THE R E C O G N I T I O N A N D INSTITUTIONALIZATION O F ISLAM I N BELGIUM

The Recognition and Institutionalization of Islam in Belgium Meryem Kanmaz Gbenl University Gbent, Bekium

n December 131h 1998, elections were held for what is called Muslim “Head of Cult” of the “Muslim Executive” in Belgium, Islam being the 0 second largest religion in the country after Catholicism. The media

made much of this event, describing it as a unique phenomenon, or as they put it, a “world prime.”’ Some viewed these elections as opening the door for new interpretations of the relationship between state and religion, calling Islam the “Precursor,”2 and the “only democratic religion in Flanders.”3 Results of the election were published in the Belgian Monitor in May 1999. But in fact this achievement came only after a long and agonizing process, starting in 1974 with the official recognition of Islam as a Belgian religion. When the Belgian situation is viewed from abroad, this earlier juridical recognition seems to have been a real accomplishment insofar as it granted equal rights to Islam. However, for a long time, this recognition was in name only, since it is only very recently, after more than 25 years, that the Muslim Head of Cult has actually been institutionalized.

In both the initial recognition and the final realization, it is the Belgian government that has taken the initiative. Official recognition of Islam was characterized by a hasty response to the international political climate on the one hand, and by the fact that Islam was becoming problematic in terms of the state minority policy on the other hand (i.e., Constitutional rules 19, 20 and 21 concerning the freedom of religion and freedom of speech and state- church relations, as well as the 1870 law concerning the temporal administra- tion of a religion). It did not, however, until more recently consider the internal requirements of the religion of Islam itself,

The Musl im Population in Belgium The Muslim population* in Belgium was initially composed mainly of

foreign laborers who were recruited in the 1960s from the Mediterranean

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regions to work in the Belgian steel and mining industrie~.~ This immigration concentrated primarily in the Walloon and Limburg mining regions. Com- pared with France or Great Britain, Belgium had no contact with Muslims by means of colonization. It is by means of bilateral agreements, especially with Turkish and Moroccan governments, that Muslim foreign workers settled in Belgium since the 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~ This controlled and organized migration stopped in 1974, when the economic crisis of the 1970s led to a decreased need for foreign workers. However, a second and less structured wave of immigration from North Africa and Turkey followed, as family reunification and tourist visas opened the way for new Muslim immigrants. Some of these new arrivals settled in Brussels, but most went to other regions of Flanders. The number of immigrants from Islamic countries increased from 1,200 in 1960 to 65,000 in 1970 and around 200,000 in 1985,’ approximately one third being Turkish and two thirds North African, mostly of Moroccan origin.

The exact number of Muslims living in Belgium today is of course diffi- cult to determine, since there is no registration on the basis of religion, and the criterion of nationality does not account for the numerous naturalizations. During the preparations for the election of the Muslim Executive in 1998, the total number of Muslims was estimated at 350,000, converts included. Studies at the beginning of the 1 9 9 0 ~ ~ showed the majority originating from North Africa (160,900 Moroccans, 8,300 Tunisians, 12,400 Algerians), 99,000 coming from Turkey and 4,800 from other countries. According to this estimation, the Muslims at that time made up about 2.9% of the Belgian population. Calcula- tions and predictions from 1998 estimate it now to be at 3.6%.9 Almost half of the Muslim population lives in the Brussels region, remaining more or less equally spread over Wallonia and Flanders. The North African community has mostly settled in the French-speaking part of Belgium (Brussels and Wallonia) and the majority of the Turkish population in Flanders, especially in Limburg and Ghent.

Visibility of Muslims The perception of immigrants as Muslims has been a continuous process

since the 1980s, especially because of the rise of militant Islam on the interna- tional scene and the repercussions of that phenomenon in Belgium. The discourse of the Flemish extreme right wing political parry Vlaams Blok is similar to that of French groups, who identdy Islam with extreme fundamen- talism. Internal processes within the Belgian Muslim community have also played an important role in the way that Belgians view Islam. Initially com- prised solely of migrant laborers, the Muslim Community came to include also the families of the Muslim men who decided to extend their time as workers in Belgian society. Family reunification thus resulted in the increased visibil-

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ity of Muslims. Instead of living in poorly maintained guesthouses with other workers, as they had initially done, families now started to settle into their homes. Thus, they created new neighborhoods, where children went to local schools. A network of their own services emerged, ranging from shops and travel agencies to mosques with Qur’anic schools, inspired by the concern for transmission of their own norms and values. At the same time, the myth of returning to their countries of origin dissipated and was replaced by the recognition that their futures lay in Belgium. The expansion of the infrastmc- ture met different necessities ranging from socio-religious education and identity-development to social help.1° The most obvious sign of Islamic identity was the mosque or prayer-hall. From only a few at the beginning of the 1980s, the number of mosques grew io nearly a hundred several years later, to over two hundred in 1990. Now the number is estimated at around three hundred,” some two thirds of which are North African and one third Turkish. Most of the mosques are still organized on the basis of nationality, residence, village or kinship. Two-thirds of the Turkish mosques are linked to Diyanet, the Turkish ministry of Religious Affairs, and the rest to Milli G o r i i ~ . ’ ~ These mosques bear little resemblance to those found in Muslim countries, but are mostly simple places in old industrial and commercial buildings with few external signs of Islamic identification.

