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Master in Global Energy Transition and Governance 2018-2019
TURKISH ENERGY
TRANSITION AND
CURRENT CHALLENGES
Author: Cüneyt Taha Özkan
Supervisor: Gilles Lepesant
Abstract Turkish energy system has experienced a radical reform process starting from the 70’s in line
with global trends mainly in developed countries. Turkish energy transition pathway consists of
an extensive restructuring of the energy market and this fact led to serious changes in the roles
of market actors. The major factors which leads to such a transition are the swiftly growing
energy demand and the high rates of dependency on imported energy sources. Turkey has one
of the fastest growing energy demand among IEA member states and import dependency ratio
is close to 70% in primary energy sources. This paper tries to explain the factors inhibiting or
accelerating the energy transition in Turkey while describing Turkish energy market reforms
with a particular focus on the electricity market and on the issue of energy efficiency. It tries to
explain the historical evolution of Turkish energy market and electricity market liberalization,
taking into account the changes of roles of market players and other actors. illustrates the current
situation and the evolution of Turkish renewable energy and energy efficiency policies and
regulations which give direction to the Turkish clean energy transition process. Turkey has
experienced a fast proliferation of renewable energy sources in mainly in electricity production
thanks to those policies and regulations.
Ek 1: Bursiyer ve Programa Ait Bilgi Formu
Adı-Soyadı Cüneyt Taha Özkan
Sözleşme No. TR2016/DG/04/A1-01/1098
Başvuru Yaptığı Sektör
(Kamu-Üniversite-Özel Sektör) Kamu
Başvuru Esnasında Bağlı Bulunulan Kurum Enerji Piyasaları İşletme A.Ş.
Başvuru Esnasında Bağlı Bulunulan Kurumdaki Unvan
Eğitim ve Araştırma Uzman Yardımcısı
Çalışma Alanı (AB Müktesebat Başlığı) Enerji
Öğrenim Görülen Ülke Fransa
Öğrenim Görülen Şehir Nice
Programın Öğretim Dili İngilizce
Üniversite Centre International de Formation Européenne
Fakülte -
Bölüm -
Program Adı Master in Global Energy Transition and Governance
Programın Başlangıç/Bitiş Tarihleri (PDS belgesindeki tarihler)
15.10.2018 / 26.06.2019
Öğrenim Süresi (ay) 9 months
Tez/Araştırma Çalışmasının Başlığı Türkiye Enerji Dönüşümü ve Mevcut Engeller
Danışmanının Adı/Soyadı Dr. Gilles Lepesant
Danışmanının E-posta Adres/leri [email protected]
NOT: Bu sayfa bilgisayar ortamında doldurulduktan sonra tez/araştırma raporu metnine ilgili sıra ile eklenmelidir.
Annex 1: Scholar and Programme Information Form
Name/Surname Cüneyt Taha Özkan
Contract No. TR2016/DG/04/A1-01/1098
Sector as of the Application Date
(Public Sector-University-Private Sector) Public
Institution as of the Application Date Enerji Piyasaları İşletme A.Ş.
Title as of the Application Date Research and Training Assistant Specialist
Field of Study (i.e. EU Acquis Chapter) Energy
Country of Host Institution France
City of Host Institution Nice
Language of the Programme English
Host Institution Centre International de Formation Européenne
Faculty -
Department -
Name of the Programme Master in Global Energy Transition and Governance
Start/End Dates of the Programme (as in the PDS) 15.10.2018 / 26.06.2019
Duration of the Programme (months) 9 months
Title of the Dissertation/ Research Study The Turkish Energy Transition and Current Challenges
Name of the Advisor Dr. Gilles Lepesant
E-mail/s of the Advisor [email protected]
NOT: Bu sayfa bilgisayar ortamında doldurulduktan sonra tez/araştırma raporu metnine ilgili sıra ile eklenmelidir.
1
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... 0
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 3
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 5
Chapter 1. Historical Evolution of Turkish Energy Market ......................................... 8
1.1 Market Reforms of 2001 .................................................................................. 12
1.1.1 Energy Market Regulatory Agency (EMRA) ........................................... 12
1.1.2 Unbundling of Activities ........................................................................... 13
1.1.3 Other Reforms ........................................................................................... 14
1.2 2004 Strategy Document .................................................................................. 16
1.3 Balancing & Settlement ................................................................................... 17
1.4 Tariff Structure ................................................................................................. 18
1.5 The new Electricity Market Law of 2013 ........................................................ 20
Chapter 2. Policies and Legislations on Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency . 23
2.1 2004 Strategy Document .................................................................................. 23
2.2 2009 Strategy Paper ......................................................................................... 24
2.3 2014 National Renewable Energy Action Plan ................................................ 26
2.4 Legislations ...................................................................................................... 29
2.5 2005 Renewables Law ..................................................................................... 32
2.6 Amendments to Renewable Energy Law ......................................................... 33
2.7 Unlicensed Generation ..................................................................................... 36
2.8 Renewable Energy Resource Areas (YEKA) - Auction System for Renewables
.................................................................................................................................... 38
2.9 Other Legislations Promoting Energy Generation from Renewables .............. 40
2
2.10 Energy Efficiency Policies and Regulations .................................................. 40
Chapter 3. PESTLE Factors That Affect the Success of Renewable Energy Policies in
Turkey ............................................................................................................................. 44
3.1 Political ............................................................................................................ 44
3.1.1 The Coal Issue ........................................................................................... 44
3.2 Economic.......................................................................................................... 46
3.2.1 Increasing burden of feed-in tariff ............................................................ 46
3.2.2 Jobs and economic activity ....................................................................... 48
3.3. Social ............................................................................................................... 50
3.4 Technological ................................................................................................... 51
3.4.1 System Integration Challenges of Variable Renewable Energy Sources.. 51
3.5 Legal ................................................................................................................. 51
3.6 Environmental .................................................................................................. 53
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 56
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 58
Appendix .................................................................................................................... 60
Table 2.3: Status of YEKA auction design elements, as of December 2018 (SHURA,
2018) ........................................................................................................................... 60
3
Abbreviations
BO Build-Operate
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer
BPM Balancing Power Market
DAM Day-Ahead Market
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIE Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (under
MENR)
EML Electricity Market Law
EMRA/EPDK Energy Market Regulatory Authority - Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu
ETS Emission Trading System
EPİAŞ Turkish Energy Exchange - Enerji Piyasaları İşletme Anonim Şirketi
EU European Union
EÜAŞ Electricity Generation Corporation - Elektrik Üretim Anonim Şirketi
FiT Feed-in Tariff
IEA International Energy Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
MBI Market Based Instrument
MCP Market Clearing Price
MENR/ETKB Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources - Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar
Bakanlığı
MYTM National Load Dispatch Center - Milli Yük Tevzi Merkezi
NDC/INDC (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions
4
NETA New Electricity Trading Arrangement
PESTLE Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental
PMR Partnership for Market Readiness
PMUM Market Financial Settlement Center - Piyasa Mali Uzlaştırma Merkezi
PPA Power Purchase Agreement
PV Photovoltaic
REC Renewable Energy Certificate
REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century
RES Renewable Energy Source(s)
TBSR Transitional Balancing and Settlement Regulation
TEAŞ Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission Company - Türkiye Elektrik
Üretim-İletim Anonim Şirketi
TEDAŞ Turkish Electricity Distribution Company - Türkiye Elektrik Dağıtım Anonim
Şirketi
TEİAŞ Turkish Electricity Generation Corporation - Türkiye Elektrik İletim Anonim
Şirketi
TEK Turkish Electricity Authority
TETAŞ Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Corporation - Türkiye Elektrik
Ticaret ve Taahhüt Anonim Şirketi
TOR Transfer of Operating Rights
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VRE Variable Renewable Energy (Wind and Solar)
YEKA Renewable Energy Resource Areas - Yenilenebilir Enerji Kaynak Alanları
YEKDEM Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism - Yenilenebilir Enerji
Kaynakları Destekleme Mekanizması
ABSTRACT
Turkish energy system has experienced a radical reform process starting from the 70’s in line
with global trends mainly in developed countries. Turkish energy transition pathway consists
of an extensive restructuring of the energy market and this fact led to serious changes in the
roles of market actors. The major factors which leads to such a transition are the swiftly
growing energy demand and the high rates of dependency on imported energy sources.
Turkey has one of the fastest growing energy demand among IEA member states and import
dependency ratio is close to 70% in primary energy sources. This paper tries to explain the
factors inhibiting or accelerating the energy transition in Turkey while describing Turkish
energy market reforms with a particular focus on the electricity market and on the issue of
energy efficiency. It tries to explain the historical evolution of Turkish energy market and
electricity market liberalization, taking into account the changes of roles of market players
and other actors, illustrates the current situation and the evolution of Turkish renewable
energy and energy efficiency policies and regulations which give direction to the Turkish
clean energy transition process. Turkey has experienced a fast proliferation of renewable
energy sources in mainly in electricity production thanks to those policies and regulations.
ÖZET
Türk enerji sistemi, 70'lerden başlayarak, özellikle gelişmiş ülkelerdeki küresel eğilimler
doğrultusunda radikal bir reform süreci yaşamıştır. Türkiye'nin enerji geçiş yolu, enerji
piyasasının kapsamlı bir şekilde yeniden yapılandırılmasından oluşmaktadır ve bu durum
piyasa aktörlerinin rollerinde ciddi değişikliklere yol açmıştır. Böyle bir geçişe yol açan
temel faktörler, hızla büyüyen enerji talebi ve ithal enerji kaynaklarına yüksek bağımlılık
oranlarıdır. Türkiye, IEA üyesi ülkeler arasında en hızlı büyüyen enerji talebinden birine
sahiptir ve birincil enerji kaynaklarında ithalat bağımlılığı oranı% 70'e yakındır. Bu çalışma,
Türkiye enerji piyasası reformlarını özellikle elektrik piyasasına ve enerji verimliliği
konusuna odaklanarak açıklarken, Türkiye'de enerji geçişini engelleyen veya hızlandıran
faktörleri açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Piyasa oyuncularının ve diğer aktörlerin rollerindeki
değişiklikleri dikkate alarak, Türkiye enerji piyasasının ve elektrik piyasasının
serbestleştirilmesinin tarihsel gelişimini açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Türkiye'nin temiz enerji
geçiş sürecine yön veren, Türkiye'nin yenilenebilir enerji ve enerji verimliliği politika ve
düzenlemelerinin mevcut durumunu ve gelişimini göstermektedir. Türkiye, bu politikalar ve
düzenlemeler sayesinde, esas olarak elektrik üretiminde yenilenebilir enerji kaynaklarının
hızla yayılmasını sağlamıştır.
5
Introduction
“Through a variety of interlinked measures, Turkey’s energy reforms have achieved
energy security for a fast-growing economy with rapidly increasing energy needs. These
measures include legislation regarding electricity, gas, renewable energy, and energy
efficiency; the establishment of an energy sector regulatory authority; energy price
reform; the creation of a functional electricity market and large-scale introduction of
natural gas; the restructuring of state-owned energy enterprises; and large-scale private
sector participation through privatization and new investment. As a result, (a) an
electricity market with over 800 participants has been developed, (b) from 2001 to 2014
over 30,000 megawatts (MW) of market-based, private-sector power generation capacity
was commissioned; and (c) investors took over the entire power distribution system
between 2008 and 2013.” (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
“The Turkish energy sector reforms should be studied within the context of global
restructuring and energy market trends. Energy industry is global with increasing
interconnections of electricity and pipeline networks, increased trade of oil, products, and
natural gas (both in liquefied form as LNG and via pipelines); climate change is another
factor that brings countries together to focus on emissions from the energy industry.
