The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement in the post-Cold War era

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The Turkish‐Israelirapprochement in thepost‐Cold War eraMeliha AltunisikPublished online: 06 Dec 2006.

To cite this article: Meliha Altunisik (2000) The Turkish‐Israeli rapprochementin the post‐Cold War era, Middle Eastern Studies, 36:2, 172-191, DOI:10.1080/00263200008701313

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The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in thePost-Cold War Era

MELIHA ALTUNISIK

Turkey's relations with the Middle East have entered into a new era in thepost-Cold War period. This era has been characterized by the increasinginvolvement of Turkey in Middle East politics. The nature of thisinvolvement, however, has changed over time in response to domestic andregional developments as interpreted by the Turkish political and militaryelite. The newest and at the same time the most controversial aspect ofTurkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War Middle East has beenconstantly developing Turkish-Israeli relations. In a relatively short periodof time economic relations flourished between the two countries andculminated in the signing of a free trade agreement in 1996. Cultural andeducational links accelerated at an unprecedented degree. Furthermore, andthe most controversial of all, the two countries increased security co-operation within the framework of two agreements that were signed in1996. This increasingly deep and open relationship between the twocountries disturbed some of their neighbours in the region.1 It has beenargued that growing ties between these two countries were steadilychanging the regional balance of power. The discussion that follows treatsTurkey's rapprochement with Israel in the post-Cold War era from theperspective of Ankara's policy. In the first part the reasons for increasingties between Turkey and Israel in the 1990s will be discussed. In the secondpart, different aspects of the relationship between Turkey and Israel will behighlighted. Finally, there will be a discussion of the future prospects andlimitations of the relations between the two countries.

Turkish-Israeli relations in the post-Cold War era can be divided intotwo periods. The first period corresponds to the immediate aftermath of theGulf crisis and lasts till the mid-1990s. During this period there wasconsiderable improvement in relations between the two countries and yetTurkey was initially reluctant to emphasize political and security co-operation with Israel, at least openly. Therefore, Turkish decision-makerspreferred to focus more on fostering economic, technical and cultural ties.However, later, once the post-Cold War environment in the Middle East

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, April 2000, pp. 172-191PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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TURKISH-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 173

began to take shape and once the Turkish political and military elitereinterpreted this new environment, security aspect of this co-operationbecame dominant for Ankara. This second period started in the mid-1990sand is still continuing today. In the first period changes in the internationalsystem and the regional subsystem played the major role, whereas in thesecond period, from Turkey's perspective, Turkey's internal security andpolitical considerations have been playing the primary role in determiningTurkey's relations with Israel.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War increased theconcerns of the Turkish political elite that Turkey's strategic importance forthe West would decline in the post-Cold War era.2 As far as the Middle Eastregion is concerned, the outbreak of the Gulf crisis provided an opportunityfor Turkey to overcome these concerns. Although Turkish troops did notengage the Iraqi military, Turkey sided with the US at the inception of thecrisis. Especially the decisions of president Turgut Ozal and the governmentto allow the United States to use its bases in Turkey, to deploy over 100,000troops along the Iraqi border and to effectively close the Iraqi pipeline to theMediterranean (through which Iraq exported 54 per cent of its oil)contributed significantly to the US-led coalition's war efforts. Thesepolicies provoked domestic criticisms in Turkey. It was argued thatpresident Ozal was changing Turkey's traditional policy in the region andpulling Turkey into a dangerous adventure. Responding to such criticisms,however, Ozal claimed that at the end Turkey had a lot to gain from itsinvolvement in the US-led coalition. For him the Gulf War signalled abeginning of a new era in the Middle East and Turkey had to be on thewinning side in order to influence post-war developments in the region.Whatever the reasons of Ozal's decision, Turkey's involvement in the GulfWar in such a way seemed to signal a more active Turkish involvement inMiddle East affairs. Later the Arab-Israeli Peace Process that started afterthe Gulf War further increased the possibility of a new and active Turkishrole in the Middle East by relieving Turkey from the burden of trying tostrike a balance between the two sides. The aura of co-operation thatemerged in the region after the initiation of the Peace Process created hopeson the part of Turkey that there could be new opportunities in involvingregional co-operative schemes in political, economic and security fields.

It is within this context that came the establishment of closer ties withIsrael. There were several specific reasons for this considerableimprovement in relations between the two countries. First of all, concernedwith their place in the 'new world order' both countries wanted to increasetheir strategic values in the post-Cold War era. The United States, which

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174 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

was trying to create a 'new Middle Eastern order', welcomed and supportedthis rapprochement between its two allies. Second, from Turkey'sperspective, as mentioned above, the initiation of an Arab-Israeli PeaceProcess removed complications due to Turkish policy of uneasy balancingbetween the Arab countries and Israel especially since the 1960s. After all,even at the height of its pro-Arab policy and despite the pressures comingfrom the Arab governments, Ankara had never considered to completelybreak its relations with Israel. Turkey, as a NATO member and an ally of theUnited States, always seemed to look upon Israel favourably. Thisviewpoint was much more prevalent among the political elite. Turkey alsowanted to enlist the help of the Jewish lobby in Washington. Moreover,starting in the mid-1980s the relations between the two countries wereimproving anyway. A clear sign of this was seen in the diplomatic sphere,since from 1985 onwards higher ranking diplomats had been assigned byboth sides despite the fact that formally diplomatic relations remained at thelevel of charge d'affaires. Thus, in practice diplomatic ties between the twocountries got back to the level it was before 1980. Parallel to this, there wereeven signs of increased political links. During that period there were evenrumours that Israel provided Turkey with some intelligence information.Finally, commercial ties and tourism also started to improve between thetwo countries during the same period. Ozal in January 1986 argued thathaving relations with Israel, in addition to Turkey's relations with the Arabcountries, was a practical necessity for Turkey to play a role in solving theproblems of the Middle East.3 The initiation of the Arab-Israeli PeaceProcess in 1991 removed the last barrier towards a betterment of theserelations. More importantly the peace process made such relationsacceptable and thus public. In fact, most of the Arab states were'normalising' their relations with Israel at that time. It could have beenunimaginable that Turkey would not do the same.

