Speak of War and prepare for peace: rome, 10 June 1940(*)

1. In the afternoon of the 10th of June 1940, an oceanic crowd around Palazzo Venezia in rome learned from mussolini’s voice that Italy had declared war against Great Britain and france. It was the end of the so-called «non-belligerence» during which Italy had remained somewhat aloof from the on-going european tragedy. many thousand miles apart that afternoon, another president announced to a quieter and less numerous audience that «the Government of Italy has now chosen to preserve what it terms its “freedom of action” and to fulfil what it states are its promises to Germany. In so doing, it has manifested disregard for the rights and security of other nations, disregard for the lives of the peoples of those nations, which are directly threatened by this spread of the war; and has evidenced its unwillingness to find the means through pacific negotiations for the satisfaction of what it believes are its legitimate aspirations. on this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbour»(1). With these words, president roosevelt anticipated many elements of later interpretations about Italy’s entrance in World War Two as an immoral “stab in the back”. churchill’s rhetorical ability, on the other hand, emphasised the guilty role of mussolini as the «one man alone» who after many «years of unbridled power» had diverted Italy from her traditional path of friendship with the western nations(2). The images of a war fought to the bitter end blurred with those originated from the civil war further complicating an analysis of the reasons behind mussolini’s fateful decision to join Hitler in that late spring of 1940.

(*) Based on new sources, this article expands the analysis made in E. Gin, L’ora segnata dal destino. Gli Alleati e Mussolini da Monaco all’intervento (Settembre 1938- Giugno 1940), roma, edizioni nuova cultura, 2012.

(1) Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939-June 1940, S. S. Jones – d. p. myers (eds.), Boston, World peace foundation, 1940, II, p. 81.

(2) W. S. ChurChill, The Second World War, new York, mariner Books, 1985, vol. II, Their Finest Hour, p. 548.

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(3) G. SalvEmini, Mussolini diplomate, paris, Grasset, 1932, and Preludio alla seconda guerra mondiale, a. Torre (ed.), milan, feltrinelli, 1967.

(4) G. roChat, Le guerre italiane 1935-1943. Dall’Impero d’Etiopia alla disfatta, Torino, ein-audi, 2005, pp. 145 ff. and 239 ff.

(5) d. maCk Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, London, Longman, 1976 [it. trans. Le guerre del duce, Bari, Laterza, 1976, pp. 252 ff.]; see also maCk Smith, Mussolini, London, Weidenfeld and nicholson, 1981, and d. c. Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, London, Heinemann, 1989, passim. on the point see also, J. GooCh, Mussolini and his Generals. The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940, new York, cambridge university press, 2007, pp. 1-3.

from a historiographical perspective, much debate has centred on the role played by mussolini himself and his ambitions in shaping fascist foreign policy. Since 1932, Gaetano Salvemini interpreted mussolini’s diplomacy as an incoher-ent pattern in which the need for preserving his charismatic image and the do-mestic stability of his dictatorial regime was paramount. The legacy of Salvemini’s Mussolini diplomate has resulted enduring(3). for instance, it has been recently reemphasised the inconsistency between the policy of power followed by the tenant of Palazzo Venezia and the abysmal state of Italian military preparedness. The inadequacies of the Regie Forze Armate derived from the lack of effective liaison between civil and military institutions and from the corporative mental-ity of the armed forces which were viewed mainly as an instrument of power and propaganda. With these premises, without caring about the yawning abyss between means and ends, mussolini’s foreign policy was more or less a reckless gamble, an irresponsible and unscrupulous game with fate played for power and prestige. The fateful decision to join Hitler in war was then mussolini’s ultimate bluff as well as an obvious choice for ensuring the survival of a regime that had legitimated itself by relying on the myth of the “new Italy” and on the infallibility of its absolute master(4).

echoes of Salvemini are also easily recognizable among anglo-Saxon histo-rians. The Primat der Innenpolitik of mussolini’s policy has resurfaced strongly through the pages of historians like denis mack Smith or donald Watt. mus-solini’s escapades in foreign policy were the by-product of his continual –and violent- quest for personal prestige and further maintenance of power(5).

on the Italian side of the debate, ennio di nolfo, among the first to rewrite with method and accuracy the fascist behaviour on the international arena, has observed mussolini’s habit to look at the vital connection between Palazzo Chigi, the Italian foreign office, and the Minculpop, the fascist ministry of propaganda. as a result, although not disregarding the long-term aim of expanding Italian

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(6) e. Di nolfo, Mussolini e la politica estera italiana, 1919-1933, padova, cedam, 1960, pp. 44 ff. and 100 ff.; see also Il revisionismo nella politica estera di Mussolini, pavia, fusi, 1954 and Le oscillazioni di Mussolini, in «nuova antologia», LXIV, 1990, 4, pp. 172-195.

(7)cfr. J. PEtErSEn, Hitler e Mussolini. La difficile alleanza, roma-Bari, Laterza, 1975, passim, who significantly stops his compelling analysis at birth of the axis.

(8) m. knox, Alleati di Hitler. Le regie forze armate, il regime fascista e la guerra del 1940-1943, milano, Garzanti, 2002, pp. 19 ff.; Mussolini Unleashed. Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War, new York, cambridge university press, 1982, pp. 44-86 and 87-133, and also r. m. SalErno, Vital Crossroads. Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-1940, Ithaca-London, cornell university press, 2002, passim.

(9) I. kErShaW, Scelte Fatali. Le decisioni che hanno cambiato il mondo, 1940-1941, milano, Bompiani, 2012, pp. 168-239 and Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, London, penguin Books, 2001, pp. 291-2, 327-8, 382-3.

influence by exploiting the competition among the other major powers, mus-solini’s decisions always presented a certain degree of incoherence(6).

In contrast, by drawing pointed attention to the role of ideology a more meaningful picture of fascist foreign policy has been outlined. The partnership with nazi Germany favoured by the personal entente between the two dictators, the similarity of the two “revolutions”, their social-darwinistic vision of inter-national relations and the harsh contempt for senescent and allegedly corrupt democracies would make fascist diplomatic manoeuvres more comprehensible in their drive to destabilise the european order(7).

although not discounting ideological aspects, those who have overstated the bellicose nature of mussolini’s policy have reached similar conclusions. as suggested by mackGregor knox, for example, war formed the core of the Duce’s political agenda as he regarded it as a vital tool to strengthen his position against the king and the church and as a unique opportunity to achieve the fascistisa-tion of Italian society. along the path towards his craved war laurels mussolini was thus destined to meet his former disciple, adolf Hitler. only an alliance with nazi Germany could realise the fascist imperial dreams and forge the birth of the fascist homo novus(8).

Whether one stresses the ideological bonds between fascist Italy and nazi Germany or not, the ethiopian campaign, the pact of steel, the invasion of al-bania, the meeting at the Brenner pass, and the fateful opening of mussolini’s window onto the crowd assembled around Palazzo Venezia on the 10th June 1940 seem to be bound together in a monolithic whole. In this framework of fascist foreign policy, the position of non-belligerency was a humiliating expedient imposed by the Italian military unpreparedness and the following intervention in war was mostly determined by the eagerness to realise the Italian imperial aspirations in the wake of Hitler’s victorious legions(9).

