control into household dirt control. The social approval message was extensively used, and in the case of Sani-Flush in 1935 which warned that 'a dirty dingy toilet' might result in 'whispered comments' from guests who 'go upstairs' (cited in Hoy, 1995:156).
By the end of the 1950s, with the reproduction of the culture of cleanliness firmly in the hands of industry and advertising and, with the success of mass vaccination programs, health ceased to be the primary justification for cleanliness (Hoy, 1995:171). The new postwar housing, which made extensive use of ceramic tiles and synthetic laminates, was probably a less favourable habitat for the kind of household dirt that had been the mainstay of the
[Appendix B2.25]
household cleanliness products industry for the first half of the 20th century. Less dirt was a possible threat to the industry, whose response was to invent the indoor atmosphere as a new source of concern about cleanliness. Although Hoy does not draw this out, to could be said that, to a certain extent, the wheel had turned full circle to the 19th century miasmic fear of odours. The advertising representation of indoor odours as insidious and pervasive shared these qualities with 19th century conceptions of miasmas. Masking odours with air fresheners appealed to the same simplistic but erroneous logic that a bad odour could be destroyed by a good one, as did the custom among urban dwellers of the 19th century and earlier of pressing a scented handkerchief to the nose when passing foetid drains and cesspits. The only difference between the late 20th century and the 19th century is that the dangerous consequences of neglecting to cleanse the indoor atmosphere related to social opprobrium rather than the risk of contracting disease.
Until the 1950s and 1960s, the direction of change in the various cleanliness domains had generally been uni-directional — towards greater cleanliness. But the postwar prosperity that brought greater volumes of consumer goods and their associated packaging and greater use of leisure time outside the home, resulted in a decline in the perceived cleanliness of public spaces (Hoy, 1995:173). While the dirt of public spaces in the late 19th century that was the target for the sanitary reform movement was offensive for its smell, dustiness, and disease potential, the much of the dirt of public spaces that attracted attention in the late 20th century was discarded packaging materials, neither odorous, dusty nor breeding disease, but an offence against aesthetics. The packaging industry was quick to respond by forming the Keep Our Roadsides Clean Council in 1953, which later adopted the name, Keep America Beautiful (Hoy, 1995:175). The organisation's strategy, not unlike that of the sanitary reformists of the late 19th century, was to develop broad support for the idea that packaging disposal behaviour in public spaces should be the same as in private spaces, notwithstanding the cleansing and refuse removal services provided in the former. The framing of litter in public places as a 'people problem', intentional or otherwise, successfully deflected attention from the industry's role in producing the packaging, at least until environmentalists raised the issue in the 1970s.
[Appendix B2.26]
B2.3 Economic and Technological Policy Studies
The relationship between charging and collection factors and waste generation was studied by Petrovic and Jaffee (1978). Bogert and Morris (1993), in a study of the economics of recycling in Washington State found that recycling cost less than disposal. Usherson (1992) examined the economic factors in paper recycling that resulted in recycled paper being relatively more expensive.
Plueddemann (1994) reviewed the waste management options for the State of Michigan, briefly canvassing the advantages and disadvantages of financial disincentives, product restrictions or bans, product standards, procurement policies, tax incentives, fees, source separation, deposit programs, labelling requirements, education and grants and loans.
Cohen (1998:40), in a review of the environmental economics literature on environmental enforcement found that there was broad agreement the amount of illegal dumping of waste was generally related to the cost of legal disposal. Consequently, raising the cost of disposal, rather than causing firms to find substitutes for the process producing the waste, is likely to increase illegal disposal.
La Plante and Luckert (1993, 1994) examined the impact of the policy of requiring certain content levels of recycled paper in newsprint in reducing the consumption of trees and the need for landfill space in Canada. These authors estimated that such a policy would have minimal impact on either the demand for trees or landfill space, arguing that newsprint was only one of many products from trees and that recycling of paper created costly above ground storage problems for a material that could be more cheaply sent to landfill, as well as creating sludge disposal problems equivalent to about one quarter of the volume of paper recycled. However, the suggested alternative — to correct separately for market failure in each of the forest and waste disposal industries — suffered from number of economists flaws of its own. For example, La Plante and Luckert assumed that increasing waste disposal charges would lead consumers to 'demand products with less packaging' (La Plante and Luckert, 1993:373), a view that is at odds with the frustration continually expressed by consumers at perceived overpackaging, a frustration that the packaging industry has done little to relieve (see, for example, Hine, 1995:6, 238 or Lynch, 1990:209 for public perceptions of packaging and Puplick and Nicholls, 1992 for an example of the Australian packaging industry's defence of packaging
[Appendix B2.27]
quantities). Further, in promoting the efficiencies that might be gained if waste was redistributed to areas were disposal costs were lower, the authors ignore completely the frequent and successful citizen opposition to waste imports for disposal in their locality. The effectiveness of this opposition and that to landfills generally has resulted in a decline in the number of landfills in operation as older landfills exhaust their capacity and new landfills failed to come on stream (for example, the number of landfills in the United States declined from 16 000 in 1979 to 5500 in 1988 — Forester, 1991, cited by Gandy, 1993:37). The difficulties of implementing the economists ideal of a free market in waste disposal with waste flowing to the sites of lowest disposal cost have also been canvassed by the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal in its 1996 report on pricing policies for waste disposal (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 1996:2).
Wilson (1996) reviewed a comprehensive collection of data on waste policy measures in 25 countries. The point of departure for this study was that 'the objective of national waste strategies in many countries in the 1990s is to make waste management more sustainable by moving up the hierarchy of options/ The hierarchy Wilson referred to is the waste management hierarchy, a policy principle that expresses the belief that waste avoidance is preferable to re-use, which is preferable to recycling, which is preferable to disposal. Wilson presented a graphical representation of 'the version of the waste management hierarchy which has been used for many years' (figure B2.1).
According to Wilson, the waste management hierarchy, or EU waste management hierarchy first appeared in the Second Environmental Action Programme (1977-81) of the EU. Wilson noted that 'It is, by definition, almost impossible to measure the baseline position for waste avoidance and minimisation.' While Wilson probably saw this as a technical problem, it also amounts to tacit recognition that what counts for avoided waste is socially constructed. From a technical perspective, the problem is that economic structural change that is totally unrelated to any waste management actions may well result in the cessation of the production of something that is now, but not was not formerly, regarded as waste. From the constructivist perspective, whether that which is avoided is waste or not is socially contingent. Avoiding factory emissions may be avoiding 'the sweet smell of progress' rather than avoiding air pollution.
[Appendix B2.28]
Choe and Fraser (1998) reviewed the economics literature to that date which had examined the question of policies to influence household waste behaviour. The neo-classical economics framing of waste policy is as a problem in setting the level and locus of taxes, given relationships between waste quantities moving to particular destinations and various prices and costs such as:
• the price of consumer goods that result in post-consumer waste,
• the 'price' (i.e. fines) for illegally disposing of waste,
• the price of legal landfill disposal,
• the price of kerbside collection of recyclables, and
• the monitoring, compliance and administration costs of taxes imposed at various loci in the waste stream
[Appendix B2.29]
From this perspective, Choe and Fraser's concern was that:
... when setting policy targets, such as the 50 per cent reduction in waste going to landfill, unless all such costs and benefits have been considered, there is no guarantee that policy will be efficient. ... The important lesson for Australian household waste management policy is to properly evaluate proposed policy options and not to let unwarranted social pressures dictate
(Choe and Fraser, 1998:282)
Concluding their review of the increasingly sophisticated theoretical modelling and empirical estimation carried out by economists over the previous twenty years, Choe and Fraser admitted that their review '... almost seem[ed] to raise more questions about the issue of household waste management than are resolved'(p.296). While acknowledging that the complexity of the economic models employed had brought problems and recommendations of little practical relevance(pp.295-296), that application of cost-benefit analysis to the question of user charges had yielded conflicting results (p.294), and that the multi-jurisdictional environment in which policy making takes place in Australia places the findings of economic modelling in doubt, Chloe and Fraser nevertheless concluded in favour rationalist policy evaluation.
This brings the whole discussion around to the simple but powerfid mantra so frequently articulated by environmentalists — reduce, reuse, recycle and dispose. There is no reason to argue against this approach to waste management. What must be guarded against, however, is an unquestioning application without taking into account the very real economic costs associated with the implementation of any policy.
(Choe and Fraser, 1998:297)
It can be noted that when economists have attempted such evaluation for waste management in a specific region, they have found targets to have some attractions. For example, a study in 1996 by the New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of the pricing policies of the New South Wales Waste Service pointed out that there were more external costs than just those produced by the landfilled waste. The production of the materials that ultimately become waste involves a further set of complex and difficult to measure externalities. This led the Tribunal to state that:
Needless to say, a target based on an accurate analysis of the external costs of virgin versus recycled materials and conservation is likely to lead to a more efficient outcome than one based on an arbitrary target. In practice, estimating external costs usually requires numerous assumptions that may be no better grounded than the 60% waste-to-landfill target.
(Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 1996:60)
[Appendix B2.30]
This finding of the Tribunal is consistent with the argument of Wynne (1992:117) that, for the flow of materials from resources to manufactured goods to waste, the further upstream one moved, the greater the uncertainty as to the environmental outcomes consequent upon various policy options. This uncertainty, and the difficulty of non-comparability of different environmental impacts was particularly well illustrated in Ackerman's (1998) study that attempted to construct overall measures of the health and environmental impacts of packaging.
B2.4 Historical Policy-Related Studies
B2.4.1. Martin Melosi
‘Garbage in the Cities’
The main historical studies of solid waste management in the USA have been undertaken by Martin Melosi, starting with his major study 'Garbage in the Cities' (1980), which had its main emphasis on waste management in USA cities in the period 1880 to 1920. This was the period of transition from the miasmic to the germ theory of disease, many aspects of which have discussed in the review of Hoy's (1995) work in section B2.2.4 above. The following discussion will be restricted to additional aspects that were raised by Melosi.
As Hoy's account shows, the domain within which dirt was seen as a danger to be cleaned away expanded from the private space of the household to include the public space of the streets. Hoy argues that this came about through women's desire to protect their homes from disease — what she termed 'municipal housekeeping'. However, Melosi (1980:32) points out that there was another reason for which street cleaning became to be seen as necessary. The late 19th century saw a transition in the nature of many streets from social spaces in which children played and neighbours and tradespeople on foot interacted, to commercial transport arteries. The resultant increase in horse drawn transport meant that street cleaning met both women's desires for clean surroundings, and commerce's need for the free passage of traffic.
Debate over the centralisation of waste removal services arose in the USA as this extension of cleanliness took place. Melosi notes that, while contracting out
[Appendix B2.31]
waste removal to private operators was attractive to many cities, others formed their own municipal waste services, the justification often being that maintaining a reasonable quality of service through contractors who had every incentive to take shortcuts was too difficult (pp.29-30,155). In addition, both the municipal engineers who assumed responsibility for waste disposal in the early 20th century, and the sanitary reform movements favoured municipal ownership (see below).
Mass movements, and particularly those with women members, played an important role in sanitation reform in the late 19th and early 20th century. Citizen's groups and civic organisations undertook a range of activities not unlike those undertaken by the environmental movement in the late 20th century. These included holding mass meetings, circulating petitions, and lobbying city officials. A women's organisation in Chicago in 1892 distributed, for hanging in kitchens, 20 000 printed cards with suggestions on how to dispose of waste and information on local ordinances — equivalent to the present day fridge magnet (pp.34-35). In a manner somewhat analogous to Landcare groups in Australia today, community group formation was also encouraged by the state. One part of Waring's sanitary reforms in New York in the 1890s was the formation of Juvenile Street Cleaning Leagues, the members of which were school children whose duties were speak to people observed littering in the streets about sanitation, to extinguish street rubbish fires and pick up dangerous litter from the footpath and put it in the gutter. The Leagues grew to over 5 000 members in New York and 10 000 members in Philadelphia (Melosi, 1980:74-76).
An annual ritual introduced by the sanitary reform movement that rivalled the Juvenile Street Cleaning Leagues in capturing public attention was the spring clean-up campaign. According to Melosi (p.129) these reached the proportions of a movement about 1910. Some clean-ups were on a grand scale, such as Philadelphia's in 1913, when 1 000 000 cardboard folders and 350 000 circulars were distributed to the citizenry and a total of 140 000 cubic yards of rubbish was collected (p.131).
Melosi (pp.35-36) also notes that the sanitation movement tended to re-frame sanitation issues away from the more complex health arguments and towards simple messages about beauty and cleanliness. Although Melosi does not draw this out, this role in the articulation of issues is similar to that performed by some present day environmental groups (see section B2.6.1 below).
[Appendix B2.32]
One consequence of the replacement of the miasmic theory of disease with the germ theory was that the responsibility for the removal and disposal of solid waste was gradually relinquished by health departments and taken over by the engineering departments which had already in the late 19th century developed considerable expertise in water supply and sewerage (pp.82-86). The application of engineering expertise to waste disposal brought surveys and studies of waste composition as a prelude to designing disposal systems. These surveys and studies revealed the size and complexity of the waste disposal problems in a large city, so that centralisation of control in the hands of municipal government where the principles of Taylorist scientific management could be applied was an appealing solution (p.100). A further consequence of the application of engineering expertise to urban waste disposal was the engineers' interest in technological solutions such as incinerators and reduction plants, and disinterest in the promotion of community involvement and sanitary reform movements (p.104).
However, the rise of waste engineering did not supplant the role of the sanitary reform movements. While engineers focused on efficient technological solutions, the reform movements placed waste in a broader context that included city aesthetics, civic progress and the morals of the citizenry (pp.103- 112). The fear of municipal corruption with contracting out of waste collection, transport and disposal services, meant that the sanitary reform movements also favoured centralisation of waste management within municipal governments (p.113). The two groups with an interest in sanitation, the municipal engineers and the reform movements did not, however, ever join forces to become an effective political force (p.132).
Other studies
In his study of sanitary service provision and decision-making in Houston from 1876 to 1945, Melosi (1993(b)) found that many of the problems that occurred with sub-standard sanitary infrastructure in the post-war years could be traced to dependence on particular technologies, such as incineration. This had come about through excessive emphasis on design at the expense of planning that locked the dty into inflexible infrastructure unable to accommodate the rapid growth of the post war years.
[Appendix B2.33]
In another paper in 1993, Melosi (1993(a)) has discussed the persistence of 'garbage crises' in media and professional discourses in that country since the 1970s, concluding that the available quantitative information on waste volumes, composition, and options for disposal showed no evidence of sudden changes that might have supported the notion of a crisis.
B2.4.2. Matthew Gandy
‘Recycling and Waste’
In his 1993 book, 'Recycling and Waste', Matthew Gandy examined the history of waste management arrangements in the cities of London and Hamburg in the course of a more detailed study of policy-making relating to recycling in the two cities. He suggested that the evolution of urban waste management since the Industrial Revolution could be broadly separated into two periods. The period of municipalisation of waste management extended till the early 1980s and was characterised by increasing involvement of local government in waste management. The period of demunidpalisation of waste management dates from the 1980s and is characterised by declining local government involvement and democratic control of waste management as many waste management functions are taken over by the private sector. Demunicipalisation has also resulted in a decline in large scale strategic planning of waste management. Gandy attributed the reversal of municipalisation to the upsurge of neo-liberal policy-making in the 1970s which led to pressure on local governments to reduce the costs of their waste management operations, at the same time as they were experiencing increasing demands for improvements in environmental quality. Growing technological sophistication in waste management and the emergence of multi-national firms specialising in waste management made the private sector involvement in waste management possible at a scale that could not have happened in the early 20th century. The twin pressures for cost- effectiveness and environmental responsibility resulted in recycling policy in London and Hamburg favouring the collection centre approach over the kerbside collection approach. Where the more expensive kerbside collection schemes were in place, Gandy concluded that these had been the result of sophisticated lobbying by which packaging interests had made some contributions to the schemes to protect themselves from the threat of interventionist packaging legislation.
[Appendix B2.34]
Gandy suggested that the increasing dominance of the private sector in waste management has led to a change in emphasis in recycling policy away from recycling as a means of comprehensive materials recovery towards recycling as energy recovery. The latter is favoured by the private sector because it reduces the need for policy intervention in the manufacturing and retailing sectors. If post-consumer waste materials are to be recycled to provide materials that can economically substituted for virgin materials in manufacturing processes, then there must, of necessity, be controls on the composition of packaging to make recycling feasible. Many innovations in packaging, such as blister packs, involve composites of plastics and paper that are difficult to separate for recycling. In contrast, if post-consumer waste materials are simply to be burnt for their energy content, then the need for such controls is much reduced.
The demunicipalisation of waste management is also claimed by Gandy to have resulted in the disappearance of what he termed radical waste management policies. The last decade or so of the period of municipalisation of waste management was termed by Gandy the period of strategic policy-making, characterised by centralised waste management authorities, with major public sector investment in infrastructure and the extensive data collection and medium term planning. Towards the end of this period, in the early and mid 1980s, the Greater London Council began to promote programs that combined recycling with employment creation, as well as lobbying the British Government and the European Union to introduce policies to reduce waste at its source, such as taxing non-recyclable products and extending the polluter pays principle to producers of materials that ultimately enter the waste stream. These more radical approaches were lost from sight in the period of demuni cipalisation as the choice of options came to be influenced more by the profitability of the waste industry than by strategic planning for the needs of the community coordinated through elected local governments.
While the broad pattern of municipalisation followed by demunicipalisation occurred in both Hamburg and London, Gandy found that the different systems of municipal governance had quite different implications for waste management in the two cities. In Gandy's view, the relatively high recycling rate in Hamburg could be attributed to the ultimate responsibility for waste collection and disposal resting with a single entity, the Hamburg Senate, within which the German Green Party had some representation as a consequence of the proportional representation electoral system. In contrast, responsibility for
[Appendix B2.35]
waste collection and disposal in London was divided between the Boroughs and various Waste Disposal Authorities.
Within these different municipal governance structures, there were nonetheless several factors common to both cities that acted as barriers to increased levels of recycling. These included the difficulties faced by local government in financing waste management infrastructure, the lack of control over the size and composition of the waste stream, and the inherent weakness of the market for recycled materials which led to recurrent collapses, particularly at times of more general economic recession.
Gandy suggested that there are three main influences on recycling policy in the 1990s. Firstly, the private sector is lobbying to have energy recovery by incineration considered as a legitimate form of recycling. Secondly, national governments, responding to the environmental concerns of the electorate, are attempting increase the amount of recycling by placing controls on the packaging industry. Thirdly, environmentalists are calling for policy to minimise waste creation rather than simply recycling waste. Interestingly according to Gandy, there has been some coalescence in the positions of at least some environmentalists, the waste management industry and the packaging industry in that all have opposed national government initiatives such as the 1991 German packaging ordinance on the grounds that such initiatives are largely symbolic with questionable environmental gains. These three interest groups, however, have distinctly different reasons for the position they take and their preferred alternatives are also different.
‘Recycling and the Politics of Urban Waste’
In this 1994 publication, Gandy provides an account of the evolution of waste management in New York City, as well as revisiting Hamburg and London. There are some similarities among the three cities up until the 1930s, insofar as waste management in all three was affected by professionalisation of municipal sanitation in the late 19th century, and the popularity of incineration in the early 20th century (Gandy, 1994:92). However, New York City is notable for the brief period from 1894-1898 when a reformist administration introduced what would be termed kerbside recycling today. This early instance of modern recycling practice also suffered the modem problem of fragile markets for recycled materials. While the trade in waste paper in the USA grew from five
[Appendix B2.36]
million tonnes a year in 1881 to over 22 million tonnes a year in 1895, the invention of methods of making paper from wood pulp in the 1890s provided a cheaper source of pulp and led to the collapse of the waste paper market (Gandy, 1994:73). Technological innovation also brought the manufacture of fertilisers by the chemical and petroleum industries in the early 20th century and rendered uneconomic the steam reduction of putrescible wastes to make fertiliser (Gandy, 1993:72). Similarly, the introduction of the oxygen steel making process in the 1950s reduced the demand for scrap iron and steel (Packard, 1960:210).
Gandy suggests that the evolutionary path of waste management in New York City began to diverge in the 1930s from that followed by London and Hamburg, insofar as New York City became increasingly dependent on landfill. This dependence has persisted to the present today, with the Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island becoming the largest aggregation of human waste in the world. This dependence was in part due to difficulties faced by incineration, such as the demand for municipal garbage as fill in the construction of parks and highways, and the difficulty in obtaining incinerator sites. As well, the shortage of parts and labour during World War II led to the closure of some incinerators (Gandy, 1994:74). By the 1980s, New York City was reliant on virtually just one landfill (Fresh Kills) and three small incinerators. The growth of environmental concern in the 1970s had brought recycling and re-use back onto the waste political agenda and, despite opposition from the packaging industry, the New York State Legislature passed the Returnable Container Law in 1982. A commission of inquiry into the effectiveness of the Law in 1989 concluded that it had reduced litter by 72 per cent and the solid waste stream by five per cent by weight and eight per cent by volume. In addition, return and re-use of beverage containers had provided employment and income for some of the most disadvantaged groups in New York City (Gandy, 1994:77,78).
Following pressure from environmental groups and the State Department of Environmental Conservation, New York City introduced Local Law 19 which made kerbside collection mandatory from September 1993. This goal of universal kerbside collection sets New York City apart from London and Hamburg which have greater reliance on the 'bring' system, involving transport of recyclables by householders to recycling centres or street receptacles. The rate of implementation of universal kerbside collection implementation, at least up until Gandy's time of writing, has been less than ideal, due the inability of local government to influence changing patterns of
[Appendix B2.37]
manufacturing and packaging, the difficulties associated with promoting recycling in high population density, low income areas, and opposition by adjacent residents to recycling centres (Gandy, 1994:83). In addition, waste management policy in New York City generally remains uncertain and disputed as debate continues over the proposal for a large incinerator at Brooklyn Navy Yard, and the Fresh Kills landfill faces closure as its height approaches the limit above which it would pose a navigational hazard for aircraft.
Gandy draws a number of conclusions from the comparison of the evolution of waste management policy and infrastructure in the three cities. Firstly, as in Recycling and Waste, he suggests that responsibility for collection and disposal of waste within one tier of government that is responsible to a single elected authority is conducive to greater emphasis on recycling. According to this view, the lower rates of recycling in London are due to the fragmentation of responsibility for collection and disposal and the lack of accountability to a single elected authority. While Gandy does not dwell on this point, it would seem that the institutional arrangements for waste management in Ffamburg in particular enabled the environmental concerns in the legislature (where the proportional representation system resulted in the presence of a number of members of the Green Party) to be successfully translated into a major municipal composting program, an approach which may not have occurred if waste management policy had been driven solely by economic and technical planning (Gandy, 1994:96). This Gandy terms 'institutionalisation of environmental policy into waste management7 (Gandy, 1994:110). This concept is similar to Hajer's (1995:61) discourse institutionalisation which Hajer describes as when, for example, 'the theoretical concepts of ecological modernisation are translated into concrete policies'.
Secondly, there is little doubt that the economics of recycling compared to landfill and incineration has a role in the decision-making by municipal authorities. This is particularly the case in low income, high population density urban areas where high rates of recycling can only be achieved at high cost, so that recycling programs compete with social welfare programs for scarce municipal funds.
Thirdly, events in New York City suggest that environmental movements may still have substantial influence on the evolution of waste management policy, even if they do not have formal representation in the legislature. Gandy
[Appendix B2.38]
suggests that the environmental movement was influential in New York City, both in the promotion of recycling and resistance to incineration (Gandy, 1994:110). Although Gandy does not draw out this point, it might be argued that the different institutional arrangements in Hamburg and New York City mediate crucially in the extent to which the idealised innovative proposals of the environmental movement can be tested in operation and improve the understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposals. In Hamburg, the ideal of composting as a means of recycling putrescible waste was relatively quickly put to the test with pilot scale trials of centralised composting and a program to promoted home composting in households with gardens (Gandy, 1994:96-98). As a consequence a number of practical problems and useful insights came to light that had not been appreciated to that time (Gandy, 1994:101). In contrast, in New York City, environmentalists were forced to run pilot kerbside collection programs themselves to demonstrate the feasibility of kerbside collection as an alternative to incineration. This took place for some seven years before the State and the City responded with waste management polices that gave substantial emphasis to recycling (Gandy, 1994:78-79). It might also be speculated that the institutional arrangements in Hamburg may have led to more rapid acceptance in the waste management bureaucracy of the legitimacy of composting as a waste management option, because this bureaucracy would itself be involved in the implementation and evaluation. In contrast, the waste management bureaucracy in New York City may have been able to reject the findings of the trials run by environmentalists as not meeting the technical and professional standards of the bureaucracy.
Fourthly, both Hamburg and New York City illustrate how events at higher levels of government than the level which is responsible for waste management can intrude into local waste management policy. In the case of Hamburg, the passage of the 1991 packaging ordinance by the Bundesrat established the dual system of waste management where industry was required to organise the collection and disposal of post-consumer packaging materials (which in Germany amounted to about half by volume of the waste stream — Choe and Fraser, 1998:270), and local governments retained responsibility for the remaining part of the municipal waste stream. The emptying of Grüne Punkt bins by a subsidiary of Duale System Deutschland became part of waste management arrangements Hamburg, despite the opposition of the Hamburg Senate to the introduction of the Duale System Deutschland on the grounds that it did nothing to reduce the generation of waste at source (Gandy, 1994:106).
[Appendix B2.39]
Similarly, waste management policy in New York City in the late 1980s, was overtaken by the passage of New York State's Waste Management Act of 1988.
Finally, Gandy concludes that there is a limit, of the order of ten to twenty per cent, on the level of recycling that can be achieved by relying on consumers to bring recyclables to collection centres. To achieve higher levels of recycling, either the more costly kerbside collection method must be used, or more interventionist policy is required to place constraints on the packaging industry to prevent the production of materials that are difficult to recycle, and to force industry to take some responsibility for the collection and disposal of postconsumer packaging. Various alliances of the packaging and plastics industry have strongly resisted such intervention by the state and lobbied for energy recovery via incineration to be counted as recycling, so that the state can meet undertakings it has made on the level of recycling, without the need for intervention in the packaging and plastics industry. In a similar conclusion to that in Recycling and Waste, Gandy argues that it would be unfortunate if industry pressure, narrowly economistic policy assessment and conservative and neo-liberal influences in government led to further demunicipalisation of waste management, such that important choices about waste management options were relegated to the market rather than to strategic planning by instrumentalities responsible to elected governments.
B2.4.3. Craig Colten
Colten's (1994) study of chemical waste disposal in the United States from 1900- 1960 provides some insights into the relations between industry and government that shaped how chemical waste was disposed of in the first half of the 20th century. Colten identifies three periods, the first from 1900-1929 in which the dominant institution for dealing with chemical waste problems was the common law's notion of nuisance, the second from 1930-1947 when unsuccessful attempts were made by Federal legislatures to bring the problem under statutory control, and the third period from 1948-1960 during which the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was in force.
As the chemical industry grew in the early part of the 20th century, the success of nuisance proceedings against individual firms led the industry to favour isolation in the siting of its plants as a means of avoiding litigation. While effluent treatment technologies were available at this time, the strategy of plant
[Appendix B2.40]
isolation obviated the need for treatment and affirmed industry's right to use streams for disposal, which approach was consistent with early 20th century public health understanding which held that 'streams had natural purification powers and considered certain toxic discharges beneficial owing to their germicidal effects' (Colten, 1994:87).
In the 1930s, as the growth of industry and population in the 1920s placed more demands on water resources, the Federal legislatures began to question industry's claim to the use of streams for the dilution of its discharges. At this time and despite new effluent treatment technologies becoming available, industry began to dispose of wastes on land, which amounted to a continuance of its preference for isolation of wastes from the public rather than treating the wastes. Industry, with the assistance of the production priorities of World War II, successfully delayed legislative response until 1948 by appealing to a number of arguments (which, interestingly, were not necessarily internally consistent):
• that water pollution was more due to municipal sewage than industrial waste,
• that treatment would be too costly,
• that it was already doing much to treat the problem,
• that the treatment technologies were not available, and
• that cooperation with government was preferable to legislation.
During this period, the Manufacturing Chemists Association, the peak industry body, formed the Stream Pollution Abatement Committee to retain control of waste treatment expertise in the industry and to demonstrate the goodwill of industry (Colten, 1994:97-98).
The Water Pollution Act was passed in 1948 and this placed primary responsibility for implementation of its intent on local government. With the passage of this Act, the Stream Pollution Abatement Committee turned its attention to ensuring that State legislative responses were uniform (Colten, 1994:100).
[Appendix B2.41]
Enforcement of the Water Pollution Act was infrequent for reasons which, according to Col ten, included:
• the lack of expertise in local government and State public health authorities to deal with the complexities of chemical pollution of waterways,
• the view in these authorities that industry could be trusted to behave responsibly,
• the preference in these authorities for cooperative relationships with industry, and
• claims by industry that public consideration of the composition of their effluents would be a breach of commercial confidentiality.
During the period the Act was in force, the toxicity of chemical wastes to wildlife and human health became a major public health issue, although industry continued to counter criticism by claiming that the problem was under control and it was prevented from doing more by the costs of pollution control, notwithstanding clear evidence from as early as 1939 that where industry was seriously threatened by legal action, it was capable of operating profitably with state-of-the-art effluent treatment technology in place (Colten, 1994:99).
In the 1950s and 1960s, as it became clear that the isolation approach pursued by industry was failing to deflect the risk of public litigation, the chemical industry began to employ new strategies to shift the responsibility for the deleterious impacts of its wastes, by discharging to municipal sewerage systems, by taking out insurance and by selling the land on which wastes had been disposed.
Colten concluded that it could not possibly be claimed that the chemical industry was unaware of the health and environmental risks posed by its effluents. Despite this awareness, industry from the 1930s consistently and successfully delayed legislative responses and their implementation. The result of this public policy failure was that by the mid 1980s, some 762 millions tons of chemical wastes had been deposited at 3300 locations around the United States. Federal and State investigations in the
[Appendix B2.42]
1990s revealed more that 1200 chemical waste sites in urgent need of remediation and the likelihood of a further 9000 sites eventually requiring remediation (Colten, 1994:85).
B2.5 Waste Policy and Policy Theory
B2.5.1. Luton and Political Systems Theory
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Larry Luton undertook a case study of the establishment of a waste-to-energy incinerator in the city of Spokane in Washington State (Luton, 1996). After a very brief review of the history of waste management in Spokane, Luton turned to the processes of policy-making in the late 1980s that led to the establishment of the privately operated incinerator, with a particular focus on the role of community consultation and participation.
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, municipal waste in Spokane was disposed of by a number of incinerators and rubbish dumps. Many residents transported their rubbish for disposal themselves, and it was not until 1949 that the Universal Garbage Collection Ordinance was passed by the city of Spokane, requiring all residents to use the kerbside rubbish collection system.
In the 1960s, modern landfilling replaced open dumping and burning. Surprisingly, there was resistance to this change by some citizens and the League of Women Voters sponsored a 'picnic at the landfill' to allay fears about the safety of the new technique (Luton, 1996:10).
The possibility of a waste-to-energy facility for Spokane's waste was first raised in 1971 in a solid waste management study for the city. However, little progress was made in establishing such a plant until it was discovered that landfills were threatening the water quality of the Spokane-Rathdrum aquifer, upon which some 300,000 city and county residents relied for their water supply (Luton, 1996:10-11). In 1982, a feasibility study for a waste-to-energy facility was undertaken with funding from industry, the dty and the county. This identified a possible site near the Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical plant which could use the steam and electricity from the waste-to-energy facility. In 1983, the city council applied to the Washington State Department of Ecology for Referendum 39 funds to construct the facility and these were granted in
[Appendix B2.43]
1986. In 1984, the city had adopted a solid waste master plan which depended on a waste-to-energy facility and in 1985 the city and the county formed the Solid Waste Disposal Project which included a project policy committee, a citizen's advisory committee and a technical advisory committee (Luton, 1996:12-13).
While representatives of the Sierra Club testified at environmental impact hearings in 1986 (Luton, 1996:208), the emergence of local groups formed specifically to oppose the waste-to-energy facility did not occur until late 1987. Commencing with an attempt to have the city pass a proposition requiring a referendum on major infrastructure projects, a total of sixteen citizen groups took part in various campaigns to defeat the facility at various junctures over the next two years. In 1989, attention was focused on the city elections which provided an opportunity for opponents of the facility to obtain a majority of councillors opposed to the facility. However, by this time, the project had incurred substantial sunk costs and only one anti-incinerator candidate was returned (Luton, 1996:18-20).
The disposal of incinerator ash in landfill provoked further citizen opposition in areas identified as possible disposal sites. Finally, after dismissal of a lawsuit brought by the Klickitat County residents in 1991, Spokane was able to contract with a private firm to dispose of the incinerator ash in its landfill 210 miles from Spokane in Klickitat County.
The approval of the waste-to-energy facility did not put an end to public debate over waste management in Spokane. Kerbside collection of recyclables commenced in 1990 and the centralised composting several years later. The city received criticism over the rate increases necessary to fund these programs, as well as facing difficulties with its centralised composting operation, where it was caught between the need to act on complaints of odour problems and to avoid being sued for breach of contract by the firm operating the composting site. Further delays in making waste incineration operative were encountered when resistance emerged from those in the vicinity of the transfer station from which incinerator ash would be railed to Klickitat County. In 1989 and in the early 1990s, the council also found itself in the invidious position of being threatened with substantial fines under its contract with the operator of the waste-to-energy facility when approval for commencement of construction and for operation was slow coming from the State due to statutory public consultation periods. Wheelabrator (the operator of the facility) had negotiated
[Appendix B2.44]
its contract with the city in such a way that the city bore much of the risk and uncertainty associated with State approval and public consultation. In addition, the dty bore the future legislative risk, being responsible under its contract with Wheelabrator for the cost of any additional anti-pollution equipment that might be required due to the introduction of more stringent environmental standards. Finally, the dty was legally bound to provide an adequate supply of waste for the facility — the 'put or pay' clause in the contract. This meant that uncertainties in estimating the future supply of waste were a risk to the city rather than to Wheelabrator.
By the mid 1990s it was evident that mistakes could be made in estimating the supply of waste. However, the error was in the opposite direction to that against which the 'put or pay' clause guarded. Only 20 months into the 20 year contract between Wheelabrator and the city, the supply of municipal waste increased sufficiently to exceed the capacity of the waste-to-energy facility for several months at a time. In addition, the cost of operating the fadlity had been underestimated, and a series of increases in tipping and collection fees brought further criticism. Then, in 1994, the United States Supreme Court ruled that indnerator ash should be handled as hazardous waste, thereby more than doubling the disposal cost for the city. The economic viability of the fadlity was further threatened in 1995 when the US Senate passed a bill to prohibit state and local government from regulating the flow of solid wastes — a practice that had arisen to ensure that waste generated in the region of a waste- to-energy fadlity was available for the facility, and not shipped to some other locality after the facility was built. Finally, throughout much of the period over which the waste-to-energy facility was the subject of controversy, the city also faced pressure from the State and escalating costs in relation to the remediation of old closed landfills and the dosure of existing ones. As Luton (1996:32) put it,
In a very real sense this story has no ending. As long as the people of Spokane continue to generate solid waste, they will continue to adjust their solid waste management policies.
B2.5.2. Gandy and Realist/Structuralist Approaches
The studies by Gandy in 1993 and 1994 described in section B2.4.2, above, reviewed a number of theoretical approaches to explaining the evolution of waste management policy, before choosing to use neo-Marxist regulation
[Appendix B2.45]
theory in his interpretation of the trends in waste management policy identified in his two studies. Gandy's rationale for this choice is described in section 2.5.2.
B2.5.3. Ozawa’s Empirical Generalisations
As one of three studies of the role of science in environmental policy-making, Ozawa studied the attempts in the 1980s by the New York City Department of Sanitation (DOS) to establish a waste-to-energy incinerator at a site in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, as a response to concerns about the diminishing capacity of landfills to take New York's increasing volume of waste. In the early 1980s, the DOS presented to the Board of Estimate a proposal for the design, construction and operation of the first of eight such incinerators. By the time the DOS had prepared a draft environmental impact statement, there was strong public opposition on the grounds of the possibility of dioxin emissions from the incinerator. The Board of Estimates had requested a further health impact study by the DOS. This study, known as the Hart Report differed by a factor of 240 in its estimate in the cancer risk compared to the estimate of the Centre for the Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College, which had been engaged by the local community (Ozawa, 1991:51-52).
As a consequence of an urgent request from the DOS, the New York Academy of Sciences facilitated a one-day policy dialogue. Two days after this, in December, 1984, the Board of Estimate voted to approve the incinerator and the waste management plan of which it was part. However, the residents of the area near the incinerator then took legal action against the incinerator. According to Gandy (1994:85) the completion of the incinerator was at that time still uncertain.
B2.5.4. Feiock and West’s Positivist Approach
While there is a large body of literature in behavioural and social psychology that takes a logical positivist approach to the study of individual recycling and waste disposal behaviour (section B2.2.1, above), such approaches to waste management policy are relatively rare. Feiock and West's (1993) regression analysis of the adoption of recycling programs in USA cities is one such example, and is described in detail in section 2.5.4.
[Appendix B2.46]
B2.5.5. Other Studies
Robert Lake
Lake (1994) used examples from radioactive waste disposal, hazardous waste management and solid waste management in the United States to argue that Federal waste policy making has constrained State and local waste management in ways that are not generally recognised among either the advantages or disadvantages usually advanced in political fora for centralised environmental policy making. A number of reasons are advanced in favour of centralisation. First there is the obvious reason that environmental effects extend across local jurisdictional boundaries. Second, uniform environmental standards facilitate efficient interstate commerce, a view that has been generally vigorously advanced by industry interests concerned with, for example, manufacturing products to meet varying environmental performance standards. Third, uniform standards prevents firms from engaging in rent- seeking with States which are competing for investment by those firms. This reason is more often advanced by States who stand to lose investments, than by industry interests.
A number of disadvantages of centralisation are also often advanced. Firstly, uniform national standards may be too inflexible to deal with the need for locally specific policy responses. Secondly, uniform national environmental regulations may not reflect the preferences of local communities for a particular level of environmental quality, but rather the desire of large corporations to reduce costs and risks by negotiating with just one government, rather than many.
Lake points out that a further and less well recognised disadvantage of centralised environmental policy making is that how problems are framed at the Federal level then constrains the options and innovation at the local level. For example, by setting hazardous waste disposal standards for State implementation, the Federal Government defines the problem as a disposal problem rather than a problem of the production of too much hazardous wastes by industry. Since industries span State boundaries, individual States are in a weakened negotiation position if they wish an industry to reduce its production of hazardous wastes.
Federal non-policy is also a problem in this regard, even when policy making is highly decentralised, as is the case with solid waste disposal. Lake argues that
[Appendix B2.47]
the Federal Government, through insisting that solid waste disposal is a local government issue, places local government at a severe disadvantage if it wants to pursue any waste management options other than disposal. The need for stable markets in recycled materials, or the need to regulate the production practices of industry cannot be addressed effectively by local government.
Alan Gilpin
Gilpin (1980), as part of a descriptive account of environmental policy in Australia at that time, surveyed the policy responses that had been made to solid waste problems. Gilpin's description serves both to highlight the differences between the conditions under which waste management policy was made in the 1970s compared to the 1990s and to draw attention to some of the more permanent features of waste management policy making.
For example, Gilpin discussed the regionalisation of waste management arrangements as a solution to the increasingly non-uniform spatial distribution of disposal sites as a solution already implemented in Sydney with the establishment of the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority (MWDA), and worthy of consideration for Melbourne (pp.345, 347). However, in the 1990s in Sydney, regionalisation came to mean the devolution of waste management from the centralised authority of the MWDA to regional waste management boards.
As a second such example, it can be noted that Gilpin's description of liquid waste disposal is almost totally devoid of the issue of toxic, hazardous or intractable wastes which was to emerge in the mid to late 1980s and have a significant influence on solid waste management policy (pp.366-367).
A third example (pp.350-351) is the justification of recycling from a 'Limits to Growth' perspective (i.e. to prevent the world running out of resources), whereas by the 1990s, the main justification for recycling was as a means of eking out scarce landfill disposal space.
On the other hand, some aspects of waste management policy and its analysis described by Gilpin still apply in the 1990s. For example, Gilpin referred to a 1974 study by a waste management policy group set up by the Environment Committee of the OECD (pp.348-349). The broad waste management strategies identified by this group were almost identical with the waste management
[Appendix B2.48]
hierarchy that was to become a fundamental principle of waste management in the 1990s.
The problems with unstable markets for recycled paper that loomed large in recycling policy in the late 1980s were already apparent to Gilpin (p.350). He also drew attention to the inevitable and only partly reconcilable conflict between the goal of making packaging easy to dispose of in an environmentally responsible way and the goal of making packaging serve as a source of innovative features to capture market share — a conflict that continues to be the subject of debate between local government and the environmental movement who emphasise the first goal, and industry which emphasises the second goal (p.357).
Gilpin also described the emphasis by the Keep Australia Beautiful Council on framing litter as a 'people' problem caused by deficient morals and deserving tougher penalties, together with the packaging industry's desire to prevent container deposit legislation (pp.359, 362) — both of which have remained important influences on waste management policy in the 1990s.
B2.6 Theories of Environmental Policy Making
B2.6.1. Influences on Environmental Policy Making
External influences I — Diffusion of ideas from other policy domains
There are many ways in which environmental policy making in a particular domain can be affected by influences from outside of that domain. Perhaps at the simplest level, is the diffusion of ideas from other policy domains. With the revival of classic liberalism (neo-conservatism in the USA) and economic rationalism in the 1980s, there has been increasing emphasis in public policy on economic instruments as an alternative to regulation (Fenna, 1998:35-38 and, for New South Wales, Laffin and Painter, 1995). While the notion of a dichotomous choice between economic instruments and regulation is somewhat illusory, given that most economic instruments require the existence of regulations to ensure that markets work as desired (see, for example, Jacobs, 1993), interest in economic instruments in environmental policy nevertheless grew substantially in Australia in the late 1980s and 1990s (Fenna and Economou, 1998:339-340). The economists' framing of this illusory dichotomy — the efficiency and
[Appendix B2.49]
freedom of choice associated with market-based instruments, versus the negative overtones of "command and control' — became prevalent in the environmental policy discourse of the 1990s (see James, 1994:8 for an example of this framing, Dryzek's, 1997:82, characterisation of 'command and control' as a 'rhetorical accomplishment which has no real basis' and Richards', 1998 analysis of the gradations within this 'false dichotomy'). Jänicke and Weidner (1997:3-5) were critical of the growth in this type of environmental policy analysis, arguing that a considerable body of monofactorial considerations of policy instrument types had failed to appreciate the importance of the structural characteristics of the context within which policy operated — an importance that often outweighed the nature of the instrument itself.
The appearance of ways of framing policy problems from sources outside the policy domain of interest is termed 'discursive contamination' by Hajer (1995:67). Hajer argues that the acid rain policy-making that he studied was largely played out on the stage of ecological modernisation (pp.5-6), which he defines as:
...the discourse that recognizes the structural character of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes that existing political, economic and social institutions can internalize the care for the environment
(Hajer, 1995:25)
The discourse of ecological modernisation, according to Hajer, became '...the most credible way of "talking Green" in spheres of environmental policymaking and increasingly function[ed] as the organizing principle for the innovation of institutional procedures in the early 1990s.' (Hajer, 1995:30).
If ecological modernisation was the organising principle for institutional innovation in the 1990s, then some consideration needs to be given to what may have preceded it. One possibility is the discourse of administrative rationalism described by Dryzek (1997:61-83) as an early response to the emergence of environmental issues in the late 1960s. Weale (1998:307) describes the key assumptions behind the rationalist pollution control strategies of the 1970s as that:
environmental problems were well understood,
they could therefore be dealt with satisfactorily by specialist branches of government,
[Appendix B2.50]
environmental problems could be handled discretely,
end-of-pipe technologies were adequate, and
a balance had to be struck between environmental protection and economic growth.
External influences II — Constraining ideologies
The ideologies reflected in such discourses not only shape the policy response to issues that have found a place on political agendas, they can also prevent the appearance of these issues on the agenda in the first place. Papadakis (1996:138) pointed out that the preoccupation of the Liberal and National Parties in Australia with economic development in the 1950s and 1960s was a formidable barrier to the acknowledgment of environmental problems in the policy positions of these parties. Similarly, Weale (1998:316) argued that the Thatcher Government's neo-liberal laissez-faire ideology prevented its escape from the belief in a trade-off between environmental protection and economic development, whereas the acceptance of the principles of ecological modernisation in Germany at the same time enabled environmental problems to be framed as a coincidence of interest between environmental and industry groups, rather than a conflict.
External influences III — Federal-State and global-national relations
A form of external influence that is far more complex than the sources of diffusion of ideas or impediments mentioned above is Federal-State relations. Doyle and Kellow (1995:144-150) discussed a number of consequences for environmental policy making that stem from the relationships between the Australian Federal Government and the State Governments with respect to environmental responsibilities. Because of the lack of definition in the Constitution as to the division of environmental powers, this relationship remains in a state of flux. The Federal Government's role has changed since the 1970s from being that of a champion of environmental interests that over-rode the State's developmental interests to that of a partner of the States in the concurrent management of the environment. Along the way, the need for the Federal Government to take action on environmental conflicts that rose to the
[Appendix B2.51]
level of the national political agenda resulted in a number of institutional reforms such as the Ecologically Sustainable Development process, the Resource Assessment Commission and the Regional Forest Agreements, the first two reforms having a relatively short life, and the last still failing to obtain the cooperation of the environmental movement. While Doyle and Kellow rightly point out the complexity of Federal-State relationships over environmental matters, they appear to make little progress in explicating the processes by which this complexity influences the content of environmental policy making at either the Federal or State level.
Lester (1995) reviewed the extent and implementation of environmental policy making by USA State governments following the devolution of authority for environmental policy that took place under the New Federalism in the 1970s and 1980s. He found considerable variation in the performance of individual States over time and suggested that four broad factors could explain some of this variation: the physical severity of environmental problems, the level of fiscal resources available for expenditure on these problems, the political ideologies of the parties in government and the organisational capacity of the State environmental bureaucracy. Lester classified States into those with high levels of environmental commitment and institutional capacity ('the Progressives'), those with neither ('the Regressives'), those with high levels of commitment but poor capacity ('the Strugglers') and those in the opposite condition ('the Delayers'). He suggested that the effectiveness of further devolution of environmental policy making authority to the States would depend on the type of State involved, the Progressives being able to use additional authority effectively.
A clearer account of how dialogue at one level of collective action can impact on environmental politics and policy making at another is given by Lafferty (1998), who described how the concept of sustainable development has provided an ethical legitimacy for global dialogue on environment and development issues. While the concept has been extensively criticised as obfuscatory and ill thought through, its popularity with politicians has meant that the commitments they make in global fora such as the Rio Earth Summit have the potential to be used by social movements, political opponents or the media to bring pressure to bear in domestic environmental policy issues. Lafferty provides empirical evidence to suggest that this potential was realised in at least one instance in Norwegian environmental politics. However, while global consensus undoubtedly carries some rhetorical force for national politics (or national consensus for State
[Appendix B2.52]
politics), it needs to be demonstrated that the same flexibility of meaning inherent in the concept of sustainable development that makes global consensus possible does not also allow politicians the leeway to creatively interpret domestic inaction as progress.
The cognitive-informational framework
This term is used by Jänicke and Weidner (1997:11-12) as a category that includes the influence on environmental policy of culture, values and "environmental knowledge and the conditions under which it is generated, distributed, interpreted and applied'. The processes by which this occurs have been elaborated as theories by a number of authors and these are described in section B2.6.3, below.
Environmental groups
Ingram, Colnic and Mann (1995) discussed the nature of environmental groups and their influence on environmental policy. These authors identified three 'waves' in group formation: first, the conservation-oriented groups that formed prior to the 1960s (some of which were formed in the late 19th or early 20th century); second, the pollution-oriented groups that formed in the 1960s and 1970s; and third, the small grassroots groups that formed in and since the 1980s (many of these having an anti-toxic or environmental justice orientation). Ingram et al. , divided environmental groups into the relatively few direct action groups (including ecotage and purchase of land for conservation purposes) and the majority that follow the standard American political practices in attempting to influence policy, such as lobbying, electioneering, litigation, coalition building and mobilising public opinion. Groups can also be distinguished according to other dimensions, such as whether the group criticises existing policy by recourse to technical mastery of the science involved, or to rhetorical argument in advocacy and publicity; whether or not the group is willing to enter into negotiation with the organisations considered to be its opposition; and the extent which the group aims to build access to state officials. These differences have made coalition building among environmental groups difficult to achieve. However, while this fragmentation and a lack of cohesion might be regarded as a disadvantage to lobbying activities, it nonetheless enables the environmental movement to respond effectively to a
[Appendix B2.53]
wide range of environmental issues and do so at the local level. Ingram et al, concluded that the experience with environmental groups in the USA could be best understood within the pluralistic view of environmental policy making. There was little support for either Olson's rational actor thesis which holds that the survival of interest groups is a function of their ability to offer benefits to their members, or for the view that environmental groups would coalesce into a broad-scale social movement that would transform American politics. Consistent with their rejection of this latter view, Ingram et al., concluded that, despite the institutionalisation of environmental concern, environmental groups had made very little impact on the quality of the environment as expressed by various technical measures.
Against this fairly pessimistic view, in which relatively little attention was given to the actual mechanisms by which environmental groups might bring about policy change, are more optimistic views that spell this out in some detail. Papadakis (1996:64-69) draws attention to how the environmental movement is a source of both new ideologies that a provide a basis for challenging dominant ideologies and proposed policy solutions to environmental problems. However, as Jänicke and Weidner (1997:12) pointed out, the 'openness' of policy making and judicial processes to input from the environmental movement is an important factor that determines the extent to which its innovative ideas make an impact on environmental policy.
Doyle and Kellow (1995:270) suggest that it might be expected that environmental groups might play a greater role where issues are 'lumpy', for example, a mining proposal that can only proceed or not proceed. Such issues make the normal politics of compromise difficult, thus leading environmental groups to try to work outside of mainstream politics.
Environmentally innovative firms
A source of influence on environmental policy that appears to have rarely been identified in the literature, apart from the discussion by Jänicke and Weidner (1997:11), is environmentally innovation by firms. Although Jänicke and Weidner's view seems to stem partly from their inclusion of company policy with public policy, it is conceivable that environmental innovation, and particularly profitable environmental innovation, by some firms provides policy makers with additional justification for environmental policies against
[Appendix B2.54]
the resistance by other firms who might claim that it is impossible or too costly to respond to the requirements of the policy.
Political parties
Kamieniecki (1995) analysed party platforms, voting patterns in the legislatures and the environmental attitudes of Democrat and Republican voters. He concluded that, and in agreement with other empirical research, that there remained a weak but consistent link between political ideology, party identification and environmentalism. Kamieniecki found that there had been some convergence in the environmental attitudes of Democrat and Republican voters in the 1990s, although this was not reflected in the voting patterns of representatives in the legislatures. Support for Kamieniecki's conclusions also comes from Jänicke and Weidner (1997:10) who argued that, from their and others cross-national studies, 'political orientation of ruling parties explains little in environmental policy'. However, Jänicke and Weidner (1997:11) qualified this with the observation that the existence of green parties has been influential on environmental policy.
Papadakis's (1996) study of the emergence of environmental issues in the policy speeches and policy platforms of political parties in Australia showed that, in general, this occurred earlier with the Australian Labor Party and Australian Democrats than with the Liberal or National Parties (p.137).
Doyle and Kellow (1995:126-129) pointed out that the key elements of federal environmental policy put in place by legislation enacted by the two terms of the Whitlam government. This was followed by a regressive phase in which the Fraser government returned some powers relevant to environmental management to the States, as well as failing to intervene in a number of development vs environment disputes. The Hawke government enjoyed a close relationship with the peak environment organisations and took a number of environmental initiatives during its term, and outcome that is consistent with the view of Jänicke and Weidner (1997:13) that environmental policy making is facilitated by corporatism. Doyle and Kellow conclude that, at the federal level, there has been more common ground between the environmental movement and the ALP than the Coalition. However, the relationship is by no means clear at the State level, where developmental politics are important (Kellow, 1995).
[Appendix B2.55]
The Electoral System
While the relationship between the ALP and the environmental movement at the federal level brought indirect representation of the latter in the federal legislatures, the nature of the electoral system influences the extent to which environmental concerns in the electorate can obtain direct representation in the legislature (Doyle and Kellow, 1995:130-134). This is amply demonstrated by the difference in the electoral success of the Green Party where forms of proportional representation are employed — such as the Senate, the Tasmanian Legislative Assembly (until recently), and the New South Wales Legislative Council — compared to where optional or compulsory preferential voting is employed (such as the House of Representatives and many State lower houses).
Weale (1998:305-306) attributed the emergence of ecological modernisation in Germany in the 1980s partly to the proportional representation system which prevented any one party from governing in its own right. The need to form coalition governments put minority parties in a position to demand concessions from their coalition partners. However, Weale cautions against excessive reliance on such explanations rooted in rational choice theory, as there is a danger of neglecting the important question of how the policy changes brought about with ecological modernisation were legitimated and justified in the policy community and society at large.
Vogel (1993:269) also found that proportional representation and coalition government was more likely to give environmental interests greater access to, and more effective responses in, environmental policy making.
Bureaucracies and administration
Given that much of the environmental policy making that has occurred in the latter half of the 20th century has involved administrative reforms and reorganisation, the relationship between environmental policy and state bureaucracies should bear close analysis. Rosenbaum (1995) reviewed the extensive literature on the administrative reforms brought about by environmental legislation in the USA. Rosenbaum argued that this environmental legislation differed from other legislation outside of the domain of environment, public health and safety in two key respects. Firstly,
[Appendix B2.56]
environmental legislation institutionalised scientific, and particularly ecological, analysis as an important part of agency rulemaking. Secondly, legislators' fears of agency capture resulted in a reliance on statutory micromanagement as a means of ensuring that the agencies of the state gave expression to legislative intent against the hostility of business interest. Summarising the findings of evaluations of the introduction of environmental impact assessment, standard setting and risk assessment into administrative decision making, Rosenbaum concluded that:
• evidence that environmental impact assessment had caused significant changes in the development programs and projects of federal agencies was fragmentary at best,
• the environmental impact assessment process had altered the structural relationship between organised interests and agencies, creating new means of access and political strategies that mostly have benefited environmental groups, and
• the environmental impact assessment process had opened agencies to judicial scrutiny (this has also occurred in Australia, as for example, with the Land and Environment Court in New South Wales).
In contrast to at least some arguably positive outcomes from the introduction of environmental impact assessment, Rosenbaum noted, as has Raufer (1998:197), that in the 1990s growing demands for 'risk based regulation' as a means of establishing scientifically and economically defensible priorities for environmental regulation have coincided with increasing controversy about the validity of the science of risk assessment, about the entry of political values and ideological bias into risk assessments, and about the further confusion introduced into risk assessment by legislative attempts to guide agencies in the risk assessment process.
Rosenbaum's summation of the assessments of statutory micromanagement was also pessimistic, noting that two decades of experience with action-forcing legislative strategies had shown that these strategies were fundamentally flawed by the legislators' inattention to the realities and intricacies of implementation within the state agencies.
[Appendix B2.57]
In contrast to Rosenbaum's depiction of the situation in the USA, Vogel (1993:270) reported that bureaucrats in Japan had been fairly successful in imposing regulation on industry, partly due to Japan's prosperity and partly due to the relative strength of the Japanese state.
Doyle and Kellow (1995:150-152) suggested that one impact of the emergence of environmental issues that crossed the boundaries of State departmental authority was the merging of previously separated environmental functions into single departments. While Doyle and Kellow claimed that such centralisation of function 'politicises' environmental administration, because there are no longer separate agencies to appease various interests, the extent of such politicisation is probably also influenced by a range of other factors, such as the interest taken by the environmental movement and the access of prodevelopment interests to departments or Ministers able to over-ride the views of the environmental department and its Minister.
Walker (1992:249) suggested that the extent to which a captured agency influences policy will depend on the salience of the issue. When an issue is receiving wide publicity and the attention of a range of interest groups, politicians are less likely to rely solely on the advice of government agencies whose views might reflect those of a particular interest group.
The role of the media
Doyle and Kellow (1995:158-174) took the view from their analysis of two environmental conflicts in Queensland (the Wet Tropics campaign and the Lindeman Island affair) that: 'The media are, quite simply, immensely powerful players in environmental policy formulation and implementation in Australia'. They found support for both the instrumentalist and structuralist perspectives on the processes that influence media content. The reporting, and particularly that of provincial newspapers, of the conservationist campaign against the Daintree Road, clearly stereotyped the participating conservationists as deviants and so undermined their claim as legitimate interest groups. With the Lindeman Island affair, Doyle and Kellow show that national newspapers placed the affair within the frame of National Party politics and the Queensland Premier, Joh Bjelke Petersen, while the Queensland press framed the affair as a conservation campaign. Doyle and Kellow argue that the readiness of the media to place environmental issues within the dominant frame of pluralist
[Appendix B2.58]
politics results in the environmental movement being portrayed as a specialist interest group, so deflecting attention from the widespread support for the environment among the populace at large.
In contrast to the claim for an 'immensely powerful' role for the media, the study by Papadakis (1996) of articles on the environment in The Bulletin showed that, while there was a strong correspondence between the appearance of particular environmental issues in The Bulletin and their appearance in the policy speeches and platforms of political parties, there was some indication that the media had taken their cue from politics, rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, the media could be seen as playing an important role in articulating environmental issues as it responded to its own needs for news stories that are simple, impactful and graphical, and therefore appealing to its audience. Papadakis noted that such articulation included the use of well-tried framing devices (conservationists as deviants, events as being of crisis proportions, and the environment-development conflict), together with a readiness to use new concepts such as sustainable development.
Hannigan (1995:58-75) provides an account of the process by which the media manufactures environmental news and endows it with symbolic meaning for its audiences. Hannigan noted five factors that were important in making environmental news stories attractive to the media:
• environmental messages situated in frames that are widely recognised, such as health and safety, or bureaucratic bungling,
• environmental problems with the legitimation of appropriate sources of authority in politics and science,
• problems that can be portrayed as part of 'social drama' (having readily identifiable heroes and villains, for example) are more likely to be taken up by the media,
• problems with immediacy, and
• problems that have a feasible and immediate solution attached to them.
From forgoing, it would appear that the influence of the media is not directly on environmental policy, but rather through its influence on public opinion
[Appendix B2.59]
which is under scrutiny by politicians, particularly in the period preceding elections.
Public opinion
Vogel (1993:265) concluded from his study of post war environmental policy making in Great Britain, United States and Japan that the content and intensity of public opinion over time about the environment was clearly reflected in the extent and effectiveness of environmental regulation.
B2.6.2. Theories of Evolution in Environmental Policy Making
Change over longer time periods
Among the theories which seek to explain the variation in political attention to environmental issues over time, Costain and Lester (1995:15-38) examined Schlesinger's cyclical thesis, Sabatier's policy-learning thesis and Amenta and Skocpol's backlash or zigzag thesis, while Dunlap (1995:63-114) assessed trends in environmental public opinion in the USA in the framework of Downs' (1972) issue attention cycle and related approaches dealing with the emergence of, and responses to, social problems. Costain and Lester found little correlation between the introduction of environmental legislation and the swings between national conservatism and liberalism on the 30 year cycle posited by Schlesinger.
According to Costain and Lester's rendering of Sabatier's work, environmental policy dynamics is characterised by periods of relative stability in which there are no significant changes in the core program being implemented by government, nor in the balance between competing advocacy coalitions in the particular policy subsystem. These periods of stability alternate with periods of instability with major changes in the policy core and the balance between advocacy coalitions, these changes being precipitated by events outside the policy subsystem rather than within it. The empirical data Costain and Lester used in their assessment, consisting mainly of the patterns over time of new environmental legislation, formation and membership of environmental organisations and environmental articles in the New York Times, was hardly
[Appendix B2.60]
ideal for the task and, as might have been expected, there was no dear support for, or rejection of, the policy-learning thesis. There was, however, evidence that environmental topics in the media tend to be cumulative over time, i.e. new topics, once introduced, do not disappear again from the media. This Costain and Lester took as at least more consistent with the policy-learning thesis than with the zigzag thesis. This latter thesis, which posits that policy change in any one era is best understood as a reaction or backlash to policy changes in the previous era, found little support, insofar as the constantly growing environmental group membership, increasing range of environmental legislation and the cumulative nature of media reporting, could scarcely be seen as an anti-environmental backlash.
To the extent that levels of public environmental concern may be related to the amount of attention governments pay to environmental policy, theories of change in environmental concern may also be relevant. Dunlap's review of public opinion data for the USA shows that there was a peak in various polling measures of environmental concern such as direction, degree and salience in 1970, followed by a decline through the rest of the decade, and then an increase again during the 1980s. Dunlap interprets this as a deficiency in Downs' theory, particularly as the decline in public interest in environmental issues in the mid to late 1970s was not the result of a realisation of the costs of environmental measures as Downs predicted, but was the result of public perceptions that the government had the problem in hand. Given the substantively different environmental issues of the 1980s that Dunlap describes, it might equally be said that the empirical evidence supports the existence of two separate issue attention cycles, each with its own constellation of environmental issues. Compared with the localised water and air pollution problems and the wilderness preservation issues that were the focus of concern in the early 1970s, the environmental problems that emerged during the 1980s, such as toxic waste sites, and the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion, carried a more explicit threat to the health of individuals. Dunlap was unable, at the time of writing, to present sufficiently recent data that might show whether the second wave of environmental concern was declining in the mid 1990s (Australian data suggests that public concern about environmental issues rose rapidly in 1989 after a slow decline through much of the late 1970s and 1980s, with a similar declining trend evident in the early 1990s — Lothian, 1994). Dunlap did, however, identify what he considered to be the three factors that contributed to the rise of environmental concern in the 1980s: an objective increase in the incidence of worrying environmental problems, an increase in
[Appendix B2.61]
media coverage of environmental problems, and the continuing activity of environmental organisations.
Lack of change over longer time periods
Fenna (1998:75-76) point out that some aspects of public policy remain unchanged for long periods of time, despite changes in government. He advances three possible explanations for this policy inevitability. Firstly, the logic of industrialism creates social needs that governments must fulfil, regardless of their ideological priorities. Secondly, long running demographic changes, such as an aging population structure, require policy attention that transcends changes in government. Thirdly, market forces create imperatives to which governments much respond, regardless of their political colour. It is the debate over such considerations that has given rise to the argument that political parties are of little consequence in policy making (Wanna, 1993), a view which is to some extent consistent with Kamieniecki's (1995) observation, above, of the convergence of Republican and Democratic environmental policy making in the 1990s. On the other hand, Fenna notes that others have put forward an 'initiative and resistance' thesis that attributes policy reform to the Labor Party and resistance to these reforms to the non-Labor parties, a view that is not inconsistent with that of Doyle and Kellow noted in the subsection on political parties in the previous section (section B2.6.1).
Of course, any theory of public policy making that argues that particular interests consistently dominate the policy making process could serve to explain why there may be lack of change over long time periods, provided it can be shown that these particular interest groups do not change their demands of government over time. Lindblom's (1977,1981) neo-pluralist view of the structural dependence of government on business is one such theory. Such a view is broadly consistent with the observation of Jänicke and Weidner (1997:2,8,19) that environmental policy failure is most commonly associated with those problems, such as solid waste generation, where a large part of society and the economy is structurally dependent on the conditions that produce the problem.
Crowley (1992:131-132) lists a number of studies that describe the ways in which the political economy actively avoids responding to environmental concerns. These include the avoidance of environmental ideology by
[Appendix B2.62]
traditional political parties (a contrary finding to that of Papadakis, 1996), superficial and manipulative participative processes, ineffectual legislation and bureaucracies, administrative hostility to challenges to the dominance of economic considerations, narrow definition of environmental problems, industry interests protected by control of policy making by elites, secrecy by industry and developers to prevent environmentalists' access to information, delaying tactics by industry to thwart regulatory intent and legislation that appeases interest groups rather than resolving environmental problems. Given this wide range of obstacles to environmental policy making, it is not surprising that a theory of 'the unpolitics of non-decision making' is possible (see, for example, Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Crenson, 1971). While such a theory might be regarded as a product of its time (the first wave of environmentalism), it nevertheless raises the question, as does Crowley's review of power theory and environmental policy, of the extent to which observable environmental policy making behaviour, and the observable influences upon it are merely a residue of a much larger potential for action that has been severely circumscribed by the less visible and more subtle power of the interests opposed to environmental reform. Crowley concludes that the more carefully these invisibilities and subtleties are examined, the better will be the account of the balance between the power of economic interests and the ability of environmental ideology to survive despite this power.
Walker (1992:233-234) lists a number of examples from Australia where business or developmental interests have prevailed, despite opposition from environmentalists. The Gray Government in Tasmania used the compensation funds provided by the Federal Government for the loss of the Franklin scheme to build further dams on other rivers in western Tasmania. The Queensland Government, despite popular hostility to its plans for Moreton Island, adopted national parks policy that left open the option of sandmining in national parks. The same government pursued hydroelectric development in the northern tropics despite the projected inundation of areas listed as World Heritage. Walker argues that much of the apparent policy progress on environmental issues is largely symbolic and does not alter the developmentalist political culture, the hegemony of developmentalist myths and the vulnerability of Australian politics to the demands of business and developmental interests. He advances a structural explanation for this state of affairs. Developmentalism had its origins in the 19th century need for Australia to attract capital and labour to its economy. Federation and the loss of natural monopolies in areas such as transport resulted in the States becoming more dependent for revenue
[Appendix B2.63]
on the exploitation of natural resources. In addition, competition between States for investment supports the 'development at any cost' ideology of State politics that is inimical to preservation of resources on environmental grounds.
However, as Fenna and Economou (1998:355) point out, despite this pessimistic outlook there is still Vogel's (1993) opposing view, that the changing fortunes of business mean that there are periods when governments can take less notice of the needs of business. This was also observed in Blowers' (1984) study of the London Brick dispute and may be borne out by the wave of environmental legislation that occurred in the late 1960s. The processes by which such environmental policy change occurs has received considerable attention in the literature.
B2.6.3. Theories of Process in Environmental Policy Making
Recourse to technical assessment
Fenna and Economou (1998) argue that policy makers, faced with the irreconcilability of ecological and economic logics in the framing of environmental problems, attempt to transform latent environmental conflicts with their potential for politicisation into technical assessment processes. The environmental impact assessment legislation passed by the Commonwealth and State Governments in the 1970s was the first example of such attempts at depoliticisation of environmental issues. After reviewing the experience of the Resource Assessment Commission and the Regional Forest Agreement, Fenna and Economou concluded that these attempts to transform political choices into technical procedures had been a 'conspicuous failure', in that 'no amount of procedural fine tuning or technical calculation would remove the fundamentally political nature of environmental policy decisions' (pp.347, 350). Although Fenna and Economou do not discuss this, it may be the case that academic research and discourse provides a source of new technical assessment procedures that are periodically adopted by policy makers, or passed into legislation, in the hope that a means of depoliticisation has been found. Certainly, the contingent valuation methodology used by the Resource Assessment Commission had its origins in economic research in the field of cost-benefit analysis. If there is periodic migration of technical assessment methods from academic or professional research to policy analysis, then it could be expected that environmental policy making might show cycles of
[Appendix B2.64]
emergence and submergence of depoliticising technical assessment procedures. Submergence might amount to total abandonment, as occurred with the Resource Assessment Commission, or retention as ritual which is no longer central to the decision making process, as some would argue is the case with environmental impact assessment (see, for example, Rosenthal and Russ, 1988).
While Fenna and Economou do not elaborate on the possibility of different forms of technical assessment, the nature and outcomes of policy processes centred on technical assessment will clearly depend on whether science is used as a means of establishing consensus (see, for example, Lee, 1998:104) or adversarially as is the case in Ozawa's model described in section B2.5.3, above.
Goal setting
Another means of depoliticising environmental issues may be goal setting. Jänicke and Weidner (1997:5-6) suggest that governments may set goals or targets with respect to particular environmental indicators, without entering into the debate as to how such goals are to be achieved. The announcement of the goal serves as a signal to industry that 'there is a universally perceived problem and the will to take action against it'. The more proactive firms may take action that contributes to achieving the goal, thereby improving the conditions if policy intervention is required in the future.
The process of goal setting is probably worthy of closer examination, as it appears to be becoming a popular policy strategy in the more intractable environmental policy areas, such as greenhouse emissions, solid waste reduction and agriculture (in the latter case, goals are encapsulated in catchment plans, rather than being specific numerical reductions).
Symbolic politics
Walker (1992:248-249) suggested that Edelman's (1964) views about symbolic politics are a complement to Downs' issue-attention cycle, in that symbolic action, such as public inquiries, information campaigns, or setting up new agencies, is electorally calming at the alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm stage.
[Appendix B2.65]
Elites in the policy process
Rushefsky (1995) reviewed the literature on the role of elites in environmental policy making. In contrast to the view of the policy process taken in the other reviews in Lester's collection, Rushefsky took a neo-constructivist perspective in explicitly recognising that the early part of the process consists of the perception of particular situations through the lenses or screens of existing ideologies and beliefs, and the interpretation of these situations as problematical. This is the first in a sequential series of steps that Rushefsky defined as: problem perception and definition, agenda building, problem formulation, adoption, evaluation and succession. Rushefsky argued that elites play an important role in the earlier stages, as their belief systems and those that are prevalent in the political arena they belong to (for example, after Price, 1965, corporate-managerial, executive, legislative, regulatory, judicial, popular mobilisation, academic-professional and organised labour), are likely to structure how problems are identified, framed and given a status that will guarantee a place on political agendas. As Papadakis (1996:62) points out, the justification for the need for action on environmental problems often lies with scientific discoveries, so that scientific elites can play an important role in bringing environmental problems to wider notice, as has been done by Rachel Carson, Paul Ehrlich and David Suzuki, to name but a few. Walker (1992:245- 247) provides a number of examples from Australian environmental issues where the rationalities of professional elites resulted in the information available in the decision making process being partial and coloured by the framing of the problem by professional elites. He further observed (p.253) that environmental policy making faces a fundamental conflict between 'the rationalities of neo-classical economics and bureaucratic administration on the one hand, and that of ecology on the other'.
Within the social psychology literature on the determinants of environmental concern, there are any number of studies that have demonstrated that different elites have different attitudes and beliefs about environmental issues, thus supporting Rushefsky's contention that the belief systems of elites are an important influence in the early stages of policy formation. However, this somewhat static view could be regarded as wanting in some respects, and Rushefsky pointed out that relatively few studies have focused on how the ideology of policy elites influences the play of strategy and tactics in policy debates (for example, Dietz and Rycroft, 1987), or how policy elites change their
[Appendix B2.66]
views, positions, and perceptions of causation as they are exposed to alternative problem framings in the course of policy debate (for example, Sabatier and McLaughlin, 1988; Sabatier and Hunter, 1989). Rushefsky concluded by suggesting that larger studies and more comparative studies in the above areas are required to validate the emerging findings from the few studies that had been undertaken to that time.
Policy process as discourse I — Hajer and acid rain
Perhaps one the more comprehensive and elaborated constructivist approaches to a theory of environmental policy-making is the work of Maarten Hajer on the evolution of policy relating to acid rain in Great Britain and the Netherlands. Drawing on the discourse analytic and argumentative traditions of Foucalt, Harre and Billig, Hajer's point of departure is that "whether or not environmental problems appear as anomalies to the existing institutional arrangements depends first of all on the way in which these problems are framed and defined' (Hajer, 1995:4).
From this perspective:
Policy-making is in fact to be analysed as the creation of problems, that is to say, policy-making can be analysed as a set of practices that are meant to process fragmented and contradictory statements to be able to create the sort of problems that institutions can handle and for which solutions can be found.Hence policies are not only devised to solve problems, problems have to be devised to be able to create policies.
(Hajer, 1995:15)
The process by which a collection of contradicting and ambivalent environmental concerns among a group of actors gels into a small number of more cohesive and clearly related or opposed understandings and narratives (frames in the terminology of other authors discussed below) about an environmental problem is termed discursive closure by Hajer (1995:22-23). Jasanoff (1999) argues that such frames constrain the range of possible policy options. Of necessity, discursive closure must precede problem closure in which some degree of agreement is obtained as to the appropriate solution to a problem framing that has emerged in the discursive closure process. Discursive closure is accompanied by what Hajer (1995:22) terms social accommodation, the process by which latent social conflicts that might be brought on by environmental impacts are avoided through discursive subtleties which
[Appendix B2.67]
position actors in ways that make particular problem framings more acceptable to others or deflect blame to others.
Relevant here is Cohen's (1972) claim that the initial calls for action in moral panics are shaped by the values that are perceived to be under threat (section B2.2.3, above). Whereas Hajer views policy-making as the search for a problem formulation that will fit the solutions that are institutionally feasible, Cohen alerts us to the possibility that the problem formulation is likely to be related to the values that are seen to be under threat. If, for example, the value under threat is consistent and integrated action by different levels or parts of government (what Treanor, 1998 terms a fragmentation moral panic), then it is likely that the problem will be formulated as a lack of coordination, from which will follow the promotion of coordinating solutions. If the growing interconnectedness of environmental problems outstrips the capacity for matching institutional adjustment, it might be expected that concerns about fragmentation might become more prevalent. According to Rosenbaum (1995:231) fragmentation of authority among too many agencies is one of the institutional flaws most commonly referred to by commentators on the effectiveness of environmental regulation in the USA.
From his study of add rain policy-making, Hajer concluded that a number of discursive practices could be identified which had substantial influence on the course of discursive closure and social accommodation, and ultimately on the institutional response to acid rain. These included:
• the use of story-lines, simplified narrative accounts of the problem that enabled various organisations to position themselves favourably against the demands of their opposition,
• the formation of discourse coalitions, i.e. coalitions that emerge at particular points in time due to the compatibility of evolving story-lines,
• the ability of policy-making institutions to erect insurmountable barriers to policy change, such as requiring scientific certainty, a practice labelled as disjunction markers by Hajer,
symbolic politics, such as the publication of complex and comprehensive policy plans by state agencies, which purport to
[Appendix B2.68]
coordinate action but also serve as a discursive positioning strategy on the part of these agencies,
• the discursive construction of ignorance, by which relevant policy knowledge was excluded from consideration in the dominant policy discourses,
• black boxing, after Callon and Latour (1981:284), — a fundamental mechanism in the construction of story-lines, by which the meanings and relational significance of certain concepts and assumptions are no longer available for criticism or elaboration in policy discourse, and
• structured ways of arguing among particular groups of policy actors, whereby previous modes of thought and action (possibly related to existing institutions) provide a template for discourse about a novel policy problem.
The overarching claim in Hajer's work is that discourse matters in environmental policy-making. And nowhere does it matter more than in what Hajer terms (after Roqueplo, 1986) 'accidents in slow motion'. These are the environmental changes that occur slowly, perhaps obvious to some, but generally subject to chronic political inattention, apart from intermittent surges of interest occasioned by scientific reports presaging disaster, or symbolic media spectacles by activist environmental groups. Acid rain and the greenhouse effect are, according to Hajer (1995:21) typical 'accidents in slow motion'.
Policy process as discourse II— Williams and Matheny and hazardous waste
Acid rain policy-making differs in one important respect from hazardous waste policy-making — the latter involves the siting of facilities that engender enormous and frequently successful local opposition. The study of hazardous waste policy-making in the USA led Williams and Matheny (1995) shows the importance of particular periods characterised by community outrage, intense media interest, and political entrepreneurship and expedience within the legislatures. At these times, it is clear, according to Williams and Matheny, that controversy has its roots in the incompatibility of three discourses. Managerial discourse, located largely in bureacurades, sees the public good as best
[Appendix B2.69]
discovered by the application of scientific rationality. Pluralist discourse, located among established interest groups and politicians, gives primacy to the representation of interests and due process as the mean of reaching a compromise that serves the public good. Communitarian discourse, located with the grass-roots opposition in particular localities, places emphasis on direct and well-informed participation by those affected. Under the conditions of inherent uncertainty about the future where hazardous wastes are concerned, local residents are angered by managerialist retreat to probabilistic estimates that hide value-laden assumptions. But the managerialist response is to bring yet more science and expert panels into the process. Local residents are also outraged that decisions affecting their health and future are made by elites in distant places . But the pluralist response is simply to increase elite representation of interests, or engage in tokenistic local consultation exercises. Consequently, local opposition is able to mount a powerful attack on the legitimacy of existing institutions to which bureaucracies, formal interest groups and political parties have difficulty formulating a satisfactory response. In the 1980s in the USA, for example, of 81 applications made for siting hazardous waste disposal facilities since 1980, only six had led to operating facilities by 1987 (Williams and Matheny, 1995:135).
Policy process as discourse III— Schön and Rein and intractable policy disputes
In common with Hajer and Williams and Matheny, Schön and Rein (1994) drew attention to the incompatibilities of particular discourses as an important influence in policy-making. While Hajer's analysis was in terms of story-lines that are a cohesive amalgam of interpretations of history and justifications for a policy actor's present position, and while Williams and Matheny focused on managerial, pluralist and communitarian discourses, Schön and Rein were concerned with what they termed 'frames' — 'underlying structures of belief, perception and appreciation' (Schön and Rein, 1994:23). According to Schön and Rein, the construction of frames proceeds through generative metaphors by which familiar and powerful ideas in our culture are brought into a new situation, where they can exercise considerable normative force. Particularly important are dualisms such as health/ disease, or wholeness/fragmentation which, if serving as metaphors within a complex and uncertain policy situation, provide the comfort of simplicity and the security of an obvious prescription for action. Schön and Rein argue, as does Hajer (1995:59), that the frames through which actors understand a problematic situation determine what they will see
[Appendix B2.70]
as their interests, and hence what conflicts will lie between which groups of actors (Schön and Rein, 1994:27-29).
Tradition and innovation— an institutionalist perspective
The institutionalist perspective directs attention to both process and participants. A focus on institutions, as persistent patterns in social and political behaviour at both the individual and collective level that 'organise political life and make things happen' (Papadakis, 1996:26) recognises both the organisations and other political and social actors that are a part of these patterns, and the processes by which these entities interact.
Papadakis (1996) examined the question of the extent to which institutions might either facilitate, or pose obstacles to, the response of modern industrial societies to environmental problems. His analysis was structured around a hypothesised sequence of how various policy actors and organisations shape policy agendas and public opinion. This sequence commenced with the identification and formulation of environmental problems by expert communities. Once an environmental issue has been identified in this way, then the actions of political parties, social movements and interest groups are influential in determining whether the issue finds its way onto the policy agenda, and in what form. With an environmental issue on the policy agenda, the mass media becomes important in further articulating the issue and influencing public opinion. Papadakis argued that, despite a plethora of reasons justifying a pessimistic view of the political system as insular, self- referential and lacking the capacity to adapt to the challenges posed by environmental issues, the environmental movement had nevertheless been successful in bringing about some changes in values and behaviour in governments and in business, so that institutional adaptation has occurred. He concluded that adaptation is particularly favoured if there are well expressed scientific concerns surrounding the issue that can be given a crisis framing by the media, if these concerns are adopted and further articulated by social movements and if the environmental issue results in the emergence of new political parties that may be a threat to the electoral success of existing parties.
It is not enough, however, that environmental issues find their way onto policy agendas. Unless those involved in the search for solutions are prepared to move outside of the adversarialism and often irreconcilable binary codes of the
[Appendix B2.71]
political, economic, legal and environmentalist framings of the issue, then the political system is likely to impede rather than facilitate institutional change. Papadakis concluded that there was evidence from the experience with environmental politics in Australia that constructive dialogue (i.e. dialogue that seeks win-win solutions through an empathetic understanding of the various viewpoints, a willingness to listen and exercise discretion) had been successful in a number cases in bringing about institutional change. Such a view is consistent with that of Webler (1995), who applied Habermas's theory of communicative action in attempting to improve the conditions for public participation in a landfill siting decision. From the perspective of Papadakis's hypothesised sequence described above, the media and public opinion may play an important role in the conditions for constructive dialogue. The willingness of those who may have an interest in the continuance of the status quo to engage in such dialogue, such as politicians in government and business interests, will be greater if there is a weight of public opinion in favour of action on the issue, which weight of opinion will be in part be due to how the mass media has dealt with the issue.
