Introduction: From Centrismto Neo-Centrism

SHMUEL SANDLER and JONATHAN RYNHOLD

Among political scientists and sociologists who study the State of Israel,one of the most accepted theses is that Israel is a ‘deeply divided society’.1

Originally, this thesis posited profound and persistent cleavages withinIsraeli society between Jews and Arabs, religious and secular, andAshkenazi and Sephardic Jews. Over the last three decades, a new divisionappeared: the dichotomy known as the Right–Left divide, namely thoseopposing Israeli withdrawal from territories acquired in 1967 versus thosesupporting a territorial compromise. The new division reinforced theexisting cleavages2 and resulted in a divided political map following almostevery election since 1977. The question posed here is to what extent theJewish State is truly polarized in light of the success of the centrist Kadimaparty in the 2006 Knesset elections. Might the ‘deeply divided society’concept no longer hold true in light of the victory of a centrist party thatincluded on its list members from both opposing camps? If so, what is theessence of this centrism that is emerging in Israeli society? As Israel appearsto be slipping back to the pre-1967 borders, is the old consensus thatexisted before the emergence of the great divide on the Territoriesreturning? Or are we witnessing the emergence of a new centrism? And,how will the consequences of the Second Lebanon War affect theseprocesses?

What is the basis for thinking that the Kadima victory is indicative ofthe existence of a strong centre in Israel? First, it is important to recognizethe significance of the unprecedented victory of a new centrist party. Thevictory of centrism was also evident in the way Kadima’s leadership soughtto base the party on inclusivism by courting diverse groups, such thereligious, Sephardim and even Arab personalities to make up its list. Thiscontrasted with Shinui, which appealed exclusively to Ashkenazi secularvoters. Clearly, Kadima’s centrism went beyond the ideological dividebetween Left and Right. It was a preconceived political strategy. TheKadima party experiment, even if it ultimately fails and the partydisintegrates especially after the disappointing results of the Second

Israel Affairs, Vol.13, No.2, April 2007, pp.229–250ISSN 1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online

DOI: 10.1080/13537120701204654 q 2007 Taylor & Francis

Shmuel Sandler is a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University. Jonathan Rynhold is alecturer in political studies at Bar-Ilan University.

Lebanon War, is important because the fact remains that almost one-quarter of Israeli society expressed its support for a centrist party thatsought to present pragmatic positions.

At the same time it is important to take note of another trend: the on-going diffusion of the Israeli political map. A new manifestation of thistrend in 2006 was the growth of the number of mid-size parties, at theexpense of the large parties. While the pivotal party, Kadima, received lessthan a quarter of the vote and seats (29) in the Knesset, the two traditionalruling parties, Labour (19) and Likud (12) were reduced to mid-size partieswhere they were joined by Shas (12) and Israel Beiteinu (11). Anothergroup consists of parties that won fewer than 10 seats: the NationalUnion–NRP (National Religious Party) list (9) the Pensioners party, Gil(7), United Torah Judaism (UTJ) (6) and Meretz-Yahad (5). All the Arabparties achieved fewer than five seats: United Arab List–Arab Movementfor Renewal (4), Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (3) and Balad (3)(see Tables 1 and 2 and Fig. 1). Overall, 12 parties passed the new electoralthreshold of 2 percent. This diffusion could not be credited to the electoralsystem, since this time voters only cast one ballot. Undoubtedly, the 2006election has produced a fractured political map.

The question is how can these two occurrences be reconciled; thevictory of a centrist party in the midst of a diffused political map?Answering this question and analysing the new Israeli centre is importantin light of the severe animosity between different elements of Israeli societywhich a decade ago culminated in a political assassination. Below, thecontention that the victory of Kadima was indicative of a desire by many inIsraeli society to abandon the divisive forces that had characterized it overthe last two decades is examined.

THE VICTORY OF THE CENTRISTS

Early polls predicted over 40 seats for Kadima. In the end, Kadima gainedfar fewer than that, following some unwise pronouncements by the partyleader Ehud Olmert. Despite these errors, Kadima won 29 seats, aplurality. This was still a very significant achievement as no self-declared,newly formed party has ever won so many seats in Knesset elections, norhave they ever risen to become the strongest party before. Thus, Kadima’svictory cannot go unacknowledged.

Kadima’s achievement cannot be credited to the appearance of acharismatic leader, since Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was absentthroughout almost all of the campaign due to his illness and the resultingtermination of his political career. The post-Sharon era effectively began inmid-January 2006. Olmert, who came to head the party list because of hisformal position in the government as deputy prime minister, was not aprincipal contender for prime minister until he replaced Sharon as head of

ISRAEL AFFAIRS230

the government by default. In addition, survey data indicates that theparties’ stance on specific issues, rather than leadership per se, was the mostinfluential factor in determining voting behaviour; even though the role ofpersonalities has increased.3

The interim government headed by Olmert had no outstandingaccomplishments to present before the public, and the continuing plightof uprooted and homeless Gaza Strip settlers did not reflect well on the

TABLE 1

2006 ELECTION RESULTS

Parties Votes % Seats þ /–

Kadima 690,901 22.02 29 new1

Labour (incorporating Am Ehad & Meimad) 472,366 15.06 19 –22

Shas 299,054 9.53 12 þ1Likud 281,996 8.989 12 –153

Yisrael Beitenu 281,880 8.985 11 þ 84

National Union & National Religious Party 224,083 7.14 9 –15

Gil (Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset) 185,759 5.92 7 NewUnited Torah Judaism 147,091 4.69 6 þ1Meretz-Yachad 118,302 3.77 5 –1Ra’am-Ta’al (United Arab List–Arab Movementfor Renewal)

94,786 3.02 4 þ2

Hadash (Democratic Front for Peaceand Equality)

86,092 2.74 3 0

Balad 72,066 2.30 3 0The Greens (environmentalist party) 47,595 1.52 0 0Green Leaf 40,353 1.29 0 0The Jewish National Front 24,824 0.79 0 0Tafnit 18,753 0.60 0 0Hetz 10,113 0.33 0 New6

Shinui 4,675 0.16 0 –157

Other parties 36,375 1.16 0 0Total 3,137,064 100 120

Eligible voters: 5,014,622

Total votes cast: 3,186,739 (63.6% turnout)

Valid ballots: 3,137,064

Spoiled ballots: 49,675 (1.56% of votes cast)

Threshold (2%): 62,741

Votes per seat: 24,620

114 Knesset members joined Kadima in November 2005, 13 of them from Likud.2Am Ehad (3 MKs) merged with Labour (19 MKs) in 2004.3Israel B’Aliya (2 MKs) merged with Likud (38 MKs) in 2003, 13 MKs split and joined Kadima in2005.4Yisrael Beitenu (3 MKs) split from National Union (7 MKs) in 2003.5National Religious Party (6 MKs joined with National Union (4 MKs after the split) prior to theelection.69 MKs from Shinui joined Hetz prior to the elections.7Only 2 MKs were left from the original faction after the split, prior to the elections.