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(10) on the point see r. J. B. BoSWorth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers. Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1979.

(11) r. DE fEliCE, Mussolini il Duce, Torino, einaudi, 1996, vol. II, Lo Stato totalitario 1936-1940, pp. 543 ff.; p. pastorelli, La politica estera fascista dalla fine del conflitto etiopico alla seconda guerra mondiale, in L’Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati, La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale, r. de felice (ed.), Bologna, Il mulino, 1973 pp. 103-126; r. Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlino, roma, Jouvence, 2001, vols. I-II, passim.

(12) Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1939-1939, (hereafter cited as dBfp, followed by Series, Volume, document number and pages), London, Her majesty’s Stationery office, 1954, Third Series, vol. VII, doc. 192, p. 157; see also doc. 83, pp. 80-2.

In contrast, the Italian historian renzo de felice, in his monumental biog-raphy of mussolini, has stressed the Duce’s opportunistic approach to foreign policy, his hyperrealism and the lines of continuity with his liberal predecessors. along with rosaria Quartararo and pietro pastorelli, de felice has described the “decisive-weight diplomacy” that enabled fascist Italy to exploit international rivalries to her own advantage. In short, at least until the mid-1930s, mussolini conformed in large measure to the policy that had sustained Italy’s role as “the least of the great powers” after national unification(10). notwithstanding his bellicose rhetoric, even after the ethiopian campaign, when ideological factors and rough assessments began to replace his pragmatism, the Italian dictator manoeuvred to avoid or dilate the outbreak of the war, up until the last days of peace(11).

although contrasting, the interpretations mentioned above each reveal im-portant aspects of fascist foreign policy as a whole and should deserve a detailed comparison. Such an enterprise would go well beyond the limits of this essay. Limiting the analysis to the non-belligerence, however, could yield a picture of mussolini which much resembles that outlined by de felice. as we will see in the following lines, the Duce appeared more concerned to preserve somehow the crumbling balance of power and the precarious Italian position rather than eager to march headlong into a long desired conflict.

2. already before the outbreak of the war, mussolini began sending un-equivocal signals about the mediating role that he sought to acquire for himself. While molotov and ribbentrop were shaking their hands before the photog-raphers, ciano, on mussolini’s behalf, told the British ambassador, Sir percy Loraine, that the Duce «wanted peace» and that «he was willing to co-operate with His majesty’s Government in search for conditions in which a peace by negotiation […] could be started»(12). during the conversation, ciano advised

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(13) dBfp, III, VII, doc. 373, p. 302; see also G. Ciano, Diario, 1937-1943, r. de felice (ed.), milano, rizzoli, 1998, pp. 335-6.

(14) Diario Storico del Comando Supremo, a. Biagini, f. frattolillo (eds.), roma, ufficio Storico dello Stato maggiore dell’esercito, 1986, vol. I, tome 2, pp. 101-2.

(15) dBfp, III, VI, doc. 258, pp. 283-285; see also a. BErnaSConi-G. muran, Il testimone di Cemento, udine, LnB, 2009.

the most absolute discretion since «his position was delicate as Italy was all the same Germany’s ally». although ciano had supported Hitler’s demands towards poland, his words brought to light clear differences between Berlin and rome. few days later, during a telephone conversation with Halifax, ciano reaffirmed his will «to cooperate […] for a peaceful solution», clarifying that mussolini’s aim was «to gain more time»(13). on the basis of these premises, Palazzo Chigi proposed a last minute conference which was, as it is known, soon surpassed by events.

The poor state of the Italian armed forces, as well as the restraining influence of the crown, the church, and ciano himself, have generally been considered as the main reasons of mussolini’s non-belligerence. although domestic political problems and military unpreparedness undoubtedly played a significant role in mussolini’s decisions, his true motivations for distancing himself from Hitler may appear, from a closer analysis, a bit more complex.

His reluctance to join the Fuhrer in a general conflict manifested itself very early. on 16th august, no sooner did ciano return from Germany, where he had learned from ribbentrop’s voice that Germany had decided to invade poland, than the Duce wrote down for Badoglio his directives to the armed forces: «If Britain, france and their allies become involved in a nazi-polish conflict, we will adopt a strictly defensive posture, not doing anything that might be interpreted as our acceptance of the German initiative»(14). further in the letter, mussolini prodded his chief of the General Staff into studying, «the situation permitting», operative plans against Yugoslavia and Greece, but pointed up the vital need for Italy to strengthen her border defences. rather than being the outcome of a prolonged struggle against his domestic opponents, mussolini’s decision to adopt a neutral stance was, therefore, taken at the first worsening of the international situation, well before the signature of the nazi-Soviet pact. as ciano revealed to the Soviet chargé d’affaires in rome, Boris Helfand, the Italians were «erect-ing fortifications on their frontier with Germany» at least from the beginning of July(15). In addition, while writing to Badoglio, mussolini directed the fascist general emilio de Bono to reconnoitre the Italian-German border defences,

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(16) e. DE Bono, Diario, notebook XXXXIII, in archivio centrale dello Stato, rome (acS), Carte De Bono, b. 2.

(17) See m. knox, Mussolini, cit., p. 61.(18) m. roatta, Otto Milioni di Baionette. L’Esercito Italiano dal 1940 al 1944, milano, mon-

dadori, 1946, p. 90; m. montanari, Politica e Strategia in Cento Anni di Guerre Italiane, roma, ufficio Storico dello Stato maggiore dell’esercito, 2007, vol. III, tome 2, p. 40.

(19) See for example I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (hereafter cited as ddI followed by Series, Volume, document number and pages), rome, Libreria dello Stato, 1954, IX Series, vol. I, docs. 80, 89, 94 pp. 47-50, 61 and 63 respectively, and vol. II, doc. 280, pp. 238-9; see also Documents on German Foreign Policy (hereafter dGfp), Series d, vol. VIII, Washington, united States Government printing office, 1954, docs. 23, 176, pp. 22 and 184-194 respectively, and G. Ciano, L’Europa verso la catastrofe, milano, mondadori, 1948, pp. 466-77. See also p. StafforD, The French Government and the Danzig Crisis: The Italian Dimension, in «The International His-tory review», VI, 1984, 1, pp. 48-87.

(20) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 337.

which were to be considered «the most important of all»(16). In the following weeks, the frontier shared with the Reich was thus given the highest priority in the allocation of funds receiving one billion Liras, an impressive figure when compared with the 600 million granted to the Italian-french border and the 300 million to the frontier with Yugoslavia(17). The works of fortifications from the Brenner to the Tarvis pass continued well into 1941 until strong German protests made them pause(18). This waste of money in trenches and pillboxes along the German border well showed the stains on the “steel” of the pact between fascist Italy and nazi Germany. furthermore, it has to be noticed that the whole Italian attitude during the danzig crisis actually played against the German “war of nerves” to force the allies to give in. It should surprise no one that in the following months, at least until the spring of 1940, nazi rulers continued to blame the Italians for the outbreak of the war(19).