While it may be too early to suggest that the successes noted by Papadakis have resulted in the institutionalising of constructive dialogue into political deliberation over environmental issues at the national level in Australia, Weale (1998:311-312) gave a clear example of the effect of established institutional traditions on environmental policy outcomes. Weale argued that an important reason for the acceptance of the ideology of ecological modernisation in Germany in the 1980s was that it could be justified by appeal to the principle of precaution (Vorsorgeprinzip). The reason for the wide acceptance of this principle lay in that part of the German system of government that encouraged the careful (including judicial review) elaboration of policy principles to provide a guide and rationale for the subsequent implementation of policy. In contrast, policy making in the UK (where, according to Weale, progress on acid rain policy lagged that in Germany considerably) tended to eschew the statement of programmatic principles, preferring to treat issues individually and on their merits, with greater emphasis placed on scientific proof as a justification for policy intervention.
Vogel (1993), in a study of the influence of the differences between parliamentary systems and the USA system of separation of powers on the representation of diffuse environmental interests, found a number of differences in the extent to, and manner in which, environmental interests were
[Appendix B2.72]
given recognition in environmental policy making in Great Britain, Japan and the United States. Vogel found that, when environmental issues are not the centre of political attention, a number of institutional features provided environmental groups with continuing access to the policy process. These included independent legislatures and judiciaries, and a federal system of government. In the United States, separation of the executive and the legislature resulted in improved access by environmental groups to policy makers when the control of the legislature and the executive rested with different political parties.
B2.7 Some Relevant Insights from the Public Policy Literature
B2.7.1. The Rational-Comprehensive Model
For many in the environmental movement and among environmental professionals, the rational-comprehensive model of public policy making is either believed to be also the reality of environmental policy making, or hoped for as the ideal towards which policy making should strive. As Doyle and Kellow (1995:137, 139) point out, there is a consonance between the ideal of comprehensive policy making and the holism of environmentalism; and also between the ideal of rational policy making and the scientific understandings of causation in the natural world in which environmental concerns are founded.
B2.7.2. Incrementalism
The incremental model of public policy making, due to Lindblom (1959), represents policy making as a process of modest, incremental goal selection, assessment of a small number of alternatives, and selection on the basis of consensus rather than on the merits. Following the arguments of Dror (1971), Doyle and Kellow (1995:143-144) point out that incrementalism will fail when changes in social values outstrip the pace of policy reform, or when there is little continuity in either problems or the means of addressing them through policy. On these grounds, it might be expected that the incremental model will have difficulty explaining the nature of policy processes when there are relatively rapid changes in environmental attitudes, or when new classes of environmental problems arise.
[Appendix B2.73]
B2.7.3. Streams and Windows
One of the more detailed accounts of the early stages of public policy formation is given by Kingdon (1984), who set out to explain why some situations become to be defined as problematical by those with an interest in policy change, how some problems gain political attention and others do not, and how some proposals for solutions reach the short list amongst which choice are made, while other proposals sink without trace from political view. Kingdon argued that it is futile to attempt to explain policy innovation by a search for the ultimate origin of the ideas incorporated in the innovation, that the rational model of policy making occurs infrequently, and that incrementalism fails to explain periods of rapid policy change.
He presented a conceptualisation of the policy process that built on the garbage can model of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). The policy process was seen in terms of three, mostly independent, 'streams' of events: the problem stream in which problems come to the attention of policy actors; the policy stream, which Kingdon likened to a 'policy primeval soup' of ideas for policy proposals that are constantly 'floating' in the discourse of policy specialists; and the political stream which provides a flow of opportunities for, and obstacles to, policy change.
Situations become problems when:
• they are defined as such by the indicators that governments monitor and extrapolate (or by extrapolations by individuals, such as Rachel Carson, or organisations, such as the Club of Rome),
• they are brought to public attention by focussing events such as disasters,
• they emerge out of comparison of existing situations with more ideal states of affairs that occur elsewhere or that are suggested by social values, and
a re-framing of a situation turns a non-problem into a problem.
[Appendix B2.74]
Survival of ideas in the policy primeval soup generated by policy specialists and entrepreneurs to the point when they might receive serious political consideration depends on technical and financial feasibility, match with dominant values and national mood, and political support.
The political stream, according to Kingdon (p.21), is composed of 'such factors as swings of national mood, administration or legislative turnover, and interest group pressure campaigns'.
Kingdon defines policy windows as times when the coincidence of events and conditions in the three streams allow problems to be coupled to policy proposals, and both to receive political support, i.e. policy windows are times of policy formation and change. Kingdon's conceptualisation draws a distinction between agendas, which are created by events in the problem and political streams, and alternatives (policy solutions) which are created in the policy stream ('primeval soup').
While Kingdon's account is largely a realist's view of policy processes, it contains much that is consistent with constructivist and neo-constructivist views of these processes. For example, his account of how situations become problems and find their way to political agendas, the 'softening-up' in the policy stream by which ideas are floated to give policy actors the time become comfortable with them, and the role of chance alignments of problems and political opportunity, is not inconsistent with Hajer's account of the evolution of story-lines and the emergence of discourse coalitions. However, Kingdon does not explicitly identify the forms of discursive practice that make possible the processes he describes.
Perhaps a more serious failing in Kingdon's model is its treatment of politics as a stream of events independent of the problem and policy streams. While the elections of governments to power, broad swings in public opinion, and interest group campaigning may all proceed according to dynamics that seem disconnected from the policy domain of interest, to insist on complete independence of the political stream and the total randomness of the opening of policy windows is to downplay the possibility of forms of organisational learning such as the changes in policy platforms of political parties, interest group strategies and media framing — which changes have their roots partly in previous policy attempts and their outcomes. A coincidence of events that may not have been a policy window in the past may become a policy window
[Appendix B2.75]
simply because of the learning that has occurred. In this sense, Kingdon's account provides little explanation beyond a single cycle of policy formation.
The location of the 'policy primeval soup' with professional elites in the bureaucracy and academia is also less than satisfactory if Kingdon's approach to be applied to environmental policy making. As Papadakis (1996:64) notes, environmental groups can be important sources of policy alternatives. However, such groups are probably not always the original sources of such alternatives. Their influence on the policy process lies in their ability to simplify, articulate and increase the popular appeal of alternatives that have already been put forward by policy elites, possibly by members of such elites whose views lie outside the mainstream.
APPENDIX B4
The Waste Disposal Act 1970
B4.1 The Advent of Modern Environmentalism in Sydney
1 Individual elements of the beliefs, values and concerns that can be found in present day environmental discourse appeared in Sydney well before the time of the late 1960s and early 1970s that is generally regarded as when environmental issues began to receive substantial and sustained media and political attention. Examples of appeals to some of the instrumental value arguments of modem environmentalism and categorised by Fox (1992:5-6) can be found in the pages of the Herald. As mentioned in section 10.1, the Parks and Playground Movement was concerned that the physical health of city dwellers depended on their access to the transformed nature represented by parks (Fox's gymnasium argument). Also in the 1930s, beach pollution was seen as a threat to the vigour of the nation's youth if they did not have access to the surf (see section 7.1.1). In 1933, protests about the proposed siting of an incinerator dose to Balmoral Beach were couched in terms of the desecration and despoliation of the natural beauty of the area — Fox's cathedral and art gallery arguments (SMH, 23.12.33:8; 2.1.34:3). The idea of the wastefulness of sending to tips materials that could be re-used was part of the salvage campaigns organised during World War II (SMH, 5.7.40:8). With the passing of the Soil Conservation Act and the establishment of the NSW Soil Conservation Service in 1938, the need to conserve both soil and water resources to ensure the productivity of agriculture had been officially recognised and responded to (Fox's life support system argument).
2 In the 1950s, dumping in reserves was represented as desecration of bushland (SMH, 29.12.53:2). The practicality of turning organic wastes into a product that restored soil exhausted by food production had been demonstrated by the Canterbury composting plant in the 1950s and had been discussed at length in the Legislative Assembly in 1966 (see section 9.2.2). The idea of cancer as a consequence of the hidden dangers of affluence was canvassed by a staff writer in the Herald in 1955 (SMH, 6.11.55:50) who suggested that the best way to avoid cancer might be to
[Appendix B4.2]
retreat to a desert island. In the same year, the Herald contained a report of dangerous chemicals dumped in a park at Palm Beach (SMH,6.9.55:1). By 1960, food additives, heating of starch in foods and lipsticks had been mentioned as possible cancer causes or dangers to health in articles in the Herald (SMH, 15.6.57:10; 24.9.58:6; 8.10.59:1). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the representation of plastic as a useful or even miraculous material with hidden dangers had been established with a number of incidents in which children suffocated themselves with plastic bags (SMH, 25.8.59:13; 11.4.60:2; 7.6.61:13; 9.3.62:6).
3 In the period from 1962 till 1968, there were relatively few additional elements of modem environmentalism expressed in articles in the Herald, beyond what had already appeared before 1962. The concept of pollution probably underwent further broadening from being the despoliation of parts of the environment with which people had direct contact, such as beaches or the harbour foreshores, to being the contamination for parts more remote from people such as the atmosphere and waterways generally.
4 In 1967, a letter to the editor of the Herald drew attention to ecology as the science that was most relevant to solving the growing pollution problems (SMH, 6.5.67:2). Also in 1967, the Wahroonga and North Narrabeen landfill siting controversies marked the first appearance of ecological arguments against landfills, supplementing the arguments referring to nuisance, vermin and disease that had been deployed by opponents to landfill siting in Berry's Bay in 1959 and Moore Park in 1939. A letter to the editor of the Herald pointed out that seepage from the proposed landfill at Wahroonga would travel along waterways and affect estuarine fish populations (SMH, 11.7.67). A person protesting about the North Narrabeen proposal was reported by the Herald as arguing that the insecticides used to control insects in the tip would be a threat to birds, fish and bathers in the Narrabeen Lakes (SMH, 9.10.67:4). The North Narrabeen controversy also marked the first occurrence of an on-site protest rally over a waste issue, when a rally at the proposed landfill site attracted an attendance of 300 residents (SMH, 9.10.67:4).
5 By the end of 1967, the media discourse in the pages of the Herald, contained many of the elements of modem environmentalist discourse. Perhaps one important omission at this stage was the representation of
[Appendix B4.3]
secondary industry as a major source of environmental pollution. However this deficiency was forcefully remedied in the early 1970s when the Herald ran a series of articles with prominent headlines and visually arresting photos of industrial pollution in the Sydney Region (SMH, 13.4.70:4; 14.4.80:1; 15.4.70:4; 16.4.70:4; 17.4.70:4; 20.4.70:4; 21.4.70:6; 22.4.70:4; 27.4.70:4; 28.4.70:6). Interspersed with these articles were prominent reports on the celebration of the first Earth Day in the United States (SMH, 24.4.70:1,6) and on the Apollo 13 mission, including the drawing of parallels between the lunar module of Apollo 13 and 'spaceship earth' (SMH, 18.4.70:2).
B4.2 The Department of Public Health
1 The 1950s and 1960s saw substantial growth in secondary industry in the Sydney region. For example, in 1965-66 just over one half of the factories operating in Sydney had been established between 1950-51 and 1965-66 (Coward, 1988:228). This growth would have resulted in an increase in the quantity of wastes for disposal, while the production of new materials such as plastics resulted in wastes which were much less readily assimilated by the environment and some of which were more serious threats to human health. In the annual reports of the Department of Public Health prior to 1959, there had been virtually no reference to problems associated with the disposal of effluents from factories. However, in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the annual reports of the Department referred to increasing complaints about air pollution (Department of Public Health, 1959:133), to increasing water pollution problems (Department of Public Health, 1968:49), to new pollutants (Department of Public Health, 1959:133), to surveys of water pollution (Department of Public Health, 1965:104; 1968:49), to location of sources of water pollution (Department of Public Health, 1964:147), to dissatisfaction with local governments' ability to deal with pollution problems (Department of Public Health, 1963:159), the generally unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to water pollution (Department of Public Health, 1966:44), and to the generally difficult and time-consuming nature of the work of locating and abating water pollution (Department of Public Health, 1960:167).
[Appendix B4.4]
2 However, it was not only pollution from factories that was increasing the workload of the Department of Public Health. As Butlin (1976:17-20) described, annual reports of the Department record increasing problems with availability of suitable sites for landfills (see section B4.7, below), an increasing administrative load in approving septic tanks as Sydney's peripheral growth outstripped the installation of sewerage mains by the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board (MSWDB), and problems with industrial waste in municipal landfills (see section B4.7, below). The Department of Public Health also made a substantial contribution to the monitoring of air pollution in the 1950s in conjunction with the Smoke Abatement Committee.
3 In summary then, the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by increasing levels of pollution, which placed an increasing load on the Department of Public Health. The Department was not always able to carry out its responsibilities satisfactorily — the 1963 annual report of the Department records that 'Except for complaints to the Minister, it has not been possible in all instances to investigate fully, complaints made to this Department by the public' (Department of Public Health, 1965:159).
B4.3 The Waste Management Industry
1 There is some evidence that Sydney's growing waste problems had not escaped the notice of engineering consultants and waste management technology firms. Advertisements by these firms caught the attention of politicians (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8343). Other firms were demonstrating their technology to local government and State Government departments (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8345). Some members of Parliament were well versed in the relative merits of the various techniques being promoted (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8379- 8380), while others appeared to be aware of figures in the sales literature for municipal incinerators (Legislative Assembly, 25.11.70:8386). Interestingly, in this latter case, both the Minister for Local Government and another MLA also ventured the opinion that an advantage of incinerators was their ability to destroy plastics, which were already at that time being identified as a problem component of municipal waste.
[Appendix B4.5]
B4.4 The Clean Air Act 1961
1 The series of legislative changes that culminated in the three environmental Acts of 1970 began with the Clean Air Act in 1961. However, this legislation was not the first institutional response to pollution in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1955, the Maritime Services Board gazetted the Navigable Waters (Anti-Pollution) Regulations using its powers under the Maritime Services Act of 1935 (Butlin, 1976:22). While the jurisdiction of the Maritime Services Board extended over all navigable waters, these being defined as waters in which the smallest of water craft are able to float, it focused its attention on the port areas. Consequently, the areas in which the Department of Public Health subsequently found gross water pollution in the 1960s tended to be the waterways away from the port areas, such as the Alexandra Canal and the Cooks and Georges Rivers.
2 While Sydney had experienced recurring air pollution since the late 19th century due to the use of coal to fire the boilers of ships, locomotives and factories, the sources that received the most attention from the 1930s to the 1950s were the inner Sydney power stations (Coward, 1988:237, 264). The Department of Public Health commenced dust deposition measurements in 1953, and air pollution was raised spasmodically in the Legislative Assembly until the NSW Government formed the Smoke Abatement Committee in 1955 (Coward, 1988:264-265). This Committee reported to the Government in 1958 and recommended the introduction of a Clean Air Act. The Committee reported that there had been considerable change in the nature and quantities of air pollution in the 1950s due to the post-war industrial expansion and the technological changes that resulted in the emission of new pollutants. It had also received complaints from industry that the ambiguity of existing legislation which depended on the concept of public nuisance resulted in uncertainty about the levels of abatement that might be expected of it.
3 The Clean Air Act embodied some of the recommendations of the Smoke Abatement Committee, particularly the recommendations that a central organisation be formed to be responsible for the abatement of air pollution, and that this organisation be funded by a system of registration of emitting premises (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.60:2544).
[Appendix B4.6]
The Act was also modelled on legislation in United Kingdom (Legislative Assembly, 17.11.61:2662) and in Pittsburgh in United States, which city had been visited by the Minister for Public Health in the course of drafting the Clean Air Act (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.60:2543). The vesting of responsibility for control of air pollution in a central authority appears to have originated with the United Kingdom legislation (Legislative Assembly, 21.11.61:2744), while the legislation in Pittsburgh, where responsibility was spread across a number of local authorities, appears to have been more influential on the cooperative approach towards industry taken in the Clean Air Act (see below). According to the Minister's statements in the second reading debate, support for the appropriateness of a central authority also came from a recent United Nations report, although the Minister went on to quote a section of the report that suggested that control functions could also be distributed between a central authority and local authorities (Legislative Assembly, 21.11.61:2755) The concept that central authority would also be able to offer advice and expertise to industry on pollution abatement appears to have originated with the Alkali Inspectorate in the United Kingdom (Coward, 1988:268). The Minister's speech in introducing the Bill in the Legislative Assembly suggests that the drafters of the legislation found the task a complex one, and consequently, the legislation was regarded as 'experimental, exploratory and educational' (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.61:2542,2543).
The concerns about air pollution appear to have been focused more on property damage and public health than on the effects on the environment. For example, in debate in the Legislative Assembly in which air pollution was mentioned in the period from 1959 until the introduction of the Clean Air Act, when the justification for the Act was discussed, it was almost invariably in terms of reducing the incidence of lung disease, damage to property and associated declines in property values (Legislative Assembly, 25.8.59:385; 20.10.59:1479; 3.11.59:1581; 25.8.60:73. The only other justification advanced was that the levels of deposition of particulates in Port Kembla, Wollongong and Newcastle, that had been measured for the first time in the 1950s, were comparable with the levels in the Midlands of the United Kingdom and Pennsylvania in the United States, where legislation had already been enacted (Legislative Assembly, 25.8.59:384). While some of the most serious air pollution was occurring at the steelworks in Port Kembla and
[Appendix B4.7]
Newcastle, there were a number of emitters in Sydney itself that were ultimately to come within the ambit of the Act. These included power stations, gasworks, foundries and brickworks (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.1961:2545).
The manner of introduction of the Act established a precedent for environmental legislation that was followed for some of the legislation introduced in 1970. This was to leave the Bill at the second reading stage for twelve to eighteen months, while the relevant government department and members of the Assembly received submissions on the legislation. A revised Bill was then introduced, incorporating such modifications as the departmental committee responsible for the drafting of the Bill saw fit. According to the Minister for Public Health, most of the comment the Clean Air Bill received was favourable (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.60:2544).
The Clean Air Act, insofar as it established a body with an advisory role to a minister, supported by technical staff was to serve partly as a model for environmental legislation passed in 1970, in particular, the Clean Waters Act and the Waste Disposal Act. The Clean Air Act provided for the establishment of an Air Pollution Control Branch within the Department of Public Health, and an Air Pollution Advisory Committee. This committee was to have twelve members: the Director General of Public Health, two officers of the Department of Public Health nominated by the Minister, and a nominee of the Department of Local Government, two nominees of the Labour Council of NSW, a nominee of the universities in Sydney, the Institution of Engineers, the Institute of Fuel, the Australian Coal Association, the Chamber of Manufacturers, the Metal Trades Employers Association. The Air Pollution Advisory Committee's role was to establish emission standards, advise the Minister on the granting of licences to scheduled premises and on other matters referred to it by the Under-Secretary of the Department of Public Health, or the Minister. The function of the Committee was as much to provide technical advice as to represent the interests of those affected by the Act (Legislative Assembly, 21.11.61:2753).
The Clean Air Act also seems to have introduced the conciliatory and cooperative approach that appeared in much of the subsequent
[Appendix B4.8]
environmental legislation in NSW. The second reading speech by the Minister for Health made his preference for this approach quite clear. 'We seek co-operation. It is not prosecution but co-operation that will make the legislation a success/ 'Therefore hon. members see that every attempt has been made to be reasonable in our approach to this problem so that the measure will not inflict undue hardship on those affected by it.' ' [the legislation] was not intended to be merely a punitive measure and that nothing effective would be gained by fining offenders and not helping them to overcome their air pollution problems.' (Legislative Assembly,15.11.61:2458-2451).
8 It was also quite clear that cooperation between industry and government was to require tolerance on the part of the public.
The provisions of the bill call for a great deal of tolerance and understanding, not merely by the industries but by the public who must be educated to realise that they should not make airy-fairy complaints against industries and expect the provisions of the statute to be implemented to interfere with an industry that they claim is causing damage to them. The education of the public is just as important as the education of industries.
(Legislative Assembly, 15.11.61:2553)
9 While it might be tempting to attribute the concessions affordedindustry by this approach simply to a Labor Government anxious not threaten the prosperity and employment in its industrial electorates in Newcastle and Wollongong, there is some evidence that the approach had its origins in earlier legislation, both in NSW and in the United States. The Minister for Health in his second reading speech noted that: 'The prime purpose is to educate the people, in the same way as farmers who have problems in soil erosion and other matters are educated by the Department of Agriculture.' and that:
The authorities in Pittsburgh have not found it necessary to resort to prosecution; they have deliberately asked for co-operation, especially from the steel industry, which burns coal. 1 widerstand that prior to the introduction of the legislation there the air pollution was almost insufferable, and 1 was told by people outside the industries concerned that it was most remarkable that the Act, which provided penalties for offences, had been so successful without the authorities' resorting to prosecutions.
(Legislative Assembly, 15.11.61:2552)
[Appendix B4.9]
The inference that the cooperative approach of the Clean Air Act had its origins more in legislative antecedents than in concerns about electoral unpopularity in the industrial areas is also supported by the second reading speech by the member for Wollongong-Port Kembla, who made it quite clear that industry could not rely on its economic importance to the region to gain it exemption from the Act (Legislative Assembly, 17.11.61:2660).
As with some of the subsequent environmental legislation in 1970, the Clean Air Act ,in establishing a central authority to deal with air pollution, inevitably reduced some powers that had previously been held by local government. While the Minister for Health was at pains in his second reading speech to emphasise that 'the Government has no wish to detract in any way from the standing of local government in the eyes of the community' (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.61:2546), it is quite clear from other speakers that there was some dissatisfaction with what was perceived as over-zealous pursuit by local government officers of smoke nuisances under the Smoke Abatement Act of 1902. The industry most affected by this was the brick-making industry which, through the Clay Products Association supported the Clean Air Act because, in repealing the Smoke Nuisance Abatement Act, it provided the industry with the opportunity to escape the attentions of local government (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.61:2550; 17.11.61:2661, 2663). The fact that some local councils may have been vigorously attempting to reduce air pollution with the institutional means at their disposal (viz. the Smoke Nuisance Abatement Act 1902, the Public Health Act 1902, the Local Government Act 1919, the Maritime Service Act 1935, and the Motor Traffic Act 1909 — Coward, 1988:267) appears to have escaped the notice of the Smoke Abatement Committee, which concluded:
These provisions have been in force for many years but have done little to control pollution. Legal proceedings for offences have been comparatively few and in the majority of cases the results have been disappointing.
(cited by Coward, 1988:267)
Finally, it should be noted that, while the Clean Air Act was passed before the emergence of modern environmentalism, this is not to say that no modem environmental concepts were mentioned in debate in the Legislative Assembly. The comments of the member for Wollongong-Kembla in November 1961 would not be out of place in the
[Appendix B4.10]
...since the industrial revolution, the advent of the steam engine and the use of metallurgical coke, the combustion of coal, with the resultant release into the atmosphere of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, still largely unabsorbed, has created a blanket around the earth. There are well-established scientific means of proving that the recent successive rises in the average seasonal temperature of the earth are leading to a progressive raising of the level of the sea.
(Legislative Assembly, 17.11.61:2657)
13 The concepts of stewardship of nature and duties to future generations, which were part of ideas of the USA conservation movement in the late 19th and early 20th century, were alluded to in the Legislative Council debate on the Clean Air Bill.
Indeed, of all these million species of animals that exist upon the face of the earth, we, the humans, are the only ones who recklessly squander the natural gifts that we have been given, to the detriment of the rest of the creatures that have been given life by God. It is we who are responsible, as human beings, for the necessity of a measure such as we have before us tonight.
...[air pollution] is due to man's ignorance and failure to realise that he owes a duty to his fellow men and future generations. After all, he is only a link in the great chain of society that has existed from the beginning of time.
(Legislative Council, 23.11.61:2898-2899)
B4.5 The Water Pollution Bill 1969
1 During the period from June 1966 till March 1969 in which the Water Pollution Bill was in preparation, some concerns were being expressed as to the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act. While the Clean Air Act had been given assent in 1961, the regulations drafted by the Air Pollution Advisory Committee were not proclaimed until 1964, and the emission standards for scheduled premises came into effect in 1965, while those for unscheduled premises came into effect in 1966 (Butlin, 1976:21). Given the relationship in time between the operation of the Clean Air Act and the drafting of the Water Pollution Bill, the possibility existed for the lessons learnt from the former to shape the latter. In addition, there were institutional arrangements already in existence for dealing with water pollution under the Local Government Act 1919 and the Maritime Services Act 1935, and a similar possibility existed for
[Appendix B4.11]
experience under existing institutional arrangements to influence the Water Pollution Bill. The remainder of this section surveys some of the problems with the implementation of pollution legislation that were discussed in the Legislative Assembly during the period the Water Pollution Bill was being drafted.
The long running dispute between the Parramatta and Auburn Councils in the 1960s over the impacts on the residents of the former by the Duck Creek tips operated by the latter demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining cooperation in the face of local government intransigence. Requests by the Parramatta Council, meetings between health inspectors and mayors of the two councils, and petitions by residents during 1961 resulted in minimal action by Auburn Council. Legal action was commenced in late 1961 by Parramatta Council, but this was abandoned due to legal difficulties and some undertakings made by Auburn Council (Legislative Assembly, 6.3.63:3143-3144). In 1963, the Minister for Local Government and Highways, in an adjournment debate initiated by the member for Granville and ex-mayor of Parramatta, gave an undertaking to have the matter investigated and the dispute resolved (Legislative Assembly, 6.3.63:3144). One year later, in response to a question from the member for Granville, the Minister reported that he had not yet received a report from the officer of the Department of Local Government who made the investigation, that it was not possible for the Parramatta Council to take action against the Auburn Council under the Local Government Act, rather action was only possible under common law, and that the Department was asking the Auburn Council to 'do everything possible to mitigate this nuisance' (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.64:7723-7724). Two years later, after the change of government, the member for Granville was again requesting an investigation and the closing down of the Auburn Council tips (Legislative Assembly, 9.3.66:4017). The Minister informed the Legislative Assembly later in March 1966 that, under section 283 of the Local Government Act 1919, local governments had the power to operate garbage tips, although they were required to obtain the approval of the Minister for Health to establish a new tip. Further, the Minister for Local Government had no power to direct councils how to operate tips under their control, nor the power to take action against councils who failed to operate tips in a 'proper' manner. Such powers lay with the Department of Health which had inspected the Auburn tips and concluded that fire outbreaks
[Appendix B4.12]
had been smothered promptly and that the tips were operated satisfactorily (Legislative Assembly, 30.3.66:4857).
3 While the air pollution from the Auburn Council tips was not raised again in the Legislative Assembly, suggesting that the member for Granville may have finally obtained the relief he sought, there is some evidence that the poor landfill management of the Auburn Council continued, if not at Duck Creek, then certainly at its industrial waste tip, which was inspected in 1970 by A.E. Barton, a United Kingdom waste management expert, in the course of his investigation of waste management in the Sydney region, undertaken at the request of the NSW Government. Barton reported:
This [the Auburn Council tip] is a trade waste tip and one would have to go a long way to find a tip in a worse condition. It is grossly on fire adjacent to Haslam's Creek, which is black in colour and no doubt derived some of it from this site. The smoke from the fires travels a considerable distance and it is difficult to understand how a local council can allow a tip to get into its present condition... the attendant at the site says the council Public Health Inspector calls regularly, and once again it is difficult to see what is the purpose of this visit if the council allows the appalling state of affairs at the site to continue.
(Barton, 1970:15)
4 The member for Granville had also drawn attention to the water pollution caused by the Duck Creek tips (Legislative Assembly, 7.9.65:426), and in March 1966, the Minister for Local Government announced that the penalty for pollution of water courses under Ordinance 37 of the Local Government Act had been increased from $100 to $200 (Legislative Assembly, 30.3.66:4857). In September 1966, the member for Granville was again questioning the Minister for Local Government and Highways about water pollution in Parramatta River (into which Duck Creek flowed), to be told by the Minister that the Government was concerned about water pollution and the fragmentation of responsibility for its control and the situation would be improved by the establishment of a Water Pollution Advisory Committee under the Water Pollution Bill (Legislative Assembly, 28.9.66:1243-1254; 4.10.66:1416).
5 In August 1967, the member for Granville was again criticising the government for the lack of effective measures against water pollution, and exhorting the drafters of the Water Pollution Bill to beware of the
[Appendix B4.13]
possibilities of local agency capture, to ensure that, when enacted, it would not fall behind as new pollutants were created by industry (a problem that the member for Granville claimed was occurring with the Clean Air Act), and to ensure that penalties were sufficiently severe to serve as a deterrent:
On one occasion I heard a company director point out that rather than spend $100,000 or $120,000 on drainage, it would be far better to pay the fines imposed for discharging waste into the river. He said that he spent more on morning tea in a week that it would cost him in fines... M y concern with this legislation [the Water Pollution Bill! is that we should be aware of all these problems when this matter is being discussed.
(Legislative Assembly, 3.8.67:153-154)
In August 1968, there was further suggestion that the Clean Air Act did not have sufficient 'teeth' to deal with air pollution in the western Sydney region (Legislative Assembly, 15.8.68:281). In March 1969, the Minister for Health reported in answer to a question that, since the penalty provisions of the Clean Air Act had come into force at the commencement of 1965, one prosecution had been made under the Act and it had been successful (Legislative Assembly, 4.3.69:4115).
On the same day, the Labor member for Maroubra moved that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the control o f' air, river and foreshore pollution and noise nuisance'. The member for Maroubra claimed that the inquiry was needed because the control of pollution in the State was inadequate and went on to cite the 1968 report of the Air Pollution Advisory Committee which alluded to 'disturbingly high' sulphur dioxide levels in the locality of an oil refinery at Matraville. These levels were due, the member for Maroubra claimed, to the companies failure to carry out an order that had been issued under the Clean Air Act, and the failure of the Department of Health to prosecute. The member for Maroubra also claimed that he had been denied access to Departmental files to establish whether the company had been granted an exemption (which power was held by the Minister for Health under the Clean Air Act) (Legislative Assembly, 4.3.69:4127-4129). The Minister for Health replied that Matraville was an isolated case, that the member for Maroubra had not followed the proper procedures in approaching the Department of Health, and that he (the Minister) did not, his Labor predecessor did not, consider it proper to intervene in the
[Appendix B4.14J
work of the Air Pollution Advisory Committee (Legislative Assembly, 4.3.69:4134-4135).
8 In the course of further comment on the adequacy of pollution control generally, the Minister raised a number of difficulties that caused the progress in reducing air pollution to be less than ideal. Firstly, it was thought that, because of legal problems, negotiation in the shadow of prosecution was more effective than prosecution.
In general terms, negotiation rather than prosecution leads to better and quicker results. There are highly technical questions involved. The onus of proof in a highly technical field can be difficult to discharge, and legal action could delay decisions for a considerable time. It could take years to fight a case and it could prove most expensive in time and money.
(Legislative Assembly, 4.3.69:4136)
9 Secondly, the Government was itself a polluter through its operation of power stations. Retrofitting the older power stations with emission control devices was costly and the Government preferred to decommission the older power stations while it built new ones further away from Sydney and with emission control integrated into the design. This meant the Government was then exposed to criticism from industry on moral grounds that it was not, as it were, practicing what it preached.
10 Also, it appears the Minister for Health recognised that any expectations, such as those expressed by his Labor predecessor in the debate on the Clean Air Bill in 1961, that air pollution control would simply be a technical matter resolved by a committee of technical experts (Legislative Assembly, 21.11.61:2754, 2756) were largely wishful thinking, with the reality of the Air Pollution Advisory Committee's task being largely a political exercise in balancing the interests of various groups (Legislative Assembly, 4.3.69:4138).
11 The Minister had no illusions as to the difficulty of this task in the case of water pollution:
In administering the legislation [the Water Pollution Bill in preparation! the Department of Public Health will take on an extremely difficult task to which we do not look forward. We have no wish to administer the legislation and have not sought the job.
[Appendix B4.15]
(Legislative Assembly, 4.3.69:4141)
Against the difficulties described above should be set the achievements of the Clean Air Act. The Annual Report of the Clean Air Advisory Committee for 1968 recorded that $40 million had been spend on air pollution control equipment in New South Wales in the preceding five years, and that there had been improvements in air quality in some industrial areas.
This was despite, as shown for the period in figure B4.1, the relatively large number of exemptions compared to directions to abate air pollution and prosecutions for failure to obey a direction.
The committee that assisted in the drafting of the Water Pollution Bill included four officers from the Department of Health, and senior representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Decentralisation and Development, Conservation, Lands, Local Government, Mines and Public Works. There were also representatives of the Chief Secretary's Department, the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, the Hunter District Water Board and the Maritime Services Board (Legislative Assembly, 2.4.69:5503).
The Bill was to establish a Water Pollution Advisory Committee reporting to the Minister for Health. This Committee was to consist of representatives of the Chief Secretary's Department, the Department of Public Works, the Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission, the Maritime Services Board, the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, the Local Government Association and the Shires Association. Representatives of primary and secondary industry were included as were two persons with technical qualifications (Legislative
[Appendix B4.16]
Figure B4.1: Exemptions, directions and prosecutions between 1965-66 and 1973-74 underthe Clean Air Act. (From Air Pollution Advisory Committee Annual Reports, compiled by Butlin (1976:225))
40 t
Directions35 --
30 --
25 --Number
peryear
20 - -
Exemptions
10 =- Prosecutions
71 /72 73 /7465 /66 67 /68 69/70
Assembly, 2.4.69:5505-5506). The drafting committee had recommended a commission rather than an advisory committee, but the Government, perhaps with an eye to ensuring that political considerations could be accommodated in pollution control decisions, opted for an advisory committee (Legislative Assembly, 2.4.69:5504).
16 As with the Clean Air Act, a system of licences was involved, but rather than relying solely on definitions of the types of premises that would require licences, the Water Pollution Bill allowed for waterways to be classified into various categories, with licences required to discharge effluent into classified waters. It seems that the Government was well aware of the time required to classify waterways, as the Minister for Health in his second reading speech specifically mentioned that it had taken New Zealand 15 years to classify 11 waterways. This problem did indeed recur in New South Wales, as by 1979, only the Georges and Cooks Rivers and the Alexandra Canal had been classified and the State Pollution Control Commission was claiming the system was unworkable (Beder, 1989:29).
[Appendix B4.17]
17 The Water Pollution Bill was also to follow the cooperative approach of the Clean Air Act.
It is important that everybody should co-operate to overcome pollution.Little will be achieved by the mere passing of legislation. It will be necessary to educate and to encourage people to give the maximum cooperation with the authorities in this matter.
(Legislative Assembly, 2.4.69:5505)
18 In the first and second reading debates, members on both sides of the House were quick to show that they were cognisant of at least some of the lessons that had been learnt from the Clean Air Act. The Liberal member for The Hills, Mr Ruddock, who had spoken frequently in debates on environmental matters in previous years, pointed out it would be necessary for the legislation to apply to the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, which was a major polluter of waterways and beaches (Legislative Assembly, 27.3.69:5254-5255). The member for Granville expressed concern that the legislation would be ineffective unless enforced with greater purpose than was currently the case with section 37 of the Local Government Act where, he claimed, major industry polluters were avoiding their responsibilities by applying for extensions of time from the Parramatta Council (Legislative Assembly, 27.3.69:5255). Another Labor member stated that the Clean Air Act had not been effective because of the lack of 'teeth' of the Air Pollution Advisory Committee (Legislative Assembly, 27.3.69:5254).
B4.6 The Clean Waters Act 1970
1 The Clean Waters Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 27 October 1970, a period of eighteen months after the second reading debate on the Water Pollution Bill. The main features of an advisory committee and classification of waters remained essentially unchanged. According to the Minister for Health, the reason for retaining an advisory committee, rather than establishing a statutory authority was that it would have required further consideration and water pollution was of such 'transcending importance that we should proceed without delay' (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7372). Another reason for haste that may also have been of 'transcending importance' was, of course, that an election was due in next year, as the Opposition suggested (Legislative Assembly, 5.11.70:7439). This was not the only evidence
[Appendix B4.18]
that Cabinet may have imposed pragmatic or political considerations on the Act. In the second reading debate, a member of the Opposition implied that the Minister's personal preference was for a statutory authority, but he had been over-ridden by Cabinet (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7377).
The reasons for the retention of the system of classification of waters is not at all clear. As mentioned above, the Minister for Health had shown he was aware of the length of time taken to classify waters in New Zealand when he introduced the legislation in 1969. Perhaps this was seen as a positive feature by Cabinet, insofar as the slow progress would give time for industry to adjust — an approach that had been a feature of the Clean Air Act. What is more surprising, is that the Minister for Health, in the face of criticism by the Opposition that the classification system would be ineffective, seemed to admit quite readily that this was the case. A member of the Opposition quoted from a scientific paper from Australian Chemical Processing and Engineering that Australian river systems had a generally low capacity for the dispersion of pollutants, and went on to argue:
This is why our Australian [river] system is so different from the New Zealand system. New Zealand has a vast volume of water in its rivers, and the classification of waters based on a New Zealand system would not be effective in New South Wales.
At this point (assuming that the identity of the interjector was not erroneously reported in Hansard) the Minister for Health interjected that 'It is not effective over there' (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7378). Despite this negative assessment, the Minister for Health stated in the same debate that he expected the classification of NSW water would be completed 'certainly within five years' (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7368).
The main changes that had been made to the Water Pollution Bill were:
• the name change to avoid the Act being seen as 'an Act authorising the pollution of water' (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7362),
• the advisory committee was expanded from twelve to sixteen members by the addition of representatives of the Hunter
[Appendix B4.19]
District Water Board, the State Planning Authority, and conservation and recreation interests (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7362),
• the Clean Waters Act specifically stated it would not affect the provisions or powers under any other Act (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7362),
• where disputes arose between the Department of Health administering the Clean Waters Act and other Government departments, these would be referred to the Premier for resolution (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7362),
• the body to whom decisions under the Act would be appealed was changed from the District Court to an appeals board (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7362-7363), and
• the maximum penalty for an offence and the maximum penalty for a continuing offence were increased fivefold to$10 000 and $5000 per day, respectively (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7365).
As for the Water Pollution Bill, the Minister for Health had the power to grant exemptions and the duties of the Clean Waters Advisory Committee were to advise on the classification of waters, to recommend regulations and changes to regulations and to make recommendations for the control of pollution (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7369). In describing the Act, the Minister for Health specifically acknowledged a debt to United States federal legislation for the cooperative approach, to Scottish legislation for the system of licences and to New Zealand for the system of classification of waters (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7368- 7369). The similarities with the Clean Air Act were alluded to by members from both sides of the House, both positively by the Minister as an example of successful legislation, and negatively by the Opposition as an example of ineffective legislation (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7363, 7372; 5.11.70:7434, 7437; 10.11.70:7521, 7533).
Of the various pollution control issues raised in the Legislative Assembly in the period between when the Clean Air Act became operational and the Clean Waters Bill was introduced (see section B4.5,
[Appendix B4.20]
above), there are three that appear to have been purposefully accommodated by the Bill. Firstly, the need for penalties to be sufficiently substantial to rule out noncompliance as a financially attractive option for industry was acknowledged in the five fold increase in penalties.
Secondly, the fear of delay due to legal obfuscation over scientific uncertainties was reflected in appeals being handled by an appeals board rather than by a court. In the Committee stage, the Minister for Health was quite emphatic in the face of amendments suggested by the Opposition.
His [the member for Canterbury] plan would remove any limit on court hearings in respect of the tremendously complex matters that could arise following breaches of this law [the Clean Waters Act]. Many differences of opinion could arise over classification of waters. It is only reasonable and equitable that these matters be dealt with promptly.
The last thing in the world the Government would want in bringing forward this important measure is the procedure contained in the foreshadowed amendment [by the member for Canterbury], which would require a justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to deal in a legal sense with something that is very much a practical problem.The opinions of experts and assessors of various kinds could shroud decisions with complexity and introduce an element of delay that would be undesirable.
(Legislative Assembly, 11.11.70:7644)
It should also be noted here that Government members' misgivings about the role of science in policy making went beyond the delays it might cause in the legal system. Several Government member in the Legislative Council accused technical experts as being unable to make decisions on the one hand, and making politically impractical decisions on the other.
Personally I cannot place a great deal of confidence in them [technical experts]... The composition of the committee contemplated [the Clean Waters Advisory Committee] should be such that it includes ordinary businessmen and members of the public. They are the people who get things done — not the experts.
Experts talk and talk, pass the buck and twist things about, looking at one another to see who is agreeing. Men from the trade unions, or management or the public get things done. They are not frightened to draw public attention to matters that will not be tolerated.
(Legislative Council, 24.11.70:8176)
[Appendix B4.21]
and
The Hon. N.K. Wran proposed what really amounts to a dictatorship of scientists who would say to all concerned: 'There is no argument about it. Stop polluting at once.'
(Legislative Council, 24.11.70:8183)
Thirdly, the idea that pollution problems had been caused by fragmented responsibility was repeatedly mentioned in debate as a justification for the formation of the Clean Waters Advisory Committee as a central authority. The idea of a central authority formed a persistent thread in the debates in the Legislative Assembly during the passage of the Bill, although the precise definition of what constituted a central authority was not clearly articulated. Authoritative sources that favoured a central authority that were mentioned in debate included the 1966 report of an expert committee of the World Health Organisation and the Commonwealth's Senate Select Committee on Water Pollution (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7364; 5.11.70:7439). While there was agreement on both sides of politics on the need for a central authority, the two sides differed on whether the Clean Waters Advisory Committee represented a central authority with the necessary powers to overcome water pollution problems. The Clean Waters Advisory Committee was considered to be the required central authority by the Government which, as mentioned above, supported its stance by reference both to the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act and to expert opinion in Australia and overseas.
The Opposition argued that the 16 member Committee, variously described by the member for Georges River as 'an advisory committee with fairy floss powers', a 'set of sixteen sinecures with a built-in guarantee of ineffectiveness' and a 'regular rogues' gallery of polluters' was simply a repetition of the diffusion and fragmentation of powers that was currently believed to be causing water pollution problems. The Opposition proposed as an amendment in the Committee stage of the passage of the Bill, a five member Authority with a majority of technical experts (Legislative Assembly, 10.11.70:7531).
The Opposition's reservations about the large Advisory Committee and its composition revolved around:
[Appendix B4.22]
• the representation of polluters on the Committee, in particular large Government polluters like the Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, the Department of Public Works and the Maritime Services Board (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7373; 5.11.70:7437; 10.11.70:7531-7532),
• the likelihood that representatives of government departments on the Committee would allow their departments' needs to override the need for the control of pollution (Legislative Assembly, 11.11.70:7638),
• • the lack of technical expertise on the Committee (Legislative Assembly, 4.11.70:7377; 5.11.70:7429),
• the representation of polluters and 'anti-polluters' on the Committee which would result in conflict-ridden and ineffective meetings (Legislative Assembly 10.11.70:7537), and
• the presence of civil and mechanical engineers (perceived as responsible for pollution) on the Committee rather than people with technical expertise in biology, zoology, oceanography, and chemical engineering (perceived as being able to solve the pollution problems) (Legislative Assembly, 11.11.70:7639).
12 The Opposition not only proposed a smaller Advisory Committee, but also proposed that the Committee should in due course become part of an environmental authority (Legislative Assembly, 10.11.70:7530) responsible for controlling all forms of pollution, thus strengthening the centralisation of pollution control.
B4.7 The State Pollution Control Commission Act 1970
1 In the debates following the introduction of the State Pollution Control Commission Bill in the Legislative Assembly on19 November 1970, members made frequent references to the growing seriousness of environmental problems. The sources that members of the two Houses cited as evidence included:
[Appendix B4.23]
President Nixon's speech to Congress in February 1970 that announced a range of legislative proposals against pollution in that country (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8255),
discussion of the seriousness of environmental problems in the twenty third and twenty fourth sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the latter session resolving to hold a United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8255),
the Senate Select Committees on air and water pollution (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8256)
Some examples of how the seriousness of environmental problems were represented follow.
Premier Askin introducing the SPCC Bill in the Legislative Assembly:
As honourable members know, there has become evident throughout the western world recently a growing awareness of the serious problems posed by the contamination of the environment from a number of sources.
(Legislative Assembly, 19.11.70:8093)
Premier Askin in his second reading speech in the Legislative Assembly:
...it is true to say that in recent years it has become apparent that the problems of environment pollution are growing both in size and complexity and there are persons who say that pollution, if left unchecked, will not only affect our health, our comfort and our well-being but will indeed threaten the continued existence of the human species.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8257)
The Hon. C.J. Cahill (Labor) in the Legislative Council:
The problem of pollution is so big that there must be one fundamental coordinating committee.
(Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8326)
The Minister for Decentralisation and Development (J.B.M. Fuller) in the Legislative Assembly:
[Appendix B4.24]
1 look forward to the creation of this commission so that it can get down to work and control what is probably the world's greatest problem.
(Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8332)
7 Given these perceptions of dire threat, it is not surprising that the role of the SPCC was described in almost militaristic terms. The SPCC was to:
... be first and foremost a co-ordination and supervisory body oriented towards management. For this reason, it is not proposed that it take over the day-to-day activities of the specialist authorities referred to above [the existing Air Pollution Control Branch within the Department of Public Health and the branch to administer the Clean Waters Act to be set up within the same Department] which will be the front rank force in the fight against pollution.
(Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8317)
8 The SPCC was to supervise the implementation of environmental legislation, or environmental provisions within other legislation by government departments, other state instrumentalities and local government. In this way, the SPCC was expected to be able to assess the effectiveness of existing legislation and make recommendations to the Government for changes in policy. The SPCC was also intended to act as a technical advisory service to State departments, local government and industry (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8259).
9 The SPCC was to consist of twelve commissioners. Three were specified directly: the Under Secretaries of the Departments of Public Health and of Local Government, and the President of the MWSDB. The remaining nine were to be appointed by the Governor-in-Council on the recommendation of the Premier (as Minister administering the State Pollution Control Commission Act — Legislative Council,25.11.70:8317). They included a chairman, a director, two commissioners selected from panels submitted by the Local Government and Shires Associations of New South Wales, and five commissioners to represent primary industry, secondary industry, commerce, conservation and recreation (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8260).
10 The SPCC was to have the power to carry out planning, monitoring and research activities into the cause, nature and extent of pollution and to set environmental standards. It had the power to direct government departments and local government to carry out their statutory powers.
[Appendix B4.25]
As in the Clean Waters Act, the Premier was to settle disputes between Government departments or instrumentalities (Legislative Assembly, 24 .11 .70:8260- 8261).
In contrast to the Advisory Committees under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Waters Act, the Commissioners of the SPCC did not include technical experts. Instead, these were represented on the Technical Advisory Committee to the Commission. The Technical Advisory Committee comprised the Director of the SPCC as chairman and officers appointed by the Premier from each of the Chief Secretaries Department (which administered fisheries matters), the National Parks and Wildlife Service, and the Departments of Agriculture, Decentralisation and Development, Motor Transport, Public Health, Public Works, together with one officer from any of the Department of Conservation, the Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission, the Forestry Commission or the Soil Conservation Service. The remaining eight members of the Technical Advisory Committee were to be representatives of the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority (to be formed by legislation to be introduced after the State Pollution Commission Control Bill), the MWDSB, the Maritime Services Board, the State Planning Authority, a person holding a health inspector's certificate and three other members with technical expertise as considered appropriate by the Premier. The Technical Advisory Committee was to inquire into, and report on, matters referred to it by the Commission (Legislative Assembly, 24 .11 .70:8262).
The Government in both Houses was at pains to stress the co-ordination and integration that was to be achieved by the Commission, to the extent of having a chart prepared and circulated to all members. After going through the environmental responsibilities of a long list of government departments, a Government member of the Legislative Assembly went on to say:
This may seem at a glance to be a dissipation of authority. ... I should like members to have copies of this co-ordination table [see figure B4.2, belowj. I believe that, having seen it, they will get the whole picture in perspective and will see t hat there is a clear co-ordinated plan to deal with the total pollution problem in the State. The co-ordination table is a blueprint for what is actually happening.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8270)
[Appendix B4.26]
Subsequently, he summarised his speech as showing:
. . that the series of steps that may well have appeared to have been isolated in themselves, are linked together. It may now be clearly seen that they are integrated and that this governments vigorously attackmg the problem ...
(Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8272)
And in Legislative Council:
Because of the difficulties associated with understanding the Government's approach 1 have tonight displayed a chart so that honourable members may integrate the various activities envisaged by the new legislation. The Government has planned an all out attack on pollution problems in New South Wales.
(Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8322)
The task for the Government of defending the structure of the SPCC against the criticism of the Opposition was not an easy one. Given that the Government had justified the legislation, at least partly, in terms of the need for 'a co-ordinated and vigorous attack on pollution in all its forms', and given the Opposition's stance that a single authority was needed, the Government had to show that the co-ordinated and vigorous attack was more likely to be achieved with an administrative structure that was sufficiently complicated to require a chart to be comprehended, than with Labor's single authority. This it did by arguing that it had considered a range of structures, including a single authority, and that:
. . . any attempt to remove all existing anti-pollution measures — which have been in operation for some years — from their present location in government, merely for the purpose of centralizing such activities in the one cumbersome agency, would be a disruptive move and that it could well create more problems than it solved. The action eventually decided upon by the Government... is considered at this point in time to be the most practical method of approach.
(Legislative Assembly, 1970:8263)
[Appendix B4.27]
Figure B4.2: 'Co-ordination table' showing role of the State Pollution Control Commission (Source: Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8315).
[Appendix B4.28]
The Government did not, however, insist that its reasons were likely to remain valid indefinitely into the future. Rather it suggested that, in the long term, 'the State Pollution Control Commission will eventually emerge as the body having the day-to-day responsibility in this [environment protection] field' (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8264).
In respect of the question of the desirable degree of centralisation of authority, and in many other respects, the debate in both Houses was as though it was following the script already provided by the debate on the Clean Waters Bill. For example, the Opposition questioned the ability of the representatives of government departments and instrumentalities on both the Commission and the Technical Advisory Committee to divorce themselves from the priorities of their own departments, some of which were responsible for substantial pollution (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8272; Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8322). The Opposition's fears appear to have been borne out by the subsequent experience of the Technical Advisory Committee. According to an interviewee, an academic who had served on the Committee in its first few years as one of the three members with relevant technical expertise, the representatives of the government departments were at first at first extremely protective of their departments' interests and unwilling to support policy initiatives that might impact on their departments. According to this interviewee, they became less defensive after a few years on the Committee and he attributed this to the skilled chairmanship of Eric Coffey, the first director of the SPCC, in encouraging the representatives to work as a group.
The question of the adequacy of penalties was also raised by the Opposition (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.70:8276), as was the Opposition's view that pollution control was a technical matter rather than a political one (Legislative Assembly, 19.11.70:8096).
One departure from the script, as it were, was the incisive criticism from a new arrival in the Legislative Council, the Honourable Neville Wran Q.C.. Whereas much of the debate on the Clean Waters Bill and the State Pollution Control Commission Bill over the issues of centralisation of authority, adequacy of penalties and the objectivity of committees was conducted in terms of vague generalisations, Wran presented
[Appendix B4.29]
somewhat more carefully articulated criticisms of the Bill. For example, he argued that the Opposition was not supporting a central authority for centralisation's sake, but for reasons of administrative efficiency and effectiveness (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8322). Rather than simply casting doubt on the objectivity of committee members as previous Opposition members had done in criticising the Clean Waters Bill and the State Pollution Control Commission Bill, Wran pointed out the significant procedural weakness in the latter Bill. This was the requirement for the State Pollution Control Commission to have a recommendation from, or the concurrence of, the Technical Advisory Committee before it could direct a public authority to take action against pollution, this power to direct being the primary means by which it was anticipated the Commission could bring about a reduction in pollution (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8323). Wran was also careful to draw the distinction between clauses in the Bill that were general statements of policy, and clauses that actually conferred powers on the Commission, arguing that the Bill contained too many of the former and too few of the latter (Legislative Council, 25.11.70:8323).
APPENDIX B5
The Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority
Directors, Powers, and Objectives
According to the Herald, the MWDA was not to be set up until a director could be appointed (SMH, 20.4.71:13). The membership of the MWDA Board comprised its director, R. Connolly, deputy director A.G. Forrester, engineer from Ryde Council. Industry representatives were R.B. Raines, chartered accountant andA.V. Sinclair, consultant. Local government representatives were R.S. Luke, of Mosman Council, and J.F Carr of Marrickville Council who was also the president of the Local Government Association (MWDA, 1971- 72:1). Richard Conolly had a background in management and planning in local government, having been Town Clerk of Willoughby Council and managed several electricity county councils.
In November 1971, the Mayor of Strathfield complained that State Government was not contributing to the cost of the Authority (SMH, 13.11.71:8).
Three of the board members of the WMA continued as members of the board of WRAPS (WRAPS, 1991-92:5).
The mission and objectives of the WRAPS were reviewed in 1992-93, as shown in table B5.1, Tn anticipation of an increasingly competitive climate and ambitious waste reduction targets' (WRAPS, 1992-93:6).
The Waste Service took its first waste activist as a Board Member with the appointment of John Denlay to the Board in July 1995 (WRAPS, 1994-95:5).
[Appendix B5.2]
T a b l e B5.1: Com parison of the MW DA's and WRAPS's stated mission and objectives in 1977-78 (the first year in which it made such a statem ent in its A nnual Report), 1987- 88,1988-89 and 1992-93 (source, MWDA, 1977-78:2; 1987-88:12-16;1988-89:7; WRAPS, 1992-93:4).
M W D A
1 9 7 7 - 7 8
M W D A
1 9 8 7 - 8 8
M W D A
1 9 8 8 - 8 9
W R A P S
1 9 9 2 - 9 3
T h e W a s te D isp o sa l A c t c o n fe rs a n d im p o s e s on th e A u t h o r i t y 'r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s , p o w e r s , a u th o r i t ie s , d u t ie s a n d f u n c t i o n s w i th r e s p e c t to th e tr a n s p o r t , c o lle c tio n , r e c e p tio n , tr e a tm e n t , s to ra g e a n d d isp o sa l o f w a s te w i th in th e M e tr o p o l i ta n W a s te D isp o sa l R e g io n ; a n d f o r p u r p o s e s c o n n e c te d th e r e w ith '.
T h e A u t h o r i t y 's c h a r te r is to p r o te c t th e c o m m u n i t y 's h e a lth a n d e n v i r o n m e n t b y e n s u r in g th a t w a s te g e n e r a te d in th e S y d n e y r e g io n is s to r e d , co lle c ted , tr a n s p o r te d a n d d is p o s e d o f in a n e f f ic ie n t a n d e n v i r o n m e n ta l l y a ccep ta b le m a n n e r .
T h e A u t h o r i t y 's m is s io n is to e n c o u ra g e th e m in im is a t io n , r e c y c l in g a n d m a te r ia ls r e c o v e r y o f so lid a n d in d u s tr ia l l iq u id w a s te , to c o n tro l th e s to ra g e , c o lle c tio n , tr a n s p o r ta t io n a n d t r e a tm e n t o f w a s te a n d to e n s u r e th a t th e r e s id u a l w a s te is m a n a g e d a n d d isp o se d o f in a ne n v i r o n m e n ta l ly s o u n d m a n n e r .
T o p r o v id e o u r c u s to m e r s w i th a Q u a l i t y w a s te m a n a g e m e n t s e rv ic e w h ic h is s o c ia lly , e n v i r o n m e n ta l l y a n d f i n a n c ia l l y r e s p o n s ib le .
O b j e c t i v e s
T o p r o g r e s s iv e ly im p r o v e th e s ta n d a r d s o f tr a n s p o r ta t io n a n d d isp o sa l o f w a s te .
T o p r o g r e s s iv e ly im p r o v e th e e n v ir o n m e n ta l s ta n d a r d s o f w a s te m a n a g e m e n t a n d e n c o u ra g e w a s te m in im is a t io n .
T o m in im is e w a s te g e n e r a tio n b y b e s t p ra c tic a b le m e a n s .
T o p r o v id e in te g r a te d s o l id w a s tem a n a g e m e n t fa c i l i t ie s .
T o p r o v id e s u i ta b le w a s te d isp o sa l fa c i l i t ie s f o r th e R e g io n a t m in im u m co s t to th e c o m m u n i ty as a w h o le .
T o m a in ta in a n d e f f ic ie n t a n d f i n a n c ia l l y s e lf- s u p p o r t in g o p e ra tio n
T o in c re a se r e c y c l in g to o p t im a l le v e ls .
T o p r o v id e sa fe liq u id w a s te t r e a tm e n t a n d d is p o s a l fa c i l i t ie s .
T o in c o rp o ra te r e c y c l in g a n d re so u rc e re c o v e r y s y s te m s as th e y b eco m e te c h n ic a l ly a n d e c o n o m ic a lly fea s ib le .
T o p r o m o te a w a re n e s s o f th e n e e d fo r r e s p o n s ib le w a s te m a n a g e m e n t w i th in th e c o m m u n i ty .
T o d e v e lo p fa c i l i t ie s f o r th e r e c o v e r y o f m a te r ia ls a n d e n e r g y f r o m w a s te s w h e re te c h n ic a l ly a n d e c o n o m ic a lly fea s ib le .
T o p r o v id e sa fe tr e a tm e n t fa c i l i t i e s fo r s c h e d u le d w a s te s .
T o d e v e lo p a so lid w a s te m a n a g e m e n t s y s te m w i th in - b u i l t f l e x i b i l i t y to ca ter fo r a b re a k -d o w n in a n y p a r t o f th e s y s te m a n d to a l lo w f o r th e in t r o d u c t io n o f im p r o v e d p ro c e s s in g te c h n o lo g y .
To d e v e lo p a n d m a in ta in a s t a f f w i th c o m m i tm e n t , e x p e r ie n c e a n d e x p e r t is e in w a s te m a n a g e m e n t a n d i ts a d m in is t r a t io n .
T o s e t a n d en fo rce s ta n d a r d s f o r th e e n v ir o n m e n ta l ly s o u n d s to ra g e , c o lle c tio n , a n d tr a n s p o r ta t io n o f w a s te .
T o p r o v id e sp ec ia lise d w a s te m a n a g e m e n t c o n s u l t in g se rv ic e s .
[Appendix B5.3]
Table B5.1 (contd) C om parison of the M W D A 's a n d W RAPS's sta ted m ission an d objectives in 1977-78 (the first y ea r in w h ich it m ade such a s ta tem en t in its A nnual Report), 1987-88,1988-89 an d 1992-93 (source, M W D A , 1977-78:2; 1987- 88:12-16; 1988-89:7; W RAPS, 1992-93:4).
M W D A1977-78
M W D A1987-88
M W D A1988-89
W R A P S1992-93
O b je c t iv e s
The encouragem ent o f recycling o f selected [ in d u s tr ia l l iq u id ] w astes and w aste exchange between com panies to the m a x im u m ex ten t possible.
To ensure that adequate w aste trea tm en t and disposal facilities are provided and operated in an effective, econom ic and en v iro n m en ta lly sound m anner.
To rem ain fin a n c ia lly viable and achieve a com m ercial re tu rn to shareholders.
Collective physical and chemical trea tm en t or the collective sp littin g and dew a tering o f particu lar [in dustria l liq u id ] w astes as appropriate, by technically com peten t com panies.
To recover and u tilise biogas fro m landfill sites.
To develop a total qua lity env iro n m en t w here all s ta ff are em powered and m otiva ted to share the responsib ility fo r Q u a lity , continuous and custom er satisfaction.
The provision o f special trea tm en t facilities fo r oil-based and selected toxic and hazardous wastes.
To m a in ta in the A u th o r ity as an effective, efficient and fin a n c ia lly self- su p p o rtin g operation.
To m ean ing fid ly invo lve the co m m u n ity in p la n n in g and im plem enta tion o f decisions tha t affect them .
The use o f regional landfill depots fo r the acceptance o f liqu id w astes w hich have been satisfactorily treated by the m eans o f the processes ou tlined above.The phasing ou t o f the Castlereagh Regional Liquid W aste D isposal D epot fo r the acceptance o f liqu id w astes and its reten tion on ly fo r special and em ergency conditions.
[Appendix B5.4]
B5.2 Waste Management Planning
B5.2.1 Taking Stock in 1971
1 One of the first tasks the MWDA undertook was to make a survey of the condition and remaining life of existing landfill in the Sydney region (SMH, 13.9.71:2; MWDA, 1971-72:4). The survey was undertaken by Dwyer and Associates and was completed in March 1972 (SMH, 21.3.72:3). It found that there was an 'urgent need for additional land-fill sites' with one third of the 47 landfills expected to be exhausted in the next twelve months (MWDA, 1971-72:5). The main waste problems identified in this preliminary survey were abandoned motor vehicles (65 000 per year in the Sydney region) and used car tyres (1.5 to 2 million per year) and, according to the Herald, some tips were found to be emitting leachates (SMH, 21.3.72:3). The MWDA commissioned two further studies which, together with the Dwyer and Associates study, provided the information base for the development of the Phase I Plan (see section B5.2.2, below) (Butlin, 1976:266).
2 In its first year, the MWDA also looked to the task that was ahead of it (MWDA, 1971-72:12-16). Its departure point for this preliminary assessment of the next 30 years was that, while lack of space would curtail the use of landfill in the future, this method of disposal would be kept in use as long as possible because of the benefits it conferred on the community in the creation of recreational space.
3 The MWDA estimated that by 2000 the population of Sydney would increase from 2.75 million to 5.5 million, the per capita waste generation rate would increase from 0.54 ton/yr to 1.1 ton/yr, resulting in an increase in the total annual generation of waste from 1.5 million tons to 6.0 million tons (MWDA, 1971-72:12). In addition to these projections, the Herald reported that the MWDA had estimated that all the municipal tips in the Sydney region would be full within four years (SMH, 13.9.72:2).
4 Such projections were considered by the MWDA to be good reason to 'embark on a major project to prepare a 30 year Master Plan' to accommodate this increase in waste with 'economies of scale and minimising transport costs' (MWDA, 1971-72:13-14). This early
[Appendix B5.5]
projection exercise introduced the concept of the facilities planning gap, defined as the quantity of waste generated minus the amount recycled and the available disposal capacity. The MWDA annual report then went on to describe the many technical difficulties in predicting the quantities and composition of solid waste. However, the logic of administrative rationalism prevailed, with the MWDA concluding:
Notwithstanding the size of the task ahead the Authority feels confident that, with the guidelines it has already established, it will effectively and efficiently fulfil what must be one of the most important roles in the community today — the improvement of man's environment and thus improvement of the quality of life.
(MWDA, 1971-72:16)
5 Landfill was still nominated as the disposal method of choice although the MWDA's reason for favouring landfill changed from the creation of recreational areas to:
...the most expedient interim method for solid waste disposal as it provides the immediate capability for handling the present developing crisis within the time constraint imposed upon the Authority.
(MWDA, 1972-73:9)
6 The MWDA also observed in this early stocktaking era that growing environmental concern would require more sophisticated waste disposal methods, which would lead to increasing cost. However, the Authority was:
...confident that the planning steps taken to date will provide the best possible base upon which an adequate waste disposal system will develop; a system which will provide economy to the community compatible with maximum environmental control.
(MWDA, 1972-73:14)
B5.2.2 Phase I and Phase II Plans
1 Waste planning was established early in the history of the MWDA. In its first Annual Report in 1972, the Authority announced it was embarking on the preparation of a 30 year Master Plan for the disposal of solid and liquid waste in the Sydney region (MWDA, 1971-72:13). In 1973, the Authority reported it was going to prepare a series of ten year plans as 'the most appropriate way to attempt the preparation of a long term master plan' (MWDA, 1972-73:9).
[Appendix B5.6]
2 In 1974, the Phase I plan was produced, covering the period from 1975 to 1978, inclusive. This was described as 'a logical approach to the rationalisation of the Sydney Region solid waste transportation and disposal system4 * * 7 and involved upgrading some facilities and phasing out others, with little change to the pattern of transport and disposal of industrial and commercial waste by private contractors (MWDA, 1973- 74:7-8). Despite Butlin's assessment that MWDA staff had limited experience in data handling, planning and management, the mathematical simulation he describes that was used to arrive at a least- cost solution for the location of transfer stations and regional landfills appears to have been very sophisticated (Butlin, 1976:267). The plan aimed to ensure councils in each of the MWDA's nine waste regions had access to at least one depot. The tenth regional depot was the Waterloo incinerator. Four transfer stations were to be set up for councils that were too far from regional depots (SMFI, 21.8.74:10). Phase I was, according to the MWDA, completed in1980 (MWDA, 1979-80:4).
3 Butlin's assessment of the Phase I plan in 1975 raised a number of issues which were not to impact on the achievement of that plan as Butlin thought they might, but were nevertheless important in the late 1980s and the 1990s.
The longer term future [of waste management in Sydney] depends on the adoption of radical changes — such as separation and recovery of wastes, incineration and pyrolysis and prevention of waste generation. To have any long-term success, the M.W.D.A. will need to commit considerable resources in this direction. If it is subjected to extensive political intervention, which could warp the short-run solutions, the longer term and much more drastic solutions will be exposed to correspondingly greater jeopardy
(Butlin, 1976:269)
4 The Phase II plan was to be developed during the period that the Phase Iplan was in force, and was to include further investigations into a rangeof large scale options such as incineration, pyrolysis and resourcerecovery. Phase II planning commenced with a study of the northern region of Sydney where the shortage of landfill space was most critical. As a result of the studies conducted, the MWDA concluded that landfill would remain the most economical method of disposal for some time (MWDA, 1974-75:7). This view was expressed again in 1977,1978 (MWDA, 1976-77:5; 1977-78:5). This view that landfill was more
[Appendix B5.7]
economical than recycling or resource recovery continued to be expressed through the late 1970s and most of the 1980s.
In 1979, the Authority revealed that the implementation of Phase II was taking place in two stages. The first stage, to cover the period from 1976 to the early 1980s, involved making the best use of existing landfill capacity within the inner Sydney region, while establishing some new regional landfills in the outer parts. This was regarded as having been well advanced in 1979. The second stage of Phase II was to involve the establishment of a series of transfer stations forming a ring through the inner region of heaviest waste generation. It was envisaged that these transfer stations might include waste processing and resource recovery operations (MWDA, 1978-79:14; 1979-80:18). A detailed review of Phase II plan was commenced in 1980 (MWDA, 1979-80:18). Throughout most of the 1980s, the Authority reaffirmed its commitment to transfer stations in the inner region of Sydney and landfills on the outskirts (MWDA, 1983-84:42; 1984-85:47;1987-88:41; 1988-89:32). It also continued to state that its planning objective was to minimise the costs of waste disposal (see, for example, MWDA, 1986-87:45).
In its 1981 publication commemorating ten years of operations, the MWDA confirmed its commitment to a system of inner transfer stations and large scale landfills on Sydney's outskirts, 'located well distant from urban areas'. The Authority considered that landfill would remain the most economically and technically viable method of disposal until other methods became cheaper and technically feasible (MWDA, 1981:6; MWDA, 1980-81:35). This publication also contained some of the first graphs recording the annual amounts of waste disposed to landfill. These showed that the annual tonnage had increased from 1.5 million tonnes to almost 2 million tonnes in the space of five years, but excited no concern in the accompanying text (MWDA, 1981:11). The Authority pointed to the fact that the extractive industries were constantly creating large holes that could be used for landfills and estimated that such holes could provide for most of Sydney's waste for 30 years to come. With other sites suitable for development as landfills within the Sydney region, the Authority was confident that there would be no shortage of landfill sites in the immediate future (MWDA, 1980-81:48)
[Appendix B5.8]
7 In 1981-82, the Authority noted that some changes had been made to its Phase II plan, necessitated by the failure to establish a regional landfill at Cecil Park (see section B5.3, below) and the decision not to develop a landfill at the Castlereagh Depot (MWDA, 1981-82:24). However, the Authority was still confident that holes created by the extractive industries provided landfill capacity for most of the waste stream for the next 30 years (MWDA, 1981-82:26), although it felt that in the long term the increasing costs of transporting waste from the transfer stations to distant landfills, and 'the growing concern over depletion of resources' would mean that resource recovery would become more important (MWDA, 1981-81:27-28).
8 The graphical projections of landfill capacity in the 1982-83 and 1983-84 Annual Reports showed that by 1986 Sydney would have only two or three years of capacity in hand (MWDA, 1982-83:10;1983- 84:12).
9 Also, between 1984 and 1986, it was projected that three of the Authority's regional landfills would be filled (MWDA, 1983-84:24). A large increase in landfill capacity was projected for 1987, presumably when extensions at the Lucas Heights depot came on stream. The Authority continued to place a great deal of faith in its ability to obtain further space through the activities of the extractive industries, reporting throughout much of the 1980s that there were many holes in the ground being created by the industry on Sydney's outskirts and that it was liaising with the extractive industries (MWDA, 1982-83:33; 1983-84:41;1984- 85:47; 1985-86:46). The MWDA was also confident that landfill, as well as being the most economical method of disposal, could also 'meet today's strict environmental standards' (MWDA, 1983-84:15).
10 The Authority noted that greater reliance on more distant former extractive industry sites would increase the need for transfer stations and raise waste disposal costs. The latter change might mean that resource recovery technologies might become economically viable, although these technologies had suffered 'a number of severe setbacks over recent years'. However, because there was 'considerable landfill capacity' available, there was ample time to evaluate overseas developments in these technologies (MWDA, 1982-83:33-34).
[Appendix B5.9]
In 1984-85, the Authority announced it would undertake a complete review of its Waste Management Plan, including taking account of developments overseas that were being examined by two senior officers on overseas study (MWDA, 1984-85:8).
One factor that impacted on the Authority's planning in the early 1980s was the introduction of wheeled bins and the consequent increase in the amount of green waste entering the waste stream. This resulted in the need to review the time phasing of some planned facilities (MWDA, 1982-83:37; 1984-85:49).
On the other hand, the approval of the Mill Creek extension to the Lucas Heights landfill, with its projected life of over thirty years, was a significant increase in landfill capacity (MWDA, 1984-85:14, 50).
Another factor that impacted on the MWDA's planning, this time in the mid- and late 1980s was the rapid growth in the generation of industrial solid waste. The 1988-89 Annual Report of the MWDA noted that, while the total amount (by weight) of solid waste had increased by nine per cent between 1987 and 1988, the increase in industrial and commercial waste was twice this figure (MWDA,1988- 89:14-15). In its 1989-90 annual report, the WMA showed graphically that in four years from 1985 to 1989, the per capita amount of municipal solid waste had increased by approximately25 per cent, while industrial solid waste had more than doubled (WMA,1989- 90:18). Informant 4, a former senior manager with the MWDA and WMA regarded the increase in industrial solid waste as the main factor contributing to greater than expected decrease in landfill capacity in the early 1990s that came to be seen as the waste crisis.
In December 1989, a Cabinet committee chose a site at Londonderry for a major landfill to serve the north west sector of Sydney (see section B6.4), while the WMA suggested it was going to require a new site for a major landfill in the south west sector as Eastern Creek and Jack's Creek landfills reached capacity in the mid- to late 1990s (WMA, 1989-90:23;1990- 91:31).
[Appendix B5.10]
B5.2.3 Taking Stock in 1990 — The Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy
1 By 1990, the WMA was still affirming that landfill was the most economical method of waste disposal, although it did add the rider 'while land is still available in the region'. The WMA also reaffirmed its commitment to the concept of inner transfer stations and peripheral landfills (WMA, 1989-90:20).
2 In 1990, the WMA also canvassed for the first time the possibility that Sydney's solid waste would have to be transported to disposal sites outside the region, with a resultant increase in transport costs (WMA, 1989-90:11; 1990-91:16). Incineration was also mentioned in passing as a further option (WMA, 1990-91:16). Both these options were also mentioned in the Waste Service annual report in1991-92 (WRAPS, 1991-92:18).
B5.2.4 Planning after the Green Paper
1 The Waste Management Green Paper released on 24 September 1992, set a 50 per cent reduction in the per capita amount of waste going to landfill by 2000 (see appendix B6.7). The Waste Service produced a 'waste reduction scenario' based on the 50 per cent figure (the Strategy prepared several years earlier had been based on 40 per cent by 2010), showing that markets would have to be found for an additional 1.9 million tonnes per annum of materials recovered from the waste stream. The Service was confident that the additional quantities of newsprint, glass and metal would be absorbed by industry under the industry plans specified in the National Kerbside Recycling Strategy that had been negotiated by the Commonwealth Government earlier that year (see appendix B6.1.2:5). However, markets were lacking for plastics, demolition materials and various organic wastes (WRAPS, 1992-93:18).
2 The Government policy statement 'No Time to Waste', released on 23 June 1994, confirmed the Government's commitment to the 50 per cent target. The Waste Service then prepared an updated plan for the achievement of the target (WRAPS, 1993-94:4). It was able to report in 1993-94 that the available landfill capacity had increased from 5.3 years in 1993 to 7.9 years, due to increased recycling, improved compaction
[Appendix B5.11]
techniques and landfill extensions becoming available at Eastern Creek (WRAPS, 1993-94:5). This capacity was further increased in 1994-95 to nine years (WRAPS, 1994-95:4).
With the election of a Labor Government in March 1995, the Waste Service faced a waste reduction target of 60 per cent. In addition, the Government announced a freeze on the establishment of new landfills (WRAPS, 1994-95:1). However, the amount of waste being landfilled by the Waste Service began to increase in 1995, after falling through most of the early 1990s. This increase was attributed in the Chairman and Managing Director's review in the 1994-95 Annual Report to the economic upturn and to the fact that 'there has been no government body with direct responsibility for waste in the Sydney Metropolitan Region since 1992, and initiatives to establish new technologies and divert waste from landfill slowed' (WRAPS,1994-95:4).
Regional Landfills and Transfer Stations
In October 1974, the Labor member for Woronora asked in the Legislative Assembly why the Government was proposing to establish a regional landfill on 2000 acres in the Menai area (Legislative Assembly, 24.10.74:2162)
By 1975, the MWDA had established its first regional landfill at Jack's Gully, Camden and negotiations were under way to transfer the control of the Sutherland Shire's Lucas Heights landfill to the Authority (MWDA, 1974-75:5). The Lucas Heights landfill came under MWDA control in July, 1976 (MWDA, 1976-77:13).
The process of establishing regional landfills and transfer stations was not without negative impacts on councils. For example, the Canterbury Council had invested in a garbage shredder to extend the life of its Salt Pan Creek tip, enabling it to continue its arrangement with Concord Council to receive the latter waste at Salt Pan Creek for a fee. However, the MWDA Phase I Plan directed Concord's waste to a transfer station in Strathfield, and waste from Ashfield, Rockdale and Burwood Councils to Salt Pan Creek, thus shortening the life of Canterbury
[Appendix B5.12]
Council's tip and subsequently requiring the transport of Canterbury's waste to an outlying landfill at additional cost (Butlin, 1976:116).
4 In 1977, the MWDA reported that it expected that there would be a need for regional transfer stations as inner landfill sites were exhausted. Planning had commenced on the Rockdale Transfer Station (MWDA, 1976-77:8,16).
5 In May 1977, the MWDA announced regional waste depots at Homebush Bay and Grange Avenue, Blacktown (SMH, 21.6.77:3).
6 Two additional regional depots, the Bare Creek landfill and the Rockdale transfer station were established in 1978-79, bringing the Authority's total to seven regional depots (MWDA, 1978-79:4). The latter was extended in 1987-88 (MWDA, 1986-87:29; 1988-89:18). A second transfer station to replace the Homebush landfill was commenced at Auburn in 1982-83 and completed in mid-1984 (MWDA,1982- 83:12; 1983-84:3-4). A third transfer station was commenced at Ryde as a replacement for the Thomleigh landfill in early 1984 (MWDA,1983- 84:28). This was opened on 8 May 1985 and, as with the other transfer depots, was operated by a private firm under contract (MWDA,1984- 85:3, 19, 23). A fourth MWDA-built transfer station was announced in 1985-86, to be established at Artarmon, following a request by the Willoughby Council, which had decided not to renew the lease on a site where a run-down private transfer station had been operating, but had gone into liquidation. Consequently, the Artarmon Transfer Station closed in April, 1987 (MWDA, 1986-87:3,14, 16). A development application for the new transfer station was lodged with the Artarmon Council in June 1986, and construction commenced in January, 1987 (MWDA, 1985-86:3, 29; 1987-87:27). The Artarmon Transfer Station was completed in July 1989 and included a recycling centre, the seventh of the MWDA recycling centres (MWDA, 1989- 90:18). At this time, the Authority announced it would construct its fifth transfer station at Belrose, to replace the Bare Creek landfill which was expected to be full by the early 1990s (MWDA, 1988-89:18; WMA, 1989- 90:23). This transfer station was opened on 12 July 1994 (WRAPS, 1993- 94:20).
[Appendix B5.13]
The MWDA appears to have received its first set-back in establishing regional landfills in 1978-79 with the Cecil Park proposal which was to serve the Fairfield and Liverpool regions. The Authority reported that it had decided to take no further action on the proposal, due to Tocal opposition' and the availability of existing landfills within reasonable distance of the two regions (MWDA, 1978-79:14).
In 1979, the Authority opened the Merrylands regional depot, and the Thornleigh regional depot in 1980. Both these landfills were located in disused brickpits surrounded by residential and commercial development. The Authority placed considerable weight on its expertise in reducing the environmental impacts of landfill operations in gaining the acceptance of local residents:
The environmental impact reports, publicly displayed and debated, were essential to give the assurances that the recommended safeguards, properly implemented would maintain the status quo or improve the environmental amenity of the areas in which the two brickpits are located.
(MWDA, 1979-80:10)
It should probably be noted here that the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act that required the public display of environmental impact statements was passed in 1979. In this era of 'pre-toxic innocence' and 'pre-EIA cynicism' the combined impact of environmental assurances and artists impressions of the restored areas would make these appear very attractive compared to the dangers to children of the disused brickpits.
By 1980, the MWDA had nine regional depots in operation (MWDA, 1979-80:4).
In 1981, the Authority had commenced negotiations for an extension to the Lucas Heights landfill and a new regional depot at Eastern Creek (MWDA, 1981-82:9). Approvals for these were obtained in 1981-82 (MWDA, 1981-82:3-4), although the Authority was seeking approval for further extensions to the Lucas Heights landfill, which it intended to use when the existing area was filled in 1984-85 (MWDA, 1981-82:4). Work commenced on the Eastern Creek landfill in 1982-83 (MWDA, 1982- 83:12), and it was completed in mid-1984 (MWDA, 1983-84:3-4). Additional land for an extension to this landfill was obtained by the Authority in 1988-89 (MWDA,
[Appendix B5.14]
1988- 89:18), and ministerial approval in 1989-90 (WMA,1989- 90:22-23). In 1992-93, the Waste Service sought development approvals to remove and market clay and shale from the site to extend the life of the landfill beyond its then projected life of five years (WRAPS, 1992-93:21). Approval was received in 1993-94 (WRAPS, 1993- 94:18).
12 By 1982-83, the Authority was expressing concern that delays in approval for this further extension into Barden's Creek at Lucas Heights would affect the implementation of its Phase II plan and 'have a significant detrimental impact upon a large section of the community' (MWDA, 1982-83:3). However, due to the abandonment of a proposed motorway across the Lucas Heights site, the MWDA was able to change the final contours of the landfill and increase its life until early 1987 (MWDA, 1984-85:29).
13 An alternative site to the Barden's Creek extension that had been under consideration by the MWDA was upper Mill Creek at Menai. However, while this site was suitable for the establishment of a landfill, its status was uncertain due to an impending exchange of land between the State of New South Wales and the Commonwealth within the exclusion zone surrounding the Australian Atomic Energy Commission nuclear facility at Lucas Heights. When the exchange was completed in late 1983, the Authority then submitted a development application to the Sutherland Shire Council for a landfill at the upper Mill Creek site (MWDA, 1983- 1984:26). This was approved in 1985 (MWDA, 1984-85:30). The new Lucas Heights Regional Depot was opened in early 1987 (MWDA, 1987- 88:25). According to later accounts by the Liberal member for Sutherland, within one month of opening, the then Minister for the Environment, Bob Carr, increased the number of councils served by the Depot from seven to twenty-three (Legislative Assembly, 7.5.92:3977).
14 In August 1989 it was revealed that the MWDA was assessing a number of sites in Sydney's north west as landfills to replace the Grange Avenue landfill at Marsden Park which was nearly full (SMH, 12.8.89:6).