INTRODUCTION 231

TABLE 2

ELECTION RESULTS 2006, 2003, 1999

Nos. seats (MKs), nos. votes, share of voteParty 2006 2003 1999

Kadima 29690,095 Did not exist Did not exist21.8%

Labour 19 19 26472,746 458,183 670,48415.1% 14.5% 20.2%

Likud 12 381 19282,070 925,279 468,1038.9% 29.4% 14.1%

Shas 12 11 17299,130 258,879 430,6769.6% 8.2% 13%

Israel Beitenu 11 7 ( joint with NU) 4281,850 173,973 86,1539% 5.5% 2.6%

National Religious Party (NRP) 9 (with the NU) 6 5223,830 132,370 140,3076.9% 4.2% 4.2%

National Union (NU) (ran with NRP) (ran with Israel Beitenu) 3100 1714%

Pensioners (Gil) 7 0 0185,7905.9%

United Torah Judaism 6 5 5146,958 135,087 125,7414.8% 4.3% 3.7%

Meretz-Yachad 5 6 10118,356 164,122 253,5253.6% 5.2% 7.6%

United Arab List 4 2 594,460 65,551 114,8103.1% 2.1% 3.4%

Hadash 3 3 385,830 93,819 87,0222.8% 3.0% 2.6%

Balad 3 3 372,013 71,299 66,1032.4 2.3% 1.9%

Shinui 0 15 64,165 386,535 167,7480.16% 12.28% 5.0%

Yisrael B’Aliyah (part of Likud) 2 667,219 171,7052.15% 5.1%

1The two MKs of Yisrael B’Aliyah joined Likud after the election, giving the party 40 seats.

ISRAEL AFFAIRS232

government’s ability to solve a human problem. Nor did the success ofHamas in the Palestinian national elections suggest great political wisdomor prescience on the part of the Olmert government. In addition, several ofKadima’s candidates, such as Tzachi Hanegbi, Roni Bar-On and evenOlmert himself, had questionable political track records, includingallegations of corruption in their backgrounds. Therefore, the success ofKadima cannot be taken as a natural outcome of an incumbent party with

FIGURE 12 0 0 6 E L E C T I O N R E S U LT S

INTRODUCTION 233

an outstandingly attractive list. One can certainly assume that with Sharonat its head, Kadima would have polled better.

The centrist vote extended beyond Kadima. It is possible to detectcentrism in the results of other parties. The Pensioners list, that ran inalmost every previous election but failed to pass even the old threshold of 1percent, never mind the new 2006 threshold of 2 percent, suddenlyreceived seven seats in the Knesset. Another victor in the 2006 polls wasIsrael Beiteinu headed by the right-wing Avigdor Lieberman. In a change ofpolicy, he indicated readiness for territorial compromise as long as itincludes a territorial swap in which areas within pre-1967 Israel with ahigh concentration of Arab citizens would be annexed to the impendingPalestinian State. The third party that increased its power was Shas, whoseleader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef is known for his moderate positions, despite thehawkishness of most of the party’s supporters. Shas ran primarily under asocioeconomic banner, while blurring its positions on foreign policy.

To a large extent, the centrist phenomenon was already apparent in thetwo previous elections. In 2001, Ariel Sharon, a politician who had beendiscounted as a realistic candidate for prime minister, portrayed himself as acentrist candidate and won the election gaining 62 percent of the vote. Mostsignificant in that election was Sharon’s promise to assemble a national unitygovernment, should he win. By doing this he not only responded to the wishesof the electorate but also positioned himself at the centre of the political map.In 2003, Sharon, who had proven himself pragmatic in the eyes of the Israelipublic during the second Intifada, doubled his party’s strength in the Knesset.In addition, Shinui, which also campaigned as a centrist party, increased itsstrength from six to 15 Members of Knesset (MKs).4

Against this background, the next question needs to be addressed,namely: does the turn towards the centre represent a new developmentcorresponding to a new consensus or alternatively is it merely thecontinuation of a process that had always characterized Israeli politics?

THE NEW CONSENSUS THESIS

In the wake of the recent election, it has been suggested that a major factorbehind the rise of a strong centrist party was the emergence of a ‘newconsensus’ in Israel. This consensus could be described as a defaultposition, an emerging consensus that has given up both on the dream ofJewish control of the historic borders of the Land of Israel, and on thedream of a permanent status of comprehensive peace with the Palestinians,in exchange for extensive Israeli territorial withdrawals. An indication ofthis ‘new consensus’ is widespread public support for the erection of thesecurity barrier between Israel and the Palestinians. The barrier is a symbolboth of the abandonment of the historic Territories and of resignation tothe implausibility of a negotiated peace.5

ISRAEL AFFAIRS234

How did this new consensus emerge? One could argue that it is theresult of two external events: the 1987 and the 2000 Intifadas. The firstIntifada, which broke out in December 1987, indicated that the Israelisettlement movement, initiated by Menachem Begin and Gush Emunim in1979, could not overcome the realities of the large Palestinian populationthat dwelt in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank: Judea and Samaria, asthese territories are known in Jewish historic terminology.6 This reality ledto the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 and subsequently to the OsloProcess beginning in 1993.

However, the collapse of the Oslo process brought home to Israelis a newreality. Yasser Arafat refused to even consider Prime Minister Ehud Barak’sproposals at Camp David in July 2000, which included the division ofJerusalem. The Palestinians then launched the second Intifada in September.Meanwhile, in January 2001 Arafat rejected the Clinton Parameters for acomprehensive peace that would have given the Palestinians the equivalentof 100 percent of the Territories including sovereignty over all the Arabareas of Jerusalem and the surface of the Temple Mount. While Barakaccepted the Parameters, Arafat rejected them. He refused to compromiseon a ’right of return’ for the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and all theirdescendants, a demand that implied an end to the Jewish state.7 As a result,Israelis came to believe that there is no partner for a negotiated peace basedon the 1967 borders that would extricate them from the Palestinianproblem.8 The dream and promises of Yossi Beilin and the Israeli Leftcollapsed, suffering a similar fate to the dream of preserving the wholenessof the Land of Israel. The era of idealistic messianic dreams was over.

THE INTRINSIC ISRAELI CENTRE THESIS

The implication of the ‘new consensus’ thesis is that the 2006 electionresults correspond to a new development, and hence have no connection tothe more basic rudiments of Israeli society. An alternative theory is thatsupport for the centre is not a new phenomenon; rather it has alwayscharacterized Israeli politics.