The stress laid by ciano, in his intercourse with the British, on the need to buy time may add further evidence of mussolini’s inner thoughts. His state of mind in the days preceding the German onslaught against poland was well re-corded by ciano’s diary: «The duce has recovered his serenity, as usually happens when he takes a decision. He does not want to utter the word “neutrality”, but it is this frame of mind that he has definitely reached. He even begins to hope that the struggle will be hard, long, and bloody for others, for he sees in this a possibility of great advantage for us»(20). Two weeks later, while the Wehrmacht’s armoured columns were clearing the pockets of the surrounded polish army, mussolini confided his thoughts to alberto pirelli, an influential industrialist close to him: «Hitler was resolved to open the hostilities on august 25. Had he not been so suddenly successful, the occurred delay could have hampered

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(21) a. PirElli, Taccuini 1922-1943, Bologna, Il mulino, 1984, p. 234.(22) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 356.(23) r. DE fEliCE, Mussolini il duce, cit., II, pp. 701 ff.(24) acS, Carte della valigia, b. 1.(25) See, for example, the meeting between Bastianini, mussolini and attolico in G. BaStianini,

Volevo fermare Mussolini. Memorie di un diplomatico fascista, milano, rizzoli, 2005, pp. 69-73.

him seriously as the rain, towards the end of September, begins to fall heavily on poland. one should never defy the elements when choosing the starting date of a war»(21). These words throw, therefore, a very different light on the last minute conference he proposed during the last days of august. moreover, as soon as ciano returned from Germany on the 3rd october after a round of consultations with Hitler, mussolini openly began to wish for a decisive German setback, dismissing the Fuhrer’s boasted confidence in victory(22).

With regard to ciano, his opposition to the intervention in war and his distrust of the Germans were surely genuine and he shared this attitude with other fascist leading figures. The sudden coalition of heterogeneous anti-German elements was soon detected at home and abroad and it constituted a growing menace to mussolini’s supremacy as many fascist leaders put aside their previ-ous rivalries to form a sort of “anti-interventionist party”(23). The vast cabinet reshuffle occurred in the following october and the Italian diplomatic attitude until the spring of 1940 seemed to vouch for the weakening of mussolini’s strength to keep the reins of power firmly in his grasp. In his diary, however, the Duce’s son in law tended to overstate his role in the decision-making process that led to the non-belligerence. as we have seen, on leaving the Führer on his own, the Duce himself had opted for non-belligerency before the nazi-Soviet pact made the war almost certain and before a neutralist faction rose within the fascist party. Then, in a telegram without date, written presumably around the 25th and 28th of august and later retrieved in his bag after his capture in 1945, mussolini reassured the king that in the foreseeable war Italy would maintain an «attitude of pure façade» and that the British and the french had informed him that «they would behave accordingly»(24).

at the same time, the Italian dictator feared to burn all the bridges behind him. By pursuing an attitude of non-belligerency rather than neutrality he hoped to preserve his relationship to both Germany and the allies and to avoid a complete rupture with Hitler, as sought by the anti-German party. His known pro-German tirades, well recorded in ciano’s diary and other sources(25), were the result of this struggle to assert his role as supreme leader. characteristic in this sense was the cabinet meeting on the 1st September wherein, after having

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(26) DE fEliCE, Mussolini il duce, cit., II, p. 672; G. Bottai, Diario, 1935-1944, G. B. Guerri (ed.), milano, rizzoli, 2001, p. 157, f. GuarnEri, Battaglie economiche tra le due guerre, milano, Garzanti, 1953, vol. II, pp. 427 ff.; d. GranDi, Frammenti di diario, in archivio Storico del min-istero degli affari esteri (hereafter aSmae), rome, b. 151.

(27) r. DE fEliCE, Mussolini il duce, cit., II, pp. 700-1; see also the reports in mussolini’s private papers, acS, Segreteria particolare del Duce. Carteggio Riservato, (hereafter Spd-cr), b. 67.

(28) In contrast see B. S. viault, Mussolini et la recherche d’une paix négociée (1939-1940), in «revue d’Histoire de la deuxième Guerre mondiale», XXVII, 1977, 107, pp. 1-18.

(29) f. GuarnEri, Battaglie economiche, cit., II, p. 429. mussolini, as we see, did not refrain from using the word ‘neutrality’ in his private conversations. See also The national archives, London, (hereafter Tna), Records created or inherited by the Foreign Office (hereafter fo), 371/33232, Sir Percy Loraine’s Mission to Italy, p. 12.

formalised the non-belligerency, mussolini abruptly closed the session to prevent dino Grandi, minister of Justice and former fascist ambassador in London, from pleading for absolute neutrality(26).

although the ill-organized plots against him, masterminded by the royalist generals Badoglio and caviglia(27), eventually showed his resilience and his abil-ity to recover the lost ground, the Duce himself was well aware that the growing influence of the neutralists could weaken his position. The non-belligerency thus became preparatory to a division of roles with ciano(28). The Duce assumed a low profile, managing to preserve his grip on domestic policy and his privileged relationship with Hitler, while his son-in-law reshaped the Italian foreign policy by stressing the growing distance of rome from Berlin’s embrace.

3. Having so improved his position, mussolini felt free to set the non-belligerence on its proper course. The reserves of the Bank of Italy in gold and hard currencies were, at the outbreak of the war, alarmingly low and hampered any hope of quick rearmament. on that issue the cabinet had split into two factions, one led by the military who pressed for a policy of stockpiling strate-gic and critical materials, thus limiting the export, and the other led by felice Guarneri, minister of Trade and currency, who pushed for an export-oriented approach to address the financial problem. It is worth noting that mussolini, deciding in favour of the latter, did not rule out the possibility of selling arms to the allies: «here is the Italian policy», he said to Guarneri few days after the cabinet meeting, «we must be so strong as to avoid being dragged into war by anyone. our neutrality should allow us to work. even important arms deals can be concluded, judging case by case. The sales are to be paid in cash»(29). The improvement in economic relations with the allies, after this decision, was another hint at what the relationships within the axis really were.

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(30) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 353, and ddI, IX, I, doc. 545, p. 325.(31) See the Note by the Direction politique of the french foreign office signed 23rd Sep-

tember 1939, in Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1939 (3 septembre - 31 décembre), (hereafter ddf 1939), Bruxelles-Bern-Berlin-frankfurt am main-new York-oxford-Wien, p.I.e. p. Lang, 2002, pp. 223-224.

(32) f. marzari, Projects for an Italian-Led Balkan Bloc of Neutrals. September-December 1939, in «The Historical Journal», XIII, 1970, 4, pp. 767-788; see also B. millman, The Ill-Made Alliance. Anglo-Turkish Relations 1939-1940, montreal and kingston, mcGill-Queen’s university press, 1998.

(33) ddI, IX, II, docs. 121 and 493, pp. 87-90 and 383 respectively.(34) for the text of the speech see r. DE fEliCE, Mussolini il duce, cit., II, p. 692.