15 In December 1989, the Parliamentary Urban Development Committee of Cabinet selected a Londonderry site as the only remaining suitable site in north west Sydney, following upon submission by the WMA, the
[Appendix B5.15]
Water Board and the Departments of Planning, Housing and Lands (WMA, 1989-90:23). As the Londonderry proposal, and the Lucas Heights extension proposal which followed not long after were important events in the politics of waste management in the 1990s, these events are described in detail in chapter 6.
In 1990-91, the Authority announced stricter registration requirements for operators of waste disposal facilities, giving as its justification 'the potential for depots to have significant environmental impact'. The additional requirements included a site management plan, a water management plan, a site rehabilitation program, a proposed final landuse for the site and details of monitoring and controls of environmental problems that might arise from operation of the facility. In addition, facility operators were required to lodge a bank guarantee with the Authority, so that the Authority could remedy any failures on the part of the operator (WMA, 1990-91:37).
By 1992-93, the sophistication of the Waste Service's approach to restoration of landfills sites was evident in its description of the procedures followed at Lucas Heights, with seed collection from native vegetation prior to it being cleared for new cells, stockpiling of topsoil, propagation of native plants in a nursery on site, and re-planting after the cells were filled and the surface contoured (WRAPS, 1992-93:26). The expertise that had been developed by the Waste Service and the former Authorities was also demonstrated in the remediation of Homebush Bay (WRAPS, 1992-93:34).
Incineration of Municipal Solid Waste
Initially, the MWDA appeared to favour incineration of municipal solid waste. Connolly, returning from an overseas tour, said that he expected incineration would be used more widely as this was the trend overseas. However, incinerators would not be built near residential areas (SMH, 13.9.72:2). Yet, nine months later Connolly was reported as saying that no further incinerators were being planned because they created heat and air pollution. The trend overseas was away from incinerators and towards lengthening the life of landfills by pulverisation and compaction (SMH, 4.6.73:3).
[Appendix B5.16]
2 However, the 1973-74 Annual Report suggests that incineration had not been dismissed out of hand as there was a possibility that 'rising costs of energy production by conventional means may stimulate greater use of solid waste as an energy source' (MWDA, 1973-74:12). In addition, it appears that it was generally regarded at the time that incineration would be a necessary part of liquid industrial waste treatment (MWDA, 1973-74:10). In 1978, pilot scale fluidised bed incineration was being planned to investigate the combustion characteristics of particular liquid wastes (MWDA, 1977-78:7). The liquid waste treatment plant announced in 1978-79 (see section B5.5.1, below) included 'a high temperature incinerator [which] will be capable of destroying the majority of toxic wastes presently being generated' (MWDA, 1978- 79:18).
3 However, for solid waste, the Authority continued to argue that, although incineration was attractive through the volume reductions obtained, the adequate availability of landfill capacity for 'many years' and the high capital costs of incineration, it would not consider investing in incineration (MWDA, 1980-81:37).
4 Incineration of municipal solid waste appears not to have been publicly acknowledged as a disposal option by the Authority until 1989-90 when, in the context of the decreasing availability of landfill space, it was pointed out that incineration was 'becoming more popular overseas' (WMA, 1989-90:11). Incineration was again mentioned briefly in 1990-91 as an option (WMA, 1990-91:16). However, by this time, it is likely that incineration would not have been regarded very favourably by the WMA, in view of the considerable politicisation that had occurred in the efforts to find a site for a high temperature incinerator. Nevertheless, incineration continued to receive passing mention as a possible disposal option (see, for example, WRAPS, 1991-92:6,18).
[Appendix B5.17]
B5.5 Liquid Waste
B5.5.1 The Central Treatment Plant
1 In its first year (1971-72), the MWDA also tackled the liquid waste disposal problem that had been the catalyst for the Waste Disposal Act. After calling for tenders for the establishment and operation of a liquid waste treatment and disposal plant in November 1971 (SMH, 4.6.73:3), the MWDA decided to undertake a comprehensive survey before proceeding . This study was commissioned in May 1972 (MWDA, 1972- 73:10) and, according to the Herald, completed in May 1973, whereupon the previous tenderers were to be approached again about the liquid waste disposal plant (SMH, 4.6.73:3). The MWDA had estimated that a plant would be operating by 1975 (MWDA,1971-72:8; SMH, 13.9.72:2), but the response from the previous tenderers was 'not encouraging'. As a result, the MWDA decided to build and operate the plant itself (MWDA, 1981:13). According to the Herald, a waste transporter had put a number of schemes to the government about this time but had them rejected. He bought land near Blacktown to set up a liquid waste treatment plant, but approval was refused by Blacktown Council, despite his requests to the Minister for Environment Control (SMH, 4.6.73:3).
2 In 1974, the Authority reported that it had resolved to adopt the concept of a 'minimum plant', i.e. as simple a plant as possible designed to treat the wastes expected in the early years of operation, with the capacity to be expanded as required. This decision was partly justified by the belief that some of the large generators of liquid industrial waste were finding it profitable to reprocess their wastes (MWDA, 1973-74:10; Butlin, 1976:274)).
3 In March 1975, after undertaking research into liquid waste incineration jointly with the CSIRO, the Authority called for tenders for the construction of an incineration plant, receiving eight tenders. Not long after this, the Authority received a submission from a large company expressing interest in establishing the liquid waste treatment plant. The Authority suspended its work on the incineration plant, but the company subsequently failed to get development consent from the
[Appendix B5.18]
council in the area where it intended to locate its plant (MWDA,1981:14).
4 The Authority undertook a further review of the nature and volume of liquid wastes, and after further discussions with industry, adopted a new policy that industry should be required to process its liquid wastes to a form that would not be hazardous to the environment if placed in landfills (MWDA, 1981:14). Until the 1977-78 Annual Report, there had been no mention of industry treating its wastes to some predetermined standard before they would be accepted by the Authority. The assumption under which the planning of a central treatment plan appears to have been proceeding during this time was that the Authority or private operator of the liquid waste treatment plant should accept and treat any wastes that industry saw fit to produce.
5 The 1977-78 Annual Report (p.7) announced that it had prepared a list of standards to which liquid wastes should conform so that the wastes could be disposed of in existing regional landfills. The Authority was evaluating industry's reaction to these standards. It also announced that it had adopted the guidelines in implementing its liquid waste policy for the next three years that industry should reduce the quantity of waste it produced wherever possible by re-use within plant or failing that, by in plant treatment or exchange through the Authority's Industrial Waste Exchange.
6 During 1978-79, the NSW Government announced that the Authority would establish a liquid waste treatment plant. This would treat liquid wastes to a standard that would enable them to be disposed of in regional landfills, and these landfills would also accept similarly treated wastes from industry (MWDA, 1978-79:18). By1979-80 the plans for the plant had progressed further and the Authority stated that the establishment of the plant was 'regarded as a matter of the highest priority. The plant would include an aqueous waste treatment plant and an incinerator that would 'be capable of destroying the chlorinated hydrocarbon wastes and other intractable wastes which are presently being stored because no environmentally satisfactory disposal outlet exists' (MWDA, 1979-80:20). It appears that the impetus for this initiative had come from the Minister for Planning and Environment, the Hon. Paul Landa (see section B5.5.2, below).
[Appendix B5.19]
In January 1981, the Minister for Planning and Environment, Mr Bedford, announced that the MWDA was planning to build a high temperature waste incinerator in Sydney. He ruled out the suggestion from the Victorian Environment Protection Authority that Victorian toxic wastes would be shipped to the incinerator. Apparently, this idea had been raised in a meeting of the Environment Council in Adelaide in 1980 (SMH, 30.1.81:13 — headline: 'Industrial incinerator for NSW')
In March 1982, the Minister for Planning and Environment announced that a liquid waste treatment plant would be established at Wetherill Park, Fairfield (MWDA, 1981-82:20; SMH, 18.3.82:12). Although the plant consisted of physical-chemical and biological treatment facilities, and a high temperature incinerator, the Herald article reported only that a $15.5 million high temperature incinerator was to be built. The headline stated 'Fairfield chosen as toxic waste centre' (SMH, 18.3.82:12)
There was some criticism of the $250 000 road grant to Fairfield Council, decided at a meeting in February between Bedford and members of the MWDA. Two independent Fairfield councillors accused the State Labor Government of locating the incinerator in Fairfield because it was the safest Labor seat in the State (SMH, 31.3.82:3). When the ruling ALP group of councillors joined with the independents in opposing the incinerator, the Minister announced that a Commission of Inquiry would be held under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act — 'Inquiry into proposed toxic waste plant' in the words of the Herald headline. The final decision would then rest with the Minister and there would be no right of appeal. A meeting of 200 rank and file ALP members in Fairfield rejected the incinerator and called for an incinerator ship to be used (SMH, 24.4.82:7).
The MWDA subsequently decided against establishing a plant at Fairfield, preferring instead to investigate the possibility of separating the incinerator from the plant, presumably to reduce public opposition to the plant. The Authority also noted that both the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation's report on its Inquiry into Hazardous Chemicals, and the Australian Environment Council, had recommended that a single national high temperature incinerator be established (MWDA, 1981-
[Appendix B5.20]
82:20). By 1984, the Minister for Planning and Environment had contacted the Ministers of other States to compile an assessment of the quantities of intractable wastes being generated and stored. This was to be considered by a meeting of the Australian Environment Council in July 1984 (MWDA, 1983-84:34).
11 It appears that in the early 1980s, the MWDA received a number of inquiries from both overseas and local companies interested in establishing liquid waste treatment facilities (Legislative Assembly, 20.10.83:2045).
12 In 1982, grease trap wastes came under the four docket system that was introduced for liquid industrial wastes in the 1974 (MWDA, 1984-85:34).
13 During 1982-83, the State Pollution Control Commission undertook a review of liquid waste disposal in Sydney, concluding that there was a high priority for the construction of a treatment plant to take the wastes being disposed of at the Castlereagh Depot (MWDA,1982-83:26). The MWDA decided in 1982-83 to separate aqueous waste treatment from incineration and submitted a development application for the former to Botany Municipal Council for a treatment plant at Banksmeadow. Part of the reason for this separation was that incineration was that a national incinerator for intractable waste was under consideration by the Commonwealth (Legislative Assembly, 1.5.84:34).
14 The Council sought much more information on the proposal than the MWDA had provided, to the extent that the MWDA decided to withdraw the application and re-submit it at a later date with the requested information provided (MWDA, 1982-83:28; 1983-84:33).
15 During the public display period during January and February of 1984, a large number of public submissions were received. According to the MWDA, these submissions could be divided into favourable ones from 'industry, environmental groups, and State Government authorities' and opposing submissions from 'local residents and local councils'. The MWDA noted that, even though it had ruled out any high temperature incineration at the site, the most common objection to the aqueous treatment of wastes was that 'it would lead to the construction of a high
[Appendix B5.21]
temperature incinerator for disposal of intractable wastes' (MWDA, 1983-84:33). The Botany Municipal Council considered the proposal at its meeting on 6 June 1984. It opposed the granting of consent by the Minister for Planning and the Environment and requested the Minister direct that an inquiry be held under the terms of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979 (MWDA, 1983-84:34). The inquiry was held in November 1984. The Commissioners found that while 'the evidence of the inquiry established beyond doubt that the operation was not a hazardous operation', it was not clear that Banksmeadow was necessarily the best site for the plant. The Minister for Planning and Environment, Bob Carr, asked the Authority to investigate alternative sites to Banksmeadow (MWDA, 1984-85:35). According to the Herald, Carr argued that insufficient assessment had been made of alternative sites, in particular one at Lidcombe. The Herald also noted that 'State environment officials' were of the opinion that the grounds for the refusal were political (Banksmeadow being close to Mr Carr's electorate) rather than technical. A SPCC spokesperson said both the Bankstown and the Lidcombe site were environmentally sound, but the latter would take longer to establish at plant because of new approvals needed. Dr John Poliak of Sydney University (and later of the Total Environment Centre Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals Committee) favoured the Banksmeadow site because of its proximity to the sea for dilution of its effluent (SMH, 23.5.85:15). A development application and environmental impact statement for a treatment plant adjacent to a transfer station at Lidcombe site was lodged by the MWDA with the Auburn Council in May 1985 (MWDA, 1984-85:35). This was approved in October 1985 (MWDA, 1985-86:35). In 1986-87, the MWDA commissioned a hazard and operability study of the plant to 'ensure that the design is failsafe', and emphasised that the plant would not accept intractable wastes (MWDA, 1986-87:31).
The Lidcombe Aqueous Treatment Plant was completed in October 1988 — seventeen years after planning for the Plant commenced in 1972 (SMH, 2.3.89:7). The Authority regarded it as a 'major achievement', many of the processes used by the Plant having been developed in the years of painstaking research with the pilot scale Plant at the Castlereagh Depot (MWDA, 1987-88:31-32).
[Appendix B5.22]
17 While the Lidcombe Plant provided a means of treating many liquid industrial wastes, Sydney's intractable wastes remained in storage, with the MWDA noting that a high temperature incinerator for intractable waste had been proposed in a number of States, but 'opposition to its location, even in remote areas, has frustrated progress' (MWDA, 1987- 88:32).
18 Not long after the construction of the Plant, the Sydney Water Board introduced more stringent requirements for waste water discharged to its sewers. In addition, the Government commenced more vigorous prosecution of illegal waste dumping. This meant the Authority had to upgrade the Plant to take 80 000 to 90 000 tonnes per annum, rather than 50 000 as originally designed. It was also necessary for the Authority to commence a research program into how to improve the quality of the water it discharged, and to ban some liquid wastes that had formerly been accepted (MWDA,1988-89:3, 25; 1990-91:32). In 1989-90, the WMA announced that it was undertaking capital works to upgrade the plant to an annual capacity of 90 000 tonnes (WMA, 1989-90:24). A new pricing structure was introduced at the Plant in May 1990, based on the difficulty of treating waste — a change which the Authority maintained was in line with the user-pays principle (WMA, 1989-90:26).
19 In fune 1993, the biological processing facility was opened, which enabled effluent from the plant to be brought up to the new standards required by the Sydney Water Board for discharge to its sewers (WRAPS, 1992-93:29).
20 About this time, the Waste Service was reporting that the financial viability of the aqueous waste treatment plant was being threatened by competition from private sector plants that had begun to treat the more easily treated wastes (WRAPS, 1992-93:30).
21 Subsequently, the Waste Service sought liquid wastes for processing from the Hunter Region to make good the continuing shortfall in demand for use of the Lidcombe facility, due, according to the Service, to competition from the private sector, the recession and waste minimisation by industry (WRAPS, 1993-94:22).
[Appendix B5.23]
B5.5.2 The Castlereagh Depot
1 In 1970, the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board (MWDA) and the Maritime Services Board commenced an investigation of suitable sites for the disposal of liquid industrial waste on land, the former being concerned about the disposal of industrial wastes into the sewerage system, and the latter about disposal into harbours and estuaries. Sites at Luddenham and Castlereagh were assessed and rejected, the latter because the depth of excavation was limited by the underlying Tertiary gravels. Two years later, the MWDA approached the Department of Mines to make a further geological survey of an eight hectare area at Castlereagh within the area formerly investigated. The Department of Mines concluded that the site was suitable for the disposal of liquid waste, provided that impermeable clay was used to line excavations (Butlin, 1976:271).
2 With the closure of Bradshaw's liquid waste disposal site at Alexandria in October 1972 (see section B8.6), the MWDA was under greater pressure to find a site for liquid waste disposal.
3 On 13 November 1972, the MWDA informed the town clerk of Penrith City Council that it would be commencing liquid waste dumping on a five acre site in the Castlereagh State Forest the following day. After the mayor of the Councils sent telegrams to the Premier and several Ministers, the proposal was abandoned the following day (Legislative Assembly, 14.11.72:2617). There is, however, some evidence that dumping of liquid waste had already been occurring in the Castlereagh Depot area, with a letter to the editor of the Herald in July 1972 claiming that the Authority was dumping drums of hazardous liquid waste there (SMH, 26.7.72:6).
4 From the debate in the Legislative Assembly on 14 November, it is clear that the members were well aware of what would now be called the NIME (not in my electorate) problem.
It seems to me that every honourable member, especially those on the Opposition side, has the answer for this problem so long as it is in some other member's electorate.
(Legislative Assembly, 14.11.72:2621)
[Appendix B5.24]
5 According to Labor's Mrs Lo Po' in 1993, the Castlereagh Depot was opposed, in 1972, to no avail, by PRANG (Penrith Residents Against Noxious Garbage) (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:678).
6 In December 1972, the MWDA announced that it had decided to establish a 'temporary liquid waste disposal depot in the area known as Castlereagh' (MWDA, 1972-73:11) to replace Bradshaw's site at Alexandria. The site would be used until a permanent depot opened at Mortlake , a joint venture between the Australian Gas Light Co and Readymix Concrete Ltd (SMH, 13.12.72:8). The proposed site had been used by the Department of Main Roads for gravel extraction and was leased from the Department of Lands (MWDA, 1972-73:11). The MWDA's Annual Report provided a long list of sites that had been considered as liquid waste disposal sites, together with an extensive range of environmental reasons for rejecting these sites. One of the alternatives was ocean dumping, which was reported in the Herald (SMH, 24.5.73:2). Citing from the MWDA's study of the possible disposal sites, the Annual Report noted that:
Operation of a liquid waste disposal depot at Castlereagh is the best interim solution to the present crisis and such action will have very little chance of causing environmental harm provided the depot is operated according to the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority's plan. As far as the actual site of the proposed depot is concerned, the intended rehabilitation of the area will transform the site from wasteland into useful forest.
(MWDA, 1972-73:11)
7 The objections of the Penrith City Council were overcome by the expedient of the Minister for Local Government's power to suspend planning schemes. It appears that the MWDA may have been giving serious consideration to dumping liquid waste at sea in late 1972. However, the Australian Broadcasting Commission ran a 'fairly extensive' television program on the proposal, which resulted in the Minister for Local Government and the MWDA receiving a large number of complaints from the public (Legislative Assembly, 23.10.74:2088-2089).
8 In May 1973, the MWDA was reported in the Herald as giving an assurance that two environmental impact studies, one by itself and one
[Appendix B5.25]
by a consultant had shown that there was 'no chance' that seepage from the site would cause pollution of nearby water bodies (SMH, 24.5.73:2).
In late 1974, the Labor member for Woronora claimed on several occasions in the Legislative Assembly that loads of liquid industrial waste that were too noxious to be accepted at Castlereagh were being turned away, with the instruction that the wastes should be kept in holding tanks. However, waste transporters were simply driving into bushland areas and releasing their loads there (Legislative Assembly, 13.8.74:175; 24.10.74:2162-2163).
In December 1974, and in response to claims by the Labor ML A for Woronora that large volumes of 'noxious industrial waste' were being dumped in bushland around Menai, Connolly was reported by the Herald as saying that the MWDA was investigating the establishment of a dump for noxious liquids that it would not take at Castlereagh and expected to have a site for treatment in about two years (SMH, 13.12.74:1,11).
In 1975, the MWDA increased the size of the Castlereagh Depot to deal with increasing volumes of liquid waste being delivered there (MWDA, 1974-75:8). However, it was claimed in the Legislative Assembly in November 1975 that liquid waste was still being dumped in bushland, due either being rejected by the Castlereagh Depot, or because of the cost for disposal being charged at Castlereagh (Legislative Assembly, 6.11.75:2388).
In 1975, Butlin (1976:261) noted that, since the four main liquid waste disposal companies had reduced or discontinued their activities, it was likely that their services were being offered by small firms and individual contractors, about which there was very little information.
With the election of Labor to government in May 1976, little appeared to change with the Castlereagh Depot. The Minister for Local Government, Mr Jensen, was able to blame the previous Coalition Government for the lack of alternative to Castlereagh and, when questioned in the Legislative Assembly, give assurances that the MWDA was investigating liquid waste treatment processes overseas, and that the Government was considering methods of encouraging the major
[Appendix B5.26]
producers of liquid waste to treat it themselves (Legislative Assembly, 31.8.78:855).
14 In 1977-78, at the same time as the Authority announced its new guidelines requiring industry to reduce liquid waste production where possible, it obtained approval to extend the life of the Castlereagh Depot till June 1981 (MWDA, 1977-78:7).
15 According to claims by the Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, in September 1992, a report by Golder and Associates in 1978 suggested that contaminants had leached into the underlying gravels and were travelling in the gravel stratum at one metre per year (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6446).
16 In April 1979, the Minister for Planning and Environment, the Hon. Paul Landa announced that, following a visit to incineration plants that were apparently successfully operating in the US, he had instructed the MWDA to construct a combined mechanical treatment and incineration plant. Landa was cognisant of the health impacts at Love Canal due to the burial of industrial waste and undertook that the Castlereagh Depot would be closed when the plant was operational (Legislative Council, 23.4.79:4738).
17 Throughout much of the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a decline in the volume of liquid waste industrial waste delivered to the Castlereagh Depot. This the MWDA attributed to the development by industry of more efficient production methods, more treatment and recycling of liquid wastes and disposal via the Industrial Waste Exchange (MWDA, 1983-84:31).
18 In 1981, the MWDA obtained approval, under State Environmental Planning Policy No 3, to continue operating the Depot for liquid industrial waste disposal until 1986 (MWDA, 1981-82:18; Legislative Assembly, 20.10.83:2045).
19 The early 1980s saw what might be termed a 'cosmetic greening' of the Castlereagh Depot, with the introduction of ducks, geese, silver perch and rainbow trout into some of the dams on the site (MWDA, 1983- 84:32).
[Appendix B5.27]
In November 1983, Democrat Legislative Council member, the Hon. Elisabeth Kirkby, claimed that the clay stratum on which containment of buried liquid wastes at Castlereagh relied, would be unlikely to remain impervious over long periods of time, with the consequence that the Hawkesbury River could be polluted (Legislative Council, 2.11.83:2224).
In 1984-85, the safety arrangements and procedures appear to have undergone considerable upgrading (MWDA, 1984-85:33-34).
In March 1985, in response to questioning in the Legislative Council by Democrat the Hon. Elisabeth Kirkby, the Government admitted that 100 tonnes of blue metal contaminated with PCB had been disposed of at the Castlereagh Depot (Legislative Council, 26.3.85:4999).
In 1985-86, the Authority announced that it had finalised plans for the future use of the Castlereagh site and made submissions to the Penrith Council, the Department of Environment and Planning and the State Pollution Control Commission. The plans entailed that the site continue to be used for small quantities of liquid industrial waste and the residues from the Lidcombe Plant once it was operational. It was also proposed that additional solid waste be bought to the site for placement over filled areas. This marked a change in the Authority's position with respect to Castlereagh, in that it had previously always been referred to as an 'interim' facility until the central liquid waste treatment Plant was operating. The idea of using Castlereagh to take solid waste from the Authority's transfer stations had been part of the Phase II plan for some time in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but was abandoned in 1981-82 (MWDA, 1981-82:25-26).
In 1985-86, the Authority had yet to realise the strength of public fears about Castlereagh that would grow in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It believed that, with sufficient solid waste to contour the site, it would become a site for recreational purposes (MWDA, 1985-86:32).
Because the central treatment plant at Lidcombe did not include a high temperature incinerator for disposing of most of the residues from the plant, the Authority then needed to extend the life of the Castlereagh Depot past the formerly approved 1986 closure date. In late 1986, the
[Appendix B5.28]
Authority submitted an environmental impact assessment to the Penrith Council for a proposal which included the continuation of receipt of liquid industrial wastes until the Lidcombe Plant was completed, the receipt of residues from the Plant and other industrial sludges after the completion of the Plant, and the placement of mounds of solid waste over the site. This last aspect was intended as a means of 'developing a more pleasing visual landscape, improving site drainage and providing a buffer between the liquid waste cells and the ground surface'(MWDA, 1986-87:34). According to the Authority, the main concerns expressed during the public display period for the environmental impact assessment related to the mounds of solid waste and the potential for leakage from the site.
The 1986-87 Annual Report of the MWDA reported that the quantities of liquid industrial waste delivered to its Castlereagh Depot had begun to increase again after a period of decline in the first half of the 1980s. The increase was attributed to a resurgence in industrial activity (MWDA, 1986-87:35).
A consequence of the approval sought by the Authority was that the Lands Department required that the Authority appropriate the site (MWDA, 1986-87:35).
In February 1987, the Department of Environment and Planning advised the Authority that the proposal was 'appropriate for determination by the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority' and the Authority approved its own proposal soon after. Approval to commence site works was obtained from the SPCC in March 1987 (MWDA, 1986-87:35), and the first liquid waste was received in the extended area in June 1987 (MWDA, 1987-88:30).
Consistent with its meticulous scientific approach, the Authority in 1987- 88 gave consideration to a field-sized trial of placing mounds of solid waste over the liquid waste cells, accompanied by comprehensive instrumentation to monitor leakage from the site (MWDA, 1987-88:30).In 1991-92, the Waste Service reported that it had concluded that the mounding would 'make a positive contribution to the long-term security of the site'. The EPA had reviewed its report and approved the proposal in principle (WRAPS, 1991-92:31). However, the Waste Service gave an
[Appendix B5.29]
undertaking not to proceed with the proposal until Stage II of the independent environmental audit had been completed (see section B5.5.2:42 and below).
With the election of the Coalition Government in March 1988, blame for the continuing operation of the Castlereagh Depot could once again be directed towards the previous Government (Legislative Assembly, 30.11.88:4012).
In November 1988, the newly elected Labor member for Londonderry, in whose electorate the Castlereagh Depot lay, claimed in an interview on the ABC that farm produce grown in the vicinity of the Depot and sold in Sydney was contaminated with leachate from the Depot — a claim that was strenuously denied by the new Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore (Legislative Assembly, 30.11.88:4012).
The Castlereagh Depot experienced a substantial increase in the wastes received in 1988-89, despite the opening of the Lidcombe Plant. This was partly due to the receipt of over 57 000 tonnes of contaminated soil from the clean-up of the Mobil Oil Terminal at Hunters Hill and to the growth in the liquid industrial waste stream resulting from the more stringent standards for disposal to the sewerage system introduced by the Sydney Water Board (MWDA, 1988-89:24). A further source of increase was the direction of all hospital wastes to the Castlereagh Depot, an outcome of a joint study by the NSW Health Department, the SPCC and the WMA. The WMA progressively increased charges for hospital waste at Castlereagh to 'encourage the private sector to augment incineration capacity in Sydney' (WMA, 1989-90:25). The volume of grease trap wastes being accepted at Castlereagh also increased, due to the four private sector grease trap waste recycling facilities in Sydney experiencing increasing difficulty in meeting environmental requirements (WMA, 1989-90:25). In all, the volume of liquid wastes accepted at Castlereagh had increased by 58 per cent over the previous year (WMA, 1989-90:26).
According to the Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, studies for the MWDA by Jeffries (presumably a consulting group) in 1985 and 1989 showed that contaminants were moving in the underlying gravels at just under one kilometre per year (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6446)
[Appendix B5.30]
In March 1990, Paul Gibson gave a lengthy description in an adjournment debate of problems that were being encountered in the vicinity of the Castlereagh Depot by his constituents.
The Londonderry electorate faces a predicament that typifies possibly one of the greatest environmental tragedies that could be found anywhere in the world today. The matter is current, because today the people in my electorate are experiencing mutations in the birth of animals, devastation of grasslands and trees, and many other problems...
Almost one hundred million tonnes of some of the most toxic waste known to majikind is stored at Castlereagh. Very little is known about toxic waste today, but in 1974, virtually nothing was known about it. We do not know what was buried in the cells at Castlereagh then, and we do not know what harm might have been done to the environment at that time.We do not know what harm is being done today. One cannot overlook the many strange events that are happening in my electorate today....
Many times I have said that the greatest fear is the fear of the unknown.That is the case with my constituents.
(Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:875)
Gibson went on to detail a number of events that had occurred on constituent's properties in the neighbourhood of the Castlereagh Depot (Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:874-876).
• A Mr Frank Demanulle was irrigating from a dam on his property and over the previous two years, all his ducks and goats, all his lawn and every tree on his property had died. Livestock were refusing to drink from the dam.
• A neighbour to Mr Demanulle had also lost all his livestock over the previous two years and these had also refused to drink from the neighbour's dam.
• A Ms Maryanne Strieker had problems with horses with abnormal behaviour, such as biting and scratching at their feet. One stabled horse attempted to climb a nine foot high wall and impaled itself on the wall. A veterinarian was unable to provide any explanation, apart from noting the horses had high temperatures in their feet.
[Appendix B5.31]
• Over 20 market gardeners had experienced the simultaneous loss of crops of cauliflowers and cabbages over a period of three days.
• A Ms Mary Buttigeig lost five vealers overnight following heavy rain. The family had been raising pigs in the area for many years and reported that two years previously, the average size of litters had dropped from 6-10 to 2-3. In the past twelve months, every litter had been born dead.
• A Mr Bill Gosbell reported that in the previous two years, and particularly in the previous six months, he had lost animals whenever there were heavy rains. He had lost a total of 40 ducks, three goats, one ram, four lambs, two black swans, two Egyptian geese and two turkeys.
In every case, the Waste Management Authority and State Pollution Control Commission had tested water samples and assured the residents that there was nothing wrong with the water, although these instrumentalities had refused to put the assurances in writing (Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:877).
Gibson queried why, if there were no problems with the water, the Waste Management Authority had recently begun to sink additional monitoring bores on the affected properties (Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:877).
Gibson also claimed that he had been told by constituents that the monitoring bores at Castlereagh were deliberately filled with water prior to when the officers of the State Pollution Control Commission arrived to undertake testing, so that any contaminants would be diluted (Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:879).
In addition to the concerns raised by Gibson, he also pointed out the environmental justice dimensions to the issue, referring to recent shifting of contaminated soil from Wollstonecraft and Hunters Hill to Castlereagh:
[Appendix B5.32]
The people living on the North Shore have their tennis courts, their villas and other things but the residents of Londonderry are stuck with their toxic waste.
(Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:885)
40 In his reply, the Minister for Environment, Tim Moore, revealed that the Waste Management Authority had made a decision a month previously to reduce the amount of liquid industrial waste being disposed of at Castlereagh from the 1989-90 level of 192 000 tonnes per year to a level of 19 000 tones per year in 1994-95. He also contended that it was impossible to open up the older cells at Castlereagh to examine what kinds of wastes might be in them because experience at Love Canal in the USA had shown it could be impossible to reseal the cells and prevent pollution by the contents occurring (Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:881-882).
41 In April 1990, a group of volunteers from the University of Western Sydney, including the director of the University's Centre for Industrial Research, began testing water samples from the vicinity of the Castlereagh Waste Depot. The director claimed the tests that been conducted by government authorities were inadequate, being limited to measurement of pH. He also raised the possibility that the area may have to be evacuated in the future. Following a public meeting at the Londonderry Hall, the Minister for the Environment announced a ministerial investigation into the claims of environmental and health effects surrounding the Depot. The Waste Management Authority maintained that no chemicals had leaked from the Depot because, if there had been any leakage problems, they would have been detected by its network of monitoring bores (SMH, 24.4.90:2).
42 In response to the concerns raised by Paul Gibson, the Government established the Castlereagh — Londonderry Catchment Inquiry Steering Committee, comprising representatives of Government Departments, local government and the community. The Committee was to identify and examine any environmental effects that could be attributed to the operation of the Castlereagh Depot. It called for submissions and reported to the Minister for the Environment in late 1990 that, while there may have been some environmental problems in the area, there had been no apparent escape of chemicals from the depot or any problems that could be attributed to the Depot. Subsequently, the
[Appendix B5.33]
Minister for the Environment, directed that independent environmental audits be undertaken at all WMA facilities, including the Castlereagh Depot (WMA, 1990-91:33; Legislative Assembly, 10.12.91:6093). According to the Waste Service reporting of the audit, its recommendations were 'primarily focused on the refinement of procedural matters and do not raise any significant adverse environmental impacts for consideration' (WRAPS, 1991-92:32).
43 In 1989-90 the WMA reported that in several periods of heavy rain, the capacity of its system for retaining surface water on-site had been exceeded. It maintained, however, that the pollutant levels in the water discharged from the Castlereagh Depot were below prescribed limits, and that its borehole monitoring had shown that the movement of contaminants in groundwater was insignificant and contained within the boundaries of the Depot (WMA, 1989-90:25). Nevertheless, in 1990- 91, the Authority engaged a firm of geotechnical consultants to review the Authority's surface and groundwater monitoring data. The consultants concluded that there was no evidence that either surface or groundwater quality was deteriorating (WMA, 1990-91:33).
44 It appears that the consultants' data was provided to Greenpeace for comment. Greenpeace reported that there were 18 instances of detectable levels of phenyl in ground and surface waters, the highest being 8.5 ppm. The Government was later to make light of what Greenpeace had represented as leaks from the cells by pointing out that the levels were lower than the levels at which harmful effects were observed in animals, and that the same compound was present in many pharmaceutical products (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:681).
45 With the difficulties the Authority faced in siting landfills in the early 1990s, and given that it was well appreciated in the Authority that it had a negligible chance of establishing a replacement for the Castlereagh Depot, this facility took on new meaning as 'a finite resource that may be irreplaceable' (WMA, 1990-91:32).
46 To extend the life of the Castlereagh Depot, the Authority reported it was encouraging those generating wastes unsuitable for the Lidcombe Plant to treat them such they could be disposed of in ordinary landfills
[Appendix B5.34]
(WMA, 1990-91:32). This policy had in fact been introduced in 1978 (see above).
47 In December 1991, it was reported that a scientist from the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) had found high levels of heavy metals in a sample of soil taken from the State Forest adjacent to the Castlereagh Waste Depot. According to the Herald, the scientist had been instructed by his organisation to cease testing samples from the area, and the WMA had received a letter from ANSTO apologising for the embarrassment caused to the WMA. The WMA maintained it would detect any leaching problems through its groundwater monitoring, but the scientist argued that some chemicals would not be detected in groundwater because they would be bound to soil particles. The manager of the Castlereagh Depot attributed the heavy metals to metalliferous slag dumped illegally in the past. The article also made references to residents concerns in the past about the incidence of human birth deformities, livestock deaths and health problems in the vicinity of the Depot (SMH, 5.12.91:3).
48 Several days later, the Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, criticised the Government for its inaction since the Castlereagh - Londonderry Catchment Inquiry Steering Committee had completed its work a year earlier. Such criticism had also come nine months earlier from the Liberal member for Penrith, Guy Matheson (Legislative Assembly, 14.3.91:1060). Gibson reported that he had provided some of the files from the Committee to 'one of the leading environmental scientists in New South Wales'. This person, who was a Government employee and not named by Gibson, made the following observations about Depot:
• there was evidence from bore hole 916 that waste material was moving in the gravel strata below the waste cells,
• the sampling regime of the WMA and SPCC appeared to be avoiding analysing for the types of compounds likely to be found,
• boreholes placed in the cells indicated that several of the cells were leaking from above and below,
[Appendix B5.35]
• the WMA had no record of what had been placed in the cells and therefore no knowledge of the chemical reactions likely to take place,
• the investigations of complaints from outside the Depot area failed to analyse groundwater for contamination (Legislative Assembly, 9.12.91:6010).
Gibson went on to raise more serious health concerns:
The area contains a million tonnes of some of the most toxic waste known to mankind. Three children of three families living next door to each other have been born with cleft palates. Those sorts of things do not usually happen. Each time it rains at Castlereagh animals die. Children cannot play in their yards because their feet are scalded.
(Legislative Assembly, 9 .12.91:6011)
In September 1992 the Herald reported on responses to a report on the Castlereagh Depot by AGC Woodward-Clyde commissioned by the EPA and released in August. The Coalition of Hawkesbury and Nepean Groups for the Environment claimed that the report supported the beliefs of the local community that the Depot had caused health problems and birth deformities in animals due to leakage of toxic chemicals. The report revealed that the compounds being tested for at the Depot were the least likely to travel in water and the least dangerous. The report also claimed that staff at the depot were inadequately trained, that the contents of all trucks arriving at the Depot were not being analysed, that there were no site inspection and maintenance reports available and that there was no emergency plan (SMH, 21.9.92:8). The criticisms in the report of the management of the Depot were subsequently rejected by the managing director of WRAPS, John Cook (SMH, 22.9.92:4).
In the second reading debate on the Castlereagh Liquid Waste Disposal Depot Bill (see section B6.6) in September, Gibson reiterated the shortcomings in the management of the Depot identified in the AGC- Woodward Clyde report, frequently compared the Castlereagh Depot with Love Canal and was careful to distance his stance from nimbyism by maintaining that it was a question of appropriate siting of rubbish
[Appendix B5.36]
dumps (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6447). A number of events occurred between this time and when the second reading debate was resumed in early March 1993.
52 In October 1992, the Government announced a detailed testing and consultation program at the Castlereagh Waste Depot, including the establishment of a community monitoring committee, health surveys, environmental surveys and a two stage commissioned audit (SMH, 30.10.92:7).
53 The committee was to have representatives from relevant Government departments, the two affected local governments, three environmental groups and five non-aligned community representatives. The committee was to meet monthly during the environmental audit and receive reports on the progress of the audit and to provide comments on these and information about community perceptions (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:670).
54 In late April 1993, Paul Gibson informed the Legislative Assembly that a further two horses on Marianne Streicher's property had died from head tumours and a further six had developed similar tumours. In response, the Minister for the Environment assure the Assembly that further environmental monitoring was being undertaken, including the checking of an allegation about radio-active wastes (Legislative Assembly, 21.4.93:1393).
55 In July 1993, the release of a draft report on Stage II of the independent environmental audit by AGC Woodward-Clyde that showed cyanide, benzene and formaldehyde had been detected in several bores in the groundwater testing program led local action groups and residents to protest at the site and call for the Castlereagh Tip to be closed. The Environment Minister responded that there was insufficient proof and the Government would await the final report in December before making a decision (SMH, 30.7.93:3; WRAPS, 1992-93:29).
56 In the meantime, the Waste Service seemed determined to bring absolutely every scientific technique to bear on the problem.
In addition to the Stage II Audit, Waste Service is undertaking several other studies of the Castlereagh Depot including satellite image
[Appendix B5.37]
interpretation, airborne electromagnetic surveys, ground electromagnetic conductivity surveys, gamma logging of boreholes, and mineralogy and absorptive capacity investigation of Londonderry Clay.
(WRAPS, 1992-93:29)
57 In November 1993, the Herald reported on a number of animal deformities and deaths that had occurred in the vicinity of the Castlereagh Depot. This page one story described the waste dumped in the Depot since 1974 as Toxic waste' and canvassed the possibility that the deformities were due to the leaching of 'toxic chemicals' (SMH, 26.11.93:1). The WRAPS agreed to pay for soil tests on the farm where the deformities had occurred (SMH, 14.12.93:4).
58 In January 1994, the EPA ordered the WRAPS to rectify problems with overflows of contaminated water that occurred during periods of heavy rainfall at the Castlereagh Depot. These problems had been identified in an interim report of the AGC Woodward Clyde study. The EPA was also reported as having commenced a review of the licence conditions for the Depot (SMH, 7.1.94:5).
59 In March 1994, the draft report of the AGC Woodward Clyde study was released, It concluded that there was no evidence that chemicals had leached from the Castlereagh Depot into surrounding properties. It found that some chemicals would have escaped in surface waters and that the groundwater immediately below the Depot was contaminated. The report recommended further monitoring. The president of the Residents' Action Group for the Environment claimed that the study was flawed and that birth deformities in animals continued to occur (SMH, 10.3.94:3).
60 The independent Stage II Environmental Audit was completed in April 1994 and found that 'the potential for movement of waste chemicals off site is considered to be low' and that 'there is a negligible potential for human, livestock and environmental receptor exposure to waste chemicals originating from the site for the pathways assessed' (WRAPS, 1993-94:24). A study by the Health and Agriculture Departments found 'no substantiated link between the WMC [Castlereagh Depot] and reported phenomena in the surrounding community' (WRAPS, 1994- 95:24).
[Appendix B5.38]
61 In late October 1994, the Herald ran several prominent articles about the Castlereagh Depot, following an investigation by the Department of Health which found that the incidence of brain cancer among males in the vicinity of the depot was three times higher than the State average. These articles appeared on pages one, three and four, with headlines 'High brain cancer rate near dump', Death in the shadow of the dump' and 'Cancer link to toxic dump'. The second of the headlines above headed a human interest story about the widow and daughter of one of the brain cancer victims. The account includes interviews with a number of residents in the area who told of their, or family members, problems with poor health, cancer and birth deformities. Most of those interviewed had asked not to be identified for fear of being unable to sell their homes. The writers of the article played on the image of hidden danger: 'But a growing body of evidence suggests that something is terribly wrong in the deceptively peaceful Londonderry bush'. One article added some empirical evidence to the hyperbole of the human interest study by pointing out that what had been dumped there prior to 1988 was largely unknown, and that during 1993-4 the dump received 47.4 tonnes of pesticides and 790 tonnes of paints resins and inks. A further article also made it quite clear that scientific investigation would be virtually unable to establish whether there was a link between the dump and the brain cancers, due to the large number of possible confounding factors (SMH, 26.10.94:3; 27.10.94:1; 27.10.94:4).
62 In April 1995, the new Labor Minister for the Environment, Pam Allan, announced that the Castlereagh Depot would be closed and remediated. This was to take place a year earlier than the Waste Service had recommended (WRAPS, 1994-95:4, 24). While the study by the Department of Health had found brain, breast and uterine cancer rates twice the State average in the vicinity of the Depot, it was 'unable to determine if the cancers were caused by the tip or were the result of other factors' (SMH, 22.4.95:7).
63 In August 1995, the Minister for the Environment announced that the Castlereagh Waste Depot would be closed at the end of 1997, a year earlier than proposed by the Waste Service (SMH, 5.8.95:10).
[Appendix B5.39]
B5.5.3 A Policy Shift — Industrial Waste Minimisation
As mentioned in section B5.5.1, above, the Authority had adopted 'guidelines for implementation of its policy over the next three years' that included that industry should, wherever possible, reduce the amount of waste it produces (MWDA, 1977-78:7). From this point in time, there was no mention of reduction by industry — rather the Authority's policy was stated to be that where wastes were unsuitable for discharge to the sewers, they should be converted to a form that presented no hazard to the environment. In this statement of policy, there was never any mention of whose responsibility this was, industry's or the Authority. However, given that the Authority proceeded with the development of a central treatment plant, and given it stated in 1987- 88 that it regarded liquid waste disposal as a public utility (see, section B5.ll, below), it would appear that it was assumed that it was the Authority's responsibility.
However, in 1987-88, the idea that industry should take at least some responsibility for minimising the amount of liquid waste it produced featured prominently in the Authority's annual report. Noting that 'its liquid waste management strategy is not based solely on providing environmentally sound disposal facilities' it announced it had adopted a 'broader management perspective by encouraging industry to minimise the generation of wastes' (MWDA, 1987-88:29). This policy was reiterated in 1988-89, as well as noting the user pays principle applied to facilities such as the Lidcombe Plant (MWDA, 1988-89:23). In 19889-90, the policy was formalised in the Industrial Liquid Waste Minimisation Strategy, which the Authority describe as comprising 'a mix of regulatory, financial, research and educational measures' (WMA, 1989-90:16).
A further policy initiative in 1989-90 was the requirement that, as part of the registration conditions for waste-generating premises, firms prepare waste management plans. The rationale behind this was that the preparation of these plans would demonstrate where savings could be made by reducing waste collection and disposal costs, as well as the costs of raw materials (WMA, 1989- 90:16). By mid-1991, more than half of the 200 firms responsible for about 80 per cent of the liquid industrial waste stream had submitted waste management plans. If adhered to, these plans were expected to result in an aggregate reduction of 40 per cent in waste generation by mid-1992. The Authority noted that waste management planning made 'good economic, environmental and
[Appendix B5.40]
public relations sense for industry', and that it was pleased with the positive response of industry to the planning requirements (WMA, 1990-91:24).
B5.5.4 Intractable Waste and Scheduled Waste
1 In 1988-89, the New South Wales Government received the findings of the Joint Task Force on Intractable Waste which had been established by the it and the Federal and Victorian governments in 1987. The NSW Government announced that a high temperature incinerator for intractable waste would be established in New South Wales to receive waste from all over Australia, and to be operated by the MWDA (MWDA, 1988-89:26). In 1989-90, the Authority was still waiting for the completion of the community consultation phase (WMA, 1989-90:27). However, the WMA commenced the development of a Hazardous and Special Waste Strategy that applied to 'various hazardous wastes such as bulk liquids, sludges and drum wastes. This also used the framework of the waste management hierarchy' (WMA, 1989-90:11). Following on an initial recommendation of the Joint Task Force that the incinerator be established in Corowa, the Authority established and office in Corowa, which became' the object of concentrated local opposition' (WMA, 1990- 91:36). With the removal of a number of sites from the Joint Task Forces list, and continuing public opposition, the Independent Panel on Intractable Waste was formed in November 1990. Believing that the Panel would, in accordance with its terms of reference, make a final recommendation for a site and a disposal technology, the WMA called for expressions of interest for the environmental impact statement and some aspects of project management. Subsequently, responsibility for the environmental impact statement passed to the Panel (WMA, 1990- 91:36).
2 In 1991-92, the Waste Service's role had been reduced to a provider technical assistance to the Independent Panel (WRAPS, 1991-92:37). However, it continued its investigations and evaluations of emerging technologies that it regarded as being likely contenders in any solution to the intractable waste problem arrived at by ANZECC (WRAPS, 1991- 92:38).
[Appendix B5.41]
With the recommendations of the Indecent Panel against a central facility and in favour of small scale relocatable treatment plants that could be sited near where waste was stored (see section 8.6), the Waste Service joined forces with Australian Defence Industries (Industrial Decontamination Division) to examine the market opportunities for treatment of intractable waste (or scheduled waste as it came to be termed about this time) and evaluate possible treatment technologies (WRAPS, 1992-93:34). In 1993-94, Plasma Arc Centrifugal Treatment was subsequently selected as the technology being most appropriate to the scheduled wastes in storage that required disposal (WRAPS, 1993- 94:25).
Hospital and Medical Wastes
In 1986-87, the Authority completed a review of practices in the management of wastes from hospitals and other medical facilities (MWDA, 1986-87:24). The report from this review recommended that these wastes no longer be accepted at landfills and should be incinerated instead. In July 1989, the Authority ceased accepting hospital and medical wastes at all its depots with the exception of Castlereagh, where it increased its disposal charges with a view to encouraging the private sector to invest in additional medical waste incinerators (MWDA, 1988- 89:17). In 1988-89, the Authority noted that increasing concern was being expressed about these wastes and their disposal (MWDA, 1988- 89:17).
In 1990-91, after the opening of a clinical waste incineration facility by the private sector, the Authority recommended that landfill disposal at Castlereagh be discontinued from July 1990. However, accusations were made by the Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, that there had been corrupt conduct in the awarding by the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, of a contract for medical waste disposal without calling for tenders to a firm in which the former director of the MWDA, Richard (Bob) Connolly, was a senior employee. In January 1991, ICAC reported that there had been no corrupt conduct. Consequently, all NSW hospital waste was then incinerated at Clinical Waste Australia Pty Ltd's high temperature incinerator at Silverwater (SMH, 15.1.91:2). However, the Waste Service appeared to still be
[Appendix B5.42]
receiving some 2000 tonnes of clinical wastes at Castlereagh in 1991-92 (WRAPS, 1991-92:32).
B5.7 Recycling
B5.7.1 Early Assessments
1 In its first year of operation the MWDA investigated alternatives to landfill and in its first annual report stated that recycling was the method most favoured by the MWDA and that 'future planning of the waste stream will be designed to accommodate maximum recycling' (MWDA, 1971-72:7). However, in the following year's Annual Report, 'accommodate maximum recycling' had been changed to 'include facilities for recycling' (MWDA, 1972-73:10), although the Herald had reported in February 1973 that the MWDA had announced it had begun a study of recycling, to cope with the expected increase in waste in the coming years. The future of recycling depended on whether the Government made it compulsory regardless of cost, and on technological innovations (SMH, 6.2.73:10). This was consistent with the view expressed in its Annual Reports at the time that recycling 'could only be successful where economic incentives are created or imposed' (MWDA,1971-72:7; 1972-73:10).
2 In an interview with the Herald in June 1973 for the pollution feature, Connolly said that the MWDA had no desire to move into physical operations, preferring to leave that to local government. It preferred to be an advisory body. He also said that the Authority was not involved in recycling, as this was 'best done on citizen initiatives' (SMH, 4.6.73:3).
3 By 1974, the Authority had concluded, in part from its study of overseas experience, that there were major economic difficulties with recycling due to recycled materials being more expensive than their virgin equivalents. Consequently, it argued that it would be more appropriate that recycling be studied as part of its long term planning for the period after 1978 (Phase II planning) (MWDA,1973-74:12).
[Appendix B5.43]
4 In June 1975, the MWDA released its Position Paper on Recycling. This formalised the distinction between resource recovery (capital intensive recovery of resources from the mixed waste stream) and source separation (labour intensive separation of materials at the point of waste generation). It was reported that resource recovery appeared to have 'the potential to make a significant contribution to waste management' and evaluations of overseas experience were continuing. Notwithstanding this potential, it was also reported that 'it is possible that a future community-wide recycling scheme will involve a combination of both resource recovery and source separation' (MWDA, 1975-74:12-13).
B5.7.2 Source Separation
1 A pilot scheme to evaluate source separation was planned for the Manly-Warringah area (MWDA, 1975-74:12-13). By 1977, it was reported by the MWDA that planning for this scheme had reached 'an advanced stage' (MWDA, 1976-77:20). However, in 1978, the Authority decided to defer the pilot scheme, citing the global economic downturn and the fall in waste paper prices as grounds for not proceeding (MWDA, 1977-78:19).
2 In 1980-81, the MWDA estimated that about 200 000 tonnes (or 10 per cent of total solid waste stream) was being recycled through source separation. It estimated that as much as 300 000 tonnes (or 16 per cent) could theoretically be recycled, but argued that this was not achievable in practice because of 'the reluctance of householders to keep recyclable materials separate from domestic waste' (MWDA, 1980-81:37).
B5.7.3 Recycling Centres
1 A study by Camp, Scott, Furphy, Pty Ltd commissioned by the MWDA in 1973, recommended that the MWDA establish public reception areas for recyclable materials at all its regional landfills and transfer stations (Butlin, 1976:266).
[Appendix B5.44]
2 By 1977, the MWDA had established recycling centres at its regional landfills at Jack's Gully and Lucas Heights (MWDA, 1977-76:15). By 1978-79, the Authority was constructing recycling centres on a 'reverse supermarket' principle (MWDA, 1978-79:18-19). The first of these, at the Lucas Heights landfill, became operational in 1980, although the response by the public in the first six months operation was reported as 'disappointing' (MWDA, 1979-80:4, 16). Further doubts were expressed in 1980-81:
High levels of motivation on the part of the public are required to ensure that recyclables are presorted. Recycling Centres are thus not seen as a total answer to reclamation, but as one measure amongst a number of complementary possibilities.
(MWDA, 1981-80:33)
3 Doubts were expressed again in the 1981-82 and 1982-83 Annual Reports, when it was recorded that the prices for recycled materials were depressed, that the volume of recyclables delivered to the centres was less than satisfactory and that consequently the centres, which by this time included a centre at the Rockdale transfer station, were operating at a loss. The Authority implied that it may have to consider whether it continued to operate the centres. (MWDA,1981-82:4, 22; 1982-83:29). In 1983-84, the Authority reported that the quantity of materials processed through the centres had fallen 15 per cent in calendar year 1983, compared to calendar year 1982. However, there was some improvement in the demand for, and price of waste paper and glass (MWDA, 1983-84:36-37). The Ryde transfer station, opened in May 1985, included a recycling centre which, according to the MWDA, had 'been enthusiastically accepted by users of the station' (MWDA, 1985-86:41). However, demand for recycled materials was variable in 1985-86, with improvements in the demand for ferrous scrap metal and weakening in the demand for waste paper (MWDA, 1985- 86:38-40).
4 In the mid-1980s, the Authority increased the prominence of recycling in its annual reports by bringing information and graphs about the performance of the recycling centres to the front section of the report which covered the Authority's performance in terms of various measures such as its disposal charges at landfills and transfer stations, the past and projected landfill capacity and the compaction being achieved in its landfills (MWDA, 1984-85:13-15; 1985-86:13-15).
[Appendix B5.45]
5 In 1986-87, the Authority arranged a long term agreement with Australian Paper Manufacturers for the purchase of waste paper from the Authority's recycling centres (MWDA, 1986-87:40), and in 1987-88 it reported that the economic environment for recycled material was improving, due to improved handling technology and a steady demand (MWDA, 1987-88).
6 Up until 1987-88, the MWDA had never explicitly stated what it regarded as the role of its recycling centres at its regional depots and transfer stations. These centres, by their nature, were only capable of diverting materials from the waste delivered by small vehicles, a very small amount compared to the total as table B5.2, below, shows.Increases in the amount of materials delivered were generally reported on favourably and decreases were regarded as disappointing, suggesting that the MWDA would not have been averse to an expanding role for the centres. However, in 1987-88, the Authority explicitly stated:
The Authority sees the role of its recycling centres as only a final filter to screen out the small quantities of remaining recyclable materials in the waste streams before the disposal process.
(MWDA, 1987-88:15—emphasis in original)
7 This clarification and downplaying of the potential role of recycling centres was reaffirmed in 1988-89 and 1989-90 (MWDA, 1988-89:10; WMA, 1989-90:7). In 1990-91, the Authority stated that it expected little increase in the quantities of recyclables delivered to its recycling centres, in contrast to house-to-house collection which it expected to increase (WMA, 1990-91:12).
8 In 1988-89, the Authority undertook a review of its recycling centres, concluding that they were being under-utilised and proposing to remedy the situation by establishing performance guidelines in its contracts with the operators and by 'providing feedback on performance to all depots and staff to engender a sense of comparison and competition' (MWDA, 1988-89:20).
9 Another recycling centre was opened at Eastern Creek in January 1992 (WRAPS, 1991-92:29).
[Appendix B5.46]
Quantities recovered bytheMWDA
10 The amounts of materials actually recovered during the 1980s from domestic waste for recycling through the Authority's recycling centres were relatively small compared to the overall size of the waste stream, as table B5.2 shows.
11 Table B5.2 does not, of course, include recycling by private sector house- to-house collections and other industrial and commercial recycling. The actual magnitude of this recycling appears to have been unknown during most of the 1970s and 1980s, although the Authority estimated in mid-1989 that about 17 per cent of all solid waste was being recovered for recycling (MWDA, 1988-89:19).
B5.7.4 The Recycling Hotline and other Publicity Initiatives
1 In March 1978, the Authority established a Recycling Hotline which aimed to assist the public in locating convenient collection points for recyclables. By this time, it had opened a third recycling centre at its regional landfills (MWDA, 1977-78:14-15). The instability in the waste paper market in the early 1980s resulted in rapid changes in the location of private sector collection points, which resulted in the Hotline information being inaccurate (MWDA, 1982-83:31; 1983-84:38).
2 In December 1984 to January 1985, the Authority had consultants running a publicity campaign to raise resident awareness of its recycling facilities at the Auburn transfer station and Lucas Heights, where use of the facilities had been low. The campaign achieved a doubling in the amount of material collected at the facilities (MWDA, 1984-85:41).
[Appendix B5.47]
Table B5.2: Quantities of materials recovered from domestic waste for recycling incomparison to the size of the waste stream. (Domestic waste figure is that published as 'council waste' from 1977 -1991. Source: MWDA annual reports from 1977-78 to 1991-92).
Year Q uan tity recovered at M W DA recycling centres (tonnes)
Q uantity recovered via
kerbside recycling (tonnes)
D om estic w aste (tonnes)
Total w aste stream
(tonnes)1977 not rep o rted 741 786 1 507 1981978 not reported 771 520 1 644 7211979 2 386 (1979-80) 808 281 1 753 5241980 3 255 819 718 1 892 4851981 3 593 863 949 1 990 1381982 3151 853 797 2 045 1881983 2 522
2 369 (1983-84)908 154 1 962 163
1984 2 322 (1984-85) 1 007 497 2 257 8241985 3 618
5 031* (1985-86)1 056 757 2 534 617
1986 5 782 1 130 693 2 848 3601987 6 348 1 211105 3 073 8771988 5 590
5 715 (1988-89)1 282 956 3 360 173
1989 6 757 (1989-90) 1319 816 3 751 1601990 8 164(1.4.90-30.6.1)** 42 000*** 1 328 190 3 406 0951991199219931994
22 814(1992-93) 34 205 (1993-94) 46 362 (1994-95
105 000**** 1 287 446 2 942 309
Much of the increase between 1984-85 and 1985-86 was due to the opening of the Ryde transfer station and its recycling centre.This 15 month reporting period was a consequence of the re-organisation of the MWDA into the Waste Management Authority
*** The Council Recycling Rebate Scheme was introduced on 12.1.91. This figure is for the first two quarters of 1991 only.
**** Average of first and fourth quarter rates (WRAPS, 1991-92:15)
B5.7.5 The Industrial Waste Exchange
1 In March 1977, the Industrial Waste Exchange was established. Thiscomprised a register of types and quantities of industrial waste available (outside of those wastes where commercial collection was occurring), which through publicity about these wastes, aimed to put potential users of waste materials in contact with those producing the wastes
[Appendix B5.48]
(MWDA, 1976-77:15; SMH, 30.6.77:2). In December 1977, the exchange was being reported as a success by the Minister for Local Government, Mr Jensen. He also said that the MWDA was 'emphasising that the recycling of waste materials and urging that disposal should only be a last resort'. Jensen also reported that, after favourable assessments of the success of shopping centre recycling depots, the MWDA was considering expanding its regional recycling depot plans to include shopping centre depots (SMH, 21.12.77:2)
2 In 1984-85, the Authority noted that there had been a change in the nature of listings on the Exchange, with a growing number of listings for materials required, while the listings of materials available were tending to low value materials that generated very few enquiries and remained listed for longer periods (MWDA, 1984-85:43).
3 The Director of the Authority also noted that 'a network of contacts' had developed between Authority staff and the recycling industry, such that exchanges could be arranged directly, rather than having to be listed (MWDA, 1984-85:5).
B5.7.6 Resource Recovery
1 Research and evaluation of resource recovery was undertaken in the early and mid-1970s, with the MWDA reporting in 1977 that it was likely that resource recovery would become a 'significant factor' in Sydney's waste management by the mid-1980s. At this time, there appears to be the first inkling of the idea that community pressure might require resource recovery to be introduced prior to its becoming economic (MWDA, 1976-77:18). In 1978, the Authority expected that centralised resource recovery from mixed waste 'could be feasible by the mid 1980s' (MWDA, 1977-78:5). In its 1978-79 report, the Authority argued that the source separation approaches such as the recycling centres and the Recycling Hotline, the Industrial Waste Exchange, and composting garden waste were 'only applicable to a small proportion of our waste output'. It considered that there was a large potential for resource recovery from the mixed waste stream, although it recognised that this was very much dependent on obtaining suitable markets for the products. The Authority had concluded in a report to be published
[Appendix B5.49]
in August 1979 (MWDA, 1979) that materials recovery and refuse derived fuel were the two technologies most suited to the Sydney region. The Authority intended to trial these technologies (MWDA, 1978-79:26-27). However, by 1981, it still appeared simply to be maintaining a watching brief. While suggesting that centralised resource recovery from mixed waste had the potential to increase threefold the amount of recovered materials from the waste stream by 1990, the Authority was still pessimistic about marketing such materials:
The introduction of such processes would require firm market agreements for the sale of recovered products and much work is still required to obtain such agreement.
(MWDA 1980-81:39)
The Authority concluded that the development of resource recovery technology was not going to be as rapid as it had anticipated when it introduced the Phase II plan in 1976 (MWDA, 1980-81:49; 1981-82:28). However, it maintained that its Phase II plan had the 'flexibility' to introduce centralised resource recovery when it became feasible (MWDA, 1981-82:28). This view was reaffirmed through the second half of the 1980s (MWDA, 1984-85:47; 1985-86:46; 1986-87:47;1987-88:41; 1988-89:32).
From 1981, the MWDA commenced a program of waste sampling and analysis from its Bare Creek Laboratory. The Authority argued that, because resource recovery required high capital investment in plant, it was important to have a detailed understanding of the nature of the waste stream. The Authority intended eventually to have detailed analyses for all of Sydney's waste stream, including that from commercial and industrial premises (MDWA, 1981-82:32).
However, in 1989-90, along with the many other changes, mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, that occurred at this time, resource recovery came under more serious consideration than the watching brief that had been maintained for the previous eighteen years. It was announced that the Authority 'envisages the development of materials processing and recovery systems on a demonstration scale basis within the planning period' (WMA, 1989-90:10). While such wording left plenty of scope for inaction, the Authority did go on to mention the processes being considered, which included composting, waste derived fuels, lightweight aggregate production and chipmulch production. It also
[Appendix B5.50]
proposed undertake a joint preliminary feasibility study with Neutralysis Industries into the production of Neutralite, a product made by firing garbage and clay pellets and suitable for use as lightweight aggregate in concrete or as a landscaping material (WMA, 1989-90:15).
5 In 1990-91, the Authority made available grant funding of$750 000 towards the development of a materials recovery facility. The rationale behind this was the kerbside collection of an increasing range of different materials and keeping them separate for transport was becoming costly and impractical. It was regarded as being more efficient to collect mixed recyclables and sort them in a central materials recovery facility (WMA, 1990-91:20). A feasibility study for a demonstration materials recycling facility was commenced in mid-1992 (WRAPS, 1991-92:19). Between 1990-91 and 1991-92, although the basic concept was the same, the proposed facility changed its name from a materials recovery facility to a materials recycling facility.
6 In 1993-94, the Waste Service reported that it had made a submission for a materials recovery facility in response to a call by Ryde Council for expressions of interest in constructing waste management facilities at its Porter's Creek former landfill site (WRAPS,1993-94:10). In July 1995, the Waste Service, in conjunction with the Macarthur Regional Organisations of Councils, had a development application approved by the Camden Council for a materials recovery facility at Jacks Gully Waste Management Centre (WRAPS, 1994-95:10- 11) .
B5.7.7 The Government/Industry Working Party
1 In August 1979, the Minister for Planning and Environment, the Hon. Paul Landa reported to the Legislative Council that he had appointed a senior industry figure to assist him in bring together the major industries generating waste with a view to having industry play a more significant role in recycling and waste reduction (Legislative Assembly, 23.8.79:532).
2 In 1980, Landa established a joint Government /Industry Working Party to examine ways of increasing the recovery of materials from Sydney's
[Appendix B5.51]
waste stream. The Working Party comprised one representative from the Local Government Association, and four representatives from the glass, paper, aluminium, steel and bottling industries with the Director of the MWDA, Richard Connolly, as chairperson. The Working Party was also to report to the Minister on the feasibility of a total recycling and resource recovery scheme in Sydney (MWDA, 1979-80:5; 1981- 82:23). In 1981, the MWDA reported that the Working Party supported the need for 'controlled pilot schemes to test various means of source separation' (MWDA,1980-81:39).
The Working Party produced its recommendations in a report in December 1981 (Working Party for Industry-Government Co-operation, 1981). These were that:
• the MWDA should maintain its watching brief on overseas developments in centralised resource recovery and this technology could be introduced should it become technically feasible and economically viable,
• although the then current level of recycling in industry was claimed to be high, there was potential for an awareness raising program with industry associations about the potential for recycling,
• source separation at household level was the most feasible option that could be implemented in the short term,
• the two approaches to source separation, kerbside collection and community recycling centres, should be trialed, with the Litter Research Association contributing $126 000 of the total $186 000 cost of the schemes and the MWDA contributing the remainder.
The Working Party believed that kerbside collection would be more effective in recovering recyclables than community recycling centres, but both should be trialed nevertheless. In relation to the latter, the rationale was an attractive site that was convenient and easy to use would 'dispel the traditional rag and bone image'. With a facility that closely resembled other buildings in a shopping centre and identified
[Appendix B5.52]
with it by name ' it was thought [by the Working Party] that the family or community activity of shopping could be extended to include (all within the one trip) the return and sale of household recyclables" (emphasis in original) (MWDA, 1987:7). The concept of the community recycling centre as a form of reverse consumerism was also reflected in the publicity for the first centre established. The radio commercials followed the same breathless format as advertising for a bargain sale:
Have you been to the new Glenquarrie Buy-Back Recycling Centre yet?...They'll pay you instant cash for your old newspapers, aluminium cans, glass and PET bottles and they're conveniently located right next to the Glenquarrie Shopping Centre carpark... so don't throw money out with the garbage ... go to Glenquarrie and get cash for all that recyclable material you use in your home every week ... no item is too small to be worth good money at Glenquarrie.
('../s in original, presumably indicating pauses in the announcer's delivery, rather than omitted text — cited in MWDA, 1987:36)
5 The Authority successfully negotiated with the Campbelltown City Council to establish a community recycling centre at the Glenquarrie Shopping Centre. However, the Authority was less successful in establishing kerbside collection, noting that:
Although approval in principle was obtained from a metropolitan council for conducting the scheme, negotiations with the council and other affected parties were protracted and fruitless.
(MWDA, 1982-83:32)
6 The Authority further noted that the coverage of kerbside collections by private industry was increasing and the Working Party considered that the need for the pilot scheme had declined and so decided to abandon the proposal (MWDA, 1982-83:32).
B5.7.8 Buy Back Centres
1 The first of the community recycling centres, the Glenquarrie Buy Back and Recycling Centre was opened on 1 February 1984 and, according to the MWDA was "proving popular with local people" during its first five months of operation. The delay in finding a shopping centre at which the facility could be located was in part due to the concerns of shop owners that the facility would be "detrimental to the image of the shopping centre' (MWDA, 1987:7). This fear of the facility was also
[Appendix B5.53]
reflected in at least one of the local newspaper reports about the Centre, which noted at the end of a long article describing the history of the Centre and its aims that 'It is well away from local housing' (Macarthur Advertiser, 31.1.84:17 — reproduced in MWDA, 1987:42). In its design for the Centre, the MWDA aimed to screen the operations from public view, as this was seen as important in 'gaining acceptance and maintaining a clean image' (MWDA, 1987:12), and in projecting 'the new image of modernity, cleanliness and efficiency' (MWDA, 1987:27). Similarly, in operating the Centre, recyclable materials from light industry were refused on the grounds that the storage of such miscellanies of recyclables would lead to a 'disaster area look of the yard [which] could not be tolerated since it would be contradictory to the sought after clean image' (MWDA, 1987:15 — emphasis in original).
2 The Authority planned to run the Centre for 15 months and then evaluate its future (MWDA, 1983-84: 38-39). Some $110 000 of the $150 000 total cost of the trial was contributed by the Litter Research Association (MWDA, 1987:4). Soon after, the buy back concept was introduced at the Lucas Heights Recycling Centre also.
3 In 1984-85, the Director of the MWDA expressed doubt that the Centres would ever produce sufficient income to amortise the establishment costs and cover operating costs (MWDA, 1984-85:5). In 1985-86, it was reported that the contractor operating the Glenquarrie Centre had requested early release from the agreement with the Authority, and that the Authority was assessing the future of the Centre (MWDA, 1985-86:5, 42). In 1986-87, the operator was granted release and the Authority put in place interim arrangements for the operation of the Centre (MWDA, 1986-87).
4 The MWDA undertook a review of the Centre and published its report in 1987. The report suggested that:
• the facility was 'at best, a marginal financial venture',
the shopping centre at which it was located was too small to provide a sufficient flow of recyclables,
[Appendix B5.54]
• the concept would be successful at larger shopping complexes, and
• increasing public acceptance of recycling would improve the feasibility of recycling centres and a long-term public education campaign could be considered to bring about this increase (MWDA, 1987:5).
5 As with its composting and chipmulch research (section B5.8, below), the MWDA appears to have paid meticulous attention to scientific or engineering aspects, perhaps at the expense of other aspects that could have been considered in their assessment. In its assessment of the Centre, even the method used by staff to break glass bottles destined for re-melting so that they occupied less volume came under scrutiny:
Two different inodes of breakage were observed. In one, each glass container is individually aimed and thrown against a steel rod standing in the drum of broken glass (cullet). The aim has to be accurate and some considerable force is required in the throwing.
(MWDA, 1987:15 — emphasis in original)6 The poor level of patronage of the Centre (a survey of the public in the
region showed that 67 per cent knew of its existence, but only37 per cent had visited it at least once) was of concern to the Authority, in view of The generally accepted view that the recycling message has been widely accepted by the public' (MWDA, 1987:21,27).
7 In 1987-88, the Authority reported that negotiations between it, the Campbelltown City Council and the Litter Research Association were under way with a view to having the Centre managed by a local community group (MWDA, 1987-88:48). The Challenge Foundation of Picton took over the operation of the Centre in 1988-89 (MWDA, 1988- 89:22).
B5.7.9 The NSW Recycling Committee
1 This Committee was formed in 1986-87. According to the MWDA, the formation was with the support of the Minister for Planning and Environment. The aim of the Committee was to monitor and assess the current situation in NSW in relation to recycling and resource recovery and to recommend to the Minister ways of increasing the levels of these
[Appendix B5.55]
activities. The membership of the Committee comprised: representatives of the MWDA, the SPCC, the Litter Research Association, the Local Government Association, the NSW Recyclers Association, the Australian Institute of Health Surveyors, the Australian Council of Recyclers and the Keep Australia Beautiful Council. The Director of the MWDA chaired the committee. After its first two meetings, the Committee resolved that its first priority should be to develop an information base on existing recycling activities, from which it could develop its recommendations (MWDA, 1986-87:38).
2 By 1987-88, it was reported that the Committee had established that industry could take significant additional quantities of materials recovered from the waste stream, and was proposing to undertake a survey of local government on the recycling schemes being operated by this tier of government (MWDA, 1987-88:35). This was reported on by the Committee in 1989-90 (WMA, 1989-90:14). In August 1988, the Committee released its report at the Inaugural NSW Recycling Seminar. The report identified that about 22 per cent of the domestic waste stream had commercial value and recommended that house to house collections of recyclable materials be improved by providing special collection containers (what was subsequently to become known as kerbside collection) (MWDA, 1988-89:20).
B5.7.10 Adopting a Recycling Target
1 As mentioned in section B5.7.1, above, the MWDA in its first annual report claimed that 'future planning of the waste stream will be designed to accommodate maximum recycling'. Subsequently, and throughout much of the 1980s, the MWDA's position on recycling was that it would encourage recycling to the 'maximum practicable extent7 (see, for example, MWDA, 1981-82:21; 1983-84:10; 1985-86:37). In 1990, however, the WMA committed itself for the first time to a target bases on a percentage of the total solid waste stream, viz.25 per cent, a figure eight per cent higher than that estimated for the previous year as mentioned in section B5.7.3, above (WMA, 1989-90:10).
[Appendix B5.56]
B5.7.11 Corporatist Approaches to Recycling
1 The Authority reported that it had undertaken 'extensive negotiations' with the paper industry, these negotiations resulting in the announcement by Australian Newsprint Mills that it would establish a newsprint recycling plant at Albury. In addition, Visy Board was proposing to build a similar plant in Sydney (WMA,1989-90:12).
2 It is worth noting that these proposals by the paper industry did not occur until there was an oversupply of waste newsprint, due to, as the Authority noted 'the dramatic increase in community awareness of environmental issues over the past 18 months' (WMA,1989-90:12).
3 The plastics industry was also felt the effect of the new dynamics.
In recognition of community concerns for the impact of the disposal of plastics in our environment, the Government, through the WMA and the NSW Recycling Committee, approached the plastics industry during the year to seek a commitment for the support and development of domestic plastics recycling systems.
(WMA, 1989-90:13)
4 The response of the plastics industry was to develop a coded labelling system for plastic packaging, ostensibly to 'facilitate its identification and separation for recycling purposes' (WMA, 1989-90:13). This response subsequently came under considerable criticism — see section B9.6
B5.7.12The Government Recycling Policy
1 The WMA and the Department of Administrative Services jointly developed this Policy in 1989-90. It required all NSW Government departments and statutory authorities to recycle their waste materials and to purchase products with recycled content. Such organisations were also expected to report their recycling performance in their annual reports (WMA, 1989-90:17). A Recycling Advisory Unit was established within the Department of Administrative Services in early 1990 to ensure the Government purchasing contracts gave emphasis to products
[Appendix B5.57]
with recycled content, with the aim of encouraging the growth of recycling industries (Legislative Assembly, 2.5.90:2273; 3.5.90:2379; 16.10.90:8415).
2 It appears that the Government saw this approach to promoting recycling as preferable to public education:
We recognise that the current public awareness of recycling presents an excellent opportunity to effect major social change without the high costs often associated with public education campaigns.... We strongly believe that creating a market for goods made from recycled materials is the best way to encourage recycling.
(Legislative Assembly, 16.10.90:8414)
3 In 1991-92, the Waste Service provided $25 000 to the NSW Government Recycling Advisory Unit to assist with it 'Recycling in Public Places Trial' (WRAPS, 1991-92:25). It is clear from the description of the trial that it was concerned with litter control, however the act of putting litter in a bin had become recycling in a public place.
B5.7.13The Council Recycling Rebate Scheme
1 In 1988-89, the Authority announced it was making available$250 000 in grants to encourage recycling activities. The greater part of this was to be spent on projects relating to kerbside collection, such a providing recycling bags and containers to a number of councils to trial kerbside collection (MWDA, 1988-89:21).
2 In 1989-90, the WMA acknowledged the important role of local government to the success of kerbside collection (WMA, 1989-90:10). The amount allocated to grants to encourage recycling activities was increased to $300 000 (WMA, 1989-90:13).
3 On 12 January 1991, the WMA introduced the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme, under which councils received a rebate of $17.50 per tonne of domestic recyclables they collected. These funds were raised by the Authority with a levy of $1.24 per tonne on council waste disposal fees. The NSW Government provided a guarantee that the Scheme would operate for at least five years (WMA, 1990-91:20).
[Appendix B5.58]
B5.7.14 Waste Recycling and Processing Parks
1 In 1991-92, the Waste Service proposed setting up a Waste Recycling and Processing Park adjacent to the Lucas Heights landfill (WRAPS, 1991-92:14). These Parks were envisaged as industrial parks for a collection of industries involved in waste recycling and processing (WRAPS, 1991-92:19). Further development of the concept of what were subsequently termed Resource Recovery Industry Cluster Parks took place in discussions with interested industry partners in 1993-94 and 1994-95 (WRAPS, 1993-94:12; 1994-95:12).
B5.8 Chipmulch and Compost
1 In 1977, the MWDA began investigations into producing chipmulch and compost from tree loppings and garden prunings (MWDA,1976-77:20). These continued through 1978 to 1984. It was concluded in 1982 that composting would best be carried out as a subsystem of a resource recovery plant (MWDA, 1981-82:30). In 1983 and 1984, research continued into the technical and engineering aspects of chipmulch production, although the Authority admitted that it had not assessed the marketability of the product (MWDA, 1983-84:49). A year later, the Authority invited tenders for the purchase of 50 cubic metre lots of chipmulch but found there was little interest in the product (MWDA, 1984-85). In 1985-86, the Authority reported that it considered that its basic aim of demonstrating the feasibility of producing chipmulch had been achieved (MWDA, 1985-86:55).
2 In 1983-84, the Authority formed a working party to investigate the feasibility of establishing a composting plant in Sydney. This group comprised officers of the Authority, the Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage Board, the State Pollution Control Commission, the Soil Conservation Service and the Departments of Agriculture and Health (MWDA, 1983-84:41-42). By 1984-85, the working party had decided that such plants were worthy of further investigation and the Authority sent a senior officer overseas to study composting plants in Europe and Japan (MWDA, 1984-85:48). It was reported in 1985-86 that composting
[Appendix B5.59]
plants were working satisfactorily overseas, and that the Department of Agriculture had undertaken a market study of the demand for compost. This study concluded that there was sufficient demand to justify establishing a composting plant. However, the study seemed to set up a 'Catch 22' situation, insisting that field trials of marketing the compost product were imperative. However, the working party found that quarantine restrictions prevented it from importing compost from overseas plants to use in the field trials (MWDA, 1985-86:58). Nevertheless, the Working Party continued to investigate the extent of markets for products and the health protection criteria that would be required by the Department of Health (MWDA, 1986-87:43; 1987-88:48).
In December 1987, the Working Party produced and interim report which concluded that composting was a cheaper alternative to incineration for reducing the amount of waste going to landfill (MWDA, 1987-88:48).
In 1989 and 1990, the WMA made available $400 000 in interest-free loans for projects to recover wood waste and vegetation from the waste stream (WMA, 1989-90:12; 1990-91:20).
By 1993-94, the Waste Service had established separate facilities for the collection of garden and wood waste at three of its transfer stations and three of its regional landfills. It also called for tenders for the operation of outdoor composting facilities for garden and wood waste at Eastern Creek, and for the operation of a closed composting facility for food waste (WRAPS, 1993-94:4,11). However, these initiatives experienced delays when the Minister for the Environment in the Coalition Government could not assure the Waste Service that it would not be disadvantaged by food wastes going to lower cost private putrescible waste landfills. With the election of the Labor Government and the restoration of the Waste Service's monopoly on putrescible waste management, the initiatives were once more put in train, with the awarding of a tender to operate garden and wood waste composting at Eastern Creek, and additional composting operations planned for Lucas Heights and Jacks Gully. By this time, the Waste Service had separate facilities for the collection of garden and wood waste at all its waste management centres (WRAPS, 1994-95:5,12,13, 16).
[Appendix B5.60]
B5.9 Methane Control
1 In 1981, the MWDA stated that 'The emission from landfills of methane, which is an odourless gas produced by decomposition, does not create any adverse impacts on the environment' (MWDA, 1981:20). By June 1983, it had successfully conducted its first trial of methane gas extraction from the Merrylands Regional Depot (MWDA, 1982-83:42).In 1983-84, the Authority initiated discussions with the Energy Authority of NSW with regard to using the gas on-site (MWDA, 1983- 84:51), and with a neighbouring brickworks in 1984-85 and 1985-86 (MWDA, 1984-85:56; 1985-86:53). The brickworks was reported to have reached agreement to purchase the gas in1986-87 (MWDA, 1986-87:5). However, this company ceased operations in October 1989, leaving the WMA no choice but to flare the gas until a new user could be found (WMA, 1989-90:21). In 1990-91, the WMA conducted a trial project jointly with Prospect Electricity to examine the feasibility of using the gas to generate electricity (WMA, 1990-91:29), and by 1992-93,120 kW of electricity were being fed into the grid (WRAPS, 1992-93:25).
2 In 1988-89, the Authority's methane extraction techniques were applied to the Thomleigh and Lucas Heights landfills. In the case of the latter, the potential yield of gas was sufficient to justify the establishment of an industrial area nearby to use the gas, and the Authority entered into negotiations with the Sutherland Shire Council for such and area (MWDA, 1988-89:31). However, by1990-91, the WMA was calling for expressions of interest for a power generation plant at the Lucas Heights landfill (WMA, 19990-91:29). At the same time, the Authority commenced work on the methane extraction system at the Bare Creek landfill (WMA, 1990-91:30). Flaring commenced in March 1992 (WRAPS, 1991-92:28), while the Lucas Heights power station started generation in April, 1994 (WRAPS, 1993- 94:20).
[Appendix B5.61]
B5.10 Industry Relations
1 The Herald reported in September 1971 that, according to the Director, the MWDA had been welcomed by industry in Sydney (SMH,25.9.71:19). In 1973, the MWDA reported that it had association with 'by direct representation or by issue of advice' the NSW Government Packaging Industry Commission and the NSW Plastics Waste Management Committee (MWDA, 1972-73:13;1973-74:13). In 1979, the Authority reported that it 'continued to encourage closer liaison with private industry'. After a meeting between the Waste Contractors' Association and senior staff to discuss policies and the operations of regional depots, it was resolved to hold meetings on a regular basis, as was already occurring with the New South Wales Road Transport Association (MWDA, 1978-79:28). This continued throughout the 1980s. This liaison was formalised in 1991-92 with the introduction by the Waste Service of two Customer Councils to maintain formal dialogue with, respectively, local government, and commercial and industry associations (WRAPS, 1991-92:17).
2 In the Director's Review in the 1979-80 Annual Report, Connolly noted that it was the intention that the waste industry would continue to play an important role in the collection, transport and disposal of waste from commercial and industrial premises (MWDA, 1979-80:4). In 1985-86, the Authority noted that it had received a high level of cooperation from industry and commerce and that only in a few instances in the past years had it been necessary to seek recourse in the penal provisions of the Waste Disposal Act (MWDA,1985-86:61).