Turkey is, in some ways, a leader and, in many other ways, a follower of sector trends.
As a country that is heavily dependent on energy imports but one that is also playing an
increasingly important role as a conduit between resource-rich regions of the Caspian and
Middle East and consumers in Europe and elsewhere, Turkey learned from the
experiences of others as the country restructured its energy sectors but also has a lot to
offer in lessons learned.” (Atiyas, Çetin, & Gülen, 2012)
As the quote above explains to some extent, Turkish energy system has experienced a
radical reform process starting from the 70’s in line with global trends mainly in
developed countries. Turkish energy transition pathway consists of an extensive
restructuring of the energy market and this fact led to serious changes in the roles of
market actors. The first step towards a modern Turkish energy market structure was the
market liberalization, which is followed by a transition from a fossil-based energy sources
to a system in which renewable energy sources constitutes a significant share in total
6
energy consumption of the country thanks to progressive energy policies and renewable
energy support mechanisms.
The major factors which leads to such a transition are the swiftly growing energy
demand and the high rates of dependency on imported energy sources. Turkey has one of
the fastest growing energy demand among IEA member states and import dependency
ratio is close to 70% in primary energy sources. “To meet this growing demand while
dealing with import dependency, Turkey decided to transform its energy markets and
started implementing major market reforms. The main objectives were to establish
financially viable, stable, transparent, and competitive markets under independent
regulation to ensure reliable and affordable energy supply to consumers in an
environmentally friendly manner. These objectives are based on several laws and
covering most aspects of the relevant European Union (EU) acquis. According to the
EU’s Turkey 2018 Progress Report “Turkey has continued to align with the EU acquis.
As regards the internal energy market, good progress was made on the electricity market
and good progress can be reported on renewable energy and energy efficiency.”
(Bayraktar, 2018)
This paper tries to explain the factors inhibiting or accelerating the energy transition
in Turkey while describing Turkish energy market reforms with a particular focus on the
electricity market and on the issue of energy efficiency. Although there are various
definitions of the term energy transition, it is defined as an irreversible and persistent
structural change in the energy system for the purpose of this study. Turkish energy
transition is examined in two dimensions; first the changes in electricity market structure
and second, the renewable energy and energy efficiency policies and regulations which
substantially reformed the energy system of the country.
The first chapter tries to explain the historical evolution of Turkish energy market and
electricity market liberalization, taking into account the changes of roles of market
players and other actors. It is not possible to understand Turkish energy transition
pathway without learning how the energy system evolved over time and which actors
took part in the transition.
The second chapter illustrates the current situation and the evolution of Turkish
renewable energy and energy efficiency policies and regulations which give direction to
7
the Turkish clean energy transition process. Turkey has experienced a fast proliferation
of renewable energy sources in mainly in electricity production thanks to those policies
and regulations.
However, future success of this transition depends on various factors. To be able to
map those factors that inhibit or accelerate the transition, PESTLE analysis method is
utilized in the third chapter. The PESTLE analysis is a useful and comprehensive tool to
illustrate political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental factors that
may alter the future success of the energy transition in a country.
8
Chapter 1. Historical Evolution of Turkish Energy
Market
In the beginning of 1960’s, after the establishment of State Planning Organization,
five-year development plans are prepared for the period between 1963-67 and 1967-71.
It was determined in the first five-year development plan (1963-1967) and the second
five-year development plan (1967-1971) that the whole electricity generation,
distribution, transmission and trading activities would be under public authority control.
In accordance with those plans, national electricity monopoly company, TEK (Türkiye
Elektrik Kurumu - Turkish Electricity Authority) was established in 1970, with a
monopoly over all activities carried out in the electricity market. Ironically, in Turkish
language, the word “tek” can be translated into English as “only one, single”. The
establishment of TEK as a state-owned public company created the vertically integrated
structure in the Turkish electricity market. (Çetintaş & Bicil, 2015)
“Until the 1970s the system was fragmented. Except for some regional networks, the
transmission and distribution systems were not interconnected; instead they were owned
and operated by different public administrations, and all electrification programs were
carried by different public entities. Municipalities and private concessionary companies
had their own rights and responsibilities with respect to electricity generation,
transmission, distribution, and sales. Although there were several public organizations
dealing with electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, there was no central
planning.” (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
There were several efforts to liberalize the energy market and to attract private capital
in 1980’s and 1990’s. It was partly a result of the transformation of the whole economy
from import substitution policy regime to the export-oriented and market-oriented
regime. Import substitution policy regime can be summarized as the heavy state
involvement in various economic activities, especially those which are considered of
strategic importance, such as energy and telecommunications. Another important driver
for these liberalization efforts was the need of huge investments to meet growing energy
demand. A prominent scholar in the field of energy economics in Turkey explained this
situation as the following: “In addition, there was a strong public finance reason for
9
privatization: throughout the 1990s Turkey experienced high public deficits and mounting
public debt. Forecasting high growth in electricity demand, and high investment
requirements to build the necessary generation capacity, Turkish governments wanted to
reduce the burden on the public budget by attracting private investment to the industry.”
(Atiyas et al., 2012)
To be able to attract private investments, three types of contracts between private
actors and the government were introduced: BO (Build-Operate), BOT (Build-Operate-
Transfer) and TOR (Transfer of Operating Rights). “In the 1980s and 1990s, attempts to
engage the private sector took the form of designing investment schemes such as BOT,
BO, and transfer of operating rights (TOR) contracts. The first law that established a legal
framework for private sector participation in the electricity industry was enacted in 1984
(Law No. 3096). This law introduced two types of contracts: BOT contracts for new
generation facilities and TOR for existing generation and distribution facilities. A BOT
was a concession through which a company would build and operate a generation plant
for 99 years (later reduced to 49 years) and then transfer the plant to the state at no cost.
A TOR was a lease-like arrangement under which the private company would operate
and, where necessary, rehabilitate a government-owned facility for a specified period of
time. The attractiveness of the BOT projects was enhanced in 1994 through Law No.
3996, which provided tax exemptions and authorized the treasury to grant guarantees. In
1997, the BO model was introduced through Law No. 4283. Investments under the BO
model were also eligible for treasury guarantees.” (Atiyas et al., 2012)
“Under the BOT model, companies were allowed to build and operate power plants,
selling their generation to the public utility (TEK and later TEAŞ and TEDAŞ) through a
combination of long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) and “assignment” or
concession contracts between the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) and
the company. At the end of each contract, the plant was transferred to public ownership.
The terms and PPA price were determined in the main contract and TEAŞ had to sign the
PPA according to the main contract.” (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
“As a result of BOT model implementation, 24 power plants were commissioned
between 1984 and 2001: 18 hydro, 2 wind, and 4 natural gas Combined Cycle Gas
Turbine. As shown in Figure 1.1, in 1994 BOT installed power was only 35 MW; most
10
of these plants were contracted and commissioned after 1994; and the total installed
power of these BOT plants reached 2,450 MW. Compared with the country’s energy
needs, as well as the government’s continuous efforts and ambitious expectations, this
outcome cannot be considered as satisfactory.” (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
Figure 1.1 - Development of the BOT Plant Capacity 1984-2005
There were some structural problems regarding BO and BOT contracts that prevented
increased competition in the electricity market for several reasons. Firstly, some of those
contracts were awarded without a competitive procedure, there are some claims that some
of them were selected among bids from preselected companies. Another reason was the
fact that those contracts were designed so as to provide earlier cost recovery for investors,
this led to expensive electricity purchase by the state, especially for the first years of
contracts. Finally, those contracts included take-or-pay clauses which means that they did
not have to compete in the market, all commercial risks were taken by the state. State was
buying the electricity from those facilities with a fixed price; thus, it did not enhance cost
minimization. Private investors were competing for the market through the tenders
organized for BO, BOT and TOR contracts. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
Another type of private electricity generators at the time were autoproducers, which
were mainly industrial companies which need heat in their production processes, and the
electricity production is not the main objective. Before the liberalization period, there
were some state-owned industrial facilities (e.g. sugar factories) functioning as
cogeneration power plants. The government decided to incentivize autoproducers to
11
increase investments in electricity supply, their numbers and shares increased
significantly. New cogeneration plants were built mainly to generate electricity, and
autoproducer groups were formed. Autoproducer groups refer to industrial companies
coming together and establishing a generation company to meet their own electricity
needs, and selling excess energy to TEAŞ or TEDAŞ with a fixed price regardless of the
generation time. The growth of autoproducer power plant installed capacity at the time is
shown in Figure 1.2. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
Figure 1.2 Growth of Autoproducer Plant Installed Capacity, 1984–2001 (MW)
(Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
There had been an attempt to privatize TEK by selling ownership rights in 1994.
Constitutional Court intervened and cancelled relevant legislation since it was concerned
about foreign ownership of a strategic industry such as energy, and another concern was
the fact that there were no provisions preventing excess market power in forms of
monopolization and cartelization. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
The first unbundling of activities related to electricity system took place in 1993, when
the state monopoly, TEK was divided into two separate corporate entities: TEAŞ (Turkish
Electricity Generation and Transmission Company) and TEDAŞ (Turkish Electricity
Distribution Company). TEAŞ was responsible for electricity generation, transmission
and wholesale activities whereas TEDAŞ was in charge of electricity distribution.
However, both of these companies were publicly owned monopolies and this attempt did
12
not cause a change in the vertically integrated structure of the electricity sector in Turkey.
Electricity market structure of that period is illustrated in Figure 1.3 below.
Figure 1.3 Electricity Market Structure in 2000 (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
1.1 Market Reforms of 2001
“Dissatisfaction with the BOT–BO model of private participation in electricity had
already led the bureaucracy to search for more competitive models of electricity supply.
A stabilization program supported by the IMF and the World Bank became instrumental
in pursuing a more fundamental restructuring of the electricity industry through the
adoption of the electricity market law (EML, Law No. 4628) in 2001. Electricity Market
Law envisaged a competitive market, liberalization of both supply and demand and the
creation of an independent regulatory authority.” (Atiyas et al., 2012)
1.1.1 Energy Market Regulatory Agency (EMRA)
One of the major reforms of 2001 EML was the establishment of the energy market
regulator. Electricity Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) was the regulator of
electricity markets with wide powers to issue secondary legislation. After the enactment
of Gas Market Law in 2001 and Petroleum Market Law in 2003, the EMRA was also
given authority over the natural gas and oil industries. Its name was also changed to
Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA).
13
The EML describes the EMRA as an ‘‘independent, administratively, and financially
autonomous public institution’’. It is governed by its own board which consists of nine
members and a president, appointed for 6 years by the Council of Ministers. The Board
members cannot hold jobs in the industry for 2 years after their term in office is
completed.