These internal developments might have remained unnoticed if they had not coincided with the period of the oil crisis. The Muslim community gener- ally lives at the lowest social level due to such factors as the difficulty of finding jobs,13 limited education, poor housing, etc.I4 Their search for em- ployment became more difficult as the Belgian population began to perceive them as competitors in the labor market. Unlike the former immigrants, Turkish and Moroccan workers were only able to take advantage of the high economic prosperity for one decennium.’j Their settlement coincided with a time of economic crisis in which the basis of their legitimization, i.e., the need For their services in the labor market, came to be seriously questioned.I6 The Muslim community became visible in Belgium in this climate of hostility.

bly led in many instances to various forms of stigmatization. Initial appella- tions such as ‘foreign workers,’ and later ‘migrants,’ had no religious connotations-it was only later that they began to be referred to as ‘Muslim.’” The social construction** of the immigrant as a Muslim is especially evident in the discourse of the Flemish extreme right wing, Vlaams Blok. Nonetheless, this process has had a decisive influence on the perception of large groups of the population. It is irrefutable that the Vlaams Blok has dictated the political agenda of the other political parties. M. Swyngedouw suggests that the social construction of the immigrant as a Muslim gradually evolved as Belgians

This process of increasing visibility and identity as a distinct group inevita-

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attacked the. symbolic, economic and cultural capital of the immigrants, thus denigrating and therefore stigmatizing them. They did this by praising their own Western culture and opposing it diametrically to Islam. It was argued that these two cultures could not be mixed, and that Western ethnicity and culture (more so than race) are superior. Counter toshe philosophy of the Enlighten- ment in which equality is central as the basis of the nation state, belonging to an ethnicity or culture was emphasized. The resulting cultural racism stigma- tizes and devalues the culture of the Muslim immigrants. International as well as local events were seized upon to illustrate that Islamic fundamentalism is the new enemy.19 ’On another level, as the 1970s and ’80s were marked by an economic crisis which boded an uncertain future for the lower social classes in Belgium, the (Muslim) immigrant was depicted as a competitor in the labor market and thus undesirable as a fellow citizen.

the difficult processes of the institutionalization and recognition of Islam as a Belgian religion.

This evolution of the discourse to stigmatization was simultaneous with

Recognit ion Although Belgian legislation is considered ‘tolerant towards religion,’20

the political history of Belgium has been characterized by a continuous struggle between the Catholic (social-democrat) and the liberal pillars for the retainment (which the Catholics want) or the extension (which the liberals favor) of other spheres of influence. Apart from the Catholic Church, which had a dominant position in the regime, other smaller religious communities were merely ‘recognized.’ The secularization of Belgium and the position of religion are affirmed by the constitutional principles of freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The relationship between church and state is charac- terized by a mutual independence, inscribed in the constitution,*l although this does not mean a strict separation between church and state as is implied, for example, in the French concept of fafcM Under a law of 1870, a differ- ence is drawn between the temporal and spiritual aspects of the religion; it is only the temporal or ‘worldly’ aspects of a religion that are officially recog- nized and therefore financed by the state. If a.religious group has this kind of recognition, it can appeal to the authorities to provide the salaries of the minister or religious leader as well as other kinds of material support. Since 1974, Islam, along with Catholicism, Anglicanism, Protestantism, Judaism and Orthodoxy has been one of the six recognized religions in Belgium.

First Steps towards Recognit ion The recognition and institutionalization of Islam in Belgium began with

the founding of an association by a group of Islamic students and Albanian +

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refugees in the early 1960s. This association asked the Ministry of Justice in 1962 to attribute the Eastern Pavilion (from the World Exposition of 1897) to the Islamic community of Belgium; the ministry, however, declined. Soon this organization was taken over by the embassies of Islamic countries such as Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. It was recognized by the Belgian government as the international 'Islamic and Cultural Centre (ICC)' (May 7, 1968). One year later, the Eastern Pavilion was given to the Islamic commu- nity, probably in return for the support of Saudi Arabia afrer the fire in the shopping center Innovation in Brussels.*' According corporate rights to the ICC was the first decisive step towards recognition.