3 However, in November 1990, the Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court criticised the WMA over its failure to act against a waste transporting company that it knew was illegally storing wastes (SMH, 19.11.90:4).
B5.11 The Defence of the Public Sector Role in Waste Disposal
1 As noted in section B5.10, above, the Authority maintained close liaison with the private sector during the 1970s and early 1980s. In February
[Appendix B5.62]
1980, during the debate in the Legislative Assembly on amendments to the Waste Disposal Act of 1970, the Government Labor members spoke of the virtues of public enterprise and in favour of the MWDA remaining a statutory authority, while the Coalition Opposition argued for private enterprise, although not specifically proposing that the MWDA should be privatised (Legislative Assembly, 27.2.80:4846-4850).
2 In October 1983, the Coalition displayed its interest in private sector involvement in a centralised liquid waste treatment plant with a question in the Legislative Assembly to the Minister for Planning and Environment as to whether the Government was opposed to such involvement (Legislative Assembly, 20.10.83:2042-2043).
3 However, in its 1984-85 annual report, a new section within the chapter on planning appeared. This was titled 'Policy' and set out the justification for the Authority maintaining its monopoly on putrescible waste disposal. Two reasons were advanced for this. Firstly, it was argued that the need for environmental controls at putrescible waste landfills made them a high cost investment, so that it was preferable that they remain a public utility to optimise their use and ensure environmental protection after closure. Secondly, it was noted that the Authority provided for considerable private sector involvement in waste management through not being involved in waste collection services, through engaging private firms to operated its regional depots, and through using contractors to construct its facilities. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Authority expected non-putrescible waste management to remain in the hands of the private sector (MWDA, 1984- 85:46-47).
4 In April 1986, the privatisation agenda of the Coalition was clearly signalled in a speech on the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill by the Hon. J.P. Hannaford in the Legislative Council.
One aspect of the authority's activities which I wish to raise as a matter of perhaps long-term concern — I hope it never in fact will be a concern — is the potential of the authority has to become a monopoly in the waste disposal area. Experience has always shown that authorities that become monopoly organizations can sometime become lazy , sometimes fat, and do not necessarily lead to the best form of administration. There is potential for this authority to become a monopoly.... I raise this as a warning. It is a matter of concern to the Opposition that this sort of monopoly could occur
[Appendix B5.63]
and it does not wish to see it do so, because competition within industry is likely to keep prices down.
(Legislative Council, 23.4.86:2511)
The Authority continued to defend the public monopoly in putrescible waste disposal in 1985-86 and 1986-87, pointing to the Sydney Region Solid Waste Management Plan as evidence of the proven success of such a monopoly. It also emphasised that the private sector had greater involvement in waste management under the MWDA than occurred prior to 1971 (MWDA, 1985-86:45;1986-87:47). It was also noted by the Director of the Authority that, at a public inquiry by Commissioner Woodward under the Planning and Environment Act, 1979, the Authority had opposed a proposal by a private firm to establish a putrescible waste landfill (MWDA,1985- 86:4). The firm was ultimately granted development consent, subject to conditions imposed by the MWDA, one of which was that the landfill should only accept non-putrescible waste (MWDA,1986- 87:4).
In 1986-87, the Authority continued to emphasise the benefits of waste management distributed between a government authority and the private sector, 'which combines the benefits of regional planning and control by a State Authority with the benefits of competitive tendering for provision of labour and plant by the private sector' (MWDA, 1986- 87:19).
In 1987-88, the MWDA, in response to the public sector reforms being introduced by the recently elected Greiner government, enlarged the description of objectives and performance measures in its Annual Report. Among the policies listed was that the Authority would provide facilities for the disposal of putrescible and industrial liquid waste on 'a public utility basis' (MWDA, 1987-88:12). Further justification for the existing balance between public sector and private sector involvement in Sydney's waste transport and disposal were enumerated:
...environmental safeguards are stringently applied through the contracts administration system, an adequate level of service to the community is assured, resources are available to properly plan and conduct research, public sector involvement in day to day operations is minimised and a stable cost structure has been established for the community as a whole.
(MWDA, 1987-88:20)
[Appendix B5.64]
8 In 1988-89, the Authority's position on the balance between private and public sector involvement in waste management was reiterated as being 'particularly important to the effective and efficient management of the region's wastes' (MWDA, 1988-89:36).
9 However, with the publication of the NSW Government Green Paper on Waste in 1992, the Waste Service appears to have changed its position:
The Waste Service, long an equal competitor with the private sector in the disposal of commercial and industrial waste, similarly welcomes the Green Paper's announcement of competition for putrescible waste.
(WRAPS, 1991-92:16)
10 The policy statement released by the Government on 23 June, 1994, 'No Time to Waste', confirmed that the private sector would be able to set up putrescible waste landfills in competition with the Waste Service, although the Service did not report on this change in its operating environment in as optimistic a way as in 1991-92 (WRAPS, 1993-94:2). It also appears that the Waste Service believed that competition from private sector putrescible landfills, with their relatively lower costs, would prevent it from developing composting technologies to divert these wastes from landfill. It appears that a similar argument may have been pursued with respect to the establishment of Resource Recovery Parks (WRAPS, 1994-95:4). However, the Labor Government elected in March 1995 reversed the previous Government's policy with an undertaking that putrescible waste management would remain in public ownership (WRAPS, 1994-95:1).
B5.12 Public Consultation and other Responses to Public Opinion
1 For much of its first decade, public relations for the MWDA was confined to activities such as giving professional advice on waste management to local government, liaison with industry bodies and local government, addresses to professional and local government conferences, disseminating information on the Authority and its operations to schools and other interested groups. While the Environment Planning and Assessment Act of 1979 imposed some public consultation requirements where development applications for waste facilities were involved, by 1982-83 the Authority appeared to be
[Appendix B5.65]
beginning to accept that public consultation was as important as engineering considerations in the siting of liquid waste treatment plants. Remarking on the observations of a senior Authority engineer who had visited a series of such plants in Europe and been surprised by the proximity of housing to the plants and relatively low level of contention over their siting, the Authority acknowledged that:
. . . one of the most significant factors in the successful siting of a plant is to inform the public of exactly what is proposed and of the risk to the environment in NOT having such a facility.
(MWDA, 1982-83:41 emphasis in original)
Several years later, the MWDA again pointed out in its annual report that high temperature incineration plants were operating in residential areas in Europe (MWDA, 1984-85:36).
In 1982-83, the Authority expanded its efforts to 'increase public awareness of waste management practices' and commissioned a film, titled 'The Safe Solution', on its liquid waste disposal operations at Castlereagh (MWDA, 1982-83:47-48). It followed the same logic of 'clarifying its proposal to the wider community' with the Banksmeadow liquid waste treatment plant proposal (MWDA,1983- 84:33). In 1983-84, the Authority produced a second film 'Managing Sydney's Waste' which depicted the planning and waste disposal operations of the Authority (MWDA, 1983-84:55).
By the mid 1980s, the MWDA was noting that it was its policy 'to make full public disclosure of its plans to establish any waste handling facility' (MWDA, 1984-85:23; 1985-86:24).
The consultation process followed in 1984-85 for the Mill Creek extension to the Lucas Heights landfill appears from the list of organisations contacted to have been extraordinarily comprehensive. The Authority attributed the fact that it had received no adverse comments during or after the public exhibition period to its consultation process (MWDA, 1984-85:3, 30).
In 1984-85, the Authority recorded that there had been a significant increase in public enquiries on waste related matters (MWDA,1984- 85:66).
[Appendix B5.66]
7 In its 1986-87 annual report, the Authority appears perhaps to have had some doubts about its earlier policy 'to make full public disclosure of its plans to establish any waste handling facility', replacing this with 'to make full public disclosure of any firm plans to establish any waste handling facility' (emphasis added) (MWDA, 1986-87:21). This policy was reaffirmed in 1987-88 (MWDA,1987-88:14, 23).
8 With the release of the Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy in 1990, public consultation was extended into one of the most central and most professionalised of the Authority's activities — long term waste planning. Concurrent with this was the admission that such planning was no longer the exclusive preserve of scientific rationality.
The mix of these [alternative disposal] options [such as incineration and disposal outside the Sydney region] to be adopted will depend on economic and environmental considerations and community attitudes.The WMA is seeking public comment on the strategy and the weight to be applied to the various options. It proposes to develop a detailed waste management plant which will take into account the public comments received.
(WMA, 1989-90:11)
9 The Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy was circulate widely in 1990 and written submissions sought by February 1991. The Authority also held meetings with industry and environmental groups and regional groupings of local councils (WMA, 1990-91:15). The nature of the responses to the Strategy is described in section B5.2.3, above.
10 By 1990-91, public opposition to the siting of waste facilities had become a major force in the Authority's decision making, being responsible for delays in the siting of both the high temperature incinerator and a major landfill at Londonderry (WMA, 1990-91:4, 7).
11 In 1990-91, the Authority introduced a new approach to public relations, by employing an education officer whose duties included visiting schools and guiding groups through WMA facilities. The Authority also ran recycling seminars for local government (WMA, 1990-91:21-22).
12 In 1991-92, the Waste Service reaffirmed its commitment to public consultation:
[Appendix B5.67]
The Waste Service also warmly welcomes the Green Paper's emphasis on community based decisions. It has been evident for some years that sensitive environmental development cannot be pursued without offering meaningful consultation with residents at the earliest possible stage.
(WRAPS, 1991-92:16)
13 It also began to distinguish between two types of public consultation:
Such consultation requires the services of skilled and independent facilitators and should be seen as quite distinct from conventional public relations and media strategies.
(WRAPS, 1991-92:17)
14 The Waste Service also maintained a discussion group with community representatives in the area surrounding the Lucas Heights landfill and ran several open days at the Castlereagh Depot (WRAPS, 1991-92-17).
15 In 1992-93, the Waste Service formed independently facilitated Community Monitoring Committees at Lucas Heights and Eastern Creek, which were to be involved in the preparation of Environmental Management Plans for each of the landfills. A Community Monitoring Committee was also formed for the Castlereagh Depot, its initial role being to oversee the second stage of the independent environmental audit of the Depot (WRAPS,1992-93:14) (see section B5.5.1). The Waste Service also sponsored a halfday seminar entitled 'Public Involvement Means Better Decision Making' (WRAPS, 1992-93:14).
16 In 1993-94, two more Community Monitoring Committees were formed, at Belrose and Auburn (WRAPS, 1993-94:5). The Waste Service also embarked on a community information campaign structured around a set of cartoon characters comprising the 'Sorter Family', who 'understand that separating waste before it gets to landfill is one way to assist in recycling an reprocessing material and thus make a personal contribution towards the 50% target7, or as a caption to a picture of Environment Minister Hartcher launching the Sorter campaign noted 'doing their bit to reduce waste going to landfill by 50%' (WRAPS, 1993- 94:13). The idea of 'doing your bit' appeared again in the same annual report as a caption — 'Every Little Bit Helps' — to an item about a community open day at Lucas Heights Waste Management Centre (WRAPS, 1993-94:18). The Sorter Family campaign was runner-up in
[Appendix B5.68]
the government section of the Australian Marketing Institute Awards in 1995 (WRAPS, 1994-95:14).
17 This campaign and market research conducted during 1994-95 suggests that the Waste Service was taking a much more sophisticated approach to public relations than formerly (WRAPS, 1994-95:15-16). Amongst the research conducted was a survey of waste management centre customers which revealed that 65 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively, did not mind having a transfer station or a landfill in their locality, provided it was well managed (WRAPS, 1994-95:15).
B5.13 Pricing
1 Until 1988-89, the MWDA had kept its price increases for receiving waste at its depots and transfer station well below the increases in the CPI. However, in April 1989 it increased its charges to councils by20 per cent and its charges for industrial and commercial wastes by 48 per cent. It justified these increases by referring to the greatly increased costs of establishing landfills, and of operating and maintaining them after closure to increasingly strict environmental standards. The Authority also referred to the requirement that had been placed on it to purchase rather than lease waste disposal sites (as occurred with the Castlereagh Depot — see section B5.5.2, above). The Authority further argued that the private sector had failed to establish sufficient non-putrescible landfills, with 49 per cent of commercial and industrial waste being received at Authority depots. Consequently, it was held that the differential pricing for industry and commerce would encourage the private sector to establish additional landfills (MWDA, 1988-89:8; 1989-90:11; 1990-91:28).
2 In 1990-91, the Authority estimated that 57 per cent of commercial and industrial waste was being accepted at its depots and announced that it was planning to divert some of this waste to private depots (WMA, 1990-91:28).
3 In 1991-92, the Waste Service introduced, under the name 'Sort and Save Campaign', differential pricing according to whether waste contained materials that could be recycled (WRAPS, 1991-92:18).
[Appendix B5.69]
With the election of the Labor Government in March 1995, the Minister for the Environment announced increased prices for waste disposal at the Waste Service centres, on the grounds that the increases were necessary to discourage wasteful use of scarce landfill capacity, that the increases could be used to fund new waste management initiatives, and that the increases for council ratepayers were less than the projected CPI increase (WRAPS, 1994-95:14).
APPENDIX B6
The Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995
B6.1 Context and Precedents
B6.1.1 Growth of Environmental Concern
1 While there were no single national public opinion surveys that spanned the interval from 1970 to 1995, there are three separate surveys that are generally accepted as providing a reasonable picture of the changes in public environmental concern over that period (Lothian, 1994; Papadakis, 1996). The surveys and the questions asked are described below.
In the Morgan Gallup Poll from 1975 to 1986, respondents were shown a card with 12 items and asked 'There are many problems facing Australia today. Which of these problems have you been paying attention to these days?' (cited by Papadakis, 1996:171). The proportion of respondents who indicated environment and pollution is shown in the middle series in the upper diagram of figure B6.1.
The Morgan Gallup National Political Issues Index, which was conducted from 1978 to 1992, asked respondents, without prompting, to name the three most important things the Federal Government should be doing something about Lothian, 1994:84). The proportion mentioning conservation and the environment is shown in the lower series in the upper diagram of figure B6.1.
Newspoll Market Research undertook a national poll from 1990 to 1994 which asked 'How important an issue would you say each of the following was to you on how you vote in a Federal election. Would you say of the issue that it is very important, fairly important, or not important on how you would vote?' (cited by Lothian, 1994:82).
[Appendix B6.2]
The proportion nominating the environment as very important is shown in upper series of the upper diagram of figure B6.1.
Figure B6.1: Comparison of national public opinion polls on various aspects ofenvironmental concern and the volume of waste-related articles in the Sydney Morning Herald.
Upper Graph (right):
Results from three national surveys of environmental opinion (source, Lothian, 1994 and Papadakis, 1996).
Lower Graph (below):
The number of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald per year on waste and/or litter (excluding letters to the editor and articles on industrial action among rubbish collectors).
100 t
90 80 70
Number of 60 articles 50 per year 4Q
30 20
10
01930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Jun-72
Proportion of respondents (%)
X• I p
VuJffip
Feb-86 Oct-99
2 If the three surveys are accepted as broad measures of publicenvironmental concern, then figure B6.1 (upper graph) would suggest that there was a decline in the level of concern during the period 1975 to 1989, followed by a rapid increase in 1989, and then decline in the early 1990s, with the possibility of an increase once more in 1993 and 1994.
[Appendix B6.3]
For comparison purposes, the volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald on waste and litter (excluding letters to the editor and articles on industrial action among rubbish collectors) is also shown in figure B6.1, with the time scale for the environmental concern graph aligned with that of the waste graph. It can be seen that there is considerable agreement between the two, particularly with respect to the decline in the 1970s and the rapid increase in the late 1980s.
3 Of all the environmental issues that attracted political attention from 1970 to 1995, the issue that was most closely related to solid waste was the form of waste known variously during this period as industrial waste, toxic waste, hazardous waste, intractable waste or scheduled waste. The main aspects of the evolution of this aspect of waste policy are described in chapter 8. It is worth noting at this point, however, that while there is agreement between the trends for public generalised environmental concern and media attention to waste issues, this is not so clearly the case for industrial waste. As figure B6.2 shows, the coverage in the Herald of dangers from chemicals and toxic waste reached a maximum in 1987, and decreased considerably thereafter.
Figure B6.2: Volume of artides in the Sydney Morning Herald about dangers from chemicalsand waste, excluding editorials and letters to the editor —1950 to 1997.
25 --
20 - -
Number of articles 15 -- per year
10 - -
l .in u tü JL iiiijU
4 The listing of headlines for 1987 provides a profile of the nature of concerns at that time (table B6.1).
[Appendix B6.4]
B6.1.2 Waste Policy at the Federal Level
1 Recycling was first mentioned in Australian Labor Party policy statements in 1973, and in Liberal policy statements in the following year (Papadakis, 1996:135-136). In December 1974, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation recommended the Federal Government impose a tax on bottles and cans not carrying refundable deposits.
The Committee rejected the view of the packaging industry that litter was a 'people problem' (SMH, 6.12.74:1). According to Pausacker (1978:132), the recommendations of the Standing Committee were shelved with the election of a Coalition Government in 1975.
2 In October 1976 the assistant secretary of the Federal Department of Environment, P.J. Crawford, revealed that the Federal Government was considering national policies to deal with 'Australia's rapidly mounting waste disposal problem'. In a paper presented to the Environment 76 conference in Melbourne and reported in the Herald, Crawford said that waste management policy should be seen as a national issue requiring Federal and State collaboration. He mentioned that methods of litter control, packaging controls and wider use of recycling were under consideration. Litter was considered to be an important aspect of the problem, despite its small contribution to the overall waste stream, because litter collection required a disproportionately large part of municipal waste management budgets (in Canberra's case, about 50 per cent more than the cost of maintaining the city's seven garbage tips) (SMH, 13.10.76:12).
3 In 1979, recycling was first mentioned in National Party policy statements (Papadakis, 1996:136).
4 In 1991, the Australian and New Zealand Environment Council released the National Packaging Guidelines. These set targets for reductions in domestic and industrial waste, including that the amount of domestic packaging waste for disposal be reduced by 50 kg per capita between 1991 and 2000. This amounted to a reduction of five per cent per year (Industry Commission, 1996:135).
[Appendix B6.5]
Table B6.1: Listing of headlines of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald during 1987about dangers from chemicals, burning chemicals and toxic and hazardous wastes.
Bayer pulls out of plan for plant at Kurnell.
Chemical spill.
Chemical danger.
Firemen injured.
Danger in the home: many familiar products are a health hazard.
Killer waste shipped secretly.
Firemen hose chemical residue.
These hazards are all around.
Bayer beaten, but debate not over yet.
How a dump left a family sick and in debt.
Health fear in wake of dioxin find.
Toxic time bomb ticks for NSW.
Threat may stay for years.
Poison wastes are dumped here.
Dioxin levels no threat, Govt says. Gutsy bacteria may solve waste problem.
Toxic 'hot spots' found on AGL gasworks site.
Pesticides found in water supplies.
Big rise in child detergent poisoning.
Firemen avert harbour toxic chemical spill.
Site seen as test of toxic disposal.
Toxic task force .
New chemical company tries for plant at Kurnell.
Pesticide risk to breast feeders.
Cancer agent used on sheep.
Some food wraps risky, says study.
Inspectors take fresh look at food wrapping.
Park will be toxic waste dump, says locals.
State moving to support ocean-going waste burner.
Chemical spill causes scare at Toongabbie.
Minister fears chemical tragedy.________________________________________
[Appendix B6.6]
5 In early 1992, the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council endorsed the introduction of the National Kerbside Recycling Strategy. The recycling targets set by the Strategy are listed in table B6.2 (Industry Commission, 1966:136).
Table B6.2: National Kerbside Recycling Strategy targets (source: IndustryCommission, 1996:6-6).
M aterial
1992Target
(%)1995 Level
(%)
DraftProposals
(%)Plastic containers(a)
PET 30 29 75HD PE 50 35 75PVC 15 10 -po lypropy lene 15 -(b) -po lysty rene 10 -(b) -
Glass containers 45 42(c) 50A lum inium cans 65 >65(c) 75Steel cans 25 18(c) 50L iqu idpaperboard 20 11 75N ew sprin t 40 45(est.) -Paper packaging 71 71(c) -
Notes:
(a) Overall target was 25 per cent.
(b) Polypropylene and polystyrene packaging is not generally recycled because of
contamination.
(c) These figures taken from submissions to the Industry Commission Packaging and
Labelling Inquiry in 1996. The remainder are from a report to the
Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency in 1994 by Maunsell Pty Ltd on
the monitoring of performance against waste minimisation and recycling targets.
6 The Strategy also set a number of targets for local government, including that all local government areas would be covered by municipal waste management plans by June 1993, and that local authorities would charge on a full cost recovery basis for domestic waste services by June 1994 . The Strategy also aimed that more than 90 per cent of households in major urban areas would have access to kerbside recycling by June 1994, and that at least 60 per cent of those households
[Appendix B6.7]
with access to a kerbside system would use the system at least once a month by June 1993 (Industry Commission, 1996:136).
The National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy was released in June 1992. Some of the lead up to the this Strategy was described in the annual report of the Waste Management Authority for 1990-91. A Packaging Task Force, in conjunction with industry, set a target of 50 per cent reduction in packaging waste requiring disposal by 2000 in its draft guidelines. The States 'got together' in early 1991 and agreed on a reduction of 50 per cent in the waste requiring disposal by 2000, with 1990 as the base year. As at mid-1991, the approval in principle for the target had been given by State Environment Ministers (WMA, 1990- 91:18). The annual report did not make absolutely clear whether the target was on a per capita basis or not, with the body of the WMA annual report not mentioning per capita, while the Director's review did.
In February 1992, the Herald reported the Minister for the Environment, Ros Kelly, as saying that environment ministers had agreed on a national framework for waste management under which recycling would be increased to reduce the amount of waste going to landfill by 50 per cent by the year 2000 (SMH, 8.2.92:9; also noted by WRAPS, 1991- 92:18)). It should be noted here that the Herald article indicated that it was the total quantity of waste that would be reduced by half, not the per capita rate.
On the eve of the release of the Federal Government's National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy, the Herald's environment writer, who had just returned from a visit to Seattle on a tour sponsored by the Association of Liquidpaperboard Carton Manufacturers, described waste management arrangements in Seattle. The article also questioned whether Australian policy would go beyond the 'feel good' kerbside recycling programs to develop markets for recycled materials, an important lesson that had been learned in Seattle (SMPI, 22.6.92:15).
In June 1992, the Federal Government released the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy. The Strategy recognised a waste management hierarchy of waste avoidance, reduction, reuse, recycling
[Appendix B6.8]
or reclamation, treatment and disposal (Industry Commission,1996:135).
11 The Herald reported strong criticism of the Strategy from environmental groups because of its lack of mandatory time frame for waste reduction and lack of any means of compelling industry to make changes. A spokesperson for the Total Environment Centre said that the reliance on voluntary compliance would render the Strategy ineffective (SMH, 23.6.92:10). As table B6.1 above, shows, three years later it was clear that the at least the National Kerbside Recycling Strategy was not completely ineffective, with the targets met, or close to being met for a number of packaging types.
12 Criticism was also forthcoming some eighteen months later from the Commonwealth Office of Regulation Review, which identified the following aspects of the Strategy that it regarded as unsatisfactory:
• the lack of particular objectives for the proposals,
• analysis was inadequate due to a failure to identify market failure and undertake cost benefit analysis of the proposals,
• there was no comparison of alternative policy instruments, and
• the use of targets ('command and control') was potentially inefficient (Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and Arts, 1994:189).
13 A similar economists critique was expressed by the Packaging Environment Foundation of Australia in 1993 (Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and Arts, 1994:189).
14 The National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, adopted by the Commonwealth Government in 1992, also supported waste minimisation, recycling and improved waste management generally, including pricing that reflected the full costs of waste disposal (Industry Commission, 1996:136-137)
[Appendix B6.9]
In August 1992, it was revealed that the Federal Government, on the last sitting day in late June, had introduced into Parliament legislation to withdraw the 20 per cent sales tax exemption on most recycled paper products. The justification, according to the Treasurer, John Dawkins, was that importers of virgin paper had been illegally claiming the paper was recycled. The Environment Minister, Ros Kelly, had given assurances in 1991 that the exemption would remain, however the decision to withdraw it had been made by Treasury. A spokesperson for the Democrats said that they questioned why the problem could not be solved by Customs inspection and warned that the Democrats would oppose the legislation in the Senate (SMH, 17.8.92:10). The Coalition then joined with the Democrats in opposing the legislation (SMH, 19.8.92:7). However, the Coalition then reversed its position, citing an Industry Commission report that said the exemption was encouraging cheap imports rather than assisting the local recycling industry (SMH, 9.9.92:6). The Federal Government, notwithstanding the assured passage of the legislation in the Senate, then announced it would pay a bounty to manufacturers of products made from recycled paper equal to the withdrawn sales tax exemption (SMH, 10.9.92:8).
In June 1994, the Herald reported on progress on the 1995 recycling targets set by ANZECC in 1992. The targets for aluminium, glass containers and some types of plastics and packaging papers had been met or were close to being met. Steel cans were not expected to meet their 25 per cent target until 1996. Liquidpaperboard products were furthest behind in achieving the target, despite having been the subject of a national publicity campaign to encourage their recycling in 1993 (SMH, 14.6.94:8).
In the first half of 1994, the Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts (SSCERA) undertook an inquiry into:
• the use of incineration as a means of disposal of waste and energy recovery,
• the application of alternative technologies to the disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes, and
[Appendix B6.10]
• the potential for commercial development and the export opportunities of methods of waste disposal and waste disposal technologies (SSCERA, 1994).
18 The Inquiry produced a report in September 1994. While its terms of reference had related more to hazardous waste than waste generally, the Committee noted that its deliberations had been in the:
...context of the waste minimisation hierarchy, and as such [itl considered that incineration and landfill should be used as a last resort. The prime focus of policy and operational sectors of government should be on waste minimisation, reuse and recycling.
(SSCERA, 1994:8)
19 Sydney's waste politics featured substantially in the Committee's deliberations, with submissions and testimony from the Zetland Community Action Group, the Total Environment Centre, the Waste Crisis Network, the Friends of the Earth, the Woollahra and Waverly Councils, the Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association of NSW, the Local Government and Shires Association of NSW and the Waste Service submissions made the Waste Service, the Total Environment Centre, Friends of the Earth (SSCERA, 1994:267-279)
20 Consequently, many of the views that had been put in Sydney waste debates were put once again to the Committee.
• Representatives of environmental groups argued for extended producer responsibility and expressed their suspicion of private sector involvement in waste management (SSCERA, 1994:22, 257- 258). These groups also pointed out that privately owned incinerators or landfills have incentives to ensure a guaranteed supply of waste, but no incentives to reduce the waste throughput (SSCERA, 1994:255, 257).
• The Local Government Association maintained that, through the collection of recyclables, local government in Sydney was subsidising industry by $3.9 million per year (SSCERA,1994:255).
• The Association of Liquidpaperboard Carton Manufacturers argued that packaging going to landfill was a relatively minor
[Appendix B6.ll]
problem, that kerbside recycling was high cost method of reducing waste being subsidised by industry through the artificially set prices for collected recyclables, and that archaic local government collection methods were a barrier to more efficient recycling (SSCERA, 1994:19, 33,47).
A number of other aspects of waste management were raised during theInquiry.
• The view that councils with high recycling rates also produce more waste was reported as having been put to the NSW Joint Select Committee on Waste Management (SSCERA, 1994:46).
• The Committee was of the view that the question of who should have responsibility for waste minimisation had not been resolved. Local government and community groups argued that industry should take full responsibility. The Committee observed that there was more industry could do, but felt that the question remained as to whether industry necessarily should take full responsibility — a question that was in need of further debate and clarification (SSCERA, 1994:50).
• The oversupply of recyclables and price decreases meant that there had emerged a 'formidable' gap between the cost of collection and the market value of all recyclables except aluminium (SSCERA, 1994:50-51).
• Studies of recycling behaviour had shown that recycling was motivated by obligation to 'do the right thing', provided that it was not too burdensome to do so. The Environment Management Industry Association of Australia noted that 'by [recycling] the community considers that it has done its bit' (SSCERA, 1994:51).
• Firms that were developing new technologies to destroy hazardous waste had indicated to the Committee that they were unlikely to invest in these technologies in the uncertain climate of that time. What was required by these companies was government regulation that specified acceptable contamination
[Appendix B6.12]
levels, set a universal and well understood procedure for approval, established an inventory of the waste needing treatment and, most importantly, ensured that waste was treated (SSCERA, 1994:123). The Committee was able to report on just under 20 alternative technologies to high temperature incineration (SSCERA, 1994:128-147). However, ICI Australia in its submission argued that these technologies had not even got to demonstration stage anywhere in the world, and that it preferred existing technologies where 'the risk factor was significantly reduced' (SSCERA, 1994:129.
• The Committee accepted that strong public resistance to high temperature incinerators would make it unlikely that one would ever be built in Australia (SSCERA, 1994:126-127).
• The Committee devoted a whole chapter of its report to 'The Community', arguing that New South Wales experience had demonstrated that the success or failure of waste management proposals depended on community acceptance. A quote from Professor Selinger (chair of the Independent Panel on Intractable Waste) encapsulated the policy makers' feeling of impotence in the face of community activism: 'You might invest $70 million in an incinerator and then people lie on the street and you can't get waste into it — how do you service that loan?' (SSCERA, 1994:171). Nevertheless, the Committee still subscribed to the view that much of community resistance was due to irrational fears: 'The issue is real risk as against perceived risk' (SSCERA, 1994:184).
The Committee appears to have had difficulty in coming up with a cohesive policy response to waste management problems. It prefaced its conclusions with the observation that 'The development of waste management strategies is hindered by uncertainty and indecision' (SSCERA, 1994:284). The Committee endorsed the concept of the waste management hierarchy and the need to place priority on minimisation, recycling and reuse, but pointed out the difficulty of choosing between these three in the absence of adequate information on the economics and environmental impacts. It drew attention to the particular difficulties of instability and uncertainty in the markets for recyclables.
[Appendix B6.13]
23 The Committee also concluded that there was a great deal of confusion in industry and the community about the principles of the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy, criticising the 'production of vast quantities of documentation' of inadequate informational content. The Committee recommended a review of Strategy and the monitoring of performance against the targets (SSCERA, 1994:22, 262- 263).
24 In October 1994, following ANZECC's refusal of an application from local governments for a seat on the Council, the president of the Australian Local Government Association threatened that local government would withdraw its support for kerbside recycling. The application had been refused by a majority of State government ministers (SMH, 9.11.94:11).
B6.1.3 NSW State Environmental Politics and Policy
Early difficulties with the SPCC
1 The former Minister for Conservation, Jack Beale, was appointed as Minister for Environment Control in April 1971 (SMH, 19.4.71:19).Beale, an engineer, had an international reputation for his achievements in water conservation. According to the Herald, Beale boasted that he had built more dams in NSW in his six years in the portfolio than had been built previously in the State (SMH, 24.10.73:6). Water conservation engineering at that time was strongly imbued with the ideology of US- style resource management, something that did not meet the approval of the infant environmental movement in NSW. According to the Herald, the acting head of the Total Environment Centre, Paul Scobie, said that the Centre:
...was not really overjoyed with Mr Beale's appointment because his career as Minister for Conservation was alarming. He built a lot of expensive dams up and down the country that were of no use to anybody.
(SMH, 24.10.73:6)
2 In his first few months, Beale made a number of public statements promising action on environmental problems, apparently without regard to the fact that the action might have to come from other
[Appendix B6.14]
departments under the responsibility of other Ministers. Cabinet friction became public when Beale proposed, without consulting the Minister for Transport, that car exhaust gases should be tested at their annual registration inspection (SMH, 24.10.73:6).
3 By January 1972 the Herald was reporting that the Department of the Environment was a facade. A senior government source described it as a post office for the receipt of public complaints and for their transmission to other departments. The Department consisted of several clerks and its attempt to appoint six technical officers was thwarted by the Department of Health appealing to the Public Service Board. A Health Department spokesperson said that the classification of waterways would be ready for the Minister in about two months. Another government source said it would be two years (SMH, 7.1.72:1; 8.1.72:9).
4 In September 1972. the Herald was attributing Earth Week to the powerlessness of the Minister for Environment Control (SMH, 18.9.72:20).
5 In October 1972, Cabinet agreed to transfer the Clean Air and Clean Waters Acts to Beale's control, but a year later the Premier had still not signed the Executive Council minute to transfer staff from the Department of Health to the Department of Environment Control (SMH, 25.1.73:6).
6 In December 1972, the Public Service Board appointed Eric Coffey, director of the SPCC, to be the permanent head of the Department of Environment Control (SMH, 20.1.73:8).
7 In January 1973, the Herald reported that the State Cabinet transferred the responsibility for the Clean Air Act and the Clean Waters Act from the Minister for Health to the Minister for Environment Control, apparently to strengthen the position of the latter Minister who had been rendered a powerless political figurehead by the appointment of Coffey. All but a few of the Minister's staff in the Department of Environment Control were moved to the headquarters of the SPCC. It was argued that the transfer of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Waters Act to the Department of Environment Control would effectively
[Appendix B6.15]
transfer them to the SPCC. As the director of a statutory authority, Coffey had independent power not subject to the authority of the Minister, but as head of the Department of Environment Control, he was both adviser to the Minister and subject to his authority. Beale was reported to be disappointed with the performance of the SPCC, due to its failure to undertake a review of existing environmental legislation which was one of its functions specified in its enabling legislation, and due to the fact that most cases where the SPCC had intervened in environmental matters it had brought criticism on the Government (SMH, 20.1.73:8).
In February 1973, the SPCC received a directive from Beale that it was to limit its functions solely to those covered by two sections of the Act.This prevented the SPCC from using its powers to direct other government departments to exercise their powers. According to an interview with Beale later in 1973, the reason for this was that Cabinet wanted the SPCC to concentrate on its "supervisory, clean-up' role. However, the Herald reporter also noted that it was possible that either Beale was disenchanted with the SPCC and wanted to reduce its powers further, or Cabinet did not want the SPCC over-riding the powers of other departments. In support of the former possibility, it was noted that Beale had submitted a draft Environment Protection Bill to Cabinet in February 1973. This would establish a 20 person committee of lay people to act as an appeal court for appeals that formerly would have been referred to the SPCC. The remainder of the SPCC's powers were to be transferred to the Ministry for Environment Control. Cabinet referred the draft bill to a Cabinet subcommittee (SMH, 25.10.73:6).
In May 1973, at seminar for NSW Labor politicians, the Opposition announced it would reform the arrangements for environmental matters if elected in 1974. All authority for protection of the environment would be vested in one minister. The laws covering environmental impact statements would be strengthened. Authorities would be established under a Rivers Commission to investigate and remedy pollution in the Georges and Parramatta Rivers. Legislation would be passed to give Government the power to remove advertising hoardings.
[Appendix B6.16]
10 In June 1973, the Herald mentioned in a pollution feature that the Health Department had retained control of the Air and Water Pollution Control Branches (SMH, 4.6.73:1).
11 In August 1973, Beale announced he was resigning from politics reportedly due to his crustaceans with his portfolio (SMH, 24.10.73:6). Both the Total Environment Centre and the Opposition said that the Government's environmental policy had been severely under resourced (SMH, 20.8.73:6; 22.8.73:4). The Opposition spokesperson for the environment claimed that Beale had no power as Minister due to the appointment of Coffey, and had been denied control of environmental functions located in the Departments of Health, Local Government and Lands. The Opposition also indicated they intended to abolish the Department of Environment Control as it had been created mainly as a vote-catcher (SMH, 22.8.73:4).
12 In September 1973, the SPCC in its annual report said that it had difficulty in carrying out its functions with such limited powers (SMH, 24.10.73:6).
13 In late October 1973, the Herald ran two lengthy articles on the problems with the implementation of the Government's environment policy, labelling Beale's ministry as the 'portfolio without power' (SMH, 24.10.73:6; 25.10.73:6). Beale was reported as saying that he believed that the SPCC was obsolete and should be replaced with a new body that was more widely based but with less power. According to the Herald, Beale was setting up a new ministry within the Department of Environment to be known as the Ministry for Environment Control.This would have responsibility for forward planning of environmental management. It appears that Beale was able to use the threat of resigning in protest just before an election in which environmental issues were solidly on the agenda to extract the concession from Cabinet to set up the Ministry. The reporter suggested that the ineffectiveness of the Government's response to environmental problems was because the environmental lobby was comprised of upper and middle class voters who were mainly Liberal supporters. This put the Government in the difficult position of trying to satisfy both the environmental lobby and industry who were also Liberal supporters and faced the costs of installing anti-pollution technology. As a result:
[Appendix B6.17]
...in an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, the Government erected a facade of environment legislation which, in reality, was a portfolio without power.
(SMH, 25.10.73:6)
14 Several days later, the Deputy Premier announced that the Government, if re-elected, would abolish the State Planning Authority and the Department of Environment and create a new ministry and department to take over their responsibilities. This was based on the recommendations of a back bench committee that argued that land use planning and environmental matters could not be separated (SMH, 26.10.73:1).
Responsible and Radical Environmentalism
15 In June 1975, the Minister for Culture Sport and Recreation, Mr Barraclough criticised Federal Government advertisements that urged people to report environmental problems to the Department for the Environment and Conservation and to form themselves into action groups. He termed the latter 'pimping groups' and reiterated his claim that environmental issues had become a 'bandwagon for cranks and extremists'. Members of the Liberal Party Environment Committee defended the former Federal Environment Minister, Moss Cass, against Barraclough's accusation that he was 'a super crank'. The same committee had also criticised the NSW Government for its lack of understanding of environmental issues. Barraclough said that he had no criticism of people with 'a legitimate and balanced attitude to the need to protect the environment7 and subscribed to this view himself. His criticism was of 'cranks and extremists who are increasingly trying to ram their irrational viewpoints down people's throats' (SMH, 7.6.75:2).
16 In late September 1975, the NSW Labor Party's Environment Committee presented a report that had been two years in the writing. According to an account by R. Cavalier in a letter to the editor of the Herald:
The report is unequivocal. It believes that preservation of our national estate is paramount, and that other considerations, so-called 'national development' and the fate of the curtailed industries, must be modified against that paramount consideration.
[Appendix B6.18]
Now in the Australian Labor Party, as in the world outside, there are many who believe quite the converse: that environmental considerations must be modified against certain 'realities'. Many of these people will claim there are 'conservationists but...'
Others, less sophisticated and usually from another generation, are resentful at what they feel is intimidation from the 'trendy middle class'.The latter led the attack on the committee's report. One union official screeched, T have been fighting against environmentalists, preservationists, ecologists — give 'em a name and they'll come to it.'
What was alarming was the response. This banality drew tremendous cheers. The speaker had struck a deep, responsive chord. The persons assailing the report were not worried about details, they were engaged in a campaign of fundamental opposition to environmental protection.
(SMH, 2.10.75:6)
Environmental policy under Labor
17 Just prior to the 1 May 1976 State elections, the NSW Labor Party announced that it would abolish the SPCC if re-elected. Labor's reasons for this were that it believed that the SPCC did not represent community environmental interests, was weighted in favour of industry and was not sufficiently diligent in protecting the environment (SMH, 30.4.76:2).
18 In June 1976, the NSW Labor Party at the State Labor Conference decided to ask the NSW Government to establish a department of planning and environment to administer stronger environment protection laws, including the reviewing of compulsory environmental impact statements for all developments. An independent environment protection authority comprised of conservationists, scientists, unionists, and people from industrial management should be established to advise the Minister on environmental matters (SMH, 14.6.76).
19 In September 1976, Landa instructed the SPCC to draft amendments to the Clean Waters, Clean Air and Noise Control Acts that would impose increased fines, transfer pollution cases from the Courts of Petty Sessions (which had limits on the size fines they could impose) to District or Supreme Courts, and give the public standing in taking action against polluters (SMH, 4.9.76:2).
[Appendix B6.19]
The Annual Report of the SPCC tabled in the Legislative Assembly in September 1976 predicted that growth of Sydney would negate any environmental improvements that had been made, particularly in reducing air pollution. Landa said the Government 'would make polluters pay' (SMH, 10.9.76:1).
In February 1977, the NSW Cabinet split over a subcommittee's recommendation to continue mining in the Myall Lakes National Park. Pro-environment ministers were Mr Landa (Planning and Environment) and Mr Walker (Attorney-General). Pro development ministers were Mr Hills (Energy and Industrial Relations), Mr Day (Decentralisation and Development), Mr Crabtree (Lands) and Mr Gordon (Conservation and Water Resources). The Herald believed that the actions of Premier Wran would be critical in resolving the impasse (SMH, 17.2.77:3).
In July 1977, the Herald reported on a private meeting between the Federal Minister for the Environment, Mr Newman, the NSW Minister for Planning and the Environment, Mr Landa, and conservationists that had taken place in the previous month. The meeting was initiated by Mr Newman, with a view to discussing the Federal Government's plans for returning some aspects of environmental impact assessment to the States. It would seem that Newman was expecting negotiations while Landa saw it as an opportunity to raise the State's standing with conservationists and to accuse the Federal Government of seeking to abrogate its environmental responsibilities:
Mr Newman said yesterday he had been shocked by Mr Landa's attack...'1 sat beside M r Landa and talked about the issue, and then he stood up and launched into this diatribe about the Federal Government's intentions.'
(SMH, 7.7.77:9)
In 1984, Paul Landa died suddenly and was replaced by Terry Sheahan as Attorney General. Sheahan had been Minister for Planning and Environment and was subsequently replaced by Bob Carr (MWDA, 1984-85:6).
The Leader of the Opposition, Nick Greiner, assured the Wilderness Society that a Liberal Government would ban logging within national parks. Carr claimed that the next State election could be significantly influenced by the environmental vote (SMH, 7.8.87:10).
[Appendix B6.20]
25 However the Wilderness Society, the ACF, the Total EnvironmentCentre and the Nature Conservation Society of NSW announced they would not endorse the Unsworth Government in the coming election because the Labor government had not done enough to protect native vegetation in agricultural areas and because it had fast tracked development proposals (SMH, 17.8.87:7).
Environmental policy under the Coalition
26 In September 1989, the Legislative Council blocked the Environmental Offences and Penalties Bill, on the grounds that individuals and groups, in addition to the Minister for the Environment and officers of the SPCC, ought to be able to bring prosecutions against offenders under the Act. The defeat of the Bill was brought about by the combined vote of the ALP and Democrat members and an independent. The Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, argued that the widened standing proposed would Trustrate the Government's attempts to launch major prosecutions, armed with the type of scientific evidence needed to ensure success' (SMH, 23.9.89:11).
27 Commencing in late 1990 and early 1991, Greiner, aided by his top adviser, Gary Sturgess, a disciple of Garett Hardin and the property rights school, enunciated a 'new environmentalism'. The rationale for this new direction in environmental policy was threefold. It would appeal to the free market liberal ideologies of the Coalition, it was held to deal with the underlying causes of environmental conflict, rather that simply being reactive, and it would be leading edge environmental reform. The 'new environmentalism' also carried the hallmark of the Sturgess-inspired post-bureaucratic reforms, the separation of regulatory functions from operational and service functions in government agencies (Kellow, 1995:258-260).
28 After speaking with representatives of the USA Environment Protection Agency in the USA, the Premier, Nick Greiner, announced that the creation of the Environment Protection Authority in New South Wales should Herald a more open approach to the negotiation of waste
[Appendix B6.21]
discharge licences, which would include a role for environmental groups (SMH, 2.6.90:9).
29 The Protection of the Environment Administration Bill to establish an Environment Protection Authority did not pass both houses prior to the May 1991 election. Consequently, due to the Greiner Government's dependence on two independent MLAs with environmental concerns, an amended version of the Bill was passed in December, 1991. The NSW EPA commenced operations on1 March 1992, with responsibility for the regulatory and licensing functions formerly held by the Waste Management Authority. The EPA had a degree of independence from ministerial control which allowed it to set its own directions within the objectives of the Act (Kellow, 1995:261).
30 The No Toxic Waste Incinerator Group ran candidates for the Legislative Council in the 1991 State election. The Group was criticised by Pam Allan for directing its preferences to the Coalition. The person second on the ticket was a member of the National Party (SMH, 21.5.90:6).
31 In August 1991, the NSW Law Society warned that the proposed bill to create the Environment Protection Authority would create an instrumentality with excessive powers to intervene in the affairs of local government. The Society also regarded as a problem the power given to the Minister for the Environment to take criminal or other proceedings against government departments or authorities. Pam Allan was reported as saying that the legislation was not strong enough (SMH, 26.8.91:3).
B6.2 Early Concerns about the MWDA and Landfills
1 The careful planning approach taken by the MWDA in its first few years (see sections B6.2.1, B6.2.2) did not win it friends in some quarters. For example, a member of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly in August 1974 noted in his address-in-reply that:
The Authority has done nothing and all that appears in His Excellency's speech is the fad that it is still searching [for landfill sites]. It is costing
[Appendix B6.22]
the ratepayers of the metropolitan councils $800 000 a year for this body to be set up and just to keep looking for suitable waste disposal sites.
(Legislative Assembly, 15.8.74:344)
However, when in Government in 1980, Labour members were more supportive of the long term waste management planning carried out by the MWDA, one member noting:
When the Opposition castigates the Government, generally in philosophical terms about the merits of private enterprise and the initiative of individuals, I sometimes wonder whether all that is required to solve life's problems is that public enterprise also should be ready to conceive long- range plans. It is a pity that more plans are not drawn up for all facets of public life, sooner or later people will realize that only by scientific planning for the future, anticipating problems, can we improve our society.
(Legislative Assembly, 27.2.80:4848-4849)
As mentioned in Appendix B5.3:2, the MWDA had established a regional landfill at Lucas Heights by 1977. In its planning stages some years before, the MWDA's plan to locate larger landfills on Sydney's outskirts aroused some concern among the Labor members of the Legislative Assembly, in particular Mr O'Connell, the member for Peats. O'Connell introduced a motion into the Assembly in September 1974 that proposed that the Government should provide funds to the MWDA to install a 'modern waste treatment system for the recovery of all recyclable materials and the conversion of the residues to useful commodities', as an alternative to the development of large landfills which were 'anachronistic, wasteful and cause[d] land, water and aesthetic pollution' (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1308).
O'Connell noted that the MWDA had estimated that there was only 2.5 years of landfill capacity remaining, and that by the year 2000, the amount of waste produced would be equivalent to the area of Sydney Harbour filled to a depth of 12.5 feet (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1309). He attributed the problem to increasing population and increasing per capita generation of rubbish, so that:
As the earth becomes more crowded there is no longer an 'away'. One person's trash basket is another's living space.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1309)
[Appendix B6.23]
The metaphor of the 'spaceship earth' featured in O'Connell's justification for the need for recycling and resource recovery:
1 should like to quote from a report that refers to this planet as the spaceship earth. When one thinks about it, that is the truth.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1313)
Waste was also seen as symptomatic of societal moral deficiency:
...the affluent society — a society which has developed the effluent era, a society that lives for today without a care for tomorrow. It is a society wanting new and better material things without care for durability.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1312)
O'Connell's Labor colleague, F.J. Walker noted in the same debate:
Perhaps we should be educating our society to be satisfied with reasonable commodities and not demand more and more.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1317)
Plastic came in for its share of blame for the waste problem.
One of the biggest problems confronting waste disposal is plastic containers and plastic bags. Boat owners have told me that a major nuisance they encounter when using their craft is plastic bags fouling propellers or engine cooling systems.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1314)
O'Connell's preference for large scale centralised resource recovery was based in part on developments in the USA at that time (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1310). Similarly, his proposals for taxation incentives related to recycled content, and for government purchasing of products with recycled content, had precedents in the USA (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1313).
It is also clear from O'Connell's and Walker's speeches that there was by this time a solid appreciation of the potential for surface and groundwater pollution from landfills (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1311,1317).
[Appendix B6.24]
O'Connell expressed distrust of private sector involvement in waste disposal, suggesting that the proposed resource recovery centres should be public enterprises (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1313)
O'Connell was supported by the Labor member for Georges River, Mr F.J. Walker who, in addition to identifying 'more and more elaborate packaging' and 'this packaging explosion' as part of the waste problem, nicely brought into contrast what might be termed the old and new landfill logics. The former saw landfill as beneficial because they replaced wastelands with useful recreation areas, while the latter saw this replacement as undesirable, because what formerly was seen as a wasteland was now seen as valuable for recreation in its own right.
On the one hand there is an undoubted need to find an economic solution to waste disposal problems and to ameliorate the shortage of sporting fields in Sydney, and fields for active recreation of all kinds. On the other hand there is a desperate need to protect our fast disappearing bushland environment with its wildlife and its passive recreation, education and aesthetic values. ... Unfortunately, most Australians, including alderman and politicians, are grossly misinformed and indeed prejudiced about mangroves. The characteristics of mangroves that make them unpopular with Australians are that they are often breeding grounds for sandflies, though not in the metropolitan area, they look slimy and tend to produce a strong odour at times, and they often block water views. What people overlook is that mangroves are among the most naturally fertile and productive areas in the world. Experiments have shown that mangroves produce as much as 2401b per acre of basic food daily. This is far better than any Country Party members can produce under the best horticultural conditions, using the most expensive artificial fertilisers. ...I challenge the thinking of those old-style politicians who see overwhelming merit and supreme priority in the provision of playing fields for little children. I submit that the educative and passive recreation values of our bushland are far more important in our urban sprawls.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1315-1316).
It was quite clear from exchanges between a number of members from both sides of politics that they were well aware of the problem that subsequently became known as NIME (not in my electorate), viz. the conflict that all members faced between acting in the public interest and blighting their political future by accepting a large landfill in their electorate, or acting in the interests of their constituents and their political future by opposing such a landfill (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1320).
[Appendix B6.25]
A consequence of the establishment of the MWDA that was bought to light in this debate by the Opposition was that councils such as Bankstown that had the foresight to make provision for space for landfill well into the future found themselves in the position of having their landfills taken over by the MWDA, and subsequently having to pay the MWDA for the use of these landfills (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1328).
In his response to the Opposition's criticism of the MWDA, the Deputy Premier, Sir Charles Cutler, chronicled the history of the Waste Disposal Act from the 'critical position that had arisen in respect of the disposal of liquid waste' in 1969, to the appointment of A.E. Barton as a 'recognised authority on waste disposal', to the overseas visits by the Minister for Local Government, Mr Morton, and the under secretary of the Department, to the discussions with the Local Government Association, 'all [of which] pointed to the need for the establishment of a co-ordinating and controlling body' (Legislative Assembly,24.9.74:1323).
While accepting that the quantities of waste were increasing, Cutler did not:
. . . accept the accusation that landfill is 'anachronistic and wasteful' and 'causes land, water and aesthetic pollution', as the motion proposes. True many garbage dumps in the past have left much to be desired, but equally many playing fields of today owe their existence to the maligned operation of land fill.
(Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1323)
Cutler's colleague on the Government benches, the ML A for Dubbo referred to another aspect of the old landfill logic — that old brickpits were dangerous to children and therefore the neighbourhood benefited by the pits being filled in (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1327).
Cutler assured the Assembly that, according to the MWDA, landfill was the main method of disposing of waste in Western nations. The Authority endorsed the 'philosophy of maximum use of resource recovery', but it was imperative that disposal areas be available if Sydney was not to end up 'knee-deep in filth'. Furthermore, the glass and paper industries were already collecting substantial amounts of
[Appendix B6.26]
bottles and waste paper for recycling, and further recycling would not be economic (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1324-1325).
19 The motion proposed by O'Connell was finally passed by the Assembly, after the Opposition accepted an amendment by Cutler that removed the parts that were critical of the Government (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1330).
20 Just under two years later in March 1976, a Government member in the Legislative Assembly proposed that the role of the MWDA should be expanded to include centralised resource recovery. The Liberal Member for Wakehurst reported that he had formed a committee including representatives of several North Shore councils and of the beverage, aluminium and glass industries. This committee concluded that 57 per cent of the waste stream was paper, glass and metal, and that if householders and commercial premises separated these categories of waste, then a recycling venture could be economic with the prices for waste paper, glass and metal at that time. The Member for Wakehurst had visited successful resource recovery plants in the USA and believed they could also be established in Sydney (Legislative Assembly, 2.3.76:3807-3812).
B6.3 Legislative Change 1970-1990
1 The Waste Disposal (Amendment) Act of 1980, which received assent in August of that year, removed a minor error in drafting of the 1970 Act that required the MWDA to specify the route to be taken when it ordered waste to be disposed at a particular site. The Act also put in place arrangements for the resolution of disputes between the MWDA and other authorities or Departments (Legislative Assembly, 27.2.80:4372-4373, 4844-4861; MWDA, 1979-80:5).
2 The Waste Disposal Act 1970, was amended on 6 May 1986 in an effort to improve the return of dockets by waste transporters under the four docket system (MWDA, 1985-86:6-7).
3 While the amendments of 1980 and 1986 received largely bipartisan support and created relatively little debate in the New South Wales
[Appendix B6.27]
Parliament, the amendments of 1989 produced lengthy and, at times, unusually earnest debate.
B6.3.1 The Debate on the Waste Disposal (Amendment) and Waste Disposal (Further
Amendment) Bills of 1989
1 In some limited respects, the debate covered the usual aspects that had appeared in debates about environmental policy since at least the time of the Clean Air Bill in the early 1960s. For example, those putting the environmentalist case were accused of subscribing to the views of the lunatic fringe, rather that those of the 'more sensible side of the environmental movement' (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6533).
2 In addition, the employment of 10 000 people in the chemical industry and the urgency of dealing with ICI's stockpile that precluded further research into alternatives were advanced as reasons for proceeding with the incinerator (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6534-6535, 6541, 6547).
3 However, the content of the debates in both the Legislative Assembly and the Council on the 1989 amendments contained elements that were entirely new to the politics of waste in Sydney.
Hyper-Sensitivity to Community Concerns
4 The debates on the amendments took place at a time when a rapid increase in public concern for the environment was taking place in early to mid-1989 (see section B6.1.1 and Papadakis, 1996:172-173). In addition, Sydney had been experiencing increased political and media attention to the problems of beach pollution and mercury and organochlorine residues in fish due to the city's ocean outfalls, a consequence of industrial wastes being discharged either legally or illegally into the sewer system (see Beder, 1989:111-138). Members from both sides of politics spoke frequently of the need for community consultation and acceptance.
5 The Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, argued that the public would not accept a high temperature incinerator operated by the private
[Appendix B6.28]
sector (recalling, no doubt, that such a proposal for Broken Hill had brought forth a petition of 10 000 signatures in1985 — see section B9.6), nor would the public countenance the import of wastes from overseas for destruction in the incinerator. It was also proposed that the incinerator would have oversight from a broad-based independent board of management, with environmentalist representation, and able to receive community input into decisions (Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5493-5494).
I make it absolutely clear that it is not the intention or desire of the Government to carry out this process and establish this facility other than in complete co-operation with, and understanding by, the local community.
(Legislative Assembly, 1.3.1989:5494)
6 Tim Moore also went to great lengths to allay the concerns of members who had made private approaches to him about whether the incinerator would be in their electorates, emphasising that no decision had been made about the siting, and that it would be made in a transparent way through a community task force. 'There is no cross marked secretly and furtively somewhere on a map of New South Wales' (Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5495).
7 The Liberal member for Pittwater, Mr Longley emphasised that:
Siting the facility will be done after extensive community consultation.This is another aspect that is important that reflects this Government's commitment to community consultation. ... The Greiner Government believes deeply in community consultation so that all proposals such as this go forward with the minimum of dislocation, to ensure a positive community response and reception
(Legislative Assembly, 5.4.89:5916)
8 The Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson suggested that:
The only way to sell the incinerator to the public is to be open with the public; otherwise the public will not accept it. The 'not in my backyard' syndrome and the fear component have been present for a long tune. As soon as toxic waste is mentioned, people start to think about property and other values.
(Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5803)
[Appendix B6.29]
9 Gibson attributed the failures of the Wetherill Park (see section B6.5.1), Rinex and Bayer (see section B9.6) proposals for high temperature incinerators to 'the fear component7 (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5803- 5804). A similar attribution was made by the Labor member for Keira, Mr Markham, for the failure of the Wetherill Park proposal (Legislative Assembly, 5.4.89:5921).
10 Frequent reference was made by both Government and Opposition members to the successful siting of a similar facility at Swan Hills in Alberta.
As the experience in Alberta has shown, the public is capable of accepting the risk posed by a hazardous waste disposal facility. What is required is education and consultation, and a commitment by governments to understand and accommodate public concern.
(Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5497; 5.4.89:5920)
11 Correspondingly, reference was made to the failure of previous attempts to site a high temperature incinerator in Australia being due to 'the governments of the day did not educate the electorate about the role this incinerator would play' (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5800).
Bipartisanship
12 In introducing the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill, the Environment Minister, Tim Moore, emphasised that:
The issue of finding a permanent resolution to the disposal of intractable chemical wastes goes well beyond the bounds of party politics. The problem ... clearly needs to be approached on a politically bipartisan basis at both State and Commonwealth levels.
(Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5492)
13 Other Government members accepted that the blame for the past inaction that led to the problem of the accumulation of intractable waste lay with both sides of politics (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.1989:5797).
14 The question of siting the incinerator was one that would 'not be determined by the Government as a political question'.
[Appendix B6.30]
I wish to make it clear also that Cabinet decided on and my parliamentary colleagues have agreed to a proposal from me that the proposed legislation should be introduced and dealt with now, well removed from the question of a decision on the site of the facility so that we, as parliamentarians, will be able to deal with the underlying merits of the concept rather than having to worry about issues related to the protection of our patches.
(Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5496)
While the Labor spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, accepted the need for bipartisanship, several other Labor members were prepared to put their private electoral interests first. One such member was Paul Gibson, the member for Londonderry, in whose electorate the Castlereagh Depot lay — described by him as 'a cancer that is growing under the ground on a daily basis' (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5804). While the Government did not explicitly place the blame for the accumulation of intractable waste withICI Australia, preferring to emphasise the problem as the whole community's (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5797, 5799), Gibson did not mince words:
Toxic waste has been created by industry: industry should be held responsible and made accountable for it. ... All these little nasties we speak about come from IC I.... Most governments have been reluctajit to bring in any legislation that would hamper a firm like ICI.
(Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5802)
Gibson appeared to reject Moore's call to avoid playing electoral politics with the high temperature incinerator, suggesting that the odds for it being located in Londonderry were tens to one, compared to 100 000 to 1 for the Environment Minister or Premier's electorate. He also drew attention to the environmental justice aspects of the issue.
We have seen 4 000 tonnes of coal tar removed from Wollstonecraft and dumped in my electorate of Londonderry. We have seen 2 500 truckloads of toxic waste taken from Hunters Hill and dumped in my electorate of Londonderry. I assure the Minister that the people in my electorate want a fair throw of the dice on the location of the incinerator. The Minister's track record has been to purify the North Shore at the expense of the western suburbs, but the people of Londonderry will have no bar ofthat.
(Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5804)
[Appendix B6.31]
About a year later, Gibson raised the environmental justice implications of the Castlereagh Depot in the Londonderry electorate and warned the Government that unless the concerns at Castlereagh were dealt with, it would be unlikely to ever be able to site a high temperature incinerator in New South Wales (Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:884).
The Labor member for Auburn, Mr Nagle, also rejected bipartisanship.
If Auburn is chosen, the Premier will probably stand next to me and say that it is a bipartisan political approach. That will not stop me from opposing the plant. The plant is ugly. It can be dangerous and destructive to its surrounding environment.
(Legislative Assembly, 5 .4 .89:5924)
In the closing stages of the debate, Tim Moore, once more called for bipartisanship.
I welcome the bipartisanship that has been expressed for this legislation.... Ultimately, one member in this chamber will feel personal political pressure because, no matter where the facility is finally located, it will be within an electorate in New South Wales. A t that time 1 hope that the other 98 members of this house ... will provide support for that member within his or her electorate where the facility is to be located on a totally political value neutral basis.
(Legislative Assembly, 5 .5 .89:5926)
The Opposition in the Legislative Council also supported the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill, referring to the need for bipartisanship to avoid the failures of previous attempts to establish an incinerator. However, Labor members also pointed out that, while an incinerator was required as a short term solution to the accumulation of intractable waste, the companies that produced it should be responsible for research into alternative technologies for disposal or avoidance (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6491).
A further manifestation of the spirit of bipartisanship was the Government's action in sending the Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, to Europe to examine incinerators there (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6498, 7065).
[Appendix B6.32]
The Increased Influence of the Environmental Movement
22 The Opposition gave broad support the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill, but followed the argument that had been put by the Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals Committee (THCC) of the Total Environment Centre (who supported the incinerator). The THCC argued that people in the region destined for a high temperature incinerator would be unlikely to accept it unless the whole population was making an effort to reduce the amount of waste they produced (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5793). The Opposition's spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, took the THCC reasoning further, arguing that strong statements about recycling were needed in the legislation to signal to industry the seriousness of the Government (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5796).
23 The environmental movement had also called for a sunset clause in the legislation, consistent with the recommendation of the Joint Task Force on Intractable Waste (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5801). The sunset clause was proposed as an amendment by the Opposition and accepted by the Government (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5794; 5.4.89:5925). It was argued by a Labor member in the Legislative Council that such a clause would make communities more amenable to accepting an incinerator in their vicinity (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6492).
24 The Government also appeared to be taking note of the arguments put forward by the THCC, with Tim Moore referring to 'a studied and measured letter' from Dr Arnold Edward of the THCC which dealt with the question of separating regulatory and operation roles (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5912).
25 In the Legislative Council, the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill was opposed only by the Hon. Marie Bignold (Call to Australia) and the Hon. Richard Jones (Democrats). Both these members, and in particular Richard Jones, presented detailed technical arguments against the high temperature incinerator that were largely those being put by the environmental groups opposing the incinerator. Jones, for example, quoted at length from a variety of sources including papers by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace in Australia, by USA environmental groups, by the US Environmental Protection Authority and by Swedish
[Appendix B6.33]
environmental protection authorities. The material quoted by Jones amounted to some seven pages of footnote sized text in Hansard.
The case against the incinerator presented by Bignold and Jones involved a number of assertions. Firstly, it was argued that the cancer clusters associated with similar incinerators overseas were evidence of the likely health impacts of an incinerator in New South Wales.Secondly, doubts were raised about the possibility of human error and the difficulty of maintaining the quality of the feedstock to the incinerator so that its emissions would be at an acceptable level. Bhopal, Three Mile Island, Exxon Valdez and Chernobyl were all cited as evidence of human fallibility (but Love Canal was cited by a Coalition member as an example of what could be avoided by having the incinerator — Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6534). Thirdly, it was asserted that there was a good deal of uncertainty in the scientific understanding of the emissions from the combustion of intractable wastes. Fourthly, it was argued that the existence of the incinerator would favour the production of more waste, rather than requiring industry to reduce the production of intractable waste. Fifthly, incineration was being preferred to alternative minimisation and recycling approaches because it was a single, central solution, whereas the wide range, and technical complexity, of alternatives made it difficult to put forward a comprehendible policy response. Sixthly, it was claimed that no consideration had been given to the disposal of incinerator bottom ash, itself a highly toxic substance. The large quantities of waste that had accumulated, and the extreme toxicities of combustion products such as dioxin made it very easy for Jones to question plausibly the legitimacy of the claims of the efficiency of high temperature incinerators (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6495-6504; 6520-6532).
[Appendix B6.34]
B6.3.2 The Waste Management Authority’s Legislative Proposals
1 With the changes to environmental and waste management legislation occurring in the late 1980s, the Waste Management Authority put forward in May 1990 its views on a replacement for the Waste Disposal Act. The WMA saw the purpose of a new Waste Management Act as broadening the role of the WMA and giving 'priority to waste minimisation, recycling and materials and energy recovery over landfill disposal' (WMA, 1990(b):10). The WMA proposed a number of initiatives that could be given effect through the legislation, including that:
• major generators of solid and liquid waste to be required to prepare waste management plans setting out a programmed reduction in waste generation (the WMA doubted that its recently introduced voluntary plans were enforceable under the existing Act),
• the Authority would be have the power to negotiate agreements and provide financial incentives to develop markets for recycled materials,
• the legislation would provide for the Authority developing and operating various resource recovery plants,
• the Authority would determine the conditions for the storage, transport and disposal of hazardous wastes, including the condition that hazard waste generators would be considered to remain owners of wastes until such wastes were accepted by an approved depot for disposal,
• the Authority's monopoly in putrescible waste disposal would be formalised in the legislation, and
• the Authority's area of operation would be extended beyond the Sydney metropolitan area (WMA, 1991:10-16).
[Appendix B6.35]
B6.4 The Proximate Roots of the Waste Crisis — Londonderry
1 In October 1989, the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, was asked in the Legislative Assembly whether the Maroota State Forest, an area of considerable conservation value, was under consideration for a landfill to serve the north west sector of Sydney. Moore gave the Government's assurance that this area would not be used for a landfill, despite it having been, according to Moore, under consideration by the previous Government (Legislative Assembly, 25.10.89:11880).
2 In December 1989, the Parliamentary Urban Development Committee of Cabinet selected a Londonderry site as the only remaining suitable site for a major landfill in north west Sydney from among some 30 possible sites, following upon submissions by the WMA, the Water Board and the Departments of Planning, Housing and Lands (WMA, 1989-90:23). The landfill was to take200 000 tonnes of household, commercial and solid industrial waste per year. The decision was attacked by the National Parks Association (raising the threat to a nearby nature reserve), the local Labor member (the electorate already contained the Castlereagh Tip and a proposed maximum security prison) and the Opposition spokesperson for the environment, Pam Allan (SMH, 4.1.90:2).
3 According to claims by Paul Gibson, the Labor member for Londonderry, the WMA had recommended three sites, Schofields, Maroota or Scheyville, but had been over-ruled by the Ministers for the Environment and for Housing. Schofields was ruled out because of the presence of Aboriginal artefacts, Maroota was ruled out because of its conservation value, and Scheyville was ruled out because the Minister for Housing wished to establish a low-cost housing project there (Legislative Assembly, 28.2.90:480; 9.5.90:2779).
4 Gibson contested the suitability of the Londonderry site on three grounds, its conservation values, its flood proneness, and fairness, in that his electorate already had the Castlereagh Depot and a maximum security prison. Gibson further criticised the Government for the lack of consultation with Penrith Council and for allowing the WMA to proceed with the landfill without a full environmental impact statement. The Minister for the Environment had also revealed to a deputation that the
[Appendix B6.36]
did not have any alternative to the Londonderry landfill (Legislative Assembly, 28.2.90:480-486).
5 The Penrith City Council applied to the Land and Environment Court for a ruling that the landfill was a 'designated development' under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act and therefore a full environmental impact statement was required as part of the local government approval procedure. Because the WMA was a Crown authority, the Council could not refuse the development application, which had been submitted with an environmental assessment report. The Court decision, rather than considering whether the possible impacts justified the closer examination of a full EIS, revolved around
• the definitional niceties of whether the act of soil removal to establish the landfill made it an extractive industry and so a designated development. The Court ruled that a full EIS was not required, although this was only on technical legal grounds and development of the magnitude of the Londonderry proposal ought to have a full environmental impact statement (SMH, 22.9.90:5).
6 In October 1990, the Government reaffirmed that its policy was for the WMA to continue to build transfer stations, in which waste was compacted before being transported to landfills, thereby extending the life of landfills (Legislative Assembly, 9.10.90:7960).
7 In December 1990, the Government offered to defer the establishment of the landfill for five years while research into other options was conducted, if the Penrith City Council could come up with an alternative short-term site. The Mayor of Penrith, Fay Lo Po', regarded this requirement as unfair. The Penrith Council was appealing the Land and Environment Court decision to the Supreme Court. According to the Herald, the deferral followed a submission by the Labor Council to the Minister for the Environment arguing that the Londonderry site was socially and environmentally unacceptable and that the waste should be railed to low population density areas (SMH, 12.12.90:6).
8 In late December 1990, the Supreme Court ruled that the WMA should prepare an EIS before commencing the Londonderry landfill (SMH, 20.12.90:6). According to Gibson, the Government then submitted as an environmental impact statement the previous assessment of
[Appendix B6.37]
environmental effects (a much less detailed document) with a small number of additional pages (Legislative Assembly, 27.2.91:415). According to the Authority, despite the environmental impact statement showing there were no aspects of the proposal where environmental safeguards would fail to prevent environmental impacts, the Penrith Council 'vehemently opposed' the proposal after local residents protested (WMA, 1990-91:30-31).
9 In February 1991, Liberal MP for Penrith, Guy Matheson, announced he was opposing the Londonderry landfill proposal. This breaking of the ranks in the Liberal Party was due, according to a 1995 account of waste management policy in the 90s by John Denlay, to the slim margin by which the seat of Penrith was held for the Liberals (SMH, 18.3.95:31). Matheson and Moore met at the Castlereagh tip and Matheson was reported as accusing Moore of 'hiding behind information given to him by public servants' (SMH, 8.2.91:4).
10 According to Gibson, the Liberal member for Hawkesbury also broke ranks about this time when it became evident from the draft boundaries for the next election that the Londonderry landfill would be in the Hawkesbury electorate (Legislative Assembly, 27.2.91:416).
11 Further resistance mounted in February 1991 with the Mayor of Penrith calling on the Government to abandon the proposal, as Penrith with three jails, the Castlereagh tip, and extensive gravel quarrying was carrying more than its fair share of 'social responsibility'. The No Tip for Londonderry group threatened civil disobedience. Penrith residents claimed Londonderry was chosen for political reasons and was ranked third in the original list of possible sites after Scheyville and Maroota (SMH, 13.2.91:7).
12 In the Legislative Council, the proposed Londonderry landfill was described as:
...the largest garbage tip in the southern hemisphere to be bu ilt... less than a kilometre from a shopping complex and two schools and only three kilometres from the Hawkesbury River. The proposed garbage tip will be 290 hectares , with a capacity of 23 million cubic metres of fill. This will be equivalent to the size of 241 football fields, with a capacity equal to 420 000 backyard swimming pools and the height of a four-storey building.
(Legislative Council, 26.2.91:158)
[Appendix B6.38]
13 The plight of the Coalition Government was put succinctly by the Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, in late February 1991.
I shall tell the house where this [the breaking of ranks by Liberals] is all leading. It is leading to a State election. It has to do with the fact that the pro-posed site for the Londonderry tip is surrounded by four Liberal seats:Blue Mountains and Penrith — two of the most marginal seats in the State — Minchinbury on the other side, which is hanging in there by about 2.5 per cent; and Hawkesbury, which has a margin of about 10 per cent. The little old issue of the Londonderry tip has changed from a suburban issue into the biggest single issue on the environmental calendar in this State.The Government and those members who have turncoated on their own party know that the Londonderry tip issue will be enough to tip all of them out of office. That is what all this is about.
(Legislative Assembly, 27.2.91:416)
14 Some measure of the strength of public feeling is given by the attendance, according to Gibson, of 1000 people from Londonderry at a public meeting in late February. There also appears to have been a high level of distrust of government amongst the population of Londonderry:
They asked me to give the Parliament and the Government this single message: they are not going to cop a promise from the Government between now and the election that the Londonderry tip will be scrapped.
(Legislative Assembly, 27.2.91:416)
15 On 26 March 1991, the Government announced it had abandoned the proposal, following representations to the Minister for the Environment by the members for Minchinbury and Penrith (Legislative Assembly, 2.5.91:3127). In the Herald, the Minister for the Environment was reported as announcing a 're-appraisal of waste-handling policies'. According to the Minister, 'waste management experts believed council garbage destined for landfills could be cut by half through recycling and composting'. This meant the Eastern Creek landfill could take the garbage that had been intended for Londonderry (SMF1, 27.3.91:2).There would be no further landfills or transfer stations (apart from those under construction at Seven Hills and Belrose) established, and the establishment of such landfills and transfer stations would in future be the responsibility of local government (WMA, 1990-91:30-31). The Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, was reported as saying the decision was a 'cynical pre-election ploy'. The Opposition spokesperson
[Appendix B6.39]
on the environment, Pam Allan, suggested that the Londonderry tip would be back on the agenda after the election (SMH, 27.3.91:2). Gibson later claimed that the Government had received 32 000 letters of protest against the Londonderry proposal (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6444).
B6.5 The Lucas Heights Extension Proposal
1 Notwithstanding this policy change by the Government, the Authority announced in October 1991 that it was planning to extend the Lucas Heights landfill (JSCWM, 1993:2). The Authority reported in 1990-91 that an environmental impact statement was nearly completed for an extension of the Lucas Heights landfill and it intended to submit a development application to the Sutherland Shire Council in early 1992 (WMA, 1990-91:31). This Council had a majority of Labor councillors (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1472).
2 In November 1991, Sutherland Shire Council voted to oppose the State Government3 * * * 7s plan to double the size of the Lucas Heights landfill. The Council also expressed its opposition to any incinerator, and continued dumping of toxic waste (SMH, 12.11.91:9; Legislative Assembly, 13.11.91:4449). The managing director of the WMA said that the decision had been made without detailed knowledge of the proposal, including plans for a $12 million recycling plant, an 18-hole golf course and five playing fields (SMH, 16.11.91:7). The Liberal MLA for Sutherland, Mr Downy, also stressed the benefits of the golf course and playing fields. He seemed well aware of the potential for politicisation: T want rational debate on this issue. Information should be disseminated in a rational way' (Legislative Assembly, 13.11.91:4450).
3 In November 1991, the 1990-91 Annual Report of the WMA was tabledin Parliament. According to the Report, if no new landfill sites werefound for Sydney, the only alternatives were major waste-to-energyplants or transport to country areas, both options being five times moreexpensive that landfill. The WMA attributed the crisis to the Governments decision to abandon the Londonderry landfill proposal. The report also noted that an increasing component of the waste stream was commercial, industrial and demolition waste which was increasing at 18 per cent per year (SMH, 18.11.91:1).
[Appendix B6.40]
4 In February 1992, Sutherland Shire Council formed a two person environmental unit which according to the Herald and the Shire President 'would give greater weight to the submissions the council made to State and Federal Governments on major development proposals'. The head of the unit was Dr Gary Smith, and environmental toxicologist who, according to the Herald, had been played a major role in the successful public campaign to halt the Bayer chemical plant proposal at Kumell in 1987 (SMH, 19.2.92:8).
5 About this time, the Blacktown City Council, also a Labor dominated Council, and in the electorate of the Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, refused an application from the MWDA for a transfer station at Seven Hills (Legislative Assembly, 14.10.92:6825).
6 In March 1992, the Waste Management Authority submitted a development application for the Lucas Heights extension to the Sutherland Shire Council (JSCWM, 1993:2). The Council was reported in the Herald as intending to take legal action against the Government for breach of a 1987 agreement that the Lucas Heights landfill would only take waste from seven local government areas (SMH, 3.3.92 missing page).
7 Also in March 1992, the independent member for Manly, Dr Peter Macdonald threatened that if the Government continued with its plans to triple the size of the Lucas Heights landfill, he would include a requirement that the proposal be withdrawn in his private members bill (SMH, 3.3.92:4).
8 A public meeting in Sutherland in early March attracted1500 residents who threatened civil disobedience to stop the landfill extension. The managing director of the WMA maintained that is was the only practical alternative to Sydney's waste disposal problem (SMH, 5.3.92:7).
9 A Commission of Inquiry was announced on 10 March 1992 by the Minister for the Environment under the Environment Planning and Assessment Act 1979. This was to take 'an independent and arm's
[Appendix B6.41]
length review' of the proposal (Legislative Assembly, 10.3.92:828; SMH, 11.3.92:4). This commenced on 9 June 1992.
The Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, claimed that the reason that the Government wished to have the extension to Lucas Heights approved was that it would add some hundreds of millions of dollars to the value of the Waste Management Authority if it was to be privatised (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1465).
In May 1992, the Herald ran a human interest story about a resident in the vicinity of the Lucas Heights landfill. The article also cited the arguments of John Cook, the managing director of the NSW Waste Recycling and Processing Service (WRAPS, formerly the WMA) that the extension was the only 'practical' solution, given that a lot of waste depots filled faster than expected in the 1980s and that the per capita waste generation rate was rising. According to the Herald, John Cook also said:
We need to progressively increase the amount of waste we take out of the waste-stream and add value to it and return it to the community.
We want to play our role in helping to reduce by half the amount of waste generated per capita by Sydneysiders by the year 2000.
(SMH, 6.5.92:5)
In May 1992, the Herald reported that there were 15 land claims registered by the Gandangara Local Land Council covering sacred sites on the area affected by the proposed expansion of the Lucas Heights landfill (SMH, 27.5.92:9).
In June 1992, three Liberal ministers broke ranks to criticise the Lucas Heights extension proposal, saying in their submission to the commission of inquiry that it was not consistent with the Government's move towards a decentralised waste management strategy. The Federal Department of Administrative Services also submitted to the inquiry that it had concerns about the extension because of its close proximity to the Commonwealth's former liquid waste disposal depot and the possible aggravation of seepage from the depot (SMH, 2.6.92:4).
In June 1992, the Commission of Inquiry, chaired by John Woodward, into the extension of the Lucas Heights landfill commenced. Woodward
[Appendix B6.42]
criticised the Environmental Protection Authority for a 'generalised and inadequate' eight page submission. The submission from the WRAPS argued that Sydney was running out of landfill space, had an urgent need for more space, and that the Lucas Heights extension was the best site. The Commission ordered that the EPA and the WRAPS to present more detailed analyses and submit them to the Commission within three months time (SMH, 15.7.92:4). The Waste Service then carried out drilling and testing of the regional groundwater system at Lucas Heights, which showed no evidence of pollution from the Lucas Heights landfill (WRAPS,1992-93:22).
15 The Sutherland Council and environmental groups were arguing that the expansion would destroy valuable flora and fauna and Aboriginal sacred sites, while local groups were more concerned about the risk of 'toxic contamination' after a recent Department of Housing report had revealed that carcinogenic chemicals were leaching into waterways in the area from old waste dumps and the current landfill site (SMH, 10.6.92:3; 12.6.92:3).
16 The Inquiry catalysed a political frenzy of blaming of opponents for problems in the Lucas Heights area. The Herald reported that Tim Moore had authorised a 'raid' by EPA officers during a media tour of the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor and the officers had reported a number of known environmental problems at the site that had not been remedied for at least two years. The Federal Minister for Science and Technology accused the NSW Government of trying to divert attention from its Lucas Heights tip expansion proposal. Tim Moore also accused the Federal Government of trying to avoid its responsibility to remediate the old IWC liquid waste dump at Lucas Heights where, according to the Herald, 'some of the most toxic substances known were dumped in the late 1960s and early 1970s'. The Federal Minister for Administrative Services, however, pointed to an agreement between the Commonwealth and NSW Governments that, although the dump was on Commonwealth land, the State Government would be responsible for regulating and supervising the disposal of liquid waste by the company which had leased the site from the Commonwealth. The State Government had ordered the company to begin remediation works in 1986, but since the election of the Greiner Government, all remediation
[Appendix B6.43]
at the site had ceased (SMH, 12.6.92:3). A Herald editorial a few days later carried the headline 'Sydney's waste policy mess' and condemned Tim Moore's raid on the Lucas Heights reactor as a political stunt and unworthy of the serious attention that waste management policy demanded (SMH, 15.6.92:12).
In mid-July, the Sutherland Shire Council argued before the Commission of Inquiry that the Commission should serve a summons on the Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher, to force the release of the Travers Morgan report on future waste management arrangements for Sydney. This had been commissioned by the Government not long after the announcement in March 1991 that it would not be establishing any further landfills or transfer stations. The Travers Morgan study had examined the economics of waste management, how waste management responsibility could best be transferred to local government and what payment local government should make to the Government for the infrastructure, valued $170 million without the Lucas Height expansion, and $300 million with it. The counsel for the Minister argued, according to the Herald, that 'the release of the document would attract premature public debate which would inhibit Cabinet's ability to make decisions on waste management' (SMH, 15.7.92:4), as well as 'inappropriate commercial speculation' (SMH, 25.7.92:6). Ten days later, the Commissioner ordered the Minister for the Environment to deliver the Travers Morgan report to the Inquiry within two weeks (SMH, 15.7.92:6).
