The Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Corsairs, 1450-1550: A Relationship Examined.

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The Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Corsairs, 1450-1550:

A Relationship Examined.

“Battles on the sea are more dangerous and fierce than the battles by land, for on the

sea there is no recoiling nor fleeing, there is no remedy but to fight and to abide

fortune, and every man shows his prowess.”

- Jean Froissart, 14th Century Chronicler.1

Introduction:

Military histories of the Ottoman Empire written mostly by European scholars have a

tendency to emphasise Ottoman naval weakness which, revisionist historian Daniel

Goffman argues, can be attributed to a biased writing of history in Europe. Goffman

states that the contemporary Christian powers laid claim to any Ottoman maritime

success on behalf of Christian renegades (predominantly Greeks) in service to the

Ottoman fleet.2 However Islamic historiography contains no such negative image of an

era which was, in their history, filled with both land and sea victories suggesting that both

sides of the conflict have aimed to confirm the superiority of their respective cultures.

Andrew Hess highlights the problems of studying Ottoman naval power the first being

the fact that an Ottoman seaborne community came into being in the fifteenth and

sixteenth centuries is largely unknown. Secondly that sophisticated historical literature on

the Islamic world is rare which leads most writers to approach Middle Eastern history

only through questions related to European matters.3 More recent works have argued that

the Ottomans demonstrated a novel competence at sea which was due as much to their

own merits as the service of skilled Greek mariners or, more importantly a coalition with

1 Roger Crowley, Constantinople: The Last Great Siege, 1453, (London: Faber & Faber, 2006), p. 123

2 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2002), p. 145

3 Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabourne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries,

1453-1525’ The American Historical Review, 75, (1970), p. 1894

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the Barbary coast.4 However disainful Europeans were of Ottoman naval power even the

great maritime power of England feared them with King Henry urging peace with the

Turks in 15025 and they were to continue to be a perennial irritation to the English state

throughout the century even to the extent of royal orders being given that special prayers

be read in religious services for success against the Turks.6 David Starkey has claimed

‘Essentially, the Barbary corsairs were the naval arm of Islam engaged in Eternal War

with Christendom.’7 It is this claim that this study aims to address both in the light of the

corsairs contribution to Ottoman naval campaigns and viewing the conflict as a Holy

War.

Originating from the steppes of Central Asia the Ottomans had no tradition of naval

warfare8 and as an initially land based empire they had no initial need of one but as their

empire grew they came to face powerful maritime nations and the creation of permanent

naval forces became an essential part of the state formation process and a practical

necessity.9 Hess has also argued the commonly held notion that the Turks did not engage

willingly in maritime activity10 which supports historical consensus that the Ottomans

treated their navy as a trivial concern and thus engaged the Barbary corsairs as their navy.

The majority of this naval activity took place during the reign of Süleyman I known to his

own people as ‘The Lawgiver’ but more commonly known as ‘The Magnificent’, who

inherited the services of the Barbary corsairs from his father Selim. At the beginning of

Süleymen’s reign Ottoman naval force was not sufficient to press an attack on Christian

nations, therefore most Muslim sea power had to rest in the hands of the corsairs.11 Yet

the corsairs were not, as some historians think, the first or indeed the only Ottoman naval


Press, 2002), p. 145

5 Diary Entry by Sanuto 18 April 1502, C. S. P. Ven., Vol I, 1202-1509, p. 2936 At Hampton Court 26 June 1542, Acts of the Privy Council, 1542-1547, p. 157 David J Starkey, ‘Pirates and Markets’ in C R Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London:

New York Press, 2001), p. 109

8 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, (London: Viking, 1993) p. 65

9 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe, (London,

Routledge, 1999), p. 95

10 Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabourne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries,

1453-1525’ The American Historical Review, 75, (1970), p. 1895

11 Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History, (London: Longman, 1997), p. 89

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force, as this study will show charting the origins of Ottoman naval activity with those of

the corsairs and showing how they came together in the early sixteenth century. However

before an examination of the corsairs it is first prudent to explain what defines them as

corsairs as opposed to other genres of pirate. Anderson states that ‘In the Mediterranean

Sea, from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century the line between piracy,

privateering and trading was seldom easily discernible.’12 Likewise Peter Earle defines

the corsairs as privateers using the terms interchangeably13 which is not strictly accurate.

