Marcin Chrusciel, Margaux Clausse, Samantha Lisik

SOME POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF “SOUTH-EASTERN

EUROPEANISATION” ON THE EXAMPLE OF CROATIA AND SERBIA

I. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to analyse Europeanisation of two Balkan countries –

Croatia and Serbia from political and social perspective. In order to conduct such an analysis

it is indispensible to throw a little light on the phenomenon of Europeanisation. Since there is

no common understanding of the present notion in scholarly debate, it can be defined in many

different ways. Nevertheless, the majority of definitions recognise the dynamic nature of

Europeanisation and perceive it as a way of spreading European norms, values and

institutional model(s) on national politics, domestic structures and local attitudes1. In

a general understanding, the process of Europeanisation is identified as an externally driven

change in national and regional discourse which is brought by the actors operating at the

European level. To enumerate some of them, one can give an example of the EU, OSCE,

EFTA or the Council of Europe.

“Most definitions of Europeanisation place the European Union at the centre of the debate,

since the EU has given to it a more systematic, concrete, and structured meaning – so much so

that at times Europeanisation is viewed strictly as ‘EU-isation’”2

However, the authors of the present paper intend to go beyond such an institutional

approach and draw some attention to the informal way of spreading European rules, norms

and values. For this reason our understanding of Europeanisation will be narrowed down to

political and socio-cultural dimension, perceiving it as an identity formation project, what

does not assume analytical rejection of institutional perspective since all of them are strongly

connected and interdependent. Another clarification, which has to be made at the beginning of

this paper, is a geographical approach towards Europeanisation. The process of construction,

1 P. Mair, 'The Europeanization Dimension', Journal of European Public Policy 11, 2004, p. 341,

K. Featherstone, 'Introduction: In the Name of 'Europe'', (in:) K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (eds) The

Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, p. 7, M. P. Vink, 'What is Europeani-

sation? and other questions on a new research agenda', European Political Science 3(1) 2003, p. 63.

2 O. Anastasakis, “The Europeanization of the Balkans”, Brown Journal of World Affairs v. XII 2005, p. 78.

2

diffusion and implementation of formal and informal European norms3 acquires different

meaning in the different countries and regions that are under its influence. In the case of

economically less developed countries it is identified rather with modernisation process; for

the more advanced and richer countries an accent is put on a smooth and stable adjustment

and reform4. Such division in the meaning of Europeanisation needs to be taken into account

in the following paper as two Balkan countries, Croatia and Serbia, will be discussed. Both of

them could be defined as examples of less developed countries (comparing to European

average), what might have a crucial influence on the nature of their expectations towards

Europeanisation. The results of surveys and opinion polls conducted on Croatian and Serbian

societies will be presented in the further part of this paper. However the analytical work is

based mainly upon social moods and expectations towards European integration process, one

cannot neglect the fact that Europeanisation of these two Balkan countries has its roots

beyond the European Union as well. Irrespectively of whether the EU is treated as the main

engine of European convergence and transition processes5. At the same time, it is necessary to

acknowledge the high level of differentiation in economic, political, cultural, and strategic

interests among particular Balkan countries. Croatia and Serbia represent diverse and very

often contrasting models of development, which influence to some extent their approach

towards EU integration and Europeanisation as such; Croatia will become one of the member

states in the foreseeable future (1 July 2013) whereas Serbia is still negotiating its candidate

status6. The aim of this paper is to analyse these differences from the socio-political point of

view. Special attention will be drawn to the role of civil society actors in internalising

European norms and values in national context. In order to analyse and compare the social

and political aspects of Europeanisation in Croatia and Serbia three indicators will be

presented: (i) the condition of civil society, (ii) outcomes of national elections / association of

national parties with European political groups, (iii) the level of European identity among

society. Simultaneously, the authors are willing to answer the question about possible

existence of the South-Eastern model of Europeanisation, as a common denominator of

Europeanisation in the Balkans region.

3 C. M. Radaelli, “Europeanization: Solution or Problem?”, [in:] Palgrave Advances in European Union

Studies, M. Cini and A. Bourne (eds), Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills – New York 2006, p. 58

4 O. Anastasakis, op. cit., p. 78

5 Ibidem, p. 79.

6 European Union leaders have granted Serbia “candidate status” at a summit in Brussels on 1 March 2012.

3

II. “South Eastern style of Europeanisation” – a theoretical approach

There is a predisposition in scholarly debate to identify the Balkans with the pejorative

notion of Balkanisation. In a common understanding the process of Balkanisation consists of

instability, fragmentation, and division into smaller ethnically homogenous entitles that

usually leads to ethnic conflicts within multicultural states. At first the notion was formulated

to describe ethnic and political fragmentation which occurred in the Balkans at the end of