The consolidation of Israeli society may have deeper roots, going backmuch further than the two Intifadas. It could be rooted in the foundationand precursor of the Israeli polity during the pre-State Yishuv period. AsDan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak describe in their renowned book, TheOrigins of the Israeli Polity, an Israeli centre existed throughout thepolitical history of Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel. This institutionalcentre gave rise to a political centre. Ben-Gurion understood this as headof the newly formed Mapai party in the 1930s, and positioned thispredecessor of Labour in the centre.9 As a result, this party ruled Israelfrom 1948 until 1977. Menachem Begin learned the lesson of beingideologically dogmatic in the wastelands of opposition and initiated

INTRODUCTION 235

a strategy of alliances with parties that were at the centre of the politicalmap, like the Liberal party, forming the Likud which in Hebrew stands forunity.10 The Likud moved further to the centre following its victory in1977. The two major parties ruled alternatively or jointly in the years tocome. In 2006, Sharon, who had roots in both camps, pushed aside the twoveteran parties and positioned his newly formed party at the hub of theIsraeli political system.

According to this reading, what allowed each of the major parties torule Israel was the absence of a broadly based centrist party. As long as itpresented positions close to the centre, whether on the Left or on the Right,one of the major parties could win a plurality of the Israeli electorate. In2006, neither of the two major parties proposed a programme that couldcompete with that of the new centrist party—Kadima, established by aprime minister who broke away from his ruling party, which he accused ofbeing dogmatic.

On the Left, Labour elected a trade union leader who insisted on asocial agenda. Having been identified with the Oslo process and the 2003Geneva draft peace agreement, Labour under Amir Peretz could notpresent itself as a centrist party. Labour headed by Peretz in 2006 was thusvery distant from the centrist image and positions cultivated by the formerparty leaders (and former Chiefs of Staff) Yitzhak Rabin in the 1992elections and Ehud Barak in the 1999 elections. Peretz’s approach wasmuch closer to Amram Mitzna, who led the party to defeat in 2003. ThenLabour was defeated primarily because of its left-wing position and itsassociation with the failed Oslo process. Also the Likud under BenjaminNetanyahu, following the breakaway of its moderates to Kadima inautumn 2005, could not present itself as a centrist party.

However, it would be oversimplifying matters to equate contemporarycentrism with the classic ‘old’ centre. This ignores the impact of two majorwaves that swept over Israel since the ‘first republic’ of Mapai gave wayto new ascending forces in the 1970s. The first was the ethno-nationalawakening in the aftermath of the 1967 war.11 The second was theprocesses of postmodernization and liberalization that have grown in thedeveloped countries and have penetrated Israeli society.12 It is inconceivablethat each trend did not leave some lasting imprints on Israeli society.

To be sure, one could argue that there is no novelty in the fact thatIsrael, like most Western democracies, has a centre. In order for a party towin an election it had to conquer the centre. The new claim proposed hereis that while the Israeli centre has changed and was influenced by valuesthat penetrated from Western democracies it has also maintained valuesfrom its original setting. Moreover, for Israel, because of its heterogeneousmakeup, the mere existence of a centre requires explanation.

ISRAEL AFFAIRS236

THE TRADITIONAL ISRAELI CENTRE

What were the main characteristics of the classic Israeli centre? BenGurion,13 after his transition from a socialist leader to a national leader, oras he defined it ‘from class to nation’, repeatedly announced the three maingoals of Zionism and later of the State of Israel as: ingathering of the exiles(or Aliya—immigration), development and settlement of the land, andsecurity. Occasionally, he would include also peace with the Arab states toreplace the centrality of security. To this list we should add two strategicmaxims in Israel’s foreign policy: support from a great Western power, andultimately recognition of Israel by the Arab states. Missing in this set ofvalues was the liberation of the rest of the Land of Israel, or preserving thedemocratic nature of the Jewish State. Since Israel perceived itself as earlyas the beginning of the 1950s as part of the Western bloc and hasmaintained elections from its outset, erecting three independent branchesof government, democracy was understood to exist implicitly; it wasperceived as natural. Herut, that supported the liberation of the wholeLand of Israel, and the Communist Party, that supported a pro-Moscoworientation, were excluded from legitimate parties with whom Ben Gurionformed a coalition. The ruling coalition was usually composed of thereigning Socialist party (Mapai), the National Religious Party and/or acentrist free trade party or another Socialist party.

In the decade immediately following the 1967 War, Israeli politics wentthrough a period of transition. The process of ideological polarizationbegan to erode soon after the war, but the erosion of the centre in thepolitical sphere did not begin to occur until 1974, after the Yom KippurWar. The position of the ruling Labour party, 1967–77, was that inexchange for peace Israel would withdraw from most of the territoriesconquered in June 1967; although the two main contenders for leadership,Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan, both demanded that Israel’s security border(as opposed to the political border) would be on the Jordan River. Despiterising voices on both the religious and the secular right in favour of theLand of Israel, the position of the Labour Alignment was primarilymotivated by security concerns rather than historical impulses. Settlementswere erected primarily on the basis of security considerations.14 Similarly,intonations in favour of a Palestinian State were heard only on the left-wing margins of the Israeli political map.

The 1977 victory of the Likud was related more to the blunders of theruling Labour elite in the 1973 war and charges of corruption than toany shift away from the centre. After all, the decline of Labour wasaccompanied by the establishment of the centrist Democratic Movementfor Change (DMC) whose leaders were primarily identified with the rulingelites. The DMC supported a territorial compromise in exchange for peace,objected to a Palestinian State and supported a liberal economy. When the

INTRODUCTION 237

DMC eventually joined the Begin government, it shifted the internalbalance of the government in a centrist direction. The appointment ofLabourite Moshe Dayan as foreign minister also indicated that the newlyelected government was sensitive to international public opinion. Thepeace treaty with Egypt, in which Israel withdrew from all of the Sinaicaptured in 1967, signalled the acceptance of the principle of territories forpeace by the centre-right coalition.

But the new government also advanced another agenda—settlement ofthe Land of Israel. In 1979 the Begin government in association with GushEmunim inaugurated a settlement policy that was not driven by securityconcerns but rather by ethno-national impulses. In time this drive broughtover 200,000 Jews into the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria as the regionwas renamed after its original Biblical designation.15

In parallel to the ascendancy of ethno-nationalism, another break fromthe consensus took place. What started as pressure on Prime Minister Beginby a group of young reservist officers to advance the peace process withEgypt in 1978 turned into a permanent extra-parliamentary organizationnamed ‘Peace Now’. Henceforth, the movement became the counterpart toGush Emunim. Both movements represented the divide in Israeli societyover foreign policy.

