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The History of Darul Islam (DI) and Kartosuwiryo1

Background

This essay briefly explains how Darul Islam developed, its relationship with

Indonesian history and the role it has played in promoting the issue of Jihad in

Indonesia. Literally, Darul Islam means Islamic State.2 The history of Darul Islam

starts with an explanation of the complex character of Kartosuwiryo, the founder of

Darul Islam, and his perception of Islam. The essay moves on to explain the complex

historical background that led to the birth of Darul Islam and its impact on modern

Indonesia. Finally, as it is claimed that Darul Islam is now promoting Jihad, the basic

concept of Jihad (referred to in The Concept of Jihad and Islamic Radicalism in

Indonesia3) is compared with Darul Islam’s view of Jihad or Holy War. This is

particularly important in understanding the driving ideology behind Darul Islam

which makes its alleged alliance with Jemaah Islamiyah possible.

Not only were Dutch military aggression and unjust government at the beginning of

Indonesian independence significant factors in DI’s development, but also the Jakarta

Charter (Piagam Jakarta) scandal acted as a trigger for the DI rebellion. This charter

was a draft of the basic concept of the Indonesian constitution, which accommodated

the Muslim political interests’ desire to include Shari’a law, enforceable for Muslims

only, in the constitution. However, the Jakarta Charter was withdrawn from the

Indonesian constitution in 1945. According to Chalmers (2006), this withdrawal

resulted in demands by some Muslim political movements for the restitution of this

Charter in the Indonesian constitution, in order to enforce Shari’a for Muslims in

1 Andrea Hynan Poeloengan, is 1st Indonesian Alumni from the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong. Currently, he is a Strategic Peace-building Activist, an Anti Corruption Practising Lawyer at RJP Law Firm, a lecturer at Indonesian Police Science College STIK-PTIK, and a Mediator at The Indonesian Mediation Center (Pusat Mediasi Nasional / PMN). This essay is a chapter from the “Mini Thesis” Understanding Terrorism in Indonesia: Jihad, Darul Islam dan Jema’ah Islamiyah, in February 2006. 2 Afdal, Awani Irewati, et.all, “Upaya Mendirikan Negara dan Kekhalifahan Islam”, in Endang Turmudi and Riza Sihbudi (eds.), Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia, LIPI Press, Jakarta-Indonesia, 2005, p. 226 3 Another chapter from the “Mini Thesis” Understanding Terrorism in Indonesia: Jihad, Darul Islam dan Jema’ah Islamiyah, in February 2006.

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Indonesia, which have continued until today 4 . It seems, though, that the

implementation of the Jakarta Charter would be extremely difficult because, although

Indonesia is the biggest Muslim population in the world, it is also a pluralistic culture

which includes various religions and beliefs. Furthermore, it could lead to human

rights issues pertaining to freedom of choice in religious belief.

This plurality of beliefs is described by Geertz5, who explains that the communities in

Indonesia, and especially in Java, were divided in 1960 into three general groups,

known as Priyayi, Abangan and Santri. Priyayi and Abangan were not part the

religious Islamic community, while Santri were. Priyayi were followers of secular

beliefs, and had, to a greater or lesser degree, been influenced by Dutch culture and

education, but were also very strict followers of the Javanese aristocracy’s mystical

‘high culture’. Abangan were villagers who preserved pre-Islamic beliefs and

traditions, commonly mixing local traditions with Animism, Hinduism, and

Buddhism. Economically, Abangan were usually in the low economic levels, whereas

Priyayi were usually grouped in the middle to upper economic levels so that Priyayi

were able to gain a better education than Abangan. Santri were divided into two large

non-political groups: modernist Muslims, represented by the Muhammadiyah group,

founded in 1912; and Nahdatul Ulama, founded in 1926, which represented the

traditional Muslim group.6

Muhammadiyah was a large non-political group Islamic founded by a teacher, KH

Ahmad Dahlan. The objective of the Muhammadiyah movement was to promote

education and better understanding of the beliefs and practice of Al Qur’an and the

Hadith. This organisation had been influenced by the Egyptian reformist scholars,

especially in the concept of returning to the purity of sources of Al Qur’an and the

Hadith and using education as a method to promote the goals of its movement.7

4 Ian Chalmers, Indonesia: an Introduction to Contemporary Traditions, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 2006, p. 5 5 Cliford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Phoenix ed.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago-USA, 1976, pp. 4-6 6 Harold Church, Radical Islam in Indonesia, in Vicziany & Wright-Neville (eds.), Above n 31, pp. 3-5, pp. 34-35. See also: Boland, Below n 40, pp. 10-12 7 B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, the Netherlands, 1982, p. 11

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The characteristics of modernist Muslims are further explained by Alfian (1969):

“What seemed to have become the central problem of the Muslim modernist in Indonesia was their desire to alleviate the Faith from all irreligious impurities which through time had been syncretized into it, and to liberalize it from its Madzhab [the main four schools’ (Hanafi-ism, Hambali-ism, Maliki-ism, Syafi’i-ism) of Islamic jurisprudence] rigidity so that it could be made compatible with the demands and needs of a progressively modern world. For that they believed that they had found the answer by returning to the true [basic principle] sources of Islam, which could be found in the Holy Qur’an [Al Qur’an] and Hadith [As Sunnah]”.8

In contrast, Nahdatul Ulama (the Awakening of Scribes), the largest non-political

Islamic group, was formed to organise the increase in the number and quality of

Ulama[s] (Islamic Scholar[s]) in order to retain the mix of customary Javanese

lifestyle with the four conservative Madzhab (Islamic schools of jurisprudence of

law). 9 This organisation was founded by K Hasjim Asj’ari, a kiyai (independent

religious teacher) from pesantren (Islamic boarding school) Tebu Ireng in Jombang,

East Java.