World War I and after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Nowadays, it refers to the

fragmentation of multiethnic states not only in the Balkans, but all over the world, and is

commonly used in opposition to integration or unification processes. Irrespectively of such

a negative connotation, the Balkans are perceived as an important part of Europe which is still

lacking political, social and economic integration with the rest of the continent. Such an

inclusive approach towards the region is represented mainly by the EU which aims to bring it

back into European structures. As a result of EU enlargement policy particular Balkan

countries perceive Europeanisation as an adjustment to the western model which guarantees

security and prosperity for the future. The same expectations towards closer integration with

European structures and common history of the region – for centuries influenced by external

actors – give grounds to distinguish “South Eastern style of Europeanisation”. Othon

Anastasakis proposed this term7 in order to emphasise the specific nature of the Balkans’

Europeanisation in comparison to three different regional schemes of becoming more

European: “Europeanisation, Western style”, “Europeanisation, Eastern style” and “Europe-

anisation, Southern style”. To understand this specific nature clearly, a closer look on

particular models will be presented.

“Europeanisation, Western style” includes processes which took place in post-Second

World War Western Europe. It was linked with development and changes in the European

Communities and adaptive capabilities of its member states. What is characteristic for

“Europeanisation, Eastern style” is the transition to democracy and market economy as well

as adaptation to the exigencies of the West. “Europeanisation, Southern style” is associated

with the impact of the European Union and advanced capitalist Europe on the late-developing

countries – Greece, Portugal and Spain. Consolidation of democracies, the adaptation of

pluralist norms and practices through socialisation and intensive engagement with EU

7 O. Anastasakis, op. cit., p. 80.

4

procedures and systems are the main characteristics for this model8. In the context of South-

Eastern Europe, a region of contrasting levels of development, geographies, cultures, and

strategic interests, the term Europeanisation gains a new meaning. Balkan countries, including

Croatia and Serbia, face a complicated, long and hard struggle, as they are still recovering

from ethnic wars and extreme nationalism. As Othon Anastasakis says, Europeanisation in the

Balkans is a much more traumatic experience than earlier experiences of Europeanisation in

Central and Eastern Europe. For the Balkans, it is not only a process of adjustment to

advanced western models or a guarantee of security and prosperity for the future, but also

a significant catalyst for democratisation of the region. Democratisation which is defined not

only in terms of institutional harmonisation to democratic norms and procedures, but which

brings a positive impact on political culture and strengthens active forms of participation in

political life as well. These indirect results of democratisation are especially needed in the

case of the Balkans, as a region that has been ruled by external actors throughout the history,

usually in an autocratic or totalitarian way. The lack of democratic traditions in the region is

recognised by Anastasakis as a common feature of South Eastern Europeanisation (SEE)9. It

provides grounds to define three additional characteristics of SEE and perceive it as an

(i) externally driven, (ii) asymmetric, and (iii) increasingly demanding process.

2.1. SEE as an externally driven process

Most of the Balkan countries are accustomed to being influenced or ruled by external

actors, from the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires, through Nazi and fascist

occupation, to Soviet domination. The European Union is the first external actor in the

region’s history which can be recognised as a democratic force offering economic prosperity,

grounds for independent civil society or increased international recognition10

. At the same

time it does not assume subordination and is based on voluntary cooperation. In this context,

the external character of South Eastern Europeanisation refers to the voluntary interaction

between international or EU agents and regional and local actors. Nevertheless, the majority

of Balkan countries, as non-members of the EU, have a weak influence on the content,

agenda, and direction of the main stream of Europeanisation. This weakness is especially

visible when comparing the Balkan region to the Central European and Baltic countries, plus

8 Ibidem, p. 79.

9 O. Anastasakis, op. cit., p. 80.

10 Ibidem, p. 81.

5

Bulgaria and Romania (new members of the EU), who after the accession respectively in

2004 and 2007 became more engaged in EU internal processes. The election of Jerzy Buzek,

the first president of the European Parliament coming from a new member state, could be

a symbolic confirmation thereof. From the perspective of EU membership, South Eastern

style of Europeanisation remains largely one-way process with a dominant position of the EU

as an agenda-setting body:

“(..) the EU acts as the main generator of change and reform, offering models and guidelines,

supplying financial assistance for reconstruction, development, and transition, and imposing

the criteria and conditions of change”11

.