Soon after that, Palazzo Chigi significantly tried to expand its influence over the minor powers of South-eastern europe by promoting a plan of an Italian-led Balkan block of neutrals. The outcome of this initiative well showed, however, the uneasiness of the Italian diplomatic position as each belligerent tried to exploit the projected neutral block for its own advantage. as the Italian ambassador in Berlin, Bernardo attolico, wrote to ciano(30), the Wilhelmstrasse tolerated the project only as a way to counter the effects of the allied economic blockade while the allies, although rome’s neutrality was crucial for the envisaged crea-tion of a Balkan front, were ill-disposed to accept a growth of Italian influence in that area(31). The Treaty of mutual assistance, signed on 19 october 1939, between Britain, france and Turkey, thus gave a serious blow to ciano’s ambi-tious drive(32). It is worth noting, however, that mussolini decided to scrap the project only when the British attempted to use it to undermine the axis solidar-ity(33). The Duce, in his effort to prepare the terrain for a diplomatic solution, could ill afford to wreck his relationship with Hitler and this may explain why he gave only a feeble endorsement to the idea of a block of neutrals under the aegis of Italy. absolute Italian neutrality would have further alienated Germany from the idea of an international conference although the spectre of a complete Berlin’s isolation constituted an important card in the gamble of the tenant of Palazzo Venezia.

on the 23rd September, in his first public speech after the outbreak of the war, he began to test the chances for a diplomatic solution to the conflict(34). after an opening shot against his domestic opponents, the Duce underscored the danger posed by a spread of communism in the Balkans and in eastern europe and pointed up how the ineffective response to the soviet invasion of poland had damaged the moral basis by which the allies had decided to wage war against Germany. This lack of will to comply entirely with their moral and formal obligations towards poland implied, therefore, the possibility that the allies might be somehow disposed to negotiations with nazi rulers.

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(35) dGfp, d, VIII, doc. 127, pp. 125-6.(36) Ibidem.(37) ddI, IX, I, doc. 196, pp. 125-6.(38) herein, doc. 596, p. 367.

Significantly, mussolini’s speech had been preceded, few days before, by a telling article in Il Popolo d’Italia, the fascist official newspaper, in whose columns a diplomatic agreement was openly suggested. The article had prodded each belligerent to probe the chances of dialogue before the clash of arms along the western front would destroy any chance to reach a point of contact. as attolico said to the nazi Secretary of State, ernst von Weizsäcker, the column «although not written by mussolini, [was] entirely in accordance with his views»(35). In ad-dition, as he had been doing in the previous days, the Italian ambassador urged on the need of a «generous gesture» as regards poland. In mussolini’s opinion, as the German military attaché in rome confirmed to Weizsäcker (36), the setting up of a «residual» polish state might persuade the allies to start negotiations.

This first official stance adopted by the supreme fascist leader gave thus the green light to a vigorous anti-Soviet drive, led personally by ciano, in order to obtain the isolation of both Berlin and moscow. Palazzo Chigi’s opening thrust in this direction was aimed at hindering the German efforts to achieve a rap-prochement between Japan and the Soviet union, whose relations were being strained by their border dispute over manchuria that had slid into an undeclared conflict. as the Italian ambassador in Tokyo, Giacinto auriti, had reminded ciano few days before mussolini’s speech, the chances of influencing the Japanese diplomatic course were, however, almost slight, at least until a successful con-clusion of the Sino-Japanese war(37). nevertheless, in the following months the chief of Italian diplomacy continued to admonish his embassy to foster Tokyo’s anti-Soviet circles by emphasising the danger of a renewed communist military build-up in the far east as a by-product of the nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact. ciano’s instructions were to facilitate an easing of the tension between Tokyo, London and Washington thus revealing the Italian support for a full agreement between Japan and the western powers.

The momentary weakening of chiang kai-shek’s position and the rise of the anti-communist Wang Jingwei seemed for a while to open a window to the Italian diplomacy as the Gaimusho officially requested mussolini’s mediation to help end the conflict in china(38). mussolini, although he had watched closely the events remaining behind the scenes, promptly accepted the role of mediator revealing his adherence to ciano’s diplomatic moves. In the long run, however,

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(39) dGfp, d, VIII, doc. 549, pp. 678-9.(40) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 371.(41) dGfp, d, VIII, doc. 428, pp. 500-501.(42) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., pp. 372-3, 383. See also ddI, IX, II, docs. 534, 567, 570, 588,

628, 673, pp. 408, 432, 434, 450, 485-486, 518 respectively.(43) ddI, IX, II, doc. 520, p. 397.(44) ddI, IX, II, docc. 741, 766, pp. 573-574 e p. 590, and dGfp, d, VIII, doc. 494, p. 583.(45) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., pp. 368, 374.

Palazzo Chigi’s calculations proved to be incorrect as Washington’s intransigence over its interests in china and German skilful mediation gradually drove the rising Sun down the path towards a rapprochement with moscow. at all events, as Weizsäcker bitterly observed(39), the Italian initiative had well remarked the apparent distance between the two poles of the axis.

Shortly thereafter, however, the Soviet invasion of finland provided the terrain for a full-fledged contest between rome and moscow. as finnish resist-ance on the “mannerheim Line” grew stronger, anti-russian feelings deepened among fascist leaders while «spontaneous demonstrations», artificially swelled by party’s youth organizations, went crackling through the squares of many Italian cities(40). on the night of 7th december, the fascist High council convened to issue an official statement regarding the on-going war and the state of interna-tional relations. remembering rome’s opposition to war, ciano recognised the poor state of Italo-German relations and justified the non-belligerency mainly as the result of the communist menace in the Balkans favoured by the connivance of nazi Germany(41). In the morning after the speech, while ciano assured the finnish ambassador of the forthcoming shipping of Italian aircrafts and war materiel(42), the duce himself notified the Italian minister in Sofia of his total satisfaction «for the High council’s communiqué»(43). With these premises the crisis reached its peak as the Soviet ambassador, Ivan Gorelkin, left rome without even informing the Italian authorities, swiftly followed by the sudden recall of his Italian colleague, augusto rosso, from moscow(44). In the meanwhile, on the 16th december, ciano delivered before the fascist chamber another violent speech formally anti-Soviet in its tone but pointed against the fatal nazi-Soviet partnership.

It is worth noting at this point that both ciano’s speeches were written, as he admitted in his diary, under the strict supervision of mussolini himself(45). moreover, the duce’s gloss on his son-in-law’s address to the fascist High coun-cil, which helped explain the meaning of non-belligerency, bolstered ciano’s arguments and well deserves an extensive quotation: «Here we have two empires fighting each other; two lions. It is our interest that there should be neither vic-

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(46) G. Bottai, Diario, cit., pp. 170-1. It’s worth noting that, before closing the speech with these words, mussolini had confessed publicly that Italy had to be faithful to her pacts with england.