1.1.2 Unbundling of Activities
There is no doubt that another main pillar of the liberalization of the electricity market
is unbundling of activities, namely distribution, transmission, generation, trading and
supply. “Under the new regime, public assets were legally unbundled into separate public
companies: TEAŞ was separated into EÜAŞ, the Electricity Generation Corporation,
TEİAŞ, the Turkish Electricity Transmission Corporation, and TETAŞ, Turkish
Electricity Trading and Contracting Corporation, a wholesale trading company. It was
envisaged that assets owned by EÜAŞ and TEDAŞ would be privatized. Transmission
activities, on the other hand, would remain under public ownership. The primary task of
TETAŞ was to take over all energy sale and purchase agreement of TEDAŞ and TEAŞ,
including energy purchase and sales agreements entered into under BOT, BO, and TOR
contracts and also export and import contracts. Also, initially EÜAŞ would sell all the
electricity it has generated to TETAŞ. The idea was that the relatively expensive
electricity purchased through BOT, BO, and TOR contacts would be balanced by what
was perceived to be relatively cheap electricity purchased from EÜAŞ and the electricity
would be sold under a uniform price to TEDAŞ. Hence essentially, TETAŞ would work
under an average cost pricing scheme.” (Atiyas et al., 2012)
Electricity market structure changed after 2001 reforms, following the unbundling of
activities and new private actors emerged in the sector. Figure 1.4 from the World Bank
report illustrates the structure of the market at the time.
14
Figure 1.4 Electricity Market Structure After 2001 Electricity Market Law (Dilli &
Nyman, 2015)
1.1.3 Other Reforms
The market model introduced by the 2001 Electricity Market Law had two pillars, a
market for bilateral contracts and a balancing mechanism to provide real-time balance
between supply and demand of electricity. This system had many similarities with the
New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) of England and Wales which was
introduced at the same year, 2001. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
The new Electricity Market Law of 2001 defined each activity regarding electricity
sector, namely generation, wholesale trade, transmission, distribution and retail supply to
final consumers. To be able to provide any of these activities required obtaining a licence
from the energy regulator, EMRA. On the supply side, it was carried out by state company
EÜAŞ, Electricity Generation Corporation, and some other private generators who
possess a generator licence issued by the regulator. Private generators also included
autoproducers, which generate electricity for their own use, and they were able to sell
generated surplus electricity to the market. Distribution companies were able to supply
electricity to final consumer provided that they were granted a retail licence by the
regulator. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
15
This new system liberalized the demand side of the electricity market as well, together
with the introduction of the concept “eligible consumer”. According to the provisions of
the Electricity Market Law, EMRA was assigned to determine a level of consumption
and consumers exceeding that level of annual consumption would be defined as “eligible
consumers” and they had the freedom to choose their electricity supplier. This eligibility
threshold was set to 9 million kWh per year, and it is being reduced gradually since then.
In 2019, the limit is reduced to 1600 kWh/year.
The privatization of generation and distribution assets was another crucial step for the
market liberalization. Electricity market law of 2001 mentioned privatization of state-
owned facilities and assets, but provisions including further details and a timetable was
provided with a strategy document issued in 2004. This document prioritized the
privatization of distribution companies over generation facilities, with the assumption that
private distributors would facilitate new entrants to generation side. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
Turkey was divided into 21 distribution regions, and 21 companies were founded for each
region, with a distribution licence issued by regulator (EMRA) for 49 years.
It was expected by policy makers that private distributors would reduce losses and
theft better than public authorities, as the theft and loss in suburbs of big cities and less
developed, socially frustrated regions were and still is a big problem.(Atiyas et al., 2012)
Loss and theft in distribution network is the amount of energy lost inside the grid due to
technical reasons, accompanied with the illegal withdrawal of energy from the grid
without paying for it. Izak Atiyas explained the causes as the following: “The fact that
loss ratios were highest in provinces that have suffered most from violence associated
with the Kurdish problem also suggests the presence of deeply rooted social factors. There
is anecdotal evidence that theft is also high in poorer districts and shanty towns in some
urban centers (most notably in Istanbul) and that in some cases industrialists engage in
large amounts of theft in areas where law enforcement is weak.”(Atiyas et al., 2012)
According to data published by EMRA for the year 2017, out of 21, 2 distribution regions
have the share of loss & theft over 50 per cent, and third highest has 25%. (EMRA, 2018)
16
1.2 2004 Strategy Document
The Strategy Document, which is issued for the implementation of Electricity Market
Law, introduced several types of transitional contracts between major actors of the
industry. One type being the contracts between EÜAŞ hydro power plants and TETAŞ,
the trading company. These contracts were used to balance TETAŞ wholesale electricity
prices that distributors have to pay, since TETAŞ was also buying expensive electricity
from private electricity generators. Other type of transitional contract was between
TETAŞ and distribution companies, which were to sell electricity purchased from EÜAŞ
and private generators. Another type being contracts between distributors and generators
for maximum 5 years period, and afterwards, they were meant to be replaced by market-
based contracts. The last type of transitional contracts was between distributors and
suppliers. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
The privatization process of distribution companies took more time than it was
expected. Strategy Document targeted to finish the privatization process until the end of
2006, whereas it was completed in 2013 with the transfer of ownership for 8 remaining
distribution companies. Among the reasons of this delay was the time needed to find the
appropriate legal form of ownership. TOR based share sale model was adopted for the
privatization of distribution companies. According to this model, the Privatization
Authority established 21 companies which have distribution and retail licences from
EMRA and these companies has the monopoly to operate distribution grids in their
respective regions. 100% share of those companies would be sold to private actors,
however, all of the existing assets and all new assets that will be created will stay under
the ownership of TEDAŞ, public distribution company. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
Huge difference of costs between distribution regions, mostly due to the varying shares
of loss & theft among regions, was dealt with a “price equalization scheme” which was
introduced with the strategy document mentioned above. This scheme is using cross-
subsidies to balance costs, regions which have low rates of losses are compensating for
the regions with high rates of loss & theft. It was preferred to direct subsidies as it does
not inflict extra burden to public budget directly. EMRA was given the authority to design
and publish the details of the scheme. This scheme was foreseen for a transitional period
17
at that time, which would end at 2010, but it is still in practice, current deadline is
announced as 2020. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
1.3 Balancing & Settlement
The first version of balancing and settlement mechanism was created in 2004, which
was called temporary at that time, since it was planned as the first step towards a more
complete wholesale market. Balancing markets are mechanisms to keep the balance of
electricity production and consumption at the same level all the time. Before the balancing
market started operations in 2006 balancing was held according to bid and offers proposed
by TETAŞ, the trading company and prices used for financial settlement of those
balancing measures were approved by EMRA, the regulator. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015) So
called “transitional Balancing and Settlement Regulation - TBSR” was introduced with
the basic principle that financial settlement of balancing transactions would be carried out
together with the settlement of bilateral contracts. Between 2006-09, the balancing
mechanism was more like a day-ahead scheduling mechanism rather than a day-ahead
market. Generators were submitting their hourly generation plans twice a month for the
next 15 days. Demand were being determined by the system operator, TEİAŞ, for every
hour of the next day. Financial settlement of balancing measures was done by Market
Financial Settlement Center at the end of each month. Settlement periods were not hourly,
it was calculated for night, peak and off-peak time periods of a day.
The functioning of the balancing mechanism changed with the adoption of the so-
called “final” version of the balancing and settlement mechanism in 2009, and day-ahead
planning was separated from the real-time balancing system. (Atiyas et al., 2012) Day-
ahead planning provides a daily electricity generation plan for each hour of the next day,
whereas real-time balancing is used to reestablish the balance when generation and
consumption is not at the same level at real time. Between 2009-11, generators were
submitting their bids every day for each hour of the next day, and demand was still being
determined for each hour by TEİAŞ National Load Dispatch Center. Marginal prices for
each hour were published one day before real time. Financial settlement of balancing
measures was done for each hour, at the end of each month. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
18
Day-ahead planning system used in this period served as a transition period to day-
ahead market which started operations in December 2011. The Day-Ahead Market
(DAM) is a marketplace where suppliers submit their offers for each hour of the next day
as the demand side of the market, and generators submit their bids for each hour of the
next day as the supply side of the market. The market clearing price, or the spot price, is
determined for each hour according to bids and offers of market participants. The system
operator is not acting as the demand side of the market according to estimations for the
next day’s consumption anymore. Rather, TEİAŞ operates the Balancing Power Market
(BPM) based on the bids submitted by generators one day before for real-time balancing
measures, i.e. up-regulations and down-regulations. During real time, when there is a
momentary imbalance between supply and demand, National Load Dispatch Center gives
instruction to some generators to increase or decrease their output.
In May 2009, another strategy paper called “Electricity Market and Supply Security
Strategy Document” was published. Regarding the further implementation of competitive
wholesale market mechanisms, this strategy document defined a road map for day-ahead
and balancing power markets. Furthermore, this document mentioned for the first time
the creation of an independent market operator as an electricity exchange. The paper also
set some target for renewables within the context of energy supply security. To decrease
dependency on costly natural gas, which was over 40% for the electricity generation at
that time, paper aimed to maximize the use of domestic sources such as hydro and lignite,
and to increase the share of renewables in electricity generation over 30% by 2023. (Dilli
& Nyman, 2015)
1.4 Tariff Structure
The Electricity Market Law of 2001 also defined tariffs that are regulated by EMRA,
such as tariffs concerning connection and use of transmission and distribution grids, retail
tariffs for non-eligible consumers and tariffs applied for the trading transactions of
TETAŞ, the wholesale trading public company. Table 1.1 summarizes the tariffs with
methodologies in regulation. Details of the tariff regulations has been subject to many
changes over time. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
Table 1.1 - Regulated Tariffs (Atiyas et al., 2012)
19
Tariff structure for distribution and retail
companies was created for a transition period
between 2006-2010, and cost-based tariffs
were intended for the period afterwards. As
Atiyas explains: “During the transition period
tariffs would entail various types of cross
subsidies across regions as well as consumer
groups, through the application of a price
equalization scheme. As a result, there was a
single national tariff structure uniform across
regions but differentiated according to
consumer groups. The price equalization
scheme was adopted to prevent large
variations in technical losses and theft across regions from resulting in large variations in
end-user tariffs.” (Atiyas et al., 2012) Price equalization scheme and cross-subsidies are
still in force, due to the fact that substantial difference in loss ratios between distribution
regions are still present.
End-user tariffs were meant to be regulated by EMRA, but for the transition period
(2006-2010), TEDAŞ, the distribution company, was offering a tariff and EMRA was
approving without making changes. The Electricity Market Law and Electricity Market
Regulation adopted by EMRA unbundled end-user tariff for electricity into following
components: retail sales, retail services, distribution, transmission and loss & theft. Retail
sales component were reflecting the overall average cost of a unit of energy to distribution
companies. Retail services and distribution components included the costs of services
plus investment requirements related to retail and distribution services, which is called
“revenue cap” model. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
Increased risk of power shortages and increased financial instability of state-owned
energy companies paved the way for a shift in a more cost-reflective tariff mechanism in
2008, when the price of electricity had increased by around 50%, the first massive
increase since 2003. The so called “automatic pricing mechanism” required quarterly
adjustment of the prices of EÜAŞ, TETAŞ, BOTAŞ (the national oil and natural gas
transmission company), and distribution companies. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
20
The current tariff structure causes some financial problems for private suppliers
offering energy to eligible consumers. For the private suppliers, the cost of buying
electricity in the spot market changes a lot due to fluctuating spot prices especially caused
by gas supply shortages and increasing costs of feed-in tariff. The increase in costs of
feed-in tariff was mainly caused by rapid growth in electricity generation from
renewables as well as serious devaluation of Turkish Lira in the past few years.