The conditions required by the EU correspond strictly to the accession criteria which

were introduced at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the Madrid European

Council in 1995. They cover three main areas: political, economic, and legal one. The first

group assumes stable system of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, regard

for human rights and protection of minorities. The second group of criteria involves the

existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure

and market forces within the European Union. The last group concerns the acceptance of

acquis communautaire and ability to fulfil the obligations of membership, including adher-

ence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. However, one cannot overlook

the fact that the process of implementation and adaptation to the above mentioned criteria

depends strongly upon national and regional capacities. From this perspective Europeani-

sation could be perceived as an adaptation of European norms and values with national

colours. Its success (or not) depends strongly on national capacity for administrative and

political reforms, which demands some level of institutional compatibility with European

requirements, as well as public support for the change. The example of public support towards

the implementation of European norms and values in Serbia and Croatia will be analysed in

the second part of this paper. Such comparison will be conducted to measure the real impact

of social moods and expectations on Europeanisation of the Balkans.

2.2. SEE as an asymmetric and coercive process

The second feature of the so-called “South Eastern style Europeanisation” is the

asymmetrical relation between the EU and its Balkan partners. The EU dominates over the

11

Ibidem, p. 81.

6

Balkans not only in terms of its economic potential, but also in terms of political meaning.

Irrespectively of the reconciliation process, the region remains strongly divided so that

cultural and ethnic differences still have a strong impact on bilateral relations. Complicated

and tense relations between Croatia and Serbia are only one example. These animosities

existing in the Balkans lead to the situation where a common and coherent regional interest

cannot be formulated. As a result, particular Balkan countries speak in many voices, whereas

their aim in foreign policy agenda remains the same: closer integration with the EU. The lack

of a coherent approach towards the EU strengthens its domination over the region. In fact, it

dictates the rules of mutual relations and the Balkan countries have inadequate power or no

capabilities to affect those rules. In order to describe and explain this inequality Othon

Anastasakis enumerates three reasons of such a state of affairs12

.

Firstly, what have been mentioned above, the majority of Balkan countries are not EU

members or their position on the way to membership differs from one another13

. Therefore

their capacity to affect the Community norms and procedures is non-existent: “(…) the

candidate countries wishing to join the EU have no say over the rules of accession; they

merely have to abide by them”14

. In the case of the Balkans this impotence is even more

visible since countries from the region are missing any realistic alternatives of external policy

– ties with NATO are more strategic and concern rather military security, the turn towards

Russia is limited by bad connotations and negative experiences of the Soviet domination. It

leads to the situation in which countries from South Eastern Europe are almost doomed to

closer integration with the EU and European structures. This dependency undermines the idea

of voluntary and spontaneous cooperation with the EU based on equal terms. Anastasakis

suggests that the initial position of the Balkan countries in the EU integration process is

largely passive, since they have no counter-arguments in negotiations with European leaders.

The lack of an active participation in the pre-accession period, which is limited to the rules

and requirements, gives an impression that the turn towards European structures is rather an

inevitable move than a fully aware choice.

12

Ibidem, pp. 81-82.

13 Accession of Croatia to the EU is expected to take place on 1 July 2013. Serbia received a full candidate

status on 1 March 2012.

14 O. Anastasakis, op. cit., p. 81.

7

Secondly, the asymmetry in the EU-Balkans’ relationship is caused by a weak position

of political elites at the national level among Balkan countries. A long experience of external

influence has led to the situation where local politics are overwhelming central authorities

which are largely identified with corruption or collaboration. This dependency syndrome is

noticeable also from the economic point of view – the unstable and feeble economic situation

in the Balkans makes them dependent upon financial aid and investments from the West. The

European Partnership with the Western Balkan countries15

, established by the EU in 2003,

could be recognised as a very powerful mechanism of financial influence. However, the logic

of its action reminds an one-way patronising process: “The EU uses a combination of carrots,

sticks, and the promise of eventual membership to bring these countries closer to Europe”16

.

Such a straightforward interpretation of the EU’s financial influence on the Balkans,

presented by Anastasakis, places it in an inglorious position. By using its financial potential to

attract less developed countries, the EU resembles to some extent an economic blackmailer.

The EU funds, such as the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IAP), are oriented towards

the implementation of European principles, priorities and conditions that very often depart

from the real needs of the region. The lack of political elites at the national level, which enjoy

a strong social legitimisation, could be identified as one of such an urgent need. However, the

majority of European funds in the region concern rather economy than democracy building.

As a result, the Europeanisation of the Balkans is perceived mainly as a modernisation or

a development process.

Thirdly, apart from the internal weakness of the region, the EU has another powerful

instrument of control at its disposal – conditionality. However it could be applicable to the

EU’s relations with all candidate or partnership countries, it gains specific meaning in the case

of the Balkans. EU conditions towards this region concern not only political and economic

requirements of Copenhagen criteria or the Association Agreements. They refer also to peace

accords and compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Abiding by its rules signifies justice, recognition of past crimes, and reconciliation between

former enemies and different ethnic communities17

. These requirements have to be met in

15

Partnership with the Western Balkans embrace: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (including Kosovo). Croatia benefits from its own accession

partnership.