(47) de Bono, Diario, cit., notebook XLIII, 16 november 1939.(48) G. Bottai, Diario, cit., p. 165.(49) ddI, IX, III, doc. 40, p. 28.(50) ddI, IX, II, doc. 422, p. 336.

tor nor vanquished. Should england be victorious, she would leave us with only the sea to swim in. Should Germany be victorious, we would feel her weight. We desire that those two lions would tear each other to pieces up to their tails. and, maybe, to be able to collect them for us»(46).

few weeks before those official statements, in a conversation with de Bono, mussolini gave another clue about what non-belligerency really meant for him by asserting that although he did not think to march against Germany «no one, not even him» could be really sure of that(47). Interestingly, this declaration matched what he had said during the cabinet meeting on the previous 30th September: «we need –he stated- 400.000 tons of gasoline for the army and 300.000 for the air force […]. We’ll side neither with the group a nor with the group B until these supplies are not at our disposal»(48). furthermore, in a more explicit manner than he had done with de Bono, instructing ciano before a round of consultations with the Hungarians in January, mussolini made clear how further German «mistakes» and closer nazi-Soviet partnership could actu-ally wreck the axis(49).

as we reflect on how the provision of russian resources could hasten the Italian rearmament program, this effort to isolate the Reich by emphasising the Italian anti-Soviet stance may seem almost irrational. actually, Italian royal navy’s plans received a hard blow as the russians, in the middle of the contest, swiftly severed their oil supply from the Black Sea by pleading «technical dif-ficulties»(50). mussolini’s consent to ciano’s diplomatic manoeuvres acquires, therefore, its true meaning if we read it as a deliberate attempt to validate in the eyes of the allies his role of «honest mediator» and, on the other hand, by remaining Hitler’s guarantee for fair peace negotiations, to compel the Germans to consider his proposals. His distancing from Berlin was, in this perspective, only the first step in this tactic since his embryonic economic negotiations with the allies were followed by more explicit signals towards paris and London.

In a conversation with françois-poncet, french ambassador in rome, by retracing for him the main themes of mussolini’s speech of the 23rd october, Giovanni Battista Guarnaschelli, Palazzo Chigi’s General director and ciano’s close collaborator, pointed out how the Soviet invasion of poland, left without

Speak of War and Prepare for Peace: Rome, 10 June 1940 1003

(51) ddf 1939, doc. 195, p. 337.(52) ddf 1939, doc. 197, pp. 341-343.(53) ddf 1939, doc. 397, pp. 799-802.

response, had struck a moral blow on the legitimacy of the allied war aims(51). The allies would have to take this fact properly into account and to express their readiness for immediate peace talks. furthermore, a general agreement by the four main european powers, followed by a disarmament process, would best satisfy the Italians since, Guarnaschelli continued, «il s’agit d’une lutte entre deux hégémonie: l’anglaise et l’allemande. nous n’avons rien à gagner au triomphe de l’angleterre […]. Le triomphe absolu de l’allemagne ne serait pas davantage souhaitable; car l’Italie se rend bien compte que son rôle en europe serait diminué dans une mesure considérable». an Italian volte-face as in 1915 was, on the other hand, inconceivable. although Italy did not intend «de profiter de [l’embarras alliée] pour négocier avec vous en vous mettant […] le coteau sur la gorge», rome preferred to await the end of the hostilities to settle her relationship with the allies. around the same time in paris, Giuliano capranica del Grillo, counsellor of the Italian embassy, in a confidential talk with a leading figure of the Quai d’Orsay, repeated more or less the same arguments adding how the nazi-Soviet partition of poland had upset mussolini who, on his part, «n’a aucun intérêt de voir le bolchevisme s’installer au cœur de l’europe»(52). The allied recognition of Italian interests and prestige might constitute the groundwork for further entente it being evident that, capranica added, «un accord général entre le puissances occidentales pour préserver la civilisation eu-ropéenne et leur intérêts vitaux sarait désirable». In this perspective, he argued, the duce saw the restoration of a polish state as an element of equilibrium in the european balance of powers and as a bulwark against the communism. on the 6th december, while the anti-russian tone in the Italian foreign policy was reaching the peak, mussolini himself joined the chorus in a conversation with a prominent french journalist «secretly» summoned to Palazzo Venezia for a personal interview. as françois-poncet wrote two days later, in summarising to daladier the outcome of the interview, mussolini had reminded how Italy, refusing to join Hitler in his war, «ne conçoit pas une hégémonie allemande sur le continent, pas plus d’ailleurs qu’une hégémonie anglaise»(53). furthermore, france and Italy, although still divided on ideological matters, were on the way of reconciliation as antibolshevism could bring all the civilized nations on the same side. To achieve that result, however, Great Britain had to show by facts «qu’elle n’entend pas nous tenir prisonniers dans notre mer. Il faut à l’Italie

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(54) according to Vatican sources mussolini said the same things to Tacchi-Venturi, ddf 1939, doc. 163, pp. 259-264.

(55) ddf 1939, doc. 432, pp. 883-5.(56) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 347.(57) r. Quartararo, Roma, cit., II, p. 799. See also Tna, fo, 371/24938/r2026/58/22;

r2054/58/22; r2055/58/22; r2239/58/22; r2258/58/22; r2301/58/22.(58) on these approaches that followed those made towards the french see r. Quartararo,

Roma, cit., II, p. 790-797; see also The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945, d. dilks (ed.) London, cassel, 1971, p. 235.

la parité et la liberté. autrement –mussolini concluded- nous resterons isolés et autarciques». Somewhat unofficially(54), with these words mussolini gave another sign of his unequivocal support for ciano’s diplomatic initiatives that in the following days, after his speeches before the chamber and the fascist High council, received further impetus. In another talk with françois-poncet on christmas eve, ciano himself became even more explicit about Italy’s resolve to defend the Balkans from the Bolsheviks(55).

In parallel with these developments, similar approaches were made in eng-land by some members of the Italian embassy and by the newly appointed am-bassador Bastianini himself. His appointment, on the 17th october, had been in itself a gesture of opening toward London as it occurred about several months after the departure of the former ambassador, dino Grandi. furthermore, Bas-tianini was chosen, with mussolini’s consent, personally by ciano with whom he shared his strong anti-German feelings(56). once in office, while the Italian press –inspired by ciano- dredged up the myth of the “mutilated victory”(57), Bastianini managed to give the British clearer hints of the conditions under which the allies could win Italy over, particularly by revising the status of Suez or that of Gibraltar or otherwise by finding a mean to grant Italy a free access to the oceans(58).

In the meanwhile, the tenant of Palazzo Venezia gave another unequivocal proof of his good disposition by personally signing a new agreement about the mutual exchange of military intelligence with London. The contact had started off as a result of the easter agreements, inked on april 1938, and had fol-lowed the ebb and flow of mussolini’s policy towards Britain. from the start of 1939, in fact, the flow and quality of data provided by rome had gone worse in conjunction with the signing of the pact of Steel with Berlin. Since then, the Italians had begun deliberately to exaggerate their strength in Libya and eastern africa reducing the amount of data in their reports. consequently, the British had grown more cautious and reticent in their disclosures. By the middle of

Speak of War and Prepare for Peace: Rome, 10 June 1940 1005

(59) archivio dell’ufficio Storico dello Stato maggiore dell’esercito (Italian army Historical archive, rome, hereafter auSSme), H-9, b. 5.