The final reason for Turkey's open rapprochement with Israel wasAnkara's disappointment with the results of its pro-Arab policy. Thisdisappointment was started to be voiced privately by policy-makers andopenly by many journalists and academics.4 One of the reasons for a pro-Arab tilt in Turkish foreign policy starting in mid-1960s was an expectationof support from the Arab states for Ankara's foreign policy problems,primarily the Cyprus dispute.5 Yet, such a support on that issue or any otherhad not been forthcoming. At the end, what was left from the pro-Arabpolicy of the mid-1960s to 1980s was improved economic ties betweenTurkey and the Arab world. However, on close scrutiny one could easily seethat the economic relations between the two sides were dependent onspecial circumstances. In the 1970s it was the emergence of a region-wideoil economy that facilitated increasing commercial ties.6 In fact, with the

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influx of large amounts of oil revenue, oil producing states becameimportant trade partners for Turkey. Furthermore, the construction boomthat was taking place in the region provided Turkish contractors anopportunity to get an international experience in this field.7 Despite theflourishing economic ties during this period, Turkey's economic relationswith the Middle East remained limited to the oil-producing states of theregion. In the 1980s, on the other hand, it was the eight-year Iran-Iraq warthat gave the impetus to the boom in Turkey's trade relations with theMiddle East. However, declining oil revenues starting in the mid-1980sdecreased the attractiveness of the area for Turkish businesses. Thepercentage of Turkey's exports to the Middle East dropped from 27 per centin 1987 to 14 per cent in 1993. Imports, on the other hand, decreased from19 per cent to 11 per cent in the same period. Of course, as a result ofTurkey's dependence on oil imports, some countries in the Middle Eastcontinued to be important trade partners, yet even there the Turkishgovernment increased its efforts to diversify imports. Furthermore, theKurdish problem and the water issue had already strained Turkey's relationswith its Middle Eastern neighbours in the 1980s. The differences over theuse of the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers started to causeproblems in Ankara's relations with both Damascus and Baghdad.8 Inaddition to the water issue, Syria's decision to give sanctuary to AbdullahOcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), after 12September 1980 coup in Turkey created tension in the relations between thetwo countries.9 This was despite the fact that Syria and Turkey together withIran and Iraq continued to co-operate on the Kurdish issue due to theircommon interests, that is, to prevent an establishment of a Kurdish state.Within this framework Syria and Turkey even signed a security protocol in1987 during a visit to Damascus by the then prime minister Turgut Ozal.However, the protocol was not really successful in solving the problembetween the two countries and Damascus continued to deny that the PKKleader was residing in Syria.10

Under these circumstances it seems that from the perspective of theTurkish political elite there was no reason for not developing bilateralrelations between Turkey and Israel. The first apparent manifestation ofimproving relations came in December 1991, when Turkey upgraded itsdiplomatic relations with Israel, and as well as with the PLO, toambassadorial level. This was followed by exceptionally frequent high-level visits between the two countries. Initially, especially economicrelations took off. The volume of trade increased 156 per cent between 1992and 1994. (See Table 1.) In 1994 the volume of trade was in Turkey's favourwith a 36 million dollar surplus. During this period the number of Israelitourists visiting Turkey increased considerably. (See Table 2.) Negotiations

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for the signing of agreements on the prevention of double taxation,encouraging investment and a free trade agreement, which eventually wassigned in 1996, started. Parallel to increased economic co-operation,cultural and educational relations flourished as well.

However, despite the occasional mention of political and security co-operation, especially the Turkish side was reluctant to talk about this, atleast openly. Asked about the rumours of strategic co-operation and political

TABLE 1

TURKISH-ISRAELI BILATERAL TRADE ($ 1,000)

Year

198919901991199219931994199519961997

Export

30.79946.50578.66990.08980.238178.079239.769254.569391.457

Import

60.56762.51678.04797.075121.794125.890166.635192.038229.282

Balance

-29.768-16.011622-6.986-41.55652.18973.13461.928162.175

Volume

91.366109.021156.716187.164202.032303.969406.404446.004620.739

Source: Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, Ankara.

TABLE 2

THE NUMBER OF ISRAELI TOURISTS VISITING TURKEY (in thousands)

1995

301.074

1996

254.445

Change (%)1997

263.423

1996/95

-15,49

1997/96

3,53

consultation between the two countries in 1992, Turkish military anddiplomatic sources were denying the existence of such relations. In October1992 the general secretariat's office at the joint chiefs of staff declared thatTurkish-Israeli relations did not involve anything of a military nature. Thedeclaration further stated that 'In the light of the realities of the Middle East,Turkey, which is an Islamic and secular country, is careful to balance itsrelations with Israel and the Arab world."1 Another example of Turkishgovernment's attempt to balance its policy between Israel and thePalestinians was the cancellation of Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin'svisit to Israel in July 1993 when Israel mounted attacks on southernLebanon.12 Therefore, still in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf crisis, it

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seemed as from the desires of active involvement in Middle Eastern affairsduring Ozal period, Turkey fell back to its earlier position of balancing andcaution in its foreign policy.

Furthermore, during those days the Turkish government was trying tomend fences especially with Syria with which it had major problems. Infact, as a result of such efforts there was an improvement in Turkish-Syrianrelations in the early 1990s. There were several high level visits by theTurkish officials to Syria during which they secured commitments fromDamascus to ease Turkey's security concerns. Furthermore, starting inNovember 1992, on Turkey's initiative, the two countries together with Iran,began to hold regular tripartite meetings to discuss major regional issues,mainly the situation in Iraq. The immediate reason for these meetings wasthe holding of elections for a Kurdish national assembly in May 1992 whichwas perceived by these countries as an important step towards statehood.Syria and Turkey again called for the reestablishment of the territorialintegrity of Iraq. When in January 1993 US war planes fired on Iraqiinstallations both countries' leaderships were critical. Turkey's primeminister Demirel flew to Damascus to discuss the developments with Syrianpresident Asad. After the meeting Demirel said that 'We are against anyevent that might harm civilian population in Iraq."3 Trilateral meetings alsoprovided for Turkey and Syria to weed out their bilateral problems. Forinstance before one of those trilateral meetings to be held in Istanbul,Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers met for one-hour-long bilateral talks.After the meeting Syrian foreign minister Tariq al-Shara announced that hewas satisfied with the talks. Hikmet Cetin, Turkish foreign minister, saidthat the two sides we agreed 'to do our best to further improve Turkish-Syrian relations in all areas'.14 Just in those days Turkish newspapersdeclared that Syria arrested 400 PKK militia.15 Even the Israeli presidentWeizmann during his visit to Turkey in January 1994 said that Israel neededto develop better relations with Syria and asked Turkey to play the role ofan intermediary.16

