The Saxon Germans: Political fate of an ethnic identity

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THE SAXON GERMANS: POLITICAL FATE OF AN ETHNIC IDENTITY

Marilyn MeArthur

INTRODUCTION

The "Saxon" [ 1 ] Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans, of southern Transylvania have faced a twofold task common to all the minority groups across culturally heterogeneous Eastern Europe, namely to sustain gloup solidarity while maintaining peaceable relations with surrounding ethnic groups and with the polity at large. Prior to the advent of socialism, the Saxons maintained a vigorous ethnic identity in well-organized communities in a polyethnic environment. Their cultural links to Germany were maintained through their Autonomous Lutheran Church, which was also the main institution organizing Saxon social life. For most of their history, Saxons were granted a degree of political autonomy as well as control over their internal affairs, including education. As peasant agriculturalists and urban dwellers, they had a land base, the Sachsenboden (Saxon land) which was protected from political encroachment by outsiders. The polyethnic social system was hierarchical, stratified by ethnic group, with the Saxons in a super- ordinate position over the local Romanians and Hungarians.

With the socialist transformation of the economic and social order, these property and ethnic relations have, of course, changed: the Saxons have been incorporated into a unitary political-economic system. Romania, however, Marilyn McArthur studies anthropology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

has not adopted an assimilationist policy toward its minorities. As a multinational state, Romania has developed a model of socialist cultural pluralism which recognizes and pro- tects the integrity of its constituent cultural traditions. The state provides bilingual education for children of minority groups, coverage in newspapers, radio, and television in minority languages, and grants minorities the right to assembly. Churches are permitted to function; minority representation in the NationaI As- sembly is equal in proportion to percent of the population. These cultural rights are granted in return for allegiance and cooperation in the task of building socialism. In sum, Romania permits enough ethnic autonomy to guarantee the continuation of the different cultural traditions, insofar as they do not interfere with the minority citizens' fulfillment of the basic responsibilities of civic life.

Nonetheless, the Saxon ethnic group has not adjusted well to Romania's model for cultural pluralism; they are not even taking full advantage of the opportunities for ethnic expression [21. Moreover, the Saxons show signs of disintegrating as an ethnic group. They are dispersing rapidly and are failing to repro- duce themselves. In the process of this disintegration, they also face a crisis of values. Saxon ethnic identity is, in short, passing out of existence.

The cause of this disintegration lies not in

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the socialist transformation per se, but at a much higher level, in the foreign policy relations that have developed between Romania and the Western powers.

On the national level, as expressed in domestic policy, it is in Romania's interest to contain the German minority. However, in the interest of international amity, especially in this era of detente, Romania has made con- cessions on the "national minori ty question." Since 1966, coincident with Willy Brandt 's Ostpolitik, Romania permits the "return" of increasing numbers of ethnic Germans to Germany [3]. The commitment of both Romania and West Germany to the Volks- deutsche is subordinate to the pace and purpose of detente, with specific reference to trade relations between the two countries. Romania is committed to making a place for the German ethnic group in Romanian society, but not so committed as to compel their in- corporation - i.e., to prohibit emigration alto- gether. Correlatively, West Germany is committed to the return of the Volksdeutsche, L but not so committed as to demand their wholesale release. Thus an accommodation is reached on this sensitive issue which serves to keep channels of communication open for other matters.

The result is that, in the case of the Germans, the national minority question remains un- resolved on the level of policy and the burden o f resolution devolves on the ethnic group itself. This means that although its fate is being orchestrated by the national government, the ethnic group in large measure remains responsible for the construction of its own social reality in both in-group and interethnic con- texts. Yet the Saxons are not merely reacting; they are also responding creatively to the situation in which they find themselves by at tempting to bring cognitive and social order to what was initially, thir ty years ago, a dis- orderly situation. However, their ideological and social responses have not served to maintain the ethnic group, but have been major

factors contributing to the process of dissolu- tion.

The complexities of Saxon adaptation to the radical changes of the twentieth century must be understood with reference to the Saxons' assessment of their experiences and the consequent development of strategies for social action. Ethnicity is, at minimum, a matter of "presumed ident i ty" [4] ; an ethnic group identifies itself, and is identified by others, as being different [5]. Therefore, I am concerned with Saxons' conception of themselves, and the conception of them held by the "others" in the polyethnic environment. To understand how the Saxons conceive of themselves, we look to the shared value system through which the group seeks to structure its social environment. For the ethnic group, values themselves are a kind of boundary. In the case of rapid social change, the " index" of a group's ethnic vitality can be measured by the degree to which it continues to consider itself, and be considered by others, as different, and then by the degree to which it is able to translate this awareness into effective social action. The ethnic structure becomes more obviously an ethnic process. As I have suggested, this index is now, for the Saxons, very low.

I shall therefore discuss Saxon adaptation to recent changes in terms of the transformations that have occurred in the social expression of two critical value clusters. The first, Zusammen- halten ("sticking together," or "We are in this together"), reflects group solidarity and refers to the constellation of principles governing Saxon internal organization. The second, Har- monie, includes those values ("keeping the peace," etc.) that pertain primarily to interethnic relations.

Prior to World War II the theme of group solidarity was highly elaborated, a complicated "code for conduct" [6] and social control within the Saxon community. On the other hand, the rules for the achievement of harmony with other ethnic groups were relatively simple.

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Since World War If, the situation has reversed: the Saxon code for conduct has deteriorated so that there are no longer institutionalized mechanisms for the maintenance of group solidarity. At the same time, the greater com- plexity in the nature and kind of interethnic contacts has resulted in an elaboration of the mechanisms for achieving "harmony." More- over, these two values are now in serious conflict. In the process of adapting to a changing environment, the Saxons have not discarded old values or adopted new ones, but have transformed their values.

In the first part of this paper, I shall examine the expression of these values prior to socialism; in the second part, I shall examine certain problems of the socialist transformation with reference to Marxist-Leninist ideology on the national question, and the impact of the resultant policy on the Saxon Germans. In the third part, I shall examine the reflection of these problems in the polyethnic village of Marienburg (Romanian: Feldioara) in Bra~ov county.