In the explanation below, this paper explains that Kartosuwirjo’s DI movement was in

fact based on Abangan values rather than modernism. That is, it should be clearly

understood that Kartosuwirjo led DI with a mixed Islamic ideology, rather than

following the supposed ideologies of the accused scholars.

Who was Kartosuwirjo ?

Kartosuwirjo was a nationalist who developed the concept of an Indonesian Islamic

State, known as Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). He was also involved in the

Indonesian revolution during the Dutch aggression after the proclamation of the

Independence of Indonesia, to defend the existence of Indonesia as a state. However,

after the era of the independence revolution, Kartosuwirjo continued his revolution

against the Soekarno government. He began to develop his idea of an Islamic State in

8 C. Van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981, Leiden, the Netherlands 1981, p. 27 9Boland, Above n 40, p. 11-12

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1949 and refused to recognize the Indonesian government at that time. His philosophy

and his movement were known as Darul Islam (DI = the House of Islam) and Tentara

Islam Indonesia (TII = the Indonesian Islamic Military), and the aim of his rebellion

was the establishment of NII.

The Strong Personal Character of Kartosuwirjo

Like Soekarno, Kartosuwirjo had a very strong character. Because of this, he was still

able to be accepted in Sundanese society, even though he had challenged a traditional

value of that culture. The marriage of Kartosuwirjo, a Javanese man, to a Sundanese

girl was atypical at that time as it broke a Sundanese tradition, which was a legacy of

the Bubat War (Perang Bubat), a conflict in 1357 AD between Gajah Mada, the

Prime Minister (patih) of Hayam Wuruk, the king of Majapahit from East Java, and

Maharaja Linggabuana, the king of Pajajaran from the Sunda region in West Java.

This war resulted in a tradition, which still can be found now in some traditional

Sundanese families, that forbids Sundanese women to marry men from East Java

(Javanese).10 Kartosuwirjo’s marriage suggests that he had a very strong character and

was very charismatic, as he was not only accepted and married a Sundanese woman

but also led the Sundanese society in rebellion and revolution at that time. In fact, the

centre of the DI rebellion was in West Java, the region of Sundanese society.

Kartosuwirjo’s strong personal character became his “capital” in developing his own

goals and means when he led the long-running Indonesian DI rebellion from 1945 to

1962.

Karotsuwirjo’s Islamic Ideas

In Islamic literature, radicalism is mostly connected to reformist groups, which in

Indonesia is more likely to be the modernist groups. Terrorism has also been

connected to the groups which believed in a return to the purity of Islamic sources, Al

Qur’an and Hadith, which in Indonesia are the groups classified as modernists.

10 Wikipedia – the Free Encyclopedia, Perang Bubat, http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perang_Bubat at 16 December 2005

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However, Kartosuwirjo’s Islamic way of life was complex. His Islamic lifestyle was

influenced by modernist, traditionalist, and also Abangan values.

The Muslim scholars, mentioned above, who allegedly introduced radicalism into

Islam, in fact inspired an Islamic movement in Indonesia. However, Kartosuwijo did

not grow up in an Islamic community but had a semi-secular Muslim background in

his early years. According to Pinardi (1964), Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo was

born in Cepu, Central Java in the first decade of the 20th century.11 Despite the fact

that his father was only an opium official, one of the lower level government officers

in the Dutch colonial era, Kartosuwirjo received a Western education in the Dutch

language and never formally studied Arabic language or Islamic religious studies.12 In

1923 Kartosuwirjo attended the Netherlands Indies Medical School (Nederlands

Indische Atrsen School = NIAS), known as the Javanese Medical School13, from

which he was expelled in 1927 when the Dutch Intelligence Police accused him of

political activities related to socialism and communism.14 Kartosuwirjo had been

found in possession of books and articles dealing with communist and socialist ideas,

which probably included contents critical of the Dutch regime.15 Kartosuwirjo had

been influenced in the idea of a nationalist movement and Marxism by his uncle,

Marko Martodikromo.16 In addition, Vickers (2005) explains that Kartosuwirjo was

expelled also because of his activities related to Islamic political groups (Sarekat

Islam: SI = Islamic League).17 It is clear that Kartosuwirjo had a varied political and

ideological background, rather than a radical Muslim ideology.

Kartosuwirjo did not follow or implement the ideas of Salaf, or Salafism, which

advocate a return to the purity of Al Qur’an and As Sunnah. In fact, semi-secularism

mixed with mysticism had a strong only began while he was a student at the

Nederlands Indische Atrsen School (NIAS), where he was influenced by the

intellectual and religious atmosphere, especially Islamic ideas, and began studying

11 Pinardi, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo, Aryaguna, Jakarta, 1964, p. 20: See also Boland, Above n 40, p 55.; Vickers, Below n 49, p. 119 12 Boland, Above n 42, p 55: See also Pinardi, Above n 44, p. 20, pp 27-28 13 Pinardi, Above n 44, pp. 20-21: See also Boland, Above n 40, 1982, p 55 14 Ibid, pp. 21-22 15 Van Dijk, Above n 41, p. 26 16 Vickers, Above n 49, p. 119 17 Ibid p. 119: See Also Van Dijk, Above n 41, p. 26

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Islam with a modernist religious teacher18. His understanding of Islam was not

directly from the first sources, which use the Arabic language, as he learnt about

Islam and Al Qur’an from a book translated into the Dutch language19.