In November 1994 prime minister (filler visited Israel. During her staythere she also visited the Orient House, unofficial Palestinian foreignministry, and met with a Palestinian delegation headed by Faisal al-Husayni.This visit angered some people in Israel and created a mini crisis.17

Officially though the response of the Israeli government was limited. Peresonly said that they regretted the event and yet preferred to focus on thepositive aspects of this first visit by a Turkish prime minister to Israel.18 Infact, despite this mini-crisis and the appearance of the continuation of olderbalancing policy, at a deeper level CiH^'s visit was a first sign of thechanging nature of relations between the two countries. During this visitseveral agreements were signed. The most interesting among them was an

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agreement that would allow the Israeli aviation industry to modernizeTurkish Phantom jets. This was the beginning of a series of military dealsthat were going to be discussed between the two countries. Moreover, theTurkish side also made it clear that they were also eager to develop closeties as regards to 'fighting against terrorism'. In fact, in general one couldargue that prime minister (filler played some role in facilitating security co-operation with Israel. Especially her more hawkish attitude towards thePKK and closer ties to the US seemed to have contributed to her eagernessto develop closer ties in security matters with Israel.19

In late 1994 Turkey's approach to its relations with Israel started tochange. Ankara became less and less reluctant in terms of increasing itsstrategic and political ties with Israel. The reasons of this change were bothexternal and internal. By late 1994 it had become obvious to many inTurkey that most of the euphoria in the post-Gulf War Middle East wasunfounded. On the contrary, when the dust settled Turkish policy makersrealized that the new developments in the Middle East were increasinglyposing problems for Turkey. Accordingly a redefinition of Turkey's nationalinterest was made. As a result of this redefinition Turkish policy appearedto rest on the conviction that in the post-Cold War era, Turkey was facedwith a widespread threat to its territorial integrity, mostly directed to it fromthe South. Since then the Kurdish issue and, later, also the perceived threatof Islamic radicalism, with their implications for Turkish security, havebecome the main elements in Turkey's relations with the Middle East.Within this context the Turkish elite, on the one hand, put the emphasis onthe relations with Turkey's neighbours, namely Iraq and Syria. The Kurdishissue became the focus of this increasingly problematic relationship. On theother hand, relations with Iran deteriorated progressively and the threat ofIslamic fundamentalism was tied to support from this country. Moreimportantly, these issues, as defined by the political and military elite, weredirectly tied to the territorial integrity of the country and the survival of theregime.

The future of Iraq emerged as one of the basic issues that remainedunresolved after the Gulf War. The post-war developments in Iraq especiallyexacerbated Turkey's security concerns. Turkish governments started toargue that the power vacuum created in northern Iraq constituted a safehaven for the PKK to launch its cross-border raids to Turkey.20 At the sametime prospects of disintegration and establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraqwere regarded unacceptable for Turkey since this would give a newmomentum to the PKK. Moreover, Turkey stated its discontent about theeconomic losses it had to endure due to the unresolved situation in Iraq.21 Inthe meantime, activities of the Operation 'Provide Comfort' were heavilycriticized by most of the political parties and the press. As a result of these

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considerations, the reestablishment of Iraq's territorial integrity became thecornerstone of Turkish foreign policy on the Iraqi issue. Parallel to theincreased uneasiness among the political and military elite on this matter,starting in the mid-1990s Ankara launched large-scale incursions into theKurdish enclave in northern Iraq to eradicate the power of the PKK. On theother hand, Ankara was apprehensive after the developments in Iraq that theUS and Israel were supportive of Kurdish nationalism, especially in Iraq.From the perspective of Turkey, even if they were not actively supportingthe Kurdish nationalists, the main players, especially the US and theregional actors like Israel and Saudi Arabia, were content with the statusquo. Therefore, external factors were highly limiting Turkey's room formanoeuvre and were making the formulation and especially theimplementation of Turkish foreign policy as regards to Iraq very difficult.22

On the other hand, Turkey's relations with Syria deteriorated rapidly.The lack of trust between the two countries seemed to create a zero-sumgame. The issues of terrorism and water were linked together and from timeto time used as a leverage by the two sides. From Turkey's perspectiverelations with this country were tied to the Kurdish issue, since Turkishmilitary and political elite believed that Syria supported terrorist activitiesagainst Turkey. What is interesting is that, as in the case of Iraq, Turkishpolicy vis-d-vis Syria differed from its allies. From the Turkish perspective,the US, eager to achieve progress in Syrian-Israeli negotiations, was veryaccommodating towards Syria. Furthermore, there was a concern amongpolitical circles that when and if the peace process was to be concluded witha settlement and Damascus would be relieved of its overriding engagementwith Israel, Turkey would have likely to be facing a more aggressive Syria,at least for the mere fact that Syria was going to be forced under a peaceagreement to re-deploy part of its troops to Syria's Turkish and/or Iraqiborders.23 Turkish policy-makers had two additional concerns. One was thepossibility that Turkey's water issue with Syria could become a bargainingchip in Israeli-Syrian talks. The other concern was the inclusion of the PKKwithin the group of terrorist organizations in those talks and, therefore,Israeli and the US insistence that the Syrian regime should stop supportingit. In sum, the Israeli-Syrian talks seemed to create an uneasiness on the partof the Turkish elite that Turkey could be left out with its problems in theregion. It is safe to argue that such an understanding required an activepolicy response on the part of Turkey.

Another event that alarmed Ankara was increasing reports in the summerof 1995 of PKK incursions in Hatay, a southern province on theMediterranean coast.24 This was a sensitive province as its accession toTurkey in 1936 was never seen as legitimate by the Syrian regime and, atleast in rhetoric, had been challenged by Damascus from time to time. In

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addition, during this period Syria seemed to increase its efforts tointernationalize its water problem with Turkey. Damascus especially wantedto bring the water issue to the attention of the Arab world. The Arab summitin Damascus in December 1995 ended with an Arab criticism of Turkey'swater policies. The final blow, however, came when in 1995 it was reportedthat Greece and Syria signed an agreement in which Syria agreed to allowGreek aircraft to use Syrian air bases in case of conflict with Turkey.25

Although Syria denied having offered this, the rapprochement between thetwo countries was enough to increase the sense of encirclement that manyin Turkey felt.26 In June 1996 there were growing tensions on theTurkish-Syrian border. Responding to the news that up to 40,000 Syriantroops were being moved towards the border, a state minister told the pressthat 'If they (the Syrians) go too far they will get a slap.' In sum, in the mid-1990s Turkey's relations with Syria deteriorated rapidly.