Upon closer examination the corsairs have several factors which distinguish them. While

it is true that both corsairs and privateers worked by license the former were usually only

active in wartime. The corsairs on the other hand operated constantly as participants of an

eternal, Holy War with no fixed duration.14 In addition privateers were usually employed

by a nation or government while these corsairs, as will be shown, operated with a degree

of autonomy and when in service sailed on behalf of not a nation but an empire and a

faith, an entirely different type of conflict.

Origins:

The origins of Ottoman maritime activity have deeper roots than the alliance with the

Barbary coast. From 1080 Turkish frontier warriors occupied large sections of the

Anatolian coast and began to construct war fleets with the aid of local shipwrights.15 Also

after the capture of Gallipoli in 1354 the straits dividing Asian and European territories

were a vital sea passage for the Ottomans.16 This all changed in the mid fifteenth century

when the assembly of a fleet allowed Mehmet to take Constantinople demonstrating

innovation and adaptability. Andrew Wheatcroft has argued that 'When need dictated,

12 John L. Anderson, ‘Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective in Maritime Predation.’in C R

Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001,) p. 90

13 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), pp. 6-7

14 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), p. 7

15 Andrew C. Hess, ‘The Evolution of the Ottoman Seabourne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic

Discoveries, 1453-1525’, The American Historical Review, 75, (1970), p. 1896

16 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: the structure of power, (Basingstoke, Macmillan 2nd ed

[1st 2002] 2009), p. 295

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they became a sea power’17 and it was during the second half of the fifteenth century with

the navies of Mehmet and Bayezid II18 that the Ottomans emerged as a maritime power.

Their initial campaign was executed for a specific purpose and there is no indication that

Mehmet saw his use of naval offensive in 1453 as a prelude to a more established

maritime sphere, the Sultan saw the strategic advantage of the Bosphorus if he wanted to

hold land securely on two continents. In addition dominating the Bosphorus meant he

could cut off grain and assistance to the Greek colonies in the Black Sea. In the Winter of

1451 Mehemt began his shipbuilding program while at the same time the image of a

castle began to form in his mind. Rumeli Hisari (the Throat Cutter) was completed on

31st August 1452 at the mouth of the Bosphorus and from there he commenced his

primary offensive.19 While maritime prowess was not the deciding factor in the capture of

Constantinople the successful siege did usher in a new era of maritime activity

necessitated by the provisioning of the capital also marking the start of use of the fleet as

an instrument of conquest.20 The gradual build up of supply bases from 1460 onwards

finally provided support to fleet operations in the Mediterranean21 and, as Gabor Agoston

has argued without the naval logistic support under Bayezid II later campaigns in Europe

and Iran would have been impossible. It was this recognition of the importance of the sea

that set the Ottomans apart from other Muslim Empires.22 This same perceptive

opportunism allowed Selim to accept the pirate Barbarossa’s23 submission in 1519 thus

extending the Ottoman realm and gaining crucial maritime prowess through the alliance.

It is worth noting here that ‘Barbarossa’ is a name applied exclusively by contemporary

Europeans and historians, to Muslims he is known as Kheir-el-Din or ’Defender of the

17 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, (London: Viking, 1993), p. 65

18 Colin Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996,) p.1

19 Roger Crowley, Constantinople: The Last Great Siege, 1453, (London: Faber & Faber, 2006,) pp. 52-61

20 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: the structure of power, (Basingstoke, Macmillan 2nd ed

[1st 2002] 2009,) p. 295

21 Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700, (London: University College London Press, 1999), p.

22

22 Gabor Agoston, ‘Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826’ in Jeremy Black (ed.) European Warfare

1453-1815, (London: Palgrave, 1999), p. 128

23 Note: Barbarossa younger of two brothers is initially known as Hizir or Heyreddin, known to Muslims as Kheir-el Din (Defender of the Faith) becoming plain 'Barbarossa' after his brother's death.