I. Z U S A M M E N H A L TEN AND R A R M O N I E IN SAXON HISTORY

Zusammenhalten

The Saxons maintain absolute identification with their forebears. "We came here 800 years ago," they say, as if it were yesterday. As a people in touch with their history, they regret that more is not known of the circumstances of their migration in the early thir teenth century out of the Flanders/Mosel-Rhine area southeastward across Europe to the Carpathians. Their history books say only that "I t was he who loved f r e e d o m . . . " [71 who responded to the invitation of King Geisa II of Hungary to settle, cultivate, and defend the southern- most reaches of the Hungarian terr i tory known as Transylvania. As a reward for this great task the settlers were granted, in 1224, the "Golden Charter" of King Andreas II, which codified

the duties and corporate privileges of the German freeman settlers, who were recognized as a "nat ion" under the Hungarian crown. The Saxon "University of the Nation" directed the affairs of the people; an elected count represented them in parliament. The charter was the basis of Saxon political autonomy and was retained until 1867, when Transylvania was finally incorporated into Hungary and the separate constitutions of its Saxon, Magyar, and Szekler "nations" abolished.

The Saxon settlements were thus self-governing from the start, but also part of a larger polity, and a non-German one at that. Hence the origin of Saxon minori ty status. Their settlement area remained the southern border of Hungary until 1918, when Transylvania was transferred to Romania, and through the centuries the Saxons defended the province against the raids of the Turks and Tartars. Thus the Saxons characterize themselves as a Grenzevolk (border, or frontier, people), and at tr ibute to themselves all the characteristics the term connotes: they are hearty, brave, proud; they are the last outpost, and protectors of German culture.

Their frontier situation demanded that they organize for protection against raids, and that they maintain group solidarity in the midst of other ethnic groups. The Sachsenboden, or Saxon land, was a kind of "national preserve," on which no other ethnic group was allowed to encroach politically [8]. However, the number of Romanians in the Saxon area came to equal and surpass that of the Saxons, while Hungarians, Gypsies, and Jews occupied surrounding villages and towns.

Less is known of Saxon communal life prior to the Reformation than of more recent times, but it is clear that that is where many Saxon institutions have their origin. Moreover, it is impossible to discuss Saxon forms of social, economic, and religious life without an under- standing of the links between this frontier people and Germany proper; the Saxons have consciously modelled their institutions on a German model. Even in the Middle Ages,

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Saxon urban intelligentsia in cities like Kron- stadt (Bra~ov) and Hermannstadt (Sibiu) sent their sons to study in German universities. In the villages the poorest peasantry, the excess

population, was sloughed off in a return migration northward. Saxon artisans spent their lgander/ahren in the growing urban centers of Germany. Students returned with the evolving German High Culture; artisans returned with patterns of economic organization in the form of guilds and associations. Kronstadt 's most noted son, Johannes Honterus ( 1498-1549) , after studying at the University of Basel, introduced the Reformation to the city. By 1550, the Reformation in Transylvania was accomplished and the Autonomous Lutheran Church founded [91.

The Lutheran church dominated society in the villages; the community of the faithful and Saxon society became synonymous. While a secular mayor and elected council directed. the civil affairs of the community, a system of church associations organized Saxon social life. Corresponding to the civil wards of the: village were the religious Nachbarschaften (neighborhood mutual-aid associations), whose elected leaders comprised the church council. For communal labor enterprises a man called not on his kinsmen but on the men of his neighborhood. Under penalty of fine, his neighbors were obligated to respond. The neighborhoods were also responsible f o r funeral rites. All youth of the village were obliged to belong to the bachelor and maiden associations (Bruderschaft and Schwester- schaft), whose overt purpose was to keep them ethnically pure as Germans by enforcing a strict code of social conduct. A "reckoning" assembly was held once a month, when fines were paid for social transgressions, such as failing to attend church or disturbing the peace. All courting behavior was supposed to take place under the auspices of the associations. The women's association oversaw wed- ding preparations and functioned as a charity and emergency help organization. Needy

Saxon families were supported by the community. Moreover, each village had a church choir, a brass band, and local chapters of the farmers' and craftsmen's associations. Apart from the activities of these formally constituted organizations, Saxons preferred to socialize quietly among themselves, in small groups, at home. Most married couples belonged to a Kranzchen, or "circle of friends." Krdnzchen were usually comprised of about six couples of approximately the same age and economic status and met on Sunday evenings for wine and conversation. The women of a Kranzchen gathered on weekday evenings in the winter to sew, leaving the men to tend the children. In general, the Saxons valued their inter- dependence and mutuali ty highly. The reluctant Saxon was not merely ignored - he was fined. These formal associations, designed to assure both ethnic solidarity despite differences in wealth and social distance from other groups, contrast with Romanian patterns of social organization. Whereas Saxons drew their strength from the civil society at large, Romanian extended kin and fictive kin net- works were more highly developed.

Lutheran control over education was of primary importance. The only village school was parochial, supported by local church taxes and funds from the University of the Nation. It provided eight years of segregated, German- language education to all Saxon children. In the nineteenth century Saxon vocational schools were founded with funds from the agricultural and merchants' associations. Largely because of these self-supporting schools, the Saxons were able effectively to resist the Magyarization pressures of the nineteenth century, when the public schools of Transylvania, which many Romanians attended, were used by the Hungarian state as a vehicle for Magyarization [ 10].

Clearly'then, although they were part of a Hungarian state the Saxons developed a strong civic life that insulated them culturally and politically from their Romanian and Hungarian neighbors.

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Harmonie

Saxons describe their relationship to Hungarians and Romanians in the old days as one of Harrnonie. The policy of harmony has been reflected in Saxon politics for seven hundred years. Saxons have worked to maintain this integrity, but never at the expense of peaceable relations with either their ethnic neighbors or the government. In the fifteenth century, for example, the Saxons formed a defensive alliance with the Magyar and Szeckler nations against both the Turkish raiders and the threat of encroachment by the Hungarian crown. I n the mid-nineteenth century the tri- partite constitution of Transylvania was abolished and Transylvania fully incorporated into Hungary. The Saxons became insignificant politically; the office of the Saxon count was abolished and the powers of the University of the Nation were reduced to control of its property. Yet under the Dual Monarchy the Saxons were favored, as Germans, in trade and mercantile activities with Austria. Saxons maintained their autonomous church and thus their educational autonomy.