The political map that emerged in the 1980s was often defined as bi-polar. Despite the victory of Labour in 1984, Shimon Peres was unable toput together a ruling coalition because the religious and the smallnationalist parties were not ready to provide him with a majority in theKnesset. Consequently, Peres had to share power with the Likud underYitzhak Shamir.16 The same thing happened in 1990, when what came tobe known as the ‘stinking manoeuvre’ of Shimon Peres failed. Polarizationclimaxed during the Oslo years and Israeli society reached its nadir withthe assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995. Inaddition, the transformation of the electoral system to a direct vote for theprime minister failed to stabilize the government.

Yet it is important not to overstate the extent of polarization duringthose years. Despite centrifugal trends, in retrospect there were alsocentripetal values that held the system together. It is possible to see the twonational unity governments in the 1980s as an indication of this. Similarly,the victory of Labour under Rabin in 1992 and under Barak in 1999indicated the existence of a centre that perceived national security as themain concern of Israeli policy. This centre was ready to shift its vote toLabour when a security oriented leader headed that party.

According to this reading, a centrist Labour or Likud party filled in forthe absence of a broadly based centrist party. As long as they presentedpositions close to the centre, whether on the Left or on the Right, one of themajor parties could win. As indicated above, in 2006 neither of the twomajor parties proposed a programme that could compete with the new

ISRAEL AFFAIRS238

centrist party, Kadima, established by a prime minister who had been theicon of the Right, and who broke away from the party he had helped toestablish three decades earlier. Sharon demonstrated his turn towards thecentre by enacting the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in thesummer of 2005. In addition, as prime minister, Sharon developed greatsensitivity to domestic consensus, a quality he lacked during hiscontroversial tenure as minister of defence.

Against the background of these two theses (the old centre and the newcentre) that seek to explain the success of Kadima, a third thesis is proposedbelow which seeks to synthesize the first two. It argues that while Israel hasalways had a strong core, the meaning of the centrist agenda changed overthe years. A new Zeitgeist has emerged within Israel, restructuring thecentre that has existed throughout its political history.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEO-CENTRISM

As noted at the outset, Israel has been consistently characterized as a deeplydivided society, in which some of the core cleavages are mutuallyreinforcing, a situation which produced polarization. In the 1990s a waveof academics and intellectuals took this a stage further by claiming thatIsrael was moving in a ‘post-Zionist’ direction. The old ‘Zionist’ centre wasdeclining along with the secular Ashkenazi ‘Statist’ elite that embodied it.17

According to Peled, the decline of this ‘Republican’ citizenship discoursewould lead to a head-on clash between the ethno-national–religiousdiscourse and the secular liberal discourse, in which the latter wouldultimately triumph.18 Uri Ram recognized a similar clash between ‘neo-Zionism’ and ‘post-Zionism’, which he framed in terms of pro- and anti-globalization forces; a local version of the clash between ‘Jihad andMcWorld’ as enunciated by Benjamin Barber.19

These claims were not without foundation. The ‘old centre’ which wasfounded on Republican idealism and the political dominance of Mapeidied in 1977. In the ensuing years, Israel has become a far more pluralisticsociety. As Ottolenghi argues in this volume, Israel has increasinglyadopted the political patterns of advanced, affluent, post-industrialdemocracies, where party differences are less marked, the importance ofpersonal leadership is more pronounced, and pragmatic solutions are moreattractive than parties with coherent ideologies. Furthermore, liberalismhas become a more potent political force, especially through the activism ofthe Supreme Court under Aharon Barak. At the same time, politics wascertainly polarized and fragmented in a way that reflected conflictingvalues and identities, not merely conflicting material interests. Nothingsymbolized this more than the assassination of Prime Minister YitzhakRabin in 1995.

INTRODUCTION 239

Yet despite this, and other traumas, Israeli democracy has provedremarkably resilient. The focus on change and polarization led to an under-appreciation of the stable consensual elements underlying the Israeli bodypolitic. Behind the ability of Israeli democracy to manage such a highdegree of domestic political conflict lay the continued existence of animplicit political centre—a core consensus. In the twenty-first century thiscore has become increasingly explicit. It is termed here neo-centrismbecause while it retains some of the core element of the old centre, it hassimultaneously incorporated new elements derived from the liberalizationprocesses referred to above.

The contemporary consensus is multifaceted, made up of a broaderspectrum of sub-cultures, than the original core of secular, Ashkenazi,socialist-Zionist ‘Israelis’, described in Amos Elon’s famous book.20 Anexample of this postmodern centrism is given by Khanin in this volume. Heargues that the million or so immigrants from the FSU (former SovietUnion) since 1990 seek to preserve a specifically Russian-Jewish identity,while at the same time seeking to integrate within mainstream Hebrew-speaking Israeli society, viewing themselves as proud Israelis. Suchcomplexity does not mean that the consensus is less meaningful, lesscoherent or less functionally powerful. Pluralism and consensus are notnecessarily contradictory, they can be complementary. In this sense,Alasdair McIntyre’s definition of a tradition is germane. He defined a livingtradition as ‘an historically extended, socially embodied argument,precisely in part about the goods that constitute that tradition’.21 Atradition contains many voices. So long as they interact around a commoncore the tradition remains coherent. What goes for a tradition goes for abody politic too.

NEO-CENTRISM: THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

Despite being comprised of citizens from an array of different linguisticbackgrounds, Hebrew is the dominant language in Israel. The dominanceof Hebrew compares favourably to the dominance of a national languagein other countries with many immigrants, such as the United States.22 Inaddition, a recent survey indicated that 86 percent of Israel’s citizens areproud to be Israeli and that 90 percent want to continue to live in thecountry in the long run.23 Once again, this compares favourably with thepercentage of citizens in other Western democracies.24

This patriotism is grounded on the core consensus—the preservation ofIsrael as a Jewish and democratic state. The overwhelming majority ofJewish Israelis support it as an expression of their national identity, theirdemocratic values and as a mechanism for ensuring their physicalsecurity.25 Thus there remains a very strong link between Israeli identityand Jewish identity. For more than 90 percent of Israeli Jews, their Jewish

ISRAEL AFFAIRS240

identity is primarily national and thus bound up with the State of Israel. Atthe same time 95 percent feel part of world Jewry, even as they recognize adistinct Israeli-Jewish identity.26 Meanwhile 85 percent of Israelis arecertain that democracy is the most desirable regime for Israel, while for 76percent democracy is the best form of government.27 Crucially, theoverwhelming majority of Israeli Jews are committed to both to Jewishpeople-hood and individual freedom. They believe that these values canand should be balanced.28 This goes not only for the state’s abstract identitybut also has clear ramifications related to the need to withdraw from mostof the Territories, and also regarding matters of religion and state.29

The meaning of ‘Jewish and democratic’ varies but it serves to frame thediscourse. Thus in the 2006 election most party platforms, including thoseas varied as Meretz, Shinui and Labour on the one hand and the NationalUnion, Shas, and Yahadut HaTorah on the other, contained an expressionof support for the existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.30

Even as Meretz simultaneously expressed support for Israel as a multi-cultural society, Shulamit Aloni and Yossi Beilin took the trouble torespond publicly to the Israeli writer A.B. Yehoshua by passionatelyaffirming their personal commitment and identification with Zionism, theJewish people and liberal democratic values.31 Of course, Rabbi OvadiaYosef and Shulamit Aloni understand the terms ‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’very differently, but the common referent remains.