From then on the demand for the recognition of Islam became more concrete. The first bills were put forward by the Catholics (1971-13721, but to no effect. After a number of attempts, the bill for recognition of Islam was finally amended and passed unanimously in 1974. It is not entirely clear what issues were then at stake. According to some authors, the first bill for recognition of Islam was determined by the need to find a solution for the problem of schooling. In some schools there was a fairly large student population from Islamic countries who, because of the absence of a regula- tion, were not able to take lessons in the Islamic religionz3 or were forced to follow courses of study pertaining to other religions, namely Catholicism. That is why some school authorities decided to offer lessons in Islam and to appoint the teachers themselves.24 Other authors speculate that the bill was passed in exchange for the beginning of a ban on immigration in 1974. I t also seems clear that the bill was not unrelated to the larger global context, since recognition of Islam took place concurrently with an international petroleum crisis.25 As was mentioned above, the negotiations were not with the Muslim community in Belgium but with the representatives of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World League.

The Non-enforcement of the Law of 1974 The law of 1974 modifies the law of 1870 concerning the temporal

aspects of religions, making it possible for Muslims to appeal for the rights guaranteed by Article 177 of the Constitution concerning salaries for reli- gious personnel (in their case, imams of mosques) as well as some other material advantages.*" This law was put into effect by the Royal Decree of May 3,1978, which determines the composition and actions of the commit- tees that will guarantee the material support of local Islamic communities, to be recognized by Royal Decree. The Royal Decree also determines that an elected committee can only function after the recognition of these local (in fact provincial) Islamic communities. However, since no local community was recognized, no elections could be held.27 Here, then, was the First major

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problem: the organization of the religious community had to occur on the provincial level, whereas in the case of other religions, it operated at the local level of the city or municipality. Since mosques form the core of Muslim religious communities, it could have been expected that no provin- cial recognition would be applied for, certainly not at that time. Organiza- tion at the provincial level was probably suggested by the head of the ICC, to increase their influence on the local communities, which were mainly Moroccan or Turkish in ethnicity. Neither the law nor the Royal Decree recognized the need for a representative organ for the whole of the Islamic community; the expectation was that the committees would represent the pluriformity of Islam in Belgium. Juridical recognition was not put into practice for a long time, and the various efforts to establish a representative organ failed. In the meantime, an important key role was attributed to the ICC by the Belgian government. It was long considered to be the official Islamic voice and representative, and the important role played by the diplomatic representatives in the ICC was not seen as a problem. As a result, the ICC gained power over the organization of mosques, the training and appointment of Islamic clergy, and the appointment of teachers for Islamic education.28 Only later, by a combination of national and international events, was the role of the ICC criticized.

Islam is Incorporated in the Minority Policy International events such as American attacks on Libya, the Salman

Rushdie affair, the Gulf War and the headscarf controversy in France all had an impact on the Belgian situation. These events led to the increased visibility of Islam and a gradual change in the public view of the religion. After the attacks in Libya, the Muslim community held protest demonstrations. The Belgian French-speaking press and local politicians from Brussels did not understand this phenomenon and interpreted it as an expression of funda- mentalism. Charles Pique, the mayor of St-Gillis, near Brussels, declared that 75% of Islamic teachers are ‘dangerous fundamentalist^,'^^ with which other mayors of the Brussels region agreed.

Consequently, an automatic link was made, first visible in Brussels, between Muslims and fundamentalists. Several mayors of the Brussels region refused to provide Islamic education in public schools. The Muslim teachers were described as initiators of fundamentalism within the context of their own schools. Fear that fundamentalist norms and values would be transmit- ted through these instructors in the process of socializing young people became increasingly evident. Opposition from the government grew toward the ICC and its role in the appointment of Muslim teachemw (As a result, for several years the prerogative for the appointment of teachers and leaders was

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given to an organization of immigrants from secular and trade union con- texts.) Other developments, including the issue of whether girls could wear headscarves to school, the assassination of the Imam-Director of the ICC (Islamic Cultural and Religious Centre in Brussels) and the establishment of

, the first and only Islamic school in Laken (Brussels), served to strengthen the view that Islam is a threat. Although these developments were mainly around Brussels, there were also incidents in Flemish schools.

In Flanders, politicians had to consider new strategies for dealing with the presence of Muslims after the first electoral success of the extreme right wing political party Vlaams Blok in the city of Antwerp (the party gained 18% of the votes and became the third largest in the city). In fact, there had been no former strategy or policy towards immigrants/Muslims. In 1989, the Royal Commissariat on Immigrant Policy (KCM) was established and Paula d’Hondt (a member of the Christian-democrat party CVP) was appointed as the Royal Commissioner. For the first time, there was an attempt to create a coherent ‘integration’ policy to deal with minorities. The concept of integration was dealt with extensively by KCM, although it was defined somewhat vaguely, and in its first report, Islam was explicitly ment i~ned .~’ With the policy’s emphasis on the position of women and respect for the principles of democ- racy, however, it is clear that this integration model focuses on a specific group of immigrants, namely, M~s1im.s.~~