16 O. Anastasakis, op. cit., p. 83.

17 Ibidem, p. 83.

8

order to apply for a financial assistance and to take part in the EU integration process. From

this perspective, the EU is perceived as a main power to determine the direction and nature of

Europeanisation in the Balkans. Partly because it is able to influence internal policies of most

South-eastern European states (especially Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) by super-

vising the reconciliation process and preventing from the recurrence of national extremism.

This additional dependence upon the EU in particular, and upon the international

community in general, is rightly pointed out by Anastasakis as another difference between the

Balkans and the other regions. This distinction is especially visible in comparison with the

Central-eastern European countries (the new member states), which had a more symmetrical

relation with the EU on their road to the accession. They were able to put forward some

demands or claims in the negotiation process since they were gathered in regional alliances,

like the Visegrád Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) or the Baltic

Assembly (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). These organisations were established to find a com-

mon position in relation to international issues, and to further their European integration. The

example of the Balkans proves that without such a regional cooperation or a sufficient degree

of political and economic independence, it is impossible to maintain symmetrical relations

with a powerful external actor, such as the EU.

2.3. SEE as an increasingly demanding agenda

The last element of Europeanisation in South Eastern Europe is the increasingly

demanding integration agenda. The agenda is widening because it encompasses a long and

historical process of European integration which consists of more and more rules, regulations

and international agreements. The gradual development and specification of the acquis

communautaire is still proceeded. This creates a situation where the Balkan countries need to

adapt their capacities to a moving target which is respectively more difficult to be reached.

Moreover, the agenda of Europeanisation in the Balkans includes much more particular cases

than it was observed on the example of previous enlargements. It encompasses security and

peace-building issues, border questions, reconstruction and development (economic and social

one), post-communist transition, and finally a strict association agenda18

. Never before, in any

other region, this process has been so complicated and overwhelming. However, the EU is

18

O. Anastasakis, “The Western Balkans; The EU's unfinished business” (Paper presented at the METU

Conference "Europe in a Changing World," Ankara: 2004).

9

obliged to legitimise and stick by designated agenda in order to protect and strengthen its

political and economic accomplishments.

The characteristics of “Europeanisation, South Eastern style” are at the first glance

very similar to those in Central and Eastern Europe. A closer look enables to see differences

between these two regions. What differentiates them is the weaker position of the former in

relation to the international community. This disadvantaged position is the result of unde-

veloped political economy which limits the abilities of local actors to induce reform and

integration. The Europeanisation process in the Balkan area is additionally weakened by

ineffective, corrupted and illegitimate political elites, limited human capital, anaemic public

administrations and fragile civil societies which are too dependent upon changes generated

abroad. With a combination to the complexity and diversity of the Europeanisation agenda,

these disadvantages weaken positive effects of European influence on the Balkans. In order to

assess the real impact of social and political dimensions on the effectiveness of “South

Eastern Europeanisation”, the case study of Croatia and Serbia will be presented.

III. The case study of Croatia and Serbia

3.1. Opinion of people about the European identity

The first indicator of the informal Europeanisation in Serbia and Croatia, that we will

take into consideration, is the behaviour and feeling of both populations towards the EU and

the European citizenship. It might be seen as an informal social aspect of Europeanisation,

that is why our hypothesis is that Croatians feel more attached to the EU than Serbs do.

3.1.1 The European feeling among Croatian and Serbian societies

In the case of Serbia our analysis will be based on regular governmental surveys titled

European Orientation of the Citizens of the Republic of Serbia – Trends, which are published

every six months by the Serbian European Integration Office19

.

At first, we would like to remark that when the following question is considered: “If a

referendum were to be organised tomorrow asking »Do you support the accession of our

country to the European Union?« how would you vote?”, 53% of the Serbian people, in June

19

European Orientation of the Citizens of the Republic of Serbia – Trends, Republic of Serbia Government,

European Integration Office, July 2011, available at: http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/

nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/opinion_poll_june_2011.pdf, date: June 28, 2012.

10

2011, answered they would vote for it, whereas only 24% would vote against. These are the

latest statistics related to this topic. However, at this point it is necessary to analyse the trends

that have been shaping the Serbian opinion over the past ten years. When calculating the

average rate, it is visible that the attitude of the Serbian people towards EU membership is

worsening: the average rate of favourable votes from September 2002 to December 2010 has

been close to 65%, whereas recently it has decreased to 53%. Another important element of

the same question shows that from 2002 to 2010 the average of people who would not

participate in the referendum amounted to 15%, when in June 2011 there were already 19% of

abstentionists. The number of people who would be against the law raised from the average

rate of 15,7% to 19% in 2011. When it comes to the feeling of European identity and personal

description as a citizen of Europe, it may be noticed that Serbian people have not yet reached

this stage. In response to the question: “When reflecting on yourself, do you feel mostly like

a...”, 45% of the interrogated people selected “citizen of Serbia” and only 7% answered

“citizen of Europe” (June 2011). One can precise that other majority choices were adhering to

regional or religious identities (see Graph 1).