(60) acS, Ministero della Marina. Gabinetto. 1934-1950, b. 105.(61) acS, Collection of Italian Military Records (1935-1943), T 821, roll. 347.(62) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 377.(63) Hitler e Mussolini. Lettere e documenti, V. Zincone (ed.), milano, rizzoli, 1946, pp. 33-

39. for the text in english, from which the quotations are drawn, see dGfp, d, VIII, doc. n. 504, pp. 604-609.

december 1940, however, mussolini personally decided to invert the course and ordered the signing of a new agreement which was henceforth to be duly executed by providing all the information required by the British regarding the mediterranean and Libyan theatres(59).

It is worthwhile to note, at this point, that the Italian secret service had rebuffed in September, with mussolini’s approval, German suggestions for a deeper and fruitful collaboration. Summoned to munich, the Italian delegates had dodged any request for aid made by canaris frustrating all his efforts to place nazi agents on Italian ships and soil(60). not surprisingly, in the following months, the Abhwer in Italy had to operate underground as if in hostile terri-tory(61). In that atmosphere, as 1939 drew to a close, mussolini prodded his son in law to secretly inform the ambassadors of Belgium and netherlands that the Wehrmacht was actively planning the invasion of their respective countries(62).

4. Bearing in mind all this background, the well-known letter that mussolini wrote to Hitler on January 3, 1940(63), represented a deliberate attempt to put the Reichskanzler before the choice either to carry on down his chosen path of no compromise, with the risk of damaging his relationship with Italy, or to espouse mussolini’s suggestion for a general peace conference.

In his writing, mussolini fully endorsed ciano’s last speech before the fas-cist council that, he said, had represented his «thoughts from the first to the last word». This put an end to the rumours about the alleged ciano’s freedom of action revealing how Italian foreign policy was devised under the inspiration of Palazzo Venezia. mussolini, in effect, criticising the results of the nazi-Soviet entente added that «a further step in [German] relations with moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in Italy». all assurances regarding Italian loyalty to the axis, somewhat obvious as he was compelled to write as Hitler’s ally, did not soften the harshness of mussolini’s remarks and helped to corroborate the main theme of his message, which was built around the need to approach the West for a peaceful solution. as in the previous months, and this time person-ally, mussolini made clear to Hitler that «the creation of a modest, disarmed

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(64) dGfp, d, VIII, doc. 518, pp. 636-640; ddI, IX, III, doc. 64, pp. 45-6; doc. 70, pp. 54-60, and doc. 95, pp. 70-2.

(65) dGfp, d, VIII, doc. 583, p. 717.(66) Sir Percy Loraine’s Mission, cit., pp. 13-15.(67) See the Cabinet Conclusions on the 21st october 1939, in Tna, Records of the Cabinet

Office (hereafter caB), 65/1/55, and the message of Bastianini to ciano, 28 november 1939, in ddI, IX, II, doc. 367, pp. 299-300.

(68) See the Cabinet discussions in Tna, caB 65/57, 65/5/18, 65/5/21, 67/4/21, 65/5/26, 65/5/38. See also, T.c. imlay, A Reassessment of Anglo-french Strategy during the Phony War, 1939-1940, in «The english Historical review», cXIX, n. 481, 2004, pp. 333-372, and a. martini, «Prigionieri nel nostro mare». Il Mediterraneo, gli inglesi e la non belligeranza del «duce» (1939-1940), alessandria, edizioni dell’orso, 2013.

poland […] can no longer constitute any threat to the Greater reich». This, he continued, «would be an element of greater importance which would deprive the big democracies of any justification for continuing the war». unless Hitler had been determined to prosecute the conflict to a finish, mussolini believed that «the creation of a polish state under the German aegis would be an element that would resolve the war and constitute a condition sufficient for the peace». In that case, he concluded, Italy was prepared to constitute a reserve for the reich first «from the political and diplomatic point of view».

not surprisingly, this advice from the World map Hall in Palazzo Venezia provoked harsh responses by ribbentrop, Bodenschatz and Göring who, in a series of animated conversations with the Italians, strongly revealed Berlin’s dissatisfaction(64). That German rappel à l’ordre did not provoke, however, any change in rome’s course. Indeed, on the 29th January, attolico flatly replied to Weizsäcker that mussolini remained firm in his convictions(65).

nevertheless, the orientation of Italian foreign policy turned sharply, few weeks later, following the failure of anglo-Italian economic negotiations. as a further element in her effort to cripple the German economy, on the 1st march, London decided to block all coal ships sailing from Hamburg and rotterdam bound for Italy. as in World War I, the economic blockade was a key element in allied war strategy and, in theory, the disruption of German exports to Italy constituted no exception. only obvious political considerations had delayed that decision until march(66). Then, Britain, announcing the extension of the block-ade, proposed to provide the Italians with all the coal they needed in exchange for agricultural goods and, above all, heavy armaments without restrictions on their use(67). The British move was made both to fathom how far mussolini might compromise in negotiations with the allies and to hasten the German economic collapse(68). This comprehensive agreement, however, was harshly

Speak of War and Prepare for Peace: Rome, 10 June 1940 1007

(69) ddf 1940, doc. 82, pp. 177-180.(70) ddf 1939, doc. 397, pp. 799-802, and doc. 435, pp. 891-896. See also Sir Percy Loraine’s

Mission, cit., p. 13.(71) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 407.(72) Herein, pp. 408-9.

rejected by mussolini who perceived it as a sort of ultimatum. as the french ambassador in rome honestly pointed out(69), the British had misplayed their hand in trying to force the duce «de se ranger sous la tutelle économique de la Grande-Bretagne». acceptance of the offer, françois-poncet reasoned, might have constituted a «pas décisif vers les alliés» destroying any mussolini’s «liberté d’action politique». The collapse of negotiations compelled mussolini to retrace his steps to Berlin where, much to his humiliation, he found Hitler all too eager to offer him the German coal by rail. from that moment, mussolini intensified his pro-German outpourings while the Italian press, shifting its tone, resumed its blatant hostility towards the West.

The reports in the papers and the Duce’s warlike behaviour soon confounded foreign observers and western diplomats as well: the lack of real military prepara-tions following his bellicose, but somewhat erratic, declarations reinforced what had been called the «enigme mussolini»(70). françois-poncet and, to a lesser extent, Loraine flooded their capitals with contrasting reports trying to interpret the mood swings of the deceptive tenant of Palazzo Venezia. His meeting with Hitler at the Brenner pass, on the 18th of march, seemed to confirm beyond doubt his resolve to throw in his lot with nazi Germany while, in time, in rome as in paris and London, the likeliness of Italian intervention appeared progressively dependent on mussolini’s psychological state of mind. The western rulers, assuming to have lost for good any chance, if any, to drag the Duce in the allied camp, soon came to face the dilemma whether to intimidate him by a show of force or to placate him with the promise of further talks. on this path they eventually failed to glimpse the foundation on which his policy, after all, continued to rest.