Kartosuwirjo’s frequent visits to sacred grave20 also suggest that he believed in

mysticism, a belief which certainly contradicts Salafism and Wahhabism, the Islamic

societies which are accused of being the embryos of terrorism. As he was a member

of a modernist Muslim society, Kartosuwirjo’s ritual habit was unusual, not only

because it could be considered superstitious or irrational, but also because the

modernists were associated with “Aqli / Aql”, or intellectual, reasonable, rational,

logical thinking, and the “true sources” (Al Qur’an and As Sunnah).

Although he grew up as a modernist Muslim activist, the change in Kartosuwirjo’s

understanding of Islam began when he suffered a serious health problem and

continued his Islamic studies with a number of rural and traditional local Islamic

scholars, such as Kiyai Jusuf Tauziri (from Wanaraja), Kiyai Adiwisastra (his father

in-law), Junus Anis (from Bandung), Mustafa Kamil (from Tasik) Abdul Kudus

Gozali Tusi and Oni.21 These scholars who were Kartosuwirjo’s tutors had a strong

influence on his Islamic spirit. It is important to understand that, although he was a

modernist, Kartosuwirjo was, in fact, also influenced by these traditionalist Islamic

scholars.

Another peculiarity in his beliefs, which highlighted the difference of his ideas from

modernist Islamists, is the story of Kartosuwirjo’s swords, called Ki Dongkol and Ki

Rompang. The legend, which he believed, was that when these two swords were

united, Kartosuwirjo and his followers would gain victory. Kartosuwirjo also claimed

that he was a Ratu Adil (Just King) and also a great Imam (Muslim leader). These

beliefs were related to Sufism, mixed with Hindu beliefs, and so, again, completely

opposite to modernist Islamic beliefs.22 Kartosuwirjo’s conviction that he was an

18 Vickers, Above n 49, p. 119 19 Pinardi, Above n 44, p. 28 20 Ibid, p. 28 21 Ibid 4, p. 28 22 Pinardi, Above n 44, pp. 153-155, See also Van Dijk, Above n 41, pp 28-29

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international Muslim leader, equal to a prophet23, especially contradicted the basic

Islamic belief because, according to Al Qur’an, the last prophet was Muhammad

SAW (Salallahu Alaihi Wassalam) and no human will ever be His equal.

Although intellectualism and the purifying of sources are the main factors in the

concept of religious practice for modern Muslims, Kartosuwirjo’s ideology did not

conform to this modernist culture. In fact, he developed an Islamic society whose

religious ideas combined both modernist and traditional ways of understanding

Islam.24 Therefore, it seems clear that Kartosuwirjo did not have as comprehensive an

understanding of the purity of Islam as Salafism and Wahhabism had and,

furthermore, his mixing of beliefs led to misperceptions and misunderstanding of

Islam and, thus, of the concept of Jihad.

Kartosuwirjo’s Early Political Career

Kartosuwirjo political activities began when he was studying in NIAS. During this

time he became an activist in the non-political and non-sectarian Jong Java (Javanese

Youth) movement and chairman of its Surabaya chapter. Some Muslim Jong Java

members also had a “political” connection and relationship with SI and tried to

express political ideas in Jong Java; however, as a secular organisation, Jong Java

could not accommodate their ideas and, as a result, Jong Java’s Islamic intellectuals,

including Kartosuwirjo, separated in 1925 and developed the Jong Islamieten Bond

(Young Muslim League). Not long after joining this league, Kartosuwirjo also

became its chairman.25

In 1927, after Kartosuwirjo was expelled from the NIAS, he began his political career

with the Partai Sarikat Islam (PSI = Islamic League Party), which changed its name

in 1930 to the Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII = Indonesian Islamic League

Party). This party was led by Haji Omar Said (HOS) Tjokroaminoto, and from 1927

23 Pinardi, Above n 44, pp. 41-44 24 Van Dijk, Above n 41, p. 27 25 Pinardi, Above n 44, p. 22: See also Van Dijk, Above n 41, p. 25

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to 1929 Kartosuwirjo was his private secretary.26 Both the Jong Islamieten Bond and

PSI or PSII were represented as organisations of modernist Muslims who had as their

principal aim to return to “true sources”27. At that time Kartosuwirjo, and also

Soekarno, had been learning a great deal about political education, strategy and

leadership from HOS Tjokroaminoto. They had also studied and been influenced by

certain Islamic religious ideas. Perhaps Kartosuwirjo learnt about and began to

develop the concept of an Islamic state for Indonesia during that time. In 1929,

because of illness, Kartosuwirjo moved to Malangbong, a suburb of Garut, West Java,

where Kartosuwirjo and his father in-law, Kiyai Adiwisastra, established the PSII in

the area.28

Kartosuwirjo’s political beliefs were quite rigid and he became more inflexible in his

ideas, which alienated him. His perspective on the relationship between Indonesia and

the Dutch was different to that of the Nationalists, as he was very uneasy about

collaborating with the Dutch government. As a result, a conflict soon developed

between members of the PSII about whether or not the organization should cooperate

with the colonial government. At the 1936 PSII Congress, this conflict led to the

resignations of Haji Agus Salim and Mohammad Roem, group leaders of the

collaborative side, who founded a new party named PSII Awareness (PSII Penyadar).