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Faith.’24

The Barbary corsairs are something of an anomaly with the definition ‘Barbary’ being

problematic as corsairs from both the Atlantic and Mediterranean Coasts are classified as

‘Barbary’ in West European sources.25 However the geographical boundaries of this study

will focus on the North African coastline. In the regencies of Tripoli, Algiers and Tunis

the social images of the ‘great corsairs’ stand out in their celebrated status as founders of

the states with the Barbarossa brothers being made into local heroes.26

The brothers themselves were born on the island of Lesbos, straddling both the Christian

and the Muslim world. With a Janissary father and a Greek mother the brothers don’t

exactly seem to fit anywhere within their own society and, ironically, their commitment

to Islam was shaped by the Knights of St John. The eldest of the two brothers, Oruch was

captured by the Knights in an encounter which left another brother dead and spent two

years as a shackled slave and oarsmen on Rhodes before filing off his chains and

swimming away. Upon his escape and reunion with his younger brother Hizir they both

devoted themselves to Holy War in the name of Islam. Establishing themselves on the isle

of Djerba, just off the coast of modern Tunisia and were well placed to plunder traffic

between the North African and Italian coast.27 At this time Spain’s domestic policy of

ideological hegemony led them to expel and persecute Muslims and suspected Muslims

and in the process providing more material for the Barbary coast.28 The corsairs would

prowl the coastline evacuating Spanish Muslims and raiding Christian villages until most

of the European coasts lived in fear. The legends of their deeds spread with Oruch

worshipped as an Islamic Robin Hood rumoured to have preternatural powers. The

brothers consciously promoted these myths themselves and Hizir had a flair for the

dramatic. Upon raiding Minorca in 1514 he left a horse in the shore with a message

24 Ernle Bradford, The Shield and the Sword: The Knights of St John, (London: Hodder & Stoughton,

1972), p. 131

25 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), p. 9

26 Goncal Lopez Nadal, ‘Corsairing as a Commercial System’, in C R Pennell (ed.)Bandits at Sea: A

Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001), p. 130

27 Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521-1580, (London: Faber

& Faber, 2008), pp. 33-34


Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001), p. 90

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pinned to its tail reading, ‘I am the thunderbolt of heaven. My vengeance will not be

assuaged until I have killed the last one of you and enslaved your women, your daughters

and your children.’29 However this reign of terror could not last and Charles V cemented

his ascension by capturing and killing Oruch. Upon the death of his brother Hizir carried

forward the Holy War and adopted the mantle of his older brother even to the extent of

dying his beard with hennae, yet not the extent of continuing Oruch’s dream of an

independent state.30 The exact motives of Barbarossa’s formal submissions to the sultans

are unclear but historian Roger Merriman has suggested that Hizir saw the inadequacy of

his own resources and thus cultivated an alliance with the Ottomans, he has further

suggested that this action proved Hizir’s superiority in statecraft over his older brother.31

Thereafter Oruch’s memory faded and Hizir became known solely as Barbarossa and

adopted the mantle of Kapudan Pasha, High Admiral of the Mediterranean fleet.

If there is one crucial difference between the initial Ottoman navy and the first corsairs

was that the Ottomans went to sea through a realisation of the necessity while for the

corsairs it was an initial ideological choice.

Administration and technology:

Whatever historians have had to say about the practical capability of the Ottoman navy

one point which has never been disputed is their prowess as administrators. The

Ottomans excelled at organising and directing the resources of their empire which was

where the strength of the fleet lay with transport being more of an issue than supply and

as it was unlikely that the Christian Mediterranean had infinite raw materials to pour into

their naval forces.32 Sultan Süleyman was highly displeased with naval performance as it

29 Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521-1580, (London:

Faber & Faber, 2008), pp. 35-36


Faber & Faber, 2008), p. 38

31 Roger Bigelow Merriman, Süleiman The Magnificent 1520-1566, (New York: Cooper Square

Publishing Inc, 1966), p. 208

32 The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282 in Colin Imber

(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996,) p. 9

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proved to him the Turks at sea were not nearly as formidable as the Turks on land the

problem being that his empire has the resources but no experience at being a maritime

commercial power33 prompting his promotion of Barbarossa to the position of Admiral.

The navy was the most expensive military undertaking for the empire34 yet historians

cannot seem to agree upon the financing method. Justin McCarthy argues that the naval

leaders were granted timars (an entitlement to land tax) which they used to finance their

ships and as need for navy increased whole provinces of the empire were given over as

timars to the navy35 yet Colin Imber sees the navy as a heavy burden on the Ottoman

exchequer but that there is too little evidence to calculate the cost of equipping and

manning a fleet.36 This is not strictly true as expense accounts are available for individual

campaigns such as Barbarossas campaign to recapture the fortress of Herceg Novi on the

Gulf of Kotor, expenses are shown to be 2,495,991 silver akçe, the coin of the realm, total

inclusive of gold coins taken in taxes from Western Europe and Hungary.37 However this

rate of expenditure could not long be maintained and the 1580s saw a debasement of

coinage in the culmination of a long period of overstraining the Empire’s economic

resources38, another factor contributing to the Sultan’s alliance with the Barbary coast.