1.5 The new Electricity Market Law of 2013
The new Electricity Market Law (No. 6446) was enacted in 2013, repealing the EML
of 2001, other than the provisions related to the energy regulator, EMRA. The new law
made some significant changes on the electricity market structure, such as changing the
role of state-owned companies and legal unbundling of retail and distribution activities,
and the provisions regarding the establishment of an independent energy exchange,
EPİAŞ.
Before the new Electricity Market Law, distribution and retail supply activities were
carried out by distribution companies, but financial accounts were being held separately
(i.e. account unbundling). The new Law necessitated legal unbundling of those activities,
distribution companies were divided into “assigned supplier” companies and distributors.
Since then, distribution companies are responsible for the operation and maintenance of
the distribution grid in their region, whereas assigned supplier company is a retail
company with an obligation to act as “supplier of the last resort”. Supplier of the last
resort is obliged to procure electricity to non-eligible consumers and eligible consumers
who did not opt for switching their supplier. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
21
Figure 1.5 Role of EÜAŞ and TETAŞ before the 2013 Electricity Market Law (Dilli
& Nyman, 2015)
The new Law also
changed the roles of
EÜAŞ (public generation
company) and TETAŞ
(public wholesale trading
company). Before, EÜAŞ
was not allowed to make
new generation
investments with an
exception for the reasons
of supply security. Its role
was to own and operate
remaining state-owned
generation facilities,
mostly large hydro plants. It was only allowed to take over hydro plants built by State
Hydraulic Works, a public institution in charge of issues related to water. The new Law
removed all these restrictions from EÜAŞ and made the company an active player in the
market with the freedom to invest in new generation capacity. since then, EÜAŞ has equal
rights and responsibilities with private generators who possess generation licence from
the regulator. It is also allowed to have shares in a private generation company. (Dilli &
Nyman, 2015) Figure 1.6 shows the shares of each generator types regarding ownership
in total installed capacity in Turkey as of June 2019.
22
Figure 1.6 Shares of Generation Capacity by Ownership Type (Source: TEİAŞ)
Before 2013, Market Financial Settlement Center (PMUM), which was a department
under the roof of TEİAŞ, transmission and system operator, was responsible from
electricity market operations, e.g. day-ahead market since 2011. The new Law defined
market operation activities as “the operation of organized power markets and the financial
settlement of the transactions made in these markets.” A new licence type was introduced
for this specific activity which is called “market operation licence” and the Law ruled the
establishment of an independent company named EPİAŞ (Turkish Energy Exchange).
EPİAŞ was established in March 2015 and obtained market operations licence from the
regulator in September 2015.
Figure 1.7 - Final Electricity Market Structure (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
23
Chapter 2. Policies and Legislations on Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency
2.1 2004 Strategy Document
The first strategy paper after the 2001 energy market liberalization reforms was
announced in 2004 with the name “Electricity Sector Reform and Privatization Strategy
Document”. The World Bank Report on Turkish energy transition explained the first
strategy document as the following: “The 2004 Strategy paper provided a roadmap for
the reform process and aimed to increase the confidence of market participants, especially
private parties who could potentially invest in Turkey.” (Dilli & Nyman, 2015) The report
also advocates that the Strategy Document was a crucial step towards liberalization
reform as it established the basis for privatization, the creation of the organized wholesale
market, and transitional measures that will be taken such as transitional contracts and the
role of public energy companies during transition. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
As it is explained shortly above, the 2004 Strategy Paper contained the principles of
privatization of public energy assets and entities such as distribution and generation. The
objective of the preparation of that document was stated as “ensuring adequate and
continuous supply of electricity at a low cost and to achieve the objective of integration
with EU acquis”. Based on this fact, we can argue that the target of being an EU member
was a major driver to energy market liberalization reforms and in general, the energy
transition in Turkey since the beginning.
The expected benefits from electricity market reforms were explained in the Strategy
Document as well. Those benefits are demonstrated below:
1. Reducing the costs by utilizing distribution and generation assets efficiently,
2. Enhancing electricity supply security and improving the quality of supply,
3. Preventing loss and theft, reducing the share of loss and theft to the average of
OECD countries,
4. Ensuring that necessary investments in renovation and expansion of the electricity
system are made by private sector without increasing the burden of public entities,
24
5. Reflecting the benefits of increased competition in electricity generation and trade
and increased service quality to final consumers.
2.2 2009 Strategy Paper
2004 Strategy Paper focused on privatization of assets and market liberalization, but
the reference to the renewables or energy efficiency is missing in the document, since it
was not among the priorities of the Turkish government and policy makers at that time.
Five years later, another Strategy Document named “Electricity Market and Security of
Supply Strategy Paper” was published in 2009, which set some targets for renewables in
Turkey for the first time. The share of renewable sources in electricity generation in
Turkey is targeted to reach 30% by 2023, 100th anniversary of the foundation of the
Republic of Turkey, and the target includes generation from large scale hydro dams. The
main objective of this Strategy Paper is to promote further utilization of domestic energy
sources such as lignite and renewables, and the share of almost completely imported
natural gas in electricity generation will be reduced below 30% by 2023, and this
reduction will be compensated with indigenous energy sources in order to enhance energy
supply security and to decrease the costs energy related imports.
Atiyas claims that the target for renewable electricity generation is rather realistic than
ambitious since the large-scale hydropower generation had around 25% share in total
electricity generation in 2010. (Atiyas et al., 2012) Figure 2.1 illustrates the shares of
hydropower and the whole renewables in electricity generation by 2009, the year when
the Strategy Paper was published. The graph shows that almost all electricity generation
from renewable sources came from hydropower plants until that date, and it supports the
argument that 30% share of renewable electricity was not an ambitious target. Even
though electricity demand has increased significantly after 2009 and the expansion of
hydropower generation met only a small percentage of that increase in demand, wind and
solar power as well as other renewable sources such as geothermal increased significantly
thanks to significantly reducing costs and renewables support mechanism (YEKDEM).
25
Figure 2.1 Shares of Renewables and Hydro in Electricity Generation in Turkey
(1970-2009) (Source: TEİAŞ)
The 2023 targets for each renewable source are specified as well by the 2009 Strategy
Document. For hydropower, the target is to utilize all technical and economic potential
in the country by the year 2023. The installed capacity of wind energy is targeted to be
increased to 20,000 MW (20 GW). Regarding geothermal, the whole potential capacity,
which is stated as 600 MW for electricity generation in the Paper, will be utilized. There
is no specific target for the share of solar energy in electricity generation, the target is
stated as “to ensure the utmost utilization of Turkey’s potential of solar power”.
Energy efficiency is also mentioned in the 2009 Strategy Paper. There is no specific
deadline or a numerical target in the Paper, but it provided commitment for the creation
of energy efficiency standards for electrical motors, air conditioners, electrical home
appliances and light bulbs that are being used in Turkey. It is also worth noting that the
Paper declares the intention of the government at that period to apply measures to ensure
energy efficiency in electricity consumption without compromising social and economic
development targets. The Paper also pledges that technical losses will be minimized in
electricity generation, transmission and distribution, and it commits the Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources to create regulations concerning demand side
management, a topic which is still not properly addressed by the regulations yet.
26
2009 Strategy Paper declares targets for the shares other non-renewable sources in
electricity generation, e.g. reaching to a minimum 5% share from nuclear power plants
by 2020 and limiting the share of natural gas to 30%. It appears that the target for nuclear
will not be achieved as the commissioning of the first two reactor units of Akkuyu Nuclear
Power Plant is expected to be completed by 2023. (MENR, 2019)
2.3 2014 National Renewable Energy Action Plan
Another policy document regarding renewable energy is the “National Renewable
Energy Action Plan for Turkey” which was published in December 2014 in accordance
with the EU Directive 2009/28/EC, the so called “Renewable Energy Directive”. The
Directive obliged all Member States to prepare a National Renewable Energy Action Plan
for the period 2011-2020 with a projection to comply with the 2020 renewable energy
targets of the European Union. The action plans that are prepared by Member States
should establish specific targets so that EU will reach a 20% share of energy from
renewable sources by 2020 in electricity, heating and cooling sectors and 10% in transport
sector.
As it is explained in the “rationale” part of the Action Plan, Turkey, as a candidate
country, prepared its own National Renewable Energy Action Plan for the period 2013-
2023 to demonstrate its commitment to EU renewable energy targets and EU accession
process. The Action Plan was prepared by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
and Directorate-General of Renewable Energy in collaboration with EBRD, European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Deloitte, a giant transnational
consultancy firm, based on the methodology shared by the European Commission.
The Action Plan first explains existing renewable energy and energy efficiency
policies and legislations, then gives data and forecasts about expected energy demand and
generation in Turkey by 2023. The Action Plan is prepared in accordance with the existing
relevant policies and legislations, namely Strategy Documents and Strategic Plans of the
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.
Figure 2.2: Electricity generation and installed capacity from renewable sources:
2013 data and 2023 forecast (MENR, 2014)
27
Regarding targets for renewable share in electricity generation, Figure 2.2 from the
Action Plan shows the existing installed power capacity and electricity generation by
source in 2013, and specifies targets for each source and technology, which will lead to
accomplishment of the overall target for renewables. For solar power facilities, the target
for installed capacity is 5 GW and for electricity generation is 8 TWh for the target year,
2023, according to the Action Plan.
Figure 2.3: Electricity generation and installed capacity: 2013 data and 2023 forecast
(MENR, 2014)
28
The Figure 2.3 illustrates forecasted shares of each renewable technology in electricity
generation. As it may be observed, future forecasts for renewables goes beyond 2023
target and expected to increase to 38% thanks to further deployment of wind, solar and
biomass technologies in electricity sector. Another important fact the Figure 2.3 shows is
that the demand for electricity will almost double in 10 years. The Action Plan also
reveals the strategy of the Government to limit the share of natural gas in electricity
generation to 30% by 2023, which is also in line with the 2009 Strategy Paper.
Table 2.1: National target for 2023 and the expected progression of renewable
sources in the sectors of electricity, heating and cooling, and transportation (MENR,
2014)
Table 2.1 indicates 2023 renewable targets for each sector, namely heating & cooling,
transportation and electricity. According to the plan, the share for renewable sources in
total energy consumption will reach to 20.5% from 13,5 % 2013. according to this table,
provided the target for transportation (10%) will be achieved. Considering the fact that
total energy demand will increase more than double in the same time period, achieving
this target will require significant deployment of renewable sources not only in the
electricity sector, but also in transport and heating & cooling sectors.