Graph 1. Ways of identification in Serbian society.

Source: European Orientation of the Citizens of the Republic of Serbia – Trends, July 2011.

In order to compare these information and trends with the Croatian case, we will use

the Eurobarometer which collects national and global surveys concerning European issues. In

this logic, one can remark that Croatian people are more attached to the European identity and

11

are even closer to it than the average rate of the whole EU. In order to understand the relation

between Croatians and their European identity one can quote the question: “Do you ever think

of yourself as not only (nationality), but also European? Does it happen often, sometimes or

never?”, asked in September 2006. In response to this question 61% of Croatians answered

positively (22% for “often” and 39% for “sometimes”), whereas 36% said “never”20

. A

related question asked in October 2005 was “In the near future do you see yourself as...?”.

32% mentioned only the nationality, 60% said Nationality and European, when 5% preferred

European and Nationality. We should underline that a significant majority of Croatians

(between 60 and 65%) takes the European identity under serious consideration21

. What is

more, all statistics are overwhelming the European average rates for the same questions.

At this point one can underline the difference between both populations when it comes

to the spread of European identity in these societies, irrespectively that both of them are

supporting the integration of their country with the EU. It can be explained by the fact that

Croatian elites were actively engaged in spreading European values and norms over their

population, and in making these rules convergent with the Croatian ones. These elements are

stressing the fact that Croatia is trying to distinguish itself from the former Yugoslavian

values and trends in order to be considered as an independent and different case than other

Balkan countries, with difficulties to fulfil European requirements.

3.2. The political parties, their programmes and values

The following indicator is related to some political aspects of Europeanisation in

Serbia and Croatia, studying the main political parties in both countries through their

trajectories and attitudes towards the EU and their values and programmes.

3.2.1. The political scene in Serbia hampered down by nationalist priorities

The Serbian Progressive Party (SPP), which won the last presidential elections, is

officially pro-European, but at the same time strongly supports cooperation with Russia. For

instance, the participation of Nikolic (the President of the party) in the Congress of United

20

Eurobarometer 66 - Public Opinion in the European Union, the Directorate General Communication,

September 2007, p. 113, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf, date:

June 28, 2012.

21 Eurobarometre 64 - l’Opinion Publique dans l’Union Europeenne, the Directorate General Communication,

June 2006, p. 50, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_fr.pdf, date: June

29, 2012.

12

Russia in November 2011 has been stressed by the party members as being crucial for Serbia

and the Progressive Party. The officials of the Party have underlined the fact that they were

the single Serbian entity to enter this meeting and claimed their willingness to strengthen

cooperation with the Russian Federation in economic and political terms. Nikolic clearly

affirms his will to join the EU and to fulfil its requirements: “We want the reconstruction of

the state in the legal field in accordance with EU standards”, but sharply opposes giving up

Kosovo or joining NATO: “We have a very sharp demand: if the precondition for EU

membership is our rejection of Kosovo, we will suspend all negotiations at the very

moment”22

. This statement clearly shows the priority of the Party for saving Serbian interests,

whatever the consequences will be on the EU integration process. SPP presents the defence of

national territory as the first tackled issue in its programme, as well as the protection of

Serbian people living abroad (in Montenegro and the Republic of Srpska). Their aim to create

the united Serbian state, including Serbia and the Republic of Srpska, may be seen as a strong

nationalist trend threatening the current borders, enacted by the Dayton agreement in 1995.

This point could be problematic in regard to criteria imposed by the EU, which is to respect

borders of the nowadays Europe and to adopt peaceful behaviours towards neighbouring

countries. If we exclude these two articles of the SPP programme, the Party backs up the

values of the EU and the Western world, claiming for social justice, democracy, and

a prospering open-market economy. SPP furthermore underlines the importance of the fight

against corruption and crime, simultaneously it wants a deeper respect to the rule of law and

the Constitution23

.

The second important party in Serbia is the pro-European Social Democratic Party of

Serbia (SDP), led by Boris Tadic. SDP supports a more qualified idea about EU integration

and the Kosovo issue, what can be recognised in the declaration by Tadic: “(...) people who

propose to give up EU integration to save Kosovo have to know that Serbia acting in such a

way would lose all its national interests in Kosovo”24

. From this point of view Tadic promotes

22

Bojic Z., We want Serbia as a supporter of Russia in the EU, Beta News Agency, Moscow 03.02.2012,

available at: http://www.sns.org.rs/%D1%81%D1%80/eng/4061--srpska-napredna-stranka-news.html, date:

June 29, 2012.