Since they numbered fewer than half a mi l l ion [ 11 ], and comprised but a fraction of Transylvania's population, the Saxon's political influence remained weak. Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the transfer of Transylvania to Romania, the Saxon Diet in 1919 voted for the union of the province with Romania. This union was based on Article 3 of the Alba-Julia Resolutions of 1918, which granted "complete national liberty for all peoples which inhabit Transylvania; each people to educate, govern, and judge itself in its own language through the medium of persons from its own midst" [12]. Interesting- ly, the Saxons of all the German ethnic groups in the newly formed Greater Romania [ 13 ], were the only group specifically granted local autonomy in school and cultural affairs, under the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities of December 1919 [ 141. The University of the

Nation remained in existence, although its functions were greatly curtailed.

The Saxons thus established "harmony" with the new Romanian state, on terms mostly to their advantage. Most importantly, they retained control over education and internal affairs, and were allowed to maintain their separate ethnic associations, including those with market and business functions.

There were two serious blows to Saxon strength during the interwar period. One was the Land Reform Act of 1921, designed to re- distribute land resources more equitably through- out Romania. The University of the Nation lost most of its property, the income from which had financed Saxon schools. The ethnic group adapted to this loss by imposing higher taxes upon themselves, and wealthier Saxons were put under moral obligation (of Zusammenhalten) to contribute large sums for the general Saxon welfare. Despite the Land Reform Act, Marien- burg's 1,200 Saxons managed to build a new school in 1928. A substantial part of this in- vestment came from the wealthiest members of the community, who were in turn rewarded with the prestige of honorary civil posts.

,The second blow came about because the Saxons in mixed Saxon-Romanian'villages had to share local governmental responsibilities with Romanians for the first time. The usual arrangement in the mixed villages was for the mayor to be a Romanian and the vice-mayor a Saxon. The elected council represented the two groups according to their numbers. How- ever, since the Saxons still controlled the best agricultural land and had superior commercial and organizational experience, they retained effective economic control in the villages.

The Saxons have always managed to present a united front so as to best protect their own self-interest. They thus had to resolve fractional intraethnic disputes before presenting their case in the political arena. The Saxons have made every effort to avoid open conflict within the ethnic group, but at times of political unrest tiffs has not always been easy to manage.

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This was evident in the 1930s. As the Saxons gravitated toward German National Socialism, a conflict developed between those who would replace Lutheran authori ty over Saxon affairs with secular Nazi authori ty and those conservatives who would retain the former. The conservatives reasoned that the church was their one effective and officially recognized institution, and that they should do nothing to jeopardize this status. Clearly both sides were concerned with how best to represent and protect the self-interest of the group as a whole, and to coordinate this with the equally imperative task of achieving harmony. But for the Saxons the definition of the environment itself is double-edged, for they carry a commitment as Germans, on the one hand, and as Romanian citizens on the other. The conservatives in the 1930s were alarmed to see Saxons merging their Saxon and German commitments in Nazism at the expense of harmony with Romania. This was not i n keeping with traditional Saxon strategy, and the Saxons themselves recognized the absurdity of claiming Romania as part of the German Reich. Yet in other respects the Saxons were already putting Nazi philosophy into practice: they were strongly Germanic, placing the Volksgemeinschaft (civil community) above the person [ 15 ]. During the Nazi years, then, their identities as Saxons and as Germans merged. But with the collapse of Nazism, these commitments once again separated, but only after a very high price had been paid. Cur- rently, the Saxons carry a triple commitment - as Saxons, as Germans, and as Romanian citizens. In the years since 1944 the task of realizing this multiple identi ty has become increasingly difficult.

II. SAXONS AND M I N O R I T Y POLICY IN R O M A N I A

It is significant that the Socialist Republic of Romania faces a similar task, that of balancing its self-interest with the need for compatibil i ty with neighboring polities, and its minori ty policy reflects this need. Romania's "solution

to the national question" was not readymade, but evolved as a function of the country 's geopolitical position within the Eastern bloc and its relations with the West.

Initially, minori ty policy grew out of a complex of border disputes: between Romania and Hungary, which advanced opposing claims to northern Transylvania; and between Romania and the USSR, over Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. The USSR annexed the two pro- vinces that it was disputing with Romania, but turned over the administration of northern Transylvania in 1945 in compensation for this loss. This was done, however, with the stipula- tion that Romania "secure the rights of the nationalities" in Transylvania [ 161. Thus began Romania's minority policy, the immediate goal of which was to reduce the hostil i ty between Romania and Hungary by promising to protect the rights of 1.5 million ethnic Hungarians in Romania. This promise has been fulfilled, and Romania's minori ty policy is a model of socialist cultural pluralism in Eastern Europe.

For Romania, the creation of an indepen- dent niche in Eastern European politics requires the support of a generally united people [ 17], and favorable treatment of minorities is a necessity. Its achievement, however, remains problematic. On the one hand, oppression of minorities would weaken Romanian unity, alienate the minorities from the state, and invite outside criticism. On the other hand, the expansion of the minorities' autonomy promotes their identification with those countries with which they share ethnic identity, and so also serves to alienate them from Romania [ 18 ].

Romania interprets the Harxist position on nationali ty more or less in accordance with the letter of the Soviet constitution of 1936, namely, "socialist in content, national in form." Therefore, Romania encourages ex- pressions of ethnic identity as long as these are devoid of a counter-revolutionary political content and do not inhibit the building of

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socialism. In the interest of internal unity Romania has demonstrated respect for the minorities and has provided them with resources to maintain their cultural identities. This balance of positive, "socialist specific" measures toward the ethnic groups in return for their cooperation represents Romania's official solution to the national question. (It should also be noted that the minorities have been in a position to bargain for the improve- ment of their situation during periods of strain within the Eastern bloc.)