The Action Plan also demonstrates numerous measures and actions that are already in
force or still under consideration in order to achieve indicated targets. Regarding the
implication of the feed-in tariff, the Plan underlines the deadline which is extended to
2020. The Action Plan does not indicate a specific support mechanism which will be
applied after 2020, but it mentions several options from a communication by the European
Commission with a title” Guidance for the Design of renewables support schemes”
published in November 5, 2013. The Action Plan acknowledges the need to reform
existing feed-in tariff mechanism to adapt falling costs of renewable technologies. The
alternative options to reform the feed-in mechanism consists of the creation of a
29
competitive allocation mechanisms, e.g. auctions, introduction of the feed-in premium
mechanism as a more market-based option and the introduction of a quota obligation
system, as it is explained in the Action Plan with reference to the aforementioned
Communication from the European Commission.
Competitive allocation mechanism option started being implemented with the
introduction of the auction system “Renewable Energy Resource Areas - YEKA” which
will be explained more in detail in the following sections. The second alternative, feed-in
premium system works as follows: the supported energy price is determined as the
wholesale market price plus a premium in feed-in premium systems, so this support
system has more interaction with the market compared to feed-in tariffs. It is still not
announced whether the feed-in premium system will be implemented or not in the post-
2020 period. The third option, quota system, is an obligation for energy suppliers to
procure a certain share of their overall consumption from renewable sources. Quota
obligation system took place in a primitive form in the first version of the Renewables
Law, but it was removed in a short period of time with an amendment. It is crucial to
design the system properly to avoid double compensation of renewable generators and to
prevent making the burden of the support system unbearable to energy suppliers and to
consumers if the quota system will be considered in the future.
2.4 Legislations
Renewable energy support mechanisms started being developed in Turkey in early
2000’s. One of the main drivers for policy makers at that time to introduce such support
mechanisms was Turkey’s accession process to the EU, which had a higher priority for
the Turkish government at that time. EU member states had already developed various
support mechanisms earlier, and EU had ambitious targets and goals for supporting
renewables, as it is the case for the time being. Another driver, especially for the second
part of that decade, was the issue of energy supply security, as Russians started cutting
natural gas supply to the Ukraine, and increase in oil prices at that time also contributed
to the decision to support renewables in Turkey in the beginning of 2000’s. (Atiyas et al.,
2012)
30
The first Electricity Market Law of 2001 mentioned for the first time “renewables”, it
consisted some provisions for EMRA to encourage renewable energy sources, but the law
did not introduce any incentives or support mechanisms, and it did not provide any clear
definition of renewables, i.e. it was not clear which sources and technologies were
considered as renewables. The Figure 2.4 illustrates a timeline for the milestone
developments and key legislative and regulative acts for renewables in Turkey for the
period 2001-2010. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
31
Figure 2.4 Legal and regulatory timeline for renewables (Atiyas et al., 2012)
A definition of renewables was introduced with an amendment in 2003 and it was
revised several times afterwards. Final definition includes wind, solar, geothermal,
biomass, biogas (including municipal waste), wave, tidal, pumped storage, run-of-the-
river hydro, and hydroelectric dams with less than 15 km2 of reservoir area.
32
First incentives to renewables were observed in 2003 with an amendment to the
Electricity Market Licencing Regulation. Those incentives included grid connection
priority to installations using renewable or domestic sources, significant reductions in
licencing fees, and even an obligation to retail suppliers to buy the electricity they procure
to non-eligible consumers from renewables unless there is a cheaper supply source. Later,
the strategy paper of 2004 assigned the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
(MENR) and State Planning Organization the responsibility to promote renewable energy
sources. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
2.5 2005 Renewables Law
The most important progress was made with the enactment of the Law on Utilization
of Renewable Energy Resources for Electricity Production No. 5346, which is known as
the Renewables Law, in 2005. The Law introduced a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) as a support
mechanism for renewables, similar to other legislations in the EU member states at that
time. The first version of the feed-in tariff was in the form of purchase obligation for all
retail suppliers. The support price was the average wholesale electricity price of the
previous year and it was limited between 5 to 5.5 €cent/kWh and according to Atiyas, it
was a fairly low price compared to other feed-in tariffs applied especially in Europe.
(Atiyas et al., 2012)
Renewable generators needed to obtain a certificate called “Renewable Energy
Source” from the regulator, in order to be able to benefit from the support mechanism.
This certificate might be confused with the tradable green certificates, or tracking
mechanisms such as guarantees of origin, but it is essentially different. Aforementioned
RES certificate is granted to renewable generators only once before they start operations,
and it is not connected to the amount of electricity being generated in that facility which
it was issued for.
Renewable generators had the opportunity to sell the electricity they produce in the
spot market or via bilateral contracts when the rates were higher. Renewable facilities
were also granted many exemptions from land use fees and 85% discount in state lands
for the first ten years of operation. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
33
Supported renewable generators were exempt from reserve capacity requirements,
which is a requirement for all electricity generators with more than 50 MW of installed
capacity. This reserve is being kept for ancillary services such as primary and secondary
frequency control which is needed for the operation of the transmission system. Since
renewable generation is intermittent, reserve capacity requirements could not be applied
to most renewable technologies with the exception of dam-type hydro power plants.
Retail suppliers had to purchase renewable generation equivalent to their market share
in the previous year. The first version of the Renewables Law even included a quota
system for retail suppliers, an obligation to meet at least 8% of their total supply from
renewables, but it was not implemented and removed with the first amendment in 2007.
Some strict rules and penalties were introduced in 2007 for developers who did not
comply with construction time limits and schedules. The main reason for this measure
was the existence of multiple applications for the same wind farm location. Those
penalties included nullification of the generation licence. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
2.6 Amendments to Renewable Energy Law
Renewable Energy Law was amended several times, but the most comprehensive
amendment passed from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in December 2010 and
entered into force in January 2011. A new version of feed-in tariff (YEKDEM - the
Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism) and premiums were introduced with
the 2011 amendment. Renewable generation facilities were supported with different rates
for each technology, and a local content premium was introduced. Table 2.2 shows the
rates that are being applied since then. This new tariff is applied for renewable generation
facilities started operations between 2005 - 2015 and for the generation facilities started
operations later than that day, the President is authorized to decide the tariffs. The existing
rates are the same rates indicated in table X.X, with an exception for building integrated
photovoltaic installations (≤10kW for residential consumers) which receive national tariff
prices for electricity consumers as the supported generation price. The feed-in tariff may
be applied to an installation for 10 years from the first operation date.
Table 2.2 - Feed-in tariff for renewables in Turkey (Gözen, 2014)
34
The new feed-in tariff was in the form of “renewable pool”. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
The cost of the support mechanism is distributed among all the suppliers including
generators and wholesalers, whereas the previous feed-in tariff reflected costs only to
retailers supplying electricity to final consumers. Renewable generators have the liberty
to either sell their energy to the market or to benefit from the support mechanism, but
they have to choose an option once a year. If a generator decides to use the support
mechanism, it cannot sell its energy to the market in the current year.
According to Atiyas, the feed-in tariff support prices were not as high as it was
expected by the investors, and after Hungary and Estonia, it was the third lowest among
other feed-in tariffs in other EU countries. Therefore, the level of support was not high
enough to promote large scale investments in renewables at the time the support
mechanism was introduced. However, there are some other market conditions that make
feed-in favourable to developers investing in renewables, especially to international ones,
such as collecting payments in a secure and timely manner. As the market operator acts
as a counterparty between electricity buyers and sellers, and it applies a collateral
mechanism to secure financial transactions, feed-in mechanism became a better option
for investors. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
The final structure of the feed-in tariff took shape with a Ministerial Decree in 2018
and with a tiny revision by a Presidential Decree in 2019. According to the final
amendments, net metering system was introduced for building integrated solar PV
installations for dwellings with an installed capacity up to 10 kW. Net metering is being
implemented also for all other building integrated renewable installations owned by
industrial and commercial consumers. In other words, aforementioned renewable
installations are excluded from the feed-in prices in Table 2.2, and they receive payments
for their excess generation with national tariff prices.
35
After 2011, renewable generators were exempted from the responsibility to carry the
real-time market risk when their predicted generation did not match with the realized
generation, i.e. real-time imbalance. The National Load Dispatch Center provided the
day-ahead supply predictions from renewable sources for each hour of the next day to the
day ahead market for each renewable installation. Any mismatch was handled via
ancillary services. (Atiyas et al., 2012) This rule was changed with an amendment in May
2016 and balancing requirements were introduced for licenced renewable generators.
Since then, all licenced renewable generators have to forecast for the next day and submit
their bids to the day ahead market. In case of a mismatch in real time, they have to pay
all the necessary fees in day-ahead market, and final settlement is being done at the end
of each month according to the feed-in tariff.
Another unique feature of the reformed feed-in tariff is the local content bonus.
Implementation regulation which was introduced after the 2011 amendment included
some requirements for developers to be able to benefit from the local content bonus
payment, such as compatibility with national and international standards. In June 2011, a
specific regulation regarding the local content bonus was issued by the regulator, EMRA.
This regulation put forward some extra technical standards for the parts being used in
solar facilities and a department under the roof of the Ministry of Energy, Electrical Power
Resources Survey and Development Administration (EIE), is authorized for the
supervision of technical requirements. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
2011 amendment to the Renewables Law introduced a limit (600 MW) for the total
capacity of licenced solar installations that could be deployed in Turkey. Smaller
(unlicensed) installations with less than a certain amount of installed capacity (currently
5 MW) were not included to this limitation. The final version of the law still has the same
limit for total solar capacity; however, this limit includes only solar facilities installed
until the end of 2013, and for newer ones, the government (President) is limit is authorized
to determine a limit. One may assert that this limitation on total solar capacity did not
pose an obstacle to the proliferation of solar PV generators in Turkey, as the total installed
capacity of licenced solar generators at the end of 2013 was at an insignificant level.
36
2.7 Unlicensed Generation
An amendment to the Electricity Market Law exempted from licencing obligation the
facilities utilizing renewable sources and smaller than 500 kW of installed capacity. The
term “unlicensed generation” was introduced first with the Energy Efficiency Law
enacted in 2007, and the initial threshold for the exemption from licencing was 200 kW.
Amendments to the Renewables Law in 2010 increased the threshold to 500 kW and
allowed unlicensed generators to sell their excess energy to assigned regional suppliers.
(Dilli & Nyman, 2015) The new Electricity Market of 2013 (No.6446) set the limit to 1
MW and authorized the government to increase the limit up to 5 MW. This limit is
increased to 5 MW with a presidential decree in May 2019. Isolated facilities, emergency
generators and micro-cogeneration facilities (less than 50 kW) are also included into the
“unlicensed” category.
Unlicensed generators can be private individuals who decide to invest in renewable
energy installations in their homes, farms etc. to meet their own energy consumption, and
they are allowed to inject their excess generation to the distribution grid. They were
included into the renewable support system and were enjoying feed-in tariff prices.
Private individuals and local businesses who opt for collectively investing in small scale
energy facilities, i.e. establishing energy communities or energy cooperatives are also
considered under the “unlicensed generation” as long as the installed capacity of those
energy facilities is within the given limits. Such small-scale energy facilities may include
rooftop solar PV installations, small wind turbines, micro-hydroelectric plants, municipal
waste plants and small biomass facilities. (Dilli & Nyman, 2015)
The main reason for the policy makers and legislators to introduce this concept was to
promote distributed power generation from renewables. In other words, the objective of
creating such a category within the renewable support system is to promote small scale
energy facilities to increase efficiency and the share of renewable sources, and to decrease
grid losses by promoting energy generation as close as possible to the location where it is
consumed.