This is highly significant because it means that despite the inherenttensions between ‘Jewish’ and ‘democratic’ emphasized by the post-Zionists there is nonetheless a consensus among Israeli Jews on theimportance of maintaining and reconciling these values. This becameapparent in the clash over the disengagement from Gaza. With hundreds ofnational-religious Rabbis calling on religious soldiers to refuse orders todismantle the settlements in Gaza, many expected large-scale civilviolence.32 Yet, at the end of the day, disengagement passed remarkablypeacefully. Crucially, most opponents of disengagement did not disagreewith it on ideological grounds.

Only among national-religious Jews was the ideology of Eretz Yisraeldeemed to be at stake. Even then, most of them remained loyal to the stateand however much disengagement pained them they opposed the use ofviolence and acts that would serve to seriously undermine the state.33 Infact, some leading Rabbis, vehemently against withdrawal on ideologicalgrounds, nevertheless opposed refusal to serve and acted to calm thingsdown at anti-disengagement rallies and demonstrations.34 This situationmade it extremely difficult for radical settlers to challenge disengagementin a violent way, and the leaders of the settler movement were aware of thisfact.35 The settlement leaders tried to widen support not by talking aboutthe value of Eretz Yisrael, which was outside the consensus, but by focusingon the lack of democratic legitimacy for the move. The adoption of orange

INTRODUCTION 241

as the colour for the anti-disengagement campaign was a case in point,inspired as it was by the contemporaneous pro-democracy demonstrationsin the Ukraine. Similarly, the main demand of the settlers was for areferendum. In other words, even those at the political margins wereconstrained by the core values.

Neo-centrism is not simply a ‘reawakening’ of the old centrism. It isdifferent. It has been altered by the processes of liberalization andpostmodernization. As a consequence, the republican idealism thatcharacterized the old centre has been severely eroded. However, changehas not been as radical as proposed by the post-Zionists. Survey dataindicates that Israel has become a moderately postmodern country, aprocess constrained by the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict.36 Israeli societyhas become more individualistic, more consumerist, more liberal, lesstrusting of governmental elites, less collectivist and consequently less easilymobilized by the state for national missions. At the same time it hasretained its cultural core, as described above.

From a comparative perspective, this hybrid centrism is not unusual.According to Inglehart,37 the process of postmodernization is a universalone, connected to economic development and generational experiences.This process has led to greater liberalism and cultural pluralism withinWestern democracies since the 1960s. However, in all the countriessurveyed by Inglehart, only a minority completely adheres to thepostmaterial values carried by postmodernization. The largest group is inthe middle; it only adopts some of the ‘postmaterial’ values, while retainingother more traditional ‘materialist’ values. Furthermore, in contrast to thepredictions made by classic theories of modernization, Inglehart arguesthat postmodernization does not lead to cultural convergence andhomogeneity, but to parallel cultural developments. Societies retain theirdistinct cultural identities even as they undergo transformation. The waysocieties respond to postmodernization is partly influenced by the contentof their traditional culture and national experiences.38 In a similar vein,Anthony Smith and Samuel Huntington have noted the tenacity of nationalidentity among the public (as opposed to the elites) in the postmodernsocieties of the United States and Europe;39 while Rubinstein hasdemonstrated that Israel’s desire to blend liberal democracy andethnonationalism is not unique, but akin to the situation in many of thepost-Soviet democracies in Central Europe, and recognized as legitimate bythe European Council.40

NEO-CENTRISM: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

The political dimension of neo-centrism is grounded on the cultural core.However, it is more narrowly defined in that it consists of peoplewho politically identify with the centre and who prioritize the cultural

ISRAEL AFFAIRS242

dimension of neo-centrism and not of those who merely accept the culturalconsensus in general terms.

The coalescence of neo-centrism into a coherent political body has beena complex process that blended the old with the new. On the one hand, itbuilt on the prior existence of a centrist orientation among the publicwhich continued to exist even during the era of polarization in the 1980sand 1990s.41 However, after 2000, the number of those identifying with thecentre expanded. In 2003 most of the new centrists came from the Left, in2006 most of the new centrists came from the Right.42

Three factors forged this neo-centrism. First, exogenous shocks—thetwo Intifadas. The influence of these two events in undermining theclassical approaches of the Left and Right has already been discussedabove. In addition, following the collapse of the Oslo process, the publicbecame increasingly concerned that time was running out regarding thedemographic balance between Jews and Arabs in Israel, the West Bank andGaza combined. After 2000, experts estimated that there would cease to bea Jewish majority Israel between 2010 and 2020, if not sooner.43 It becameclear that demographic trends combined with the post-1967 territorialstatus quo represented a major threat to the maintenance of Israel’scharacter as a Jewish and democratic state. Paradoxically, the collapse ofOslo strengthened the need for a territorial solution to the demographicproblem.

The second factor that helped to forge neo-centrism was internalprocesses, such as postmodernization, as discussed above. In addition, therise of a more postmodern, diverse and fractured body politic increased thesense of perceived threat to the core values of centrism. Thus, the increasedpower of the Haredim led many centrists to feel that their democraticvalues were under threat. Many also resented subsidizing the Haredilifestyle. This contributed to the success of Shinui in 2003. Meanwhile, theincreased assertiveness of the Israeli Arabs on nationalist issues coupledwith their demographic growth led some centrists to perceive an increasedthreat to the Jewish character of the state. These fears contributed to therise of Yisrael Beitenu, which emphasized this issue in the 2006 election.

The third and final factor that helped to forge neo-centrism was thepolitical vacuum that existed prior to the election at the centre of thepolitical map, with neither Labour nor Likud being perceived as a crediblecentrist option by the public.