Kartosuwirjo aligned himself with the non-cooperation group and later, as Vice

President of the PSII, he and Wondo Amiseno, President of the PSII, together with

Abikusno, introduced a hijra [move from bad to good] political policy within the

PSII. The aim of this political policy was to develop a “middle way” to end the

conflict. Initially, this concept was able to develop alternative solutions to solve the

problem between the two conflicting groups. However, the conflict continued at the

1939 PSII Congress, where the PSII was divided between the PSII Parliament

(Parlemen), which collaborated with the Dutch colonial government and some of

whose members became members of the Dutch parliament (Wondo Amiseno,

Abikusno, Arudji Kartawinata, Harsono and Anwar Tjokroaminoto), and a second

group, the Truth Committee of the PSII (Komite Pembela Kebenaran PSII =

26 Boland, Above n 40, p. 55 27 Van Dijk, Above n 41, p. 27 28 Pinardi, Above n 44, p. 23: See also Van Dijk, Above n 41, p. 28; Boland, Above n 40, p. 56

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KPKPSII), which did not collaborate, led by Kartosuwirjo and Kamran.29 In this

second conflict, the members who had previously supported Kartosuwijo, including

Wondo Amiseno and Abikusno, now became his opponents, and Kartosuwirjo was

thus betrayed by his peers.

To maintain his political ideas and to develop the basis of his political movement,

Kartosuwirjo began to develop his own Islamic community and gather followers.

Therefore, in 1940, in Malangbong, Kartosuwirjo and Kamran founded a kind of

pesantren, or Islamic boarding school, named Institut Supah (Suffah Institute). This

institute aimed to train and educate his followers in leadership and religious and

political areas of study based on Islam. Kartosuwirjo translated the meaning of Supah

as purification, and as well as Astronomy and Dutch Language, he also taught Tauhid

(Oneness of God), which was a means of transferring his own ideas about Islam to his

followers. Many students, especially young Muslims from all over Indonesia, studied

in this institute30.

The discussion above shows that Kartosuwirjo was not able to express his political

views and ideological beliefs. Politically, he had been marginalized. Not many

Muslims agreed with his political ideas on non-cooperation with the Dutch.

Therefore, to achieve his own goal, he developed his own ideas with new means to

achieve them, which he implemented in Institut Supah.

Kartosuwirjo and the Japanese Era

Under the Japanese occupation of Indonesia during World War II, the Japanese

terminated the Dutch political system of separation of religion and politics so that

Islam had privileges and was involved in the political system on an equal basis with

the Nationalists. This was a significant change which naturally increased the power of

Islam.31

29 Pinardi, Above n 44, pp. 25-26: See also Van Dijk, Above n 41, pp 35-39; Boland, Above n 40, p. 56 30 Van Dijk, Above n 41, pp 35-39; See also Pinardi, Above n 44, pp. 26-28 31 Boland, Above n 40, p. 12

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In the Japanese era, KPKPSII was banned as a political party and most Indonesian

politicians were made members of the Djawa Hoko-Kai Tjuo (Young Javanese

Political Organisation), founded by the Japanese. Moreover, the Japanese established

the Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Indonesia = Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims)

in November 1943, as a replacement for the MIAI (Madjlisul Islamil a’laa Indonesia

= the Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam), an organization which had been founded

by Muslim initiatives in 1937, and there is an unconfirmed report that Kartosuwirjo

was appointed by the Japanese as secretary of the Masjumi, the chairman of which

was K. Hasym Asj’ari (grandfather of the fourth Indonesian President, Gus Dur).32

The Masjumi was dominated by the two non-political Islamic groups mentioned

earlier; Muhammadiyah, which represented modernist Muslims, and Nahdatul Ulama

(NU), which represented traditional Muslims. Officially Kartosuwirjo had never held

any position or even been involved in the MIAI. However, possibly because of his

unconfirmed position in the Masjumi as one of the executive, members supported his

ambitions to develop his ideas about Islam.

The Japanese occupation gave opportunities to Kartosuwirjo and his group to develop

and to expand their ideas. Although the Japanese occupation did not provide any

direct political, social or economic improvement for Indonesians, Kartosuwirjo’s

Suffah Institute not only continued its programme of developing political cadres for

an Islamic society, but also extended its operations into paramilitary training. The

Japanese authority allowed that activity in order to provide support for the Japanese

military during World War II, especially as a civil defence force in Indonesia, which

was Japan’s occupied territory. 33 However, these cadres later became members of

Masjumi’s two military wings, Hizbullah (God’s forces), and Sabilillah (Muslims

who fight in the way of Allah), the two guerrilla groups under the Tentara Islam

Indonesia (TII = Indonesian Islamic Army).34 From 1945 to 1962, these military

groups were used as a tool by Kartosuwirjo, not only to oppose the Dutch aggression

but also to develop his own ideas of an Indonesian Islamic State (NII) after

Indonesian independence.

32 Pinardi, Above n 44, p. 31: See also Van Dijk, Above n 41, p. 44; Boland, Above n 40, pp. 10-12 33 Pinardi, Above n 44, p. 29 34 C. Van Dijk, Above n 41, pp 41-43

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Kartosuwirjo and Piagam Jakarta (The Jakarta Charter)

During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese government had twice (1st March and

7th September 1944) offered opportunities to Indonesia to gain its independence. Even

though this was only propaganda to encourage the Indonesians to support Japan in the

war against the Allies in the World War II, some Indonesian independent politicians

used that moment and opportunity to prepare for Indonesian independence.