The squadrons maintained by the Barbary corsairs were done so at their own expense, in

other words from the fruits of their plundering and joined forces with the imperial navy


Publishing Inc, 1966,) p. 211

34 Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume One: 1300-1600,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 93


36 ‘ The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282’ in Colin Imber

(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), p. 7

37 ‘ The Costs of Naval Warfare: The Accounts of Hayreddin Barbarossa’s Herceg Novi Campaign in

1539’in Colin Imber (ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), pp. 71-83 38 ‘ The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282’ in Colin Imber


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during major expeditions.39

The matter of Ottoman naval technology however has achieved less historical consensus

with some historians seeing their ability to accommodate Mediterranean warfare by

adapting their vessels in the style of Christian vessels they captured, yet where this is

noted by historians it is also agreed that their progress was belated and lagging.

Svatopluk Soucek has cited this as a reason for Ottoman ineptitude at the siege of Crete.

However this policy does not necessarily apply to every naval venture, Dr Soucek does

argue that the Ottomans preparedness for battle gave them the strategic advantage over

their Christian opponents who often had to scramble to assemble a war fleet.40 In addition

Andrew Wheatcroft has argued that the ability to adapt to new technology and tactics was

especially evident in building their naval power.41 The galley was the standard vessel for

Mediterranean since the late Middle Ages and the Ottomans were no exception using

long, lean vessels one hundred foot in length and twelve foot in width with a raised prow

for boarding the enemy. Tactics were very similar to those used on land whereby after an

initial discharge of missiles the fighting men would attempt to storm the enemy galley.42

These innovations have been attributed to the modernisation of the army and navy by

Bayezit,43 resulting in galleys which were low in the water to maximise and advance the

use of oars with a clearance above water of over two foot. These vessels could be sail

powered but the oars gave it punch and flex in battle with rowers arranged in a single tier

above decks. With the rowers exposed to battle this was a dangerous position explaining

why rowers were mainly Christian slaves and pressed men. However this low freeboard

made the galleys unseaworthy, especially in the treacherous waters of the Mediterranean

which confined the galleys to summer use with a preference for coast hugging.44 These

39 Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume One: 1300-1600,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 94

40 Svatopluk Soucek,’Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete’, Studia

Islamica, 98/99, (2004), pp.254, 238

41 Andrew Wheatcroft, The Ottomans, (London: Viking, 1993), p. 65


Faber & Faber, 2008), p. 124

43 Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, (London: Pheonix, 1994), p. 33


Faber & Faber, 2008), pp. 124-125

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short comings of galley technology determined the pattern of warfare, of limited season

and limited range.45 Dr Soucek highlighted that the Ottoman navy at Crete would have

benefited from a collateral merchant marine with the same armament as naval forces with

the ability to fight as well as trade,46 it is true that the tall merchant vessels displayed

Christian technological superiority at Constantinople. That is not to say that the Ottomans

made no progress at all in this area, during the fifteenth-century heavy, rounded ships

distinguishable as merchantmen appeared advancing to vessels with two to three masts.

These vessels were more manoeuvrable than the galleys and when armed with artillery

made effective men-of-war, such ships were the backbone of contemporary Atlantic

navies from whence the inspiration came. These round ships were divided into two

classifications, the artillery ships (top gemisi) and the horse ships (at gemisi) revealing

their functions to be primarily logistical. At the end of the fifteenth-century Sultan

Mehmed commanded vessels built at 3000 tons in imitation of the Genoese and

Venetians, unfortunately these sank upon launching with the combination of heavy

artillery and narrow decks causing them to capsize. Following this incident the armed

long galley remained the principal, and on occasion only type of warship in the fleet.47 It

is probably fair to say that on the Barbary coast the use of all and any captured prizes as

new war ships contributed to the superiority of corsair performance and with this early

windfall of technology it is hardly surprising that the corsairs were highly successful.