Before setting off for the Brenner, mussolini had a revealing conversation with ciano about his fake resolve to go to war: «I’ll do as Bertoldo did -he said- he agreed to be hanged on one condition: to let him choose the tree he would like to be hanged from. needless to say he could not find that tree»(71). once before Hitler, mussolini let him speak almost all the time. Then, he reminded him how Italy could not afford a long war and promised to join him in war only when Italian intervention might appear to be decisive. upon his return to rome, mussolini confessed to his son-in-law his uneasiness as well as his regret of not having been able to «speak more and clearly»(72).

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(73) on the point see S. J. rofE, Franklin Roosevelt’s Foreign policy and the Welles Mission, new York, palgrave macmillan, 2007.

(74) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, (hereafter, fruS 1940), Washington, united States Government printing office, 1959, vol. I, General, pp. 21-33.

(75) Herein, p. 102.(76) Herein, p. 104.

more significantly, before departing to meet Hitler, mussolini had had the opportunity to test the West on his apparent change of policy during two rounds of consultations with the american undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, who had been sent in europe to explore the chances of peace(73). as ciano disclosed to Welles during the preliminary meeting, the duce still believed the peace to be within reach(74). The allies, to achieve this, had to yield on many issues from the establishment of two German protectorates over Bohemia and Slovakia to the restitution of German colonies. as in his former suggestions, however, the cornerstone of the peace project rested on the creation of a new polish state to be carved from the German occupied zone. differently from the past, however, this time mussolini underscored how, once the negotiations were underway, Ital-ian demands regarding the internationalisation of Suez or Gibraltar had to be taken into account properly. These declarations were significant as Welles was going to meet with all the belligerents in the following days. during the second meeting with Welles, held on the 16th of march, two days before the Brenner, the Italian dictator was even more explicit. revealing how the German onslaught had to be regarded as imminent, he said that «if he was to have any chances at all in persuading Hitler to postpone the military offensive, he must have some hope to offer him that the allied Governments would not prove completely intransigeant if negotiations were undertaken». Then, mussolini wished to know whether Welles «would authorize him to communicate to Hitler the impression [Welles] had formed with regard to the possibility of a negotiated solution of territorial and political question in europe» reasoning that as soon as «the curse of minority problem» was solved, some form of «federation of greater pow-ers» might be possible(75). for much as these suggestion sounded impractical they were indicative of his true aims as he added, significantly, that «while the German-Italian pact exists, I nevertheless retain complete liberty of action»(76).

How mussolini’s ostensible shift of policy was a mere expedient to frighten the allies into a general compromise, much as he had tried done with Germany by isolating her in the previous months, it was also the opinion of Grandi, the most pro-British figure among fascist leaders. In his memories he recorded how, in the period after the Brenner, «mussolini said and got others to say that “there

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(77) d. GranDi, La fine del regime, f. perfetti (ed.), firenze, Le Lettere, 2005, p. 79.(78) ddI, IX,III, doc.669, pp. 576-9.(79) r. DE fEliCE, Mussolini il duce, cit., II, pp. 776 ss.(80) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., pp. 415-6; m. roatta, Otto milioni, cit., pp. 92-3.(81) acS, Ministero della Marina. Gabinetto. 1934-1950, b. 142.(82) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 427; ddI, IX, IV, doc. 348, pp. 283-4.

won’t be war, but I have to keep the Germans at bay”»(77). furthermore, on the 31st of may, when he laid down the general plan in case of war, on remarking the impossibility of reaching an understanding with the allies the Duce stressed the need to wage a «parallel war» independently from Germany but carefully refrained from setting a precise date(78). as de felice has pointed out, this document was written first for domestic reasons, as a test to probe the resistance of his opponents(79). at all events, all those to whom the plan was addressed, from ciano to the king, appreciated the tone of the writing without interpreting it as a dramatic turning point in mussolini’s policy(80).

at the beginning of may, while françois-poncet was still wondering about the absence of real military preparations in Italy, the Italian-German border continued to be fortified at a hastened pace and the Italian royal navy -at least until the 20th may, well after the German onslaught on france had proven suc-cessful- faithfully went on to provide the British with vital data regarding the deployment of Italian naval units in the mediterranean(81).

5. on the early morning of the 10th may, mussolini awoke to receive the nazi ambassador who handed him the letter in which Hitler announced the un-leashing of the offensive in the West. The Duce’s behaviour, «calm and smiling», well glossed over his embarrassment when he realised of having been informed at the eleventh hour and glimpsed the veiled menaces enclosed in the writing as Hitler underscored how the German offensive was to decide the future of europe and of Italy as well(82). Yet, although the Blitzkrieg had caught him in the middle of his quarrel with the allies, the substance of mussolini’s policy did not change in the following days. In this sense, the whole period between the 10th of may and the 10th of June can be roughly divided in two parts. In the first days, foreseeing a bloody stalemate on the western front, he pressed forward with his war of nerves against the West. Then, as defeat loomed for the allies, mussolini’s pressure increased along with German successes until he thought of the declaration of war as a last resort to embolden the peacemakers in paris and London and to bring them to the peace table before it would be too late to save what remained of the european balance.

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(83) fruS 1940, vol. II, General and Europe, pp. 704-5.(84) Herein, pp. 706.(85) Tna, caB 65/7/21.(86) fruS 1940, vol. II, General and Europe, p. 705.(87) Tna, caB 65/13/24, see also caB 65/7/33.(88) ddI, IX, IV, doc. 462, pp. 376-7.(89) Herein, doc. 589, pp. 462-3.

on the 18th of may, the Duce responded to roosevelt, who had pleaded him to «withhold [his] hand» and «stay wholly apart from any war and refrain from any threat of attack»(83), that «Italy cannot remain absent at a moment in which the fate of europe [was] at stake»(84). all the while, ciano reassured the Yugoslav government that, in case of war, rome would enter the conflict «through the main door»(85) and revealed to foreign diplomats that, henceforth, mussolini «would not see any ambassador»(86). This self-imposed reclusiveness marked a leap forward in his contest of will with the allies, for it was meant to prevent further attempts –of which roosevelt’s last message constituted an example- to “placate” him through promises or half menaces. at the same time, the closure of Palazzo Venezia’s doors to foreign diplomats was an explicit denial of the rumours about ciano’s loyalty as well as an invitation to ponder properly the Italian diplomatic activity. In the following days, in fact, some members of the Italian embassy in London, unofficially but surely on ciano’s behalf, began to inquire whether Britain «should like to see mediation by Italy»(87). Bastianini himself had some contacts with British officials in this sense informing rome that, although the cabinet did its best to display resolve, a sudden collapse could likely occur at short notice(88).

The allies, however, misreading the signals from rome, engaged in a vicious debate about the extent of the concessions necessary to buy the Italian neutral-ity and renewed their pressure on roosevelt for a new personal approach to mussolini. eventually, those initiatives proved disastrous as they occurred after the encirclement of the allies at dunkirk and gave the impression that both the allies were on the verge of capitulation.