One such moment was on June 1, 1945, when Soekarno made a pivotal speech about

the five principles necessary for Indonesian independence, known as the Pancasila

principles. However, these principles did not accommodate the political interests of

Muslims, who expected that Islam would have a central role in the new state. Finally,

all political factions working towards independence accepted a compromise, known

as the Kajarta Charter, that included the “seven words” (…dengan kewajiban

menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluknya. = “…, with the obligation for adherents

of Islam to carry out Islamic law”)35. Subsequently, the Pancasila principles and this

new principle were adopted as part of the draft of the Indonesian Constitution by the

Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI = Panitia Persiapan

Kemerdekaan Indonesia).

However, the Indonesian Christian groups rejected the idea of enforcing Islamic law

for Indonesian Muslims so, on August 18, 1945, in a PPKI General Meeting, Hatta

took the initiative to delete those words from the draft of the Indonesian Constitution

for the legislative body’s ratification in order to prevent the splitting of the nation36.

This final politically compromised decision to withdraw the Jakarta Charter was also

the beginning of Kartosuwirjo’s disappointment with the Nationalists and some

Muslim groups whose philosophies were opposed to his. Politically, as an Islamic

activist, Kartosuwirjo considered that even the Islamic group supporters such as Hatta

had violated their commitment to giving rights for Muslims to regulate their society

based on Shari’a. However, despite his disappointment, as one of the Muslim leaders,

35 Chalmers, Above n 37, p. 16 36 M. C Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200, 3rd ed., Palgrave the Great Britain, 2001, p. 258, p. 262: See also Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, USA, 2003, p. 49

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Kartosuwirjo initially gave the Nationalist group, including his peer, Soekarno, the

opportunity to lead the country and to try to develop the unity of Indonesia.

Kartosuwirjo believed that immorality would cause government mismanagement and

would put Indonesian independence at risk. He and certain Indonesian Muslim

fundamentalists argued that Piagam Jakarta was very important for Muslim groups

because, in Islam, the moral interest is more important than national, state or public

interest. Therefore, they argued, the sentence in the Jakarta Charter known as “seven

words”, which was deleted from the Indonesian Constitution, had expressed a basic

need, not just for Muslims but also for the whole country.37 Even though, on

Independence Day and the day following, the Muslim political faction cooperated

with the Nationalists, the Muslim community was hesitant to recognise the new

Nationalist government. The hesitance proved to be justified when the Dutch

immediately used military aggression to occupy all of Indonesia except for Jogya and

surrounding cities, and the Nationalists collaborated with the Dutch38. Clearly,

Kartsuwirjo saw this Dutch aggression as justification for his subsequent rebellion,

Jihad against the Dutch government in order to defend Indonesian independence.

While Jackson (1980) claims that Kartosuwirjo was a radical nationalist who initiated

a rebellion against the Republic and made many compromises with the Dutch39, the

facts clearly indicate that Kartosuwirjo rebelled not only because he wanted to

enforce his version of the pure beliefs of Islam but also because he was frustrated by

the weakness of political power and diplomatic strategy of the Republic in

compromising with the Dutch over Indonesian independence. That is,

Darul Islam movement was more a product of Kartosuwirjo’s disagreement with the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia than his theological-political consciousness. 40

37 Chalmers, Above n 37, pp. 15-17 38 Ibid, p. 182 39 Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, California, 1980, p.1 40 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia, ISEAS Singapore, 2003, p.35

13

However, Kartosuwirjo also believed that the only barrier to colonialism was the

Islamic way. Therefore, Kartosuwirjo used Islam and Jihad to justify his revolution

which was, in fact, for his own political group’s interests.

Kartosuwirjo’s Concept of Jihad - Phase 1:

Opposition to the Dutch after Indonesian Independence

In the beginning of this essay it is explained that Kartosuwirjo justified his rebellion

as a Jihad. Furthermore, his hatred for the Dutch gave him the opportunity to express

his own ideas about Jihad. However, his movement depended not just on opportunity,

but also on popular support. At times, as an Indonesian Muslim politician, he could be

approachable and cooperative with his political opposition. It may well be that he was

then simply waiting for the right opportunity to develop his own ideas and means and,

meanwhile, to build popular support. For instance, on August 14th, 1945 Kartosuwirjo

proclaimed the independence of the Darul Islam (House of Islam) state. However,

when Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia

three days later, Kartosuwirjo withdrew his proclamation, joined them and sided with

the Republic.41

The Linggarjati agreement, according to which the territory of Indonesia consisted of

only Sumatera and Java, was signed by the Republic and the Dutch on March 25,

1947. This agreement was followed by Dutch “police action” to stabilize the security

situation in Indonesia and to seize the Japanese military remains.42 However, after

launching their first “police action” at midnight on July 20th, 1947, the Dutch began to

occupy the rest of Indonesia again.43 On the following day, July 21st, 1947, the Dutch

military commenced their first aggression against the independence of the Republic of

Indonesia, beginning to occupy Java and Sumatera.

It was in response to this occupation by the Dutch that Kartosuwirjo called for

revolution. At that time, he and his Hizbullah and Sabilillah army groups were a part 41 Boland, Above n 40, p. 57 42 Daamurrasysyi Mujahidain, Menelusuri, Langkah-langkah Jihad Imam S.M. Kartosuwirjo, Shahwah Press, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1995, pp.46-47 43 Ricklefs, Above n 69, p. 276.