Naval Personnel:

So if all of this administration and technology was significant in the development of the

Ottoman navy just how does this relate to their relationship with the corsairs? Also what

of the men who made this huge naval machine work? Many of the oarsmen were

prisoners of war or criminals but these only gave a small amount of those required to man


(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996,) pp. 5-6

46 Svatopluk Soucek,’Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete’, Studia

Islamica, 98/99, (2004), p. 256


(ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), pp. 1-4

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the fleet. Every 200 galleys needed at least 22,000 oarsmen and slaves48 and so to remedy

this the Sultan ordered every household tax unit to send an oarsmen into the navy in

exchange for being relieved of other tax burdens.49 For the slaves who went into galley

service extensive work has been done by Suraiya Faroqhi highlighting the high mortality

rates which created a constant demand for rowers. Indeed in the sixteenth century it

became common to sentence people to the galleys for misdeeds, on occasion illegally

kidnapping subjects and selling them into the naval arsenal. Given their backgrounds the

rowers had no reason to feel loyalty to the Sultan and would take any opportunity to

revolt or escape, especially as conditions were appalling with food hardly edible and the

code on the treatment of ‘infidel’ captives was underdeveloped.50 Throughout the naval

industry recruitment took place in a very similar style to the army with recruits coming

from the same social groups and often fighting in both services. It is an oddity to note that

except for Barbarossa’s pirates Ottoman sailors were not usually Muslim until very late in

the Empire’s history with the government relying largely on the Greeks within the

Empire.51 That said it was possible for an Ottoman sailor to become a career seamen and

many single young men enlisted as azabs (Arabic for bachelor) in the hopes of gaining an

appointment as a hassa reis or galley Captain. The Barbary coast was a ready supply of

Captains with experience of command at sea highlighting another way in which the

corsairs played a crucial role in the building of the Ottoman navy. The Naval Officer

Corps was a complicated machine with each detachment of sailors or armed fighters

operating under their own officers,52 this included the Sultan’s own Janissary Corps

serving as combat troops with azabs serving as marines, critical roles given the close

quarter nature of galley warfare.53 There was no body of Ottoman troops who served

exclusively at sea yet there was a corps of skippers and officers employed only by the

48 Gabor Agoston, ‘Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826’ in Jeremy Black (ed.) European Warfare 1453-

1815, (London: Palgrave, 1999), p. 128


50 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 127-

129





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navy, including appointees from the Barbary coast showing that, while the Ottomans

were not themselves skilled sailors or sea commanders they did have the foresight to

appoint experienced commanders capable of training their fleet efficiently. In addition it

assisted the men serving as they gained an entire new skill set to add to the skills from

their other respective appointments, which could be many and varied as under the

Ottoman rule a rank in the armed forces often went hand in hand with a role in civilian

administration.54

However not all positions came with copious authority, there were several checks upon

the authority of the Admiral such as the fact that they were not always Commander-in-

Chief of naval expeditions and did not sit upon the Imperial Divan Council. Also unless

the Admiral was a Vizier he was not included in preliminary campaign discussions. The

authority of the Admiral did extend to being directly responsible for the troops in his own

property of Gallipoli and as Commander of the Fleet he was authorised to call up extra

troops when required. In addition his jurisdiction extended to all affairs in the

Mediterranean fleet and he could issue orders in the name of the Sultan. However for

more important decisions he was required to get the permission of the Grand Vizier.55

However Barbarossa was the exception to many of these rules ending his career as a

Fourth Vizier as recognition of services rendered. Upon his appointment as Admiral in

1533 Barbarossa wasted no time retaking Coron from Spain in 1534, ravaging the coasts

of Italy and occupied Tunis56, as long as Barbarossa led the fleet victory followed

victory.57 Further reforms included an intensive program of ship-building expansion and

introduced men of his own calibre into the Sultans ranks making the Ottomans the most



55 ‘The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282’ in Colin Imber




57 Jason Goodwin, Lords of the Horizon: A History of the Ottoman Empire, (London: Vintage, 1998), p.

128

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efficient navy in the Mediterranean.58 Barbarossa’s success at Tunis was achieved through

an alliance with the Grand Vizier Ibrahim, the same man who had given approval for his

appointment to Admiral. With the Ottomans in Tunis Christendom was in very real

danger and Europe looked to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to solve it. Fighting on

this front lulled in 1536 as Charles was once again at war with Franics I of France and

Barbarossa was at the time resident in Constantinople. At this time there were rumours of

secret negotiations between Charles and Barbarossa with the corsair offering to change

sides, suggested motives include jealousy at the authority of Lufti Pasha, Seraskier of