In the initial postwar confusion, the Saxons were actually able to negotiate with the Soviet Union and the new Romanian government over their survival as an ethnic group. All Germans had been declared retroactively to be members of the Hitlerite "German ethnic group in Romania," and were excluded from the privileges of the Statute for National Minorities (1945), which guaranteed "national equali ty" for Hungarians and other ethnic groups. Under the agrarian reform of 1945, the Germans were among the first Romanian citizens to have property expropriated. These laws against the Germans were revoked when Communist power was consolidated in 1947, but in the meantime leaders of the German minority, especially those of the Lutheran church, stepped in and negotiated with the Romanian government. One result of these negotiations was that the number of Germans recruited to fill the Soviet Union's request for labor to help rebuild the USSR was restricted to physically capable adults. The deportat ion of the entire population was avoided, although 75,000 Romanian Germans were sent to labor camps [19]. Many did not return: some died in the USSR, while others migrated to the West. This, combined with the war dead and the Saxon-German soldiers who did not return after 1944, left the resident German population in Romania in 1950 at one-half of its prewar level. Another result of the early negotiations was that the Lutheran church secured government recognition. From 1945

to 1947 it continued to provide parochial German education for Saxon children. In 1948, however, the responsibility of providing minority language education was transferred to the state, under the terms of the national constitution.

Through the 1950s and 1960s, the official organs of minori ty representation typically voiced support of Bucharest's foreign policy positions. For their demonstration of allegiance at crucial periods, the minorities were rewarded with increased cultural autonomy. During the Hungarian uprising of 1956, German property confiscated after World War II was returned or compensated for, with apologies for that act of "national discrimination." In 1968, at the time of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia, further improvements were made in the minority cultural sphere: more books and newspapers appeared in minority languages; programming on radio and television in minority languages was expanded; and a campaign for national unity was undertaken with the establishment of the Socialist Unity Front, designed to promote the "fraternal bonds" of all Romanians.

':~'he limits of Romanian minority policy are reached when it comes to the question of emigration. Since 1966, when Willy Brandt, then West Germany's foreign minister, established diplomatic and trade relations, Romania has come under increasing pressure on the problem of emigration. The Landsmann- schaften, refugee associations in West Germany, have repeatedly petit ioned the Bonn government to find a solution to the emigration question and to the problem of broken families [201. To date, emigration to West Germany has been limited to individuals who qualify under the international Reunification of Families plan. Between 1950 and 1971, over 17,000 ethnic Germans emigrated from Romania to Western countries under this plan [ 21 ]. It is impossible to say precisely how many of the remaining Germans in Romania qualify for emigration, and how

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many of those are in the process of applying, but the number is high. Note the spiralling effect of the reunification plan: if a family emigrates to join, say, the husband's relatives in the West, then through that move his wife's brothers, sisters, parents, and their families become eligible for emigration. This reunification process is now in a very advanced stage. If carried to completion, it would give almost every Saxon the opportuni ty to emigrate.

What, then are the implications of this complex situation for the Saxon population in Romania. First, a summary of the overall situation:

1. The resident population was reduced by half thirty years ago and has been declining ever since, through the combined effects of continued, though slow, emigration and a low birth rate (characteristic of Romania as a whole). The result is a skewed age structure with a disproportionate percentage of elderly people, and many broken families.

2. Nearly all Saxons have relatives of the first or second degree living in the West. Be- cause migration continues, and because even young families are now separated, international family relations are actively maintained. The logistics of these split families can be complicated - for example, with regard to the dis- position of inherited property. Moreover, Romania is rather lenient in its visitation regulations, and permits visits to relatives in the West as well as return visits by emigrants. Saxons in Romania and in Germany are well informed as to their respective situations, and all are impressed with the vast differences in economic and social life in the two countries.

3. With the socialist transformation the position of the Saxons within the polyethnic society has been redefined. They have been assimilated into one political-economic system and share with all other Romanian citizens both civil rights and education and employ- ment opportunities.

As indicated above, it is important to understand how Saxons have perceived these changes

and how they assess their situation. Only then can we begin to understand Saxon social and economic strategies. First, Saxons now regard outmigration as a viable option. If the borders to the West were closed, if the remaining Saxons had no alternative but to carve a life for themselves in socialist Romania, significant- ly different patterns of adaptation both within the ethnic group and in the nature of interethnic relations would no doubt develop. In that case, the Saxons would probably survive as an ethnic group, for Romania has granted them the right and the necessary facilities to do so. Second, Saxons regard their fate as being basically beyond their control. They are well aware that high-level international diplomacy has determined their fate for the last thir ty years, and will continue to do so. Moreover, these experiences have led the Saxons to dis- trust the future. In addition, with the socialist transformation they can use little of their Saxon past to guide them in planning the future. They regard the future as a series of contingencies: the borders to the West are now somewhat open, but what if they close? Romania's economy is stable and growing, but what if it declines? What if minori ty rights should be revoked?

Although they feel their fate is being orchestrated at high levels, the Saxons do not feel totally impotent. They continue to see their collective stance as contributing, in some measure, to decisions concerning minori ty policy. The most shocking lesson of the twentieth century was of course the political reaction to their Nazi collaborationist behavior, which resulted in their deportat ion to Soviet labor camps. Matters are at present much less drastic, but the issue of Saxon political reliabil- ity remains critical. If they do not cooperate under the Romanian system, they feel that forceful measures may be taken to induce compliance. On the other hand, if they do not respond to the visitation and outmigration options, such rights may be revoked as unneces- sary. In short, Saxons wish to cooperate with

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the Romanian polity, but not to the point of assimilation. Most specifically, they are concerned that their German-language schools may be closed due to a lack of students. They have reached a critically low level of population precisely through both outmigration and integration with Romanians. Indeed, the rate of intermarriage between Saxons and Romanians is about 30 percent, according to Saxon esti- mates. Thus, through the combined effects of these contradictory options, very few children are being born and raised as Saxons.

I I I . ETHNIC RELATIONS IN M A R I E N B U R G

It should be clear that the Saxons are not simply engaged in a " w e - t h e y " struggle, as a group attempting to create a niche within the dominant Romanian society. The Saxons themselves are conflicted: they are being drawn into participation in Romanian society at the same time that they are drawn to the G e r m a n society that lies beyond the borders. A total commitment to either option would signal the end to the Saxons as an ethnic group. But these forces are countered by a third impulse, to remain Saxon. This impulse is not merely conservatism, although it grows on tradition. It is vital to maintain some sort of a Saxon identi ty as a precondition for outmigration. At the same time, there are no well-defined codes of conduct to guide the Saxons in the expression of their German or Romanian identities. The Saxon code, while well known, has been severely restricted to the domestic sphere of family and neighbors. The code no longer serves to articulate between wider spheres of social and cultural identity.