14

of the Republican army named the Siliwangi Division, based in West Java.

Kartosuwirjo supported the Republic’s fight against the Dutch to retain the

independence of Indonesia and, within a month, on August 14th, 1947, he called on

his followers to engage in a Holy War against the Dutch, as a Jihad, because they had

been attacked by the Dutch.44 It is quite clear that, at this stage, DI’s Jihad was to

support the Republican army, in order to defend Indonesian independence against

Dutch occupation, and Jihad was not being used at that time to establish

Kartosuwirjo’s ideas about developing an Indonesian Islamic State. Perhaps this was

because he did not have sufficient military and political support at that time.

Under the Renville Agreement, which the Republic and the Dutch ratified on January

19, 1948, all Republican troops withdrew and moved from West Java to Central Java

(Jogja). According to Kartosuwirjo, this agreement was a failure of Republican

diplomatic strategy because it reduced the sovereignty of Indonesian independence.

Kartosuwirjo therefore rejected the agreement and ordered his troops to engage in a

guerrilla war against the Dutch, as a Holy War to protect Indonesian independence.

This decision by Kartosuwirjo was supported by the Masjumi (Majelis Sjuro Muslim

Indonesia = Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), especially the Masjumi

West Java chapter.45

On February 10-11, 1948, the Masjumi held a conference to suspend its West Java

branch and established Majelis Ummat Islam, which controlled and coordinated all

Muslim organizations in West Java to continue the armed struggle against the Dutch.

The establishment of this council was also followed by Kartosuwirjo’s establishment

of the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII = Islamic Army of Indonesia) and the elite force

known as Pahlawan Darul Islam (PADI = the Heroes of the Islamic State). In March

1948, Karosuwirjo declared himself an Imam (Islamic leader) and established a new

government and social structure for civilians and military in the new state.46

After the Dutch occupation of Jogja through a second Dutch “police action” in late

1948, there was a power vacuum in Indonesia. The facts showed that Indonesia did

44 Boland, Above n 40, p. 57 45 Jackson, Above n 72, pp. 10-11 46 Ibid, p. 11

15

not exist, as all Indonesian territory had again been occupied by the Dutch. The

Indonesian military had moved to Jogja and Soekarno and Hatta had been arrested by

the Dutch. To maintain the existence of Indonesian sovereignty and independence,

Syarifudin Prawiranegara declared Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia (PDRI

= Emergency Government of Republic of Indonesia). However, Syarifudin’s action

was not acknowledged by the Republicans later.47 This lack of acknowledgment by

the Republicans of Syarifudin’s achievement in maintaining Indonesian independence

subsequently further influenced Kartosuwirjo’s political movement, giving him more

motivation to rebel against the Republic.

In response to the Dutch “police action”, Kartosuwirjo declared himself as the Imam

of Darul Islam on December 20, 1948, and again called for a Holy War against the

Dutch, to fight to retain Indonesian independence and to remove the Dutch from

Indonesia. The declaration also included changes to the concept of the Indonesian

revolution, from a nationalist revolution to an Islamic revolution under the Indonesian

Islamic Army (TII). At that time Islamic groups inspired the Indonesian revolution for

freedom from the Dutch.48 Following Kartosuwirjo’s opposition to the Dutch, a great

deal of guerrilla warfare commenced, not just waged by Muslims, but also by the

Republican militia.49 Although, at this time, Kartosuwirjo placed greater emphasis on

the Islamic nature of his military revolution, it would seem clear that DI’s Holy War

was primarily to support the Republicans and to defend Indonesian independence.

Finally, in that political vacuum, motivated by his disagreement with the Republic

over the acceptance of the Dutch “police action” and their intervention in Indonesian

independence, and with considerable support from the West Javanese, Kartosuwirjo

declared the existence of the Indonesia Islamic State on August 7, 1949.50

47 Mujahidain, Above n 75, pp. 48-49 48 Ibid, pp. 49-50 49 Jackson, Above n 72, p. 12 50 Ibid, p. 12

16

Kartosuwirjo’s Concept of Jihad - Phase 2:

Opposition to the Republic

When Indonesia eventually regained independence from the Dutch in 1949,

Kartosuwirjo did not end his rebellion. The Dutch were no longer significant as

enemies of Kartosuwirjo’s movement; however, from 1950s West Java was the

central arena of war in which Katosuwirjo and his followers continued their Holy War

against the Republic. The rebellion spread to South and Central Sulawesi, Aceh,

Central Java and Kalimantan, with Kartosuwirjo opposing the Republic’s policy of

supporting the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI = Partai Komunis Indonesia) in

1957 - 1961.51 Clearly, for Kartosuwirjo, the Muslim majority and Islamic political

groups in Indonesia did not have a significant channel in the Indonesian political

system. In addition, the government failed to acknowledge him and other Islamic

political groups which had defended Indonesian Independence. Furthermore, the fact

that communist ideology contradicts the first principle of the Indonesian constitution

(Pancasila), which is belief in One God, and also that Islamic ideology is opposite to

communist ideology, would have further motivated Kartosuwirjo to rebel.