Finally, problems started in Turkey's relations with Iran during thisperiod.27 Turkish authorities began to accuse Iran of providing shelter for thePKK and permitting it to set up training camps in its territory. Tehranrejected these accusations. Yet this was not enough to ease tensions betweenthe two countries. There were even rumours that the Ciller governmentconsidered the possibility of a military attack on PKK bases in Iran in May1996. In the newspapers there were reports that 'Iranian PKK members'were caught during military operations. At the beginning of 1997 with theSincan affair the relations between the two countries hit the lowest point.28

This event brought back the charges against Iran that this country wassupporting 'Islamic fundamentalism' in Turkey. In addition to all these, thefact that during this period Iran and Syria forged closer ties further disturbedthe Turkish government.29

Therefore, as a result of these considerations Turkey's strategic prioritywas shifted to the Middle East. Foreign policy vis-a-vis the Middle East wasdirectly tied to domestic political and security concerns. Turkish militaryand political elite's fears and perceptions of threat formed the bases of thisnew policy. Within this context foreign policy intertwined with domesticissues, especially with the issue of insuring Turkey's territorial integrity andthe maintenance of its regime. Such a fusion of the internal and the externalon the one hand, and the political and the security on the other hadimplications for the policy making process. The implementation of thissecurity-oriented foreign policy in the Middle East affected the relativeweight of the actors in foreign policy formulation. Security-defenceestablishment, especially the military, became prominent in the formulationof Turkey's policies vis-a-vis the Middle East. The military exercised itsintervention through the National Security Council (NSC),30 whichincreasingly became the centre organ for policy-making in Turkey.

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In 1997 the military started to become unusually open and clear abouthow it saw the relations with the two neighbouring Middle Easterncountries, namely Syria and Iran. In that year the chiefs of staff gave several'briefings' to different segments of the Turkish elite, includingacademicians, journalists and also the representatives of several civilsociety organizations. With those briefings and the subsequent discussionsin the press, the Turkish public for the first time heard about a concept thata few people had heard about before, called national military strategicconcept. Furthermore, in those briefings the military announced that therewas a change in this concept. It was explained that in every two years chiefsof staff prepared a national military strategic concept within the context ofthe national security document, which was put together by the top echelonsof the state. In the briefings given by the joint chiefs of staff it was declaredthat the new national military strategic concept identified two 'internalthreats' that the Turkish state was facing, namely 'irredentism and Islamicfundamentalism' and these threats were mainly fed by two external actors,Syria and Iran.31 Therefore, it seemed that the Turkish policy-makers andespecially the military believed that strategic co-operation with Israel mightsolve much of their problems by being a deterrence to these countries.However, it is safe to argue that this belief was shared by many other actorsof Turkish politics. In fact, the alignment with Israel created an unusualcoalition in Turkey. Contrary to opposition from the Islamist Welfare(Refah) Party, growing ties with Israel drew support from a broad segmentof Turkey's body politic. As far as the political parties are concerned all theparties except the Welfare Party, including the Democratic Left Party (DSP)of Ecevit and National Action Party (MHP) of late Turkes supported theserelations. This broad coalition was made possible by the fact that for many,the relations with Israel were tied to the issues at the very core of Turkey'spolitical survival.

A related consideration was the desire of the Turkish military to obtainmilitary hardware and technology from Israel. Turkey, in fact, announced avery ambitious military modernization programme which plans to spendabout 150 billion dollars on armaments over 20 to 25 years.32 However, ithad become more and more difficult for Turkey to obtain this technologyand hardware from its Western allies because of concern over human rightsand Ankara's poor relations with Greece. In 1995 the US Congress gave thefirst signals of an arms embargo. The Europeans were more reluctant.Ankara applied to several European states for the modernization of its F-4s,but was turned down. Israel, on the other hand, was a manufacturer of topgrade missiles, tanks and aircraft, used the same US technology andstandards and, most importantly, was happy to sell without such scrutiny.

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In the meantime, the internal developments in Israel also facilitatedcloser ties in security and political matters with Turkey. BinyaminNetanyahu, who was elected prime minister in May 1996, had clear viewsabout Syria and the PKK. For instance, a Turkish journalist, who hadinterviewed Yitzak Rabin and Shimon Peres in the past, wrote that whilethey both skirted questions regarding the PKK and the Kurdish issue,Netanyahu openly and clearly said that the PKK was a terrorist organizationand Israel did not support the establishment of an independent Kurdishstate." Therefore, after the Israeli elections there were more possibilities ofco-operation in security field.

On the other hand, increasing problems in the Arab—Israeli PeaceProcess under the new Israeli government created new pressures on Turkeyfrom the countries of the region. The two governments that came to powerin Turkey in the late 1990s had an opportunity to better explain Turkey'sposition to those countries and engage in some damage control as far asTurkey's relations with the Arab countries and Iran were concerned.However, both of them, due to several reasons, failed to do so. The first ofthese governments were formed by the Welfare Party and True Path Party,as a junior coalition member in July 1996. Thus formed the Refah-Yolcoalition that was going to govern Turkey until June 1997. With accessionto power of Erbakan's Islamist Welfare Party there were discussionswhether there would be a general re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy.Before coming to power Erbakan and several Welfare officials hadrepeatedly criticized Turkey's Western orientation and stated that when theycame to power they would rc-orient Turkish foreign policy towards theIslamic countries. Within this context the Party was openly critical of Israelin general and improving ties between Turkey and Israel in particular. TheParty officials had declared on several occasions that they would tear up theagreement that was signed between the two countries in 1996 when theycame to power.