Unlicensed generators have to be connected only to the distribution grid with a few
exceptions. Cogeneration plants may be connected to the transmission grid depending on
their installed capacity. The second exception is isolated renewable generators with a
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consumption unit connected to the transmission grid. Distribution companies have to
connect unlicensed generators at the corresponding voltage level (low voltage or medium
voltage) as far as there is enough grid capacity, i.e. total capacity of unlicensed generators
shall not be more than half of the capacity of the connected transformer belonging to the
distribution company. If the transformer belongs to the generators, the capacity of those
facilities is limited to the capacity of the transformer. Distribution companies may only
reject connection applications in accordance with the relevant regulations and technical
limits and requirements are also specified in those regulations.
Assigned regional supplier companies are obliged to buy the surplus electricity fed to
the grid by unlicensed generators with feed-in tariff prices. In 2018, net metering system
was introduced for building integrated solar PV’s and this system pays prosumers, i.e.
consumers who installed rooftop solar photovoltaics, the national tariff prices rather than
supported feed-in prices.
The last revision regarding unlicensed generation took place with the new regulation
on unlicensed generation which entered into force in May 2019. This regulation
introduced the rules and procedures for the implementation of net metering system for
building-integrated solar photovoltaics. It also excluded all other solar PV installations
from unlicensed generation, which means that for all small-scale solar PV installations
except building-integrated ones, developers are obliged to obtain a generation licence
from the regulator and they will no longer enjoy the benefits of being an unlicensed
generator.
Another development that came with this amendment was the introduction of monthly
netting instead of hourly settlement with daily netting for building-integrated solar PV’s.
Monthly netting and settlement system works as follows: Distribution company collects
hourly metering data and conveys it to the market operator, EPİAŞ, for the settlement
procedure. The market operator calculates the overall cost of feed-in tariff each month,
both for licenced and unlicensed generation and collects the total cost of support
mechanism from all suppliers proportional to their share in total consumption. EPİAŞ
then transfers the money to assigned regional suppliers for the energy they purchased
from unlicensed generators, and these suppliers make the payment to unlicensed
generators each month.
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Currently, most of solar PV installations are unlicensed generators since the exempted
generation has significant administrative advantages compared to licenced generation. In
addition to the exemption from the obligation to obtain a generation licence from the
regulator or establishing a legal entity, unlicensed generators are also free from following
a timeline for the application process and entering to the contests. The Renewables Law
put forward site measurement requirements for solar and wind licence applications, and
licence applications can be made only on the dates determined in the licencing regulation.
Regarding the contests, they are organized by the system operator with the objective of
increasing the competition and to ensure the stability of the transmission grid.
2.8 Renewable Energy Resource Areas (YEKA) - Auction System for
Renewables
Until recently, the main support mechanism for renewables in the world was the feed-
in tariff system. The priority of the renewable support system was to promote higher
integration of renewables into the electricity system. However, the conditions affecting
the policy making of renewable energy changed significantly with decreasing costs of
solar PV technologies and increasing share of renewables in the electricity mix. Today’s
challenge is to manage the power system effectively with a significant share of
renewables while still promoting integration of the most cost-effective renewable
technologies. Feed-in tariff system was more effective when the costs of solar and wind
technologies were still high, but new conditions led many countries in the world to the
adoption of more market-based mechanisms such as auctions. In 2017, according to IEA,
one-third of the renewable capacity additions in the world through auctions and by 2022,
it is expected that auctions as a main policy mechanism will provide about half of new
renewable capacity in the world. (SHURA, 2018)
Article 4 of the Renewables Law introduced the concept of “Renewable Energy
Resource Areas” and addressed to a regulation that will be prepared consisting of detailed
provisions regarding identification, conservation and utilization of renewable energy
resource areas. General Directorate of Renewable Energy under the Ministry of Energy
and Natural Resources published “Regulation on Renewable Energy Resource Areas” in
39
October 2016. This regulation introduced the “YEKA” auctions system, a new policy
instrument to support renewable energy investments.
Table 2.3 (Appendix) shows the timeline and other design elements for the auctions.
The first two auctions for solar PV and wind energy were awarded successfully. Second
tenders for solar PV and onshore wind technologies were postponed, and another tender
for offshore wind is also scheduled. Until now, there is no awarded or announced
technology-neutral tender, i.e. all of them are single technology auctions. The winners of
those tenders are awarded with a 15-years long power purchase agreement, except
offshore wind auction, which will be awarded a power purchase agreement for the first
50 TWh of the electricity produced. (SHURA, 2018)
The methods used in YEKA auctions are explained in the report prepared by SHURA
Energy Transition Center as the following: “YEKA auctions are hybrid auctions. After a
sealed-bid auction, the five lowest bids are invited to a descending clock auction (i.e.
reversed auction). There is a disclosed ceiling price for the sealed bid phase. To reduce
the risk of underbidding, all bidders must meet the minimum financial and technical
reputation requirements specified in the auction notice. In addition, bidders are requested
to submit bid and completion bonds.” The bid with the lowest price is selected as winner
bid and pay-as-bid rule is employed for determination of the final price. (SHURA, 2018)
YEKA auctions differ from other auction mechanisms in Europe with minimum local
content requirements, mandatory local workforce requirements and for some cases, the
obligation to establish manufacturing facilities and to conduct R&D activities. For the
first solar PV and onshore wind tenders, there was a minimum 65% local content
requirement. The winner of the first solar PV auction has to establish a solar panel
manufacturing plant of at least 500 MW capacity in Turkey in less than two years and has
to employ 100 permanent technical staff in the R&D center that will be established. The
winner of the first onshore wind auction has to ensure that 80% of engineers working in
the projects are Turkish nationals, the winner has to establish a local R&D center as well.
(SHURA, 2018)
The first solar PV auction was held in 2017 for 1 GW of solar installed capacity. The
result price of the first auction for solar PV is 6,99 USD/kWh and it was won by a Turkish-
South Korean consortium. Total amount that will be invested by this consortium is
40
expected to be around 1.3 billion USD. The construction of the manufacturing plant and
the facility is proceeding even though the consortium collapsed when the South Korean
partner decided to leave the project. Turkish partner of the consortium announced that
they are planning to finish the construction of manufacturing plant by 2020. (Aydilek,
2019) The second auction was held in 2018 for 1 GW capacity of onshore wind power.
A giant German manufacturer, Siemens won the auction with two other Turkish partners,
for the price 3.48 USD/kWh. More than 1 billion USD is expected to be invested for this
project.
2.9 Other Legislations Promoting Energy Generation from
Renewables
There were several other laws that promotes the proliferation of renewables, namely
“Environment Law” and “Geothermal Resources and Mineral Waters Law”. The
Environment Law was amended in 2007 to pave the way for carbon trading, obligatory
standards, tax credits, exemption from various fees and emission penalties for the purpose
of promoting renewables and clean energy technologies. Another legislative document,
Geothermal Resources and Mineral Waters Law, was enacted to introduce provisions
regarding economic use of geothermal resources, exploration, development and
ownership rights. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
2.10 Energy Efficiency Policies and Regulations
Turkey is a fast-growing economy with rapidly increasing energy demand, and it is of
crucial importance for Turkey to ensure sustainable development with higher energy
efficiency. In addition to the environmental benefits attached to it since the best and
cleanest megawatt-hour of electricity is the one which has never been produced and
consumed, it also helps reducing costs and energy related imports. Reducing dependency
on imported energy sources by increasing energy efficiency also facilitate efforts to
energy supply security of the country as well.
According to Atiyas, Turkey’s energy efficiency strategy and policies are quite recent,
and they were mostly driven by Turkey’s efforts to comply with the EU acquis and
standards, just like renewable energy development in Turkey. The first strategy was
41
formulated in 2004 with the objective of harmonizing with EU laws and regulations
regarding energy efficiency. Three years later, in line with the strategy, the Energy
Efficiency Law was enacted which is still in force after some amendments. (Atiyas et al.,
2012) “The purpose of this Law is to increase efficiency in using energy sources by
avoiding waste, easing the burden of energy costs on the economy and protecting the
environment. This law covers principles and procedures applicable to increasing and
promoting energy efficiency in the energy generation, transmission, distribution and
consumption phases at industrial establishments, buildings, power generation plants,
transmission and distribution networks and transport. It also raises energy awareness in
the general public.” (MENR, 2014)
Figure 2.5: Evolution of energy efficiency regulations and policies in Turkey until
2012 (MENR, 2014)
2007 Energy Efficiency Law established an Energy Efficiency Coordination Board,
headed by the Minister of Energy and other members include senior representatives from
relevant Ministries and institutions such as Turkish Union of Chambers of Commodity
Markets and Turkish Association of Municipalities. The Board has responsibilities such
as; updating the national strategy on energy efficiency, preparing and monitoring
implementation plans and evaluating the effectiveness of those plans. (Atiyas et al., 2012)
The law does not give numerical targets and deadlines, but as a general principle, at
least 10% decrease in energy intensity is targeted. Another Strategy Document which is
published in 2011 indicated more specific targets:
42
“The Energy Efficiency Strategy Paper for 2012 - 2023 targets a decrease of at least
20% of the amount of energy consumed per unit Turkish GDP in the year 2023, by taking
2008 as reference year. The objectives established under this strategy paper can be
summarized as follows:
● To reduce energy intensity and energy losses in industry and services sectors.
● To decrease the energy demand and carbon emissions of buildings: to promote
sustainable environmentally friendly buildings using renewable energy sources.
● To promote a market transformation toward energy efficient products.
● To increase efficiency in production, transmission and distribution of electricity,
and to decrease energy losses and harmful environmental emissions.
● To reduce fossil fuel consumption of motorized vehicles, by increasing the share
of public transportation on highways, maritime transit and railroads and by
preventing unnecessary fuel consumption in urban transportation.
● To use energy effectively and efficiently in the public sector.
● To strengthen institutional capacities and collaborations.
● To increase the use of state-of-the-art technology and building awareness through
diverse activities.
● To develop financial mechanisms other than public financial institutions.