The Government then announced that it would appeal the Commissioner's order within the Land and Environment Court. The Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, condemned the Government7s action, accusing it having an agenda that included the eventual privatisation of waste management, and wanting to expand the Lucas Heights landfill so it could increase the value of the sale. The Liberal MLA for Sutherland, Chris Downy, threatened to hold a public rally outside Parliament House, unless the Government withdrew its appeal (SMH, 29.7.92:5).
In early August 1992, the Sutherland Shire Council released a legal opinion it had obtained that the NSW Government could not legally build the Lucas Heights expansion. This was because recent changes in
[Appendix B6.44]
the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Act passed in Federal Parliament made ANSTO immune to State and local planning laws. As part of the expansion included land belonging to ANSTO, development consent could not legally be given. Furthermore, development of a landfill was outside the remit of the Organisation as defined by the Act (SMH, 6.8.92:13).
20 A week later the Government released its legal advice that there were no reasons that the Lucas Heights expansion should not proceed (SMH, 13.8.92:5).
21 In early September 1992, 300 Sutherland Shire residents rallied outside Parliament House. According to the Herald, the Minister for the Environment had told Council representatives that the Government's decision on the Lucas Heights expansion might be made before the Inquiry was completed (SMH, 2.9.92:3).
22 The Waste Management Authority's development application was withdrawn and the inquiry abandoned with the release of the Green Paper on 24 September 1992 (JSCWM, 1993:3). This announced that the Government would no longer support any development without the support of the local community (WRAPS, 1991-92:18).
23 In January 1995, the Mayor of Sutherland, Councillor Genevieve Rankin, who was also an ALP candidate in the approaching State elections, announced that the Council would serve notice on the WRAPS to close the Lucas Heights landfill by 1 January 2000. This action was justified by reference to the WRAPS having increased the number of councils using the landfill from seven to 23 and to the worse than expected environmental impact. However, the member for Sutherland and the Minister for the Environment labelled the action as a pre-election political stunt and pointed out that the original consent for the landfill had been given in 1987 by the then Minister, Bob Carr (SMH, 28.1.95:7).
24 With the election of the Labor Government in March 1995, the Environment Minister, Pam Allan appointed Mr John Woodward to mediate between the Waste Service and the Sutherland Council, a move that was regarded favourably by the Waste Service (WRAPS, 1994-95:4).
[Appendix B6.45]
The Castlereagh Overtopping Proposal
In January 1992, the WMA announced it was considering covering the Castlereagh Waste Depot with municipal waste as a basis for replanting the area. The Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, accused the Government of reviving its mega-tip proposal (SMH, 21.1.92:5).
In March 1992, Gibson asked the Minister for the Environment whether the Waste Management Authority had plans to use municipal solid waste to 'build a "mega" tip' on top of the Castlereagh Depot, to be informed that the proposal had been approved by his colleague, Bob Carr, and that no further work would be undertaken until the independent environmental audit had been completed (Legislative Assembly, 20.3.92:1650-1651).
In September 1992, as part of an article on the responses to the report on the Castlereagh Depot by AGC Woodward-Clyde released in August of the same year, the Herald reported that the Coalition of Hawkesbury and Nepean Groups for the Environment was calling on the Government not to proceed with plans to cover the Depot with five million tonnes of putrescible waste, while the Opposition's environmental spokesperson gave an undertaking that a Labor government would not proceed with the plan (SMH, 21.9.92:8).
Several days later, Gibson introduced a private members bill into the Legislative Assembly, the Castlereagh Liquid Waste Disposal Depot Bill (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6443-6447). This Bill was debated at various times between late September 1992 and late April 1993. It was supported by the Labor Opposition and two independents, giving the majority needed for the Bill to pass in the Legislative Assembly.
The main aim of the Bill was to prevent the Government from proceeding with a proposed covering of the Castlereagh Depot with solid waste (overtopping). To this end, the legislation required that any overtopping work at the Castlereagh Depot was to be subject to a full environment impact statement and require approval by the local council. The uncertainty about whether a legal interpretation of State Environmental Planning Policy No 3 (SEPP3), the SEPP which had
[Appendix B6.46]
originally allowed the Wran Government to expand the Depot against the wishes of Penrith Council, would allow the proposed overtopping would be removed by the Bill (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:672).
6 In December 1992, the Herald reported that both it and the Opposition had obtained documents that showed that the Government still planned to cover the Castlereagh Depot with household waste. WRAPS had obtained a licence for the purpose from the EPA, despite being advised by its barrister that it was illegal to proceed. The Opposition spokesperson for the environment, Pam Allan, promised that a Labor Government would prevent the proposal from going ahead (SMH, 18.12.92:3).
7 When the second reading debate on the Castlereagh Liquid Waste Disposal Depot Bill resumed in March 1993, the Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher, argued that the changed circumstances, viz. the release of the Green Paper on waste (see section B6.7), the establishment of the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management (see section B6.8 and the October 1992 announcement about further testing and the establishment of a community monitoring committee, meant that the Bill had become irrelevant. Hartcher took considerable pains to detail the Labor Government's role in both the MWDA's 1976 Phase II plan (see section B6.2.2) that proposed the overtopping and the 1981 SEPP that enabled the Depot to continue to operate. Hartcher gave an undertaking that the overtopping proposal would not be considered until the environmental audit announced in October had been completed (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:665-672). As with his predecessor, Hartcher appeared to be looking to science to provide certainty about the impacts of the Castlereagh Depot:
The auditors [conducting the environmental audit of the Depot] will be required to make a conclusive risk assessment of the site to ascertain once and for all whether the site poses any threat to the environment or to public health.
(Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:670)
8 Similar hopes were expressed by the Minister for Administrative Services, Mrs Cohen:
When the audit is finished, the Government will know exactly what is happening at the Castlereagh Depot
[Appendix B6.47]
(Legislative Assembly, 3.11.93:702)
The Labor spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, left little doubt that waste management and electoral politics had become linked in western Sydney:
The Fahey Government has given up all hope of winning back seats in western Sydney. It knows there is no political future for it in the area so it has abandoned any creative attempts to deal with waste disposal and has gone back to dumping waste in Labor electorates, which has been always the case.
(Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:673)
Her speech also suggests that the Castlereagh Depot issue was not simply a conflict between the interests of manufacturing industry in low cost disposal of its liquid wastes and local environmental and amenity interests. It would appear that land and housing developers may also have had an interest in closing the Depot, or at least quelling public concerns about its safety (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:675).
Concerns about the effect of the overtopping in increasing the pressure on the liquid waste contained in the cells were raised by Labor's Mrs Lo Po':
Honourable members can imagine that rubbish piled three storeys high on top of the cells will have the effect of compressing the liquid so that it squirts out the bottom like a garlic press.
(Legislative Assembly, 3.11.93:679)
The independents supported the Opposition and the Bill was passed in the Legislative Assembly on 1 April 1993. The Government appeared to take one further step to distance itself from possible future political damage by proposing an amendment in the committee stage that would make the Director of Planning the determining authority, rather than the Minister for Planning. However, the independents voted with the Opposition and the motion was lost (Legislative Assembly, 1.4.93:1137- 1139).
[Appendix B6.48]
B6.7 The Waste Management Green Paper
1 On 24 September 1992, the NSW Government released its Green Paper on Waste Management. According to the Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher, the Government was 'determined to introduce a strategy to reduce, reuse and recycle' (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6492).
2 While Hartcher was the Minister for the Environment at the time of release of the Green Paper, the preparation of the Paper had also occurred during the time that Tim Moore was Minister for the Environment.
B6.7.1 How the Waste Problem Was Defined
1 The Green Paper provided an account of what had led to the need for policy changes in waste management. Waste management arrangements prior to the 1970 Waste Disposal Act were described as:
...a hodge podge of tips and transfer stations run either by councils or small private companies... The industry was characterised by poor planning, marginally profitable companies keen to contain costs by cutting corners and absence of strategic direction.
(Hartcher, 1992:10)
2 The MWDA was established 'to bring coordination and sound management to an industry in disarray'. It 'fulfilled its charter admirably', however the MWDA and its customers lacked:
...any notion that landfill space is a finite resource and that no matter how well a tip is run, its mere existence affects the local environment. Put simply, the M W DA's role was to find a convenient place to dig a hole, fill it with waste and move onto the next hole.
(Hartcher, 1992:10)
3 According to the Green Paper, the 'rise in environmental awareness' at the end of the 1980s 'brought an appreciation of the external cost of our wasteful practices and the increasing scarcity of land in the Sydney metropolitan area boosted the financial cost of waste disposal' (Hartcher, 1992:10).
[Appendix B6.49]
4 Given the representation of the history of waste management described above, the required goals for policy were:
• to reduce the volume of waste generated,
• to reform the structure of the waste industry, and
• to improve the regulation of the emerging range of sites involved in waste management, such as composting plants, transfer stations and recycling facilities.
5 While reasonably straightforward justifications could be given for the first and third point above, that given for the second point was somewhat more complicated. Firstly, it was noted that 'circumstances have changed considerably' from the 1970s when there were 'good reasons' for a central government waste management agency.According to Hartcher, these changes included the concentration of private sector waste management activity into several large firms, and the increased awareness and involvement of local government in environmental responsibilities. In addition, since the Government had transferred the regulatory functions of the Waste Management Authority (WMA) to the EPA, and had announced in March 1991 that the WMA would not develop any new landfills or transfer stations, Hartcher argued that the Waste Service (formerly the WMA) was no different from any private sector organisation with similar waste management expertise and subject to regulation by the EPA (Hartcher, 1992:11-12)
B6.7.2 Principles Underpinning Policy
1 According to the Green Paper, the policy proposals under consideration were underpinned by a number of principles and existing constraints. Firstly, the Government accepted the 50 per cent reduction in the per capita disposal of waste to landfill that had been set by the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (see section 7.1.1).
[Appendix B6.50]
2 Secondly, the Government had 'adopted a hierarchy of waste management'. This had occurred with the release of the Waste Management Authority's Solid Waste Management Strategy for Sydney in 1990.
3 It is clear from the description of the hierarchy in the Green Paper that the Government viewed the hierarchy as a menu of options, dependent on the dictates of the market as much as upon expert assessment:
The Government's approach to the adoption of the hierarchy is that its implementation should be approached in an holistic manner taking account of local physical and economic constraints. Thus, within the category of recycling, reuse of products without reprocessing is not automatically favoured over the reprocessing of materials as the market should be left to decide which system will be used, based on an appraisal of local conditions and costs.
(Hartcher, 1992:14)
4 The waste hierarchy diagram in the Green Paper was identical with that published two years earlier in the WMA's 1989-90 annual report (see figure 12.1), although the Authority had, in explaining diagram, referred to the hierarchy a s '... a sequentially integrated approach to waste management which gives primary concern to waste minimisation and recycling (WMA 1989-90:9).
5 Thirdly, and consistent with Greiner's 'new environmentalism', the pricing of waste disposal was to take account of environmental costs. According to the Travers Morgan study conducted for the Government earlier that year, the WMA prices for waste disposal would not cover the long term costs of establishing new landfills to replace those presently in use. With no discussion of the issue of whether waste disposal should be costed to cover the construction the landfills being used (in effect, the current generation pays in full for the disposal of its own waste), or to cover the establishment costs of replacements (in effect, the current generation pays in full for the disposal of its own waste and part of the costs of waste disposal for the next generation), the Green Paper opted for the principal that waste disposal costs should cover the replacement costs of landfill space. However, it was noted that higher disposal costs would provide an incentive for recycling, although no reference was made to the trade off between increased charges and incentives for illegal dumping (Hartcher, 1992:14).
[Appendix B6.51]
6 Fourthly, the Green Paper argued that the success of its proposals depended on 'the whole community playing a role in waste reduction', the whole community being described as the State and local governments, industry, interest groups and individuals (Hartcher, 1992:14). For this reason, the Minister for Planning would no longer use the powers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act to over-ride local government decisions on development applications for landfills.
7 Lastly, the Green Paper signalled that the Government viewed the achievement of waste reduction targets as operating within a 'voluntary framework', with regulatory enforcement only applying to the environmental impacts of waste facilities and transport. The responsibility for setting and enforcing of environmental standards would continue to lie with the NSW EPA (Hartcher, 1992:15).
B6.7.3 The Policy Proposals
1 The Green Paper set out policy proposals under five broad areas:
• the restructuring of the waste industry,
• a review of the costs of waste disposal,
• a review of the regulatory framework for waste management,
• voluntary and regulatory management of waste generators and disposers, and
• market development for recycled products.
2 The focus of the Green Paper overall was on municipal waste, with the waste generated by commercial and industrial premises receiving relatively little attention. The five broad areas are now described briefly in turn.
[Appendix B6.52]
Restructuring of the waste industry
3 The Government reported in the Green Paper that it had considered three options, privatising the Waste Service, a contestable franchise model, and selling the Waste Service to all or some of the councils in the Sydney region. The first option was rejected on the grounds that there was a risk of the Waste Service becoming a private monopoly, and that it was unreasonable for the Government to sell Waste Service infrastructure that had been ceded by local government to the MWDA in the 1970s with little or no compensation.
4 The reasons advanced for rejecting the second option turned on the basic requirement for spatially distributed infrastructure in waste management. Under the contestable franchise model, it would be possible that some councils might find that the facilities of the Government's franchisee were more distant (and therefore more costly to transport waste to) that other facilities belonging to the firm or firms not awarded the franchise.
5 Accordingly, the State Government invited local government to consider the purchase of the Waste Service, although the State Government would retain ownership of the Lidcombe Aqueous Waste Treatment Plant and the Castlereagh Depot (Hartcher,1992:18-19).
6 The Green Paper also put forward the idea that local communities should have the choice of accepting landfills in their area, and receiving compensation, or transporting waste out of their area, and paying higher prices for waste disposal (Hartcher, 1992:16).
Waste Disposal Pricing
7 The Green Paper proposed that the Government's IndependentRegulatory and Pricing Tribunal would undertake a review of waste disposal pricing. In addition, the Government would contribute to the cost of research at local government level into the merits of volume- based charging for municipal rubbish collection. It also signalled that it was considering increasing the section 29 levy under the 1970 Waste
[Appendix B6.53]
Disposal Act, which would enable it to increase payments under the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme (see section B10.3.2) (Hartcher, 1992:21-22).
Regulatory Framework for Waste
8 The policy proposals put forward in this part of the Green Paper were mainly simple re-statements of options that were available to the Government in environmental management generally through the proposals in the Protection of the Environment Administration(No 2), 1991. These related to consolidating, integrating and streamlining the body of regulations under the Clean Waters Act and the Clean Air Act. It was also proposed that the definition of waste within the regulatory regime be broadened, so that material formed by recycling or processing waste would also be classified as waste.
9 Finally, the possibility that the Waste Prevention and Minimisation Plans, previously required by the WMA as part of the conditions for the registration of waste generating premises (see sections B6.5.3 and B6.3.2), might become part of the conditions of licences for these premises administered by the NSW EPA (Hartcher, 1992:24-27).
Voluntary and Regulatory Management of Generators and Disposers
10 Under this heading, the Green Paper put forward a mixture of various policy options, which appeared to be more a means of refuting some of the criticisms it received from those who disagreed with its market- based policies. The argument that private operators of landfills would have no incentive to reduce waste volumes was countered by reference to the possibility that the EPA could impose on such operators requirements for the establishment of recycling and recovery facilities at their landfill sites as part of their licensing conditions. The argument that industry would not achieve desirable waste reduction targets unless they were imposed by government was countered by suggesting that imposition of such targets would lead to stockpiles of recyclables for which there was no market, resulting in falling prices and pressure on the viability of council kerbside recycling schemes. According to the
[Appendix B6.54]
Green Paper, this undesirable outcome would not occur if industry were allowed voluntary targets.
11 The last of the refutations was a detailed rejection of the introduction of container deposit legislation (see section B10.5). In the introduction to the section in the Green Paper on voluntary and regulatory management of generators and disposers, it was noted:
The introduction of Container Deposit Legislation (CDL) is one of the most frequently mentioned issues in letters to the Minister for the Environment on waste management matters.
(Hartcher, 1992:31)
12 However, a second important theme among the various policy options canvassed was the threat of their introduction if voluntary approaches proved ineffective. For example, the Paper canvassed the possibility of using Protection of the Environment Policies (PEPs) similar to State Environment Planning Policies (SEPPs) to require councils to establish recycling schemes.
13 In relation to container deposit legislation, the Government undertook to continue monitoring the success of such legislation elsewhere, and to re-examine the issue in the light of the findings of the proposed Joint Select Committee on Waste Management. The German Dual System was also referred to as a system that went beyond what the Government considered as necessary, but would nevertheless be monitored closely.
14 The possibility of banning particular products that were "entirely non- recyclable and incapable of safe disposal' was also alluded to (Hartcher, 1992:28-33).
Market Development for Recycled Products
15 The concept of market development for recycled products had already been announced in Premier Greiner's statement on 'new environmentalism' (WMA, 1990(b):ll).
16 The Government's proposal in the Green Paper was to increase the purchasing of products with recycled content by Government departments and statutory authorities.
[Appendix B6.55]
17 The simple economic logic put forward, that once the price of recycled materials reached parity with, or fell below, that for raw materials, manufacturers would start using recycled materials, gave no consideration to the important question of uncertainty of supply of recycled materials in comparison to raw materials where relationships of trust with suppliers and backward integration strategies ensured certainty of supply (Hartcher, 1992:35).
B6.7.4 Reaction to the Green Paper
1 Labor's Mrs LoPo referred to the Green Paper as 'a blueprint on how to dump on western Sydney'. According to Mrs Lo Po the Government's proposal to allow the entry of the private sector into putrescible waste disposal had resulted in several companies approaching the Penrith Council with a view to establishing landfills for putrescible waste in the area (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:678).
B6.8 The Joint Select Committee on Waste Management
B6.8.1 Proposals for a Joint Select Committee
The Macdonald motion
1 In February 1992, the independent member for Manly, Dr PeterMacdonald, announced he was going to introduce a private members bill to establish a public inquiry into Sydney's long term garbage disposal requirements and to evaluate privatisation of garbage disposal. The bill had the potential to be passed provided support from the ALP and other independents was forthcoming. Macdonald argued that the government was trying to avoid one of its major environmental responsibilities and that: 'There needs to be centralised co-ordination of Sydney's waste and recycling, targets set and full waste minimisation strategy put in place' (SMH, 12.2.92:8).
The Downey motion
[Appendix B6.56]
2 In March 1992, the Liberal ML A for Sutherland, Mr Downy, moved a motion calling upon the Government 'to agree to establish a select committee into long term waste strategies to be dealt with in the proposed Government policy paper on the waste stream' (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1460). In his introduction to the motion, Downy made it quite clear that he considered waste minimisation and recycling to be serious policy options, maintaining that 'This megatip syndrome concept has failed dismally. No one has planned for this city's future waste management' (of course, the Waste Management Authority had planned extensively in producing the 1990 Sydney Waste Strategy). Downy was also at pains not to condemn the opposition in Sutherland to the Lucas Heights extension as nimbyism, care that was also taken by Gibson later in the year (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1462; 24.9.92:6447).
3 However, the Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, while not opposing the motion, nonetheless accused the Government of simply trying to save Downy's seat in the next election (a three per cent swing would have been sufficient to unseat him) (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1463).
4 The Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore's, contribution to thedebate on the motion was to emphasise the Government's commitment to the waste hierarchy.
It is the intention of the Government to establish, prior to the conclusion of the Autumn sittings of the Parliament, a joint select committee comprising members of both Houses of the Parliament to deal with matters as outlined in the motion of the honourable member for Sutherland dealing with the hierarchy of waste in our society. Some time ago, in 1989 or early 1990, the Government formally adopted a hierarchy of waste management. The first element ofthat hierarchy of waste management, and the most important element, is to seek to avoid the production of waste in the first instance. That involves both the elimination of unnecessary packaging and unnecessary consumption in the domestic waste streams, and encouraging industry to move towards what is known generically as cleaner production that uses less nasty material and produces lest waste, whether it is of a hazardous or special waste category or a waste suitable to be put in a landfill.
It is only after we have addressed the issue of waste minimisation — that is, reducing the absolute amount of waste produced in our society, preferably reducing the per capita levels of waste produced in our society — that we should turn to issues such as recycling and reuse. Then, and only then, should we turn to the question of disposal.
[Appendix B6.57]
(Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1466-1467)
5 Moore also foreshadowed that an important term of reference for the Committee would be the question of creation of markets for products made out of recycled materials. The Government clearly found the idea of cleaner production attractive, in that it promised both environmental benefits and benefits to industry (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1468- 1469).
6 The member for Penrith, Mrs Lo Po', argued that the Coalition'spenchant for privatisation was inconsistent with waste minimisation, in that private sector landfill operators would have no incentive to reduce the amount of waste going into the landfill (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1470). She put this argument again in November 1994 during the debate on the Landfill Depots (Moratorium) Bill (see section B6.13), also claiming that her view was shared by the NSW EPA, at least in respect of Pacific Waste Management (Legislative Assembly, 29.11.94:5914).
7 The independent member for Manly, Dr Macdonald asked that the Committee should consider the broader political issues of waste management, such as privatisation and centralisation versus decentralisation (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1471).
8 The debate finished with a heated argument as to whether waste management was a political issue or not:
Mr Downy: ...I am disappointed that the Labor Party should try to make a political issue out of this.Mrs Lo Po: It is politicalMr Downy: It is not political. Every speaker from this side of the House talked about the issues involved. The Opposition played politics...[interruption]Do not have the hide to tell me I am a hypocrite. You would be the biggest hypocrite in the place.
(Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1472-1473)
B6.8.2 The Terms of Reference and Membership
1 The terms of reference were announced on 13 October 1992:
[Appendix B6.58]
That the Joint Select Committee examine and report upon the 'Waste Management Green Paper' having regard to:
(a) the aim to achieve a 50% reduction in waste quantities per capita by the year 2000;
(b) the need to ensure community involvement into siting decisions for was te management facilities;
(c) the need to ensure that sufficient capacity is available in waste management facilities to cope with NSW waste management requirements;
(d) other matters related to waste management raised in the Green Paper;
(e) future statewide strategies for waste management concentrating on options for waste minimisation, reduction in waste at source, recycling and community participation in the formulation and implementation of these strategies;
(f) long term safe disposal, or processing of remaining waste, with minimum environmental impact; and
(g) proposals to transfer waste management to local government.(JSCWM, 1993:v, 1)
It was alleged in the Legislative Assembly that the terms of reference forthe JSCWM purposefully excluded consideration of liquid industrialwaste and Castlereagh (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:674).
The Committee comprised:
• five Coalition members, including the member for Sutherland, Chris Downey, whose electorate had been affected by the proposals to extend Lucas Heights;
• three Labor members, including Paul Gibson, in whose electorate the Castlereagh Depot and the Londonderry proposal were situated, and Pam Allan, the Opposition spokesperson on the environment;
• the Australian Democrats MLC, the Hon. Richard Jones; and
• the independent member for Manly, Dr Peter Macdonald (JSCWM, 1993:iii).
[Appendix B6.59]
As mentioned in section B6.7.4, above, the Green Paper proposed that the Committee have a Local Government Reference Group to allow local government greater access and influence in the deliberations of the Committee. A Community Reference Group was also established, following a motion in the Legislative Assembly on 15 October 1992 by the Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan. In February 1993, due to irreconcilable differences of opinion, the Community Reference Group was split into the Nature Conservation Reference Group, comprising representatives of the NSW Nature Conservation Council; and the Industry and Recycling Reference Group, comprising representatives of the packaging and recycling industries (JSCWM, 1993:iii, viii, 1). The Joint Select Committee on Waste Management was the first such Committee in the history of the NSW Parliament to have Reference Groups as part of its formal structure (JSCWM, 1993: viii).
In February 1993, the Leader of the Opposition, Bob Carr, accused the Government of planning to introduce a $10 per week charge for households to pay for waste management. In denying the accusation, Premier Fahey, nevertheless voiced the simple argument that might be expected to justify increased charges in the future, an argument that completely avoided the issue of the substantial contribution of industry and commerce to the generation of waste for disposal:
The simple fact is that there are not enough holes left in this city to continue to put landfill waste into, and we have to address that question for the future and for this State's future and deal with it in a sensible way.
Whatever the outcome [of the Joint Select Committee!, it does seem abundantly clear that individuals will have to pay for their garbage as a disincentive [because] payments that are made now are heavily subsidised by the many local government areas.
(SMH, 26.2.93:12)
In late March 1993, the Herald reported on the final day of hearings of the Joint Select Committee, focusing on the criticism by several Committee members of the EPA submission's support for incineration as an environmentally responsible means of reducing the volume of waste when disposal alternatives were limited. The writer of the article demonstrated a confusion between metropolitan solid waste incineration and intractable waste incineration that was probably representative of the views of many of the public at the time: 'The
[Appendix B6.60]
endorsement [of incineration by the EPA] stands in contrast to the Intractable Waste Task Force, which last year rejected incineration for waste management/ The Labor environment spokesperson, Pam Allan, was quoted as saying that the endorsement was Totally out of touch with community expectation, which is to find an alternative to incineration', thus demonstrating the in influence of public opinion and protest on the politicians' understanding of waste management options. The EPA submission was also criticised for proposing that waste management responsibility should be placed with local government.
7 In answer to questioning by the Committee, the director-general of the EPA, Neil Shepard, said that the EPA neither supported nor rejected the
. idea of megatips, as each megatip should be assessed on its merits.
8 The Local Government Association submission suggested that the polluter pays principle should be pursued to ensure that industry took full responsibility for the collection, re-use, recycling and disposal of its products and packaging (SMH, 29.3.93:5).
9 The draft report of the Committee was released in August 1993. The recommendations reported by the Herald included:
• the view of the board of the EPA that incineration was 'a viable and environmentally responsible disposal system for wastes which cannot be avoided or recycled',
• that a new authority should be formed as a local government business enterprise that would set waste disposal charges, conduct research and develop regional waste management plans,
• that the WRAPS should be subject to more competition from private enterprise, and
• that the price of waste disposal should better reflect the cost of establishment of landfills.
10 The Local Government Association agued that increased privatisation of waste disposal would result in less attention to environmental impacts as 'private enterprise was profit driven'. The Opposition environment
[Appendix B6.61]
spokesperson, Pam Allan, said that incineration was a backward step when 'communities in the United States are screaming out in opposition to air pollution caused by incineration' (SMH, 12.8.93:1).
B6.8.3 The Majority Report
1 Because the members of the Committee were unable to agree on the wording of some 19 of the 47 recommendations, Majority and Minority Reports were published by the Committee, the latter providing the rationale for the alternative wording proposed by the minority of members for the 19 recommendations on which there was disagreement. Of the 19 recommendations on which agreement could not be obtained:
• the Labor members were in disagreement with the Coalition in 18 instances (either alone or with the Australian Democrat or independent member)
• Labor and the Australian Democrats member were in disagreement with the Coalition in three instances,
• Labor and the Australian Democrats member and the independent member were in disagreement with the Coalition in eight instances, and
• the Democrats and the independent member were in disagreement with both the Coalition and Labor in one instance.
2 The Majority Report generally covered the same areas as the Green Paper, as might be expected, given the terms of reference for the Committee. Thus, the main focus of the Committee's deliberations was municipal waste rather than industrial, commercial, building and demolition waste — despite the fact that the latter types of waste had been growing rapidly through the late 1980s and come to generate a larger waste stream than that from municipal sources (JSCWM, 1993:5). The aspects of municipal waste issues discussed in the Majority Report were grouped according to the terms of reference.
[Appendix B6.62]
Waste Minimisation
3 The waste management hierarchy diagram presented in the Green Paper was modified by each of the Reference Groups to reflect their ideological perspectives on waste management.
4 The Government (Green Paper) and Industry and Recycling Reference Group diagrams reflected a focus in the achievement of the 50 per cent waste reduction target on diversion of materials from landfill into products made from recycled materials. Re-use was given a lower priority than recycling (Industry and Recycling Reference Group), or subsumed within recycling (Green Paper).
5 The Nature Conservation Reference and Local Government Reference Group diagrams, on the other hand, reflected a focus on reduction in the generation of waste as the means of achieving the50 per cent target. Re-use was given a higher priority than recycling by both Reference Groups.
6 While the Committee and the Reference Groups were unanimous that avoidance and minimisation were the 'first and most important step in waste management' (JSCWM, 1993:8), the tension between the views of minimisation as diversion and minimisation as reduction at source made itself felt at various points during the Committee's deliberations.
7 For example, the Nature Conservation Reference Group argued that the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme was not encouraging waste minimisation as the councils in the Sydney region with the highest recycling rates were also those with the highest per capita generation of waste. The Managing Director of the Waste Service also argued that the primary objective of the Scheme was not waste minimisation (JSCWM, 1993:26-27).
8 The Majority Report recommended that:
• the ANZECC 50 per cent target be the minimum acceptable target and should apply to industry and municipal sectors (Recommendation 1),
[Appendix B6.63]
• the State Government should have 'ultimate' responsibility for waste minimisation programs and legislation (Recommendation 5).
9 The reasons advanced for responsibility for waste minimisation resting with the State Government was its 'expertise ... in dealing with industry groups', and its power to legislate (JSCWM, 1993:viii).
10 It was generally agreed within the Committee that industry would be unlikely to pursue waste minimisation beyond what was in its commercial interests, thus requiring monitoring and penalties for non- compliance. However, the NSW EPA pointed out that monitoring would be difficult unless it had wider powers, due to industries claiming commercial confidentiality, or deliberately under-reporting waste amounts to avoid Section 29 levies. The Majority Report did not, however, recommend widening the powers of the EPA (JSCWM, 1993:11).
Community-Based Decision Making
11 In contrast to the State Government's difficulties in the early 1990s with siting landfills, those representatives of the private waste management industry who gave evidence before the Committee appeared to be confident that, with appropriate community consultation, it would be possible to obtain the agreement of communities to the siting of landfills in their vicinity (JSCWM, 1993:13-14). One such representative also argued that 'community' should be defined as a local government area and negotiation should take place with the council as the representative of the community (JSCWM, 1993:15).
12 One strand of the administrative rationalist view was also put to the Committee by Dr David Russell of the Cooperative Research Centre for Waste Management and Pollution Control, that 'equipping the public with all relevant information, both good and bad, was the most likely scenario for achieving a negotiated outcome (JSCWM, 1993:15). Another was put by the Local Government Reference Group:
...what was required was a co-ordinated planning approach developed and controlled by a centralised body which adopts both a long term and totally
[Appendix B6.64]
%
integrated view of landfill disposal on a regional basis. ... A strong interaction would take place between this regional advisory body and community participation activities.
(JSCWM, 1993:16)
13 The Majority Report recommended that guidelines should be prepared for community consultation processes and that local government should conduct the process (Recommendations 8 and 9), although it acknowledged the view that had been put by environmental groups that local government had a poor record with community consultation (JSCWM, 1993:16).
14 With the State Government having introduced a policy of not using its Ministerial planning powers to over-ride local government rejection of landfill development applications, at least one private waste management industry representative put to the Committee that there still had to be some appeal process available to applicants (JSCWM, 1993:16-17).
15 On the subject of compensating communities for having landfills in their area, the Committee's hearings showed that the private waste management industry was generally in favour of compensation. Other witnesses, though, argued that compensation was inappropriate as it 'exacerbates social, financial and environmental inequities between communities' (JSCWM, 1993:17-18).
16 It is likely that compensation would have reduced uncertainty for private operators seeking to establish landfills, and other testimony before the Committee certainly supports the view that there was a great deal of uncertainty surrounding landfill siting. The Majority Report dealt with the question of who should bear the cost of reducing the environmental uncertainties associated with siting a landfill — should the applicant do all the work, or should the NSW EPA take a role in environmental evaluation prior to the application receiving development consent? The Director-General of the EPA took the view that the EPA would be:
. . . wasting very substantial resources in doing very detailed analyses on the engineering, pollution control, and other aspects of the development that may never get up because of its social or other consequences.
(JSCWM, 1993:20)
[Appendix B6.65]
Economic Factors
17 The Majority Report canvassed some of the difficult issues associated with the application of the logic of economics to waste management. It was argued that increasing prices for waste disposal would assist in changing public and government perceptions about the value of land suitable for landfill sites. It was also argued increasing prices for waste disposal would 'make consumers more conscious of the need to minimise their waste', which would 'then indirectly put pressure on manufacturers to reduce packaging'. However, the Majority Report also acknowledged the perennial problem that increasing waste disposal charges can lead to illegal dumping (JSCWM, 1993:22).
18 The account of experience with waste reduction in Seattle given in the Majority Report raised another difficulty experienced when waste management is the responsibility of organisations financially dependent of waste disposal charges rather than public utilities with access to additional sources of funds. Success in waste reduction can threaten the financial viability of the organisation as waste reduction results in reduced revenue. The organisation then has the choice of reducing services or increasing prices. Both choices are threats to the financial viability of the organisation, while the latter also increases the likelihood of illegal dumping, thus generating additional waste management costs in the public sector through the need for monitoring and prosecution (JSCWM, 1993:24).
Management of Waste in NSW
19 One of the key issues to be considered by the Committee was whether waste management, and putrescible waste management in particular, should be in private or public ownership. The Coalition majority were clearly impressed by the environmental and engineering standards of the private landfills they visited and felt that this was a convincing argument that the public sector should not have monopoly power to own or operate landfills (JSCWM, 1993:31).
[Appendix B6.66]
20 However, the Local Government Reference Group argued strongly that waste management should be the role of the public sector, its main argument being that the private sector would have little incentive to reduce the volume of waste being delivered to its landfills, or to sort waste for recycling at its landfills. Private sector representatives argued to the contrary, although the argument from the Managing Director of Browning Ferris Industries cited in the Majority Report did not seem very convincing:
If you want to hear it in economic terms, you would look at any landfill we begin, and look at the fact that if its life was extended because of waste minimisation, then the longer the period the higher the rates might be on a particular siting.
(JSCWM, 1993:32)
21 The Local Government Reference Group view about recycling facilities at private landfills was, in fact, borne out by private sector representatives who argued that it would be unfair for them to be required to separate materials for recycling as that should occur before the waste is delivered to their landfills (JSCWM, 1993:33).
22 An important aspect of the question of whether waste management should be in private or public ownership is the question of responsibility for after-care of landfills, which can be as much as several decades. The deliberations of the Committee revealed that, while the after-care requirements of private landfills could be met by requiring environmental bonds or bank guarantees from private operators, if these were to be of sufficient magnitude to cover after-care eventualities, then the bonds or guarantees would act as a substantial barrier to entry to smaller waste disposal firms (JSCWM, 1993:35-36). The Majority Report decided in favour of bonds and guarantees as 'on-going protection of the environment should be a premium consideration' (JSCWM, 1993:36).
23 Another key issue for consideration by the Committee was how responsibility for that part of waste management that lay in the public sector should be distributed between State and local government. The Majority Report gave surprisingly little justification for its conclusion (Recommendation 29) that regional groupings of councils should be established to take responsibility for some aspects of waste management. The justification advanced was that such groupings were being established in Victoria and the USA where:
[Appendix B6.67]
This approach is based on the philosophy that councils must work together to site, establish and operate waste facilities within their region to overcome problems due to lack of land space and funding problems.
(JSCWM, 1993:36)
24 Contrary to the position of the Local Government Reference Group, the Majority Report recommended that a new waste authority be developed as a Local Government Business Enterprise, which would then place responsibility for the coordination of waste management, the development of regional waste plans, the siting of new waste facilities and landfills and the siting and operation of waste depots for hazardous and liquid waste (Recommendations 30 and 33).
25 The reasons advanced for structuring a new waste controlling authority as a Local Government Business Enterprise were that local government had traditionally dealt with waste matters, its planning knowledge and 'more importantly, its close relationship with local communities' (JSCWM, 1993: viii).
Regulatory Control of Waste Management
26 With the transfer of centralised waste management functions to a Local Government Business Enterprise, the only waste management function remaining with the State Government was a regulatory regime to minimise the health and environmental impacts of the solid waste management industry. It was clear from the testimony of private waste industry representatives that the industry favoured strong regulation of the industry, at least of the environmental impacts of the industry. The NSW Division Manager of Pacific Waste Management noted that:
...it is essential that the new EPA becomes an effective regulator possessing an appropriate charter together with the resources and commitment necessary to regulate environmental protection. Waste management is a highly capital intensive business and companies can only make the ongoing very substantial financial commitments if clearly defined and properly enforced regulation exist. Pacific Waste Management is so concerned about the inadequacies of the current regulations and the current level of control of landfill operation that it has commenced perpetration of a very specific position paper for presentation to the Minister to the Environment.
(JSCWM, 1993:42)
[Appendix B6.68]
Specific issues
27 The Majority Report finished with discussion of a number of specific issues including container deposit legislation (see section B10.5), overseas packaging legislation, composting, incineration (see section B9.4), neutralysis, and legislative and policy measures. The latter included brief discussion of mandatory source separation, virgin materials tax, mandatory recycled content (see section B10.3.1), and government purchasing policy. Of these possible policy measures, it was only government purchasing policy that went forward into a recommendation (Recommendation 45). The Coalition members expressed concerns about the coercive element of the other measures,
. and the possibility that such measures would make New South Wales uncompetitive with other States. Consequently the final recommendation of the Majority Report was that 'no legislative changes or policies be introduced that would make NSW industries uncompetitive with those in other States (Recommendation 47).
The Majority Report’s view of history
28 There is some evidence that the waste crisis storyline was beingcreatively adapted within a few years of the occurrence of some events. For example, in the Majority Report description of the events leading to the establishment of the Committee, it was implied that the Londonderry proposal followed after the Waste Management Authority's 1990 Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy had estimated that the annual generation of solid wastes would reach 7.1 million tonnes by 2011 (JSCWM, 1993:2). Reference to sections B6.4, B6.2.2 and B6.2.3 shows that the Londonderry decision was taken by the Parliamentary Urban Development Committee of Cabinet prior to the release of the Sydney Solid Waste Management Strategy. Furthermore, the Strategy paid considerable attention to the question of reducing the size of the waste stream to conserve landfill capacity.
[Appendix B6.69]
B6.8.4 The Minority Report
1 The Minority Report was prepared by the three Labor members of the Committee, the Australian Democrats member and the independent member. The Report argued that the Majority Report had ignored The majority of submissions to the Committee which opposed the Green Paper' and was a 'rubber stamp' for the Green Paper. However, the Minority Report did not refer to any of these submissions; rather, it gave an account of the views of the five members listed above. The areas in which there were major differences with the Majority Report are described below.
Management of waste in NSW
2 The Minority Report claimed that there was 'overwhelming evidence to suggest the State should maintain a central role as a waste management operator' because:
• the volume of municipal waste was relatively small compared to the volume of the overall waste stream,
• the contention that local government would be able to site landfills where the State Government had failed was 'absurd',
• waste management solely in the hands of the private sector could lead to monopolies, and
• commercial imperatives in a privately run waste industry would over-ride environmental considerations.
3 The minority members were also 'totally opposed' to any private sector ownership of putrescible waste landfills (JSCWM, 1993:66).
Container deposit legislation
4 The Minority Report recommended that container deposit legislationshould be introduced in three years time if industry failed to meet waste
[Appendix B6.70]
reduction targets set by the EPA. The Australian Democrat and independent members favoured the immediate introduction of container deposit legislation. The minority members argued that New South Wales should be moving to greater emphasis on minimisation rather than recycling and were sympathetic to the environmentalist claim of that time that recycling was an 'environmental political alibi'. According to the Minority Report, glass production had increased by 50 per cent between 1980 and 1990, of which only 25 per cent was from recycled glass. The minority members were also sympathetic to the claims of the NSW Nature Conservation Council that container deposit legislation would create 3 000 jobs, encourage the re-establishment of smaller regional beverage manufacturers, and shift the costs of dealing with post-consumer waste back to the private sector (JSCWM, 1993:69).
Incineration
5 The Minority Report recommended that the Government shouldprohibit further development of municipal waste incineration in New South Wales. The Australian Democrats and independent members further recommended that the Waterloo incinerator should be closed immediately (JSCWM, 1993:70)
Comprehensive waste planning
6 In contrast to the Coalition members, who were prepared to leave waste planning in the hands of local government and to the forces of the market, the minority members favoured 'comprehensive waste planning for the State', to be carried out by the EPA (JSCWM,1993:70-71).
Other measures
7 The independent member on the Committee, Dr Peter Macdonald, and the Australian Democrats member, the Hon. Richard Jones favoured the introduction of packaging legislation that would impose, monitor and penalise non-compliance with targets for reduction in packaging waste.
[Appendix B6.71]
The independent member supported the introduction of further legislation to provide for a virgin materials tax and mandated recycling content (JSCWM, 1993:71-72).
B6.8.5 The Herald on the Majority and Minority Reports
1 According to the Herald, the Minority Report labelled the Majority Report as a rubber stamp of the Green Paper and the proposal to devolve waste management responsibility to local government as an abrogation of responsibility. The minority report recommended retention of responsibility at State Government level, mandatory separation of garden waste and food scraps, replacement of landfills for putrescible waste with composting plants. The minority report also pointed to the rejection by the majority report of container deposit legislation. This was, according to the Independent MLC, Dr Peter Macdonald, evidence that the Government was 'clearly in the lap of industry' (SMH, 15.9.93:6).
2 The majority report also recommended increased composting of putrescible and garden waste by extending the kerbside recycling rebate system. However, this was the only area of agreement between the two reports. The majority report recommended the formation of regional groupings of councils to prepare waste management strategies, and the establishment of a government business enterprise to acquire the assets of the WRAPS, excluding the Castlereagh Depot and the aqueous waste treatment plant. Landfill charges were to reflect the true cost of waste disposal and garden waste was to be banned from landfills. The Committee chairperson and Coalition MLC accused the dissenting members of being 'more interested in politics than in the problem of waste management in NSW. The recent oversupply of recycled materials afforded the chairperson the opportunity to imply that this oversupply was due to a bureaucratic approach to recycling which could be avoided by 'allowing] markets to be developed rather than simply stockpiling materials in a feel-good but pointless, program'. She also claimed that a market approach would reduce the costs of waste disposal to ratepayers as a consequence of competition, and that devolution would make use of the 'years and years' of expertise in local government. According to the Herald, the majority report was generally
[Appendix B6.72]
condemned by local government and environmental groups, but supported by industry, the support of the latter coming from the rejection of container deposit legislation. The Packaging Institute of Australia was reported as claiming that container deposit legislation increased costs and did not reduce significantly the amount of garbage going to landfill (SMH, 16.9.93:6).
B6.9 Disengagement of the State from Waste Policy
1 As mentioned in section B6.4, above, the Government announced on 21 March 1991 that it would not be establishing any further landfills or transfer stations.
2 In May 1991, the State Government announced it would provide financial assistance to local government for 'waste disposal, minimisation and recycling' under the new waste disposal strategy. The Government also moved away from the concept of a mega-tip for Sydney, preferring instead a series of smaller tips which would be the responsibility of local government. The Local Government Association claimed this would lead to ad hoc waste management and 'turn the clock back to the 1960s when there was no coordination or control of waste disposal' (SMH, 1.5.91:16).
3 In December 1991, the Herald reported on a confidential State Cabinet Office document which revealed that the Government was considering either privatising the WMA or passing control of its facilities to local government. The Opposition spokesperson on the environment was highly critical of the Government, accusing it of having been ineffectually 'groping around' for solutions and then wishing to wash its hands of the problem. Pam Allan claimed the privatisation would be 'dangerous' and that local government was too under-resourced to deal with the problem (SMH, 4.12.91:6).
4 In March 1992, Premier Greiner announced that the State Government would implement the revision of its policy of non-interference in local government through a series of State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs). The powers would only be used when local governments delayed or rejected employment generating proposals, but would still
[Appendix B6.73)
involve environmental safeguards. The Government was considering using the new power to approve a paper recycling plant at Albury (SMH, 25.3.92:9).
5 At this time, the Government received the final report of the Travers Morgan study. The existence of the report did not become generally known, however, until the Commission of Inquiry into the Lucas Heights expansion three months later (SMH, 15.7.92:4).
6 In November 1993, the EPA reported on current and projected sources of pollution in the Hawkesbury Nepean catchment, among which were two projected 'mega-tips'. The Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher, was reported by the Herald as saying that the decision about them was in local government hands and that the Government had 'no intention of overriding the decisions of local government regarding the siting of landfill facilities' (SMH, 11.11.93:13). It was clear from this article that the term 'mega-tip' had by this stage acquired a wealth of meaning that did not require explanation by the journalist.
7 In February 1994, the Herald reported that the Minister for the Environment was expected to make a submission to Cabinet that would recommend that private waste disposal companies be allowed to operate landfills taking putrescible waste. Such landfills were at that time operated only by the WRAPS. The Local Government Association president, Peter Woods, rejected the proposal as shirking of responsibility by the State Government and put forward the Association's view that the WRAPS should be replaced by a new body with a majority of elected local government representatives and which would be able to retain revenue rather than having to pay dividends to the State Government and invest these revenues in recycling, waste minimisation and composting (SMH, 2.2.94:5).
B6.10 The Formation of Labor Waste Policy
1 From comments made by the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, in March 1992, it appears that the Opposition had some time early in 1992 set a target of 25 per cent reduction in the amount of waste going to landfills. Moore was aware that the National Waste Minimisation and
[Appendix B6.74]
Recycling Strategy to be released by the Federal Government in about three months time would set a 50 per cent target (Legislative Assembly, 10.3.92:828).
2 Speaking at a rally of 300 Sutherland Shire residents outside Parliament House in early September, the Opposition leader, Bob Carr, announced a number of elements of Labor's election policy on waste management in Sydney (SMH, 2.9.92:3). This included:
• a decrease in the amount of waste going to landfill by 60 per cent over ten years,
• increasing home composting of garden waste to achieve a 15 per cent reduction in the waste going to landfill,
• encouraging the recycling of building waste, and
• the requirement that industries producing materials that end up in landfills, such as plastic packaging, prepare waste management policies that would be monitored by the EPA.
3 As described in section 7.9, above, the Joint Select Committee into Waste Management provided further opportunity during 1993 for the Labor Party to articulate and develop its waste policy.
B6.11 The Policy Issues in 1994 According to the Herald
1 In March 1994, the Herald's waste management feature contained a lengthy article on the difficulties of waste policy making and the conflicting views about appropriate policy. Starting with the statement that There is no such thing as a straight answer in the world of Sydney garbage', the article probably reflects the Sydney waste problem storyline as it stood at that time. The primary justification for concern was that Sydney's existing landfills had a limited life, although just what this was in number of years appeared to vary from three years to fifteen years depending of the assumptions made about waste generation and disposal technology. The Londonderry and Lucas Heights experiences were taken as evidence that community opposition made it impossible
[Appendix B6.75]
to establish new landfills, even though there was no shortage of technically suitable sites. According to the writer 'Building new incinerators is also considered politically unpalatable', which view may have been a reflection of the failure to find a site for an intractable waste incinerator. The conclusion drawn from this was that the amount of waste going to landfill had to be reduced, rather than to ask whether the planning and public consultation process and the centralisation of disposal into mega-tips or incinerators might be at fault.
2 The next step in the story-line was to canvass the evidence that a halving of the amount of waste going to landfill was indeed possible. This part of the article framed the reduction in waste in terms of total amounts rather than per capita amounts, but later on the writer made the common slide of meaning (see section 12.2.2) by attributing all waste to households by citing the 1989 weight of waste from households as 3.75 million tonnes. Figure 1.2 shows that this can only be the figure that includes the contribution by industry.
3 The main justification for the feasibility of the 50 per cent target was that 46 per cent of household waste was compostable and 15 per cent could potentially be recycled. The Friends of the Earth were calling for compostable waste to be banned from household garbage collection and the EPA was testing a community education program on composting. This justification failed to take account of the industry contribution — the reductions achieved by the household composting contribution would only achieve about a 25 per cent reduction in the volume going to landfill, as household waste made up about half of the total waste going to landfill.
4 From this point on, there is a divergence of views as to what was the best means of bringing about a reduction in waste volume:
• the Government was expected to favour industry waste minimisation plans and placing the WRAPS in competition with the private sector,
• a spokesperson for Pacific Waste Management said that competition would mean better accountability and therefore better health and environment standards at landfills,
[Appendix B6.76]
local government was opposed to privatisation as it would place the responsibility for landfill approval on local government, but provide no means of raising revenue from waste which could be used to waste minimisation, recycling and composting programs, and
the Friends of the Earth argued for extended producer responsibility as in Germany and the introduction of container deposit legislation (SMH, 31.3.94:15).
B6.12 Coalition Policy Document — ‘No Time to Waste’
1 In June 1994, some nine months after the tabling of the report of the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management, the Fahey Government released its waste management policy, titled 'No Time to Waste7. Compared to the Labor Government's policy document in the following year, 'No Time to Waste' was a relatively brief document of about 7000 words.
B6.12.1 How the Problem Was Framed
1 The problem was represented as being 'not simply that landfill (burial) space in Sydney may be exhausted within the next decade'. The problem was also that 'land is now seen as a scarce resource that we are less and less prepared to hand over for waste disposal facilities' and that:
... we are turning other precious natural resources into rubbish at an unacceptably rapid rate. More than ever before, our society recognises that the trees, sand, water and the energy used to produce the products we consume are finite resources.
(NSW Government, 1994:5)
2 The scarcity of landfill space was due to the 'over-consumption of waste facilities' (NSW Government, 1994:7).
3 The problem was also framed as a fragmentation problem which could be solved by a broadening of policy approaches and improving the allocation of roles.
[Appendix B6.77]
The main problem is one of fragmented planning — nobody has been looking at the big picture.
The most essential feature of any modern waste management system is its capacity to bring together the full spectrum of waste solutions — from avoiding the production of waste to safely disposing of it.
Secondly, the system should ensure that all players — individuals, government and industry — perform the roles to which they are best suited.
It is only when the full spectrum of solutions is readily understood and available to the right players that we will be able to meet our waste reduction targets.
In the waste system we have lived with until now, the tasks of waste disposal and reduction have been fragmented so that some players are not using all the options available to them
(NSW Government, 1994:6)
B6.12.2 Policy Goals and Priorities
1 The policy goals amounted to an expression in words of the waste management hierarchy (although the diagram in the Green Paper was not provided):
• First, and most important, to avoid the production of waste by individuals and the community;
• Second, to reduce the waste going to disposal by reusing and recycling it;
• Third to dispose of the remaining waste in an environmentally responsible way.
(NSW Government, 1994:5)
2 It is worth noting here that industry was not included in the first goal. While it is possible that 'community' was intended to include industry, throughout the remainder of the document, individuals, the community, government and industry are separate categories to which policy was directed.
3 The three main priorities in achieving the 50 per cent waste reduction target were seen as:
[Appendix B6.78]
• integrating waste avoidance, reduction and disposal strategies
• recognising that everybody had to make some changes
• ensuring that everybody does what they do best(NSW Government, 1994:7)
4 The changes and those who should make the changes are summarised in table B6.3.
B6.12.3 The Policy Proposals
1 The 'No Time to Waste' document put forward proposals for substantial changes to policy in five areas.
Table B6.3: Changes that various groups needed to make, according to the 1994 NSW Government waste policy document 'No Time to Waste'.
Group needing to make changes Changes needed
Individuals Altering buying habits and taking greater responsibility for organic waste (composting)
Local communities Participate in landfill siting decisions and negotiate compensation
Industry Consume less virgin resources and support recycling and recovery of materials
State Government 'provide greater leadership in waste management by assigning to everybody the power to do what they do best'
Local government Improve integration of waste avoidance, reduction and disposal strategies
Waste industry Adopt international best practice
Regionalisation
2 Councils were to group into Regional Waste Authorities which would produce regional waste management plans. These would be 'based on best practice models' and 'deliver the economies of scale needed to draw
[Appendix B6.79]
on a range of options, and will encourage creative problem solving rather than blanket solutions'. The plans would also 'provide local councils with a clear and forward-looking mandate for creative and entrepreneurial collaboration' (NSW Government, 1994:10).
3 The description of the regional waste management plans suggested that, while the waste management hierarchy had been articulated as an overall policy principle in the document, the 'menu of options' approach would be taken with waste plans:
The result will be regional waste plans tailored to regional problems covering all components of the waste stream and establishing a balance between waste avoidance, reuse, recycling and disposal
(NSW Government, 1994:10)
4 The justification for regionalisation was in terms of the economies of scale that could be achieved by grouping individual councils and sharing larger waste facilities. However, there was no discussion as why these economies of scale were preferable to the even greater economies of scale that might be had with centralised facilities, as being operated by the Waste Service. Neither was there any discussion of the existence of any diseconomies of scale associated with centralised waste management (NSW Government, 1994:9).
Strengthening State regulation
5 The policy document noted that the Green Paper and the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management had shown that there was 'widespread' support for stronger regulation of the waste management system. Consequently, the NSW EPA would be required to set waste reduction targets, review and approve regional waste management plans, enforce stricter environmental controls on landfill and incineration facilities and widen its community education programs.
6 In an example of how importance could be assigned to particular components of the waste stream depending whether they were expressed as a proportion of the total or of the municipal waste component, garden waste was identified as making up 'one third of the waste going to our landfills and for which the public must become broadly responsible' (garden waste was one third of the municipal
[Appendix B6.80]
waste stream, which was less than half of the total waste stream, the remainder being from commercial and industrial sources). The EPA would be required to prepare a green waste strategy by the end of 1994 to divert garden waste from landfill.
Local control of landfill siting
7 'No Time to Waste' re-affirmed the Government's commitment not to use its planning powers to over-ride local government decisions on landfill siting, and its favour for the idea of local communities being compensated for landfills established in their area. This section of the
• document also proposed that:
Carefully timed public education campaigns will reinforce the nature and extent of existing waste probleins and inform consumers how they can make a difference to the environment through the products they purchase.
(NSW Government, 1994:12)
Industry Waste Reduction Plans
8 Key industries such as the packaging and newsprint industries, brown and white goods manufacturers, the tyre industry and the demolition and construction industry would be required to prepare industry plans that would 'formalise waste reduction goals and allow for sanctions to be imposed where agreements are breached'. The plans would also specify the resources to be allocated to waste reduction, set a time frame for the achievement of targets, and establish a public monitoring and reporting system. The onus would be on industry to demonstrate that targets had been met. The Government signalled that 'the door remains open to greater regulation' (NSW Government, 1994:13-15).
9 The policy document also set out a justification for not introducing legislation on container deposits and mandatory recycled content. The latter was rejected on the grounds that a large proportion of products sole in New South Wales came from other States or from overseas. The container deposit approaches were rejected on the grounds that they were not 'a true waste reduction strategies, but simply methods for collecting waste'. Experience in Germany suggested that it would lead
[Appendix B6.81]
to collected materials being stockpiled rather than re-used or recycled (NSW Government, 1994:15).
10 The advantage of the flexibility of the waste plans in allowing industries to find their own solutions was illustrated by reference to the recent introduction of PET recycling in Sydney which 'radically reduces the need for new resin in their product7 (NSW Government, 1994:15). The actual reduction was 30 per cent and the technology was such that this was the upper limit on what could be achieved — (see section B10.3.2).
Restructuring and regulation of waste management operations
11 The policy document proposed that the Waste Service would be retained in State Government ownership, rather than being sold to local government. However, the Service would be corporatised and would 'operate in State-wide competition with the private sector' to create 'a level playing field' and 'a diversity of choice' for Regional Waste Authorities.
12 The private sector would be allowed to operate putrescible waste landfills, and waste disposal pricing would be referred to the Independent Prices and Regulatory Tribunal.
13 The Regional Waste Authorities would be able to set up waste management operations, but these would have to be commercial entities at arms-length from the Authorities.
14 The strengthening of the EPA's powers would include the preparation of landfill / incineration siting guidelines, designating waste disposal facilities under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act so that more detailed assessment and consultation was required, enforcing pollution control standards for landfills and incinerators and requiring environmental bonds from landfill and incinerator operators (NSW Government, 1994:15-17). The former Waste Management Authority had been taking this latter action as early as 1991 (see section B6.3).
[Appendix B6.82]
B6.12.4 Implementation of policy
1 The Government proposed to allocate $35 million from 1 July 1994 to assist local government with the setting up of the Regional Waste Management Authorities. Local government was free to choose its own groupings of councils and the EPA was to prepare guidelines for the setting up of the Authorities by the end of 1994.
2 The Waste Disposal Act of 1970 was to be amended to make provision for the negotiation of industry waste reduction plans, with the EPA to commence negotiations with key sectors as a priority.
3 • The EPA was to prepare guidelines for the establishment and operationof landfills and other waste facilities by June 1995, and a Green Waste Strategy by December 1994. Landfills and waste facilities would immediately become designated developments under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act.
4 Waste pricing was to be referred to the Government Pricing Tribunal "as a matter of priority'.
5 One million dollars were to be allocated for a waste education campaign in 1994-95 (NSW Government, 1994:18-20).
6 In October 1994, in response to calls from the Waste Crisis Network for legislation to extend producer responsibility for its products, the director of the EPA's waste branch, Sue Dawson, said that an educational strategies targeting green and building waste were favoured rather than legislation. These waste categories made up35 and 20 per cent respectively of the waste going to landfill and, while the Joint Select Committee upon Waste Management had recommended banning all garden waste from landfills by 1997, the Government's waste strategy was based on 'the less strict strategy' of developing regional composting schemes (SMH, 22.10.94).
7 By February 1995, the EPA had begun to negotiate waste management plans or agreements with industry bodies (SMH, 6.2.95:4).
[Appendix B6.83]
B6.12.5 Reactions to ‘No Time to Waste’
1 According to an article in the Herald following the release of the Coalition's waste policy document, the president of the Local Government Association argued that the plan 'devolves all the nasties and centralises all the fundamental decision-making', and announced he was calling a crisis meeting of mayors. The Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, painted the policy as 'a recipe for the establishment of new mega-tips and incinerators all over NSW. It means privatisation, skyrocketing waste charges and an exacerbated waste crisis'. The Total Environment Centre spokesperson, Jeff Angel, argued that the policy would lead to an expansion of landfills and 'unfair competition with waste-reduction schemes'. The Greenpeace spokesperson, Jakki Trenbarth, was quoted as calling for extended producer responsibility ('You have to show industry that when they make something, once they've sold it that's not the end of the matter'), as well as container deposit legislation despite acknowledged 'political' difficulties with implementation. Incineration was also ruled out as an option because of its emissions of toxic gases and CO2 . On the other hand, Pacific Waste was reported as welcoming the policy, maintaining that a regional approach to waste management would have environmental benefits (SMH, 24.6.94:1, 6).
2 The Local Government Association held its crisis meeting in early July. According to the Herald, there was a vote calling for all member councils to refuse to cooperate with the State Government until satisfactory partnership arrangements had been established. The meeting also agreed that the WRAPS should stay in public ownership, but should have a majority of local government representatives on its board. The Local Government Association appeared to be taking the position that privatisation of waste management arrangements would result in money going to shareholders that would have otherwise gone to supporting recycling. A spokesperson for the Minister for the Environment, on the other hand, pointed out that the new policy was only extending privatisation to the one area where the private sector was not already operating — putrescible and domestic waste. For Councillor Peter Woods, the loop concept behind recycling also served as a metaphor for the financial arrangements for waste management: 'If a higher price is paid for disposal, obviously it should go back in the
[Appendix B6.84]
loop for recycling research or education — not put in the pockets of private individuals7 (SMH, 6.7.94:4).
3 According to an account of the reaction to 'No Time to Waste' given by the newly elected Labor member for Badgery's Creek in December 1995, the release of the document had resulted in 'people in garbage trucks' demonstrating outside the Parliament (Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4143).
4 In September 1994, the Minister for the Environment referred to the policy released in June as 'a coordinated strategy' and 'the first systematic approach to waste minimisation and management in this State' (Legislative Assembly, 15.9.94:3082).
B6.13 The Landfill Depots (Moratorium) Bill, 1994
1 On 23 November 1994, the Government introduced this Bill into the Legislative Assembly. According to the Minister for Police and Emergency Services, who introduced the Bill, its purpose was, 'due to continued expressions of concern', to 'give legal status' to the moratorium on new applications for putrescible landfills announced by the Government on 16 September 1994. The Bill was also to prohibit the development of a quarry at Erskine Park as a putrescible landfill, an undertaking that had also been previously given by the Government (Legislative Assembly, 23.11.94:5651). It was also argued by the Government that the moratorium was necessary until the guidelines for landfill siting (a policy announced in the 'No Time to Waste' paper the previous June) had been prepared (Legislative Assembly, 29.11.92:5912).
2 According to the Labor spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, the Bill was a 'backflip' from the Government's announcement in September, which she claimed had involved a moratorium on all types of waste facilities, not just putrescible waste landfills (Legislative Assembly, 29.11.94:5909).
3 Allan argued that the Bill would force local government and private operators to use incineration instead of landfill, backing up her argument by referring to NSW EPA strategy papers that supported
[Appendix B6.85]
incineration as a waste management option, and to the recent reports that the Ryde Council was considering an incinerator (see section B9.4) (Legislative Assembly, 29.11.94:5908).
4 In Allan's view, the main purpose of the legislation was to protect themarginal seat of Badgery (in which the Erskine Park quarry was located) held by a Liberal Member of the Assembly, Mrs Cohen. Allan appears to have deliberately drawn the attention of the media to the Erskine Park proposal:
A few weeks ago I held a press conference to alert the media to the fact that a company called Environguard Proprietary Limited had lodged a development application to develop a private putrescible landfill in Erskine Park in the Government's marginal seat of Badgery's Creek. This event sent the honourable member for Badgery's Creek into a tail spin, and it eventually sent shock waves through the Government.
(Legislative Assembly, 29.11.94:5907)
5 Allan also argued that the legislation would lead to an increase in waste to landfill at Lucas Heights, which would put another Liberal seat under threat (Legislative Assembly, 29.11.94:5910-5911).
B6.14 Public Comment on Waste Policy preceding the 1995 Election
1 In an editorial on the day that Pacific Waste Management lost its appeal against Penrith Council's rejection of its application to extend its Badgery's Creek landfill, the Herald argued that Sydney's waste problems were due to politicians unwilling to deal with the unpopular issues of landfilling and incineration, preferring instead to talk about the 'fashionable environmental ideas' of waste minimisation. The editor dismissed plans for disposal in coal mines in the Hunter Valley as 'absurd' and 'probably the most inefficient, dirty and expensive solution', although acknowledging that opposition there would not have as much political impact in Sydney. Also, it did not escape the editor that the State Government's recent devolvement of responsibility to local government was a reversal of the centralisation that took place in 1970 (SMH, 25.2.95:34).
2 In late March 1995, the Herald carried a lengthy article canvassing the policy options and political aspects of waste management in Sydney.
[Appendix B6.86]
The article reported on a recent public meeting of Sutherland Shire residents at which the mayor of North Sydney (which sent its waste to the Lucas Heights landfill) pointed out that North Sydney had reduced its waste to landfill by 42 per cent in accordance with an undertaking he had given Sutherland Shire Council previously. The article also referred to a consensus among waste experts, local government and environmentalists that the State Government's privatisation policy would lead to increased waste to landfill because privately operated landfills would have no incentive to reduce the flow of waste into them. The president of the Local Government Association took the argument further, suggesting that privatisation would increase costs to ratepayers. The recent Denlay report for the Sutherland Shire Council was quoted as emphasising the need for 'Sydney-wide' planning of waste management and that:
The temptation [for local government! to break ranks and quickly sign up with a private multinational waste disposal company may seem appealing to some councils, but the long-term impacts of such contracts can be devastating and can fragment any attempt at Sydney-wide planning.
(SMH, 18.3.95:31)
3 Not mentioned in previous reporting on the Denlay report was the preparation of the six point waste management plan by US waste consultant, Dr Paul Connett (SMH, 18.3.95:31).
B6.15 From Election Success to New Waste Legislation
B6.15.1 Various Initiatives
1 In April 1995, the new Labor Government announced that waste charges at Sydney landfills would rise by $8 per tonne to fund waste reduction programs (SMH, 29.4.95:10).
2 In July 1995, the Premier announced 'tough' new guidelines to reduce the amount of liquid industrial waste from small and medium businesses going into the sewer system (SMH, 3.7.95:3).
3 In the September 1993 Budget, the State Government announced it would spend $5.5 million on waste minimisation, in addition to the
[Appendix B6.87]
normal $3 million on the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme (SMH, 8.9.93:9).
B6.15.2 The Independent Regulatory and Pricing Tribunal Review
1 In May 1995, the Premier ordered a Tribunal review of waste disposal prices in Sydney. In covering the announcement of the review, the Herald quoted extensively from a lengthy interview with the chairperson of the Tribunal, Professor Tom Parry. The issues that appeared to be of concern from the economic perspective of the Tribunal were:• whether existing waste disposal charges adequately reflected the
need for future investment in landfills,
• the relative merits of various volumetric and weight systems of charging householders, and
• distributional consequences of changes to such systems given the existing relationships between social class and volume of waste generation (SMH, 13.6.95:4).
2 The first discussion paper released in August 1995, continued the economic framing of waste problems with reference to landfill charges not accounting for 'external costs' and the need for landfill charges to rise to reflect the 'true cost3 * * * 7 of landfill sites, which included depreciation and replacement costs of existing sites (SMH, 19.8.95:3).
3 Also in October 1995, the Herald interviewed Professor Tom Parry of theGovernment Pricing Tribunal, who indicated that it was highly likelythat he would recommend a $40 per household increase in garbage rates (SMH, 23.10.95:2). This recommendation did not surface in the finalreport of the Tribunal in April 1996, which concluded that 'Currentrevenue is adequate of Waste Service NSW's present activities, given current environmental management standards', although 'Charges may need to rise to recover the cost of meeting the EPA's new Environmental Guidelines for Solid Waste Landfills' (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, 1996).
[Appendix B6.88]
B6.15.3 Debate and Interest Group Positioning Prior to ‘Waste Reforms’
1 In June 1995, the Sutherland Shire Council, which by then was receiving 70 per cent of Sydney's waste, released a report that reviewed the waste situation in Sydney. It suggested that rather than eight years remaining in landfills, Sydney had only four years. This misconception had come about through 'fractured rules exacerbated by a "void" in government policy'. A key aspect of the report was, according to the Herald, its proposal for a single agency, the State Waste Authority, to take responsibility for waste management. The Authority would have local, State and Federal representatives. In obtaining a response to the report from the Minister for the Environment, Pam Allan, the Herald was informed that she would be 'taking a package of measures to Cabinet' in July. A spokesperson for the Minister was quoted as saying that 'existing legislation governing waste disposal was 25 years out of date. 'You cannot deal with the issues of today and tomorrow with legislation that was drafted in 1970' (SMH, 13.6.95:4).
2 In August 1995, the managing director of the Waste Service, John Cook, was quoted by the Herald as saying that Sydney was unlikely to achieve the target of reducing waste going to landfill by 60 per cent by 2000. Although he was speaking at a time when about five years of waste management policy that might have been typified as 'lack of political will' had ended with a change of government and some firm policy decisions such as the closing of the Castlereagh Depot and the Waterloo incinerator, John Cook was reported as believing that 'all the political will in the world' would not help achieve the target. Rather, he saw source separation in the home and in businesses as the key:
The advances in dealing with waste can only be used at their optimum if the waste is separated properly. The more we can separate waste at its source, that is the home or business, the better chance we have with dealing with it effectively.
(SMH, 28.8.95:19)
3 The Minister for the Environment also admitted that the previous Government's 50 per cent target could not be achieved without changes in policy and increased regulation. The Herald noted that the packaging industry was 'at the centre of intense negotiations' with the State Government over recycling targets in the proposed Waste Disposal Bill.
[Appendix B6.89]
The chief executive of the Packaging Council of Australia maintained that the packaging industry had improved packaging techniques and helped improve packaging recycling rates.
The Minister for the Environment was quoted again by the Herald in September 1995 as acknowledging that Sydney was having difficulty in achieving the 60 per cent waste reduction target. She was reported as blaming industry for failing to act responsibly and foreshadowed stricter measures against illegal dumping in the Waste Disposal Bill which was shortly to go to Cabinet (SMH, 21.9.95:3).
Using an aerial inspection of illegal dumping activities as an initial theme, the Herald reported at length on the issues and interest groups involved in the Governments new Waste Disposal Bill. The local government position may have been exemplified by the criticisms of the EPA by the Penrith Council and other Western Sydney councils. These included that:
• EPA inspection of landfilling operations was inadequate,
• private landlers wanted to fill holes in the ground as quickly as possible,
• the EPA over-rode council decisions in favour of private operators,
• there was ambiguity in the control of landfilling with the councils responsible for approving landfills as developments and the EPA responsible for issuing licenses to operate landfills, and
• councils had not been consulted during the writing by the EPA of landfill operation guidelines, while private landfillers had.
The head of the waste branch of the EPA, Sue Dawson, attributed some of the problems faced by the Government to the age of the existing Waste Disposal Act. She also regarded the definition of waste as a major problem, at least partly because the Government had made an election promise not to allow private landfilling of putrescible waste, but there was no legislative definition of putrescible waste .
[Appendix B6.90]
7 The Private Landfillers' Association, a body representing small to medium size private landfill operators, had informed the Government in a meeting in June that its members could be forced out of the industry if the Government required large environmental bonds which would only be within the capacity to pay of the large operators, such as Pacific Waste Management (SMH, 21.9.95:11).
8 Further details of the Government's waste reforms became apparent a week later when the Minister for the Environment responded to a report by the Herald that the waste management company already operating several medical waste incinerators in Sydney, Kolback Group Ltd, was
• investigating railing one million tonnes of waste per year to an old tin mine near Ardlethan. The Minister said that the Government did not want Sydney's waste dumped in rural areas and had 'a firm policy of opposing mega-tips'. The measures to be put before Cabinet would 'emphasise the need to minimise waste at its source and for regional communities to deal with their own waste on a regional scale'. The principle of local responsibility was supported by a spokesperson for the Nature Conservation Council of NSW, while a spokesperson for Pacific Waste Management argued that there were still plenty of facilities closer to Sydney (SMH, 28.9.95:5).
9 In October 1995, in response to a Herald article showing that the amounts of waste going to landfill were increasing rather than falling, the Minister for the Environment blamed the problem on the inattention of the previous government to waste policy in the industry, building and business sectors. It was revealed that the forthcoming waste reforms would replace 'antiquated 25 year old legislation' and include quotas on licenses for industry and greater vigilance and enforcement with respect to illegal dumping (SMH, 3.10.95:2).
10 In late October, the Minister for the Environment, Pam Allan, in commenting on a $25 million contract for the supply of waste paper obtained by the NSW Local Government Recycling Cooperative, claimed that the Industry Commission criticisms of recycling were '"out of step" with public feeling'. She continued:
[Appendix B6.91]
I can only say the Industry Commission is somewhat out of step, and tends to ignore the ground swell of community demand for reforms to ensure a more intensive and equitable waste reduction effort.
My greatest fear with re-ports like this is that it will provide some industry sectors with an excuse to relax the drive for greater waste reduction.
(SMH, 30.10.95:8)
11 She went on to describe the coming waste reforms as targeting key components of the waste stream and providing the EPA with "right armoury of penalties so that it can hunt down the illegal dumpers and take them to the cleaners for their environmental vandalism' (SMH, 30.10.95:8).
12 In early November, Cabinet agreed to the proposed legislative reforms to waste management. The Herald, from an examination of the EPA submission to the Government Pricing Tribunal, revealed that the reforms were likely to include a ban on garden waste (the headline said 'kitchen waste') from landfills (SMH, 1.11.95:6). Several days later, the Herald clarified this ambiguity with an article about the EPA's redefinition of the term 'green waste'. The EPA definition of green waste was, according to the Herald, contrary to the international classifications in that it included kitchen waste, rather than confining green waste to grass clippings, garden trimmings etc. The EPA maintained that it wished only to exclude garden wastes from landfill and not kitchen wastes, while local government seemed to be of the opinion that green waste as defined by the EPA would be excluded. The Minister for the Environment appeared to be comfortable with the idea of re-definition for the purposes of policy.
All those definitions have been a bit untidy in the past and I think we should be reviewing them so they fit into what we are trying to achieve with the reforms.
(SMH, 6.11.95:4)
B6.16 Labor Policy Document — ‘Waste Reforms’
B6.16.1 Specific Problems Identified
1 Specific deficiencies in the current institutional arrangements that were discussed in some detail included:
[Appendix B6.92]
• lack of clear definition of waste in the Act, which meant that it was not possible to direct specific kinds of wastes to the facilities best suited to their disposal,
• neither was it clear whether newly emerging waste reprocessing industries, such as composting, were covered by the licensing provision of the Act,
• the system of licensing of waste generations, at that time involving some 4200 licences in the Sydney region, did not differentiate between industries more, or less, likely to cause environmental problems, so that the resources of the EPA could not be focused on the industries most likely to cause problems,
• a similar deficiency was claimed in the case of waste transporters,
• landfill siting arrangements were resulting in strong community opposition, excessive contestation in the Land and Environment Court, and too much uncertainty and expense for local government and the waste industry.
• penalties under the Waste Disposal Act were not commensurate with the penalties under the Clean Air and Clean Waters Acts (NSW Government, 1995:2-4).
2 The emergence of these deficiencies was attributed to wastemanagement becoming more complex, both in the nature of the problems faced and in the options available. In addition, it was argued that there had been a 'fundamental change' in public opinion about waste: 'People are now much more aware of the need to avoid waste and, wherever possible, to re-use or recycle materials' (NSW Government, 1995:1).
B6.16.2 Policy Goals and Principles
1 The main aim of the new policy was to change the focus of wastemanagement from disposal to reduction — specifically, to reduce the
[Appendix B6.93]
amount of waste per capita going to landfill by 60 per cent by the year 2000. The waste management hierarchy was described as an underlying principle that 'stresses avoidance and re-use over recycling and reprocessing (with waste disposal as a last option)'. This principle was accompanied by the diagram shown in figure B6.3.
2 In this diagram, the triangle had been inverted and additional explanatory text added to make it clear that the upper levels of the hierarchy were the preferred options in terms of conserving resources.
3 However, when the Government introduced the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill in the Legislative Council some weeks after the release of 'Waste Reforms', the description of industry waste reduction plans referred to an approach to waste management, while concerned with waste reduction, exhibited the characteristics of the menu of options approach:
Each Plan will represent the most effective blend of strategies and different manufactured products will be subject to different sorts of waste reduction strategies and programs, depending on the type of product and the progress made to date on waste reduction.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5038)
Figure B6.3: Waste hierarchy diagram from the 1995 Labor Government waste policy document, 'Waste Reforms' (NSW Government, 1995:2).
THE WASTE MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY
1. Avoiding w aste
2. Re-using m aterials
3. Recycling and rep rocess ing m aterials
4. W aste d isposal (if th e first th re e a re not possible)
[Appendix B6.94]
B6.16.3 The Policy Proposals
Broadening and focussing of waste management regulation
1 The broadening and clarification of the definition of waste in theproposed Act was to enable waste processing facilities such as compost plants to be brought under licensing and regulatory control. The Act would also enable regulatory definition of which waste operators, in which localities, and with which environmental impacts, would be subject to licensing provisions. Under the provisions of the proposed Act, operators of landfills would be required to provide financial assurance, such as a bond, bank guarantee or insurance policy, that environmental problems during and after the active life of the landfill would be remedied (NSW Government, 1995:4-5).
Public ownership of putrescible waste landfills
2 Arguing that there was strong community resistance to privateownership of putrescible waste landfills, the Government proposed to require that the controlling interest in putrescible landfills be held by the Waste Service, waste boards, or local government. According to the policy document, 'Waste Reforms', this was to be achieved by corporatisation of the Waste Service. Apart from the fact that corporatisation under the State Owned Corporations Act would enable the Service to operate across all of New South Wales, the document provided no explanation as to why corporatisation was necessary to achieve its commitment to public ownership of putrescible waste landfills (NSW Government, 1995:5). However, in the second reading speech on the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill by the Minister for the Environment, Pam Allan, it was made clear that the commitment to public ownership would be given effect by permitting the EPA only to issue licences for the operation of putrescible waste landfills where the controlling interest was held by a public sector entity (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.95:3203).
[Appendix B6.95]
Consent authority for putrescible waste landfills
3 The Government proposed that the Minister for Urban Affairs andPlanning would prepare a State Environmental Planning Policy (SEPP) which would establish the Minister as the consent authority for proposals for the extension or creation of regional putrescible waste landfills. The SEPP would require the Minister to have regard to the EPA's assessments of the need for landfill capacity and to EPA- approved regional waste plans (NSW Government, 1995:5). According to the second reading speech by the Minister for the Environment, these arrangements would overcome the problem of too many waste siting decisions ending up in the courts and bring transparency and consistency to the decision making process (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.95:3204).
Regionalisation of waste management
4 Compared to its Coalition predecessor, 'Waste Reforms' provided much more detailed proposals as to how waste boards would be formed, the conditions under which councils might be exempted from becoming members of waste boards, the content and approval process for regional waste plans and the powers and accountability of the waste boards. However, the Labor Government proposal for regionalisation was little different in its broad form from that proposed by the Coalition Government the previous year. In addition, 'Waste Reforms' presented almost identical arguments as presented in 'No Time to Waste' with respect to regionalisation being a 'progressive' approach to waste management increasingly be adopted in industrialised countries, and to the economies of scale and avoidance of duplication of effort that might be obtained by 'pooling the resources of a number of local councils' (NSW Government, 1994:9; NSW Government, 1995:8).
5 The main differences with the Labor Government's proposals for regionalisation were:
• the regional bodies would be established under a waste management act, rather than under the county council
[Appendix B6.96]
provisions of the Local Government Act (NSW Government, 1994:18; NSW Government, 1995:8),
• membership of a waste board would be mandatory for councils in the Sydney, Hunter, Illawarra regions (NSW Government, 1995:9), while the Coalition policy document did not specify whether membership was mandatory or not,
• detailed conditions were specified under which a council might seek exemption from the Ministers for the Environment and Local Government from joining a waste board (NSW Government, 1995:9-10),
• detailed description of the content of regional waste plans, the requirement that they be approved by the Minister for the Environment, and the criteria for approval, one of which was that the plan should be consistent with the State Government's 60 per cent waste reduction target (NSW Government, 1995:10),
• detailed account of the powers and responsibilities of waste boards, including the penalties and sanctions applying to failures by waste boards to prepare regional waste plans, to breaches of waste plans and breaches by councils of their commitments under waste plans (NSW Government, 1995:11).
6 The concept of regionalisation had been rejected by Labor in adissenting statement against Recommendation 29 in the Joint SelectCommittee on Waste Management. This recommendation stated that:
Regional groupings of councils be established for the purposes of waste management, to be developed by consensus between councils and approved by the Waste Authority.
(JSCWM, 1993:37)
7 The dissenting statement was:
This recommendation supported by Government Members is an attempt to privatise and decentralise waste management and to force local government in concert with the private sector to take the bulk of responsibility for waste management. It is another example of Government Members' support for the State Government opting out of responsibility for waste management.
(JWSCWM, 1993:37)
[Appendix B6.97]
Producer Responsibility Scheme
8 The Labor Government's policy document also adopted the idea of Industry Waste Reduction Plans, which had been proposed in the Coalition's policy document the previous year. In comparison to the Coalition's proposals, which largely relied for their effect on the threat of further regulatory intervention, Labor's proposals detailed a wide range of possible sanctions against industries failing to develop or implement waste reduction plans. These included:
• imposition of waste reduction targets on a nominated industry by the Minister for the Environment,
• attachment of commitments in waste reduction plans to other licensing requirements being administered by the EPA,
• definition of offences relating to failure to provide information needed for the development of waste plans, or failure to comply with licence conditions or regulations requiring compliance with a waste plan as Tier 2 offences under the Environmental Offences and Penalties Act,
• the imposition of product bans,
• the requirement for manufacturers to establish a system for collecting and re-using or recycling post-consumer waste, to avoid the imposition of a product ban,
• the posting of waste reduction bonds by industry which would be returned of the achievement of an agreed proportion of postpost consumer waste being collected and re-used or recycled
• the introduction of product levies (NSW Government, 1995:13- 15).
[Appendix B6.98]
The State Waste Advisory Council
9 The proposal for this Council was a new initiative on the part of the Labor Government. Together with the appointment of a local government representative to the EPA Board, the aim of establishing the Council was to improve the representation of local government in waste management policy deliberations by the Government. Similar improvements in representation were expected for other interest groups. The representatives on the Council comprised two from local government, two 'environmental members', one 'consumer member', two representatives of waste generating industries, one representative of the waste industry and one EPA member (NSW Government, 1995:7).