After the Refah-Yol government was formed there were at least somesigns that the Welfare Party would implement different policies especiallyvis-d-vis the Middle East. Right after the formation of the government therewere rumours that Erbakan would visit Damascus and resolve Turkey'sproblems with Syria by reaching an agreement with that country on the waterissue. In return, the rumours in the papers continue, Syria would expelAbdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK from its soil.34 In fact, the firstforeign visitor Erbakan received after he formed the government was theSyrian ambassador to Turkey. After the visit Prime Minister Erbakandeclared to the press that he did not believe that Syria supported the PKK.He dismissed these accusations and called them propaganda by the West.35

However, nothing really came out of these early contacts. On the contrary

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apart from some idiosyncrasies and the infamous Libyan visit, the newgovernment's Middle East policy showed remarkable continuity.36 Despite itsharsh criticisms before coming to power, the Welfare government supportedthe extension of the mandate of the Operation 'Provide Comfort' in theparliament.37 The earlier policies towards Iraq and Syria continued. Withinthis context Turkey's relations with Israel progressed unabated. Free tradeagreement that was signed between the two countries was brought to theparliament by the Refah-Yol government and ratified on 23 December 1996by affirmative votes of overwhelming majority of the parliamentariansincluding those of the Welfare Party. In the meantime Welfare officialsshowed signs of pragmatism when they declared that the 'mutual interestsdirect bilateral relations' with Israel.38 The government also signed a secondagreement with Israel that called for co-operation in defence industries in fall1996. May be more important were the visits by several Welfare Partyofficials on several occasions to Israel and their attendance at independenceday celebrations at the Israeli embassy in Ankara. This continuity inTurkish-Israeli relations was partly due to the fact that the Welfare Party'sroom for manoeuvre was rather limited. First of all, this was after all acoalition government and, thus, the Welfare Party was not totally free toimplement its programme. More important, the traditional elite andespecially the military, made it clear from the beginning that they would notallow the government to change Turkey's policy towards the Middle East.Since Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East had been tied to theterritorial integrity of the country and the maintenance of the regime, noflexibility was allowed in that policy. In general Refah-Yol's one-year tenurewas characterized by increased tensions between the government and thesecular groups in Turkey, and among them especially the military. Turkey'sties with Israel factored into this conflict since they were used by the militaryas an example to show the Welfare Party its limitations in power. Whenasked about the issue General Cevik Bir, then-deputy chief of staff of theTurkish armed forces, summed up the view of the military and made it clearthat relations with Israel were a matter of state policy: 'The governments arelike hats, they would come and go. What is permanent is the state.'3'However, it would be wrong to blame solely these limitations that wereimposed on the government for the lack of innovation in Welfare Party'sMiddle East policy. The Party's one-year tenure, in fact, demonstrated thatespecially as a party that aimed fundamental change in Turkish foreignpolicy, the Welfare lacked a program and a project.

The Refah-Yol coalition was replaced by another coalition governmentin June 1997. The new government headed by Mesut Yilmaz, the leader ofthe Motherland Party (ANAP), also had an opportunity to introduce someflexibility to Ankara's Middle East policy. Right after coming to power, the

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Mother Left-D coalition initiated a policy of building bridges with itsneighbours in the Arab world and with Iran. Within that context there wereclear moves that aimed to break the impasse in relations with Syria. First aforeign ministry official was sent to Damascus to discuss the issues withSyrian officials, including the PKK.40 This visit marked the beginning of there-opening of a dialogue which was completely suspended more than 20months ago. This was followed by a meeting between foreign ministers ofTurkey and Syria in Doha, Qatar, in March 1998 during foreign ministers'meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization. After a four-hourdiscussion, the two foreign ministers, Ismail Cem and Faruq al-Shaara,announced that they had a very positive meeting. In addition to discussingways of improving relations between the two countries, the ministers alsotalked about the situation in Iraq. In fact, the new government was alsotrying to lead an effort to develop a regional policy regarding the issue ofIraq. Within this context, Turkey proposed a four-point plan, calledNeighbourhood Forum, for co-operation among the countries borderingIraq. Finally, there have also been signs of improvement in Turkey'srelations with Iran. First of all, diplomatic relations were normalized withthe reciprocal appointment of ambassadors. Furthermore, Turkish foreignministry started to deny the existence of PKK camps inside Iran, and arguethat some problems arise due to the difficulties of controlling the border. Inorder to deal with such issues the two countries instituted periodic meetingsat three different levels between their security officials.

The reasons of this attempt to improve ties with Turkey's Arabneighbours and Iran lay partly in the nature of the coalition governmentitself. Especially one of the junior coalition partners, the Democratic LeftParty (DSP), to which foreign minister Cem belonged, had long been anadvocate of what was termed as 'regional foreign policy'. This approachwas based on the premise that a Turkey with good relations in its region(s)could be a much more powerful country. A corollary of this was that Turkeycould then develop a more independent foreign policy, one that was basedon its own national interest rather than the interests of others. Within thiscontext, especially the DSP advocated a normalization with Turkey'sneighbours and regarded this in the interest of Ankara especially in terms ofsolving the problems the country was facing. In addition, the coalitiongovernment tried to prevent Turkey to further isolate itself from the Arabworld, not out of rhetoric that emphasized brotherhood with the Islamiccountries, as the Welfare Party did, but as a result of their reading of recentregional developments. Therefore, Turkey's attempt to build bridges with itsneighbours was an attempt to prevent Ankara's isolation, to increase itsoptions, and in sum to have more say in the regional developments thatcould occur in the near future.

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Increased contacts between Turkey and the Arab states and Iran createda perception of a parallel slowdown in Turkish-Israeli relations. However,although the government initiated a policy of good relations with itsneighbours in the region, this did not necessarily mean a deterioration inTurkish-Israeli relations. Rather, the aim seemed to be a transition fromhyperactivity to normalization in relations between the two countries, whichwould not exclude close co-operation in economic, political and securityfields. After all, mutual interests and benefits continued to propel therelationship between Turkey and Israel. In the meantime, Ankara wanted tosolve the problems it was facing through a 'constructive dialogue' with itsneighbours.

However, even this slight shift in policy and a parallel perception ofslowdown in Turkish-Israeli relations seemed to disturb the military. Thegovernment's and the Foreign Ministry's efforts to establish better relationsespecially with Syria were criticized. As if to deter such criticisms ForeignMinister Ismail Cem visited Israel in July 1998 and told the press that 'Youknow that certain circles in Turkey say that our relations with Israel arehindered by our efforts in searching for better relations with neighbouringcountries, but, quite the contrary, this was declared untrue by the IsraeliPrime Minister himself."" In fact, during this visit the government alsostarted to emphasize Turkey's possible role as a mediator in the Arab-Israeliconflict as, in Cem's words, 'one of the rare countries that have goodrelations with both sides'.