23

Programme of Serbian Progressive Party, available at: http://www.sns.org.rs/%D1%81%D1%80/important-

documents/3584-program-of-serbian-progressive-party.html, date: June 29, 2012.

24

Tadic: Hold on, no crisis lasts forever, Belgrade 30.12.2011, available at: http://www.tanjug.rs/news/28674/

tadic--hold-on--no-crisis-lasts-forever.htm, date: June 29, 2012.

13

a solution respecting both Serbian and Kosovo interests in order to not suspend the integration

process. An approach that one can define as closer to the EU guidelines and less sharp than

the SPP’s one. However, an agreement signed on 24 February 2012 between Kosovo and

Serbia, allowing the former to take a seat in each international Balkan meeting without being

recognised as an independent state by Serbia, took place when Serbia was under the rule of

Tadic. The principal values of SDP are the same as in other moderate European parties, such

as tolerance, freedom, political and judiciary equality or social justice25

. As a part of the

global trend, the Europeanisation of Serbian political parties has speeded up during the last

decade, since the SDP became an associated member of the Party of European Socialists in

2006, and since three different Serbian parties are also linked to the European People's Party

(G+17, Democratic Party of Serbia). Besides these formal agreements, they seem to adopt

slowly to the values and priorities defended by the EU in their official discourses and

programmes. However, we should consider their deep acceptance of these values, whilst it is

noticeable that they are still not ready to find an agreement concerning Kosovo, except for the

SDP which has recently launched a beginning of cooperation. To some extent, the domestic

political competition cannot be analysed in the light of Europeanisation if it is to be realised

that the three parties, linked to the European People's Party, took part in three different

coalitions during the elections in 2008. Therefore, it is obvious that presently European values

are not shaping the Serbian political life.

3.2.2. Croatian political landscape less contradictory to European standards

In the case of Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Social

Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), as the two main political parties in the country, were

taken under consideration. To begin with, we can precise that both are respectively members

of European parties, the first belongs to the EPP, the second to the EPS. Moreover, two other

minor Croatian parties are linked to the European People's Party. The debate on Europeani-

sation of Croatian political parties cannot be analysed in the same light as the Serbian one,

because of different levels of advancement in the EU integration. According to Marko Stojic,

only one single party is against Croatia’s integration with the EU – Croatian Party of Rights –

whereas several Serbian parties have clearly declared themselves against it26

. There is

25

Political Programme of Social Democratic Party of Serbia, available at: http://www.sdpsrbije.org.rs/english_

program/, date: June 29, 2012.

26 Stojic M., Ideology and nature of Serbian and Croatian political parties' attitudes towards the EU, Sussex

European Institute, April 2012, p.18.

14

a common consensus about the idea to become a part of the EU in Croatia. One of the striking

element in HDZ’s programme is the support and attention paid to sustainable development

and protection of the environment, which cannot be found in the programmes of Serbian

parties. The state trying to consolidate its democracy will not be able to focus on some

environmental aspects and policies, which can be the case of Serbia, who is not a post-

industrial state yet. However, one cannot confirm that Croatia finished to build its democracy

(as we cannot say that consolidating democracy is an ending process), but these dimensions of

its policies underline the fact, that Croatia does not need to focus as much as Serbia on

corruption or external borders. The quality of life is also a part of European discourse, as the

treatment of water or the recycling of waste, and the protection of national culture and

architecture are seen in Croatia rather as a wealth than as a nationalist aim. Moreover, the

HDZ brings up the issue of gender equality which is nowadays a topic highly debated in

Western European democracies, and what is not included in Serbian political parties agenda.

3.2.3. A deep instability of both party systems: the need of strong roots

From a general point of view, Marko Stojic does not find significant differences

between Croatia and Serbia when it comes to their behaviour towards the EU. His main

thought is that pragmatism and self-interests are leading these political parties instead of

strong ideologies, since some of the most important parties switched their support towards

the EU, like HDZ, the Socialist Party of Serbia or the leader of SPP – Nikolic. Stojic points

out a lack of institutionalisation of Serbian and Croatian parties, as leaders are changing their

belonging and parties, like the SDP, move from the centre-right position to the left one27

.

These incoherent behaviours are linked to the dominating vote-seeking strategy that leads to

several contradictions between economic and political stands, taken mainly by Serbian parties

which show their lack of identity and stability. Furthermore, we can remark some unequal

support towards the EU even among the same political family, as for instance the

conservatives in Serbia. This proves unstable political and ideological logics. The lack of

institutionalisation of the party system in Croatia, and in Serbia above all, underlines the close

link existing between democratisation and Europeanisation in the Balkans.