In this way, KCM reopened the issue of Islam and tried to organize the elections of the “Head of Cult” o r Muslim Executive. Always an issue in the negotiations and debates was the requirement that this position be elected democratically, even though such a condition has never been asked of any other Belgian religion.

interpretation of the concept of integration, since, in the initial report, consid- erable attention is paid to the notion of integration on three levels.33 Since KCM was developed on the federal level, Flanders and Wallonia had to be r e p r e ~ e n t e d , ~ ~ as is apparent from both the text and the discourse that took into consideration the fact that different traditions regarding immigrants exist in the two parts of the country. In Wallonia, due to the historical predomi- nance of the social-democrats (Parti Socialiste, PSI, emphasis was put on the ‘integration’ of disadvantaged persons, without reference to any religious connotation. In Flanders, where more attention is paid to cultural and reli- gious (i.e., Flemish) identity, as articulated by the dominant position of the Christian Democrat Party (CVP),35 the immigrants were also perceived in the same way. This does not mean, however, that Islam was not an issue in the French-speaking part of Belgium. Indeed, as previously noted, they were fully engaged with the (French) discourse on secularism OaTcit$ the so-

The appearance of Islam within the minority debate is also linked to the

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called incompatibility between Islam and democracy and the discourse about fundamentalism finf@n3me), 36 extrapolating these ideas to the Belgian context. It is in this climate that the first concrete steps towards an organized Islam were taken.

The Concrete Steps Taken by the Different Parties Concerning the Installation of a Head of Cult

Inspired by the concern of involving the whole immigrant community, and the desire to undermine the monopoly of the ICC, KCM proposed to install a Superior Islamic Council (HRMB).37 The Council was to be made up of representatives of the different segments of the Belgian Muslim popula- tion, including the ICC, mosques, teachers of Islamic religion and socio- cultural organizations.% The Minister of Justice, however, did not accept this proposition because it does not fulfill the condition that representation should be through the process of election.

The ICC anticipated the action of KCM and announced that it would organize elections and make the necessary preparations to that end.39 This was again not accepted by the Minister of Justice, who insisted on the sus- pension of elections on the grounds that the results would not be representa- tive. The ICC ignored this ban and did organize the elections on January 13, 1991. The participating mosques were mostly Moroccan, along with Turkish mosques attached to the Milli GOri i~.*~ Out of the 32,000 Muslims who registered for the election (18% of the total adult Muslim population), 26,000 did vote. This elected body established an executive committee, also called H€UV~B,~I made up of 17 members (14 elected from within the Council and three from outside). As predicted, the HRMB was not recognized by the Ministry of Justice.

The powerful Francophone liberal party ( P a ) in the Senate was in favor of governmental intervention in this matter. They pressured the authorities to take the initiative to install an executive committee that would be truly representative of Muslims in Belgium. As a result, the Belgian government established a Provisional Council of Elders (VRW)'12 in June 1996 as an advisory board. Its functions were to make further arrangements for the preparation of elections, handle the urgent matter of the teaching of Islamic religion:? and achieve more control over the leaders in the Muslim commu- nities4* This VRW, however, was not recognized or accepted in Muslim circles because it had no real religious authority or competence in Islamic law, but was instead a socio-cultural representation of immigrants. The Diyanet mosques, which represented two-thirds of Turkish mosques, were opposed to the establishment of the HRMB by the ICC. As for the Moroccan

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community, their representation consisted merely of trade union and secular (luique) social environments.45 Moreover, the ICC rehsed the three seats reserved for them.

When neither the VRW nor the HRMB would recognize each other, negotiations reached an impasse. It soon became clear that outside interven- tion was necessary. The Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism (CGKR), a successor organization to the KCM, at the end of 1992 began consulting the different Muslim communities and groups to determine what kind OF council would be acceptable to 311 parties. At the begmning OF 1993, this council, consisting of 51 members, was established. It elected an executive body, the Provisional Executive,46 consisting of 17 members. Anticipating that the Minister of Justice might not give it re~ognition,~’the council made two important moves. On the one hand it guaranteed the representation of different nationalities and interests, and on the other hand provided for the election of members on a personal basis rather than as spokesmen For others. The Provisional Executive was Finally recognized in November 1994 as the interlocutor of the Belgian government. This executive body was appointed until the end of 1997 and was authorized to arrange for the appointment of Muslim teachers and also, together with the Flemish and Walloon governments, for the formation and appointment of almoners in hospitals and prisons. In 1996, the existence of this Provisional Executive was ratified and became ofFicia1.