B6.17 The Waste Minimisation and Management Bill 1995
B6.17.1 The Introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Assembly
1 In introducing the Bill, the Minister for the Environment represented the previous Government's record on waste management as one of inaction, ineptitude and lack of commitment to implementing policy. Specific shortcomings referred to were the absence of a legislated reduction target, the privatisation of all aspects of waste management and the lack of 'an effective mechanism for coordination and management' (Legislative Assembly, 15.11.95:3199).
2 According to the Minister the 'hallmarks' of the new policy being given effect in the legislation were:
. . . a 60 per cent waste reduction target by the year 2000; a new body to advise on statewide policies and priorities; a regional system of waste planning and management drawing from international trends; dedicated funds to resource regional and statewide waste reduction programs; strict requirements and strong actions for failure to perform on industry waste generators; a new licensing scheme based on environmental impact; harsh penalties for illegal waste dumping; and public sector control of all putrescible landfills.
(Legislative Assembly, 15.11.95:3200)
[Appendix B6.99]
3 In all, the Minister's second reading speech, did not provide any further detail or justification to what had been presented in the policy document 'Waste Reforms'.
B6.17.2 Opposition Criticism in the Legislative Assembly
1 There were a number of criticisms of the legislation from the Coalition Opposition. The first and main criticism was that there had not been sufficient consultation prior the to Bill being introduced in the Legislative Assembly. For this reason, it argued that the Bill should be deferred until the following year (Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4134).
2 Secondly, the Opposition cast doubt on the workability of the wider definition of waste in the Bill by pointing out that such things as the 4.5 million tonnes of ash produced by power stations each year, and the methane gas emitted by cows, would fall within the definition, and questioning whether the 60 per cent reduction target was to apply to that waste (Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4135, 4141).
3 Thirdly, the difficulties were pointed out as to how the target would be applied — whether it would be applied uniformly across firms, or as and average across an industry sector, with some firms not meeting the target and others exceeding it. The question of firms who had already achieved substantial reductions prior to the introduction of the legislation was also raised (Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4135-4136). This was also raised in the Legislative Council (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5053).
4 Fourthly, the validity of the waste management hierarchy was questioned.
While the hierarchy is widely accepted, particularly in environment circles, it has not been subjected to a rigorous analysis to establish whether this hierarchy universally holds the best environmental outcome in all cases. That is of concern. If the aim of this legislation is to achieve net positive environmental outcomes then we need to be careful about imposing ideological viewpoints which have an intuitive appeal. I grant that it does have an intuitive appeal, but the reality is that it has not been subjected to rigorous analysis to determine whether, in all circumstances, it does universally hold the best environmental outcome. It is not too difficult to construct scenarios that can lead to environmentally worse outcomes, and
[Appendix B6.100]
that has not been dealt with at all. It is also equally clear that the hierarchy has not been established as being economically optimal either, let alone the far more subtle issue of interactions between obtaining best environmental outcomes and optimal economic outcomes. This is an area of subtlety that is completely lost on the Government.
(Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4136)
5 Fifthly, the Opposition also took exception to various aspects of the legislation that were at odds with its political ideology, such as the formation of a 'massive new bureaucracy' (the establishment of regional waste boards), the Minister's power to impose waste reduction plans on industry and public monopoly in putrescible waste landfills (Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4136-4137). The Opposition referred to the possibility of capital flight from New South Wales due to the legislation, quoting from a press release from the Chamber of Manufacturers which stated that:
NSW is trying to set a new benchmark for waste reduction, but may only achieve a situation where business looks elsewhere to establish, as a result of the unrealistic target set in this State
(Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4141-4142)
6 The ideological difference between Labor and the Coalition on cooperation versus compulsion that had structured some of the debate environmental bills in 1970 also occurred in the debate on the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill:
Contained within this bill are the traditional coercive and imposed approaches that Labor prefers with regard to education and the environment. The Opposition prefers an approach that essentially revolves around cooperation and consultation: things that are missing from this bill.
(Legislative Assembly, 6.12.95:4230)
7 The Opposition signalled that it would move an amendment to require 'an economic cost benefit analysis and an environmental cost benefit analysis' to accompany all industry waste reduction plans because it was 'essential that more rigour be imposed on the IWRP process' (Legislative Assembly, 5.12.95:4138).
[Appendix B6.101]
B6.17.3 Independent Criticism in the Legislative Assembly
1 The independent member for Manly pointed out that the legislation did not incorporate some of the proposals in Labor's election policy document. These included:
• that the EPA would be directed to develop a state-wide waste management plan — this was not required by the legislation,
• that public ownership of putrescible waste facilities would be 'enshrined in law' — there were still 'backdoor opportunities' for private ownership under the legislation,
• that the EPA would be directed to prohibit the expansion of incineration in New South Wales — the legislation was silent on the question of incineration,
• the introduction of container deposit legislation — there was no mention of it in the Bill,
• the phasing out of yard waste — not mentioned in the Bill, and
• that industry would be required to meet waste reduction targets — the Bill was 'full of discretionary weasel words' (Legislative Assembly, 6.12.95:4232).
2 The member for Manly also pointed out that there was no commitment to retain milk bottles and suggested that the Legislative Council should introduce such an amendment, with container deposit legislation being introduced if the target was not met within three years (Legislative Assembly, 6.12.95:4233).
[Appendix B6.102]
B6.17.4 The Passage of the Bill through the Legislative Council
The Australian Democrats’ and Greens’ Concerns.
1 The Australian Democrats and the Greens supported the Bill, although they had a number of concerns, some of which were ultimately remedied through amendments to the Bill.
2 The Hon. Richard Jones referred to his experience on the Joint SelectCommittee on Waste Management in supporting his view that industry required the threat of container deposit legislation to force it to reduce its generation of waste.
In the committee hearings I asked company representatives whether they would take a cradle-to-grave approach to their products. Every one of them said no, except for Coca Cola. ... The Australian Democrats will be moving an amendment, the effect of which will be for the Minister to have a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of industry. One of the conditions on which the Australian Democrats will support the legislation is that the Minister may introduce container deposit legislation if industry does not come to the party.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5042)
3 Jones also emphasised that 'the Government must not cave in to the revamping of the [Waterloo] incinerator' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5043), and was adamant that the private sector should be kept out of putrescible waste management.
There are companies such as Pacific Waste Management, who parent company is Waste Management Incorporated — that infamous American firm — that would love to be able to get hold of the waste stream and make an absolute fortune out of it. ... We cannot let Pacific Waste Management, Collex Waste Management or any of these foreign companies move into the market and make money out of landfilling. Waste must be and should be reused, recycled or composted.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5043)
4 Jones advised that he intended to move an amendment to 'bring back the milk bottle'.
It would be nice to be able to bring back milk bottles, because they can be used up to 40 times. However that will not occur unless their use is mandated. . . .
[Appendix B6.103]
It will be difficult to argue to keep milk bottles, but it should be attempted.The Minister will have to be strong to any opposition to this legislation....Industry will have to be dragged kicking and screaming to meet those [waste reduction] targets.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5044)
Both Jones and the Greens MLC member, the Hon. Ian Cohen, referred to McDonalds packaging as exemplifying the "throw away mentality" they were concerned about. Jones in particular described the ubiquity of discarded McDonalds packaging:
One could see the golden arches 'M' everywhere. I seem to be haunted by the golden arches. Up in my property in Gittoes Lane, Possum Creek — which is something like 30 kilometres from the nearest McDonalds — lam finding McDonalds rubbish in my street. I have no idea how it got there.... Every time 1 walk out of the front door of my house in Manly I find McDonalds cartons in the gutter.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5041)
The Greens viewed the legislation favourably, insofar as it was regarded as being consistent with the polluter pays principle and cradle to grave responsibility for products (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5044-5045).
However, Cohen also outlined a number of concerns that the Greens had about the legislation.
• the lack of container deposit provisions in the legislation,
• an unfair amount of responsibility for waste management was being transferred from the State Government to local government,
• a clearer definition of putrescible waste was needed as the definition in the legislation did not cover disposable nappies and yard waste, both of which would be undesirable in non- putrescible landfills,
• private sector involvement in putrescible waste management should be completely ruled out — the legislation's approach of allowing private sector involvement if a supervisory licence was held by a public sector entity was regarded as unsatisfactory
[Appendix B6.104]
because of the possibility of a small council being persuaded by a large private sector operator, perhaps for financial reward, to take on a supervisory licence,
• the legislation failed to meet the pre-election commitments to ban the expansion of the incineration industry and to allocate the funds raised from the waste levy to waste minimisation programs, and
• the lack of a ban on yard waste being sent to landfill (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5046).
8 The Greens were also concerned about the phasing out of milk bottles by the dairy industry, regarding this, and the growth of beverages in liquidpaperboard packaging, as examples of industry not taking the waste crisis seriously (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5045).
The Coalition’s Concerns
9 The Coalition also supported the Bill (Legislative Council,15.12.95:5054), although it also raised many concerns about specific aspects. In a number of cases, these concerns were being relayed to the House from representations that industry groups had made to Coalition members.
10 As in the Assembly, the Coalition members stressed the lack of consultation in the period preceding the introduction of the Bill, particularly with industry (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5047). The Coalition also had read into Hansard an excerpt from a letter from the Grocery Manufacturers of Australia to the Minister for the Environment, Pam Allan, which appeared to suggest that the Government was avoiding meeting with this industry group in the month preceding the release of the policy document 'Waste Reforms' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5047).
11 However, the Labor member who was leading for the Government in the Legislative Council, the Hon. Jan Bumswoods, rebutted the Coalition's claim of lack of consultation by listing a large number of
[Appendix B6.105]
industry and environmental interest groups with which the Government had discussions in preparing the legislation (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5073).
12 Industry representations to the Coalition had clearly emphasised the progress that industry considered it had already made in reducing waste (see below for a description of industry lobbying strategy). The Hon. J.F. Ryan was able to provide a detailed listing of the nature and quantities of recycling in a number of industries (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5049). Other arguments put by the Coalition members were similar to those that had been put by the packaging industry for some time, and probably reflect the influence of industry lobbying at the time of the introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Council. For example, the benefits of packaging were described and the view put that the increases in packaging were an inevitable consequence of changes in lifestyle and retailing (Legislative Council,15.12.95:5069-5070). The Coalition argued that, overall, the legislation was putting an unfair amount of pressure on industry and not enough on the community (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5070). The Coalition proposed to move an amendment that would provide for a representative of the Department of Business and Regional Development on the State Waste Advisory Council (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5070). This amendment had also been recommended by the NSW Chamber of Manufacturers (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5081).
13 The Coalition considered that the legislation gave too much ministerial power in a wide range of aspects of waste management, and this would lead to waste management being 'closely married to the political process' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5048-5052).
14 The Coalition's case against the legislation appears to have brought the first questioning of the existence of a waste crisis.
One of the problems about the discussion of waste is that ti has been motivated by political considerations that may not have environmental merit. Tor example, it has been said in this debate that New South Wales is running out of space in which to dispose of solid waste. We are not.There are endless opportunities for the disposal of solid waste in New South Wales. This State is a vast place, and much of it has been developed or hollowed out for quarrying and mining.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5053)
[Appendix B6.106]
The bill predicates that New South Wales is running out of landfill sites.It is not. There are more holes in the ground and disused mining shafts than we could ever possibly fill with garbage.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5070)
15 However, Labor's rejoinder to this view clearly demonstrated that theperceived supply of available waste disposal sites was determined more by politics and morality than by physical abundance.
Yes, there is a tin mine here and a coalmine there, and in numerous relatively poor local government areas there are afezv holes in the ground.This matter was raised many times during hearings of the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management, as the Hon. R.S.L. Jones would remember. I believe I christened it the third world solution because it appeared at one stage that the Liberal majority on the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management felt that local government areas a long way from Sydney with low rate bases could perhaps be bribed into taking waste from metropolitan Sydney to put in a convenient old mine or hole in the ground.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5075)
16 The case that had been made in the Green Paper (see section B6.7.3) for government involvement in market development for products using recycled materials was revisited in the Coalition's arguments against the Bill. This argument was that there was little point in setting targets for waste reduction unless markets were found for the collected recyclables. It was assumed that, since 'industry will already doing anything that is economical' there was a role for government in the development of markets. The Coalition considered that the legislation was lacking in this regard (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5057, 5069).
17 The Coalition also relayed to the House a number of concerns that the Local Government Association and individual councils had made known to its members. While some local government concerns had been addressed in amendments passed in the Legislative Assembly, local government was concerned about the lack of consultation and the pressures put on it in terms of mandatory membership of waste boards, resourcing the staff time to contribute to the waste boards, meeting waste reduction targets and penalties for non-compliance Local government was also concerned about the lack of a 'trigger' in the legislation to ensure that container deposit legislation would be
[Appendix B6.107]
introduced in three years time if packaging waste reduction targets were not met (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5055). Local government sought a greater role in the determination of members of the State Waste Advisory Council (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5070).
18 A drawback of regionalisation raised by the Coalition was thepossibility of a lack of uniformity across waste boards (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5071).
The Concerns of the Call to Australia Party
19 The speech on the Bill by Reverend the Hon. Fred Nile of the Call to Australia Party was, of all the speeches made in the Legislative Council in the debate on the Bill, the one that contained the most reference to the industry position on the legislation. This may have been a reflection of the Party's former disinterest in waste matters, with the result that the intense lobbying by industry provided the Reverend Nile with a surfeit of material on which to base his speech. Alternatively, the Call to Australia Party, with two members on the cross benches, may have attracted more than its share of industry lobbying, although the Coalition and the Call to Australia Party were not capable of defeating the Labor Party, provided the Australian Democrats and the Greens voted with Labor. Regardless of the reasons behind the industry emphasis in the content of the Reverend Nile's speech, it provides a detailed account of the industry position on the legislation.
20 The Call to Australia Party supported the Bill in principle, but proposed to vote with the Coalition on its amendment to delay the Bill while further consultation took place (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5075).
21 The Reverend Nile perhaps made it clearer than the Coalition had in objecting to the extent of public consultation, that the extensive public debate that had occurred over the preceding five years was different from the kind of consultation the legislation required.
It is no good talking about the effect of packages, bottles or recycling material. That has been a continuing discussion and is different from a debate on a bill that has serious ramifications for commercial companies, which doubt they can fulfil the requirements of the legislation and meet the expected standards. It has to be a two-way operation. ...
[Appendix B6.108]
All these bills should be referred to a committee such as the Standing Committee on State Development. The members could calmly look through the legislation and hear submissions from industry on the wording of the legislation. This is different to discussions on plans, proposals and targets.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5076)
22 Australian Co-operative Foods Limited, facing an amendment from the Hon. Richard Jones that might require a particular proportion of milk sales to be in glass bottles, argued that such bottles were not necessarily better for the environment, due to the use of energy in transportation and cleaning (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5076).
23 The Packaging Council of Australia registered its concern with the Call to Australia Party over the lack of avenues of appeal in the drafting of industry waste reduction plans, the possibility of product bans, the possibility that levies could be placed on companies to fund recycling programs, the power to mandate industry waste reduction with out negotiation and the legislation not taking into account the benefits of packaging. According to the Reverend Nile, the Packaging Council was also concerned that the possibility of a requirement for a certain proportion of milk to be sold in glass did not 'take into consideration the fact that consumers are demanding plastic, paper packaging and glass' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5078).
24 The Packaging Council also had argued in its correspondence that milk bottles were less environmentally friendly because of the 'process of producing the bottle and the need to clean them' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5078, 5082).
25 A number of firms put the view that industry waste reduction plans should be subjected to cost benefit analysis, and recommended that the Call to Australia Party should move and amendment to that effect (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5079).
26 Correspondence from Australian Paper Limited, the Australian Business Chamber and the NSW Chamber of Manufacturers that threatened of capital flight from New South Wales was also quoted by the Reverend Nile (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5079-5081).
[Appendix B6.109]
27 The Australian Business Chamber submission to the Call to Australia Party, on behalf of some 25 manufacturing, retail, food, beverage and packaging industry associations, claimed to represent 500 000 jobs in New South Wales. The concerns of industry were summarised in this document and quoted verbatim by the Reverend Nile.
The Bill has been prepared without consultation with the industries which will be required to make the legislation work.
The Bill will lead to higher costs being passed on to consumers.
The Bill places excessive power in the hands of the Minister and will lead to an inefficient means of achieving waste minimisation objectives.
The Bill allows the Minister to introduce a range of measures disproportionate to the environmental threats.
The Bill does not adequately address the issue of cost benefit analysis in determining the viability of Industry Waste Reduction Plans (IWRPs).
The Bill empowers the Minister to ban products irrespective of consumer preferences.
The composition of the ruling body, the State Waste Advisory Council (SWAC), does not reflect an equitable or effective balance of interests and expertise.
The Bill does not contain proper provision for arbitration of right of appeal related to IWRPs. The determination should consider economic and environmental costs and benefits.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5080-5081)
Striking Deals over Amendments
28 It appears that, because the Coalition would have been able to defeat the Bill with the support of the cross benches, a great deal of negotiation may have occurred between the major parties and the cross bench members in the period prior to the introduction of the Bill in the Council.
...the Opposition does not have the support of the crossbench on this issue — whether it wants appropriate consultation or prefers jackboot tactics and unwise decisions without consultation. ...
[Appendix B6.110]
The Op-position has appreciated the opportunity in the past few days to work with crossbench members on environmental issues.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5048)
Industry Lobbying Strategy
29 The Hansard account of the passage of the Bill through the Legislative Council provides some insights into the strategies that industry lobby groups pursued in attempting to protect their interests. Firstly, in the early stages of consultation over the legislation, industry appears to have given the impression that it had no major concerns with the Bill.
Three weeks ago, the Minister had a consultation with people from industry ... The upshot ofthat briefing was messages in the media and via other means that industry was comfortable with the bill.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5054)
30 The Packaging Council of Australia released a press statement to the effect that:
The packaging industry would work cooperatively and constructively with the N SW Government in implementing this legislation.
The N SW Minister for the Environment has ensured that the Packaging Council of Australia and its members were well-briefed on the Government's approach
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5074)
31 The Litter Research and Recycling Association (representing beverage and packaging industry interests) had published a press release headed 'Beverage industry welcomes industry waste reduction plans'. The headline on the Pacific Waste Management press release was 'Pacific Waste Management supports tough new waste bill' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5074).
32 However, industry appears to have increased its lobbying effort just prior to the introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Council. Some four days before the introduction of the Bill, 24 industry groups, representing a wide range of manufacturers, retailers and the beverage and packaging industries in particular met to develop a position on the
[Appendix B6.111]
legislation, their concerns about the legislation being made known to at least some Coalition members. The position taken by these and other industry groups which lobbied Coalition members comprised the following elements:
• industry supported 'effective' waste minimisation and the objectives of the legislation,
• but it was concerned that the legislation would lead to unnecessarily costly schemes with Tittle or no environmental benefit7, with the result that,
• industry would have no choice but to pass the costs on to consumers — costs that were estimated by one industry group to be of the order of $100 million (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5056-5057).
33 It would appear that there was a stepping up in the intensity of lobbying 24 hours before the introduction of the Bill on 15 December 1995, at least insofar as correspondence directed to the Call to Australia Party was concerned.
Much of this correspondence is dated 14 December. Today is 15 December, so these submissions have been received in the past 24 hours. 1 doubt whether the Government has all the material that 1 have . . .
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5080)
34 The difference between industry's public position and that it took in correspondence with members of the Legislative Council was noted by the Reverend Nile.
In this debate some Government members have said that the Packaging Council of Australia was happy with the bill. On face value that could be accepted, but correspondence from that organisation said the opposite.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5078)
35 There is some evidence that various firms and industry interest groups shared their lobbying material. The cases put by Kemcor Australia Pty Ltd and BHP, and quoted verbatim by the Reverend Nile, contained at least one identical paragraph (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5079).
[Appendix B6.112]
36 At least from Coalition members speeches in the Legislative Council, it would appear that industry lobbying had made some impact.
As my colleague the Hon. J.F. Ryan said earlier, fax machines have been running hot around this place. I am sure that all the Independents have been moved by the way in which some of the industry groups have come together to consider the legislation and express their concerns. One cannot receive the sorts of faxes that have come in from industry groups this week without wondering whether the Government is doing the right thing and whether the legislation is really in the best interests of the State.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5055)
Amendments and the passing of the Bill
37 The Coalition regarded its amendment on industry waste reduction plans as 'perhaps the single most important amendment', arguing that 'the Government does not understand the importance of this amendment to industry'. The Coalition went on to state that it:
...receives letters daily from industry urging it to do exactly what this amendment will provide. ... The industry is widely concerned that the discussion about waste management will be overtaken by emotional issues that will quickly become part of the political process.
Consequently, the debate about waste management will be driven by emotive and political concerns rather than objective scientific and economically viable alternatives to waste minimisation. For example, when we talk about waste most people immediately think about packaging.There has been lengthy discussion about the evils of packaging. ...
By the Government not accepting this incredibly reasonable amendment, it is sending a signal to the industry and to the community that it is not interested in an objective process that is, at least to some extent, divorced from the political process.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5088-5090)
38 The Coalition speaker then enumerated some of the benefits of packaging and drew attention to its relatively small contribution to the waste stream, as commonly described in information provided by the packaging industry (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5090).
39 It was also pointed out that the amendment would not prevent the Government from introducing container deposit legislation in the future, or from mandating a proportion of milk sales in glass bottles.
[Appendix B6.113]
If the Government wanted to ban bottles [sic], it could so even if this amendment were passed. The only difference is that at the moment the Government is able to ban milk bottles [sic] without anyone knowing the costs involved. There are claims and counter-claims from industry, the Government and environmental groups, but there is no objective way to measure the cost. The Opposition is asking for an objective basis for such decisions.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5090)
40 The other aspect of the legislation that the Coalition believed was important to industry was the possibility of product bans. The Government emphasised that the legislation only allowed these bans to be introduced if an industry failed to meet the targets in its waste reduction plan. The Coalition declined to introduce an amendment to remove product bans because it did not have sufficient support from the cross benches: 'the Opposition is able to count and does not intend to delay the proceedings of the House (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5095). The fate of Coalition and other amendments are shown in table B6.4, below.
41 The Australian Democrats 'milk bottle' amendment brought forth debate as to whether refillable milk bottles were superior from an environmental point of view, and whether the change to plastic and cardboard cartons was driven by consumer demand or industry interests. As the Greens member, Hon. Ian Cohen, had pointed out earlier in the debate, the dairy industry decision to phase out refillable milk bottles would result in an additional 20 million plastic and plastic coated containers entering the waste stream each year (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5045). The Democrats amendment aimed to avoid this growth of the waste stream. The Democrats member, the Hon. Richard Jones argued that 'the only reason we do not have so many milk bottles now is that they simply have not been available in supermarkets, where people prefer to buy their milk' and it was a choice by industry not to make refillable bottles available in supermarkets (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5091-5092).
[Appendix B6.114]
Table B6.4: The fate of amendments moved in the Legislative Council on the WasteMinimisation and Management Bill.
M ovedA m endm ent by For A gainst O utcom eAn additional m em ber of SWAC, Co Co La D efeatedrepresenting the D epartm en t of Business CA Deand Regional D evelopm ent Gr
Expand the role of the SW AC to have La La Passedinpu t into decisions abou t penalties for Conon-com pliance w ith in d u stry w astereduction plans, an d advise the M inisteron particu lar w aste stream s subject todisposal bans
SWAC to have reg a rd to the principles of La La Passedecologically susta inab le developm ent Co
De
SWAC requ ired to rep o rt annually La Laf n
Passed
M inisters for Local G overnm ent and Lav ^ v /
La PassedPlanning m ay n o t g ran t exem ptions to Cocouncils from joining w aste boards Deunless the M inisters are satisfied thatw aste p lann ing is in accordance w ith theprinciples of ecologically sustainabledevelopm ent
W aste boards opera te according to the La La Passedprinciples of ecologically sustainable Codevelopm ent
G uidelines on w aste p lann ing issued to La La Passedw aste boards shou ld contain benchm arks Coagainst w hich perfo rm ance can bem easured
W aste boards req u ired to consult w ith La La Passedthe com m unity in p rep a rin g w aste plans Co
De
Industry w aste red u c tio n p lans requ ired La La Passedto reflect S tate-w ide w aste policy Co
De
Industry w aste red u c tio n p lans m ust Co Co La D efeatedspecify the in d u stry or in d u stry m em bers CA Deto w hich the p lan app lies, and include Greconom ic and env ironm en ta l cost benefitanalyses
[Appendix B6.115]
Table B6.4 (contd): The fate of amendments moved in the Legislative Council 01 Waste Minimisation and Management Bill
the
M ovedA m endm ent by For A gainst O utcom eThe M inister shou ld be taken to have De De Co Passeddeterm ined th a t an in d u s try w aste Lareduction p lan be req u ired from the dairyindustry , and tha t the p lan set a targetlevel of use of refillable m ilk bottles andinclude a public educa tion cam paign toencourage the use of refillable m ilk bottlesThe NSW EPA m ust advertise the La La PassedM inister's decision th a t a p articu la r Coin d u stry shou ld p rep are a w aste reductionp lanThe NSW EPA shou ld p rov ide a repo rt to La La Passedthe SW AC on the scope of a p ro p o sed Coin d u stry w aste reduction p lanIf the packaging in d u stry sh o u ld fail to De De Co Passedm eet its w aste reduc tion ta rge ts asspecified in its w aste reduc tion plan,SW AC m ay advise the M in ister of theneed to in troduce container depositlegislationA dditional reference to 're fu n d ab le De De Passeddeposit' in the legislation, to ap p ly if an Lain d u stry d id n o t m eet its w aste reductiontargetsA dd ing the requ irem en t to separate La La Passeddelivered w aste to the cond itions tha t Cocould be attached to a licence to opera te a DelandfillA dd ing the p rep ara tio n of a closure p lan La La Passedto the conditions th a t could be a ttached to Coa licence to operate a landfillO m ission of reference to p ro d u c t bans in Co Co La D efeatedthe legislationP rovide SW AC w ith m ore invo lvem en t in Co Co La D efeatedthe allocation of funds from the W asteP lann ing and M anagem ent F u n dC ouncils w ou ld be able to ap p ly for Gr Gr La Passedfund ing from the W aste P lann ing and CoM anagem ent F und for staff to m onito rprem ises for com pliance w ith a regionalw aste p lanThe M inister shou ld seek the advice of Gr Gr PassedSW AC before vary ing the levels of Lafinancial contribu tions from councils and Cow aste facility opera to rsEstablish a process for appea l to a court Co Co La D efeatedw hen an in d u s try is aggrieved by adecision in a w aste red u c tio n p lan
Notes: Only those parties who explicitly indicated their support or opposition to an amendment in the debate are shown. Abbreviations are: Co — Coalition, La — Labor, De — Australian Democrats, CA — Call to Australia Party, Gr — Greens.
[Appendix B6.116]
42 The Coalition argued that the environmental benefits of refillable milk bottles were doubtful, quoting both from information from Australian Cooperative Foods Limited and from a study carried out in 1991 by the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies at the Australian National University. The latter found that:
The differences between glass, plastic and paperboard carton milk containers were so small it was questionable, in fact misleading, to rank the containers according to their environmental impact.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5091)
43 The refillable bottle only had an environmental advantage if the trip rate was sufficiently high and transport distances not too long. Australian Cooperative Foods had reported that trip rates had declined from 25 to 7 (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5091). The rejoinder from Jones was to point out that the Australian National University Study had been funded by the milk carton industry.
44 The Coalition also argued that the decline of the refillable milk bottle was due to the preference of supermarket customers for the lighter plastic and paperboard containers (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5092).
45 The Democrats container deposit amendment was, in the Hon. Richard Jones's view, more of an inducement for the packaging industry to meet its targets, than a serious proposal for future legislation.
I talked to my friends in the packaging industry about container deposit legislation. I told them that I do not mind how they reach their targets, nor would anyone in the community, as long as they are reached. This, in a sense, is placed in the bill as the proverbial sword of Damocles: if you do not do it, mate, you may get container deposit legislation.
(Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5094)
46 As for the 'milk bottle' amendment, studies of the benefits of container deposit legislation were not conclusive, with the Coalition able to quote figures showing the 'real' glass bottle recycling rate in South Australia (where container deposit legislation was in force) to be no better than in Victoria (where it was not if force) at about 40 per cent. The Democrats were able to quote figures showing a 85 to 97 per cent return of glass containers (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5095).
[Appendix B6.117]
47 The Coalition amendment to provide for a process of appeal to a court where an industry was aggrieved by a decision in a waste reduction plan brought forth debate on whether such a right of appeal was 'natural justice' (the Coalition) or 'an opportunity for industry to obstruct the commencement of the IWRP [industry waste reduction plan] process' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5099).
48 The final attempt by the Coalition to defer the legislation was an amendment to the motion that the Bill be read a third time that would delay the third reading until the resumption of Parliament in 1996. This amendment was defeated, with the Greens and the Australian Democrats voting with the Government (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5100).
B6.17.5 Reactions to the Waste Minimisation and Management Act
1 Reactions obtained by the Herald after the Bill was tabled in the Legislative Assembly were positive. According to the Herald the Total Environment Centre and the Friends of the Earth described the Bill as 'a gutsy effort to tackle the waste crisis'. The consequence of the Bill was, according to Jeff Angel, director of the Total Environment Centre, that 'Everyone is now on trial — government, consumers and producers'. The chief executive officer of the Packaging Council, Gavin Williams, was quoted as saying that industry would cooperate:
Because of its exposure to environment issues over a long period, the packaging industry believes it has a positive role to play and can contribute to the smooth and efficient implementation of the NSW legislation.
(SMH, 16.11.95:3)
2 However, the chief executive of the NSW Chamber of Manufacturers was reported as saying that he believed that manufacturing industries had been unfairly targeted by the legislation:
3 In particular, the Chamber was offended by Ms Allan's comments that manufacturers had been 'lax' about waste reduction.
'Obviously we want to do something about waste, but not in a way that would burden business with even more costs,' Mr Holt [the chief
[Appendix B6.118]
executive] said. 'NSW is trying to set a new benchmark for waste reduction, but may only achieve a situation where business looks elsewhere to establish, as a result of the unrealistic target set in this State.'
(SMH, 30.11.95:13)
It was also in the aftermath of the introduction of the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill that the implications of the inaccuracies in waste accounting for the target were finally made explicit. According to the Herald in late November 1995,
There are few in either the private of public side of the waste industry who believe the target can be reached. In the end, a numeric figure is probably meaningless, particularly when it is based on a rubbery 1990 base figure when no-one could say for certain how much waste was being produced or dumped.
(SMH, 30.11.95:13)
APPENDIX B7
Littering, Dumping, Clean-Ups and Waste Places
B7.1 Beach Pollution in the Early 1930s
1 In the 1930s, the beach pollution from ocean dumping of municipal waste became a contentious issue. Questions were asked of the Ministers for Health and for Local Government in the Legislative Assembly as to whether these Ministers were aware of the pollution of ocean beaches and whether they would consider bringing in a bill, or amending the Local Government Act, to prohibit ocean dumping (Legislative Assembly, 17.9.29:65, 20.3.30:3960, 2.3.32:8056,15.9.32:250- 251, 11.10.32:916-917). The Minister for Health stated that he did not have the power to bring in such a bill, and that the problem was a matter for the Minister of Local Government. The Minister for Local Government explained that he had before for him for approval a request from the Glebe Council to raise a loan for the construction of an incinerator (this council being the last to use ocean dumping). However, he was delaying giving his approval for three reasons. Firstly, the price quoted for the incinerator was£2000 higher than the cost of a similar incinerator recently constructed by the same company for another council. Secondly, it might be possible for Glebe Council to obtain a contract to dump its garbage 20 miles out to sea instead of the present five miles for half the cost of the present contract. Thirdly, the Minister was aware that Glebe Council had the second most expensive rates in Sydney and he was concerned that the incinerator proposal should not add to the existing rate burden.
2 In speaking to his motion of 15 October 1932. Moverly also referred to a deputation from the eastern suburbs councils and the surf life saving associations that was received by the Minister for Local Government on 6 October 1932 (reported in the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) of 7 October (SMH 7.10.32:13)). This deputation was one of a series, all protesting about ocean dumping, received by the Minister for Local Government during 1932. According to the Herald deputations were
[Appendix B7.2]
received in May, October and November (SMH, 31.5.32:4; 7.10.32:13; 24 .10.32:10 and 18.11.32:10). According to Moverly, the Minister for Local Government rejected the deputation's demands that ocean dumping be banned on three grounds. Firstly, reports from his department cast doubt on whether the beach pollution was due to ocean dumping. Secondly, the Minister for Local Government argued that he did not have the power to direct councils how to dispose of their garbage. Thirdly, the Minister pointed out that the need for specific action on ocean dumping was obviated by the proposed introduction in three months time of the Greater Sydney Bill which would constitute a Greater Sydney Council, one of whose responsibilities would be the disposal of garbage. Moverly argued in response that there was little doubt that the beach pollution was due to ocean dumping, that the Minister did have the required powers, and that the Greater Sydney Bill had been before the House for many years without any progress occurring. In further support of his demand, Moverly referred to the losses being suffered by small businesses on the seafronts of the eastern suburbs beaches and to the ban on ocean dumping that had been introduced by New York City in response to beach pollution.
3 In his response, the Minister for Local Government was at pains to point out that, as a previous resident of Coogee, he was also proud of Sydney's beaches, but he also had to consider the matter of the proposed Glebe incinerator and whether it would impose too high a rate burden on the ratepayers of Glebe. The Minister further argued that action should be deferred until the passing of the Greater Sydney Bill, which could result in the centralisation of responsibility for garbage disposal (Legislative Assembly, 13.10.32:1074-1075).
4 In the ensuing debate, there was bipartisan support for the need to keep the Sydney beaches free from pollution not only from garbage, but also from pollution from the ocean sewage outfalls. However, before Moverly's motion could be put to a vote, debate was adjourned due to the late hour (after 3 a.m.). Debate was to be resumed five days later (18 October 1932). A question to the Premier on this day reveals that the matter had been omitted from the order of business for the day (Legislative Assembly, 18.10.32:1159). The Premier stated that he might make a statement after the tea adjournment as to the rest of the business of the House for that and the next week. As further deputations
[Appendix B7.3]
protesting about ocean dumping were received by the Minister for Local Government in October and November, according to the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH, 24 .10.32:10 and 18.11.32:10), it would appear that the debate had not been resumed by mid-November.
In answer to a question on 1 December 1932, the Deputy Premier stated that the matter of a ban on ocean dumping would be debated the following week (Legislative Assembly, 1.12.32:2519). However,Hansard for this period does not carry any account of such a debate. Interestingly, in a supplementary question on 1 December, it was claimed that a private company, the Harbour, Land and Transport Company, was actively promoting ocean dumping as a cheaper alternative for municipal councils to incineration.
There are some inconsistencies between various sources as to whether legislation was introduced or amended in New South Wales to ban ocean dumping. It was reported in the Herald in 1940 that: 'Years ago it [garbage] used to be taken out to sea in barges and dumped, but since 1932 this has been prohibited by law' (SMH, 9.10.40:12). Yet also according to the Herald, in August 1933 the Rand wick Council was still calling for the government to amend the Sydney Corporation Act and the Local Government Act to prevent ocean dumping (SMH, 23.8.33:17). This is supported by Hansard for7 September 1933, which records that the Minister for Local Government advised the Legislative Assembly that his department had received communications from Rand wick Council and Warringah Shire on the question of ocean dumping of garbage and the matter was under consideration by the Department (Legislative Assembly, 7.9.33:371).
In October 1934, the Minister for Local Government was questioned in the Legislative Assembly as to whether he would consider having the Sydney City Council dump its garbage 15-20 miles off shore, in view of this method of disposal costing one third of the cost of incineration, and in view of advice from the Superintendent of Navigation that currents at this distance were away from the land (Legislative Assembly, 28.9.33:745). In his answer, the Minister said that he had no power to prescribe the method of disposal to be used by the City Council. He added that there was no need for a total prohibition on the ocean dumping of garbage, because the Commonwealth government had
[Appendix B7.4]
banned dumping close to the coast expressly to prevent beach pollution, which provided support for the view that garbage dumped further out would not find its way back to the beaches (Legislative Assembly, 4.10.33:833).
The Mayor of Randwick Council, Alderman Arthur Moverly M.L.A., who had been prominent in the deputations to the Local Government Minister in 1932, was reported by the Herald in 1934 as saying in his speech at the opening of the Willoughby incinerator that ocean dumping had been stopped by Parliament (SMH 7.9.34:16).
The ocean dumping issue appears to made its final appearance in the Legislative Assembly on 15 November 1944, when the Premier was asked if he was aware of recent press reports of 'hundreds of tons of garbage ... washed ashore on our ocean beaches, allegedly discharged from punts immediately off the coastline'. These punts apparently belonged to contractors who collected garbage from ships moored in the harbour. He was also asked:
Is it a fact that in 1933 legislation was passed by this House prohibiting the punting of garbage to sea by municipal councils unless it was taken beyond the 20-mile limit?
(Legislative Assembly, 15.11.44:1002)
The Premier replied that he understood that 'the dumping of garbage at sea had been discontinued a very considerable time ago', to which the questioner interjected, 'Only by councils!'
It is possible that the inconsistencies have arisen from the coincidence of debate in the Legislative Assembly about ocean dumping with the passage of Federal legislation banning ocean dumping close to the coast. In the absence of any record in Hansard to the contrary, it seems that the need for legislative action was forestalled when the last council in the Sydney region that was using ocean dumping, Glebe Council, was given permission by the Department of Local Government on 17 October 1932 to construct an incinerator (SMH 18.11.32:10). A second possible factor may have, of course, been the enactment by the Commonwealth Government in December 1932 of the Beaches, Fishing Grounds and Sea Routes Protection Act which prevented dumping of garbage in
[Appendix B7.5]
prescribed areas, one of which included a 15 mile wide strip from Botany Bay to Newcastle (Coward, 1988:260).
B7.2 Littering and Clean Ups
1 The idea of special clean ups goes back at least to 1935 when inner Sydney municipalities held a clean up and the Department of Public Health recommended the continuation and extension of the practice (Department of Public Health, 1937:106).
B7.2.1 Keep the City Clean in the 1940s
1 This was the call from the Lord Mayor of Sydney City Council in June 1943 reported in the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH, 5.6.43:8) and which marked the beginning of a period of five years in which there was an increase in the number of articles about litter and dumping in the Herald (see figure B7.1, below). The shortage of cleaning staff, the increase in numbers of people in transit, and a reluctance to prosecute members of the armed forces for littering all combined to cause a marked increase in the levels of litter in Sydney (SMH, 27.11.44:2, 3.1.46:5). The campaign to clean up Sydney was widened immediately after World War II to include the restoration of streets where trenches had been constructed and the removal of air-raid shelters from city parks (SMH, 3.1.46:5). In January 1946, Sydney City Council had 22 inspectors on duty and was prepared, according to a statement by the Lord Mayor, to prosecute either for littering in the street or for not having proper garbage receptacles. By mid-January 1946, ten summonses had been issued against city traders for having garbage bins without a properly fitting lid (SMH, 12.1.46:4).
B7.2.2 Growth in Litter and Dumping in the 1950s and 60s
1 Litter and roadside dumping became of increasing public concernduring the 1950s and 1960s. Increasing car ownership also increased the amount of recreational visits to the outer areas of Sydney, thereby bringing the problem to the notice of a greater proportion of the metropolitan population (see, for example, Legislative Assembly, 28.9.55:676). As shown in figure B7.1, with the exception of five years in
[Appendix B7.6]
the early 1960s, there was a generally increasing trend in the number of articles about litter and dumping in the Sydney Morning Herald over the two decades.
Figure B7.1: Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about litter and dumping, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997.
12 - -
10 - -
Number of 8 -- articles per year 6
2 The increase in litter and dumping may have also been associated with an increase in the amount of floating debris and garbage in Sydney Harbour and its foreshores. The problem was raised intermittently in the Legislative Assembly between 3 September 1953 and 22 September 1953 (Legislative Assembly, 3.9.53:461; 9.9.53:480-481; 15.9.53:564; 16.9.53:611; 22.9.53:709).
3 One factor that have may have contributed to the litter and dumping problem was industrial action by garbage collectors that resulted in garbage being uncollected. As shown in figure B7.2, there were several periods of industrial unrest among garbage collectors in the 1950s.
4 One institutional response to the growing litter and dumping problem that was made quite early was the appointment by councils of rangers with the power to prosecute people dumping rubbish. In 1951, both Randwick and Warringah Councils had such rangers (SMH, 10.6.51:5; 9.12.51:6). However,
[Appendix B7.7]
the Randwick Council suggested to the Department of Local Government in 1952 that Ordinances Number 30 (Roads and Bridges) and 39 (Health and Convenience) be amended to provide for a higher minimum penalty for dumping rubbish as, although the Ordinances provided for a maximum
Figure B7.2: Volume of artides in the Sydney Morning Herald about industrial disputation involving garbage collectors, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997.
14 --
12 - -
10 - -Number of articles per year
2000
penalty of £5 and £50, respectively, magistrates generally imposed fines of the order of several pounds, these fines being seen by Randwick Council as providing insufficient deterrent. Randwick Council's proposal was endorsed by the Local Government and Shires Association and the Minister for Local Government approved an amendment to the Ordinances in May 1952, setting a minimum penalty of £5. The Ordinances were proclaimed in August 1952 (Department of Local Government, 1953:10,1954:10).
5 Other approaches used in the late 1950s, and mainly in the northern suburbs, included the use of private security firms to detect dumpers, the cleaning up of roadsides and the placement of warning signs. Many councils also introduced regular 'clean-up' campaigns to encourage householders to place unwanted items out for collection (Department of
[Appendix B7.8]
Local Government, 1960:38). Such campaigns appear to have been first introduced in 1935, when the Department of Public Health reported favourably on campaigns conducted by a number of inner city municipalities during Health Week and announced that the campaigns would be extended to other municipalities in 1936 (Dept Public Health, 1937:105).
6 In 1960, an amendment to the Crown Lands Act increased the fines for dumping rubbish on crown land from £5 for a first offence,£10 for a second offence and £20 maximum to, respectively,£50, £100 and £500.
7 Rangers were used again in 1967, when Lane Cove Council appointed 20 Justices of the Peace as 'honorary litter rangers' with the power to take litterers' names and addresses for subsequent prosecution by the Council under the Local Government Act (SMH, 4.1.67:4).
8 One form of littering that attracted attention was the problem of bottles broken and discarded on beaches. The problem was raised in the Legislative Assembly on 3 November 1960 and deposits on beer bottles suggested as a solution (Legislative Assembly, 3.11.60:1707).
9 In mid-1970, the Department of Main Roads began a campaign aimed at the littering of roads from cars and 72 prosecutions had been made by early September 1970 (Legislative Council, 9.9.70:5674).
B7.2.3 The 1970 Litter Bill
1 In August 1970, the Coalition Government introduced into theLegislative Assembly the Local Government (Further Amendment) Bill which, among other things, had as its aim 'the consolidation and improvement of existing provisions designed to control the depositing of litter in public places' (Legislative Assembly, 11.8.70:5065). The Bill, in addition to consolidating a number of previously separate ordinances, increased the maximum penalty for littering from $200 to $300, introduced on-the-spot fines, extended the definition of public places and widened the class of those who could be appointed as special constables for the enforcement of the anti-littering provisions to include
[Appendix B7.9]
all employees of the Crown and statutory bodies representing the Crown (Legislative Assembly, 13.8.70:5169-5171).
The definition of litter adopted in the Bill was in terms of 'defiling or defacing a public place or reverse' a concept that was the result of 'considerable thought' (Legislative Council, 9.9.70:5671-5673). The subjectivity of this definition became quite clear in the debate over the Bill in the Legislative Council, with the question being raised as to whether lawn clippings on the footpath constituted litter, and the answer being given that a pile 12 feet high for six months would be litter, but that a small pile for a few days would not be (Legislative Council, 9.9.70:5672-5673).
The debate over the Bill in the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council was structured around a number of themes. Firstly, and in keeping with the nature of environmental concerns of the time, littering was frequently represented as a form of pollution, and less frequently held not to be pollution.
The difference between litter and pollution is not great.(Legislative Assembly,
11.8.70:5068)
The problem of litter is one facet of the whole pollution scene...(Legislative Assembly,
13.8.70:5169)
It has become popular — quite justifiably — for an outcry to go up against pollution. There is nothing worse than garbage that is left by the side of the road to create health hazards.
(Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5233)
This bill has nothing whatever to do with industrial pollution... Perhaps it is the Government's intention to do a little window dressing and to mislead the people of New South Wales into believing it is doing something that will reduce to a minimum the pollution of our natural habitat, whether in rural or urban areas.
(Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5236)
Pollution is a big thing today. People are told to be tidy, to keep the air clean, not to litter the roads, the parks or the forests.
(Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5240)
[Appendix B7.10]
The tüne is long overdue to deal with people who litter the neighbourhood. This is just another form of pollution.
(Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5240)
Though the problem of litter is only part of the whole pollution problem, the littering of streets, parks and other public places has reached the stage where the public conscience must be troubled.
(Legislative Council, 3.9.70:5536)
The most important thing the Government should consider with regard to litter is the rubbish that goes into our harbours and rivers and the pollution of the air. Pollution is much more dangerous than litter caused by cigarette butts and cigarette packs thrown down in the street.
(Legislative Council, 3.9.70:5543)
The DEPUTY-PRESIDENT: Does the honourable member contend that there is a connection between litter and pollution and that, therefore, reference to pollution is admissible because it comes under the definition of litter?The Hon, F.W. BOWEN: 1 believe that the two words are synonymous.
(Legislative Council, 8.9.70:5597)
The Government must take stock of where it is going. It should not be concerning itself with the discarding of a lolly paper. Instead it should be concerning itself with the pollution that is evident to all of us.
(Legislative Council, 8.9.70:5599)
Generally, it was the members of the Coalition Government who framed littering as a pollution issue, and Labor members who argued that littering not a pollution issue, or trivial compared to the seriousness of pollution.
Secondly, littering was represented as form of moral deficiency, an offence against dvic virtue, cleanliness and civic freedoms, frequently to be found among children. However, in some cases, some members almost seemed to take perverse pride in this deficiency as a national trait.
We have to do much more; we have to instil in our young people some sense of civic pride.
(Legislative Assembly, 11.8.70:5068)
[Appendix B7.11]
It is as though the Government had announced that an increase from $200 to $300 in the penalty for offences relating to littering will be the panacea for the lack of civic pride that permeates so many strata of our society.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.8 .70:5175)
We realise that it is difficult to instil into the average Australian any pride in his country and local area. It seems to be part of our make-up to be apathetic and complacent about these things ... The civic pride of Sydney people is not as strong as it is in other places.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.8 .70:5181)
We Australians get used to this type of litter. We think nothing of throwing things down in the streets; we drop cigarette packets, paper, paddle-pop sticks and lolly paper, without any regard to the effect it creates. We would be the untidiest and dirtiest group of people that one could find in any white city, although it might be worse in the Wazza in downtown Cairo.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.8 .70:5184)
Littering public places, including public reserves, is an infringement on the full enjoyment of life and a limitation of the use of these places by the public generally.
(Legislative Assembly, 18.8 .70:5240)
This vandalism is in the same category as littering.(Legislative Council,
3 .9 .70:5548)
In some cases, the litter as pollution and litter as moral deficiency
framings were combined.
If tomorrow we are to have clean, litter-free, non-polluted communities, it will be only as a consequence of the development by young people of an awareness of the dreadful consequence to mankind of the present recreant attitude of some people on the wasting of material, especially material that when thrown about destroys a desirable environment.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.8 .70:5177)
It is fair to say that recently there has been a State-wide appeal for people to have civic pride in their locality. The fat that various groups have been formed to combat vandalism, littering and pollution clearly establishes that at least some sections of the community are most conscious of the need for civic pride. ...Littering, pollution and vandalism are closely related problems. ... these problems of littering, pollution and vandalism constitute a sad reflection on the habits of sections of our society.
(Legislative Council, 3 .9 .70:5547)
[Appendix B7.12]
7 In contrast to the moral deficiency of youth and the average Australian, local government and business were represented as moral bastions in the fight against litter.
Naturally the Government will be most anxious to avail itself of support from local government, from the Chambers of Commerce and other civic minded organisations which, it is hoped, will be encouraged to participate in the Government's intended war on litter.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.8.70:5170)
8 While both sides of politics appeared to support the idea that littering was caused by the moral deficiency or criminality of individuals, there were other dimensions around which the debate was structured where support came markedly from one side of politics or the other.
9 There was some debate as to whether penalties or education was the appropriate policy response to the litter problem. The Opposition argued that penalties had been shown to be ineffective and that:
...it would be preferable in every way to place before this House proposals that would encourage people to retain the beauty of the countryside that to be seeking leave to consolidate Acts to make penalties more effective against those who defile it.
(Legislative Assembly, 11.8.70:5066)
10 The justification for holding that penalties were ineffective rested with the observation that local government had failed to use the its powers to prosecute litterers, a point that was allowed by the Minister for Local Government and Highways:
...there has been criticism of local government generally for failure properly to enforce these provisions, lfeel some of this criticism is justified.
(Legislative Assembly, 13.8.70:5170)
11 The Opposition also argued that it was unfair to impose penalties for littering if local government did not provide sufficient receptacles in public places (Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5228).
12 The Coalition tended to argue that it was proposing both education and penalties (Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5244; Legislative Council, 8.9.70:5603). Some Coalition members (e.g. Legislative Council,
[Appendix B7.13]
8.9.70:5595) were more sure than others (e.g., Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5244) about the importance of the penalties, Education, however, was not an aim of the Bill, but rather was to occur as a result of offers the Government had received from various organisations to support a public awareness campaign when the Bill was passed. These organisations included the Local Government Association of NSW and the Chambers of Commerce Federation of NSW (Legislative Assembly, 13.8.70:5169).
13 The Opposition was also more likely to attach blame for the littering problem to the packaging and beverage industries (Legislative Assembly, 11.8.70:5068-5070, 5175), while the Coalition Government tended to excuse industry:
One cannot expect manufacturers to be responsible for what happens to the containers in which their goods are sold, first to the wholesaler and then through the retailer to the consumer. 1 see no useful purpose in referring to manufacturers at all in connection with this legislation.
(Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5233)
14 As cited above, the Government also referred to the civic-mindedness of organisations representing commerce in supporting an anti-litter publicity campaign.
15 There is some evidence in the debate over the 1970 Litter Bill that the Government had some pressure exerted on it from Liberal Party branches and local government on the north shore to do something about littering (Legislative Assembly, 13.8.70:5183; 18.8.70:5233).
16 Notably, while the Government claimed that the Bill would consolidate and integrate a collection of ordinances about littering in various places, the responsibility for prosecuting offenders, formerly the main preserve of local government, was intentionally extended to include the Forestry Commission and the National Parks and Wildlife Service, thus fragmenting responsibility (Legislative Council, 9.9.70:5675-5676).
[Appendix B7.14]
B7.2.4 Litter Frustration in the Early 1970s
1 In May 1972, the Department of Environment Control released the results of a survey of councils throughout the State that showed that 164 of the State's 223 councils had not issued any on-the-spot litter fines in 1970. A further 23 had issued less than ten fines. A spokesperson for the Local Government Association said that the police should be more closely involved in enforcing anti-litter laws and the Department of Education should conduct a campaign in schools (SMH, 31.5.72:13).
2 In July 1972, the Minister for Environment Control announced that Sydney City Council would spend $1.2 million on cleaning up litter. (SMH, 19.7.72:8).
3 In December 1972, the Herald claimed in an editorial that little impact had been made on the litter problem, due to the council reluctance to issue fines. This was partly due to the costs, far in excess of the $5 fine, of pursuing unpaid fines (SMH, 28.12.72:6).
4 In March 1973 the Department of Environment Control survey of councils showed that 143 councils had not issued any on-the-spot litter fines in 1972 and 32 had issued less than ten. Beale had asked the SPCC to use its powers to clean up litter and recover the costs from councils not enforcing the anti-litter laws. The Local Government Association had made a submission to the SPCC for littering fines to be increased from $5 to $25 (SMH, 26.3.73:3).
5 An editorial in the Herald soon after supported the Local Government Association, but pointed out that it was also necessary to restrict elaborate and throw-away packaging (SMH, 27.3.73:6).
6 In September 1973, the Herald in its editorial was calling for increased penalties for littering (SMH, 25.9.73:6).
7 On 4 October 1973, the Premier announced the fine for littering had been increased from $5 to $25 (SMH, 5.10.73:10). The Herald maintained this was insufficient and it should have been increased to $50 (SMH, 9.10.73:6).
[Appendix B7.15]
Several days later, Opposition members in the Legislative Assembly were claiming that there had been no improvement in the level of litter since the passing of the Local Government (Further Amendment) Bill. They argued that the Act did nothing to require local governments to publicise the existence of the increased fines for littering, nor did it require local governments to prosecute people for littering. The Opposition maintained that mandatory penalties and education campaigns were required (Legislative Assembly, 10.10.73:1869, 1873).
In December 1973, the Minister for Planning and Environment announced that the Government was planning to increase further fines for littering (SMH, 21.12.73:2).
In February 1974, the Minister for Planning and Environment announced an Anti-Litter Day for 6 April (SMH, 22.2.74:3).
In June 1974, the Herald ran a lengthy article about the ineffectiveness of anti-litter legislation by a Professor of Law (SMH, 18.6.74:6).
In December 1974, the Herald reported on a Melbourne council which proposed a system of fines for littering and dumping to be adopted Australia wide (SMH, 4.12.74:14).
In December 1974, the Minister for Planning and Environment announced the State Government was considering new ways to stop people littering, including 'flying squads'. The Herald reported Fuller as saying Tittering begins with people' (SMH, 23.12.74:9).
In February 1975, Blacktown Council introduced part-time litter rangers paid per successful prosecution (SMH, 17.2.75:6). At the same time, the Sydney City Council was appointing women as anti-litter inspectors (SMH, 25.2.75).
In April 1976, councils bordering the Georges River were proposing to jointly employ an inspector solely to prevent rubbish dumping along the river (SMH, 21.4.76).
In September 1979, the Blacktown Council approached the Minister for Local Government to have the fines for littering and dumping increased,
[Appendix B7.16]
as the fines imposed were only a fraction of what it cost to apprehend litterers and dumpers. Most councils were not enforcing the anti-litter ordinances because of the cost (SMH, 12.9.79:9).
B7.2.5 More Litter Frustration in the 1980s
1 In April 1980, the Local Government Association was calling for a meeting of councils to discuss the problem of litter outside take away food shops. The Herald reported also that the Sydney City Council had written to authorities in Hong Kong for information on litter laws there that made shop owners responsible for the litter on their footpath (SMH,
• 3.4.80:3).
2 In December 1982, Choice Magazine reported that littering was decreasing according to the litter counts maintained by the Keep Australia Beautiful Council (SMH, 6.12.82:12).
3 In January 1985, the SPCC released a discussion paper reporting that there had been a great improvement in the reduction in casual littering, but the levels of litter were still unacceptably high and the rate of waste generation was increasing. This was due to the shift to pre-packaged goods and food, and non-returnable beverage containers. In addition there was a growing industrial waste problem and industry was criticised for its limited support of recycling measures. The discussion paper also noted that while various States had introduced ad hoc schemes to reduce waste, there was as yet no comprehensive national policy. The Herald reported that the Mayor of North Sydney, Ted Mack, disagreed with the SPCC, arguing that waste expands to fill the space available. His Council intended experimenting with removing bins in some areas (SMH, 24.1.85:3; 13.6.85:5).
4 In February 1985, North Sydney Council decided not to renew its contract for emptying of bins in public places and remove the bins. Ted Mack claimed that the packaging industry funded 'Do the Right Thing' Campaign had backfired, because people now believed they had the right throw away litter wherever they happen to be (SMH, 19.2.75:1).
[Appendix B7.17]
In June 1985, the State Government launched a new 'Do the Right Thing' campaign (see section B7.3 below for details on the first 'Do the Right Thing' campaign), again funded by the packaging industry to a sum of $1.2 million (SMH, 13.6.85:5; 14.6.85:3).
In February 1987, the Herald ran a major article on the litter and dirt of Sydney (SMH, 11.2.87:15).
In March 1988, the Herald ran a quarter page article on rubbish and disrepair around the Sydney CBD (SMH, 14.3.88:5).
According to the MWDA, the Sydney Environs Cleanliness and Safety Task Force was established following concerns expressed by the then Premier, Neville Wran, about the cleanliness and safety of the city. The Task Force comprised representatives of the SPCC (chair), Sydney City Council, Police Department, the Department of Environment and Planning and the Authority. The main outcome of the Task Force's deliberations appears to be that, after approaches by the Authority's inspectors, waste skips at construction sites in the city were moved from the street to inside the property line. Construction firms were also instructed to use only licensed waste hauliers (MWDA, 1987-88:52-53).
Clean Up the Harbour and Australia
In October 1983, a member of the Opposition raised the issue of the need for the cleaning up of rubbish that had been thrown into the upper reaches of the Harbour and its tributaries and ended up on the foreshores (Legislative Assembly, 20.10.83:2018-2019).
Several days later, the Herald published a human interest story on the MSB dog boats that collected 40 tonnes of floating rubbish in the harbour each day (SMH, 26.10.83:2). In the same issue was a lengthy article on the flora and fauna of the Harbour and the environmental threat of stormwater runoff (SMH, 26.10.83:9).
In early November 1983, the pollution of the Harbour by floating rubbish was raised again, this time being quite clear that the Minister for
[Appendix B7.18]
Planning and Environment, Mr Bedford, understood that urban stormwater runoff was a major contributor (SMH, 1.11.83:2120-2121).
4 In February 1986, the problem littered foreshores was again discussed in an adjournment debate in the Legislative Assembly, when it was feared that the Queen's trip by boat up the Parramatta River might be spoilt by dumped rubbish along the foreshores (Legislative Assembly,26.2.86:518).
5 In October 1987, the problem of 'diffuse refuse' entering the Parramatta River with stormwater runoff was briefly referred to (Legislative Assembly, 27.10.87:15224).
6 On the day before Kiernan's Clean up the Harbour Day in January 1989, the Herald ran further articles more focused on the present than on history. One article cited the health precautions recommended by the chairperson of the National Health and Medical Research Foundation's committee on communicable diseases, a second was a human interest story of an elderly lady who had been cleaning beaches in her area for 40 years, and the third was an announcement by the Minister for Transport (responsible for the MSB) that he would be holding discussions with the foreshore councils on how local government could make a greater contribution to the MSB harbour cleaning costs, including the possibility of a levy on councils according to the length of foreshore or the number of stormwater outlets to the harbour (SMH, 7.1.89:6).
7 In January 1990, the Clean Up the Harbour campaign became the Clean Up Sydney campaign. In the first of a series of articles leading to Clean Up Sydney Day, Ian Kiernan was pictured with a Rose Bay resident who had been unsuccessfully trying to get Woollhara Council to prevent a large stormwater drain from depositing rubbish in the beach at Rose Bay. Ian Kiernan was quoted as attributing the stormwater rubbish problem to lack of coordination in government: 'For decades we have had all this fragmentation of responsibilities, buck-passing and sidestepping on this. It has got to stop', he said. (SMH, 9.1.90:3).
[Appendix B7.19]
In the 1990 Clean Up, the Army volunteered the use of two landing barges to collect rubbish from areas, such as fringing mangroves, that could not be reached readily from the land (SMH, 11.1.90:6).
In November 1990, the activities of the previous January were described as the 'Australia-wide Clean-Up Day'. The organisers were reported as having approached all local governments in Australia and to be hoping in an increase in the number of volunteers from 300 000 to 500 000 (SMH, 13.11.90:4).
In December 1990, IBM joined with Westpac and Telstra in sponsoring Clean Up Australia Day for 24 March, 1991 (SMH, 19.12.90:6).
In February 1991, the Herald reported on preparations for Clean Up Australia Day. Ian Kieman announced that local groups would be 'encouraged to act as public custodians for sections of the [Cooks] river'. A litter survey was to be conducted as part of the Day, and the results to be distributed in the form of a 'Rubbish Report' to governments, industry and conservation groups (SMH, 11.2.91).
A major feature in the Herald with maps and sponsors' advertising and logos preceded the 1991 Clean Up Day. Considerable space in the article about the Clean Up Day was given to groups who were seeking to improve their image by their association with the day. A group of body builders from local gymnasiums were to clean up a section of the Nepean River. According to the Herald, the spokesperson for the body builders, who was Mr Australasia 1991:
...hopes that putting so much muscle to work will help lift the public image of body builders.
People think if you lift weights, you must be on anabolic steroids. We're not. Body building's about health, fitness and quality of life. We just want a quality environment to go with it.
(SMH, 20.3.91:28)
The members of the Four Wheel Drive Association of NSW were to remove large objects like dumped cars and washing machines in the Castlereagh and Londonderry areas. According to the Herald, the spokesperson for the Association said:
[Appendix B7.20]
Everyone thinks people with four-wheel drives are ratbags who go around ploughing up the bush. Ninety-nine percent of the people in the association are very ecology-minded.
(SMH, 20.3.91:28)
14 The article also reported that in past clean ups, plastic had made up 42 per cent of the garbage collected, a figure that would most likely have been collected on a per item collected basis. Ian Kiernan was also reported as saying that he wanted to make Clean Up Australia Day more than just a one day and use data on the rubbish collected to pressure authorities to reduce the waste at its source (SMH, 20.3.91:28). The Herald presented the results again in December 1991, pointing out that 94 per cent of rubbish collected was packaging or package-related. The spokesperson for the Plastics Industry Association, Susan Ryan, responded that plastic use in packaging was increasing and it was recyclable and necessary to prevent food spoilage (SMH, 4.12.91:7).
15 The number of volunteers for the 1991 Clean Up Day was estimated at 35 000, which was less than the estimate of 50 000 for the previous year. The amount of rubbish collected was also down, and this was attributed to the effectiveness of the previous clean ups. In reply to the question whether he was considering giving up the clean ups, Ian Kiernan was reported as saying that he would continue to promote them until 'the Australian environment was no longer polluted by the careless disposal of sewage and domestic waste' (SMH, 25.3.91:1).
16 A further article in the Herald noted stormwater drains as the main source of rubbish in the Harbour and referred to the participation of the Governor of NSW and his wife at Rose Bay (SMH, 25.3.91:5).
17 An article later in the year about the opening of a plastic recycling plant in Albury carried a photo of Ian Kiernan beside bales of plastic bottles, although no comments from him were reported in the article (SMH, 20.6.91:5).
18 An article a week later reported on the clean up plans at Rookwood cemetery where rubbish included both remnants of objects placed on graves and demolition and garden waste and car wrecks dumped by householders. Ian Kiernan was dted as saying that the clean ups 'helped change people's behaviour and focused their attention on
[Appendix B7.21]
environmental issues such as waste reduction, recycling and water pollution'. He also referred to his plans to run a Clean Up the World Day (SMH, 29.2.92:7).
The turnout for the 1992 Clean Up Australia Day in Sydney was down on the previous years participation. The Herald report followed in the framing established in previous years' reports with the 'weird and dangerous articles' angle and the 'everyone doing their bif angle. The Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, was the prominent person chosen as 'everyone' for the 1992 article. He was quoted by the Herald as saying that 'It's the sort of thing the Government couldn't do if it tried.It would be seen as authoritarian and cynical' (SMH, 2.3.92:3).
In keeping with the cycle of publicity established in previous years, the Herald announced the findings of the 1992 Rubbish Report and the expectations for the 1993 Clean Up Australia Day in November 1992. Packaging came in for criticism, constituting 75 per cent of rubbish items, an increase of 18 per cent from the previous year. Plastic made up 50 per cent of the items collected. The 1993 Clean Up was to concentrate on roadsides.
In February 1993, Ian Kiernan, announced plans to boost the Sydney 2000 Olympics bid by cleaning up Sydney. The Lord Mayor of Sydney and vice president of the Olympic bid, Frank Sartor, was quoted by the Herald as saying that:
...the public had led the way in the fight for the environment.
We, the authorities, have a responsibility to make sure that we do our bit where we can, to assist,...
(SMH, 2.2.93:11)
Ian Kiernan was reported as saying that even with the remarkable contribution of volunteers, there was a need to continue to pressure government, industry and the Sydney Water Board to safeguard waterways (SMH, 2.2.93:11)
In an article the day before the 1993 Clean Up, Ian Kiernan was quoted by the Herald:
[Appendix B7.22]
7 am constantly amazed by the amount of rubbish I see on the roads — we treat them as public dumping grounds,' Mr Kiernan said. 'What people don't seem to realise is that a lot of this waste is finding its way into our water zu ays.'
(SMH, 6.3.93:5)
24 The article carried a photo of Ian Kiernan in the Clean Up Tally Room.
25 The Herald's reporting of the 1993 Clean Up followed the usual pattern of catching attention with reference to unusual finds. The estimated number of participants in Sydney fell from 25 000 in1992 to 15 000 in 1993 and the amount of rubbish collected was thought to have been less than the previous year. The plastic 'problem' was emphasised with the article's headline 'Sydney clean-up shows up the plastic problem'. Conservation groups were reported as calling for a ban on some types of plastic packaging and the introduction of container deposit legislation (SMH, 8.3.93:2).
26 The Herald ran its first publicity for the 1994 Clean Up in December 1993. The article reported on Ian Kiernan's frustration and despair that packaging continued to be the most common constituent of the rubbish collected on Clean Up days and the roadside the most common source location.
I don't want to stand up here year after year telling you the same story, giving you the same statistics. ... Normally on Sunday, I'd be sailing my boat... let's get on with [cleaning up Australia] so I can go back to sailing, and hopefully, not just on Sundays.
(SMH, 6.12.93:7)
27 The figures in the third annual Rubbish Report that Ian Kiernan felt were so disappointing were that 71.5 per cent of rubbish items were packaging, with plastic and polystyrene accounting for 46.9 per cent of items, an increase on the previous year. Kiernan argued that legislation was required to create incentives for industry to 'reduce packaging and to take rubbish back for reuse or recycling', either by the Federal Government or, if it did not have the power, by the State governments (SMH, 6.12.93:7).
28 Further publicity in the Herald in January 1994 focused on the rubbish exposed by bushfires in the Royal National Park. The article mentioned that the public had reported at least 300 car bodies to the Clean Up
[Appendix B7.23]
Australia offices. Ian Kiernan was reported as making renewed calls for a deposit of $200 to be imposed on car prices to be redeemed of then the car was disposed of responsibly (SMH, 25.1.94:3).
29 According to the Herald, the first commercial on-site compostingoperation was established by Digital's South Pacific headquarters at Rhodes in September 1994 and opened by Ian Kiernan (SMH, 15.11.94:36; 30.3.95:39).
B7.2.7 Littering Issues in the 1990s
1 The Minister for the Environment announced that litter fines would be increased from $20 to $200 (SMH, 23.1.90:1). The Lord Mayor of Sydney was reported as pledging a crackdown on litterers when the legislation came into effect. In the meantime, it was planning to run an anti-litter campaign in conjunction with McDonalds (SMH, 14.3.90:2).
2 On 1 July 1991, the penalties for littering were increased from $20 to $200. The Herald article headline used the theme of the Do the Right Thing campaign ('Do the right thing or pay'). A month later, the Herald reported that very few fines had been issued by councils (SMH, 29.6.91:6; 31.7.91:3).
3 In November 1993, the Litter and Recycling Research Association, a lobbying organisation for the packaging industry, announced it was launching a new version of the 'Do the Right Thing' campaign that connected litter to wider environmental issues ('Do the Right Thing, Your Planet Thanks You'). The Association believed that 'many Australians discuss the greenhouse effect and the ozone hole at the dinner table but have yet to realise that the litter they drop is making a serious contribution to environmental pollution'. The manager of the Association was quoted as saying 'What the they [the public] dump in the gutter is what they will complain about seeing in their favourite waterway' (SMH, 30.11.93:6).
4 In August 1994, Legislative Council Democratic, Richard Jones, was reported by the Herald to have sent a bag of McDonalds litter to the companies chairman. The correspondence between the two reported in
[Appendix B7.24]
the Herald provides a nice example of the collision of the packaging industry's line on litter and the emerging idea of extended producer responsibility.
He [the chairman of McDonalds] goes on to recount how he has been telling politicians for a long time that litter does not litter - people litter and says that until governments are prepared to educate and police we cannot expect to reduce the amount of litter in our environment.
Mr Jones was not to be deterred by this.
He returned the salvo: 7 notice you refer to "your bag of rubbish" as if it were mine.
In fact it is your, that is McDonalds, bag of rubbish... Your organisation has to take responsibility for items in the street with your name on them.'
(SMH, 31.8.94:20)
5 In November 1994, Keep Australia Beautiful reported that littering had decreased by nine per cent but 'Australians were still dumping an alarming amount of disposable items' (SMH, 22.11.94:2).
6 In March 1995, Keep Australia Beautiful released a report of focus group work that showed that teenagers, while favouring biodegradable products, and being upset by the impact of plastic on wildlife, regarded responsible disposal of litter in a bin as 'uncool' and a habit of the older generation (SMH, 29.3.95:5).
7 In May 1995, cigarette butts began to become an issue as non-smoking rules in city buildings forced smokers onto pavements. The Herald reported on a study by Sydney Water on the problem and quoted the executive director of the environmental group Ark Australia as describing a butts as a 'poison pellet'. He also raised the issue of lack of enforcement of littering laws by local government and represented the cigarette butt as an environmental pollutant that could re appear in distant places several years after being discarded (SMH, 18.5.95:5).
B7.3 The Packaging Industry, Container Deposit Legislation and Litter Politics
1 In late February 1972, an editorial reported Beale was threatening to introduce harsh legislation against the packaging industry which he believed was responsible for 50 per cent of the litter problem. The
[Appendix B7.25]
editorial mentioned that the ACF had pointed out a year earlier that recycling was the solution (SMH, 28.2.72:6).
2 The details of a proposed packaging levy scheme devised by officers of the Department of Environment Control were provided to the packaging industry in June 1972 (SMH, 4.12.72:3).
3 April 1973 the Keep Australia Beautiful Council said that its studies had shown that only 2.7 per cent of roadside litter was plastic. Spokesperson for the Plastics Institute said that litter 'is a people problem not a product problem5 * 7. The solution was education and enforcement. The plastics industry had requested that anti-litter messages be incorporated on all plastic containers (SMH, 26.4.73:6).
4 In February 1974, the Packaging Industry Advisory Council executive director, Joseph Honeysett, proposed to a hearing of the Federal House of Representatives Standing Committee on the Environment and Conservation that a national organisation should be formed to produce co-ordinated recommendations for implementation by governments and industry. The membership of the organisation would include governments, industry, consumers and retailers. He had recently returned from visiting countries overseas where container deposit legislation had been introduced. He said that marked reduction in litter had been reported, but this may be due to the increased expenditure on roadside collection in these countries. He agreed with evidence given to the Committee that there had initially been no increase in drink prices in Oregon when container deposit legislation was introduced, but claimed that prices had subsequently increased. He repeated that the Council did not support the introduction of container deposit legislation (SMH, 20.2.74:14).
5 In March 1976, the Liberal Member for Wakehurst, Mr Viney, reportedon a visit to USA, maintaining (on the basis of litter and dumpingobserved from his car window) that container deposit legislation in Oregon State had been a failure. In contrast, the Litter Control Act in Washington State, which had been requested by industry and levied it to fund litter education programs, had been a success according to departmental representatives he had spoken to. Mr Viney stated that he believed that the beverage and packaging industries in New South
[Appendix B7.26]
Wales had reached 'a sense of environmental responsibility' such that they would be willing to pay a tax or levy provided it did not go into consolidated revenue (Legislative Assembly, 2.3.76:3909-3809, 3811- 3812).
6 By 1976 there was a Keep Australia Beautiful Council of NSW, and its executive director, Col. Donald Ramsay was reported as wanting Australia to adopt a USA anti-litter program that he learnt about at the Clean World Conference in Dublin. The program was claimed to bring about a 70 per cent reduction in litter. Research in the USA had shown that bottle deposits was a minor way of tackling the litter problem'. Col. Ramsay claimed that the chairman of the Keep Australia Beautiful Council of NSW, Lady Galleghan, had appealed personally to the Minister for Planning and Environment, Paul Landa, for government funding. This had been rejected on the grounds that private industry should support the Council rather than government (SMH, 28.10.76:6).
7 In November 1976, in reply to a question as to whether the Government intended to ban ring-top cans and introduce container deposits on beer cans and bottles, and as to what the effect this would be on employment in the liquor industry, the Minister for Planning and Environment, Paul Landa, revealed that he was investigating the effect on litter of the South Australian container deposit legislation and was in the process of discussions with Comalco to 'get their ideas on anti-pollution schemes that have been introduced in other States or overseas' (Legislative Assembly, 18.10.76, 3143-3144).
8 In August 1977, Paul Landa, the Minister for Planning and Environment in the Labor Government, announced a three year, $2.5 million anti-litter program funded by the packaging and beverage industries. The first priority was a publicity campaign to get public cooperation in reducing litter, with the program then to 'direct its attention to devising programs for the most environmentally desirable and cost-effective methods of solid waste management'. The Government was to encourage local government to establish Titter collection depots' at shopping centres, beaches and parks and service stations were to be encouraged to provide litter bins. Landa stated that if the program did not work, the Government would consider introducing compulsory beverage container deposits or a packaging levy (SMH, 20.8.77:2).
[Appendix B7.27]
In December 1978, the 'Do the Right Thing' Campaign was launched.At the launch, Landa stated that the anti-litter program would consist of media publicity, community education programs, pilot litter reduction schemes with local government, research into litter patterns and recycling and the development of solid waste management programs (SMH, 14.12.78:8).
In November 1980, the Government replied to a question on notice in the Legislative Assembly that private industry had provided $700 000 towards the Government's litter reduction campaign between October 1979 and October 1980, of which $540 000 had been expended by the Government by 30 June 1980. The contributions were made by the packaging and beverage industries through a corporation registered as the Litter Research Association (Legislative Assembly, 12.11.80:2807- 2808).
In January 1984, the Herald reported that the Litter Reduction Campaign's litter index survey had shown that acts of littering had decreased by more than half between 1979 and mid-1983. However, the SPCC was considering introducing a litter act in NSW which was the only State without such an act. The SPCC wanted increased controls on some forms of packaging and economic incentives to encourage recycling. The costs of waste disposal were rising, and the steady movement from re-useable to disposable bottles was resulting in increased waste and littering (SMH, 2.1.84:3).
In November 1988, the Government member for Manly in the newly elected Greiner Government canvassed the possibility of introduction of container deposit legislation as a solution to the substantial costs incurred by local government in cleaning up Harbourside beaches. The success of the South Australian container deposit legislation was referred to and, for the first time, the fact that much of the litter was potentially recyclable was added to the justification for doing something to reduce littering (Legislative Assembly, 17.11.88:3681-3682).
In June 1989, the Herald carried an article on a report by the Federal Govemmenf s Business Regulation Review Unit which concluded that a container deposit system extended to all Australian states would result
[Appendix B7.28]
in $500 million of costs to consumers and producers. This report was funded in part by the Litter Research Association (Business Regulation Review Unit, 1989). In the words of the Director of the Unit, Dr Alan Moran, the system would be 'a $500 million solution to a $14 million problem'. The SPCC disputed the findings that a container deposit system would not affect littering and a spokesperson, It pointed out that the glass and aluminium recycling rates in South Australia were about 85 to 90 percent, compared to 43 per cent and 63 per cent respectively in NSW. Local councils, through the Local Government Association, were asking that the NSW Government introduce container deposit legislation. However, the SPCC view was that the legislation would not be effective in NSW because drink containers made up only a small proportion of the total waste stream (SMH, 30.6.89:5).
14 The report by the Business Regulation Review Unit carried a copy of the 1986 agreement between the SPCC and the Litter Research Association, under which the latter contributed funds for use by the former for, among other things, litter education. The agreement stated that it could be terminate by either partner if:
...environmental or litter control measures are introduced or if legislation is -passed by the State of New South Wales or the Commonwealth of Australia which conflicts with the spirit and intent of this Agreement
(Business Regulation Review Unit,1989:133)
15 In August 1989, in reply to a question on notice from a Government member to the Minister for the Environment about the problem of broken glass and the possibility of introducing container deposit legislation, the Government stated that it preferred to 'fully explore the potential of voluntary methods of waste reduction and recycling and on public education'. It referred to the report of the NSW Recycling Committee which recommended the promotion of kerbside collection (see appendix B5.7.9:2), arguing that this was preferable to container deposit legislation because it was applicable to a greater number of components of the waste stream. The reply to the question on notice did, however, allude to the possibility of container deposit legislation, not so much as a solution to littering, but as a means of increasing the level of recycling, if recycling levels were not satisfactory (Legislative Assembly, 2.8.89:9293).
[Appendix B7.29]
16 In December 1992, the Friends of the Earth, Sydney released a study of container deposit legislation that drew attention to the funding agreement between the former SPCC and the Litter Research Association (Hopper, 1992). The agreement was reported in the Herald as a 'sweetheart deal' between the State Pollution Control Commission by which the packaging industry was preventing the introduction of container deposit legislation in New South Wales. Under this agreement, the members of the Litter Research Association had contributed $9 million for litter reduction campaigns on the understanding that container deposit legislation would not be introduced. This had been revealed in the June 1989 report of the Business Regulation Review Unit (SMH, 24.11.89:7).
17 In February 1993, the Environment Protection Authority ended the agreement with the beverage and packaging industries (SMH, 18.2.93:4).
B7.4 Landfill Siting Controversies
1 The advantages in filling dangerous brickpits and creating parkland, and the improvements in the management of landfills in the earlier parts of the 20th century (see appendix B8.1.3) did not mean, however, that the siting of new landfills was without controversy. Throughout much of the 20th century, the siting of landfills periodically excited media (figure B7.3) and political attention.
B7.4.1 Moore Park, 1939
1 In the late 1930s, the Sydney City Council proposed that it extend the area within Moore Park where it dumped incombustible waste, and this issue received some coverage in the Sydney Morning Herald (see Figure B7.3, above). The Mayor of Randwick Council, Alderman Moverly, made representations to the Minister of Agriculture for the proposal to be refused (SMH, 4.4.39:16). The proposed additional tipping site was
[Appendix B7.30]
Figure B7.3: Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about landfill siting, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997.
18 t
16 --
14 --12 - -
Number of articles per year
10 - -
2000
adjacent to the Moore Park golf course and the Golf Club made similar representations to the Minister for Lands (SMH, 5.10.40:6). Both Ministers communicated their disapproval of the proposal to the Sydney City Council, but the Council maintained that it had little choice but to continue to dump in Moore Park, due to the cost of transporting waste to more distant disposal sites (SMH, 6.6.39:7), and the refusal of the Rockdale Council to allow the City Council to use land that the City Council purchased within the boundaries of Rockdale Council as a disposal site (SMH, 9.10.40:12). In March 1941, the Minister for Lands threatened to remove Moore Park from the control of the City Council if it did not cease dumping there (SMH, 4.3.41:10). After further warnings from the Minister for Lands, the City Council was finally ordered to cease dumping in May 1941 (SMH, 27.5.41:8). The City Council then resurrected the plan to establish a tipping site on land that it would purchase within the Rockdale Council area, and the plan was again rejected by the Rockdale Council (SMH, 6.6.41:11). No articles describing subsequent actions of the Sydney City Council were located in the Sydney Morning Herald, but it is likely that the Council established one or more tips in disused brick pits in the St Peters area.
[Appendix B7.31]
B7.4.2 The Closure of St Peters Tip, 1958-1964
1 An important event that precipitated many of the siting controversies described in the following sections was the closing of the St Peters Tip. Marrickville Municipal Council was responsible for this tip and in 1958 decided that the tip would be closed in June 1959. This tip was used by a number of councils other than the Marrickville Council, including the Randwick, Waverley, Botany, Woollahra and North Sydney Councils, and the tip closure decision placed pressure on them to find alternative sites or methods for disposal. While some councils turned to incinerators as a possible solution, the Department of Local Government favoured landfill. It appears from references in articles in the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH, 17.7.58:5; 10.9.58:7; 10.12.58:7) that following a meeting on 23 July 1958 between the Under-Secretary of the Department of Local Government, representatives of the Health Department, the Cumberland County Council, Marrickville Council and other councils using the tip to consider the proposals of the Department of Local Government, the Marrickville Council agreed to continue receiving garbage at the St Peters tip for a further seven years. This plan was publicly condemned by Alderman Frost of the Woollahra Council as inflicting an 'incubator for flies' on St Peters residents for the further period. Alderman Frost's criticisms came four days after the Sydney Morning Herald had carried a lengthy article and photo of the fly problem from the Campbell St tip at Alexandria. Also, the Sydney Morning Herald in the first two weeks of November had carried large Mortein advertisements emphasising the dangers of flies and disease. The Superintendent of Cleansing for the Sydney City Council denied that the flies came from its tips (SMH, 4.1.58:8) and this view was later supported by the Department of Public Health in 1964 which attributed a similar fly outbreak to migration of bush flies into the city in the summer months (Department of Public Health, 1965:99).