Rumelia or possible anger at the execution of political ally Ibrahim. However such

rumoured negotiations were never successful as Charles himself never appeared to the

meetings thus offending Barbarossa.59 Despite the emphasis upon skilled training only

three Ottoman Admirals on record had any sea experience those being Barbarossa, Kiliç

Ali Pasha and Kiliç’s successor Uluç Hasan Pasha both of whom had been corsairs in

Algiers,60 it seemed that once the Sultan found a successful leader from among the

corsairs he decided to maintain the practice. The position was also held temporarily by

Mahmud Pasha who was dismissed as Grand Vizier in 1469-70 in order to command the

attack on Negroponte. For that one year it was the most important role in the Empire and

needed Mahmud’s abilities to fulfil it.61 However this was a temporary appointment and

the highest naval positions were still predominantly filled by ex-corsairs.

Unlikely Allies?:

At first glance the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Corsairs

seems to be one of mutual gain. The corsairs, after the loss of their initial leader gained


1972,) p. 132


Publishing Inc, 1966), pp. 212-219





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some level of legitimacy in the service of the Empire while the Ottomans gained a strong

naval arm to protect their colonial and mercantile interests. Yet what is the true nature of

this relationship? What exactly did each participant gain or have to sacrifice? In order to

paint a clearer picture of the alliance it is worth examining the motives and practices of

both the corsairs and the Ottomans. The first factor to be examined is the alleged

autonomy of North Africa. The politics of the Barbary regencies were dominated by a

clash between two sorts of military men with differing motives. While some saw the main

purpose of the Barbary states as a haven for corsairs other believed in the expansion of

Turkish power into the African interior. Despite being initially ruled by a Pasha, very

likely one of the conquerors himself North Africa enjoyed much more autonomy than any

other Ottoman state from the very beginning. It was unlikely that the Pashas would

trouble themselves with an authority so far away as Istanbul while the second generation

of rulers were appointed for a triennial term of office and struggled to maintain their

authority depending heavily upon Janissaries recruited locally from the Levant and, by

the end of the fifteenth century the Janissaries ruled the Levant in place of the Pashas.

Peter Earle has argued that it was unlikely the Sultan was disturbed by the growing

autonomy of Barbary for, as long as it remained Turkish it was valuable to the Empire’s

defence as well as being a hindrance to their Christian enemies. That said the

participation of corsairs in naval action depended a great deal upon who the Ottomans

were fighting as the Barbary regencies had their own interests to consider. For example

Algiers had very little interest in going to war with France as French reprisals were a

closer threat than the likelihood of Turkish assistance. When the Ottomans were at war

with a naval power, predominantly Venice, Barbary and Turkey acted independently thus

states at peace with Turkey were not necessarily at peace with Barbary and visa versa. In

reality the only areas where the Barbary states had close links to the Sultan were in the

formal acceptance of him as their religious and political superior and the recruitment of

Janissaries.62 However this autonomy can be perceived in Ottoman naval practice as a

whole. Each flotilla in defence of the Empire operated under the command of an

independent Admiral (kapudan) or the local lords (sancak beys) in whose territory they

ran. Each was independent of the Grand Admiral except when they joined the main body

62 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), pp. 24-27

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of the Imperial Fleet for large summer campaigns.63

Another aspect of the relationship that merits examination is the assumed ideological

camaraderie between the Barbary Coast and the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan used his

navy for the protection and regulation of trade, to control coastal areas and as a support

for imperial expansion. He also spent a great deal of time curtailing the activities of

corsairs, both Christian and Muslim in his waters64 where they potentially threatened his

political policy. While this may appear to be the Sultan invading the corsairs supposed

autonomy it was in fact very shrewd statesmanship. It is true that the corsairs, in the

words of Starkey ‘cruised against Christian shipping with the spiritual blessing of

Muhammed and the temporal authority of the Sultan’65 yet their zealousness seemed

beyond even the desire of His Imperial Majesty. The Ottomans operated a radical

religious tolerance policy within their realms with no forced conversions to Islam.