In 1950s, the Republic also faced another rebellion from Westerling in Bandung,

West Java. Westerling was a former military officer from the Royal Netherlands

Indies Army (also known as KNIL) who aimed to bring down Indonesian

independence. After being defeated by the Republican army (notably the Siliwangi

Division), some members of Westerling’s movement, known as Angkatan Perang

Ratu Adil (APRA = the Army of the Just Prince), joined with the Indonesian Islamic

Military of Kartosuwirjo. 52 This rebellion was allegedly a conspiracy between

Kartosuwirjo and Westerling as a result of the “Hotel Preanger meeting”, at which

they planned a strategy to attack the Republican military (Tentara Nasional

Indonesia/TNI).53

51 Damien Kingsbury, the Politics of Indonesia, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Melbourne – Australia, 2005, pp. 45-46 52 Jackson, Above n 72, p. 13 53 Pinardi, Above n 44, pp 121 – 125

17

One of the Dutch APRA members who joined with Kartosuwirjo was the German-

born Van Kleef, who had been a police inspector for the Dutch. After the APRA

rebellion was defeated, Van Kleef moved to Lembang and developed contacts with

other ex-APRA members to collect military goods to support Kartosuwirjo and, in

1951, he became DI’s chief of information and foreign affairs. Van Kleef’s

responsibility was to obtain military weapons support from the Dutch government for

DI, and to lobby Westerling to join in Kartosuwirjo’s Holy War, or Jihad, against the

Republic.54 It can be seen that Kartosuwirjo justified his collaboration with his former

enemy to obtain military support to continue his rebellion.

This discussion shows that, after Indonesia regained independence after the Dutch

military aggression (“police actions”), Kartosuwirjo collaborated with the Dutch

against the Republic in order to achieve DI’s goal. In other words, DI’s concept of

Jihad at this stage allowed collaboration with the Dutch, which was totally opposite to

DI’s previous realisation of Jihad at the time of the first and second Dutch “police

actions”. In other words, Kartosuwirjo’s interpretation and implementation of Jihad

were opportunistic.

Other Forms of Radicalism in Indonesia Allegedly Influenced by DI

As this essay has explained, at the beginning of the preparations for Indonesian

independence in 1945, there was a debate among Muslims and between Muslims and

non-Muslims, including Nationalist and Christian groups, because some Muslims

wanted to enforce Islamic law for Muslims and use Islamic law as one of the

principles in the draft of the Indonesian constitution. Even though all groups finally

agreed to that principle and included it in the Jakarta Charter, Shari’a did not finally

have any place in the Indonesian constitution. Clearly, this rejection of Shari’a has

been a constant justification for rebellion by Islamic groups throughout Indonesian

history.

The Darul Islam movement was not monopolized by Kartosuwirjo’ group only, even

though he was a central figure for all of DI’s movements. In late 1949, Amir Fatah

54 Ibid, pp. 138 - 140

18

and KH Machfudz’s followers in Central Java joined the DI rebellion. However, this

rebel group was defeated by the Republican army in early 1950s.55 In 1950 Ibnu Hajar

led a Darul Islam rebellion movement in South Kalimantan56until his surrender to the

Republic in 1963 and execution by the government in 1965.57 In 1952 Qahar

Muzzakar, a disappointed former Soekarno bodyguard who had helped Soekarno to

recruit Republican militia in Sulawesi, led a rebellion against the Republic in Central

and South Sulawesi. Muzzakar’s initial motivation was that his military wing

members were not recognized by the Republican army. However, in 1953, he joined

with DI, accepted Kartosuwirjo as his Imam, and declared Sulawesi as a part of the

Indonesian Islamic State.58

Another DI rebellion took place in Aceh in 1953, led by Daud Beureuh, who was

appointed as a vice Imam of DI in 1955. Although Beureuh declared a ceasefire and

surrendered to the Republicans in 1957, withdrew from DI in 1959 and was pardoned

in 196259, his ex-followers later played a significant role in the birth of the rebellion

known as the Free Aceh Movement (GAM = Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in 1976 in

Sumatera.60

After the capture and execution of Kartosuwirjo by the Indonesian government in

1962, there was no significant Muslim movement similar to DI until the beginning of

1970s. However, the number of radical Muslims in Indonesia continued to increase

because of government repression and the unjust legal process. The radicalism of

Muslims also grew because there was no opportunity for Islamic groups to express

their political interests in the parliament. As Sidney Jones claims in an ICG report

(2005):

The rationales for the uprisings differed from place to place, but most were rooted in the unhappiness of local militants at concessions newly independent Indonesia had made to the Dutch or at its failure to accord due recognition to local guerrillas in the new national army. Religious factors were not

55 Fealy, Above n 31, pp. 18-19 56 DENSUS 88/Anti Terror, Ancaman Terrorisme, Environment & Terrorism in Indonesia, 2005, Presentation Slide No. 2 (Unpublished) 57 Fealy, Above n 31, p. 19 58 International Crisis Group (ICG) 2002a, Above n 3, p.3 - 4 59 Fealy, Above n 31, p. 19 60 International Crisis Group (ICG), 2002a, Above n 3, p.3

19

paramount, but Islam became the common bond of the leaders, and by 1953, they had agreed to form a united front to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia = NII).61

During the anti-communist era in the early 1970s, Muslim groups were used by the

Indonesian government to counter the communism movement. The strategy of Ali

Murtopo, the leader of Indonesian Intelligence in 1970s, was to support the Islamic

militants, including those who had joined DI, to help the government oppose the

communists.62 Nevertheless, the Islamic movement continued to criticise corruption

within the government and Islamic groups still did not have opportunities to become

involved in economic and political activities at the national level. However, even

though they did not win the 1977 national general election (PEMILU = Pemilihan

Umum), Islamic groups were able to gain a significant amount of support, a result

which displeased the Soeharto group because at that time they did not want to face

any significant opposition. Consequently, an intelligence operation was commenced

to create propaganda made Muslims activists scapegoats by labelling them as

insurgents, as Soeharto had done with the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia).63 Many