In terms of practical political objectives, the ‘Jewish and democratic’postmodern consensus translates into support for a large Jewish majorityinside the State of Israel. This means support, in principle, for the partitionof Eretz Israel; and an extensive Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.44

The question of how, when and to what degree to implement this remainscontentious, but the strategic direction is clear. Centrists supportcompromise not because they believe in peace but because they think

INTRODUCTION 243

that separation from the Palestinians will enhance their personal securityand neutralize the impact of demographic trends, thereby ensuring thatIsrael remains a Jewish and democratic state with a large Jewish majority.The emphasis on personal security, characteristic of postmodernization,45

fuelled massive support for the construction of the separation barrier,mentioned above, which embodies the concept of ‘separation’ thatunderlies the centre’s support for compromise. For centrists it is aboutdivorce rather than peace. This helps explain why most Israelis have beenequivocal about negotiations.

On the one hand, there has generally been support for dialogue, thoughwith a clear preference for negotiations over an interim agreement ratherthan permanent status talks. On the other hand, due to their greatscepticism regarding the outcome of negotiations and the desire to separatefrom the Palestinians and effect the demographic balance, a majorityconsistently supported the unilateral disengagement from Gaza andaround 40 percent supported Olmert’s Realignment plan (initially termed‘convergence’) for an extensive unilateral withdrawal from the West Bankwhen it was initially presented to the public during the election campaign.46

KADIMA CAPTURES THE CENTRE

Kadima’s electoral victory followed from its success, as pointed out above,in branding itself as credible centrist party. One survey demonstrated that40 percent of the public defined itself as centrist and these people togetherwith the overwhelming majority of Israelis positioned Kadima and itsleaders, Sharon and Olmert, in the centre, with Labour on the Left andLikud on the Right.47 Near its peak in the polls, Kadima attracted centristvoters from a number of different parties: 60 percent of former Shinuivoters, 50–60 percent of former Likud voters and 30–40 percent of formerLabour voters.48 Kadima also gained the support of centrist immigrantsfrom the FSU and centrist religious voters, as is demonstrated by Cohenand Khanin in their respective contributions to this volume.

Kadima’s centrist identity was made credible by numerous factorsincluding the fact that it drew in leading politicians from both the Left andthe Right, such as Shimon Peres, Daliah Itzik and Chaim Ramon fromLabour and Sharon, Olmert, Tzipi Livni and Shaul Mofaz from the Likud.

Another reason Kadima was able to capture the centre was its approachto peace and security. In this regard, the ability to attract the centrist voter isnot simply a function of the details of a party platform; it also relates to thedegree of correlation between the public’s view of the diplomatic andsecurity environment, especially its perception of the Arab/Palestinian side.Kadima’s overall approach was broadly centrist in that it combinedscepticism regarding the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement withwillingness for concessions and an emphasis on demography—preserving

ISRAEL AFFAIRS244

Israel’s identity as a Jewish and democratic state with a large Jewishmajority. Forty-two percent thought that Kadima’s main electoral asset wasits stance on peace and security.49

The image of leadership also played a role. Sharon’s standing with thepublic was far above that of any other politician.50 Eighty percent thoughthe was a real leader.51 He not only adopted what centrists considered to beappropriate policies, but he was also perceived to have implemented themsuccessfully. In particular, the defeat of suicide terrorism and the manner inwhich disengagement was implemented, without the expected level ofinternal violence. Furthermore, Sharon initially gave Kadima the mediavisibility, and thus wide public recognition, that other centrist partieswhich failed to pass the threshold, such as Tafnit, lacked. In any case, bothSharon and Olmert were always regarded in opinion polls as most capableof bringing peace and security. Correspondingly, Kadima’s leader wasalways the preferred candidate for prime minister.52

In contrast, the emphasis placed by Labour on economic and socialissues, its focus on helping the most vulnerable, may well have improved itselectoral performance on Israel’s periphery but it was nowhere near enoughto allow the party to challenge Kadima. Apart from lacking credibility onforeign and security affairs, Labour’s appeal to the poor was out of touchwith many of its middle class centrist supporters in the 1990s, whoswitched to Shinui in 2003 and Kadima in 2006. In contrast, Olmert’smessage chimed more with neo-centrist aspirations; a ‘vision’ he presentedin his pre-election interview with Ha’aretz that was aptly entitled, ‘ACountry that’s Fun to Live In’.

NEO-CENTRISM AND DIFFUSION

How can the victory of centrism be reconciled with the continued existenceof a diffused political map? The answer is that there is no inherentcontradiction between centrism and diffusion. The 2006 election wasabout the victory of the centre, particularly the victory of Kadima. Thecentre has always existed in Israeli politics; however between 1987 and2000 it began to alter its character as a result of both the underlyingprocess of postmodernization and the two Intifadas. For a while it seemedthat the existing cleavages were reinforced by the debate over theTerritories, thereby leading to a deeply split society. The political map wasextremely divided during those years, when the two major parties, Likudand Labour, obtained between 95 MKs (1981: 48 Likud and 47 Labour)and 76 MKs in 1992 (Labour 44 and Likud 32), culminating in a politicalassassination that appeared to take the country to the verge of a civil war.Subsequently, after 2000 the political centre was forged around what hasbeen described here as neo-centrism. While both Labour and Likud leaderstried to portray themselves as centrists they were perceived as remaining

INTRODUCTION 245

true to their respective Left–Right ideologies. Kadima moved into thevacuum with a centrist identity that resonated with the neo-centrist public.

There are two inter-related questions concerning the future of neo-centrism. First, will it survive, especially after the Second Lebanon War?Second, if it does have a future, what are the main challenges for neo-centrism?

The Second Lebanon War and Neo-Centrism

Only a few months after the elections, in summer 2006, Israel embarked onthe Second Lebanon War against Hezbollah. Despite numerousoperational successes, there was widespread and heavy criticism of thegovernment’s conduct of the war. Most Israelis felt that Israel did not winin a convincing enough manner.

At first glance, the results of the war seem to challenge the longevity ofneo-centrism in three ways. First, the public has blamed the currentgovernment led by Kadima for the perceived failure of the war; notOlmert’s predecessors who allowed the problem to develop following thewithdrawal in 2000. As a result, support for Kadima fell significantly andcracks appeared within the party. Meanwhile, support for the Likud rose.53

Second, the sustained rocket attacks on northern Israel by Hezbollahdramatically reduced support for a further unilateral withdrawal from theWest Bank—Olmert’s Realignment plan.54 The population of northernIsrael spent weeks in bomb shelters as normal life there came to a halt. Thiswas the result of the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. The samedynamic followed Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, as Kassammissiles reigned down on Israeli towns bordering the Gaza Strip.Consequently, most Israelis fear that a unilateral withdrawal from theWest Bank will expose them to continual bombardment, as such awithdrawal would probably put the bulk of Israeli population centreswithin missile range. Third, as a result of the above, Olmert had to shelvethe Realignment plan, which deprived Kadima of its main policy.Subsequently, the public debate over the conflict appeared, at least initially,to have been recast along familiar lines, with some on the Left calling for anagreement with Syria, while the Right emphasizes the importance ofdeterrence and opposition to concessions.