Based on the strategic objectives established in the Energy Efficiency Strategy Paper,
Table 2.4 includes estimates of final energy consumption in the areas of heating and
cooling, electricity and transport. The ‘reference scenario’ and ‘additional energy
efficiency scenario’ are presented separately. The reference scenario includes all the
measures on energy efficiency and energy saving taken before 2013, while the additional
energy efficiency scenario forecast includes all the additional measures in energy
efficiency and energy savings that would be undertaken from 2013 onwards.” (MENR,
2014)
Table 2.4: Expected gross final energy consumption of Turkey for electricity, heating
and cooling and transportation up until 2023 taking into account the effects of energy
efficiency and energy saving measures (MENR, 2014)
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In March 2018, National Energy Efficiency Action Plan for the period 2017-2023 was
published by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources in accordance with existing
legislation and strategies. The introduction of this Action Plan has the objective to
facilitate the efforts to comply with the EU acquis and standards regarding the topic, as it
was the case for the Renewable Energy Action Plan. The Directive 2012/27/EU of the
European Parliament and the Council on Energy Efficiency requires the Member States
to prepare a draft action plan for energy efficiency, and Turkey prepared its’ own to
demonstrate its willingness and commitment to harmonize with the EU acquis in energy
field. (MENR, 2018)
The Action Plan puts forward 55 actions in the fields of industry, energy, buildings
and services, transport, technology, agriculture and cross-cutting areas. The objective of
the Action Plan is explained as the following: “The National Energy Efficiency Action
Plan aims to boost and accelerate efforts to improve energy efficiency in all sectors to
make energy efficiency support models more effective; develop sustainable finance
mechanisms; advance sustainable procurement; develop culture, awareness and
consciousness of energy efficiency in public and private sectors; promote onsite
generation and consumption; position smart cities and smart networks in respect of energy
efficiency; improve energy efficiency in industry, transport and agriculture; scale up
district heating systems; increase the use of alternative fuels and resources in the context
of energy efficiency; promote environment-friendly structures, and make existing
structures more efficient.” (MENR, 2018)
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Chapter 3. PESTLE Factors That Affect the Success
of Renewable Energy Policies in Turkey
This chapter aims to analyze economic, political, social, legal and environmental factors that inhibit or
accelerate the success of energy transition.
3.1 Political
3.1.1 The Coal Issue
High dependency on imported energy resources is among the top priority concerns
regarding energy supply security of Turkey. Turkish government and policy makers try
to address this concern by increasing the use of renewables and domestic energy sources,
such as domestic lignite. Strategic Plan of the MENR for the period 2015-2019 explained
the importance of the diversification of energy sources to ensure energy supply security:
“Diversification of primary energy resources and utilization of the country’s resources
rationally are the key components for both of sustainability and low-cost energy supply.
Resource diversity involves the diversity both in resource type and in the import country.
Within this context, reducing the risks arising from import dependency and bringing
forward the indigenous energy resources are of utmost significance in terms of national
economy. Provision of resource diversity in electricity generation is a prominent factor
for effective utilization of resources and decrease of import dependency. Due to the fact
that natural gas is an import resource causing high foreign trade deficit as well as
procurement risk, it is aimed that the share of the natural gas in electricity generation
should be reduced to 38% by the end of the plan period.” (MENR, 2015)
In 2009 Electricity Market and Security of Supply Strategy Paper, one of the objectives
of the Turkish energy policy is stated as follows: “In order to minimize external
dependency in energy supply, encouraging new technologies, ensuring resource
diversification, and utilizing indigenous and renewable energy resources at the maximum
level” The paper also indicated the 2023 target for domestic coal: “The proven lignite
reserves will have been utilized for electricity generation purpose by the year 2023. To
this effect, the practices for utilizing the indigenous lignite and hard coal sites suitable for
electricity generation for projects aimed at electricity generation will be continued.”
45
(MENR, 2009) The Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources gave
a more specific target for the utilization of domestic coal for electricity generation: “The
most effective utilization of domestic coal resources has been specified as one of the basic
objectives and it has been further aimed that by the future investments, the electricity
generation from domestic coals should reach a level of 60 billion kWh/year by the end of
the plan period. For accomplishing this objective, these investments are to be accelerated
and new resources shall be explored.” (MENR, 2015)
The Paper also revealed the strategy of the Turkish government on imported coal:
“Indigenous and renewable resources shall have priority in meeting the need for
electricity, yet high-quality import coal-fired power plants will also be used, taking into
consideration the developments regarding the use of indigenous and renewable resources
and security of supply.” (MENR, 2009) Falling prices of imported coal due to the fact
that the U.S. increased its coal exports has significant impacts as well. “In the coal prices
which developed under the effect of petroleum prices until 2011, particularly due to coal
supply that USA has contributed to international coal trade in the recent period, a decline
has occurred independently from petroleum prices.” (MENR, 2015)
Turkey is a signatory to the UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change and it has submitted its Nationally Determined Contribution in the Paris
Conference in 2015, in which it pledged to reduce 21% of its CO2 emissions by 2030
from the business-as-usual scenario. The international commitments of Turkey regarding
global climate change necessitates decreasing the usage of polluting energy sources such
as lignite. However, “Turkey’s own coal production is mostly lignite, which typically has
much lower heat content than other coal types. Lignite plants are less efficient and their
emissions per unit of electricity generated are higher as compared to other coal plants.”
(Atiyas et al., 2012) The strategy of the Turkish government to incentivize the use of
domestic coal in electricity generation may be the biggest political issue that jeopardizes
the clean energy transition in Turkey.
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3.2 Economic
3.2.1 Increasing burden of feed-in tariff
Among the economic factors affecting the success of energy transition in Turkey,
increasing burden of YEKDEM (feed-in) to the industry and economy stands at the top.
The proliferation of renewable energy producers enjoying the feed-in tariff especially
during last few years, hand in hand with other recent economic developments, i.e. serious
devaluation of Turkish Lira, has made the cost of the support mechanism unbearable to
the sector and economy, and in particular, to the energy suppliers.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of electricity market prices and feed-in unit cost (2013-2019)
(Source: EPİAŞ)
The Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolution of day-ahead electricity market price (MCP -
Market Clearing Price) and the unit cost of feed-in tariff in recent years, between March
2013 and June 2019. This graph is considered useful to analyze the effects of feed-in costs
to the electricity market. MCP is the reference price for wholesale electricity market and
it is the price paid by energy suppliers for each kilowatt hour of electricity they purchase
in the day-ahead market. YEKDEM (feed-in) unit cost is the amount of feed-in cost
reflected monthly to energy suppliers for each kilowatt hour of their consumption. The
feed-in cost for 1 kWh of electricity consumption increased to more than half of the
47
electricity price itself for some months, e.g. 74% in April 2019 and 77% in May 2019. In
other words, this means that in May 2019, an electricity supplier paid an extra 77% of the
price it paid for the electricity it procured. Although there is a cost-reflective tariff
structure in Turkey since 2008, the electricity suppliers face serious short-term financial
difficulties since tariffs are determined quarterly and it takes time for suppliers to reflect
the costs to final consumers.
As it is mentioned in Chapter 2, the current feed-in mechanism (YEKDEM) will expire
in 2020 and as of July 2019, there is not still any announced renewables support
mechanism for the period afterwards. The most recent policy document of the Turkish
government regarding the issue, the 2014 National Renewable Energy Action Plan
acknowledges the fact that a more cost-effective and market-based support mechanism
such as feed-in premium or a quota based green certificate system should be introduced
for the post-2020 period. Feed-in premium and quota obligation mechanisms are
explained briefly in Chapter 2. Quota-based green certificate system is explained by the
report “ Renewable Energy Policies in a Time of Transition” which is prepared jointly by
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the International Energy Agency
(IEA) and the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) in this
way: “Most countries with quota obligations support the scheme with tradable RECs. A
REC is typically awarded to a generator for each megawatt hour of renewable energy
produced. Market participants, such as suppliers or generators, participate in receiving or
buying a number of certificates to meet the mandatory quotas established for the year.
Certificates can be accumulated to meet obligations and provide a tool for trading among
participants.” (Amin, Birol, & Zervos, 2018)
A policy recommendation for the future support mechanism might be as the following:
A quota-based tradable REC system may be implemented for licenced renewable
generators, so that the cost of support mechanism will be determined by market forces
and the support mechanism would be more cost-efficient and more adaptive to changing
dynamics of the energy sector and the economy. However, this system is more difficult
to implement to small-scale installations due to administrative complexity of this system
compared to other support mechanisms such as fixed feed-in tariff or feed-in premium
systems. Therefore, feed-in premium mechanism could be implemented for unlicensed
generators and the implementation of net metering system could be further expanded to
48
renewable technologies other than small-scale building-integrated solar PV installations.
It is also crucial to underline that the effectiveness of renewable support mechanisms may
vary substantially depending on numerous factors such as design elements of the support
mechanism. Hence, further detailed analyses should be carried out to find out the best
support mechanism that may be applied for the post-2020 period.
3.2.2 Jobs and economic activity
“The energy transition will bring benefits and opportunities beyond saved import costs
and an improved balance of trade; it could also drive badly needed value-added
manufacturing and employment. Turkey’s auction system for energy tenders aimed to
reverse the trade imbalance—particularly in electricity generation equipment—and foster
broader domestic economic development.” (Saygin, Hoffman, & Godron, 2018)
“Under the new system, bidders that win auctions to develop solar or wind fields are
required to manufacture and use equipment that is at least two-thirds locally produced.
This aims to drive economic activity and incentivize Turkey’s local production capacity.
This sort of higher value-added equipment manufacturing is essential to Turkey’s broader
economic agenda as well as to its efforts to create jobs and avoid the middle-income trap.
It is also important that Turkey develop a strategy that offers a long-term view of the
gigawatt-size market while creating investor confidence.” (Saygin et al., 2018)
Figure 3.2: Breakdown of Renewable Energy Jobs in Turkey in 2017 (Saygin et al.,
2018)
“By the end of 2017, about 84,000 people were already employed in Turkey’s
renewable energy sector, primarily in the solar industry. By comparison, the entire legacy
electricity and gas sector employs a total of 819,000 people—and only directly employs
one-third of that number. Indeed, local content requirements will drive up economic
activity and create new jobs, but one should also consider the upfront costs and time
49
needed to create a domestic manufacturing base. Turkish stakeholders should factor in
these considerations when planning for the country’s energy transition in order to avoid
both delays and increases in the current account deficit “(Saygin et al., 2018)
As the quotations above explained the expected benefits of local content obligations
applied in Turkey, this measure could be a driver towards a successful energy transition
in Turkey. However, there are some drawbacks of the strategy to promote domestic
manufacturing industry. Atiyas explained possible negative outcomes of this strategy in
detail as follows:
“Although the Turkish local content approach is not based on mandates but rather on
bonus payments for using locally produced parts (a mandate was introduced later with
the first auction for solar PV in 2017), it is raising concerns among globally established
suppliers. More importantly, renewables industry has become globally competitive in a
fairly short period of time, at least partially in response to rich incentives available in
Europe and the US. As in many other manufacturing operations, Chinese and Indian
companies have a cost advantage. Their cost advantage will likely disappear or diminish
as wages and costs increase in these countries but next several years could be difficult for
emerging Turkish businesses despite the additional incentives. Those incentives can also
be found against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and/or EU rules on fair trade.
International trade implications of similar local content requirements are already being
felt. In response to bankruptcies and factory closures by solar companies in the US, a
group of US solar manufacturers petitioned the US International Trade Commission to
investigate China’s support of its solar industry with respect to dumping and illegal
subsidies. China reportedly poured $30 billion of subsidies into its solar industry in 2010.
This action is one of the latest international trade battles caused by support programs for
clean energy technologies across the globe. The lesson from these industry observations
and trends is that economic development promises based on locally produced and
installed renewable energy technologies are difficult to defend. The key point to
remember for Turkey, or any other jurisdiction pursuing promotion of renewables, is that
energy is a key input to the rest of the economy. Since energy supply is capital rather than
labor intensive, the sector will not create as many jobs as many other sectors of the
economy for the same dollar invested but reliable and affordable supply of energy will
50
certainly increase economic activity and job creation in the rest of the economy.” (Atiyas
et al., 2012)
3.3. Social
The ongoing energy transition in Turkey introduced new roles to individual citizens
since the energy supply chain is changing with the decentralization of the energy system.