These limitations are explicit - particularly that of emigration, but also with reference to an efficient adaptat ion to Romanian society. Keeping all options open precludes a ranking of the various commitments (such as would be evident in sentences like: ' T m a Saxon first and a Romanian citizen second"; or, "I am a German first and a Saxon second").

But real-life situations force people to rank their options, to follow through on actions fulfilling one commitment at the expense of another. Since ranking cannot become institutionalized, holding options open is itself converted into a principle.

At one level, options A, B, and C may be means toward a single end. At another level, options A, B, and C may be ends. One may rationalize A, B, and C as a system, i.e., institutionalize priorities among them or a set of principles for the assignment of priorities. Or one may not. If one does not, and furthermore regards concerted move- ment in one direction as excluding the possibility o f other directions, then one has a serious case of option- maximizing at the highest level The maximization o f options itself is institutionalized as a high-level value [221.

In this discussion of Banaban behavior Silverman points out that option maximizing will obtain in a dependent community, which must balance its self-interest against limitations imposed upon it from outside. The Saxons have no term to express the value they place on option maximizing, but the same message is effected through the complementary interaction of the Saxon values of group Zusammenhalten and Harmonic.

Marienburg is an exemplary arena for these conflicts. It had a prewar Saxon population o}" about 1,200, along with an equal number of Romanians. By 1956 the Saxon population was reduced to 785, whereas the Romanian population had risen to 1,815. Today, after some continued outmigration (between 1956 and 1974, 75 individuals, comprising 23 families, moved to the West) and dispersal due to job migration, there are 541 Saxons. There are few young people in the village: only 121 (21 percent) are between the ages of 15 and 30, while 26 percent are over 60.

Conforming with Romanian patterns, the birth rate is low. For the Saxons in Marien- burg it is crucially low: one baby was born in 1972, one in 1973, and two in 1974. Marien- burg has German-language parallel classes through the eight grade, but starting with the 1976 academic year the school will probably

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begin to be phased out for lack of children. The closing of the school is perceived by the Saxons as a death knell. The few Saxon children left will not have the benefit of the highly prized German-language education un- less their parents move to a thickly settled Saxon area, such as Bunsov, where German education will still be available.

As I have noted above, prior to the dis- ruption of the 1940s and 1950s the Saxon ethnic code of conduct, or Zusammenhalten, was finely elaborated, and the code for dealing with outsiders, Harrnonie, was relatively simple. Saxons now meet with Romanians at the work place, on the commuter train, as neighbors, and, in a growing number of cases, as in-laws. But today the Saxons have had to elaborate greatly on their simple method for dealing with their Romanian counterparts. To achieve "harmony" in social relations in the village it was enough to maintain distance, for the Saxons were well insulated in their segregated schools, businesses, and associations. Inter- ethnic contacts were limited to the market- place, to a few other arenas of non-Saxon speciality (such as Gypsy fortune telling), and to the pa t ron-c l i en t relationship they maintained with farm laborers. The average Saxon farm was larger than could be worked by .... :~' family labor alone, so it regularly employed full-time Romanian labor. From their superior economic position, Saxons dictated the terms of the relationship, which included social and economic exploitation. The importance of this cannot be overestimated because it was a major source of Saxon teachings of superiority. In- deed, the numerous children born illegitimately of Saxon fathers and Romanian mothers were considered "half-breeds" by the Saxons, the result of miscegination.

But for the purpose of maintaining Harmonie the Saxons developed an ethic of civility to ~ ward Saxon-Romanian contacts, and even pro- hibited the use of Saxon in mixed-ethnic company. The Saxons, in addition to their own dialect, were fluent in German and spoke

Hungarian and Romanian, whereas the other ethnic groups were typically monolingual. Furthermore, the Saxons displayed respect for the Romanians' Orthodox religious obligations; wealthy Saxons often entered into the Romanian na~-fin (godparenthood) relationship as a favor to a well-liked servant. But while it created Saxon-Romanian ties, this fictive kin relationship also served to express and even strengthen the status advantage of the Saxon.

In any case, the Romanian peasants in a bi-ethnic village lacked any political voice before 1918 and had no leverage vis-/i-vis the powerful Saxons. They were in no position to demand greater respect from the Saxons, to whom they were economically and politically subordinate. Thus, a "harmonious" relationship of explo i te r -explo i ted obtained between Saxon and Romanian. Further, although the change in the social order and the overthrow of capitalist relations has transformed the code governing interethnic relations, Saxons still a t tempt to apply the rule of social distance between Saxon and Romanian, even though the class relationships have shifted. And in some ways this has been possible - in neighborhoods, in factories~ and on the cooperative

. farm one need only be civil more often than before; exaggerated civility becomes a mechanism for distancing. In the past Saxons only called upon each other for emergency help and they were not paid, in keeping with the Saxon tradition of generalized reciprocity. Now, when Romanian neighbors are called upon they are paid, either in cash or in kind, while Saxon neighbors are not. These shifts in Saxon-Romanian economic relationships are deflating Saxon notions of superiority and make the maintenance of social distance, which had been a function of exploitation, increasingly difficult.

We must also understand the transformations necessary in the in-group code. The code for Zusarnrnenhalten was previously quite elaborate, with rules governing everything from proper

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Saxon etiquette to marriage preference (village endogamy), and it has suffered deterioration, mainly because the types of social interaction it governed no longer exist. The Bruderschaft and Schwesterschaft and almost all other exclusivist Saxon associations are now defunct. The only remaining function of the Nachbar- schaft is to bury the dead. The code for behavior appropriate to a Saxon has been whittled to the vanishing point: honor familial obligations above personal; prefer fellow Saxons to others. But because it governs those immediate obligations of home and family, it is still very powerful. Problems arise because the traditional mechanism for enforcing these dictates, especially those of the associations, are gone, because the goals of family Zusammenhalten and Saxon Zusarnmenhalten now sometimes conflict. This contradiction represents an un- precedented cultural dilemma among the Saxon Germans.