However, it would be a mistake to conclude that neo-centrism isfinished. The Realignment plan may yet return, perhaps in the format of aninterim agreement. But in any case, neo-centrism does not stand or fall withKadima and Realignment. Postmodern publics in general have becomeincreasingly fickle regarding party loyalty, so it would not beuncharacteristic if Kadima failed to last. Realignment was certainly oneexpression of the attitudes underlying neo-centrism, but it is definitely notthe only way neo-centrism can find programmatic expression. The newIsraeli centre remains wedded to the ‘Jewish and democratic’ base line.

ISRAEL AFFAIRS246

It is not going to support the ideology of Eretz Israel, nor has it suddenlyreversed its scepticism regarding the viability of a permanent statusnegotiated peace in the absence of a partner that is both able and willingto deliver on the other side. In order to win an election, any party willneed to frame its foreign and security policy in a way that is credible tothe centrist public’s underlying outlook. Labour and Likud lackedprogrammatic credibility in the 2006 election. Kadima lost credibilityduring the war, primarily because of its conduct and the standard of itsperformance.

The Challenges for Neo-Centrism

The first challenge for neo-centrism is how to cope with the negative by-product of the disenchantment with the visions of the Left and the Rightand the decline of republicanism. For the new consensus, based on greaterindividualism and a pragmatic realization of the limits of Israeli power tofulfil idealistic visions can lead to a sense of resignation and passivity.Indeed, this provides a possible explanation for the lower participation ofthe public in elections and political parties; coupled with the decline of thebelief among the public that it can really influence political outcomes.55

One way of potentially meeting this challenge would be to broaden thecentrist policy agenda beyond the Arab–Israeli conflict. There are otherissues, such as good governance/corruption, and religious–secularrelations on which there is potential for a clear-cut centrist policy agenda.Indeed, this is what Tafnit, the small centrist party that failed to cross theelectoral threshold, managed to craft; though it failed to succeed, in theshadow of Kadima.

The second challenge for neo-centrism concerns the tension betweencoherence and inclusiveness. The pluralistic nature of neo-centrism makesit imperative for any political party seeking to represent the centre to alsorepresent various sub-cultures, either within the party itself or as itscoalition partners. As Khanin argues in this volume, Olmert may havealready severely damaged Kadima’s future chances by disregarding theimportance of giving an FSU immigrant the Absorption portfolio. Olmertseemed to make similar mistake with Israeli Arabs as Kadima onlyincluded an Israeli Arab on its Knesset list as an afterthought.

Indeed, the challenge for centrism in this regard is at its greatestconcerning the Israeli Arab community. On the one hand, there wouldappear to be some potential for inclusion. Seventy percent of Israeli Arabsaccept a definition of Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic state, in whichJews and Arabs live together’, while 38 percent accept the Zionist principleof Israel’s right to preserve a Jewish majority.56 On the other hand,mainstream Israeli Arab attitudes towards the Israeli–Arab conflictconsistently diverge in a significant sense from Jewish Israeli attitudes.57

INTRODUCTION 247

Given the pervasiveness and vicissitudes of the conflict, this makes stablepolitical partnership very difficult.

Moreover, among those in the centre, who support partition fordemographic reasons, there are quite significant differences. The originalproponents of a wide-ranging unilateral disengagement such as Tafnitleader Uzi Dayan argued that it would assist the integration of IsraeliArabs.58 However, Avigdor Lieberman’s move towards the centre bysupport for partition involves the transfer of areas within pre-1967 Israeladjacent to the West Bank, and inhabited predominantly by IsraeliArabs, to a future Palestinian state. It also involves new, more stringentcriteria for full citizenship that are pertinent mainly for Israeli Arabs.These are similar to schemes proposed by the far right Techiya and Tzometparties in the past.

This ambivalence among the elite is also reflected in the attitudes of theJewish public. In 2006, 60 percent of Israelis favoured equality for Arabcitizens, up from 52 percent in 2003. However, only 38 percent of IsraeliJews categorically opposed the idea that the government should encourageArab emigration.59 Following the Second Lebanon War, when key Arab-Israeli leaders were perceived as identifying more with Syria and Hezbollahthan with Israel, the results of one poll were that 78 percent of Israeli Jewsbelieved that Israeli Arabs constitute a fifth column.60

The existence of a strong centre, which in 2006 gave most of its vote toKadima and some to mid-size parties like the Pensioners, Shas and IsraelBeiteinu, moderated the traditional cleavages in Israeli society. Theemergence of neo-centrism softened those dichotomies which had beenreinforced by the territorial issue and which formed a cloud over Israelipolitics in recent decades. Among those divides, the Jewish–Arab cleavage,which had been reinforced by the rise of religion, has maintained itsstrength, proving to be the most resilient.

NOTES

1. Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, London, 1978; Dan Horowitz and MosheLissak, Trouble in Utopia, Albany, 1989, chapter 3.

2. Shmuel Sandler, The State of Israel, The Land of Israel, Westport, 1993, chapter 6.3. Asher Arian, Nir Atmor and Yael Hadar, The Democracy Index 2006, Jerusalem, 2006, p. 90.4. Shmuel Sandler and Ben Molov, ‘Israel at the Polls: A New Turning Point in the Political

History of the Jewish State’, in Shmuel Sandler, Ben Mollov and Jonathan Rynhold (eds.),Israel at the Polls 2003, London, 2005, pp. 8–10.

5. On the barrier and unilateralism see Jonathan Rynhold, ‘Israel’s Fence: Can Separation MakeBetter Neighbours?’, Survival, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2004), pp. 55–76.

6. On the role of the Intifada in changing Israeli opinion, see Asher Arian, Security Threatened,Cambridge, 1995.

7. Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace, New York, 2004, pp. 3–14, 650–758; Gilad Sher, WithinTouching Distance, Tel Aviv, 2001, pp. 382–88 (Hebrew).

8. Jonathan Rynhold and Gerald Steinberg, ‘The Peace Process and the 2003 Israeli Elections’,Israel Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2004), pp. 181–204.

ISRAEL AFFAIRS248

9. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, The Origins of the Israeli Polity, Chicago, 1978, chapter 3and pp. 85–204.