Christians were permitted to worship in segregated societies and would not suffer

persecution save for a slightly heavier tax burden and having to sacrifice boys from their

communities to be conscripted. Barbarossa on the other hand was an enemy of all

Christians66 and embarked upon more of an irrational extermination jihad as opposed to a

politically feasible war. As Peter Earle has stated ‘The definition of the corsairs enemies

was that they worshipped a different God.’67 In this respect the allies were incompatible

and potentially some measure of autonomy would be beneficial to both sides both for the

corsairs to pursue their extremist agendas and so that the mainstream Ottoman authorities

could distance themselves to a certain extent from the actions of the Barbary coast.

Motives for this extremism can be traced back to the roots of Oruch as a slave on Rhodes

but it is doubtful that one man’s grudge could survive to motivate an entire century or

more of piracy. More likely explanation is the memories and descendents of those





65 David J Starkey, ‘Pirates and Markets’ in C R Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London:

New York Press, 2001), p. 109


1972), p. 131

67 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970), p.6

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Muslims rescued from Spain escaping the persecution of Queen Isabella and her

Inquisition. An alternative explanation is that it merely became traditional for the corsairs

to swear allegiance to Islam and that, after the first generation, it was merely a case of

paying lip service to the religion of their forefathers. More research would have to be

carried out to support this theory and in addition it would be useful to discover exactly

what type of Islam was being practised by the corsairs in North Africa, whether or not it

was the orthodox beliefs practised in Istanbul and the rest of the Empire or whether they

followed the unorthodox doctrine of Islam, which could be another explanation for their

zealousness. However such anomalies are not unusual in the studies of naval warfare at

this time. Despite the prominent religious tone of the conflict as Christian against

Muslimboth sides equally attacked wealthy targets such as the Venetians.68

So upon closer inspection how could two allies with so many dissenting political and

religious differences between them manage to maintain a loyal alliance? Aside from the

allegations of Barbarossa’s negotiations with Charles V the corsairs remained loyal allies

to the Ottoman state for several centuries. Perhaps the shared religious ideology, no

matter how modified was enough to hold them together, or perhaps it was something

more. The benefits the corsairs gained from the arrangement far outweighed the

sacrifices, alliance with the Ottomans gave them another avenue by which they could

carry Holy War to the enemy and with it a measure of legitimacy they had not previously

enjoyed. Also Muslim corsairs were well known for their cruelty with their brutality

forming part of the legend of Turkish cruelty69 suggesting that once a corsair joined the

brotherhood leaving it would not be so easy. In addition it would be easy for Barbarossa,

as leader of the corsairs to use his power and position to keep them loyal to the Ottomans.

Voluntary loyalty would be exactly what the Sultan required as, by his own decree corsair

participation in Ottoman warfare was strictly voluntary, he could ‘encourage’ the corsairs

to join his fleet but did not exercise any direct control over them.


Pennell (ed.) Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, (London: New York Press, 2001), p. 90

69 Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary, (London: Sedgewick & Jackson, 1970,) p. 10

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Conclusions:

In concluding this research it is necessary to re-examine allegations of Ottoman naval

incompetence. It is true that the Barbary alliance did raise the technical and tactical skill

of the Ottoman navy, in addition historians have viewed the fact that the Turks developed

none of their captured ports as naval bases as a weakness.70 However this can not be

taken as a strictly naval weakness. In addition it must be remembered that the Barbary

alliance was not formed until 1519 and prior to that sate the Ottomans had been involved

in several highly successful conflicts such as the Venetian wars of 1499 cited by Daniel

Goffman.71 In fact it can be seen that Christian Europe feared the Ottoman advance right

up to the Barbary alliance with rumours circulating in 1500 of a powerful Turkish armada

under Bayezit72 leading to a plea by the Venetian Ambassador in 1512 that Europeans

make universal peace with each other in order to unite against the Infidel.73

So can it be said that the contributions of the Barbary corsairs were indicative of a lack of

priority given by the Ottomans to their navy? Firstly it must be confirmed exactly what

those contributions were and they seem to be predominantly within the officer corps.