Despite the fact that this organization was recognized by the Belgian government and mutual overtures were made, these efforts did not lead to a final arrangement, since the Provisional Executive is not officially a Head of Cult and its responsibilities are limited to Islamic education and moral counseling.

emergence of a sense that the Head of Cult was not acting in a representative manner, thus suggesting the interference of the Belgian government in strictly religious affairs. Central is the fact that due to the changed political climate, the position of the ICC was questioned and there was a need for another ‘partner.’ But it was not clear what this newly formed organization should look like (for example, the proposal of KCM to create a body made up of different segments of the Muslim community was rejected by the Minister of Justice). Because an alternative for the ICC was not as yet avail- able, the idea of an interlocutor as an elected council of Muslims, and there- fore more representative than ICC, 48 gained influence. The Belgian government had accepted interlocutors of the Catholic and Protestant faiths as ‘partners’ without checking to see if their organizations were representa- tive of the whole of Belgian Catholicism and Protestantism. This would not

Most striking for this period of negotiations and arrangements is the

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be possible, insofar as this kind of investigation would be construed as interference in the religion. In light of these constitutional provisions, if the government wants to conduct and supervise the establishment of a Head of Cult for the Islamic religion, it enters a forbidden area.*9

The Belgian government not only expressed the wish to install a repre- sentative body but took also the initiative to organize it. With the establish- ment of the VRW, there is interference by the government in religion, blurring the distinction between church and state. By selecting which groups of Muslims are allowed (or not) to participate in the VRW, the government interfered directly in a strictly religious matter. The fact that none of the members selected were religious, philosophical or political experts or leaders also shows that the selection of VRW was influenced by a minority discourse about Islam and not by the internal dynamics of Muslim communities them- selves. Those selected were primarily professionals, part of the Belgian political landscape. Most of them were chosen because of their affiliation with the Christian or socialist (social-democrat) parties and because of the need for balance between the Flemish and Walloon representation. It was not religious competence that counted, since by profession, they were mainly physicians, lawyers, researchers and trade unionistsbW

The ‘Unique’ Elections of December 13,1998 The Provisional Executive asked the Ministry of Justice in 1997 to autho-

rize the necessary actions to prepare the elections for the ‘Head of Cult.’ They pointed out the necessity of such elections, given their restricted competence and the fact that many cases were deemed urgent.51 Prerequisites were the importance of preparing clear and competent proposals, and the recognition that the elections must take place respecting the principles of the constitu- tional de rn~cracy .~~

The intention of the elections is the establishment of a Constitutive Assembly of 68 representatives of the Muslim community, of which 51 are to be directly elected, and 17 appointed (ten by the Provisional Executive and seven by the other 61 members of the Constitutive Assembly). During the second round of the elections, an executive council is to be chosen from among the members of the Constitutive Assembly. To be elected, one must be at least 25 years of age, have resided in Belgium for at least five years, know one of the Belgian official languages, have at least a high school degree, be without political and diplomatic mandate and have signed a declaration of loyalty to the Belgian kingdom.53 Registration for the elections took place at the mosques or at the Provisional Executive itself in September and October of 1998. Of the 70,000 people who registered, 35% were female

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and 24% were between 18 and 25 years of age. Of all those registered, 64% finally voted.

Electoral colleges were based on four ‘ethnic’ Muslim groups, i.e., Moroc- cans, Turks, Other Nationalities and Converts. The first two were determined by province (Brussels also counted as one province), the latter two on a regional basis, namely Flanders or Wallonia. In every province, three mosques and one public place were opened for the elections.

council serving as Head of Cult was elected, made u p of six Moroccans, four Turks, three Muslims of other nationalities and three converts. It is at this level that the authorities intervened by screening the candidates. They had the authorization, through the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice, to reject ‘undesirable’ candidates. To anticipate this, the newly elected Constitu- tive Assembly asked all their members to confirm in writing if they wanted to participate in the Head of Cult; they then transmitted a list of forty names to the Ministry of Justice. This gesture of ‘goodwill’ was publicized by the press.54 Based on the returned list of screened candidates, a Head of Cult was elected, which was institutionalized by Royal Decree on May 3, 1999.

fear of fundamentalism as revealed by the creation of a supervision-commis- ~ i o n , ~ ~ the screening of candidates by the National Security without any declaration of the criteria for rejection, and the information provided by the media. The representativeness was also controlled by and evaluated within the framework of Belgian integration policy, as before, focusing on the one hand on nationality and on the other on integration as a linear process.j6

After the election of the 51 members and the appointment of 17 more, a

The discourse of the 1980s is also found in these elections, governed by a

Conclusion The long road to the effective recognition of the Islamic religion can be

seen as related to the unilateral initiative of the Belgian authorities, with no demand or even request from the Muslim communities themselves. As a result, recognition was rushed and lacked any consultation with or contribu- tion from these communities. Thus, the spokesman selected, the ICC, was not acknowledged by Belgian Muslims themselves.

This enforced course of action also resulted in the late implementation of the 1974 law, leading one to suspect an unwillingness to effectively handle the matter. The fact that these issues remained relatiyely unattended from 1974 to the mid-l980s, and were only taken into account when Islam began to dominate the international scene, s e e m illustrative of this fundamental unwillingness. It was only after trouble with young immigrant Muslims and the success of the conservative Vlaams Blok that the case was reopened.