10. Giora Goldberg, ‘The Struggle for Legitimacy—Herut’s Road from Opposition to Power’, inStuart A. Cohen and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (eds.), Conflict and Consensus in Jewish PoliticalLife, Ramat Gan, 1986, pp. 146–69.

11. Sandler, The State of Israel, The Land of Israel.12. See the discussion below.13. See Shmuel Sandler, ‘Ben-Gurion’s Attitude towards the Soviet Union’, Jewish Journal of

Sociology, Vol. 21 (December 1979), pp. 154–56.14. Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank: A Study in

Intercommunal Conflict, Lexington, MA, 1984.15. Sandler, The State of Israel, The Land of Israel.16. Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler (eds.), Israel’s Odd Couple: The 1984 Elections and the

National Unity Government, Detroit, MI, 1987.17. Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness, Berkeley, CA, 2001.18. Yoav Peled, ‘Will Israel be a “State of its Citizens” on its 100th birthday?’, Studies in Law

(Summer 2001), pp. 45–72, (Hebrew); see also Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, The NewIsraelis, Cambridge, 2002.

19. Uri Ram, ‘The Israeli Public Sphere between Capitalism and Fundamentalism’’, Israel Studies,Vol. 3, No. 1 (1998), pp. 24–44; Uri Ram, The Globalization of Israel, London, 2006;Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995).

20. Amos Elon, The Israelis, 2nd edition, London, 1983.21. Alasdair McIntyre, After Virtue, London, 1981, p. 207.22. Efraim Ya’ar, ‘Continuity and Change in Israeli Society’, Israel Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2005),

pp. 95–127.23. Arian et al., The Democracy Index 2006.24. In 1990 21 percent of citizens were proud to be German; the figure was 58 percent in the UK

and 85 percent in the US. Cited in Russell Dalton, Politics in Germany, 2nd edition, London,1993, p. 117.

25. Efraim Ya’ar and Tamar Hermann, ‘The Peace Index’, August 2003, Tami Steinmetz Centrefor Peace, Tel Aviv University, available at http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace (accessed 25October 2003).

26. Ya’ar, ‘Continuity and Change in Israeli Society’; Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn and ElihuKatz, A Portrait of Israeli Jewry: Beliefs, Observances and Values among Israeli Jews,Jerusalem, 2002.

27. Arian et al., The Democracy Index 2006, pp. 11, 44.28. Levy et al., A Portrait of Israeli Jewry.29. Ibid.30. Links to the parties’ platforms can be found at the Knesset website, http://www.knesset.gov.il/

elections17/eng/list/ListIndex_eng.asp.31. Yossi Beilin, ‘First and Foremost a Jew’, Ha’aretz, 15 May 2006; Shulamit Aloni, ‘An Israeli

without Hyphens’, Ha’aretz, 16 May 2006.32. Yaakov Katz, ‘Sharon: Keep IDF out of Gaza Debate’, Jerusalem Post, 13 September 2004;

Tamar Lazaroff, ‘Settler Rabbis say Dichter’s Report Baseless’, Jerusalem Post, 6 July 2004;’Peace Index’, September 2004.

33. See research conducted by Anat Roth for her PhD thesis on ‘The Council of Settlements(Moetzet Yesha) in the Wake of the Disengagement’, Ramat Gan, forthcoming (Hebrew).

34. Yaacov Katz and Mathew Wagner, ‘War of the Camps’, Jerusalem Post, 30 September 2005.35. Personal communication with authors.36. Ephraim Ya’ar, ‘Value Prioritisation in Israeli Society’, Comparative Sociology, Vol. 1, Nos.

3–4 (2002), pp. 327–347; See also Shlomo Egoz, ‘Similarities and Contrasts in IsraeliPolitical Culture: The Inter-generational Dimension’, PhD thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 2005(Hebrew).

37. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, Princeton, NJ, 1997.38. Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker, ‘Modernization’s Challenge to Traditional Values: Who’s

afraid of Ronald McDonald?’, The Futurist, Vol. 35, No. 2 (March/April 2001), pp. 16–21.

INTRODUCTION 249

39. Anthony D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of Europe’, International Affairs, Vol. 68,No. 1 (1992), pp. 1–16; Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? America’s Great Debate, NewYork, 2005.

40. Amnon Rubinstein, ‘Zionism’s Compatriots’, Azure, No. 16 (Winter 2004), pp. 111–122.41. See the chronological tables of Left–Centre–Right voter self-identification presented in Arian

et al., The Democracy Index 2006, p. 86.42. Ibid.43. Lilly Galili, ‘Jewish Demographic State’, Ha’aretz, 30 June 2002; Amiram Barkat, ‘For First

Time, Jews are no Longer a Majority between the Jordan and the Sea’, Ha’aretz, 11 August2005. Others claimed that Jews would continue to outnumber Palestinians by about 60–40,see Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid and Michael Wise, The Million Person Gap: The ArabPopulation in the West Bank and Gaza, Ramat Gan (2006).

44. For details, see the essay by Jonathan Rynhold in this volume entitled, ‘Peace and Security inthe 2006 Election’.

45. Avi Kober, ‘Western Democracies in Low-Intensity Conflicts: Post-Modern Aspects’, Reviewof International Affairs, Vols. 2–3 (Spring 2003), pp. 3–20.

46. See Rynhold, ‘Peace and Security in the 2006 Election’.47. Yossi Verter, ‘Kadima still in the Driver’s Seat’, Ha’aretz, 23 February 2006.48. Yossi Verter, ‘Poll: Likud, Labor, Shinui voters back Sharon’, Ha’aretz, 9 December 2005;

Dahaf poll cited in Yediot Ahronot, 25 November 2005.49. Teleseker poll cited in Ma’ariv, 20 January 2006.50. Ibid.51. Yossi Verter, ‘The People’s Choice’, Ha’aretz, 14 March 2005.52. Dahaf polls cited in Yediot Ahronot, 25 November 2006; 23 December 2006; 13 January

2006; 24 February 2006; 10 March 2006; 17 March 2006; Teleseker poll cited in Ma’ariv, 30December 2005; Dialogue poll cited in Ha’aretz, 4 January 2006.

53. See polls carried out by Dahaf for Yediot Ahronot and Smith Research for the Jerusalem Post,both published on 22 September 2006.

54. Ibid.55. Arian et al., The Democracy Index 2006.56. David Rudge, ‘Most Israeli Arabs Support ’67 Borders’, Jerusalem Post, 16 May 2004.57. These results are consistently found in the monthly polls of Ya’ar and Hermann, ‘The Peace

Index’.58. Author interview, 2003.59. Arian et al., The Democracy Index 2006, p. 45.60. Smith Research Poll, Jerusalem Post, 22 September 2006.

ISRAEL AFFAIRS250