One change that Saxon and Romanian vil- lagers both experience is the dispersal of the village community as young people follow job opportunities from rural to industrial areas. Saxons have always valued higher education, but now upward educational mobil i ty most often results in a move away from the home community, due to the lack of middle-level positions in the village. In the interests of family Zusamrnenhalten, there is some evidence that Saxons are willfully checking their con- ventional impulses and are not urging their children on to higher education. In the 1 9 7 5 - 1976 school year, the German-language academic secondary school in Bra~ov, always considered highly competitive, was underenrolled. Twelve of the fourteen Saxon eighth graders in Marienburg had planned to go on to vocational schools but were discouraged from doing so - even though there are ample jobs for skilled workers in the area, and workers do not have to worry about being transferred out. More- over, the emigration option also serves as a check on occupational mobili ty: why spend years in costly education for degrees that may

not be recognized in Germany? In addition, taking a middle-level administrative job in the Romanian system usually means investing in a commitment, perhaps in party membership. Saxons shy away from responsible leadership positions for fear of being considered too important to be allowed to emigrate. During the Stalinist period of the 1950s, Saxons were excluded from such positions, but now that they are open, Saxons are not seeking them, even within the village, in spite of their con- stant complaint of Romanian mismanagement of civic affairs.

With the age curve in Marienburg skewed at the elderly end, the elderly are anxious that their married sons and daughters should not leave them ("We stick t o g e t h e r . . . " ) . Parents feign incompetence in dealing with the Romanian bureaucracy and manufacture situations to demonstrate their dependence on their children. The youth serve as mediators between their parents and the civil bureaucracy - they fill out the plethora of official forms for their parents and even represent them in minor disputes with the village government. These functions increase the autonomy of the young within the family.

One power the parents do retain, however, is control over property - namely, their homes and those abandoned by their relatives who have emigrated. Before the war Saxons occupied 280 homes in Marienburg; now, only 120. These are for the most part large, spacious, valuable properties with garden plots, in the desirable location at the center of the village and close to the school and shops. For most Romanians owning a home is the greatest in- vestment in material wealth they will make. Many a Saxon parent has offered a home, at no cost, to a young couple in the hope they will stay in Marienburg. Occasionally this strategy works.

The " lobby" of the elderly Saxons is strong. It is rooted in their domestic possessions, but their only tactical weapon is gossip, which has become in the absence of institutionalized rules

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for the orderly inheritance of property, their only controlling mechanism in the give and take of everyday life. This is not idle gossip (Klatschen), but Hetzen, best translated as baiting, or "siccing," a feared form of harrass- ment most aptly practiced by the elderly, even upon each other. The main accusation of the Hetzen is Falschheit (hypocrisy): that someone claims to be a proper Saxon, but fails to act like one. The problem is that there is no longer complete agreement as to the definition of "proper" Saxon behavior. Virtually all Saxons thus run the risk of being labeled. hypocrites: either they have established social ties with Romanians, Or they are participating " too much" in Romanian society. However, the charge of being hypocritical will only be leveled when those ties in some way threaten the general, ill-defined Saxon welfare. Thus, the friendship of two eighty-year-old men, one a Saxon, the other a Romanian, who reminisce together about the "good old days," will be benignly overlooked. But other social ties are not tolerated, and are hetzed against. There is a clique of five Saxon women who consider themselves progressive, and in the interests of "harmony", as they perceive it, act as self-styled ambassadors to the Romanian community: they participate in the predominantly Romania~a women's club and otherwise are " token" Saxons at community functions. This behavior is regarded as too assimilationist by others who hetz them and call them hypocrits.

Hetzen does serve to check Saxons from acting in self-interest to the detr iment of the Saxon civility. The elderly are loathe to see Romanians moving into old Saxon houses. Those Saxons who emigrated have often yielded to the threat of Hetzen, refusing to sell their homes to high-bidding Romanians and transferring title to remaining relatives. Yet homes are being sold anyway. Personal interest and Saxon interest, once identical, now conflict, and this places individuals in impossible situations. In one case, an old woman was "saving" a house she owned for her son

and his family, letting her sister-in-law live there temporarily. The son chose a Romanian bride: the ensuing Hetzen, led by the old sister- in-law, was to pressure the woman not to allow her son to move in. The owner was portrayed as intending to put the sister-in-law, an old woman, out of her home in favor of a Romanian But the mother wanted her son near her, and decided not to yield. For many months she was shunned; she received no visitors, made no calls, did not leave her courtyard. In the end she gained her son but was alienated from her contemporaries. She will slowly reestablish the ties with her cronies who hetzed her, and she will probably vigorously join in the next Hetzen to accomplish this. In general, the civic response to Hetzen is giving way to personal familial interest. Today some young families are resettling in more thickly populated Saxon districts to assure German education for their children; no amount of Hetzen could stop them. This shift toward a certain kind of personal priority is regretted; it is after all very un-Saxonlike.

Saxon youth have even more commitments to juggle, and the job of adequately maintaining them all is difficult, if not impossible. The postwar generation was reared primarily by their grandparents, while their mothers and fathers were in Russian labor camps and then working in Romanian factories. The grandparents, anxious not to lose any more from the Saxon fold, reared these children in an or thodox Saxon way, teaching them the old Saxon values ("We stick together," "We look out for one another") and the proud Saxon history ("We came here 800 years ago .. 2'). Fearful of the assimilationist pressures of life in modern Romania, the grandparents made every effort to make the young people feel as different from Romanians as possible, and drilled into their heads, with an urgency never before needed, a configuration of stereotypes and simplified " w e - t h e y " dichotomies: we are moral, strong, clean, orderly - they are not. Above all, these children learned the value of

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Zusammenhalten ("A Saxon keeps his word," "A Saxon honors his commitments") . School- children, responding to an essay on the image of the "good life," stressed the virtues of a close-knit family. Saxon children are actively discouraged from associating with Romanian children. In order to assure that Saxon youth associate with each other and not with Romanians, parents permit them to socialize in ways that are new and were formerly dis- approved: all-night, unchaperoned parties are a common weekend feature. This new behavior is, however, couched in the old Saxon tradition of the Krdnzchen. In Marienburg there are seven KrSnzchen of married couples of various ages, and about three among the youth. They are informally linked with similar Kr~inzchen in surrounding villages, thus expanding the courting pool. The activities of the young Kriinzchen bear almost no resemblance to the old institution, but they remain Kra'nzchen nonetheless.