In his last conversation with Bastianini on the 25th may, Halifax explicitly referred to the possibility of negotiations adding that «Britain fully recognised the special ties between Italy and Germany» and that Italy «would partake, even if not belligerent, in the future peace conference on equal status with the belligerent powers»(89). Similarly, in asking mussolini to inform him of «the specific desires of Italy», roosevelt granted that if Italy remained neutral and «if an agreement were arrived at, it would involve an assurance to [roosevelt]

Speak of War and Prepare for Peace: Rome, 10 June 1940 1011

(90) fruS 1940, vol. II, General and Europe, p. 711.(91) ddI, IX, IV, doc. 500, pp. 399-400.(92) fruS 1940, vol. II, General and Europe, p. 712.(93) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 435.(94) Tna, caB 65/7/41.(95) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 346 and Sir Percy Loraine’s Mission, cit., p. 21.(96) G. Ciano, Diario, cit., p. 438, ddf 1940, doc. 354, pp. 740-1; see also Actes et Documents

du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, p. Blet, a. martini, B. Schneider (eds.), vol. I, Le Saint Siège et la Guerre en Europe, Mars 1939 - Août 1940, Vatican, Libreria editrice Vaticana, 1970, doc. 332, pp. 471-2.

(97) ddf 1940, doc. 354, pp. 740-1.(98) L’attitude italienne depuis le 21 mars 1940, paris 3 July 1940, ddf 1940, doc. 358, pp.

748-5.

by the french and British Governments that such agreement would faithfully executed by them at the end of the war and that those Governments would welcome Italian participation at any peace conference with a status equal to that of the belligerents»(90). apart from being unpractical, these approaches to obtain the neutrality of Italy could not have the same impact they would have had only few weeks before. The worsening of the allied position, in fact, now prevented mussolini from acting as mediator while the Germans were gaining the upper hand on the battlefield. Palazzo Venezia knew well that an offer of mediation made to Spain by the Quai d’Orsay, on the 20th of may, had been flatly refused by franco who, in those conditions, had ruled out any chance of agreement bello durante(91).

To evoke before him the possibility of negotiations and to plead for his neutrality, in a moment in which he could not propose the long-sought peace conference by himself, constituted a grave misunderstanding of mussolini’s psy-chology. The only route that seemed open to him was then to give the allies’ dwindling will to fight the final blow. With this task in mind, in the morning of the 27th may, ciano said to the american ambassador that «he could not tell [him] precisely when Italy would enter the war; it will not be possible for a few days and it might not be for a few weeks» but he said that «it will hap-pen soon»(92). The day after(93), the head of Palazzo Chigi repeated the same words to Loraine adding that, in doing so, he was keeping «his promise of fair warning»(94) as Loraine had requested him to do at the beginning of non-belligerency(95). Within hours, ciano completed the manoeuvre with françois-poncet and the nuncio of the Holy See by stressing that mussolini’s decision was «irrevocable»(96). as the french pointed out, the allies stood therefore «en présence d’une declaration de guerre à terme»(97), which was a «fait sans précédent dans l’histoire»(98).

Emilio Gin1012

(99) fruS 1940, vol. II, General and Europe, p. 715.(100) Diario storico del Comando Supremo, cit., p. 224.(101) See, for example, Il Dossier Hitler, H. eberle, m. uhl (eds.), Torino, uTeT, 2005, pp.

89-91, and the memoirs of the Italian ambassador d. alfiEri, Due dittatori di fronte, milano, rizzoli, 1948, pp. 43-7.

(102) Diario storico del Comando Supremo, cit., p. 224.(103) f. anfuSo, Roma Berlino Salò, milano, Garzanti, 1950, p. 153.

It was not a chivalrous gesture. This odd choice to forewarn his enemies well in advance becomes clear, evidently, only if we bear in mind the strictly political consequences which that declaration had to produce, in mussolini’s calculations, within the western political circles. on the 1st June, skirmishing with phillips, who was manifesting roosevelt’s disappointment, ciano assured him on mussolini’s behalf that the declaration of war did not mean an extension of hostilities in the mediterranean(99). mussolini himself, on the other hand, said to Badoglio on the eve of war: «I invent nothing new. I’ll do as the Germans and the french have done, who stood face to face doing nothing for six months»(100).

Those declarations help understand more clearly how, ruling out any active involvement of the Italian armed forces, the Duce relied on the psychological and political effects of his intervention to win over the allies. any further harm to them, in effect, would have benefited only Hitler who, on his part, grew colder towards the Italians as his panzer divisions were gaining ground in france(101). consequently, in parallel with ciano’s diplomatic moves, mussolini modified the general plan by stressing the need to maintain a strictly defensive posture on all the fronts. This meant that any offensive against the allies was ruled out. The navy was forbidden to voluntarily engage enemy task forces or to carry out minelaying operations around enemy ports. The air force was prohibited from striking at enemy airbases and even from flying reconnaissance missions. for fear of incidents, Italian aircraft were prohibited from getting any closer to the french border than ten kilometres. only submarines were allowed to make attacks of opportunity as a demonstrative act, while the Regia Aeronautica, scrapping its plans to strike alexandria and Gibraltar, had to carry out a feeble airstrike on malta on the first morning of the war(102).

Had Hitler been able to attend the meetings between mussolini and his generals he surely would have roared in one of his uncontrolled bursts of anger. Indeed, the fear of German vengeance had been among the reasons that spurred the Duce into action. as he reasoned with ciano and anfuso on the 26th of may «We cannot –he said slowly articulating the words- draw ourselves away. after france it may be our turn: to find ourselves on the anvil after having signed the so-called pact of Steel, that would take the biscuit!»(103).

Speak of War and Prepare for Peace: Rome, 10 June 1940 1013

(104) a. roBErtS, ‘The Holy Fox’. The Life of Lord Halifax, London, phoenix, 1997, pp. 210 ff.

The meltdown of the european balance of power, made predictable by the fury of the Blitzkrieg, combined with mussolini’s long desire to dominate the political arena by playing the role of a mediator and compelled him to break his non-belligerency in that late spring of 1940 in the hope that a formal –and fake- declaration of war would open the gates of peace. In the end, it was a fatal blunder since Britain proved to be more resilient than france as churchill, in resisting the temptation to probe for peace before testing Britain’s defence preparedness to repel invasion, managed to isolate Halifax and consolidate the cabinet behind him( 104). few hours after the Duce’s speech from his balcony in Piazza Venezia, the first squadrons of the royal air force took off from Britain for their first air strike on Turin of the Second World War.

Emilio Gin

università degli Studi di Salerno

Further expanding an analysis previously made by the same author, this essay addresses the nine months of Mussolini’s «non-belligerency» and adds new evidence on the factors that influenced Mussolini’s decision to join Hitler in the war on 10 June 1940. In particular, the article provides an insight into the efforts made by Mussolini to differentiate his position from that of Germany and to validate himself as a reliable mediator for peace negotiations. Having failed to achieve this during the first half of the non-belligerency, Mussolini apparently reverted to a policy of solidarity with Berlin. Then, as defeat loomed for the Allies, Mussolini’s pressure increased along with German successes until he thought of the declaration of war as a last resort to embolden the peacemakers in Paris and London and to bring them to the peace table to save what remained of the European balance.

kEyWORDS

Mussolini’s «non-belligerency»Peace negotiations, 1939-40World War Two