Citizens are gradually becoming prosumers, i.e. they acquire the ability to produce energy
in addition to their role as consumers thanks to proliferation of distributed small-scale
energy generation from renewable energy sources such as solar and wind.
Aforementioned energy policies and renewable support mechanisms aims to favour
distributed energy generation from renewables over centralized energy system where
large-scale utilities procure energy from conventional fossil-based energy sources.
This change in citizens’ role provides the empowerment of individuals as they become
more and more independent from the utilities. The initiatives to form energy cooperatives
in Turkey are another significant developments which make the energy system more
democratic in a way. There are more than twenty energy cooperatives in Turkey as of
2018. Some of them are being formed by existing industrial and farmers’ cooperatives
with the support of European institutions such as EBRD and development agencies of
prominent EU member states like Germany and France. (Damcı, 2018)
However, it is essential to keep in mind that such transitions do not happen in a few
days. Lack of expertise in the management of cooperatives in Turkey is among the factors
that pose a threat over the success of energy cooperatives. (Erkan, 2018) Another obstacle
is the rapidly changing regulations regarding unlicensed generation. Last revisions on the
regulation limited the support for small-scale solar PV only to building-integrated ones,
thus field-type solar installations that could be installed by farmers’ cooperatives are not
included to the unlicensed generators category.
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3.4 Technological
3.4.1 System Integration Challenges of Variable Renewable Energy Sources
Increasing shares of wind and solar technologies in electricity generation brings
technical challenges to the transmission and distribution system due to the fact that
electricity generation from those renewable sources is variable and intermittent. The
imbalance in geographical distribution of electricity demand and supply already pose a
significant challenge to the grid management in Turkey, large demand centers are located
mainly in western parts of the country whereas huge generation capacity from hydro are
mostly situated in the eastern parts of the country. Since variable renewable energy (VRE)
resources are not evenly distributed geographically, further integration of such resources
into the grid may complicate the situation.
A recent study conducted by SHURA Energy Transition Center claims that existing
transmission capacity will be enough to integrate VRE sources up to a total capacity of
40 GW without need for further investments beyond planned grid capacity investments.
As the target for total installed capacity is 20 GW for wind and 5 GW for solar by 2023,
it is less likely to have significant congestions in transmission grid due to proliferation of
wind and solar technologies in the near future. However, a total VRE installed capacity
of 60 GW would require the introduction of various flexibility options to avoid huge
redispatching costs, according to the study. These options for Turkey include retrofitting
old coal power plants, introducing a demand response system and investing in energy
storage technologies. (Saygin, Cebeci, Tör, & Godron, 2019)
3.5 Legal
Legislative and regulatory aspect of the energy transition in Turkey is explained in the
previous chapters of this paper. The energy market liberalization and clean energy
transition are driven by energy policies of the government which shapes relative laws and
regulations. The success of the Turkish energy market reforms depends heavily on the
creation of a predictable, stable and credible legislative and regulatory environment. It is
vital to bear in mind that rapid necessary changes in energy related legislations and
52
regulations should be designed so as to ensure that private investments in sustainable
energy generation and energy efficiency measures will continue increasingly.
The importance of a reliable regulatory environment for the energy market actors and
current problems related to it are explained in detail by a prominent NGO representing
energy traders in Turkey, including suppliers, generators and wholesale market
participants as the following:
“The legislative changes in the energy sector have a significant impact on the financial
and operational sectors of the sector players. The sudden, unpredictable and legislative
changes made without an agreement between stakeholders create uncertainty for existing
and potential new investors in the sector. The uncertainty about the future increases the
risk for investors. Accordingly, the demand for risk premiums by financing institutions
increase while funding energy projects; the increased risk premium is reflected in our
country and our citizens as a serious cost.” (Energy Traders Association, 2017)
“The creation of a reliable investment environment is only possible through a
legislative infrastructure which has been designed in a predictable and efficient manner.
Changes in the framework of legislation do not have to be a factor that reduces
predictability. In this context, the public and private sector can develop the process of
legislative amendment and the contents of the legislation. When the legislative
infrastructure is examined, it is seen that some regulations were not opened to public
consultation before publication, the regulations came into force as of the day they were
published and some of them were revised with provisional clauses after publication.
When the legislation development process is examined, it is seen that the main reason for
such practices is the lack of participation of the private sector in the drafting process.
During the process of creating or revising a legislation, there are points of development
in terms of information sharing and transparency in the process of gathering opinions.
First of all, the publication of the legislation timetable foreseen by EMRA will be useful
for the private sector and other organizations to form opinions on similar issues. When a
decision to draft a regulation is made afterwards, meetings in the form of brainstorming
and discussion of the needs, scope, risks and possible models will enable the draft to be
smoother and objective. In this respect, there are also points of improvement regarding
the current drafting and subsequent processes. First of all, writing the purpose at the
53
beginning of the draft, publishing the responses given to the feedback forms of the draft
in the EMRA web site, publishing the revised draft if needed and announcing the reasons
why the comments and suggestions of the participants are accepted or not. A reasonable
time period between the date of publication and the date of entry into force should be
given to market actors to adapt to the new rules. These measures will play a major role in
reducing uncertainties related to legislations and regulations.” (Energy Traders
Association, 2017)
3.6 Environmental
As it is mentioned in the previous chapters, Turkey has liabilities regarding
international efforts to fight climate change. Turkey is a signing party to the UNFCCC,
and it has submitted its Nationally Determined Contribution in the Paris Conference in
2015, in which it pledged to reduce 21% of its CO2 emissions by 2030 from the business-
as-usual scenario. The realization of this environmental target relies on several external
factors such as macroeconomic situation in the country until 2030. Even though the Paris
Agreement is not ratified yet by the Parliament, it is deemed necessary to create a carbon
pricing mechanism, i.e. putting a price for each ton of emission of polluting gases such
as CO2, in order to make sure that targeted reduction in GHG emissions in Turkey will
be achieved until the due date, 2030.
In this regard, a project named “Partnership for Market Readiness - PMR Turkey” was
launched in January 2016. “Launched by the World Bank, Partnership for Market
Readiness (PMR) is a technical assistance program aiming at supporting developing
countries which have significant importance in the global fight against climate change in
their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emission, through effective use of market-based
instruments (MBIs). PMR Turkey was set to analytically analyze the suitability and
applicability of market-based emission reduction policy instruments, such as emissions
trading scheme, carbon tax in detail, in addition to white and green energy certificates,
scaled-up crediting mechanism, result-based finance in Turkey. The final output of the
PMR Turkey is a report which suggests a carbon pricing policy package, in consideration
of its economic and sectoral implications. This report is presented to the to the decision-
makers.” (PMR Turkey, 2019)
54
The Environment Law is mainly relevant in relation to fighting climate change in
Turkey. Article 3, sub-article (h) of the Law states: “For the purposes of protection of the
environment, prevention and mitigation of environmental pollution, besides compulsory
standards, market based mechanisms, economic instruments and incentives such as
taxation, fee and contribution payment, promotion of renewable energy and clean
technologies, emission fee and pollution charge and carbon trading shall be
used.”(Ecofys, 2016) So, it is possible to claim that existing legal structure allows and
promotes the introduction of a carbon pricing mechanism in Turkey.
Policies and measures having direct price effect on carbon emissions are called market-
based emission reduction instruments, or carbon pricing mechanisms. These instruments
include carbon tax and emission trading system. Carbon tax is a rather simpler instrument
to implement, as it is a fixed tax applied to each ton of carbon dioxide emission. On the
other hand, emission trading system is a market where emission allowances are being
traded between polluters, so that the ones who emit less get the chance to raise some
revenues from selling their extra allowances they did not use. Establishing an ETS would
be more challenging as the price of emission allowances should be stabilized to ensure
the sustainability and predictability of the system.
Turkey is an emerging country with a fast-growing economy and population. This
causes a huge increase in energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions in the country.
Turkey is a part of the international efforts to combat climate change for a long time,
however it always had serious concerns about the possibility that climate policies would
limit the existing development pace of the Turkish economy.
Existing international obligations of Turkey and climate policies and strategies creates
the necessity of introducing an effective emission reduction mechanism. Putting a price
for GHG emissions is the best way to ensure the environmental targets while providing
the most cost-effective measure. There are some alternative possible implications for
carbon pricing that have advantages and disadvantages of their own. It is crucial to take
into account the cost on the whole economy and environmental outcomes of each of these
alternatives. An ETS system could be the best alternative in terms of reduction while
being the most cost-effective instrument. However, due to the limits on scope of this
55
system, a complementary instrument such as carbon tax for non-ETS sectors might be
considered as well.
56
Conclusion
Turkish energy system has experienced sweeping reforms during last few decades.
Restructuring of the electricity market began with the establishment of a state monopoly
in all market activities in 1970, and market liberalization process started ten years later in
line with global trends. The first step towards opening up the market was the privatization
of generation assets and attracting private investors for the new electricity generation
capacity, in which a great deal of success was accomplished.
A milestone in the Turkish energy transition was the energy market reforms of 2001
which took place with the adoption of the first Electricity Market Law. 2001 reforms
paved the way for the creation of a competitive energy market structure and new key
actors were introduced such as the energy market regulator, EMRA. Even though the first
unbundling activity was done in 1993 when distribution activity was separated from the
rest, completion of unbundling process was made possible with 2001 reforms. The
creation of a balancing mechanism, the introduction of the “eligible consumer” concept
and changes made in the tariff structure were other key reforms for the market
liberalization. 2013 Electricity Market Law shaped the electricity system to the current
state and other new key actors such as the energy exchange, EPİAŞ and retail supply
activity was separated from distribution activity.
Turkish energy transition took on a new dimension with the enactment of the
Renewables Law in 2005 when the first support mechanism for renewables was launched.
Proliferation of the utilization of renewable energy sources except large-scale hydro
power plants occurred thanks to the policies and legislations starting from the 2000’s. The
existing feed-in tariff structure was formed with the 2011 amendments to the Renewables
Law which is still the main instrument put forward by the Turkish government to promote
further integration of renewable sources in electricity generation. Distributed generation
started being promoted with the “unlicensed generation” concept. The first auctions for
renewables were held in the last few years.
In the last chapter, a PESTLE analysis was utilized to map the challenges that Turkish
energy transition could face in the near future. This paper suggests that the support for
domestic lignite for electricity generation, increasing burden of the feed-in tariff, rapidly
57
changing rules and regulations, uncertainties regarding future renewable support
mechanism and lack of a carbon pricing instrument are among the barriers that may
jeopardize the success of the energy transition pathway that Turkey tries to achieve. The
effects of clean energy transition on jobs and economic activity and system integration
challenges of variable energy sources were also analyzed in this chapter. The introduction
of a carbon pricing instrument such as an emission trading system and announcing a more
market-oriented and cost-effective renewable support mechanism for the period after
2020 was recommended in the paper.
58
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