Even small Saxon children will say, "I never play with Romanians." But a simple look around the village shows this is not true. Saxon children begin playing with their Romanian neighbors by the age of five or six, as soon as they are old enough to play away from home. By then a Saxon child speaks Romanian well enough to communicate informally with Romanian friends. By ten or so a boy who loves to fish may be bosom friends with a Romanian peer. Yet he knows better than to bring his friend home. All Saxon- Romanian contacts take place on the neutral terri tory of the playing field and schoolyard - and for teenagers, in the bar and the youth car6, where Romanian and Saxon youth dance (together) one evening a week in the summer.

After eighth grade the majority of Marien- burg students begin their years of integrated schooling, when they enter the vocational academies in Bra~ov and other cities. In these regional schools there are rarely more than two or three Saxons to a class, and since the students often board in the city, the teen-

ager begins to learn how to get along on his own in Romanian youth society. The Saxons are not discriminated against. On the contrary, their good manners often earn the respect of teachers and classmates alike. Saxon teenagers in this situation begin to see that they are not that different from Romanians and, especially, that Romanians are not as dreadful as their Saxon upbringing instructed them. Saxon youth feel extremely ambivalent about their friendships with Romanians, knowing that they may not admit these friendships to their parents, yet knowing also that their parents have Romanian friends of their own. They suspect hypocrisy on their parents ' part - especially when it comes to the question of intermarriage.

Intermarriage is occurring at two ends of the economic-educational spectrum. There is greater likelihood, on the one hand, that the Saxon who does go on to become an engineer or a doctor will marry someone, perhaps a Romanian, with the same educational achieve- ments. On the other end, intermarriage also occurs among individuals who did not receive the strong separatist socialization of a Saxon, those from broken homes or disrupted families. Increasingly, however, even staunch conven- tional families are not immune from the possibility of mixed marriage. Most Saxons who have married outside the ethnic group choose to leave Marienburg rather than suffer dis- approval and accept a marginal position. For example, there are no Kriinzchen with mixed- marriage couples. Saxon patterns of sociability, in the absence of the many balls and church outings of the old associations, are now centered in the home. There are numerous family feasts, with upwards of twenty people attending, at which much congenial eating, dancing, and drinking go on. The presence of a Romanian at one of these feasts creates an awkward situation for all concerned, if only because of the language-switching that must occur. Saxons have always had a rule against speaking the dialect in the presence of Romanians who do

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not understand it. Yet they find it difficult in the ambience of a party to have to remember to switch languages. Even when there is no animosity toward the Romanian in question (and there usually is), he or she tends to be avoided. Intermarriage is still so rare that rules have not developed for dealing with the situations it creates. In a family setting such as a party, it is difficult for Saxons to meet their own expectations of "civil" conduct to Romanians.

Saxons fear that with "Romaniza t ion ," some of them will actually shed their ethnic identity. To date, Romanization has occurred only in the next generation: a Saxon marries a Romanian and raises his or her child as a Romanian, away from the home community. Yet Saxons are titillated by the idea of an adult Saxon actually ceasing to be a Saxon. A case in point: a stranger, a Romanian who had a Saxon name, came to Marienburg. The man was obviously not a Saxon; he could not speak Saxon or German; he worshiped in the Romanian church; he had none of the manners and bearing of a Saxon, only the external marker of his name. Had Saxons asked him, they would have learned that he had a Saxon father he never knew, and had been raised by his Romanian mother in a village not far from Marienburg. No Saxon ever asked him; they preferred to speculate about the circumstances of his shedding his ethnic identity.

The strongest check on the "Romanizat ion" process is the option for outmigration to Germany. The relationship between the "Saxon" and "German" aspects of ethnic identity has become complex. The Saxon was always a type of German, and Saxon a category of inclusion in the German identity. Since contact between Transylvania and Germany was never broken, Saxons kept pace with events in Germany and perceived themselves as fully German. The vehicle for this was the Lutherar_ church, charged with educating the populati, The evolving High German was the literary language; the Saxon dialect of the thirteenth

century became the vernacular. A major part of Saxon upbringin~ has been, and remains, education as Germans. The Saxons pride themselves as rein Deutsche, pure Germans, unadulturated by the Hungarian and Romanian cultures surrounding them. The Landsmannschaft, or ethnic German associations, founded in Germany in the 1950s, were in fact based on the belief that the eastern Germans had brought with them to modern Germany the last, pure Germanic forms, and the associations dedicated themselves to recording these [23].

Until the present, postwar era, there were no serious definitional disruptions between Saxon and German identity. And from the safe distance of six hundred miles, Saxons were perhaps unaware of the degree to which German society since the industrial revolution had changed, and conversely, how anachronistic and conservative their own society had remained. Since 1945 the gap between "Saxon- ness" and "Germanness" has widened tremen- ddu'siyl Saxons are aware of this from visits paid by German relatives, and from the trips to the "Reich" some Saxons have made. The German relatives own the coveted material objects (automobiles, modern appliances, and so forth) that are out of reach of the Romanian- Saxon worker. But the Saxons also perceive that 'their relatives have thrown their fate in with that of Germany and have, indeed, deracinated themselves. They project, correct- ly, that should they emigrate, they would face a life that is individualistic (nuclear-family centered, without support of community), competitive, fast-paced and hectic, probably living in a cramped housing project in a strange city. The Saxons most fear losing reign over their children. Although some Saxon emigrants live in clusters in the industrial Rhine region, they do not have the resources to maintain a separate existence apart from the mainstream of German life. The children become Germans; often they do not even learn the Saxon dialect. The German children who come to visit are regarded with awe by their Saxon cousins, and

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with horror they fail to defer to elders; their slang is offensive, as is their taste in clothes and (rock) music. The Saxons fear that if they emigrate, their children will become modern Germans.