Technological skill in building and to a certain extent sailing the ships can also be

attributed to Christian participants and the manning of the fleet was drawn largely from

the army yet the training of the navy came from the corsairs appointed to officer roles

such as Admirals and Captains. In addition where the Admiral had little to no sea

experience he was advised not to take action without consulting with the more seasoned

commanders in his fleet.74 So was the corsairs contribution really so significant? With the

benefit of hindsight it has to be said that it was not overwhelmingly significant, one or

two corsairs appointed strategically to high ranking positions did make a difference

however. It is a sign of sophisticated political tactics on the part of the Ottomans that they

70 Svatopluk Soucek,'Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquests of Rhodes, Cyprus and Crete’, Studia

Islamica, 98/99, (2004), p. 258


Press, 2002), p. 145

72 Diary Entry by Sanuto 8 May 1500, C. S. P. Ven., Vol I, 1202-1509, p. 28773 Venetian Ambassador in Rome to Sanuto 21/22 June 1512, C. S. P. Ven., Vol II, 1509-1519, p. 6774 ‘ The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificant, Archivum Ottomanicum VI: 1980 pp. 211-282’ in Colin Imber


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appointed the corsairs to train their own men and did not merely enlist corsairs directly as

their naval force thus avoiding an embarrassing military dependence. By extension was

the Barbary alliance a necessity or a convenience? The Ottomans were nothing if not

opportunists and the chance to gain maritime expertise in addition to expanding their

empire through the acquisition of a new vassal state, however loosely the term may be

applied was not to be turned down. Finally can it be said that some Sultans were more

negligent than others of their navy? From this research it can not really be seen that any

Sultan neglected his navy but merely utilised the Barbary alliance to maximise the

Empire’s naval potential with minimum cost or effort input save for a sophisticated

administration. To conclude revisionist interpretations of this topic such as those of

Goffman appear stronger under historical scrutiny than the more established stereotypes

of the Ottomans as a weak naval power.

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Appendix: Glossary of Turkish Naval and Administrative Terms

AKÇE: a silver coin, the chief unit of account in the Ottoman Empire, valued in the mid-

sixteenth century at fifty to sixty akçe to the gold ducat.

AT GEMİSİ: cavalry ship

AZAB:

1. an officer on a galley serving under a reis

2. an azab oarsman (kürekçi azab): an oarsmen from the annual levy

3. a member of the corps of azabs, provincial soldiers serving in garrisons or

fortresses

BEYLERBEYI: the governor of a berylerbeyik the highest rank in the provincial

government

HASSA: belonging to the Sultan; therefore employed or owned by the Ottoman state

KAPUDAN: a commander of a fleet, squadron, or detachment of ships

1. the Admiral of the Sea (kapidan-i derya): the title of the Grand Admiral of

the Mediterranean fleet

2. kapudan paşa: a title of the kapudan-i derya when he held the rank of

beylerbeyi

3. kapudan bey: a title of the kapudan-i derya when he held the rank of

sancak beyi

PASHA: social title commanding obedience and respect also used to refer to provincial

representatives of the Sultan

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REIS: a commander; in naval useage, the captain of a single vessel

1. hassa reis: the captain of a state owned vessel

2. captain with a detachment (bölüklü reis): a galley-captain commanding a

detachment of azabs

3. captain without a detachment (bölüksüz reis): a galley-captain not

commanding a detachment of azabs

4. müteferrika reis: perhaps a captain without a detachment, first in line for

appointment to the command of a detachment of azabs

5. volunteer captain (gönüllü reis): the captain of a privateer serving in the

imperial fleet

SANCAK: an administrative district governed by a sancak beyi, sub-division of a

beylerbeyik

SANCAK BEYİ: the governor of a sancak and commander of militia within it.

TIMAR: a fief with an annual value of less than 20,000 akçes whose revenues were held

in return for military service. These were of two kinds:

1. a tumar granted by a diploma issues in the Sultan's name.

2. A tumar granted directly by a beylerbeyi

TOP GEMSİ: artillery vessel

VIZIER:

1. a minister of the Sultan and member of the Imperial Divan

2. Grand Vizier: the chief vizier and deputy of the Sultan, Turkish vezir

Adapted from Colin Imber, Studies in Ottoman History and Law.

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Bibliography:

Black Jeremy, (ed.) European Warfare 1453-1815, London: Palgrave, 1999

Bradford, Ernle, The Shield and the Sword: The Knights of St John, London: Hodder &

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Crowley, Roger, Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean, 1521-1580,

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Imber, Colin, (ed.) Studies in Ottoman History and Law, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996

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Primary Sources:

Acts of the Privy Council, 1542-1547

Calendars of State Papers Venetian, Volume I, 1202-1509

Calendar of State Papers Venetian, Volume II, 1509-1519

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23

The Ottoman Empire and the Barbary Corsairs, 1450-1550: A Relationship Examined.

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