To summarise our research on political parties and the Europeanisation of political

sphere in Serbia and Croatia, we can conclude that the values broadcasted by the EU are

officially included in the discourse of these political parties, even with some environmental

27

Ibidem, p. 7.

15

promises made in Croatia. However, the burning issue of Kosovo in Serbia shows the Serbian

inadequacies toward EU criteria. The membership of political parties in European

organisations became a standard, but cannot be understood as an important indicator of

Europeanisation, since these belongings do not have consequences among the national politi-

cal scene. On the other hand, being a part of a defined domestic political family does not

mean that particular parties will support (or not) the EU. It shows a lack of stability and the

prominence of self-interests, particularly when it comes to the Serbian political landscape.

3.3 A comparative study of both civil societies

The wide definition of civil society may be analysed as a concept which involves all

the inter-individual relations out of the state sphere, in other words family, associations,

cultural and social relations. Civil society is supposed to be autonomous from the state and

can be either formally – due to associations or various organisations - or informally built. In

this paper we understand and use the term “civil society” encompassing non-governmental

organisations, charitable, religious, cultural or sport associations, labour unions or trade

associations. Thus, our last criterion will be a comparative study of civil society and its

organisations in Serbia and Croatia, in regard to the analyses published by the World Alliance

for Citizen Participation “CIVICUS”, an organisation working to strengthen civil societies

around the world.

The two documents, which were the source of data to make a comparison between

both countries, are following: “Civicus Civil Society Index in Croatia – Policy Action Brief”

written by Gojko Bezovan and Jelena Matancevic and “Civil Society in Serbia suppressed

during the 1990's – Gaining legitimacy and recognition after 2000” written by Zdenka

Milivojevic and published in 2006. They measure the level of civil society using similar

logics and indicators which are: the civil engagement, the level of organisation, the practice of

values, the perceived impact, and the external environment.

The participation of Croatian people in civil society organisations (CSO) is compara-

tively the weakest point of their civil society: 7% of the population is volunteering, whereas

only 17% of Croatians are members of at least one civil society organisation28

. In comparison,

47% of the population of Serbia were members of a civil society organisation in 2006 and

28

Bezovan G., Matancevic J., Civicus Civil Society Index in Croatia – Policy Action Brief, Zagreb, January

2011, pp. 3-4., available at: https://www.civicus.org/images/stories/csi/csi_phase2/croatia%20csi%20policy

%20action%20brief.pdf, date: June 30, 2012.

16

21% declared themselves as volunteering or “participating in local community actions”29

.

These surveys point out some similar situations in both countries, since the value of voluntary

services is not seen in a positive way in Croatia, whereas helping each others in Serbia is

visible only in times of crisis or when catastrophes occur. This explanation allows to qualify a

slightly higher number of the CSO members in Serbia in comparison with a smaller group of

Croatians belonging to any association. In terms of funds and organisation, it is noticeable

that the management of money and human capital is an important problem weakening civil

society organisations in Croatia, which have some difficulties to get regular and motivated

young workers. There are similar problems in Serbia, with even deeper difficulties with the

funds because of the lack of state transparency. While most of the finances gathered by the

Croatian associations are coming from the state or from local administrations through the help

of the National Foundation for Civil Society Development, Serbian organisations face

unequal state’s treatment. The Serbian government, as the survey shows, clearly favours sport

and cultural associations, whereas it strongly ignores organisations which, for example, fight

for closer cooperation with the Hague tribunal30

. This lack of transparency in the relation

between the state and the civil society actors provokes a distrust of private sector towards

CSOs and pejorative common recognition. That is why civil society is defined by the masses

as a corrupted and dark sphere with only few people willing to join it. The average trust rate

of Serbs towards NGOs in 2004 has been evaluated at 36%, while only 25% declared

themselves as trustful towards “other civil organisations”, in other words organisations out of

religion, politics, economy or media circles31

. In both situation the EU is playing a significant

role in financing CSOs, since these countries are closer to it. The values claimed by civil

society actors in Croatia are suffering from a lack of visibility and officialdom because of the

absence of written documents or internal charters in these organisations. They tend to base on

external rules or values, forgetting to create their own structure of functioning, but also need

more mediatisation to be accepted by masses and put out the criticisms and false scandals,

like corruption ones. These elements show how CSOs are not independent and legitimated

enough among people. The values shared by the Serbian CSOs are very similar – tolerance,

democracy, environment, non-violence – even if one of the most important and regularly

29

Milivojevic Z., Civil Society in Serbia suppressed during the 1990's – Gaining legitimacy and recognition

after 2000, CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Serbia, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 39-40., available at: https://

www.civicus.org/media/CSI_Serbia_Country_Report.pdf, date: June 30, 2012.