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The logical consequence is a policy designed to control these events, this ‘danger.’ How else could we interpret the co-assignment (or rejection) of candidates for an organ as the Provisional Council of Elders? How else can we read the clear attempts at interference on the part of the Ministry of Justice and even the Ministry of Internal Affairs, through the National Security, in the framework of the Belgian constitutional separation of church and state? Attempts to achieve this control were translated through the need for ‘repre- sentativeness,’ a condition that is stipulated in no other regulation and has been enforced in no other ‘recognized religion. The role of the Belgian authorities concerning the institutionalization of the Islamic religion can best be described as a ‘turcification’j’ of the policy, i.e., allowing for no real separation of church and state, and at the same time demonstrating a signifi- cant level of state control over religion.

Endnotes 1. 2. 3.

The Dutch weekly magazine Knack, 9.12.1998. Dutch daily paper, Dekfotgen (1 j.12.199j). Saying of a representative of CGKR in the daily paper DeNiarua Cazet

(14.12.1998). The CGKR is the official siiccesor of the KCM, the Royal Commissariat on Immigrant Policy. It is a federal governmental organization that works under supervision of the Department of the Prime Minister.

By the use of the term ‘Muslim community,’ we mean those who are themselves or whose parents originated from an Islamic country as well as converts.

For studies of immigration in Belgium, see: Albert Martens, Les/mmigre-Fime/ t@~r d%ne main-d beu L w d ;7ppoint-Lapolih@&e b&e de /’immzgrition de 1H’& 1370 (Editions Vie Ouvriere/Presses Universitaires d e Louvain, 19761; Anne Morelli, Hisioi?ze de.- gfrafzgm et de ~‘inlnigrutio~zs en Bekrque de /up?F%zktoztzpd t~mjOr4~~(Bruxel~es: Vie OuvriPre, 1992); A. Bastenier and F. Dassetto, eds., /mm&rutions et norrwaup/ura/rjnles.. rrne confrontation dessoci‘te3 (Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite, 1990); R. Lesthaeghe, ed., Commtuzifies arid Generations-7irrkrjh andMoroccmippzikzthns hi Be&irrnz (Rruxelles: VUB University Press, 2000).

the mining disaster in Marcinelles in 1956 where 262 people died, of whom 136 were Italians, the Italian government decided to submit the agreement to more severe guarantee conditions concerning the safety of the workers. After this period agreements with other countries were set up; Spain (19561, Greece (1957), Morocco and Turkey (19641, Tunisia (19691, Algeria and Yugoslavia (1970).

7. A. Bastenier, “Islam in Belgium. Contradictions and perspectives,” in 22e aeu fslamicpresence in WestemEurope., eds. T. Gerholm & Y.G. Lithman (London: Mansell, 19813), 133.

8. of the estimated percentage of people who acquired the Belgian nationality. See Felice Dasetto, ‘Islam e n Belgicjue et e n Europe: Facettes e t Questions,’ in /;acertesde/Ts&zm Be&?, ed. F. Dassetto (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 197), 18.

4 .

5.

6. Earlier post World War I I immigrations were from Italy, Spain and Greece. After

The.= values are based on the census of 1991 and were adapted with a quotient

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9. U. Manco and M. Renaerts, “Lente institutionnalisation d e I’islam et persistence d’inCga1itPs face aux autres cukes reconnus,” in U. Manqo, Vo/orlr et uoies muz!r/vzanes Pn ge&que (Bruxelles: Publications des Faculti-s universitaires Saint-Louis, 20001, 87.

10. 11.

12.

Dasseto, in Dassetto (19971, 23. L. Panafit, “Quand le droit Ccrit I’lslam-L‘integration juridique de l’lslam en

I am currently conducting field research in the Flemish city of Ghent for a Belgique” (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 19991, 261.

research project entitled: “Islam in Flanders-the social functions of the mosques.” The city of Ghent provides a good illustration of the balance of the mosques on the national level. There are 3 Diyanet-mosques, 1 Milli Goriis and 2 of Brotherhoods o fa Turkish community existing of approximately 15,ooO members. The North African community of approximately 3,700 is spread over three mosques. See the website of the Centre for Islam in Europe for more information: httn://allserv.nip.ac. be/Z hdelev/C r e . k .

13. Compared to a mean unemployment rate of7.6% in the age category 15-64 for men and 15-59 for women, the rates for Moroccans and ’Turks are remarkably higher; 20.2% Moroccans; 22.7% Turks. U. Manco. “La presence musulmane en Belgique: dimensions historique, demographique et economique.” Vok et uoies musdnzaaes erz Be&ique, ed. U. Manqo (Bruxelles: l’ublications des facult& universitaires Saint-l.nuis, 20001, 32-37.