Nothing really came out of the good neighbourhood policy, except forthe normalization of relations with Iran, which after all enjoyed widesupport within the political and military establishment. In the meantime,Turkish-Israeli relations were further strengthened. In July 1998, amidstIsraeli Prime Minister's announcement of an Israeli-Turkish axis, PrimeMinister Yilmaz visited Israel. During this visit the plans for a second jointmanoeuvre in the Eastern Mediterranean was announced. Responding to thenews about Syrian criticism of his visit, Yilmaz said that 'Frankly, I don'tcare how Syria comments (on) my visit. Everyone is aware of Syria'shostile intentions toward Turkey.'42 Therefore, the relations with Syria wereonce again problematic. The deterioration eventually led to the crisis inOctober 1998, during which Ankara warned Damascus that it would takemilitary action if Ocalan remained in Syria. The intensity of the campaignand the mediation by Egypt and Iran led to a resolution. Ocalan left Syriaand in a Special Security Meeting that was held in Adana, a southern city ofTurkey, on 19-20 October the two sides signed an agreement in which Syriaundertook commitments to satisfy Turkey's security concerns.

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One of the distinguishing characteristics of Turkish-Israeli rapprochementin the 1990s has been its multi-dimensional character. In fact, despite theemphasis on security aspect, unlike the 1950s, the relations between the twocountries this time spanned over a variety of areas. One important aspect ofTurkish-Israeli relations has been increased economic ties between the twocountries. The relations developed within the context of agreements thathave been signed the 1990s. The institutional-legal framework of therelations mainly consisted of four agreements. Among them the mostimportant has been the Free Trade Agreement that was signed in March1996 after difficult negotiations mainly due to the resistance of small butinfluential Israeli textile sector for some protection. This agreement wasseen as vital by Turkish businessmen not only to have access to the Israelimarket, but also to use this market as a jumping ground for other markets,such as the American, Palestinian, Jordanian.43

Within this context three major areas of relations can be identified: Oneis the trade relations that have been increased considerably in recent years.What is more significant from the perspective of Turkey is that since 1994the volume of trade has been in Turkey's favour. In 1997, for instance,Turkey's exports to Israel increased 54 per cent compared to previous year,whereas the imports increased 19 per cent for the same period. Secondly, inrecent years the number of Israeli tourists visiting Turkey increasedconsiderably. In order to facilitate this, a co-operation agreement on tourismwas signed in June 1992. Finally, there has been relatively less developmentin investments partly due to lack of an institutional base and a legalframework.44 The Israeli government seemed especially interested inlaunching Turkish-Israeli joint ventures, in agriculture and in other areas, inthe newly independent Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics. Inaddition Israel's possession of high agricultural technology createdpossibilities of co-operation especially in Turkey's agricultural projects insouth-eastern Turkey. Therefore in general, one can argue that the economicrelations have been beneficial for Turkey, although there are limits forfurther improvement since both of the economies are directed towards theEuropean markets.

A second aspect of the relationship between Turkey and Israel has beensecurity co-operation, which consists of three interrelated aspects. First ofall, there have been agreements which provided the framework for securityco-operation. The first one was the Military Training Co-operationAgreement that was signed in 21-23 February 1996, before a visit to Israelin March by Turkish president Demirel. The agreement was made publiconly two months after it was signed and created severe criticisms both inTurkey and in the Middle East. In Turkey especially the Welfare Party andthe Islamist media became vocal critics of the agreement. But apart from

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them, the secretive attitude of the government drew criticisms fromdifferent circles as well.

The published parts of this agreement list areas of co-operation like theexchange of information in military training, exchanges of visits betweenmilitary academies, joint training, the invitation of observers to other trainingexercises, port visits, and exchanges between military archives.45 This wasanother indication of the formulation of new security-oriented Turkishforeign policy in the Middle East. In particular it was a response to theannouncement of Cupertino agreement between Syria and Greece andTurkey's increasing perception of threat coming from the region. Althoughthis was not an alliance, it is obvious that Turkish political and military elitedecided that the agreement would provide benefits for Turkey in its fightagainst the PKK and could also be a deterrent against Syria. The mostcontroversial aspect of the agreement became the provision that provided forthe right of the air forces to fly training missions over each other's air space.

The second agreement regarding co-operation in the defence industryfield was signed on 26 August 1996. This agreement among other thingsprovided for technology transfer and training of technicians andresearchers.46 This was, in fact, a framework agreement which also calledfor intelligence sharing and holding of regular meetings between thesecurity establishment of the two countries for the evaluation of regionalthreats and regional terrorism. This was called 'strategic dialogue'.47

The second aspect of the security co-operation between the twocountries has been the joint naval operation, including the US, namedOperation 'Reliant Mermaid'. In January 1998 Turkey, Israel and the USlaunched joint naval manoeuvres in the Mediterranean, off the coast ofIsrael.48 The four-hour exercise became a stark symbol of deepeningstrategic alignment between Turkey and Israel. Declared as a search andrescue operation and thus not directed against anyone, the exercise drewangry protests from Iran and some Arab countries. Jordan took part as anobserver. Egypt, however, rejected a similar invitation.49

The military deals between the two countries constitute the third aspect ofsecurity co-operation between them. As mentioned above Turkey realizedthat it could get US hardware and technical knowledge via Israel. On 5December 1996 them signed an agreement to modernize 54 of Turkey's F-4Phantom aircraft for 650 million dollars.50 In 1997 Israel also won the tenderfor upgrading Turkey's F-5 aircraft. Israel and Turkey also agreed to producethe sophisticated Popeye II air-to-ground missile in a deal initially worthabout $ 100 million. Turkey had already bought 50 Popeye I missiles for its F-4 fighters. The deal involved a consortium with two Turkish finns to producePopeye II, a smaller version with more advanced technology.51 In additionthere were talks for deals for the modernization of tanks and other aircraft.

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In sum, in the post-Cold War period the Middle East, which had alwaysoccupied a minor position, has become the most important element ofTurkish foreign policy. This policy, formulated as a result of a redefinitionof threat perceptions, could no longer be defined only as an extension ofTurkey's relations with the West. As such Turkey's policy toward theMiddle East became more 'independent' and tied directly to themaintenance of the regime and the territorial integrity of the country asdefined by the political and the military elite. Although improvement inrelations with Israel was expected in the post-Cold War and the post-GulfWar era, such a bold move on the part of Turkey in the mid-1990s becamepossible because of the redefinition of Turkey's security concerns in itspolicy vis-a-vis the Middle East and also for domestic reasons. As a result,in contrast to its earlier policy of balancing, Ankara did not pay muchattention to the problems in the Arab-Israeli peace process when it waslaunching its initiative for strategic co-operation with Israel and largelydisregarded the criticism coming from the regional states.