2 Following representations by the Premier, Mr Cahill, in whose electorate the St Peters tip lay, to the Minister for Local Government in November 1958, and to the Marrickville Council in December 1958, asking that the tip be closed, a meeting was held on 17 February 1959 between those who had been at the July 1958 meeting. At this meeting, it was decided that the tip would be used for a further seven years and the councils outside the Marrickville area using the tip were asked to sign
[Appendix B7.32]
agreements guaranteeing that they would continue to supply garbage for a period of three years so that Marrickville Council could recover the costs of the additional plant required to ensure that the tip operated to the satisfaction of the Health Department.
3 The St Peters tip was finally closed in mid-1964 to reduce the danger of sea gulls to aircraft using the Kingsford Smith Airport at Mascot (see section B7.4.4, below).
B7.4.3 Berry’s Bay, 1959
1 • The Berry's Bay proposal was initiated on July 7,1959 by a number ofNorth Sydney Councillors who, in committee, moved that the Council investigate using Berry's Bay as a garbage tip, by constructing a seawall across the entrance of the Bay and using dredged sediment from the Bay as cover. At that time, North Sydney Council was transporting its solid waste across the Sydney Harbour Bridge for disposal in the St Peters tip. Those favouring the proposal argued that a saving of £11 000 per annum could be made by disposal in Berry's Bay. By the time the motion was put to an open meeting of Council a week later, public opposition to the plan was very evident in a packed public gallery at the meeting. Amongst those who opposed the plan were a minority of Councillors, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly whose home overlooked Berry's Bay, and office bearers of the Waverton, Lavender Bay and McMahon's Point Progress Associations. Support for the plan was expressed in a letter to the editor of the Sydney Morning Herald by the secretary of the Parks and Playgrounds Movement (SMH, 16.7.59:2). A motion to seek the views of the Health and Lands Departments was successfully carried, however a month later the Health Department advised that it did not consider the bay a suitable site, citing pollution from drainage through the seawall and the proximity to a playground, swimming baths and residences as grounds for its opinion. This decision may have marked the beginning of a change of policy on the part of the Health Department towards landfills in wetlands, although the Metropolitan Medical Officer of Health was also reporting in 1959 that the reclamation of swamps with landfills had resulted in a beneficial decrease in the breeding of mosquitos (Butlin, 1976:18).
[Appendix B7.33]
2 The issue disappeared from the pages of the Sydney Morning Herald in September, 1959 with a final article reporting that the Council had deferred for one month the decision to send a delegation of Councillors to the St Kilda incinerator in Melbourne to determine the feasibility of building an incinerator in North Sydney. Presumably, garbage from North Sydney continued to the transported to St Peters tip where, two months later, 300 residents of St Peters were petitioning the Sydney City Council over the odour and flies from the tip.
3 The Berry's Bay proposal may have been an act of revenge precipitated by a zoning conflict rather than a purposeful waste management initiative. The proposal was initiated not long after the Minister for Lands, J.B. Renshaw had rezoned an area of McMahon's Point from industrial to residential. Alderman E. Drew of the North Sydney Council was reported by the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH, 15.7.59:1) as believing that 'the garbage plan was brought down in a fit of pique because of the fight put up to preserve the area as residential'.
B7.4.4 Botany Bay, 1962-1965
1 One proposal for a major landfill that did not get past the preliminarystudy stage was to reclaim part of Botany Bay. The eastern suburbs had faced increasing difficulties during the 1950s in obtaining sites for waste disposal and in 1958 the Premier constituted the Botany Bay Reclamation Committee to investigate establishing a garbage disposal area on the northern shores of Botany Bay (Department of Local Government, 1962:46). The Committee submitted its report in September 1963, recommending a major reclamation scheme on the northern shore of Botany Bay that would take eastern suburbs garbage for many years into the future. In the same month, Prime Minister Menzies contacted the Premier, Mr Heffron, with regard to the danger posed to aircraft at Kingsford Smith Airport by seagulls foraging on the tips at St Peters and Barton Park, Rockdale. The Premier pointed out that the State had no power to close the tips that were operating within the law and gave assurances that inquiries were proceeding into locating alternative tip sites. In May 1964, Commonwealth regulations were gazetted that gave the Department of Civil Aviation the power to prevent the dumping of waste food near airports, and the St Peters and
[Appendix B7.34]
Barton Park tips were closed. The Department of Civil Aviation also objected to the Botany Bay reclamation scheme and the proposal was dropped (Department of Local Government, 1965:48-49; Dept of Public Health, 1965:160). In the aftermath, the Mayor of Waverley argued that, since the Commonwealth had required the Council to use other disposal methods, the Commonwealth should contribute to the cost of an incinerator to serve the Eastern Suburbs, which facility was seen by the Mayor as inevitable in the future.
B7.4.5 East Wahroonga, 1966
1 In November 1966, the Kuring-gai Municipal Council lodged with the Department of Local Government a planning scheme for the rezoning of an area of Crown land in East Wahroonga for municipal purposes, including garbage disposal. A total of 89 hectares of bushland including deep valleys and sandstone cliffs with considerable recreational usage was to be rezoned. Prior to receiving permission from the Department to put the scheme on public exhibition, the Council held a meeting in June 1967 to provide information on the scheme. A total of 300 residents attended the meeting to protest at the rezoning. In contrast to the Berry's Bay proposal where protest had come from existing civic organisations, the East Wahroonga proposal resulted in the formation of the North Wahroonga Action Committee (NWAC). While those protesting at the June Council meeting ('businessmen, professors, doctors, barristers and their wives' according to the SMH, 30.6.67:5) emphasised the loss of amenity due to the rezoning to light industrial, the NWAC was concerned with seepage from the landfill polluting Lovers' Jump Creek.
2 In the July 3 meeting of Council, the alternative of incineration was mooted, and in the July 18 meeting, a special committee of aldermen was appointed to make a broader study of waste disposal in the Municipality, including estimating the life of the existing tip, and identifying alternative sites and methods of disposal.
3 In late September, the Kuring-gai Municipal Council reduced to one third the area rezoned for municipal purposes, the available tip space
[Appendix B7.35]
allowing the Council a further ten years to seek alternative methods of garbage disposal.
B7.4.6 North Narrabeen, 1967
1 Also in September 1967, the administrator of the Warringah ShireCouncil proposed that part of the North Narrabeen recreation area be used as a garbage tip. Those protesting against the decision made representations to the Premier, Mr Askin, who publicly stated that he did not have the authority to over-rule a Council decision. A protest rally at the recreation area was organised by two professors from Sydney University7 and was attended by over 300 residents. The North Narrabeen proposal appears to have been the first at which the environmental impacts of pesticides were considered a cause for concern. According to the Sydney Morning Herald, protesters '... contended that the use of insecticides to deal with vermin on the rubbish tip would pollute nearby bathing areas'.
B7.4.7 Bankstown, 1973
1 In January 1973, residents and 'environmentalists' opposing Bankstown Council's proposal to use 80 acres of Little Salt Pan Creek as a landfill. Resident engaged in extensive letter-writing campaign (SMH, 19.1.73:8). The Bankstown Council decided not to go ahead with the proposal (SMH, 1.2.73:9).
B7.4.8 Loftus, 1973
1 In January 1973 Loftus residents were protesting against Sutherland Shire Council's plans to establish a landfill at Loftus (SMH, 22.1.73:3), but the Council decided to go ahead (SMH, 22.1.73:3). The Minister for Lands then informed the Council that it could not use the area as a landfill. The Council then appealed to the MWDA and the SPCC (SMH, 28.2.73:10).
[Appendix B7.36]
B7.4.9 Terrey Hills, 1975
1 In January 1975, the negotiations between the Warringah Shire Council and the MWDA to establish a regional depot at Terrey Hills became an issue in the by-election for the seat of Pittwater which had become vacant with the retirement of Sir Robert Askin. Main objections were the increased truck traffic in Mona Vale Road. Negotiations were temporarily suspended while an environmental impact study was completed at the request of the Council (SMH, 6.2.75:3; 7.2.75:3).
B7.4.10 Londonderry, 1989-1991
1 Because the Londonderry 'megatip' proposal became highly politicised and was a significant step on the path to the Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995, the account of the attempt to site this landfill is given in chapter 7.
B7.4.12 Toongabbie, 1990
1 In June 1990, the Minister for the Environment reversed a decision to build a waste transfer station at Toongabbie after opposition from Liberal backbenchers whose electorates were affected and who had mobilised residents against the station. A new site was proposed in the Seven Hills electorate (SMH, 13.6.90:7; 15.6.90:2).
B7.4.13 Kurri Kurri, 1991
1 In December 1991, the Herald reported that the State Government'sGovernment Trading Enterprises Reform Committee was considering a proposal by Stockrington Rail-Waste to dispose of Newcastle and Sydney waste in a disused coal mine between West Wallsend and Kurri Kurri. According to a letter from Premier Greiner to the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, Greiner was attracted by the proposals consistency with the Governments privatisation agenda, and with its decision at Londonderry not to own any more landfill sites. The Herald reported that the company had briefed Cessnock, Newcastle and Lake
[Appendix B7.37]
Macquarie Councils on the proposal and had received qualified support. A point in favour of the proposal was its ability to create employment in the depressed Lower Hunter region (SMH, 7.12.91:1). According to a response by the Minister for the Environment to a question in the Legislative Council in March 1992, the company had been advised that the Waste Management Authority had a formal monopoly in putrescible waste disposal and the Government had not made a decision to change this position (Legislative Assembly, 20.3.92:1654-1655).
B7.4.14 Lucas Heights, 1991-1995
1 The Lucas Heights extension proposal, like the Londonderry proposal (section B7.4.10, above) also became politicised and played and important role in the events leading up to the Waste Minimisation and Management Act 1995. The account of the Lucas Heights extension proposal is given in chapter 7.
B7.4.15 Berrima, 1992
1 In August 1992, at the height of the Commission of Inquiry into theLucas Heights expansion, Coll ex Waste Management announced that, conditional on an environment impact assessment it had commissioned, it would submit a development application to the Wingecaribee Shire Council to develop a landfill in a 300 hectare quarry near Berrima. The landfill was to have a life of about 30 years and would take 500 000 tonnes per year, with a royalty of $1 per tonne to the Council (SMH, 4.8.92:10). Environmental and community groups immediately announced that they would fight the proposal on the grounds that the proposed methods of leachate control (plastic or clay liner and pumping) would fail, resulting in contamination of groundwater, protected wetland nearby and possibly the Wollondilly River, the main source of Sydney's water supply. Residents also threatened to have their own environmental impact assessment prepared. The Berrima Shire President said that the royalty was attractive (SMH, 6.8.92:13).
2 Several days later, the Herald revealed that a Berrima Shire Councilreport showed that the Berrima Shire Council had received a letter from
[Appendix B7.38]
the Department of Water Resources in early June advising that the proposal had the potential to "adversely affect what appear to be ecologically significant wetlands". An additional note on the letter said that 'after discussion with the Water Resources Commission, [sic] their response could be interpreted as an approval in principle subject to the environmental issues being properly managed". In the same Council report, consultations with the Department of Conservation and Land Management were mentioned, but the director of the Department denied that these had taken place (SMH, 8.8.92:12).
APPENDIX B8
The Agents of Danger
B8.1 Solid Waste Dangers
B81.1 Monstrous Accumulations in the 19th Century
1 Fitzgerald's study of Sydney in the 1870s and 1880s provides some indication of the nature of solid waste management at that time.Perhaps the worst conditions were in the residential closes and courtyards of inner Sydney, where rows of small roomed terrace houses with no backyards faced a narrow courtyard in which were the communal privies and which received all the garbage from the houses (Fisher, 1982:40). It is likely that municipal garbage was treated in a similar way, possibly with burning of combustibles. In 1890, the government health officer, Ashburton Thompson tabled a report in the Legislative Assembly that indicated that the Sydney City Corporation was itself responsible for the creation of health hazards:
With especial reference to the City Corporation, it must now he pointed out that they have always been ready to tip garbage, on request, wherever a greedy landholder or other misguided person may wish ... this principal corporation may almost be named the chief offender against the public health ... All the care and cost expended to secure a pure water supply and safe sewerage are here to be nullified by an illegal, but practically unavoidable, collusion between municipal councils and house builders.
(cited by Fitzgerald, 1987:79)
2 Thompson also referred to 'monstrous' accumulations behind Victoria Barracks and at Centennial Park. According to Fitzgerald, the City's Inspector of Nuisances did not deny the accusations, but saw it as a convenient way of filling dangerous or unsightly holes — a justification that was to surface repeatedly during the 20th century.
3 Some idea of the scale of waste generation in late 19th century Sydney and the short distances it was transported is given in an exchange quoted by Fitzgerald between the Corporation's Inspector of Nuisances and a member of the Government Health Board:
[Appendix B8.2]
What is the quantity of refuse which is removed by the Corporation weekly in their carts, do you know? Yes; for the present week ... 1,007 loads of street sweepings, 432 loads of house rubbish, 25 loads of refuse from the city markets, 36 loads of stuff from earth closets and 190 loads of street refuse from gully shafts, making a total of 1,690 loads for the week. Dead animals for the same week, 542; of all sorts — fowls, rats, cats, dogs etc. 1 have a book (producing it) which shows everything — the street it was found in and where it is taken to.
What becomes of these 1,690 loads of rubbish? A great deal of it goes to the City Common [now Moore Park]; some of it goes to Harris Street to fill up large holes, some of it goes to Macquarie Street for the same purpose,... to the Domain ... to Wynyard-square, and some to the Flagstaff.
Is it offensive, in your opinion? It is offensive for a day or two, but after that it is not. You can pass along Wynyard-square without being offended by it.
(cited by Fitzgerald, 1987:76)
4 The annual report of the Inspector of Nuisances for the City of Sydney in 1890 stated that just under 300 men were employed in removing human rubbish and animal excreta from the City, a figure considerably less than in previous years due to reductions in available funds (Fitzgerald, 1987:77).
B8.1.2 The 1900 Bubonic Plague Outbreak
1 An event at the turn of the century that was to have significantconsequences for waste management policy and infrastructure in Sydney was the bubonic plague outbreak of 1900. According to Fitzgerald (1992:215-216), the Sydney City Council's Flealth Officer,Dr Gynne-Hughes, in common with many at that time, did not understand the method of transmission. In contrast, it is clear that the Department of Public Health's chief officer J. Ashburton Thompson was well aware of the recent discovery of the role of rats in transmission. Consequently, the Council's initial response, after plague was reported in Adelaide on 15.1.1900, focused on the removal of accumulations of garbage. When the first case of plague occurred in Sydney ten days later, the State Government took over control of city cleansing from the Council. According to Coward (1988:210), the response of the Department of Public Health was a mixture that leant towards both the rat and rat flea transmission mode and the miasmic theory of disease transmission. The response evolved into a massive clean-up of inner
[Appendix B8.3]
Sydney, which may have gained official and public support because of its consistency with the 'common sense' of the miasmic theory. Between 25 March 1900 and 11 June 1900, 24 430 tons of garbage was burnt on site, and 28 455 tons of garbage was taken out to sea (Coward, 1988:210). Fitzgerald notes that the area in which the clean-up was conducted corresponded less closely to the incidence of plague and more closely to the slum areas that had for some time been represented as a 'problem' by the Council. The clean-up would have fortuitously removed a substantial amount of harbour for rats, but after several months of cleansing activities the incidence of plague continued to increase, until Ashburton Thompson's views were heeded and efforts directed to rat extermination.
It was not long before the plague outbreak began to have an effect at the level of waste management policy. According to Fitzgerald:
lhe public reaction was muted at first, but eventually became more agitated as the press whipped up a sense of moral outrage against the filth of the city and a neglect of sanitary matters which was sheeted home to the City Council.
(Fitzgerald, 1992:217)
The death from plague on 8 March 1900 of a two year old boy whose family lived adjacent to the rubbish tip at Moore Park precipitated a major policy change by the Sydney City Council. Fearing that the rubbish tip at Moore Park might be a nucleus from which the disease could spread, the Council decided that all city garbage would be taken to sea from 19 March 1900 onwards (Coward, 1988:214).
In 1901, the Sydney City Council, which had been procrastinating over the building of an incinerator for a decade prior to the 1900 plague outbreak, approved the construction of a Goddard, Massey and Warner Perfectus Destructor to be erected at Moore Park. Additional actions taken in by the City Council in the period of sanitary reform following the plague outbreak included the distribution of free garbage bins and the purchase of new street watering carts and garbage carts (Fitzgerald, 1992:262).
[Appendix B8.4]
B8.1.3 Open Burning and Controlled Tipping
1 While the plague outbreak of 1900 gave a good reason for theinstallation of municipal incinerators and for tipping waste further from habited areas, for those councils without incinerators, standards of municipal waste management in the early 20th century were probably not much better than those of the late 19th century. For example, the Metropolitan Medical Officer of Health reported in the annual report of the Department of Public Health in 1920:
The garbage of Redfern is deposited on a racecourse near South Sydney Hospital, that of Paddington near the Hampton Oval, and that of Woollahra on Bellevue Hill, 'The Dress Circle of Sydney' according to some house and land agents ... The City of Sydney, North Sydney,Marrickville, Leichhardt and Balmain are alone in possessing incinerators ... no other method than incineration should be tolerated in a great centre like the Metropolis of Sydney, otherwise it is impossible to combat the rat and fly nuisance ...
(cited by Spearitt, 1978:18)
2 Similar concerns were also expressed by the Department of Public Health in its annual reports for 1929 and 1937 (Department of Public Health, 1930:66; 1939:108). The inadequacy in municipal waste management may have been due in part to the rapid increase in the population of Sydney in the early 20th century.
So phenomenal has been the increase of population, which has been trebled in the metropolitan area of Sydney since 1900, and doubled during the last twenty years, that the progress in sanitation has with difficulty kept pace with it.
(Department of Public Health, 1933:70)
3 In the 1930s, the value of controlled tipping in transforming wetlands that were viewed at that time as waste land into useful recreational space was referred to in a number of Department of Public Health annual reports in the 1930s (Department of Public Health, 1930:66; 1934:71; 1937:105). While the Department expressed the view in its annual reports that incineration was the garbage disposal method of first choice, it nonetheless provided recommendations for the sanitary disposal of garbage by controlled tipping.
Where the tipping and filling in of waste land is the method of choice, this should take place with due regard to the principle of'controlled tipping', which primarily calls for a daily covering with 6 inches of clean earth of the
[Appendix B8.5]
face of the tip , which should not be deeper than 6 feet or too broad for ease of control. By such means the depot can be kept free from offensive odours, and much useful filling in of depressions may take place without annoyance to the ratepayers in the vicinity.
(Department of Public Health, 1939:108)
4 In the late 1950s and 1960s, the value of landfills in transforming disused quarries, brickpits, and wetlands into parks, golf courses or industrial land was re-iterated in a number of annual reports (Department of Public Health 1961:133,1965:160, 1965:99). The Department of Public Health appears to have maintained pressure on local government garbage depots during the 1950s and 1960s to ensure that the recommended controlled tipping method was followed (Department of Public Health 1961:133,1962a:lll, 1967:104, 1971:49). This technique reduced problems with odours, rats and flies and fires that had been a source of increasing public complaint during the 1950s, when, in some cases, garbage was simply piled above ground and periodically burnt (figure B8.1). It can be seen from this figure that the change to solid waste disposal techniques more akin to present day landfill techniques appears to have been successful in reducing complaints from those living near rubbish tips.
Figure B8.1: Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about the impacts of tipson surrounding areas, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997.
6 T
5 --
4 --Number of
artic les 3 -- per year
2 - -
1 - -
I
m i0 nr t v m i1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
[Appendix B8.6]
5 While improved landfill management on the part of at least somecouncils would have reduced the odour and vermin impacts of garbage tips, many councils would have continued to fire the day's garbage before covering i t This would reduce the volume of garbage to be buried and extend the life of the landfill. The Blue Mountains bush fire disaster of December 1957 increased the concern about fires at tips as potential sources of bushfires in surrounding bushland, as shown in figure B8.2.
Figure B8.2: Volume of artides in the Sydney Morning Herald about fires in tips, exduding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997.
Number of articles per year
T-p i f i l i I I I I I 1 I \
6 Fires at the Auburn Council tip at Duck Creek in the early 1960s were not reported in the Herald but, according to the member for Granville, were a serious problem for the adjacent residents of Housing Commission homes. This was raised repeatedly by the member for Granville in the Legislative Assembly in the first half of the 1960s, his description suggesting that it was a problem of no small consequence.
... great fires burning day and night, with dense smoke making the adjoining living area in my electorate almost unbearable. In fact, the smoke and soot have ruined carpets and curtains in many homes and caused sleepless nights and much inconvenience to hundreds of Housing Commission tenants ... A t one stage visibility in Wellington Road and Clyde Street during the night in winter months was reduced to a few feet.
(Legislative Assembly, 7.3.63:3143-3144)
[Appendix B8.7]
Yet this issue, which also involved Parramatta Council taking legal action against Auburn Council (SMH, 19.9.61:11), and repeated warnings from the Department of Public Health (Legislative Assembly, 7.3.63:3144) went unreported in the pages of the Herald, apart from one article on the legal action by Parramatta Council.
In 1958, the annual report of the Smoke Abatement Committee (formed by the NSW Government in 1955 to investigate, and recommend remedial measures against, air pollution; Butlin, 1976:20) raised the question of air pollution from garbage disposal.
The question of garbage disposal, already mentioned, is one feature of domestic life which does lead to pollution but not usually directly. In a small area of the city, certain flats have incinerators and create local pollution, but most garbage is removed by municipal authorities. It is then either incinerated in reverberatory furnaces, which are certainly not free from the suspicion of pollution but are much preferable to the method adopted by some councils of dumping on heaps and burning or allowing to catch fire. Smoke and odour nuisances from such burning refuse piles can be extremely dense and widespread. Probably the worst offender of this type is in the St Peters-Sydenham area, about 4 or 5 miles south of Sydney.From personal observations, this cause appears to predispose towards an abnormal number of fogs in that area. As it is almost immediately adjacent to Sydney's main air terminal, the economic consequences of the dump in the form of unnecessarily grounded aeroplanes could be very considerable indeed.
(Smoke Abatement Committee, 1958:32)
With the passing of the Clean Air Act in 1961 (Coward, 1976:20), councils may have been under some pressure for voluntary reduction in burning at tips and any reduction in burning would have contributed to the problem of decreasing availability of landfill space. However, there is little doubt that some councils at least continued to allow tips under their control to burn. In September 1967, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Northbridge residents had complained about smoke from the Flat Rock Creek tip, a tip used by North Sydney Council (SMH, 19.9.67:6).
In 1970, the Air Pollution Advisory Committee (which, under the Clean Air Act, had replaced the Smoke Abatement Committee ) reported that it had carried out a survey of municipal tips in 1969-70 and found that eight tips out of 57 still practised open burning.
[Appendix B8.8]
The results of this survey showed that significant smoke emissions arose from those tips on which open burning was practised. These emissions were commonly of a duration measurable in hours, and often resulted from several isolated fires burning at the same time. The existence of a fire on a tip where a wide variety of refuse is deposited, makes the ignition of materials such as oil, plastic and rubber very likely. Several such incidents occurred during the course of the survey and gave rise to spectacular air pollution.
(Air Pollution Committee, 1970:9)
11 This report to the Parliament of NSW went on to state that:
The recommendation made by an officer of the Air Pollution Control Branch that you issue a Ministerial Order prohibiting open burning at garbage depots and industrial premises, has the full support of this Committee.
(Air Pollution Committee, 1970:9)
12 This recommendation was eventually to be embodied in the Open Burning Amendment to the Clean Air Act which took effect from 1 March 1972.
13 In December 1978, South Sydney Council threatened to prosecute Sydney City Council over the latter's dump in Alexandria (which was within South Sydney Council's area). South Sydney Council felt it was polluted by 'noxious smells, unsightly appearance, poisonous gases and by noise' (SMH, 14.12.78:8).
14 In February 1979, the Sydney City Council was seeking an urgent meeting with the SPCC and the MWDA over the issue. According to the Herald, the SPCC had told the Sydney City Council that the tip was operating in breach of the Clean Air Act. However, the Lord Mayor of Sydney had said that the SPCC allegations were without substance and the tip was operating to the satisfaction of the MWDA (SMH, 27.2.79:9).
15 While the advances in landfill management by the MWDA brought about substantial changes in the impacts that concerned residents, even in the late 20th century, the old sources of danger could reappear when landfills were not managed appropriately. For example, in December 1984, the Herald carried a human interest story about residents in Belmore adjoining an old brick pit being used a private waste contractor for building and demolition waste complained about 'infestations of large rats and mice, cockroaches, and large black blowflies'. The
[Appendix B8.9]
problem appeared to be due to some putrescible waste mixed with the building and demolition waste (SMH, 5.12.84:2).
The waste crisis of the 1990s brought a new set of fears that were expressed in terms of being overwhelmed by mountains of waste, although in some cases Sydney Harbour was used as the measure of volume, a representation that dates back to at least 1974, when a speaker in the Legislative Assembly warned that by year 2000 the amount of waste produced would fill the Harbour to a depth of 12.5 feet (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1309). Examples, mostly from the 1990s include:
• it was imperative that disposal areas be available if Sydney was not to end up 'knee-deep in filth' (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1324).
• 'the man-made mountain' — headline to an article on waste quantities (SMH, 31.5.93:18),
• following a headline of 'Sydney is making a Harbour of waste', the Herald reported that' If Sydney continues to produce waste at current rates, it will, in the next 20 years, have to dispose of enough garbage to fill the Harbour, the Waste Management Authority has warned' (SMH, 4.7.90:3),
• following a headline 'Sydney up to its ears in garbage', the Herald reported that 'Sydney is facing a garbage crisis with less that six year landfill capacity remaining in the city, according to a State Government report' (SMH, 18.11.91:1),
• 'It seems the Government has to have this hill of waste somewhere in the State'. Mrs Lo Po (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1470),
• 'The fact that landfills will be full within six years is a crisis in itself.' Dr Peter Macdonald (Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1471),
[Appendix B8.10]
'we're going to have to start eating the stuff' — John Cook justifying the need for the Lucas Heights extension (SMH, 6.5.92:5),
'Now that the Lucas Heights megatip proposal has been cancelled, where will the mountain of waste be tipped?' The Hon. Richard Jones (Legislative Council, 24.9.92:6409),
'New South Wales is facing a vast waste disposal problem/ Mr Chris Hartcher (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.92:6490).
'rubbish discarded by motorists is "knee-deep" in places' — reported statement by Ian Kiernan (SMH, 30.11.92:6),
T assure him [Hartcher] that Londonderry does not need a monstrous mountain of rubbish' Mrs Lo Po in the Legislative Assembly (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:678),
'How can we trust a Government that is prepared to build a mountain of rubbish three storeys high in a most sensitive environment' A.S. Aquilina (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:683),
'Metaphorically speaking, it could be said that Sydney could smother under a mountain of garbage unless something is done about minimisation of waste' Dr Liz Kernohan (JSCWM, 1993:vii),
Herald article with a headline 'Sea of garbage still a big threat' and in the leading paragraph: '...Sydneysiders still chum out unacceptably high mountains of waste' (SMH, 30.3.95:39),
Herald journalists referring to Sydney's waste management problems as a 'waste crisis' and a struggle against 'the huge tide of waste' (SMH, 23.8.95:2) and as 'spiralling piles of waste' and the 'battle to slash waste' (SMH, 28.8.95:19),
'... we must solve this problem or we will be buried beneath that waste. Mr Sullivan (Legislative Assembly, 6.12.95:4229).
[Appendix B 8.ll]
B8.2 The Heyday of Incineration in the Early 20th Century
B8.2.1 The Emergence of Incineration
1 For late 19th century city governments, the incinerator (or crematory) was a triumph of technology over trash. As aDr Kilvington told a meeting of the American Public Health Association in 1888:
Everywhere interest in the question of cremation is awakening, and the present points to the future — a near future — in which every city, large or small, upon the American continent will consider the crematory a necessary part of its municipal outfit; forward to a time when our cities will be redeemed from the curse of accumulating waste, when rivers will be unpolluted by the sewage which now converts them into common sewers, when the cess-vault and the garbage-pit and the manure heap and even the earth cemetery zvill be abandoned, when the age of filth formation will be superseded by the era of filth-destruction, when fire will purify alike the refuse of the living and the remains of the dead — but also it is allotted to each one of us to help to bring in the coming of this sanitary consummation.
(Kilvington, 1899:170 cited by Melosi, 1980:47)
2 For a city in the throes of a bubonic plague outbreak in 1900 as Sydney was, incinerators may have seemed to be an attractive option to councillors, and a source of sales for the incinerator firms. At the height of the outbreak in March 1900, the Southgate Garbage Destructor Company organised an inspection of the incinerator it had installed for the Leichhardt Council by those councils who might be interested in building a similar incinerator. The Leichhardt incinerator was inspected by 38 councillors from ten councils in the Sydney region (Coward, 1988:214).
3 The first municipal incinerator in New South Wales had been purchased in 1898 by the North Sydney Council — a one cell incinerator made by the Pinhoe Refuse Destructor Co. This incinerator disposed of 65 loads of garbage per week (Department of Public Health, 1937:109). Table B8.1, summarises details of the Sydney incinerators and is derived from the aforementioned source (which was a historical retrospect written by a retiring Director General of Public Health in 1937), together with Johnson (1977:124-125) and Coward (1988:214). The gradual uptake of
[Appendix B8.12]
incineration by Sydney councils shown in table B8.1 would suggest that the plague scare had been insufficient to catalyse very many councils into the substantial expenditure involved in installing and operating incinerators.
4 As table B8.1 shows a number of incinerators built in the 1930s were in buildings designed by Walter Burley Griffin. Burley Griffin worked in association with the Reverbatory Incinerator and Engineering Company (REICo), whose Managing Director, Nisson Leonard-Kanewsky aggressively promoted the companies incinerators against established competition (Johnson, 1977:116). The successful domination by REICo of the incineration industry in the 1930s was, according to Johnson, due to their lower installation and maintenance costs, the achievement of a waste volume reduction to ten per cent, compared to twenty-five per cent for the incinerators of competitors and the Australian patented design of the furnace and its construction from local materials. The REICo incinerators were very simple by today's standards, although it should be borne in mind that the range of substances in solid waste was much less and the standard of emissions was judged by sight and smell.
5 Incineration was the method of solid waste disposal favoured by the Department of Public Health. 'There are now 12 incinerators in the metropolitan area, and gradually local authorities are realising that incineration is the most hygienic method of disposal of garbage.' (Department of Public Health, 1929:66). 'The most hygienic method of disposing of household garbage is by incineration.' (Director General of Public Health, 1933:70). 'Today there are twenty incinerators in the metropolitan area, all milestones of sanitary progress.' (Director General of Public Health, 1937:109). 'As a matter of fact, for cities it [incineration] is the first method of choice.' (Department of Public Health, 1939:109).
6 Incineration was also viewed favourably because the residue provided a relatively stable material that could be used fill brick pits and 'improving parks and playing areas' (Department of Public Health, 1933:71).
[Appendix B8.13]
Table B8.1: Summary of available information on the dates of construction, location andcapacity of incinerators in Sydney.
Datebuilt Municipality Location Type Capacity Notes1898 North Sydney Pinhoe Refuse
Destructor Co65 loads per week
1899 Leichhardt Southgate Garbage Destructor Co
Also used by Ashfield and Petersham
1901 Sydney City MoorePark
Goddard Massey Warner top feed
22,709 tons per annum
1901 Leichhardt Meldrum two 3221 tonscell per annum
1910 Sydney City Pyrmont Hughes Stirling front feed
19,006 tons per annum
1914 Manly Hughes Stirling
1914 Marrickville Meldrum Also used by Petersham
1915 North Sydney CareeningCove
MeldrumSimplex
11,889 loads in 1926
1922 Newtown MeldrumSimplex
Also used by Redfern
1929 Bexley REICo Burley Griffin design
1930 Kuring-gai Pymble REICo Burley Griffin design
1931 Waratah REICo Burley Griffin design
1932 Waterloo Goodrid re verba tory
1932 Randwick REICo Burley Griffin design
1933 Glebe REICo Burley Griffin design
1934 Willoughby REICo Burley Griffin design
1936 Leichhardt REICo Burley Griffin design
1936 Sydney City Pyrmont REICo Burley Griffin design
1937 Mosman WarringahShire
Heinan andFroudereverbatory
Ashfield Meldrum
[Appendix B8.14]
Table B8.1 (contd):Summary of available information on the dates of construction, location and capacity of incinerators in Sydney.
Datebuilt Municipality Location Type Capacity Notes1937 Balmain At the
Electric Light Works
Hughes Stirling
Canterbury Fox Pinhoe temporarily closed in 1937
Dundas small army typePaddington Armstrong
Hollandalso used by Waverly
Woollahra CooperPark
Meldrum
B8.2.2 Opposition to Municipal Incineration
1 There were two main periods in which the Herald carried significantnumbers of articles about incineration and local opposition — the early 1930s and the late 1950s (figure B8.3).
Figure B8.3: Volume of articles in the Sydney Morning Herald about proposals for, or sitingof, incinerators for municipal waste, excluding editorials and letters to the editor — 1930 to 1997.
16 --
14 --
12 - -
Number of articles per year
10 - -
‘¥ 11 H >1 TT~U I I I I I 111 IT 11 l' t— {
[Appendix B8.15]
Spearitt (1978:18) noted that the second incinerator at Pyrmont was located there after protests by residents against the construction of an incinerator at Moore Park (see also Legislative Assembly, 7.9.33:371). Fitzgerald (1992:265-268) documented some aspects of the siting difficulties the Sydney City Council faced. In 1932, the Council successfully had a site in Moore Park dedicated by the Lands Department as an incinerator site, in exchange for the conversion of a nearby Council depot to parkland. A tobacco manufacturer located near to the site of the proposed incinerator objected on the grounds that the incinerator would damage its stored product and the health of its workers. The Council's response was to propose that the Lands Department reverse the two dedications, allowing the incinerator to be located at the depot site. This brought forth objections from a glass manufacturer and a jam manufacturer and local residents. The Tramways Department objected on the grounds that a depot nearby would be 'pervaded by objectionable fumes and infested with myriads of flies'. One of the local residents was W.J. McKell ML A, who headed a deputation of residents to the City Council. Both proposals were rejected by the Metropolitan Land Board and after some preliminary assessment of sites in Woolloomooloo and Surry Hills, the Council finally chose to locate the new incinerator on the existing incinerator site at Pyrmont. This resulted in some minor protest by industry and residents, but the prevailing industrial nature of the area and the existing incinerator meant that it could scarcely be argued that the proposal would add significantly to the current level of disamenity. The second Pyrmont incinerator was a Burley Griffin design and was subsequently the subject of a dispute between the Sydney City Council and REICo when the incinerator suffered major damage during its testing prior to the Council taking possession. Griffin himself saw a role for architecture to reduce public protest over incinerator siting, writing:
The final test of modernism is the replacement of industrial eyesores with public amenities. During the seven years of the depression whilst mdustrial growth had stopped, I fortunately found afield in which the architect could help allay the suspicious fears and political animosities sufficiently to enable a dozen municipal authorities to determine upon sites within their boundaries for replacing dumps and other uneconomic methods of disposal of public waste matter, with quicker incineration in monumental buildings.
(cited by Birrell, 1964:176)
[Appendix B8.16]
3 The Sydney Morning Herald in 1933 and 1934 carried a number of articles and letters to the editor about public protest over an existing incinerator in Woollahra, and a proposed incinerator, initially at Mosman and subsequently in Warringah Shire. In May 1934, the Minister for Local Government set up a public inquiry to deal with the protests by Bellevue Hill residents about the incinerator in Cooper Park, Woollahra. Not long after this inquiry found that the incinerator did not constitute a nuisance, French's Forest residents were protesting at the possible siting of an incinerator for Mosman Council there. The Mosman incinerator was also the subject of a Department of Local Government inquiry, and in July 1935, the Executive Council approved, despite vigorous protests from Manly Council, a site for the incinerator in Warringah Shire that had been agreed to by Warringah Shire and Mosman Council and which would involve the passage of garbage trucks through a small part of Manly Council's area. By mid-1935, there were, according to a statement attributed to the Minister for Local Government,Mr Spooner by the SMH (13.7.35:12), 20 incinerators operating in the Sydney metropolitan region.
B8.2.3 The Decline of Incineration
1 The capacity of incinerators to reduce the volume of waste going tolandfill was, of course, limited by their effective working life. The North Sydney Council's incinerator at Careening Cove was reported to have gone out of service in 1939 (SMH, 5.1.40:4). As mentioned in section B8.4, below, the Willoughby Council's incinerator was closed down in December 1967. The Sydney City Council incinerator at Pyrmont was closed in September 1971 (SMH, 16.3.71). The Council undertook remedial work on the reinforced concrete chimney of the Pyrmont incinerator, which contained a number of sculptural elements designed by Walter Burley Griffin (SMH, 27.10.76:3; SMH, 16.11.76:8). A controversy about its retention for its heritage value emerged in the 1990s, but it was finally demolished and the site redeveloped (SMH, 27.6.91:13).
[Appendix B8.17]
B8.3 An Incineration Resurgence in the Eastern Suburbs
B8.3.1 The View Street Incinerator
1 As shown in figure B8.3, municipal incinerators attracted increased media attention in the late 1950s. In February 1958, the Woollahra Municipal Council adopted a recommendation by their Chief Engineer to build a £150 000 incinerator in View St, Woollahra. The Council meeting also passed a motion that the Department of Health be asked for permission to build the incinerator. A small number of aldermen moved a rescission motion in a subsequent meeting, but this was lost.By July 1958, over 3000 residents had signed a petition against the incinerator, while the Department of Local Government had announced that it favoured disposing of Woollahra's garbage as landfill on several foreshore sites to reclaim land for factory construction. In the meantime, a dispute had arisen in the Randwick Municipal Council over the siting of an incinerator, and the Waverley Municipal Council had approached both Woollahra and Randwick about building an incinerator to serve all three councils. In September 1958, the Mayor of Woollahra, who was one of the proponents of the incinerator, accused both the Departments of Health and of Local Government of being evasive about its requests for permission to construct the incinerator and to borrow funds for the construction. In November 1958, the Woollahra Council received a letter from the Department of Local Government which recommended that the Council not proceed with the incinerator, the Department favouring landfills as a more economical method of waste disposal. The Local Government Association also regarded landfills favourably, with the secretary of the Association describing in an article in the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH, 25.11.58:14) the benefits as a lower cost means of waste disposal and as a means of transforming 'wastelands' to building or parkland sites. A motion was passed in the November 10 meeting of Woollahra Council to receive the letter and advise the Department of Local Government that the Council disagreed with the Department's views on waste disposal. One influence on the Council's pro-incinerator stance was Alderman A.D. Frost, a doctor, who publicly condemned landfill as antiquated and a risk to the health of residents in the vicinity, accusing the secretary of the Local Government Association of 'living in the past' (SMH, 26.11.58:25). The Woollahra Council took no further action on its incinerator proposal.
[Appendix B8.18]
2 The Department of Local Government preference for landfills, and the identification in the late 1950s of sufficient landfill sites for a further 35 years (see section 4.5) did not put a complete end to the possibility of incineration. Also in September 1959, the Minister for Local Government advised Eastern Suburbs councils that they should select a site for a future incineration to serve the councils when insufficient landfill capacity remained (SMH, 15.9.59:14).
3 In February 1960, representatives of three Eastern Suburbs councils met unsuccessfully with the Minister for Local Government to discuss a proposal to form a county council to operate an incinerator (SMH,
' 2.2.60:8).
4 In February 1967, the Woollahra Council refused to contribute£200 to the Local Government Association for the purpose of carrying out a study into waste disposal in the Sydney Metropolitan area, on the grounds that it was intending to construct an incinerator (SMH, 3.2.67:7). As mentioned in appendix B7.4.5.L2, incineration was also being considered in 1967 by the Kuring-gai Shire Council in connection with the controversy over the North Wahroonga tip (SMH, 4.7.67:5).
5 In August 1967, the First Australian Refuse Disposal Conference was held at the University of New South Wales, at which favourable views were expressed by Australian and overseas experts as to the safety and desirability of incineration — views that were contrary to those of the Minister for Local Government, Mr P.H. Morton who stated when opening the conference that incinerators were undesirable in residential areas and that the cheaper landfill method would continue to be the preferred method of disposal in Sydney while sites were available (SMH, 23.8.67:13). Professor N.Y. Kirov of the Department of Fuel Technology, University of New South Wales, and Mr H.K. Toner, Chief Health and Building Inspector with Waverley Council presented a paper reporting favourably on the efficiency and safety of incinerators being used overseas (Kirov and Toner, 1967). It is worth noting here that the Department of Fuel Technology had also had a link with the Waverly and Woollahra Councils through the Councils' funding of a masters degree study in the Department that involved establishing the composition and seasonal variation in municipal waste in the Eastern
[Appendix B8.19]
Suburbs (SMH, 4.1.68:7). This study was an integral part of the specification of the design for an incinerator to serve the Eastern Suburbs (Fowler, 1971:199).
B8.3.2 The Waterloo Incinerator
1 In October 1969, the Waverley and Woollahra Councils approved in principle a $1.75m tender from a German company, Vonrolls, to construct an incinerator at Waterloo. The incinerator was also to be used by Marrickville, North Sydney and Randwick Councils. The incinerator proposal then required the approval of the Minister for Local Government to raise loans to fund its construction (SMH, 16.10.69:11). This incinerator was opened in May 1973 and, as shown in figure B8.3, the siting of this incinerator was not accompanied by any public opposition that reached the pages of the Sydney Morning Herald. It was reported as being 'nearly pollution free' and the ash 'suitable as filling for playing fields, roads and tennis courts'. The stack gases were reported as being well below the requirements of the Clean Air Act (SMH, 16.5.73:2). The contrast with the attempt by Woollahra Council to establish an incinerator in View Street in Woollahra in 1958 may have been due to the difference in the nature of the adjacent area, View Street being surrounded by mainly middle and upper socio-economic class residences and the Waterloo site being surrounded by mainly commercial and industrial premises and working class residences.
2 In April 1974, it was alleged by the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly that the Waterloo incinerator was emitting 15 times the maximum level permitted by the Clean Air Act, due to the failure of its electrostatic precipitators (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.74:2610).
3 The problem was, at least in part, due to the increasing amount of PVC plastic in waste. In a report to the Federal Department of Environment and Conservation in 1974, Professor Kirov of the University of New South Wales recommended that government action be taken to discourage the production of plastics containing halogens such as chlorine, because of the impact on the anti-pollution equipment of incinerators (Pausacker, 1978:38).
[Appendix B8.20]
4 In June 1974, the SPCC ordered the Waverly and Woollhara Councils to reduce the quantity of garbage being burnt in the Waterloo incinerator in a attempt to overcome the air pollution problems it was causing (SMH, 15.10.74:16).
5 In October 1974, the SPCC advised the Waverly and Woollhara Councils that unless they reduced the feed rate of the Waterloo incinerator to the lowest possible level and brought emissions under the level required by the Clean Air Act, they would be ordered to close the incinerator (SMH, 15.10.74:16).
6 In March 1975, the $5.5 million Waterloo incinerator closed due to its faulty electrostatic precipitators. Waverly Council was under considerable financial strain and seeking a $2.5 million grant from the Federal Government to repair the incinerator (SMH, 15.3.75:2).
7 In November 1976, the Minister for Planning and Environment, the Hon. Paul Landa informed the Legislative Council that the incinerator was being used only on a trial basis while further tests were conducted (Legislative Council, 18.11.76:3143).
8 In November 1977, Landa reported to the Legislative Council that all quarantine waste from the port and airport was being destroyed in the Waterloo incinerator (Legislative Council, 29.11.77:10408).
9 In June 1990, it was reported that the SPCC had analysed the fly ash emissions from the Waterloo incinerator and found dioxin and furan emissions at 30 to 60 times higher than the maximum concentrations permitted overseas. The Waverly and Woollhara Councils that operated the incinerator were given notice by the SPCC to explain why the incinerator should not be closed. The Councils maintained that, as there were no standards in place in New South Wales, they could not be accused of exceeding the standards. In addition, if overseas standards were introduced then it would have far-reaching consequences for many waste disposal and industrial plants throughout New South Wales. The SPCC chairperson, Professor John Niland, signalled that the Commission would be seeking to work out a strategy with the Councils for the future operation of the incinerator (SMH, 4.6.90:8; Legislative Council, 4.6.90:4936; 13.6.90:5472).
[Appendix B8.21]
In July 1990 the Waverly and Woollhara Councils met with the SPCC to consider of the incinerator. In reporting the impending meeting, the Herald also referred to testing of the emissions of Sydney Water Board incinerators at the sewerage treatment plants at North Head and Malabar had also revealed low levels of dioxin and that the Health Department had instigated further testing programs (SMH, 14.7.90:11).
In November 1990, the Herald reported that the volume of waste being burned at the Waterloo incinerator had been reduced and the furnace temperature increased (SMH, 5.11.90:7).
In April 1991, the Waterloo incinerator was referred to in the Legislative Council as 'spewing toxic waste all over the inner city area' (Legislative Council, 9.4.91:1637).
In May 1991, the a question was directed to the representative of the Minister for the Environment in the Legislative Council as to whether the dioxin levels in the emissions were 12-38 times higher than the levels set for new incinerators in Sweden and Germany, as well as being higher than the levels expected from the high temperature incinerator being discussed at that time (Legislative Council, 2.5.91:3020).
According to the Herald, a study commissioned by the Waverly and Woollahra Councils in July 1991 found that dioxin levels in emissions were 153 times higher than overseas standards permitted (SMH, 18.4.92:6).
In April 1992, the Waverly and Woollahra Councils accusing the Government of forcing them to spend $40 million to upgrade the Waterloo incinerator, by virtue of the Minister for the Environment's decision to deny the eastern suburbs councils access to Sydney landfills. According to the Herald, the Environment Protection Authority believed that there were not sufficient grounds for closing the incinerator, a view contrary to some eastern suburbs councillors and resident action groups who were seeking to have the incinerator closed (SMH, 18.4.92:6).
In May 1992, it was reported in the Legislative Assembly that the Stage 3 Report of the Maunsell Pty Ltd study on the incinerator had
[Appendix B8.22]
recommended that it was no longer acceptable to operate the incinerator with the existing levels of emissions (Legislative Assembly, 5.5.92:3517).
17 It appears from comments by the Liberal member for Sutherland that by May 1992, the Labor Opposition had announced that it would close the Waterloo incinerator if elected (Legislative Assembly, 7.5.92:3977).
18 In October 1992, the results of a study by Maunsell Pty Ltd and RiskCorp Australia commissioned by the Councils were released. The study advised that the only options were to upgrade the incinerator, which would increase charges for ratepayers by $15 each, or to close the incinerator. Residents, environmental groups and the Mayor of South Sydney Council called for the incinerator to be closed, while the Waverly Council supported the retention of the incinerator if it could be upgraded to meet world health standards and remained in public ownership (SMH, 24.10.92:11).
19 In March 1993, in a Herald article on Sydney's difficulties with waste policy, reference was made to the application by Waverly and Woollahra Councils to upgrade the incinerator as being successful (SMH, 31.3.94:15).
20 In September 1993, the Minister for the Environment revealed, in response to a question in the Legislative Council from Democrat MLC, Richard Jones, that about one third of the waste incinerated at the Waterloo incinerator remained as ash and that no tests had been done on the ash before December 1992. The ash was currently being disposed of in the St Peter's Tip in South Sydney (Legislative Council, 16.9.93:3315).
21 In April 1994, the Zetland Community Action Group gave evidence to the inquiry into waste disposal by the Senate Standing Committee on Environment, Recreation and the Arts, claiming that plans to upgrade the Waterloo incinerator had not included assessments of the impact on noise, traffic and the health of residents. A Woollahra Councillor denied that there would be any health impacts (SMH, 20.4.94:7).
22 At this time the Waverly Woollahra Process Plant Committee was considering a report on building a new waste to energy plant at
[Appendix B8.23]
Waterloo to replace the incinerator. The Zetland Community Action Group continued to oppose the plan on the grounds that it was an inappropriate development in a residential area, while a Greenpeace spokesperson drew attention to the danger due to the nature of the garbage being burnt being unknown and the 'cocktail of gases'. The development of the waste to energy plant depended on approval from the South Sydney Council, the Mayor of which was opposed to incineration (SMH, 21.2.94:7).
In July 1994, the Herald reported that the Waverly and Woollahra Councils were about to ratify a plan costing $1.65 million to ensure that a $44 million waste-to-energy plant was built at Waterloo. This expenditure included $75 000 for 'media management' and a similar amount for 'public consultation'. While private sector involvement was a possibility, the two Councils were prepared to take on the project by themselves. However, they did not expect to be able to obtain the required funds from commercial equity markets unless they could negotiate 15-20 year contracts with two other councils for a guaranteed supply of waste for the plant. The mayor of South Sydney Council, the local government area within which the Waterloo incinerator was located, was reported as calling for Waverly and Woollahra to locate the plant in their own areas. The latter two Councils were planning to offer cheap electricity from the plant to South Sydney residents.
The residents of South Sydney have put up with the fear of cancer for 20years now. We have had enough.
South Sydney doesn't want cheap electricity in return for serious healthproblems.
(SMH, 25.7.94:3)
In April 1995, the new Labor Government announced it would phase out the Waterloo incinerator and establish a committee headed by the EPA with representatives of the councils served by the incinerator and the South Sydney Council to find waste disposal alternatives for the area. However, the Herald revealed in late May that the Waverly and Woollahra Councils were pressing ahead with plans to modernise the incinerator and were reassuring concerned tenderers for the modernisation work that the Premier had not given a firm reassurance that the incinerator would be closed. The South Sydney Council called for the State Government to expedite the formation of the committee
[Appendix B8.24]
(SMH, 22.5.95:5). Several days later the Democrat MLC, Richard Jones, asked in the Legislative Council whether the Government would close the incinerator as promised. The reply received from the Premier in September 1995 was that Government policy was to phase out the incinerator. The Eastern Suburbs Waste Management Inquiry had been established and the Government's position made clear to both Councils. The policy to phase out the incinerator was despite the fact that the Minister for Health had been advised that there was 'no clear evidence available as to whether the incinerator poses a long term health threat to residents in the area' (Legislative Council, 30.5.95:311-312; 21.9.95:1263).
25 In June 1995, the Minister for the Environment, Pam Allan, announced a six month investigation into waste disposal for the eastern suburbs. If a suitable means of disposing of waste from the eastern suburbs could be found, the incinerator would be closed immediately. However, at the same time, the Waverly and Woollahra Councils were paying $150 000 for consultants to travel to Germany to study waste-to-energy plants in that country. According to the Herald, these Councils saw the incinerator being part of the solutions that would be found by the investigation, rather than being replaced by them. The South Sydney Council Mayor was quoted as saying that his Council would refuse any refurbishment plans from the two Councils (SMH, 16.6.95:4).
26 The draft report of the Eastern Suburbs Waste Inquiry was obtained by the Herald in November 1995. The main recommendation of the Inquiry was for the establishment of a $400 million waste recycling park on the site of the former Bunnerong Power Station. A spokesperson for the Minister for the Environment was reported by the Herald as saying that the Minister was aware of the proposal, but would not consider it if it was a 'de facto waste tip'. The draft report also recommended:
• that the Waterloo incinerator remain open for a further 18 months until the park was established,
• that the Government research and establish markets for recycled materials,
• a review of Government purchasing policies to favour products with recycled content,
[Appendix B8.25]
• that local government be required to make recycled content mandatory in new buildings, and
• that corporations be required to give details of their waste management performance in their annual reports.
According to the Herald, the draft report also took the view that waste management had to be comprehensive and planned over long time horizons (SMH, 11.11.95:4).
Other Incinerator Proposals in Mid-20th Century
The shutting down of North Sydney Council's incinerator (section B8.2.3, above), together with a recommendation by the Department of Public Health that the Lane Cove Council should incinerate its garbage rather than simply dumping it on the surface at its disposal site and burning it in the open air, led to some attempts in the 1940s to establish an incinerator to serve a number of northern suburbs (SMH 5.1.40:4). Lane Cove Council obtained permission from the Federal Government in 1942 to construct an incinerator for use by it and North Sydney Council (SMH 1.7.42:8) but, following some public protest at the diversion of materials and manpower from war purposes, the Department of War Organisation of Industry withdrew its permission in early 1943 and requested that Willoughby Council take part of North Sydney's garbage in the Willoughby incinerator (SMH 20.4.43:7). However, it appears that North Sydney Council continued to seek a new incinerator site in the latter years of World War II, resulting in resident protests to a proposed site at Cammeray in 1943 (SMH 25.11.43:7) and at Ball's Head in 1945 (SMH, 18.7.45:5).
In September 1959, an alderman from the North Sydney Council visited the St Kilda incinerator in Melbourne and reported favourably to Council (SMH, 12.9.60:9).
In November 1959, three hundred St Peters residents petitioning the Sydney City Council about the St Peters tip called for the installation of an incinerator to replace landfilling. A report to Council by the
[Appendix B8.26]
Superintendent of Cleansing of the Sydney City Council in response to the demands of the St Peters residents maintained that incineration would cost 35 shillings per ton compared to 2 shillings per ton for landfilling and that brickpits that were a danger to children would not be filled in (SMH, 3.11.59:8).
4 The possibility of locating an incinerator at Ball's Head was raised in the North Sydney Council in July of the same year (SMH, 15.7.60:6). In March 1961, the Sydney City Council refused an application by Australian Consolidated Press to erect a garbage and industrial waste incineration plant in Alexandria (SMH, 21.3.61:13). In April of the same year, the North Sydney Council unsuccessfully attempted to interest councils on the north side of the Harbour in forming a county council for joint operation of an incinerator (SMH, 5.4.61:4).
5 In mid-September, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that seven North Shore councils were considering jointly operating an incinerator and that incineration was the method of disposal preferred by the Health Department (SMH, 19.9.67:16). It is possible that this preference for incineration was a consequence of a growing realisation in the Health Department that landfills were often responsible for large quantities of polluted leachate entering waterways (Butlin, 1976:18).
6 In September 1967, a few weeks after the First Australian Refuse Disposal Conference, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Willoughby, North Sydney, Mosman, Kuring-gai, Lane Cove, Hunter's Hill and Ryde Councils were considering building an incinerator to be shared between the Councils because of growing resident opposition to landfills. The Health Department had advised the Councils that any extensions to landfills would have to be carried out under strict supervision and that the Department now regarded incineration as the preferred method for waste disposal (SMH, 19.6.67:16).
7 Six regional incinerators were proposed in a lengthy article by David Warner in the Sydney Morning Herald in January 1968 that compared the problems of vermin, odour, polluted leachates and despoliation of bushland at landfills with the efficiency and cleanliness of incinerators (SMH, 24.1.68:2).
[Appendix B8.27]
8 In D ecem ber 1968, the W illoughby M unicipal Council, w h ich had been experiencing com plaints from res id en ts about its N o rthb ridge tip, sent
its chief health and bu ild ing inspecto r and its d ep u ty eng ineer to Tahiti to exam ine an A ustralian m ade inc inerato r operating at Papeete. Earlier
m odels of the incinerator, w hich w as m ad e by the G oodrid Incinerator Co Pty Ltd, had already been in sta lled a t Tenterfield, B laxland and
Griffith. The W illoughby Council h ad sh u t do w n its W alter Burley
G riffin designed incinerator in D ecem ber 1967 w hich, according to the
Sydney Morning Herald, it reg a rd ed as a 'sm elly m onstrosity ', desp ite the
N ational T rust assessm ent of the b u ild in g as being of h istoric and
architectural in terest (SMH, 29.10.68:5; 30.10.68:6).
9 In D ecem ber 1971, the Herald rep o rted th a t the Sydney C ity Council w as
looking a t setting u p an incinerato r (SMH, 8.5.71:8).
10 In N ovem ber 1973, the K uring-gai, W arringah, M anly an d W illoughby C ouncils m et w ith the M W DA an d the decision w as taken to u n d ertake
a feasibility s tudy for an incinerato r to serve the councils. The inc inerato r w ou ld no t be ready for abou t six years (SMH, 13.11.73:22).
11 In late A ugust 1977, the Executive D irector of the N ational C entre for Resource Recovery in the USA (an in d u stry financed organisation), and seven o ther A m erican litte r and w aste m anagem ent experts visited Sydney and M elbourne p rom oting centralised w aste separa tion and energy recovery p lan ts a t a series of sem inars. These experts m ain ta ined th a t v o lun tary househo lder separa tion h ad no t been successful in USA,
a lthough depo ts at shopping centres h ad been successful (SMH, 23.8.77:10).
12 Incineration w as discussed in b o th the M ajority and M inority Reports of
the Joint Select C om m ittee on W aste M anagem ent in 1993. The M ajority
R eport no ted th a t the C om m ittee h a d only received a few subm issions
on incineration. The Board of the NSW EPA had in c luded a statem ent
on incineration in its subm ission, in w hich it w ished:
...to state publicly that it considers incineration, subject to the constraints of local conditions and EPA regulatory requirements, a viable and environmentally responsible disposal system for wastes which cannot be avoided or recycled
(JSCWM, 1993:51)
[Appendix B8.28]
13 The Waverly and Woollahra Councils expressed concern at the lack of national standards for incinerator emissions and that any future establishment of standards should apply to comparable facilities such as power stations and brick kilns. The Councils submitted that the Green Paper had failed to recognise the trend towards incineration overseas and that incineration would become more attractive as more was discovered about the limitations of landfill disposal (JSCWM, 1993:52).
14 The Majority Report recommended that incineration should remain as a an option for consideration should it become economically feasible (Recommendation 44).
15 In November 1994, Ryde Council, according to the Herald, had announced it was considering an incinerator for disposing of its municipal waste, a proposal that both the local MP and opposition candidate vowed they would fight (SMH, 18.3.95:31). It was clear that politicians at this time were well aware of electoral perceptions of incineration, with Labor members referring to the majority (Liberal) report from the Joint Committee on Waste Management, which accepted incineration as an option, and Liberal members accusing the Labor Party of having a hidden agenda to establish a regional incinerator in the northern suburbs (Legislative Council, 23.11.94:5646; Legislative Assembly, 30.11.94:6029-6030).
16 Also at this time, a professor of chemistry from the USA, a Dr Paul Connett was brought out to Sydney to deliver lectures about the negative experiences with municipal waste incinerators in that country. These had become a burden on local government, and the US Supreme Court had banned incinerator ash from landfills, requiring it to be treated as hazardous waste (Legislative Assembly, 29.11.94:5916).
17 The Council's environmental health director dismissed the issue as a media beat-up (Legislative Council, 2.12.:94:6186).
18 According to a later account given by the Labor member for Gladesville, the issue of a possible North Ryde incinerator resulted in the seat changing hands in the 1995 election:
This was a major issue in the election earlier this year, and so it should have been. With the active support of the State Government, Ryde Council
[Appendix B8.29]
in the last 18 months developed plans for this incinerator on the Porters Creek site. ...
In the election, the people of North Ryde, threatened with the development of a major garbage incinerator for neighbouring councils, rejected the former Government's position and voted for a Labor alternative that quite clearly rejected incineration as an option.
(Legislation Assembly, 6.12.95:4232)
19 The Coalition also later accused the Labor Party of 'deliberatelydistributing propaganda' suggesting that 'a toxic waste incinerator was to be established in the Porters Creek area of Gladesville' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5048).
B8.5 Residential Incinerators and Backyard Burning
1 In February 1974, the Herald reported on a problem with smoke from residential incinerators in Potts Point, Kings Cross and Elizabeth Bay (SMH, 21.2.74:7).
2 In December 1974 the Sydney City Council, at the request of the Deputy Mayor, asked the Minister for Planning and Environment for powers to ban the use of residential incinerators in the Elizabeth Bay, Rushcutters Bay and Potts Point areas (SMH, 26.12.74:17).
3 In November 1975, the Minister for Planning and Environment issued an order under the Clean Air Act prohibiting residential garbage incinerators in parts of the Eastern Suburbs. The Sydney City Council recommended that residents install under-sink garbage disposal units (SMH, 28.11.75). The Council later said people would be given time to phase out incinerators and it would not prosecute people for using incinerators (SMH, 1.3.76:3).
4 In March 1977, the Lord Mayor of Sydney, Alderman Port announced that more pressure would be put on owners of buildings with incinerators in the Kings Cross area, although the Council would be 'more persuasive than punitive' (SMH, 10.3.77:23).
5 In July 1979, the SPCC announced a scheme by which backyard burning would be banned on days of adverse atmospheric conditions. The
[Appendix B8.30]
Blacktown Council health surveyor was to report to the council on the feasibility of banning all backyard burning (SMH, 6.7.79:3).
6 In November 1982, the Herald reported that the SPCC was considering total or partial bans on backyard burning, which had been identified as a major contributor to brown haze (SMH, 5.11.82:9).
7 By March 1983, the SPCC had received comment from councils on four options: voluntary restriction, no bum days, restrict hours of burning to 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. and a total ban. The SPCC favoured a total ban, but some councils had reservations (SMH, 5.3.84:3).
8 In April 1984, the Herald reported that local councils had been invited to submit proposals to the State Government for total bans on backyard burning in their areas. This followed a series of SPCC seminars at which councils expressed support for reducing air pollution (SMH, 11.4.84:5).
9 By January 1988, a total of 17 councils had imposed backyard burning bans (SMH, 4.1.88:3).
B8.6 Industrial Waste and High Temperature Incineration
1 The South Sydney Council withdrew its approval for Bradshaw's liquid waste dumping at their depot in Alexandria on 30.9.70 (SMH,26.11.71:2).
2 Waste tankers were still dumping an estimated 40 000 gallons per day of liquid industrial waste illegally into sewers (SMH, 22.1.72:15).
3 In late January 1972, the appeal by Bradshaws against the termination by the South Sydney Council of approval to operate a liquid waste disposal site in Alexandria was followed by a series of reports in the Herald (SMH, 25.1.72:10; 26.1.72:9; 28.1.73:3). The judge allowed Bradshaws to continue to operate for another three years until a central industrial waste treatment plant was constructed. However, it appears that in October 1972, a decision of the Land and Valuation Court in the
[Appendix B8.31]
litigation between South Sydney Council and Bradshaws resulted in the closure of Bradshaws site and all liquid waste produced in the city being diverted to the Menai dump (Legislative Assembly, 14.11.72:2618; 24.9.74:1328-1329).
In July 1972, a letter to the editor in the Herald claimed 'poisonous byproducts', viz. carbon tetrachloride, hexachlorobenzene, BHC, and hexachloro-butadiene were being poured onto the soil at the rate of 20 drums per day in an area of permeable gravels where there was a risk of leaching into a nearby wildlife sanctuary and the Hawkesbury River (SMH, 26.7.72:6).
In June 1973 according to the Herald, one Sydney waste transporter was dumping 100 000 gallons of liquid waste in bushland each week while playing 'cops and robbers' with the pollution authorities (SMH, 4.6.73:3).
In April 1974, the St George and Sutherland Shire Leader reported under the headline 'Toxic Waste Alarm' that liquid industrial waste was being dumped illegally near Mill Creek in the Menai area. In having his attention drawn to the article in the Legislative Council, the Minister for Planning and Environment, Sir John Fuller, responded that the forthcoming transfer of the administration of the Clean Waters Act and the Clean Air Act from the Health Commission to the State Pollution Control Commission would:
...make it much easier to have a streamlined approach to pollution control.The matters raised by the honourable member will be considered in detail as soon as the new administrative procedures are adopted
(Legislative Council, 4.4.74:2558)
In August 1974, the Labor member for Woronora alleged that Conroy Chemicals Pty Ltd was taking waste from the Sunbeam Corporation (which had been recently prosecuted for discharging wastes into the Cook's River) and dumping it in the Woronora electorate (Legislative Assembly, 13.8.74:175).
In September 1974, the Labor MLA for Woronora complained in the Legislative Assembly about large quantities of 'noxious liquid industrial waste' being spread by tankers over an area of several hundred acres in the Menai area. He argued that the problem was a consequence of the
[Appendix B8.32]
Government's failure to establish a facility for disposing of the waste that the MWDA depot at Castlereagh would not accept. The companies generating the waste, by using waste contractors, were avoiding any responsibility for the waste. The member reported that children playing in the area had become ill after getting waste residues on their fingers, and that greyhounds exercised in the area had subsequently died (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1319-1320).
9 At this time in the Legislative Assembly, it was also revealed that, almost four years after the passing of the Waste Disposal Act in 1970, Part V of the Act, which allowed for the registration of premises producing and disposing of liquid waste, together with the licensing of waste transporters, still had not been proclaimed (Legislative Assembly, 24.9.74:1325).
10 In November 1974, Conroy Chemicals were prosecuted by the State Pollution Control Commission for dumping liquid waste near Sandy Point off the Heathcote Road. The chemicals were alleged to have been finding their way into Mill Creek and the Georges River (Legislative Assembly, 27.2.80:4847).
11 In December 1974, the Labor ML A for Woronora complained that tankers were dumping thousands of gallons of 'noxious industrial waste' in bushland at Menai. According to the Herald, only one tip would take liquid waste, the Castlereagh tip and it would not take 'noxious waste'. Several days later the ML A for Woronora called for waste transport contractors to be licensed and required to carry log books with details of loads carried and where they were disposed of.The Head of the Sydney University School of Chemical Engineering, Professor R.G.H. Prince said that the problem was mainly small firms, particularly electro-plating firms. The large firms such as manufacturers of plastics and pesticides were extremely careful about the disposal of 'toxic wastes' and could afford to treat wastes to convert them to harmless by products (SMH, 16.12.74:8).
12 In November 1975, liquid industrial waste was still being dumped in bushland due to rejection at Castlereagh or the cost of disposal at Castlereagh (Legislative Assembly, 6.11.75:2388).
[Appendix B8.33]
13 In July 1977, the Herald reported that Australian Oil Refineries were dumping 7500 tonnes of waste sulphuric acid 240 km out to sea as a consequence of the closing down of Australian Fertilizers Ltd at Port Kembla because of the clean air laws (SMH, 29.7.77:13).
14 In April 1978, the Herald reported that the SPCC was investigating whether 60 tonnes of dioxin contaminated waste had been dumped in three Sydney landfills, the Major's Bay tip at Concord, Bradshaw's tip at Homebush Bay, and the Menai tip. The waste was the result of Union Carbide's production of 245T, and consisted of dioxin absorbed onto activated charcoal in steel drums. The General Manager of Research for Union Carbide, Mr S. Preston was quoted by the Herald as saying the total quantity of dioxin 'would amount to a few kilograms' and that, although the drums would rust, the company felt it was a very safe method of disposal. Preston maintained that the drums had been dumped between 1970 and 1974 with the permission of the appropriate authorities. The State Attorney General and Acting Minister for Planning and the Environment said he could not find any authority which had given permission. The local governments, in whose areas the tips were located, said that they would not have given permission for such wastes to be dumped. The MWDA said that it would not have given permission for any of the areas it controlled. Bradshaws was not available for comment. All these authorities agreed that the drums would break down. The article mentioned the Seveso dioxin release as an example of the health risks (SMH, 28.4.78:8). Three years later, the Minister for Planning and Environment, the Hon. Paul Landa, could only report that the drums had not been located, that no dioxin had been detected in the leachates of three tips and that investigations were continuing (Legislative Council, 9.4.81:5620-5621).
15 In December 1978, a waste tanker driver was killed in an explosion that occurred when he was unloading liquid industrial waste at the Castlereagh Depot (Legislative Assembly, 19.9.79:1004).
16 In July 1979, ICI Australia booked the German incinerator ship, Vulcanus, to dispose of its accumulated store of toxic wastes in the following year. It was also reported that the NSW Government was negotiating with other companies with toxic waste stores to have their wastes incinerated at sea. The Herald reported that the Government had
[Appendix B8.34]
decided to build a $5 million high temperature toxic waste incinerator in Sydney and an officer of the MWDA was currently investigating incinerators overseas. The Minister for Planning and Environment, Mr Landa, was reported as saying that he had inspected a high temperature incinerator in Texas and believed it was the solution for NSW. The NSW incinerator would be made available to other States. The SPCC was monitoring sites where toxic waste had been disposed — "These tests have shown there is no problem of vaporising or leaching. There is no time bomb in the ground around Sydney. We must be sure that we have no chance of a Love Canal here' (SMH, 10.7.79:3).
It was apparent in February 1980 that politicians were becoming aware of the dangerous side of waste disposal. In the debate over the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill, the member for Hawkesbury maintained that:
Control is the key to the problem of waste disposal. It does not really matter whether the control is by a public authority or private enterprise. The control must be rigid, for the end results of and unfortunate occurrence, either deliberate or accidental, could be horrific. The system of control is important.
(Legislative Assembly, 27.2.80:4852)
Another speaker referred to the important role of the Sydney Morning Herald in giving exposure to waste disposal issues, and the warnings about waste problems that had been occurring for years from people such as Judith Wright, Thor Heyerdahl, and Rachel Carson. This speaker argued that the advent of toxic waste had made waste disposal problematical:
Twenty or thirty years ago waste disposal was not a problem. It became a problem with the introduction of toxic substances. When foaming detergents were discharged into the Mississippi the river had foam twelve feet high over it.
(Legislative Assembly,27.2 .80:4857)
In February 1980, it was reported in the Legislative Assembly that a chemical company had been dumping mercury wastes at the Kimbriki Road Tip (Legislative Assembly, 27.2.80:4855-4856).
[Appendix B8.35]
20 Later in the same year it was also revealed in the Legislative Assembly that wastes containing dioxin had been dumped prior to 1971 in a privately operated tip adjacent to the Atomic Energy Commission's disposal area at Lucas Heights (Legislative Assembly, 12.11.1980:2741).
21 In a question, in March 1982 in the Legislative Council about the proposed Wetherill Park liquid waste treatment plant (which included an incinerator), the concerns appeared to be more about the potential for explosions, odours, noise and visual degradation than long term health risks (Legislative Council, 31.3.82:3027).
22 In April 1982, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation Inquiry into Hazardous Chemicals recommended there should be a single national incinerator for the destruction of intractable waste (Legislative Assembly, 20.10.83:2045). Over three years later, the Australian Environment Council was still deliberating on the recommendations (Legislative Assembly, 25.9.85:7182).
23 In July 1983, the Herald reported that a private firm, Rinex Australia, had abandoned its attempt to build a high temperature incinerator at Bringagee, midway between Hay and Leeton, due to opposition in the region and State Rail's refusal to lease a site on the grounds that the company could not guarantee there would be no residual wastes left in the soil. The firm was considering another site at Hillston (SMH, 11.7.83:5). The Far West regional manager of the NSW Department of Industry and Decentralisation had been asked by the NSW Government to act as a local liaison for Rinex (SMH, 26.4.85:5).
24 In December 1983, the Minister for Planning and Environment, the Hon. Paul Landa, in response to a question from Kirkby, revealed that each year some 5 tonnes of arsenic, 19 tonnes of cadmium,1.3 tonnes of mercury, 190 tonnes of cyanide and 12.3 tonnes of phenolic compounds were discharge at Sydney's three ocean sewage outfalls (Legislative Council, 1.12.83:4229).
25 Between 1982 and 1984, the amount of intractable waste for disposal decreased considerably for, according to the MWDA, three reasons. Firstly, the visit of the incinerator ship MV Vulcanus to Sydney in
[Appendix B8.36]
December 1982 removed 3500 tonnes of pumpable chlorinated hydrocarbon waste. Secondly, a private company arranged to containerise solid and liquid PCB wastes and have these incinerated in the UK. Thirdly, the amount of intractable waste produced by industry reduced from 850 tonnes per annum in 1981-82 to 700 tonnes per annum in 1983-84 due to recycling in the production processes used by industry (MWDA, 1983-84:34).
26 In April 1985 the Government confirmed that some 15 kilograms of dioxin, dispersed through 160 tonnes of waste charcoal were stored the Union Carbide plant at Rhodes, and that the same firm had disposed of drums of dioxin contaminated charcoal into landfill at Menai,
' Homebush Bay and Concord between 1949 and 1971 (Legislative Council, 10.4.85:5623).
27 In April 1985, the Herald ran a major article on the proposal by Rinex Environmental Services Pty Ltd to construct a high temperature incinerator at Broken Hill. It claimed that the $2 company had no expertise in toxic waste incineration. The article was replete with journalistic hyperbole with head lines and box headings such as:
Secrecy shrouds project to destroy toxic waste. Tony Horwitz reports onthe $2 company lobbying for one of the world's most perilous tasks.
Where the toxic dangers lie.
A deadly process that offers no second chances.
28 The article also reported a source in the MWDA as saying that a national incinerator was needed (SMH, 23.4.85:4).
29 Rinex submitted a development application in May 1985 (MWDA, 1984- 85:36)
30 By the time the development application had been submitted, considerable opposition to the incinerator had been mobilised in Broken Hill and a petition with 10 000 signatures was presented to the Labor MLA for Broken Hill, who bought the petition to the notice of the Minister for Planning and Environment, Mr Carr (SMH, 3.5.85:5). The petitioners stated that:
[Appendix B8.37]
We are opposed to this [the incinerator] because our population and future population as yet unborn will be exposed to the hazards of chemical fallout and the frightening possibility of intellectual, mental and physical impairment.
(Legislative Assembly,23.4.85:6754)
It is interesting to note that, among the many reasons advanced by the Director of the Department of Environment and Planning for refusing the proposal, was the doubt that the firm would be able to obtain adequate insurance for the facility (Legislative Assembly, 15.10.85:7826).
The experience of Rinex at Bringagee, Hillston and Broken Hill appears to have made an impression on politicians as to the political feasibility of siting incinerators, as mentioned by the Hon. Jack Hallam in the Legislative Council some two years later (Legislative Council, 7.4.87:10113).
In January 1986, the Australian Consumers' Association was calling for a national high temperature incinerator as industry was using 'grossly im proper' methods to dispose of toxic waste (SMH, 19.6.86:3).
In March and April 1986, the Hon. Elisabeth Kirkby was drawing the attention of the Legislative Council to toxicity of dioxin (alleged to be 150 000 times more toxic that cyanide) and to disturbing findings in the USA about dioxin in breast milk (Legislative Council, 12.3.86:811; 22.4.86:2265).
In April 1986, the Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Tim Moore had noted that there was a need for a high temperature incinerator for the disposal of intractable wastes, and that decisions about the disposal of theses waste would be politically difficult (Legislative Assembly, 22.4.86:2391). The need for the high temperature incinerator was echoed by a Democrat member in the Legislative Council, the Hon. Elisabeth Kirkby (Legislative Council, 23.4.86:2514). The Minister for Agriculture commented on the community response to the Broken Hill incinerator proposal:
One would not have thought there would have been the degree of reaction that occurred in the Broken Hill area, but nevertheless, it did.
(Legislative Council, 23.4.86:2515)
[Appendix B8.38]
36 In late April, 1986, the Government admitted in the Legislative Council that there was little that could be done about the dioxin in storage at Rhodes, although Union Carbide would have to apply for licence to store dioxin under the new Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act (Legislative Council, 30.4.86:3253).
37 In June 1986, the Herald reported that the SPCC believed that NSW would be able to dispose of its hazardous wastes in an incinerator to be built in Western Australia or the Northern Territory, a proposal that had been under discussion in the Environment Council for some time (SMH, 20.6.86:5).
38 The annual report of the MWDA revealed in 1986 that the national survey it had undertaken into intractable wastes showed there were 7 800 tonnes in Australia, of which 95 per cent were in New South Wales. Of the quantity in New South Wales, 95 per cent had been produced by one firm in Sydney (MWDA, 1985-86:36).
39 In September 1986, the Herald reported a case where a private contractor had collected drums of chemical waste from Monsanto and the Australian Gaslight Company. The contractor had been refused disposal at a Sydney landfill and had then travelled to Bargo and dumped the load in a tip there (SMH, 11.9.86:4).
40 One indication of the presence of toxic waste in the national consciousness was the inclusion of 'death caused by a company knowingly ridding itself of poisonous waste' in a list of crimes used in a national study of views about the seriousness of crimes. This crime was ranked the third most serious after stabbing to death and heroin trafficking (SMH, 12.11.86:6).
41 In December 1986, the chemical industries and a high temperature incinerator proposed by Bayer on the Kurnell peninsula became an issue in the Heathcote by-election. Those protesting drew attention to the historic nature of the Kurnell peninsula, a recent explosion that killed five workers at CSR's chemical plant adjacent to the site where Union Carbide was storing dioxin contaminated waste, and the extensive mangrove wetlands in Quilbray Bay (SMH, 3.12.86:6).
[Appendix B8.39]
In December 1986, the Government announced in the Legislative Council that notices had been served under the Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act on the occupiers of land identified as having received dioxin contaminated wastes in the past. The notices required that the land not be disturbed in any way, and the sites had been covered (Legislative Council, 3.12.86:7883).
In January 1987, Bayer withdrew its application after a Commission of Inquiry recommend rejection of the application. The Opposition environment spokesperson, Tim Moore, maintained that the Government should use the decision as an opportunity to change the hazardous industry zoning of the peninsula (SMH, 23.1.87:2). The Herald, in an editorial, questioned why a plant that had been regarded as insufficiently hazardous in 1982 to warrant locating in the hazardous industries zone had subsequently been rejected by a Commission of Inquiry, despite the Department of Environment and Planning's approval subject to some modifications. The Herald's analysis was that Bayer had been 'a pushover' because groups opposing it were able to 'thoroughly poison the political atmosphere' by citing the recent Bhopal, Chernobyl and Rhine disasters, and because Bayer failed to take its case to the public (SMH, 26.1.87:6).
In February or March of 1987, a number of illegal dumpings of industrial waste into the Nepean River occurred. No prosecutions had been made by November 1987 (Legislative Assembly, 20.11.87:16782).
In March 1987, the Herald reported that Union Carbide had secretly shipped 160 tonnes of dioxin contaminated waste to Wales for incineration. According to Government and company sources the secrecy was necessary to prevent public or union opposition (SMH, 7.3.87:1).
This was confirmed by the Minister for Planning and Environment some six months later (Legislative Council, 15.10.87:14570).
A week later, the Herald had a major front page article and two further pages of articles on Sydney's 'toxic time bombs'. Dioxin had been found in the soil at Union Carbide's storage site at Rhodes, which was being
[Appendix B8.40]
prepared for sale or lease to other users. Additional articles described the nature of intractable wastes, the storages and contaminated sites around Sydney and current difficulties in establishing a high temperature incinerator for Sydney or Australia. A human interest story chronicled the experience of a family living close to the Castlereagh tip who, with their pets, had suffered ill health and cancer and eventually had to walk away from their home, unable to find a buyer. A commentary by Dr Kate Short of the Total Environment Centre's Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals Committee proposed that the NSW Government should establish a hazardous industry zone with a generous buffer from residential areas and a management board with responsibility for the environmental management of the zone as a whole (SMH, 16.3.87:1, 4, 5).
48 The following day, the Herald published reassurances from the NSW Government that the dioxin contamination at Rhodes did not pose a threat to health or the environment. However, the Herald also obtained comments from a leading authority on the health risks of dioxin in the USA which cast doubts on the Government's reassurances. The Opposition accused the Government of missing the opportunity to support the West Australian Government's proposal to build a high temperature incinerator on the eastern goldfields, while the Minister for the Environment, Mr Carr, pointed out that the Coalition had been in power when the disposal of dioxin wastes occurred (SMH, 17.3.87:5).
49 Further discoveries of 'toxic hot spots' at a gas works site undergoing redevelopment at Waverton were also reported by the Herald in March, 1987 (SMH, 19.3.87:3).