14.

15. 16. 17.

A fundamental obstacle is the absence 0 1 the right to vote for non-Belgians. on

Manqo, in Manqo (2000), 24. Dassetto, in Bastenier and Dassetto (1930), 181. M. Vanderneulebroecke, “Sous le regard des medias,” in La Be&ique ef ses

both the local and national levels.

immzg~s-/espo/ i f i~~es marzqueex, eds. M-T. Coenen and R . Lewin ([’aris/Bruxelles: De Roeck Universite, 1997), 20520; M. Swyngedouw, “La construction du ‘Peril iinmigre en Flandre : 1930-1980,”’ in Zmmigratirbrz etracismeen Ezirop# ed. A. He3 (Edilions Complexes, 19981, 107-30.

18. Zbid 19. Rased on Bourdieu, Swyngedouw mentions the following international events:

Khomeini’s rise to power in Iran, and later the fatwa against S. Rushdi; the taking of hostages in Lebanon; and the attacks on Western tourists in Egypt and Algeria. As national events: the Headscarf-affair; the so-called over-representation of immigrants in criminality statistics; the ‘massive’ construction of mosques all over Europe and t h e West.

zoektoch t naar godsdienst-gespreksparners bij oiide en nieuwe minderheidsgodsdiensten,” in Her recht iri de sainertlmirzg-Recbt en Verdmagzcnwzbei~f iri cie midticiiitiireie samedeuirzg. (Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Bijdragen van het Centrurn Grondslagen van het Recht, UFS[A, Maklu, 1993), 99.

“Belgie-een regime sui generis,” in Verboudiqg staa6 kerk etz unipiktiigbeid in Eirmpa- een recbtsueqe/J&erzde s td ie (Brussels: CVZ, 1336), 123.

among authorities and Muslims in Belgium,” in Muslims ih t b e ~ ~ f a ~ i t ~ - ~ o / i ~ i c a ~ R e ~ ~ o ~ z s e s to fbePresenceof/s/nm in %2s%ern Ezimpe, eds. W.A.H. Shndid and P.S. Van Koningsveld (Kampden: Kook Pharos Publishing t rouse, 1996), 166.

20. A. Overbeeke, “Inrichtingsvrijheid op het terrein van eredienst en school-de

21. Articles 79 and 20 of the Belgian Constitution. See A. Ketelaer and A. Five,

22. Johan Leman and Monique Renaerts, “Dialogues at dilferent institutional levels

111

THE MUSLIM WORLD VOLUME 92 SPRING 2 0 0 2

23. If a religion is recognized in the juridical meaning, the government has to provide the possibility to organize Islamic education (2 hours/week) in public primary and secondary schools (i.e., subsidized by the state). These regulations are fixed in the “School pact” law of 1959. In the case of Islam, this law of 1959 was amended in 1978 so that it also became possible to organize Islamic religious education.

in M-T. Coenen & R. Lewin, eds. LaBe&ique erses immigr&s-lespofi&$ues maq&x (Paris/BXL: D e Boeck Universite, 1997), 225.

ambkuous at the nine. EML fsome of thepmmoten of &e law u r n impiri by e p c r for the fmedom of relzgion, tbu Zaw was meant to muintaingoodn4atiom m2h the oil- producing countnks in the context of thefirst oii cr&& and at a time when Be&ium was npgociatiating commemaicontrac& with them. ’I Bastenier in Gerholm and Lithman (19881, 140. See also L. Panafit (1999); Swyngedouw in Rea (19381, 107-30.

26. Such as the remuneration, retirement and housing or the administers of the cult; the appointment of almoners in the army, hospitals and prisons; the construction and the maintenance of religion buildings; religious education in public schools, etc.

24. P. Blaise and V. Coorebyert, “La reconnaissance et la representation de I’islam,“

25. “ne motives of the ~ ~ i u n g o ~ m m ~ t ~ o r a d ~ t i y g g the law of 2974 were fair&

27. A. Overbeeke (1993), 109. 28. R. Strijp, “Moslims in Nederland e n Belgic?,” in In hetbziljtwn de durn-

Geograje, gescbieclennlj; geioqfss/eet; cuZtucuz; economie, poiitiek ed. H. Driessen (Nijmegan: SUN, 1997),419-20; F. Dassetto and A. Bastenier, Midim UAkhr Confrontations uutourd’une manfestaiions. (Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO, 1987).

and image of Islam in Europe (Belgium) .see F. Dassetto and A. Bastenier, Midias UAkbur. Confron#utions autour d’rmne manfestatiom (Louvain-la-Neuve: CIACO, 1987).

BelgiC,” in De integmtieeuai.r de khm in Be@ anno 2993, Crd!iurealzfigratie, ed. Johan Leman ( 1992-21, 53.