However, as the time passed some of the limitations of strategic relationsbetween the two countries became apparent. From the perspective of Israel,the problem has been the danger of getting involved in Turkey's ownproblems. Israel is still apprehensive of being seen as a party in the Kurdishissue. Moreover, Turkey's problems with Greece and the issue of Cyprushave the potential to create some problems for Israel. Greece has beenopenly declaring its discontent over Turkish-Israeli strategic relations. Thedifficulties over this issue became obvious when in the summer of 1998 acrisis broke out in Cyprus.52 That crisis also opened up a discussion in Israel,both at the government and the public level as to the limits ofTurkish-Israeli relations. There are also problems as regards Syria, althoughthis issue has much more complicated implications for the relationship. Onthe one hand, obviously Israel welcomed Syria's perception of encirclementas a result of Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. However, from the Israeliperspective, at the same time the relations between Turkey and Israel shouldnot come to a point of totally obstructing any peace process between Israeland Syria. Most people in Israel, including the current Likud governmentseemed to understand that there could not be a comprehensive peacewithout Syria. Especially the opposition Labour Party seems to beapprehensive about possible negative effects of Turkish-Israeli relations.53

From the perspective of Turkey, on the other hand, there are alsolimitations. First of all, despite everything the two countries' interests stilldiverge on many points as regards Syria and Iraq. On the issue of Iraq whilethe Turkish government has been arguing for the territorial integrity of Iraq,Israel seems to be content with the status quo. On Syria, however, it is clearthat total deterioration of relations between Ankara and Damascus creates

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problem for Israel. During the latest crisis Israel was careful not to be seenas a party to what was going on between the two countries. Although thislow-key attitude can be considered an attempt to deflect criticism for Turkeyin the Arab world, it was not perceived as such by some in Turkey. Thus,there is still a slight problem of perceptions in the case of both Syria andIraq. A second limitation for Ankara is still the Peace Process. Despite thefact that beginning in the mid-1990s Ankara adopted a policy that wasindependent of the Peace Process, increasing problems in that process arebound to create problems for Ankara. On the one hand, this will strengthenthe hands of the critics of Turkish-Israeli rapprochement in Turkey. On theother hand, Ankara's relations with other countries in the region will turnmore problematic. Within this context Turkey will probably recognize thePalestinian state if it will be declared in May 1999.

All these do not mean the collapse of Turkish-Israeli rapprochementthat started in the 1990s. There are many commonalities between the twocountries to sustain this relationship. However, they point to tensions thatare embedded in the relationship especially if the general atmosphere in theregion does not improve soon. The signs of counter alignments in the regionand the prevalence of old Cold War style politics will not at the end servethe interests of any of the powers involved.

NOTES

1. Most vocal critics of the Turkish—Israeli relations have been Syria and Iran. The Iraqi regimehas also been highly critical, but, being aware of its vulnerability, voiced its criticism lessfrequently. Egypt's attitude, on the other hand, has been the most curious one and has rangedfrom understanding to harsh condemnation. This seemed to originate out of the difficultposition the Egyptian government finds itself in its quest for regional leadership, by trying tomaintain ties with both the pro-Western states and others in the region

2. See, for instance, D. Sezer, 'Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma', InternationalSpectator, Vol.27, No. 1 (January-March 1992).

3. M.B. Aykan, 'The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the1990s', International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.25, No.l (1993), p.103; A.L.Karaosmanoglu, 'Turkey's Discreet Foreign Policy Between Western Europe and the MiddleEast', in A.L. Karaosmanoglu and S. Tashan (eds.), Middle East, Turkey and the AtlanticAlliance (Ankara, 1987); H. Yavuz, 'Turkey's Relations with Israel', Foreign Policy(Ankara), Vol.5, No.3^1 (1990), pp.48-50.

4. See for instance, Hasan Cemal, 'Ortadogu'da Tiirkiye...' (Turkey in the Middle East),Sabah, 5 Dec. 1997.

5. For an analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s seeO. Kiirkciioglu, Turkiye'nin Arap Orta Dogusuna Karsi Politikasi (Ankara, 1973)

6. Before the oil crisis of 1973-74, Turkey's economic ties with the Arab world were negligible.Turkey's export to the Middle East was only 6 per cent in the 1960s and 7 per cent in theearly 1970s. E. Manisali, Foreign Economic Relations of Turkey: A General Appraisal ofTurkey's Economic Relations (Istanbul, 1979), pp.7-8.

7. Between 1973 and 1985 the total value of Turkish contracts for work undertaken in SaudiArabia, Libya and Iraq totaled 14.5 billion dollars. F. Chalabi, 'Prospects for Arab-TurkishEconomic Cooperation', paper presented at the Arab-Turkish Seminar, Amman, 18-19

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March 1996, p.2.8. On the issue of water between Turkey and its two neighbours, namely Iraq and Syria, see, for

instance, A.i. Bagis, 'Turkey's Hydropolitics of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin', WaterResources Development, Vol.13, No.4 (1997), pp.567-81; S. Bolukbasi, 'Turkey ChallengesIraq and Syria: The Euphrates Dispute', Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,Vol.16, No.4 (1993), pp.9-32; J.F. Kolars and W.A. Mitchell, The Euphrates River and theSoutheast Anatolia Development Project (Carbondale, 1L, 1991).

9. R. Olson, 'Turkey-Syria Relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water', Middle EastPolicy, Vol.5, No.2 (1997), pp.169-70.

10. It is claimed that after the signing of the protocol Asad temporarily sent Ocalan to the Beqaavalley in Lebanon. Olson, ibid., p. 170.

11. Middle East International, 23 Oct. 1992, p.3.12. This visit was later realized in November 1993.13. Middle East Monitor, Vol.23, No.l (1993), p.3.14. Milliyet, 7 Feb. 1994.15. Sabah, 7 Feb. 1994.16. Hurriyet, 27 Jan. 1994.17. See, for instance, Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el, 5 Nov. 1994, in Foreign Broadcast and

Information Services- Near and South East (hereafter FBIS-NES), 7 Nov. 1994, p.36.18. Jerusalem Qol Tisra'el, 6 Nov. 1994, in FBIS-NES, 7 Nov. 1994, p.36.19. For a similar view see A. Makovsky, 'Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish "Periphery

Strategy"?', in H. Barkey (ed.), The Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East(Washington, DC, 1991), pp.150 and 169.