50 In late March 1987, the Hon. Elisabeth Kirkby, along with other members, was again asking questions in the Legislative Council about the dangers of posed by dioxin generally and the contaminated soil in particular (Legislative Council, 24.3.87:9247, 9259-9260; 25.3.87:9379). At this time, Kirkby also referred to a waste tanker alleged to have dumped thousands of litres of 'toxic waste chemicals' at Llandilo (Legislative Council, 31.3.87:9625). Several months later, the Government had still not been able to identify the person or persons responsible (Legislative Council, 12.5.87:11515).
[Appendix B8.41]
By about March 1987, the governments of Victoria, Western Australia and the Northern Territory were all investigating the feasibility of establishing high temperature incinerators in their States (MWDA, 1986- 87:32). According to the Authority, only one such incinerator was warranted in Australia, due to the high capital costs and the relatively small quantity of intractable wastes to be disposed of.
In a meeting with representatives of the Total Environment Centre in May 1987, Mr Carr agreed to use the Rhodes site to test alternative methods of remediation to high temperature incineration, such as chemical, bacterial and fungal methods. The article reported that the Rhodes site was being reviewed by UK and USA experts. Mr Carr was also reported as saying the plans for a high temperature incinerator seemed to have stalled, because there was not sufficient quantities of waste (SMH, 1.5.87:16).
In May 1987, the Government reported that the SPCC estimated that about 30 kg of dioxin had been disposed of, together with several hundred tonnes of waste, at waste disposal sites at Menai, Homebush and Concord. These sites had been covered with soil and had been made subject to notices that forbade any excavation below 0.5 metres. Even if a high temperature incinerator had been available, it was doubtful that the contaminated soil at Rhodes and elsewhere could be treated (Legislative Council, 12.5.97:11515).
In May 1987, the Joint Task Force on Intractable Waste was set up by the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victorian Governments to examine options for the disposal of intractable waste and, if a high temperature incinerator was chosen, to deal with community consultation and siting issues (SMH, 29.5.87:9; Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5492).
In October 1987, the Minister for Planning and Environment,Mr Carr, revealed that the Government had been approached by the Australian National Line about building an incinerator ship. Greenpeace opposed the idea — Tf it is not safe to bum these wastes on land, why is it safe to do so at sea?' (SMH, 23.10.87:8). Carr had approved the establishment of a working group to report on the proposal by March 1988 (Legislative Assembly, 22.10.87:15063-15064).
[Appendix B8.42]
56 In December 1988, the Commonwealth, Victorian and New South Wales Governments announced that a high temperature incinerator would be sited in New South Wales, the reporting having been delayed until after the Victorian elections to avoid the incinerator becoming an election issue (Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5492-5493).
57 On 1 March 1989, the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, referred to an audit of intractable wastes in Australia which had shown there some 11 000 tonnes in storage, of which 85 per cent was in New South Wales, including 8000 tonnes of hexachlorobenzene stored by ICI Australia at Botany (Legislative Assembly, 1.3.89:5492).
58 The following day, the Herald reported on interviews with waste tanker drivers at the Lidcombe Aqueous Treatment Plant that had been opened by the MWDA the previous October (see appendix B6.5.1) and reported that most drivers were aware that illegal dumping of industrial waste was extensive, mainly into the sewer system. The problem was attributed to small manufacturers unwilling to pay the costs of legal disposal, lack of enforcement by the MWDA and the Sydney Water Board, and a fine for illegal disposal of a tanker load of industrial waste was $1500 compared to a $2000 charge for legal disposal (SMH, 2.3.89:7).
59 Also in late 1988 and early 1989, a number of illegal waste dumping events, such an alleged 1000 litres of white paint into the sewerage system and cyanide waste into the Cooks River, attracted the attention of the Legislative Council (Legislative Council, 13.12.88:4750; 28.2.89:5273; 2.3.89:5556; 2.5.89:7033).
60 It appears that, at least by the late 1980s, ICI was well aware of the political infeasibility of high temperature incineration, and had been allocating funds to researching alternative methods of disposal of its hexachlorobenzene stockpile (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6527). At that time, there appeared to be a number of promising processes, including super critical water oxidation, plasma arc, molten salt, cement kilns, catalytic hydrodechlorination, chlorinolysis and gas phase hydrogenolysis (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6529).
[Appendix B8.43]
The powerlessness of the formal institutions of government in acting against illegal liquid waste dumping was evidenced by the seeking of assistance from Neighbourhood Watch and similar organisations in May 1989 (Legislative Council, 24.5.89:8354).
In October 1989, the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, announced that several waste disposal companies would be prosecuted for illegal transport and storage of wastes (SMH, 19.10.89:5).
In September 1989, Moore revealed that tests had shown dioxin contamination in the sediments on the floor of Homebush Bay and in marine life in the Bay. Fishing in the Bay had been banned and further testing was proceeding in the area (Legislative Assembly, 21.9.89:10482- 10483).
As with the Castlereagh Depot (see appendix B6.5.2), the change of Government in 1988 enabled the blame for the illegal industrial waste problem to be placed on the previous Government (Legislative Council, 11.10.89:10810).
In November 1989, it the magnitude of illegal waste dumping became evident when the Government's 'Dob in a Dumper' campaign resulted in an initial 70 per cent increase in deliveries of liquid industrial waste to the Lidcombe treatment plant, followed by a levelling off to 40 per cent above normal (Legislative Assembly, 14.11.89:1223). Applying this increase to the MWDA's figures for normal throughput at the plant would suggest that perhaps as much as 500 tonnes of liquid waste per week was still being dumped in the early months of 1989.
In January 1990, the SPCC was, according to the Herald, attempting to trace the origin of 25 drums of toxic waste dumped in bushland at Doonside (SMH, 23.1.90:1).
In March 1990, concerns were expressed in the Legislative Council that drilling being undertaken as part of the investigation of former industrial waste dumps at Homebush Bay could possibly release dioxin into the environment (Legislative Council, 29.3.90:1298).
[Appendix B8.44]
68 In May 1990, the Herald reported that the Sydney Water Board was investigating ten tonnes of liquid waste illegally dumped in the Hawthorne Canal (SMH, 24.5.90:7).
69 In an article in the Herald on the Waterloo incinerator in July 1990, it was reported that a national high temperature incinerator was supported by the Australian Conservation Foundation, provided that a ban was placed on the further production of toxic wastes (SMH, 14.7.90:11).
70 In August 1990, it was reported in the Legislative Council that ICI Australia had released mercury wastes into the sewerage system (Legislative Council, 16.8.90:5854). This was some six months after the Government had announced it had signed a contract with ICI Australia in which the company agreed to undertake an 'environmental clean-up' program. This involved an environmental performance bond and a series of environmental indicators to be achieved according to a timetable. The Government hailed this initiative as:
...leading the common law world in forcing industry to comply with this form of environmental protection. In this case a contract which has taken eight months to negotiate is one in which the company is willing to join the Government and lead the fight against industrial pollution in the waters off Sydney.
(Legislative Assembly, 22.3.90:868)
71 In August 1990, charges against a company for illegal waste dumping into sewer inlets were dismissed because, while there was no doubt that the actions had occurred, the magistrate could not be satisfied that the men who dumped the waste were doing so as part of their employment (SMH, 29.8.90:7).
72 In September 1990, according to a Government member of the Legislative Council, the Labor member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, had claimed in an article in the Daily Mirror that athletes at the State Sports Centre at Homebush were being affected by odours from toxic substances (Legislative Council, 11.9.90:6826). Gibson subsequently raised these concerns in the Legislative Assembly in November of the same year (Legislative Assembly, 28.11.90:11034).
[Appendix B8.45]
In September 1990, a waste disposal firm found guilty in the Land and Environment Court of illegally dumping asbestos avoided paying fined through going into receivership (SMH, 26.9.90:8).
On 18 September 1990, the Joint Task Force on Intractable Waste (JTFIW) announced its preferred site for the high temperature incinerator as Corowa (Legislative Assembly, 24.10.90:9144). This had the support of the Corowa Shire Council (SMH, 15.11.90:8). The preferred technology was high temperature rotary kiln incineration (WMA, 1990-91:35).
In September 1990, concerns were expressed in the Legislative Assembly by the member for Bankstown about a proposal by Simsmetal Ltd to establish a high temperature incinerator for medical waste at Chullora. The concerns revolved around the potential for contamination of a nearby water reservoir and a Franklins food distribution centre, and a lack of confidence that the incinerator would perform as cleanly as intended. The response from the Government was that:
It is an emotional issue and the debate can be muddled as a result of the fear people have. ... In my electorate there is a biomedical waste incinerator.That is a more apt description than contaminated waste, which puts fear in the community. ... No one can give a 100 per cent guarantee about the safety and effectiveness of such installations. ... Please do not stir the pot because the waste must be disposed of.
(Legislative Assembly, 19.9.90:7504-7507)
In late September 1990, the NSW Government gazetted a regulation under the Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act that required all firms storing hazardous waste to register details of that waste with the SPCC and arrange with the proposed hazardous waste incinerator at Corowa for the waste to be destroyed. Production of such wastes would be banned after the end of 1994. The Minister for the Environment announced that the Cowra incinerator would operate on a 'strictly polluter-pays basis' (SMH, 27.9.90:7).
Also in September 1990, the Sutherland Shire was reported as being outraged by the dumping of 700 tonnes of mercury contaminated sewerage sludge by the Water Board at the Lucas Heights landfill. The contamination was the result of a mercury spill at the ICI Botany plant the previous July (SMH, 27.9.90:9).
[Appendix B8.46]
In October 1990, the member for Murray, a member of the Coalition argued forcefully against the siting of the high temperature incinerator at Corowa. The incinerator was also opposed by the member for Albury, and the Federal member for Farrer, Tim Fischer (Legislative Assembly, 10.10.90:8141). In response, the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore emphasised the need for the decision to be made on scientific grounds:
Within the Corowa community there are legitimate and strongly voiced concerns about the siting criteria, and those concerns need to be resolved.The appropriate was for those matters to be resolved is by way of an environmental impact study ... The legitimate concerns of the local community must be addressed by way of the EIS process.
(Legislative Assembly, 10.10.90:8142)
In late October 1990, it was revealed in the Legislative Assembly that the motel proprietor where the Waste Management Authority's community relations officer was staying, had received death threats against his family (Legislative Assembly, 24.10.90:9145). In relation to such threats, the member for Albury and the Minister for the Environment later revealed that had been 'very real concerns about the possibility of social breakdown in the Corowa community' (Legislative Assembly, 26.11.90:10572).
In November 1990, the Corowa Shire Council reversed its support for the high temperature incinerator. Of fourteen provisional sites identified by the JTFIW, only one remained that had some support from local government. A protest rally held in Corowa attracted 5000 people and was addressed by Tasmanian green, Christine Milne (SMH, 15.11.90:8; 27.11.90:3). A public meeting in Moree, which was also a possible site, attracted 2000 people (Legislative Council, 13.11.90:9436).
In early November 1990, the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore, confirmed that, despite the objections of local members, the environmental impact studies for an incinerator at Corowa would continue as proposed, emphasising that the studies would not be carried out by the Waste Management Authority, but by an 'independent panel'
[Appendix B8.47]
which would be 'at arm's length' from the Authority (Legislative Assembly, 14.11.90:9642).
It appears that by 19 November 1990, the NSW National Party was confident that the incinerator would not be sited at Corowa (Legislative Assembly, 20.11.90:9951).
On 26 November, the Federal, NSW and Victorian environment ministers announced that Corowa had been ruled out as a site for a high temperature incinerator (Legislative Assembly, 26.11.90:10567). The ministers maintained that the decision had been made on technical, not political grounds. The ministers were continuing consideration of seven sites. The Opposition environment spokesperson, Pam Allan, claimed the selection process was 'a total shambles' and predicted that an incinerator would not be built in NSW. Greenpeace argued that funds should be used for research into alternatives to incineration, while ACF supported incineration (SMH, 27.11.90:3; 29.11.90:3; 4.12.90:12).However, the Minister for the Environment clung to the ideal that the decision could be made scientifically: 'But all further assessment will be made, as it has been made with Corowa, on technical grounds rather than on political grounds' (Legislative Assembly, 20.11.90:10569).
In late November, politicians began to raise questions about the availability of superior alternatives to high temperature incineration (Legislative Council, 27.11.90:10659).
In January 1991, the managing director of the WMA, John Cook, accused Greenpeace of making false and distorted claims about the effects of a hazardous waste incinerator in order to get publicity. Greenpeace's national toxics coordinator, Lynette Thorstensen, denied the accusation and said that Greenpeace's preference was for better storage and on-site disposal facilities (SMH, 17.1.91:7).
In February 1991, the member for Broken Hill reaffirmed his and his electorate's opposition to a high temperature incinerator in that region (Legislative Assembly, 26.2.91:241).
In March 1991, the Independent Panel on Intractable Waste (IPIW) was established by the Federal, NSW and Victorian governments. The Panel
[Appendix B8.48]
was to supervise the preparation of an environmental impact statement, conduct community consultation, review alternative technologies and recommend a final site (WMA,1990-91:36). Its responsibilities were described a little differently by the Waste Service in 1991-92: to review intractable waste streams, to evaluate all technologies with full community consultation, and make a final recommendation to the Ministers (WRAPS, 1991-92:37).
88 In March 1991, the Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan was informed by the Minister for the Environment in response to a question that the Government did not propose to make the Menai tip 'a major dumping ground for asbestos, mercury, industrial and toxic waste' (Legislative Assembly, 14.3.91:1088).
89 In April 1991, the Deputy Premier, Wal Murray, who had initially supported a high temperature incinerator being built in his electorate, gained preselection by the National Party in the Barwon electorate only on the condition that there would be no incinerators in that electorate (Legislative Council, 10.4.91:1798).
90 In April 1991, Dr David Hughes, a GP who gave up his practice to campaign on the pollution of the Hawkesbury River, claimed that chemicals and oils were being dumped illegally at night into Hawkesbury Ponds (SMH, 24.4.91:2). Also at this time, the Herald reported that Worksafe had found white asbestos in a building waste stockpile belonging to a building materials recycling firm (SMH, 24.4.91:5).
91 In May 1991, Sutherland residents were protesting, according to the Herald, against the expansion by the State Government of the Menai landfill, which was already taking toxic waste (being cheaper than Castlereagh) and asbestos (SMH, 1.5.91:16).
92 In May 1991, the Hornsby Shire Council refused an application for the construction of a medical waste incinerator. In providing this information in response to a question on notice, the Minister for the Environment noted that:
[Appendix B8.49]
The use of the emotive word 'hazard' in connection with this issue is based on the desire to create 'political controversy rather than on any rational understanding of the issues.
(Legislative Assembly, 2.5.91:3148)
93 In May 1991, the Herald carried a front page story about FederalAirports Corporation staff taking large bribes in return for allowing the dum ping of concrete demolition waste at the Mascot airport (SMH, 6.5.91:1, 8).
94 In June 1991, the Land and Environment Court fined a firm foroperating an illegal waste depot and causing water pollution as a result. The judge criticised the SPCC for failing to prevent the pollution, which the defence accused the WMA of failing to advise the firm on how to contain pollution from stockpiled waste after its licence was revoked (SMH, 27.6.91:13).
95 In December 1991, the Herald published details of a study commissioned by the Panel into the quantities of intractable wastes in NSW rural areas. In terms of quantity, the study was able to show that rural NSW held more intractable waste than the previously known storages in Sydney and Melbourne (SMH, 5.12.91:6).
96 The Sydney hearings of the Panel continued to be reported by the Herald in December (SMH, 7.12.91:11). In February 1992, the Herald reported on country hearings and quoted Selinger's universal responsibility argument: 'W e've all been responsible for the problem and we've all got to be responsible for the solution' (SMH, 8.2.92:9).
97 A report in the Herald in December 1991 revealed the existence of 38 contaminated sites on the Australian Defence Industries munitions site at St Mary's. ADI was proposing to vacate the site and sell it for redevelopment but councils did not want to assume legal responsibility by rezoning it as residential (SMH, 7.12.91:21).
98 In June 1992, the Herald reported that 'toxic contamination' had been found in the Lucas Heights and Mill Creek area due to waste disposal in the area (SMH, 2.6.92:4).
[Appendix B8.50]
99 By June 1992, extensive testing had been undertaken at Homebush to ascertain which areas were safe and which areas were in need of remediation (Legislative Assembly, 24.6.92:4234).
100 In early July 1992, concerns were raised in the Legislative Council by the Democrat MLC, the Hon. Richard Jones, about a proposal to build a medical waste incinerator at Werris Creek (Legislative Council, 1.7.92:4930-4931).
101 The IPIW recommended to ANZECC in July 1992 that new technologies such as base-catalysed dechlorination be the preferred method of disposing of intractable waste, rather than incineration (SMH, 10.7.92:5). This would involve small local and often relocatable facilities (WRAPS, 1991-92:32). From the both the Herald article and the reporting by the Waste Service, it appears that this choice was as much justified by the Elliott and Shanahan survey of public opinion as it was by the science.In fact, Ben Selinger was reported as saying that the IPIW was convinced that incineration worked well (SMH, 10.7.92:5; WRAPS, 1991- 92:36). Overseas export was rejected on grounds of the moral principle that people had a responsible to clean up their own waste.
102 In August 1992, the Herald was reporting Selinger's concern that the final report would sink from view unless environmental groups and industry placed pressure on governments to act. Selinger claimed that the bureaucracies in particular would be pleased by the winding up of the IPIW. The final report favoured emerging technologies over incineration, but pointed out that there was no 'coherent' licensing mechanism for these technologies. The fragmentation of responsibility with the EPA examining emissions and planning authorities dealing with siting issues was seen as an obstacle to the implementation of the technologies. The report also recommended that the Department of Agriculture, the Electricity Commission of NSW and ICI should be made to take responsibility for the disposal of intractable waste generated by their industries (SMH, 19.8.92:4).
103 In September 1992, a 18 tonnes of intractable waste (PCBs) from Australia was impounded in Belgium and became the focus of a Greenpeace action (SMH, 3.9.92:8). The Herald editorial once again
[Appendix B8.51]
framed intractable waste policy as 'messy as the waste itself' (SMH, 3.9.92:12).
In September 1992, Ben Selinger was reported as claiming that Australia would be rid of all its intractable waste by 2001. He believed that emerging or available technologies would be able to dispose of most of the waste without the need for incineration. Only after Australia had 'tried really hard' would there be a moral argument for exporting the remainder (SMH, 8.9.92:4).
In October 1992, the Premier, John Fahey, revealed in response to a question in the Legislative Assembly that an independent committee was examining a proposal to establish a waste dump for radio-active waste in western New South Wales (Legislative Assembly, 14.10.92:6866-6867).
In October 1992, it was revealed in the Legislative Assembly that an incinerator operated by Clinical Waste Australia at Silverwater was exceeding overseas standards for dioxin in emissions to the atmosphere, such standards for Australia still being under consideration by the National Medical and Health Research Council. The Government was unable to close the plant, on the grounds the resultant problems with the disposal of medical waste would be a greater health hazard than the dioxin emissions (Legislative Assembly, 15.10.92:7269). In September 1993, it was claimed in the Legislative Assembly that it had taken three and a half years for the company to install a secondary scrubber to improve the plant's emissions to the atmosphere (Legislative Assembly, 8.9.93:2916).
The IPIW was disbanded on 6 November 1992 and its final report released. This included a recommendation that large chemical companies be taxed to fund assistance to small firms to improve their handling of intractable waste, a proposal that was rejected by the chemical industry and the Federal Government (SMH, 6.11.92:2). In launching the final report, the Federal Minister for the Environment announced that a high temperature incinerator would not be built. However, she rejected Selinger's recommendation for a two year moratorium on the export of intractable waste. Greenpeace gave its support to the recommendations and said that they vindicated the
[Appendix B8.52]
actions it had taken. Selinger was appointed to the chair of an implementation committee announced by the Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) (SMH, 7.11.92:4).
108 In March 1993, the Minister for the Environment, in a response to a question on notice, revealed that Ciba-Geigy was storing hazardous waste at Pendle Hill, at a site located in an area that was mainly residential (Legislative Assembly, 11.3.93:798).
109 In May 1994, the Minister for the Environment, in a response to a question on notice, stated that he was aware that a Perth company, Multiple Constructions, was preparing a proposal to store toxic wastes in disused mine shafts at Broken Hill (Legislative Assembly, 13.5.94:2828).
110 Some indication of the residual sensitivity about incineration in Sydney is given decision by the proponents of a packaging plant at Smithfield in November 1994 to term a facility that was burning waste packaging to raise steam a 'multifuel boiler' rather than an incinerator (Legislative Assembly, 24.11.94:5830).
B8.7 Other Sources of Danger from Chemicals
1 The earliest mention in the Herald of harmful gases emitted by burning plastics was April 1973 (SMH, 26.4.73:6).
2 In July 1974, an article about cancer risks with vinyl chloride warned that care needed to be taken with the disposal of PVC to ensure vinyl chloride was not generated (SMH, 30.7.74:7).
3 In 1978, Pausacker, in his study of recycling in Australia reported that plastics had 'received more adverse publicity than most other components of solid waste'. This he attributed to suspicion because it was a new material and to the massive growth in production (Pausacker, 1978:42).
[Appendix B8.53]
In November 1981, the Herald reported that a doctor from the Blue Mountains had made a submission to the House of Representatives subcommittee inquiry into hazardous chemicals, suggesting high cancer incidence in the area may have been related to dumping of nerve gas canisters during World War II (SMH, 2.11.81:3). This was disproved in a study published in the Medical Journal of Australia late in 1982 (SMH, 6.10.82:3).
In August 1987, Sutherland Shire received an application for a catalytic cracking plant at Kurnell. The hazardous industry zoning on the peninsula was under review by the State Government, while the Opposition pledged to remove the 'toxic zoning' (i.e. hazardous industry zoning) (SMH, 25.8.87:4).
In September 1987, a study by the Australian Consumers' Association found that relatively large quantities of di-iso-octyl phthalate plasticiser was leaching out of plastic wrapping and into food (SMH, 8.9.87:6). The following day, the store where the problem had been detected revealed that the problem was due to use of the incorrect type of wrapping, an 'isolated incident'. The ACA pointed out that food stores continued to use PVC wrapping, despite findings released by the ACA in the previous year that polyethylene was safer than PVC. The PVC wrapping was preferred by stores because it suited wrapping machines, while the Australian Plastics Institute issued a statement that PVC wrapping was not a health hazard (SMH, 9.9.87:2).
In September 1987, the Maritime Services Board came under criticism by the Save Rozelle Bay Committee over its plans to dredge the Bay for a marina development and use the spoil, containing high levels of heavy metals from former industries to create a foreshore park (SMH, 19.9.87:7).
In March 1989, the Opposition spokesperson for the environment, Pam Allan, referred to the regular occurrence of chemical spillages due to traffic accidents involving trucks transporting chemicals and wastes (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5792). Similarly, the member for Londonderry, Paul Gibson, noted that 'somewhere in the metropolitan area virtually every couple of days an accident occurs involving a vehicle carrying toxic waste' (Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5802).
[Appendix B8.54]
9 The impact of the public's experience with various government's management of pesticide issues on the siting of a high temperature incinerator in New South Wales was put very clearly by the Labor member for Keira, Mr Markham.
Community opposition to a given project may spring from ignorance of the facts or from economic concerns about a decline in property values. Much also springs from a genuine appreciation of the issues and a realistic understanding of the risks involved. In this was the community has many a precedent to refer to. On a range of technical and public health issues, both the State and the federal governments' responses to problems involving chemicals have been weak, indecisive and unconvincing. Governments have failed to deal effectively with the phase-out of persistent organochlorine pesticides in the urban and rural environment. Aerial spraying of schedule six and seven poisons still continues close to communities, and pesticide pollution of mayor rivers persists.
About six or seven weeks ago a constituent telephoned me to complain bitterly about a pest control operator who was working next door to my constituent's home. The operator was fully protected from the pesticide he was spraying, but no one in the vicinity had been notified that the spraying would take place. M y constituent had a five-day-old baby in a cot in a bedroom on the side of the house next to the property being sprayed, with the window open, those incidents make people suspicious, and that is why there must be full consultation. I have no doubt that honourable members are aware of the problems of asbestos and fibreglass. ...
There are many reasons why the public is suspicious of governments, and a close consideration of the history of waste management gives further substance to that view.
(Legislative Assembly, 5.4.89:5921-5922)
10 Medical waste, and particularly illegally dumped medical waste took on a more dangerous dimension with the possibility of syringes being contaminated with AIDS (SMH, 23.1.90:1).
11 In June 1990, the Herald reported a study of residents in the vicinity of the Kingston Goldmine toxic waste site in Brisbane, that while it was unable to attribute any health effects directly to the waste, found a wide range of stress-related symptoms amongst residents surveyed, and that these symptoms did not decrease when media interest in the issue had subsided (SMH, 4.6.90:2).
12 In December 1993, it was reported that hospital waste was beingcompacted before transport for incineration in Brisbane, a practice that
[Appendix B8.55]
was contrary to NSW Department of Health guidelines (SMH,2.12.93:6).
13 In July 1994, the Sutherland Shire Council took the WRAPS to the Supreme Court to obtain an injunction on the destruction by the WRAPS of consultants' reports about water contamination due to the leaching of chemicals from an old liquid waste dump. The managing director of WRAPS said that the existing WRAPS landfill at Lucas Heights had been cleared as a source of contamination. John Cook also said that the consultants' reports had commercial value and the WRAPS hoped to sell it to developers in the future (SMH, 28.7.94:6).
14 In the debate in the Legislative Council on the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill in December 1995, the Australian Democrats MLC, the Hon. Richard Jones referred to plastic as being 'the most intractable of all waste' (Legislative Council, 15.12.95:5043).
15 In the period from August 1972 to May 1995, Hansard had in its index the terms 'chemicals' and 'toxic waste'. Figure B8.4 shows the number of items (e.g. questions on notice, debates on Bills) that were referenced under the two terms for the period. As terms of Parliament are of irregular length, the count of items in each session is expressed as items referenced per 100 working days of the session (thus ensuring that long sessions do not appear to have an increased number of items). Each count of items for a session is plotted in figure B8.4 at the midpoint in time of the session.
[Appendix B8.56]
Figure B8.4: The number of items (e.g. questions on notice, debates on Bills) referencedunder the terms 'chemicals' and 'toxic waste' in Hansard indexes for the period August 1972 to May 1995. See text for explanation of how the item count was calculated.
18 -r16 --
14 --No of
Hansard items
per 100 working
days
12 - -
10 - -
21/12/66 12/6/72 3/12/77 26/5/83 15/11/88 8/5/94 29/10/99
APPENDIX B9
Recycling and Packaging
B9=1 Salvage of Waste during World War II
1 In 1940, a Salvage Committee was formed to oversee the collection of waste material such as paper, rags and metal as a means of supporting the war effort (SMH, 2.7.40:6). A State Controller of Salvage for National Purposes was appointed, who liaised with local government to appoint local controllers who would organise salvage drives by voluntary organisations. The returns from the sale of salvaged waste were to go the charity groups which were, at that time, were already collecting salvaged waste materials to raise money for organisations such as hospitals (SMH, 4.4.40:10, 5.7.40:8).
B9.2 Centralised Resource Recovery
1 From June 1954 to September 1957, Canterbury Municipal Council operated a composting plant at Kingsgrove that separated paper, metal, bottles and rags from municipal waste and composted the remaining organic fraction into fertiliser that it sold locally. The plant had a capacity of 300 tons per week and was designed by the Council's own engineers. Being fairly advanced for its time, it attracted considerable overseas interest. The plant was closed in1957 due to increasing wage bills, falling prices for scrap metals, the disappearance of a market for baled waste paper and the inability of the compost produced by the plant to compete with cheap inorganic fertilisers (SMH, 5.6.54:5, 20.11.57:2). A full account of the problems faced by the plant was given by the Municipal Health Surveyor,D.M. Watkins, to the First Australian Refuse Disposal Conference in 1967.
2 Municipal composting was put forward by the Member for The Hills,Mr Ruddock, in the Legislative Assembly in March 1966 as potential form of waste disposal that should be considered by an authority that he proposed be set up to investigate and report upon Sydney's waste
[Appendix B9.2]
disposal problems. Mr Ruddock provided the Legislative Assembly with extensive details on the operation of the Canterbury plant, the plant installed in Auckland in 1962, and the 15 municipal composting plants operating in the Netherlands, some of which had been operating for 35 years. However, the motion to establish the authority was not put to the vote, as debate was adjourned to make way for Government business (Legislative Assembly, 8.3.66:3918-3933).
Recycling
The production of non-returnable bottles began in Sydney in 1960 (Legislative Assembly, 18.8.70:5243).
Glass bottle collecting started in NSW in 1967 (SMH, 19.4.71:22).ACI-Australian Glass Manufacturers Co claimed it set up the first collecting point for used glass bottles in the grounds of the Royal South Sydney Hospital late in 1966 (MWDA, 1987:40).
In August 1974, the Labor member for Peats, Mr O'Connell, argued in the Legislative Assembly that the newly developed centralised resource recovery techniques in the USA should be introduced in Sydney (Legislative Assembly, 7.8.74:75). The Minister for Local Government was asked later in the same year whether he would have the MWDA introduce centralised resource recovery (Legislative Assembly, 28.11.74:3447). In September 1983, the Labor Minister for Planning and Environment was asked the same question by the Opposition, responding with the argument that had been put over several years in the MWDA's annual reports (see appendix B6.3.6) that a watching brief was being maintained and centralised resource recovery would be introduced when it was technically and economically viable (Legislative Assembly, 15.9.83:821).
In 1975, a substantial study of recycling in Australia was published by a Victorian environmentalist, Ian Pausacker (Pausacker, 1975). This had been undertaken for the Victorian Division of the Institution of Engineers (Pausacker, 1978). Pausacker's work was republished in 1978 by Penguin. The study was well ahead of its time, insofar as it identified
[Appendix B9.3]
many of the issues that were to receive attention in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
5 The increase in deposits placed on returnable soft drink bottles in the mid-1970s (see below) was claimed by Pausacker to have been strategy on the part of the soft drink manufacturers to make drinks in non- returnable bottles appear to be equivalent in price, or cheaper than those in returnable bottles, as the drinks in non-returnable bottles were more expensive to produce (5-20 per cent according to an industry submission to a 1974 House of Representatives inquiry). The non-returnable bottles were important to the beverage bottlers as a means of countering the erosion of their market share by the growth of sales of canned beverages, many lines of which were more suited to the supermarket retailing environment. The bottle collection centres set up by ACI Ltd in the late 1960s was also claimed by Pausacker to be a public relations exercise to counter opposition to non-returnable bottles (Pausacker, 1978:24-26). The importance of the threat to the bottle industry of canned beverages was evident in the establishment of Pacific Can Ltd by a major glass manufacturer in the mid-1970s (Pausacker, 1978:54).
6 Pausacker reviewed some studies of energy use with the supply of beverages in returnable and non-returnable glass bottles and concluded that, as long as the returnable bottles were refilled about eight times, considerably less energy was used than with non-returnable bottles (Pausacker, 1978:31-32). Pausacker suggested that standardisation of glass bottles would overcome many of the problems associated with a large scale comprehensive collection and refilling (Pausacker, 1978:33), however this fails to appreciate the importance of diversity of bottle type to manufacturers seeking to differentiate their product from others in a highly competitive market
7 In a paper published by the Total Environment Centre, Angel (1975:2), cited 'recycling to the greatest extent possible' as one of the 'values [which] have been developed by the environmental movement.
8 The difficulty of measuring the costs and benefits of recycling was referred to by Butlin (1976:258): 'The estimation of net social costs of recycling is very difficult and certainly much more complex than many assessments would suggest' (emphasis in original).
[Appendix B9.4]
9 In January 1975, the main bottle collecting firm ceased its services to hospitals and rubbish tips, because of the declining proportion of returnable bottles relative to non-returnable (the latter bringing$8 per ton compared to $16 per ton for the former). Other contributing factors included less people returning bottles to collect the deposit (in fact the soft drink manufacturers had raised the deposit to encourage more returns without success).
10 While drinks in non-returnable bottles were more expensive than in returnables, the sales growth was in non-returnables. This was partly due to the growth of the supermarkets' share of retail drink sales as the supermarkets said they could not afford the extra space and labour required for returnables. Also the bottle manufacturers were producing non-returnable bottles to compete with the can makers in the non- returnable container market (SMH, 13.1.75:9).
11 ACI began house to house collections of bottles in Woollahra Municipality in 1977 in conjunction with the Council.
12 However, in June 1979, the MWDA reported that bottle collections sponsored by Australian Glass Manufacturers and Glass Containers Ltd had been expanded and, at that time, served approximately 25 per cent of Sydney's population. The Authority also reported increased levels of aluminium recycling by Alcoa ('Cash-a-Can') and Comalco with its 'Buy-Back-Centre' scheme (MWDA, 1978.79:12). This expansion continued during late 1979 and early 1980, with 37 per cent of Sydney being serviced by bottle collections by mid-1980 (MWDA, 1979-80:16).
13 In August 1979, Paul Landa announced a waste disposal campaign that would ask householders to separate paper, cans and bottles from their garbage and compost vegetable matter. A MWDA report released the previous day had shown that ten percent of the5000 tonnes of waste generated every day was being recycled, and argued that the recycling rate could be raised to 75 per cent by 1990. Landa was reported as saying that he was concerned at the shortage of suitable landfill sites and the increasing number of applications for landfills in creeks and rivers. He planned to investigate garbage recycling plants overseas (SMH, 23.8.79:3). Landa was asked in the
[Appendix B9.5]
Legislative Council shortly after he announced the waste disposal campaign whether he would consider introducing centralised composting of organic wastes. He replied that he had extensive briefings on the matter from the MWDA and it appeared that such plants overseas had encountered difficulties of a technical nature and in marketing the composted waste (Legislative Council,23.8.79:531-532).
In October 1983, the Minister for Planning and Environment provided figures calculated by the MWDA on recycling to the Legislative Assembly. It was estimated that 33.5 per cent by weight of household garbage in Sydney comprised packaging of glass, steel, aluminium, paper or plastic. About 40 per cent of glass and 65 per cent of aluminium was being recycled or reused, while the amounts of paperboard, plastic and steel cans being recycled or reused was small or zero (Legislative Assembly, 19.10.83:1947).
During the early 1980s, demand for scrap metal was variable with prices fluctuating accordingly. This was partly a reflection of the recession in the early 1980s and by the mid-1980s, demand had begun to increase again. Glass and aluminium were relatively more stable (MWDA, 1984- 85:38). Demand for recycled materials recovered in 1986-87 (MWDA, 1986-87:38).
In April 1989, a Democrat member in the Legislative Council, the Hon. Richard Jones, described what would later be termed extended producer responsibility (Legislative Council, 18.4.89:6531).
In May 1989, health surveyors from the Western Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils (WSROC) developed a scheme by which a large packaging company could collect 21 000 tonnes of glass from the area each year. WSROC was lobbying the State Government to provide a $250 000 grant for the hessian collection bags needed to start the scheme. The MWDA had confirmed it would grant $37 000 toward the scheme. According to the scheme's organiser, small recycling schemes had been unsuccessful because small contractors skipped streets or refused to collect small amounts. As residents did not like their rubbish being left on their footpath, they then withdrew their participation (SMH, 12.5.89:5).
[Appendix B9.6]
18 In June 1989, it was reported that Australia had reached a recycling level of 56 per cent for metal cans. The Herald noted that the Cash for Cans program was 20 years old and suggested that recent Pat Cash commercials had captured public attention. About half of Australian Cash for Cans centres were run by service clubs (SMH, 30.6.89:5).
19 In October 1989, a marketing firm presented its findings at a seminar on local government and recycling that teenagers regarded recycling as 'nerd' type behaviour. The survey found that 73 per cent of respondents believed that local councils should be responsible for providing a recycling service. It was also reported that some people, particularly women, did not like the stockpiles of recycled materials in or outside the home that became smelly and attracted vermin. Flat dwellers complained of lack of space (SMH, 31.10.89:5).
20 A human interest story in January 1990 pointed out that much of the recycled aluminium was collected by old age and invalid pensioners of non-English speaking background. The article reported that the price for cans had recently fallen by a third, and that, at 56 per cent, Australia had the highest voluntary can recycling rate in the world (SMH, 16.1.90:3).
21 The relative low rates of recycling of most recyclables in New South Wales was the subject for an article in January 1990. The recycling rates from the quantities cited by the Herald were: paper — 35 per cent, glass — 19.7 per cent, plastic — 10 per cent and aluminium cans — 64 per cent. The introduction to the article suggested that people could expect most of the newspapers they bundled up for collection for recycling to end up in landfill. According to the director of the Waste Management Authority, the problem with paper was the lack of markets for recycled paper. While glass manufacturers reported they could use more recycled bottles, there was a problem in preventing people discarding bottles into the municipal waste stream (SMH, 24.1.90:4).
22 In April 1990, the South Australian Government announced it was considering extending refundable deposits to a much wider range of consumer goods that beverage containers (SMH, 26.4.90:4).
[Appendix B9.7]
In June 1991, a Democrat member of the Legislative Council, the Hon. R.S.L. Jones, claimed that Alcoa payed as little as $500 per tonne for aluminium cans and sold aluminium ingots made from the cans for $7000 per tonne (Legislative Council, 6.6.90:5170).
In June 1991, economics columnist Ross Gittins reviewed the Industry Commission report on recycling, generally following the standard neoclassical economics and rationalist approach that the monetary and energy costs of collection and transport needed to be set against the cost savings in production. Consequently, recycling would not always represent a monetary or environmental saving. The Industry Commission report argued that waste disposal was underpriced and the preferred solution was for councils to charge the true cost of disposal (SMH, 26.6.91:17).
In April 1992, the Herald carried an article by their local government writer that, after describing projected garbage disposal costs and assuming that 'obviously the only way to save money is to reduce the amount of rubbish by recycling', went on to list various recycling initiatives (SMH, 8.4.92:15).
In reporting on an ABS report, 'Australia's Environment: Issues and Facts', the Herald in June 1992 noted that 'Recycling is seen as one of the best ways to reduce the amount of rubbish being sent to landfills../ (SMH, 2.6.92:6).
In July 1993, the Environment Minister, Chris Hartcher, announced that the EPA would be looking at how the costs and benefits of recycling were distributed between industry and local government. His view was that local government was largely meeting the costs and that:
...the time has come for industry to accept a greater responsibility for its products.
Industry needs to internalise the net costs of recycling its products and packaging within the cost of production and the cost to consumers.
(SMH, 31.7.93:11)
Hartcher was also reported as saying that 'there was little incentive for industry to minimise the amount of products it produced'.
[Appendix B9.8]
29 In a human interest story in August 1993, the Herald reported on the financial difficulties faced by the small metal scrap dealers and Simsmetal due to the recession and the closing of factories that supplied metal waste (SMH, 21.8.93:1).
30 In August 1993, the Litter and Recycling Research Association, the lobbying organisation for the packaging industry, suggested that a policy change to require government departments to purchase goods with recycled content would help prevent the collapse of the recycling system in Sydney (SMH, 28.8.93:11).
31 In October 1993, the Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher, released the findings of an EPA trial which showed that it was possible to recover separately all of the recyclable beverage containers at major events by providing colour coded recycling bins. He suggested that organisers of major events should be required to pay of the provision of recycling bins (SMH, 8.10.93:5).
32 In as article by the executive director of the Motor Traders Association of NSW in October 1993, it was reported that Shell Oil had closed down its waste oil re-refining operations. According to the writer: '... the marketplace generally does not want to have to deal with waste oil unless it's both exceptionally clean and exceptionally cheap' (SMH, 8.10.93:45). However, in April 1995, Shell's recycling subsidiary, Trifoleum, merged with Transpacific Industries to form Tri-State Oil to form a company that would use an ICI process to transform used oils into a light fuel oil substitute for use as a start up fuel in power stations and in cement kilns (SMH, 28.4.95:42).
33 In October 1994, economics columnist, Ross Gittins, reviewed the findings of a recently released Bureau of Industry Economics survey of residents and local government in NSW, Victoria and Queensland on recycling. The suey found participation rates as high as 80 per cent for glass bottles and 70 per cent for composting garden waste. Gittins argued that recycling had become '... part of our modern-day secular religion, We accept without question that everyone ought to recycle, and everyone ought to recycle as much as possible'. The Bureau survey found that most local governments gave 'community desire' or 'environmental awareness' as the reason they offered a recycling
[Appendix B9.9]
scheme, and only three per cent gave profitability. While some plastics manufacturers were prepared to pay subsidised prices for recycled materials for public relations reasons, local government generally gave lack of markets and low prices as their main problem with their recycling schemes. Three quarters of the residents surveyed, on the other hand, said they were not prepared to pay for kerbside collection because they believed collectors and manufacturers were making money from the recyclables (SMH, 12.10.94:17).
B9.3.1 Newspaper and Paper Recycling
1 During the early 1980s, demand for waste paper was particularly• volatile, with prices fluctuating accordingly. This was partly a reflection
of the recession in the early 1980s and by the mid-1980s, demand had begun to increase again (MWDA, 1984-85:38).
2 In May 1989, an oversupply of waste paper began to emerge. According to waste collection contractors contacted by the Herald, this was due to a number of factors. Increased environmental concern and weekly collections had encouraged more people to separate newspapers from the household waste stream. The Sydney firm exporting waste paper to Jakarta where it was made into newsprint was up for sale, having fallen prey to undercutting by USA competitors with the benefit of mandatory recycling on some States. Local demand for waste paper was limited and, according to Friends of the Earth, few governments were introducing recycled paper into their stationery supplies (SMH, 27.5.89:8).
3 In June 1989, the Minister for Administrative Services, Mr Webster, announced that the NSW Government would be calling for tenders for the supply of recycled paper (SMH, 6.6.89:5).
4 In September 1989, the employees in a 44 storey office block organised a paper recycling scheme for the whole building (SMH, 7.9.89:4).
5 In February 1990, Australian Newsprint Mills (ANM) announced it was commencing a project to introduce the use of recycled paper in its newsprint production. It was expected that a recycled content of one
[Appendix B9.10]
quarter could be achieved within three years, and perhaps one half in five years. The managing director of ANM was reported as saying the company was under pressure from the newspapers and the public to introduce recycled content: 'We are coming to the conclusion that if we put a product out that's causing a problem we ought to see what we can do about that' (SMH, 13.2.90:4). In April 1990, ANM announced it would commence construction of a de-inking plant to produce pulp from recycled paper, although it would be eighteen months before the plant would be operational (SMH, 28.4.90:9). The Australian Conservation Foundation and the Friends of the Earth threatened to launch a consumer boycott of newspapers unless the industry subsidised the export of waste paper to de-inking plants in South East Asia until such a plant was working in Australia. The NSW Recyclers' Association, in a submission to the Minister for the Environment, also claimed there was a need for a government or industry subsidy to enable newsprint produced in South East Asia from Australian waste paper to compete with cheap newsprint from the United States where several States had introduced mandatory recycling. The Association secretary said that the price of waste paper had dropped from $68 to $50 per tonne (SMH, 30.4.90:4).
6 In March 1990, the Deputy Premier announced that the Government was assisting Southern Paper Converters to establish a newsprint mill using recycled paper at Smithfield (Legislative Assembly, 29.3.90:1339).
7 In response to a question on notice, the Minister for the Environment noted in May 1990 that the price of waste newspaper had fallen to $40 per tonne, a decline he attributed to the introduction of mandatory recycling in the USA (Legislative Assembly, 15.5.90:3362).
8 In early June 1990, the Friends of the Earth called for a boycott of newspaper purchases on the following Monday because the industry had not, it claimed, taken any action to re-use newsprint in newspaper production. According to the Herald, the boycott was conceived by the Maleny Waste Busters, a group 'committed to the philosophy of waste minimisation'. Responses by the industry reported by the Herald included the formation of a Publishers National Environment Bureau and the establishment of an Environmental Secretariat by News Limited (SMH, 8.6.90:4).
[Appendix B9.11]
9 The Publishers National Environment Bureau, formed in May, 1990, offered $1 000 000 to support recycling in New South Wales over the next two years. A quarter of the funds were earmarked for research into new uses for old newspapers, and funds were also used to subsidise local councils to export waste paper to Asian newsprint mills. The funds were administered by the Waste Management Authority (WMA, 1990-91:19).
10 In July 1990, the Industries Commission released an interim report into paper recycling that recommended against mandated levels of recycled fibre in paper products, arguing that governments would be better advised to direct their attention to the costs of waste disposal, the pricing and management of forests and impediments to information flow about recycled products. The Commission concluded that paper recycling rates were low because virgin paper and waste disposal charges were low. The report noted that there was wide community support for paper recycling and concern that organisations collecting waste paper from households might not remain viable with the declining prices for waste paper, which had fallen from $100 per tonne in Sydney in December 1988 to $10 per tonne in early 1990. The report concluded that the effect of increased paper recycling on Australia's forests would be minimal as most wood fibre used in paper products came from plantation forestry or was imported from Canada. The News Limited Environmental Secretariat was reported as saying the report was a 'balanced and positive document', while the Friends of the Earth described the report as 'disappointing and appeared to have swallowed the industry line' (SMH, 12.7.90:6).
11 In September 1992, the Government announced that it had signed a wood supply agreement with Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd that would enable the company to establish a paper recycling plant in Albury. Associated Pulp and Paper Mills were considering a similar plant for its Shoalhaven mill. The establishment of such plants was obviously very pleasing for the Government, given that it simultaneously boosted its environmental and development credentials:
It [the establishment of the plants] is also a vote of confidence in this Government's commitments to job growth, recycling and environmental protection.
(Legislative Assembly, 3.9.92:5473)
[Appendix B9.12]
12 In May 1993, the Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association claimed that kerbside paper collection would collapse, unless the Government gave the industry a six-month $1.2 million assistance program. Prices for mixed waste paper had fallen from $50 per tonne to $25 per tonne over the previous few months. The Opposition environmental spokesperson blamed the Government's failure to create new markets for recycled materials, claiming this could be done with some of the $16.5 million it collected each years in tipping fees. A spokesperson for the Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher, said that the Government only raised $11 million from tipping fees and $3.8 million of this was returned to local government through the kerbside recycling scheme. The spokesperson said that the EPA would be asked to consult with the waste industry on the matter (SMH, 27.5.93:1, 4).
13 The Government refused to provide assistance, with Chris Hartcher taking the line that: 'Commercial ventures are commercial ventures.The Government7s only interest... is a social interest in encouraging recycling'. The recycling director of Australian Paper Mills blamed a world wide glut for the problem and said that if the Government wanted to 'push' recycling, it should 'work out what to do with it all'.
14 Due to dumping of subsidised European and American waste paper on the Asian market, the prices continued to fall in June to $20 for a tonne of paper that the recycling manager of APM claimed cost $75 to collect. A firm sorting paper for export put off workers and refused to accept any further newspapers (SMH, 25.6.93:3). At the same time, ACI, glass manufacturers were seeking additional supplies of bottles for recycling (SMH, 29.6.93:31).
15 In July 1993, the Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association was threatening to shed staff and reduce kerbside collections as no word had been received on assistance from the State Government. According to the Herald, the EPA had helped negotiate a deal with Australian Newsprint Mills under which it would buy 25 000 tonnes of newspapers at $40 per tonne over the next 5 years to provide some stability in the market, leaving some 50 000 tonnes with no guaranteed market (SMH, 1.7.93:2). Further stability was provided by a $15 per tonne subsidy from the Publishers' National Environment Bureau to local councils
[Appendix B9.13]
exporting used newspapers. The subsidy was to operate until the Albury de-inking plant commenced operation (SMH, 6.7.93:4).
After further criticism from industry, local government and the Total Environment Centre, the State Government rejected the proposals for subsidies, but said that it would not let the paper recycling industry collapse. While the Local Government Association maintained that the State Government should introduce legislation to compel the paper industry to reduce the production of virgin paper, the Total Environment Centre framed the collapse of kerbside collection in terms of increased litter and a worsening waste crisis (SMH, 9.7.93:5).
Three days later, the price of waste paper on the international market was reported to have reached $15 per tonne and the Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association threatened to cease collections over most of Sydney. The Association claimed that a payment of $3.5 million would tide the industry over till the next calendar year when local government could increase rates: 'Recycling is an additional service to your garbage service; recycling has to be paid for by someone — it won't self fund, Mr Johns [of the Association] said'. Both the Opposition and the Association accused the State Government of not returning the funds raised by the householders' garbage levy to support recycling, which had been the justification for the levy originally (SMH, 10.7.93:1).
In late July 1993, the State Government, one day before the threatened halt to collection was to take place, announced it would pay the kerbside recycling rebate to Councils for the next six months in advance. The Government was criticised again by Charlie Johns, chairman of the Waste Contractors and Recyclers Association, for returning only $3 million of the $14.7 million per year collected in tip fees to support recycling (SMH, 22.7.93:3).
In the aftermath of the near-collapse of newspaper recycling, the Local Government Act was amended to allow councils to levy a separate and unpegged rate for garbage and recycling collection, which would give the potential for households to pay the actual costs of collection (SMH, 26.7.93:5).
[Appendix B9.14]
20 In August 1993, the Herald reported on the nearly completed ANM de- inking plant at Albury. The writer saw the plant as: '...a conservationist's dream — a virtual closed loop of production with minimal waste and maximum use of sustainable plantation wood.'. The corporate affairs manager was reported as saying that newsprint had previously been manufactured solely from the thinnings from pine plantations. After the plant came on stream, the recycled content of newsprint would rise to 50 per cent (SMH, 28.8.93:7).
21 In September 1993, it was pointed out in the Majority Report of the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management that it would be difficult for New South Wales to legislate for mandatory recycled content in paper, as this could be interpreted as being contrary to Section 92 of the Australian Constitution on free trade between the States. In addition, it was argued that mandatory recycled content might result in manufacturers moving their operations to other States (JSCWM, 1993:54).
22 In February 1994, Sydney councils obtained contracts for the supply of 49 000 tonnes of waste paper to recycling plants in Australia and Asia (SMH, 1.2.94:4).
23 By March 1995, the Herald briefly mentioned a newsprint 'crisis' with a shortage of waste paper and prices of $50 per tonne (SMH, 30.3.95:39).
24 In April 1995, the Sydney City Council announced free door-to-door paper recycling service for city offices as part of its plan to reduce the amount of commercial waste by 50 per cent over the next five years (SMH, 11.4.95:3).
[Appendix B9.15]
B9.3.2 Plastics Recycling
1 In January 1989, Smorgons announced they were starting a pilot plastic recycling program in Melbourne and would establish a plant in Sydney for converting commingled plastic waste into timber substitutes (SMH, 14.1.89:7).
2 In December 1989, it was revealed in the Legislative Council that the Minister for Environment had entered into discussions with Smorgons with a view to having a plastic recycling plant established in Sydney (Legislative Council, 8.12.89:14777).
3 In January 1990, the Minister for the Environment announced that the State Government would support a proposal from Smorgons to build a plant in Sydney. However, even with this plant, it would be unlikely that more than a third of plastic would be recycled (SMH, 24.1.90:4).
4 In June 1991, ACI Petalite opened a large plastic recycling plant at Albury. It was expected that, because of the plant, the recycling rate for plastic would be lifted to 30 per cent by 1995. A Friends of the Earth spokesperson, David Vincent, was reported as saying that the plant was a cynical public relations exercise. Vincent cited the Industry Commission report into recycling that cast doubt on the viability of plastic recycling and pointed out that '...now concerns about the environmental image of the PET bottle is forcing the industry down the economically (and environmentally) irrational path of recycling'. The collected PET would be used to create other plastic products such as wrapping film and carpet (SMH, 20.6.91:5).
5 In April 1993, ACI Petalite announced it had successfully adapted a multi-layering extrusion process that enabled recycled polyethylene teraphthalate to be extruded with a layer of virgin plastic either side, thus enabling it to be used in food and beverage containers, thus achieving a recycled content of about 30 per cent. The Australian Conservation Foundation was enthusiastic about the process, labelling it as a breakthrough of international significance and as setting a challenge for the rest of the plastics industry: 'This closes the loop and allows large quantities of soft drink bottles collected for recycling all over Australia and overseas to go back into new drink bottles' (SMH, 28.4.93:7).
[Appendix B9.16]
6 The concept of 'closing the loop' had been referred to the previous year by the Minister for the Environment, Tim Moore:
[the previous speaker] does not address one very fundamental point in the waste debate, that is, the debate about closing the loop. There is no point in simply removing more and more items from the waste steam for recycling if we, as a community, do not consume the products that are made from those wastes.
(Legislative Assembly, 19.3.92:1467)
7 In August 1993, the first PET bottles with recycled content (Coca Cola and Diet Coke) were produced (SMH, 24.8.93:2).
8 In February 1994, the Herald, in connection with a plan by the Local Government Recycling Cooperative to introduce its own plastic recycling symbol, reported that ACI Petalite and Smorgon Plastics were charging fees to firms such as Coca Cola for an 'R' symbol on their beverage containers. According to the Local Government Recycling Cooperative, this resulted in only 25 per cent of PET bottles being recycled and the remainder going into landfill because the drink manufacturers had not paid for the 'R' symbol, despite the bottles being of identical composition and equally recyclable. A Litter and Recycling Research Association spokesperson justified the charging system on the grounds of the costs of advertising and promotion (SMH, 21.2.94:7).
9 It seems it may not have taken very long for PET collection to exceed the demand of the recyclers, with the Herald reporting in March 1995, that prices were going to fall and councils were already finding that it was costing more to collect PET than what they were paid by the recyclers (SMH, 30.3.95:39).
B9.3.3 Kerbside Collection
1 Some councils such as the Rockdale Council, had already introduced residential collection of recyclables in the mid-1970s (SMH, 4.5.90:2).
2 The idea of kerbside collection was described in some detail in Pausacker's (1978:124) study of recycling in Australia.
[Appendix B9.17]
3 The idea of kerbside collection was put forward in April 1985 in the Legislative Assembly:
The Government could experiment by requesting councils to use bins, perhaps of a colour different from that used in the present service, in which local residents would be encouraged to place their recyclable materials such as paper, glass, cans and so on.
(Legislative Assembly, 11.4.85:5895)
4 In October 1987, the Lane Cove Council was trailing kerbside collection of paper and bottles (Legislative Council, 15.10.87:14575).
5 In 1988-89, the Waste Management Authority announced it was making available $250 000 in grants to encourage recycling activities. The greater part of this was to be spent on projects relating to kerbside collection, such a providing recycling bags and containers to a number of councils to trial kerbside collection (MWDA, 1988-89:21).
6 In August 1989, the Managing Director of the Waste Management Authority wrote to all councils in the Sydney region urging them to implement kerbside recycling programs (Legislative Council, 8.12.89:14775).
7 In November 1989, the Ku-Ring-Gai Council introduced the State's first mandatory recycling scheme, sponsored by the Waste Management Authority. The Council announced that it would not empty any domestic bins containing recyclable materials. The Herald reported that 34 of Sydney's 40 councils were providing some sort of collection service for recyclables, although few provided a complete service (SMH, 4.11.89:9).
8 In 1989-90, the WMA acknowledged the important role of local government to the success of kerbside collection (WMA, 1989-90:10).The amount allocated to grants to encourage recycling activities was increased to $300 000 (WMA, 1989-90:13).
9 In April 1990, Concord Council issued orange plastic crates to householders for kerbside collection of recyclables (SMH, 30.4.90:4).
[Appendix B9.18]
10 In July 1990, the Premier Nick Greiner announced that the State Government was considering introducing legislation to force local government to set up recycling schemes. According to the Herald, in what was his:
...second scathing attack in as many weeks on local government, Mr Greiner said that while councils were good at delivering services, they tended to be 'very, very conservative', as well as 'reactionary' and opposed to change, particularly in respect of equal opportunity and recycling, or 'environmental consciousness'.
(SMH, 31.7.90:5)
11 The Herald reported that the Government was soon to release a discussion paper on waste management strategy that was considering other options apart from forcing councils to implement recycling programs. These included establishing a quota for the use of recycled materials by departments and statutory authorities, charging councils that did not implement recycling programs more for waste disposal, and requiring local councils to provide a statement on their recycling performance in their annual reports. The secretary of the NSW Local Government and Shires Association was reported as saying in reply that councils were 'more than happy to collect recyclable waste' (SMH, 31.7.90:5).
12 At the Local Government Association's annual conference in 1990, the newly elected president, Peter Woods, warned that council recycling programs could collapse due to the low prices for recycled materials, unless State and Federal Governments provided incentives to manufacturers and other consumers of recycled products. Woods claimed that the State and Federal governments had forced local government to take responsibility for recycling (SMH, 25.10.90:16).
13 On 12 January 1991, the WMA introduced the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme, under which councils received a rebate of $17.50 per tonne of domestic recyclables they collected. These funds were raised by the Authority with a levy of $1.24 per tonne on council waste disposal fees ($2.00 per tonne according to the Minister for the Environment in October 1991 — Legislative Assembly, 22.10.91:2989). The NSW Government provided a guarantee that the Scheme would operate for at least five years (WMA, 1990-91:20).
[Appendix B9.19]
In May 1991, the Government announced that local government would be given further assistance with recycling programs under the new waste disposal strategy (SMH, 1.5.91:16).
From 1 January 1992, the levy was to be increased to $2.80 per tonne to provide additional funds for research into waste reduction and minimisation (Legislative Assembly, 22.10.91:2989).
In July 1994, the Herald reported on what appeared to be per capita recycling rates released by the EPA and recycling participation rates measured by the Litter and Recycling Research Association (LRRA). A spokesperson for the EPA, Tim Hoffman (manager of waste policy and programs) said that domestic recycling had achieved a fall of nine per cent in the amount of domestic waste going to landfill, but the fall in the amount of industrial and commercial waste could be attributed to the recession. New programs would be needed if the year 2000 target was to be met. The LRRA report showed that participation rates in Sydney had increased from 65 per cent in the previous year to 68.1 per cent (SMH, 13.7.94:6).
In October 1994, the Herald reported on recycling figures recently released by the EPA. These showed that the amount of recyclable products collected in Sydney had more than doubled in the last three years. However, in the same period there had been no significant decrease in the amount of domestic rubbish going to landfill, although the total had decreased due to the decrease in industrial waste which was attributed to the recession (SMH, 22.10.94:13).
In October 1995, kerbside collection came under attack from a draft report of an Industry Commission inquiry. The report claimed that 'many recycling programs did not make economic sense and were costing Australian taxpayers more than $90 million per year with "unclear benefits" to the environment', and drew attention to the possibility that some recycling schemes where recyclables were transported over long distances were probably doing more harm than good for the environment.
[Appendix B9.20]
19 The waste minimisation spokesperson for Friends of the Earth, John Denlay, was quoted as pointing out that the report would 'undermine community efforts to reduce waste'.
Over the last decade Australian councils have worked hard to establish recycling programs,
The Industry Commission is now proposing to turn back the clock to the days when the only options were for waste was to dump it in landfill.
This is the green light of industry to keep producing throw-away packaging.
Australia is already falling behind on waste reduction targets and if we adopt these recommendations things will only get worse.
(SMH, 23.10.95:2)
B9.3.4 Recycling Symbolism
1 By 1978, recycling appears to have acquired sufficient legitimacy in the Legislative Assembly, that the Opposition spokesperson on the environment, Tim Moore, did not see as pointless the putting of identical questions on notice via the relevant Minister to 17 different Government Departments as to what arrangements they had in place for the recycling of waste and whether suitable arrangements would be implemented if they were lacking (Legislative Assembly, 13.12.78:1934 to 19.2.80:4423)
2 The astronaut metaphor that had been important in symbolising the fragility of ecosystems in the late 1960s, was transferred to recycling in 1980, as one politician described in the debate over amendments to the Waste Disposal Act 1970.
The astronauts completely recycled all they took with them into space. ...The community should be made aware of the need to recycle as much waste material as possible.
(Legislative Assembly, 27.2.80:4858)
3 There is some evidence that by early 1989, politicians were becoming aware of the symbolic nature of recycling. The Labor spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, noted during the debate on the Waste Disposal (Amendment) Bill that:
[Appendix B9.21]
Honourable members will hear increasing statements from the Government about the need to recycle because, after all, recycling is a safe issue. It is not controversial like the subject of ocean outfalls. No one will knock recycling.
(Legislative Assembly, 4.4.89:5796)
4 The environmental symbolism of recycling was affirmed by the Minister for Administrative Services in May 1990:
Recycling is a program to which every member of the community can make areal and substantial contribution in order to conserve the natural resources of the environment. It gives every person, every business, every public authority and all governments the opportunity to demonstrate that their support for the protection of our planet goes beyond the emotional level.
(Legislative Assembly, 3.5.90:2379)
5 The replicated questioning approach was employed by the Democrat member, the Hon. Richard Jones, in the Legislative Council in 1989 (Legislative Council, 14.11.89:12218 to 8.12.89:14767). In addition to Government Departments, other domains of paper use were exposed to the recycling test, such as the Higher School Certificate Papers (Legislative Council, 14.11.90:9628-9629). With the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill before the House, the Opposition pursued the replicated questions strategy with respect to how each Government Department would achieve a 60 per cent reduction in waste (Legislative Assembly, 15.12.95:5483, 5493,5497-5499, 5502-5504).
6 In March 1990, the Deputy Premier referred to the environmentalbenefits of a proposed newsprint recycling mill terms of the number of trees saved: 'we could save 1.5 million trees a year, based on the figure of six eucalypt trees for every tonne of paper' (Legislative Assembly, 29.3.90:1340).
7 In November 1990, Telecom announced it would trial the recycling of phone directories, which according the to Australian Conservation Foundation used the equivalent of 1 020 000 trees per year (SMH, 10.11.90:11).
[Appendix B9.22]
8 In September 1993, the Minister for the Environment, Chris Hartcher,referred to the 35 per cent of households not participating in the Council Recycling Rebate Scheme as being "still not involved in saving our resource and protecting our environment" (Legislative Assembly, 9.9.93:2978).
9 Perhaps the question that took this to the minutest detail was that of the Labor spokesperson on the environment, Pam Allan, who asked about the use of recycled materials in TAB tickets. The reply from the Minister of Administrative Services included information on the recycled content of Instant Lottery tickets:
However, I am advised that a number of measures have been taken toimprove the overall environment friendliness of Instant Lottery ticketsincluding:• All base board that is used has a component of recycled material.• Only harvested forests, and not virgin forests, are used in the
manufacture of base boards.• Water based primer is used on the foil for ink adhesion instead of
environmentally unfriendly resins and hardeners.• Water based inks are used for printing instead of environmentally
unfriendly solvent of oil based inks.(Legislative Assembly,
16.9.93:3487)
10 In September 1993, the chairperson of the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management noted in her forward to the Committee's report that: "However, the adoption by the public of recycling is the educational success story of the 90s and to speak against it is virtually sacrilege' (JSCWM, 1993:vii).
B9.4 Packaging Levies and Container Deposits
1 In December 1972, after a Herald report revealed that steel cans gathered for recycling were being dumped, the Minister for Environment Control announced that unless the packaging industry could develop a program to reduce the impact of product packaging waste he would introduce a levy on packaging materials. Three representatives of the Packaging Industry Environment Council had been meeting with the Department of Environment Control to discuss the proposal. According to the Herald, the industry was under the impression that the Government was not 'wedded to the specific levy proposal', but it would be put into
[Appendix B9.23]
effect by the middle of 1973 unless a more 'workable' scheme was proposed. The Leader of the Opposition claimed the levy was constitutionally invalid (SMH, 4.12.72:3). The Local Government Association supported the proposal and urged the Government to put a higher tax on non-returnable bottles (SMH, 16.12.72:9). The Herald also supported the proposal in an editorial in late December, claiming that little impact had been made on the litter problem, due to the council reluctance to issue fines. This was partly due to the costs, far in excess of the$5 fine, of pursuing unpaid fines (SMH, 28.12.72:6).
In March 1974, the Hon. Paul Landa claimed in the Legislative Council that the packaging and beverage industries had mounted an intensive campaign against container deposit legislation, following the introduction of such legislation into the South Australian Parliament the previous day (Legislative Council, 14.3.74:1426).
In June 1977, Cadbury-Schweppes, Coca-Cola and Shelleys increased their bottle deposits to 20c in an attempt (according to the Herald — but see Pausacker's explanation above) to increase the return of empty bottles, a measure that had proven successful in South Australia twelve months previously (SMH, 21.6.77:3).
In December 1982, a report by the Australian Consumers Association showed that the return rate for bottles and cans in South Australia was more than 80 per cent, compared to 46 per cent nationally. Can and bottle waste made up only four per cent of litter in South Australia, compared to 34 per cent in Western Australia. The report also said that container deposit legislation was totally opposed by the beverage and packaging industry on the grounds that it increased costs and inconvenienced consumers. However, a study in 1980 by the South Australian Department of Environment and Planning had found that soft drinks were cheaper after refund that in any other State (SMH, 6.12.82:12).
Further calls were made in the Legislative Assembly in November 1983 for the introduction of container deposit legislation. The member for Waverly, Mr Page, rejected the view, alleged to be being promoted by the industry funded Litter Research Association, that the consumer
[Appendix B9.24]
rather than industry was responsible for the disposal or recycling of packaging. Page pointed out some of the confounding factors that made it difficult to say whether the South Australian container deposit legislation had affected beverage sales or not, due to changes in consumption patterns and the introduction of excise duty on beer by the Federal Government at that time. Page called for container deposit legislation and the banning of liquidpaperboard and ring pull cans (Legislative Assembly, 10.11.83:2965-2967).
6 In March 1986, it was suggested that taxes on packaging should be introduced to defray some of the public cost of waste disposal (Legislative Assembly, 12.3.86:869).
7 In August 1989, in reply to a question on notice from a Government member to the Minister for the Environment about the problem of broken glass and the possibility of introducing container deposit legislation, the Government stated that it preferred to 'fully explore the potential of voluntary methods of waste reduction and recycling and on public education'. It referred to the report of the NSW Recycling Committee which recommended the promotion of kerbside collection (see appendix B6.7.9:2), arguing that this was preferable to container deposit legislation because it was applicable to a greater number of components of the waste stream. The reply to the question on notice did, however, allude to the possibility of container deposit legislation, not so much as a solution to littering, but as a means of increasing the level of recycling, if recycling levels were not satisfactory (Legislative Assembly, 2.8.89:9293).
8 In May 1990, a Labor member of the Opposition in the Legislative Council, the Hon. I.M. Macdonald, argued that the absence of container deposit legislation in New South Wales was evidence of the Government's lack of commitment to recycling. Macdonald also accused the Government of being 'under the sway of the beverage industry lobby group, such as the so-called Litter Research Association, from which honourable members receive numerous copies of literature virtually on a daily basis' (Legislative Council, 1.5.1990:1945-1946).
9 In August 1990, the Australian Democrat MLC, Richard Jones, asked whether the Government would negotiate with the Federal government
[Appendix B9.25]
and other State Governments to introduce a tax on new paper and non- recyclable containers. The Government responded that this was one of the options that would be considered in the development of the National Waste Minimisation and Recycling Strategy (see appendix B7.7.7:8) (Legislative Council, 22.8.90:6197).
In October 1990, Australian Democrat MLC, the Hon. Elisabeth Kirkby, claimed that over 500 bills placing taxes on packaging had been introduced in the USA in the previous 12 months, including bans on plastic packaging, and asked whether the Government would consider a tax on packaging in New South Wales (Legislative Council, 17.10.90:8517).
In March 1991, the Australian Democrat MLC, Richard Jones gave notice of a private member's bill to introduce a deposit system on beverage containers. The Minister for the Environment praised South Australia's bottle deposit legislation, which had been in place for 15 years. Jones claimed that legislation had been prevented in NSW by pressure from the heavily funded industry lobby groups. The executive director of the Australian Soft Drink Association, Tony Gentile, argued that legislation would be 'inefficient, counter-productive and discriminatory' as well as threatening kerbside recycling by removing soft drink bottles which were the most valuable component. He also argued that bottles and cans represented a 'minute' fraction of the solid waste stream (SMH, 13.3.91:9).
The emblematic nature of container deposit legislation was shown in the Democrat MLC, Richard Jones' logical leap from landfill shortage to container deposit legislation:
Now that the Lucas Heights megatip proposal has been cancelled, where will the mountain of waste be tipped? Will it be shipped to the proposed megatip in Wingecarribee shire in the electorate of the Premier, and Treasurer, or will the Government develop a program to speed up the recycling of all waste materials? Will the Government finally grasp the nettle and introduce desperately needed container deposit legislation?
(Legislative Council, 24.9.92:6409)
In September 1992, the Government member for North Shore in the Assembly, Mr Smiles, requested that the forthcoming Green Paper on waste policy include a consideration of container deposit legislation. In
[Appendix B9.26]
making this request, Smiles appears to have expanded even further the class of environmental problems for which container deposit legislation was seen as a solution.
Tonight I call upon the Minister for the Environment and the Government to include in that green paper consideration of compulsory deposit legislation for containers. I do so because 1 believe that the community at large must find a solution to the massive waste problem.
(Legislative Assembly, 3.9.92:5512)
14 Smiles also noted that the container deposit legislation issue become a divisive issue, with the conservation movement in favour and the beverage industry against it. He noted that substantially higher recycling rates had been achieved in South Australia, compared to New South Wales; and that the marketing manager for Coca Cola in South Australia had stated that reusing bottles had been 'a healthy economic proposition' (Legislative Assembly, 3.9.92:5513).
15 The Government's Waste Management Green Paper, released in September 1992 contained a list of arguments for and against container deposit legislation, with a much greater number of arguments against being presented, compared to the arguments for. The latter were restricted to the claims that, with a deposit, people would be more likely to return containers for recycling and there would be an incentive for people to collect discarded containers, thereby reducing litter. The arguments against included:
• high cost to retailers because of the storage space needed,
• beverage manufacturers would have to develop costly and inefficient accounting systems to reimburse retailers for the deposits refunded to customers,
• removing beverage containers from the kerbside collection stream of recyclables would threaten the viability of kerbside collection,
• kerbside collection could achieve return rates equally as high as those achieved with container deposit systems,
[Appendix B9.27]
• container deposit legislation provides no incentive to use kerbside collection schemes, so there is 'no overall change in behaviour away from the ethos of the throwaway society', and
• consumer education can reduce litter rates equally effectively as container deposit legislation (Hartcher, 1992:31).
In December 1992, the Friends of the Earth made a submission to the Joint Select Committee upon Waste Management (which had been set up to consider the Green Paper), that made a strong case for the introduction of container deposit legislation in New South Wales. The Herald reported on the submission's claims that container deposit legislation could create 3000 jobs, result in 97 per cent of beverage containers being re-used, reduce beverage container litter by 70-90 per cent and reduce overall litter by 50 per cent. According to USA studies, drinks in refillable containers would be up to 40 per cent cheaper. The author of the submission, Peter Hopper, accused the Government of washing its hands of the waste crisis, arguing that the focus should be waste reduction and the only way to obtain this was to make those responsible for creating the waste responsible for disposal (SMH, 21.12.92:5).
The Friends of the Earth submission has had a relatively long shelf life. It was referred to again in a waste management feature in the Herald in March 1995 (SMH, 30.3.95:39) and was placed on a website in 1998 (Hopper, 1998).
In May 1993, the Nature Conservation Council was reported as saying that the local and State government and industry focus on kerbside recycling was avoiding the 'real' issue of introducing legislation to reduce waste. Their project officer, Peter Hopper, stated that the Council was pushing for the introduction of container deposit legislation similar to South Australia's, where a return rate of 85-97 per cent had been achieved. He argued that container deposit legislation 'would encourage community involvement and put the responsibility back on industry', and pointed out that the community could not buy beverages in anything but non-refillable containers (SMH, 31.5.93:19).
[Appendix B9.28]
19 In their submissions to the Joint Select Committee on Waste Management in 1993, the beverage and packaging industries dted Keep Australia Beautiful litter count data to show that litter rates in South Australia, which had container deposit legislation, were no lower than any other State apart from New South Wales (JSCWM, 1993:44-46).
20 The Committee Majority Report recommended that container deposit legislation should not be introduced (Recommendation 37).
21 Between 1990 and 1995, a number of petitions asking that container deposit legislation be introduced were received by the New South Wales Parliament (Legislative Assembly, 17.10.90:8595; 20.11.90:9951; 21.2.91:67; 2.3.94:20; 15.11.95:3231).
B9.5 The Packaging industry and Recycling
1 In August 1971 Australia's steel makers and steel can makers established the Steel Can Plan for Conservation of Environment and Resources to recycle steel cans. Involved were BHP, United Packages, Containers Ltd, J. Gadsen Australia Ltd and National Can Co Pty Ltd (SMH, 18.9.72:21).
2 NSW was the only Australian State where the Keep Australia Beautiful Council (KABC) did not operate in the early 1970s. The Council was funded by the packaging industry to promote the view that people rather than packaging was the cause of the litter problem and that container deposit legislation would not fix the problem. The KABC had approached the National Trust in NSW in 1970 but had been rejected. In September 1971, the KABC approached the Department of Environment to get support for its anti-litter campaign (SMH, 22.9.71).
3 In September 1972 the chairman of the national waste management committee of the Plastics Institute of Australia reported that not one of the 52 municipal engineers they surveyed had mentioned disposal problems with plastics. Plastic was not a technical problem, it was in people's minds. Plastics represented between two and three percent of municipal wastes by weight. Development of biodegradable plastics would be 'socially irresponsible' because it would put people at risk
[Appendix B9.29]
when ageing plastic containers released their contents in people's houses (SMH, 13.9.72:2). Pausacker, reporting on the same survey in 1978, recorded that twelve municipalities had mentioned problems with plastic not degrading in landfills, and five municipalities mentioned compaction problems with plastic in waste (Pausacker, 1978:38).
The Packaging Industry Environment Council was established in 1972 (Pausacker, 1978:146). In September 1972 the Executive Director of the Packaging Industry Environment Council was arguing in the Herald's Earth Week feature that solid waste management should not be the responsibility of local government, but of state governments, because only they could finance the creation of markets to close the recycling loop. The technology was already available to do this (SMH, 18.9.72:21).
In 1975, Butlin reported that he had been informed by officers of the Metropolitan Waste Disposal Authority of the reluctance of industry to be involved in large scale centralised resource recovery. The reason for this, according to Butlin, was that many industries involved in the manufacture of packaging were vertically integrated, so that the replacement of virgin materials with recovered materials could amount to the closure of one or more subsidiary companies (Butlin, 1976:266).
Pausacker's study of recycling in Australia uncovered some of the deceptive behaviour being engaged in by some major packaging manufacturers. For example, Pausacker claimed that Australian Paper Manufacturers were paying charities $1 per tonne of collected waste paper to use the charities' name in what was called the Taper and Cardboard Appeal'. The reason for this was that people were more likely to go to the trouble of separating waste paper if they believed it was being done for a charity (Pausacker, 1978:9). Pausacker also claimed that his research and charges made by former employees of the Steel Can People showed that the Steel Can Plan was a 'very carefully engineered marketing and public relations exercise'. Pausacker argued that the Australian packaging industry was following the same strategies as the industry in the USA. The first was to shift responsibility to local government by arguing that collection of cans for recycling could only be economic at the municipal level. The second strategy was to use anti-litter organisations such as Keep Australia
[Appendix B9.30]
Beautiful to represent the litter problem as being due to people rather than the packaging itself (Pausacker, 1978:46-47).
7 Pausacker published direct quotes from boardroom discussions at BHP at the time of the Steel Can Plan, one of which is fairly revealing of how the pressure for recycling was being seen from within industry:
We see recycling as only a phase. We have to resolve whether the recycling centres will be a millstorie around our necks. We are being cast in the role of villains. It might be better to accept a nationally imposed tax.
(Pausacker, 1978)
8 It appears from an interview by the Herald with Lady Galleghan in 1984, that the Keep Australia Beautiful Council of NSW was formed in 1975 and eventually got the support of the State Government. 'We started of work with $5000 a year from the Government... The late Paul Landa, as Minister for Planning and Environment lit the torch of environmental programs and supported us' (SMH, 1.2.84:3).
9 In November 1976, Landa announced he would make a three week of tour of the USA with a view to assessing the merits of American approaches to recycling packaging and then consulting with industry, unions and local government before putting proposals to Cabinet (SMH, 19.11.76:2).
10 In 1978, Pausacker noted in his study of recycling in Australia that the plastics industry had responded to growing public concerns about its product with 'an aggressiveness equalled by no other industry encountered in by research for this book' (Pausacker, 1978:42). He also claimed that the Packaging Industry Environment Council was actively promoting centralised resource recovery as a solution to waste problems (Pausacker, 1978:147).
11 Pausacker also mounted a strong attack against the Keep Australia Beautiful Council, pointing out that most of its funding was supplied from industry sources. Pausacker claimed that:
Keep Australia Beautiful councils are promoting the idea that if we put and aluminium can, piece of paper or glass bottle into a litter-bag or bin, we have 'done our bit to help the environment'. People's consciences are relieved and their attention diverted away from where the disposable item came from and where it's heading, from the long, complex chain of mining,
[Appendix B9.31]
refilling, manufacture, sale and disposal or recycling (as discussed in this book) and on the one small link in this chain — the placing of the item into a disposal system.
(Pausacker, 1978:148-149)
Pausacker suggested that this focus on the one aspect — personal packaging disposal behaviour — led the Council into ludicrous acts, such as when it placed plastic litter bags under the windscreen wipers of cars outside a Joan Baez concert in Melbourne, the result being that further litter and wastage was created (Pausacker, 1978:148). Pausacker also drew attention to the withdrawal of membership in the Keep America Beautiful Council of the US EPA and a number of environmental groups because it was felt that the focus on litter and people's behaviour was distracting attention from source reduction and undermining the efforts of local government to introduce container deposit legislation (Pausacker, 1978:150).
In August 1990, the packaging industry formed the Packaging Environment Foundation. At a conference in Canberra, the industry announced it was introducing a national voluntary code that would identify the different types plastics used in containers. According to the executive director of the Plastics Industry Association, Susan Ryan, the code would help overcome the confusion among consumers as to which containers could be recycled, thus raising the plastics recycling rate from its then one per cent. The industry would also work towards households having several small bins, some of which would take recyclable containers, instead of one large bin (SMH, 16.8.90:3).
In 1990, the Glass Packaging Institute and the Litter Research Association formed Recycle Sydney, an organisation to carry out surveys of local government recycling (SMH, 12.3.91:2).
In June 1991, the logo introduced by the plastic industry to identify plastic types was attacked by Friends of the Earth for using a 'chasing arrows' symbol, representing recycling, when less that one per cent of plastics were recycled in Australia. Friends of the Earth argued that the use of the logo was misleading and made a complaint to the Trade Practices Commission. A spokesperson for the Plastics Institute said that there was no intention to mislead (SMH, 5.6.91:4).
[Appendix B9.32]
16 The plastic industry's logo for identifying plastic types came under criticism again in February 1994 from the secretary of the Local Government Recycling Cooperative (a body formed by councils to centralise the marketing of collected recyclables) who claimed it was causing massive confusion among consumers. This view was corroborated by the general manager of the Litter and Recycling Research Association who said that the Association had strongly argued to the Plastic Industry Association that the logo was causing confusion. However, a spokesperson for the Plastic Industry Association said that the Association was waiting for the completion of a review of the issue being undertaken by the industry group in USA which developed the symbols (SMH, 21.2.94:7).
17 In June 1994, the chief executive of the Packaging Industry Council, Gavin Williams, claimed that the burden of recycling was falling unfairly on industry and called on the Federal Government to review its policies on recycling. The concept of unfairness related to Australian industry being required to contribute to the costs of recycling while its overseas competitors did not, and to receiving the blame for litter that came from imported products. Williams, referring to a forthcoming issues paper from the Council, was reported as saying that there should be wider use of incineration to recover the energy content of packaging. Recycling should be seen as only one of a number of options, such as reducing package weights, and not as something that 'has achieved almost a religious stature in this country'. In addition, Williams argued that packaging made up only 10 per cent of total urban waste (SMH, 14.6.94:8).
18 There is some evidence that the packaging industry engaged in lobbying activities in the period preceding the introduction of the Waste Minimisation and Management Bill in November 1995. For example, the Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association took members of Parliament around a number of facilities at this time. One item of information provided by the Association that made an impression on at least one member was the claim that 70 per cent of plastics were manufactured for packaging foodstuffs and that Federal legislation did not permit the use of recycled plastics in contact with foodstuffs (Legislative Assembly, 6.12.95:4230).