29. Vandemeulebroecke, in Coenen and Lewin (1997), 205-20. On representation

30. J. Leman and D. Van Den Bulck, “De rechtspositie van de lslamitische Praxis in

31. KCM, 1989,389-401. 32. A. Rea, “La politique des immigris en Belgique,” in M. Martiniello & M. Poncelet,

Mzgrutiom et minonMs ethniques duns l bspce eump&n (Bruxelles: De Boeck Universite, 1993L 52.

Lwn funge udem, &el L Bu&ens en eente uoorsteil~z (Brussels, 1989); for a critical analysis of the concept of integration in Belgium: J. Blommaert and J. Verschueren, Debutirrg DiLwxiQ. Ana&zirzg theDbscount- of ToZerance (London; Routledge, 1938).

33. Koninklijk Commissariaat voor het Migrantenbeleid, /ntegrat&hlaZ eefz w e d

34. 35. 36.

37. 38. KCM (19831, 59 a.f. 39.

Rea in Martiniello and M. Poncelet (1933), 149. Rlommaert and Verschueren (1998), 6. Discourses on political Islam are broadly held in France, in the media as well in

Hoge Raad van Moslims in Relgie/Conseil Supt5rieur des musulmans de Belgique.

The ICC did indeed dispose of the authority to organize the elections. It was

scientific discourse.

stipulated in art. 2 of the Royal Decree of 1978 that the ICC had lo organize the establishment of the first elected organizations of the local Muslim communities. Overheeke (1993). 1 I t .

The Moroccan government as we11 as Diyanet called on them not to participate at the elections. Panafit, 1999, 210. The other mosques belong to Diyanet (Diyanet Isler Bakanligi). Diyanet is the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Turkish government. Since

$0.

112

THE RECOGNITION A N D INSTITUTIONALIZATION O F I S L A M I N B E L G I U M

the beginning of the 1980s, it is represented in Belgium by an official with diplomatic status. Central is to propagate a national, Turkish Islam. They also appoint Islamic teachers and imams to work in Belgium for a period of time.

Hoge Raad van Moslims in Belgie/Conseil Superieur des musulmans de Belgique. Voorlopige Raad van Wijzen/Conseil Provisoire de Sages pour I’organisacion du

These are teachers of Islamic religion at public schools: Since the formal

41. 4 2 .

43. cuke islamique.

recognition of Islam in Belgium in 1974, Islamic religious education is offered to Muslim pupils at public schools. Despite legislation, their employment statute has not been properly regulated yet and payment has been poor. Since there has not been an official Head of Cult, which has to appoint Islamic teachers, this statute has remained a problem Since 1997 a diploma in Dutch language, pedagogic, didactics and Islam is compulsory. However, there is a chronic shortage of teachers who fulfil these demands. There is n o inspection of the contents of the lessons.

44. Panafit (1339), 203. 45. Blaise and de Coorebyter, in Coenen and Lewin (1997), 233. 46. Voorlopige Executieve/Executif Provisoire des musulmans de Belgique 47. After a first list was given to the Minister of justice, 3 candidates were refused

because they were linked to so-called radical movements, i.e., Milli G o d s and the Muslim Brotherhood. Panafit (19391, 215.

48. Overbeeke ( 19731, 1 1 1. 49. fbid., 112. 50. Panafit (1933), 204. 51. Urgent matters were, among others: 1) creating of a theology-training program;

2) training for Islamic teachers and regulation of their legal status; 3) determining the content of the lessons in Islamic religion and the appointing an inspectorate; 4) appointing, remunerating and training almoners and imams; 5 ) attributing corporate personality for the bodies responsible for the administration of the goods of the cult and also the regulation of government support for this organ; 6 ) intervention of the province in the administration of the mosques and the prayer rooms; 7) regulation concerning the housing of imams by the province; 8) organization of religious broadcasting on radio and television as well in religious publications. Manqo and Renaerts, in Manqo (20001, 95.

52. /bid, N. 53. yaffimesur l’honneiuradheiwd la wlzgion darniqLip, en EsRcter les

prescn$Xions et les ensegnemmts de fratemit. de tof‘rame et depmbite et m ‘Pngagertr agir h n s fe cadw de mes fonctions dams 1 ‘irit@..r achs~dgd cuke er cekz dam le tespcf de la Conrtiwtion du Royaumq des Lois ef des Insritutions dupeuple beke. ’I Pana fit (1799), 22 1.

54. Herman de Ley, “Islam in Belgium: ala turka?,” CIENeudette? 1/1 (februari 1999): 42.

55. This ‘supervision-commission’ consists out of seven members appointed by the Minister ofjustice; three are members of the Provisional Council (a body created in 1994, after negotiations with the different parties), one representative of the Minister of Justice, one of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one of the CGKR and a magistrate as chairman.

56. Panafit (19991, 229. 57. Dassetto (1397), 18-34.