20. See, for instance, Milliyet and Cumhuriyet, 5 Sept. 1996.21. Before the Gulf crisis Iraq was Turkey's second largest trading partner. However, due to the

embargo the trade between the two countries virtually stopped. In addition, the border trade,which was a source of economic vitality for the impoverished south-eastern part of Turkey,almost disappeared. And, finally, as a result of the closing of the Kerkuk-Yumurtahkpipeline, the Turkish treasury lost an estimated 750,000 US dollars a day in revenue.

22. Under these circumstances Turkey tried to have influence over the developments in northernIraq by mainly keeping its contacts with all the Kurdish groups there open. However, inrecent years Ankara increasingly began to support Massoud Barzani's KDP (KurdishDemocratic Party) when the relations between the two main groups in northern Iraq, namelythe KDP and Jala] Talabani's PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) deteriorated and at timesturned into an all out war. Furthermore, also recently a new element has been introduced toTurkish policy in Iraq, i.e. the so-called 'Turcoman card'.

23. FB1S-WEU, 24 June 1996.24. Hurriyet, 17 Sept. 1995.25. Hurriyet, 1 Aug. 1996.26. Appearing in a Turkish TV show, Al-Shara denied that they signed a defense agreement with

Greece. But added that the two countries had good relations. Istanbul SHOW Television inTurkish 1930 GMT 2 July 1996, in FBIS-WEU, 3 July 1996, p.38.

27. For Turkish-Iranian relations in the post-revolutionary era, see S. Bolukbasi, 'Turkey Copeswith Revolutionary Iran', Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.13, No.land 2 (1989); A. Eralp, 'Facing the Challenge', in H. Barkey (ed.), Reluctant Neighbor.

28. In February 1997 'Jerusalem Day' celebrations were organized by the mayor of Sincan, asuburb of Ankara, who was of the Welfare Party. During these celebrations the Iranianambassador to Turkey made a speech that called for the adoption of the Sharia in Turkey.Following this event the ambassador was declared persona non grata. Iran responded byexpelling the Turkish ambassador.

29. The alignment between Iran and Syria goes back to the beginning of the 1980s. For more onthis alliance see A. Ehteshami and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in aPenetrated Regional System (London, 1997).

30. NSC is a constitutional advisory body that deals with domestic and foreign issues andcomposed of top level civilian and military officials.

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31. This process was explained by retired ambassador Siikrii Elekdag in his column in a dailynewspaper. Milliyet, 12 May 1997.

32. Yeni Yiizyil, 6 Jan. 1998.33. M.A. Birand, Sabah, 26 May 1997.34. Hiirriyet, 1 July 1996.35. Hiirriyet, 8 May 1996. Erbakan's coming to power and such remarks by him and other

Welfare officials were welcomed by the Asad regime. Syrian newspapers quoted presidentAsad as saying that Erbakan's election 'opens new horizons to establish ties on the bases ofmutual trust and common interests.' Olson, op. cit., p.184.

36. For the argument for continuity see, for instance, Philip Robins, 'Turkish Foreign PolicyUnder Erbakan', Survival, Vol.39, No.2 (Summer 1997). For discussion specifically onWelfare Party's Middle East policy, see M. Altunisik, Giivenlik Kiskacinda Tiirkiye-OrtaDogu Iliskileri', in G. Ozcan and S. Kut (eds.), Turkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve Dif PolitikaGundeminde Doksanh Yillar; En Uzun On W (Istanbul, 1998).

37. The leader of the Welfare Party, Erbakan, used to call Operation 'Provide Comfort' the'Second Sevres', a reference to the Treaty of Sevres, which was imposed on the OttomanEmpire after the First World War in 1920, and aimed to bring virtual foreign tutelage overthe government and divide up the country into different spheres of influence by the Europeanpowers.

38. Cumhuriyet, 2 July 1996.39. ATV Television, Evening News, 5 May 1997.40. Yeni Yuzyil, 18 March 1998.41. A. Esmer, 'Caught in the Middle East Quandary', Turkish Probe, 11 July 1998.42. Ha 'aretz (English Edition), 14 Oct. 1998.43. The Free Trade Agreement became effective in 1 May 1997. The other agreements that were

signed between the two countries were: An Agreement on Commercial, Economic, Technicaland Scientific Cooperation, signed in January 1996, became effective in 16 June 1996; AnAgreement for the Prevention of Double Taxation signed in March 1996, ratified by theTurkish parliament in February 1998 and expected to enter into force in January 1999; TheAgreement for Mutual Encouragement and Protection of Investments entered into forceearlier than expected, on 27 August 1998.

44. Lower labour costs in Turkey have the potential to attract some Israeli businesses. Forexample in the summer of 1998 Rav-Car Industries, a publicly quoted companymanufacturing air-conditioning units for cars and trucks, announced its decision to closedown its business in Israel and signed an agreement to establish a joint venture plant inTurkey. Ha aretz (English Edition), 12 June 1998.

45. Later the unofficial text of this agreement have been published first in a weekly, Aksiyon,18-24 June 1996, and later in a daily, Hiirriyet, 14 July 1996.

46. Yeni Yuzyil, 29 Aug. 1996.47. For instance see Yeni Yuzyil, 2 May 1997.48. Five Turkish, Israeli and American warships took part, along with naval reconnaissance

aircraft and helicopters of the three countries. Washington Post, 7 Jan. 1988.49. Washington Post, 5 Jan. 1998.50. Yeni Yuzyil, 4 Sept. 1995.51. The Middle East Dispatch, Daily News From Israel, Issue 358, 18 May 1997.52. Ha'aretz (English Edition), 14 July 1998. On Greece's response to Turkish-Israeli relations

in general see A. Nachmani, 'The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie', Middle East QuarterlyVol.5, No.2 (1998).

53. For instance, during his visit to Egypt in June 1998 Ehud Barak, then opposition leader,asked Mubarak to convey to the Syrians that they need not be concerned over the tighteningmilitary co-operation between Israel and Turkey. Ha'aretz (English Edition), 16 June 1998.

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The Turkish-Israeli rapprochement in the post-Cold War era

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