Muslim activists were accused of having committed the crime of subversion against

the sacred Pancasila, which was interpreted by the Soeharto government as also

acting against national stability. The Soeharto regime repressed some Muslims groups

and arrested them.64 Many Muslims activists suffered severe treatment and were

jailed without process of trial.65

Under the Soeharto regime, Indonesian intelligence operations were supported by the

CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies), which was a Chinese-Catholic66

influenced research organisation operating as a think-thank, BAKIN (State

Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency), which collected intelligence data, and

KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)

61 International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005, Above n 2, p. 2 62 Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, UNSW Press, Sydney, Australia 2004, pp. 47-48, 106 63 Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror, Zed Press, London, 1983, p. 91 64 Ibid, p. 92 65 Ibid, , pp. 190-192 66 Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (paperback ed.), RoutledgeCurzon, New York-USA, 2005, p.25

20

which operated as the executor.67These intelligence organisations successfully divided

Muslim political power and discriminated against particular Muslim groups,

stigmatising them as radical groups. This labelling even became an excuse for the

Soeharto regime to brutally break down an Islamic extremist group which had in fact

been created by a government intelligence operation.

After that time, the names of Islamic radical and militant movements such as

Komando Jihad, Warman Reign of Terror, Free Aceh Movement, Usroh and Ring

Santa became familiar.68 These radical groups were a result of unjust government

treatment and the repressive government approach to Muslim groups. Therefore, it is

perhaps not surprising that in Indonesia there may be many Muslim individuals and

organisations, like those mentioned above, which still want to achieve their ambition

of developing an Islamic state and enforcing Shari’a and which may also, in the

future, take revenge against the Nationalists, non-Muslim groups and Muslim groups

responsible for their discrimination and suffering.

In the New Order era under the Soeharto regime, one rebellion which must be

highlighted was the Usroh movement. This rebellion allegedly was connected to DI,

but, again, the Islamic beliefs of the two groups were clearly different. While the

Usroh in 1981 took the Iranian revolution as a model, 69 and held the values of the

Shie’tes (Shia’ah), DI followed Shunni values. Most Islamic radical groups in

Indonesia follow Shunni values, which differ from Shie’tes’ values because Shie’tes

follow only the actions of the Prophet Muhammad SAW and His Families, whereas

Shunni values follow the lives of the Prophet Muhammad SAW and His Companions.

However, because of its success, the Iranian Revolution had a significant influence on

some parts of the Usroh movement.

All of those rebellions mentioned above had similar goals to those of DI, which were

that they wanted to establish an Islamic State in order to enforce Islamic law (Shari’a)

in Indonesia. This idea is a heritage not just of the DI rebellion, but also of the

disappointment of the former Muslim politicians and groups who wanted to restore 67 Southwood & Flanagan, Above n 96, p. 90 68 Ibid, p. 92 69 International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005, Above n 2, pp. 12-14

21

the “seven words” of the Jakarta Charter as one of the basic principles of the

Indonesian Constitution. Moreover, these rebellions were also stimulated and

triggered by the unjust social, political and economic conditions in Indonesia. For

example, lack of law enforcement in areas such as vice, from an Islamic perspective,

leads to immorality. Similarly, corruption leads to poverty and socio-economic

injustice and unfair political practice can lead to deconstruction of democracy.

Although Indonesian law already regulated against such problems, practically, this

law was not enforced by the government.

Another stimulus is the Muslim radicalism was their lack of any significant political

channel to express their ideas although, according to its constitution, Indonesia is

supposedly a democracy. This lack of political opportunity occurred because the New

Order regime manipulated elections. The regime was selective in which Muslim

groups could collaborate with the government. Another significant trigger for

insurgency was that, in 1985, all mass organisations, political groups, local non-

government organisations and social (non-profit) institutions were forced to accept

the Pancasila as their sole guiding principle (azas tunggal).70 This political condition

stimulated the radical opposition of many Muslims groups, especially those who

believed in the return to the purity of Islamic sources (Al Qur’an and As Shunnah),

because Muslims believe that the highest Islamic source is Al Qur’an, followed by As

Shunnah, and these sources must be higher than the Pancasila.

The conditions described above clearly show that Muslims groups did not have a real

political channel to express their ideas and were also treated unjustly. This anomie, or

strain,71 led to the deconstruction of conventional values and radical Muslims’

substitution of the existing values for the model developed by Muslims scholars. In

other words, some individuals and groups, such as those mentioned above, formed a

new means to express their ideas and strive, as a Jihad, for their goals, inspired by the

concept of justice which had been developed by Muslims scholars such as those

referred to in The Concept of Jihad and Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia72. These

70 Chalmers, Above n 37, pp. 255-256 71 Giddens, Above n 35, pp. 207-208; See Also: Merton’s Strain Theory, < http://home.comcast.net/~ddmelo/crime/mert_strain.html > at 23 December 2005 72 Another chapter from the “Mini Thesis” Understanding Terrorism in Indonesia: Jihad, Darul Islam dan Jema’ah Islamiyah, in February 2006.

22

groups argued that only Shari’a could meet their goals and that, in order to enforce

Shari’a, they must establish an Islamic state. Thus, they justified their rebellion as a

Jihad against the existing Indonesian government.

23

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