However, becoming such a German remains a viable alternative to becoming a Romanian. Indeed, even today the drive toward Germany could almost be described as millenarian. To check the youth 's "Romanizat ion," parents promote "Germanization," even if they do not really like that either. The youth are engaged in active preparation to go to Ger- many - they listen to German pop music on cassette tapes and copy the styles and slang of their cousins. Their German identi ty is thus the last boundary separating Saxons from Romanians; but developing German identi ty requires the adoption of values that are radical- ly different from Saxon values and that are dysfunctional until the actual move is made.

There is another aspect to emigration. When Saxons first arrive they are provincial, clumsy in maneuvering themselves about German society; they are welcomed at best with indif- ference, and at worst wit h hostil i ty by the German working class they join. They are regarded as a drain on the welfare state since all emigrants receive compensation from the West German government while establishing themselves. The Saxons are sometimes called Zigeunerdeutsche, gipsy Germans, who once wandered away and now put forth a false claim to return; or, worse, they are labeled Rumanier, Romanians. In any case, they are not regarded as the pure Germans, the protectors of German culture they thought themselves to be.

There is a self-reinforcing process between the emigrants and the Saxons still in Romania, which stimulates still further outmigration. When a Saxon family emigrates, in fulfillment of its dreams, the children have been saved from Romanization and look forward to good job opportunit ies and a high standard of living. Yet in Germany this family is lonely, displaced,

and yearns for the comfort of the relatives they have left behind. Rather than return to Romania or otherwise admit that the dream has not come true, they write back and say: it 's wonderful here, please come. Some Saxons are totally taken in by the myth of the Wonder- ful Germany that shines through these letters; others remain skeptical. Out of this confusion, the one sure thing that arises on both sides of the border is an acute awareness of Saxon ties to the Heimat, the homeland, which is neither Germany nor Romania, but Siebenburgen Transylvania. For the Marienburgers, the Siebenburger Heimat is the Burzenland, the Birsei land of the thirteen Saxon villages around Bra$ov. At Saxon parties, which are frequent, Saxons passionately sing this song: "Burzen- land, oh, fair homeland / You are so dear to me / I will never leave you." This song, ironical- ly enough, was written after 1950 by emigrants, Saxons who had in fact left the homeland.

In short, the Saxons have a sense that they are "abandoning ship," despite the value they place on Zusammenhalten, or sticking together. Whether this is done by leaving the Saxon society for the Romanian, or by outmigration, it is not done with a clear conscience. The conscience of the society has its locus in the coterie of the elderly who in their advancing age are least eager to pull up roots, and so are most active in pulling the inward, Saxon strings, primarily through the houses they offer, their protestations of Zusammenhalten, and by the divisive and cruel Hetzen, which have nonetheless failed in achieving Saxon solidarity. Perversely, the other locus of conscience is in the emigrants, who send out conflicting mes- sages of sentimental devotion to the homeland and the dream of a new life in Germany, and who then assert their right to a Zusammen- halten-like behavior on the part of their relatives by calling the last Saxons to Germany.

CONCLUSION

The nature of the Saxon dilemma should

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now be clear. It should be stressed that this dilemma has n o t been brought about by official Romanian ideology and policy concerning minorities. Quite to the contrary, it is largely because of positive measures that recognize the integrity of the minorities that the Saxons, although now very small in number, continue to exist. It is the factor of continuing outmigration that throws the plan for peaceful "cohabitation" and mutual respect between Saxons and Romanians into question and acts as a check on full Saxon participation in Romanian society. Therefore, the envisioned stable, complementary coexistence of the different cultural traditions has not been achieved.

NOTES

1 The term "Saxon" refers to the German-speaking population of Transylvania, and dates from at least the thirteenth century. This Balkan ethnic group is not to be confused with the Germans of Saxony.

2 Research for this paper was conducted from January through July 1974, under the University of Massachusetts Department of Anthropology European Field Studies Program, Professor John V. Cole, Director.

3 To date, emigration is conducted under the international Reunification of Families plan, which reunites families split in the aftermath of World War II. Since 1974, pressure on Romania to ease emigration restrictions has also been applied by the United States, according to the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Reform Act.

4 Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), vol. i , p. 389.

5 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969).

6 Martin Silverman, "Maximize Your Options: A Study of Values, Symbols, and Social Structure," in Robert F. Spencer, ed., Forms o f Symbolic Action (Seattle: Univer- sity of Washington Press, 1969).

7 Friedrich Teutsch, Die Siebenburger Sachsen in Vergangen- heit und Gegenwart (Leipzig: Verlag von K.F. Koehler, 1916).

8 C.A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 254.

9 Friedrich Teutsch, Geschichte der evangelischer Kirche in Siebenburgen (Hermannstadt: W. Kraft Verlag, 1922), vol. 1.

10 Macastney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 263 ft. 11 In 1910, the total population of Transylvania was

2.6 million, with the following breakdown by ethnic group: 55 percent Romanian; 34.3 percent Magyar; 8.7 percent German; 2 percent others. See Theodor Schieder, ed., The Fate of the Germans in Rumania (Bonn: Federal Ministry for ExpeUees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961; Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, vol. 3), p. 6.

12 Ibid., p. 28. 13 The "Greater Romania'. of the interwar years had a total

population of about 18 million, roughly 4 percent of which was German. In addition to the Saxons in Transylvania, there was a large settlement of "Suabians" in the Banat, and smaller numbers of Germans in Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the Dobruja,

14 Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in Rumania, p. 30. 15 Macartney, Hungary andHer Successors, p. 344. 16 Robert R. King, Minorities Under Communism:

Nationalities as a Source o f Tension Among Balkan States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 38.

17 According to the 1966 census, the population distributior. of Romania was: 87.7 percent Romanian; 8.5 percent Hungarian; 2.0 percent German; 2.8 percent other.

18 King, Minorities Under Communism, p. 160. 19 Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in Rumania, p. 80. 20 See HansW. Schoenberg, Germans from theEast (The

Hague: Martinus Hijoff, 1970). 21 King, Minorities Under Communism, p. 165. 22 Silverman, "Maximize Your Options," p. 101. 23 Schoenberg, Germans from the East.

Dialectical Anthropology 1 (1976) 349-364 © Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

The Saxon Germans: Political fate of an ethnic identity

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