30 Ibidem, p. 14.

31 Ibidem, pp. 125-127.

17

tackled value is gender equity. The persistent lack of transparency and their inefficient fight

against corruption create an atmosphere in which NGOs are perceived as “tools” which can

help to implement reforms or carry some values, but they are not seen as a long-term allies.

Surveys made on Regional Stakeholders show clearly that there are only limited effects of

CSOs on the society. The question “To what extent was the civil society successful in

influencing public policy decision making on human right issues?” provokes only moderate

positive answers: 58% of answers are defining their actions as “successful to some extend”

and still 15% think that they were “non successful”32

. The trend is even deeper when one

analyses the answers for the same question but on poverty issues: only 10% responded in a

clearly positive way and thought that the actions of the CSOs were “successful” or “very

successful”. In Croatia, impacts produced on the society neither are so important. According

to the survey, it is obvious that most of the reforms and laws are led by the government and

upper spheres. However, one can recognise some social effects on marginalised groups, but

the main barrier is still the lack of awareness of masses about civil issues and concerns.

IV. Conclusions

The presented and analysed data indicate the common aspects and, at the same time,

subtle differences which occur in the process of “South Eastern Europeanisation” in Croatia

and Serbia. When considering the institutional level, Croatia is definitely more advanced in

the process of Europeanisation than its eastern neighbour. The membership in NATO and the

forthcoming accession to the UE certainly shows the readiness and maturity of Croatia to

become a fully European state. Joining the EU remains a national priority for both countries.

However, after having analysed some social and political aspects of Europeanisation, it is

clearly visible that European identity is not yet fully internalised by Serbian society, while

Croatians consider themselves as citizens of Europe and share a common European feeling:

“In Serbia the European idea is not that present, and is not that positive… This absence is best

seen when you compare Serbia to other countries in the region. In all other countries, the

European idea took more ground, and is felt in all segments of society, at every step. Those

32

Ibidem, pp. 51-52.

18

countries are trying hard to show how much they care about the EU, and to show what they

are doing in order to become members. This is not the case with Serbia”33

.

Croatia is highly informed about the European agenda, while the lack of information

is a serious obstacle in the process of Europeanisation in Serbia. It must be noted that the high

awareness of Croatian society is the result of the elites’ engagement to spread knowledge

about the EU integration. In the case of Serbia, instead of being a successful change agent that

brings about policy shift in the areas of democratisation and human rights, the political elites

use the European discourse to pursue strategies far removed from EU norms and standards.

What is more, the image of the EU among Serbs is gradually worsening. The lack of trust in

European institutions is considered to be the consequence of the post-Yugoslavian wars and

the opposition towards the US and Western powerful states’ bombing of Serbia in 1999. Even

though there are some claims for democratic and European values in Croatia and Serbia, the

lack of stability in political life is characteristic for both countries. Moreover, most of the

Serbian parties prefer to ignore Kosovo’s claims for independence than to become a member-

state of the EU. Another factor, which impedes the process of Europeanisation in Serbia, is

the fact that Serbian nationalists are much more attracted to the idea of forging closer

partnership with Russia than to follow the EU’s rules of the game.

The comparison of civil societies in Croatia and Serbia reveals the problems that both

countries must cope with - very low level of social involvement in CSOs actions, as well as

financial and structural difficulties. The main difference between Croatia and Serbia are the

links between civil society and the state, which are much less transparent and equal in the

latter. Clientelism and some associations blacklisted by the government (for example associa-

tions that support closer cooperation with the Hague tribunal) are still present in the Serbian

political sphere.

The examples of Croatia and Serbia justify the use of the term “South Eastern

Europeanisation” proposed by Othon Anastasakis. For these two countries, and for the whole

Balkan region, it is not only a process of adjustment to advanced Western model or a guaran-

tee of security and prosperity for the future, but also a significant catalyst for democratisation.

Considering the informal level of Europeanisation of Croatia and Serbia, it is clearly an elite-

based project. Different attitudes of Croatian and Serbian elites towards the EU issue result in

uneven level of the informal Europeanisation in these two countries. The success of soft

33

Miroslav Laichak, EU special representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina [in:] Danas, September 11, 2006.

19

Europeanisation of Croatian society is the result of informative campaign launched by the

elites. The improvements that recently have been done, and that distinguish it from Serbia, are

due to the fact that Croatia is to become an integrating element of the EU in the Balkan

region. In other words, Croatia will be an example and ally for other Balkan countries willing

to get closer to the EU.

20

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